The Journal of Development Studies

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/fjds20

Women's Resistance: An Alternative Perspective to Women's Participation in Community-Driven Development

Peter Shapland, Annemarie van Paassen, Conny J. M. Almekinders & Cees Leeuwis

To cite this article: Peter Shapland, Annemarie van Paassen, Conny J. M. Almekinders & Cees Leeuwis (2024) Women's Resistance: An Alternative Perspective to Women's Participation in Community-Driven Development, The Journal of Development Studies, 60:2, 179-195, DOI: 10.1080/00220388.2023.2279483

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2023.2279483

Published online: 24 Jan 2024.

The Journal of Development Studies, 2024
Vol. 60, No. 2, 179–195, https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2023.2279483

Women's Resistance: An Alternative Perspective to Women's Participation in Community-Driven Development

PETER SHAPLAND[*], ANNEMARIE VAN PAASSEN[**], CONNY J. M. ALMEKINDERS[**] & CEES LEEUWIS[**]
[*]Department of Social Sciences, Wageningen University and Research, Bamako; [**]Department of Social Sciences, Wageningen University and Research, Wageningen, Netherlands

(Original version submitted May 2023; final version accepted October 2023)

ABSTRACT Community-driven development (CDD) programs compel communities to adopt egalitarian decision-making processes for the duration of the project. However, dominant groups use their power to orchestrate a public performance of social domination and subordinated groups combat social domination via subtle acts of resistance. Rather than conceptualizing social transformation from a holistic perspective that includes subtle acts of resistance and incremental forms of self-empowerment, CDD implementation and monitoring focusses on women's public performance in community meetings, and this approach generally fails to produce social transformation. We conducted an ethnography of an unconditional direct transfer to a village in Western Mali. We used Bourdieu's approach to investigate how rural Malian women resist domination and empower themselves in this unfettered CDD project. We observed the women strategically submit to patriarchal forms of domination during the public decision-making processes but resist male domination over their labour. Our results suggest that CDD can better achieve enduring forms of social change when it builds off local women's self-directed forms of resistance. To better capture women's resistance and self-empowerment, CDD should adopt a more holistic and open impact assessment approach, such as the Most Significant Change technique and Culturally Responsive Evaluation.

KEYWORDS: Community-driven development; women's empowerment

1. Introduction

1.1. Community-driven development (CDD) and women's empowerment

CDD empowers target communities with control over development resources (Dongier et al., 2003). Scholars and practitioners agree that unfettered CDD projects (that rely entirely on existing local governance systems) exclude women from decision-making processes, do not result in

Correspondence Address: Peter Shapland, Department of Social Sciences, Wageningen University and Research, Rue 37, Porte 42, Faso Kanu, Bamako, Mali. Email: peter.shapland@wur.nl

positive outcomes for women, and can even impact them negatively (Bardasi & Garcia, 2017; Browne, 2014; Cornwall, 2003; IFAD., 2019; Lubbock & Carloni, 2008; Poncin, 2012). The experts conclude that CDD must implement 'mandatory participation requirements' for women in target communities to resolve this inherent problem (Browne, 2014, p. 2; S. Wong & Guggenheim, 2018), and this is often accomplished via quotas for the number of women on project committees (Bardasi & Garcia, 2017; Casey, 2018). CDD is able to force gender egalitarian decision-making processes on communities by conditioning CDD funds on their adoption (Casey, 2011, 2018; Fritzen, 2007; Lawson, 2011). Women's empowerment in CDD is measured via project indicators that register women's public political performances (Bardasi & Garcia, 2017; Bhatt, Buchhave, Labonne, & Parker, 2011; Bhatt & Brown, 2011). Implementers count the number of women who attend and speak at project meetings and evaluate the community's project selection in terms of the women's stated priorities.

However, subordinated groups combat social domination via subtle and ambiguous acts of resistance (Scott, 1985), because social domination is maintained and reinforced by its public performance (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 41, 95; Scott, 1990, p. 2, 56, 66). Dominant groups use their power to produce the public appearance of domination and it is usually in the subordinated groups' interest to avoid contradicting this shared performance (Scott, 1990, p. xii, 87). Ethnographic research has repeatedly shown that subordinated groups resist social domination in subtle and intentionally ambiguous ways to avoid the negative consequences of public defiance (Constable, 2007; Levi, 1999; Lo, 2015; Nations, Misago, Fonseca, Correia, & Campbell, 1997; Scott, 1985). In other words, public political performances are the domain of groups that are already empowered.

We cannot assume that resistance is ineffective just because we do not observe public political action among subordinate groups (Dick, 2008). The subjectivity of rural men and women is where traditional and modern discourses intersect, sometimes reproducing traditional patriarchal notions and sometimes challenging them (Long & Long, 1992, p. 26). Resistance can lead to new forms of subjectivity (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 141; Pickett, 1996), and the slow shift of subjective dispositions is how radical social transformations are frequently produced (Dick, 2008; Foucault, 1977; Scott, 1990). For example, Malian men have traditionally maintained the right to arrange their daughters' marriage without their daughters' approval, a power men can use to acquire money and political power (Sarich, Olivier, & Bales, 2016). Women throughout rural Mali slowly appropriated some of this power in the 1990's (Hertrich, 2008). During the data collection, a fiancée in the village tried (unsuccessfully) to sneak away to escape an arranged marriage that she already consented to. Resistance accumulates and leads to new forms of subjectivity – she could not have asserted her right to change her mind if countless women before her had not already asserted a woman's right to have a say in the first place. Scott (1985, 1990, p. 135, 191, 192) famously showed how ambiguous, quotidian, subtle acts of resistance are crucial to social change because (1) they are an operationalization of the dominated's coherent political position, or what Scott calls 'the hidden transcript', and (2) they can slowly accrete into larger shifts in power dynamics. For example, factory workers secretly sabotaging machines or slowing down their pace of work to protest certain policies can, over time, force factory owners to the negotiating table (Scott, 1990, p. 192). Subtle, ambiguous, and deniable acts of resistance are how dominated groups accretively empower themselves.

Rather than addressing culturally entrenched gendered power dynamics by supporting local women's subtle and incremental strategies to resist patriarchal structures and empower themselves, CDD compels communities to *perform the result* of women's empowerment (public political performance). CDD literature shows that this approach does not impact gendered power relations or entrenched governance structures. Women's attendance and meaningful participation in community meetings remain the major gender-related challenge for CDD programs (Browne, 2014). When the CDD projects end, the communities generally return to their culturally entrenched patriarchal governance practices (Anderson, 2019; Browne, 2014; Casey, 2011,

2018; Haider, 2012; White, Menon, & Waddington, 2018), and only a few cases have shown any progress for women's overall empowerment (Beath, Christia, & Enikolopov, 2015; Voss, 2016).

Theories of Change within CDD generally focus on two main goals: (1) inclusive governance (e.g. women's participation as an end itself), and (2) equitable community benefits (White et al., 2018). While participation requirements generally fail to achieve CDD's first goal, they do achieve its second goal. Research shows women's participation requirements do enable women to benefit from the project activities (Browne, 2014; Wong & Guggenheim, 2018). Thus, women's empowerment in CDD is currently a means to improve development services. However, some scholars argue that development services should a means to achieve transformative change in gender relations (Wong, Vos, Pyburn, & Newton, 2019), and this is a daunting aspiration. When CDD programs finally acknowledge the resilience of hierarchical social structures, empowerment is no longer 'a smooth programmatic exercise orchestrated by international development' but rather 'a radical project of social transformation' (Luttrell, Quiroz, Scrutton, & Bird, 2009, p. 2; Poncin, 2012, p. 26).

1.2. Resistance as an alternative to participation

CDD assumed that requiring women's participation would lead local actors to internalize gender inclusive governance principles, thus catalysing social change. However, participation in CDD has not produced the assumed empowerment outcomes (Anderson, 2019; Fritzen, 2007; White et al., 2018). Since local leaders tend not to hand over their power willingly, an exploration of women's resistance could be an effective alternative for CDD's efforts to promote women's empowerment. CDD programs could learn how to effectively nudge gendered power relations by learning more about how male domination is legitimised among rural populations, and how rural women selectively comply and resist male domination on their own.

However, the ambiguous forms of resistance that women deploy to empower themselves are difficult to identify. 'In a relationship of power, the dominant often has something to offer, and sometimes a great deal (though always of course at the price of continuing in power). The subordinate thus has many grounds for ambivalence about resisting the relationship' (Ortner, 1995, p. 175). Studying women's resistance in rural Malaysia, Healey (1999, p. 56) argued that sociologists occupy 'shaky ground' when trying to determine what counts as resistance because the women do not necessarily recognise their quotidian opposition to domination as resistance. The very definition of 'resistance' is highly variable, contested, and potentially irreconcilable (Courpasson & Vallas, 2016, p. 171; Hollander & Einwohner, 2004), with some scholars conceptualizing resistance quite broadly, as actions that mitigate the impact of domination (Lo, 2015; Scott, 1990, p. 117, 188), while others (Cooper, 1992; Stoler, 1986) argue that 'resistance' is not useful and we should instead focus on transformative processes. Resistance analysis is a contested terrain that faces several methodological challenges (Shaw, 2001).

1.3. Bourdieu's approach explores the dominated's subtle forms of agency

Bourdieu's approach can address many of the analytical difficulties associated with resistance (Dick, 2008; Lo, 2015; Rose, 2009), as it focuses on the 'soft forms of domination' that operate on our dispositions without our noticing (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 3, 171). For Bourdieu, objective social structures are subtly and persistently instilled into our dispositions via the commands, instructions, and subtle gestures that parents, teachers, and other authorities use to conform our behaviour to social expectations. Bourdieu (1990, p. 54) uses the term *habitus* to describe theses durably inculcated dispositions that shape our perceptions, understanding, and behaviours.

Bourdieu's notion of *symbolic power* helps explain how objective social structures subtly and persistently form our dispositions. Symbolic power imposes classification systems that legitimise structures of domination (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 13), and it thereby operates on our pre-reflective 'commonsense' understanding of the world. In other words, 'symbolic power is the form material power relations assume when they are perceived through social categories that represent them as legitimate' (Cronin, 1996, p. 65). For example, in rural Mali the classification of men as the ones who establish and sustain households is a form of symbolic power that legitimises their domination over the household.

Bourdieu uses his notion of *field* to analyse the structure of social spaces. Bourdieu defines field 'as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 97). Fields are analogous to games. Fields are where agents compete over a set of stakes – various forms of symbolic and material power – that they all agree are worth competing over (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 98–100). An agent's position in a field is based on the symbolic, cultural, social, and economic capital that they can mobilise (Bourdieu, 1986). Also, fields overlap and can exist within broader fields. For example, a nuclear Malian family, a rural household containing numerous nuclear families, and a rural Malian community can all be understood as fields where actors compete for symbolic and material power.

Bourdieu's notions of symbolic power, habitus, and field create a sociological perspective that can account for self-reflective agents struggling for material, cultural, and symbolic power within structural boundaries that are instilled into our thinking. Bourdieu's novel configuration of structure and agency enables researchers to explore ambiguous forms of resistance that are not always intentional (Dick, 2008; Lo, 2015). Thus, we define resistance broadly, as refusal: 'Refusing or challenging the legitimacy of ideas that are extant in the broader social context illustrates the capacity and importance of agency but, critically, additionally illustrates the dialectic relation between agency and structure' (Dick, 2008, p. 339).

Some scholars argue that Bourdieu's approach is poorly equipped to analyse the agency of the dominated (Lo, 2015). Bourdieu argues that symbolic power operates clandestinely on the very classifications that actors use to think. Thus, dominated groups unknowingly collaborate in their own subordination, and their complicity is an effect/embodiment of domination, not a conscious submission to power (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 24). Bourdieu refers to the dominated's complicity in their own domination as *symbolic violence*, and he argues that gender domination is a paradigmatic form of symbolic violence (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 170). Scholars argue that Bourdieu's over reliance on symbolic violence and habitus fails to account for the agency of the dominated (Jenkins, 2006, p. 75, 78; Sayer, 2005, p. 30, 51).

However, Bourdieu (2005, p. 211–212) and several other scholars (Crossley, 2001; Dick, 2008; Jagger, 2012; Lo, 2015; Rose, 2009) have addressed this criticism by showing how a self-reflective capacity to resist domination is implicit to Bourdieu's notions of habitus, symbolic power, and field:

- Habitus is 'the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations' (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 57). By focusing on competence and improvisation (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 11, 17, 81, 1990, p. 59, 2005, p. 212), habitus becomes 'a pliant, flexible idea that accounts for the reproduction of social stratification, but also contains a margin of improvisation and change that fuels social resistance' (Rose, 2009, p. 7).
- Symbolic power analyses the constant struggle over the classifications we use to think. The dominant and dominated attempt to shift classifications in ways that legitimise their position and add value to the forms of capital they possess. For example, in this study we examine local leaders trying to broaden the classification of community consensus to incorporate a few dissenting voices, and thereby veil their power over the decision-making process. By interrogating the struggles over language and categories that actors deploy to adjudicate social conflict, Bourdieu's investigation of symbolic power can account for subtle and semi-conscious struggles of domination and resistance.

- Fields are formed by relations of power, and thereby inherently provide a framework for resistance to domination (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 89). Social domination activates resistance because 'belonging to a field means by definition that one is capable of producing effects in it' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 80).

2. Methodology

In this study, we used Scott's analysis of domination and resistance to postulate the reason mandatory participation requirements in CDD do not impact long-term gender power relations, and we used Bourdieu's notions of field, habitus, and symbolic power to investigate (1) how male domination is legitimised in rural Mali and (2) women's self-directed forms of resistance. However, Bourdieu's and Scott's theories are not perfectly aligned. For example, Bourdieu's habitus is a conservative force that preserves the status quo, and Scott argues against hegemony and cultural domination (Courpasson & Vallas, 2016, p. 4, 8). Nevertheless, this apparent disagreement can be reframed as a difference of emphasis. Bourdieu's notions of habitus, field, and symbolic power provide ample room for resistance (discussed above), and Scott and Bourdieu agree on several key issues concerning this investigation. Bourdieu agrees with Scott's ideas about the importance of public performance in maintaining domination (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 95), particularly for women exercising subtle forms of power in patriarchal structures (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 41). As for Scott, he used Bourdieu's terminology and insights to support his ideas on domination and resistance (Scott, 1990, p. 47, 52, 75, 76, 106, 133, 148). Furthermore, just as Bourdieu argues that the possibilities of resistance are constrained by actors internalizing the structural boundaries of their social world, Scott argues that subordinated groups typically aspire for incremental improvements that fit within the ruling ideology (Scott, 1990, p. 78).

We used Bourdieu's approach to investigate male domination and women's self-directed forms of resistance by following intra-village power dynamics in an unfettered CDD project – an unconditional direct transfer of $10,000 to an entire village. Relinquishing control over project activities enables villagers to freely construct a project within their own social worlds, thereby revealing women's autonomous resistance to patriarchal forms of domination. In a typical CDD project that compels inclusive governance, the community's collective desire for the control of development resources temporarily skews village politics. Women are artificially placed in positions of power via the fiat of an exogenous development institution, and the community plays along (Voss, 2012). In so doing, we fail to learn about the established political order. In this study, we used an unconditional direct transfer coupled with an ethnographic approach to (1) acquire a sharper image of the endogenous forms of resistance and domination, and (2) better understand which struggles rural Malian women prioritise.

We selected the target village in Western Mali because the first author lived in the village from 2003 to 2005, spoke the local language, and already built trust with the residents. The agro-ecological context in this village exemplifies a labour-constrained agricultural system. Everyone in the target village reported that they had access to more land than they could conceivably farm, and low levels of capital accumulation prevent on-farm mechanization. In this village, struggles over labour shape agrarian change, they are inherently gendered, and women occupy a subordinated position in household and village hierarchies.

In early 2021, we informed the village leaders that we would provide $10,000 to the village for a 'community development project'. The first author lived in the community for the four-month duration of the project, and continued visiting to collect data for the subsequent year. We investigated how collective and individual aspirations are negotiated, brought to fruition, contested, and evaluated within the community. The first author was provided a room in the chief's homestead and spent his time interviewing and observing participants in all 29 homesteads in the village.

This investigation focused on (1) the first two community meetings for the project, (2) the women's consent and resistance to male domination in the community and individual households, and (3) the actors' own interpretations of the events. The first two meetings were important because this is where the villagers made two key decisions: what project to implement (meeting #1) and how they would manage the project/budget (meeting #2). The first author recorded and transcribed the first meeting and then conducted follow-up interviews to learn more about the villagers' interpretations of the meeting. However, he was not invited to the second meeting, and was forced to reconstruct it from the villagers' accounts.

To gain a better understanding of the actors' constructed meanings of project events, the first author conducted a total of 76 semi-structured interviews with 27 people (19 males, 8 females) and 109 unstructured interviews with 56 people (25 males, 31 females). In the unstructured interviews, he allowed the participant to guide the conversation. In semi-structured interviews, he started by asking informants what they thought about recent project events and slowly inched toward more pointed questions about recent conflicts and village power dynamics. He experimented with many interviewing methods: interviewing informants while going for walks in the bush, sitting under a tree safely outside of earshot of the village, and interviewing two female friends together. Despite his long history with the village, the first author was still an outsider and a wealthy educated male. The women who did not know him as well appeared less comfortable when he ventured into more pointed questions about village power dynamics. Thus, he conducted less semi-structured interviews with the women (see Table 1).

In the next section *The Rural Malian Context*, we present the results of our literature review of male domination and women's resistance in rural Mali. In the following section *Descriptions and Analyses*, we start by describing and analysing the community's first meeting and the women's interpretation of it. We then reconstruct the community's second project meeting entirely from the actors' accounts and interpretations. Finally, using the insights gained from the second-hand analysis, we focus on the women's interpretations and accounts to analyse their consent and resistance to male domination. To simplify the language, this section is reported from the perspective of the first author. In the *Discussion* section, we discuss our conclusions and the implications for CDD.

3. Rural Malian context – male domination in the household and community

According to the Global Gender Gap Report (Crotti, Pal, Ratcheva, & Zahidi, 2021), Mali has one of the highest gender gaps in the world (ranking 149 of 156). Analyses routinely depict rural Malian women as severely disempowered (Bleck & Michelitch, 2018; Deubel, 2017; Monimart & Tan, 2011). Within rural Malian households, the social organization of food production is generally characterised as a patriarchal gerontocracy (Deubel, 2017; Meillassoux, 1973). While post-menopausal women have more control over their labour-time, income-generating activities, and mobility, women of child-bearing age do not have these entitlements – they are required to work for their husband's household and they need their husband's permission to leave the village (Bleck & Michelitch, 2018; Deubel, 2017; Turrittin, 1988; Wooten, 2003). The forms of disempowerment pre-menopausal Malian women face are highly variable. Their (dis)empowerment depends on their ethnicity, their religion, their relationship with their husband, and the demands

Table 1. Gender of respondents

	Semi-structured interviews		Unstructured interviews	
	# of interviews	# of respondents	# of interviews	# of respondents
Men	50	19	59	25
Women	26	8	50	31

of their husband's family on their labour-time (Turrittin, 1988). Nevertheless, Malian women who defy their paterfamilias often face social sanctions and corporal punishment (Bleck & Michelitch, 2018).

Smallholder agriculture in much of inland west Africa is a labour-constrained production system (Becker, 1996; Berry, 1993, p. 184; Bulte, Richards, & Voors, 2018, p. 61; Nijenhuis, 2013, p. 2, 22) and agricultural labour is a source of contention in gendered household struggles (Coulibaly, 2011; Kandiyoti, 1988). The majority of the household resources are devoted to a collective plot, which is typically controlled by the male head of household (Monimart & Tan, 2011); females only lead households if all the men have emigrated or died. Agricultural production is about older men pressing women and youth to work harder (Carney & Watts, 1991, p. 652). Rural Malian women's prodigious domestic responsibilities – agricultural labour, childcare, food preparation, cleaning, water and firewood collection (Berlingozzi, 2022; Deubel, 2017) – constitute concrete evidence of their disadvantaged position in household labour struggles.

Despite rural women's general disempowerment, the structure of rural household economies provides women with room to bargain with their husbands. A husband and wife in rural Mali maintain separate economies – they each have their own sources of incomes and their own financial responsibilities to the household (Deubel, 2017; Turrittin, 1988). Men are responsible for farming/procuring grains for the household meals and women are responsible for farming/procuring the sauce that is served on top of the cooked grains (Wooten, 2003). A more transactional perspective on gendered power relations sees marriage in terms of conjugal contracts and focuses on a wife's obligations and rights – rural women are obliged to labour in the household's collective field (controlled by the head of household), and they have the right to their own parcel (Deubel, 2017; Monimart & Tan, 2011). Kandiyoti (1988, p. 277) argues that this 'form of conjugal union in which the partners may openly negotiate the exchange of sexual and labour services seems to lay the groundwork for more explicit forms of bargaining'. These marital bargains shape women's gendered subjectivity and the possible forms of their resistance in the household and the community (Kandiyoti, 1988).

Bourdieu's framework allows us to analyse how rural Malian men and women compete for material and symbolic power within the structure of a specific field of struggle (for example, the household, a women's group, the community at large, the local market, etc.), but these fields are also entangled. While each field has its own logic and contextual idiosyncrasies, it is still influenced by the logic of broader fields. This matrix of fields embedded in other fields enables Bourdieusian analysis to incorporate the interactions between broader social structures and localised fields of struggle (Dick, 2008). For example, the patriarchal gerontocracy that dominates the household in rural Mali also dominates the community. Paternalistic norms dictate that women and younger men must remain loyal to the head of their household *and* the chief of their village, and these elder male powerholders are in turn responsible for maintaining social harmony (Sborgi, 1998). '[Malian] women who seek to think or act autonomously in the household or in [community] politics may face physical punishment or other types of sanctions' (Bleck & Michelitch, 2018, p. 303). Rural Malian men and women report that it would be out of place for a woman to speak up among men in a public community forum (Berlingozzi, 2022). Gottlieb (2016) found that only 2 of 16 Malian chiefs in their study zone ever ask a woman her opinion about a village-level decision. Thus, we will also consider how the household and community fields interact when it comes to the women's habitus and their resistance.

4. Descriptions and analyses

4.1. The first community meeting

4.1.1. Description (from first-hand data). I pitched this unfettered CDD research project to the chief on my first day in the village. I started with the chief because, as several informants said: 'You can't do anything in the village without getting the chief's permission'. The chieftaincy is

inherited along patrilinear lines, and he has numerous roles, responsibilities, and powers in the village. According to respondents in the village, the chief's primary responsibilities are to protect and develop the village and mitigate conflict/maintain social harmony. Everyone in the village calls the chief 'dugutigi' – dugu (village/land) + tigi (owner of/responsible for) – including his wife, children, and closest friends.

The chief called a community meeting immediately after our discussion and invited the women to join. All the informants reported that women are rarely ever invited to the men's community meetings, and when they do attend these meetings, it is understood that they should not speak. Normally, the chief calls a meeting for the women the evening after the men's meeting, where he and Ibrahim[1] (the women's trusted advisor) inform the women what the men decided.

The chief opened the meeting and explained that I would provide aid for the village, and I would not interfere in their decision-making processes, but I would stay in the village for 6 months. He ended his opening remarks by encouraging the village to choose a project that everyone agrees to (achieves social harmony). Ibrahim, sitting opposite from the chief, spoke next. Ibrahim often speaks directly after the chief in community meetings. Ibrahim is a widely trusted elder who holds several powers that have been stripped from the chief. Ibrahim took over for the chief as the women's main advisor because the women trust him more than the chief, and Ibrahim controls the women's collective savings as well. Ibrahim also manages the village water management committee. Five years prior, the chief's extended family members (living in the capital) raised money and constructed two solar pumps and two water towers in the village, and everyone in the village pays monthly water fees to maintain the infrastructure. The chief led the water management committee until the youth accused him of skimming from the fees. When asked why Ibrahim holds all these powers that the chief used to have, the villagers often say: Ibrahim is a righteous man (tinyetigi) – tinye (truth) + tigi (owner of/responsible for). Tinyetigi is not a nickname or a title, it is merely the reason that actors most frequently provide for Ibrahim's accumulation of power and responsibility in the village. Ibrahim said that he believes he occupies this position of power because he actively encourages community solidarity and gives voice to the community consensus, particularly when consensus goes against the chief's position. However, Ibrahim led a *constrained countervailence* against the chief that was bounded by his prioritization of village harmony (Shapland, Almekinders, van Paassen, & Leeuwis, 2023).

At this first meeting, Ibrahim spoke directly after the chief, arguing that they should use the money to build a school. One of the chief's secondary advisors, Boubacar, spoke next. He expanded on Ibrahim's arguments for the school, and then the chief spoke again, saying: 'Everyone is in agreement to build the school'. Only three men had spoken in a meeting attended by at least 60 people, and the chief already declared consensus. Six more men spoke, all arguing for the school. Adama, a young man with a history of opposing the chief, was the tenth person to speak. He acknowledged that they should build a school but argued some of the money should be used to help the women increase the capacity of the solar pump in their garden, which was limiting their production. This was the only moment in the meeting that the school was somewhat contested.

When Adama finished speaking, the town crier said: 'Have you heard that too?'

Modi[2]: 'I ask to hear from the women. What do you have to say?'

Chief: 'Women, what do you want us to do? It's not only men here'.

Town crier: 'Women, did you hear this? We have two possibilities, the school, and the water problems at the garden'.

Moussa[3]: 'What are the ideas of the mason (Modi)?'

Modi spoke again at length, arguing that they cannot use the money to improve the garden.

Eight more men spoke, all in favour of the school, and then the chief said: 'Women, what do you have to say? We said the meeting is based on all our opinions'.

Town crier: 'The women are always behind the men. The women do what the men propose'.

Chief: 'Eh? No, we want their ideas'.

Moussa: 'The women also want a school. It's late. We agreed on the school. Chief, it's time to close the meeting'.

Chief: 'Even so, Women, speak'.

Town crier: 'The women will speak now. Let's calmly listen to them'.

Fantanin (the women's leader) had been sitting amongst the women on little stools 10 meters from the men. She walked over to the town crier to transmit her message in a hushed tone that was inaudible from my position.

Town crier: 'Fantanin and her group said that they are behind the men. What the men agree on, the women follow'.

The chief spoke next. He repeated his concern for the community's capacity to pay a teacher's salary for the first three years, after which the government typically takes over that cost. He did not want the community to build an unused school. (After the meeting, the chief said he invited the women to the meeting and encouraged them to speak because this decision impacted them too, but he may have done this hoping the women would argue against the school.) Ibrahim, a few elders, and the chief dominated the last 10 minutes of the meeting. Ibrahim provided his final arguments for the school, and the chief summed up the consensus of the meeting.

4.1.2. Analysis: the women's disempowerment. The women appeared disempowered at the meeting, but they disagreed with that assessment. Daily, the women expressed frustration about the lack of water in their community garden. It sounded like the garden's irrigation was the women's greatest need. However, they did not mention this frustration, explore the possibility of using some of the funds for the garden, or even speak aloud in the meeting. When asked why they did not speak at the meeting, many women independently said: 'Women follow the men', 'We did speak. The women's leader told the town crier that the women follow the men', and 'We wanted a school. We didn't have anything to add to the discussion'. When asked why they preferred the school over the garden, all the women repeated the reasons the men stated at the first community meeting. They said that the children are exhausted from walking [12k per day] to school, and their children start their education two years later than everyone else because 5- and 6-year-olds are not strong enough to walk so far.

The women in the village consider their social position and their potential political actions in terms of patriarchal categories. In this case, the symbolic power legitimizing male domination in the community drew upon the symbolic power legitimizing male domination in the household. When asked why men speak at community meetings and women do not, the women responded: 'Women can't build a house; we belong to the men' and 'men marry women; women don't marry men' – men are the subjects of marriage strategies and women are the objects in many traditional societies (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 173). Between building the concession and instigating marriage, men create households. The men also sustain households. Rather than dividing available farmland amongst able-bodied adults, most of the household resources are devoted to a collective plot. The collective plot system is a way of ensuring that the household's limited labour and agricultural equipment are prioritised on growing sufficient quantities of the most drought-resilient grains (Guirkinger, Platteau, & Goetghebuer, 2015). Also, the collective plot is typically controlled by the male head of household. Thus, the effective coordination of household resources (that ensure food security) is embedded into the men's dominant roles and responsibilities. The arbitrary assignment of these two fundamental household functions (creating and sustaining households) to the category of men legitimises, naturalises, and perpetuates gendered power relations in the household. The women appealed to the symbolic power legitimizing men's domination in the household to also legitimise male domination in the community.

According to Bourdieu, symbolic power (operating via these classification systems that naturalise social domination) functions so efficiently on us because we are unaware of its machinations (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 13). Bourdieu claims that 'we cannot understand symbolic violence and practice without forsaking entirely the scholastic opposition between coercion and consent' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 172). In a country where 79% of married women believe it is acceptable for a husband to beat his wife (INSTAT & ICF, 2019), symbolic violence could explain why the women uniformly disagreed with my conclusion that they were disempowered in the first meeting.

4.2. The second community meeting

4.2.1. Description (from the villagers' accounts). Two weeks after the first meeting, the chief called a second community meeting (for the men only) and did not inform me. I asked the attendees to recite the events of the meeting as closely as they could remember. Six of the community leaders[4] characterised the meeting as uneventful and arriving at easy consensus. They reported that they decided to build a two-room school next to the community garden, and the youth (men under 40) would dig the foundation and maintain a constant water supply for the cement mixing, and they would do it as an unpaid contribution to the school. The community leaders could not seem to remember the particulars of the meeting, who said what, who spoke, and none mentioned any conflict.

Adama and Chiaka, two youth who had a history of publicly opposing the chief, provided a different account of the meeting. They independently recited detailed accounts that included heated disagreements and one person storming out. They reported that Chiaka and Ibrahim (the tinyetigi) argued that the community should build a one-room school using the government's standard classroom size because small rooms are too hot, and the government might not support a non-standard school. Wusubi (the chief's cousin who had been given the contract to build the school, see Shapland et al., 2023) and three elders argued that they should build a two-room school with smaller rooms. Wusubi felt so strongly that he declared at the meeting that he would not help build the school if they decided to build a one-room school. Chiaka interrupted Vieux (Wusubi's younger brother, who Wusubi selected as the lead mason on the project) during the discussion, and Vieux declared that he had been insulted and stormed out. According to Chiaka, when it became clear the majority wanted a two-room school, 'Ibrahim whispered in my ear, "Let them have this one", so I did'.

The chief's main advisor understood that I was asking around for a more detailed account of the meeting and offered to recount the meeting in more detail. He described a very similar sequence of events as Adama and Chiaka, but the advisor's account had less speakers, no disputes, and seemed to indicate a natural consensus forming around the most logical conclusions. When he finished, I asked if I could recount other things that I heard were said at the meeting, that he may have forgotten. He confirmed everything in Adama's and Chiaka's more detailed accounts, except one crucial point. The advisor said Ibrahim (the tinyetigi) argued in favour of the two-room school, and Chiaka was alone in his support for a one-room school.

4.2.2. Analysis: focusing on the villagers' accounts reveals community consensus/harmony as a central value. In follow up discussions, Chiaka claimed that he believed that I was not invited to the second meeting because the leaders often try to conceal disagreements and exaggerate consensus in effort to conceal their control over decision-making processes. Researching another Mandé ethnicity, Murphy (1990, p. 26) argued that:

> the dominant often find it necessary to invoke a public language of moral consensus in order to justify their legitimacy as well as cloak their pragmatic, non-consensual interests. The anthropological problem is to understand consensual discourse as a resource in constituting and managing social relations within particular structures of dominance and subordinance.

Thus, consensus politics becomes a form of symbolic power that leaders deploy to legitimize elder male domination.

In a follow-up interview, Ibrahim claimed that he argued for the two-room school at the meeting, and he was never a proponent of the one-room school. As a tinyetigi trying to lead the community toward consensus, Ibrahim could be motivated to falsely claim he was always part of the consensus. The chief's main advisor may have also misrepresented Ibrahim's position in effort to push the consensus narrative. On the other hand, Chiaka is motivated to claim Ibrahim was on his side, and Adama and Chiaka both claimed that the leaders often prematurely claim that consensus was achieved to veil their power over decision-making processes.

I cannot know what Ibrahim said at the meeting, but the epistemological advantages of not knowing are worth exploring. By not knowing and reconstructing it with the villagers, we see actors with opposing interests struggle to define events in terms of consensus politics. We see the leaders expand the category of consensus politics around minor conflicts to suppress dissent, mobilise the community, and render invisible their domination of the decision-making processes. The nonelites contest the elites by emphasizing the lack of consensus. Focusing on second-hand accounts took more time but revealed community consensus and harmony as a shared value that actors each try to define in terms of their opposing interests. The use of consensus politics to co-opt dissent could help explain why participation requirements in CDD do not produce social change. What does exogenously compelling women's participation feasibly accomplish when public community meetings are already structured to exaggerate consensus and dispel dissent?

Bourdieu's insight into the bias of the neutral observer provides a theoretical foundation for focusing on the actors' accounts in an analysis of resistance. For Bourdieu, the problem with the neutral observer is that we are predisposed to projecting our academic goal (of understanding as an end in itself) onto the object of the research. However, the actors in the village are not merely trying to interpret power relations in the village. Their goals extend further: they also interact with power in a practical effort to address daily struggles that are rife with uncertainty. The actors have internalised a 'sense of the game' and a particular set of practical goals that are based in their relative positions of power (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 118). For Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 9), this is their 'practical knowledge'. In the analysis of the first meeting, I took up the posture of an analyst focused on social domination, but the women were thinking and speaking about resistance in terms of their subordinated position, their practical concerns, and their broader strategies for incremental gains, i.e. in terms of their practical knowledge. For Bourdieu, the bias of the neutral observer is the primary bias that researchers must guard against, as it opens a gap between theory and practice. An analysis of resistance can overcome this bias by focusing on the dominated actors' accounts, interpretations, and practical knowledge.

4.3. Resistance in the women's habitus

4.3.1. Description (from the villagers' accounts). The women enacted subtle, overt, conscious, and unconscious forms of resistance throughout the project period, and their resistance often focused on their labour. Many women questioned and challenged their daily household workloads that are considerably higher than the men's. They often expressed it as: 'The men don't want peace in our village'. Many women also argued that the women are the ones who keep household economies separate so a husband cannot spend his wife's earned income on the brideprice for a second wife. The women also publicly contested a community-level decision that impacted their workload. The chief commandeered the garden's irrigation water for the school construction. He then told the women they could not use the water taps in the village (150 meters from the garden) to irrigate their garden plots, and they would have to get their irrigation water from the well (750 meters from the garden). One of the women, Howa, marched into the chief's homestead and angrily yelled at him about the irrigation water. The chief

quickly dismissed her. The women held an impromptu meeting at the garden to discuss their options. They believed the well was too far from the garden, the well water was too deep, and they would not be able to mobilise enough labour to keep their vegetable crops alive. They argued the chief did not have the right to commandeer the garden's water because the women paid to have the solar pump in the garden connected to the grid (so it could run at night). The women sent one of their leaders, Juku, to the chief to present their argument. The chief told Juku that the whole village (including the garden) belonged to him. Juku was upset at the other women, for remaining quiet as if she were the only one with this complaint against the chief. Juku said that after her meeting with the chief, she went directly to Ibrahim (the tinyetigi) and told him that she does not want to work in the garden anymore. She told him that the chief was right: 'It's his garden. It's his village. We belong to him'. A few days later, Ibrahim privately told the chief that he would shut off the village water entirely if the women could not get water from the village spigots. Ibrahim gained control of the Water Management Committee after the chief was accused of skimming, and now this lost power was leveraged against him. The chief relented and allowed the women to use the village spigots to water their garden. Juku had helped mobilise the support of the one person in the village who had the power to outmanoeuvre the chief, and even in this act of resistance, she dutifully performed public deference: 'It's his village. We belong to him'. Resistance and public deference are linked by the dominated; resistance is often an ambiguous and unconscious act.

The women claimed that their workloads were unfairly greater than the men's, the women also claimed that they maintained the separation of household economies (to prevent their husbands from appropriating the fruits of their labour), and the women successfully mobilised against the chief when he increased their workload at the garden. These are examples of the daily struggles through which the women resisted domination. Our observations likely do not capture the full menu of the women's resistance strategies, particularly in conflicts over labour and shared costs within the household. Nevertheless, these examples enrich our understanding of women's practical perspectives. These examples help explain why women publicly submitted at the community meetings: they prioritized labour issues.

The school opened one year later, after the village leaders acquired permits and raised money from their diaspora. At the time of publication, the school was operating with one class for the first-year students. The village has ambitions to progressively increase the number of classes and attract students from the overcrowded schools in neighbouring villages. The women seemed happy with the outcome. However, given the women's daily struggles with the garden and their collective performance of not even considering the possibility of using some of the CDD funds for the garden, concluding that their preferences aligned with the men's from the beginning would elide the conscious and unconscious ambiguities of resistance and the performance of subordination.

4.3.2. Analysis: focusing on the women's accounts reveals their strategic use of consent and resistance. With greater awareness of the women's various forms of resistance, we can revisit our analysis of the first meeting, but this time focusing the analysis on the women's interpretations. The women repeatedly stated that they did not feel disempowered during that first meeting, even though they did not speak aloud or broach the possibility of using some of the funds to address their daily struggles at the garden. In follow-up interviews, the women uniformly explained their silence with: 'women follow the men' because 'men build houses' and 'men marry women'.

The women's practical knowledge emerges from their effort to understand and interact with power in the context of their strategies, vulnerabilities, and uncertainties. In their long-standing negotiations with dominant male actors, the women relied on their default patriarchal categories when men made decisions about the allocation of development resources for a public good that the women did not oppose. The women's blanket claim that they follow the men was a performance of self-reflective actors who choose their battles. When the men's decisions directly

affected demands on the women's labour, the women abandoned their performance of subordination and contested the men's authority. In as much as women's submission to patriarchal categories was strategic, it played a role in their resistance. However, none of the women admitted that they strategically subordinated themselves at the community meeting. Resistance is often an ambiguous and unconscious act.

Looking back at my initial analysis of the first meeting (based primarily on observations of participation), I projected my goal of mere understanding onto the actors, while the women's goal was to understand *and* interact with dominant males given their incremental strategies, uncertainties, and their subordinated positions. The women's practical knowledge is the internalization of long-standing and incremental strategies to resist domination by deploying their limited forms of capital on the struggles that matter most. Focusing on the actors' interpretations and practical knowledge leads to a more complete analysis of resistance.

5. Discussion

In this study, the elder men's domination was legitimised in the household and the community by their (arbitrarily-held) roles of maintaining social harmony and creating/maintaining households. The women resisted male domination as strategic and self-reflective actors who choose their battles within the narrow confines of patriarchal structures.[5] The women strategically submitted to the patriarchal forms of domination during the public decision-making processes but quietly resisted male domination over their labour. When the chief commandeered their water for the school's construction, the women organised, quietly confronted the chief (although most of the women deferred from doing so publicly), recruited the tinyetigi, and achieved a partial victory. Measuring the number of women who spoke at community meetings and following the success of their advocacy would have only captured the women's disempowerment (like our first-hand analysis that focussed on participation at the first meeting). As Scott (1990) claims, the dominant use their power to orchestrate a public performance of social domination, and the subordinated group's public performance of submission is an essential tool in the subtle art of resistance.

> [As] long as we confine our conception of the political to activity that is openly declared, we are driven to conclude that subordinate groups essentially lack a political life. … To do so is to miss the immense political terrain that lies between quiescence and revolt and that, for better or worse, is the political environment of subject classes (Scott, 1990, p. 199).

In this study, we demonstrated how resistance could be a constructive approach to encouraging social change within CDD, potentially replacing the participation model, but we arrived here accidentally. We set out to investigate how the unconditional direct transfer was socially constructed at key moments of conflict and negotiation (see Shapland et al., 2023). When the first author's field analyses dramatically shifted after he was forced to collect second-hand data, we turned to Bourdieu's insights into reflexivity and the bias of the neutral observer to explore (1) the potential epistemological advantages of second-hand data and (2) the first author's flawed analysis of the women's disempowerment in the first meeting. Our grounded descriptions of women's resistance appeared to fit Ortner's (1995) call for thick description to address the ambiguity of resistance. Dick (2008), Lo (2015), and Rose (2009) illuminated how Bourdieu's approach can address the methodological challenges posed by this ambiguity. Finally, Scott (1990) illuminated an empirical/theoretical basis for explaining (1) the failure of CDD's participation requirements to produce the radical project of empowerment and (2) how an investigation of resistance could potentially provide a viable alternative. In sum, this is how our investigation unfolded and how we ended up neglecting to use Gender Transformative Approaches and the rich contributions of gender theorists. Nevertheless, our novel combination of Scott and Bourdieu provides novel insights that challenge the use of mandatory public performance and practitioners' ideal forms of participation to promote women's empowerment. Our results suggest that CDD can better

achieve enduring forms of social change when it builds off local women's practical knowledge and supports them in the struggles they are willing to fight.

5.1. Implications for CDD

Rather than basing evaluations on predefined outcome indicators (for example, the number of women who speak at community meetings), CDD evaluations would be more likely to capture women's resistance and empowerment if they applied a more holistic evaluation approach, such as the Most Significant Change technique (Davies & Dart, 2005; Tonkin et al., 2021) and Culturally Responsive Evaluation (Stickl Haugen & Chouinard, 2019). These approaches are grounded in the experiences, interpretations, and cultural practices of the project participants. Using these techniques to focus on the women's accounts and the meanings they derive from project events could help practitioners conceptualise social transformation from a holistic perspective that incorporates subtle acts of resistance and incremental forms of self-empowerment. This could enable project staff to capture the diverse and strategic ways women exert their agency. Moving forward, CDD programs could find ways to support women in the struggles that they are willing to fight, and perhaps even nudge radical social change within CDD.

Notes

1. All the names used are pseudonyms.
2. Modi is the leader of the men's association, the main mason in the village, one of the four wealthier men who has running water in his concession.
3. Moussa is a village elder. He is a descendant of one of the village's founding families.
4. The chief, the chief's main advisor, Ibrahim, and three other elders.
5. The community and the household are entangled social structures formed by relations of power (fields).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding details

This research was financed by the researchers themselves. The ethical committee at Wageningen approved this research and recommended that the community not be informed that the researchers funded it. The community was told that the researchers raised the money from "a donor". To mitigate the researchers' power relations in the village, the main author actively worked to position himself outside of power struggles in the village. He routinely presented himself as overly polite, unassuming, and passive.

ORCID

Peter Shapland http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2070-7981
Annemarie van Paassen http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5341-3114
Conny J. M. Almekinders http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9779-5150
Cees Leeuwis http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1146-9413

Data availability statement

This study draws on ethnographic research with participants who did not consent to share their potentially identifying data publicly. Anonymised excerpts from the field notes and transcripts are included in this manuscript. The full dataset is stored on a departmental site and can be made available to external researchers upon reasonable request.

References

Anderson, B. (2019). Community-driven development: A field perspective on possibilities and limitations. Crawford School of Public Policy, Working Paper #82.

Bardasi, E., & Garcia, G. (2017). *Women's empowerment in rural community-driven development projects*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Beath, A., Christia, F., & Enikolopov, R. (2015). The national solidarity programme: Assessing the effects of community-driven development in Afghanistan. *International Peacekeeping*, *22*(4), 302–320. doi:10.1080/13533312.2015.1059287

Becker, L. (1996). Access to labor in Rural Mali. *Human Organization*, *55*(3), 279–288. doi:10.17730/humo.55.3.3um71334286120m2

Berlingozzi, L. (2022). O sister, where art thou? Assessing the limits of gender mainstreaming in preventing and countering violent extremism in Mali. *Critical Studies on Terrorism 2022*, *15*(3), 659–680. doi:10.1080/17539153.2022.2101536

Berry, S. (1993). *No condition is permanent: The social dynamics of agrarian change in sub-Saharan Africa*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Bhatt, N., & Brown, G. (2011). *Measuring the impact of community-driven development projects on gender: A toolkit for the poverty reduction fund, Lao PDR*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Bhatt, N., Buchhave, H., Labonne, J., & Parker, I. (2011). *Making everyone count: Gender-sensitive monitoring and evaluation in a community-driven development project – The Case of the Philippines KALAHI-CIDSS*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Bleck, J., & Michelitch, K. (2018). Is women's empowerment associated with political knowledge and opinions? Evidence from rural Mali. *World Development*, *106*, 299–323. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.01.006

Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a theory of practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1990). *The Logic of Practice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In *Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education (1986)*. Connecticut: Greenwood.

Bourdieu, P. (1993). *Sociology in question*. London: Sage Publications.

Bourdieu, P. (2005). *The social structure of the economy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992). *An invitation to reflexive sociology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Browne, E. (2014). *Gender in community-driven development*. Birmingham, England: GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report.

Bulte, E., Richards, P., & Voors, M. (2018). *Institutions and Agrarian Development: A New Approach to West Africa*. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

Carney, J., & Watts, M. (1991). Disciplining women? Rice, mechanization, and the evolution of mandinka gender relations in Senegambia. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, *16*(4), 651–681. doi:10.1086/494698

Casey, K. (2011). *The GoBifo Project Evaluation Report: Assessing the impacts of community driven development in Sierra Leone*. 3ie Series Report.

Casey, K. (2018). Radical decentralization: Does community-driven development work? *Annual Review of Economics*, *10*(1), 139–163. doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080217-053339

Constable, N. (2007). *Maid to order in Hong Kong: Stories of migrant workers*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Cooper, F. (1992). *The dialectics of decolonization: Nationalism and labor movements in Postwar Africa*. Proceedings of the Comparative Study of Social Transformations Conference, Ann Arbor Michigan.

Cornwall, A. (2003). Whose voices? Whose choices? Reflections on gender and participatory development. *World Development*, *31*(8), 1325–1342. doi:10.1016/S0305-750X(03)00086-X

Coulibaly, J. (2011). *Diversification or Cotton Recovery in the Malian Cotton Zone: Effects on households and women* (Doctoral Dissertation). Purdue University.

Courpasson, D., & Vallas, S. (2016). *The Sage handbook of resistance*. London: Sage Publications.

Cronin, C. (1996). Bourdieu and Foucault on power and modernity. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, *22*(6), 55–85. doi:10.1177/019145379602200603

Crossley, N. (2001). The phenomenological habitus and its construction. *Theory and Society*, *30*(1), 81–120. doi:10.1023/A:1011070710987

Crotti, R., Pal, K., Ratcheva, V., & Zahidi, S. (2021). *The global gender gap report*. Switzerland: World Economic Forum.

Davies, R., & Dart, J. (2005). *The 'Most Significant Change' (MSC) Technique: A Guide to Its Use*. Melbourne, Australia: GSDRC, Applied Knowledge Services.

Deubel, T. (2017). *Gender, markets and women's empowerment in the Sahel Region: A Comparative analysis of Mali, Niger, and Chad* (VAM Gender and Markets Study #4). Dakar, Senegal: WFP and USAID.

Dick, P. (2008). Resistance, Gender, and Bourdieu's Notion of Field. *Management Communication Quarterly*, *21*(3), 327–343. doi:10.1177/0893318907309930

Dongier, P., Domelen, J. V., Ostrom, E., Ryan, A., Wakeman, W., Bebbington, A., … Polski, M. (2003). Chapter 9 community-driven development. In *A Sourcebook for poverty reduction strategies* (pp. 301–331). Washington DC: World Bank.
Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*. New York: Random House.
Fritzen, S. A. (2007). Can the design of community-driven development reduce the risk of elite capture? Evidence from Indonesia. *World Development*, *35*(8), 1359–1375. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.05.001
Gottlieb, J. (2016). Why might information exacerbate the gender gap in civic participation? Evidence from Mali. *World Development*, *86*, 95–110. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.05.010
Guirkinger, C., Platteau, J.-P., & Goetghebuer, T. (2015). Productive inefficiency in extended agricultural households: Evidence from Mali. *Journal of Development Economics*, *116*, 17–27. doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.03.003
Haider, H. (2012). *PNPM/Community-driven development in Indonesia*. GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report. University of Birmingham, UK.
Healey, L. (1999). Gender, power and the ambiguities of resistance in a Malay community of peninsular Malaysia. *Women's Studies International Forum*, *22*(1), 49–61. doi:10.1016/S0277-5395(98)00094-6
Hertrich, V. (2008). Le mariage, quelle affaire !: Encadrement social et privatisation de l'entrée en union en milieu rural malien. *Sociologie et sociétés*, *39*(2), 119–150. doi:10.7202/019087ar
Hollander, J. A., & Einwohner, R. L. (2004). Conceptualizing resistance. *Sociological Forum*, *19*(4), 533–554. doi:10.1007/s11206-004-0694-5
IFAD. (2019). *Evaluation synthesis on IFAD's support to community-driven development, findings and lessons from case studies*. Rome, Italy: IFAD Learning Brief.
INSTAT & ICF. (2019). *2018 Mali demographic and health survey key findings*. Maryland, USA: INSTAT & ICF.
Jagger, G. (2012). Embodied subjectivity, power and resistance: Bourdieu and Butler on the problem of determinism. In S. Gonzalez-Arnal, G. Jagger, & K. Lennon (Eds.), *Embodied selves* (pp. 209–229). Macmillan UK: Palgrave.
Jenkins, R. (2006). *Pierre Bourdieu* (1st ed). London: Routledge.
Kandiyoti, D. (1988). Bargaining with patriarchy. *Gender & Society*, *2*(3), 274–290. doi:10.1177/089124388002003004
Lawson, B. S. (2011). *Developing stability: Community-driven development and reconstruction in conflict-affected settings* (Doctoral Dissertation). Pardee Rand Graduate School.
Levi, J. (1999). Hidden transcripts among the Rarámuri: Culture, resistance, and interethnic relations in Northern Mexico. *American Ethnologist*, *26*(1), 90–113. doi:10.1525/ae.1999.26.1.90
Lo, M.-C. M. (2015). Conceptualizing 'unrecognized cultural currency': Bourdieu and everyday resistance among the dominated. *Theory and Society*, *44*(2), 125–152. doi:10.1007/s11186-015-9249-4
Long, N., & Long, A. (1992). *Battlefields of knowledge: The interlocking of theory and practice in social research and development*. London and New York: Routledge.
Lubbock, A., & Carloni, A. (2008). *Does unfettered CDD hurt women more than it helps them? Discussion paper submitted by IFAD*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Luttrell, C., Quiroz, S., Scrutton, C., & Bird, K. (2009). Understanding and operationalising empowerment. ODI Working Papers #308. London.
Meillassoux, C. (1973). The social organisation of the peasantry: The economic basis of Kinship. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, *1*(1), 81–90. doi:10.1080/03066157308437873
Monimart, M., & Tan, S. F. (2011). *Gender and access to land and natural resources in Mali and Niger*. London: Iied.
Murphy, W. (1990). Creating the appearance of consensus in mende political discourse. *American Anthropologist*, *92*(1), 24–41. doi:10.1525/aa.1990.92.1.02a00020
Nations, M., Misago, C., Fonseca, W., Correia, L., & Campbell, O. (1997). Women's hidden transcripts about abortion in Brazil. *Social Science & Medicine*, *44*(12), 1833–1845. doi:10.1016/s0277-9536(96)00293-6
Nijenhuis, K. (2013). *Farmers on the move: Mobility, access to land and conflict in Central and South Mali* (Doctoral Dissertation). Wageningen University and Research.
Ortner, S. B. (1995). Resistance and the problem of ethnographic refusal. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, *37*(1), 173–193. doi:10.1017/S0010417500019587
Pickett, B. L. (1996). Foucault and the POLITICS OF RESISTance. *Polity*, *28*(4), 445–466. doi:10.2307/3235341
Poncin, E. (2012). *Hegemony, transformism and anti-politics: Community-driven development programmes at the World Bank* (Doctoral Dissertation). The London School of Economics and Political Science.
Rose, J. (2009). Pierre Bourdieu and the practice of resistance. Unpublished Paper, University of Utah.
Sayer, A. (2005). *The moral significance of class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sarich, J., Olivier, M., & Bales, K. (2016). Forced marriage, slavery, and plural legal systems: An African Example. *Human Rights Quarterly*, *38*(2), 450–476. doi:10.1353/hrq.2016.0030
Sborgi, E. (1998). Assessing democracy in Mali: A procedural analysis. *Il Politico*, *63*(3), 449–477.
Scott, J. (1985). *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Scott, J. (1990). *Domination and the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Shapland, P., Almekinders, C. J. M., van Paassen, A., & Leeuwis, C. (2023). An ethnography of endogenous institutional change in community-driven development. *The European Journal of Development Research*. doi:10.1057/s41287-023-00589-7

Stickl Haugen, J., & Chouinard, J. A. (2019). Transparent, translucent, opaque: exploring the dimensions of power in culturally responsive evaluation contexts. *American Journal of Evaluation*, *40*(3), 376–394. doi:10.1177/1098214018796342

Stoler, A. L. (1986). Plantation politics and protest on Sumatra's east coast. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, *13*(2), 124–143. doi:10.1080/03066158608438295

Tonkin, K., Silver, H., Pimentel, J., Chomat, A. M., Sarmiento, I., Belaid, L., … Andersson, N. (2021). How beneficiaries see complex health interventions: A practice review of the Most Significant Change in ten countries. *Archives of Public Health*, *79*(1), 18. doi:10.1186/s13690-021-00536-0

Turrittin, J. (1988). Men, women, and market trade in Rural Mali. *West Africa. Special Issue Canadian Journal of African Studies*, *22*(3), 583–604.

Voss, J. (2012). PNPM rural impact evaluation. Indonesia, 3ie.

Voss, J. (2016). *Lao Poverty Reduction Fund Phase II Impact Evaluation: Final Report*. Laos: World Bank.

White, H., Menon, R., & Waddington, H. (2018). Community-driven development: Does it build social cohesion or infrastructure? A mixed-method evidence synthesis. 3ie Working Paper 30.

Wong, F., Vos, A., Pyburn, R., & Newton, J. (2019). *Implementing gender transformative approaches in agriculture*. Nairobi, Kenya: CGIAR Collaborative Platform for Gender Research.

Wong, S., & Guggenheim, S. (2018). *Community-driven development: myths and realities*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Wooten, S. (2003). Women, men, and market gardens: gender relations and income generation in rural Mali. *Human Organization*, *62*(2), 166–177. doi:10.17730/humo.62.2.b5gew5paf8qer3q0