Rebel governance without territorial control: The experiences of the PKK in 1970s Turkey

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ABSTRACT

Insurgent movements rely on popular support using varying strategies to build supportive constituencies, including forms of rebel governance. The rebel governance literature explicitly limits its scope to insurgent cases with territorial control, excluding all groups that did not obtain territorial control, areas of weaker insurgent presence and early phases of mobilisation. This article focuses on Kurdistan Workers Party's (PKK) use of rebel governance (1977–1980) through municipal politics prior to the launch of its insurgency. The article makes two important contributions: firstly, it demonstrates the need to broaden the scope of the rebel governance literature to include phases where insurgent movements do not control territory. Secondly, it critiques the linearity of retrospective readings of insurgent trajectories that downplay the role of interactions and contingency in early mobilizational phases. It is based on original data including primary source documents and qualitative interviews with people involved in the PKK's municipal politics between 1977 and 1980.

1. Introduction

When revolutionary political movements emerge, they are immensely vulnerable. Without arms they may run the risk of being wiped out by competing movements and adversaries, while the step of becoming armed invites enhanced attention from state security forces. Moreover, militants are often inexperienced, failing to master the measures needed to avoid repression, detention or being killed, and movements' existing material resources (manpower, safe houses and money) are often rapidly depleted (Moyano 1992, 111–12; O'Connor and Oikonomakis, 2015, 381). Literature on social movement mobilisation has illustrated that movements tend to rely on pre-existing social ties (family/friends) or political networks to help bolster their efforts to survive initial state efforts to liquidate them. In combination with such networked forms of consolidation, some illegal revolutionary groups also attempt to attract a supportive constituency by engaging in forms 'governance', by addressing practical grievances and by providing needed services such as maintaining local security or furnishing rudimentary medical services in their communities. This broader dimension of mobilisation vis-à-vis their constituencies has become the central focus of the emergent field of rebel governance research.

Yet, until now rebel governance has explicitly limited the scope of its research to cases of insurgency with territorial control (Kasfir 2015, 25). Its focus is thus restricted to consolidated insurgent mobilisations, excluding all groups that did not obtain territorial control, areas of weaker insurgent presence adjacent to strongholds and early phases of mobilisation (O'Connor 2023). Chronologically, the impact of rebel governance in post-conflict societies has been examined (Huang 2017), but the other end of the time spectrum, the pre-conflict period when movements are obliged to urgently expand their support networks or perish, has been addressed less comprehensively in the rebel governance literature. In the case addressed in this article, the PKK ran for public office explicitly outlining their governance priorities and successfully implemented several of them, albeit for a short period of time. Thus, this article serves as an illustrative example of an armed political movement providing governance long before it had a consolidated territorial presence. The article demonstrates that incipient forms of rebel governance contribute to movement embedding in local areas, generating the social ties and emotional intertwining needed to fuel subsequent phases of intensified mobilisation such as, but not inevitably, insurgency.

Although, the rebel governance approach has analysed practises of governance in an extensive number of empirical case studies (see Teiner

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2022), it has been rarely used in the context of the PKK's insurgency in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s (O'Connor and Akin 2023, 93).[1] This is rather puzzling as with the exception of the National Liberation Army Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) in Colombia, the PKK is arguably the world's longest enduring insurgent movement. It has managed to resist decades of combat with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO's) second largest army, overcome the deaths and detention of many of its founding cadres and even spread its influence to the other constituent parts of Kurdistan beyond Turkey's borders.[2] The PKK enjoys mass popular support and its widely accepted that it has engendered comprehensive social and political change, as well as thrusting the Kurdish question into the Turkish political limelight (Gürses 2018, 3–4; Romano 2006, 159). This article addresses one of the first known instances of PKK rebel governance, thus leading to a better understanding of PKK's interactions with its supportive constituency and contribute to contextualising the movement's longevity and resilience. On the other hand, by incorporating an unexplored case study, it will also test and strengthen the existing canon of rebel governance literature.

The article makes use of a processual and relational perspective (see Crossley 2016; Emirbayer 1997, 287–89), considering armed groups not as "stable entities punctuated by episodes of change, but as fluid, perpetually becoming, interactively produced, and defined by shifting relationships within specific contexts" (Bosi and Malthaner 2023, 1). As Becker argues "we understand the occurrence of events by learning the steps in the process by which they came to happen" (1998, 61), it is therefore incumbent on us to consider this period of mobilization on its own terms, as part of a violent but not insurgent, cycle of contention rather than a simple precursor to an inevitable insurgency. The article argues against the imposition of a misplaced retrospective coherence onto this phase of the PKK's trajectory. The linear militaristic narrative, unproblematically linking stated revolutionary objectives to the telos of certain insurgency, downplays the relational nature of movements' evolution, through interactions with other political allies and rivals, internal reconfigurations, external shocks and access to institutional political opportunities.[3]

The late 1970s in Turkey witnessed dozens of Turkish and Kurdish groups rhetorically committed to revolutionary violence: radical leftist milieus were saturated with revolutionary magazines and posters attesting to their military potential, yet very few actually progressed to becoming – in any real sense – functioning armed groups which confronted the state (see Houston 2020; Jongerden and Akkaya 2019; Orhan 2015, 82). This article demonstrates that in the years immediately preceding the 1980 military coup, the PKK engaged in municipal politics when opportunities to do so, existed. This electoral strategy co-existed - both spatially and chronologically – with other forms of contestation which were violent in nature, such as targeting landlords and their armed militias, rival leftist organisations and fascist Ülkücü groups. Yet, the PKK assiduously avoided clashes with state forces, thus it cannot be classified as insurgent movement in this period. Importantly, the article is a behavioural rather than an ideological or discursive analysis of the PKK. There are copious statements from the PKK's leader Abdullah Öcalan attesting to the necessity of violence (PKK 1983, 286–87). Yet, the PKK's violence was restrained and highly selective suggesting a nuanced gap between propaganda and practise.

Extending the focus beyond the PKK's practises of violence covered elsewhere (Bozarslan, 2004; Gunes, 2013; Imset, 1992) this article addresses two rarely analysed, instances of rebel governance when PKK-backed candidates won municipal elections and began to implement ambitious local governance programmes in Hilvan and Batman. Tezcür has demonstrated that the PKK rapidly won support amongst the peasantry by its active willingness to act, to resolve local issues to the benefit of poor Kurds, and to use violence to do so (2015, 257). Yet, its commitment to action to gain legitimacy was not restricted to violence, and it is to this broader political engagement that this article turns. By highlighting these quashed efforts at governance, the paper assesses the relational process and the narrowing of opportunities which eventually lead movements to prioritise violent confrontation over other forms of mobilisation. Movement pathways to insurgent violence have been comprehensively analysed in social movement studies: a common route to insurgent violence occurs with the restriction of political opportunity structures to the point, where for opposition forces violence is seen as the only feasible option to contest power (Almeida 2003, 380–86; Goodwin 2001; McAdam 1982, 40–43). This has already been argued in the case of the PKK (Dorronsoro and Watts 2009; O'Connor 2021, 107; Romano 2006, 52). Largely in agreement with this assessment, this article explicitly counters the path determinacy of approaches which argue that initial resources determine the form insurgencies subsequently take (Weinstein 2007) or that a group's revolutionary goals delineate which forms of governance they attempt to implement (Stewart 2021). It foregrounds the contingent nature of movements' decision making, their imperfect knowledge and political inexperience, and the confusing relational context shaping their choices and strategies, including what forms any kind of governance (if any) should actually take. It argues that it is the endogenous dynamics of mobilisation itself that to a large extent, shape strategic decisions and even goals.[4]

The paper focuses on the period 1977–1980, prior to the military coup in September 1980 which irrevocably changed Turkey's political environment. Importantly, the paper does not address the period when the PKK actually launched its insurgency against the state (Jongerden and Akkaya, 2012: 136). The years covered in the article were a period of narrowing political opportunities (for e.g., the introduction of martial law in much of Kurdistan in late 1978), but one in which forms of political contestation beyond insurgency were both possible and attempted, most presciently for the purpose of this article, in the form of municipal elections. Though the PKK was an illegal organization, it engaged in representational and electoral politics, to change the conditions of the state's restrictive citizenship regime. "We were an illegal political party", one of the interviewees active in the municipal elections in Batman in 1979 said, "but we have always been looking for a legal way" (Interview #2).

The article proceeds by introducing the relevant rebel governance literature and its limitations, most notably its insistence on the parameter of territorial control and its narrow chronological scope. In a nod to broader civil wars literature, it also focuses on the overlapping logic of insurgent rationales and other forms of contentious mobilisation, emphasising endogenous relationality and interactions rather than ideologically defined strategies (Wood 2003, 19). It continues by outlining the data underpinning this article before introducing the PKK as a movement and the context of its municipal mobilisation. It then presents the cases of its electoral campaigns and their governance programmes in Batman and Hilvan. These cases were selected as they were the only places where PKK backed candidates were successfully elected. It

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[1] On the contrary, certain authors have mistakenly argued that the PKK actively chose not to implement forms of rebel governance in its first decades (Stewart and Liou 2016, 299), see (O'Connor and Akin 2023) for a rebuttal of this interpretation.

[2] Although, Kurdistan's territory encompasses land in four different states, for simplicity, the authors use the term Kurdistan here to apply only to the Kurdish region within Turkey's borders. See (Jongerden, 2007, 30; Kaya, 2020, O'Connor 2021, 6-8) for broader discussions on the use or non-use of the term Kurdistan.

[3] Paradoxically this simplification of insurgent trajectories is often derived from both the state and movements themselves. The state portrays insurgents as intrinsically violent from the outset and unwilling to engage in legitimate political contestation, on the other hand insurgent movements tend to present themselves as having had no option but to fight and having had the foresight and integrity to commit to the struggle.

[4] Unal makes a similar argument over the long durée of the PKK's mobilisation but focuses only on its practises of violence (Unal 2014).

concludes by re-affirming the need to reconsider the scope of the rebel governance approach, calls for caution in retrospective readings of insurgent trajectories and identifies certain continuities between the PKK's mobilisation then and its reconfigured repertoire since the mid 1990′s.

2. Rebel governance and the problem with territorial control

The emergence of the rebel governance literature has been a welcome boost to the study of insurgency and civil wars, extending its focus to include movements' broader repertoires beyond actual combat. Rebel governance has been defined as "the set of actions insurgents engage in to regulate the social, political, and economic life of non-combatants during war" (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015, 3). One of the field's key scope conditions is that it only addresses movements when they exercise territorial control (see Malthaner and Malešević 2022, 5). Territorial control was originally conceptualised as "obtaining the exclusive collaboration of civilians and eliminating defection" in specific areas (Kalyvas 2006, 196), with subsequent conceptual variations holding close to Kalyvas' original formulation (see Kasfir 2015, 26; Stewart 2021, 72). Kalyvas explicitly stated "I assume no anarchy; when one actor abandons a territory, the rival actor moves in" (Kalyvas 2006, 196), rendering control a dichotomous phenomenon. Yet, different forms of social order are implemented in areas where insurgent movements do not control territory, including forms of rebel governance, which can in fact beget subsequent insurgent territorial control. These spaces of overlapping contested socio-political orders have been neglected in much of the rebel governance literature. While territorial control might seem conceptually straightforward on paper, in practise it is much more ambivalent and conflict areas are usually characterised by "more complex, sometimes overlapping, complementary, or conflicting zones of control and hybrid forms of domination over parts of a population"(Malthaner and Malešević 2022, 7) rather than any zero-sum form of control by one side or another (See i.a. Bahiss et al. 2022; Gutiérrez Danton 2022; O'Connor 2023, 2021; Terpstra and Frerks 2017; Waterman 2022).

In Kalyvas' original conceptualisation of territorial control, defined as "obtaining the exclusive collaboration of civilians and eliminating defection" (Kalyvas 2006, 196), he argues that control "spawns' collaboration independently of pre-war patterns of support" (Kalyvas 2006, 118) and that "control and collaboration are self-reinforcing" (Kalyvas 2006, 112). Subsequent scholars adopting his model have however provided slightly more nuanced definitions, such as "territorial control is defined by a belligerent's ability to move freely, access information and resources, and prevent its enemies' movement and access in a particular place and time" (Rubin 2019, 5).[5] Shorn of Kalyvas' certitude that control begets collaboration, Rubin's definition hints less at controlling territory rather on insurgents' mobility and ability to acquire resources and intelligence, rendering it a less territorialised form of control and more akin to a type of social control, meaning an ability to condition people's interactions with the movement, rather than monopolising blocs of territory.

Additionally, by narrowing the scope of governance to one with territorial control, it limits our ability to assess long term insurgent trajectories. One of the key pioneers of the rebel governance approach bluntly states that it "does not seek to explain social order in areas where armed organizations do not want to control territory" (Arjona 2016, 13). Others consider it a "near precondition" for inclusive service provision

(Stewart 2018, 218). This excludes the earlier phases of mobilisation where it is highly improbable that any movement will have territorial control or even attempt to achieve it. It is methodologically problematic to leap over early phases of mobilisation, replete with greater or lesser efforts at governance, and begin one's analysis from the point movements have consolidated territorial control. Thus, preceding efforts – successful or not – of governance are analytically ignored until territorial control and rebel governance coincide. This article argues that as armed groups militarily learn from their mistakes and refine their tactics as they gather experience, that a similar developmental process is present in relation to their practises of governance. The norms and expectations of their constituency are better understood, and practical obstacles to governance are identified. Thus, further emphasising the need to contextualise rebel governance from its origins rather than when it coincides with territorial control.

More recent work on rebel governance and control has asserted that governance is not necessarily derived from control but in fact that the relationship can be the reverse, and that forms of governance can lead to insurgent control (Bahiss et al. 2022; Jackson 2018, 25; Ledwidge 2017, 33; O'Connor 2021, 50–51). Articles have increasingly concentrated on forms of rebel governance in urban contexts where armed groups are significantly less likely to control territory (Dochartaigh and N., 2022; O'Connor, 2023; Uležić, 2019). The incumbent-insurgent binary has been interrogated to demonstrate that antagonistic forces can exercise power in parallel and even paradoxically, in a co-ordinated fashion (Carnegie et al. 2022, 1337; Gutiérrez Danton 2022; Pfeifer and Schwab 2022, 3; van Baalen and Terpstra 2022). The unity of the state and affiliated extra-institutional forces and how they combine to implement governance has further emphasised the complexity of governance ((Gutiérrez Sanín, 2019)). More research has focused on "alternative geographies of power" centred on networks of influential actors rather than blocs of territory (Schouten 2019; see i.a. Rupesinghe, Naghizadeh, and Cohen 2021; Waterman 2022). All which directly or implicitly confirm that control is firstly not as binary as earlier research might have suggested and secondly that insurgent movements can provide incipient forms of governance from what may seem like inauspicious contexts.

Another important defining parameter of rebel governance is that is implemented by violent movements, thus distinguishing it from other forms of civil society or sub-cultural forms of governance (Huang 2017, 51–52). There are well founded reasons to insist on well-defined inclusionary/exclusionary parameters in a field to avoid concept stretching (see Sartori 1970). Indeed, it is necessary to specify the conditions which distinguish rebel governance from other forms of governance provided by NGOs, religious organisations, or sub-cultural initiatives.[6] Nevertheless, the process through which movements drift into violence is not a dichotomous leap from non-violence to violence. Insurgent repertoires evolve over time, combining parallel practises of violence and rudimentary governance, responding to forms of state repression and to the changing repertoires of adversarial and allied movements (della Porta 2014; Goodwin 2001). Analogous to the transition from non-violence to violence, it is equally difficult to pinpoint the moment when non-insurgent governance becomes insurgent governance. Movements ideologically influenced by Maoist protracted war strategies often engage in years of political preparatory groundwork before launching insurgencies for e.g., the Sendero Luminoso (Willems 2022). Staniland has long argued that the insurgent social bases of support reflect pre-conflict networks and organisations (2014; 2012). Nevertheless, one must guard against linear simplification, for example the Cocaleros in Bolivia actively debated whether or not to launch an armed campaign before choosing to not adopt an insurgent route to state power

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(Oikonomakis 2019). Pathways towards the future are not pre-determined by dogmas: the development of a movement towards armed struggle is full of contingencies, as we will show in our case, in which we discuss how a clandestine party participated in elections and provided governance while also practicing defensive and antagonistic violence, and how these are informed by relational interactions with state institutions and competing powers.

Moving beyond formalised instances of rebel governance centred on control or specific institutions, it is important to consider the normative relational dynamic which undergird it. This reflects the endogenous and dynamic elements of insurgent mobilisation, rooted in social ties, relational obligations and normative commitments and expectations. This is not to downplay the presence of violence which indeed casts its shadow over forms of rebel governance but to emphasise that practises of violence are often embedded in and constrained by the normative expectations of their constituencies (O'Connor 2021, 42). Rebel governance is not simply a functional exercise whereby services are exchanged for support but rather a shifting embrace between movements and their support networks. Hoffman has illustrated that 'no matter how radical the political vision of a rebel group, its practices are always embedded in historically contingent values, norms, beliefs, and forms of governance' (Hoffmann 2015, 159). This is also prescient in early phases of mobilisation when movements are particularly vulnerable. In these early phases, reciprocally dependent identities emerge where movements orient themselves to their supporters – as defenders of × or y cause – and vice versa where communities define themselves via their relationship to an illegal and armed political movement.

In an environment of violence, partial clandestinity and arms may create a protective environment for those who want to voice demands that are deemed illegitimate, such as the demand to end colonial domination and the denial of Kurdish identity in Turkey of the 1970s, but also to protect oneself from predatory landlord militias. Yet the principle focus of the struggle is not arms but challenging an unequal citizenship regime and claiming rights through action. This can be seen as a form of performative citizenship (Butler, 2015) or a type of insurgent citizenship where practices confront "regimes of citizen inequality" (Holston, 2009: 248). Isabel Käser discussed this confrontation with regimes of gender-inequality with her concept "militant feminities" (Käser 2021), Jocelyn Viterna highlighted "activist identities" (Viterna 2013) or more broadly "conflict identities"(Shesterinina 2021). What these various conceptualizations share is that its participants, through acting, constitute themselves as bearers of rights and entitlements (Butler, 2015; Houston, 2022; Secor, 2004). This is a more nuanced approach to understanding how marginalized actors that are compelled to clandestine mobilisaton, act politically, and build support beyond conceptual fixations with territorial control and the formalisation of institutions of rebel governance.

3. Methods & Data

Our research covers the 1977–1980 period, bridging the phase when the movement we know now as the PKK transformed from a loose network of activists to a clandestine political party in 1978. Research on the first decades of the PKK's mobilisation has always been methodologically challenging due to data scarcity and its unreliability, and the ongoing repressive academic climate in Turkey.[7] It is a period in which the movement distributed little more than a few recorded speeches by its leader Abdullah Öcalan and a few written documents – party manifesto and party program - and brochures. Additionally, as the candidates in Hilvan and Batman were formally running as independents because the PKK was an underground movement, it did not produce movement propaganda on their behalf for the campaigns. Importantly, it was

locally clear to voters that the candidates were affiliated to the PKK. Very limited written primary sources are available about the daily activities and political practices of the movement in this period. The available sources are mostly memoires and commemorative documents[8] published in newspapers close to the Kurdish movement. The key data for this research is therefore primarily based on interviews. Most of the twenty three interviews, were conducted with individuals who experienced the period and events discussed in this article, either as firsthand witnesses or as direct participants. These interviews took place over an extended period in various locations in Europe and Turkey. All the interviewees (nineteen men and four women) were in their sixties or seventies at the time of interview. Eighteen of them had lived in either Batman or Hilvan during the period under discussion. Three interviewees were in the early teens and high school pupils in the period 1977–1980, the other twenty interviewees were in their late teens or early twenties at the time. Eleven interviewees were active within the PKK in Batman and Hilvan, and involved in the municipal electoral campaigns. The others were indirectly involved, for example through their association with local political elite groups in the region. Three interviews were also conducted with experts, who had expert knowledge on the political and economic specificities of the 1970s, for example about legal requirements for candidacy in municipal elections or black-market politics.

Interviewees were contacted through a combination of snowball and opportunity sampling (Cohen and Arieli 2011; Silke 2001, 8). Although, interview samples related to insurgency are in practice never statistically representative due to numerous factors beyond researchers' control (Malthaner 2014, 182), the data on which this article is based, is very likely the most comprehensive one used for an analysis of the PKK's involvement in municipal politics available in any language. In line with best ethical practice in research which demands that interviewees and gatekeepers 'suffer no harm', (Parkinson and Wood 2015), and since Batman and Hilvan were relatively small towns in the 1970 s, we have been rigorous in our efforts to avoid sharing any data which might lead to their identification.

4. Introducing the PKK and municipal governance in Turkey

The PKK was established in 1978, after an extended process of group formation that had started in 1973 (see Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011; Jongerden 2023). Before formally becoming a party, they were known under the name *Kurdistan Devrimcileri* (Kurdistan Revolutionaries).[9] Historically, the emergence of the PKK should be understood in the context of two intertwined processes that have shaped the political system in Turkey. The first was the territorial centralization of political power, undermining various forms of de-centralised co-governance as had existed in the Ottoman (and Persian) Empire. The second was the nationalist territorialization of the Turkish state: Turkish nationalism became a structuring principle of the new state, and only by assimilating to the state's (Turkish) cultural identity could one access political rights and full citizenship. The intertwined processes of centralization and nationalist territorialization resulted in the establishment of an authoritarian political regime, in which Kurdish demands for forms of self-government and the right to express their identity became perceived as existential security threats by and for the state.

After a series of Kurdish revolts in the 1920 s and 1930 s were ruthlessly quashed (van Bruinessen 1978; 1994; Olson 2000; Olson and Tucker 1978; Orhan 2012; Watts 2000), when Kurdish political activity re-emerged in the 1960s in Turkey, it was very much in symbiosis with

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[7] See O'Connor 2021:12-15 for an overview on issues related to data and the PKK's early mobilisation.

[8] See for example https://www.nuceciwan98.xyz/tum-haberler/pkk-tarihi nde-ilk-ozerk-ilce-hilvan/ and https://anfturkce.com/analIz/kOeh-uen-ilk-oe zyoenetim-deneyimi-batman-ve-edip-solmaz-133255 [accessed 23–12-2022].

[9] For reasons of clarity, this article will refer to the movement as the PKK, even before the formal adoption of the name in November 1978.

the Turkish left's class-oriented politics. Through the 1970s, Kurdish political mobilisation gradually detached itself from the broader Turkish left and adopted an anti-colonial stance, emphasising national liberation (Gunes, 2012). The PKK slowly emerged from the revolutionary left, student milieu in Turkey after the 1971 military coup, between 1973 and 1978 the group consolidated and expanded through personal contacts and in an interconnected network of private spaces, university canteens, student dormitories, and youth associations. The PKK also attracted support in teacher training colleges, enjoying the active sympathies of many within the teachers' union TÖB-DER. This support was key, as once teachers qualified, they were distributed across the country and provided an initial anchor for the PKK in many remote villages. The PKK subsequently also won supporters in new neighbourhoods populated by recent rural migrants. Recruits were politicised through intensive discussions in private apartments and houses first in Ankara, and later in various cities in Kurdistan, to which PKK cadres 'returned'. Following the 1971 military coup, public space was closed by the state suppressing discontent and difference, private spaces thus became existential for political formation. The PKK's participation in municipal elections symbolized an attempt to move beyond networks in private space by entering public space to make its demands for recognition hearable and visible (Jongerden 2017).

The PKK's participation in elections goes back to 1977, when, under its original name, the 'Kurdistan Revolutionaries', the party supported an independent candidate in the municipal elections in Batman. Two years later, as the PKK, it supported two candidates, Nadir Temel, who was elected mayor in Hilvan, and Edip Solmaz, who won in Batman. Not only did these successes break a regime in which Kurds had the status of non-citizens, but in Hilvan, three women—Dürre Kaya, Saadet Yavuz, and Emine Hacı Yusufoğlu—became city councillors (*belediye meclisi üyesi*), thereby challenging a patriarchal system in which women were the de-facto property of men.

Although, the idea of revolutionary movements engaging in the most mundane articulation of institutionalized bourgeois politics, municipal elections might seem paradoxical: it was common across the wider municipal movement in the 1970s, in Turkey. Notions of "new municipal", or the "revolutionary municipal", or "social(ist) municipal" movements, had emerged as part of a nation-wide counter-hegemonic wave of urban politics. It was not only an indication of newly emerging urban working classes as a political actor (Batuman 2014), but also of the rural poor and the ethically different - Kurds, Alevis – who attempted to enter institutional politics on basis of their counter-hegemonic identity to give voice to their demands. This new municipal politics crystalized in the newly established *gecekondu* (shantytown) neighborhoods, which served as a transformative chrysalises where rural migrants became urban-workers. They established whole new squatter neighbourhoods on the urban margins and governed them through self-organized committees attending to the needs of their daily lives (Houston 2020; Yonucu 2022). Revolutionary movements both Turkish and Kurdish were integral to this new form of politics. In other regions, such efforts went beyond the neighbourhood level and governed whole cities. Most famously in Fatsa, a city in the Black Sea region with about 100,000 inhabitants in 1975, the candidate of the revolutionary socialist party Dev-Yol, Terzi Fikri was elected as mayor in 1977 where he introduced forms of participatory governance (Morgül 2007; Turkmen 2016, 140). Similar developments occurred in Diyarbakir, a city of

around 245,000 inhabitants and Ağrı, a city of 77,500 people, as well as the discussed cases of Batman and Hilvan.

The PKK was not the only Kurdish party to participate in municipal elections at the end of the 1970s. In the 1977–1979 period, several Kurdish movements ran candidates in municipal elections. In Diyarbakır, the Socialist Party of Kurdistan Turkey (*Türkiye Kürdistan Sosyalist Partisi,* TKSP), also known under the name *Özgürlük Yolu* (Freedom Road) supported Mehdi Zana,[10] who won the Diyarbakir mayoral election in 1977 (Akkaya 2013, 101; Zana 1997). Another TKSP supported candidate Orhan (Urfan) Alpaslan[11] won the 1979 by-election in Ağrı, before he was removed from office by the Ministry of Internal Affairs days before the September 12, 1980, military coup.[12] Edip Solmaz was killed by unknown assailants after being in office for 28 days only, triggering a series of violent confrontations between the PKK and a state-supported local elite group that was held responsible for the killing. Mehdi Zana and Nadir Temel were also removed from office after the coup and imprisoned in the notorious Diyarbakir Prison.[13]

5. The PKK in Batman and Hilvan

The PKK ran candidates for the municipal election in 1977 and subsequent by-election in 1979 in Batman and in Hilvan's by-election in 1979. Both Batman (Kurdish name: Iluh[14]) and Hilvan (Kurdish name: Curnereş) were urban centres with differing demographic profiles. In 1935 Batman, at the time part of the Siirt province, was a mere village with 319 inhabitants before it experienced rapid population growth after the discovery of oil in the area (Sunkar, 2011). It almost doubled its population from 44,000 in 1970 to 86,000 in 1980 (TUIK Genel Nüfus Sayımları).[15] About 80% of the population of the Batman district, lived in the city (see Table 1). Hilvan, a much smaller district situated in the northern part of the Urfa province, counted a population of 21,564 in 1980. The population of the town of Hilvan was about 24% of the entire district, contrasting with the 82% of urban dwellers in the district of Batman. Both town profiles thus diverged considerably in opposite directions, from Turkey's demographic patterns, which had an urban

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[10] In addition to being a senior TKSP militant, Zana remained at the time a member of the Turkey-wide Workers Party of Turkey TIP (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*) and the Kurdish, Revolutionary Democratic Culture Association DDKD (*Devrimci Demokratik Kültür Dernekleri*). The latter two groups backed a different candidate in the election and there were factions within the TKSP opposed to Zana's candidacy, highlighting the complex nexus of overlapping loyalties and factions which prevailed in Kurdish revolutionary politics at the time (O'Connor 2021, 85; Watts 2010, 44).

[11] In the 1980s, he was part of a group that split from the TKSP/Özgürlük Yolu and co-founded the short-lived Kurdistan Liberation Army ORK (*Ordiya Rızgariya Kurdistanin*) in 1986. Alpaslan was killed in clashes with the Turkish army in 1988 (Hêviya Gel 1988).

[12] https://ararat-welat.blogspot.com/2010/07/1979-agri-belediye-baskani-orhan.html?m=0 (accessed January 12, 2023).

[13] Mehdi Zana was released in 1991, but sentenced again to four more years imprisonment for giving testimony on human rights violations in Turkey to the European Parliament. After his release he settled in Sweden, before moving back again to Turkey in 2004. Nadir Temel was released from prison in 1988, but suffered from serious health problems due to the torture he had endured, and died in 2009.

[14] Law 5542 from 1949 stipulated that 'Village names that are not Turkish and give rise to confusion are to be changed in the shortest possible time by the Interior Ministry after receiving the opinion of the Provincial Permanent Committee'. With reference to the law, names of thousands of settlements with non-Turkish (Kurdish, Armenian, Greek, etc.) names were replaced with Turkish names. This name change was part of attempts to assimilate people and territories.

[15] https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/nufusmenuapp/menu.zul (accessed January 12, 2023).

Table 1
The Population of Batman between 1970 and 1980 (Source: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (TÜİK).[a]

	1970	1975	1980
City	44,991	64,384	86,172
Village	12,276	14,209	16,631
Total	57,267	78,593	102,803

[a] Ibid.

Table 2
The Population of Hilvan between 1970 and 1980 (Source: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (TÜİK).[a]

	1970	1975	1980
City	5,185	6,473	5,635
Village	20,362	20,297	15,929
Total	25,547	26,770	21,564

[a] https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/nufusmenuapp/menu.zul (accessed January 12, 2023).

population of around 42% (see Table 2).[16] The main reason for Batman's rapid population growth and relatively high level of urban population was its booming oil industry. The need for workers had transformed it from a hamlet to a city, not only by attracting migration from the surrounding villages and towns, but also from across Turkey. Hilvan's economy on the other hand was largely based on agriculture, and characterized by outmigration to urban centres rather than attracting inward migration.

The PKK's establishment in Hilvan and Batman had different trajectories, yet it shared one common denominator: the majority of local activists, cadres and the central committee members were very young and politically inexperienced. Some activists were at high school, others had been briefly at university studying to become teachers or engineers, and some were manual workers. Their ranks also included female cadres.

Students from Hilvan were involved in the process of PKK group formation in Ankara from the very beginning in 1973 (Interview 14). By the end of the 1970s, the PKK had a committed local cadre in Hilvan with a broader network of strong social and familial ties. These members met frequently with members of the PKK's central committee, including figures such Kemal Pir, Mazlum Doğan, Mehmet. Hayri Durmus and Cemil Bayık,[17] who were among the (de-facto) founding members of the movement, and had come to Hilvan to organize the PKK's mobilisation.

In Batman, the establishment and growth of the movement is very much related to the arrival of Mazlum Doğan, who came to Batman towards the end of 1976 (Interview #2). The party's leader, Abdullah Öcalan, visited both towns various times in the 1976–1979 period. The presence and active engagement of central PKK leadership figures confirms the importance the PKK bestowed on these municipal campaigns and the governance structures they planned to establish (Interview #1, #3, #14, #22).

6. PKK Municipalities' Practices of Rebel Governance

Although Batman and Hilvan's mayors had their periods in power cut short by state violence, they comprehensively re-configured

practices and structures of governance in the two towns. Both municipalities had a vision of governance designed to both improve the life conditions in the cities in the short term and to consolidate support for their movement and its broader goals. Their governance practices fell into categories such as justice and security, an area where most rebel groups initiate forms of rebel governance (Mampilly 2011, 17; Wickham-Crowley 1987), different platforms of representation (Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer 2021, 2), re-configured taxation structures (Mampilly 2021), education (Furlan 2020, 6) and workers' rights (Gutiérrez Danton 2018, 291). This period of PKK rule thus fall clearly under the conceptual umbrella of rebel governance. Due to the brevity of Solmaz's reign, these forms of governance remained less developed in Batman. But they were unambiguously forms of rebel governance in areas where the PKK did not enjoy any form of territorial control and many years before it launched its insurgency. In these outlined examples the PKK did not confront the state but rather attempted to usurp it from within, accessing its resources and vertical ties to regional and national level powerbrokers to further a revolutionary political agenda, and to make the voices and demands of Kurds, workers and women heard in municipal politics. Once again demonstrating the ambiguous and deeply intertwined nature of control and order between contending armed revolutionary movements and the state (Gutiérrez Danton 2022; Pfeifer and Schwab 2022; van Baalen and Terpstra 2022).

One of the first problem's the PKK encountered was finding suitable candidates to actually run in the election. As most of the PKK's activists were very young, they needed to find candidates who met the eligibility requirements for participation in mayoral elections: being older than 27 years old, and having completed their military service (Interview# 8, Interview# 11). The PKK's candidate in Batman who met these criteria was Edip Solmaz, who had studied at military academies in Istanbul and Ankara, and had served as an officer in the army, before abandoning a military career because of the anti-Kurdish racism he experienced within the army. When Solmaz was asked to become the candidate of the PKK in 1979, he was a law student in Istanbul. In Hilvan, the PKK candidate who qualified for running for office was Nadir Temel, a manual labourer, who transported stones to Hilvan for use in construction. Interviewees shared several reasons for their selection as candidates for the municipal elections: they came from families with humble backgrounds, their families were both respected in their respective communities and connected to the movement. They were thus imbued with strong local networks to secure votes and viewed as politically credible.

In Batman the PKK's candidate ran against rivals supported by landlords with connections to mainstream parties, *Adalet Partisi* (Justice Party) and the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*).[18] The municipality had been under control of one *aşiret*, the Raman, since 1955. Solmaz had positioned himself as the candidate of the people in direct opposition to the local power holders. Although he was killed on his 28th day in office, most of the interviewees referred to his short term as "people's municipalism" (*halkçı belediyecilik*). In Hilvan the PKK campaigned against the Suleymanlar *aşiret*, who were similarly political dominant to the Ramanlı in Batman and locally acted as powerbrokers for the state. The sitting mayor Mehmet Veysi Bayuk was forced to resign, after a clash between his tribesmen and the PKK resulted in the killing of a PKK member: in the ensuing by-election Nadir Temel was victorious.

Solmaz and Temel had come to the office with lofty ambitions of political and social justice, which included practical goals such as stabilizing fair commodity prices, the recognition of labour rights, as well as an acknowledgement of Kurdish identity. During his short tenure, Solmaz cracked down on speculative practices such as the withholding of primary consumption items such as tea, sugar, flour, vegetable oil, to create artificial scarcity and subsequently higher prices (Interview #4).

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[16] Of a national population of 40.347.719 the urban population counted 16.869.068 people and the rural population 23.478.651, which gives indicates that 42% of the population lived in places counted as urban. See Türkiye İstatik Kurumu, 1970 and 1975 Genel Nüfus Sayımı veri tabanı.

[17] Mazlum Doğan killed himself in Diyarbakir prison in March 1982 while M. Hayri Durmus and Kemal Pir died in September 1982 as a consequence of a hunger strike against the torturous regime dehumanization in Diyarbakir prison.

[18] Other Kurdish parties also ran candidates, the KDP and KUK received 1,070 and 751 votes respectively.

Accordingly, Solmaz's governance can be assessed not only by his stated political objectives on which he campaigned but also their partial implementation. Thus coinciding with service provision by movements identified throughout the rebel governance literature.

Witnesses at the time, claimed that Solmaz had the ambition to create an institutional space to negotiate Kurdish and worker's demands with the central state (Interview #1; Interview #2; Interview #4). Solmaz and Temel's municipalities facilitated the articulation of demands for fair prices for commodities and for fair wages. They additionally potentially served as channels of negotiation with the state, as the offices had direct contacts with key regional political functionaries. As one interviewee explained:

> "Yes, we fight an armed struggle, and it is one way of struggle, but our understanding is to solve the Kurdish problem politically. […] We never dismissed the legal. Our legal understanding started in Batman and Hilvan." (Interview #2).

Though Solmaz's short period in office is remembered for its municipalist approach, his term in office in Batman was too brief to institutionalize his new practices of governance. Yet, it is plausible that the PKK's more prolonged municipal experience in Hilvan may be an indication of the policies they would have been implemented in Batman. In Hilvan, Temel maintained the existing municipal registry for births, deaths and marriages, and its cadaster for land and property ownership, but governance was revolutionized in other sectors. He introduced a range of new committees for the organization of daily lives, which were not operated by civil servants, but by people themselves. These committees included (Interview #14; Nûçe Ciwan, 2019).

(1) **Security Committee**: aimed to provide security in Hilvan and its surroundings and protect against attacks by landlord militias. A total of 5 groups were formed to provide security in the 4 neighborhoods of Hilvan plus the town center. Each group was composed of 10–20 people, who would be on guard in 24-hour shifts. In rural areas of Hilvan, so-called Party Protection Units were established. There were two such units composed of 10–13 people active in eastern and western Hilvan.

(2) **Neighborhood committees**: sought to deal with practical demands and problems at the neighborhood level. There were four neighborhoods divided in two regions, upper Hilvan and lower Hilvan.

(3) **Village Committees**: the municipality included 64 villages. The aim of the village committee was similar to that of the neighborhood committee, and included domestic issues, feuds, and disputes, but also problems with agricultural machinery such as combine harvesters.

(4) **Education Committee**: it planned to teach a) the values of the party and its struggle for national liberation and b) establish reading groups for the reading of novels and stories.

(5) **Public Relations Committee**: it was tasked with approaching tradesman, artisans, (agricultural) workers, peasants, people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds and discuss the struggle for liberation with them. It also gathered information on quotidian problems and their potential solutions which was reported back to the other relevant committees to be practically resolved.

(6) **Finance Committee**: it was assigned the duty of collecting and administering resources. They were gathered via:
   a. Donations (among these, religion donations such as *zekât* and *fitre*)
   b. Taxes on transport – a percentage from the earnings of taxi and dolmuş businesses, and fees from trucks bringing grain to silos.
   c. Percentages from landowners who employed agricultural workers

(7) **Justice committee or the People's Court**: it was concerned with problems that could not be solved by any of the other committees.

These problems were usually more serious and more specific than general complaints. The Justice Committee was composed of a person from the party and local people with knowledge of the community.

(8) **Workers' Committee**: was concerned with all aspects of work and labor. The committee determined the working wages for those harvesting by hand, and those operating machinery, and intervened in cases of underpaid labor.

As Hilvan was an agricultural town, the movement's governance primarily affected issues of land, labor and gender. In the PKK's political assessment of the situation in Hilvan, they argued that the landlords' dominance was a direct result of their links with the Turkish state, culminating in their owning tens of thousands of acres of the district's fertile land. Their power had increased to such an extent that it had become common for villagers to refer to these landlords in terms of the number of villages they "owned". Through intimidation and violence, the landlords tried to expel peasants from their land ('Doğru Yolu Kavrayalım ve Urfa Yöresinde Devrimci Mücadele Yükseliyor.' 1978). Cognisant of the potential of the land to provide a livelihood to all, as opposed to the situation wherein masses of villagers struggled to survive while their landlords accumulated ever more land and capital, Temel's administration took targeted action. Municipal security committees prevented the landlords' violent efforts to dispossess peasants of their land. While village and workers committees fixed minimum wages to be paid for the labor of the agricultural workers, and the conditions under which machinery, such as the combine-harvester could be used. These interventions on minimum wages extended to other sectors such as the construction industry (Interview #14).

An ulterior dimension of the PKK's practices of rebel governance applied to gender relations. One interviewee recalled a meeting she had with the PKK's leader Abdullah Ocalan (Apo). She remembers complaining to him that.

> "'But we women live like slaves.' […] Do we women have to live under this pressure forever?' He said, 'No, that will not happen.' […] [H]e said, 'women will have every right, women will go as far as parliament.' […] Our women will go to parliament […] I said, 'hopefully,' but I didn't believe that this would happen" (Interview #22).

Only a few years after this meeting, which took place in 1976 or 1977, Kurdish women, whose position had been strictly limited to serving men in the private sphere, assumed roles in the public domain. The election of three women councillors was a revolutionary development in itself. Among their tasks was the coordination of support of services and goods to families who were dispossessed and displaced by the landlords' militias and who had sought refuge in Hilvan.

7. Conclusion

Though based on a single case study, this article has advanced two theoretical arguments. Firstly, it has further demonstrated the need to spatially and chronologically broaden the scope of the Rebel Governance literature to include phases of governance where illegal revolutionary movements aiming at a systemic change, do not control territory. The PKK controlled territory in neither Batman nor Hilvan, instead it appropriated institutionalised political structures – elected municipalities – as a means to challenge an exclusionary citizenship regime and immediately implement its revolutionary objectives. Secondly, the article has problematised the tendency to retrospectively apply a unilinear reading of movements' evolution from ideologically convinced revolutionaries to violent insurgents. Such linear understandings fail to countenance the massive amount of contingency involved in early mobilizational phases and the reality that notwithstanding stated objectives (i.e., violent overthrow of the state/independence) that there is a relational and procedural dynamic that shapes

movements strategic decisions and that escalation from political violence in a broader sense to insurgency against the state is not inevitable. The PKK's municipal politics in the examined period was not necessarily just a pre-history of insurgency, but also a potential missed opportunity for enacting political change without resorting to insurgency Finally, the articles shed empirical light on a heretofore little studied element of the PKK's mobilisation, its involvement in electoral politics in the late 1970s. Much research on Kurdish electoral mobilisation focuses on the travails of the series of political parties that preceded the Peoples' Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, HDP), from the late 1980s and early 1990 (Watts 2010). The electoral participation by the PKK (and a few of its revolutionary counterparts) in the late 1970s is less discussed and the long-term consequences of its crushing by the state, on subsequent electoral mobilisations are yet to be fully established.

The emergence of the rebel governance literature has enabled a better understanding of armed political movements in general, and in particular, how they establish legitimacy and popular support. However, this article demonstrates that its insistence on territorial control as a scope condition, significantly narrows the extent which the approach can more ambitiously contribute to understanding broader forms and different phases of political violence such as insurgency onset. It has been demonstrated that governance can and does occur without territorial control and this article provides a robust empirical example of it. The PKK sought to subvert the existing political infrastructure of the state by controlling local levers of institutionalised power to further their agenda. This further pushes back against the zero-sum conceptualisation of control that remains pervasive in much of the rebel governance literature. The article does not make any path determinative conclusions regarding how initial conditions definitively shape subsequent mobilisation such as the noted work of Jeremy Weinstein (2007), it advances a relational perspective of interactive spirals of action and re-action, and often simple contingency, most importantly the military coup of 1980. Yet, it is worth mentioning that the broader Kurdish movement's strategy since the mid-2000 s explicitly seeks to use electoral opportunities at the regional and municipal level to advance broader revolutionary goals (see Jongerden 2015; 2018; O'Connor 2018). It thus echoes closely the PKK's efforts as outlined here in the 1970 s, hinting at a degree of continuity across the generations of pro-Kurdish mobilisation including both the PKK and other institutional Kurdish actors.

This article argues that the PKK in the examined period was an armed movement that did employ violence but that importantly, during this phase, it was not (yet) an insurgent movement. Although, the distinction between insurgent and other forms of political violence is often difficult to ascertain, a movement which assiduously avoided confronting state forces is difficult to categorise as insurgent. Importantly, the PKK became an insurgent movement after the 1980 military coup led to mass arrests of its members – including its elected representatives - and the withdrawal of its remaining activists from Turkey to Syria, Lebanon, and then northern Iraq. One of our interviewees, at the time a high school student in Batman recalled, that he left the city, which was under a curfew, and went back to his home in a surrounding village. "The following days [after the 1980 coup] PKK sympathizers passed by our village. Some asked for weapons, others asked for food or a horse. They all moved into the mountains." (Interview #18). There were the activists who had been the drriving force behind the municipal elections, who fled the country and who would eventually come back as guerrillas. When the PKK re-organized itself in exile, it took the form of an insurgent movement. When it launched its armed struggle in 1984, it established bases in mountainous areas which were difficult to access for the army, thus conforming to expectations of advantageous sites to organise armed insurgency (Hendrix 2011), in stark contrast to its geographically diversified pre-coup mobilisation. In the cases outlined in this article, the PKK committed some of its most senior militants to engage in electoral mobilisation in two towns located in flat areas which are

inappropriate environments for starting an insurgency, thus highlighting that although the PKK did subsequently fully commit to armed insurgency that at least in this period, political imperatives prevailed over insurgent ones. This article does lead one to at least consider the counter-factual that in the absence of the military coup which removed any possibility of non-violently contesting the state, that similar to preponderance of revolutionary movements the world over, the PKK might have combined forms of violent and non-violent mobilisation resulting in a different outcome. Unal has argued that an analysis of insurgents' actual behaviour patterns, specifically their violence, rather than ideology or expressed objectives is a better way to understand their strategic decision making (Unal 2014). The authors extend that argument and suggest that by looking at the forms of *governance* insurgents actually implement, it gives an insight into their pragmatic approach to the exercise of power and realisation of their objectives. Therefore, in the Kurdish context where all revolutionary groups expressed a commitment to violence and shared the objective of an independent Kurdistan, the PKK's analogous expressions should be also viewed as a form of competing discourse rather than an explicit outline of their plans. The PKK's subsequent evolution into an insurgent army is as much a product of the changing political structures and opportunities, and contingent decision making rather than the strategic fulfilment of a long-term plan.

This article has outlined two key areas where the field of rebel governance can extend its scope and thereby further contribute to understanding insurgent mobilisation. It firstly addresses the period prior to the launch of the insurgency and long before territorial control became even a consideration of the movement. It secondly emphasises that parallel to efforts at strategic organisation, that much of what actually occurred was derived from interacting with other political forces and sympathetic communities, all filtered through the dispersed mobilisation of extremely young and inexperienced militants. Thus, hinting at a real-world divergence between what was expressed in movement propaganda and discourse and what actually occurred on the ground and how this shaped the movement's evolution. This second point also leads to a methodological consideration, how can movements of the recent past be best studied,if their own documents/propaganda are stylised accounts of how they had hoped the movement would evolve rather than how it actually developed, how can academics reconstruct the conflict? To strengthen all of these three issues, further comparative research focusing on other movements' pre-conflict mobilisation and efforts (or lack thereof) at governance would help us better understand the institutional legacies of political mobilisation and the roads not taken or blocked, preceding insurgency.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Francis O'Connor: Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing, Funding acquisition. **Joost Jongerden:** Conceptualization, Methodology, Data curation, Writing – review & editing, Project administration.

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

The authors do not have permission to share data.

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Appendix A

Table A1
Interview Index.

No. Interview	Gender	Description	Date(s) of Interview	Place of Interview
Interview 1	M	Former activist in Batman in the late 1970 s	26-02-22 & 27-02-22	Netherlands
Interview 2	M	Former activist in Batman in the late 1970 s	27-04-2022	Belgium
Interview 3	M	Former activist in Batman and Hilvan in the late 1970 s	06-06-2022	Netherlands
Interview 4	M	An acquaintance of Edip Solmaz in the late 1970 s	25-07-2022	Turkey
Interview 5	F	First hand observer of municipal politics in Batman in the late 1970 s	09-08-2022	Turkey
Interview 6	M	Active in municipal election campaign in Batman in 1977	09-08-2022	Turkey
Interview 7	M	Active in politics in Batman in the late 1970 s	13-08-2022	Turkey
Interview 8	M	Expert in Turkish military affairs	19-08-2022	Online
Interview 9	M	Acquaintance of Edip Solmaz in the late 1970 s	26-08-2022	Turkey
Interview 10	M	Expert in economic affairs,	30-08-2022	Online
Interview 11	M	Expert in economic affairs	31-08-2022	Online
Interview 12	M	Former activist in Batman in the late 1970 s	22-09-2022	Turkey
Interview 13	M	Former activist in Batman in the late 1970 s	06-10-2022	Turkey
Interview 14	M	Former activist in Hilvan in the late 1970 s	08-11-2022 & 22-11-2022	Belgium & Online
Interview 15	M	First hand observer of municipal politics in Turkey in the late 1970 s	13-08-2022	Turkey
Interview 16	F	First hand observer of municipal politics in Batman in the late 1970 s	13-12-2022	Netherlands
Interview 17	M	Former activist in Batman in the late 1970 s	13-12-2022 & 29-12-2022	Belgium
Interview 18	M	High school student and first-hand observer of municipal politics in Batman in the late 1970 s	20-12-2022	Netherlands
Interview 19	M	Former activist in Hilvan in the late 1970 s	02-01-2023	Online
Interview 20	M	Former activist in Batman and Urfa in the late 1970 s	11-05-2023	Germany
Interview 21	M	High school student and first-hand observer of municipal politics in Batman in the late 1970 s	08-08-2023	Netherlands
Interview 22	F	Former activist in Hilvan in the late 1970 s	11-08-2023	Turkey
Interview 23	F	High school student and first-hand observer of municipal politics in Hilvan in the late 1970 s	27-08-2023	Online

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