

# THE PROMISED TRANSFORMATION

---

Mexican Coffee Policies During the  
Administration of President López Obrador



**Claudia Oviedo-Rodríguez**



## Propositions

1. Bypassing farmer organizations upon providing subsidies is a powerful mechanism for reducing clientelism (this thesis).
2. Global value chain scholars who stress the importance of producing high-quality coffee overlook the benefits of low-quality coffee for small farmers' livelihoods (this thesis).
3. Food sovereignty studies fail to acknowledge that many farmers wish to be connected with the industry.
4. The meaning behind the numbers is more significant than the numbers themselves.
5. Unfulfilled promises by the state are not always equivalent to failure.
6. Polarized opinions regarding the administration of President López Obrador prove that Mexican politics have changed.

Propositions belonging to the thesis entitled

The Promised Transformation:

Mexican Coffee Policies During the Administration of President López Obrador

Claudia Oviedo-Rodríguez

Wageningen, 30 August 2023



# **The Promised Transformation**

Mexican Coffee Policies During the Administration  
of President López Obrador

Claudia Oviedo-Rodríguez

## **Thesis committee**

### **Promotor**

Dr Kees Jansen

Associate Professor, Rural Sociology Group

Wageningen University & Research

### **Co-promotor**

Dr Sietze Vellema

Associate Professor, Knowledge, Technology and Innovation Group

Wageningen University & Research

### **Other members**

Prof. Dr Han van Dijk, Wageningen University & Research

Prof. Dr Jonathan Fox, American University, Washington D.C., United States

Dr Fedes van Rijn, University of Groningen

Dr Jaime Hoogesteger van Dijk, Wageningen University & Research

This research was conducted under the auspices of the Wageningen Graduate School of Social Sciences.

# **The Promised Transformation**

## Mexican Coffee Policies During the Administration of President López Obrador

Claudia Oviedo-Rodríguez

### **Thesis**

submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of doctor  
at Wageningen University  
by the authority of the Rector Magnificus,  
Prof. Dr A.P.J. Mol,  
in the presence of the  
Thesis Committee appointed by the Academic Board  
to be defended in public  
on Wednesday 30 August 2023  
at 1:30 p.m. in the Omnia Auditorium.

Claudia Oviedo-Rodríguez

The Promised Transformation: Mexican Coffee Policies During the  
Administration of President López Obrador

185 pages

PhD thesis, Wageningen University, Wageningen, the Netherlands (2023)

With references, with summary in English

ISBN: 978-94-6447-690-3

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.18174/630017>

Many thought it was a simple change of government, that it was going to be more of the same [...] No! It's not a simulation; it's a real change, a change of regime. It's over; corruption is over. Many do not accept this way of governing. We offer apologies in advance, but the Fourth Transformation will go forward anyway.

—President Andrés Manuel López Obrador



## Acknowledgements

Throughout my PhD, I was extremely fortunate to receive the support of a variety of institutions, and to be surrounded by amazing people. I would like to use this section to acknowledge them. First, I would like to thank the *Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología* (National Council for Science and Technology) for providing a scholarship, without which the PhD simply would not have been possible. I would especially like to recognize the extraordinary guidance I received from my supervisors Kees Jansen and Sietze Vellema. Throughout my PhD, they provided me with all the analytical tools I needed; guided me in designing this project; continually provided suggestions for improving the thesis; challenged my way of thinking; and inspired me to give my best. I would also like to thank the Rural Sociology Group for hosting my project, and its staff members who—upon presenting them with multiple research progress reports—provided me with useful feedback to frame my thesis. I also thank Aïcha el Makoui, who successfully kept track of the finances for my project so that I did not go in the red.

I would like to express my gratitude to the people I interviewed during fieldwork. While I cannot mention their names as I am maintaining their anonymity, the over 170 people I interviewed, including farmers, policymakers, academics, practitioners, and entrepreneurs, were crucial for me to be able to thoroughly analyse the functioning Mexican coffee polices. I greatly appreciate all interviewees for sharing their time without hesitation, and for inspiring me with their stories. I thank Laure Delalande and Héctor Robles for providing very good suggestions for people to be interviewed. I would also like to thank Ann Greenberg for her astonishing work in reviewing the writing style of the entire thesis, and Valerie Sis and Ethan Groene for revising the grammar of some of my drafts. I wish to acknowledge Marian Vittek for producing the maps included my thesis. I thank Ángel Velázquez for taking photos for the cover, and Erik García Briones, Sergio Hernández Vega, and some interviewees for providing me with some of the photos included in this thesis. I profoundly thank Jonathan Fox for sharing his knowledge regarding the Mexican state.

I want to make a very special recognition to my mother Sonia Rodríguez Solórzano and to my father Francisco Oviedo Esquivel for contributing 23 chromosomes each to my existence! Throughout my life they have watched over

my well-being and thanks to them I am able to reach this point. My acknowledgements to my siblings Elsa, Sonia, and Fernando for teaching me that family is what matters most. I also thank my sister Elsa for helping me design the cover for this thesis. I thank friends, roommates, and colleagues whom I met in the Netherlands: Daun Cheong—famously known as Dawn—for providing me with such a special friendship; Moisés *El Pollito* Covarrubias for always being willing to listen and share; Claudia Sulowska for her kind, loving treatment; Suzanne Brandon for those nice conversations; Fernando Bueno for his true friendship; Sayel Cortés for sharing his positivism and enthusiasm; Will Leonard for those fun evenings along with plenty of Tony’s Chocolonely sweets; Julián Cortés *El Revolucionario* for teaching me about the life of an ex-combatant; Csilla Vámos for always being willing to hang out; Angelito Márquez for being there at the beginning of my PhD; Maria Oursouzidou, Rinchu Dukpa, Lia Sartika, Titis Apdini, and Sofia Monroy for creating such a cosy atmosphere at home; Carolina Berget, Francisca López *Paquita*, Lisette Nikol, Pamela Bachmann, María Contesse, Francisco Benítez, Fabio Gatti, Betzy Pelayo, Noelia Parajuá, Roald Pijpker, and Ismail Nuhu for sharing their tips on obtaining a PhD in the social sciences department, and for always being up for a chat, a lunch, or a drink to rest our minds from work. I would like to thank Gerard Verschoor for hosting many wonderful dinners for the Latin American crew at his house in Wageningen; thanks to the atmosphere he created, the cold rainy evenings that characterize the Netherlands were transformed into warm gatherings with tasty food and amazing conversations. I wish to thank Ben Hummel, my favourite landlord in Wageningen, with whom I had many conversations regarding Dutch culture.

I also wish to thank my very good friends in Mexico who listened to updates on my PhD adventure and life in the Netherlands whenever I returned home for a visit: Max Rodríguez, Diana Álvarez, Astrid Mayoral, Cristina Arias, Ernesto Laguna, and Eric Blas. I would like to mention two people I met in Mazatlán, a Mexican beach town where I lived for some months while finalizing my PhD: Chantal Loya, my roommate who spread her very positive vibes, and David Martínez, a recent PhD graduate who motivated me to push harder to reach the end of the tunnel. Finally, but no less important, I would especially like to acknowledge Gabriela León, my very good friend from my hometown, Tepatlán, who also listened to all my updates about (almost) finishing the thesis. Her conversations and good advice truly helped me to keep a healthy mind while working to submit my thesis.

# Content

List of Tables and Figures .....	iv
Acronyms .....	v
Summary .....	vii
Introduction .....	1
Chapter 1. Evolution of Coffee Policies in Mexico .....	25
Chapter 2. Incorporation of Different Types of Farmers Into Different Coffee Markets.....	47
Chapter 3. Arabica, Robusta, and the Narrative of Quality Coffee .....	71
Chapter 4. AMLO's Rural Programmes and Elimination of Intermediaries.....	95
Conclusion .....	117
References .....	137
Photographs .....	173
Completed Training and Supervision Plan .....	181
About the Author.....	183
Financial and Editorial Support.....	185

## List of Tables and Figures

### Tables

Table 1. Coffee Marketing Channels in Soconusco and Their Principal Characteristics .....	57
Table 2. Coffee Farmers Selected for In-depth Case Studies and Their Means of Production .....	58
Table 3. Summary of Interactions Between Different Types of Coffee Farmers and Marketing Channels .....	66

### Figures

Figure 1. Soconusco Region of Chiapas .....	17
Figure 2. Expansion of Coffee Plantations in Soconusco by Finqueros in the Late 19 <sup>th</sup> Century .....	29
Figure 3. Coffee Production and Exports, 1961–2018 .....	37
Figure 4. Number of Coffee Farmers According to Hectares Cultivated, Soconusco, 2018 .....	52

## Acronyms

4T	<i>Cuarta Transformación</i> (Fourth Transformation)
AGROMOD	<i>Agroindustrias Modernas</i> (Modern Agroindustries)
AMECAFE	<i>Asociación Mexicana de la Cadena Productiva del Café</i> (Mexican Coffee Value Chain Association)
AMLO	Andrés Manuel López Obrador
BIENESTAR	<i>Secretaría de Bienestar</i> (Ministry of Well-being)
CAC	<i>Comunidades de Aprendizaje Campesino</i> (Peasant Learning Communities)
CGPD	<i>Coordinación General de Programas para el Desarrollo</i> (General Coordination of Development Programmes)
CASEMEX	<i>Cafés y Semillas de México</i> (Coffee and Seeds of Mexico)
CASFA	<i>Centro de Agroecología San Francisco de Asís</i> (Saint Francis of Assisi Agroecology Centre)
CCC	<i>Central Campesina Cardenista</i> (Cardenist Peasant Union)
CEPCO	<i>Coordinadora Estatal de Productores de Café de Oaxaca</i> (State Coordinator of Coffee Producers of Oaxaca)
CIOAC	<i>Central Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos</i> (Independent Union of Agricultural Workers and Peasants)
CNC	<i>Confederación Nacional Campesina</i> (National Peasant Confederation)
CNOC	<i>Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras</i> (National Coordinator of Coffee Organizations)
CNPA	<i>Coordinación Nacional del Plan de Ayala</i> (National Coordination of the Ayala Plan)
CONAPROCAFE	<i>Coalición Nacional de Organizaciones de Productores de Café</i> (National Coalition of Organizations of Coffee Producers)
EGOS	<i>Exportadora de Granos y Oleaginosas del Sureste</i> (Exporter of Grains and Oilseeds of the Southeast)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GRAPOS	<i>Grupo de Asesores de Producción Orgánica y Sustentable</i> (Organic and Sustainable Production Advisory Group)
ICA	International Coffee Agreement
ICO	International Coffee Organization

IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
INIFAP	<i>Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Forestales, Agrícolas y Pecuarias</i> (National Institute of Forestry, Crop Agriculture, and Livestock Research)
INMECAFE	<i>Instituto Mexicano del Café</i> (Mexican Coffee Institute)
ISMAM	<i>Indígenas de la Sierra Madre de Motozintla</i> (Indigenous Peoples of the Sierra Madre of Motozintla)
MIAF	<i>Milpa Intercalada con Árboles Frutales</i> (Milpa Interspersed with Fruit Trees)
MORENA	<i>Movimiento Regeneración Nacional</i> (National Regeneration Movement)
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
PAN	<i>Partido Acción Nacional</i> (National Action Party)
PRI	<i>Partido Revolucionario Institucional</i> (National Institutional Party)
PRONASOL	<i>Programa Nacional de Solidaridad</i> (Programme of National Solidarity)
SADER	<i>Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural</i> (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development)
SUBICAFE	<i>Subcomponente Sustentabilidad y Bienestar para Pequeños Productores de Café</i> (Subcomponent for Sustainability and Well-being for Small Coffee Producers)
UCIRI	<i>Unión de Comunidades Indígenas de la Región del Istmo</i> (Union of Indigenous Communities of the Isthmus Region)
UEPC	<i>Unidades Económicas de Producción y Comercialización</i> (Economic Units of Production and Marketing)
UGOCP	<i>Unión General Obrero Campesino Popular</i> (General Popular Worker and Peasant Union)
UNORCA	<i>Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas Autónomas</i> (National Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant Organizations)
UNPC	<i>Unión Nacional de Productores de Café</i> (National Union of Coffee Producers)
UPCV	<i>Unión de Productores de Café de Veracruz</i> (Union of Coffee Producers of Veracruz)

## Summary

Coffee is a strategic crop in Mexico. It is one of the main sources of income in some of the poorest regions of the country and a crop that generates a significant amount of foreign currency. Due to the importance of coffee, previous administrations implemented many programmes to provide farmers with plants and fertilizer through coffee farmer organizations. Nevertheless, despite their continuity, these programmes were fraught with many problems including insufficient provision of subsidies to acquire farm supplies, failure to generate accurate lists of beneficiaries, provision of low-quality supplies too late in the season, and unreliable technical assistance. Furthermore, these programmes were characterized by high levels of clientelism between farmer organizations and public functionaries.

Upon taking office in 2018, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) publicly stated that previous administrations had abandoned small coffee farmers and stressed that since neoliberalism had been fully implemented, the state had renounced its role in promoting rural development. He promised to end the neoliberal paradigm that had prevailed during previous decades and create a pathway for development based on justice and well-being. He assured that in this manner, his administration would establish a radical transformation by which the state would recover its former role in developing comprehensive policies which prioritize the poorest citizens and eliminate corruption.

To achieve his ambitious objectives for rural families, AMLO announced that subsidies would be provided directly to farmers, without farmer organizations acting as intermediaries. Furthermore, he established two programmes that would prioritize small-scale farmers: *Sembrando Vida* (Sowing Life) under the *Secretaría de Bienestar* (Ministry of Well-being [BIENESTAR]) and *Producción para el Bienestar* under the *Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural* (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development). Finally, he assigned the *Coordinación General de Programas para el Desarrollo* (General Coordination of Development Programmes [CGPD])—under the Presidential Office—the responsibility of coordinating social programmes.

This thesis analyses Mexican coffee policies during the administration of AMLO to identify changes in the relationship among the state, small-scale farmers, coffee farmer organizations, and the coffee processing industry. It builds on approaches of theories of the state, agrarian political economy, and global

value chain to thoroughly comprehend the effects of rural policies on small farmers' livelihoods. The thesis is based on a case study that analyses the policy of eliminating intermediaries upon providing subsidies, implementation of *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar*, and the functioning of the CGPD in the Soconusco region of Chiapas.

This thesis contains four empirical and analytical chapters. Chapter 1, “Evolution of Coffee Policies in Mexico”, describes how although the state continually supported coffee cultivation its interests and the support mechanisms it has provided to farmers have changed significantly over time. During the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, in the interest of expanding the number of hectares for coffee production the state provided large-scale farmers with incentives to acquire land. During the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the state shifted its interest to increasing productivity, took on an active role in regulating coffee cultivation, and began to target small-scale farmers. Finally, from the late 1980s until 2018 (the last year analysed in this chapter), the state shifted its interest to improving coffee quality. While small-scale farmers continued to be the state's principal target of support, it significantly reduced its intervention in coffee production.

Chapter 2, “Incorporation of Different Types of Farmers Into Different Coffee Markets”, illustrates that although the Mexican state distinguishes farmers only based on the amount of land, great differences exist among farmers regarding their control over their means of production and the way they relate to the market; while some are able to make a profit from the market and expand their reproduction, others must to sell their labour to sustain themselves and their families. The chapter then reveals how different types of farmers relate quite differently to the prevailing marketing options in Soconusco—namely the coffee processing industry Nestlé, farmer organizations, local buyers and direct marketing. While some farmers have advantageous conditions of incorporation into the market, others do not.

Chapter 3, “Arabica, Robusta, and the Narrative of Quality Coffee”, analyses how coffee policies are shaped by collaboration and antagonism that has arisen with respect to two coffee species: arabica (*coffea arabica*)—considered to be of high quality—and robusta (*coffea canephora*)—considered to be of lower quality. Collaboration between the state and coffee farmer organizations has been aimed at improving cultivation of arabica; however, the relationship between these two actors is characterized by antagonism due to state support for Nestlé and the way the state has designed and operated coffee programmes. Meanwhile, the state and

Nestlé have established a close collaboration which has allowed them to foster robusta cultivation. Despite opposition by coffee farmer organizations to Nestlé, many Soconusco farmers have also established a close relationship with this company, although some remain critical of the company's low price it pays for their coffee.

Chapter 4, "AMLO's Rural Programmes and Elimination of Intermediaries", shows that while *Sembrando Vida* was smoothly implemented in Soconusco during 2019, implementation of *Producción para el Bienestar* was quite problematic due to the policy of eliminating intermediaries upon providing subsidies. The chapter also describes some benefits of recent coffee policies with regards to farmers' livelihoods: as a result of the policy of eliminating intermediaries, coffee farmers have received their full subsidy, and due to the substantial sum provided by *Sembrando Vida* farmers are resuming agricultural labours that they had stopped carrying out due to lack of finances. Nevertheless, it shows that both *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar* continue to be fraught with many problems with respect to their design and implementation.

The thesis concludes that to a certain extent recent coffee policies have strengthened the relationship between the state and small-scale farmers, while the relationship between the state and farmer organizations has become tense and that between the state and the industry has not changed. It concludes that the state's attention to small-scale farmers is concordant with AMLO's promise to prioritize Mexico's poorest citizens, while the policy of eliminating intermediaries is concordant with his promise to fight corruption. Nevertheless, the state has not fully recovered its role in generating beneficial policies for improving small farmers' livelihoods.



Photo by Erik García Briones

# Introduction

## Background of the Research Problem

Coffee is a strategic crop in Mexico. It is one of the main sources of income for some of the poorest regions of the country and a crop that generates a significant amount of foreign currency (Robles Berlanga, 2011; SAGARPA, n.d.). Due to the importance of coffee, for many decades the state has implemented a variety of measures to support small coffee farmers. In 1958, it established the *Instituto Mexicano del Café* (Mexican Coffee Institute [INMECAFE]) to regulate the amount of coffee produced in the country and the price paid to farmers (Rodríguez Padrón, 2012). For several decades, INMECAFE was also in charge of carrying out agricultural research; collecting and processing farmers' harvest; providing farmers with agricultural inputs; training them to increase production; and promoting development of farmer organizations (Bartra Vergés et al., 2011; Celis Callejas, 2013).

This active role of the state in coffee production ended when INMECAFE was dismantled in the late 1980s due to implementation of neoliberal policies in Mexico (Renard, 1992). With this, the state no longer regulated coffee production, or collected and processed small farmers' harvest, and agricultural research was significantly reduced (Hernández, 1990). State programmes continued to provide farmers with plants and fertilizer; however, these supplies were provided through farmer organizations that developed high levels clientelism with public functionaries (Celis Callejas, 2008). Furthermore, these programmes were fraught with many problems, including insufficient subsidies for acquisition of farm supplies (\$6,000 pesos yearly [-\$311 dollars]; DOF, 2017a),<sup>1</sup> failure to generate accurate lists of beneficiaries; provision of low-quality supplies too late in the season; lack of loans and technical assistance; failure to promote strategies for farmers to collectively cultivate and access rewarding markets; and lack of coordination with other ministries (CNOC, 2022a, 2022b; Hernández, 1992c; Renard, 1999; Robles Berlanga, 2011).

---

<sup>1</sup> Throughout the thesis, I have converted local currencies (Mexican pesos) to United States dollars using an exchange rate of \$1 dollar=\$19.28 pesos, which was the average exchange rate during fieldwork (1 October 2018 to 31 January 2020) according to *El Banco de México* (Bank of Mexico).

Many scholars pointed out that since INMECAFE was dismantled, state support involved only palliative measures that allowed for mere “survival” of small coffee farmers, without improving their livelihoods or generating growth (Hernández, 1992c; Renard Hubert & Larroa Torres, 2017). Others observed that due to the state’s withdrawal of support for the coffee sector and expansion of neoliberal policies, the coffee processing industry acquired more influence in definition of coffee policies, concentrated power over coffee trading, and took on some of the functions that the state formerly attended, such as carrying out agricultural research and organizing farmers to promote collective production (Henderson, 2017; Pérez Akaki, 2013a; Venegas Sandoval et al., 2020).

Upon taking office in 2018, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) publicly stated that previous administrations had abandoned small coffee farmers—and agriculture as a whole (AMLO, 2019a). He stressed that since President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988 to 1994) fully implemented neoliberalism,<sup>2</sup> the state renounced its role in promoting development under the “mistaken naive” assumption that market regulation would generate wealth and correct economic imbalances (GOB, 2019). He criticized public functionaries of the past 30 years for promoting policies favouring agro-industry at the expense of *ejidos*<sup>3</sup> and nature, and that the little funding provided to small-scale farmers was plundered by corrupt functionaries and farmer organizations (GOB, 2019). He denounced that rather than “modernizing” the country, neoliberalism increased poverty and inequality, expelled farmers from rural areas, and harmed the environment (AMLO, 2019a, 2019b; GOB, 2019).

Upon taking office, AMLO promised to end the neoliberal paradigm that had prevailed during previous administrations, and declared that he would establish a historic development alternative based on justice and well-being, which he named the *Cuarta Transformación* (Fourth Transformation [4T]; GOB, 2019).<sup>4</sup> He stated that under this new paradigm, the state would recover its role in generating

---

<sup>2</sup> I understand *neoliberalism* to be the set of interrelated policies aimed at increasing the role of markets in regulating economic life—while minimizing the role of the state (Evans & Sewell, 2013).

<sup>3</sup> *Ejidos* are communal landholdings of small farmers.

<sup>4</sup> AMLO refers to three previous transformations. The first was Mexico’s Independence from Spanish control (1810–1821); the second was the Reform War (1857–1860), in which President Benito Juárez struggled for equality and abolition of the Catholic church’s economic and political power; and the third was the Mexican Revolution (1910–1917), following more than 30 years of President Porfirio Díaz’s stronghold (Sáez, 2019). He presents the Fourth Transformation as a fight against neoliberalism (GOB, 2019).

comprehensive policies; that it would prioritize the poorest citizens, who he considered to have been historically marginalized by economic and political power; and that it would operate according to austerity measures and fight corruption in the public sector (AMLO, 2019a; GOB, 2018a, 2019). Furthermore, he highlighted that although private companies would still be fostered, they would operate in a transparent manner under a clearly defined legal framework (GOB, 2019).

To achieve the 4T's ambitious objectives for rural families, AMLO announced that his administration would provide subsidies directly to farmers, without farmer organizations acting as intermediaries (AMLO, 2019a). Furthermore, he announced two programmes that would prioritize small-scale agricultural production. First, *Sembrando Vida* (Sowing Life) under the *Secretaría de Bienestar* (Ministry of Well-being [BIENESTAR]) which would provide farmers holding 2.5 to 20 hectares with a monthly subsidy of \$5,000 pesos (~\$259 dollars)<sup>5</sup> as well as plants and agricultural tools (DOF, 2019a). The programme would encourage farmers to cultivate organically and introduce agroecological practices such as *Milpa Intercalada con Árboles Frutales* (Milpa Interspersed with Fruit Trees [MIAF]).<sup>6</sup> It would also encourage farmers to grow collectively in *Comunidades de Aprendizaje Campesino* (Peasant Learning Communities [CAC]). Second, *Producción para el Bienestar*, under the *Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural* (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development [SADER]), which would provide farmers with less than 20 hectares with an annual subsidy of \$5,000 pesos (~\$259 dollars)<sup>7</sup> to invest in plants and fertilizers and reduce agrochemical use (DOF, 2019b, 2019d).<sup>8</sup>

In addition to these policies, AMLO assigned the *Coordinación General de Programas para el Desarrollo* (General Coordination of Development Programmes [CGPD]) the responsibility of overseeing coordination of his administration's

---

<sup>5</sup> As of 2019, for at least 3 years \$450 pesos (~\$23 dollars) of the \$5,000 pesos was to be invested in a savings account, and an additional \$50 pesos (~\$3 dollars) in the *Fondo de Bienestar* (Well-being Fund), a trust fund created by the AMLO administration (DOF, 2019a).

<sup>6</sup> *Milpa* is a polyculture system of maize typically interspersed with beans, squash, chillies, tomatoes, and leafy greens.

<sup>7</sup> While the programme *Producción para el Bienestar* initially supported only maize, beans, wheat, and rice farmers, in May of 2019 it incorporated cane sugar and coffee farmers (DOF, 2019b, 2019d). The amount mentioned here is that assigned to coffee farmers in 2019.

<sup>8</sup> In contrast to *Sembrando Vida*, in 2019 *Producción para el Bienestar* lacked a strategy to promote social cohesion among farmers. However, in 2020 the programme established the *Estrategia de Acompañamiento Técnico* (Technical Support Strategy) with this objective (Agricultura, 2020; SADER, 2020b).

social programmes, including *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar* (DOF, 2019e). Furthermore, he assigned the CGPD with the responsibility for establishing *Centros Integradores del Desarrollo* (Integrative Development Centres) to assist beneficiaries of social programmes and to oversee establishment of branches of the *Banco del Bienestar* (Well-being Bank) so that beneficiaries would have access to financial services such as withdrawing money with no surcharge and receiving remittances (Banco del Bienestar, n.d.; DOF, 2019c). Finally, AMLO assigned the CGPD with the responsibility of carrying out the *Censo del Bienestar* (Well-being Census) to provide an accurate list of beneficiaries of social programmes (GOB, n.d.\*b).

Upon implementing these policies, the AMLO administration promised that agriculture would be reactivated (GOB, 2020b). It stressed that elimination of intermediaries would significantly contribute to reducing corruption and political manipulation (AMLO, 2019a). It also assured that *Sembrando Vida* would significantly improve the economy of farmers, rebuild social cohesion among small farmers, and protect the environment (AMLO, 2019c; GOB, 2020c), while *Producción para el Bienestar* would foster plant renovation, sustainable practices, and value-added in farmers' coffee (GOB, 2019; Robles, 2019; Suárez, 2019). Finally, it assured that the actions of the CGPD would foment a closer relationship between the state and impoverished farmers (GOB, 2020a).

All these promises represent an ambitious attempt to improve small coffee farmers' livelihoods, which had deteriorated under previous administrations. However, it is unclear how AMLO's rural policies are modifying the poor relationship of previous administrations with small coffee farmers. This social problem is the underlying motivation for analysing the effects of AMLO's agricultural policies on small coffee farmers' livelihoods, seeking to understand how the relationships among the state, small-scale coffee farmers, coffee farmer organizations, and the coffee processing industry have changed since their implementation. The following section reviews existing studies that analyse AMLO's policies, addresses knowledge gaps, and explains how this thesis intends to fill in these gaps.

### **Studies Regarding the AMLO Administration and Rural Programmes**

Since AMLO entered office, analysts have evaluated the administration using a variety of approaches. One body of literature focuses on AMLO as a political actor. Scholars using this approach address AMLO's political precedents, including his

affiliation with the historically leftist party *Partido de la Revolución Democrática* (Democratic Revolutionary Party), his role as mayor of Mexico's capital city, and his presidential candidacies in 2006 and 2012 (Ávalos Tenorio, 2019; Flores Flores, 2019). Other scholars have analysed the conditions under which AMLO took office in 2018, highlighting that the widespread support he received (53% of votes) indicates that AMLO was the only candidate with a convincing plan for responding to voters' frustration with high levels of corruption and inequality (Ríos, 2021; Salazar Pérez, 2019).

This body of literature has also addressed AMLO's personal character. Some authors observe that many people sympathize with AMLO due to his charisma and apparent honesty (Flores Flores, 2019; Navarrete Vela & Rosiles Salas, 2019). Others highlight that his leadership ability helped him to create a new party that allowed him to reach the presidency—the *Movimiento Regeneración Nacional* (National Regeneration Movement [MORENA]; Navarrete Vela and Rosiles Salas, 2019). Nevertheless, others criticize the authoritarian manner by which AMLO has made decisions and observe that he undermines critical opinions of him and his policies (Casar & Núñez González, 2019), and some warn that AMLO and MORENA have taken on excessive power (Bruhn, 2021; García Morales et al., 2019).

This body of literature has also addressed AMLO's discourse. Some authors praise AMLO for supporting social struggles through use of symbolic language, such as referring to elites as *fifi*<sup>9</sup> and those who have been oppressed as *el pueblo* (the people; Falleti et al., 2019; Serrano Rodríguez, 2019). Other scholars applaud AMLO's populist discourse that focuses on helping the poor, combating corruption and neoliberalism, rebuilding the role of the state, and operating under austerity and rule of law (Ahuactzin Martínez, 2020; Hernández Cortez et al., 2021; Meyer, 2021; Serrano Rodríguez, 2019). Nevertheless, some authors argue that AMLO's discourse deepens existing social division (Ramírez Benítez, 2020).

The above-mentioned body of literature informs this thesis by illustrating that AMLO, who was elected president with a very high percentage of votes, generated many expectations for change. It elucidates how he has used his political discourse to transmit the objectives of his administration, including fighting against neoliberalism. Furthermore, it shows that while some of these authors embrace

---

<sup>9</sup> The term *fifi*, which AMLO has popularized during his administration, was used during the Mexican Revolution (1910–1917) to refer to elites who refused to allow socio-political changes (Falleti et al., 2019).

AMLO's development plan and sympathize with his personality, others strongly criticize his way of doing politics and the power that MORENA has acquired. However, despite the importance of these insights, this body of literature does not address the effects of AMLO's policies on rural contexts.

A second body of literature evaluates AMLO's social policy. While some researchers observe that this policy focuses on the elderly, youth, farmers, and disabled people (Betances, 2020; García Morales et al., 2019; Jaramillo Molina, 2020; Martínez Espinoza, 2021), others point out the administration's high budget allocations to the poor, and that its social programmes have been financed as a result of austerity measures and a reduction in corruption (Bartra, 2019a; Betances, 2020; Ramírez Benítez, 2020). Some applaud a 2019 decree to eliminate tax waivers for wealthy individuals and businesses as a measure to reduce inequality (Fundar, 2019),<sup>10</sup> and others state that a 2020 regulation to label food and drinks with excess calories, sugar, fat, and sodium has contributed to reducing obesity, including in Mexico's rural areas (El Poder del Consumidor, 2020a, 2020b).

Nevertheless, despite these positive assessments of AMLO's social policies, some analysts severely criticize them for a variety of reasons. These include allegations that poverty has increased (Casar & Núñez González, 2019); that the budget assigned to social programmes and the percentage of poor households receiving support has decreased as compared to the previous administration (Casar & Núñez González, 2019; Jaramillo Molina, 2020); that many programmes are not subject to *rules of operation*<sup>11</sup> (Jaime, 2019; Martínez Espinoza, 2021; Ramírez Benítez, 2020); and that lack of coordination exists among ministries in charge of the social policy (Bertoli, 2021).

Within this body of literature, some scholars highlight that BIENESTAR—the ministry responsible for implementing *Sembrando Vida*—has the second highest budget of all current Ministries (Jaramillo Molina, 2020; Ramírez Benítez, 2020). Others welcome that BIENESTAR now supports farmers with subsidies for production, rather than welfare subsidies as occurred in the past (Bartra, 2019a; Gordillo, 2019). Nonetheless, some scholars criticize unjustified elimination of

---

<sup>10</sup> Based on a Fundar (n.d.) database, from 2007 to 2015 the Mexican state waived taxes on almost \$249,500 million pesos (~\$12,940 million dollars) to wealthy individuals and businesses; of this, \$2.5 million pesos (~\$130,000 dollars) corresponded to Nestlé, Mexico's leading coffee processing industry.

<sup>11</sup> *Rules of operation* refer to the set of laws of public programmes established with the aim of achieving efficiency and transparency (GOB, 2021b).

*Prospera*—the principal programme through which BIENESTAR’s predecessor (the *Secretaría de Desarrollo Social* [Ministry of Social Development]) provided cash subsidies to impoverished people to cover educational, nutritional, and other health needs (Casar & Núñez González, 2019; Ramírez Benítez, 2020).

This body of literature informs this thesis as it discusses the principal changes in AMLO’s social policies as compared to policies of previous administrations, indicating that impoverished farmers have been a priority for the current administration. It indicates that BIENESTAR has acquired a key role in implementing AMLO’s social policy, and that the AMLO administration has implemented measures to regulate the coffee processing industry. Moreover, as with the above-mentioned body of literature, it shows that some analysts positively evaluate some aspects of AMLO’s social policy, while others severely criticize it. Nevertheless, despite the useful insights provided by these scholars, they do not focus on rural policies, and although some mention *Sembrando Vida*, they do not address the impacts of this programme on small farmers’ livelihoods.

A third and final body of literature focuses on analysing AMLO’s rural policies. Within this approach attention has been given to the policy of eliminating intermediaries upon providing subsidies. While some analysts hold that this policy has contributed to reducing corruption, electoral proselytism, and embezzlement of funds by intermediaries (CONEVAL, 2020b; Ethos, 2020; García Jiménez, 2019; López Zepeda & Pérez, 2019; Mendoza, 2019), many hold that AMLO wrongly considers all farmer organizations to be corrupt (DESMI, 2021; Núñez Membrillo, 2021). Furthermore, some argue that eliminating intermediaries undermines farmer organizations’ agency and that this policy has been used as a strategy to counteract social movements in opposition to megaprojects; that this policy represents a “*coup de grace*” for “autonomous” organizations (Rosset, 2019a).

Within this body of literature, much attention has been given to *Sembrando Vida*. Some analysts have addressed the objectives of this programme, highlighting that the substantial subsidy it provides has lifted impoverished farmers above the poverty line (ASF, 2019b, 2020b).<sup>12</sup> Others observe that the subsidy has helped farmers to invest in equipment and inputs to increase their production (Fausto Moya, 2021). Nevertheless, some criticize that the

---

<sup>12</sup> In 2019, the poverty threshold with respect to monthly income for rural areas was \$2,411 pesos (~\$125 dollars), while that for extreme poverty was \$1,214 pesos (~\$63 dollars; CONEVAL, n.d.).

programme's objectives are ambiguous (CONEVAL, 2020a, 2020d; GESOC, 2021) and that it is not clear whether the focus of *Sembrando Vida* is reforestation or poverty reduction (Ethos, 2020). While some point out that the programme has not met its established goals (such as number of trees planted in 2019, having met only 14% of the stated goal; Ethos, 2020; Vega, 2020), others predict that upon finalizing the programme at the end of the present administration, farmers will stop attending their plantings (Bertoli, 2021; Collin, 2019).

Analysts have also addressed *Sembrando Vida*'s territorial coverage. Some have pointed out that the programme has operated in some of Mexico's poorest regions (ASF, 2019b, 2020b). Nevertheless, others criticize that it is unclear how the territories included in the programme were selected (Cocoa Services, n.d.; Cotler et al., 2020); that certain territories were intentionally included to suppress opposition to megaprojects (Acosta, 2021; de Ita, 2021; Giraldo, 2019; Rosset, 2019b);<sup>13</sup> and that many regions with high levels of poverty or deforestation were not included (de Ita, 2021; Cotler et al., 2020; Salgado Ramírez, 2021;)

Analysts have also studied *Sembrando Vida*'s targeting and inclusion process. Some point out the merits of the fact that the programme focuses on small-scale farmers (ASF, 2019b, 2020b; Bartra, 2019a; Gordillo, 2019) and others confirm that a large majority of farmers included in the programme have met the selection criteria (83%; ASF, 2019b). Nonetheless, some have pointed out that a very small percentage of the eligible population has been included in the programme (19% in Chiapas; de Ita, 2021). Others observe that while farmers with less than 2.5 hectares have been excluded (Salgado Ramírez, 2021), some farmers who do not meet the selection criteria have been included (Blancas Madrigal, 2021; Casar, 2019; Ethos, 2020; Fausto Moya, 2021; Sanders, 2021). Some hold that farmers are conditioned to receiving the subsidy in exchange for voting for MORENA (Casar, 2019). Finally, certain authors claim that many farmers have deforested their plots in order to present the 2.5 hectares required for eligibility (Carabaña, 2021a, 2021b; de Haldevang, 2021; Marcial Pérez, 2021; WRI, 2021).

Researchers have also evaluated *Sembrando Vida*'s principal agroecological practice (MIAF) and its strategy for promoting collective production (CAC). Some hold that the MIAF contributes to farmers achieving food security, diversifying

---

<sup>13</sup> These authors particularly claim that *Sembrando Vida* is being used to oppress opposition to the Mayan Train, a tourism project in south-eastern Mexico that has been severely criticized as an ecological threat, and due to a lack of impact studies and consultation with local communities (Greenpeace, 2020).

their income sources, and cultivating sustainably (Bartra, 2019a; Fregoso Rojas, 2019). However, many strongly criticize the required use of MIAF because this practice and the crops selected by the programme do not correspond to local practices, ecological conditions, and existing agricultural systems (de Ita, 2021; López Sánchez & Torre Estrada, 2021; Sobarzo Magallanes, 2021),<sup>14</sup> and because marketing strategies are not provided for new crops introduced (Collin, 2019; López Valentín, 2019; Sanders, 2021). Regarding the CACs, some claim that this strategy contributes to improving social cohesion among farmers and promoting exchange of local knowledge (CONEVAL, 2020a, 2020d). However, some critics point out that a specific form of organization has been imposed upon farmers, undermining the authority of pre-existing forms of organization (such as *ejido* assemblies; Ek, 2021; Uc, 2021). Others sustain that the programme is threatening *ejidos* as it is promoting fragmentation and privatization of land (González Rojas, 2021; Salgado Ramírez, 2021). Furthermore, some claim that the programme is threatening collective production as farmers must produce individually within 2.5 hectares (DESMI, 2021; Rosset, 2019b).

Research has also focused on *Sembrando Vida* staff. Some have testified that the staff frequently visit farmers' plots (ASF, 2019b). Nevertheless, many criticize the staff for including or excluding farmers according to their own criteria (Baca del Moral et al., 2021; Camacho Servín, 2022; Expansión & Connectas, n.d.; Rincón, n.d.; Pedraza López, 2021; Proceso, 2021). Some express concern with how the staff relate to farmers, claiming that they impose development plans, select providers of tools and inputs, do not consider local knowledge, and require farmers to use in vitro plants (DESMI, 2021; Linares Sosa, 2021; González Rojas, 2021; Rosset, 2019b). Some state that the staff provide agricultural supplies after they are needed in the agricultural season (CONEVAL, 2020d; Hernández, 2019, Vera-Herrera, 2021). Furthermore, some claim that the staff lack training (Collin, 2019), while others observe that they are overworked (CONEVAL, 2020d).

Finally, research has focused on *Sembrando Vida's* accountability and transparency. Auditors and researchers criticize that programme staff lack clear instructions for implementation, monitoring, and transparency (ASF, 2019b; Ethos, 2020). A transparency evaluation by the *Auditoría Superior de la Federación* (Superior Auditing Office of the Federation) reported that the programme had to

---

<sup>14</sup> These authors are particularly concerned that the programme prohibits shifting agriculture, an ancestral practice that they assure contributes to preserving nature to a greater extent than MIAF.

clarify the use of large sums of money (\$1,832 million pesos [~\$95 million dollars]); that bank transfer receipts and beneficiaries' documents (ID, land title, etc.) were missing; and that the programme had made payments to beneficiaries who were not eligible for support (ASF, 2019b, 2020b). Additionally, some state that farmers have not been informed as to how the *Fondo de Bienestar*, in which their savings are deposited, operates and how they will be able to access those funds (Expansión & Connectas, n.d.).

Within the body of literature focused on AMLO's rural policies, some attention has been given to *Producción para el Bienestar*, although to a much lesser extent than *Sembrando Vida*. While some have observed that in 2020, *Producción para el Bienestar* achieved its goals (GESOC, 2021), others assure that the programme has contributed to increasing crop yield (CONEVAL, 2020c; Enciso, 2022) and that since it introduced the *Estrategia de Acompañamiento Técnico* in 2020, farmers are transitioning to agroecological production (La Jornada, 2022). Nevertheless, some have reported deficiencies with respect to its operation in 2019, including the fact that the programmes' objectives and mechanisms for providing inputs to farmers were not clearly defined; that the way in which coffee farmers were incorporated into the programme generated a lot of confusion among staff and farmers; that little funding was provided for technical assistance; that subsidies were provided too late in the agricultural season; that there was a lack of mechanisms for accountability and transparency systems; and that responsibilities were not clearly delineated between SADER and the CGPD (ASF, 2019a, 2020a; CONEVAL, 2020b, 2020c).

Finally, some literature addressing rural policies has focused on actions carried out by the CGPD and its staff. Some consider that the CGPD could improve implementation and coordination of social programmes and thereby contribute to establishing a closer relationship between the state and rural communities (ASF, 2019b; Gordillo, 2021). However, this agency has been severely criticized for electoral proselytism (Casar & Núñez González, 2019; Dussauge Laguna & Aguilar Arévalo, 2021; Expansión Política, 2020; Hernández Estrada, 2019; INE, 2019); abuse of power, usurpation, and nepotism (Monroy, 2020); asking farmers for documents which are not stipulated for a given programme (López, 2022); deficient staff training (CONEVAL, 2021); and methodological problems in carrying out the *Censo del Bienestar* (ASF, 2019b; Ortega, 2021).

This third body of literature is particularly relevant to the present thesis as it reports the perceptions of different types of actors regarding the policy of

eliminating intermediaries. It illustrates strengths and weaknesses regarding *Sembrando Vida*'s objectives, territorial coverage, inclusion process, the MIAF, CACs, staff, and accountability systems. It discusses achievements and limitations regarding *Producción para el Bienestar*'s design and implementation. It also shows problems that have arisen as a result of the CGDP's operation. Furthermore, as with the above-mentioned bodies of literature, it demonstrates that while AMLO's policies have received a certain level of support, his administration has been severely criticized.

Nevertheless, despite the insights provided by this literature, significant gaps remain in understanding effects of AMLO's rural policies on small coffee farmers' livelihoods. Scholars have not addressed the administration's coffee policies, or the role of different types of actors within the coffee value chain in formulation of these policies. While researchers have manifested support or disapproval regarding the policy of eliminating intermediaries, few have addressed how this policy was introduced, and the reactions of different actors to it. Furthermore, scholars have not analysed the relationship among the different ministries involved in AMLO's rural programmes (SADER, BIENESTAR, and CGPD). Few have addressed *Producción para el Bienestar*, the principal programme of the ministry that historically managed agricultural programmes (SADER). Few analysts have compared the AMLO administration to previous administrations with respect to rural policies. Scholars have not addressed social differences among beneficiaries of rural programmes. While some indicate that *Sembrando Vida* lacks marketing strategies, they have not further addressed farmers' interaction with the market, or the role of quality of different coffee varieties in farmers' agricultural strategies. Finally, some scholars have failed to provide sufficient empirical field data regarding rural policies.<sup>15</sup>

The present thesis complements the body of literature addressing AMLO's rural policies by using a historical perspective to analyse the effects of AMLO's rural policies on small coffee farmers. It examines the role of the state, farmer organizations, and the coffee processing industry in formulation of coffee policies, and addresses the process of eliminating intermediaries and reactions to these policies by coffee farmer organizations, as well as by BIENESTAR, SADER, and CGPD staff at the local and federal levels. It compares the process of implementing

---

<sup>15</sup> Some analysts with rich empirical data include ASF (2019b, 2020a, 2020b), Bernabe Inés (n.d.), CONEVAL (2020c, 2020d, 2021), and Expansión & Connectas (n.d.). The rest either lack data from the field, data seems limited, or the number of interviewees is not specified.

*Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar*, and analyses the impact of each of these programmes on small farmers' livelihoods. Social differences among farmers are explored, as well as differences in relationships of farmers with different marketing channels. Finally, the role of different coffee species in small farmers' agricultural strategies as well as in academic and state narratives regarding quality of coffee are discussed.

### **Theoretical Approach**

In order to more fully analyse the effects of AMLO's rural programmes, this thesis addresses three intersecting domains: theories of the state, agrarian political economy, and global value chain studies. Regarding theories of the state, the thesis defines the state as a set of institutions that formulate and enforce decisions within a society according to the general will (Jessop, 1990). This set of theories locates the state as a key actor which participates in the *politics of development*, modifying the way people use, produce, and distribute resources to achieve growth and improve welfare (Leftwich, 2000). These theories position the state as a critical actor in redistributing resources on a national level; as the only actor with a "coordinating intelligence" capable of promoting growth and welfare on a large scale (Leftwich, 2000, 2005).

Nevertheless, these theories recognize that the functioning of the state is complex and fraught with problems. Although the state has its own capacities, powers, and forms of organization, these are constrained by institutions internal to the state that seek to deploy their own interests as well as by non-state actors that struggle to redefine state projects (Jessop, 1990, 2008). Additionally, the more the state intervenes in different spheres of society, the more complex it becomes internally, its unity and identity diminish, its powers become fragmented among other actors, and problems of coordination multiply. Failure of the state to intervene leaves other forces free to pursue their own objectives to the detriment of state goals (Jessop, 1990). Finally, unintended consequences may occur when the state does not fulfil its objectives (Rueschemeyer & Evans, 1985; Skocpol, 1985); and the state may be a source of unwanted practices, such as *clientelism*, which involves political subordination in exchange for material rewards (Fox, 2012).

This thesis uses these notions of state policies to analyse implementation of *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar* during the first year of the AMLO administration and to identify the types of relations that emerge among the different public agencies involved in rural policies (SADER, BIENESTAR, and

CGPD), small-scale farmers, coffee farmer organizations, and the coffee processing industry. State theories are also used to identify achievements and limitations of AMLO's rural policies, and to compare his administration with previous administrations.

With respect to agrarian political economy,<sup>16</sup> this thesis is guided by Bernstein (2002, 2010) who urges to differentiate social classes based on their relations of production (the process by which labour is used to meet the needs of farming) and relations of reproduction (the process of assuring future production based on current production and/or earnings). In order to identify such differences, Bernstein presents the following theoretical questions: 1) *who owns what?* which involves analysing how the means of production and reproduction (land and labour) are distributed; 2) *who does what?* which involves identifying who performs what social production and reproduction activities; 3) *who gets what?* which involves analysing how the fruits of labour are distributed; and 4) *what do they do with it?* which involves identifying how social relations of production and reproduction determine distribution and uses of a social product.

Based on these theoretical questions, Bernstein (2010) poses three categories of farmers: *emergent capitalist farmers*, *petty commodity producers*, and *semi-proletarian farmers*. *Emergent capitalist farmers* are those who are able to accumulate productive assets and reproduce themselves on a large scale. While they may use some family labour, their principal source of labour is wage labourers. They also diversify their income sources by investing in crop trading, processing, and transportation, and by providing loans. *Petty commodity producers* are those unable to increase their production as do *emergent capitalist farmers*, and rather are only able to achieve simple reproduction (they reproduce themselves without accumulation). They own land and other means of production, use family labour, and hire poorer farmers as workers. *Semi-proletarian farmers* are those who are unable to reproduce themselves as capital and must sell their labour. They may not lack access to land, but do not have enough good-quality land or the capacity to purchase necessary means of production, such as tools and seedlings.

This thesis uses Bernstein's theoretical questions—*who owns what?*, *who does what?*, *who gets what?*, and *what do they do with it?*—to identify social differences among beneficiaries of *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar*.

---

<sup>16</sup> Agrarian political economy analyses social relations of property, production, and power in agrarian societies and their processes of change (Journal of Agrarian Change, n.d.).

Bernstein's categorization—*emergent capitalist farmers*, *petty commodity producers*, and *semi-proletarian farmers*—is used to classify beneficiaries of these programmes and to analyse how different social classes interact with the market.

Regarding global value chain studies, this thesis follows the analysis of a group of value chain scholars (Bolwig et al., 2010; Riisgaard, et al., 2010) who warn that rather than assuming that with *greater market incorporation* small farmers' livelihoods will be improved (as many development agencies sustain; FAO, 2020; OECD & FAO, 2019; World Bank, 2007, 2020), we should pay attention to the *terms* or *conditions* under which farmers are incorporated. This notion emerges from having analysed the workings of the value chain at the local level and observing that incorporation into the market may not always benefit small farmers' livelihoods, but rather that they may be *adversely incorporated* (du Toit, 2004a; Hickey & du Toit, 2007). This thesis uses the notion of *terms of incorporation* to analyse the way in which *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar* attempt to incorporate farmers into the market, as well as the conditions by which different types of farmers are incorporated into different marketing options.

## **Objectives and Research Questions**

The objective of this thesis is to comprehend the effects of AMLO's rural policies on small coffee farmers' livelihoods, addressing changes in the relationships among the state, small coffee farmers, farmer organizations, and the coffee processing industry. It is hoped that this research will complement existing studies regarding AMLO's rural policies, thereby influencing formulation and implementation of policies to greatly benefit small farmers' livelihoods.

The principal research question of this thesis is:

- How do recent Mexican coffee policies resulting from a radical transformation promised by the state modify relationships among the state, small farmers, farmer organizations, and the coffee processing industry?

The following sub-questions allow for addressing different aspects of the principal question:

- How have coffee policies evolved over time?  
Responding to this question involves studying evolution of coffee policies from the time of introduction of coffee cultivation to Mexico in the 19<sup>th</sup> century until the start of the AMLO administration, addressing the

interests of the state, its relationship with small-scale farmers, and its support mechanisms to these farmers.

- How do different types of farmers interact with different marketing channels? Responding to this question involves identifying social differences among beneficiaries of rural programmes as well as the *terms* or *conditions* by which different farmers are incorporated into the market. It also involves analysing how interactions between farmers and the market inform global value chain studies and Mexican rural policies. The response to this question is guided by the concept of class differentiation according to Bernstein (2010) and notions of incorporation of Bolwig et al. (2010).
- How have collaboration and antagonism among different actors of the coffee value chain shaped recent coffee policies? Responding to this question involves analysing collaboration and conflicts that emerge among the state, small-scale farmers, national and local coffee farmer organizations, and the industry regarding formulation and implementation of coffee policies. It also involves examining farmers' choices for specific coffee species, as well as the role of quality in the politics of coffee. The response to this question is guided by Leftwich's (2000, 2005) notion of *politics of development*.
- How were rural programmes and the policy of eliminating intermediaries implemented in 2019, and what have been their effects on small farmers' livelihoods? Responding to these questions involves analysing achievements and weaknesses of rural programmes and identifying the impact of the elimination of intermediaries on the relationship among the state, small-scale farmers, and coffee farmer organizations. The response to these questions is guided by Fox's (2012) notion of *clientelism*.<sup>17</sup>

## Methodology

This research involves a case study in the Soconusco region of Chiapas, located in southwestern Mexico, bordering Guatemala. This region was selected for several reasons. First, the region has a long history of coffee production, and this crop is

---

<sup>17</sup> Reflections by Jessop (1990, 2008), Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985), and Skocpol (1985) regarding the complexities of the functionality of the state guided the framing and analysis of the entire thesis. However, these are not discussed in a particular chapter, as they were not directly connected with debates that emerged regarding the AMLO administration.

one of the principal ones in terms of income (almost 40% of all cultivated land is planted with coffee; de León & Pérez Villalba, 2009; García Aguilar et al., 1993; Lurtz, 2019). Furthermore, the region has alarmingly high levels of poverty (70% of the total population; Hacienda Chiapas, n.d.), and therefore there is a need for careful analysis of the functioning of rural programmes. Finally, in contrast to most coffee-producing regions in Mexico that cultivate only arabica—a species traded in high-quality markets such as organic and fair-trade markets—in Soconusco farmers also produce robusta—a species purchased by Nestlé for instant coffee. The prevalence of these two species allows for comparing the benefits and drawbacks of different marketing alternatives for small farmers’ livelihoods.

Fieldwork for the case study was carried out from October 2018 to January 2020.<sup>18</sup> Data were obtained from the following sources: 151 semi-structured interviews and 22 focus groups; on-site observation of meetings between programme staff and beneficiaries, including two meetings of *Sembrando Vida*, one of *Producción para el Bienestar*, and three of programmes of the previous administration;<sup>19</sup> an *ejido* assembly; two visits to coffee estates; and a national protest by coffee farmer organizations. Most data were obtained from the following fourteen localities in Soconusco shown in Figure 1: Cacahoatán, Carrillo Puerto, El Edén, Tapachula, and Tuxtla Chico, located at an altitude below 600 metres above sea level, where robusta is the principal species cultivated; Agustín de Iturbide, Benito Juárez, Faja de Oro, Salvador Urbina, and Santo Domingo, located from 600 to 900 metres above sea level, where both robusta and arabica are cultivated; and El Águila, El Platanar, Progreso, and Unión Juárez, located above 1,000 metres above sea level, where principally arabica is cultivated. Data were also obtained in Mexico City from the central offices of Ministries, national coffee farmer organizations, universities, research centres, and international organizations; in San Cristóbal de las Casas and Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas, where some coffee farmer organizations and state-wide offices are located; and in Xalapa, Veracruz, where for decades coffee farmer organizations have held national protests.

---

<sup>18</sup> As all data were obtained before Covid arrived at Mexico, this thesis does not include the pandemic as part of the analysis.

<sup>19</sup> These meetings took place in late 2018 and early 2019, when the incoming AMLO administration was still defining its new rural programmes and when programmes of the previous administration were still in operation.

Figure 1. Soconusco Region of Chiapas



Note. Elaborated by Marian Vittek, researcher of the Applied Spatial Research division of Wageningen Environmental Research.

Interviewees include:

- Coffee farmers who are either beneficiaries of *Sembrando Vida* or *Producción para el Bienestar*, as well as coffee farmers who are not part of these programmes.
- Farmworkers.
- Local and federal-level functionaries of the ministries in charge of coffee programmes (SADER, BIENESTAR, and CGPD).
- Functionaries of other agencies involved with coffee programmes, including the *Instituto del Café de Chiapas* (Chiapas Coffee Institute) and the *Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Forestales, Agrícolas y Pecuarias* (National Institute of Forestry, Crop Agriculture, and Livestock Research [INIFAP]).
- Staff of non-governmental agencies involved with implementation of coffee programmes, including the *Asociación Mexicana de la Cadena Productiva del Café* (Mexican Coffee Value Chain Association

[AMECAFE]), in charge of assisting SADER; and the *Sistema Producto Café* (Coffee Product System), an ensemble of coffee farmer organizations, public agencies, and private institutions in charge of jointly formulating coffee policies.

- Representatives of coffee farmer organizations that have actively participated in developing coffee policies on a national level, including the *Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras* (National Coordinator of Coffee Organizations [CNOOC]), Mexico's principal small coffee farmer organization; the *Unión Nacional de Productores de Café* (National Union of Coffee Producers [UNPC]), which is part of the oldest farmer organization of the country—the *Confederación Nacional Campesina* (National Peasant Confederation [CNC]); the *Coalición Nacional de Organizaciones de Productores de Café* (National Coalition of Organizations of Coffee Producers [CONAPROCAFE]), active in the states of Puebla, Hidalgo, Chiapas, Veracruz, and Oaxaca; and the *Consejo Regional del Café de Coatepec* (Regional Coffee Council of Coatepec), which promotes organic coffee in Veracruz.
- Members of organic coffee farmer organizations that operate throughout Chiapas, including the *Coordinadora de Pequeños Productores de Café* (Coordinator of Small Coffee Producers) which represents 20 coffee farmer organizations in Chiapas; and the *Unión de Ejidos La Selva* (La Selva Union of Ejidos), the first coffee farmer umbrella organization established in Chiapas.
- Members of organic coffee farmer organizations in Soconusco, including the *Centro de Agroecología San Francisco de Asís* (Saint Francis of Assisi Agroecology Centre [CASFA]); the *Grupo de Asesores de Producción Orgánica y Sustentable* (Organic and Sustainable Production Advisory Group [GRAPOS]); and *Café Justo* (Fair Coffee).
- Members of coffee farmer organizations in Soconusco that collect conventional coffee, including the *Central Campesina Cardenista* (Cardenist Peasant Union [CCC]); the *Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas Autónomas* (National Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant Organizations [UNORCA]); *Productores Agropecuarios de San Cristóbal* (Agricultural Producers of San Cristobal); *Unión Regional Campesina y Popular de Chiapas* (Regional Popular Peasant Union of Chiapas); *Cafeticultores del Progreso de Chiapas* (Coffee Farmers of El

Progreso of Chiapas); and *Santa Rosario del Campo* (Saint Rosario of the Countryside).

- Directors and operational staff of private companies, including Nestlé, the world's largest instant coffee producer; *Cafés y Semillas de México* (Coffee and Seeds of Mexico [CASEMEX]) and the *Exportadora de Granos y Oleaginosas del Sureste* (Exporter of Grains and Oilseeds of the Southeast [EGOS]), the principal companies in Soconusco that collect coffee for Nestlé; local traders that collect coffee for EGOS and CASEMEX; the *Agroindustrias Unidas de México* (United Agroindustries of Mexico), one of the main providers of Starbucks and one of Nestlé's competitors; and Yara Mexico, which produces fertilizer for coffee cultivation.
- Researchers specialized in rural and/or coffee policy from the *Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México* (National Autonomous University of Mexico); the *Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana* (Metropolitan Autonomous University); *El Colegio de México* (The College of Mexico); *El Colegio de la Frontera Sur* (The College of the South Frontier); *El Colegio de Postgraduados* (The Postgraduate College); and the American University, located in the United States.
- Staff of development organizations including the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the Inter-American Development Bank.
- Staff of research centres, including the *Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Rural Sustentable y la Soberanía Alimentaria* (Study Centre for Sustainable Rural Development and Food Sovereignty) of the Mexican Congress; *Ethos Innovación en Políticas Públicas* (Ethos Innovation in Public Policy); *Gestión Social y Cooperación* (Social Management and Cooperation); *Fundar Centro de Análisis e Investigación* (Fundar Analysis and Research Centre); and *Rimisp-Centro Latinoamericano para el Desarrollo Rural* (Rimisp-Latin American Rural Development Centre).

Of the 151 semi-structured interviews and 22 focus groups, 54 interviews and eight focus groups were carried out with farmers; four interviews and four focus groups with farmworkers; 40 interviews and four focus groups with public functionaries; two interviews and one focus group with staff of non-governmental agencies that assist with implementing coffee programmes; 27 interviews and three focus group with representatives of farmer organizations; eight interviews and one focus group with staff of coffee trading companies; twelve interviews with

academics; and four interviews and one focus group with staff of research centres and development institutions.

Primary data from interviews, focus groups, and on-site observation were complemented by over 1,500 written and filmed sources, including academic articles, books, theses, government documents, news articles, opinion articles, seminars, videos, and webinars regarding rural policies and coffee programmes. Data were also collected from coffee museums located in Tapachula, Santo Domingo, San Cristóbal de las Casas, and Tuxtla Gutiérrez. All data were analysed using Atlas.ti.

### **Limitations of the Study**

- This research project was limited to analysis of AMLO's rural policies in some localities of Soconusco. Primary data were not gathered regarding the outcome of these policies in other regions of Mexico.
- During 2019, when fieldwork was carried out, implementation of the programmes addressed in this study was in a relatively early stage. *Sembrando Vida's* fruit and timber trees had not yet been planted, *Producción para el Bienestar* had not yet implemented its *Estrategia de Acompañamiento Técnico*, only a few *Centros Integradores del Desarrollo* had been established, and no branches of the *Banco del Bienestar* had yet been established. Therefore, primary data on these topics were not obtained.
- While most interviews were recorded, some staff of private coffee companies and public functionaries preferred not to be recorded. Hence data of these conversations were less detailed. In addition, some staff of *Sembrando Vida* in Soconusco refused to be interviewed.

### **Structure of the Thesis**

This section is followed by four stand-alone chapters, and the conclusion. Chapter 1, "Evolution of Coffee Policies in Mexico", deals with changes in coffee policies from the time of introduction of coffee cultivation to Mexico in the 19<sup>th</sup> century until the presidency of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–2018). The chapter first discusses how during the presidency of Porfirio Díaz (who governed from 1876 to 1880 and 1884 to 1911), the state supported large coffee farmers by offering payment incentives to acquire land. It then describes how during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Mexican state actively regulated coffee production and prices,

promoted development of organizations of small farmers, and provided them with agricultural supplies and technical assistance. Finally, it describes how from the late 1980s to the end of the presidency of Peña Nieto, the state radically reduced its support to small farmers, principally limiting it to provision of agricultural inputs.

Chapter 2, “Incorporation of Different Types Farmers Into Different Coffee Markets”, characterizes different marketing options available in Soconusco (Nestlé, coffee farmer organizations, local buyers, and direct marketing), discussing for each market types of farmers targeted, coffee species and varieties collected, quality standards demanded, services provided, and payment offered. It then discusses how different types of farmers (emergent capitalist farmers, petty commodity producers, and semi-proletarians) relate to these marketing options, addressing the conditions by which farmers are incorporated into the market. Finally, it analyses the contributions of the chapter findings for global value chain studies, and for the way in which the Mexican state classifies farmers and attempts to incorporate them into the market.

Chapter 3, “Arabica and Robusta, and the Narrative of Quality Coffee”, describes negotiation and conflicts that have emerged among the state, coffee farmer organizations, small farmers, and the industry regarding formulation of coffee policies. It first explores how cultivation of arabica and robusta spread in Mexico and how support mechanisms by the state and the coffee processing industry for cultivation of these species evolved over time. Subsequently, the chapter illustrates the strong opposition by some coffee farmer organizations to robusta production and operation of Nestlé in Mexico, as well as how despite opposition to Nestlé, many Soconusco farmers have produced robusta for many decades and have developed a close alliance with Nestlé. Finally, it discusses narratives regarding coffee quality and the potential contributions of the chapter findings for Mexican coffee policies.

Chapter 4, “AMLO’s Rural Programmes and Elimination of Intermediaries”, analyses implementation of *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar* in 2019, particularly addressing the policy of eliminating intermediaries. This chapter first explores how throughout most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the CNC was one of Mexico’s principal clientelist organizations, and how clientelism by the CNC led to creation and unification of many organizations that proclaimed political autonomy from the state. Subsequently it presents AMLO’s rural policy objectives and illustrates the way in which *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar*

were implemented in 2019 in Soconusco, including the process of eliminating intermediaries. Finally, the chapter analyses the contrasting way in which the two programmes were implemented and intermediaries were eliminated, and explores the impacts of these policies on small farmers' livelihoods.

Finally, the conclusion addresses the research questions of the thesis, analyses the contribution of this thesis to the existing body of research regarding AMLO's rural policies, and presents a final reflection. This section first replies to the four sub-research questions, and then the main research question of the thesis, "How do recent Mexican coffee policies resulting from a radical transformation promised by the state modify relationships among the state, small farmers, farmer organizations, and the coffee processing industry?" It then analyses the contribution of this thesis to research focused on the elimination of intermediaries, *Sembrando Vida*, *Producción para el Bienestar*, and the role of the CGPD. Finally, an overall reflection is made.





Photo shared by an interviewee

## Chapter 1. Evolution of Coffee Policies in Mexico<sup>20</sup>

### Introduction

Policies focused on coffee production have a long history in Mexico. Since this crop was introduced to the country, coffee has been considered a significant source of income; however, state measures to support this sector have radically changed over time. While during the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, the state promoted coffee production by facilitating land acquisition by foreign large-scale farmers (Rodríguez-Centeno, 1993), during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the state-run *Instituto Mexicano del Café* (Mexican Coffee Institute [INMECAFE]) supported the sector by purchasing and processing the harvest of small-scale farmers (Hernández, 1991). Although INMECAFE was dismantled in 1989, the state continued to support small-scale farmers, mainly by providing them with plants and fertilizer through farmer organizations (Pérez Akaki, 2013a).

This chapter characterizes the evolution of coffee policies, addressing how the relationships among the state, large and small-scale farmers, coffee farmer organizations, and the coffee processing industry underwent multiple transitions from the time coffee was introduced to Mexico until the end of the administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–2018).<sup>21</sup> While this analysis has a national scope, it particularly addresses the Soconusco region of Chiapas during the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, focusing on the role of large coffee-producing estates in this region. Information sources consist of scholarly articles regarding the history of this crop and implementation of state policies, as well as government documents that illustrate state measures to promote development of the coffee sector, including the Mexican Constitution, national development plans, regulations and modifications to laws, and deeds regarding creation of public institutes and programmes. Furthermore, the interviews I carried out throughout fieldwork contributed to identifying the principal changes in Mexican coffee policy over time.

This chapter is structured as follows. The following section focuses on laws introduced by President Porfirio Díaz (who governed from 1876 to 1880 and 1884 to 1911) to increase coffee production, analysing how foreign investors played a significant role in increasing production while dispossessing local populations of

---

<sup>20</sup> This chapter will be submitted to a scientific journal.

<sup>21</sup> This chapter provides a foundation for the following chapters which address coffee policies during the current presidency of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO).

their land and employing them under exploitative labour conditions. The third section illustrates how following the Mexican Revolution, the state promulgated the 1917 Constitution to favour land distribution and regulate labour conditions; however, not until the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s were corresponding reforms gradually implemented. The fourth section focuses on the period during which the coffee sector was most highly regulated through INMECAFE and implementation of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA). The fifth section explains the reasons for which INMECAFE was dismantled and the ICA terminated in the late 1980s and discusses the consequences of these changes for small farmers' livelihoods. The sixth section characterizes state policies implemented since termination of INMECAFE and the ICA. The final section discusses changes in coffee policies over time.

### **State Support for Large-Scale Coffee Production**

Coffee was introduced to Mexico through the port of Veracruz in 1740, from which it was spread to other states, including Chiapas, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Puebla, and San Luis Potosi (Borrás, 1976). Historical sources indicate that during the conquest, the Spanish Crown stimulated coffee production by exempting taxes on importation of implements to be used for this purpose. From 1823 to 1861, following Mexico's Independence from Spanish control, taxes were eliminated on coffee sales; however, national coffee production during those decades remain low (less than 600 tons yearly; Bartra Vergés et al., 2011). Only during the presidency of Porfirio Díaz did Mexico undergo a coffee boom, with annual yields exceeding 28,000 tons (Bartra Vergés et al., 2011).

This drastic increase was initially triggered by an abrupt rise in international coffee prices from the 1870s to the 1890s due to a decline in production by Brazil, one of the world's leading coffee producers at the time (Kuntz Ficker, 2010; Rodríguez Centeno, 2004; Topik, 2003). Moreover, President Díaz introduced a variety of measures to increase the number of coffee plantations. In 1883, his administration emitted the *Decreto de Colonización y Compañías Deslindadoras* (Decree of Colonization and Surveying Companies) by which surveyors divided vacant land for agricultural production. Through this decree, Mexican and foreign farmers could purchase up to 2,500 hectares on credit or claim up to 100 hectares with no charge as long as they guaranteed they would cultivate it for at least 5 years. Furthermore, the decree exempted farmers from 10 years of military service, taxes on coffee exports and farm implements, as well as fees on land titles and

resident permits (Guerrero Galván, 2016; Secretaría de Fomento, 1893). In addition, in 1894 Díaz passed the *Ley Sobre Ocupación y Enajenación de Terrenos Baldíos* (Law of Occupation and Alienation of Vacant Land), establishing that any citizen—not only private companies—could announce the existence of a vacant piece of land and request to purchase it; with this law the upper limit of 2,500 hectares for land purchase was eliminated (de Vos, 1984; Memoria Política de México, 1894). Finally, Díaz’s policies also included road and railway construction and improvement, as well as the introduction of innovative agricultural techniques and machinery (Rodríguez-Centeno, 1993).

During the Díaz administration, Matías Romero (who served as Mexico’s Minister of Finance and Ambassador of the United States) widely promoted Soconusco as one of Mexico’s principal coffee-producing regions. In order to stimulate coffee production and attract the interest of investors, in 1882 he signed the *Tratado de Límites entre México y Guatemala* (Border Treaty between Mexico and Guatemala) to define the boundary between the two nations, incorporating Soconusco into Mexico (Memoria Política de México, 1883).<sup>22</sup> In addition, Romero facilitated establishment of surveying companies, including the *Compañía Mexicana de Colonización de San Francisco* (San Francisco Mexican Colonization Company) and the British enterprise Chiapas Land and Colonization (Villafuerte-Solís & García-Aguilar, 1994). Romero also requested the renovation of the San Benito Port to export coffee to the United States, promoted construction of a railway to connect Soconusco to the port of Veracruz to ship coffee for export to Europe, and fostered Mexican coffee production at international events (Rodríguez Centeno, 1996).

The multiple incentives provided by the Díaz administration for expanding coffee cultivation, as well as the high coffee prices at the time, led to migration of Mexican and foreign investors to different regions of Mexico (Tovar González,

---

<sup>22</sup> After Mexico gained independence from Spain in 1821, Mexico and Guatemala disputed the territory of Chiapas. An 1824 plebiscite established that Chiapas would be incorporated into Mexico, but Soconusco remained contested until 1842, when President Santa Ana carried out an armed intervention to incorporate Soconusco into Mexico (Toussaint Ribot, 2012). However, despite this forced intervention, the territorial limits between Soconusco and Guatemala were only defined by this treaty.

2000). In Soconusco, farmers principally from Germany<sup>23</sup> established many coffee plantations including *El Retiro*, *Argovia*, and *San Nicolás*, owned by Adolf Giesemann; *Las Maravillas*, owned by Juan Lüttmann; *Hamburgo* owned by Arthur Erich Edelmann; *Germania*, *Hannover* and *Prusia*, owned by Guillermo Kahle; *Rancho Alegre*, owned by Adolfo Gramlich; and *La Libertad*, *San Antonio*, *Chicharras*, *Badenia*, and *Colonia*, owned by von Türckheim (Renard, 1993).<sup>24</sup>

These farmers, locally known as *finqueros*, promoted a radical transformation of the region. In approximately 30 years, they expanded coffee production from the outskirts of the Tacana Volcano to the Huixtla River (see Figure 2; Bartra Vergés et al., 2011; Borrás, 1976). Small-scale coffee farms were transformed into plantations averaging 1,200 hectares, with a yield of 30 to 40 *quintals*<sup>25</sup> per hectare (Kuntz Ficker, 2010). Along with *finqueros*' new infrastructure and equipment, coffee began to be processed as *parchment coffee* under the *wet method*,<sup>26</sup> rather than being sold as unprocessed coffee (Renard, 1993). Soconusco coffee which had previously been sold only in local and national markets began to be shipped to Europe through international trading companies (Avella Alaminos, 2002). Finally, German farmers who settled in the region also created an association of large-scale farmers to coordinate coffee production and trading: *La Unión Cafetalera del Soconusco* (Soconusco Coffee Union; Villafuerte-Solís & García-Aguilar, 1994).

---

<sup>23</sup> Most of these farmers were either employees or partners in coffee trading companies based in Hamburg, Bremen, or Lübeck and received loans from these companies and from the Deutsche Bank as long as they promised to meet certain production quotas (Bartra Vergés et al., 2011). Others arrived from Guatemala, where they owned coffee plantations but due to scarcity of land and labourers had decided to migrate to Soconusco. Still others came from the Mexican ports of Mazatlán and Manzanillo, where some coffee trading companies operated (Renard, 1992).

<sup>24</sup> Names such as Adolfo, Juan, and Guillermo appear to be adaptations of foreign names into Spanish, although I was not able to confirm this through available literature. Furthermore, I was unable to obtain the first name of some farmers, such as von Türckheim.

<sup>25</sup> A quintal is a measure of volume which is equivalent to 250 kilos of *coffee cherries*, 57.5 kilos of *parchment coffee*, or 46 kilos of *green coffee*. A quintal is also equivalent to 100 pounds (Renard, 1999; Ruben et al., 2018). The *cherry*—also known as *berry*—is the form in which coffee is harvested; *parchment coffee* is after the pulp and mucilage have been removed, leaving the bean with its parchment or skin; and *green coffee* is after the parchment of the bean has been removed.

<sup>26</sup> Coffee beans may be dried using two methods: 1) the *wet method* which involves removing the pulp of the cherries with a de-pulping machine, leaving the beans, which are then fermented to remove the surrounding mucilage, and drying the beans; 2) the *dry method* which involves drying the whole cherries, including their pulp and mucilage (ICO, n.d.\*c). While the former process requires more labour and costs, it results in coffee with a better aroma and more ideal acidity in comparison to the dry method (Banti & Abraham, 2021).

Figure 2. Expansion of Coffee Plantations in Soconusco by Finqueros in the Late 19<sup>th</sup> Century



Note. Elaborated by Marian Vittek, researcher of the Applied Spatial Research division of Wageningen Environmental Research Institute.

By the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Soconusco had become one of Mexico's principal coffee-producing regions, yielding 9,200 tons annually, or nearly 30% of all coffee produced in Mexico, and 90% of that produced in Chiapas (Bartra Vergés et al., 2011). However, this increase in production was accompanied by dispossession of land from indigenous and other peasant communities, which was a continuation of that by Spanish colonizers upon invading Mexico and later by the Catholic Church upon Independence from Spain. The *Decreto de Colonización y Compañías Deslindadoras* and the *Ley Sobre Ocupación y Enajenación de Terrenos Baldíos* established during the Díaz administration contributed to perpetuating dispossession of land, but now through surveying companies (Rosales Sierra, 2009).

Coffee production also expanded at the expense of deplorable working conditions through the *peonaje por deudas* (debt peonage). This system of indentured servitude was initially introduced so that recruiters known as

*enganchadores*,<sup>27</sup> brought indigenous labourers from the *Altos de Chiapas* (Highlands of Chiapas) to Soconusco estates (González Cornejo, 2010; Helbig, 1964; Villafuerte-Solís & García-Aguilar, 1994). However, upon signing a contract that they barely understood, indigenous labourers were taken on a 6–8 day walking trip to Soconusco, with the labourers covering their own travel expenses. Once on the plantation, labourers had to pay for work equipment and were paid with tokens that could only be exchanged at the *tienda de raya* (company store),<sup>28</sup> where prices of food, cleaning products, and clothes were twice those off the farm (INEHRM, 2020). The German plantation owners paid only \$0.40 pesos<sup>29</sup> per day (Renard, 1993), and as most labourers had incurred in large debts, they were forced to return the following season or even remain on the plantation the rest of their lives (Baumann, 1983).

In addition to the debt trap fomented by plantation owners, labourers faced inhumane living and working conditions. Housing for single labourers consisted of a communal room of up to 60 people, and for families a single 10 square metre room; all rooms had dirt floors and sheet metal rooves. Labourers worked 12 or 13 hours a day and were given only *tortillas* and beans to eat. Those who did not obey orders were beaten, and even sent to solitary confinement within the plantation or to the municipal jail (Renard, 1993). Due to difficult working conditions, labourers often got sick and even died. Those attempting to escape were usually caught, and when they were not, their families became responsible for paying their debt (Baumann, 1983). Furthermore, estate owners registered infants born on the plantation and even selected their names (Renard, 1993). While some owners acknowledged their cruel treatment, they justified their actions stating that “labourers do not like to work” and claimed that if they offered better pay or treatment, they would work less (Renard, 1993). Public functionaries did little to

---

<sup>27</sup> *Enganchador* literally means hooker. This person received a commission for each labourer hired, as well as for the total amount of hours that the labourer worked (Bartra Vergés et al., 2011).

<sup>28</sup> These stores within the estates were called *raya* stores given that due to illiteracy, labourers were asked to draw a *raya* (line) on a piece of paper upon being paid.

<sup>29</sup> In this thesis, all local currencies have been converted to dollars, with the exception of those mentioned in this section and in the section of this chapter titled “The Mexican Revolution and President Cárdenas’ land distribution” as they pertain to centuries ago and it is therefore difficult to establish a meaningful exchange rate.

modify these conditions given the profits that indentured servitude generated for the region (Bartra Vergés et al., 2011).<sup>30</sup>

### **The Mexican Revolution and President Cárdenas' Land Distribution**

Concentration of land and wealth by exploiting labourers provoked one of the most emblematic wars in the history of the nation—the Mexican Revolution. This war was initially fomented by the writings of Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón, who severely criticized Díaz's dictatorship in their newspaper *Regeneración* (Regeneration), and who in 1905 established the opposition party *Partido Liberal Mexicano* (Mexican Liberal Party; CNDH, n.d.; Memoria Política de México, 1906). The war officially began on 20 November 1910, when Francisco Madero organized an armed movement to demand revocation of Díaz as President after fraudulent elections for his 7<sup>th</sup> term (Memoria Política de México, n.d.\*b).

Throughout the 7-year war, revolutionary leaders organized armed movements in different parts of the country. The most well-known were Francisco Villa, who led the army *División del Norte* (Northern Division) taking over large estates and confiscating the goods of wealthy farmers who benefited from the Díaz administration (Memoria Política de México, n.d.\*c), and Emiliano Zapata, who led the *Ejército Libertador del Sur* (Southern Liberation Army) and drew up the *Plan de Ayala* (Ayala Plan) to demand redistribution of estate land to communities that had been dispossessed (Memoria Política de México, n.d.\*a).

In 1917, after years of bloody confrontation, the Mexican Revolution concluded with the promulgation of a new Constitution containing two significant articles on agrarian reform. First, Article 27 declared that the state had the right to regulate natural resources and distribute wealth, prioritizing public over private interest. This article also legislated the division of large estates, declaring null and void all land concessions that had deprived communities of land and demanding restitution to the original owners. Second, Article 123 introduced radical changes to labour conditions, establishing a minimum wage and an 8-hour workday; prohibiting child labour and the token system; demanding that *finqueros* pay with cash and provide decent housing, health care, and disability coverage for workers; and establishing labourers' rights to unionize and strike (Rives Sánchez, 2010). In addition to these articles, as an outcome of the Mexican Revolution the state of

---

<sup>30</sup> The *enganchador* had to pay for a licence, plus \$1.55 pesos for each contract signed. Each labourer introduced to Soconusco, generated a tax of \$0.30 pesos to the municipality (Bartra Vergés et al., 2011).

Chiapas introduced the *Ley de Obreros* (Workers' Law) which declared servitude to be illegal and that all labourers' debt be forgiven. This law also established weekly pay, prohibited the *raya* stores, imposed jail and fines to anyone mistreating labourers, and demanded the establishment of schools on the estates (Memoria Política de México, 1914).

Nevertheless, despite these laws, throughout the 1920s and part of the 1930s, their implementation was limited in Chiapas. With the support of the German chancellor, Heinrich von Eckardt, *finqueros* obtained permission to re-implement the debt peonage upon promising to pay a tax of \$0.25 pesos for every 100 kilos to the Mexican state (Renard, 1993). During this period, physical punishment was reduced and a few schools were opened, however, the *raya* stores continued to operate and labourers worked more than 8 hours for less than minimum wage, without access to health care. Tiburcio Fernández Ruiz, who governed Chiapas from 1920 to 1924, also limited the revolutionary reforms by establishing that only those estates with over 8,000 hectares were susceptible to land distribution, and while some land was distributed during his term, it was of poor quality (Renard, 1993).

Continuing land concentration and oppression of labourers following the Revolution provoked the emergence of multiple socialist and communist parties as well as labour unions in Chiapas (including in the Soconusco region) such as the *Partido Socialista Chiapaneco* (Chiapas Socialist Party), the *Confederación Socialista de Trabajadores de Chiapas* (Socialist Confederation of Workers of Chiapas), the *Partido Socialista del Soconusco* (Socialist Party of Soconusco), the *Partido Comunista del Soconusco* (Communist Party of Soconusco), and the *Sindicato de Obreros y Campesinos del Soconusco* (Union of Workers and Peasants of Soconusco; Bartra Vergés et al., 2011; Renard, 1993). These parties and unions pressured German landowners and public functionaries to comply with the laws resulting from the Revolution. For instance, in 1922 with the support of the *Partido Socialista Chiapaneco* 7,000 labourers of Soconusco estates organized a strike to demand an 8-hour workday, more schools on the estates, and an increase in the daily wage from \$1.00 to \$1.20 pesos (Renard, 1993; Villafuerte-Solís & García-Aguilar, 1994). Members of these parties and sympathetic functionaries also established conciliation and arbitration offices in different regions of Chiapas and passed laws to establish collective labour contracts and increase wages. However, these achievements were accompanied by co-optation, persecution, and

assassination of many social leaders, which contributed to weakening the movement (Renard, 1993).

Not until the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1936 to 1940) did the objectives of the Revolution begin to be fulfilled to a significant extent. Recognizing that *finqueros* continued to concentrate land at the expense of labourers, and that the 1917 Constitution did not consider estate labourers to be subject to land distribution, Cárdenas modified the *Código Agrario* (Agrarian Code), which regulated rural landholdings, to divide and distribute all estates exceeding 300 hectares, and simplified the process by which landless peasants could acquire land (DOF, 1937, 1940; INEHRM, 2020). To overcome what Cárdenas termed the “*latifundio primitivo*” (primitive latifundium), he promoted collective cultivation and assigned *ejidos* the responsibility of supplying food to the country and stimulating the internal market (Gordillo et al., 1998; INEHRM, 2020).<sup>31</sup>

To support the *ejidos* in accomplishing their role, Cárdenas granted the *Departamento de Asuntos Agrarios y Colonización* (Department of Agrarian and Colonization Affairs) power of regulating land acquisition in favour of *ejidos*; established the *Departamento Agrario* (Agrarian Department) to support *ejido* production; and created the *Banco Nacional de Crédito Ejidal* (National Bank of Ejido Loans) to provide loans to *ejido* members for farm equipment and infrastructure (DOF, 1937; Gómez de Silva Cano, 2016). To accelerate state attention to the demands of farmers and farmworkers, Cárdenas encouraged their incorporation into the *Confederación Nacional Campesina* (National Peasant Confederation [CNC]) as well as into the governing party, the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* (National Revolutionary Party),<sup>32</sup> and promoted their right to strike and carry out other forms of protest (INEHRM, 2020; Memoria Política de México, 1938b).

In contrast to previous administrations that distributed very little land in Chiapas,<sup>33</sup> Cárdenas distributed 448,150 hectares (Renard, 1993). In this region, he also established the *Departamento de Protección Indígena* (Department of

---

<sup>31</sup> Lázaro Cárdenas conceived the *ejido* as collectively owned land which was inalienable, imprescriptible, and lifelong. *Ejido* members lost the right to use the land if they did not work it, rent it for others to farm, or hire others to work the land (Vázquez Pallares, 1980).

<sup>32</sup> In 1938, the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* became the *Partido de la Revolución Mexicana* (Mexican Revolution Party), and in 1946 the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (National Institutional Party [PRI]), which is still active (Memoria Política de México, 1938a, 1946).

<sup>33</sup> Governor Tiburcio Fernández Ruíz (1920–1924) distributed 20,000 hectares; Carlos Vidal (1925– 1926) distributed 87,067 hectares; and Raymundo Enríquez (1928–1929) distributed 192,517 hectares (Renard, 1993).

Indigenous Protection) and the *Agencia Gratuita de Colocaciones* (Free Agency for Placement) to regulate contracts between estates and labourers, and established the *Comisión Demográfica Intersecretarial* (Inter-agency Demographic Commission) so that estate labourers could prove their citizenship and thereby receive land upon distribution (Renard, 1993). During the Cárdenas administration, new unions were formed in Chiapas, including the *Sindicato de Trabajadores Indígenas* (Indigenous Workers' Union) and the *Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la Industria del Café y Similares del Estado de Chiapas* (Single Union of Workers of Coffee and Similar Industries of the State of Chiapas; Renard, 1993).

*Finqueros* strongly resisted these changes by offering money to labourers so they would cease their strikes or burned their houses if they refused to accept their bribes. They also threatened Guatemalan labourers with deportation, persecuted agrarian leaders who encouraged labourers to protest, and sold part of their land to their own family members to conceal the amount of land they held. Nonetheless, despite these actions, most estates were divided up and redistributed during the Cárdenas administration, and the few that land distributed became highly deteriorated during the Second World War when the United States requested Mexico to confiscate German enterprises (INEHRM, 2020).<sup>34</sup>

The Cárdenas administration is widely remembered for providing land to many small farmers, however, many stumbling blocks for small farmers emerged during this period. Although large farms were distributed, *finqueros* retained their machinery and began to run the coffee processing industry. Meanwhile, many intermediaries began to trade coffee on the local level and acquire a great deal of control over coffee prices (García Aguilar et al., 1993; Pérez Akaki, 2013b). Furthermore, although the state assigned several government agencies the responsibility of fomenting *ejido* production, these agencies were quite inefficient and corrupt, and thus small farmers relied on large-scale farmers and local intermediaries for some services that the state did not provide to a sufficient extent, such as loans (Renard, 1993). Additionally, the largest farmer organization promoted by Cárdenas—the CNC—became corrupt and functionaries and local leaders ended up operating according to clientelism (Chávez Becker, 2014).

---

<sup>34</sup> In 1942, the Mexican state confiscated 66 estates and although they were returned to their owners in 1946, crops, equipment, and roads had highly deteriorated (Helbig, 1964; Villafuerte-Solís & García-Aguilar, 1994).

## State Regulation of the Coffee Industry

Following the Cárdenas administration, the Mexican state began to intervene in regulation of different economic sectors. For the coffee sector, this regulatory role was implemented in stages. First, in 1949 as an outcome of high coffee prices on an international level, President Miguel Alemán (1946–1952) established the *Comisión Nacional del Café* (National Coffee Commission) to oversee restoration and maintenance of coffee plantations, research on cultivation and processing methods, combating of plant diseases, training of farmers, provision of loans, and issuing of export permits (DOF, 1949). The *Comisión Nacional del Café* also intervened in coffee processing and trading by creating the company *Beneficios Mexicanos del Café* (Mexican Coffee Processing), although such intervention was minimal (Economía, n.d.; Quirós, 2016). During this period, large-scale farmers and processing and exporting companies were still the main beneficiaries of state agricultural support (Barta Vergés et al., 2011).

In 1958, the state's functions with respect to the coffee industry changed as a result of replacement of the *Comisión Nacional del Café* by INMECAFE. As was the *Comisión*, INMECAFE was responsible for carrying out research and training farmers to increase coffee production. However, INMECAFE was also in charge of collecting coffee, regulating prices on a national level, and assuring that Mexico met the national coffee quota set by the ICA<sup>35</sup>—the principal coffee regulatory mechanism by which coffee-producing and consuming countries maintained coffee prices between \$1.20 and \$1.40 dollars per pound<sup>36</sup> by setting production quotas (Cafés de México, 2021; Celis Callejas, 2013; DOF, 1959; Sánchez Juárez, 2015). While the *Comisión Nacional del Café* prioritized large farmers, INMECAFE

---

<sup>35</sup> During the Second World War, European markets closed and Latin American coffee producers principally depended on the market in the United States. In order to avoid a price collapse, 15 countries of the Americas signed, in 1940, one of the first accords which aimed to regulate coffee production, the Interamerican Coffee Agreement. Later accords regulating coffee production included the Gentleman's Agreement (1954), the Agreement of Mexico (1957), and the Latin American Coffee Agreement (1958); however, these agreements did not include the majority of countries worldwide involved in the coffee sector. With the 1962 ICA agreement, most coffee-producing and consuming countries worldwide agreed not only to regulate coffee production but also to maintain prices within a given range (OIC, n.d.; Pérez Akaki, 2013b; Renard, 1999). Through the ICA, member countries also agreed to establish the International Coffee Organization (ICO) to oversee regulation of the sector (DOF, 1963; OIC, n.d.; Portillo, 1993).

<sup>36</sup> In this thesis I refer to kilos as a unit measurement for coffee, except when referring to the international coffee prices, given that the ICO uses pounds.

began to favour *ejido* members who had acquired land through Cárdenas' land distribution (Bartra Vergés et al., 2011).

In 1973, under the presidency of Luis Echeverría (1970–1976), in the context of another wave of high coffee prices as well as high petroleum revenues (Petchers & Harris, 2008), INMECAFE initiated a campaign to maximize coffee production and collection. During this period, the state organized small farmers into the *Unidades Económicas de Producción y Comercialización* (Economic Units of Production and Marketing [UEPC]) to provide them with plants, technical assistance, advanced payment, and low-interest loans in exchange for promising to deliver their coffee to INMECAFE (Celis Callejas, 2009; DOF, 1958; Hernández, 1992a; Pérez Akaki, 2013a). With the grouping of small-scale farmers into the UEPCs, the state also aimed to foment participation of farmer organizations in other functions of the coffee value chain in addition to production (Celis Callejas, 2009). Furthermore, Echeverría passed the *Ley Federal de Reforma Agraria* (Federal Agrarian Reform Law) in 1971 and the *Ley General de Crédito Rural* (General Law of Rural Loans) in 1976 to foster creation of *umbrella organizations* consisting of two or more farmer organizations to market coffee and manage financial services (Celis Callejas, 2009; DOF, 1971, 1976; Fox & Gordillo, 1989).


During operation of INMECAFE, coffee production and exports reached some of their highest levels of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries (see Figure 3).<sup>37</sup> Many refer to this period as the “golden age” of Mexican coffee, not only as a result of high yields but also because INMECAFE's collection services allowed farmers to avoid local intermediaries. However, this institute was also highly criticized for providing inputs and loans after they were needed; using deceitful practices to weigh farmers' coffee; paying low prices for coffee; promoting intensive cultivation with high levels of fertilizer, reduction of shade, increased planting density, and use of varieties that produce high volumes but of lower quality; and exporting coffee under a homogenous category regardless of variation in quality (Hernández, 1990; Hernández Navarro & Celis Callejas, 1992; Moguel & Toledo, 1999; Nestel, 1995; Sánchez Juárez, 2015). Furthermore, critics point out that although INMECAFE established a large number of UEPCs (3,396 with a total of 160,000 farmers; Bartra Vergés et al., 2011), these groups achieved very little autonomy and learned little

---

<sup>37</sup> Mexico's coffee production increased from 126,616 tons of green coffee in 1961 to 343,440 tons in 1989, decreasing to 158,308 in 2018. Similarly, coffee exports increased from 89,222 tons of green coffee in 1961 to 265,919 tons in 1989, decreasing to 113,354 in 2018 (FAO, n.d.\*b). As the earliest available data from FAOSTAT is from 1961, statistics regarding the first 3 years of INMECAFE (1958 to 1960) could not be included.

about coffee trading, and that some of the umbrella organizations created during this period were co-opted by the CNC and the prevailing PRI party (Harvey, 1992; Hernández, 1991; Olvera, 1991).

Figure 3. Coffee Production and Exports, 1961–2018



Note. Elaborated with data from FAOSTAT.

Due to the inefficiency of INMECAFE and its clientelist practices, many coffee farmer organizations founded in the 1970s and 1980s decided to seek a marketing alternative to INMECAFE—namely the organic market—and while these organizations did not cut off relations with the state, they prioritized what they called their “political autonomy”. These organizations include: in Chiapas, the *Unión de Uniones Ejidales y Grupos Campesinos Solidarios de Chiapas* (Union of Unions of Ejido and Peasant Solidarity Groups of Chiapas), the *Unión de Ejidos y Comunidades Cafeticultores Beneficio Majomut* (Majomut Union of Ejidos and Coffee Communities Processor), and *Indígenas de la Sierra Madre de Motozintla* (*Indigenous Peoples of the Sierra Madre of Motozintla* [ISMAM]); in Veracruz, the *Unión de Productores de Café de Veracruz* (Union of Coffee Producers of Veracruz [UPCV]); in Oaxaca the *Unión de Comunidades Indígenas de la Región del Istmo* (Union of Indigenous Communities of the Isthmus Region [UCIRI]); and in Puebla

*Tosepan Titataniske* (United, We Shall Overcome; Martinez-Torres, 2003; Sánchez Juárez, 2015; Venegas Sandoval et al., 2020).

### **The End of the ICA and INMECAFE**

In July 1989, after a period of a high level of regulation of the coffee sector internationally, the ICA was terminated as a result of a series of disagreements among coffee-producing and consuming countries regarding governance of the agreements (Renard, 1999).<sup>38</sup> Its termination generated one of the severest crises of the coffee sector ever as liberalization of global reserves led to a decline in coffee prices from a longstanding average of \$1.10 dollars per pound (January–June 1989) to \$0.70 dollars per pound in October 1989 (Celis, 1991; Renard, 1999). Since then, coffee prices have been set through speculation on the stock market (Henderson, 2017; Petchers & Harris, 2008).

Furthermore, just a few months after the ICA was terminated, the Mexican state began to reduce its intervention in the coffee sector. In September 1989, the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994)—known to have been one of the most corrupt presidents in Mexican history—declared that INMECAFE faced major financial loss and claimed that coffee collection was expensive and inefficient. Under the premise of modernization fostered by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the administration announced the end of the state’s role in coffee collection, processing, and trading (DOF, 1993b; Hernández, 1990). Moreover, in 1992 Salinas announced modification of Article 27 to officially end land distribution, and in 1993 signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to reduce tariffs and promote foreign investment (de Grammont et al., 2009; DOF, 1992, 1993a; Gutiérrez-Haces, 2004; Moguel, 1992b).

With the state’s withdrawal from coffee production and marketing, Salinas urged farmer organizations to take the lead in design and implementation of

---

<sup>38</sup> These disagreements include: 1) Brazil, the world’s largest coffee producer (25% of all coffee harvested), refused to have its quota reduced despite the fact that its productive capacity had been affected by a 1986 frost, while Central American countries, Mexico, and Indonesia demanded higher quotas due to increased production and because storing coffee involved high costs as well as great loss of profits. For instance, Mexico’s quota of global coffee commerce was 4.1%, or 2.1 million sacks, although it produced 5 million sacks. Storing these reserves cost Mexico \$500 million dollars (Paré, 1991; Portillo, 1993; Renard, 1992). 2) While producer countries considered the minimum price established by the agreement to be very low, consumer countries refused to raise it. 3) Aside from the ICA, a black market prevailed in Eastern Europe where coffee was traded at lower prices; this discouraged some member countries from maintaining a regulatory framework (Renard, 1999).

agricultural programmes (Chapoy Bonifaz, 2003). He also established the *Congreso Agrario Permanente* (Permanent Agrarian Congress) as an interlocutor between farmer organizations with a variety of political affiliations on one hand and the state on the other (DOF, 1989; Enciso, 1999; García, 1991), and formed the *Consejo Mexicano del Café* (Mexican Coffee Council) consisting of representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, small farmer organizations, the coffee processing industry, and exporters to formulate coffee policies based on consensus (Martínez Morales, 1996; Ramírez García & Nava Tablada, 2019). Furthermore, to support small farmers in the face of low coffee prices resulting from the termination of the ICA, Salinas provided loans to farmers through the *Programa Nacional de Solidaridad* (National Programme of Solidarity [PRONASOL]) and encouraged farmers to form *Comités Locales de Solidaridad* (Local Solidarity Committees) to foster mutual collaboration (Celis Callejas, 2009; Fox, 1994).

Nevertheless, these compensatory measures were characterized by several problems. First, the *Congreso Agrario Permanente* ended up benefiting the CNC—the farmer organization aligned with the ruling PRI party (de Grammont & Mackinlay, 2006; Ramirez Cuevas, n.d.). Second, decisions made within the *Consejo Mexicano del Café* principally favoured a few companies which had come to monopolize coffee processing and trading since INMECAFE was dismantled (Celis Callejas, 2009; Jurado Celis & Bartra Vergés, 2012). Third, funding provided by PRONASOL was insufficient for farmers to carry out agricultural projects, and the *Comités Locales de Solidaridad* rarely participated in higher functions of the value chain. Finally, the absence of the state in coffee collection and trading led local buyers to control the sector (Hernández, 1992c).

Hence, in a context of very low coffee prices and palliative measures by the state, the regional coffee organizations that had operated since the 1970s and 1980s such as Majomut and UCIRI, as well as more recent organizations such as the *Coordinadora Estatal de Productores de Café de Oaxaca* (State Coordinator of Coffee Producers of Oaxaca [CEPCO]), joined together to increase their participation in the organic market and pressure the state to support for small-scale farmers. In 1989 these coffee organizations, along with other farmer organizations, established the *Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras* (National Coordinator of Coffee Organizations [CNOC]) which became Mexico's largest coffee farmer organization and the principal representative of small farmer organizations in public policy development (Celis Callejas, 2015). The CNOC also became one of the principal representatives of

small farmers' resistance movements, for example in the 2002 campaign *El Campo No Aguanta Más* (The Countryside Can Take No More) and the 2007 movement *Sin Maíz no Hay País* (Without Maize There Is No Country), through which many farmer organizations opposed policies established by NAFTA and demanded reformulation of trade agreements to guarantee food sovereignty and support production by small farmers (Bartra, 2020; de Grammont & Mackinlay, 2006).

### **Coffee Policies During the Expansion of Neoliberalism**

Following the Salinas administration until the presidency of Enrique Peña Nieto, the Mexican state kept supporting small-scale coffee production, principally through programmes providing plants, fertilizer, and technical assistance, channelled through farmer organizations. Such programmes included the 1998 *Programa de Impulso a la Producción del Café* (Programme to Promote Coffee Production; DOF, 1998), the 2011 *Programa Fomento Productivo del Café* (Programme for Promotion of Coffee Production; DOF, 2011), and the 2013 *Programa PROCAFE e Impulso Productivo al Café* (Programme PROCAFE and Productive Fomentation of Coffee; DOF, 2013; FAO & SAGARPA, 2015; SAGARPA et al., 2011).

In contrast to previous years when INMECAFE principally focused on increasing productivity, due to greater competition among coffee-producing countries, these programmes fostered improvement of coffee quality by encouraging small farmers to replace old plants and process their coffee cherries into parchment coffee using the wet method (Martínez Morales, 1996; Rodríguez Padrón, 2012; SAGARPA & FAO, 2006). Additionally, since the passing of the 2001 *Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable* (Sustainable Rural Development Law), coffee programmes began to foster organic production (DOF, 2001). For instance, the *Programa Fomento Productivo del Café* provided a greater subsidy to organic farmers than to conventional farmers,<sup>39</sup> and the *PROCAFE e Impulso Productivo al Café* covered 70% of the cost of organic coffee certification (DOF, 2011, 2017a).

In addition to provision of plants and fertilizer, since the ICA ended and INMECAFE was dismantled the state implemented the *Fondo de Estabilización del Café* (Coffee Stabilization Fund) to provide farmers with monetary compensation when the price of coffee fell below \$0.70 dollars per pound; meanwhile, farmers contributed to the fund when the price exceeded \$0.85 dollars per pound (DOF,

---

<sup>39</sup> This programme provided \$500 pesos (~\$26 dollars) per hectare annually for conventional coffee and \$650 pesos for organic coffee (~\$34 dollars; DOF, 2011).

2002a, 2004; SAGARPA & FAO, 2006).<sup>40</sup> In addition, the state launched several campaigns to support farmers in combatting coffee leaf rust (*hemileia vastatrix*)—a fungus greatly affecting yields—and distributed introgressed varieties<sup>41</sup> resistant to rust (Barrera et al., 2013; Henderson, 2019; SADER, 2018a, 2019a). Furthermore, during this period, the state also created the *Padrón Nacional Cafetalero* (National Coffee Farmer List) to register beneficiaries of coffee programmes (SAGARPA et al., 2005; SAGARPA & FAO, 2004).

Aside from implementing these programmes, in 2004 the Mexican state replaced the *Consejo Mexicano del Café* with the *Sistema Producto Café* (Coffee Product System; Pérez Akaki, 2013a). Furthermore, in 2006, it established the *Asociación Mexicana de la Cadena Productiva del Café* (Mexican Coffee Value Chain Association [AMECAFE]) to assist the Ministry of Agriculture in designing and implementing coffee policies, improving the quality of coffee, promoting consumption of coffee on a national and international level, and managing the low-price compensation funds (AMECAFE, 2012; CNOC, 2021; SAGARPA et al., 2005).<sup>42</sup>

Nevertheless, despite the diversity of measures that the state implemented after INMECAFE was dismantled, its performance was highly criticized for clientelism promoted by farmer organizations and functionaries of the PRI and *Partido Acción Nacional* (National Action Party [PAN]; Celis Callejas, 2008;

---

<sup>40</sup> More recently, the programme operated under the name *Fideicomiso Irrevocable de Inversión, Administración y Garantía Líquida* (Irrevocable Trust for Investment, Administration, and Back to Back Guarantee) and subsidized farmers when the price of coffee fell below \$1.20 dollars per pound. However, the state recently ended this programme and is returning the money that farmers had paid back during its operation (AMECAFE, 2018).

<sup>41</sup> Introgressed varieties possess genetic traits of both *coffea arabica* (arabica) and *coffea canephora* (robusta). The oldest introgressed variety is the timor hybrid, which is a natural cross from the island of East Timor dating to at least 1920. Coffee experts also developed catimors, resulting from a cross between the timor hybrid and the caturra arabica variety, and sarchimors from the timor hybrid and the villa sarchi arabica variety. Contrary to popular belief, catimors and sarchimors are not varieties but rather groups of varieties (Anacafé, n.d.; WCR, n.d.).

<sup>42</sup> Among other activities, AMECAFE has organized and participated in national and international coffee events, including the *Expo Café* (Coffee Expo), the *México Alimentaria Food Show* (Mexico Agri-Food Show), and the *Cumbre Latinoamericana de Café* (Latin American Coffee Summit); has promoted the *Taza de Excelencia* (Cup of Excellence) contest to award growers who meet high-quality standards; and has fostered training for coffee tasters and baristas (AMECAFE & SPC, 2018; SAGARPA & FAO, 2006; Taza de Excelencia, n.d.).

Quintana, 2008; Ramírez Cuellar, 2008; Ramos, 2008).<sup>43</sup> The state was further criticized because most of its coffee programmes provided a very low subsidy; for providing plants and fertilizer of poor quality and too late in the season for farmers to make use of them; for failing to formulate marketing strategies or implementing them poorly; for failing to provide loans to farmers; for failing to consistently provide technical assistance and supervision; and for inefficiently attending to coffee rust and because the resistant varieties introduced were of lower quality (CNOOC, 2022a, 2022b; Robles Berlanga, 2011; SAGARPA et al., 2005; Senado, 2020; Venegas Sandoval et al., 2020).

Furthermore, the state was further criticized for lack of coordination among those ministries involved in implementing agricultural programmes, and because AMECAFE lacked the human resources and budget to adequately attend to small farmers' demands and the authority to regulate the coffee sector as had INMECAFE (CNOOC, 2022b; Pérez Akaki, 2013a). Despite the fact that the *Sistema Producto Café* was intended to formulate policies through consensus among all actors of the value chain, many farmer organizations have complained that the *Consejo Nacional Agropecuario* (National Agricultural Council) and the *Asociación Nacional de la Industria del Café* (National Association of the Coffee Industry)—both representing the coffee processing industry in the *Sistema Producto Café*—used their influence to counter the interests of small farmer organizations (de Grammont & Mackinlay, 2006; Venegas Sandoval et al., 2020).

Scholars and coffee farmer organizations have also lamented the state's openness to allowing the coffee processing industry to operate in Mexico and its tolerance of low-quality coffee in the sector (Bartra, 2019b; CNOOC, 2019i, 2019t; Cruz Hernández, 2019). Coffee farmer organizations were particularly concerned with the state support for Nestlé, which since 2010 has operated its Nescafé Plan to expand robusta production by providing plants and technical assistance to farmers of Veracruz and Soconusco (CNOOC, 2019d).<sup>44</sup> Moreover, coffee farmer organizations were concerned that the *Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Forestales, Agrícolas y Pecuarias* (National Institute of Forestry, Crop Agriculture,

---

<sup>43</sup> The PRI governed from 1929 to 2000 (although under different party names). "Political alternation" began in 2000 with the presidencies of Vicente Fox Quesada (2000–2006) and Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (2006–2012), both of the PAN. However, both presidencies operated in a similar manner to those of the PRI, which returned to power from 2012 to 2018 under President Enrique Peña Nieto.

<sup>44</sup> The Nescafé programme operates in many regions of Mexico. While it has supported both arabica and robusta farmers, fieldwork suggests that robusta-growing regions have been prioritized.

and Livestock Research [INIFAP]) supported Nestlé directing research on coffee breeding and that the state actively supported the growth of this company by fostering expansion of a Nestlé factory in Toluca in 2013 and establishment of the world's largest instant coffee factory in Veracruz in 2019 (CNOOC, 2018, 2019d; Nestlé, 2018c).

## **Discussion**

This chapter analysed the evolution of coffee policies since the crop was introduced to Mexico showing that while the state has continually promoted coffee production, its interests and measures of support to farmers have varied over time. Three major phases of coffee policies were identified. First, during the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, the state focused on expanding the number of hectares for coffee production and exporting coffee to North America and Europe. During this phase, the state mainly benefitted large-scale farmers by facilitating land acquisition and providing various types of incentives for them to establish coffee farms in Mexico. During this period, Soconusco played a significant role in increasing Mexican coffee production; however, this was achieved through dispossession of indigenous peoples' land and deplorable labour conditions on coffee plantations.

The second phase occurred from 1958 to 1989, when INMECAFE was in operation. Similar to the previous phase, the Mexican state was interested in expanding coffee plantations, but also in increasing productivity with higher-yield varieties and fertilizer. In contrast to the previous phase, when the state mainly supported the sector by facilitating land purchase, during this phase it played a strong regulatory role by carrying out agricultural research, training farmers, and collecting and processing coffee. In contrast to previous decades, during this phase small-scale farmers—particularly *ejido* members—were the principal target of support. While many scholars and farmer organizations observed that thanks to INMECAFE, small-scale farmers were able to avoid local intermediaries, they highlighted that its operations were characterized by inefficiency and corruption.

The third phase lasted from 1989 to 2018, the final year analysed. During this phase, the state continued to promote increased productivity, but also began to focus on improving quality. While small-scale farmers continued to be the principal target of support, the state principally supported these farmers through programmes providing plants and fertilizer via farmer organizations, having significantly reduced its intervention in the coffee sector by ceasing to regulate

coffee production quotas and to purchase and process coffee. During this phase the state implemented many programmes to support small-scale coffee farmers, however, scholars and farmer organizations complained of inefficiency, and that due to withdrawal of the state, the coffee processing industry acquired more functions within the value chain, including research, organizing farmers, and collecting and processing coffee.

This chapter also demonstrated that Mexican coffee policies have been operating within the framework of three interconnected phenomena: 1) the dynamics of coffee trading on an international level; 2) global development paradigms; and 3) the functioning of the Mexican state with respect to agricultural policy. Regarding the first, this chapter has shown how the Mexican state aligned with the ICA with the objective of maintaining coffee prices within a certain range. It illustrated that high coffee prices on a global level in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century triggered the Mexican state to foster coffee production and establish the *Comisión Nacional del Café*—the predecessor of INMECAFE. High coffee prices also motivated INMECAFE to increase its coffee-collection capacities in the early 1970s. Moreover, this chapter showed how after the ICA ended in 1989, due to low coffee prices the state implemented a variety of programmes to support farmers in the context of low coffee prices.

Regarding global development paradigms, this chapter showed how during the late 19<sup>th</sup> and the early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries Mexican coffee was produced in an international context of liberalization in which producing countries sold coffee without any authority regulating prices and without any quota restrictions. However, during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Mexican policies were embedded in a highly regulated economy in which coffee-producing countries agreed to production quotas and established an international regulatory authority (the ICO). Later, following the end of the ICA until the presidency of Enrique Peña Nieto, coffee was marketed within a neoliberal international context. Coffee-producing countries began to cultivate without any production quotas, and coffee prices began to be set by the stock market.

Finally, the chapter showed how Mexican coffee policies were influenced by the functioning of the Mexican state with respect to agricultural policy. This chapter illustrated that during the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, coffee policies operated under the macroeconomic premise of “modernization”, favouring large-scale farmers. However, this was fiercely challenged by small-scale farmers’ struggles, manifested in the 1910 Mexican Revolution. This chapter also showed

that following President Cárdenas' massive land distribution in the 1930s, rural policies began to focus on *ejido* production and creation of farmer organizations to promote collective production and marketing. Nevertheless, during the PRI and PAN administrations, these policies were characterized by high levels of clientelism between functionaries and farmer organizations.



Photo by Erik García Briones

## Chapter 2. Incorporation of Different Types of Farmers Into Different Coffee Markets<sup>45</sup>

### Introduction

For many decades, the study of value chains has been a point of reference for improving small farmers' livelihoods. Many development interventions have focused on providing small farmers with agricultural inputs and technical assistance, and improving infrastructure to increase their *incorporation into the market*. Their premise is that *greater market incorporation* will benefit farmers' livelihoods (Arias et al., 2013; Donovan & Poole, 2014; FAO, 2020; Gómez et al., 2020; Michelson, 2020; OECD & FAO, 2019; World Bank, 2007, 2020). However, certain scholars engaged with the so-called global value chain approach have noted that many interventions which have aimed at improving the position of small farmers in the value chain have failed to take into account that incorporation into the market may also generate stumbling blocks (Bolwig et al., 2010; Bray & Neilson, 2018; du Toit, 2003, 2004b, 2009; Helmsing & Vellema, 2011; McCarthy, 2010; Neilson & Shonk, 2014; Ponte, 2008). These scholars advise that rather than aiming for *greater incorporation*, there is a need to address the *terms* or *conditions* by which farmers are incorporated into the market.

While global value chain scholars raise the importance of paying attention to the conditions by which farmers are incorporated into the market, few address variation in the types of relations that emerge between different types of farmers and diverse marketing options. Hence, this chapter is aimed at shedding light on the dynamics of value chains by showing how incorporation of farmers into coffee marketing channels generates different types of relationships. For this, we first identify differences among farmers regarding their control over their means of production (Bernstein, 2010), and then address the terms by which different types of farmers are incorporated into the market (Bolwig et al., 2010). The aim of this study is to understand the struggles that different social classes face in relation to capital and the market, and the implications of these struggles for the global value chain approach and for Mexican development policies.

This study uses a qualitative approach based on semi-structured interviews and focus groups carried out from October 2018 to January 2020 in the Soconusco

---

<sup>45</sup> This chapter has been co-authored with Kees Jansen and Sietze Vellema and accepted for publication by the Canadian Journal of Development Studies.

region of Chiapas. A total of 82 coffee farmers were interviewed in the following 14 towns of Soconusco: Agustín de Iturbide, Benito Juárez, Cacahoatán, Carrillo Puerto, El Águila, El Edén, El Platanar, Faja de Oro, Tapachula, Tuxtla Chico, Progreso, Salvador Urbina, Santo Domingo, and Unión Juárez. Data obtained from farmers were complemented by interviews with the following actors: 1) local and federal level directors and operational staff of the *Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural* (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development [SADER]) and the *Secretaría de Bienestar* (Ministry of Well-being [BIENESTAR]); 2) staff of coffee trading companies, including international companies such as Nestlé as well as local traders; 3) members of local coffee farmer organizations; and 4) academics specialized in Mexican coffee policies and the agricultural sector.

This chapter is structured as follows. The following section presents our approach regarding incorporation of farmers into the market and the way in which we differentiate types of farmers. The third section presents some factors involved in how coffee is currently cultivated in Soconusco. The fourth section characterizes four marketing options for coffee farmers in Soconusco—Nestlé, farmer organizations, local buyers, and direct marketing—and discusses socio-economic differences among farmers in this region. The fifth section analyses variations in the ways in which different farmers relate to different marketing channels in Soconusco. The final section discusses the implications of our findings for the global value chain approach and for development interventions in Mexico.

## **Conceptualizing Incorporation of Farmers Into the Market and Differentiation Among Farmers**

### *Incorporation of Farmers Into the Market*

Value chains have been a point of reference for development interventions. Many international organizations and government agencies have implemented a variety of programmes that provide agricultural inputs and technical assistance to achieve *greater incorporation* of farmers into the market (Arias et al., 2013; Donovan & Poole, 2014; FAO, 2020; Gómez et al., 2020; OECD & FAO, 2019; Michelson, 2020; World Bank, 2007, 2020). In the particular case of coffee in Mexico, such efforts have been focused on supporting small-scale farmers to improve the quality of their coffee so that they participate in the organic market, which is considered to be that which generates the highest returns (Agricultura, 2022a, 2022b; ICO, 2019; Jurado Celis & Bartra Vergés, 2012; Renard & Pérez-Grovas, 2007; SAGARPA, 2015).

However, a group of researchers engaged in the global value chain approach<sup>46</sup> have observed that incorporation of small farmers into the market has not always been beneficial for their livelihoods and that farmers may be *adversely incorporated* (du Toit, 2004a; Hickey & du Toit, 2007; Ponte, 2020; Ponte & Ewert, 2009; Vellema, 2016). In the case of coffee, much attention has been paid to disadvantages to farmers' livelihoods resulting from organic coffee certification, including: 1) receiving low returns despite having been certified (Barham et al., 2011; Barham & Weber, 2012; Beuchelt & Zeller, 2013; Méndez et al., 2010; Valkila, 2014); 2) additional capital and labour required for farmers to meet standard requirements (Calo & Wise, 2005; Danse & Vellema, 2005; Jaffee, 2014; Wilson, 2010); 3) the bureaucratic process involved in obtaining certification (Mutersbaugh, 2004); 4) conflicts within coffee farmer organizations, and the fact that certain local elites obtain most of the economic and social benefits of certification (Gómez Tovar et al., 2005; González & Nigh, 2005; Murray et al., 2006; Vicol et al., 2018; Wilson & Mutersbaugh, 2020); and 5) insufficient improvement in labour rights while being certified (Raynolds & Rosty, 2021).

Considering potential disadvantages of incorporation of farmers into the market, some authors have advised that rather than assuming that farmers will be benefitted by *greater market incorporation*, development interventions should focus on the *terms or conditions* by which farmers are incorporated (Bolwig et al., 2010; Borrás et al., 2010; Bray & Neilson, 2018; Castellanos-Navarrete & Jansen, 2018; du Toit, 2003, 2004b, 2009; Helmsing & Vellema, 2011; McCarthy, 2010; Neilson & Shonk, 2014; Ponte, 2008). This chapter builds on this critical perspective and analyses the ways in which the conditions of incorporation vary according to farmers' social class and different marketing options.

### *Social Differentiation*

Most development interventions are aimed at improving small farmers' livelihoods. While the definition of *small farmer* varies from intervention to intervention, it tends to be principally based on the size of their landholding. With respect to international organizations, the World Bank (2003) considers small

---

<sup>46</sup> Many studies within the global value chain approach have focused on governance and power of lead agroindustrial firms on a global level (Daviron & Ponte, 2005; Gereffi, 1999, 2014; Gibbon, 2001; Grabs & Ponte, 2019; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002). However, some researchers study the implications of global value chains on the producer and local levels. This chapter follows the latter approach.

farmers to be those who own less than 2 hectares and have few assets, and according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO, n.d.\*a; Khalil et al., 2017) small farmers are those who farm surface areas ranging from 1 to 10 hectares, principally use family labour, and devote part of their production to family consumption. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD & UNEP, 2013) lacks a set definition of small farmer but states that *small* refers to the amount of land worked, number of workers, and amount of capital invested. According to the Mexican state (DOF, 2020b, 2020d), small farmers own less than 5 hectares, principally rely on family labour, have limited access to agricultural resources, and produce mainly for self-consumption.<sup>47</sup>

Although size of landholding is a relevant starting point for classifying farmers, we consider that classifying them based on the number of hectares they own or farm overlooks differences among farmers with respect to the way in which they relate to capital, labour, and the market (Jansen, 2015; Nikol & Jansen, 2021). Rather, we propose to differentiate farmers according to the theoretical contributions of Bernstein (2010, 2016), who suggests categorizing social classes by studying: 1) *who owns what?* which implies analysing how the means of production and reproduction (land and labour) are distributed; 2) *who does what?* which implies analysing who performs what social production and reproduction activities; 3) *who gets what?* which implies analysing how fruits of labour are distributed; and 4) *what do they do with it?* which implies analysing how different social relations of production and reproduction determine distribution and use of the social product.

Bernstein (2010) poses three categories of farmers based on these theoretical questions: *emergent capitalist farmers*, *petty commodity producers*, and *semi-proletarian farmers*. *Emergent capitalist farmers* are those who expand their relations of production and reproduction, employ wage labour (possibly combined with unpaid family labour), accumulate productive assets over time, and diversify their income sources by investing in crop trading, processing, and transportation, as well as by offering loans. *Petty commodity producers* are farmers who own land, use their own as well as family labour, and hire poorer farmers. They are unable to increase their production as do capitalist farmers but achieve

---

<sup>47</sup> In addition, the Mexican state classifies *medium farmers* as those owning 5 to 20 hectares, principally relying on hired labour, with access to resources, and producing for both family consumption and the market. Meanwhile, *large farmers* own more than 20 hectares, have access to resources, and produce for the market, including for export. The Mexican state principally provides support to small and medium farmers.

simple reproduction from the market. *Semi-proletarian farmers* are those who are unable to reproduce themselves as capital and must sell their labour. While they may have access to land, they lack sufficient high-quality land and/or the capacity to access necessary means of production, such as tools and seeds.<sup>48</sup> This study adopts this categorization to identify how different types of farmers interact with different marketing channels.

### **Coffee Farming in Soconusco**


Soconusco shares a similar socioeconomic context with other coffee-growing regions of Mexico; however, the way in which coffee farming is carried out in the region has some unique traits. First, the region underwent a structural change from large to small-scale production. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, coffee production was controlled principally by Germans who owned large coffee plantations (an average of 1,200 hectares), hired large numbers of labourers from Chiapas and Guatemala, processed coffee with the most modern equipment of the times, and exported it to Europe and the United States (Bartra, 1995; Kuntz Ficker, 2010; Roseberry et al., 1995; Villafuerte Solís, 2004; Williams, 1994).

The shift toward small-scale production began in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century as a result of the administration of President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934 to 1940) carrying out a major land distribution in favour of collective landholdings of small-scale farmers (*ejidos*; Castellanos-Navarrete & Jansen, 2017; INEHRM, 2020), and as a result of the fact that following the Second World War, German estates significantly deteriorated (Damián, 1988; Helbig, 1964). The shift toward small-scale production was also fomented as a result of the *Instituto Mexicano del Café* (Mexican Coffee Institute [INMECAFE]; in operation from 1958 to 1989) motivating small-scale farmers to begin coffee production by providing them with plants and fertilizer (Bartra Vergés et al., 2011). Currently, Soconusco has 11,927 coffee farmers (with a total of 35,448 hectares in cultivation), and most of them are of small scale (see Figure 4).

---

<sup>48</sup> These concepts are not meant to be exhaustive with respect to all farmers' practices, nor is it assumed that farmers remain permanently within one category. Rather, these concepts mainly serve the heuristic purpose of indicating how structural differences among farmers lead them to interact differently with specific marketing channels.

Figure 4. Number of Coffee Farmers According to Hectares Cultivated, Soconusco, 2018



Note. Elaborated with data provided by the *Coordinación General de Agricultura* (General Agricultural Coordination) of SADER.

A second difference between coffee production in Soconusco and other regions of Mexico is that while most other regions principally produce the arabica species (CONABIO, 2015), in Soconusco the robusta species is also cultivated. Both species are traded and consumed globally; however, significant differences exist with respect to their technical characteristics and the type of market in which they are sold. Arabica is advised for cultivation at altitudes above 1,000 metres with mild temperatures (ICO, n.d.\*a), and due to its flavour and aroma is considered to be of higher quality than robusta. This species tends to be directed toward niche markets such as organic or speciality markets;<sup>49</sup> however, it is highly susceptible to the fungus coffee leaf rust and requires much more labour than does robusta. Robusta is advised for cultivation at altitudes below 700 metres (ICO, n.d.\*a) and is principally sold to Nestlé for production of instant coffee due to its high caffeine levels. Although the quality of robusta tends to be lower than that of arabica, robusta produces higher yields and is significantly more resistant to coffee rust.

<sup>49</sup> Speciality coffee is that which obtains a score of 80 out of 100 according to a certified coffee connoisseur (SCA, n.d.\*a, n.d.\*b.).

In Soconusco, farmers sell arabica as parchment coffee, while robusta is sold as cherries.

Another characteristic of coffee farming in Soconusco is the challenge for farmers presented by low coffee prices and coffee leaf rust. With respect to low prices, in 2019 on an international level, the price per pound was \$1.00 dollar, much lower than the 10-year average of \$1.36 dollars per pound, and the lowest price since 2006 (ICO, n.d.\*b). The International Coffee Organization (ICO, 2020) has pointed out that farmers paid this price struggle greatly to cover costs of production. Regarding coffee rust, coffee plantations have been severely affected, particularly in the 1980s when this fungus was first reported at lower altitudes in Soconusco (Barrera, 2017; Henderson, 2019),<sup>50</sup> and in 2012–2013 when a proliferation reached altitudes above 900 metres, causing a 30% reduction in coffee yields (Avelino & Anzueto, 2020; Barrera et al., 2013; Ruiz-de-Oña et al., 2019). When coffee rust affected farmers at low altitudes in the 1980s, most switched from cultivating arabica to robusta, and since rust appeared at higher altitudes in 2012–2013, farmers have also gradually transitioned to robusta (Barrera, 2016; Harvey, et al., 2021; Ruiz Meza, 2015). However, it should be noted that robusta produces lower yields at higher altitudes than at lower altitudes.

A final characteristic of Soconusco is that due to high poverty levels, the region has been targeted by state programmes. Two federal agricultural programmes currently operate in the area: 1) *Sembrando Vida* (Sowing Life) which is implemented by BIENESTAR and provides \$5,000 pesos (~\$259 dollars) per month to farmers holding 2.5 to 20 hectares so that they introduce agroecological practices and cultivate organically (DOF, 2020c; GOB, 2019). And 2) *Producción para el Bienestar* (Production for Well-being) which is operated by SADER and provides \$5,000 pesos (~\$259 dollars) per year to farmers with less than 20 hectares to invest in plants and fertilizers and reduce agrochemical use (DOF, 2019d).

### **Marketing Channels and Differentiation Among Farmers in Soconusco**

In Soconusco coffee farmers sell their coffee through four different marketing channels: Nestlé, coffee farmer organizations, local buyers, and direct marketing. Although all four channels specialize in coffee collection, they vary greatly with

---

<sup>50</sup> Interviewees in Soconusco repeatedly referred to low, mid-range, and high altitudes. Although precise definitions of low, middle, and high varied from person to person, we consider low altitudes to be below 700 metres, mid-range altitudes 700 to 900 metres, and high altitudes above 900 metres.

respect to the coffee species they purchase (arabica or robusta), the types of farmers from whom they purchase, their collection mechanism, their expectations regarding quality, and payment and agricultural services they provide to farmers.

Nestlé principally offers its services in towns located below 700 metres in altitude, where robusta cultivation is prevalent. Since 2010, it has operated the Nescafé Plan, through which it provides to farmers robusta plantlets (free of charge) that produce higher yields, are highly resistant to coffee rust, and occupy less space than so-called *traditional* and *improved* varieties.<sup>51</sup> Through the Nescafé Plan, the company also provides technical assistance for farmers to grow Nestlé's plants and implement practices required by the international 4C certification which fosters sustainable practices, including elimination of highly volatile chemicals (such as paraquat), preservation of flora and fauna, and fair labour practices (4C, n.d.; Club Pro, 2016; Nestlé, 2018a, 2018b). Through the Nescafé Plan, the company also provides coffee sacks, shade cloths, and loans.

While any type of farmer may join the Nescafé Plan, by providing plants and technical assistance the company expects farmers to increase the quality of their coffee in order to obtain 60% of yield,<sup>52</sup> 12% of moisture, and 18% of defects. If farmers meet these quality standards, the company pays the market price; however, if farmers do not meet them, they are paid less. Furthermore, those meeting the sustainability requirements established by the 4C receive a premium ranging from \$0.60–\$1.00 pesos (~\$0.03–\$0.05 dollars) per kilo. Regardless of the amount of coffee that farmers sell, Nestlé pays upon reception, using specialized equipment to measure the quality and amount of coffee purchased.

In Soconusco, Nestlé has relied on the services of two local trading companies to implement the Nescafé Plan: *Cafés y Semillas de México* (Coffee and Seeds of Mexico [CASEMEX]), and *Exportadora de Granos y Oleaginosas del Sureste* (Exporter of Grains and Oilseeds of the Southeast [EGOS]). These companies grow

---

<sup>51</sup> Soconusco farmers refer to *traditional varieties* as those varieties of either arabica or robusta that have been planted for many years, and *improved varieties* as those that were modified to improve certain attributes, such as yield and resistance to coffee rust. While Nestlé's plants are *improved varieties*, they are locally known as *clones* as they are reproduced on a large scale in vitro or by stem cutting.

<sup>52</sup> As explained in the section "Coffee farming in Soconusco", in this region robusta is sold as cherries and arabica as parchment coffee. The percentage of yield for robusta results from dividing the weight of a sample of green coffee by its weight when it was in the form of *cherries* and multiplying by 100; the percentage of yield for arabica results from dividing the weight of the green coffee by its weight when it was in the form of *parchment* and multiplying by 100. Traders use a 300-gram sample to obtain the percentage of yield of robusta and arabica.

plantlets for Nestlé in their nurseries, provide supplies, and receive coffee in their collection centres located on the outskirts of Tapachula (the largest city of Soconusco)<sup>53</sup> or through local traders. Of the 82 farmers interviewed, 26 sell to Nestlé through CASEMEX or EGOS.

In contrast to Nestlé, coffee farmer organizations only receive high-quality coffee, prioritizing arabica, and fostering cultivation of traditional varieties (such as bourbon and typica).<sup>54</sup> These organizations require that farmers implement agroecology practices and produce organically. They tend to be stricter than other channels regarding percentage of defects allowed; for instance, while Nestlé allows 18% rate of defects, farmer organizations only permit 16%.<sup>55</sup> This channel collects and processes coffee from small farmers and provides them with seedlings, technical assistance, loans, and other types of economic support such as social security.<sup>56</sup> It pays a high price to farmers, however, payment is provided over the course of several months. Moreover, new farmers who do not produce organically must enter a 3-year transition period upon joining the organization, during which they are paid less than that paid to organic farmers.

Three principal farmer organizations were identified in the region. The *Centro de Agroecología San Francisco de Asís* (Saint Francis of Assisi Agroecology Centre [CASFA]), the *Grupo de Asesores de Producción Orgánica y Sustentable* (Organic and Sustainable Production Advisory Group [GRAPOS]), and *Café Justo* (Fair Coffee). CASFA and GRAPOS have 3,200 and 3,500 farmer members, respectively. Both have collection and processing centres in Tapachula and organic certifications, including Fairtrade, UTZ, USDA Organic, JAS, and *Orgánico*

---

<sup>53</sup> EGOS also has a collection centre in the mountainous town of Benito Juárez, located 30 kilometres from Tapachula.

<sup>54</sup> Bourbon and typica are arabica varieties with great genetic and cultural significance. They produce “excellent” quality coffee, but provide low yields and are highly susceptible to rust (WCR, 2019).

<sup>55</sup> While farmer organizations favour arabica, some also collect robusta. In order to compare the percentage of defects permitted by Nestlé and farmer organizations, we used the percentage of defects allowed for robusta production.

<sup>56</sup> Services provided by farmer organizations (plants, technical assistance, etc.) are financed by public subsidies, grants by international organizations, and the premium that organizations obtain by selling certified organic or fair-trade coffee.

*SAGARPA México*.<sup>57</sup> CASFA exports mainly to the United States and GRAPOS principally sells to Starbucks. In contrast, *Café Justo* only has 40 farmer members; it receives coffee in the town of Salvador Urbina (located 40 kilometres from Tapachula) and roasts it in the city of Agua Prieta (in the northern state of Sonora). While *Café Justo* lacks organic certification, it has direct contact with Presbyterian churches in the United States to which it sells its coffee. Only five of the 82 farmers interviewed sell to one of these three organizations.

Local buyers, known as *coyotes*, purchase arabica and robusta from farmers, including in isolated communities. In contrast to Nestlé and farmer organizations, which demand that coffee comply with certain quality standards, local buyers purchase coffee regardless of its condition (although some expect it to be dry). They do not provide inputs such as plants or fertilizer to farmers, although some offer loans. While they purchase coffee from any type of farmer, and some pay upon reception, local buyers are notorious for their unfair practices, including paying very low prices, using scales which are not properly calibrated, and failing to use specialized equipment to measure the quality of coffee. For example, some buyers bite a coffee bean to test whether it is dry. Of the 82 farmers interviewed, 44 sell to local buyers.

Finally, through direct marketing farmers may sell roasted coffee, often packaged under their own brand name, to local and regional markets. Arabica is the principal species that farmers sell through direct marketing, including both traditional and improved varieties. While some farmers who market directly produce arabica according to organic practices, none of those interviewed are organically certified. Those farmers who market directly receive much higher returns than those obtained from Nestlé, farmer organizations, and local buyers; however, obtaining access to this market requires that farmers have relatively high amounts of capital to roast and grind their coffee, and they must wait a long time to receive payment. Of the 82 farmers interviewed, seven have access to high-value direct markets. Table 1 presents the principal characteristics of each marketing channel.

---

<sup>57</sup> Fairtrade is an international certification promoting sustainable production (waste management, reduction of agrochemical use, etc.) and fostering social capital (democratic decision-making within cooperatives, prohibition of child labour, etc.; Fairtrade, n.d.). The UTZ certification by the Rainforest Alliance promotes “good” agricultural practices, healthy working conditions, and environmental protection (Rainforest Alliance, n.d.). USDA Organic is a certification by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA, n.d.). JAS is an organic certification by Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF, n.d.). Finally, *Orgánico SAGARPA México* is a certification by Mexico’s Ministry of Agriculture (GOB, 2016).

Table 1. Coffee Marketing Channels in Soconusco and Their Principal Characteristics<sup>58</sup>

Channel	Type of farmer	Species and varieties	Quality standards	Services provided	Payment	#
Nestlé	Any	Improved robusta (clones)	Percentage of yield, moisture, and defects; sustainable practices (4C)	Agricultural supplies and technical assistance	Lower than cooperatives but higher than local buyers; immediate payment	26
Farmer orgs.	Small-scale	Traditional varieties of arabica	Certified organic coffee with a certain percentage of yield, moisture, and defects	Processing coffee; sometimes agricultural supplies and technical assistance	High payment over the course of several months	5
Local buyers	Any	Any species, any variety	Generally, no quality standards	Some provide loans	Low payment	44
Direct marketing	Any	Arabica, traditional and improved varieties	Roasted and/or packaged coffee without certification	Not applicable	High payment, not immediately	7
<b>Total farmers interviewed</b>						<b>82</b>

Aside from mapping different marketing channels, we classified eight farmers who receive public subsidies (*Sembrando Vida* or *Producción para el Bienestar*) within Bernstein's categories (emergent capitalist farmers, petty commodity farmers, or semi-proletarians) and carried out in-depth case studies of these farmers. While Table 2 shows the means of production of these farmers, the following section discusses interactions between these farmers and the different marketing channels.

<sup>58</sup> While some farmers sell through more than one marketing channel, this table indicates the principal channel used by each farmer.

*Table 2. Coffee Farmers Selected for In-depth Case Studies and Their Means of Production*

<b>Bernstein's social class</b>	<b>Farmer<sup>59</sup></b>	<b>Means of production</b>
Emergent capitalist farmers	Elías	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Owns 20 hectares</li> <li>• Hires 26 workers; 6 year-round and 20 seasonal</li> <li>• Some of his workers are semi-proletarian farmers</li> <li>• Pays workers more than other local farmers</li> <li>• Also runs a transportation business.</li> </ul>
	Heriberto	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Owns 10 hectares</li> <li>• Tends his land with family labour, 5 year-round workers, and 10 seasonal families</li> <li>• Some of his workers are semi-proletarian farmers</li> <li>• Also collects coffee to sell to CASEMEX and EGOS.</li> </ul>
	César	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Owns 20 hectares</li> <li>• Tends his land with family labour, 3 permanent workers, and 15 seasonal workers</li> <li>• Also runs a coffee roasting business in his town.</li> </ul>
Petty commodity producers	Gonzalo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Owns 6.5 hectares</li> <li>• Tends his land with 1 family hired year-round</li> <li>• Owns a small coffee shop.</li> </ul>
	Fernando	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Owns 3 hectares</li> <li>• Tends his land with 6 family members, and hires a worker to dry the coffee</li> <li>• Is not involved in other stages of the value chain.</li> </ul>
	Alejandro	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Owns 3 hectares</li> <li>• Tends his land with 3 seasonal workers</li> <li>• Is not involved in other stages of the value chain.</li> </ul>
Semi-proletarians	Manuel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Owns 1 hectare</li> <li>• Tends his land with family labour</li> <li>• Works for other local farmers.</li> </ul>
	Orlando	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Owns 1 hectare</li> <li>• Uses only family labour</li> <li>• Works full-time as a watchman in a coffee cooperative.</li> </ul>

<sup>59</sup> Names of all farmers were changed to maintain anonymity.

## **Interactions Between Different Types of Farmers and Marketing Options**

In the field, we identified the following factors which contribute to determining the *terms* or *conditions* by which farmers are incorporated into the market: coffee species and varieties, altitude, product quality, price received, payment time, transportation, crop diseases, labour relations, provision of supplies (such as seedlings), and services (such as technical assistance and loans). This section discusses how these factors come into play in determining how emergent capitalist farmers, petty commodity producers, and semi-proletarian farmers interact with different marketing options. We also provide a qualitative assessment of favourable versus disadvantageous conditions of incorporation based on these interactions.

### *Nestlé*

Nestlé is the principal robusta buyer in Soconusco. Although any type of farmer may participate in the Nescafé Plan and obtain access to Nestlé's services, we found that capitalist farmers have access to more benefits than do other farmers. This is illustrated by contrasting two farmers who live in a low-altitude town and participate in the Nescafé Plan: Fernando and Elías.

Fernando is a petty commodity producer with 3 hectares of robusta who lives in Carrillo Puerto, located at an altitude of 500 metres. During fieldwork, he informed us that he was quite pleased with the Nescafé Plan because the seedlings he received were much more productive and more drought-resistant than the traditional robusta he formerly cultivated. He commented that Nestlé's technical assistance had helped him increase his yield, and that the sacks and shade cloths he received were useful. However, despite the benefits reported for the Nescafé Plan, he was concerned with the low price the company paid for coffee. At the time of the interview (December 2018), the price paid per kilo of robusta was \$17 pesos (~\$0.88 dollars), while 2 years earlier it had been \$26 pesos (~\$1.35 dollars). Furthermore, although he appreciated the 4C premium, he commented that it provided little additional income.

Similar to Fernando, Elías, a capitalist farmer with 20 hectares of coffee who also lives in Carrillo Puerto, spoke of the benefits about the Nescafé Plan, and also manifested concerns about the price the company paid for coffee. Regarding the benefits, he stated that he was very grateful to Nestlé because the plants he received had allowed him to increase his annual yield from 2–3 tons to 5–7 tons. He explained that this was a result of Nestlé's plants generating higher yields, but

also that since Nestlé's plants are smaller than traditional robusta, he was able to increase their density from 700 to 1,200 plants per hectare. In addition, Elías mentioned that since he began to cultivate Nestlé's plants, his percentage of yield increased from 58% to 62%, and since Nestlé requires 60%, he received the market price, without penalties. Elías was pleased that farmers are producing in a more sustainable manner as a result of the 4C certification. However, despite these benefits, Elías criticized that the company was "failing" farmers with the low payment it provided, expressing the following:

*"I'm very grateful to Nestlé as it helped us become aware of two things: that we can produce more in the same amount of land and also increase the quality of the product. This has really benefited us. But in terms of Nestlé's pay, the company is failing us because the price of coffee only is decreasing. The company justifies that it follows the price of coffee on the stock market, but the final price of its products, such as Nescafé o Nescafé Dolca, does not follow the stock market but rather the company's convenience"* (Elías, personal communication, Carrillo Puerto, 16 May 2019).

Fernando and Elías reported certain similarities regarding their conditions of incorporation into the Nescafé Plan (useful supplies and services, but low payment); however, we found that Elías perceived greater benefits than Fernando. For instance, as Elías was one of the first farmers to join the Nescafé Plan in Soconusco, and as he is one of the region's most productive farmers, Nescafé appointed him as a leader of a group of farmers who continually receive services from Nestlé, including technical assistance and provision of plants, as well as lower-priced fertilizer (2/3 of the market price), on credit. Furthermore, as Elías produces very high volumes of coffee, he obtains a greater income from the 4C certification than does Fernando.<sup>60</sup>

These cases indicate that although farmers incorporated into this marketing channel produce a species considered to be of low quality and receive a lower price than that paid for arabica, they have access to plants that allow them to increase their yield and minimize coffee leaf rust. They also indicate that while Nestlé

---

<sup>60</sup> Like Elías, Lucía, a capitalist farmer with 60 hectares, also received benefits from Nestlé due to her large scale of production. She informed us that she had received Nestlé's support in obtaining a loan from a government agency to install a plant nursery, and that as she produces high volumes of coffee she was appointed as a Nestlé ambassador to provide an example and motivate other farmers. While her case as well as that of Elías reflects the special attention that Nestlé provides to capitalist farmers, we did not include her in our case studies as she is not subject to subsidies due to the size of her landholding.

provides plants and technical assistance to all type of farmers, capitalist farmers receive special treatment from Nestlé. For example, the capitalist farmer obtained inexpensive fertilizer and Nestlé appointed him as a leader of a farmers' group, thereby providing him with prestige. Thus, these findings illustrate that capitalist farmers are provided with more advantageous conditions of incorporation into the market than are other farmers.

### *Farmer Organizations*

Farmer organizations are a marketing channel characterized by producing high-quality coffee according to organic methods. Although they focus their attention on impoverished small-scale farmers, we found that due to their requirements, semi-proletarians tend to be excluded from this market. This is illustrated by comparing the relationship between Alejandro and Orlando from Salvador Urbina (altitude of 600 metres) with *Café Justo*, the cooperative that sells organic coffee to Presbyterian churches in the United States.

Alejandro is a petty commodity producer with 3 hectares of coffee. Although many farmers of Salvador Urbina have transitioned from arabica to robusta due to coffee leaf rust as well as the high labour requirements of arabica, Alejandro uses most of his land (2 of his 3 hectares) to produce arabica. He mentioned that the main reason he continues to cultivate organic arabica is that he is able to sell it to *Café Justo* for \$70 pesos (~\$3.63 dollars) per kilo, higher than the \$40 to \$50 pesos (~\$2.07 to \$2.59 dollars) paid by other farmer organizations for the same coffee, and much higher than the \$20 pesos (~\$1.04 dollars) per kilo paid by local buyers. While he admitted that cultivating according to organic methods is labour-intensive and that at times he struggles to cover his cost of labour (three to six workers depending on the time of year), he continues to be a member of the organization given the high price he is paid.

Alejandro's case highly contrasts with that of Orlando, a semi-proletarian cultivating 1 hectare principally using his own labour, with the help of some family members during the harvest season. He informed us that many years ago he cultivated arabica, but that since the appearance of coffee rust, he decided to introduce robusta. He also mentioned that he produces "conventionally", with agrochemicals, as he is unable to provide the labour required for organic production. As does Alejandro, he works with *Café Justo*, but as a hired watchman. He commented that he does not sell to *Café Justo* not only because he does not

produce arabica and does not produce organically, but also because he cannot wait to receive his payment. He stated:

*“In Café Justo payment is split into months. This isn’t convenient for me because I need to take care of my family so they have what they need. I have a son in school, and I need to pay for his tuition. What if I don’t get the payment from Café Justo? I produce very little coffee, 1 ton or less, and the little I harvest, I sell it to local buyers because they pay right away”* (Orlando, personal communication, Salvador Urbina, 10 August 2019).

These cases show that both farmers live at an altitude where arabica and robusta may be cultivated. The petty commodity producer decided to produce organic arabica and participate in a more profitable market—*Café Justo*—as he is able to cope with the additional labour required for organic production and wait months to receive his payment. Meanwhile, the semi-proletarian farmer is unable to meet the requirements of small farmer organizations and decides to cultivate a low-quality coffee—robusta—and sell through the marketing channel that offers the lowest pay—local buyers. Thus, these cases indicate that the semi-proletarian farmer’s conditions of incorporation into the market appear to be less advantageous than those of the petty commodity producer.

### *Local Buyers*

Local buyers who collect arabica and robusta from different communities are much less strict regarding the quality of coffee than the other marketing channels, although they pay the lowest of all the channels. We found that capitalist farmers and petty commodity producers attempt to avoid this channel; however, for semi-proletarians local buyers appear to be the principal or the sole marketing option. This situation is illustrated by comparing the conditions of incorporation into the market of Gonzalo and Manuel.

Gonzalo is a petty commodity producer with 6.5 hectares who lives in Unión Juárez (located at an altitude of 1,300 metres), which was highly affected by coffee leaf rust in 2012–2013. Although many farmers of Unión Juárez transitioned from arabica to robusta due to coffee rust, Gonzalo preferred to maintain his arabica plants and cultivate them organically to sell his coffee at a coffee shop he owns. He mentioned that cultivating arabica organically requires a great deal of labour and that he had to be patient to make profits at his coffee shop; nonetheless, adding value to his product was worthwhile as he obtained a higher income. He clarified that he only occasionally sold to local buyers (as do most local farmers),

if he is in urgent need of cash, as he considers that local buyers “devalue farmers’ labour” by paying them low prices.

Gonzalo’s situation highly contrasts with that of Manuel, a semi-proletarian who owns 1 hectare and lives in El Platanar, located 1,300 metres in altitude and also severely affected by coffee rust in 2012–2013. In contrast to Gonzalo, Manuel decided to replace his arabica with robusta. He mentioned that when coffee rust affected El Platanar, he lacked the means to combat the fungus and many of his plants died, that cultivating arabica required too much labour and the price paid for arabica was not compensating the labour invested. He preferred to cultivate robusta despite the low price it received, however, he observed that his yields were quite low in comparison to those of farmers at lower altitudes; in 2019 he harvested 750 kilos while some farmers from lower altitudes harvested 4 to 6 tons. He also mentioned that although Nestlé purchases robusta, the company did not offer plants or other agricultural supplies to farmers of high altitudes.

In contrast to Gonzalo who preferred not to sell to the local buyer, Manuel sold all his production to the local buyer. Manuel informed that he knew CASEMEX and EGOS offered a higher price than the local buyer, but he would have to take his coffee to their collection centres which were located in Tapachula, 40 kilometres from El Platanar; this would involve an unreasonable cost. He added that he did not sell to these companies because his coffee did not meet Nestlé’s quality standards (percentage of yield, moisture, and defects). For these reasons, Manuel continued to sell to local buyers, as he expressed:

*“If we go to Tapachula, the collection centres will tell us that the coffee does not meet moisture and defect levels, and since I need to pay for transportation, I end up losing out. I sell my coffee in the community because the local buyer will buy my coffee in whatever condition it’s in, but I know he won’t offer a good price. Local traders have absorbed us, we’re caught in the middle, and we can’t get out”* (Manuel, personal communication, El Platanar, 17 January 2020).

These cases indicate that different types of farmers sell to local buyers and that all are aware that this marketing channel offers very low prices. However, these contrast the different ways in which farmers of different social classes relate to local buyers. As the petty commodity producer, has a more profitable marketing option with his coffee shop, the local buyer is his last option. By contrast, the local buyer is the semi-proletarian’s only option as he does not produce high-quality coffee because he lacks the labour required to cultivate arabica, and cannot meet the transportation cost involved in accessing higher-paying marketing options.

Hence, while both farmers interact with local buyers, the semi-proletarian's conditions of incorporation into this channel are much more disadvantageous than those of the petty commodity producer.

### *Direct Marketing*

Some Soconusco farmers process their coffee and sell it roasted (sometimes under their own brand name) directly to local supermarkets, restaurants, and coffee shops, as well as to the Tapachula bus terminal and airport. Additionally, some farmers send roasted coffee to other regions of Mexico. Our data reveals that while any farmer may participate in these markets, principally capitalist farmers and only occasionally petty commodity producers (see the case of Gonzalo above) manage to sell their coffee directly to such markets. The way in which farmers incorporate themselves into these profitable markets is illustrated by two capitalist farmers, César and Heriberto.

César cultivates 20 hectares of arabica coffee in the town of Unión Juárez mentioned above, located at an altitude of 1,300 metres. He indicated that he formerly sold to local traders, but that he had not been paid enough to cover costs: *“Producing a quintal of arabica cost me \$700 pesos [~\$36 dollars], but local buyers were paying \$300 pesos [~\$16 dollars]”*.<sup>61</sup> Given this low price, he decided to use savings to purchase a coffee roaster to add value to his product, and established direct contact with buyers from the states of Jalisco and Guanajuato (in central Mexico) to sell roasted coffee. Despite the additional labour required for cultivating arabica, he continues to produce the traditional variety bourbon, as he hires enough labourers to do so and his clients expect him to produce high-quality coffee. He commented that as a result of coffee rust, many nearby farmers began to cultivate robusta and that many at lower altitudes were actively participating in the Nescafé Plan. However, even if he were to be offered robusta plants free of charge, he would prefer to produce arabica and sell directly to buyers:

*“Farmers at lower altitudes are getting many benefits from Nestlé because of the free plants they’re receiving. But Nestlé is a marketing channel that doesn’t work for me. I process my coffee and deliver it directly to my clients. If I earn an extra peso, that peso is for me and not for anybody else. My dad used to say, ‘it’s better to be the head of a mouse than the tail of a lion’. In comparison to Nestlé, which is a monster, a transnational that makes millions, I’m a mouse, but I’m the head*

---

<sup>61</sup> One quintal is equivalent to 57.5 kilos of arabica parchment.

*of the mouse*” (César, personal communication, Unión Juárez, 10 November 2019).

Heriberto is a capitalist farmer who lives in Faja de Oro, located at an altitude of approximately 700 metres. He owns 10 hectares, in which he plants both arabica and robusta, at different altitudes. Of the two species he cultivates, he considers arabica to be the most important as he uses it to produce his own brand of coffee, *Montaña Azul* (Blue Mountain), which he sells roasted, whole or ground, to restaurants, coffee shops, and the Tapachula bus terminal and airport. He says that producing coffee without adding value is not profitable: “*If I sold arabica to the local buyer, I might get \$29 pesos per kilo [~\$1.50 dollars], but since I process it into ground coffee, I get \$160 pesos [~\$8.30 dollars] per kilo*”. Meanwhile, he sells his robusta coffee to Nestlé, and although this species is not his priority, he manages to obtain additional income from robusta by collecting it from other farmers to deliver it to CASEMEX and EGOS. For each kilo he collects, he keeps \$0.50–\$0.70 pesos (~\$0.03–\$0.04 dollars). Like most farmers in the area, Heriberto comments that he was affected by low coffee prices and coffee rust. Nonetheless, despite these challenges he is able to provide year-round employment to five people, as well as to ten additional families during the harvest. Furthermore, despite the low prices of coffee and coffee leaf rust, he has been able to expand his business; at the time of the interview, he was considering acquiring a freeze-drying machine to process his robusta into soluble coffee.

These cases indicate that directly accessing high-value markets provides high returns to farmers. However, they must have the capacity to produce high-quality coffee, mobilize large numbers of labourers, purchase processing equipment, and wait long periods before receiving payment. Of the 82 farmers interviewed, only seven access such markets, five of whom are capitalist farmers. Table 3 summarizes the findings for all marketing channels.

*Table 3. Summary of Interactions Between Different Types of Coffee Farmers and Marketing Channels*

<b>Marketing channel</b>	<b>Farmers analysed</b>	<b>Conditions of incorporation into the market</b>	<b>Assessment</b>
Nestlé	Petty commodity producer (Fernando) and capitalist farmer (Eliás)	Both cultivate robusta, considered to be of low quality, and are therefore paid less than for arabica. However, the inputs and services provided by Nestlé have allowed them to increase their income and prevent crop disease.	The capitalist farmer receives special treatment, and thus has an advantageous condition of incorporation.
Farmer orgs.	Petty commodity producer (Alejandro) and semi-proletarian (Orlando)	Both cultivate at an altitude suitable for robusta and arabica. The petty commodity producer cultivates arabica, has access to more profitable markets, has the labour to produce organically and control rust, and can wait to be paid. The semi-proletarian cannot meet the requirements of farmer organizations and requires cash immediately, and therefore cultivates robusta and sells through a less advantageous marketing channel (the local buyer).	The semi-proletarian has a less favourable condition of incorporation than the petty commodity producer.
Local buyers	Semi-proletarian (Manuel) and petty commodity producer (Gonzalo)	Both sell to a local buyer. However, as the petty commodity producer sells arabica at his own coffee shop, he uses the local buyer as a last resort. He is able to hire the labour to produce arabica and can wait to be paid. For the semi-proletarian, who produces low-quality coffee (robusta) and lacks the income to cover transportation to reach more profitable markets, the local buyer is his first option.	The semi-proletarian has a less favourable condition than the petty commodity producer.
Direct marketing	Two capitalist farmers (César and Heriberto)	They have access to highly profitable markets because they have the labour and capital to produce high-quality coffee and to process it, and can wait to receive payment.	Capitalist farmers have a favourable position.

## Discussion

This chapter mentioned that many development agencies assume that smallholders will be benefitted by *greater incorporation* into the market (Arias et al., 2013; Donovan & Poole, 2014; FAO, 2020; Gómez et al., 2020; Michelson, 2020; OECD & FAO, 2019; World Bank, 2007, 2020). However, some scholars of the global value chain approach have warned that farmers may be *adversely incorporated*, and that rather than aiming for *greater incorporation*, development interventions should address the *terms* or *conditions* by which farmers are incorporated into the market (Bolwig et al., 2010; Ponte, 2008).

We complemented the global value chain approach by incorporating a political economy perspective regarding social differentiation. Our analysis of four marketing channels—Nestlé, farmer organizations, local buyers, and direct marketing—indicated that farmers’ experience with these channels varied according to their social class—capitalist farmers, petty commodity producers, and semi-proletarians (see Table 3 for summary). We argue that farmers relate differently to different marketing channels and that to illustrate this, is necessary to carry out an empirical study that rather than focusing on the mechanisms of the value chain at the global level, addresses: 1) the particular workings of markets at the local level (quality standards and payment and services offered); 2) distribution and control over farmers’ means of production (land and labour); and 3) the region’s specific environmental conditions (altitude, coffee species and varieties, and crop diseases).

Nevertheless, the findings of our case study lead to a new theoretical and practical conundrum. Rather than concluding that any specific social category of farmers is typically linked to a specific type of marketing channel, we found that more than one category of farmers participates in each of the various marketing channels. Furthermore, we may not conclude that a given social class does not relate to a particular marketing channel; for instance, while we found semi-proletarians are less likely to establish direct marketing than capitalist farmers (who tend to have more options which allow them to bypass local buyers), this is not a hard and fast rule. Hence, while the categories employed here provide a more dynamic understanding of interactions between local farmers and marketing channels, they should not be employed in a reductionist sense.

The second issue in our discussion concerns interventions by the Mexican state to support smallholder farmers. First, we argue that classifying coffee producers based on the size of their farm, as commonly carried out by the Mexican state (and many development organizations), fails to take into account multiple differences among farmers. We mentioned that *Sembrando Vida* targets farmers with 2.5 to 20 hectares, and *Producción para el Bienestar* targets those with less than 20 hectares, with no lower limit. We then presented the cases of eight farmers enrolled in one of these two programmes (Elías and César with 20 hectares each; Heriberto with 10; Gonzalo with 6.5; Fernando and Alejandro with 3; and Manuel and Orlando with 1 hectare each). Our data showed that despite the fact that the state relates to these farmers based on a single factor (size of landholding), their control over their means of production (land and labour) and the way in which these farmers relate to the market vary significantly. Some farmers not only make a living from farming but also invest in other aspects of the coffee value chain, as is the case of capitalist farmers and petty commodity producers; while others—semi-proletarians—must sell their labour to sustain themselves and their families. Furthermore, we observe that the target population of both programmes contradicts their pro-poor discourse. As *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar* target farmers with up to 20 hectares, they end up supporting farmers who already enjoy *advantageous* conditions of incorporation into markets (as shown in Table 3). However, as *Sembrando Vida* has a minimum requirement of 2.5 hectares, it ends up excluding impoverished farmers from a subsidy that might significantly improve their livelihoods.

Finally, we argue that the manner by which the Mexican state attempts to incorporate small farmers into the market is problematic as it is principally focused on one type of marketing channel—the organic market. Our analysis showed that in Soconusco, farmers encounter multiple marketing options (Nestlé, farmer organizations, local buyers, and direct marketing), and while we found that organic production is attractive to some farmers, we also found that for many farmers, producing organically was not their principal strategy. For instance, robusta farmers of lower altitudes who sell to Nestlé were happy to cultivate in a more sustainable manner, but did not consider becoming organic, and many arabica farmers at higher altitudes had lost interest in organic cultivation as coffee leaf rust is difficult to control without pesticides. Given that not every type of

farmer is able to fulfil the requirements of the organic market, we urge development interventions to shift from a paradigm aimed at incorporating farmers into a *predefined* market to one that considers the workings of multiple marketing channels and the varied ways in which farmers of different social classes interact with these channels.



# Más De Lo mismo

Gobierno acuerda con grandes empresas Nestlé  
Pero no escucha a los pequeños productores de cafe  
Veracruz

Photo by Sergio Hernández Vega

## Chapter 3. Arabica, Robusta, and the Narrative of Quality Coffee<sup>62</sup>

### Introduction

Two principal coffee species are consumed worldwide: arabica, which is considered to be of high quality, and robusta, which is considered to be of lower quality. In Mexico, the state, coffee farmer organizations, and many scholars regard production of arabica as an ideal development pathway for small farmers, particularly when produced for organic and fair-trade markets (Bartra Vergés et al., 2011; CNOOC, 2019t; Escamilla et al., 2005; Martínez-Torres, 2008; Martínez-Torres & Rosset, 2014; Moguel & Toledo, 1999; Renard & Pérez-Grovas, 2007; SAGARPA et al., 2005). Mexico's support for high-quality production coincides with that of global value chain scholars who urge companies and farmers to generate products with greater value to confront global competition (Humphrey, 2006; Humphrey & Navas-Alemán, 2010) and with coffee specialists who have analysed the workings of the coffee value chain on a global level and who advise farmers to produce high-quality coffee to confront low coffee prices (Daviron & Ponte, 2005; Fischer, 2022; Ponte, 2002).

Nevertheless, despite the prevalence of this narrative focused on high-quality coffee production in Mexico, a shift to lower-quality production has also taken place in the country. This has occurred following an active campaign by the transnational food and beverage firm Nestlé, that in 2010 implemented the Nescafé Plan to enable robusta farmers—principally of the state of Veracruz and the Soconusco region of Chiapas—to increase their production with high-yield plants (Nestlé, 2018c). Although many coffee farmer organizations have vehemently campaigned against the expansion of robusta and Nestlé within Mexico (CNOOC, 2019d), robusta farmers and some functionaries and agronomists have perceived this expansion as a solution to decreases in yield of arabica resulting from coffee leaf rust.

This chapter discusses the political battle among the state, coffee farmer organizations, Nestlé, and robusta farmers regarding production of arabica versus robusta. To comprehend this conflict, we go beyond the technical characteristics

---

<sup>62</sup> This chapter has been co-authored with Kees Jansen and Sietze Vellema and will be submitted to a scientific journal.

of each species to unpack the *politics*<sup>63</sup> of the coffee sector in Mexico by analysing the following: 1) how support mechanisms provided by the state and the coffee processing industry for these species have evolved over time; 2) why coffee farmer organizations have opposed robusta and Nestlé; and 3) ways in which robusta farmers have interacted with Nestlé in Soconusco. This analysis aims to understand how collaboration and antagonism around each species shape coffee policies in Mexico and identify implications of high versus low-quality production for small farmers' livelihoods and development interventions.

Our analysis is based on data obtained through semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Interviews were carried out with eight representatives of national and regional coffee organizations who oppose robusta production and 61 farmers of Soconusco who cultivate robusta and receive supplies from Nestlé. This was complemented by interviews with staff of the *Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural* (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development [SADER]) and the *Secretaría de Bienestar* (Ministry of Well-being [BIENESTAR]) at the local and federal and levels; researchers of the *Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Forestales, Agrícolas y Pecuarias* (National Institute of Forestry, Crop Agriculture, and Livestock Research [INIFAP]); Nestlé staff; and researchers with expertise on coffee. Most data were obtained in 2019, soon after President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) took office, and therefore reflect the transition into his administration.

This chapter is structured as follows. The following section explores the history of arabica and robusta in Mexico, describing how the state has actively supported arabica cultivation and how Nestlé became a key player in robusta production. The third section illustrates why coffee farmer organizations have opposed expansion of Nestlé and robusta and the ways in which these organizations have strongly manifested their opposition. The fourth section explores why many Soconusco farmers transitioned from arabica to robusta decades ago, and the effects of the Nescafé Plan for robusta farmers of this region. The final section discusses the implications of our findings for Mexican coffee policies and for development interventions focused on production of high-quality coffee.

---

<sup>63</sup> We use Leftwich's (2000) definition of politics as "*all the activities of conflict, cooperation, and negotiation involved in the use, production and distribution of resources, whether material or ideal, whether at the local, national, or international levels, or whether in the private or public domain*".

## **Historical Expansion of Two Coffee Species and Their Support Mechanisms**

Arabica was the first coffee species introduced to Mexico, and cultivation of this species has predominated ever since (currently accounting for 95% of all coffee produced nationwide; Cámara de Diputados & CEDRSSA, 2019; FIRA, 2016). Therefore, most state policies have focused on this species. By contrast, robusta production has been promoted mainly by Nestlé to manufacture instant coffee. This section illustrates how coffee policies focused on arabica production have evolved over time, and then illustrates the expansion of robusta and Nestlé within Mexico.

### *State Policies Focused on Arabica Production*

Since coffee was introduced to Mexico in 1795 (González Jácome, 2004; Martínez-Torres, 2003), the country has experienced three principal phases of state support. The first phased lasted from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century until the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. During this period state measures were focused on expanding coffee production, including providing incentives to acquire land and tax exemption to farmers producing large quantities of coffee, as well as improving railways, roads, and ports to facilitate its shipping (Avella Alaminos, 2002; Rodríguez Centeno, 2004). During this period, coffee production increased from 70,000 sacks in 1882 to 505,000 in 1909, leading the country to become the world's third largest coffee producer (Pérez Akaki, 2013b). Nevertheless, this phase of state support started to decline during the 1910 Mexican Revolution when workers demanded improved labour conditions as well as land distribution (INEHRM, n.d.). Support waned even further with the 1929 international financial crisis (the Great Depression), which led to a drastic decline in coffee prices (Anderzén et al., 2020; Venegas Sandoval et al., 2020).

In the late 1950s, the Mexican state entered a new phase characterized by a high level of intervention to increase productivity. During this period, the *Instituto Mexicano del Café* (Mexican Coffee Institute [INMECAFE]) supplied farmers with high-yield coffee varieties, encouraging them to plant in high-density monocultures with increased use of fertilizer (Martínez-Torres, 2003; Nestel, 1995). This institute was also in charge of meeting the production quota assigned to Mexico by the International Coffee Agreement (ICA); collecting and processing coffee; and promoting organization of farmers into *Unidades*

*Económicas de Producción y Comercialización* (Economic Units of Production and Marketing [UEPC]; Pérez Akaki, 2013a; Rodríguez Padrón, 2012). While the state had principally supported larger farmers during the coffee boom of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, INMECAFE focused on small farmers who had received land during the land redistribution promoted by president Lázaro Cárdenas in the late 1930s (INEHRM, n.d.).

This phase of high level of state intervention ended in the late 1980s upon termination of the ICA and dismantling of INMECAFE. The ICA was terminated in July 1989 as a result of disagreements between coffee-producing and consuming countries (Renard, 1992), leading to one of the most drastic declines in coffee prices ever: from an average of \$1.10 dollars per pound from January to June 1989, to \$0.70 dollars per pound in October 1989 (Lewis & Runsten, 2005; Renard, 1999). Meanwhile, in September 1989, INMECAFE was dismantled by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994) under the argument of inefficient and costly operation, as well as corruption (Hernández, 1990; Hernández Navarro & Celis Callejas, 1992; Renard, 1992).

Another phase began with the dismantling of INMECAFE and has lasted until recent years. Throughout this period, the state has established a variety of programmes to provide coffee farmers with plants, fertilizer, and technical assistance; offer financial compensation when coffee prices are low; and promote consumption of Mexican coffee (SAGARPA et al., 2005; SAGARPA & FAO, 2004). Furthermore, since INMECAFE was dismantled, the state has established councils to develop policies through consensus among several actors in the value chain, including farmer organizations, traders, roasters, and the Ministry of Agriculture. These councils include the *Consejo Mexicano del Café* (Mexican Coffee Council) which operated from 1993 to 2004 and the *Sistema Producto Café* (Coffee Product System) which has operated since 2005 (Rodríguez Padrón, 2012; SAGARPA et al., 2005). Furthermore, in 2006, the Mexican state established the *Asociación Mexicana de la Cadena Productiva del Café* (Mexican Coffee Value Chain Association [AMECAFE]) to support the Ministry of Agriculture in implementing coffee programmes (AMECAFE, 2012).

During this phase, coffee policies have aimed not only to increase productivity, but also to improve quality. For instance, during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the *Programa de Retiro de Cafés de Calidades Inferiores* (Programme to

Withdraw Inferior Quality Coffee) aimed to eliminate the 5% lowest quality coffee from the market, and the *Programa de Reconversión Productiva* (Programme of Productive Reconversion) encouraged farmers below 600 metres in altitude to convert their coffee plots to other crops (DOF, 2002b; SAGARPA et al., 2005). However, these programmes were not well-accepted by farmers and traders, and therefore the state began to promote improvement of coffee quality by providing incentives for farmers to replace older plants and introduce higher-quality varieties (Pérez Akaki, 2013a; SAGARPA & FAO, 2006). In addition, through the technical assistance provided by AMECAFE, the state has stimulated farmers to produce speciality coffee, considered to be of high quality (AMECAFE, 2012).

Furthermore, since the passing of the 2001 *Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable* (Sustainable Rural Development Law) to foment preservation and rational use of natural resources (DOF, 2001), state programmes have promoted organic production as one aspect of improving quality. For example, the 2011 *Programa Fomento Productivo del Café* (Programme for Promotion of Coffee Production) provided a greater subsidy to organic farmers than to conventional farmers, and the 2013 *PROCAFE e Impulso Productivo al Café* (Programme PROCAFE and Productive Fomentation of Coffee) covered 70% of costs of organic certification (DOF, 2011, 2013; SADER, 2018b). The programmes *Sembrando Vida* (Sowing Life) and *Producción para el Bienestar* (Production for Well-being) under the current AMLO administration have also encouraged farmers to incorporate agroecological practices and reduce agrochemical use (DOF, 2019a, 2019b).

Nevertheless, despite state efforts to improve the quality of coffee, coffee leaf rust has limited implementation of such policies. For instance, when an abnormal proliferation in 2012–2013 decreased national coffee yields by 30% (Barrera, n.d.; Barrera et al., 2013), the Ministry of Agriculture responded by distributing introgressed varieties including *oro azteca* and *marsellesa*,<sup>64</sup> which are more resistant to rust but of lower quality than the so-called *traditional varieties* (SAGARPA, 2016; SADER, 2019a; Venegas Sandoval et al., 2020; WCR, n.d., 2019). Despite this challenge, the state has maintained its policy goal of improving the quality of Mexican coffee.

---

<sup>64</sup> *Oro azteca* is Mexican variety belonging to the catimor group that is rust-resistant, and according to the World Coffee Research (WCR, 2019), has a “high” yield potential, and produces “good” quality coffee. *Marsellesa*, which belongs to the sarchimor group, has similar characteristics.

### *Operation of Nestlé in Mexico and the Expansion of Robusta*

Since establishing operations in Mexico in 1930, Nestlé has implemented a variety of initiatives to promote production and collection of milk, maize, coffee, and cocoa through the *Compromiso Lácteo* (Dairy Commitment), *Plan Maíz por México* (Maize Plan for Mexico), the Nescafé Plan, and the Cocoa Plan, respectively (Nestlé, n.d.\*a, n.d.\*b). Nestlé has also implemented programmes to improve nutrition (especially of children and the elderly), support women in establishing businesses, provide youth with professional experience, and reduce energy use (Ganar-Ganar, n.d.; IPADE Business School, 2019; Nestlé, n.d.\*a). Currently in Mexico, Nestlé employs more than 16,000 people, produces more than 1,600 products under 50 brand names, and has 18 factories (Nestlé, n.d.\*a).

With respect to coffee, since 2010 the Nescafé Plan has been implemented in different Mexican states, including Chiapas, Veracruz, Oaxaca, Guerrero and Puebla (Nestlé, 2015), although farmers have more actively participated in low altitudes areas of Veracruz and the Soconusco region of Chiapas, where principally robusta is cultivated. Through this programme, the company has provided farmers with in vitro plants, especially of robusta, that are higher yielding, resistant to coffee leaf rust, and may be planted at higher densities. The programme has also provided technical assistance for farmers to improve their production and introduce sustainable practices aligned with the 4C certification, including reducing agrochemical use and preserving rivers and forests, as well as eliminating child labour (4C, n.d.; Nestlé, 2011b, 2018c).

Besides implementing the Nescafé Plan, Nestlé has installed two factories to process coffee for national markets as well as international markets including the United States, Central America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Japan (Nestlé, 2013). The first factory was established in 1961 in the industrial city of Toluca (approximately 70 kilometres from Mexico City) and was expanded in 2013 during the administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–2018; GOB, 2013; SAGARPA, 2013). Products made in this factory include Nescafé Clásico, Nescafé Decaf, Nescafé Dolca, Nescafé Protect, and Nescafé Cappuccino (Nestlé, 2013). The second factory was announced in December 2018 by AMLO and Nestlé CEO Fausto Costa, and inaugurated in Veracruz in July 2022 (GOB, 2018b; Nestlé, 2018c, 2022). Upon announcing the plan to build this factory, the Mexican state and Nestlé indicated that it would become the world's largest instant coffee factory,

capable of processing 20,000 tons of green coffee annually; that it would involve an investment of \$154 million dollars to build; and that it would provide 1,200 direct and 12,000 indirect jobs in Mexico (GOB, 2018b; Nestlé, 2018c, 2019). However, upon inauguration, Nestlé updated that \$340 million dollars had been invested, and that the factory would be capable of processing 40,000 tons of green coffee annually (Nestlé, 2022).

### **Opposition by Coffee Farmer Organizations to Robusta and Nestlé's Expansion**

During fieldwork, we identified that coffee farmer organizations strongly opposed Nestlé's expansion in Mexico as well as increased robusta production. This opposition was expressed in interviews with representatives of farmer organizations and public protests, and identified in analysis of social media (especially CNOC's Facebook page) and opinion articles published principally by *La Jornada* (Mexico's leading leftist newspaper, which generally supports grassroots movements). This section presents those coffee farmer organizations which have led opposition to robusta and Nestlé, and the reasons for such opposition. It then illustrates the tense relationship that emerged between coffee farmer organizations and the state as a result of the announcement of the plan to construct Nestlé's Veracruz factory in 2018.

#### *Coffee Farmer Organizations Leading Opposition to Expansion of Robusta and Nestlé*

Those farmer organizations that have led the opposition to robusta production and to Nestlé's expansion in Mexico currently participate actively in formulation of federal coffee policies. These include: the *Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras* (National Coordinator of Coffee Organizations [CNOC]), the largest coffee farmer organization in the country and one of the main promoters of organic arabica production; the *Unión Nacional de Productores de Café* (National Union of Coffee Producers [UNPC]), member of the *Confederación Nacional Campesina* (National Peasant Confederation [CNC]); the *Coalición Nacional de Organizaciones de Productores de Café* (National Coalition of Organizations of Coffee Producers [CONAPROCAFE]), active in the states of Puebla, Hidalgo, Chiapas, Veracruz, and Oaxaca; and the *Consejo Regional del*

*Café de Coatepec* (Regional Coffee Council of Coatepec) of Veracruz, which promotes local organic coffee (Aguirre, 2005; Sánchez Juárez, 2015).<sup>65</sup>

These organizations strongly opposed robusta and Nestlé due to a variety of reasons. First, they observed that the price of arabica was already very low and assured that given an overproduction of robusta, the price of both arabica and robusta would further decrease. Regarding the low price of arabica, the representatives of farmer organizations interviewed pointed out that during the 2018–2019 harvest season, farmers were paid approximately \$1,500 pesos (~\$78 dollars) per quintal of arabica parchment coffee (57.5 kg); they stated this is half the price that farmers require to obtain even a small profit (\$3,000 pesos or ~\$156 dollars; CNOC, 2019a). Regarding the influence of robusta production on the price of arabica, the representatives of farmer organizations assured that although arabica and robusta are different species, the total production of coffee (both arabica and robusta) has a significant impact on the price of each species.<sup>66</sup> These representatives were greatly concerned that during the 2018–2019 coffee cultivation cycle there was a surplus of 10 million sacks, 6 million of which were robusta, mainly produced by Brazil and Vietnam (CNOC, 2019g, 2019m).

A second criticism concerned the price that Nestlé pays to farmers and the Nescafé Plan. The representatives of farmer organizations interviewed stressed that Nestlé has historically controlled coffee prices “to the detriment of farmers”, and that rather than increasing the price of coffee, Nestlé justifies its prices by referring to the stock market, as if the company were unable to regulate its prices. Farmer organizations complained that no institution regulates the price that Nestlé pays to farmers nor the consumer price of its products (CNOC, 2019b, 2019i). Furthermore, the representatives stated that rather than a development project, the Nescafé Plan was a “political discourse” that “exploited” farmers; they

---

<sup>65</sup> Many academics and directors of civic associations supported their movement, including Armando Bartra, researcher of the *Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana* (Metropolitan Autonomous University; Bartra, 2019b), Isabel Cruz, director of the *Asociación Mexicana de Uniones de Crédito del Sector Social* (Mexican Association of Credit Unions of the Social Sector; Cruz Hernández, 2019), and Fernando Morales de la Cruz, founder of *Café for Change* (Mérida, 2018). Based on personal interviews, we identified that AMECAFE and the *Sistema Producto Café* also backed opposition by coffee farmer organizations.

<sup>66</sup> Understanding whether total production of robusta affects the price of arabica requires studying the workings of the stock market, which is beyond the scope of this study. However, this data is shown to illustrate the arguments of farmer organizations that oppose robusta production.

assured that this project provided no benefits for farmers in terms of their livelihood (Desinformémonos, 2018).

A third criticism concerned the Nestlé model of coffee production. The representatives of farmer organizations stated that the high levels of chemical fertilizer required to cultivate Nestlé's plants damage soil fertility, and that the company's recommendation of planting monocultures and reducing shade trees threatens biodiversity. This starkly contrasts with the traditional form of coffee cultivation based on indigenous knowledge and preservation of biodiversity that farmer organizations claim to promote. Additionally, they pointed out that Nestlé's practice of in vitro production of plantlets in specialized laboratories provides the company with greater control over production, arguing that farmers should have complete control over production and reproduction of plants, including seed selection.

The fourth criticism concerned Nestlé's products. Coffee farmer organizations consider arabica to be a higher-quality species than robusta but lament that as a result of Nestlé's mass marketing campaigns and lack of consumer awareness regarding the low quality of robusta, consumption of instant coffee has drastically increased in comparison to high-quality arabica coffee. The representatives of farmer organizations also pointed to the low nutritional values of Nestlé's products, providing the example of a 20-gram bag of Nestlé Cappuccino, which sells for the low price of \$7.70 pesos (~\$0.40 dollars) but contains only 7% coffee, 42% sugar, and unspecified percentages of milk, artificial flavourings, and preservatives (CNOc, 2019d). Using this example, in its social media, CNOc argued that Nestlé considers Mexico to be a "poor country with a taste for sugar and a population in need of cheap products", further criticizing the fact that Nestlé carries out "educational" programmes to introduce its products to schools despite the tremendous problem of obesity in Mexico.

In general, those representatives of farmer organizations interviewed conceive of the industry and farmer organizations as being antagonistic, as one representative expressed:

*"The interests of coffee farmer organizations and Nestlé are incompatible. The company wants robusta and instant coffee, and we, organizations, want arabica and roasted coffee. We have worked for many years producing certified organic arabica coffee and farmers are better off when they participate in this market"*

(Representative of a farmer organization, personal communication, Mexico City, 21 January 2019).

*The Tense Relationship Between the State and Farmer Organizations During the First Year of the AMLO Administration*

A few days after the Mexican state announced Nestlé's plan to establish a factory in Veracruz (GOB, 2018b), the state published the 2019 *Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación* (Federation Expenditure Budget) which indicated a significant reduction for the coffee sector: from \$783 million pesos in 2018 (~\$41 million dollars) to \$346 million pesos in 2019 (~\$18 million dollars; DOF, 2017b, 2018). This provoked strong opposition by coffee farmer organizations, which considered state support for Nestlé accompanied by a budget reduction for coffee farmers to be contradictory to AMLO's supposed "anti-neoliberal project" (CNOOC, 2018; Gómez, 2018, 2019). Through a variety of media (CNOOC's Facebook page, articles in *La Jornada*, etc.) farmer organizations expressed their grievances, and demanded to hold a meeting with SADER staff to discuss their position.

Federal SADER officials as well as those of the state of Veracruz responded to organizations' criticisms by arguing the importance of the new Nestlé processing plant. In a January 2019 press conference, federal Minister of Agriculture Víctor Villalobos Arámbula voiced his support for the Nestlé factory, claiming the absence of competition between growers of the two species since robusta is cultivated at low altitudes and is used for instant coffee, while arabica is cultivated at higher altitudes (800 to 1,300 metres) and is directed to a different market (SDPnoticias, 2019). In an interview with *La Jornada*, Jorge Carmelo Pérez Sanfilippo, Director of Coffee of the *Secretaría de Desarrollo Agropecuario, Rural y Pesca* (Ministry of Agricultural, Rural, and Fishing Development) in Veracruz, also defended Nestlé (Moreno Alvarado, 2018). He assured that the company would pay fair prices to farmers and manifested his approval of construction of the plant that would be accompanied by cultivation of an initial 20,000 hectares of robusta (later to be expanded to 80,000 hectares), at altitudes below 500 metres above sea level, with a projected yield of 50 quintals per hectare (Gobierno de Veracruz, 2019; Moreno Alvarado, 2018).

Farmer organizations rejected these arguments in favour of the Nestlé plant. One representative interviewed stated that given that Villalobos had economic

interests in the industry, he failed to acknowledge the harm caused by promoting robusta, and that Pérez was a bureaucrat who wrongly claimed supposed benefits of Nescafé. As farmer organizations were not successful in obtaining the meeting they had requested with SADER, they organized a public protest in Xalapa, Veracruz on 15 January 2019, where they presented the following demands: 1) that SADER provide \$1,800 million *pesos* (~\$93 million dollars) to the coffee sector in compensation for low coffee prices, including \$2,000 *pesos* (~\$104 dollars) per hectare for each of the 500,000 hectares throughout Mexico's coffee-producing regions (CNOOC, 2019p); 2) that SADER provide \$1,200 million *pesos* (~\$62 million dollars) for the coffee programme that was being formulated to support renovation and maintenance of coffee plantations; 3) that the state not support robusta production and that a public consultation be held in each of Mexico's ten coffee producing regions before continuing Nestlé's factory (CNOOC, 2019n, 2019t; Gómez, 2018); and 4) that the state defend farmers from the industry, as one representative of a coffee farmer organization expressed:

*"We demand that the state get its act together, and that it become the voice of farmers in the face of multinational companies, that it defend us from the industry that is malevolently linked to the stock market, to speculators who don't know anything about the sector, and don't care about farmers. We demand that the state face this problem. It's not fair that the state leaves the farmers by themselves in front of this capitalism that only aims to win over everybody"* (Representative of a farmer organization, personal communication, Xalapa, Veracruz, 10 April 2019).

As a result of this protest, coffee farmer organizations obtained a meeting with SADER on 18 January 2019. A CNOOC (2019s) Facebook post informed that in this meeting, SADER had promised to provide a budget of \$780 million *pesos* (~\$40 million dollars) to the coffee sector, which was greater than the \$346 million *pesos* (~\$18 million dollars) initially assigned, but lower than the \$1,200 million *pesos* (~\$62 million dollars) that organizations had requested in the Xalapa protest for the coffee programme. This Facebook post also reported that SADER lacked funds to compensate farmers for low coffee prices, but that SADER staff had said they would inquire into the matter with the *Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público* (Ministry of Finance and Public Loans). Furthermore, it informed that SADER had stated that the incoming AMLO administration aimed to deliver subsidies directly

to farmers rather than through their organizations, but that it was not yet certain how this change would be carried out. By then, both parties had agreed to continue to work together on these issues.

As a result of this meeting, coffee farmer organizations were slightly appeased; however, they observed that the state continued to defend Nestlé's investment. For instance, in one of AMLO's press talks, *La Mañanera* (The Early Morning) a reporter questioned AMLO as to why the state supported a factory that coffee farmers opposed, and why the coffee sector budget was lower than in previous years. AMLO responded by clearly defending Nestlé, but also assured that throughout his administration the state would support coffee farmers:

*"We need the investment, private, national, and foreign. I've always said that public investment is not enough to push the country forward. We need to grow. Don't you see what the International Monetary Fund says? That we're not going to grow! [with some sarcasm]. We need to grow [...] coffee farmers in Mexico, and this is my word, I rest my case, will receive support like never before in the history of the country [...] we're going to plant 1 million hectares with fruit and timber trees [...] 150,000 hectares will be for coffee"* (Rompeviento TV, 2019).

Although AMLO stated that he would support coffee farmers "like never before", coffee farmers did not embrace this message due to the fact that his statement implied that rather than supporting coffee farmers through the Ministry of Agriculture as in past decades, it would support them through the recently announced programme *Sembrando Vida* operated by BIENESTAR, with which they had no relationship. Furthermore, regarding AMLO's talk, the representatives of farmer organizations criticized that by Nestlé making an initial investment of \$154 million dollars in its processing plant, it was blackmailing the Mexican state to subsidize robusta plantations (CNOc, 2019e).

In the midst of this heated debate, coffee farmer organizations again met with SADER and BIENESTAR staff in February and March 2019. In these meetings, farmer organizations managed to modify several aspects of coffee policies. First, SADER and BIENESTAR committed to not using public subsidies for robusta production (CNOc, 2019u). Second, the coffee budget was increased from \$785 million pesos to \$1,400 million pesos (from ~\$41 million dollars to ~\$73 million dollars; CNOc, 2019v). Third, SADER announced the *Subcomponente Sustentabilidad y Bienestar para Pequeños Productores de Café* (Subcomponent for

Sustainability and Well-being for Small Coffee Producers [SUBICAFE]; SADER, 2019b), a programme similar to coffee programmes of previous administrations which provided plants, supplies, and technical assistance to farmers *through organizations*. These outcomes somewhat pleased the coffee sector, but not for long.

A few weeks after SUBICAFE was announced, SADER informed that the subsidies would be provided *directly* to farmers through bank cards and that farmer organizations would not be involved in the process. According to a later interview with a SADER staff member, this rule was applied “without exception”. This significantly upset the sector, which considered that upon bypassing farmer organizations, the state was overlooking their hard work over many years to benefit small farmers. Thus, in response, they organized a second protest in Xalapa, Veracruz on 10 April 2019 with the following demands: 1) that SADER provide subsidies *through farmer organizations*; 2) that SADER provide compensation for low coffee prices (which they had requested since the beginning of the administration, with no response); 3) that SADER support farmers in receiving higher prices from the industry; and 4) that SADER respect their previous agreement to abstain from subsidizing robusta production (CNOOC, 2019c).

In contrast to the relatively positive outcome that farmer organizations obtained from the first protest—including a higher budget for the coffee sector—the months following the second protest were characterized by increasing friction between the organizations and SADER. In May 2019, SADER announced that coffee farmers receiving support from SUBICAFE would be transferred to *Producción para el Bienestar* (DOF, 2019d)—SADER’s main programme. However, as the administration did not trust the veracity of SUBICAFE’s list of beneficiaries because it had been drawn up on applications made by farmer organizations, SADER had to validate the accuracy of the list with the help of the *servidores de la nación* (Servants of the Nation)—a set of authorities created by AMLO to help implement social programmes. While coffee farmer organizations agreed with the need to validate the list of beneficiaries, they denounced that SADER at the state level (particularly in Veracruz) and the *servidores de la nación* validated or rejected farmers based on political interests (CNOOC, 2019k). As SADER would not provide the subsidy to farmers until the list of beneficiaries was updated, it did not initiate

payment until September 2019, after the time had passed when these funds would have been invested in weeding, pruning, and applying fertilizer (CNOOC, 2019r).

Friction between the state and coffee farmer organizations heightened at the end of 2019, when farmer organizations identified that robusta farmers were receiving public subsidies in Veracruz and Soconusco. The representatives of farmer organizations denounced that *Sembrando Vida* staff directed subsidies to robusta farmers under “the pretext” of reforestation, and assured that with this, the state was “killing the chicken that lays the golden egg”; they reiterated their demand that BIENESTAR not subsidize robusta (SPC et al., 2019). While BIENESTAR did not respond publicly, a SADER staff member interviewed stated that if farmers wished to produce robusta they were free to do so, adding that Nestlé did not receive any public funding from the state.

By the end of 2019, SADER staff assured that despite their discrepancies with the coffee sector throughout that year, the state was directing all its efforts to support coffee farmers. Nevertheless, for farmer organizations, the state’s actions in 2019 represented a “true failure” with respect to support of coffee farmers and evidenced that the industry “dictated coffee policies” (CNOOC, 2019j, 2019f).

### **The Relationship Between Robusta Farmers and Nestlé**

The anti-robusta position of coffee farmer organizations was little represented in our interviews with farmers of the Soconusco region of Chiapas. Rather, we identified that farmers were quite engaged with robusta production and appeared to have a positive relationship with Nestlé through the Nescafé Plan. To illustrate this, this section describes how decades ago Soconusco farmers had transitioned from arabica to either *traditional* or *improved* robusta, and then illustrates how the Nescafé Plan operates in the region and how robusta farmers perceive this Plan.

#### *Transition From Arabica to Robusta in Soconusco*

During fieldwork, we were informed that Soconusco farmers of low altitudes (below 700 metres) had transitioned from arabica to either traditional or improved robusta 30 to 40 years ago. Three main factors explained this transition. First, when coffee leaf rust first appeared in the area in the late 1980s, many coffee plots were greatly affected and despite a campaign by the Ministry of Agriculture

to combat the fungus, many farmers were unable to recover their trees.<sup>67</sup> Farmers explained that since then, a large majority of farmers have either totally or partially transitioned to robusta, as it is much more rust resistant than arabica.

The second factor explaining farmers' shift from arabica to robusta was the low quality of arabica cultivated at low altitudes, which generally resulted in lower prices. Farmers informed that until the 1980s, they cultivated arabica at low altitudes regardless of its quality, but in the 1990s the international market raised coffee standards and the Mexican state began to recommend that arabica be cultivated only at higher altitudes. While farmers were aware that robusta is of lower quality than arabica and its price tends to be lower, they considered that since robusta yields higher volumes, its lower price is compensated by its higher yield.

A third factor in the transition from arabica to robusta was the amount of labour involved. Many farmers indicated that in contrast to arabica which is sold as parchment coffee in Soconusco, local farmers sell robusta as cherries. They indicated that arabica involves more labour because farmers must harvest the cherries, remove the pulp and mucilage, and dry the coffee beans, while with robusta farmers simply harvest and dry the cherries. Furthermore, farmers indicated that with robusta fewer harvests are required as buyers are less strict regarding its quality and are therefore more tolerant of unripe cherries. They also stated that in contrast to arabica which has few cherries per branch which must be removed very carefully to avoid affecting its quality, a robusta branch contains many cherries which may be removed with little effort. For these reasons (acceptance of green cherries, greater volume per branch, and less work to remove cherries), farmers pick robusta once or twice during the harvest season, while arabica is harvested 4 to 6 times per season. Farmers also indicated that both traditional and improved robusta are much easier to harvest because they mature during the relatively dry months (November to January), while arabica matures during the rainy season (August to October), and it is more difficult to find labourers willing to work in the rain. Finally, farmers specified that during the

---

<sup>67</sup> Some farmers expressed that despite this campaign, the state failed to properly combat coffee rust; these farmers considered that the disease should have been handled as an emergency but that public functionaries attempted to minimize the seriousness of the problem to prevent damaging Mexico's coffee production image.

rainy season labourers are pressured to work faster as the rain may cause the cherries to fall to the ground, reducing the quality of the coffee.

Some farmers mentioned that they lacked family members able to tend to their coffee and struggled to find labour as Guatemalans, formerly their principal source of labour, have returned to their country due to a less favourable exchange rate between Mexico and Guatemala. Thus, arabica—which requires more labour—is more difficult for them to cultivate. Some farmers also stated that producing arabica was not viable given that due to low coffee prices they struggled to cover its high labour cost. Farmers did mention a few drawbacks to robusta with respect to labour, for example that it produces more suckers that must be removed. However, taking into account the entire process from cultivation to sale, most farmers agreed that robusta requires less labour.

Based on interviews carried out in Soconusco, we identified that cultivating arabica is no longer a viable option for lowland farmers, as one robusta farmer expresses:

*“As a farmer, I’m in love with arabica and its production, but the love is over once you’re up to your neck in debt and unable to compete. In the lowlands of Soconusco, farmers are inclined to cultivate robusta, which is a more rustic species, but with it we can move forward”* (robusta farmer, personal communication, Cacahoatán, Chiapas, 25 March 2019).

#### *Operation of the Nescafé Plan in Soconusco*

Since 2010, the Nescafé Plan has operated throughout the lowlands of Soconusco, where robusta production has predominated. Implementation of this plan involved intensive propagation of Nestlé’s robusta plants—locally known as *clones*—which compared to traditional and improved robusta have higher yields, may be planted at higher densities, and are more resistant to coffee leaf rust (Nestlé, n.d.\*d, 2021).<sup>68</sup> To develop these cloned varieties, the Mexican research centre INIFAP located in Soconusco evaluated the adaptability of different coffee

---

<sup>68</sup> Nestlé (Club Pro, 2016) claims that as its coffee varieties are smaller than those formerly cultivated in the area, plant density may be increased from one plant every 4 metres to one plant every 2.5 metres, resulting in an increase of 625 to 1,600 plants per hectare. Nestlé (2021) also claims that with its varieties, farmers may double their yields in comparison to other varieties.

varieties<sup>69</sup> to Mexico's climatic conditions and developed a methodology for reproducing them on a large scale through somatic embryogenesis, (which involves reproduction of asexual cells in vitro), and vegetative reproduction through stem cuttings (Nestlé, 2011a). Subsequently, the biotechnology firm Agroindustrias Modernas (Modern Agroindustries [AGROMOD]) also located in Soconusco reproduced 30 million plants through somatic embryogenesis (Nestlé, 2011a).<sup>70</sup>

Implementation of the Nescafé Plan in Soconusco also involved establishment of a close relationship between Nestlé and the local companies *Cafés y Semillas de México* (Coffee and Seeds of Mexico [CASEMEX]) and *Exportadora de Granos y Oleaginosas del Sureste* (Exporter of Grains and Oilseeds of the Southeast [EGOS]). These companies have been in charge of providing farmers with Nestlé's plants<sup>71</sup> and supplies such as shade clothes and coffee sacks, and providing low-interest loans. CASEMEX and EGOS have been in charge of growing Nestlé's plantlets, processing coffee into green coffee, and providing technical assistance to farmers to meet Nestlé's quality standards: 60% of yield (conversion ratio from dry cherries to green coffee), 12% of moisture, and 18% of defects. The technical assistance provided by CASEMEX and EGOS has also supported farmers to carry out sustainable practices in order to obtain the 4C incentive (\$0.40–\$0.60 pesos; ~\$0.02–\$0.03 dollars per each kilo of robusta). CASEMEX and EGOS have also taught farmers to reproduce Nestlé's plants through stem cuttings.<sup>72</sup>

### *Farmers' Perceptions of Robusta and the Nescafé Plan*

Farmers informed us that when Nestlé arrived in Soconusco in 2010, they were quite sceptical of the Nescafé Plan because they were unfamiliar with clones and

---

<sup>69</sup> Nestlé has a collection of 72 robusta varieties, of which INIFAP selected four suited to Mexico's climatic conditions: FRT06, FRT07, FRT09, and FRT023 (Anacafé, n.d.; Nestlé, n.d.\*d).

<sup>70</sup> For INIFAP's and AGROMOD's research activities, Nestlé paid \$15 million dollars (Nestlé, 2011a; SADER, 2013).

<sup>71</sup> In the field, we found that while Nestlé fostered the formation of groups of farmers to receive plants, farmers could also deal with Nestlé on an individual basis. For instance, some farmers picked up plantlets individually at CASEMEX and EGOS nurseries.

<sup>72</sup> We observed that while most of Nestlé's technical assistance relied on CASEMEX or EGOS staff, INIFAP provided courses to farmers regarding plant reproduction through stem cuttings. We were also informed that Nestlé staff provided technical assistance, although we never encountered them.

risked replacing their established plants. One of the first farmers to join the plan when most were reluctant to do so recalled that some referred to him as “the crazy one in town”, but when farmers began to notice the benefits of the clones, many “became crazy” as he was.

We found that almost ten years after implementation of the Nescafé Plan, many Soconusco farmers were quite pleased with it, especially with the economic benefits resulting from increased yields. For instance, one farmer who cultivates 3 hectares indicated that before joining the plan, he produced 1 or 2 tons per harvest but at the time of the interview he produced 5 tons; similarly, a farmer cultivating 20 hectares informed that his yield had increased from 2.5 to 6 tons. Based on multiple testimonies, we identified that farmers’ yields had increased by 100% to 450%, depending on a variety of factors: whether they formerly cultivated traditional or improved plants; the age of their original plants when replacing them with Nestlé’s plants; farmers’ care of the new plants; and local climatic conditions (for example, Nestlé’s plants produce higher yields at 500 metres in altitude than at 600–700 metres).

Farmers also reported economic benefits resulting from the fact that since producing Nestlé’s plants, their yield increased from 58–59% to 60–61%, making them eligible for receiving Nestlé’s market price, rather than facing price reductions. Economic benefits also resulted from the technical characteristics of Nestlé’s varieties, which begin to yield within 2 years, while traditional and improved robusta require 3 to 4 years. Farmers also indicated that Nestlé’s plants are easier to prune and harvest than traditional and improved robusta as they are smaller and grow fewer suckers. Finally, they reported economic benefits from the 4C incentive, particularly farmers producing larger quantities of coffee.

In addition to these economic benefits, farmers also discussed the implications of Nestlé for them as a marketing option and the difference between Nestlé’s development intervention and that of the state. Many farmers mentioned that before the Nestlé Plan was implemented in the area, they struggled to find a marketing channel, but with the plan they have a secure market. Some also manifested that Nestlé’s intervention was preferable to those of the state; for instance, Nestlé provided all necessary supplies (plants, shade clothes, etc.) and services (loans and technical assistance), while with the state farmers had to deal with abusive “leaders” of farmer organizations to obtain their supplies. Some also

indicated that unlike with Nestlé, with public programmes farmers had to apply each year. Some held that the state provided only “crumbs” while Nestlé truly supported them.<sup>73</sup>

Despite the benefits of Nestlé’s support for robusta production mentioned by farmers, some had criticisms of Nestlé. Not surprisingly, they criticized the low prices Nestlé paid. As one farmer commented:

*“The people in charge of Nestlé’s purchasing are people who are only in the office and who have never come to the field to sweat or get muddy. They don’t know what it takes to produce a kilo of coffee. If they came here, they would realize that the pay they give us is very low. The fact that Nestlé gives plants for free shouldn’t justify the low pay. No! I could buy the plant, but Nestlé should pay well. With a good income, I can maintain my coffee, fertilize it, buy more plants, and a lot more. The company should use the millions they invest in their commercials to improve the pay for farmers”* (robusta farmer, personal communication, Carrillo Puerto, Chiapas, 16 May 2019).

As did coffee farmer organizations (CNOOC, UNPC, CONAPROCAFE, and the *Consejo Regional del Café de Coatepec*), robusta farmers of Soconusco complained that the state did not regulate the price Nestlé pays to farmers and that the company justified their prices saying that they depend on the stock market, avoiding further discussion. Despite the benefits that robusta farmers reported from the Nescafé Plan, some suggested that Nestlé also uses the Nescafé Plan and the 4C incentive to improve its image in the face of controversial practices for which they have been accused, such as child labour, inhumane working conditions, and “treading on farmers”. Despite the benefits that farmers identified in the Nescafé Plan, they also referred to Nestlé as a “transnational company interested only in its profits”, a “hoarder that controls the market”, and a “monster” that “does what it wishes and freely destroys”.

Robusta farmers also complained that Nescafé’s benefits have been temporary. Initially, Nestlé provided free plantlets, but more recently the company attempted to charge \$1.50 to \$16 pesos (~\$0.08 to \$0.83 dollars) per plant, to which farmers objected. Farmers mentioned that although clones provided by CASEMEX and

---

<sup>73</sup> It should be noted that these complaints regarding the state were reported before the AMLO administration had implemented its own rural programmes in the area; hence, these complaints referred to previous administrations. Chapter 4 analyses farmers’ perceptions of AMLO’s rural programmes.

EGOS did meet Nestlé's standards (60% yield, etc.), these two companies still attempted to pay farmers lower prices for their coffee. They also considered that formerly Nestlé had been somewhat flexible accepting green cherries, but in recent years the company began to demand higher quality (mature red cherries), and thus farmers must pick more frequently, thereby reducing the advantage of cultivating robusta with respect to labour.

Regarding the technical aspects of coffee cultivation, some farmers claimed that the clones developed by Nestlé required more fertilizer than do traditional or improved varieties, although others stated that the amount of fertilizer they use depends on their expectation of yield. Farmers also expressed concerns that Nestlé's plants have a shorter lifespan than do traditional and improved robusta, but some have been cultivating Nestlé's plants for 10 or 15 years and are satisfied with them. Some pointed out that even if clones have a shorter lifespan, their lifetime production may be higher than that of traditional and improved robusta over their 20 to 30 year lifespan. Farmers also mentioned that their workload had increased with clones because they have more plants; however, they assured that given higher yields, their income covered the additional labour costs.

Due to the above-mentioned drawbacks, some farmers left the Nescafé Plan and returned to cultivating traditional or improved robusta. However, the large majority of farmers interviewed have remained with the plan and referred to more benefits than disadvantages of working with Nestlé.

## **Discussion**

This chapter described that for many years coffee farmer organizations have joined together to participate in the organic and fair-trade markets, and pressure the state to implement policies to foster arabica production. We also explained that although coffee farmer organizations strongly oppose production of robusta (which they consider to be of lower quality) and expansion of Nestlé within Mexico, in Soconusco many farmers consider the transition from arabica to robusta to be positive. This chapter analysed how collaboration and antagonism developed around each species shape coffee policies in Mexico and identified implications of high versus low-quality production for small farmers' livelihoods and development interventions.

Regarding how collaboration and antagonism shape coffee policies, we found that arabica production is a joint matter between the state and coffee farmer organizations in which the state plays a large role in funding development programmes, and farmer organizations identify farmers' needs, take action to reach profitable markets, and participate in formulating coffee policies. Although the state and farmer organizations share an interest in supporting high-quality production, policymaking around this species is characterized by a tense relationship between the state and farmer organizations as a result of disagreements regarding design and implementation of coffee policies and state support for Nestlé. In contrast, robusta production is driven by agribusiness interacting with groups of farmers and individual farmers to increase their productivity and reduce costs and risks. While farmers are generally pleased with their relationship with the industry, they criticize some of its practices, such as low pay. Based on these findings, we argue that coffee policies are shaped by collaboration and antagonism regarding two coffee species, arabica and robusta.

Regarding implications of high versus low-quality production for small farmers' livelihoods and development interventions, this chapter illustrated that in Mexico, production of high-quality arabica coffee has been widely supported by a variety of actors, including the state, coffee farmer organizations, development organizations, and scholars (Bartra Vergés et al., 2011; CNOOC, 2019t; Escamilla et al., 2005; Martínez-Torres, 2008; Martínez-Torres & Rosset, 2014; Moguel & Toledo, 1999; Renard & Pérez-Grovas, 2007; SAGARPA et al., 2005). We indicated that this support coincides with value chain literature that states that increasing the quality of agricultural products is an ideal way out of poverty for small farmers (Daviron & Ponte, 2005; Humphrey, 2006; Humphrey & Navas-Alemán, 2010; Ponte, 2002). However, we showed that lowland Soconusco farmers transitioned from a high-quality to a lower-quality species due to multiple reasons: arabica was highly susceptible to rust, it required a great deal of labour, and it did not result in high-quality coffee at all altitudes. We also indicated that Nestlé reinforced this transition in the region by providing high-yield robusta plants, and that for lowland Soconusco farmers returning to arabica is not a viable alternative.

These findings challenge optimistic interpretations of the global value chain approach, as well as those by Mexican scholars and public functionaries who

portray production of high-quality coffee as the best, or only, development strategy for alleviating poverty. Our results indicate that high-quality coffee indeed generates benefits for small farmers' livelihoods, especially in the context of low coffee prices, but that for many farmers cultivation of low-quality coffee is better suited to their livelihoods. Therefore, we argue that a policy focusing exclusively on production of high-quality coffee risks overlooking how some farmers may successfully develop a strategy by combining lower quality with higher volumes and lower costs, labour, and risks. This perspective coincides with an observation made in some of the global value chain literature that reducing the quality of products may be a suitable option for some farmers (Ponte & Ewert, 2009).



A photograph of a weathered concrete wall with a sign. The sign features the word 'morena' in large, bold, red letters, and below it, the phrase 'La esperanza de México' in smaller, dark blue letters. The wall is flanked by dark wooden panels. In the background, there are lush green banana plants and other foliage under a bright sky. A portion of a building with a corrugated metal roof is visible on the right side.

**morena**  
La esperanza de México

## Chapter 4. AMLO's Rural Programmes and Elimination of Intermediaries<sup>74</sup>

### Introduction

From the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century until recent years, the Mexican state had implemented multiple programmes to support small coffee farmers in increasing their production. Nevertheless, despite the continuity of such programmes, these were strongly criticized for a variety of reasons including the very low subsidies they provided; for having a flawed list of beneficiaries; for failing to consistently provide technical assistance and supervision; and for lacking marketing strategies (CNOOC, 2022b; Hernández, 1992c; Martínez, 2004; Renard, 1999; Robles Berlanga, 2011). Coffee programmes in particular were also highly criticized because subsidies were distributed through farmer organizations under high levels of *clientelism* (Harvey, 1992; Henderson, 2020; Olvera, 1991).<sup>75</sup>

In late 2018, upon taking office President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) stated that the coffee sector had been “abandoned” and blamed corrupt functionaries and leaders of farmer organizations for misuse of rural subsidies (AMLO, 2019a). He promised that his administration—which he termed the *Cuarta Transformación* (Fourth Transformation [4T])—would eliminate corruption and prioritize the well-being of the poorest (GOB, 2019). To accomplish these objectives, his administration launched two programmes focused on small-scale farmers: *Sembrando Vida* (Sowing Life) under the *Secretaría de Bienestar* (Ministry of Well-being [BIENESTAR]) and *Producción para el Bienestar* (Production for Well-being) under the *Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural* (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development [SADER]; DOF, 2019a, 2019b). Furthermore, he emphasized that rather than channelling funds through organizations as had occurred in the past, his administration would provide subsidies to farmers directly, without intermediaries (AMLO, 2019a).

In addition to these programmes and the policy of eliminating intermediaries, AMLO announced that the *Coordinación General de Programas para el Desarrollo* (General Coordination of Development Programmes [CGPD]), under the

---

<sup>74</sup> This chapter has been submitted to the journal *Latin American Perspectives*.

<sup>75</sup> I use Fox's definition of clientelism: “relationship based on political subordination in exchange for material rewards” (Fox, 2012).

Presidential Office, would be responsible for facilitating implementation of social programmes, including *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar*, and for carrying out the *Censo del Bienestar* (Well-being Census) which would be used to register the beneficiaries of his administration's social programmes (DOF, 2019e; GOB, n.d.\*a).

This chapter analyses implementation of *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar* in 2019, paying particular attention to the process of eliminating intermediaries. The aim of this chapter is to understand the implications of AMLO's rural policies on the livelihoods of small farmers and the (clientelistic) relationship between the state and farmer organizations. This analysis is based on data from 151 semi-structured interviews and 22 focus groups<sup>76</sup> carried out from October 2018 to January 2020. Interviewees included: 1) beneficiaries of *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar*; 2) federal and local-level staff of BIENESTAR, SADER, and the CGPD; 3) representatives of farmer organizations; and 4) researchers specialized in coffee and Mexican rural policy. Most data were obtained in Soconusco, a region of the state of Chiapas which produces high coffee yields, but also has a high level of poverty (CONEVAL, 2020e; SADER, 2020a). Data were also obtained in Mexico City where the federal offices of BIENESTAR, SADER, and the CGPD are located and where some coffee umbrella organizations operate. Additional data were obtained in Xalapa, Veracruz during a manifestation of coffee organizations.

This chapter is structured as follows. Section two addresses the role of different farmer organizations in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, illustrating how the *Confederación Nacional Campesina* (National Peasant Confederation [CNC]) became one of Mexico's largest clientelistic organizations subordinated to the authoritarian *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (Institutional Revolutionary Party [PRI]). It also discusses opposition by many farmer organizations to clientelism in the 1970s and 1980s, and their unification to push for economic and political autonomy. Section three provides additional information regarding the principal measures introduced by the AMLO administration in 2019 to improve the livelihoods of farmers—namely *Sembrando Vida*, *Producción para el Bienestar*, the policy of eliminating intermediaries, and the role of the CGPD in supporting

---

<sup>76</sup> This was the total of interviews and focus groups carried out for the entire thesis; to some extent, all collaborators provided data on the Mexican state.

implementation of social programmes. Section four describes the differences in operation between *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar* during 2019, as well as their difference with respect to eliminating intermediaries, and the role of the CGPD in each programme. The final section discusses the effects of AMLO's rural programmes and the elimination of intermediaries on the relationships among the state, small-scale farmers, and farmer organizations.

### **Clientelistic Organizations and the Response of Autonomous Organizations**

Clientelism<sup>77</sup> has occurred in rural Mexico for almost a century (Palmer-Rubin, 2019). In the 1930s, President Lázaro Cárdenas implemented the largest land reform in Mexican history (INEHRM, 2020) and organized *ejido* members into the CNC with the purpose of representing their demands vis-à-vis the state (Garay et al., 2020; Sánchez Juárez, 2015). For many decades, the state channelled most agricultural subsidies through the CNC; however, this organization became a platform for clientelistic practices with the rural sector (Delalande Vincenti, 2019). Public functionaries allowed CNC leaders to make discretionary use of public funding as long as the organization ensured that their farmer members voted for the PRI and participated in political rallies, and contained farmers' protests (Audelo Cruz, 2005; de Grammont & Mackinlay, 2006; Fox & Gordillo, 1989; Henderson, 2020; Hernández, 1992b; Seffer, 2015).

These clientelistic practices began to be challenged during the 1970s and 1980s when new farmer organizations arose to struggle for political autonomy from the state. These included the *Coordinación Nacional del Plan de Ayala* (National Coordination of the Ayala Plan [CNPA]), the *Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas Autónomas* (National Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant Organizations [UNORCA]), the *Unión General Obrero Campesino Popular*

---

<sup>77</sup> The relationship between the long-dominant party PRI (from 1929 to 2000) and farmer organizations has often been studied under the notion of corporatism, which has been defined as follows: "a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports" (Schmitter, 1974). However, I use the notion of clientelism (mentioned above) to focus on the political subordination of farmer organizations by the state.

(General Popular Worker and Peasant Union [UGOCP]), and the *Central Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos* (Independent Union of Agricultural Workers and Peasants [CIOAC]). These organizations emerged as an outcome of farmers' discontent with the clientelistic relations between state functionaries and the CNC, as well as unfulfilled promises of land re-distribution in some regions, lack of state support for small-scale farmers, and inefficient bureaucratic programmes. In contrast to the CNC which centralized power in the hands of a few leaders, these organizations aimed to collaborate with each other in a horizontal democratic manner (de Grammont & Mackinlay, 2006; de Grammont et al., 2009; Fox & Gordillo, 1989; García, 1991).

Parallel to the establishment of these autonomous farmer organizations, in the 1970s and 1980s many organizations were created to promote coffee production. In Chiapas, these included the *Unión de Uniones Ejidales y Grupos Campesinos Solidarios de Chiapas* (Union of Unions of Ejido and Peasant Solidarity Groups of Chiapas), which came to represent a large proportion of coffee farmers in Chiapas but suffered multiple ruptures and sub-divisions; the *Unión de Ejidos y Comunidades Cafeticultores Beneficio Majomut* (Majomut Union of Ejidos and Coffee Communities Processor); and the *Indígenas de la Sierra Madre de Motozintla* (*Indigenous Peoples of the Sierra Madre of Motozintla* [ISMAM]); in Veracruz the *Unión de Productores de Café de Veracruz* (Union of Coffee Producers of Veracruz [UPCV]); in Oaxaca the *Unión de Comunidades Indígenas de la Región del Istmo* (Union of Indigenous Communities of the Isthmus Region [UCIRI]), and the *Coordinadora Estatal de Productores de Café de Oaxaca* (State Coordinator of Coffee Producers of Oaxaca [CEPCO]); and in Puebla the *Tosepan Titataniske* (United, We Shall Overcome; Martínez-Torres, 2003; Sánchez Juárez, 2015; Venegas Sandoval et al., 2020).

Similar to the autonomous farmer organizations mentioned above, coffee organizations were quite critical of the clientelistic practices of the CNC and the state, including those of the *Instituto Mexicano del Café* (Mexican Coffee Institute [INMECAFE])—the public agency that from 1958 to 1989 oversaw coffee collection and processing (Cámara de Diputados & CEDRSSA, 2018). These organizations were particularly dissatisfied with the low prices that INMECAFE paid for coffee, as well as its deceitful methods of weighing it, delays in providing plants and fertilizers, highly bureaucratic processes, and inadequate infrastructure such as

roads and electricity in rural communities (Celis, 1991; Hernández, 1992b). For many years, these organizations pressured INMECAFE to improve coffee policies to favour smaller farmers, albeit unsuccessfully.

Not until the late 1980s—when INMECAFE was dismantled and the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) which regulated the price of coffee was suspended (Renard, 1992; Renard & Ortega Breña, 2010)—did coffee farmer organizations begin to develop a variety of initiatives to increase pressure on the state and achieve autonomy from the “conventional market” and its very low prices (Sánchez Juárez, 2015). One such initiative was to improve the quality of cultivation and processing and to establish collection and processing centres to access higher-paying markets, such as the organic and fair-trade markets (Hernández Navarro & Celis Callejas, 1992; Moguel, 1991, 1992a; Renard & Pérez-Grovas, 2007).<sup>78</sup> Another initiative was unification of the existing coffee farmer organizations into the *Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras* (National Coordinator of Coffee Organizations [CNOOC]), which became the largest coffee farmer organization in Mexico and served as their principal mediator with the Ministry of Agriculture in negotiating policies, and their principal representative in international meetings (Celis Callejas, 2015, 2019; CNOOC, 2019); Hernández, 1992a; Paré, 1991).

Despite the unification among autonomous farmer organizations and coffee farmer organizations, and their efforts to eliminate subordination to the state, clientelism continued (Celis Callejas, 2008; Quintana, 2008; Ramírez Cuellar, 2008; Ramirez Cuevas, n.d.; Ramos, 2008). Although the CNC’s power declined when the PRI lost the 2000 elections, the organization continued to manage subsidies due to its extensive territorial coverage and the permanence of PRI functionaries in state and municipal governments (de Grammont et al., 2009; Zeledón Zeledón, n.d.). Aside from the CNC, throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century other clientelistic organizations emerged, including *Antorcha Campesina* (Peasant

---

<sup>78</sup> One of the most iconic cases of involvement in such markets was the incorporation of UCIRI into the fair-trade market via the Dutch certifier Max Havelaar in the late 1980s, which motivated organizations of other regions of Mexico to transition to organics and provide mutual support so that additional coffee organizations could obtain certification (CLAC & Comercio Justo Fairtrade, 2018; Unión Majomut, n.d.\*a, n.d.\*b). Although participation in organic and fair-trade markets has been challenging as farmers must meet strict requirements and pay high certification costs (Olvera, 1991; Taylor, 2002), in recent decades Mexico has become one of the world’s leading organic coffee producers as a result of these organizations (ICO, 2009).

Torch), *Central Campesina Cardenista* (Cardenist Peasant Union [CCC]), *Central Campesina Independiente* (Independent Peasant Union), and the *Confederación Agrarista Mexicana* (Mexican Agrarian Confederation; Bartra, 2020; Palmer-Rubin, 2019). Furthermore, the political independence proclaimed by some autonomous organizations such as CNPA, UGOCP and CIOAC became contested, and in contrast to their original principles, these organizations also began to adopt clientelistic practices upon distributing subsidies to farmers (Bartra, 2020; Ramirez Cuevas, n.d.; Villafuerte Torrez, 2013). Thus, when AMLO took office in 2018, the agricultural sector was characterized by a diversity of organizations with access to public subsidies.

### **The AMLO Administration: A Change in Direction**

Since INMECAFE was established in 1958 until recent times, the state had implemented many programmes to promote small-scale coffee production by providing farmers with technical assistance, plants, fertilizer, and irrigation equipment to be able to apply pesticides to combat coffee leaf rust. However, farmers and researchers criticized the operation of state programmes due to their inefficiency and clientelism developed between certain farmer organizations and public functionaries (CNOC, 2022b; Hernández, 1992c; Martínez, 2004; Renard, 1999; Robles Berlanga; Senado, 2020). Upon taking office in 2018, AMLO (2019a) recognized that the coffee sector, and the agricultural sector as a whole, had been abandoned, and blamed this on “shameless” functionaries who corruptly managed subsidies, as well as farmer organizations that delivered subsidies with “*moche*” or “*piquete de ojo*”.<sup>79</sup>

AMLO assured that his administration would be different, that he would eliminate corruption, and that small-scale farmers would have support like never before (AMLO, 2019a). To accomplish these objectives, AMLO launched two programmes that, unlike previous programmes, provide a subsidy directly to farmers, without intermediaries: *Sembrando Vida* operated by BIENESTAR, and *Producción para el Bienestar*, operated by SADER. While both programmes prioritize small-scale production, they differ significantly with respect to their operation, budget, and connection with previous coffee programmes.

---

<sup>79</sup> *Moche*, which may be translated as cut, colloquially refers to someone keeping part of the money. *Piquete de ojo*, literally eye poke, refers to people’s eyes looking over corrupt practices.

*Sembrando Vida* focuses on reforestation and provides \$5,000 pesos (~\$260 dollars) per month, as well as plants and agricultural tools, to farmers who cultivate any crop and who have 2.5 to 20 hectares to perform the following agroecology practices: 1) an agroforestry system, combining a crop with timber and fruit trees; and 2) *Milpa Intercalada con Árboles Frutales* (Milpa Interspersed with Fruit Trees [MIAF]; DOF, 2019a; GOB, 2019). Along with these practices, this programme encourages farmers to produce organic fertilizer, save seeds, and reintroduce so-called *traditional* varieties. Furthermore, it aims to promote collaboration and solidarity among farmers through *Comunidades de Aprendizaje Campesino* (Peasant Learning Communities [CAC]) of approximately 25 farmers who organize agricultural and environmental tasks.<sup>80</sup> In 2019, this programme had a budget of \$15,000 million pesos (~\$778 million dollars; CONEVAL, 2020b; DOF, 2018) and had no connection to previous coffee programmes.<sup>81</sup>

Meanwhile, *Producción para el Bienestar* focuses on plant production. During the first few months of the programme, support was limited to maize, beans, wheat, and rice farmers (DOF, 2019b), although sugarcane and coffee farmers were incorporated later, in May 2019 (DOF, 2019d). While the programme allows participation by any farmer with less than 20 hectares, it provides a much lower subsidy than that of *Sembrando Vida*: \$5,000 pesos per year (~\$260 dollars; DOF, 2019b). In contrast to *Sembrando Vida* which promotes organic production and includes a strategy to promote collective production, *Producción para el Bienestar* initially promoted only “sustainable production” and lacked a particular strategy

---

<sup>80</sup> In addition to implementing *Sembrando Vida* in Mexico, AMLO promoted this programme in Central America with the objective of reducing migration (AMLO, n.d.). He also highlighted the contribution of this programme to reforestation at the 26<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties (COP26), held in 2021 (AMLO, n.d.; GOB, 2021a).

<sup>81</sup> Beneficiaries of the programme *Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro* (Youth Building the Future) also participate in *Sembrando Vida*. This programme is run by the *Secretaría de Educación Pública* (Ministry of Public Education) and the *Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social* (Ministry of Work and Social Welfare), and focuses on providing youth with agricultural experience. Despite the relevance of this programme, I do not study the activities of these beneficiaries as I consider they are embedded in dynamics which are outside the range of this thesis, such as promotion of intergenerational knowledge and reduction in migration of rural youth.

to foster social cohesion.<sup>82</sup> In 2019 it received a budget of \$9,000 million pesos (~\$467 million dollars; CONEVAL, 2020a; DOF, 2018), and had a significant connection to previous coffee programmes as all subsidies for coffee farmers were formerly managed by the Ministry of Agriculture.

Furthermore, to ensure proper implementation of AMLO's social policies, the administration appointed the CGPD to be responsible for coordinating the implementation of all social programmes, including *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar* (DOF, 2019e).<sup>83</sup> In 2019, it oversaw the establishment of *Centros Integradores del Desarrollo* (Integrative Development Centres) in urban and rural areas in which CGPD functionaries, known as *servidores de la nación* (Servants of the nation), assisted potential beneficiaries of social programmes with their applications and provided beneficiaries with their bank cards to receive their subsidy (DOF, 2019c; STyPS, 2020). Additionally, in order to obtain trustworthy data regarding recipients of subsidies, in 2019, the CGPD was in charge of carrying out the *Censo del Bienestar* involving: 1) identification of potential beneficiaries of AMLO's social programmes, and 2) verification of the list of programme beneficiaries during the previous administration (GOB, n.d.\*a).<sup>84</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup> As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, social cohesion among farmers began to be promoted by the AMLO administration in 2020, when the programme established the *Estrategia de Acompañamiento Técnico* (Technical Support Strategy) to support collective practice of agroecology through the *Módulos de Intercambio de Conocimientos e Innovación* (Knowledge and Innovation Exchange Modules) involving groups of 100 farmers, as well as technical advisers and community promoters (Agricultura, 2020; SADER, 2020b).

<sup>83</sup> Other social programmes included: 1) under BIENESTAR: *Apoyo para el Bienestar de las Niñas y Niños Hijos de Madres Trabajadoras* (Support for Well-being of Sons and Daughters of Working Mothers) and *Programa de Pensión para el Bienestar de las Personas Adultas Mayores* (Pension Programme for Well-being of the Elderly); 2) under SADER: *Crédito Ganadero a la Palabra* (Livestock Loan); 3) under the *Secretaría de Educación Pública* (Ministry of Public Education): *Jóvenes Escribiendo el Futuro* (Youth Writing the Future); and 4) under the *Secretaría de Educación Pública* and the *Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social: Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro* (GOB, n.d.\*a).

<sup>84</sup> The CGPD has also been in charge of establishing branch offices of the *Banco del Bienestar* (Well-being Bank) from which beneficiaries of state programmes withdraw their subsidies with no surcharge, and through which they may access additional financial services, for example, to receive remittances (AMLO, 2021; Banco del Bienestar, n.d.). However, by 2019 no *Bancos del Bienestar* had been established in Soconusco, and beneficiaries received their subsidy through cards from commercial banks.

## **Implementation of *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción Para el Bienestar* During the First Year of the AMLO Administration**

### *Sembrando Vida*

During 2019, the AMLO administration extensively promoted *Sembrando Vida*. AMLO and the BIENESTAR Minister at the time, María Luisa Albores González,<sup>85</sup> introduced this programme in one of AMLO's daily press talks, *La Mañanera* (Early Morning; AMLO, 2019b), and promoted it in public rallies held throughout the country, as well as in social media. During fieldwork in Soconusco, local-level BIENESTAR staff were continually seen holding meetings with farmers to present the programme, helping them to establish organic coffee nurseries and select fruit and timber trees to be introduced in the future,<sup>86</sup> and promoting cohesion among farmers. In Soconusco, many signs referring to *Sembrando Vida* were placed in rural communities.

Throughout 2019, the AMLO administration repeatedly promoted the benefits of this programme. Federal-level BIENESTAR staff interviewed emphasized that, unlike previous programmes that focused either on food security or on increasing farmers' income, *Sembrando Vida*'s MIAF contributed to improving food security and generating both short and long-term income. The staff celebrated the fact that the programme was supporting farmers to produce organically, reducing their dependence on inputs from the market; that it was building social cohesion among farmers who had previously been divided; that its operation was based on close interaction between farmers and technical advisors; and that it provided substantial and timely payment. In general, federal-level staff referred to *Sembrando Vida* as a programme "without precedents".

BIENESTAR staff in Soconusco furthermore highlighted that unlike neoliberal administrations that had failed to support rural areas, the AMLO administration was approaching those who have the least, and that its staff were recovering the trust that small farmers had lost in public programmes. Soconusco staff also boasted that unlike previous administrations in which public functionaries and

---

<sup>85</sup> In September 2020, María Luisa Albores left her post as Minister of BIENESTAR to become the Minister of the *Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales* (Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources).

<sup>86</sup> In 2019, *Sembrando Vida* was mainly focused on coffee plant production and promoting social cohesion. During this year, staff helped farmers to select timber and fruit trees, but I did not witness these trees being planted.

farmer organizations had “sucked up” public subsidies, *Sembrando Vida* was ending corruption by depositing subsidies directly to farmers and that through the CACs it was transferring the “power” of clientelistic organizations to small farmers. Finally, they assured that this was one of the “best” programmes of its kind.

During 2019, coffee farmers in Soconusco were also quite enthusiastic about *Sembrando Vida*. Most if not all farmers were pleased with the subsidy they were receiving, which was more than small farmers had ever received from a public programme. Some farmers interviewed highlighted that the \$5,000 pesos (~\$260 dollars) they received monthly was a strong incentive to either resume activities they had left aside due lack of funds, or to replace their old coffee plants. Some farmers indicated that the subsidy motivated them to reintroduce a higher-quality coffee species (arabica);<sup>87</sup> while others manifested that since receiving the subsidy they had stopped working for other farmers as they preferred to invest their time in their own plots. Farmers referred to *Sembrando Vida* as “real support”, a “good programme that truly supports small farmers”, and a “programme that provides a lot of help”. One farmer’s testimony clearly expresses this view:

*“The coffee sector has been abandoned for many years; there was no funding and the price of coffee was very low. There was no way to move forward. Due to the lack of funds, I reduced the amount of land I tended and let the weeds grow. Now with AMLO, the support is clear, and we’re resuming our activities. AMLO is taking us out of the hole where we were”* (Beneficiary of *Sembrando Vida*, personal communication, Unión Juárez, Chiapas, 11 September 2019).

Many farmers interviewed also celebrated the fact that the administration no longer provided the subsidy through intermediaries and that they now receive the full amount of their subsidies. As one farmer expressed:

*“I was part of an organization where it was clear that the leader of the organization took advantage of farmers, that he used his position to his favour. If a subsidy was \$5,000 pesos [~\$260 dollars], the leader only gave us \$2,000 pesos [~\$104 dollars]. The organization had a warehouse with a drying machine, toaster, and mill, but the leader was the only one who used it; we had to look for*

---

<sup>87</sup> As mentioned previously in this thesis, due to the 2012–2013 coffee leaf rust crisis, many farmers at higher altitudes replaced arabica with robusta, as one farmer who had introduced robusta at a high-altitude due to coffee rust stated.

*our own way to process and sell our coffee. It's better the way it is now, it's more direct: government to farmer"* (Beneficiary of *Sembrando Vida*, personal communication, El Edén, Chiapas, 27 June 2019).

Regarding the elimination of intermediaries, some farmers informed that since the AMLO administration introduced this policy, their (clientelistic) organization disintegrated and farmers stopped having contact with the leaders. Others stated that unlike the previous farmer organizations to which they belonged, the CACs provided an opportunity to seek better markets. Some mentioned that presenting their documents and picking up the bank cards up was bureaucratic, but that they preferred to do this themselves rather than leaving it to a leader they did not trust. Meanwhile, others were pleased to be able to go to the BIENESTAR office and sign their documents themselves, rather than entrusting the task to someone else.

Farmers of Soconusco seemed generally pleased with the technical assistance of *Sembrando Vida*. They expressed enthusiasm about participating in meetings with staff and other farmers, and were pleased to be receiving continual staff attention and that farmers were being motivated to collaborate with each other through the CACs. However, in contrast to BIENESTAR staff who portrayed *Sembrando Vida* as a model programme, some farmers manifested concerns. For example, some expressed that they wished that the staff would incorporate more local knowledge, rather than prioritizing the expertise of technical staff.

Regarding the MIAF, farmers expressed that they embraced the idea of producing in a more sustainable manner. However, they indicated that they lacked the space to introduce the timber and fruit trees requested by the programme; that they had no idea how to tend the trees that would be introduced; that they were afraid that these trees would not be suitable for their area (as had happened with state programmes); and that they preferred not to have to intersperse timber and fruit trees with coffee as this would be more labour-intensive. Some farmers mentioned that reforestation, which is one of the pillars of the programmes, was not their priority. Others preferred not to have to produce organic coffee as they did not participate in this market. Finally, some farmers were reluctant to introduce the traditional coffee varieties proposed by the programme due to their low level of resistance to rust.

Additional concerns indicated by farmers in 2019 included the fact that *Sembrando Vida* staff demanded rapid results, and thus staff and farmers were

unable to properly attend to some agricultural tasks. For example, farmers indicated that due to time limits, the soil of a nursery was not disinfected, and many plants were contaminated with fungus. Some farmers indicated that those with less than 2.5 hectares were not permitted to join the programme.<sup>88</sup> Finally, participants also pointed out that the programme did not provide any marketing strategies that year.<sup>89</sup>

### *Producción Para el Bienestar*

In contrast to BIENESTAR, which since the beginning of the AMLO administration clearly stated that it would support coffee farmers through *Sembrando Vida*, SADER took almost half a year to establish a defined strategy to support the coffee sector. While SADER announced *Producción para el Bienestar* in January 2019, this programme only considered production of maize, beans, wheat, and rice (DOF,2019b). Meanwhile, coffee fell under the *Subcomponente Sustentabilidad y Bienestar para Pequeños Productores de Café* (Subcomponent for Sustainability and Well-being for Small Coffee Producers [SUBICAFE]), which was also established by the AMLO administration but functioned in a similar manner to programmes of previous administrations, providing plants and fertilizer to

---

<sup>88</sup> While the 2019 rules of operation of *Sembrando Vida* indicated that only farmers with more than 2.5 hectares could join the programme, at some point that year I observed that the programme allowed two farmers with less than 2.5 hectares to join together, dividing the subsidy between them. However, throughout 2019, many farmers with less than 2.5 hectares kept mentioning that they were not allowed to participate in *Sembrando Vida* due to the size of their landholding. Aside from this issue concerning inclusion, SADER staff in Soconusco expressed that *Sembrando Vida* staff hurriedly accepted many farmers without verifying whether they met the requirements. I also observed that some farmers with more than 20 hectares had divided ownership of their plots among family members to be able to apply for multiple subsidies.

<sup>89</sup> In the introduction to this thesis, I mentioned that *Sembrando Vida* received much criticism regarding supposed deforestation by farmers in order to have 2.5 hectares eligible for the programme. In 2019, I did not encounter any Soconusco farmers who had deforested their plots to join the programme. However, I did observe that the 2019 rules of operation did not correspond to a reforestation programme as the administration proclaims, as they did not specify that the programme would operate in deforested territories, nor did they target farmers with already deforested land (DOF, 2019a). For these reasons, I consider that *Sembrando Vida*'s design does not correspond to its *reforestation* objectives.

farmers through farmer organizations (DOF, 2017a; SADER, 2019b).<sup>90</sup> Not until 15 May 2019 did SADER announce that SUBICAFE would be eliminated and that the beneficiaries would be incorporated into *Producción para el Bienestar* (DOF, 2019d).

The elimination of SUBICAFE and the transfer of its beneficiaries to *Producción para el Bienestar* meant that coffee farmers would now be part of SADER's main programme. However, this change generated great tension among coffee farmer organizations, federal and local-level SADER staff, and CGPD staff. The change from SUBICAFE to *Producción para el Bienestar* also generated many operational difficulties. Both the tension among actors and the operational difficulties resulted from two interconnected phenomena: 1) the elimination of intermediaries and 2) purging the list of beneficiaries as a result of the *Censo del Bienestar*. This section first illustrates the conflicts that emerged from the elimination of intermediaries and then further discusses the process of purging the list of beneficiaries.

#### *Elimination of Intermediaries*

During SUBICAFE's 2019 registration period (8 March to 8 April; SADER, 2019b), farmer organizations had signed up 150,000 farmers for the programme through a total of 450 applications, and 100,000 farmers had applied on individual basis. When SUBICAFE was eliminated and the coffee sector incorporated into *Producción para el Bienestar*, these applications were still on file. While AMLO had stated since the beginning of his administration that subsidies would be transferred directly to farmers, federal-level SADER staff contradicted each other with respect to the method by which subsidies would be provided to farmers whose SUBICAFE applications had been filed by farmer organizations; some SADER directors indicated that applications that had been filed by organizations would continue being processed, while others said they would not (CNOC, 2019h, 2019v). Not until late May and early June 2019 did SADER at the federal level

---

<sup>90</sup> The rules of operation of previous coffee programmes stated that subsidies were to be directed to individual farmers and farmer organizations. However, most informants indicated that subsidies were provided through farmer organizations. SUBICAFE's rules of operation indicated that subsidies were to be provided on an individual basis as well as through organizations, but as with previous coffee programmes, most informants stated that SUBICAFE transferred subsidies through farmer organizations.

emphatically state that all subsidies would be provided directly to farmers and that all applications would be considered on an individual basis (CNOG, 2019o, 2019q).

When SADER declared that subsidies would be delivered without intermediaries, the representatives of the following farmer organizations<sup>91</sup>—that along with SADER for decades had formulated agricultural policies—strongly manifested their opposition: 1) CNOG, which had been created in the late 1980s as an umbrella organization for multiple coffee organizations throughout Mexico; 2) the *Coalición Nacional de Organizaciones de Productores de Café* (National Coalition of Organizations of Coffee Producers [CONAPROCAFE]), which was created following the 2012–2013 coffee leaf rust crisis by some of the autonomous farmer organizations that had formed in the 1970s and 1980s, including UNORCA, UGOCP, CIOAC, CNPA, and the CCC (Cafés de México, 2019); 3) the *Consejo Regional del Café de Coatepec* (Regional Coffee Council of Coatepec), which has promoted organic coffee production in Veracruz; and 4) the *Unión Nacional de Productores de Café* (National Union of Coffee Producers [UNPC]), which is a member of the CNC, one of the most clientelistic organizations in the history of rural subsidies.<sup>92</sup>

Representatives of these coffee farmer organizations interviewed opposed elimination of intermediaries under a variety of arguments. First, representatives of coffee organizations assured that not all organizations have misused subsidies; that not all farmer organizations are the same. As one CNOG member stated:

*“During the previous administration, the Ministry of Agriculture asked organizations what their ‘needs’ were and assigned funding without informing how much it spent, nor how funding was spent. A lot of discretion was used to favour relations between representatives of farmer organizations and the state.*

---

<sup>91</sup> In this chapter I refer to *representatives of farmer organizations* as those of CNOG, CONAPROCAFE, *Consejo Regional del Café de Coatepec*, and UNPC-CNC, as one of their principal functions is to *represent* small farmers in formulation of coffee policies at the national level. By contrast, I refer to the heads of any other farmer organization as *leaders*.

<sup>92</sup> Opposition by these farmer organizations was supported by representatives of Chiapas, Veracruz, Oaxaca, Puebla, and Guerrero of the *Sistema Producto Café* (Coffee System Product)—an ensemble of public and private actors that formulate public policy—and the *Asociación Mexicana de la Cadena Productiva del Café* (Mexican Coffee Value Chain Association [AMECAFE])—a non-governmental organization which assists the Ministry of Agriculture in implementing coffee programmes (SPC & AMECAFE, 2019).

*Yes, the sector was flawed and rampant corruption was carried out by the Ministry and organizations, but not all organizations are the same” (CNOC member, personal communication, Mexico City, 21 January 2019).*

A second argument of organizations rejecting the elimination of intermediaries was that farmer organizations play an important role in improving small farmers’ livelihoods. Representatives of farmer organizations stated that since INMECAFE was established, they have pressured the state for policies to favour small farmers, including a larger budget and support to compensate for low coffee prices and crop diseases. Representatives of coffee farmer organizations also pointed out that for many decades they had provided farmers with plants, fertilizer, and technical assistance to increase production. They stressed that even without proper state support they had been able to channel small farmers’ harvests into the organic and fair-trade markets. They assured that bypassing organizations represented a setback for farmers and that the elimination of intermediaries would cause organizations to disintegrate.

Furthermore, these representatives stated that in contrast to previous coffee programmes that contributed to increasing yields, *Producción para el Bienestar* was an “assistentialist” programme that trained farmers to “extend their arm to receive cash”, implying that this programme was not properly formulated to increase production. They stressed that now that farmers directly received their subsidies, nobody was overseeing whether farmers really invested their subsidies in their land or used it to cover daily expenses or even to purchase alcohol.<sup>93</sup>

Upon voicing these concerns through direct meetings with SADER, public protests and social media, some representatives of coffee farmer organizations hoped the state would revoke the changes implemented by the AMLO

---

<sup>93</sup> During fieldwork, I identified that some organizations in Soconusco did not reject the elimination of intermediaries; rather, some assured that their elimination did not affect them because they operated mainly with the profits from selling coffee, as well as from donations by development organizations. Others manifested that if farmers considered that the organization represented a benefit for their livelihoods, organization leaders and farmers would create new arrangements for organizations to continue to support them. I also found that some national farmer organizations did not oppose the elimination of intermediaries; for instance, staff of the *Asociación Nacional de Empresas Comercializadoras de Productores del Campo* (National Association of Marketing Companies of Agricultural Producers) mentioned that this policy was a matter of “justice”. However, farmer organizations that did not oppose this policy do not actively participate in formulation of coffee policies as do CNOC, CONAPROCAFE, *Consejo Regional del Café de Coatepec*, and UNPC-CNC.

administration, stating that they believed in AMLO's "good intentions", and assuring that he was simply being advised by the "wrong people". However, federal-level SADER staff maintained a firm position to bypass organizations, as one federal-level SADER department head manifested:

*"We're delivering subsidies directly and we're not contemplating participation of organizations at this moment. If an organization wants to provide farmers with plants, they must sell the inputs as if they were any other business. We're not asking farmers to get the plants from a particular organization. These are presidential instructions and there's no deal, so goodbye"* (Federal-level SADER staff, personal communication, Mexico City, 12 December 2019).

Surprisingly, this position strongly contrasted with that of SADER staff in Soconusco who defended their history of collaboration with coffee farmer organizations, as one local department head expressed:

*"This administration does not want to have anything to do with organizations. Many leaders of farmer organizations have complained to us. Yes, there are many bandit organizations, but the 40 organizations that are here have done a good job. Organizations took inputs for combatting coffee leaf rust and fertilizer to the communities and had the 'good will' to organize farmers and deliver the inputs as close as possible to farmers' communities. Organizations did this work and we verified that the inputs were delivered properly; if a farmer had any complaints, we pressured the organizations and made arrangements so that the farmers were satisfied"* (Local-level SADER staff, personal communication, Tapachula, 12 November 2019).

Additionally, SADER staff of Soconusco interviewed criticized the elimination of intermediaries, questioning from whom and under what conditions farmers would now receive their plants and fertilizer, as the programme would only provide subsidies, which the farmers would have to use to purchase these supplies. They warned that some farmers lived far from where agricultural supplies are sold and doubted that merchants would be willing to deliver them to individual farmers, and if they did, this would greatly elevate prices. They also questioned whether farmers who live in isolated communities would be able to travel to the closest SADER office to apply individually for the programme given. As were coffee farmer organizations, SADER staff in Soconusco were also concerned that since neither state staff nor organizations would supervise use of subsidies,

farmers would not invest their subsidy in coffee but rather use it for non-agricultural purposes.<sup>94</sup>

### *Purging the List of Beneficiaries*

As mentioned above, by the time the coffee sector was transferred from SUBICAFE to *Producción para el Bienestar*, farmer organizations had signed up 150,000 farmers for SUBICAFE that year through 450 applications, and 100,000 farmers had applied on an individual basis. As a whole, these applications were submitted using farmers' registration numbers from the *Padrón Nacional Cafetalero* (National Coffee Farmer List)—which had been compiled by previous administrations. Since the AMLO administration did not accept the veracity of the *Padrón Nacional Cafetalero* compiled by farmer organizations and former functionaries, SADER at the federal level demanded that farmers re-apply on an individual basis meeting new requirements, namely land ownership and georeferencing of their plots.

Some interviewees (such as CNOC and farmer organizations in Soconusco) in theory accepted verification of SUBICAFE's list of beneficiaries, however, they had observed that the new requirements, which were quite imprecise, caused many operational difficulties. First, regarding proof of land ownership, interviewees indicated that SADER did not specify which particular document they required nor how the title of ownership could be obtained.<sup>95</sup> Regarding georeferencing, they stated that little information had been provided regarding how to carry this

---

<sup>94</sup> In contrast to staff of *Producción para el Bienestar*, *Sembrando Vida* staff did not report significant confrontations with existing coffee organizations. Federal-level *Sembrando Vida* staff acknowledged the achievements of some organizations in fostering organic production and accessing high-paying markets, and manifested interest in collaborating with such organizations by incorporating their technical advisors into the programme. Local-level *Sembrando Vida* staff established a close relationship with the *Centro de Agroecología San Francisco de Asís* (Saint Francis of Assisi Agroecology Centre [CASFA]) which has a long history of exporting certified organic coffee, and its former director Jorge Aguilar Reyna became the coordinator of *Sembrando Vida* in Soconusco.

<sup>95</sup> Based on a 2018 report by the Ministry of Agriculture, there are nearly 60 documents that farmers can use to prove land ownership or possession, which are issued by at least eight different agencies. This report does not specify which documents may be used to prove land ownership and which may be used to prove land possession (SAGARPA, 2018).

out and that little consideration had been given to the fact that many farmers are computer illiterate.<sup>96</sup>

Conflicts regarding purging lists of beneficiaries also emerged with respect to the role of the CGPD, which along with SADER oversaw verification of farmers' documents. CGPD staff interviewed said they were working in collaboration with SADER to objectively verify the list of beneficiaries without blaming previous administration. However, federal and local-level SADER staff had a different opinion. Federal-level SADER staff stressed that as the CGPD was strongly backed by AMLO, the *servidores de la nación* misused their power, and “mistreated” many people, including members of farmer organizations. Federal SADER staff also indicated that they had received reports from local-level staff indicating that the *servidores*—along with municipal presidents, state congress members, local-level SADER staff of different regions, and farmer organizations—had tried to incorporate their own beneficiaries into the updated list. SADER staff acknowledged that a variety of actors “got their hands into” the updated list of beneficiaries, but that they had no option other than to accept this list as they had no way of determining who had modified the list.

SADER staff of Soconusco also criticized the CGPD, pointing out its lack of experience with agriculture. However, in contrast to federal-level SADER staff, Soconusco staff defended the list of beneficiaries they had compiled during previous administrations. One SADER department head in Soconusco expressed:

*“We had a well-defined list of beneficiaries, but now the servidores come and include farmers who were never on our list. I don’t agree with that. We had the area well controlled, with more than 25,000 farmers on the list. The servidores say we’re the corrupt ones, but we’re the ones who know things. It’s not easy to be a coffee technical advisor. You need to know how rugged the land is; you need to know the farmers and the leaders of organizations. We have the capacity and over 40 years of experience, and they, the servidores, are staff who lack*

---

<sup>96</sup> In contrast to *Producción para el Bienestar, Sembrando Vida* demanded farmers present their prove of ownership or possession and specified that they could use their *certificado parcelario* (plot certificate), *certificado de derechos agrarios* (agrarian rights certificate), *escritura pública* (public deeds); *sentencia del Tribunal Agrario* (sentence of the Agrarian Court), *acta de asamblea ejidal* (ejido assembly minutes), *acta de la asamblea de bienes comunales* (minutes of the assembly of communal land). Finally, *Sembrando Vida* did not require farmers to show the georeferencing of their plots (DOF, 2019a).

*experience and knowledge. If you leave them in the field on their own they would cry because they don't know what to do*" (SADER staff of Soconusco, personal communication, Tapachula, 12 November, 2019).

Furthermore, in Soconusco, lower-ranking SADER staff expressed the rocky relationship they observed between SADER and the CGPD, indicating that many SADER staff—especially department heads and unionized staff—are not used to receiving “orders”, and that CGPD treated SADER staff with arrogance. They informed that they had witnessed a strong confrontation between SADER and the CGPD over firing staff members, use of offices and vehicles, and whether the Ministry of Agriculture or the CGPD sign should appear on the office.<sup>97</sup>

The year 2019 ended with a chaotic and disappointing interaction between *Producción para el Bienestar* and the coffee sector. Initially, the programme aimed to support farmers in cultivating more sustainably, but during 2019 no technical advisory was evident in the field, nor was social cohesion promoted among farmers. Rather, most Soconusco SADER staff were occupied with administrative tasks such as informing farmers of changes in the programme or reviewing farmers’ applications. Since SADER was unable to authorize payment to farmers until the list of beneficiaries was approved, only in September of 2019 did farmers begin to receive their first deposit—months after farmers required the subsidy to cover agricultural expenses. While some farmers interviewed indicated that they appreciated that the programme paid the subsidies directly to them, they indicated their desire to join *Sembrando Vida* due to its greater subsidy.

## **Discussion**

This chapter illustrated that one of the main problems with coffee programmes under previous administrations was the high level of clientelism under which they were operated by public functionaries and farmer organizations (Harvey, 1992; Henderson, 2020; Olvera, 1991), leading to AMLO’s promise to eliminate intermediaries in order to end corruption (2019a). Through analysis of the operation of *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar*, this chapter

---

<sup>97</sup> *Sembrando Vida* staff of Soconusco also criticized the *servidores*, for example for including people who were not technically eligible for support. However, they did not report confrontations such as those that occurred in Soconusco between SADER and the CGPD. Furthermore, CGPD staff indicated that in contrast to *Producción para el Bienestar*, *Sembrando Vida* had more “autonomy” from the CGPD to operate.

revealed significant changes in small farmers' livelihoods as an outcome of the elimination of intermediaries. For the first time in recent decades, farmers received their full subsidy, and were glad to have received it directly. Furthermore, while many farmers ended relations with the clientelistic organizations to which they had belonged, others became involved with new forms of organization through which farmers could develop new marketing alternatives (*Sembrando Vida's* CACs).

Considering these developments, I argue that the elimination of intermediaries appears to have successfully contributed to reducing clientelism by functionaries and farmer organizations; hence, I consider this policy to be one of the most effective of the AMLO administration. However, despite this optimism, it should not be assumed that this policy in and of itself guarantees the eradication of clientelism, which may still occur through other mechanisms (for instance between public functionaries and farmers). Nor should it be assumed that elimination of intermediaries must necessarily be accompanied by the rupture of the relationship between farmers and those organizations that for many years have significantly supported them in improving their marketing conditions and their livelihoods. Farmers have not been prohibited from interacting with farmer organizations if they wish to do so. What has changed is that farmers now have the power to decide whether they want to belong to a particular organization, and what agricultural supplies they wish to purchase and under what conditions; as one informant manifested, this is a *matter of justice*.

Furthermore, the analysis of the elimination of intermediaries in *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar* shed light on the contrast between the ways in which this policy was implemented in the two programmes. While *Sembrando Vida* appeared to have implemented this policy without significant conflicts, its implementation in *Producción para el Bienestar* resulted in great tension and operational difficulties. While SADER at the federal level had acquired the task of delivering subsidies to farmers without intermediaries, coffee farmer organizations and local-level SADER staff strongly opposed this. Participation of the CGPD in purging the list of beneficiaries also created tension with federal and local SADER staff, as well as with coffee farmer organizations. I argue that the contrasting outcomes of the two programmes are due to the close connection of *Producción para el Bienestar* with previous coffee programmes. The fact that such

programmes were previously managed only by the Ministry of Agriculture led to resistance by various actors to modifying the prevailing relationship between the state and farmer organizations.

A final reflection involves the operation of rural programmes, aside from the issue of the elimination of intermediaries. This chapter indicated that apart from clientelism, coffee programmes were characterized by many other deficiencies, such as a low budget, lack of technical assistance, and deficient marketing strategies (CNOG, 2022b; Hernández, 1992c; Renard, 1999; Robles Berlanga 2011). It also stated that with the implementation of *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar*, AMLO aimed to ensure farmers' well-being (GOB, 2019). The analysis of the operation of both programmes in 2019 demonstrated that certain aspects of coffee programmes have improved in comparison to those of previous administrations. However, rural programmes are still characterized by deficient implementation.

Regarding *Sembrando Vida*, this chapter indicated that due to the substantial subsidy farmers were receiving, they decided to resume activities they had left aside, and that they were pleased to be receiving continual technical assistance and that the staff motivated them to work with other farmers. However, they expressed resistance to some of the programme's demands, which included reforestation, producing organically, introducing traditional varieties, and intercropping. Farmers also informed that the programme excluded those with less than 2.5 hectares and that it lacked marketing strategies. Regarding *Producción para el Bienestar*, farmers indicated that they appreciated the direct payment, but that they were negatively affected by many operational issues, including the need to reapply, failure to clearly explain programme requirements, and late delivery of funding. Thus, I argue that while the state's handling of small farmers has improved somewhat, many deficiencies continue to exist with respect to formulation and implementation of rural programmes.



Photo by Ángel Velázquez

## Conclusion

This chapter is divided into three interconnected sections. The first addresses the research questions of the thesis. For this, I first reply to the four sub-research questions, and then to the main research question, “How do recent Mexican coffee policies resulting from a radical transformation promised by the state modify relationships among the state, small farmers, farmer organizations, and the coffee processing industry?” The second section addresses the contribution of this thesis to studies focused on rural policies of the administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). Such studies have examined: 1) elimination of intermediaries, which involves bypassing farmer organizations upon providing agricultural subsidies; 2) the programme *Sembrando Vida* (Sowing Life) under the *Secretaría de Bienestar* (Ministry of Well-being [BIENESTAR]), focused on reforestation and agroecology; 3) the programme *Producción para el Bienestar* (Production for Well-being) under the *Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural* (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development [SADER]), focused on plant production; and 4) the role of the *Coordinación General de Programas para el Desarrollo* (General Coordination of Development Programmes [CGPD]) in coordinating social programmes. The third section discusses final considerations.

### Response to the Research Questions

#### *First Sub-Question*

The first sub-question of the thesis is, “How have coffee policies evolved over time?” In Chapter 1, I illustrate three phases of state support to coffee farmers. The first occurred from the late 19<sup>th</sup> to the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. In order to geographically expand coffee production, during this phase the Mexican state implemented a variety of policies, including payment incentives for farmers to acquire land, as well as construction and improvement of railways, roads, and ports to facilitate shipping coffee (Rodríguez-Centeno, 1993). The target of these policies was foreign investors, who acquired large amounts of land, hired large numbers of labourers, and shipped Mexican coffee to Europe and North America (Bartra Vergés et al., 2011). During this phase, coffee production dramatically increased; however, this involved dispossession of local communities from their land and deplorable labour conditions on large estates (Baumann, 1983).

The second phase lasted from 1958 to 1989. During this period, the state adopted a very active role in coffee production, focusing on increasing productivity. The *Instituto Mexicano del Café* (Mexican Coffee Institute [INMECAFE]) oversaw compliance with the production quota assigned to Mexico by the International Coffee Agreement (ICA; then the major mechanism regulating coffee production and prices), and established coffee prices on a national level (Sánchez Juárez, 2015). This institute also carried out agricultural research, collected farmers' harvest, provided farmers with supplies and technical assistance, and promoted development of farmer organizations (Celis Callejas, 2013). In contrast to the previous phase, the main target of support was small-scale farmers who had been beneficiaries of President Lázaro Cárdenas' massive land distribution in the 1930s (Bartra Vergés et al., 2011). During this period, coffee production and exports steadily increased; nevertheless, INMECAFE was highly criticized for inefficiency and corruption (Hernández, 1990).

The third phase lasted from the dismantling of INMECAFE in 1989 to the end of the presidency of Enrique Peña Nieto in 2018. During this phase, the state maintained its interest in increasing productivity; however, its principal focus was improvement of quality, in response to competition by other coffee-producing countries upon finalizing the ICA in 1989 (Martínez Morales, 1996). While small-scale farmers continued to be the main target of support, the state no longer regulated coffee production or national coffee prices; it stopped collecting and processing farmers' harvest; and it greatly reduced agricultural research (Hernández, 1990). During this period, most state support consisted of programmes providing farmers with plants and fertilizer through coffee farmer organizations. Nevertheless, these programmes were characterized by high levels of corruption (Celis Callejas, 2008).

Based on these findings, I argue that although the state supported coffee production continually from the time coffee cultivation was introduced to Mexico to the start of the AMLO administration, its interests and mechanisms for supporting coffee production have changed significantly over time. Initially, in the interest of expanding the number of hectares for coffee production, the state benefited large-scale farmers with incentives to acquire land. Later, it shifted its interest to increasing productivity, adopting an active role in regulating coffee production and targeting small-scale farmers. Finally, the state shifted its focus to

improving coffee quality. While small-scale farmers continued to be the principal target of support, the state significantly reduced its intervention in coffee production, and principally supported small-scale farmers through programmes providing plants and fertilizer.

### *Second Sub-Question*

The second sub-question is “How do different types of farmers interact with different marketing channels?” In response, in Chapter 2 I first classify beneficiaries of rural programmes into Bernstein’s (2010) social classes: *emergent capitalist farmers* (those who accumulate productive assets and reproduce themselves on a large scale), *petty commodity producers* (farmers who are unable to increase their production as do capitalist farmers but achieve simple reproduction from the market), and *semi-proletarian farmers* (those who are unable to reproduce themselves as capital and must sell their labour). I then analyse how farmers of different social classes interact with the marketing channels that prevail in the region, namely Nestlé, coffee farmer organizations, local buyers, and direct marketing.

With respect to Nestlé, which collects mainly robusta coffee, I present one petty commodity producer and one emergent capitalist farmer who share similar incorporation conditions; while they receive Nestlé’s improved plants that allow them to increase their yield and volume, they receive low pay as they cultivate a low-quality species. Despite these similarities, the emergent capitalist farmer receives more benefits as Nestlé provides this farmer with inexpensive fertilizer and appoints him as leader of farmers’ groups.

Regarding coffee farmer organizations which collect organic arabica, provide high pay, and target impoverished farmers, I show that while a petty commodity producer is able to participate in this marketing channel, a semi-proletarian is excluded. While the former has the means to produce a high-quality species, cultivate organically, combat coffee leaf rust, and can wait months to receive payment that farmer organizations provide over the course of several months, the latter is unable to meet these requirements. Although both farmers live in a community where arabica and robusta may be cultivated, the petty commodity producer uses most of his land to produce arabica which he sells to a coffee farmer

organization, while the semi-proletarian uses all his land to produce robusta which he sells to local buyers.

Concerning local buyers, who generally do not demand high-quality coffee but pay very low prices for coffee, I contrast the incorporation conditions of one petty commodity producer and one semi-proletarian who live in communities located over 1,300 metres above sea level where principally arabica is grown. Although both farmers sell to local buyers, the petty commodity producer is able to bypass them on some occasions, while the semi-proletarian is unable to do so. As the petty commodity producer has the means to cultivate arabica organically, process it, and sell it in the small coffee shop he owns, he sells to local buyers only occasionally, when he is in the need of quick cash. By contrast, local buyers are the only alternative for the semi-proletarian. This farmer, who does not produce arabica organically, is unable to sell to coffee farmer organizations. Despite living in a community adapted to arabica, he has severely struggled to combat coffee leaf rust and therefore produces robusta. While he could sell to Nestlé, which purchases robusta, he is unable to meet the company's quality standards and cover transportation costs to deliver his coffee to one of Nestlé's collection centres.

With direct marketing, farmers obtain very high returns in comparison to Nestlé, coffee farmer organizations, and local buyers. Although any farmer could add value to his coffee and sell it directly to rewardable markets (such as coffee shops or restaurants), principally capitalist farmers are able to do so. I present the case of two capitalist farmers who sell their coffee in local and regional markets; both have large amounts of land and labourers, cultivate a high-quality species (arabica), are able to combat coffee rust, own equipment to process (roast and/or pack) their coffee, and are able to wait long periods of time to receive their returns.

Based on these findings, I argue that different types of farmers interact differently with diverse marketing channels. In order to further illustrate this, it is necessary to carry out empirical studies that—rather than just focusing on the mechanisms of the value chain at the global level—address: 1) the particular workings of markets on the local level (quality standards, as well as payment and services provided); 2) distribution and control over farmers' means of production (land and labour); and 3) the region's specific environmental conditions (altitude, coffee species and varieties, and crop diseases).

Such findings are relevant to global value chain studies focused on incorporation of farmers into the market. Some scholars with this approach assume that farmers will be benefited by *greater incorporation* into the market (Arias et al., 2013; Donovan & Poole, 2014; FAO, 2020; Gómez et al., 2020; Michelson, 2020; OECD & FAO, 2019; World Bank, 2007, 2020). Nevertheless, others observe that farmers may be *adversely incorporated* and that rather than aiming for *greater incorporation*, there is a need for addressing the *terms* or *conditions* by which farmers are incorporated into the market (Bolwig et al., 2010; Castellanos-Navarrete & Jansen, 2018; du Toit, 2003, 2004b, 2009; Helmsing & Vellema, 2011; Ponte, 2008). The findings of the present study support the second position: there is a need to further address the *terms* by which farmers are incorporated into the market. I add that more attention should be given to the fact that these *terms* vary significantly according to the type of market and type of farmer involved.

These findings are also relevant to Mexican rural policies. In Chapter 2, I show that the Mexican state categorizes farmers principally according to the size of their landholding. However, I demonstrate that beyond land size, farmers differ significantly with respect to their control over their means of production and the way they interact with the market; while some are able to make a profit from the market and expand their reproduction, others must sell their labour to sustain themselves and their families. This chapter also indicates that for coffee, the Mexican state presents the organic market as the ideal marketing channel to incorporate farmers. However, I demonstrate that while some farmers benefit from this marketing channel, others prefer to participate in other markets, such as Nestlé or direct marketing. Based on these findings, I argue that instead of classifying farmers based on the size of their holdings and incorporating farmers into a single market, the state should consider farmers' relations of production and interactions with different marketing options.

### *Third Sub-Question*

The third sub-question is, "How have collaboration and antagonism among different actors of the coffee value chain shaped recent coffee policies?" To address this question, in Chapter 3 I review the political battle that has taken place among the state, coffee farmer organizations, Nestlé, and robusta farmers regarding

production of arabica versus robusta. For this, rather than merely examining the technical characteristics of each species, I analyse the *politics* of coffee production in Mexico, which involves conflict, cooperation, and negotiation with respect to distribution of public resources (Leftwich, 2000).

In this chapter, I indicate that collaboration between the state and coffee farmer organizations has shaped policies focused on improving the quality of arabica. For at least 3 decades, the Ministry of Agriculture has implemented programmes to improve arabica quality by fostering introduction of high-quality species and replacement of old unproductive coffee trees. The state has also implemented programmes to compensate farmers for low coffee prices and to promote consumption of high-quality coffee throughout Mexico. Meanwhile, coffee farmer organizations have actively represented small farmers' needs upon formulating national coffee policies, and have pressured the state to help farmers access profitable markets, such as the organic and fair-trade markets.

I illustrate that although the state and coffee farmer organizations share an interest in improving the quality of arabica, their relationship is characterized by antagonism. One cause of this is the close relationship between the state and Nestlé—the processing industry that coffee farmer organizations strongly oppose due to the low prices it pays farmers for coffee, its low-quality production, and its promotion of cultivation based on high use of chemical fertilizers and reduction of shade trees. Another cause for antagonism between the state and coffee farmer organizations is the inefficient manner in which the state operates coffee programmes and the fact that since the start of the AMLO administration, the state has bypassed farmer organizations upon providing plants and fertilizer to farmers.

In contrast, I indicate that collaboration between the state and Nestlé has shaped policies focused on robusta production. The Mexican state has strongly supported implementation of the Nescafé Plan, through which this company provides farmers with high-yield plants, technical assistance, and the 4C incentive (a coffee standard promoting sustainable production). Despite opposition by coffee farmer organizations to robusta production and Nestlé, many farmers of the lowlands of Soconusco, Chiapas have established a close relationship with this company due to the inputs and services it provides and because it purchases a coffee species that require less labour and is resistant to coffee rust. Finally,

although robusta farmers have generally been pleased with their collaboration with Nestlé, some have been critical of some of its practices, such as the low prices the company pays for their coffee.

Based on these findings, I argue that coffee policies are shaped by collaboration and antagonism regarding two coffee species: arabica and robusta. With respect to arabica, collaboration between the state and coffee farmer organizations has aimed to improve the quality of coffee; however, the relationship between these two actors is characterized by antagonism due to state support for Nestlé and problems related to implementation of coffee programmes. Meanwhile, the state and Nestlé have closely collaborated to promote robusta cultivation. Despite opposition by coffee farmer organizations to Nestlé, Soconusco farmers have established a close connection with the company, although many are quite critical of the low prices it pays.

These findings are relevant to debates focused on production of high-quality coffee. In this chapter, I indicate that a variety of actors in Mexico, including the state, coffee farmer organizations, development organizations, and scholars, conceive production of high-quality arabica as the ideal development pathway for small coffee farmers (Bartra et al., 2011; CNOC, 2019t; Martínez-Torres & Rosset, 2014; Moguel & Toledo, 1999; Renard & Pérez-Grovas, 2007; SAGARPA et al., 2005). This perspective coincides with value chain literature that portrays cultivation of high-quality coffee as the principal option for small farmers to overcome their poverty (Daviron & Ponte, 2005; Humphrey & Navas-Alemán, 2010). I affirm that high-quality coffee has generated benefits for small farmers' livelihoods in Socunusco as well as elsewhere in Mexico, especially given the context of low coffee prices. However, I also demonstrate that Soconusco farmers have established a strategy based on production of high volumes of low-quality coffee, which allows for reducing costs, labour, and risks. Based on these findings, I argue that scholars and development policies focusing exclusively on production of high-quality coffee overlook the fact that some farmers may successfully develop a strategy based on lower quality.

#### *Fourth Sub-Question*

The fourth sub-question is, "How were rural programmes and the policy of eliminating intermediaries implemented in 2019, and what have been their effects

on small farmers' livelihoods?" To address this question, in Chapter 4 I first explain that during the previous administration the Ministry of Agriculture implemented many programmes to support small coffee farmers by providing plants and fertilizer. Nevertheless, these programmes were fraught with problems, including insufficient provision of subsidies to acquire farm supplies; failure to generate accurate lists of beneficiaries; provision of low-quality supplies too late in the season; unreliable technical assistance and supervision; failure to promote strategies for collective coffee cultivation and accessing rewarding markets; and lack of coordination with other ministries (CNOOC, 2022b; Hernández, 1992c; Martínez, 2004; Renard, 1999; Robles Berlanga, 2011). In addition, implementation of these programmes involved high levels of *clientelism* (political subordination in exchange for material rewards; Fox, 2012) between public functionaries and farmer organizations in charge of providing plants and fertilizers to farmers (Celis Callejas, 2008).

Following this discussion, I explain that the AMLO administration introduced the policy of eliminating the role of organizations in providing agricultural subsidies with the aim of reducing corruption (AMLO, 2019a). It established *Sembrando Vida* under BIENESTAR and *Producción para el Bienestar* under SADER with the promise that the state would radically improve benefits for small-scale farmers (AMLO, 2019a). Furthermore, it gave the CGPD the responsibility of coordinating social programmes and overseeing the process of conducting the *Censo del Bienestar* (Well-being Census), involving: 1) identification of potential beneficiaries for AMLO's social programmes, and 2) verification of the lists of programme recipients of the previous administration (DOF, 2019e; GOB, n.d.\*a).

Regarding the process by which both programmes were implemented in 2019, I explain that in 2019 AMLO repeatedly promoted *Sembrando Vida* in his early morning press talks and public speeches throughout Mexico. Furthermore, I often observed local-level BIENESTAR staff in rural communities promoting *Sembrando Vida*, signing farmers up as beneficiaries, fostering social cohesion among farmers, and helping them to establish organic coffee nurseries and select timber and fruit trees to be planted. Although staff appeared to be overworked, I did not identify significant challenges to implementation of the programme or the policy of eliminating intermediaries.

By contrast, *Producción para el Bienestar* was characterized by a great deal of tension resulting from the policy of eliminating intermediaries. First, federal-level SADER staff took almost half a year to firmly declare that they would provide subsidies without intermediaries; at the beginning of the administration some SADER department heads indicated that farmer organizations would still participate in providing subsidies, while others stated they would not. When federal-level SADER staff finally established a rigid position to bypass intermediaries, coffee farmer organizations that for many years had participated in formulating coffee policies strongly manifested opposition, claiming that this policy would disintegrate farmer organizations and reverse the gains they had achieved for small farmers' livelihoods. Local-level SADER staff in Soconusco also opposed this policy, defending their labour and that of coffee farmer organizations in the territory.

Tension and difficulties with the programme also emerged regarding the need to purge the list of beneficiaries. At the start of the administration, coffee farmers still received subsidies through farmer organizations from the programme *Subcomponente Sustentabilidad y Bienestar para Pequeños Productores de Café* (Subcomponent for Sustainability and Well-being for Small Coffee Producers [SUBICAFE]; SADER, 2019b); however, in May 2019 coffee farmers were transferred to *Producción para el Bienestar*, along with applications that had been submitted during SUBICAFE's registration period (8 March to 8 April). As some of SUBICAFE applications had been filed by farmer organizations and they used registration numbers from the *Padrón Nacional Cafetalero* (National Coffee Farmer List) which had been compiled by previous administrations, SADER and the CGPD had to verify SUBICAFE's list of beneficiaries. Although the CGPD assured they carried this out in a collaborative manner with SADER making an effort not to fault past administrations for any errors made, federal-level SADER staff stated that the CGPD misused its power acquired due to AMLO's support of this agency, "mistreating" farmer organizations and including beneficiaries "for political proposes". Meanwhile, local-level SADER staff expressed their opposition to the CGPD modifying the list of beneficiaries that local-level SADER staff and local farmer organizations had compiled, and undermined the CGPD due to its lack of experience with agriculture.

Hence, I argue that the contrasting manner by which *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar* implemented the policy of eliminating intermediaries corresponds with each programme's antecedents. As coffee programmes had formerly been managed by the Ministry of Agriculture and coffee farmer organizations played an active role in formulation and implementation of coffee policies, *Producción para el Bienestar* faced strong resistance by these organizations and local-level SADER staff to modifying the existing relationship between the state and the organizations. Meanwhile, *Sembrando Vida*—which lacked a direct relationship with previous coffee programmes and coffee farmer organizations—did not have to purge any list of beneficiaries, and apparently did not undergo confrontation with coffee farmer organizations.

Regarding the effects of the policy of eliminating intermediaries on small farmers' livelihoods, I demonstrate that farmers participating in *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar* appreciated the fact that the AMLO administration provided the subsidy directly and that for the first time they received their full subsidy. Some farmers specified that since *Sembrando Vida* was implemented they left the clientelist organizations to which they belonged, while others expressed satisfaction with the new form of organization (*Comunidades de Aprendizaje Campesino* (Peasant Learning Communities [CAC]), through which they could access more profitable markets. Based on these findings, I argue that elimination of intermediaries is contributing to reducing clientelism.

Regarding the effects of *Sembrando Vida* on small farmers' livelihoods, I demonstrate that farmers appreciated the substantial income they were receiving and that as a result they had resumed certain agricultural labours they had stopped carrying out, replaced unproductive plants, and stopped working as wage labourers for other farmers. While farmers participating in *Sembrando Vida* appreciated the continual attention from staff and adopted the objective of producing in a more sustainable manner, some manifested concern with the programme's demands, which included reforestation, cultivating organically, introducing native varieties, and intercropping. Additionally, some farmers expressed the desire that programme staff take into account their local knowledge.

Regarding the effects of *Producción para el Bienestar* on small farmers' livelihoods, I demonstrate that farmers were negatively affected by a variety of problems with the programme's implementation. For example, they had to re-apply when SUBICAFE was transferred to *Producción para el Bienestar*; they had to meet new requirements for which precise instructions were not provided; they lacked technical assistance; no strategy was implemented to foster collaboration among farmers; and they received their subsidy too late in the season. I also found that many farmers preferred to belong to *Sembrando Vida* due to the programme's substantial subsidy; however, farmers lacking 2.5 hectares had no option other than to remain in *Producción para el Bienestar*.

Taking into account that previous programmes were characterized by insufficient subsidies for acquisition of farm supplies, provision of low-quality supplies too late in the season, lack of continuity of technical assistance and supervision, and failure to promote strategies for collective production and accessing profitable markets (Renard, 1999; Robles Berlanga, 2011), upon observing the achievements of *Sembrando Vida*'s in 2019 I argue that agricultural programmes have somewhat improved. However, many deficiencies continue to exist with respect to formulation and implementation of both programmes.

### *Main Research Question*

The main research question of the thesis is, "How do recent Mexican coffee policies resulting from a radical transformation promised by the state modify relationships among the state, small farmers, farmer organizations, and the coffee processing industry?" To address this question, in the introduction to this thesis, I highlight that upon taking office, AMLO promised to end the neoliberal paradigm that had prevailed during previous administrations and that he would establish a development alternative based on justice and well-being (GOB, 2019). He promised a radical transformation by which the state would recover its former role in developing comprehensive policies; that it would prioritize the poorest citizens; and that it would operate under austerity measures and fight corruption (AMLO, 2019a; GOB, 2019). He also assured that large companies would operate in a transparent manner under a clearly defined legal framework (GOB, 2019). To achieve these ambitious objectives for rural families, AMLO announced that his administration would provide subsidies directly to farmers, without farmer

organizations acting as intermediaries (AMLO, 2019a). It established *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar* to support small farmers and assigned the CGPD the responsibility of coordinating social programmes and creating the *Censo de Bienestar*.

Regarding changes in the relationship between the state and small-scale farmers, in this thesis I first point out that in the past small-scale farmers were quite disappointed with the state's implementation of coffee policies (Hernández, 1992c; Renard, 1999; Robles Berlanga, 2011), including high levels of clientelism (Harvey, 1992; Henderson, 2020). I then demonstrate that AMLO's policies have generated certain benefits for small farmers' livelihoods. Due to the policy of eliminating intermediaries, for the first time in many decades farmers have received their full subsidy and some farmers stopped belonging to clientelistic organizations. Furthermore, *Sembrando Vida's* substantial subsidy—\$5,000 pesos monthly (~\$259 dollars)—has been a strong incentive for farmers to invest in improving their plots. Farmers belonging to this programme were also pleased that staff continuously visited their plots and promoted collaboration among farmers through CACs.

Despite these achievements, the state's attention to small-scale farmers remains deficient. Both *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar* overlook the fact that different farmers' conditions vary greatly according to their means of production, and the possibility that beneficiaries may find benefits in marketing options other than the organic marketing channel. *Sembrando Vida* excludes farmers with less than 2.5 hectares and demands that they carry out agroecological practices that do not correspond to the local context. Implementation of *Producción para el Bienestar* was fraught with problems and provided farmers' subsidies months after they were needed to cover agricultural expenses. Furthermore, the CGPD failed to generate an accurate list of beneficiaries and failed to improve coordination among the various ministries in charge of AMLO's rural programmes (especially between itself and SADER at the local level).

Regarding the relationship between the state and coffee farmer organizations, in this thesis I explain that for many years some coffee farmer organizations—including the *Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras* (National Coordinator of Coffee Organizations [CNOC]), Mexico's principal small coffee

farmer organization—had actively participated in formulation of coffee policies on a national level. This has not been modified by AMLO’s rural policies; rather, these organizations continue to collaborate with the Ministry of Agriculture to improve the quality of coffee and incorporating small-scale farmers into the organic and fair-trade markets. What has changed is that the relationship between the state and those coffee farmer organizations engaged in policy formulation has been characterized by increased friction as a result of the policy of eliminating intermediaries and the state’s support of Nestlé.

Finally, regarding the relationship between the state and the industry, in this thesis I state that since neoliberal policies began to be implemented in Mexico, Nestlé has increased its influence in formulation of coffee policies and concentrated power over coffee trading, and has taken on some of the functions that the state formerly attended, such as carrying out agricultural research and organizing farmers to promote collective production (Henderson, 2017; Pérez Akaki, 2013a; Venegas Sandoval et al., 2020). I did not identify significant changes in the relationship between the state and Nestlé in 2019. Rather, this company continues to exercise great control in the coffee processing sector and the state continues to promote its expansion. Furthermore, while I found that many Soconusco farmers were pleased to work with Nestlé given the high-yielding plants and continual technical assistance it provides, the state did not take any action to address farmers’ main concern regarding this company—the low pay it provides.

In summary, to a certain extent recent coffee policies have strengthened the relationship between the state and small-scale farmers; the relationship between the state and farmer organizations has become tense; and the relationship between the state and the industry has not changed. Based on these findings I argue that the attention by the state to small-scale farmers is concordant with AMLO’s promise to prioritize the poorest citizens—especially taking into account *Sembrando Vida*’s subsidy, technical assistance, and promotion of collaboration among farmers. Furthermore, the policy of eliminating intermediaries is concordant with AMLO’s promise to fight corruption. Nevertheless, I do not consider that the state has fully recovered its role in generating “comprehensive” agricultural policies, as *Sembrando Vida* and *Producción para el Bienestar* have been fraught with problems with respect to their formulation and implementation

and the CGPD failed to establish a trustworthy list of beneficiaries and improve coordination among Ministries. Furthermore, the state undermined certain coffee farmer organizations that had previously played a role in improving small farmers' livelihoods. Finally, it did not address the industry's practice of paying low prices to farmers. I conclude that while certain changes of the AMLO administration concord with the promise to provide a development alternative, AMLO's radical transformation is still far from being implemented.

I consider that the conceptual framework and methodology of this study provide a strong foundation for arriving at the above-mentioned arguments. Analysing AMLO's policies based on three intersecting approaches—state theories, agrarian political economy, and global value chain—allow for generating insights from different perspectives regarding the influence of the state on small farmers' livelihoods. Carrying out a case study with a qualitative approach allows for profoundly addressing “the how and why” of social occurrences (Yin, 2009). The 151 semi-structured interviews and 22 focus carried out with farmers, policymakers, coffee farmer organizations, staff of the coffee processing industry, and researchers, as well as on-site observation of rural programmes in operation and coffee protests, have provided a wealth of empirical data. Nevertheless, when considering the arguments presented above, it should be noted that this study evaluated implementation of rural programmes only in Soconusco during 2019; hence, analysis of coffee programmes in other regions of the country or in other years might lead to different results.

## **Contribution to Rural Studies**

### *Elimination of Intermediaries*

In the introduction to this thesis, I mention that of the many analysts who have addressed elimination of intermediaries, some argue that this policy has contributed to reducing corruption, electoral proselytism, and embezzlement of funds (CONEVAL, 2020b; Ethos, 2020; García Jiménez, 2019; López Zepeda & Pérez, 2019; Mendoza, 2019), while others state that AMLO wrongly considers all farmer organizations to be corrupt (DESMI, 2021; Núñez Membrillo, 2021). Furthermore, some argue that this policy undermines farmer organizations' agency and has been used as a strategy to counteract social movements in

opposition to megaprojects; that it is the “*coup de grace*” for “autonomous” organizations (Rosset, 2019a).

In the thesis, I illustrate Mexico’s long history of clientelism and Soconusco farmers’ frustration with previous administrations which allow farmer organizations and public functionaries to embezzle public funding, with only the “leftovers” for farmers. I demonstrate that Soconusco farmers greatly appreciate the AMLO administration providing subsidies without intermediaries as well as the fact that they now receive their full subsidies, and furthermore that many farmers have left the clientelistic organizations to which they had belonged. Based on these findings, I support analysts (CONEVAL, 2020b; Ethos, 2020) who argue that the policy of eliminating intermediaries is reducing corruption, electoral proselytism, and embezzlement of funds.

I coincide with critics (DESMI’s, 2021; Núñez Membrillo, 2021) who hold that not all organizations are corrupt. In the study, I point out that despite the fact that for many years organizations such as CNOC have represented small farmers’ needs in formulation of policies and have helped them access organic and fair-trade markets, AMLO refused to distinguish among the variety of Mexico’s farmer organizations and federal-level SADER staff were not considering collaborating with farmer organizations, at least in 2019. Nevertheless, I did not find evidence to support scholars (e.g. Rosset, 2019a) who argue that the policy of eliminating intermediaries undermines farmer organizations’ agency. In Soconusco, the few organizations that appear to have contributed to improving small farmers’ livelihoods—such as the organic farming organizations *Centro de Agroecología San Francisco de Asís* (*Saint Francis of Assisi Agroecology Centre* [CASFA]); *Grupo de Asesores de Producción Orgánica y Sustentable* (Organic and Sustainable Production Advisory Group [GRAPOS]); and *Café Justo* (Fair Coffee)—continued to operate as before. CASFA staff specified that the policy of eliminating intermediaries did not affect them as they functioned mainly with the profits from selling coffee, and praised *Sembrando Vida*’s substantial subsidy.

I acknowledge that providing subsidies directly to farmers modifies governance by coffee farmer organizations and farmers, as now farmers rather than organization leaders manage the subsidy. However, if farmer organizations and farmers have developed agency, might they not use it to establish new organizational arrangements? Based on my findings in Soconusco, I do not agree

that providing subsidies directly to farmers destroys “autonomous” farmer organizations, and while I stress the importance of developing sound critiques of the AMLO administration, I claim that scholars such as Rosset (2019a) do not sufficiently consider that for almost a century clientelist organizations were an epidemic, and that the policy of eliminating intermediaries does not restrict farmers from continuing to collaborate with “autonomous” organizations.

### *Sembrando Vida*

In the introduction to this thesis, I mention that observers have assessed *Sembrando Vida*’s objectives, highlighting that the substantial subsidy it provides has lifted impoverished farmers above the poverty line (ASF, 2019b, 2020b). Nevertheless, others stress that the programme’s objectives are ambiguous (CONEVAL, 2020a, 2020d; Ethos, 2020; GESOC, 2021). I support analysts (ASF, 2019b, 2020b) who stress the importance of the subsidy. Nevertheless, I share concerns of some analysts (Ethos, 2020) regarding failure to clearly define the programme objectives; in particular, I question why—if *Sembrando Vida* was intended to reverse deforestation—it did not specify that the programme should operate in deforested regions or target deforested plots (DOF, 2019a).

Regarding the programme’s requisites for inclusion of farmers, some analysts point out the merits of the programme’s focus on small-scale farmers (ASF, 2019b, 2020b; Bartra, 2019a; Gordillo, 2019). Nevertheless, other observers alert that it excludes those with less than 2.5 hectares (Salgado Ramírez, 2021); that some of its beneficiaries do not meet the selection criteria (Ethos, 2020); that some farmers are conditioned to receiving the subsidy in exchange for voting for AMLO’s party—*Movimiento Regeneración Nacional* (National Regeneration Movement [MORENA]; Casar, 2019); and that many farmers have deforested their plots in order to demonstrate that they have the 2.5 hectares required for eligibility (Carabaña, 2021a, 2021b).

In this thesis I demonstrate that the AMLO administration has indeed prioritized small-scale farmers; hence I support analysts (ASF, 2019b, 2020b; Bartra, 2019a; Gordillo, 2019) who endorse the programme for this reason. Nonetheless, I share concerns of others (e.g. Salgado Ramírez, 2021) who point out that the 2.5 hectare requisite leads to exclusion. Furthermore, I demonstrate that as the programme targets farmers with up to 20 hectares, it ends up benefiting

farmers who have been able to accumulate productive assets and already have advantageous marketing conditions. I did not find any evidence to support analysts (e.g. Casar, 2019) who claim that subsidies are conditioned upon voting for AMLO's party. Nevertheless, I do not rule out the possibility that subsidies might be conditioned as a result of lack of measures to assure accountability, as mentioned by some (ASF, 2019b; Ethos, 2020). In Soconusco, I found no evidence to support critics (Carabaña, 2021a, 2021b) who argue that farmers are deforesting their plots. Nevertheless, given the lack of clarity of programme objectives, requisites, and rules of implementation I do not discard the possibility this has occurred in certain areas of Soconusco or in other regions of Mexico.

Regarding *Sembrando Vida's Milpa Intercalada con Árboles Frutales* (Milpa Interspersed with Fruit Trees [MIAF]) some scholars hold that this system contributes to farmers achieving food security and diversifying their income (Bartra, 2019a). However, many criticize the requirement of implementing the MIAF because this practice and the crops selected by the programme do not correspond to local practices (de Ita, 2021); and because marketing strategies have not been provided for new crops introduced (López Valentín, 2019; Sanders, 2021). My findings indicate that while farmers generally welcome the idea of cultivating sustainably, many also have concerns related to *Sembrando Vida's* MIAF, including the requirement to reforest and cultivate organically. Therefore, I support analysts (Ita, 2021) who claim that the programme fails to take into account local practices. My research findings also coincide with critics (López Valentín, 2019; Sanders, 2021) who argue that the programme lacks marketing strategies.

Regarding *Sembrando Vida's* CACs, some claim that this strategy contributes to improving social cohesion among farmers (CONEVAL, 2020a). However, critics point out that a specific form of organization has been imposed upon farmers, which undermines the authority of already existing forms of organization, particularly the *ejido* assembly (Ek, 2021; Uc, 2021). Furthermore, some sustain that the programme is threatening *ejidos* as it is promoting fragmentation and privatization of land (González Rojas, 2021; Salgado Ramírez, 2021). Finally, some claim that *Sembrando Vida* is threatening collective production as farmers must produce individually within 2.5 hectares (DESMI, 2021; Rosset, 2019b). In this thesis, I illustrate that prior to the programme many if not the majority of

Soconusco farmers produced and traded their coffee on individual basis; therefore, when the programme was introduced, many farmers were quite enthusiastic about participating in CACs. Based on these findings, I support analysts (CONEVAL, 2020a) that praise this collaborative mechanism. In Soconusco, farmers did not speak of CACs as an imposition, or mention that they conflicted with *ejido* assemblies. However, I do not rule out the possibility that such conflicts alluded to by some critics (Ek, 2021; Uc, 2021) may have occurred in other regions, as rural programmes have been implemented in a variety of manners depending on the local social dynamics.

My findings from Soconusco do not support the claim of critics (González Rojas, 2021; Salgado Ramírez, 2021) that *Sembrando Vida* is promoting fragmentation and privatization of land. In Soconusco, *ejido* land was already fragmented; in Chapter 2, Figure 4 titled “Number of Coffee Farmers According to Hectares Cultivated”, indicates the diversity in number of hectares that farmers either hold or own. While the programme did demand that farmers prove land “ownership” or “possession”, I did not witness that it fostered *ejido* members changing land tenure. Nor did my findings support the claim of critics (DESMI, 2021; Rosset, 2019b) who argue that the programme threatens collective production as farmers are forced to produce individually within 2.5 hectares. While Soconusco farmers did receive their subsidy individually, coffee nurseries were established and maintained collectively by farmers. Furthermore, while farmers were required to have at least 2.5 hectares to join the programme, they were not restricted from cultivating additional hectares they might hold or own.

Finally, regarding programme staff, some have testified that *Sembrando Vida* personnel frequently visit farmers’ plots (ASF, 2019b). Nevertheless, many criticize staff for including or excluding farmers according to their own criteria (Expansión & Connectas, n.d.; Rincón, n.d.), while others express concern with how staff select development plans and providers of inputs (DESMI, 2021; Linares Sosa, 2021; González Rojas, 2021; Rosset, 2019b). In the thesis, I illustrate that one of the main problems of previous coffee programmes was lack of continuity in providing technical assistance and demonstrate that Soconusco farmers appreciate that staff frequently visit farmers’ plots, a finding in line with analysts (ASF, 2019b) that indicate that technical assistance is continually provided by the programme. Nevertheless, I share some criticisms of staff, as I found that they did not properly

verify that farmers met programme requirements, and demanded that they hastily carry out certain agricultural labours.<sup>98</sup>

### *Producción Para el Bienestar*

In the introduction, I mention that some researchers have analysed *Producción para el Bienestar*, although to a much lesser extent than *Sembrando Vida*. Some have observed that in 2020 the programme achieved its goals (GESOC, 2021) and that it has contributed to increasing crop yield (CONEVAL, 2020c; Enciso, 2022). However, others have reported deficiencies with respect to programme implementation in 2019, including that many farmers had difficulties registering for the programme; that little funding had been provided for technical assistance; that subsidies were provided too late in the agricultural season; and that responsibilities were not clearly delineated between SADER and the CGPD (ASF, 2020a; CONEVAL, 2020b, 2020c). This thesis illustrates several limitations of the programme in 2019: farmers had to re-apply when SUBICAFE was transferred to *Production for Well-being*; they had to meet new requirements based on imprecise instructions; they lacked technical assistance; collaboration among farmers was not promoted; and farmers received the subsidy very late in the season. Based on these findings, I support analysts (ASF, 2020a; CONEVAL, 2020b, 2020c) who argue that operation of the programme in 2019 was fraught with deficiencies.

### *The CGPD*

In the introduction, I mention that some researchers have analysed the performance of the CGPD. Some highlight that the CGPD could improve coordination and implementation of social programmes, thereby contributing to establishing a closer relationship between the state and rural communities (ASF, 2019b; Gordillo, 2021). However, this agency has been severely criticized for electoral proselytism (Expansión Política, 2020; Hernández Estrada, 2019; INE, 2019); abuse of power, usurpation, and nepotism (Monroy, 2020); requiring farmers to provide documents which are not stipulated for a given programme (López, 2022); deficient staff training (CONEVAL, 2021); and methodological problems in carrying out the *Censo del Bienestar* (ASF, 2019b; Ortega, 2021). I

---

<sup>98</sup> Scholars evaluating *Sembrando Vida* also analysed the programme's territorial coverage and system of accountability, which I do not address as they are outside the focus of the thesis.

coincide with analysts (ASF, 2019b; Gordillo, 2021) who hold that the CGPD was assigned with tasks that may contribute to improving implementation of rural and other social policies. Nonetheless, my research indicates that this agency has not properly fulfilled the role which it was assigned to it. Rather, it misused its power to depose leaders of coffee farmer organizations; included beneficiaries based on political interest; and failed to establish a collaborative relationship with SADER, particularly on a local level.

### **Final Considerations**

Many have strongly criticized the AMLO administration holding that it is “more of the same” (López Sánchez & Torre Estrada, 2021); that rather than a “transformation” it is a “simulation” (DESMI, 2021); and that rural programmes are only “weakening farmers’ livelihoods” (Linares Sosa, 2021). Based on a thorough analysis of AMLO’s rural policies and their implications for small farmers’ livelihoods, I observe that the administration has not fulfilled all of its promises. Nevertheless, I consider that the AMLO administration is far from being “the same”, “a simulation”, or “weakening farmers’ livelihoods”. In just 2019, the state began to resolve problems that had prevailed in Mexico for almost a century, such as high levels of clientelism and weak attention by the state to small scale farmers. Although rural policies continued to be fraught with deficiencies in 2019, over the course of the AMLO administration some have been addressed.

Based on the present study of Mexico’s rural policies in 2019, the administration has not yet achieved AMLO’s promised radical historical transformation. However, previous transformations (the Mexican Independence; the Reform War; and the Mexican Revolution) involved years of bloody confrontation and took decades for their objectives to be implemented. For instance, while the Mexican Revolution took place from 1910 to 1917, land only began to be distributed to small-scale farmers during the administration of President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940). Since the start of neoliberalism, the Mexican state had grown to be so dysfunctional that even an entire administration seems little time for the state to fully recover its role of generating progress and welfare. Certainly, the administration has not fulfilled all of its promises, however it has generated significant changes toward a new option for development—this is no small achievement.

## References

- 4C. (n.d.). *About: What is 4C*. 4C. Retrieved February 6, 2020 from <https://www.4c-services.org/about/what-is-4c/>
- Acosta, E. (2021). SV y sus usos para el llamado Tren Maya. In *Comunidad y autonomía frente a Sembrando Vida* (pp. 151-171). Centro de Estudios para el Cambio en el Campo Mexicano (CECCAM).  
<https://www.ceccam.org/sites/default/files/comunidad%20y%20autonomia.pdf>
- Agricultura. (2020, marzo 9). *Estrategia de Acompañamiento Técnico* [Video].  
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=beiPmuyHYVA&t=432s&ab\\_channel=Agricultura](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=beiPmuyHYVA&t=432s&ab_channel=Agricultura)
- Agricultura. (2022a, febrero 24). *La cafeticultura y la necesaria transformación de su mercado hacia sistemas sustentables* [Webinar]. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EomHeX1L-Co&t=23s>
- Agricultura. (2022b, abril 28). *Políticas públicas para una cafeticultura sustentable* [Webinar].  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8W8mt4RXlaw&t=7s>
- Aguirre, F. (2005, noviembre 29). 2.4 *Características políticas de las empresas sociales*. Revista Vinculando. Retrieved January 14, 2022 from  
[https://vinculando.org/comerciojusto/cafe\\_mexico/caracteristicas\\_politicas\\_empresa\\_social.html](https://vinculando.org/comerciojusto/cafe_mexico/caracteristicas_politicas_empresa_social.html)
- Ahuactzin Martínez, C. E. (2020). Política y persuasión en México. Construcción del ethos en los spots electorales de Andrés Manuel López Obrador en 2018. *Discurso & Sociedad*, 14(1), 59-85. [http://www.dissoc.org/ediciones/v14n01/DS14\(1\)AhuactzinMartinez.pdf](http://www.dissoc.org/ediciones/v14n01/DS14(1)AhuactzinMartinez.pdf)
- AMECAFE. (2012, febrero). *Plan integral de promoción del café de México*.
- AMECAFE. (2018, junio 21). *Procedimiento para compensar los ingresos de los Fideicomisarios del Fondo en caso de contingencia en la baja del precio del café* [Área responsable: FIRCAFÉ](Versión 1.1). [https://amecafe.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Procedimiento\\_para\\_entrega\\_recursos\\_por\\_baja\\_dePrecio\\_21\\_junio\\_2018.pdf](https://amecafe.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Procedimiento_para_entrega_recursos_por_baja_dePrecio_21_junio_2018.pdf)
- AMECAFE, & SPC. (2018, agosto 21). *Convención del Comité Nacional Sistema Producto Café* [Informe del Prof. Cruz José Arguello Miceli, representante no gubernamental del Comité Nacional Sistema Producto Café y coordinador ejecutivo de AMECAFE].  
<https://amecafe.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/INFORME-COORDINADOR-EJECUTIVO.pdf>
- AMLO. (2019a, mayo 31). *Versión estenográfica. 'Programas Integrales de Bienestar' y apoyo a cafeticultores, en Coatepec, Veracruz*. Retrieved March 29, 2022 from  
<https://lopezobrador.org.mx/2019/05/31/version-estenografica-programas-integrales-de-bienestar-y-apoyo-a-cafeticultores-en-coatepec-veracruz/>
- AMLO. (2019b, febrero 1). *Versión estenográfica de la conferencia de prensa matutina del presidente Andrés Manuel López Obrador*. Retrieved March 2, 2022 from  
<https://lopezobrador.org.mx/2019/02/01/version-estenografica-de-la-conferencia-de-prensa-matutina-del-presidente-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-36/>
- AMLO. (2019c, octubre 9). *Versión estenográfica de la conferencia de prensa matutina del presidente Andrés Manuel López Obrador*. Retrieved March 2, 2022 from

- <https://lopezobrador.org.mx/2019/10/09/version-estenografica-de-la-conferencia-de-prensa-matutina-del-presidente-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-172/>
- AMLO. (2021, septiembre 29). *Inauguración de sucursal del Banco del Bienestar en Gustavo A. Madero, Ciudad de México* [Video].  
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=moqwnBLqQE&ab\\_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3pezObrador](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=moqwnBLqQE&ab_channel=Andr%C3%A9sManuelL%C3%B3pezObrador)
- AMLO. (n.d.). *Sembrando Vida Centroamérica*. Retrieved June 21, 2022 from  
<https://lopezobrador.org.mx/temas/sebrando-vida-centroamerica/>
- Anacafé. (n.d.). *Guía de variedades de café. Guatemala*.  
<https://www.anacafe.org/uploads/file/9a4f9434577a433aad6c123d321e25f9/Gu%C3%ADa-de-variedades-Anacaf%C3%A9.pdf>
- Anderzén, J., Guzmán Luna, A., Luna-González, D. V., Merrill, S. C., Caswell, M., Méndez, V. E., Hernández Jonapá, R., & Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho, M. (2020). Effects of on-farm diversification strategies on smallholder coffee farmer food security and income sufficiency in Chiapas, Mexico. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 77, 33–46.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2020.04.001>
- Arias, P., Hallam, D., Krivonos, E., & Morrison, J. (2013). *Smallholder integration in changing food markets*. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).  
<https://www.fao.org/3/i3292e/i3292e.pdf>
- ASF. (2019a). *Informe individual del resultado de la fiscalización superior de la cuenta pública 2019* [Grupo Funcional Desarrollo Económico].  
[https://www.asf.gob.mx/Section/58\\_Informes\\_de\\_auditoria](https://www.asf.gob.mx/Section/58_Informes_de_auditoria)
- ASF. (2019b). *Informe individual del resultado de la fiscalización superior de la cuenta pública 2019* [Grupo Funcional Desarrollo Social].  
[https://www.asf.gob.mx/Section/58\\_Informes\\_de\\_auditoria](https://www.asf.gob.mx/Section/58_Informes_de_auditoria)
- ASF. (2020a). *Informe individual del resultado de la fiscalización superior de la cuenta pública 2019* [Grupo Funcional Desarrollo Económico].  
[https://www.asf.gob.mx/Section/58\\_Informes\\_de\\_auditoria](https://www.asf.gob.mx/Section/58_Informes_de_auditoria)
- ASF. (2020b). *Informe individual del resultado de la fiscalización superior de la cuenta pública 2019* [Grupo Funcional Desarrollo Social].  
[https://www.asf.gob.mx/Section/58\\_Informes\\_de\\_auditoria](https://www.asf.gob.mx/Section/58_Informes_de_auditoria)
- Audelo Cruz, J. M. (2005). Sobre el concepto de corporativismo: Una revisión en el contexto político mexicano actual. In D. Cienfuegos Salgado & M. A. López Olvera (Eds.), *Estudios en homenaje a don Jorge Fernández Ruiz. Derecho constitucional y política* (pp. 1–24). Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM).  
<http://ru.juridicas.unam.mx/xmlui/handle/123456789/10543>
- Ávalos Tenorio, G. (2019). México: Del colapso a la restauración del estado. In J. L. Cisneros, M. G. Barrón Cruz, & J. A. Parra Molina (Eds.), *Sentido y tendencias de la transformación en México* (pp. 43–65). El Aleph.  
[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351135072\\_Sentido\\_y\\_tendencias\\_de\\_la\\_transformacion\\_en\\_Mexico](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351135072_Sentido_y_tendencias_de_la_transformacion_en_Mexico)
- Avelino, J., & Anzueto, F. (2020). Coffee rust epidemics in Central America: Chronicle of a resistance breakdown following the great epidemics of 2012 and 2013. In J. B. Ristaino & A.

- Records (Eds.), *Emerging plant diseases and global food security* (pp. 185–198). American Phytopathological Society (APA). [https://doi.org/10.1094/9780890546383\\_009](https://doi.org/10.1094/9780890546383_009)
- Avella Alaminos, I. (2002). Los cafetaleros alemanes en el Soconusco ante el Gobierno de Carranza (1915). In *Anuario 2000* (pp. 445–476). Universidad de Ciencias y Artes de Chiapas (UNICACH). <https://repositorio.cesmeca.mx/handle/11595/259>
- Baca del Moral, J., Cuevas-Reyes, V., & Barradas-Miranda, P. (2021). De la dispersión a la concentración de políticas públicas rurales en México. *Revista de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades*, 30(59), 4–19. <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=8488613>
- Banco del Bienestar. (n.d.). *Programa Institucional 2020–2024* [Banco de Bienestar, Sociedad Nacional de Crédito, Institución de Banca de Desarrollo. Programa derivado del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2019–2024]. [https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/685797/Programa\\_Institucional\\_2020\\_2024\\_compressed.pdf](https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/685797/Programa_Institucional_2020_2024_compressed.pdf)
- Banti, M., & Abraham, E. (2021). Coffee processing methods, coffee quality and related environmental issues. *Journal of Food and Nutrition Sciences*, 9(6), 144–152. <https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfns.20210906.12>
- Barham, B. L., Callenes, M., Gitter, S., Lewis, J., & Weber, J. (2011). Fair Trade/organic coffee, rural livelihoods, and the “Agrarian question”: Southern Mexican coffee families in transition. *World Development*, 39(1), 134–145. <https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.08.005>
- Barham, B. L., & Weber, J. G. (2012). The economic sustainability of certified coffee: Recent evidence from Mexico and Peru. *World Development*, 40(6), 1269–1279. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.11.005>
- Barrera, J. F. (2016). Café Robusta, ¿héroe o villano?. *Ecofronteras*, 20(58), 14–17. <https://revistas.ecosur.mx/ecofronteras/index.php/eco/article/view/1661>
- Barrera, J. F. (2017). La roya, implacable enemigo del café. *Claridades Agropecuarias*, 280, 22–29.
- Barrera, J. F. (n.d.). *Broca y roya del café. Viejos problemas, nuevos enfoques*. Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT). Retrieved September 22, 2021 from <https://www.cyd.conacyt.gob.mx/?p=articulo&id=161>
- Barrera, J. F., Avelino, J., Huerta, G., Herrera, J., & Gómez, J. (2013). La roya del café, crónica de una devastación anunciada. *Ecofronteras*, 49(septiembre/diciembre), 22–25. <https://revistas.ecosur.mx/ecofronteras/index.php/eco/article/view/378>
- Bartra, A. (1995). Origen y claves del sistema finquero del Soconusco. *Chiapas*, 1, 1–22. <https://geopolitica.iiec.unam.mx/sites/geopolitica.iiec.unam.mx/files/2019-09/chubartra.pdf>
- Bartra, A. (2019a). *El principio. Los primeros cuatro meses*. Para leer en libertad AC. <http://www.brigadaparaleerenlibertad.com/libro/el-principio-los-primeros-cuatro-meses>
- Bartra, A. (2019b, abril 9). *Políticas de la Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural* [Seminar]. El Colegio de México (COLMEX). [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F2LPYGbhQ5k&ab\\_channel=ElColegiodeM%C3%A9xicoA.C.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F2LPYGbhQ5k&ab_channel=ElColegiodeM%C3%A9xicoA.C.)
- Bartra, A. (2020). *Los nuevos herederos de Zapata. Campesinos en movimiento 1920–2012*. Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD); Secretaría de Trabajadores del Campo,

- Desarrollo Rural y Pueblos Indios.  
<https://unpensamientomundano.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/nuevos-herederos-zapata.pdf>
- Bartra Vergés, A., Cobo, R., & Paz Paredes, L. (2011). *La hora del café. Dos siglos a muchas voces*. Comisión Nacional para el Conocimiento y Uso de la Biodiversidad (CONABIO).  
[https://www.biodiversidad.gob.mx/publicaciones/versiones\\_digitaless/HoraCafe.pdf](https://www.biodiversidad.gob.mx/publicaciones/versiones_digitaless/HoraCafe.pdf)
- Baumann, F. (1983). Terratenientes, campesinos y la expansión de la agricultura capitalista en Chiapas, 1896-1916. *Mesoamérica*, 4(5), 8-63.  
<https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4009438>
- Bernabe Inés, L. (n.d.). *Evaluación de Diseño: Programa Sembrando Vida* [Tesis de Maestría, Universidad Autónoma de Chapingo]. [http://biblioteca.clasco.edu.ar/Mexico/cesmea-unicach/20170419034553/pdf\\_655.pdf](http://biblioteca.clasco.edu.ar/Mexico/cesmea-unicach/20170419034553/pdf_655.pdf)
- Bernstein, H. (2002). Agrarian classes in capitalist development. In L. Sklair (Ed.), *Capitalism and development* (pp. 40-71). Routledge.
- Bernstein, H. (2010). *Class dynamics of agrarian change*. Fernwood Publishing; Kumarian Press. <https://practicalactionpublishing.com/book/2571/class-dynamics-of-agrarian-change>
- Bernstein, H. (2016). Agrarian political economy and modern world capitalism: The contributions of food regime analysis. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 43(3), 611-647.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2015.1101456>
- Bertoli, M.-A. (2021, febrero 16). *Sembrando Vida: Riesgos y oportunidades frente a la austeridad y la desinstitucionalización*. Nexos. Retrieved June 21, 2022 from <https://economia.nexos.com.mx/sembrando-vida-riesgos-y-oportunidades-frente-a-la-austeridad-y-la-desinstitucionalizacion/>
- Betances, E. (2020). México: ¿El retorno del Estado desarrollista?. *Revista Global*, 16, 1-22.  
[https://latinamericanperspectives.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Me%CC%81xico-%C2%BFEL-retorno-del-Estado-desarrollista\\_\\_Emelio-Betances\\_Jan-2020.pdf](https://latinamericanperspectives.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Me%CC%81xico-%C2%BFEL-retorno-del-Estado-desarrollista__Emelio-Betances_Jan-2020.pdf)
- Beuchelt, T. D., & Zeller, M. (2013). The role of cooperative business models for the success of smallholder coffee certification in Nicaragua: A comparison of conventional, organic and Organic-Fairtrade certified cooperatives. *Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems*, 28(3), 195-211. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742170512000087>
- Blancas Madrigal, D. (2021, agosto 15). *Sembrando vida inscribe a caciques, terratenientes...y "narquillos"*. Crónica. Retrieved July 21, 2022 from [https://www.cronica.com.mx/notas-omiten\\_cuestionario\\_socioeconomico\\_en\\_sembrando\\_vida\\_se\\_filtran\\_caciques\\_terratenientes\\_especuladores-1194746-2021.html](https://www.cronica.com.mx/notas-omiten_cuestionario_socioeconomico_en_sembrando_vida_se_filtran_caciques_terratenientes_especuladores-1194746-2021.html)
- Bolwig, S., Ponte, S., du Toit, A., Riisgaard, L., & Halberg, N. (2010). Integrating poverty and environmental concerns into value-chain analysis: A conceptual framework. *Development Policy Review*, 28(2), 173-194. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2010.00480.x>
- Borrás, L. (1976). El Soconusco. *Artes de México*, 192, 65-74.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/24324428>
- Borras, S. M., McMichael, P., & Scoones, I. (2010). The politics of biofuels, land and agrarian change: Editors' introduction. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 37(4), 575-592.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2010.512448>

- Bray, J., & Neilson, J. (2018). Examining the interface of sustainability programmes and livelihoods in the Semendo highlands of Indonesia. *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, 59(3), 368–383. <https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12205>
- Bruhn, K. (2021). AMLO y su partido. *Política y gobierno*, 28(2). <http://www.politicaygobierno.cide.edu/index.php/pyg/article/view/1559>
- Cafés de México. (2019). Coalición Nacional de Organizaciones de Productores de Café (CONAPROCAFE). *Cafés de México*, 296(enero), 14–17.
- Cafés de México. (2021, marzo 13). *Entrevista a Don Fausto Cantú Peña en Puebla, México en agosto 2017*. Retrieved June 7, 2022 from <https://cafesdemexico.com/entrevista-a-don-fausto-cantu-pena-en-puebla-mexico-en-agosto-1917/>
- Calo, M., & Wise, T. A. (2005, October). *Revaluing peasant coffee production: Organic and fair trade markets in Mexico*. Global Development and Environment Institute (GDAE). [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242149345\\_Revaluing\\_Peasant\\_Coffee\\_Producti\\_on\\_Organic\\_and\\_Fair\\_Trade\\_Markets\\_in\\_Mexico/link/5b006655of7e9be94bd8ddc4/download](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242149345_Revaluing_Peasant_Coffee_Producti_on_Organic_and_Fair_Trade_Markets_in_Mexico/link/5b006655of7e9be94bd8ddc4/download)
- Camacho Servín, F. (2022, enero 29). *Agricultores de Chiapas denuncian ilícitos de técnicos de Sembrando Vida*. La Jornada. Retrieved March 29, 2022 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/notas/2022/01/29/politica/agricultores-de-chiapas-denuncian-ilicitos-de-tecnicos-de-sembrando-vida/>
- Cámara de Diputados, & CEDRSSA. (2018, julio). *El café mexicano* [Palacio Legislativo de San Lázaro]. <http://www.cedrssa.gob.mx/files/10/31El%20caf%C3%A9%20en%20M%C3%A9xico.pdf>
- Cámara de Diputados, & CEDRSSA. (2019, julio). *Investigación interna. Comercio internacional del café, el caso de México* [Palacio Legislativo de San Lázaro]. <http://www.cedrssa.gob.mx/files/b/13/94Caf%C3%A9%20-Producci%C3%B3n%20y%20Consumo.pdf>
- Carabaña, C. (2021a, noviembre 29). *Sembrando Vida contra la Selva Maya*. El Universal. Retrieved March 29, 2022 from <https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/interactivos/2021/sembrando-vida-contra-la-selva-maya/>
- Carabaña, C. (2021b, noviembre 29). *Sembrando Vida no es un programa ambiental. El gobierno mexicano debería investigarlo y corregirlo*. The Washington Post. Retrieved March 29, 2022 from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/es/post-opinion/2021/11/29/sembrando-vida-amlo-deforestacion-chocolates-aristegui-mexico-2021/>
- Casar, M. A. (2019, agosto). *Programas sociales, clientelismo y corrupción*. Mexicanos Contra la Corrupción y la Impunidad (MCCI). <https://contralacorrupcion.mx/los-mexicanos-frente-a-la-corrupcion-y-la-impunidad-2020/assets/pdf/los-mexicanos-frente-a-la-corrupcion-y-la-impunidad-2020.pdf>
- Casar, M. A., & Núñez González, L. (2019). *¿Primero los pobres? La política social: Un barco a la deriva*. Mexicanos Contra la Corrupción y la Impunidad; Nexos. Retrieved October 12, 2022 from <https://contralacorrupcion.mx/primero-los-pobres-nexos-barco-deriva>
- Castellanos-Navarrete, A., & Jansen, K. (2017). Why do smallholders plant biofuel crops? The ‘politics of consent’ in Mexico. *Geoforum*, 87, 15–27. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.09.019>

- Castellanos-Navarrete, A., & Jansen, K. (2018). Is oil palm expansion a challenge to agroecology? Smallholders practising industrial farming in Mexico. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 18(1), 132–155. <https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12195>
- Celis Callejas, F. (2008, septiembre 12). *Intercambio de favores*. La Jornada del Campo. Retrieved June 10, 2022 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/2008/09/12/plaga.html>
- Celis Callejas, F. (2009, noviembre 14). *Las organizaciones de los cafetaleros*. La Jornada del Campo. Retrieved June 8, 2022 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/2009/11/14/cafetaleros.html>
- Celis Callejas, F. (2013, noviembre 16). *El TLCAN y la cafeticultura mexicana*. La Jornada del Campo. Retrieved June 7, 2022 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/2013/11/16/cam-cafe.html>
- Celis Callejas, F. (2015). *La CNOC: Una organización cafetalera independiente*. La Jornada del Campo. Retrieved September 22, 2021 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/2015/08/15/cam-cnoc.html>
- Celis Callejas, F. (2019). *Incertidumbre y molestia: La voz de los cafetaleros*. La Jornada del Campo. Retrieved September 22, 2021 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/2019/07/20/cam-voz.html>
- Celis, F. (1991). Unión de Productores de Café de Veracruz. Del cambio de terreno al fortalecimiento de una organización democrática. In *Cafetaleros. La construcción de la autonomía. Cuadernos de desarrollo de base 3* (pp. 157–171). Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras (CNOC).
- Chapoy Bonifaz, D. B. (2003). *Planeación, programación y presupuestación*. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). <https://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/bjv/detalle-libro/1009-planeacion-programacion-y-presupuestacion>
- Chávez Becker, C. (2014). Autonomía político-organizacional rural y solidaridad global: La UCIRI y el Comercio Justo en México. *Revista UNAM*, 15(9), 1–14. <http://www.revista.unam.mx/vol.15/num9/art73/>
- CLAC, & Comercio Justo Fairtrade. (2018, febrero 1). *UCIRI-Las raíces del Comercio Justo* [Video]. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WUlgVTQ-JAA&ab\\_channel=CLAC-ComercioJustoFairtrade](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WUlgVTQ-JAA&ab_channel=CLAC-ComercioJustoFairtrade)
- Club Pro. (2016, noviembre 14). *Plan NESCAFÉ para la sostenibilidad | Pro Café* [Video]. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYqvDRxvHpQ&t=42s&ab\\_channel=ClubPro](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYqvDRxvHpQ&t=42s&ab_channel=ClubPro)
- CNDH. (n.d.). *Aprehenden a los hermanos Flores Magón*. Retrieved June 8, 2022 from <https://www.cndh.org.mx/noticia/aprehenden-los-hermanos-flores-magon>
- CNOC. (2018, diciembre 24). *Hoy 24 dic en Plaza Regina Mtz (antes Plaza Lerdo para los productor@s) en Xalapa, declaraciones de Fernando Celis, asesor de la Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras (CNOC)* [Ecochavarrillo Cafaselva's video] [Status update]. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/Ecochavarrillo/videos/517947245358753>
- CNOC. (2019a, enero 16). *Afectaciones en los precios del café arábigo nacional si se tienen un fuerte aumento de las plantaciones y producción de café Robusta en Veracruz y en México* [Image attached] [Status update]. Facebook. <https://web.facebook.com/cnocafe/photos/a.637216723069326/972199382904390/>; <https://web.facebook.com/cnocafe/photos/a.637216723069326/972199469571048/>; and <https://web.facebook.com/cnocafe/photos/a.637216723069326/972199592904369>

- CNOC. (2019b, noviembre 26). *Alfonso Romo y sus influencias* [Image attached] [Status update]. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/cnocafe/posts/1414780948646229>
- CNOC. (2019c, abril 12). *Boletín de prensa* [Image attached] [Status update]. Facebook. <https://web.facebook.com/cnocafe/photos/a.637216723069326/1078785455579115> and <https://web.facebook.com/cnocafe/photos/1078785688912425>
- CNOC. (2019d, enero 5). *Comentarios sobre las preguntas más constantes en relación a la nueva planta de café soluble de la Nestlé y nuevas plantaciones de café Robusta en Veracruz* [Status update]. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/cnocafe/posts/960323497425312>
- CNOC. (2019e, enero 23). *Comentarios sobre lo que se manejó del café y la Nestlé en una conferencia de prensa del presidente López Obrador* [Status update]. Facebook. [https://mobile.facebook.com/nt/screen/?params=%67B%022note\\_id%022%03A765324794046051%07D&path=%02Fnotes%02Fnote%02F%02\\_rdr](https://mobile.facebook.com/nt/screen/?params=%67B%022note_id%022%03A765324794046051%07D&path=%02Fnotes%02Fnote%02F%02_rdr)
- CNOC. (2019f, diciembre 12). *Cómo ha terminado el programa de apoyo a la producción de café del 2019* [Status update]. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/cnocafe/posts/1444615388996118>
- CNOC. (2019g, enero 7). *Confusión e incertidumbre sobre las políticas cafetaleras que seguirá la SADER* [Image attached] [Status update]. Facebook. <https://web.facebook.com/cnocafe/photos/a.637216723069326/962507603873568>; <https://web.facebook.com/cnocafe/photos/a.637216723069326/962507813873547>; and <https://web.facebook.com/cnocafe/photos/a.637216723069326/962507950540200>
- CNOC. (2019h, abril 29). *Controversia por la aplicación del programa de apoyo a productores de café en el 2019* [Status update]. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/632587553532243/posts/1100467153410945/?app=fbl>
- CNOC. (2019i, agosto 16). *¡Demasiados privilegios para la Nestlé en Veracruz!* [Status update]. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/cnocafe/posts/1251080245016301>
- CNOC. (2019j, noviembre 25). *Escrito elaborado para la revista Cafés de México* [Status update]. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/cnocafe/posts/1413239775467013>
- CNOC. (2019k, agosto 15). *Escrito que se envió a los secretarios* [Image attached] [Status update]. Facebook. [https://mobile.facebook.com/story.php?story\\_fbid=1249783248479334&id=632587553532243&\\_rdc=1&\\_rdr](https://mobile.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1249783248479334&id=632587553532243&_rdc=1&_rdr)
- CNOC. (2019l, septiembre 24). *Hoy inició la reunión del Consejo General de la O.I.C. en Londres, Reino Unido* [Status update]. Facebook. [https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story\\_fbid=1308436625947329&id=632587553532243](https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1308436625947329&id=632587553532243)
- CNOC. (2019m, enero 16). *Ing. Cuitláhuac García Jiménez. Gobernador del Estado de Veracruz* [Image attached] [Status update]. Facebook. <https://web.facebook.com/cnocafe/photos/a.637216723069326/971977139593281> and <https://web.facebook.com/cnocafe/photos/a.637216723069326/971977396259922>
- CNOC. (2019n, enero 11). *Lo que debe aclarar el gobierno del estado de Veracruz es si van a seguir con lo que manejaron que harían en relación al plan de nuevas plantaciones de café Robusta que quiere la Nestlé* [Status update]. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/cnocafe/posts/966642970126698>

- CNOC. (2019o, junio 7). *Minuta de acuerdos sobre la instrumentación de los apoyos a la producción a productores de café en el 2019* [Status update]. Facebook.  
<https://www.facebook.com/632587553532243/posts/1152363254888001/?app=fbl>
- CNOC. (2019p, enero 21). *Nota sobre la baja de precios del café pagados a los productores en México* [Image attached] [Status update]. Facebook.  
<https://www.facebook.com/cnocafe/posts/977750085682653>
- CNOC. (2019q, junio 17). *Otro capítulo de esta historia* [Status update]. Facebook.  
<https://www.facebook.com/632587553532243/posts/1166722433452083/?app=fbl>
- CNOC. (2019r, octubre 18). *¿Por qué ha fallado el programa de apoyo a productores de café en el 2019?* [Status update]. Facebook.  
<https://www.facebook.com/cnocafe/posts/1347364602054531>
- CNOC. (2019s, enero 18). *Primera reunión del sector cafetalero con funcionarios de la SADER* [Image attached] [Status update]. Facebook  
<https://www.facebook.com/cnocafe/posts/974229369368058>
- CNOC. (2019t, enero14). *Reunión nacional de la CNOC en Cuetzalan, Puebla* [Image attached] [Status update]. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/cnocafe/posts/970178623106466>
- CNOC. (2019u, enero 25). *¡Una definición importante!* [Status update]. Facebook.  
<https://web.facebook.com/notes/1071579353262782/>
- CNOC. (2019v, abril 12). *¡Vergonzosa situación con el programa de fomento productivo del café vía SADER!* [Status update]. Facebook.  
<https://www.facebook.com/cnocafe/posts/1078840062240321>
- CNOC. (2021, noviembre 8). *Situación actual del FIRCAFE* [Image attached] [Status update]. Facebook.  
<https://d.facebook.com/cnocafe/photos/a.637216723069326/3114495038674803/?type=3&source=48>
- CNOC. (2022a, abril 21). *Se presenta documento elaborado a partir de una presentación en un taller de Coopcafé, realizado en San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas* [Status update]. Facebook <https://www.facebook.com/632587553532243/posts/3603042169820085/?app=fb>
- CNOC. (2022b, enero 19). *Una propuesta de nuevas políticas cafetaleras en México* [Status update]. Facebook  
<https://www.facebook.com/632587553532243/posts/3351038355020469/?app=fbl>
- Cocoa Services. (n.d.). *Evaluación de diseño 2019–2020 Sembrando Vida* [Cocoa Services]. BIENESTAR.  
[https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/565806/Informe\\_Final\\_Dise\\_o\\_Sembrando\\_Vida.pdf](https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/565806/Informe_Final_Dise_o_Sembrando_Vida.pdf)
- Collin, L. (2019). Programas sociales ¿Transformación o distribución?. In J. L. Cisneros, M. G. Barrón Cruz, & J. A. Parra Molina (Eds.), *Sentido y tendencias de la transformación en México* (pp. 87–128). El Aleph.  
[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351135072\\_Sentido\\_y\\_tendencias\\_de\\_la\\_transformacion\\_en\\_Mexico](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351135072_Sentido_y_tendencias_de_la_transformacion_en_Mexico)
- CONABIO. (2015). *Bosques, selvas y cafés de Chiapas*  
[https://www.biodiversidad.gob.mx/corredor/cbmm/pdf/bosques\\_selvas\\_cafes\\_chiapas.pdf](https://www.biodiversidad.gob.mx/corredor/cbmm/pdf/bosques_selvas_cafes_chiapas.pdf)
- CONEVAL. (2020a, julio 12). *Avances y retos del Programa Producción para el Bienestar* [Dirección de Información y Comunicación Social](Comunicado No.15).

- [https://www.coneval.org.mx/SalaPrensa/Comunicadosprensa/Documents/2020/COMUNICADO\\_11\\_PROGRAMA\\_SEMBRANDO\\_VIDA.pdf](https://www.coneval.org.mx/SalaPrensa/Comunicadosprensa/Documents/2020/COMUNICADO_11_PROGRAMA_SEMBRANDO_VIDA.pdf)
- CONEVAL. (2020b, julio 12). *Avances y retos del Programa Sembrando Vida* [Dirección de Información y Comunicación Social](Comunicado No.11).  
[https://www.coneval.org.mx/SalaPrensa/Comunicadosprensa/Documents/2020/COMUNICADO\\_11\\_PROGRAMA\\_SEMBRANDO\\_VIDA.pdf](https://www.coneval.org.mx/SalaPrensa/Comunicadosprensa/Documents/2020/COMUNICADO_11_PROGRAMA_SEMBRANDO_VIDA.pdf)
- CONEVAL. (2020c). *Evaluación de Diseño con Trabajo de Campo del Programa Producción para el Bienestar 2019–2020*.  
[https://www.coneval.org.mx/Evaluacion/IEPSM/Paginas/Evaluaciones\\_Disenio\\_Desarrollo\\_Social.aspx](https://www.coneval.org.mx/Evaluacion/IEPSM/Paginas/Evaluaciones_Disenio_Desarrollo_Social.aspx)
- CONEVAL. (2020d). *Evaluación de Diseño con Trabajo de Campo del Programa Sembrando Vida 2019–2020*.  
[https://www.coneval.org.mx/Evaluacion/IEPSM/Paginas/Evaluaciones\\_Disenio\\_Desarrollo\\_Social.aspx](https://www.coneval.org.mx/Evaluacion/IEPSM/Paginas/Evaluaciones_Disenio_Desarrollo_Social.aspx)
- CONEVAL. (2020e). *Informe de pobreza y evaluación 2020. Chiapas*.  
[https://www.coneval.org.mx/coordinacion/entidades/Documents/Informes\\_de\\_pobreza\\_y\\_evaluacion\\_2020\\_Documentos/Informe\\_Chiapas\\_2020.pdf](https://www.coneval.org.mx/coordinacion/entidades/Documents/Informes_de_pobreza_y_evaluacion_2020_Documentos/Informe_Chiapas_2020.pdf)
- CONEVAL. (2021). *Informe de evaluación de la política de desarrollo social 2020*.  
<https://www.coneval.org.mx/Evaluacion/IEPSM/IEPSM/Paginas/IEPDS-2020.aspx>
- CONEVAL. (n.d.). *Líneas de pobreza por ingresos* [Data set].  
<http://sistemas.coneval.org.mx/InfoPobreza/Pages/wfrLineaBienestar?pAnioInicio=2016&pTipoIndicador=0>
- Cotler, H., Manson, R., & Nava Martínez, J. D. (2020, abril). *Reporte: Evaluación de la focalización del Programa Sembrando Vida*. Instituto de Ecología (INECOL); Centro de Investigación en Ciencias de Información Geoespacial (CentroGeo); Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT).  
[https://centrogeo.repositorioinstitucional.mx/jspui/bitstream/1012/294/1/200518\\_evaluacion-de-la-focalizacion-del-programa-sembrando-vida.pdf](https://centrogeo.repositorioinstitucional.mx/jspui/bitstream/1012/294/1/200518_evaluacion-de-la-focalizacion-del-programa-sembrando-vida.pdf)
- Cruz Hernández, I. (2019, enero 8). *La Nestlé y la ausencia de estrategias gubernamentales en el café*. El Financiero. Retrieved January 12, 2022 from  
<https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/opinion/isabel-cruz/la-nestle-y-la-ausencia-de-estrategias-gubernamentales-en-el-cafe/>
- Damián, A. (1988). Conformación histórica de la región del Soconusco, Chiapas. *Estudios Fronterizos*, VII(17), 61–80. <https://doi.org/10.21670/ref.1988.17.a03>
- Danse, M., & Vellema, S. (2005). Small-scale farmer access to international agri-food chains: A BoP-based reflection on the need for socially embedded innovation in the coffee and flower sector. *Greener Management International*, 51(Autumn 2005), 39–52.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/greemanainte.51.39>
- Daviron, B., & Ponte, S. (2005). *The coffee paradox: Global markets, commodity trade and the elusive promise of development*. Zed Books.  
[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259999050\\_The\\_Coffee\\_Paradox\\_Global\\_Markets\\_Commodity\\_Trade\\_and\\_the\\_Elusive\\_Promise\\_of\\_Development](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259999050_The_Coffee_Paradox_Global_Markets_Commodity_Trade_and_the_Elusive_Promise_of_Development)
- de Grammont, H. C., & Mackinlay, H. (2006). Las organizaciones sociales y la transición política en el campo mexicano. In H. C. de Grammont (Ed.), *La construcción de la*

- democracia en el campo latinoamericano* (pp. 23–68). Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO)  
<http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/clacso/gt/20100926014303/grammont.pdf>
- de Grammont, H. C., Mackinlay, H., & Stoller, R. (2009). Campesino and indigenous social organizations facing democratic transition in Mexico, 1938–2006. *Latin American Perspectives*, 36(4), 21–40. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X09338588>
- de Haldevang, M. (2021, March 8). *How Mexico's vast tree-planting program ended up encouraging deforestation*. Bloomberg. Retrieved October 29, 2022 from <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-03-08/a-tree-planting-program-in-mexico-may-encourage-deforestation>
- de Ita, A. (2021). Sembrando Envidia In *Comunidad y autonomía frente a Sembrando Vida* (pp. 13–28). Centro de Estudios para el Cambio en el Campo Mexicano (CECCAM). <https://www.ceccam.org/sites/default/files/comunidad%20y%20autonomia.pdf>
- de León, E. E. S., & Pérez Villalba, E. (2009). Atraso económico, migración y remesas: El caso del Soconusco, Chiapas, México. *Convergencia Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, 50(mayo–agosto), 57–77. <https://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/conver/v16n50/v16n50a3.pdf>
- de Vos, J. (1984). Una legislación de graves consecuencias: El acaparamiento de tierras baldías en México, con el pretexto de colonización, 1821–1910. *Historia Mexicana*, 34(jul–sep), 76–113. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25135874>
- Delalande Vincenti, L. (2019). *Lógicas de captura de renta pública en la Secretaría de Agricultura* [Tesis de Doctorado Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)].
- Desinformémonos. (2018, diciembre 21). *Cafetaleros rechazan instalación de planta procesadora de Nestlé en Veracruz*. Retrieved January 13, 2022 from <https://desinformemonos.org/cafetaleros-rechazan-instalacion-planta-procesadora-nestle-veracruz/>
- DESMI. (2021). La historia es semilla. In *Comunidad y autonomía frente a Sembrando Vida* (pp. 29–59). Centro de Estudios para el Cambio en el Campo Mexicano (CECCAM). <https://www.ceccam.org/sites/default/files/comunidad%20y%20autonomia.pdf>
- DOF. (1937, agosto 31). *Decreto que reforma al Código Agrario* [Departamento Agrario]. [https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_to\\_imagen\\_fs.php?cod\\_diario=194665&pagina=24&seccion=1](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?cod_diario=194665&pagina=24&seccion=1)
- DOF. (1940, octubre 29). *Código Agrario de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos* [Departamento Agrario](Tomo CXXII, No. 48). [https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_to\\_imagen\\_fs.php?codnota=4555331&fecha=29/10/1940&cod\\_diario=194769](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?codnota=4555331&fecha=29/10/1940&cod_diario=194769)
- DOF. (1949, octubre 21). *Decreto que crea la Comisión Nacional del Café* [Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería]. [https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_to\\_imagen\\_fs.php?codnota=4572370&fecha=21/10/1949&cod\\_diario=195809](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?codnota=4572370&fecha=21/10/1949&cod_diario=195809)
- DOF. (1958, diciembre 31). *Ley que crea el Instituto Mexicano del Café* [Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público]. [https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_to\\_imagen\\_fs.php?codnota=4571921&fecha=31/12/1958&cod\\_diario=195779](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?codnota=4571921&fecha=31/12/1958&cod_diario=195779)

- DOF. (1959, junio 13). *Reglamento del Instituto Mexicano del Café* [Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería].  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_to\\_imagen\\_fs.php?codnota=4589255&fecha=13/06/1959&cod\\_diario=196870](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?codnota=4589255&fecha=13/06/1959&cod_diario=196870)
- DOF. (1963, noviembre 6). *Decreto por el que se promulga el Texto del Convenio Internacional del Café, 1962, aprobado por la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas* [Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores](Tomo CCLXI, No. 5).  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_to\\_imagen\\_fs.php?codnota=4749459&fecha=06/11/1963&cod\\_diario=204645](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?codnota=4749459&fecha=06/11/1963&cod_diario=204645)
- DOF. (1971, abril 16). *Ley Federal de Reforma Agraria* [Departamento de Asuntos Agrarios y Colonización](Tomo CCCV, No. 41).  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_to\\_imagen\\_fs.php?codnota=4754777&fecha=16/04/1971&cod\\_diario=204826](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?codnota=4754777&fecha=16/04/1971&cod_diario=204826)
- DOF. (1976, abril 5). *Ley General de Crédito Rural* [Presidencia de la República].  
[https://dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=4843719&fecha=05/04/1976#gsc.tab=0](https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=4843719&fecha=05/04/1976#gsc.tab=0)
- DOF. (1989, mayo 31). *Decreto por el que se aprueba el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1989-1994 (Continúa en la Segunda Sección)* [Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto](Tomo CDXXVIII, No. 23).  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_to\\_imagen\\_fs.php?codnota=4816216&fecha=31/05/1989&cod\\_diario=205446](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?codnota=4816216&fecha=31/05/1989&cod_diario=205446)
- DOF. (1992, enero 6). *Decreto por el que se reforma el artículo 27 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos* [Secretaría de Gobernación].  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_to\\_imagen\\_fs.php?codnota=4643312&fecha=06/01/1992&cod\\_diario=199845](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?codnota=4643312&fecha=06/01/1992&cod_diario=199845)
- DOF. (1993a, diciembre 20). *Decreto de promulgación del Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte* [Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores].  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_to\\_imagen\\_fs.php?codnota=4815052&fecha=20/12/1993&cod\\_diario=207247](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?codnota=4815052&fecha=20/12/1993&cod_diario=207247)
- DOF. (1993b, junio 1). *Decreto por el que se abroga la Ley que crea el Instituto Mexicano del Café* [Secretaría de Agricultura y Recursos Hidráulicos].  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_to\\_imagen\\_fs.php?codnota=4741298&fecha=01/06/1993&cod\\_diario=204289](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?codnota=4741298&fecha=01/06/1993&cod_diario=204289)
- DOF. (1998, junio 3). *Normas de operación de la Alianza para el Campo 1998, para los Programas de Fomento Agrí-cola, Ganadero, de Desarrollo Rural y Sanidad Agropecuaria* [Secretaría de Agricultura y Recursos Hidráulicos].  
[https://dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=4881535&fecha=03/06/1998#gsc.tab=0](https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=4881535&fecha=03/06/1998#gsc.tab=0)
- DOF. (2001, diciembre 7). *Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable* [Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación].  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=756874&fecha=07/12/2001#gsc.tab=0](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=756874&fecha=07/12/2001#gsc.tab=0)
- DOF. (2002a, febrero 25). *Reglas de Operación del Fondo de Estabilización del Café* [Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación].  
[https://dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle\\_popup.php?codigo=736720](https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle_popup.php?codigo=736720)

- DOF. (2002b, marzo 28). *Reglas de operación del Programa de Retiro de Café de Calidades Inferiores* [Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación].  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=735975&fecha=28/03/2002](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=735975&fecha=28/03/2002)
- DOF. (2004, marzo 22). *Modificaciones al Capítulo 18. Programa Fondo de Estabilización, Fortalecimiento y Reordenamiento de la Cafecultura contenido en las reglas de operación de la Alianza para el Campo para la Reconversión Productiva; Integración de cadenas agroalimentarias y de pesca; Atención a factores críticos y atención a grupos y regiones prioritarios, publicadas el 25 de julio de 2003.*  
[https://dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=675293&fecha=22/03/2004#gsc.tab=0](https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=675293&fecha=22/03/2004#gsc.tab=0)
- DOF. (2011, agosto 31). *Lineamientos específicos del Proyecto Transversal Componente Fomento Productivo del Café.*  
[https://dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=5207227&fecha=31/08/2011#gsc.tab=0](https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5207227&fecha=31/08/2011#gsc.tab=0)
- DOF. (2013, diciembre 18). *Acuerdo por el que se dan a conocer las reglas de operación del Programa de Fomento a la Agricultura de la Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación* [Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación].  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=5327085&fecha=18/12/2013#gsc.tab=0](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5327085&fecha=18/12/2013#gsc.tab=0)
- DOF. (2017a, diciembre 29). *Acuerdo por el que se dan a conocer las reglas de operación del Programa de Apoyos a Pequeños Productores de la Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación para el ejercicio 2018. (Continúa en la Séptima Sección)* [Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación].  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=5509748&fecha=29/12/2017#gsc.tab=0](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5509748&fecha=29/12/2017#gsc.tab=0)
- DOF. (2017b, noviembre 29). *Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación para el ejercicio fiscal 2018. (Continúa en la Tercera Sección)* [Presidencia de la República].  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=5506080&fecha=29/11/2017#gsc.tab=0](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5506080&fecha=29/11/2017#gsc.tab=0)
- DOF. (2018, diciembre 28). *Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación para el ejercicio fiscal 2019* [Presidencia de la República].  
[https://dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=5547479&fecha=28/12/2018#gsc.tab=0](https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5547479&fecha=28/12/2018#gsc.tab=0)
- DOF. (2019a, enero 24). *Acuerdo por el que se emiten los lineamientos de operación del Programa Sembrando Vida* [Secretaría de Bienestar (BIENESTAR)].  
[https://dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=5548785&fecha=24/01/2019#gsc.tab=0](https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5548785&fecha=24/01/2019#gsc.tab=0)
- DOF. (2019b, enero 23). *Acuerdo por el que se emiten los lineamientos para la operación del Programa Producción para el Bienestar para el ejercicio fiscal 2019* [Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural (SADER)].  
[https://dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=5548620&fecha=23/01/2019#gsc.tab=0](https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5548620&fecha=23/01/2019#gsc.tab=0)
- DOF. (2019c, julio 18). *Acuerdo por el que se emiten los lineamientos que regulan las funciones de las delegaciones de Programas para el Desarrollo* [Coordinación General de Programas para el Desarrollo; Secretaría de Bienestar].  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=5566026&fecha=18/07/2019#gsc.tab=0](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5566026&fecha=18/07/2019#gsc.tab=0)
- DOF. (2019d, mayo 15). *Acuerdo por el que se modifica el similar por el que se emiten los lineamientos para la operación del Programa Producción para el Bienestar para el ejercicio fiscal 2019, publicado el 23 de enero de 2019* [Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural].  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=5560461&fecha=15/05/2019](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5560461&fecha=15/05/2019)

- DOF. (2019e, diciembre 9). *Reglamento de la Oficina de la Presidencia de la República* [Presidencia de la República].  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=5581283&fecha=09/12/2019#gsc.tab=0](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5581283&fecha=09/12/2019#gsc.tab=0)
- DOF. (2020a, marzo 30). *Acuerdo por el que se emiten las reglas de operación del Programa Sembrando Vida, para el ejercicio fiscal 2020* [Secretaría de Bienestar (BIENESTAR)].  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=5590695&fecha=30/03/2020](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5590695&fecha=30/03/2020)
- DOF. (2020b, diciembre 28). *Acuerdo por el que se dan a conocer las reglas de operación del Programa Producción para el Bienestar de la Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural para el ejercicio fiscal 2021* [Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural].  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=5609033&fecha=28/12/2020](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5609033&fecha=28/12/2020)
- DOF. (2020c, junio 26). *Decreto por el que se aprueba el Programa Sectorial de Bienestar 2020-2024* [Presidencia de la República].  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=5595662&fecha=26/06/2020](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5595662&fecha=26/06/2020)
- DOF. (2020d, junio 25). *Programa Sectorial de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural 2020-2024* [Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural].  
[https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota\\_detalle.php?codigo=5595549&fecha=25/06/2020](https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5595549&fecha=25/06/2020)
- Donovan, J., & Poole, N. (2014). Changing asset endowments and smallholder participation in higher value markets: Evidence from certified coffee producers in Nicaragua. *Food Policy*, 44, 1-13. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2013.09.010>
- du Toit, A. (2003, April 7-9). *Hunger in the valley of fruitfulness: Globalization, social exclusion and chronic poverty in Ceres, South Africa* [Paper presentation]. Staying Poor: Chronic Poverty and Development Policy, Manchester, United Kingdom.  
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08cdd5274a27b20014ad/duToit.pdf>
- du Toit, A. (2004a). *Forgotten by the highway: Globalisation, adverse incorporation and chronic poverty in a commercial farming district of South Africa* (Chronic poverty and development policy No. 4). Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM); Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS); Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC).  
<http://hdl.handle.net/10566/4551>
- du Toit, A. (2004b). 'Social exclusion' discourse and chronic poverty: A South African case study. *Development and Change*, 35(5), 987-1010. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2004.00389.x>
- du Toit, A. (2009). *Adverse incorporation and agrarian policy in South Africa, or, how not to connect the rural poor to growth* ['Adverse Incorporation' and Agrarian Policy in South Africa](Draft 28). Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS).  
<http://hdl.handle.net/10566/65>
- Dussauge Laguna, M. I., & Aguilar Arévalo, M. R. (2021). Populismo, retrocesos democráticos y administraciones públicas: La experiencia de México durante la primera mitad del gobierno de Andrés Manuel López Obrador. *Estado, Gobierno y Gestión Pública*, 36, 135-186. <https://semanariorepublicano.uchile.cl/index.php/REGP/article/view/66054>
- Economía. (n.d.). *Historia del giro*. Retrieved June 7, 2022 from  
<http://www.contactopyme.gob.mx/cpyme/guiasempresariales/guias.asp?s=14&guia=3&giro=1&ins=85>
- Ek, E. (2021). Despojo y reordenamiento territorial. In *Comunidad y autonomía frente a Sembrando Vida* (pp. 179-185). Centro de Estudios para el Cambio en el Campo Mexicano

- (CECCAM).  
<https://www.ceccam.org/sites/default/files/comunidad%20y%20autonomia.pdf>
- El Poder del Consumidor. (2020a, febrero 7). *Las organizaciones de Naciones Unidas (OPS/OMS, FAO y Unicef) en conjunto felicitan al presidente de México por la aprobación del nuevo etiquetado frontal de advertencia*. Retrieved January 20, 2023 from <https://elpoderdelconsumidor.org/2020/02/las-organizaciones-de-naciones-unidas-ops-oms-fao-y-unicef-en-conjunto-felicitan-al-presidente-de-mexico-por-la-aprobacion-del-nuevo-etiquetado-frontal-de-advertencia/>
- El Poder del Consumidor. (2020b, mayo 12). *Todo lo que debes saber sobre el nuevo etiquetado de advertencia*. Retrieved January 20, 2023 from <https://elpoderdelconsumidor.org/2020/05/todo-lo-que-debes-saber-sobre-el-nuevo-etiquetado-de-advertencia/>
- Enciso, A. (1999, abril 28). *El Congreso Agrario Permanente: 10 años no es nada?*. La Jornada del Campo. Retrieved June 8, 2022 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/1999/05/25/cam-agrario.html>
- Enciso L., A. (2022, agosto 6). *Aumenta producción de maíz y frijol con Producción para el Bienestar*. La Jornada. Retrieved February 8, 2023 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/notas/2022/08/04/recursos/aumenta-produccion-de-maiz-y-frijol-con-produccion-para-el-bienestar/>
- Escamilla, E., Ruiz, O., Díaz, G., Landeros, C., Platas, D. E., Zamarripa, A., & González, V. A. (2005). El agroecosistema café orgánico en México. *Manejo Integrado de Plagas y Agroecología*, 76, 5–16. <https://repositorio.catie.ac.cr/handle/11554/6135>
- Ethos. (2020, octubre). *Riesgos de corrupción en los programas sociales. Caso del Programa Sembrando Vida*. <https://ucarecdn.com/a4ac17bc-3546-4b88-bfbc-2de83cfe9762/>
- Evans, P., & Sewell, W. H. (2013). The neoliberal era: Ideology, policy, and social effects. In P. Hall & M. Lamont (Eds.), *Social resilience in the neoliberal era* (pp. 35-68). Cambridge University Press.
- Expansión, & Connectas. (n.d.). *La caja negra llamada Sembrando Vida*. Retrieved September 22, 2022 from <https://politica.expansion.mx/mexico/2021/10/28/programa-sembrando-vida-irregularidades-opacidad>
- Expansión Política. (2020, octubre 30). *Ocho 'superdelegados' dejan sus cargos para ir por gubernaturas en 2021*. Retrieved June 22, 2022 from <https://politica.expansion.mx/estados/2020/10/30/cinco-superdelegados-dejan-sus-cargos-para-ir-por-gubernaturas-en-2021>
- Fairtrade. (n.d.). *How Fairtrade differs from other labels*. Retrieved December 6, 2022 from <https://info.fairtrade.net/what/how-fairtrade-differs-from-other-labels>
- Falleti, V., Juárez-Salazar, E. M., & Delgado Deciga, R. (2019). Cambio social, antagonismo y contingencia. Coordinadas para pensar la 4T de AMLO. *Tramas. Subjetividad y Procesos Sociales*, 52, 181–212. <https://tramas.xoc.uam.mx/index.php/tramas/article/view/892>
- FAO. (2020). *The state of agricultural commodity markets. Agricultural markets and sustainable development: Global value chains, smallholder farmers and digital innovations*. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cbo665en>

- FAO. (n.d.\*a). *Smallholders and family farmers*.  
[https://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/nr/sustainability\\_pathways/docs/Factsheet\\_SMALLHOLDERS.pdf](https://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/nr/sustainability_pathways/docs/Factsheet_SMALLHOLDERS.pdf)
- FAO. (n.d.\*b). *Cultivos y productos de ganadería* [Data set].  
<https://www.fao.org/faostat/es/#data/QCL>
- FAO, & SAGARPA. (2015, noviembre). *Evaluación Nacional de Resultados 2013. Componente Fomento Productivo del Café*.  
<https://www.agricultura.gob.mx/sites/default/files/sagarpa/document/2018/11/14/1531/14112018-evaluacion-nacional-de-resultados-fpc.pdf>
- Fausto Moya, T. d. J. (2021). *Programa Sembrando Vida: Mecanismos de focalización, estudio de caso en Españita, Tlaxcala* [Tesis de Maestría, Universidad Autónoma de Chapingo].  
<https://repositorio.chapingo.edu.mx/items/d174ed4d-4341-41eb-80a8-22b6f2310ceo>
- FIRA. (2016). *Panorama Agroalimentario. Café 2016* [Dirección de Investigación y Evaluación Económica y Sectorial].  
[https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/200636/Panorama\\_Agroalimentario\\_Caf\\_2016.pdf](https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/200636/Panorama_Agroalimentario_Caf_2016.pdf)
- Fischer, E. F. (2022). *Making better coffee: How Maya farmers and third wave tastemakers create value*. University of California Press.
- Flores Flores, Á. (2019). El efecto AMLO, resultado de un movimiento social de largo aliento, y la experiencia en Puebla. In J. L. Cisneros, M. G. Barrón Cruz, & J. A. Parra Molina (Eds.), *Sentido y tendencias de la transformación en México* (pp. 19–41). El Aleph.  
[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351135072\\_Sentido\\_y\\_tendencias\\_de\\_la\\_transformacion\\_en\\_Mexico](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351135072_Sentido_y_tendencias_de_la_transformacion_en_Mexico)
- Fox, J. (1994). The difficult transition from clientelism to citizenship: Lessons from Mexico. *World Politics*, 46(2), 151–184. URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2950671>
- Fox, J. (2012). State power and clientelism. Eight propositions for discussion. In T. Hilgers (Ed.), *Clientelism in everyday Latin American politics* (pp. 187–211). Palgrave Macmillan.  
[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137275998\\_10](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137275998_10)
- Fox, J., & Gordillo, G. (1989). Entre el estado y el mercado: Perspectivas para un desarrollo rural autónomo en el campo mexicano. *Investigación Económica*, 190(octubre-diciembre), 143–184. [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jonathan-Fox-5/publication/241753552\\_Entre\\_el\\_estado\\_y\\_el\\_mercado\\_Perspectivas\\_para\\_un\\_desarrollo\\_rural\\_autonomo\\_en\\_el\\_campo\\_mexicano/links/548040f80cf25b80dd7073c5/Entre-el-estado-y-el-mercado-Perspectivas-para-un-desarrollo-rural-autonomo-en-el-campo-mexicano.pdf](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jonathan-Fox-5/publication/241753552_Entre_el_estado_y_el_mercado_Perspectivas_para_un_desarrollo_rural_autonomo_en_el_campo_mexicano/links/548040f80cf25b80dd7073c5/Entre-el-estado-y-el-mercado-Perspectivas-para-un-desarrollo-rural-autonomo-en-el-campo-mexicano.pdf)
- Fregoso Rojas, P. A. (2019, julio 20). *Al bienestar por la ruta de la milpa*. La Jornada del Campo. Retrieved July 10, 2022 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/2019/07/20/cam-ruta.html>
- Fundar. (2019, mayo 21). *Prohibir la condonación de impuestos, un paso fundamental contra la desigualdad*. Retrieved January 29, 2023 from <https://fundar.org.mx/el-presidente-prohibe-la-condonacion-de-impuestos/>
- Fundar. (n.d.). *Descarga la base de datos de condonaciones (2007–2015)* [Data set].  
<https://privilegiosfiscales.fundar.org.mx/>
- Ganar-Ganar. (n.d.). *Fausto Costa*. Retrieved December 12, 2021 from <https://ganar-ganar.mx/2019/07/18/fausto-costa-presidente-ejecutivo-de-nestle-mexico/>

- Garay, C., Palmer-Rubin, B., & Poertner, M. (2020). Organizational and partisan brokerage of social benefits: Social policy linkages in Mexico. *World Development*, 136, 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105103>
- García, A. (1991). Proceso de construcción del movimiento campesino en México: La experiencia de la CNOC. In *Cafetaleros. La construcción de la autonomía. Cuadernos de desarrollo de base 3* (pp. 9–16). Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras (CNOC).
- García Aguilar, M. d. C., Villafuerte Solís, D., & Meza Díaz, S. (1993). Café y neoliberalismo. Los impactos de la política cafetalera en el Soconusco, Chiapas. In *Anuario 1992* (pp. 285–302). Instituto Chiapaneco de Cultura (IHC). <http://repositorio.cesmeca.mx/handle/11595/454>
- García Jiménez, A. (2019, octubre 19). *Del intermediarismo a la autogestión campesina*. La Jornada del Campo. Retrieved June 15, 2022 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/2019/10/19/cam-autogestion.html>
- García Morales, M. I., Martínez Rodríguez, M. C., & Téllez Cabrera, M. R. (2019). Gobierno federal 2019–2024: Principales programas y acciones de la política social, una perspectiva coyuntural. In M. C. Martínez Rodríguez & M. I. García Morales (Eds.), *La gobernanza en las finanzas públicas y privadas en México* (pp. 45–68). Colofón. <https://ipn.elsevierpure.com/en/publications/la-gobernanza-de-las-finanzas-p%C3%BAblicas-y-privadas-en-m%C3%A9xico>
- Gereffi, G. (1999). International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel commodity chain. *Journal of International Economics*, 48, 37–70. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996\(98\)00075-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(98)00075-0)
- Gereffi, G. (2014). Global value chains in a post-Washington Consensus world. *Review of International Political Economy*, 21(1), 9–37. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2012.756414>
- GESOC. (2021). *Índice de desempeño de los programas públicos federales. Reporte completo*. <https://www.indep.gesoc.org.mx/downloads/2021/Reporte%20Completo%20INDEP%202021.pdf>
- Gibbon, P. (2001). Upgrading primary production: A global commodity chain approach. *World Development*, 29(2), 345–363. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X\(00\)00093-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00093-0)
- Giraldo, O. F. (2019, diciembre 4). *Cooptación de la agroecología y Sembrando Vida* [Webinar]. Keller, K. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_S9oMeoN6fM&t=4s&ab\\_channel=KateKeller](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_S9oMeoN6fM&t=4s&ab_channel=KateKeller)
- GOB. (2013, mayo 17). *Inauguración de la fábrica de café soluble más grande del mundo*. Retrieved August 14, 2022 from <https://www.gob.mx/epn/prensa/inauguracion-de-la-fabrica-de-cafe-soluble-mas-grande-del-mundo#:~:text=Nestl%C3%A9%20ose%20instal%C3%B3%20aqu%C3%AD%20en%201961%20oesta%20planta,la%20hospitalidad%20de%20la%20empresa%20Nestl%C3%A9%20para%20conmigo>.
- GOB. (2016, octubre 18). *Qué es el sello Orgánico Sagarpa México y cómo obtenerlo*. Retrieved December 6, 2022 from <https://www.gob.mx/agricultura/es/articulos/certificacion-de-productos-organicos#:~:text=En%20M%C3%A9xico%20C%C3%B3mo%20obtener%20comercializarlos,calidad%20sanidad%20y%20seguridad%20alimentaria%20>

- GOB. (2018a, diciembre 1). *Discurso de Andrés Manuel López Obrador, presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*. Retrieved October 12, 2022 from <https://www.gob.mx/presidencia/articulos/discurso-de-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-presidente-de-los-estados-unidos-mexicanos?idiom=es>
- GOB. (2018b, diciembre 18). *Presidente López Obrador y Nestlé México anuncian inversión histórica de 154 mdd para instalación de nueva fábrica en Veracruz*. Retrieved December 12, 2021 from <https://www.gob.mx/presidencia/prensa/presidente-lopez-obrador-y-nestle-mexico-anuncian-inversion-historica-de-154-mdd-para-instalacion-de-nueva-fabrica-en-veracruz>
- GOB. (2019). *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2019–2024*. <https://presidente.gob.mx/plan-nacional-de-desarrollo-2019-2024/>
- GOB. (2020a, junio 17). *Centros Integradores del Desarrollo | Conferencias sobre Programas del Bienestar. Versión estenográfica*. Retrieved January 15, 2023 from <https://www.gob.mx/stps/es/articulos/centros-integradores-del-desarrollo-conferencias-sobre-programas-del-bienestar?idiom=es>
- GOB. (2020b, agosto 5). *Producción para el Bienestar | Conferencias sobre Programas del Bienestar. Versión estenográfica*. Retrieved January 21, 2023 from <https://www.gob.mx/stps/articulos/produccion-para-el-bienestar-conferencias-sobre-programas-del-bienestar-249613?idiom=es>
- GOB. (2020c, mayo 21). *Sembrando Vida | Conferencias sobre Programas del Bienestar. Versión estenográfica*. Retrieved January 21, 2023 from <https://www.gob.mx/stps/es/articulos/sembrando-vida-conferencias-sobre-programas-del-bienestar?idiom=es>
- GOB. (2021a, noviembre 3). *México propuso programa de reforestación suscrito en COP26, afirma presidente*. Retrieved June 21, 2022 from <https://www.gob.mx/presidencia/prensa/mexico-propuso-programa-de-reforestacion-suscrito-en-cop26-afirma-presidente>
- GOB. (2021b, julio 28). *Reglas y lineamientos de operación*. Retrieved February 21, 2023 from <https://www.gob.mx/se/acciones-y-programas/reglas-y-lineamientos-de-operacion?state=published#:~:text=Son%20disposiciones%20normativas%20a%20las,p%C3%BAblicos%20asignados%20a%20los%20mismos>
- GOB. (n.d.\*a). *Estrategia y Metodología Censo del Bienestar. Diagnóstico de las necesidades de México* [Coordinación General de Programas para el Desarrollo]. [https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/552532/CENSO\\_DEL\\_BIENESTAR\\_19\\_05\\_2020\\_hapf.pdf](https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/552532/CENSO_DEL_BIENESTAR_19_05_2020_hapf.pdf)
- GOB. (n.d.\*b). *Programas Integrales de Bienestar* Retrieved October 29, 2021 from <https://presidente.gob.mx/programas-sociales/>
- Gobierno de Veracruz. (2019, enero 22). *Respaldan cafeticultores inversión de Nestlé en Veracruz. Comunicado 0078*. <https://web.facebook.com/cnocafe/photos/a.637216723069326/978696168921378/>
- Gómez de Silva Cano, J. J. (2016). *El derecho agrario mexicano y la Constitución de 1917*. Secretaría de Gobernación (SEGOB); Secretaría de Cultura (CULTURA); Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de las Revoluciones de México (INEHRM); Universidad Nacional

- Autónoma de México (UNAM).  
<https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/9/4452/19.pdf>
- Gómez, E. (2018, diciembre 21). *Productores de café rechazan planta de Nestlé en Veracruz*. La Jornada. Retrieved December 22, 2018 from  
<https://www.jornada.com.mx/2018/12/21/estados/029niest>
- Gómez, E. (2019 enero 6). *Caficultores de Veracruz piden consulta pública para instalar planta de Nestlé*. La Jornada. Retrieved January 8, 2019 from  
<https://www.jornada.com.mx/2019/01/06/politica/006n1pol>
- Gómez, M. I., Meemken, E., & Verteramo Chiu, L. J. (2020). *Agricultural value chains and social and environmental impacts: Trends, challenges, and policy options. Background paper for the state of agricultural commodity markets (SOCO) 2020*. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). <https://doi.org/10.4060/cbo715en>
- Gómez Tovar, L., Martín, L., Gómez Cruz, M. A., & Mutersbaugh, T. (2005). Certified organic agriculture in Mexico: Market connections and certification practices in large and small producers. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 21(4), 461-474.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2005.10.002>
- González, A. A., & Nigh, R. (2005). Smallholder participation and certification of organic farm products in Mexico. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 21(4), 449-460.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2005.08.004>
- González Cornejo, A. P. (2010). Trabajadores agrícolas guatemaltecos en el corte del café del Soconusco, Chiapas y sus condiciones laborales. In I. Vizcarra Bordi (Ed.), *Balance y perspectivas del campo Mexicano: A más de una década del TLCAN y del movimiento zapatista. Tomo III Migraciones y movilidad laboral* (pp. 97-119). Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM); Asociación Mexicana de Estudios Rurales (AMER).  
<http://ru.iis.sociales.unam.mx/handle/IIS/4393>
- González Jácome, A. (2004). Dealing with risk: Small-scale coffee production systems in Mexico. *Perspectivas Latinoamericanas*(1), 1-39.  
<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/236154861.pdf>
- González Rojas, A. (2021). El programa en la Sierra Juárez de Oaxaca. In *Comunidad y autonomía frente a Sembrando Vida* (pp. 95-116). Centro de Estudios para el Cambio en el Campo Mexicano (CECCAM).  
<https://www.ceccam.org/sites/default/files/comunidad%20y%20autonomia.pdf>
- Gordillo, G. (2019, julio 20). *El campo en su encrucijada*. La Jornada del Campo. Retrieved June 15, 2022 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/2019/07/20/cam-campo.html>
- Gordillo, G. (2021). La gobernabilidad realmente existente. In H. Gómez Bruera (Ed.), *4T claves para descifrar el rompecabezas* (pp. 65-80). Grijalbo.
- Gordillo, G., de Janvry, A., & Sadoulet, E. (1998). Entre el control político y la eficiencia: Evolución de los derechos de propiedad agraria en México. *Revista de la CEPAL*, 1998(66), 149-166. <https://www.un-ilibrary.org/content/journals/16820908/1998/66/8>
- Grabs, J., & Ponte, S. (2019). The evolution of power in the global coffee value chain and production network. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 19, 803-828.  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbz008>

- Greenpeace. (2020, junio 1). *Comunicado sobre el proyecto Tren Maya en el marco de la visita presidencial para su promoción*. <https://www.greenpeace.org/static/planet4-mexico-stateless/2020/06/4e47bb73-visita-lopez-obrador-comunicadofinal.pdf>
- Guerrero Galván, L. R. (2016). A propósito del aniversario Porfiriano. Una aproximación acerca de las compañías deslindadoras en tiempos del Porfiriato. *Revista Latinoamericana de Derecho Social*, 22, 257–268. <https://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/rlds/n22/1870-4670-rlds-22-00009.pdf>
- Gutiérrez-Haces, T. (2004). La inversión extranjera directa en el TLCAN. *Economía UNAM*, 1(3), 30–52. [https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci\\_arttext&pid=S1665-952X2004000300002](https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1665-952X2004000300002)
- Hacienda Chiapas. (n.d.). *Programa Regional de Desarrollo. Región X Soconusco*. <http://www.haciendachiapas.gob.mx/planeacion/Informacion/Desarrollo-Regional/prog-regionales/SOCONUSCO.pdf>
- Harvey, C. A., Pritts, A. A., Zwetsloot, M. J., Jansen, K., Pulleman, M. M., Armbrecht, I., Avelino, J., Barrera, J. F., Bunn, C., García, J. H., Isaza, C., Muñoz-Ucros, J., Pérez-Alemán, C. J., Rahn, E., Robiglio, V., Somarriba, E., & Valencia, V. (2021). Transformation of coffee-growing landscapes across Latin America. A review. *Agronomy for Sustainable Development*, 41(62), 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13593-021-00712-0>
- Harvey, N. (1992). La Unión de Uniones de Chiapas y los retos políticos del desarrollo de base. In J. Moguel, C. Botey, & L. Hernández (Eds.), *Autonomía y nuevos sujetos sociales en el desarrollo rural* (pp. 219–232). Siglo XXI; Centro de Estudios Históricos de Agrarismo en México (CEHAM). <https://sigloxxeditores.com.mx/tienda/ols/products/autonomia-y-nuevos-sujetos-sociales-en-el-desarrollo-rural>
- Helbig, C. (1964). *El Soconusco y su zona cafetalera en Chiapas*. Instituto de Ciencias y Artes de Chiapas. <https://biblioteca.ufm.edu/opac/record/110735>
- Helmsing, A., & Vellema, S. (2011). Governance, inclusion and embedding: Raising the issues. In A. H. J. Helmsing & S. Vellema (Eds.), *Value chains, social inclusion and economic development. Contrasting theories and realities* (pp. 1–20). Routledge. <https://www.routledge.com/Value-Chains-Social-Inclusion-and-Economic-Development-Contrasting-Theories/Helmsing-Vellema/p/book/9781138244009>
- Henderson, T. P. (2017). La reestructuración de los sectores del café y el cacao en México y Ecuador. Control agroempresarial de la tierra y trabajo campesino. *LiminaR. Estudios Sociales y Humanísticos*, 15(1), 128–141. [https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci\\_arttext&pid=S1665-80272017000100128](https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1665-80272017000100128)
- Henderson, T. P. (2019). La roya y el futuro del café en Chiapas. *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, 81(2), 389–416. [https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci\\_arttext&pid=S0188-25032019000200389](https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0188-25032019000200389)
- Henderson, T. P. (2020). Elite-led development and Mexico's independent coffee organisations in the wake of the rust epidemic. *Third World Quarterly*, 41(6), 1012–1029. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1729726>
- Hernández, A. (2019, diciembre 13). *Dan de baja a 17 mil beneficiarios de 'Sembrando vida' que pretendían 'cobrar sin trabajar'*. El Financiero. Retrieved March 29, 2022 from <https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/dan-de-baja-a-17-mil-beneficiarios-de-sembrando-vida-que-pretendian-cobrar-sin-trabajar/>

- Hernández Cortez, N., Moya Vela, J., & Menchaca Arredondo, E. (2021). El discurso nacional-popular de Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2020). *Revista Republicana*(31), 39–54.  
[http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?pid=S1909-44502021000200039&script=sci\\_abstract&tlng=es](http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?pid=S1909-44502021000200039&script=sci_abstract&tlng=es)
- Hernández Estrada, R. (2019). *Servidores de la Nación. La operación política del gobierno de la 4T*. Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD).  
<https://www.prd.org.mx/libros/documentos/libros/Servidores-4T.pdf>
- Hernández, L. (1990). Café: Privatización y concertación social. *El Cotidiano*, 38, 53–58.  
<https://ceccam.org/sites/default/files/el%20cotidiano%2038%20Privatizaci%20c3%b3n%20y%20Concertaci%20c3%b3n%20Social.pdf>
- Hernández, L. (1991). Nadando con los tiburones: La Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras. In *Cafetaleros. La construcción de la autonomía. Cuadernos de desarrollo de base 3* (pp. 17–48). Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras (CNOC).
- Hernández, L. (1992a). Cafetaleros: Del adelgazamiento estatal a la guerra del mercado. In J. Moguel, C. Botey, & L. Hernández (Eds.), *Autonomía y nuevos sujetos sociales en el desarrollo rural* (pp. 78–97). Siglo XXI; Centro de Estudios Históricos de Agrarismo en México (CEHAM).
- Hernández, L. (1992b). La UNORCA: Doce tesis sobre el nuevo liderazgo campesino en México. In J. Moguel, B. Carlota, & L. Hernández (Eds.), *Autonomía y nuevos sujetos sociales en el desarrollo rural* (pp. 55–77). Siglo XXI; Centro de Estudios Históricos de Agrarismo en México (CEHAM).
- Hernández, L. (1992c). Las convulsiones rurales. In J. Moguel, C. Botey, & L. Hernández (Eds.), *Autonomía y nuevos sujetos sociales en el desarrollo rural* (pp. 235–260). Siglo XXI; Centro de Estudios Históricos de Agrarismo en México (CEHAM).
- Hernández Navarro, L., & Celis Callejas, F. (1992). Pronasol y la cafecultura. *El Cotidiano*, 49, 1–14.  
<https://ceccam.org/sites/default/files/el%20cotidiano%2049%20Pronasol%20y%20la%20Cafecultura.pdf>
- Hickey, S., & du Toit, A. (2007). *Adverse incorporation, social exclusion, and chronic poverty* (CPRC Working Paper 81). Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM); Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS).  
[https://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication\\_files/WP81\\_Hickey\\_duToit.pdf](https://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/WP81_Hickey_duToit.pdf)
- Humphrey, J. (2006). Policy implications of trends in agribusiness value chains. *The European Journal of Development Research*, 18(4), 572–592.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09578810601070704>
- Humphrey, J., & Navas-Alemán, L. (2010, March). *Value chains, donor interventions and poverty reduction: A review of donor practice* (IDS research report 63). Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex.  
[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2040-0217.2010.00063\\_2.x](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2040-0217.2010.00063_2.x)
- Humphrey, J., & Schmitz, H. (2002). How does insertion in global value chains affect upgrading in industrial clusters?. *Regional Studies*, 36(9), 1017–1027.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/0034340022000022198>

- ICO. (2009). *Organic coffee export statistics. Coffee year 2007/08* [Data set].  
<https://www.ico.org/documents/wp-statistics-135e-organic.pdf>
- ICO. (2019). *Coffee development report 2019. Growing for prosperity. Economic viability as the catalyst for a sustainable coffee sector* [Flagship report of the International Coffee Organization]. <http://www.ico.org/documents/cy2021-22/coffee-development-report-2019.pdf>
- ICO. (2020). *Coffee development report. The value of coffee. Sustainability, inclusiveness, and resilience of the coffee global value chain* [A flagship report of the International Coffee Organization].  
[https://www.internationalcoffeecouncil.com/\\_files/ugd/38d76b\\_4fc7b54a15f14a548b2f4a208c2eae6d.pdf](https://www.internationalcoffeecouncil.com/_files/ugd/38d76b_4fc7b54a15f14a548b2f4a208c2eae6d.pdf)
- ICO. (n.d.\*a). *Aspectos botánicos*. Retrieved June 15, 2021 from  
[https://www.ico.org/es/botanical\\_c.asp](https://www.ico.org/es/botanical_c.asp)
- ICO. (n.d.\*b). *Historical data on the global coffee trade* [Data set].  
[https://www.ico.org/new\\_historical.asp](https://www.ico.org/new_historical.asp)
- ICO. (n.d.\*c). *Glossary of terms used*. Retrieved September 22, 2021 from  
<https://www.ico.org/glossary.asp>
- IFAD, & UNEP. (2013). *Smallholders, food security, and the environment*.  
[https://www.ifad.org/documents/38714170/39135645/smallholders\\_report.pdf/133e8903-0204-4e7d-a780-bca847933f2e](https://www.ifad.org/documents/38714170/39135645/smallholders_report.pdf/133e8903-0204-4e7d-a780-bca847933f2e)
- INE. (2019, agosto 16). *Procedentes medidas cautelares contra promoción realizada por Servidores de la Nación*. Retrieved June 22, 2022 from  
<https://centralectoral.ine.mx/2019/08/16/procedentes-medidas-cautelares-promocion-realizada-servidores-la-nacion/>
- INEHRM. (2020). *Lázaro Cárdenas: Modelo y legado* (Vol. II).  
[https://www.inehrm.gob.mx/recursos/Libros/Lazaro\\_CardenasMLT2.pdf](https://www.inehrm.gob.mx/recursos/Libros/Lazaro_CardenasMLT2.pdf)
- INEHRM. (n.d.). *El Agrarismo Cardenista*.  
[https://inehrm.gob.mx/work/recursos/Cardenas/pdf/5\\_ElAgrarismoCardenista.pdf](https://inehrm.gob.mx/work/recursos/Cardenas/pdf/5_ElAgrarismoCardenista.pdf)
- IPADE Business School. (2019, septiembre 17). *Entrevista | Fausto Costa, CEO de Nestlé en México* [Video].  
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=njl810oneKo&t=2s&ab\\_channel=IPADEBusinessSchool](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=njl810oneKo&t=2s&ab_channel=IPADEBusinessSchool)
- Jaffee, D. (2014). *Brewing justice: Fair trade coffee, sustainability, and survival*. University of California Press. <https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520282247/brewing-justice>
- Jaime, E. (2019, marzo 1). *365,000,000,000 sin reglas de operación*. México Evalúa. Retrieved October 7, 2022 from <https://www.mexicoevalua.org/365000000000-sin-reglas-operacion/>
- Jansen, K. (2015). The debate on food sovereignty theory: Agrarian capitalism, dispossession and agroecology. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 42(1), 213-232.  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03066150.2014.945166>
- Jaramillo Molina, M. E. (2020). ¿Una nueva política social?: Cambios y continuidades en los programas sociales de la 4T. *Análisis Plural*(Segundo semestre), 137-154.  
<https://rei.iteso.mx/bitstream/handle/1117/6397/S2-%C2%BFUna%20nueva%20pol%C3%ADtica%20social%3F.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

- Jessop, B. (1990). *State theory: Putting the capitalist state in its place*. Pennsylvania State University.
- Jessop, B. (2008). *State power. A strategic-relational approach*. Polity.
- Journal of Agrarian Change. (n.d.). *Overview*. Retrieved October 11, 2022 from <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/page/journal/14710366/homepage/productinformation.html>
- Jurado Celis, S., & Bartra Vergés, A. (2012). Cómo sobrevivir el mercado sin dejar de ser campesino. El caso de los pequeños productores de café en México. *Veredas: Revista del Pensamiento Sociológico*(Especial), 181–191. <https://veredasojs.xoc.uam.mx/index.php/veredas/article/view/511>
- Khalil, C. A., Conforti, P., Ergin, I., & Gennari, P. (2017, June). *Defining small scale food producers to monitor target 2.3 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* [FAO Statistics Division](Working paper series ESS/17-12). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). <http://www.fao.org/3/i6858e/i6858e.pdf>
- Kuntz Ficker, S. (2010). El café. In *Las exportaciones mexicanas durante la primera globalización (1870–1929)* (pp. 291–344). El Colegio de México (COLMEX). <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv47w6xr.11>
- La Jornada. (2022, diciembre 29). *La Sader da capacitación agroecológica sin usar glifosato ni transgénicos*. Retrieved February 8, 2023 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/notas/2022/12/27/politica/la-sader-da-capacitacion-agroecologica-sin-usar-glifosato-ni-transgenicos/>
- Leftwich, A. (2000). *States of development. On the primacy of politics in development*. Polity Press.
- Leftwich, A. (2005). Politics in command: Development studies and the rediscovery of social science. *New Political Economy*, 10(4), 573–607. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13563460500344542>
- Lewis, J., & Runsten, D. (2005, March 21). *Does fair trade coffee have a future in Mexico? The impact of migration in a Oaxacan community* [Paper presentation]. Trading Morsels's Conference, Princeton University. [https://www.academia.edu/16331328/Does\\_Fair\\_Trade\\_Coffee\\_Have\\_a\\_Future\\_in\\_Mexico\\_The\\_Impact\\_of\\_Migration\\_in\\_a\\_Oaxacan\\_Community](https://www.academia.edu/16331328/Does_Fair_Trade_Coffee_Have_a_Future_in_Mexico_The_Impact_of_Migration_in_a_Oaxacan_Community)
- Linares Sosa, G. (2021). Propuestas campesinas desde la Sierra Juárez. In *Comunidad y autonomía frente a Sembrando Vida* (pp. 117–126). Centro de Estudios para el Cambio en el Campo Mexicano (CECCAM). <https://www.ceccam.org/sites/default/files/comunidad%20y%20autonomia.pdf>
- López, I. (2022, febrero 1). *Denuncian corrupción en el programa de Producción para el Bienestar*. El Heraldo de Chiapas. Retrieved January 22, 2023 from <https://www.elheraldodechiapas.com.mx/local/denuncian-corrupcion-en-el-programa-de-produccion-para-el-bienestar-7808364.html>
- López Sánchez, A. P., & Torre Estrada, G. (2021). ¿Qué significa sembrar vida?. In *Comunidad y autonomía frente a Sembrando Vida* (pp. 127–149). Centro de Estudios para el Cambio en el Campo Mexicano (CECCAM). <https://www.ceccam.org/sites/default/files/comunidad%20y%20autonomia.pdf>

- López Valentín, R. M. C. (2019, diciembre 4). *El Programa S.V. sus impactos y las diferencias con las agroecologías* [Webinar]. Keller, K.  
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_S9oMeoN6fM&t=4s&ab\\_channel=KateKeller](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_S9oMeoN6fM&t=4s&ab_channel=KateKeller)
- López Zepeda, L., & Pérez, E. (2019, julio 20). *No se trata de dinero, sino de políticas y apoyo claro para pequeños y medianos productores: ANEC*. La Jornada del Campo. Retrieved June 15, 2022 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/2019/07/20/cam-dinero.html>
- Lurtz, C. M. (2019). *From the grounds up. Building an export economy in Southern Mexico*. Stanford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvqsdmtt>
- MAFF. (n.d.). *Japanese Agricultural Standards (JAS)*. Retrieved December 6, 2022 from <https://www.maff.go.jp/e/policies/standard/jas/>
- Marcial Pérez, D. (2021, noviembre 1). *Deforestación, opacidad y dependencia: Las grietas del Programa Sembrando Vida*. El País. Retrieved March 29, 2022 from <https://elpais.com/mexico/2021-11-01/deforestacion-opacidad-y-clientelismo-las-grietas-del-programa-sembrando-vida.html>
- Martínez, A. C. (2004, July 25–30). *Efectos de la globalización en los productores cafetaleros* [Paper presentation]. XI World Congress of Rural Sociology, Trondheim, Norway.  
<http://ru.iiec.unam.mx/1890/>
- Martínez Espinoza, M. I. (2021). La política social de la cuarta transformación en México. Un balance del primer año de gobierno de López Obrador. *Revista Española de Ciencia Política*, 55(marzo), 121–142. <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=7836960>
- Martínez Morales, A. C. (1996). *El proceso cafetalero mexicano*. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). <http://ru.iiec.unam.mx/1888/>
- Martínez-Torres, M. E. (2003). *Sustainable development, campesino organizations and technological change among small coffee producers in Chiapas, Mexico* [Doctoral dissertation University of California].
- Martínez-Torres, M. E. (2008). The benefits and sustainability of organic farming by peasant coffee farmers in Chiapas, Mexico. In C. M. Bacon, V. E. Méndez, S. R. Gliessman, D. Goodman, & J. A. Fox (Eds.), *Confronting the coffee crisis: Fair Trade, sustainable livelihoods, and ecosystems in Mexico and Central America* (pp. 99–126). MIT Press.  
[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270882350\\_Confronting\\_the\\_Coffee\\_Crisis\\_Fair\\_Trade\\_Sustainable\\_Livelihoods\\_and\\_Ecosystems\\_in\\_Mexico\\_and\\_Central\\_America](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270882350_Confronting_the_Coffee_Crisis_Fair_Trade_Sustainable_Livelihoods_and_Ecosystems_in_Mexico_and_Central_America)
- Martínez-Torres, M. E., & Rosset, P. M. (2014). Diálogo de saberes in La Vía Campesina: Food sovereignty and agroecology. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 41(6), 979–997.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2013.872632>
- McCarthy, J. F. (2010). Processes of inclusion and adverse incorporation: Oil palm and agrarian change in Sumatra, Indonesia. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 37(4), 821–850.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2010.512460>
- Memoria Política de México. (1883, mayo 1). *1882 Tratado de Límites entre México y Guatemala*. Retrieved June 3, 2022 from  
<http://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Textos/5RepDictadura/1882TLG.html>
- Memoria Política de México. (1894, marzo 25). *1894 Ley sobre ocupación y enajenación de terrenos baldíos*. Retrieved June 3, 2022 from  
<http://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Textos/5RepDictadura/1894DSO.html>

- Memoria Política de México. (1906, julio 1). *Se da a conocer el programa del Partido Liberal Mexicano*. Retrieved June 8, 2022 from <http://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Efemerides/7/01071906.html>
- Memoria Política de México. (1914, octubre 31). *1914 Ley de Obreros. Gobierno Constitucionalista del Estado de Chiapas*. Retrieved June 6, 2022 from <https://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Textos/6Revolucion/1914-LO-GCh.html>
- Memoria Política de México. (1938a, marzo 30). *El PNR se convierte en el Partido de la Revolución Mexicana*. Retrieved June 13, 2022 from <https://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Efemerides/3/30031938.html>
- Memoria Política de México. (1938b, agosto 28). *Surge la Confederación Nacional Campesina CNC*. Retrieved June 3, 2022 from <http://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Efemerides/8/28081938.html>
- Memoria Política de México. (1946, enero 18). *Desaparece el Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM) y surge en su lugar el Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)*. Retrieved June 12, 2022 from <http://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Efemerides/1/18011946.html>
- Memoria Política de México. (n.d.\*a). *Emiliano Zapata Salazar. 1879-1919*. Retrieved June 8, 2022 from <https://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Biografias/ZSE79.html>
- Memoria Política de México. (n.d.\*b). *Francisco Ignacio Madero González (1873-1913)*. Retrieved June 8, 2022 from <http://memoriapoliticademexico.org/Biografias/MFI73.html>
- Memoria Política de México. (n.d.\*c). *Francisco Villa (Doroteo Arango Arámbula)*. Retrieved June 8, 2022 from <https://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Biografias/VIF78.html>
- Méndez, V. E., Bacon, C. M., Olson, M., Petchers, S., Herrador, D., Carranza, C., Trujillo, L., Guadarrama-Zugasti, C., Cordon, A., & Mendoza, A. (2010). Effects of Fair Trade and organic certifications on small-scale coffee farmer households in Central America and Mexico. *Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems*, 25(3), 236-251. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742170510000268>
- Mendoza, U. (2019, julio 20). *El dilema de las organizaciones campesinas en la 4T*. La Jornada del Campo. Retrieved June 15, 2022 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/2019/07/20/cam-dilema.html>
- Mérida, M. (2018, diciembre 22). *México se duerme en crisis del café*. El Heraldo. Retrieved January 12, 2022 from <https://heraldodemexico.com.mx/opinion/2018/12/22/mexico-se-duerme-en-crisis-del-cafe-70478.html>
- Meyer, L. (2021). La 4T y los cambios de régimen previos. In H. Gómez Bruera (Ed.), *4T claves para descifrar el rompecabezas* (pp. 24-43). Grijalbo.
- Michelson, H. (2020). *Innovative business models for small farmer inclusion. Background paper for the state of agricultural commodity markets (SOCO) 2020*. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). <https://doi.org/10.4060/cbo700en>
- Moguel, J. (1991). La Coordinadora Estatal de Productores de Café de Oaxaca. In *Cafetaleros. La construcción de la autonomía. Cuadernos de desarrollo de base 3* (pp. 103-121). Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras (CNOG).
- Moguel, J. (1992a). La lucha por la apropiación de la vida social en la economía cafetalera: La experiencia de la CNOG. 1990-1991. In J. Moguel, C. Botey, & L. Hernández (Eds.), *Autonomía y nuevos sujetos sociales en el desarrollo rural* (pp. 78-97). Siglo XXI; Centro de Estudios Históricos de Agrarismo en México (CEHAM).

- Moguel, J. (1992b). Reforma constitucional y luchas agrarias en el marco de la transición salinista. In J. Moguel, C. Botey, & L. Hernández (Eds.), *Autonomía y nuevos sujetos sociales en el desarrollo rural* (pp. 261–275). Siglo XXI; Centro de Estudios Históricos de Agrarismo en México (CEHAM).
- Moguel, P., & Toledo, V. M. (1999). Biodiversity conservation in traditional coffee systems of Mexico. *Conservation Biology*, 13(1), 11–21. <https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1523-1739.1999.97153.x>
- Monroy, J. (2020, enero 24). *Suman 102 denuncias contra superdelegados federales: SFP*. El Financiero. Retrieved June 22, 2022 from <https://www.economista.com.mx/politica/Suman-102-denuncias-contrasuperdelegados-federales-SFP-20200123-0148.html>
- Moreno Alvarado, T. (2018, diciembre 24). *Con inversión de Nestlé, Veracruz retomará papel de gran productor nacional de café* La Jornada Veracruz. n.a.
- Murray, D. L., Reynolds, L. T., & Taylor, P. L. (2006). The future of Fair Trade coffee: Dilemmas facing Latin America's small-scale producers. *Development in Practice*, 16(02), 179–192. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09614520600562397>
- Mutersbaugh, T. (2004). Serve and certify: Paradoxes of service work in organic-coffee certification. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 22, 533–552. <https://doi.org/10.1068/d396>
- Navarrete Vela, J. P., & Rosiles Salas, J. (2019). El liderazgo de Andrés Manuel López Obrador: De la derrota electoral a gobernar la victoria. *Argumentos. Estudios Críticos de la Sociedad*, 32(89), 177–201. <https://argumentosojs.xoc.uam.mx/index.php/argumentos/article/view/1059>
- Neilson, J., & Shonk, F. (2014). Chained to development? Livelihoods and global value chains in the coffee-producing Toraja region of Indonesia. *Australian Geographer*, 45(3), 269–288. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2014.929998>
- Nestlé, D. (1995). Coffee in Mexico: International market, agricultural landscape and ecology. *Ecological Economics*, 15(2), 165–178. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0921-8009\(95\)00041-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/0921-8009(95)00041-0)
- Nestlé. (2011a, septiembre 27). *Grupo Nestlé México firma alianza con AGROMOD e INIFAP para apoyar la producción del café mexicano*. Retrieved November 11, 2021 from <https://www.nestle.com.mx/media/pressreleases/news2011agromod>
- Nestlé. (2011b, mayo 31). *NESCAFÉ® trabaja con productores de café*. Retrieved December 12, 2021 from <https://www.nestle.com.mx/media/pressreleases/news2011productores>
- Nestlé. (2013, mayo 17). *Nestlé inaugura la fábrica de café soluble más grande del mundo*. Retrieved December 12, 2021 from <https://www.nestle.com.mx/media/pressreleases/nestle-inaugura-fabrica-cafe-mas-grande-mundo>
- Nestlé. (2015, septiembre 3). *NESCAFÉ® lanza, por primera vez, Orígenes, una edición especial para rendir tributo a Chiapas, Oaxaca y Veracruz*. Retrieved January 1, 2022 from <https://www.nestle.com.mx/media/pressreleases/nescafe-lanza-origenes>
- Nestlé. (2018a, septiembre 6). *El gobierno de Oaxaca y NESCAFÉ® firman convenio para impulsar la producción cafetalera del estado*. Retrieved November 11, 2020 from [https://www.nestle.com.mx/media/pressreleases/plannescafe\\_oaxaca](https://www.nestle.com.mx/media/pressreleases/plannescafe_oaxaca)
- Nestlé. (2018b, agosto 29). *NESCAFÉ® rinde tributo a los caficultores de México*. Retrieved November 11, 2020 from [https://www.nestle.com.mx/media/pressreleases/nescafe\\_tributo](https://www.nestle.com.mx/media/pressreleases/nescafe_tributo)

- Nestlé. (2018c, diciembre 18). *Nestlé México invertirá 154 millones de dólares en innovadora fábrica de producción de café en Veracruz*. Retrieved August 14, 2022 from [https://www.nestle.com.mx/media/pressreleases/inversion\\_fabrica\\_veracruz](https://www.nestle.com.mx/media/pressreleases/inversion_fabrica_veracruz)
- Nestlé. (2019, noviembre 25). *Aumenta Inversión en Fábrica de Veracruz | Nestlé*. Retrieved December 12, 2021 from <https://www.nestle.com.mx/media/pressreleases/inversion-fabrica-veracruz>
- Nestlé. (2021, April). *A breakthrough in coffee breeding. How Nestlé's scientists discovered unique low carbon, drought-resistant coffee varieties*. Retrieved June 17, 2021 from <https://www.nestle.com/stories/nestle-breakthrough-coffee-breeding-low-carbon-drought-resistant-varieties>
- Nestlé. (2022, julio 17). *El Presidente Andrés Manuel López Obrador inaugura fábrica de Nestlé en Veracruz que, con una inversión de 340 millones de dólares, convierte a México en el mayor productor de café para la empresa en el mundo*. Retrieved December 17, 2022 from <https://www.nestle.com.mx/media/pressreleases/presidente-inaugura-fabrica>
- Nestlé. (n.d.\*a). *Creación de valor compartido. Reporte de resultados México 2016-2018*. <https://www.nestle.com.mx/sites/g/files/pydnoa511/files/2019-10/CVC2016-2018.pdf>
- Nestlé. (n.d.\*b). *Historia*. Retrieved December 12, 2021 from <https://www.nestle.com.mx/aboutus/historia>
- Nestlé. (n.d.\*c). *Nescafé Plan* Retrieved November 11, 2020 from <https://empresa.nestle.es/es/cvc/desarrollo-rural/cadena-suministro-cafe/nescafe-plan>
- Nestlé. (n.d.\*d). *Our sustainable journey. Ten years of the Nescafé Plan*. <https://www.nestle.com/sites/default/files/2021-01/sustainable-journey-ten-years-nescafe-plan-2021-en.pdf>
- Nikol, L. J., & Jansen, K. (2021). Rethinking conventionalisation: A view from organic agriculture in the Global South. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 86, 420-429. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2021.07.001>
- Núñez Membrillo, H. (2021). Las organizaciones rurales en tiempos de la 4T: ¿Procesos de cooptación o el viejo dilema de las izquierdas mexicanas?. *El Cotidiano*, 36(227), 111-124.
- OECD, & FAO. (2019). *OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2019-2028. Special focus: Latin America*. [https://doi.org/10.1787/agr\\_outlook-2019-en](https://doi.org/10.1787/agr_outlook-2019-en)
- OIC. (n.d.). *Organización Internacional del Café 1963-2013*. <http://www.ico.org/documents/cy2012-13/history-ico-50-years-c.pdf>
- Olvera, A. J. (1991). Las luchas de los cafeticultores veracruzanos: La experiencia de la Unión de Productores de Café de Veracruz. In *Cafetaleros. La construcción de la autonomía. Cuadernos de desarrollo de base 3* (pp. 141-155). Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras (CNOOC).
- Ortega, A. (2021, marzo 3). *Los "siervos" de AMLO acumulan cuestionamientos con miras a la elección de 2021*. Expansión Política. Retrieved January 29, 2023 from <https://politica.expansion.mx/voces/2021/03/03/siervos-de-amlo-acumulan-cuestionamientos-hacia-eleccion-2021>
- Palmer-Rubin, B. (2019). Evading the patronage trap: Organizational capacity and demand making in Mexico. *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(13-14), 2097-2134. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019830745>

- Paré, L. (1991). ¿Adelgazamiento del INMECAFE o de los pequeños productores de café?. In *Cafetaleros. La construcción de la autonomía. Cuadernos de desarrollo de base 3* (pp. 49–61). Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras (CNOOC).
- Pedraza López, J. (2021). El programa estratégico Sembrando Vida: ¿Promueve la soberanía alimentaria?. *Grietas. Revista Crítica de Política Internacional*, 2(marzo 2020–febrero 2021), 147–161. <http://www.revistagrietas.com/index.php/grietas/article/view/16>
- Pérez Akaki, P. (2013a). Las políticas públicas cafetaleras en México: Un análisis histórico. *Investigaciones Geográficas*, 72, 121–143. <https://federaciondefeferos.org/static/files/4LaspoliticaspUBLICAScafetalerasenMexico.pdf>
- Pérez Akaki, P. (2013b). Los siglos XIX y XX en la cafeticultura nacional: De la bonanza a la crisis del grano de oro mexicano. *Revista de Historia*, 67, 159–199. <https://www.revistas.una.ac.cr/index.php/historia/article/view/5262>
- Petchers, S., & Harris, S. (2008). The Roots of the Coffee Crisis. In C. M. Bacon, V. E. Méndez, S. R. Gliessman, D. Goodman, & J. A. Fox (Eds.), *Confronting the coffee crisis: Fair trade, sustainable livelihoods and ecosystems in Mexico and Central America* (pp. 43–66). MIT Press. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270882350\\_Confronting\\_the\\_Coffee\\_Crisis\\_Fair\\_Trade\\_Sustainable\\_Livelihoods\\_and\\_Ecosystems\\_in\\_Mexico\\_and\\_Central\\_America](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270882350_Confronting_the_Coffee_Crisis_Fair_Trade_Sustainable_Livelihoods_and_Ecosystems_in_Mexico_and_Central_America)
- Ponte, S. (2002). The 'Latte Revolution'? Regulation, markets and consumption in the global coffee chain. *World Development*, 30(7), 1099–1122. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X\(02\)00032-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(02)00032-3)
- Ponte, S. (2008, June). *Developing a 'vertical' dimension to chronic poverty research: Some lessons from global value chain analysis* (Working paper 111). Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC). [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23529161\\_Developing\\_a\\_'Vertical'\\_Dimension\\_to\\_Chronic\\_Poverty\\_Research\\_Some\\_Lessons\\_from\\_Global\\_Value\\_Chain\\_Analysis](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23529161_Developing_a_'Vertical'_Dimension_to_Chronic_Poverty_Research_Some_Lessons_from_Global_Value_Chain_Analysis)
- Ponte, S. (2020). The hidden costs of environmental upgrading in global value chains. *Review of International Political Economy*, 1–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2020.1816199>
- Ponte, S., & Ewert, J. (2009). Which way is “up” in upgrading? Trajectories of change in the value chain for South African wine. *World Development*, 37(10), 1637–1650. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.03.008>
- Portillo, L. (1993). El Convenio Internacional del Café y la crisis del mercado. *Comercio Exterior*, 43, 378–391. <http://revistas.bancomext.gob.mx/rce/magazines/245/8/RCE8.pdf>
- Proceso. (2021, noviembre 28). *Sembrando vida y la fábrica de chocolates*. Retrieved June 21, 2022 from <https://www.proceso.com.mx/nacional/2021/11/28/sembrando-vida-la-fabrica-de-chocolates-276570.html>
- Quintana, V. M. (2008, septiembre 12). *Clientelismo multicolor*. La Jornada del Campo. Retrieved June 7, 2022 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/2008/09/12/plaga.html>
- Quirós, E. (2016, octubre 26–28). *Modelos institucionales de atención al sector cafetalero en otros países* [PowerPoint slides]. Instituto Interamericano de Cooperación para la Agricultura (IICA). <https://www.biodiversidad.gob.mx/media/1/region/files/spsb/05-modelos-institucionales-atencion-sector-cafetalero-otros-paises.pdf>

- Rainforest Alliance. (n.d.). *UTZ Certification (Now Part of the Rainforest Alliance)*. Retrieved December 6, 2022 from [https://www.rainforest-alliance.org/utz/?\\_ga=2.29176633.405868792.1669742826-1954490222.1669742826](https://www.rainforest-alliance.org/utz/?_ga=2.29176633.405868792.1669742826-1954490222.1669742826)
- Ramírez Benítez, L. D. (2020). *Efectos de un contexto de erosión democrática en las estrategias de reforma a las instituciones de la administración pública: El caso de la Secretaría de Bienestar, 2018–2020* [Tesis de Maestría, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE)]. <http://repositorio-digital.cide.edu/handle/11651/4264>
- Ramírez Cuellar, A. (2008, septiembre 12). *El corporativismo, igual*. La Jornada del Campo. Retrieved June 10, 2022 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/2008/09/12/plaga.html>
- Ramírez Cuevas, J. (n.d.). *Una radiografía de las organizaciones agrarias. Movimiento campesino: Las razones de la furia*. Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP). Retrieved November 11, 2022 from [https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Movimiento\\_campesino\\_las\\_razones\\_de\\_la\\_furia.htm](https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Movimiento_campesino_las_razones_de_la_furia.htm)
- Ramírez García, S., & Nava Tablada, M. E. (2019). *Comercio justo y empoderamiento. Realidades y expectativas de los pequeños cafetaleros en Veracruz y Chiapas*. Gobierno del Estado de Veracruz. [http://www.editoraveracruz.gob.mx/docs/Comercio\\_justoyEmpoderamiento\\_WEB.pdf](http://www.editoraveracruz.gob.mx/docs/Comercio_justoyEmpoderamiento_WEB.pdf)
- Ramos, C. (2008, septiembre 12). *También los empresarios*. La Jornada del Campo. Retrieved June 10, 2022 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/2008/09/12/plaga.html>
- Raynolds, L. T., & Rosty, C. (2021). Fair Trade USA coffee plantation certification: Ramifications for workers in Nicaragua. *Development Policy Review*, 39(S1), O102–O121. <https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12473>
- Renard Hubert, M.-C., & Larroa Torres, R. M. (2017). Política pública y sustentabilidad de los territorios cafetaleros en tiempos de roya: Chiapas y Veracruz. *Estudios Latinoamericanos*, 40(julio–diciembre), 95–113. <http://revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rel/article/view/61593>
- Renard, M.-C. (1992). Mercado mundial y economía regional. El café en el Soconusco, México. *The International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food*, 2, 74–87. <https://doi.org/10.48416/ijsaf.v2i.403>
- Renard, M.-C. (1999). *Los intersticios de la globalización: Un label "Max Havelaar" para los pequeños productores de café*. Centro de Estudios Mexicanos y Centroamericanos (CEMCA). <https://doi.org/10.4000/books.cemca.510>
- Renard, M. C. (1993). *El Soconusco. Una economía cafetalera*. Universidad Autónoma de Chapingo.
- Renard, M.-C., & Ortega Breña, M. (2010). The Mexican coffee crisis. *Latin American Perspectives*, 37(2), 21–33. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20684713>
- Renard, M.-C., & Pérez-Grovas, V. (2007). Fair trade coffee in Mexico: At the center of the debates. In L. T. Raynolds, D. L. Murray, & J. Wilkinson (Eds.), *Fair Trade. The challenges of transforming globalization* (pp. 138–156). Routledge. <https://www.routledge.com/Fair-Trade-The-Challenges-of-Transforming-Globalization-Raynolds-Murray-Wilkinson/p/book/9780415772037>
- Riisgaard, L., Bolwig, S., Ponte, S., du Toit, A., Halberg, N., & Matose, F. (2010). Integrating poverty and environmental concerns into value-chain analysis: A strategic framework and

- practical guide. *Development Policy Review*, 28(2), 195–216. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2010.00481.x>
- Rincón, S. (n.d.). *Los proveedores consentidos de Sembrando Vida en Veracruz*. Ethos.
- Ríos, V. (2021). La élite tropical. In H. Gómez Bruera (Ed.), *4T claves para descifrar el rompecabezas* (pp. 49–64). Grijalbo.
- Rives Sánchez, R. (2010). *La reforma constitucional en México*. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). <https://repositorio.unam.mx/contenidos/5027428>
- Robles Berlanga, H. M. (2011). *Los productores de café en México: Problemática y ejercicio del presupuesto* (Mexican Rural Development Research Reports No. 14). Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. [https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/Hector\\_Robles\\_Cafe\\_Monografia\\_14.pdf](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/Hector_Robles_Cafe_Monografia_14.pdf)
- Robles, H. (2019, julio 20). *La construcción de una nueva política para el campo*. La Jornada del Campo. Retrieved January 10, 2023 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/2019/07/20/cam-construccion.html>
- Rodríguez Centeno, M. M. (1996). México y las relaciones comerciales con Estados Unidos en el siglo XIX: Matías Romero y el fomento del café. *Historia Mexicana*, 737-757. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25139018>
- Rodríguez Centeno, M. M. (2004). Fiscalidad y café mexicano. El porfiriato y sus estrategias de fomento económico para la producción y comercialización del grano (1870–1910). *Historia Mexicana*, 51(1), 93–128. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25139553>
- Rodríguez Padrón, B. (2012). *Institutions in the Mexican coffee sector—changes and responses* [Doctoral dissertation, Wageningen University]. <https://edepot.wur.nl/238636>
- Rodríguez-Centeno, M. M. (1993). La producción cafetalera mexicana. El caso de Córdoba, Veracruz. *Historia Mexicana*, XLIII(1), 81–115. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25138886>
- Rompeviento TV. (2019, enero 22). *López Obrador-Rompeviento TV, la Nestlé y la inconformidad de los caficultores*. Retrieved February 3, 2019 from <https://www.rompeviento.tv/lopez-obrador-rompeviento-tv-la-nestle-y-la-inconformidad-de-los-caficultores/>
- Rosales Sierra, V. (2009). Conflictos por la tierra: Despojo secular de los pueblos indios. In *Estado de desarrollo económico y social de los pueblos indígenas de Guerrero* (pp. n.a.). Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM); Secretaría de Asuntos Indígenas del Gobierno del Estado de Guerrero. [https://www.nacionmulticultural.unam.mx/edespig/diagnostico\\_y\\_perspectivas/RECUADROS/CAPITULO%206/5%20CONFLICTOS%20POR%20LA%20TIERRA.pdf](https://www.nacionmulticultural.unam.mx/edespig/diagnostico_y_perspectivas/RECUADROS/CAPITULO%206/5%20CONFLICTOS%20POR%20LA%20TIERRA.pdf)
- Roseberry, W., Gudmundson, L., & Samper K, M. (1995). *Coffee, society, and power in Latin America*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Rosset, P. (2019a, junio 1). *Apoyos individualizados: ¿Contrainsurgencia o contención social?*. La Jornada. Retrieved March 6, 2022 from <https://www.jornada.com.mx/2019/06/01/opinion/012a1pol>
- Rosset, P. (2019b, diciembre 4). *Understanding Sembrando Vida: The governmental programme in Mexico that inspired the COP agreement on reforestation* [Webinar]. Keller, K. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_S9oMeoN6fM&t=4s&ab\\_channel=KateKeller](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_S9oMeoN6fM&t=4s&ab_channel=KateKeller)

- Ruben, R., Sfez, P., Ponsioen, T., & Meneses, N. (2018, marzo). *Análisis integral de la cadena de valor del café en Honduras: Informe final*. Wageningen University & Research. <https://edepot.wur.nl/450336>
- Rueschemeyer, D., & Evans, P. B. (1985). The state and economic transformation: Toward an analysis of the conditions underlying effective intervention. In P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol (Eds.), *Bringing the state back in* (pp. 44–77). Cambridge University Press. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/bringing-the-state-back-in/629F1D194C7E4FC19CF5208F345D6AD8>
- Ruiz Meza, L. E. (2015). Adaptive capacity of small-scale coffee farmers to climate change impacts in the Soconusco region of Chiapas, Mexico. *Climate and Development*, 7(2), 100–109. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2014.900472>
- Ruiz-de-Oña, C., Rivera-Castañeda, P., & Merlín-Uribe, Y. (2019). Coffee, migration and climatic changes: Challenging adaptation dichotomic narratives in a transborder region. *Social Sciences*, 8(12). <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8120323>
- SADER. (2013, julio 14). *Renovación de cafetales, una realidad en Chiapas EMM*. Retrieved December 12, 2021 from <https://www.gob.mx/agricultura%07Cchiapas/prensa/renovacion-de-cafetales-una-realidad-en-chiapas-emm>
- SADER. (2018a octubre 3). *México vs. la roya del café*. Retrieved September 21, 2021 from <https://www.gob.mx/agricultura/articulos/mexico-vs-la-roya-del-cafe>
- SADER. (2018b, enero 10). *PROCAFÉ, garantía de riqueza agroalimentaria*. Retrieved September 21, 2021 from <https://www.gob.mx/agricultura/es/articulos/procafe-garantia-de-riqueza-agroalimentaria>
- SADER. (2019a, septiembre 30). *México firme en el combate de la roya del cafeto*. Retrieved September 21, 2021 from <https://www.gob.mx/agricultura/es/articulos/mexico-firme-en-el-combate-de-la-roya-del-cafeto?idiom=es>
- SADER. (2019b, marzo 8). *Programa de Fomento a la Agricultura. Componente estrategias integrales de política pública agrícola. Convocatoria 2019 Subcomponente sustentabilidad y bienestar para pequeños productores de café* [Subsecretaría de Agricultura. Dirección General de Fomento a la Agricultura]. <https://amecafe.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CONVOCATORIA-CAF%C3%89-2019.pdf>
- SADER. (2020a, octubre1). *Café, la bebida que despierta a México*. Retrieved March 29, 2022 from <https://www.gob.mx/agricultura/es/articulos/cafe-la-bebida-que-despierta-a-mexico#:~:text=el%20caf%C3%A9%20es%20la%20bebida,millones%20de%20tazas%20de%20caf%C3%A9&text=En%20nuestro%20pa%C3%ADs%20el%20caf%C3%A9,el%2090%20%25%20de%20la%20producci%C3%B3n>
- SADER. (2020b, febrero 28). *Transitemos hacia prácticas agrícolas sustentables. Programa Producción para el Bienestar, Estrategia de Acompañamiento Técnico*. Retrieved March 29, 2022 from <https://www.gob.mx/agricultura/acciones-y-programas/componente-acompanamiento-tecnico-233999>
- Sáez, H. E. (2019). Cuarta Transformación: Antecedentes y perspectivas. *Argumentos. Estudios Críticos de la Sociedad*, 89(enero–abril), 83–102. <https://argumentosoj.s.xoc.uam.mx/index.php/argumentos/article/view/1055>
- SAGARPA. (2013, mayo 17). *Diversas intervenciones durante la Inauguración de la Fábrica de Café Soluble más Grande del Mundo*. Retrieved June 10, 2022 from

- <https://www.gob.mx/epn/prensa/diversas-intervenciones-durante-la-inauguracion-de-la-fabrica-de-cafe-soluble-mas-grande-del-mundo>
- SAGARPA. (2015, julio 7). *México y el crecimiento del café orgánico*. Retrieved November 11, 2022 from <https://www.gob.mx/agricultura/es/articulos/mexico-y-el-crecimiento-del-cafe-organico>
- SAGARPA. (2016, abril 28). *Café oro azteca, variedad 100 por ciento mexicana*. Retrieved November 11, 2021 from <https://www.gob.mx/agricultura/es/articulos/cafe-oro-azteca-variedad-100-por-ciento-mexicana>
- SAGARPA. (2018, agosto). *Procedimiento Operativo del PROAGRO Productivo* [Dirección General de Operación y Explotación de Padrones](04). <https://www.agricultura.gob.mx/sites/default/files/sagarpa/document/2018/07/11/1087/180913-anexos-pop-version-28agosto2018-final.pdf>
- SAGARPA. (n.d.). *Planeación Agrícola Nacional 2017–2030. Café*. [https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/256426/B\\_sico-Caf\\_.pdf](https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/256426/B_sico-Caf_.pdf)
- SAGARPA, CHAPINGO, Consejo Poblano del Café, & INCA Rural. (2005, noviembre). *Plan rector del Sistema Producto Café*
- SAGARPA, COFUPRO, CHAPINGO, SPC, AMECAFE, & INCA Rural. (2011, noviembre). *Plan de innovación en la cafeticultura de México. Proyecto estratégico Fomento Productivo 2010. Estrategia de innovación hacia la competitividad en la cafeticultura*.
- SAGARPA, & FAO. (2004). *Evaluación Alianza Contigo 2003. Informe de evaluación nacional. Programa Fondo de Estabilización, Fortalecimiento y Reordenamiento de la Cafeticultura 2002/2003*. <https://www.agricultura.gob.mx/sites/default/files/sagarpa/document/2018/11/14/1533/14112018-2003-nal-cafe.pdf>
- SAGARPA, & FAO. (2006, octubre 31). *Proyecto evaluación Alianza para el Campo 2005. Análisis prospectivo de política cafetalera*. <https://www.agricultura.gob.mx/sites/default/files/sagarpa/document/2019/01/28/1608/01022019-analisis-prospectivo-de-politica-cafetatera.pdf>
- Salazar Pérez, R. (2019). ¿Dónde quedó el sujeto político en la Cuarta Transformación en México?. In J. L. Cisneros, M. G. Barrón Cruz, & J. A. Parra Molina (Eds.), *Sentido y tendencias de la transformación en México* (pp. 67–85). El Aleph. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351135072\\_Sentido\\_y\\_tendencias\\_de\\_la\\_transformacion\\_en\\_Mexico](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351135072_Sentido_y_tendencias_de_la_transformacion_en_Mexico)
- Salgado Ramírez, Á. (2021). Sembrar trabajo comunitario para cosechar vida. In *Comunidad y autonomía frente a Sembrando Vida* (pp. 61–93). Centro de Estudios para el Cambio en el Campo Mexicano (CECCAM). <https://www.ceccam.org/sites/default/files/comunidad%20y%20autonomia.pdf>
- Sánchez Juárez, G. K. (2015). *Los pequeños cafeticultores de Chiapas. Organización y resistencia frente al mercado* (Publication Number 4) [Tesis de Doctorado Universidad de Ciencias y Artes de Chiapas (UNICACH)]. [http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/Mexico/cesmecha-unicach/20170419034553/pdf\\_655.pdf](http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/Mexico/cesmecha-unicach/20170419034553/pdf_655.pdf)
- Sanders, N. (2021, octubre 12). *Sembrando Vida: Una ilusión sin futuro*. Gatopardo. Retrieved May 21, 2022 from <https://gatopardo.com/reportajes/sembrando-vida-el-proyecto-milagro-de-lopez-obrador-para-el-campo-mexicano-2021-2020/>

- SCA. (n.d.\*a). *What is specialty coffee?*. Retrieved June 6, 2022 from <https://sca.coffee/research/what-is-specialty-coffee>
- SCA. (n.d.\*b). *Protocols & best practices*. Retrieved June 6, 2022 from <https://sca.coffee/research/protocols-best-practices>
- Schmitter, P. C. (1974). Still the century of corporatism?. *The Review of Politics*, 36(1), 85–131. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670500022178>
- SDPnoticias. (2019, enero 5). *Niega Sader que planta de Nestlé afecte a caficultores nacionales*. Retrieved January 13, 2022 from <https://www.sdpnoticias.com/negocios/afecte-nestle-planta-sader-niega.html>
- Secretaría de Fomento. (1893). *Código de Colonización y Terrenos Baldíos de la República Mexicana. Años de 1451 a 1892*. [https://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Textos/5RepDictadura/IM/1883-Dic-15-ley\\_baldios.pdf](https://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Textos/5RepDictadura/IM/1883-Dic-15-ley_baldios.pdf)
- Seffer, K. (2015). Clientelism a stumbling block for democratization? Lessons from Mexico. *Latin American Perspectives*, 42(5), 198–215. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X14547511>
- Senado. (2020, septiembre 9). *Iniciativa con proyecto de decreto por el que se expide la Ley de Fomento a la Cafeticultura*. [https://infosen.senado.gob.mx/sgsp/gaceta/64/3/2020-09-29-1/assets/documentos/Inic\\_Sen.Eduardo\\_Ley\\_Fomento\\_Cafeticultura\\_Act.pdf](https://infosen.senado.gob.mx/sgsp/gaceta/64/3/2020-09-29-1/assets/documentos/Inic_Sen.Eduardo_Ley_Fomento_Cafeticultura_Act.pdf)
- Serrano Rodríguez, A. C. (2019). Discursos paralelos, pero en sentido opuesto. Análisis de los populismos de Jair Bolsonaro y Andrés Manuel López Obrador. *Estudios Políticos*, 56, 149–173. <https://www.redalyc.org/journal/164/16463289007/16463289007.pdf>
- Skocpol, T. (1985). Bringing the state back in: Strategies of analysis in current research. In P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol (Eds.), *Bringing the state back in* (pp. 4–37). Cambridge University Press. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/bringing-the-state-back-in/629F1D194C7E4FC19CF5208F345D6AD8>
- Sobarzo Magallanes, A. (2021). ¿Un programa agroecológico?. In *Comunidad y autonomía frente a Sembrando Vida* (pp. 203–219). Centro de Estudios para el Cambio en el Campo Mexicano (CECCAM). <https://www.ceccam.org/sites/default/files/comunidad%20y%20autonomia.pdf>
- SPC, & AMECAFE. (2019). Comunicado sin título con encabezado "Ciudad de México a 23 de abril de 2019". *Cafés de México* 299(abril), 8–10.
- SPC, AMECAFE, & CONAPROCAFE. (2019). *Comunicado sin título con encabezado "Ciudad de México a 20 de noviembre del 2019. Coordinación Ejecutiva. N. 233/2019"*. Facebook. <https://web.facebook.com/cnocafe/photos/a.637216723069326/1407565386034452/?type=3> and <https://web.facebook.com/cnocafe/photos/a.637216723069326/140756542701103>
- STyPS. (2020). *Centros Integradores del Desarrollo. Conferencias sobre Programas del Bienestar*. Retrieved October 29, 2021 from <https://www.gob.mx/stps/es/articulos/centros-integradores-del-desarrollo-conferencias-sobre-programas-del-bienestar?idiom=es>
- Suárez, V. (2019, abril 9). *Políticas de la Secretaría de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural [Seminar]*. El Colegio de México (COLMEX). [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F2LPYGbhQ5k&ab\\_channel=ElColegiodeM%C3%A9xicoA.C](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F2LPYGbhQ5k&ab_channel=ElColegiodeM%C3%A9xicoA.C)
- Taylor, P. L. (2002, September). *Poverty alleviation through participation in Fair Trade coffee networks: Synthesis of case study research question findings* [Report prepared for project

- funded by the Community and Resource Development Program, The Ford Foundation, New York]. Center for Fair and Alternative Trade (CFAT). <https://cfat.colostate.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/63/2009/09/Research-Findings.pdf>
- Taza de Excelencia. (n.d.). *¿Qué es Taza de Excelencia?*. Retrieved September 22, 2021 from <https://www.tazadeexcelenciamexico.org/que-es-taza-de-excelencia/>
- Topik, S. (2003, September 17–20). *The world coffee market in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from colonial to national regimes* [Paper presentation]. GEHN Conference, London, United Kingdom. <https://www.lse.ac.uk/Economic-History/Assets/Documents/Research/GEHN/GEHNWP04ST.pdf>
- Toussaint Ribot, M. (2012). Los negocios de un diplomático: Matías Romero en Chiapas. *Latinoamérica*, 2(55), 129–157. [https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci\\_arttext&pid=S1665-85742012000200006](https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1665-85742012000200006)
- Tovar González, M. E. (2000). Extranjeros en el Soconusco. *Revista de Humanidades*(8), 29–43. <http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=38400802>
- Uc, H. (2021). Un disruptivo programa en el ámbito comunitario. In *Comunidad y autonomía frente a Sembrando Vida* (pp. 173–178). Centro de Estudios para el Cambio en el Campo Mexicano (CECCAM). <https://www.ceccam.org/sites/default/files/comunidad%20y%20autonomia.pdf>
- Unión Majomut. (n.d.\*a). *Comercio Justo. Comprometidos con el desarrollo social y ambiental*. Retrieved March 29, 2022 from <http://www.union.majomut.org/comercio-justo/presentacion/>
- Unión Majomut. (n.d.\*b). *Producción de café orgánico. Respecto y compromiso ancestral*. Retrieved March 29, 2022 from <http://www.union.majomut.org/nuestra-cafe/produccion-organica/>
- USDA. (n.d.). *USDA Organic*. Retrieved December 6, 2022 from <https://www.usda.gov/topics/organic>
- Valkila, J. (2014). Do fair trade pricing policies reduce inequalities in coffee production and trade?. *Development Policy Review*, 32(4), 475–493. <https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12064>
- Vázquez Pallares, N. (1980). El ejido de Lázaro Cárdenas. *Problemas del Desarrollo*, 11(44), 125–134. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43907460>
- Vega, A. (2020, enero 30). *Programa Sembrando Vida solo consiguió 13.9% de las plantas que necesitaba en 2019*. Animal Político. Retrieved March 29, 2022 from <https://www.animalpolitico.com/2020/01/sembrando-vida-plantas-ejercito/>
- Vellema, S. (2016). Global value chains and inclusive development: Unpacking smallholder producers' agency. In G. Gómez M. & P. Knorringa (Eds.), *Local governance, economic development and institutions* (pp. 201–215). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Venegas Sandoval, A., Soto Pinto, L., Balente Herrera, O., & Álvarez Gordillo, G. (2020). Transformaciones de la caficultura en Chiapas: Un análisis de las crisis desde la perspectiva del ciclo de renovación adaptativa. *Sociedad y Ambiente*, 23, 1–31. <https://doi.org/10.31840/sya.v123.2188>
- Vera-Herrera. (2021). *¿Convertir en jornaleros a milenarios guardianes?*. In *Comunidad y autonomía frente a Sembrando Vida* (pp. 221–247). Centro de Estudios para el Cambio en el Campo Mexicano (CECCAM). <https://www.ceccam.org/sites/default/files/comunidad%20y%20autonomia.pdf>

- Vicol, M., Neilson, J., Hartatri, D. F. S., & Cooper, P. (2018). Upgrading for whom? Relationship coffee, value chain interventions and rural development in Indonesia. *World Development*, 110, 26–37. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.05.020>
- Villafuerte Solís, D. (2004). El Soconusco: La frontera de la frontera sur. In J. Sánchez & R. Jarquín (Eds.), *La frontera sur. Reflexiones sobre el Soconusco, Chiapas, y sus problemas ambientales, poblacionales y productivos* (pp. 157–168). Senado; Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM).
- Villafuerte Torrez, A. B. (2013). Lucha campesina, autonomía e institucionalización: El caso de la CIOAC en Acala, Chiapas. *Pueblos y Fronteras Digital*, 8(16), 282–312. [https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci\\_arttext&pid=S1870-41152013000200282](https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-41152013000200282)
- Villafuerte-Solís, D., & García-Aguilar, M. d. C. (1994). Los empresarios cafetaleros de Soconusco ante la crisis. In *Anuario 1993* (pp. 318–341). Instituto Chiapaneco de Cultura (IHC). <https://repositorio.cesmecha.mx/handle/11595/434>
- WCR. (2019, mayo 1). *Las variedades del café arábica. Un catálogo global de variedades que abarca: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenia, Malawi, Nicaragua, Panamá, Perú, República Dominicana, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.* <https://varieties.worldcoffeeresearch.org/content/3-releases/20191206-update-may-2019/las-variedades-del-cafe-Arabica.pdf>
- WCR. (n.d.). *Arabica Coffee*. Retrieved November 11, 2022 from <https://varieties.worldcoffeeresearch.org/info/coffee/about-varieties/main-types>
- Williams, R. G. (1994). *States and social evolution: Coffee and the rise of national governments in Central America*. University of North Carolina Press. <https://uncpress.org/book/9780807844632/states-and-social-evolution/>
- Wilson, B. R. (2010). Indebted to fair trade? Coffee and crisis in Nicaragua. *Geoforum*, 41(1), 84–92. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2009.06.008>
- Wilson, B. R., & Mutersbaugh, T. (2020). Solidarity Interrupted: Coffee, Cooperatives, and Certification Conflicts in Mexico and Nicaragua. *Rethinking Marxism*, 32(3), 348–367. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2020.1780670>
- World Bank. (2003). *Reaching the rural poor. A renewed strategy for rural development.* <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/14084/267630REACHINGoTHEoRURALoPOORo.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- World Bank. (2007). *World development report 2008. Agriculture for development.* <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5990>
- World Bank. (2020). *World development report 2020: Trading for development in the age of global value chains. A World Bank flagship report.* <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1457-0>
- WRI. (2021, marzo 18). *Análisis de los impactos en las coberturas forestales y potencial de mitigación de las parcelas del Programa Sembrando Vida implementadas en 2019.* <http://movilidadamable.org/WRIMexico/WRI%20M%C3%A9xico%20An%C3%A1lisis%20sobre%20los%20impactos%20ambientales%20de%20Sembrando%20Vida%20en%202019.pdf>
- Yin, R. K. (2009). *Case study research: Design and methods* (Vol. 5). SAGE Publications.

Zeledón Zeledón, R. (n.d.). *Surge la Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC)*. Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CNDH). Retrieved June 6, 2022 from <https://www.cndh.org.mx/noticia/surge-la-confederacion-nacional-campesina-cnc>



## Photographs



A worker on a coffee estate (*photo shared by an interviewee*).



Coffee drying in the sun (*photo by Claudia Oviedo-Rodríguez*).



A coffee collector (photo by Claudia Oviedo-Rodríguez).



A farmer asking the price of coffee (photo by Erik García Briones).




Family together during harvest season (*photo by Claudia Oviedo-Rodríguez*).



EGOS staff weighing farmers' coffee (photo by Claudia Oviedo-Rodríguez).



Infrastructure of a farmer organization (photo by Claudia Oviedo-Rodríguez).



Sample of farmer organization member (photo by Claudia Oviedo-Rodríguez).



Shipping coffee, Mexican style (photo by Erik García Briones).



*A Sembrando Vida sign (photo by Claudia Oviedo-Rodríguez).*



*A Centro Integradores de Desarrollo sign (photo by Erik García Briones).*



A fading PRI sign (*photo by Erik García Briones*).

## Completed Training and Supervision Plan

Name of the learning activity	Department /Institute	Year	Credits
<b>A) Project related competences</b>			
<i>A1. Managing a research project</i>			
WASS Introduction course	WASS	2017	1
Developing the research proposal	RSO, WUR	2018	6
Presentation "Inclusion of Smallholders in Productive Activities"	WASS	2018	0.5
Presentation "Inclusion of Smallholders in Productive Activities"	CONACYT	2018	1
Presentation "Contrastando Políticas Públicas y los Términos de Incorporación del Pequeño Agricultor en el Mercado"	AMER	2018	1
Presentation "Is Nestlé Necessary a Bad Alternative for Small Farmers? A Critique of the Food Sovereignty Approach"	JPS	2020	0.5
Presentation in the workshop "Échate un pitch"	MEXA	2020	0.5
Presentation "Two Coffee Trajectories: Struggles Between Arabica and Robusta Farmers"	WASS	2021	0.5
Writing and Publication of Scientific Articles: Techniques and Tools course	Atkinson	2019	0.3
Scientific Writing course	Wageningen in'to Languages	2020	1.8
Participation in relevant seminars	RSO	2018– 2020– 2021– 2022	2
<i>A2. Integrating research in the corresponding discipline</i>			
Qualitative Data Analysis course	WASS	2018	3
Journal club (discussions regarding social science methods)	RSO, WUR	2018	1.4
Academic Publication and Presentation in the Social Sciences course	WASS	2020	4
Journal of Peasant Studies Writeshop	JPS	2020	3
Masterclass "Making Better Coffee: Mayan Farmers, Third Wave Tastemakers, and the Creation of Quality", by Ted Fischer	RSO	2022	0.5

Writing retreat	CSPS, WUR	2022	1
<b>Category B) General research related competences</b>			
<i>B1. Placing research in a broader scientific</i>			
Philosophy of Social Science course	WASS	2018	3
Institutions and Societal Transformation course	WASS	2019	2
<i>B2. Placing research in a societal context (research in context) – min 1 activity, max 4 ECTS</i>			
Presentation in the workshop Cutting Across the Silos	Boerengroep, WUR	2018	0.5
Co-organising the PhD's magazine for the 75th RSO anniversary	RSO	2020–2021	1
<b>C) Career related competences</b>			
<i>C1. Employing transferable skills in different domains/careers</i>			
Carousel course	WGS	2018	0.3
Mentor at the SDG e-conference: Foodathon	WASS	2018	0.3
Supervision of a Master's student	RSO, WUR	2019–2020	2
Committee member of the Mexican Association in Wageningen	MEXA	2020	1
The Choice: Un-Box Your PhD Process & Take Charge of Your Performance course	WASS	2021	0.5
Lecture: Implications of Agro-Industries for Rural development	SDC	2022	1
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>39.6</b>

\*One credit according to ECTS is on average equivalent to 28 hours of study load.

## About the Author



I am a Rural Sociology PhD Candidate at Wageningen University, Netherlands. My thesis focuses on Mexican coffee policies, particularly addressing the role of the state, farmer organizations, and the industry in coffee farmers' livelihoods. I have a Masters in International Politics with a specialization in Globalization, Poverty, and Development from Newcastle University, United Kingdom. Before initiating my PhD, I worked part-time for four years for the United Nations International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), carrying out socio-economic analysis of several Latin American countries. This job was complemented by working part-time in *Rimisp-Centro Latinoamericano para el Desarrollo Rural* (Rimisp-Latin American Rural Development Centre) coordinating implementation of the project *Territorios Productivos* (Productive Territories) which supported small-scale farmers in formulating agricultural plans based on the characteristics of their territories. During these 4 years, I participated in two training courses: "Territorial Rural Development" in Antioquia, Colombia, organized by Rimisp and the *Universidad Nacional de Colombia* (National University of Colombia), and "Shortening Rural Supply Chains: Global Trends and Local Innovations" in Turin, Italy, organized by the International Labour Organization, Rimisp, and Slow Food. Before working for IFAD and Rimisp, I worked at the Inter-American Development Bank as a research assistant supporting specialists in implementing development projects.



## Financial and Editorial Support

### Financial

- A 4-year scholarship was provided by the *Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología* (National Council for Science and Technology) under grant number 387257/472114.
- A junior researcher grant was provided by Wageningen School of Social Sciences.
- Covid compensation funding was provided by Wageningen University.
- Funding for printing the thesis was provided by Wageningen University and the Rural Sociology Group.

### Editorial

- Ann Greenberg reviewed the writing style of the thesis, although some changes were later made. Therefore, I assume responsibility for any mistakes.
- Cover photos by Ángel Velázquez |angelvelazquezfoto.com
- Cover design and thesis layout by Elsa Oviedo Rodríguez |elsaoviedo.art

