13

URBAN MIGRATION IN EAST AND WEST AFRICA SINCE 1950

Contrasts and Transformations

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1 Urban growth in sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa[1] is the least urbanized region in the world. Yet, home to the world's youngest and fastest-growing population, Africa has recorded faster urban growth than any other world region since 1960. Its urban population has been growing at an average annual rate of 4%–5% since 1960, at much lower income levels than Asia or Latin America. The United Nations forecasted that Africa's urban population is likely to nearly triple between 2018 and 2050. Cities are viewed as important engines of African economic growth, generating a much larger share of countries' GDP than their share of the population (McKinsey 2011; UN-Habitat 2016a). Cities are thus attractive to those in search for economic opportunity. Cities not only offer higher wages than rural areas, but urban housing, schools, and health facilities also tend to be superior. Such perspectives of urban privilege, upward social mobility, and opportunity remain dominant motivations for rural-urban migration in Africa.

Such enthusiasm should not mask the fact that, whereas in other parts of the world urban agglomeration generally has been associated with structural economic change and a move into more productive (formal) jobs, in Africa urban centers are often built around consuming the rents extracted from natural resources. Cities, therefore, have become dominated by locally consumed low-value (informal) services and goods, rather than tradable goods or services (Gollin, Jedwab, and Vollrath 2016). Over the second half of the 20th century Africa's rapid urbanization process (see Maps 13.1 and 13.2), amidst a comparatively poor economic performance, has therefore resulted in rising urban poverty with the majority of urban residents living in slums (Marx, Stoker, and Suri 2013).

However, for most of African history, until the mid-20th century, rural-to-rural migration has been of greater prevalence than rural-to-urban flows.[2] Yet, throughout Africa, the onset of colonial rule accelerated urban growth and structural change, fueled by rural migrant flows (Coquery-Vidrovitch 2005, 4).[3] Maps 13.1 and 13.2 as well as Figure 13.1 illustrate those dynamics over the second half of the 20th century. Maps 13.1 and 13.2 show each African city with a population exceeding 10,000 in 1950 and 2015, respectively.

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

MAP 13.1 African cities by size range, 1950.
Source: Derived from OECD/SWAC (2020), drawn by Stefan de Jong. Madagascar is excluded.

Figure 13.1 counts the number of cities and their corresponding share of the total population in 1950–2015. It reveals that by 1950 only 11% resided in 302 urban agglomerations. However, in 1990, the number of urban centers in sub-Saharan Africa had risen more than six-fold to 1,955, housing almost a third of Africa's population. By 2015, 39% (i.e., ~400 million) of Africans resided in urban centers spread across 5,779 urban agglomerations. Thus, between 1950 and 2015, the percentage of Africa's urban population nearly quadrupled, while the number of cities increased 19 times, reflecting both exceptional migration inflows and the natural growth of former villages transforming into towns. This makes Africa the region with the lowest levels of urbanization worldwide, but with the highest rates of urban growth. At those rates, by 2035, every second African will live in urban centers (United Nations 2018), which is bound to significantly impact the economic landscapes of urban hinterlands as urban demand for building material, food, and energy will soar (Parnell and Pieterse 2014, 1).

One key feature of Africa's urban revolution is the rapid rise in the number of large cities with populations ≥300,000 (Table 13.1). While in 1950, on average 19% of Africa's



MAP 13.2 African cities by size range, 2015.
Source: Derived from OECD/SWAC (2020), drawn by Stefan de Jong. Madagascar is excluded.

urban population lived in those cities,[4] by 2020 they housed more than half of Africa's urban dwellers. Table 13.1 shows that prior to 1960 there were no African settlements with populations larger than 1 million. In 1950 there were seven African cities with more than 300,000 residents, of which four were located in South Africa. By 2020, this number had grown to 187 cities, with Lagos, Kinshasa, and Luanda leading in population size. However, Africa did not only witness the emergence of mega-cities (≥1 million) from zero in 1950 to 55 in 2020, but it also saw substantial expansion of cities with populations below 1 million, which make up almost 70% of the population living in cities ≥300,000. This suggests that over time urbanization and urban migration has also become more diversified.

Drawing on demographic data, this chapter examines the *shifting patterns* and *key drivers* of rural-urban migration in East and West Africa since 1950 – from mostly temporary and male to increasingly permanent and gender-equal in nature. East and West Africa make an intriguing comparative regional case study. Historically, more densely populated West Africa also had much deeper urban roots and hence urban migration than East Africa. West Africa's early urban advantage then persisted into the present day, despite the colonial



FIGURE 13.1 Urban agglomerations (≥10,000) and urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa, 1950–2015.
Sources: OECD/SWAC (2020) for cities; World Bank (2020) for urbanization rates.

TABLE 13.1 Number of major urban settlements (>300,000) by size in sub-Saharan Africa, 1950–2020

City sizes	*1950*	*1960*	*1970*	*1980*	*1990*	*2000*	*2010*	*2020*
300,000–500,000	4	5	12	25	30	34	47	71
500,000–1,000,000	3	6	10	14	25	28	46	61
1,000,000–5,000,000	–	1	4	10	18	30	34	51
5,000,000–10,000,000	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	2
>10,000,000	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	2
Total	**7**	**12**	**26**	**49**	**73**	**92**	**130**	**187**
% of total urban population	19	21	32	41	46	48	49	52

Source: United Nations (2018).

era decisively accelerating rural-urban migration in both regions. Moreover, West African cities retained a powerful female presence in terms of residence and market trading during the colonial era, contrary to the male-dominated migrant cities of East Africa. Contrary to Southern Africa, where urban migration was closely linked to manufacturing industries and mineral discoveries, in East and West Africa those factors played a less obvious role in rural-urban migration processes.

The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 traces shifting patterns and drivers of urban growth in East and West Africa. Section 3 summarizes some of the opportunity gaps that motivate rural-urban mobility. Section 4 reviews the empirical literature and distills some key insights on shifting individual profiles of urban migrants with regard to gender, education, and age profiles. Section 5 unpacks the paradox that rapid African city growth appears barely affected by urban poverty, slum formation, and overall economic performance. Section 6 concludes.

2 Urban growth in East and West Africa

Although rapid urban growth in Africa is a 20th-century phenomenon and much of present-day urban development originated in the colonial era, urbanism has been an important social feature of Africa's pre-colonial history (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1991; Anderson and Rathbone 2000, 1). Urban centers, and associated urban migration, have deeper roots in historically more densely populated West Africa than in East Africa.[5] Early cities in the West African savanna emerged from trans-Saharan trade and as places of Islamic scholarship as early as 300–1600.[6] In the West African forest belt the towns of Ife, Benin City, and Old Oyo represented commercial and political centers. The Sahelian towns of Katsina, Zaria, and Kano became important commercial hubs of Islamic influence from the 10th century onward (Hance 1970, 212). In contrast to West Africa's urban focus in non-coastal areas, in East Africa most towns located along the Arab-Swahili coast as centers of Indian Ocean trade, including the port cities of Mombasa, Bagamoyo, Zanzibar, Lindi, and Mogadishu. Even earlier exceptions include Meroë, along the Nile in present-day Sudan, and Aksum, situated on present-day Ethiopia's highland plateau. However, by the 19th century, there were no urban civilizations in Eastern Africa to match West Africa's scale (Anderson and Rathbone 2000, 5). In 1850, 10 of the 11 African cities ≥40,000 in 1850 were West African (Chandler 1987).

Figures 13.1 and 13.3 reveal that those regional differences in pre-colonial urbanization persisted into the late colonial era and up to the present day. In 1950, West Africa harbored 9.3% of its population in 147 cities, making up half of total African cities with a population exceeding 10,000 of which two-thirds concentrated in Nigeria alone, home to half of West Africa's population. Yet, Figure 13.2 shows parallel urbanization trends between the West African average and Nigeria, suggesting that Nigeria was not driving the region's urban development alone. In contrast, East Africa was half as urbanized with 31 cities home to 4.9% of its population.[7] No large differences in urbanization levels are observed between



FIGURE 13.2 Urbanization rates and number of urban centers in East and West Africa, 1950–2015.
Sources: OECD/SWAC (2020); United Nations (2018, 2019).

East Africa and Ethiopia, home to about a third of East Africans and with historically deeper urban roots. Despite rapid urbanization in both regions, by 2015 West Africa continued to be almost twice as urbanized (44%) as East Africa. The convergence in the number of cities (≥10,000), despite persistent urbanization differences, suggests that West African cities on average tend to be larger.

How then did the colonial era affect African urbanization patterns? Did pre-colonial cities attract fewer migrants and thus grow slower after 1950 than cities founded during the colonial era due to specific locational advantages, such as external trade? To explore urban continuity, Table 13.2 ranks the 20 major urban agglomerations in East and West Africa since the late colonial era. In both 1950 and 2015, West African cities made up about three in four of the largest cities. The Nigerian city bias is clearly visible; in particular, in 1950 eight of top 20 cities are Nigerian. Cities can be either broadly classified into cities with pre-colonial roots or created during colonialism (both indicated for 1950 in Table 13.2). Colonizers often selected pre-existing urban structures often located in accessible trading areas, such as ports, as their African capitals but also founded entirely new ones (Thomas 1965; Coquery-Vidrovitch 1991).

In 1950, about half of the largest urban agglomerations were pre-colonial interior commercial hubs and political centers, often located at junctions of ancient trade routes (Table 13.2). For example, Kano, a Sahelian capital city which became a major cloth manufacturing

TABLE 13.2 The largest 20 urban agglomerations by population (million) in East and West Africa

Rank	*1950*		*1970*		*1990*		*2015*	
1	Ibadan[a]	0.44	Lagos	1.49	Lagos	4.87	Lagos[b]	11.85
2	Addis Ababa[a]	0.36	Addis Ababa	0.80	Khartoum	2.17	Nairobi[b]	5.88
3	Lagos[b]	0.29	Ibadan	0.77	Abidjan	2.11	Dar es Salaam[b]	5.33
4	Khartoum	0.23	Khartoum	0.66	Addis Ababa	1.80	Khartoum[b]	5.26
5	Dakar[b]	0.23	Accra	0.62	Ibadan	1.62	Abidjan[b]	4.72
6	Accra[b]	0.16	Abidjan	0.58	Dakar	1.59	Accra[b]	4.45
7	Nairobi[b]	0.14	Dakar	0.56	Nairobi	1.38	Kano[a]	3.89
8	Ogbomosho	0.13	Nairobi	0.53	Kano	1.31	Kampala[b]	3.79
9	Kano[a]	0.12	Kano	0.39	Dar es Salaam	1.23	Addis Ababa[a]	3.71
10	Oshogbo[a]	0.12	Conakry	0.36	Accra	1.19	Ibadan[a]	3.09
11	Ife[a]	0.11	Dar es Salaam	0.35	Conakry	0.90	Dakar[b]	3.07
12	Asmara[b]	0.10	Kumasi	0.35	Kampala	0.86	Kumasi[a]	2.80
13	Iwo[a]	0.10	Kampala	0.34	Kaduna	0.79	Bamako[b]	2.78
14	Mombasa[a]	0.09	Mombasa	0.25	Bamako	0.75	Ouagadougou[b]	2.30
15	Kumasi[a]	0.09	Onitsha	0.25	Benin City	0.73	Oyo[a]	2.27
16	Bamako[a b]	0.08	Ilorin	0.25	Kumasi	0.68	Kigali[b]	2.20
17	Abeokuta[a]	0.08	Port Harcourt	0.24	Mogadishu	0.67	Conakry[b]	2.19
18	Dar es Salaam[b]	0.08	Mogadishu	0.23	Onitsha	0.62	Hawassa	2.18
19	Freetown[b]	0.07	Asmara	0.22	Port Harcourt	0.58	Abuja	2.00
20	Onitsha[a]	0.07	Kaduna	0.21	Ouagadougou	0.58	Port Harcourt	1.85

Source: OECD/SWAC (2020).

Notes:

a Pre-colonial commercial or major political center.

b Colonial capital cities in 1950.

Kenyan (Embu, Kisii, Kisumu), Nigerian (Onitsha), and Ugandan (Mbale) county or province populations have been classified by OECD/SWAC (2020) as urban agglomerations, and thus have been dropped.

center; Ibadan, grown as refugee settlement during the Yoruba wars; Kumasi, the capital of the Ashanti kingdom; Bamako, a major market town along the Niger River and center for Islamic scholarship; Mombasa, center of Indian Ocean trade; and Addis Ababa founded by Emperor Menelik in 1886. The other group of cities were colonial capitals mostly on the coast, to facilitate global market access (i.e., Lagos, Accra, Dakar, Dar es Salaam, Freetown), and in the hinterland, Nairobi, founded by the British as a colonial railway depot in 1899, and Asmara, initially a village that grew quickly after Italian occupation in 1889. By 1970, the two West African port cities of Conakry and Abidjan, initially created by French colonists, as well as British Kampala adjoining the Buganda kingdom's court, entered the top 20. All those (colonial) capitals became connected to the railway, developed into the main economic hubs of their colonies, and continued growing post-independence (Jedwab, Kerby, and Moradi 2017). Contrarily, pre-colonial towns that were "bypassed" by colonial transportation and administration investments lost their former position. For example, some important pre-colonial urban centers, such as Bagamoyo in Tanzania, Cape Coast in Ghana, Saint-Louis in Senegal, and Porto Novo in Benin experienced a reversal of fortune under colonialism, with Dar es Salaam, Accra, Dakar, and Cotonou, respectively, emerging as colonial capitals (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1991). Harboring the seats of government, the largest commercial markets, and chief manufacturing centers, capital cities attracted the bulk of rural-urban migration (Storeygard 2016). For example, Greater Accra, Abidjan, and Freetown captured 88%, 56%, and 41% of the total net migration to all urban areas, respectively (Little 1973, 8; Zachariah and Condé 1981, 96), while 82% of Kenyan rural-urban migration targeted Nairobi and Mombasa in 1969 (Rempel 1981, 46–7).

By 2015, Table 13.2 reveals that 12 colonial capitals were among the top 20 cities, suggesting that settlements selected or founded as colonial capital cities appear to have attracted relatively more migrants and consequently grown faster over colonial and post-colonial eras. Indeed, between 1950 and 2015, colonial capital cities' populations in East and West Africa (excluding non-colonized Ethiopia and Liberia) had on average grown about three times as rapidly as non-capital cities (with ≥10,000 inhabitants) in 1950. The colonial era thus to some extent redefined patterns of urban development, and hence the direction of urban migration.

What stimulated Africa's rapid expansion of urban populations? There are three sources of urban growth: (i) cities' own *natural increase*, which is the excess of births over deaths in an urban area, (ii) *rural-urban migration*, and (iii) *densification in rural areas,* resulting in the reclassification from rural to urban.

For 11 countries for which data was available in 1960–70, Figure 13.3 disaggregates their urban growth into annual natural increase and annual residual migration.[8] It shows that in the decade following independence, urban areas expanded in particular due to rural-urban migration, accounting for 55% of urban growth on average. In Côte d'Ivoire, Tanzania, Kenya, and Liberia, where urban growth was above 6%, net migration constituted on average even 63% of urban growth. Dar es Salaam alone grew annually at 6.8% over the period 1948–71 (Sabot 1979, 46), of which an impressive 78% was due to net migration. Abidjan grew at an even faster rate of 9.3% during 1965–70 fueled by a massive domestic rural and foreign migrant influx (Joshi, Lubell, and Mouly 1975). Only 29% of Abidjan's population was born there. In 1965, 95% of Nairobi's inhabitants had arrived less than ten years ago (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997, 79). In 1957, 66% of Kampala's enumerated labor force originated from outside Kampala's surrounding province of Buganda (Elkan 1960, 33).

Similarly, 60% of Lagos' inhabitants were born outside the capital in 1950, respectively, about half from the surrounding Yoruba Western Region (Abiodun 1974). Farrel (2018) estimated that the urban natural increase already contributed to 56% of Nigerian urban growth in the 1960s, while rural-urban migration and rural-urban reclassification made up the remaining 23% and 21%, respectively. According to the 1970 Ghana census, 43% and 46% of the population of Kumasi and Greater Accra, respectively, were born there. Overall, both lower urban migrant shares on both the city and the country level in West Africa suggest that they experienced earlier migration, comprising larger settled (i.e., non-migratory) populations, than the comparatively more recent urban and colonial capital city-based growth in East Africa and the Côte d'Ivoire.

Figure 13.4 decomposes annual urban growth into natural increase and residual migration for ten selected African counties in 2000–10. It shows that compared to the 1960s (Figure 13.3), the contribution of the natural increase and migration have reversed over time. On average, the natural increase accounted for 60% of urban growth. Similarly, Beauchemin and Bocquier (2004) report that while two-thirds of urban growth in Francophone West Africa was due to migration and urban reclassification in the 1960s, this dropped to one-third during the 1990s. The natural urban increase in Benin, Kenya, Mali, and Rwanda even exceeded the natural rural increase in the 2010s (Fox 2017). In West and Central Africa, the contribution of natural growth to urbanization was also markedly superior to migration reclassification since the 1980s, while in East and South Africa urban natural growth exceeded migration classification growth only by the 2000s (Menashe-Oren and Bocquier 2021). This shift from migration (and reclassification) as a main source of urban growth toward cities expanding primarily by their own natural increase can be explained by (i) lower infant and child mortality in cities than in rural areas (Günther and Harttgen 2012);



FIGURE 13.3 Natural increase and residual migration in urban growth, c. 1960–70.

Sources: Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Togo, Senegal, and Burkina Faso (Zachariah and Condé 1981, 82) based on varying periods in 1960–75. Tanzania is the weighted average of its seven largest towns, 1948–71 (Sabot 1979, 46). Kenya (1970s) and Ghana (1960s) from Chen, Valente, and Zlotnik (1998, 80). Nigeria's residual migration includes both migration and reclassification (Farrell 2018). Averages are not weighted by population.



FIGURE 13.4 Natural increase and residual migration in urban growth, 2000–10 average.
Source: Adapted from Jedwab, Christiaensen, and Gindelsky (2017), Web-Appendix Table 3. CAR experienced counter-urbanization. Average is not weighted by population.

(ii) relatively high urban birth rates, underpinned by a stalled urban fertility transition (Menashe-Oren and Bocquier 2021), changing age structures associated with in-migration of young people, and the relatively minor urban representation of the elderly (see Figures 13.8 and 13.9); (iii) the shift from predominantly male labor cities to the increasing presence of young women in cities, reflected in narrowing urban sex ratios over the second half of the 20th century (see Figure 13.5); (iv) superior urban socio-economic dynamics and access to healthcare (Potts 2009; Fox 2017).

3 Rural-urban opportunity gaps

Why do some people migrate to towns, while others stay behind? Rural-urban migration is by and large a response to economic incentives. Some move with the entire household; others send a household member. According to the classic migration model of Harris and Todaro (1970), better economic opportunities, both formal and informal, at urban destinations act as incentives for rural-urban migration. They model that rational individuals in rural areas base their urban migration decision on a careful cost-benefit analysis, comparing expected returns of migration (urban wages) to their rural agricultural income. In the case of superior urban real wages, the income maximation objective is fulfilled and rural people may decide to migrate to the city. Moreover, if expected urban income premiums are sufficiently high, rural-urban migrants may endure a period of employment search (Mazumdar 1987). De Haas (2017) presents empirical evidence that until the 1950s cotton and coffee cultivation in rural Uganda was more lucrative than urban unskilled wages, and thus provided few incentives for farmers to exchange agricultural with urban unskilled work.[9] Frankema and van Waijenburg (2012) suggest a similar mechanism for Ghana, observing that laborers on cocoa farms earned comparable real wages as their urban counterparts. Consequently, laborers directed their migration destination toward cocoa plantations during the beginnings

of Ghana's cocoa revolution (Hill 1963). This highlights that people in rural sending regions have been conscious of *opportunity gaps* between the countryside and town.

Economic incentives remain key to most migration decisions. Indeed, 88% of rural-urban migrants in Ghana stated that they were induced by "jobs, money and consumer goods" in 1963 (Caldwell 1969, 89). Still, there are various kinds of opportunity differentials that have attracted young people to African urban areas, including the prospect of men earning cash to pay bride price, as well as achieving a degree of social status unreachable by junior members of rural traditional systems (Little 1973, 18). Young people may also be motivated to move to the city to further their education or to find a suitable marriage partner, far away from traditional elders' control over marriage choices. Likewise, cities can offer women an escape from an unwanted marriage or divorce, free of the pressures of rural customs (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997, 74–5).

Often, however, urban migration is not an individual decision but taken jointly within rural households with a clear family welfare-maximizing strategy (Bigsten 1996). Urban migrants, for example, can support their rural family through remittances, which raise consumption and investment (e.g., farm inputs, school fees) at home. Costs and benefits of rural-urban migration, however, materialize at different speeds. The loss of farm productivity and social networks incurred by migration and the costs of moving as well as higher urban living costs are felt immediately, while benefits only accrue after urban arrival, finding work, and earning sufficiently to remit back home. Such serious investments suggest that some rural households cannot afford urban migration or are able to send only one household member. The transaction costs of urban-rural remittances have reduced substantially with the uptake of mobile phone technology and mobile money in the 21st century, making the transfer of purchasing power from urban-dwelling relatives to rural recipients more feasible (Jack and Suri 2014; Munyegera and Matsumoto 2016).

Uneven opportunity structures may be caused by the lack of economic opportunities in rural areas, triggered, for example, by high volatility in agricultural commodity export prices that affect rural incomes. Moreover, rapid rural population growth paired with environmental degradation intensifies pressure upon the land, which sets in motion rural outmigration. Africa is the region most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Weather anomalies, such as irregular rainfall patterns and temperature increases, negatively impact African rain-fed agriculture on which rural livelihoods depend. Climate change can thus accelerate rural-urban migration, as a risk diversification strategy in response to increased volatility in rural incomes (Bryceson and Jamal 1997). Indeed, shortages in rainfall have been linked to increased urbanization (Barrios, Bertinelli, and Strobl 2006; Mueller et al. 2020), in particular in regions in which cities are likely to be manufacturing centers providing escapes to adverse precipitation shocks. However, only 25% of cities can be classified as "production cities" (Henderson, Storeygard, and Deichmann 2017). Instead, African countries heavily dependent on natural resource exports (oil and minerals) tended to generate "consumption cities" where a large share of the workforce specializes in informal/non-tradable services (Gollin, Jedwab and Vollrath 2016).

4 Who is the rural-urban migrant?

Rural-urban migration is a complex choice, influenced by various individual motives and household decision-making processes.[10] Migrants are thus expected to distinguish

themselves from their rural population of origin in certain characteristics. At what age did people leave their village and move to towns? Were women equally as likely to migrate as men? And was it the desperate poor or the aspiring educated who sought their luck in cities? This section explores the changing profiles of urban migrants with regard to gender, age structures, and education over the second half of the 20th century.

4.1 The feminization of rural-urban migration

Urban sex ratios provide a useful departure point for tracing sex selectivity in rural-urban migration. They measure the number of males for every female in the urban population. A ratio of 100 means that the urban population comprises equal numbers of both sexes. A ratio greater than 100 indicates a greater presence of men than women. A city's sex ratio can be affected by (i) sex-selective rural-urban migration and (ii) the urban natural increase. Whereas the natural urban increase generally levels urban populations toward parity (100), sex-selective rural-urban migration distorts the sex ratio. Therefore, the greater the rural-urban migration's contribution to urban growth, the more meaningful do sex ratios become as measures of sex-selective urban migration. Figure 13.5 presents sex ratios for a selection of seven major cities in East and West Africa, identified from Table 13.2, over the 1948–2015 period.[11] It conveys three messages.

First, by the late colonial era urban sex ratios were strongly male-biased, consistent with (circular) male urban migration systems (Elkan 1967). Colonial governments, (mission) schools, and hospitals, as well as commercial firms employed mostly men, which rural migration strategies anticipated. Rural men were more likely to leave their family members in search of urban employment. If successful, they remitted any spare money to their rural families. Wives and children that remained on the family farm guaranteed continuity of land rights, family's subsistence, and a source of income from cultivation, which would otherwise have been abandoned in the case of wives joining their husbands (Coquery-Vidrovitch



FIGURE 13.5 Sex ratios in East and West Africa's major cities, 1948–2015.

Sources: Various census returns. Nairobi's sex ratio was 352 in 1948, which is not shown due to capping of sex ratios at 200. Sex ratio of 100 = equality.

1997, 74). Those urban–rural ties provided insurance and diversify economic risks in the event of the husband's inability to find urban employment. This practice of *circular migration* thus represented a common strategy for maintaining two bases in order to optimize livelihoods and mitigate risks of permanent settlement in economically precarious cities. Typically, after a period of urban work of a couple of months or years, husbands returned for an extended stay to their rural family, ideally to help during the agricultural peak season before moving back to the city again (Gugler and Ludwar-Ene 1995). During the early and mid-colonial era, characterized by low wages and labor shortages, this was a viable strategy. According to Little (1973, 18–9), there was even an incentive for village elders and parents to prevent their daughters from migrating to cities because they worried that once women left the farm, their migrating men would never return or send remittances.

Second, Figure 13.5 documents the transition from male-selective urban migration toward parity. By the 1990s, sex ratios were close to par in all major cities, reflecting the rise in the proportion of women in urban areas over the second half of the 20th century. The movement of families replacing male migration also indicates the transition from temporary to more permanent employment opportunities. Moreover, rural families' circular migration strategy lost its financial viability once urban unemployment increased. Rural-urban migrants could simply not afford months of job search, and therefore men held on to their urban jobs. More permanent settlement in cities was a response to higher urban wages after the mid-20th century, which allowed men to sustain their family in the urban setting. Moreover, the (colonial) government intending to stabilize the urban labor force increasingly invested into housing and schooling, which encouraged men to permanently settle in town with their families. Bienefeld and Sabot (1971) described this transition in Nairobi as follows: "The urban labor force is now stable and most migrants appear to be committed to wage employment for the remainder of their working lives." As a result, men either kept their rural visits shorter or were joined by their wives and children in the city, causing sex ratios to decline from the 1960s onward. This surge in feminization of urban residence was famously phrased by Gugler (1989): "Women stay on the farm no more," in which he ascribed four factors that weakened the economic rationale for women and children to stay behind in the countryside: (i) increased urban wages allowed men to bring their family to town; (ii) improved urban employment opportunities for women; (iii) lower market prices from cash crops due to adverse pricing policies of marketing boards which lowered rural incomes; and (iv) comparatively higher-quality education and healthcare in urban areas.

The gradual decline in African cities' sex ratios was a precondition for natural increase becoming the key driver of urban growth. Yet, little of this increase in female urban migration initially appeared to be directed toward jobs. Formal urban labor opportunities for women remained modest. Rather, women tended to join their husbands' urban move. For example, during the early 1970s, 49% of women who arrived to Kampala were accompanying or following their husband – 31% came alone (Obbo 1980, 71). In Tanzania, 73% of female rural-urban migrants in 1971 stated that they arrived to live with their husband or relatives, while only 9% indicated to have moved to find work (Sabot 1979, 91). In sharp contrast, 70% of male rural-urban migrants stated that they had migrated to seek employment. Similarly, only 7% of female migrants to Benin City in Nigeria came for employment-related reasons in 1980 (Okojie 1984). In Accra, only 9% of women worked for a wage in 1960. Likewise, 7% of the enumerated labor force of Dakar was female in 1955 of which half were petty traders (Haut Commisariat 1955).

From the 1950s onward formal urban occupations, in nursing, midwifery, teaching, secretarial work, as well as light manufacturing, became increasingly available to women, primarily for the well-educated classes (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997, 75; Meier zu Selhausen 2014; Meier zu Selhausen and Weisdorf 2016, 2021). Also, in Kenya and Tanzania domestic service, an occupation predominantly held by men, became increasingly feminized from the late 1950s onward (Stichter 1977; Bujra 2000). Over the second half of the 20th century, gender gaps in educational attainment declined (Baten et al. 2021) and female urban labor force participation gradually increased. Urban earning opportunities outside the village economy provided young women a chance of economic independence denied to them previously. Cities' transition toward balanced sex ratios also reflects both rural areas' growing social acceptance of women coming to cities on their own (Lattof et al. 2018) and some degree of emancipation from the control of rural elders over their marriage decisions (Gugler and Ludwar-Ene 1995).

Third, clear differences in the sex composition between East and West African urban centers can be observed in Figure 13.5. Until the 1990s, the proportion of men among East Africa's urban population was significantly higher than in West Africa's major cities, where sex ratios had equalized earlier. While the sex ratios in Freetown, Accra, and Lagos never exceeded a ratio of 120, all four East African cities consistently ranged higher. In particular, the comparatively more recently founded cities of Nairobi and Kampala showed clearly more distorted sex ratios. The sex ratio of Nairobi, which was founded only in 1899 as a depot on the Uganda Railway, stood in fact at 800 in 1931 and 352 in 1948, which created significant demand for female sex work and associated female migration into Nairobi (Davies 1993). Still, in 1969, women made up hardly one-third of Nairobi's or Mombasa's adult population. How come there were considerably more women in West Africa's coastal cities? Were West African migrant women more independent movers?

Unskilled real wages in colonial East Africa's major cities were close to subsistence until the 1950s (Frankema and van Waijenburg 2012; de Haas 2017). Colonial wage-setting practices geared wages to the needs of a single male worker (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997, 74). Consequently, on the basis of subsistence wages male rural-urban migrants in East Africa could not afford their wives abandoning farming and joining them in town. Rural-urban migration was thus mostly male and temporary, in which men saved up and sent some remittances before returning home. Contrarily, urban unskilled real wages in colonial West Africa were on average almost twice as high during the first half of the 20th century (Frankema and van Waijenburg 2012). Rural-urban migration was thus more sex-balanced and permanent. This allowed male urban migrants employed in formal work to send for their families or migrate jointly much earlier than in East Africa. The legislature on minimum wage levels, pressed by trade unions, sharply increased urban real wages in both East and West Africa from the 1950s onward. The improvement in urban purchasing power by formal laborers enabled unskilled labor migrants to increasingly take their families to town, which not only fueled urban growth but also resulted into converging sex ratios between the two regions. Moreover, the opening of skilled wage jobs to Africans in Uganda and Kenya increased migration toward the urban economies (Rempel 1981, 27).

Another important difference that may explain West Africa's lower sex ratios is that West African urban women enjoyed a greater degree of mobility and economic independence.[12] They historically dominated urban market trading (Sudarkasa 1977) – a status largely preserved despite missionary domesticity teachings over the colonial era (Meier zu Selhausen

and Weisdorf 2021). Earnings from urban market trading not only secured West African women's economic independence from their husbands (Gugler 1972) but allowed them to contribute to household finances, diversifying risks and maximizing income. In this sense, urban West African centers have historically been more open to female commercial activity, and thus in-migration, than those in East Africa. For example, in 1948 and 1960, 89% and 82% of economically active women in Accra were listed as retail and wholesale traders, respectively (Little 1973, 34). In Abidjan, 70% of adult women worked as sales workers, compared to about 21% of men (Robertson 1984). Many West African female traders were organized in voluntary associations that promoted their economic interests (Little 1973, 49–60).

Whereas trade was at the core of women's survival in urbanized areas of colonial West Africa, East African women participated much less in urban trade during most of the colonial era (Kyomuhendo and McIntosh 2006, 57; Meier zu Selhausen and Weisdorf 2021). For example, in Dar es Salaam 77% of adult women in 1967 were categorized as homemakers and only 1% as sales workers. The exclusion from trading and formal economic opportunities relegated female urban migrants mostly to participate in the informal economy as petty traders, beer brewers, and prostitutes (Davis 2000; White 2009). Single female migrants were also discriminated against. In Kampala, during the 1950s there were laws requiring the repatriation of single women found on the streets who were branded as "prostitutes" (Obbo 1980, 26). In particular, Nairobi's severely distorted male-female ratio during 1950–70 (see Figure 13.5) and scarce colonial supply of housing offered economic opportunity for female sex work (White 1986). Overall, larger gender imbalances in access to urban economic opportunities seemingly prevented many women from migrating in East Africa for most of the colonial era, except for joining their husbands and prostitution (White 2009). Those major differences in the levels of East and West African sex ratios then suggest that natural increase became the primary driver in West African urban growth even earlier, as indicated in Figure 13.3.

The post-independence era, however, saw East African women catching up in urban trade – 41% of Kampala's market venders were female in the 1960s (Temple 1969). In Nairobi, women made up almost half of all major market traders during the late 1980s (Robertson 1997, 26). Although the branding of female urban migrants as prostitutes by rural elders was intended to discourage female migration, its deterrent powers were limited since rural areas provided comparatively fewer economic opportunities (Obbo 1980, 28). Single women were consistently more likely to migrate than married women in both East and West African countries in the late 1980s (Brockerhoff and Eu 1993). Rather than following their husbands, female migrants to Nairobi sought their own or their families' economic advancement since the 1980s (Robertson 1997, 277). Moreover, about 40% of female urban spinsters got married two years after their move (Brockerhoff and Eu 1993), suggesting that the urban marriage market was an important motivation for migration and that women enjoyed increasing autonomy to do so. Those changing conditions then transformed gendered migration patterns over the second half of the 20th century in both East and West Africa.

4.2 Young adult migration

At what age did people leave their villages to seek their urban luck? Age profiles of city populations, in the absence of detailed mid-colonial-era data on age at migration, serve as a departure point. Figure 13.6 presents the age distribution of Lagos' population (>61 years) in 1931. It shows that 15–34-year-old men and women accounted for about 50% of the city's

population, while the 45–60-year-old made up merely 8%. Those low shares of the elderly are consistent with the fact that colonial-era cities received large influxes of working-age migrants (often circular or short-term). Since few were entitled to pensions, covered by social security, or owned urban property (Gugler and Ludwar-Ene 1995), a significant proportion of urban migrants did not settle permanently in the city. Instead, they retired in their rural homes with their relatives. Therefore, urban migrants typically maintained land and retained strong ties with their regions of origin, so they could return when their working days were over or they had failed to achieve an urban career (Cooper 1996, 462; Gugler 2002). In 1960, nine out of ten urban migrants in Ghana stated their intention of returning to their place of origin (Caldwell 1969). In Sierra Leone, although urban-rural return migration was a common feature across adults in the early 1970s, its share was largest among those older than 35 (Byerlee, Tommy, and Fatoo 1976). Men older than 45 were more likely to leave towns than migrate into them (Byerlee 1974).

For the late colonial and contemporary eras, more detailed data on individuals' age of migration is available. Figure 13.7 presents the proportion of Kampala migrants by age in 1951 from household surveys conducted by Southall and Gutkind (1957) among dwellers in two suburbs of Kampala. It clearly shows that the majority of adults, both male and female, decided to migrate young. About 50% of urban migrants were aged 16–30 and 75% were aged 16–45. Urban in-migration after age 45 was almost negligible. Also, in Ghana and Nigeria, the highest propensity to migrate occurred around age 15–24 and old-age outmigration flows set in at age 45 (Callaway 1967; Caldwell 1969, 199). Indeed, over 90% of migrants still living in town intended to return to their home village. As a result, the number of returning urban migrants to their rural origins exceeded the number of rural-urban outmigrants. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, 86% of rural-urban adult migrants in 1974 moved at age 15–34 (Byerlee, Tommy, and Fatoo 1976). In Dar es Salaam, age at migration was even more skewed toward younger age cohorts as 82% of those migrating after their 14th birthday arrived to the capital at ages 14–29 (Sabot 1979, 86–7).



FIGURE 13.6 Age distribution of Lagos' population, 1931.
Source: Census of Nigeria (1932), Vol. IV, Census of Lagos, 35–6.



FIGURE 13.7 Age at migration to Kampala, 1951.
Source: Southall and Gutkind (1957, 226–7), based on a survey of 2,026 men and 1,417 women.



FIGURE 13.8 Age at migration to Mombasa and Nairobi (>14 years), 1999 and 2009.
Source: Kenya census 1999 and 2009, accessed via Minnesota Population Center (2019).

Note: Shows the migrant stock in 1999 and 2009. Excludes migrants who returned to their birth region or elsewhere.

For the more recent period, Figure 13.8 shows adults' (14–50 years) age at migration of those who had previously migrated to Kenya's largest cities of Mombasa and Nairobi in 1999 and 2009. I use the Kenyan 1999 and 2009 census and compute the age at urban in-migration of those who enumerated in Mombasa and Nairobi but were born outside the two city districts, which form the two major urban hubs in Kenya. This stock approach

necessarily only captures those who stayed in the city and thus were enumerated there – not those who returned to their rural areas due to unemployment or old age. Also, multiple movements remain undetected. Figure 13.8 shows that rural-urban migration decisions to the main urban centers of Nairobi and Mombasa formed disproportionally during early adulthood. Three in four urban residing migrants enumerated had arrived at age 14–25.

4.3 Human capital on the move

Are urban migrants the most needy, those unable to find a job in rural areas, or those with most aspirations? Education is a useful measure because it indicates parents' investment (capacity) into their offspring's human capital – costs borne in anticipation of enjoying returns in the future. It thus also reflects families' financial situation, as poorer parents are expected to have fewer resources to invest into their children's education because they may not be able to afford associated (opportunity) costs of schooling.

Surveys from the 1960s in rural Ghana reveal that there has been a strong association between individuals' level of education and their propensity to migrate to urban areas (Caldwell 1969, 68). Migrants were significantly more likely to have acquired literacy and knowledge of English – relevant abilities for a productive urban life. Also, in Sierra Leone, in 1974 rural-urban adult migrants had attained on average nearly 2.5 years of education more than rural-rural migrants and non-migrants (Byerlee, Tommy, and Fatoo 1976). While only 1% and 4% of non-migrants and rural-rural migrants, respectively, had attended secondary school, 33% of rural-urban migrants had enrolled in secondary schooling. Also, Nairobi migrants had accumulated on average about three more years of schooling than rural residents in both 1979 and 1989 Kenyan censuses. Indeed, the rural youth in Kenya with higher primary school academic test scores were found more likely to migrate to urban areas in the following ten years (Miguel and Hamory 2009). Also, Tanzanian men who had acquired some secondary education were five times more likely to migrate to cities than those with some primary education (Barnum and Sabot 1977). Similarly, Nigerian rural-urban migrants were three times as likely to have completed secondary school than rural-rural or rural non-migrants in 1993 (Mberu 2005).

Superior accumulation of human capital is still a feature of migrants in Africa today. Figure 13.9 shows the educational attainment gap between rural and urban areas in 2010. It highlights that individuals with more schooling have higher urban migration rates in Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, and Senegal. Urban migrants were much more likely to have attained some secondary and higher education than rural non-migrants. Overall, education is a critical determinant of urban migration. Since education represents a considerable proportion of parental rural investment, rural-urban migration thus embodies a substantial human capital transfer toward urban areas.

5 Migration into urban poverty?

Rural-urban migration is a common feature of a country's economic development process. Although many developing regions today witness high rates of urbanization at comparatively low levels of industrialization (Gollin, Jedwab, and Vollrath 2016), Africa is urbanizing at lower levels of per capita GDP than any other region. Africa's urban population has grown at the world's fastest rate of about 4.5% annually since 1970, despite lower economic



FIGURE 13.9 Educational attainment gap of rural residents and urban migrants, 2010.
Source: Calculated from De Brauw, Mueller, and Lee (2014, 38). Includes individuals ≥ 16 years. It shows the percentage point difference between the share of educational attainment of rural residents and non-migrants. A positive gap means that rural-urban migrants had higher attainment shares than rural non-migrants.

growth (0.6%) and prolonged phases of economic stagnation in the 1970s–90s, which has been coined as "urbanization without growth" (Fay and Opal 2000).[13] Higher urban productivity may thus just reflect the selection of more skilled workers and firms into cities – not cities actually enhancing productivity (Bryan, Glaeser, and Tsivanidis 2020).

The expansion of the public sector since the late colonial era has acted as an important engine of urban African growth (Tacoli 2001, 145). Although the government, the largest urban employer (Simson 2019), could not absorb everyone into formal employment, the demand for services from this sector has consequently given rise to an urban *informal economy*, involving petty trading, transport, crafts, and artisanry (Hart 1973), accounting for about three in four urban jobs (Cobbinah et al. 2015). Compared with other cities in Asia or Latin America, these structural conditions cause African cities to produce fewer goods, mostly for local consumers, rather than for export markets (Lall, Henderson, and Venables 2017, 13), which limits employment growth. In particular, African countries heavily dependent on natural resource exports (oil and minerals) tended to generate "consumption cities" where a large share of the workforce specializes in non-tradable services (Gollin, Jedwab, and Vollrath 2016).

With the increasing influx of urban migrants around independence, unemployment in Africa's major cities began to rise rapidly (Iliffe 1987, 171) to 8% of male adults in Monrovia (1959), 10% of the workforce in Dakar (1955), 18% in Abidjan (1955), and 22% in Lagos (1964). In 1957, only the best-paid 10% of Nairobi's workforce were able to save and invest into their houses, while the lowest 34% depended on rural subsidies and endured a poor diet during the last days of the month (Wallace Forrester 1962, 121, 128). During the early 1960s, the largest category of unemployed in Nairobi were young men, aged 16–25, with some primary education, seeking their first urban job. Also, in Kampala 69% of the unemployed were younger than 25. According to Iliffe (1987, 172), such young migrants often lacked family responsibilities and could sit out long periods until finding a job.

By the 1970s, Africa's major cities "were increasingly coming to be seen as centers of poverty and social deprivation" (Anderson and Rathbone 2000, 8). During the era of the debt crisis and structural adjustment programs the rural-urban income gap in many African countries had reversed in the 1970s and 1980s in favor of farmers (Rakodi 1997). Despite an initial rise in minimum wages after independence, real unskilled urban wages fell dramatically over the 1970s and 1980s in both East and West Africa (Jamal and Weeks 1994), pushing large proportions of wage-earning households into urban poverty. In Kenya, an estimated 30% of urban wage earners were unable to attain the minimum calories needed to sustain a family of five (Jamal and Weeks 1994). In urban Uganda, the minimum monthly wage in the early 1980s could only buy one week of food supply. Equally, in Sierra Leone the urban minimum wage could barely cover the cost of 10 family meals per month in 1987 (Potts 1995). Consequently, urban-rural remittances declined (Bah et al. 2003), eroding the ability of impoverished urban migrants to maintain rural ties.

Rural-urban migration patterns adapted to the inhospitable urban economic conditions, resulting in increasing rates of migration from the urban to the rural sector (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 1992; Potts 1995; Beauchemin 2011). The relative decline in rural-urban migration contributing to city growth increasingly in favor of cities' natural increase (Figure 13.3) then suggests that migration rates have somehow adjusted to declining urban opportunity. In Kenya, urban migrants' linkage status with their rural origins has even sometimes reversed from urban-rural remittance senders to temporary receivers of rural supplements of food and income (Owuor 2007). Also, Beauchemin and Bocquier (2004) have documented the reinvention of migratory circulation and rural-urban links in Francophone West Africa during the economic crisis. Family return migration can also only be split or temporary, with especially the wife and children moving back to the rural home to cultivate family land and attend village school, which relieves the costs of supporting and educating them in the city. Indeed, in Nairobi's slums, women and children were severely under-represented among migrants compared to non-slum areas in 1999 (Archambault, de Laat, and Zulu 2012).

Persistent rapid urban growth in a context of stagnating economic performance and insufficient structural change to absorb rural-urban migrant inflows then resulted in a situation whereby cities grew in tandem with poverty and rising levels of informal settlements. Although migrants arrive to exploit urban areas' greater economic opportunity, initially they often reside in *slums*[14] that facilitate affordable urban access. Figure 13.10 shows that in 1990 about three in four urban dwellers, in both East and West Africa, lived in slums. Despite a reduction in slum incidence over 1990–2014, the majority (56%) of Africa's urban population still lives in slum conditions (UN-Habitat 2016). According to Fox (2014), slums are the most visible manifestation of Africa's urban poverty, inequality, and underinvestment in housing and infrastructure by urban planners.

With rapid urban growth, living conditions in slums appear to have deteriorated. Slum dwellers are confronted with high premiums of living in city proximity. Marx, Stoker, and Suri (2013) calculated that the average monthly housing rent for rural Kenyan households amounted to 1% of household consumption and 10% for urban households, as opposed to nearly one-third of non-food expenditures for the average Kibera slum dweller.[15] Transport costs from long commutes between slums and the wider urban system further eat into budgets.

Although on average children are healthier in Africa's more densely populated areas (van de Poel, O'Donnell, and van Doorslaer 2009; Günther and Harttgen 2012; Fink,



FIGURE 13.10 Slum population as percentage of urban population, 1990–2014.
Sources: Calculated from World Bank (2020), UN-Habitat (2016). Unweighted country averages.

Günther, and Hill 2014), there is increasing evidence that the urban health advantage has diminished in some countries due to poor living conditions in expanding slums (Gould 1998; APHRC 2002; Kimani-Murage et al. 2014). For example, the prevalence of underweight, stunting, and wasting is greater in Freetown's slums than in rural Sierra Leone. Also, in Nairobi's Kibera, Africa's largest slum, incomes have stagnated with duration of residency (Marx, Stoker, and Suri 2013), suggesting that slum living does not necessarily represent a transitory phase in the life cycle of urban migrants.[16] Moreover, the infectious disease burden among slum-dwelling children under three years in Nairobi was considerably higher than in Kenya's non-slum urban or rural areas (APHRC 2002). Children born in slums to women who were pregnant at the time of migration even had a higher risk of dying than those in rural or formal urban settlements (Bocquier et al. 2010). Finally, the urban poor tend to be at greater risk of HIV infection (Magadi 2013, 2017). Altogether, this suggests that urban environments can impose a higher health burden on rural-urban migrants.

So, on the one hand urban slums can help to lift urban migrants out of rural poverty representing affordable and proximate entry points to urban labor markets. On the other hand, urban poverty can confine residents to enduring harsh living and working conditions. What can explain this apparent paradox of city growth and urban migration being barely affected by urban hardship and overall economic performance?

First, poverty rates are on average still consistently higher in rural areas than in cities. Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula (2007) estimate that Africa's rural poverty rate was more

than twice the urban rate in 1993–2002. Second, in densely populated rural areas with scarcity of farmland, firewood, and limited off-farm opportunities, continued population pressure is likely to shrink farm sizes and increase land fragmentation, causing further expansion of youth outmigration to urban areas (Holden and Otsuka 2014; Jayne, Chamberlin, and Headey 2014). Despite unemployment and widespread slum conditions in urban Africa, Tacoli and Mabala (2010) assert that migrants still prefer urban areas to rural areas because of limited rural livelihood options and restrictive rural power relations (e.g., marriage choices). Second, urban areas still provide more income opportunities, social mobility, and higher real wages than rural areas. Although rural-urban income- and unemployment-rate ratios affect the probability of urban migration in Ghana, individuals appear to assign more weight to income differentials than to unemployment differentials (Duplantier et al. 2017). Third, childhood migration to African cities significantly raises primary school completion, school attendance, and literacy rates, suggesting that rural-to-urban migration on average improves the human capital of children (van Maarseveen 2021). Finally, currently urban access to water, sanitation, and electricity is nearly two times higher than in rural areas (World Bank 2020). Also, the supply of and access to health and schooling facilities is generally superior in urban areas, resulting in lower child mortality for rural-urban migrants (Bocquier, Madise, and Zulu 2011).

6 Conclusion

Rural-urban migration and urbanization are (interlinked) key demographic features of Africa's long 20th century. This chapter highlighted five major transitions in African urban growth patterns over the 20th century. First, although, for most of African history, rural-rural migration has been the most important type of migration, by the mid-20th century migrant flows were primarily rural-urban, leading to unprecedented urban growth rates and urbanization levels. Second, Africa's exceptional urban growth, primarily driven by rural-urban migration for most of the 20th century, has shifted toward urban centers nowadays mainly growing out of their own natural population increase. Third, while most urban migrants initially targeted capital or port cities, the expansion in the number of medium-sized cities suggests that urban migration has become less concentrated. Fourth, city growth appeared barely affected by rising urban poverty, slum formation, and overall economic performance. Fifth, while urban migration used to be a male privilege during colonial times, in the second half of the 20th century cities have seen an increase in rural-urban migration of women and children, balancing Africa's urban sex ratios.

Today, West Africa remains almost twice as urbanized as East Africa. This difference mainly seems to be a difference of initial conditions and timing that continued to affect the two regions' urbanization and urban migration patterns over the 20th century. At the beginning of the colonial era, West Africa was already more commercialized and urbanized than East Africa. Consequently, over the 20th century it also had larger cities, experienced higher urbanization rates, and saw an earlier equalization of urban sex ratios, a stabilization of the urban population, a more balanced urban age pyramid, and thus more urban natural growth relative to migration. Also, most West African cities had emerged as "African cities," not established or developed as colonial cities established by white settlers. With the exception of sex-selective migration, urban migrant characteristics appear similar between East and West Africa.

Notes

1 Hereafter Africa.
2 See De Haas and Travieso (Chapter 11, this volume).
3 See Frederick and Van Nederveen Meerkerk (Chapter 12, this volume) on pre-1960 city growth and rural-urban migration in Southern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo.
4 There were large regional differences. In 1950, 44% in Southern Africa lived in large cities (>300,000) versus 10% in East Africa, 12% in West Africa, and 16% in Central Africa.
5 See Pallaver (Chapter 4, this volume) on pre-colonial roots of East African migration.
6 Examples include Kumbi Saleh (Mauritania), Timbuktu, Djenné, and Gao (Mali).
7 Figures are derived by dividing the aggregate city population for East and West Africa (OECD/SWAC 2020) by their regional population in 1950 (Frankema and Jerven 2014). East Africa excludes Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia.
8 There is insufficient data to accurately determine the relative contribution of rural reclassification to urban growth. Its contribution, however, is not negligible. Rapid population growth has caused the emergence of entirely new cities. The number of cities with populations ≥10,000 increased from just 292 in 1950 to 5,448 in 2015 (Figures 13.1 and 13.2).
9 Due to comparatively higher living costs in urban Kampala, the many male labor migrants from Ruanda-Urundi preferred to work for rural rather than urban employers (de Haas 2019).
10 Various stakeholders participate in the migration decision of African labor migrants (Byerlee, Tommy, and Fatoo 1976): migrant (32%), rural household head (40%), other rural relatives (16%), town relatives (7%), and spouse (5%).
11 Sex ratios shown represent the entire urban population, not adult sex ratios, which would give higher ratios.
12 This is not to deny that restrictions toward female urban migration existed. In Nigeria the migration patterns of female Hausa Muslims were highly restricted and seen as tantamount to prostitution (Sudarkasa 1977; Pittin 1984).
13 We still observe a positive correlation between African countries' income per capita and urbanization (De Brauw, Mueller, and Lee 2014; Meier zu Selhausen 2018).
14 A slum household is defined as a group of individuals living under the same roof lacking one or more of the following conditions: access to improved water, access to improved sanitation, sufficient living area, and durability of housing (UN-Habitat 2016).
15 Food makes up 61% of average consumption.
16 Study only captures permanent slum dwellers. Only 15% of the Kibera sample exited 2003–07.

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