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FROM INTEGRATION TO REPATRIATION. FLIGHT, DISPLACEMENT, AND EXPULSION IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA

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1 Introduction

The majority of African countries shook off the chains of colonial oppression between 1951 and 1975. The end of colonial rule heralded a contentious era of nation-state building culminating in widespread armed conflict in the closing quarter of the 20th century. As earlier independence struggles in the Americas and Asia had shown, political disorder and violence arose easily in the power vacuums left by retreating imperial forces (Bates, Coatsworth, and Williamson 2007). Colonial rule had bequeathed Africa with more than 50 territorially compartmentalized polities, separated by a web of mostly arbitrary borders, uniting different peoples in a challenge to shape post-colonial societies, while splitting others apart. At the same time, colonial authorities had bolstered ethnic identities, amongst others through the granting of customary land rights, which incentivized local authorities to distinguish insiders from outsiders along ethnic lines and to discourage permanent settlement of ethnic others (Chanock 1991; Peters 2013).

The short breeze of Afro-euphoria that blew across the region in the early 1960s, stirred by visions of pan-African liberty and solidarity, vanished in the wake of mounting political tensions. Conflict broke out over the inheritance of the central institutions of the state, including control over the army, fiscal monopoly, state-owned land, and other economic monopolies. The ideals of democratic negotiation gave way to the praxis of single-party rule, reinstating the autocratic governance cultures of the colonial era (Nugent 2012; Young 2012). According to some scholars, large-scale organized violence was partly also rooted in the unfinished military revolution of the 19th century, which was only temporarily halted by colonial intervention (Reid 2012). In any case, former European metropoles meddled in African conflicts in attempts to preserve their political and economic interests, while Cold War politics guaranteed a steady supply of weapons, military training, ideological support, and financial aid to opposing factions, thus deepening and prolonging intra-African violence during the second half of the 20th Century (Reid 2009, Chapters 20 and 21).

According to Anthony (1991) there were at least three models of colonial state building that set the stage for the type of open violence that generated massive refugee flight. First,

there were forms of "radical separation" between regions in their access to power and re-sources. The north-south divisions in British-ruled Sudan and French-ruled Chad serve as key examples of such policies of regional inclusion and exclusion, ending up in long civil wars in the post-colonial era. Second, there was the creation of a governing class whose rule was backed up by the imperial power, but was destined to be contested when empire broke down. Key examples are the powers granted to the Tutsi minority in Ruanda-Urundi and the Baganda in Uganda. Third, while all forms of colonial rule were paternalistic in one way or another, there were important differences. The paternalist modes of colonial rule that were practiced in, for instance, Portuguese Africa and the Belgian Congo, focused on preserving so-called "traditional cultures," but stripped these cultures from their authori-tarian structures and strongly discouraged social and political emancipation. Consequently, newly independent states came to be ruled by elites who assumed responsibilities of govern-ment for which they were ill-prepared.

The wave of violence and disorder that characterized post-colonial Africa constitutes the background for an exploration into the surge of forced migration that shaped a significant part of African mobility patterns from the 1960s unto the early 21st century. My central ar-gument is that, historically, African societies had largely supported the *integration* of "aliens" into systems of domestic slavery to enhance agricultural labor supplies, accumulate wealth, strengthen military capacity, reproduce lineages, and bolster elite status. In colonial times, when slavery was outlawed, forced displacement remained primarily motivated by the de-sire to concentrate cheap labor in key sites of export production (Okia, Chapter 8, this volume). However, Africa's post-colonial nation-states increasingly turned to the *expulsion* of aliens, to the *deliberate displacement* of enemies within and across national borders, and to the *repatriation* of international refugees. This chapter attributes this shift from integration to repatriation, and the related changes in the attitude of receiving societies, to the long-run demographic transition that has profoundly altered the relative scarcity of rural and urban labor supplies, as well as the juncture in the meaning and legal status of territorial borders and related notions of *national* sovereignty, identity, and citizenship. I further argue that the long shift from absorbing to expelling "outsiders" is likely to continue during the 21st century, but that not all historical forms of *forced migration-cum-integration* have been eliminated. State-building activities of military sects such as Boko Haram or Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army that seek to amass kindred spirits through murder, kidnapping, and brainwashing replicate integrative strategies that had been common in pre-colonial times (Austin, Chapter 2, this volume).

As noted in the introduction, there is no sharp dividing line between "forced" and "free," or "involuntary" and "voluntary" migration (De Haas and Frankema, Chapter 1, this volume). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), forced migration contains "an element of coercion […], including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes" (IOM 2011, 39). The narrow definition I adopt emphasizes three features: forced migration occurs when people experience an *over-whelming pressure* to move due to forces largely *beyond their control* (man-made or otherwise), paired to an *urgency* to leave nearly everything behind at once. This definition separates war refugees, expellees, exiles, as well as raided slaves and forced labor recruits, from migrants who swap the countryside for the city after more extensive deliberations, even though they may feel pressed to do so because of circumstances beyond their control (for a discussion of definitions: Betts 2013; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014).

Under colonial rule, the overwhelming majority of African "subjects" were denied formal citizenship rights (Mamdani 1996). Race, ethnicity, and religion were the principal dimensions of identity, determining people's tax obligations (in-labor, in-kind, or monetary), their access to local indigenous networks of power and land, and possible restrictions on their mobility (e.g., pass laws). In his *Making of the Modern Refugee*, Peter Gatrell (2013, 4–6) points out that refugees turned into a distinct legal category when national borders and citizenship redefined the distinction between "insiders" and "outsiders." Hence, with independence, race, ethnicity, and religion were complemented and partially superseded by notions of national identity that had gained prominence in the struggle against colonial domination. Citizenship rights were underpinned by the issuing of passports and the adoption of immigration acts, quota systems, residence permit systems, and visa entry regulations to control the inflow of foreigners (Peil 1971, 205–7; Adepoju 1995, 166; Flahaux and De Haas 2016). National identity became the basis for large-scale repatriation of refugees and expulsions of immigrants lacking valid residence permits. Exit restrictions targeted at individuals, groups, or even whole societies were adopted by many African countries as well (Lucas 2105, 1473–4). Even though African borders remained porous, they came to function as spatial demarcations between sovereign African nation-states, providing millions of people security after crossing one, while at the same time turning millions into "illegal" residents.

This juncture intertwined with a much more gradual and prolonged but irreversible transition in demographic geographies. In pre-colonial times, the relatively high *labor value* of slaves had been shaped by conditions of (seasonal) labor scarcity and land abundance (Austin 2008). Slaves were raided for export markets, to work on farms, on agricultural estates, and in mines, or to serve in armies, royal courts, or households (Miers and Kopytoff 1977; Lovejoy 2000; Stilwell 2014). To reduce the chance of flight, captives were taken far away from their homeland, crossing various cultural, ethno-linguistic, and political borders. In the colonial era, labor recruits were also forced to work in mines, on landed estates, or at construction sites, often traversing long distances and sometimes working under slave-like conditions (Okia 2012; van Waijenburg 2018; see also Ribeiro da Silva and Alexopoulou, Chapter 9, this volume). In settler colonies such as South Africa, the Rhodesia and Kenya, "native reserves" were established to control the mobility of Africans, involving large-scale displacement and containment, with the aim to commodify labor to fulfill the demand for cheap hands by the settler population (Mosley 1983; Feinstein 2005).

Thus, where forced migration in (pre-)colonial settings had mostly consisted of people being forced *toward* the loci of extraction (or contained for that purpose), the post-colonial era saw more and more people being forcibly *expelled from* territories. Forced displacement without deliberate spatial replacement happened to foreigners as well as resident populations. Demographic expansion shifted the relative proportions of land (and other environmental resources) to labor. The old rationale of relieving local labor shortages by bringing in migrants, by means of force, false propositions, or competitive wages was complemented and partly replaced by a new rationale to expel people in order to preserve resources and job opportunities for locals, original inhabitants, or "sons of the soil" (Boone 2017, 276–7). Large-scale repatriation of refugees as well as voluntary labor migrants started in the 1950s and intensified after independence. Of course, demographic pressures were unevenly distributed and labor demands were sensitive to world market swings, but this long-term transition in relative labor supplies occurred nearly everywhere in Africa. Especially when economic conditions and employment opportunities deteriorated, the colonial legacy of

territorial sovereignty and the anti-colonial legacy of national identity helped to juxtapose "citizens" to "illegals." These threats of expulsion applied not only to African labor immigrants, but also to earlier generations of settlers of Asian and European descent, who held valuable assets (land, real estate) that could be stripped for political and economic gain.

The long-term shift from absorption to expulsion that we identify at the macro level of African migration history (De Haas and Frankema, Chapter 1, this volume) closely resonates with Robin Cohen's (2019) three-fold classification of African host society responses to "strangers" – not necessarily forced migrants. Cohen distinguishes between the "swallowing societies" which absorb migrants, the "parallel" or "alternating societies" as the intermediate form referring to oscillating migrant communities in ghettos, and the "vomiting out societies" which expel strangers. A person being kidnapped, traded, and integrated as a slave into a new host society, or a war refugee being repatriated back to his/her home country, falls on the far ends of this spectrum of absorption and expulsion. Intermediate patterns have occurred throughout African history, but they have arguably become more common with the post-colonial refugee crises: many refugees have ended up living in the twilight zone of parallel communities, in refugee camps or ghettos, where they were neither integrated nor repatriated. The adoption of these typologies in the remainder of this chapter is not intended to deny personal experiences of flight and displacement, but rather to highlight a long-term shift in the mental and political systems that have shaped these varied personal experiences.

2 Clusters of conflict and refugee mobility

During the 1940s and 1950s the world's major refugee crises occurred in Europe and Asia, not in Africa. In 1945, in the final stages of the Second World War, more than 10% of the European population, some 40 million people, were displaced. In addition, there were some 13 million ethnic Germans (*Volksdeutsche*) expelled from Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union and another 11 million displaced people working in Germany as forced laborers to support the Nazi war machine, of which about 700,000 people were confined in concentration camps (UNHCR 2000, 13; Orth 2009, 194). In the immediate aftermath of the war, a million people fled from the advancing Soviet army. The Japanese invasion of China and the ensuing Second Sino-Japanese war between 1937 and 1945 resulted in a death toll of 20 to 25 million, and an estimated 30 million displaced (Schoppa 2011). The artificial border that partitioned British India into an Islamic majority state (Pakistan) and a Hindu majority state (India) in 1947 initiated a two-way mass exodus by an estimated 17 million people, and resulted in a death toll of at least 1 million (Khan 2007; Bharadwaj and Ali Mirza 2019, 1). The Korean war of 1950–53 resulted in estimated 4 million military and civilian casualties and several millions of refugees and displaced persons (Cummings 2011, 35). Independence struggles in Indochina (1946–54) and Indonesia (1945–49) also led to mass displacement in response to famine, warfare, and territorial partition (Windrow 1998; Luttikhuis and Moses 2014).

These incomprehensible orders of magnitude had been uncommon in Africa, but in the 1960s the gravity center of humanitarian crises began to shift (Adepoju 1982; Nindi 1986). As shown in Figure 15.1, Africa's share in the registered global refugee population after 1960 hovered around 30% with a peak of 50% in the late 1970s, and was consistently higher than Africa's share in the world population (about 10–18%). The cracks in the bulwarks of

FIGURE 15.1 African refugees as a percentage share of the world total and relative to the African population as a share of the world total, 1960–2020.

Source: Refugee data from UNHCR, Population Statistics Database, accessed 29-03-2020; Population data from United Nations, World Population Prospects 2019, accessed 29-03-2020.

colonial order had become visible in the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62) and the violent repression of the *Mau Mau* rebellion in Kenya (1952–60). The mass exodus of Algerians and evacuation of *pieds-noirs* to France and Corsica following Algerian independence involved close to 1 million people (Eldridge 2016).[1] In the 1960s violence-induced refugee crises also emerged in Portuguese Africa, the Great Lakes area, the southern Congo, the Horn of Africa, Chad, and eastern Nigeria. By 1969, about two-thirds of the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*' (UNHCR's) global program funds were directed to Africa (UNHCR 2000, 37).

Figure 15.2 shows the rise in the number of armed conflicts divided into interstate conflicts, intrastate conflicts, and independence wars.[2] The spread of economic crises in the 1970s, provoked by declining world market prices for primary export commodities, escalating debt positions, and inflationary pressures, further deepened social tensions. Structural adjustment programs prescribed severe austerity policies, which at least temporarily pushed more people into poverty. An increasing number of African countries got pulled into a vicious cycle of economic decline and political instability in the 1980s (Bates 2008, Nugent 2012). During the 1970s to 1990s more than 20 out of 50 African nations witnessed outflows or inflows of refugees exceeding 100,000 persons, while Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Burundi, and Angola experienced such large flows in both directions.[3]

After 1995 the number of countries trapped in intrastate warfare declined, but this trend was soon reversed by the outbreak of the First and especially the Second Congo War. At its peak the *Great War* of Africa involved 9 countries and some 20 different armed groups,

FIGURE 15.2   Number of countries involved in major armed conflicts in Africa, 1960–2018.

Source: Centre for Systemic Peace, Database of Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946–2018, accessed 29-10-2019.

Note: Episodes of "conflict" are defined by the systematic and sustained use of lethal violence by organized groups that results in at least 500 directly related deaths over the course of the episode.

causing one of the biggest humanitarian crises in post-colonial Africa (Prunier 2009). Most of the war was fought within the DRC and led to an estimated death toll of 3 to 4 million people, often as a result of starvation, disease, and collapse of basic public health facilities. After the signing of a peace agreement in 2002 the intensity of warfare on the continent declined, even though peace was never fully restored in eastern Congo. This trend again reversed in 2012 with the deterioration of political and social relations in the African Sahel that drew an increasing number of countries into new spirals of violence.

Figure 15.3 shows the total number of refugees in Africa and the share of refugees in the total African population. These estimates include all persons with an *officially registered* refugee status in their host country, living in a designated refugee camp, or scattered across villages, towns, and cities in border areas, or further abroad. We are looking here at lower bound estimates since only officially registered refugees end up in the statistics. Comparable data on internally displaced persons (IDPs henceforth) is harder to obtain because of a larger proportion who are unregistered. In many conflicts, the number of IDPs tends to exceed the number of international refugees, especially in larger countries where violence is concentrated in specific areas while other areas remain unaffected.[4]

Figure 15.3 shows that the official number of refugees rose from about half a million in 1965 to 6.5 million at the peak of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, close to 1% of the continental population. Part of the rise in the 1960s has probably to be attributed to improved (international) record keeping, but most of it was caused by the rapid spread of armed

FIGURE 15.3   Total number of refugees in Africa (bars, left-hand *Y*-axis) and as a % share of Africa's population (line, right-hand *Y*-axis), 1960–2018.
Source: UNHCR, Population Statistics Database, accessed 29-03-2020.

conflict. The numbers then started to decline to around 3 million in 1998, and further down to 2.3 million in 2008. It appears as if the Great War of Africa (1998–2002) did not raise the number of registered refugees, but it should be kept in mind that the number of refugees caused by the civil wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Liberia were declining at the same time, thus compensating for the compounding effect of Congolese refugees. Moreover, the majority of people fleeing the violence ended up as IDPs within the DRC. After 2008, and especially the renewed outbreak of the Sudanese civil war in 2012, the numbers again rose dramatically.

In combination with Table 15.1, which lists the most disruptive wars in Africa in terms of total refugees and IDPs, Figure 15.4 shows the trends in mass flight from various African conflict hotbeds. Between 1960 and 2010 the Great Lakes area, the Horn of Africa, and Angola constituted the three largest spatial clusters of forced migration. In West Africa the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone stand out. The Sudanese civil war, including the operations in Darfur and the secession of South Sudan and ensuing civil war, has led to a steep spike in the 2010s (also because the new border turned many IDPs into international refugees). At the time of writing, there were about 2 million IDPs in South Sudan and over 2 million South Sudanese refugees in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda.[5] Compared to these eruptions of mass displacement, other parts of Western, Eastern, and Southern Africa have remained (far) more stable.

The clustering of violence-induced mobility is partly caused by historical genealogies of conflict. For instance, the Congo wars were in part provoked by refugees flowing into the DRC after the Rwandan genocide of 1994, and the slumbering threat of raids into Rwanda organized by Hutu extremists (*Interahamwe* militias) who were controlling the refugee camps in the eastern part of the Congo (Clark 2002). To exterminate these militias

and to prevent new attacks, the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan army invaded eastern Congo with support from Ugandan and Burundian troops. These forces also supported the rebel groups under the command of Laurent-Desiré Kabila, who ousted Mobutu Sese Seko from power. Whereas the Great War of Africa is impossible to understand without the Rwandan genocide preceding it (Prunier 2009; Nugent 2012, 466–7), the Rwandan genocide of 1994, in turn, is impossible to understand without the way in which the colonial authorities molded ethnic divisions between *Hutu* and *Tutsi* to govern Ruanda-Urundi. This is just one of many examples of historical reproduction of violent conflict which has connected groups of migrants in time through a ramifying cycle of flight and return.

Other factors come into play as well. For instance, in the West African Sahel violence between *Hausa* farmers and *Fulani* herders is flaring up time and again. In this case distributional conflicts concerning scarce economic resources (e.g., land, water), religious dividing lines, fragile environmental conditions, and difficulties to establish a state monopoly on the use of violence are key ingredients of continuous conflict that stretch back to the jihads of the 18th and 19th centuries. In the Lake Chad area, the national borders between Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon are used by terrorist groups to escape persecution, to pile up new resources, and to plan new activities (Lovejoy 2016; Oginni, Opoku and Alupo 2018).

Finally, we need to factor in the interference of external powers, including the former metropoles. External interventions do not explain the spatial clustering of conflict as such, but the decisions to intervene (openly or secretly) were often guided by specific economic and geo-political interests, such as the presence of strategic natural resources (e.g., uranium, coltan, oil) or strategic allies who held their bases in a specific region. The assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1961, the first prime minister of independent Congo, was commissioned by leaders of the Katanga secessionist movement, who were openly backed by the Belgian government (Vanthemsche 2010, 94–8). South Africa's apartheid regime backed RENAMO in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola to oppose the dominance of the Marxist parties of FRELIMO and MPLA, who sought to establish a socialist one-party state (Nugent 2012, 286–95).[6] A very recent example is the meddling of Turkey, Russia, France, Italy, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the US in the Libyan civil war, supporting opposing factions in the struggle for control over the country and its exclusive economic zone in the Mediterranean Sea.[7]

As we can see in Table 15.1, the great majority of refugees moved to a neighbor country, often by foot, or on carts, bicycles, lorries, and buses. Consequently, island states such as Madagascar or Mauritius have comparatively little experience with hosting refugees. Despite being the focus of much media and scholarly attention (Abegunrin and Abidde 2021), the number of African refugees outside Africa has remained low compared to those accommodated by mainland African countries. Refugees who made it to Europe, the US, or a more distant African country (e.g., South Africa) were often part of small-scale refugee resettlement schemes or went into exile as political dissidents. The recent influx of young Eritrean men into Europe, fleeing from excessive state repression, is no exception. Compared to the millions of Eritrean refugees living in neighboring Sudan, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, Eritrean communities in Europe are tiny (Bariagaber 2006; Schmidt, Kimathi and Owiso 2019).

While the statistics shown in Figure 15.4 do no justice to the sheer variety of individual experiences of deprivation, anxiety, hunger, humiliation, structural dependence, and loss of loved ones, they do reveal that for many refugees the migration experience was a prolonged

FIGURE 15.4 Number of refugees from major African sending areas, 1960–2018.
Source: UNHCR, Population Statistics Database, accessed 29-03-2020.

one. Fleeing a country is a matter of hours to a few days at most. Yet, returning to one's place of origin often involves years of waiting, false hopes, and shattered illusions. In many cases the full cycle of a major upsurge in refugee migration followed by stepwise repatriation took a decade at the very least, and a considerable share of refugee populations never returned home. Many also lost reason to aspire a return, as they built new livelihoods, forged new social relations, invested in immobile assets, or raised children who internalized the languages and customs of the host society.

3 Colonial borders and post-colonial realities

In pre-colonial times "foreign" territory was hardly a safehouse for people who tried to escape violence. As Gareth Austin (Chapter 2) points out in this book, crossing borders implied the risk of being enslaved by neighboring peoples. This risk was particularly high in the coastal zones of Western Africa during the 18th and 19th century (Whatley 2020). To escape raiding militia, the default option was to move into areas where one could physically hide and organize defenses (e.g., mountains, forests, lakes), rather than flee into no man's land, or cross into alien territory. In fact, living in the proximity of borders could already be dangerous. Islamic law offered protection to Muslims, who would not enslave their fellow-men, but such legal protection did not extend to the non-Muslim populations living at the fringes of the Islamic heartlands in West and East Africa. Religious dividing lines thus put additional pressure on people living in border areas that were within the reach of expanding Jihadist state armies (Lovejoy 2016).

TABLE 15.1 Numbers and shares of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and international refugees (RFGs) in major African wars, 1954–present

	Period	Peak year	IDPs	IDP/POP	Peak year	Refugees	RFG/POP	Main destination(s)
			000s	%		000s	%	
North Africa								
Algeria (independence war)	1954–62	1960	1,200	10.9	1960	260	2.4	Morocco/Tunisia
Former Portuguese Africa								
Angola (independence war)	1961–75	1976	350	4.8	1979	652	8.1	Congo-Kinshasa
Angola (civil war)	1975–2001	2002	4,300	24.5	2001	471	2.8	Congo-Kinshasa
Mozambique (civil war)	1976–92	1990	3,500	27.0	1992	1,445	10.5	Malawi
Great Lakes area								
Rwanda (civil war)	1959–62	1965	…	…	1964	166	5.2	Uganda/Tanzania/Burundi
Rwanda (civil war)	1990–94	1995	1,545	26.5	1994	2,258	38.0	DRC/Tanzania/Burundi
DRC (Second Congo war)	1998–2002	2003	3,200	6.2	2004	462	0.9	Tanzania/Congo Rep.
Uganda (civil war)	1980–86	1983	…	…	1983	315	2.3	Sudan/DRC/Rwanda
Horn of Africa								
Ethiopia/Eritrea (civil war)	1974–91	1984	1,650	4.0	1980	2,568	7.0	Somalia/Sudan
Somalia (civil war)	1980s–	2006	1,300	12.1	2012	1,137	8.9	Kenya
Sudan (civil war)	1983–2011	2011	2,423	5.4	2017	2,440	4.7	Chad/South Sudan
West Africa								
Nigeria (Biafra war)	1967–70	1969	3,500	6.7	1969	41	0.1	Equatorial Guinea
Sierra Leone (civil war)	1991–2002	2000	750	16.4	1999	490	11.0	Guinea
Liberia (First Liberian civil war)	1989–1996	1994	1,100	55.4	1994	798	40.2	Guinea/Côte d'Ivoire

Sources: Estimates of IDPs from Centre for Systemic Peace, *Database of Forcibly Displaced Populations, 1964-2008*, accessed . Data on refugees and main destination(s) from UNHCR Population Statistics http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series; Population data from UN World Population Prospects 2020. IDP and refugee data Algeria from UNHCR (2000, 39–41); Refugee data Nigeria from CSP.

The conquest of African territories by European powers marked the beginning of the "slow death" of slavery in Africa (Miers and Roberts 1988; Lovejoy and Hogendorn 1993). Given the reluctance to disturb relations with local power-brokers and to undermine social order, the first attempts to suppress slavery were directed at raiding and trading, leaving ownership untouched. Yet, colonial occupation itself provided slaves with an opportunity to flee into areas where slavery was legally prohibited. Runaway slaves could appeal at courts against attempts of their masters to bring them back. In several parts of West Africa, such as the French Soudan and the defeated Sokoto Caliphate (mainly present-day Nigeria), the new political and legal realities set a mass exodus in motion involving hundreds of thousands of former slaves leaving their masters and returning to the villages from which they were once taken (Hogendorn and Lovejoy 1988, 395–400; Klein 1998). Many people never reached their homeland, as they got caught in the machineries of colonial state formation projects, ending up in colonial armies, in forced labor schemes, or being subjected to anti-vagrancy laws which restricted their mobility (Stilwell 2014, 192–8).

Colonial borders also played a role in the regulation of voluntary labor migration. Opportunities of wage employment motivated millions of Africans to cross borders to earn cash for tax obligations, to complement household incomes, to accumulate bridewealth or luxury goods, and also to escape forced labor obligations at home (De Haas 2019; De Haas and Travieso, Chapter 11, this volume). In most instances these forms of labor migration to mining or cash-crop areas was deliberately kept circular. Receiving societies controlled "foreign" immigrants through segregated living spaces and temporary labor contracts and by restricting access to land. Sending societies that experienced a drain of labor to adjacent areas often tried to prevent exit by closing borders, but such attempts were only successful when there were alternative propositions. For instance, the copper mines in Northern Rhodesia that opened up in the late 1920s diverted migrants away from the mines in Katanga (southeast of Belgian Congo), which in turn stimulated so-called "labor stabilization" policies to accommodate structural labor shortages (Juif and Frankema 2017; Juif, Chapter 10, this volume). Yet, border controls failed to stop the large recurring flows of labor migration from Ruanda-Urundi into Buganda, and from Côte d'Ivoire and Haute Volta to the Gold Coast's cocoa belt (De Haas and Travieso, Chapter 11, this volume).

At independence, these colonial borders rapidly assumed a new meaning. While the region had consisted of five major, albeit spatially unequal, empires (British, French, Portuguese, Belgian, and Italian) and most borders ran within unified imperial spaces, the region was ultimately carved up into more than 50 sovereign political entities. Hosting "foreigners" who fled from neighboring countries became an increasingly sensitive issue. For example, in the late 1950s, the British Bechuanaland Protectorate developed into a safe haven for political refugees from South Africa's apartheid regime. Nelson Mandela, alias David Motsamayi, used the opportunity to escape persecution using the Bechuanaland corridor, as did many others with him (Parsons 2008). When more and more guerrilla fighters began to use the country as an operating base, the government closed the border for a while, to relieve tensions with South Africa. The border re-opened again when the government of newly independent Botswana (1966) started to support the anti-apartheid movement more actively, using its status as an independent sovereign nation to protect opposition groups, and relying in turn on foreign (British) support to prevent a military invasion from South Africa. Rapid economic growth boosted Botswana's self-confidence and claims to nationhood. Botswana's reputation as a safe haven resulted in a large influx of refugees after the Soweto rising of 1976 (Parsons 2008, 17).

In virtually all of the long–drawn conflicts in post–colonial Africa, the cross–border presence of militarized groups was a complicating factor. The presence of militarized refugees complicated the reception of civil asylum-seekers as they raised the risk of being drawn into an international war. It did not help that new national borders often cut across existing social, economic, cultural, or ethno-linguistic spaces where movement "beyond the frontier" was the norm, not the exception. Many Rwandan refugees who went to Burundi did not cross a clearly distinguishable ethno-linguistic or cultural border. Refugees moving into Uganda were following in the footsteps of previous generations of migrants who had traveled up and down these routes for decades, as circular labor migrants seeking employment on the coffee and cotton plantations of Baganda farmers, or fleeing the *Rwakayihura* famine in 1928–29 and the *Ruzagayura* famine in 1943–44 (Newbury 2005, 258–60; De Haas 2019).

Yet, whereas militarized refugees were mostly men, the lion's share of the refugee flows consisted of women and children. While men stayed to fight, were imprisoned, or got killed, women and children bore the brunt of transposing their livelihoods from a known environment into one of permanent insecurity and heightened competition for resources. Whether they ended up in refugee camps just across the border or settled further away in rural or urban areas by themselves, or with relatives, their social position had to be renegotiated, their lives to be rebuild. Women and children were in a particularly vulnerable position. In their 1980 report, the UNHCR recognized this vulnerability, as well as the change in attitude toward refugees that I will discuss in the next section:

> Hospitality towards the traveller, the exile is a characteristic of African societies, a deeply rooted tradition which has allowed vast numbers of refugees in Africa to rebuild their lives among their former neighbours. Ideal as this solution may appear from a distance, experience has shown that it can hide patterns of severe hardship to both the host and refugee populations. Refugees who may be integrated with relative ease in areas where cultivable land is abundant are liable to find themselves condemned to the bottom of the social ladder in regions where resources are already stretched thin.
> *(UNHCR 1980, 17; quoted in Adepoju 1982, 26)*

4 From integration to repatriation

Refugee scholars have argued that policies focusing on integration appear to work better in areas where population densities are low enough to avoid competition over land, where new settlements alleviate local labor shortages and stimulate economic exchange, and where refugee settle among people with a shared ethno-linguistic background or a mutually acknowledged degree of cultural affinity (Porter et al. 2008, 232). Tanzania has long been the poster child of the integrationist ideal. The country has hosted some of the largest refugee populations since the 1970s, with peaks in the 1990s exceeding 600,000 refugees.[8] At the same time, Tanzania is one of the few African countries that has never produced substantial outflows of refugees. The 1966 *Refugee Act* underpinning Tanzania's famous "open door" policy included liberal granting of refugee status to groups, generous allocation of land, and large-scale offers of Tanzanian citizenship through naturalization (Kamanga 2005, 103). Asylum-seekers who entered in tidal waves from many neighboring countries including the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Mozambique benefited from this humanitarian approach of refugee crises, for which its architect, Julius Nyerere, received the *Nansen Refugee Award* in 1983.

Tanzania's tolerant approach may be attributed to various factors. First, the vast land borders of the country were very difficult to control with the limited means the Tanzanian state had at its disposal. Second, the northwestern border region which experienced the largest refugee inflows from Rwanda and Burundi was a thinly populated area. Nyerere once remarked that "*I know you will get some people who will say, we don't have enough land in Tanzania, but that idea is absurd. The country is empty*" (Kamanga 2005, 103). Third, in the northwestern region there were clear ethno-linguistic connections between the refugees and local residents. Cultural affinity and cohesion among ethnic "cousins" dampened social tensions (Daley 1993; Kamanga 2005; Newbury 2005). Fourth, the socialist state ideology embraced by the Nyerere regime encapsulated visions of pan-African liberation, egalitarianism, and solidarity, which prescribed an open attitude toward "victims" as well as "freedom fighters." Fifth, Rwandan refugees were not posing an explicit security threat to the national government as the militarized Rwandan refugees in the Congo did (Whitaker 2003). Finally, sixth, even though hard to verify, the Tanzanian government, as well as international aid agencies, exploited their handling of the situation to raise publicity and attract external funds (Kamanga 2005, 102; Mogire 2011). The political recognition that the "open door" policy paid off in terms of additional aid and international goodwill may explain why Tanzania sustained this policy well into the 1990s.

The 1998 *Refugee Act*, which replaced the 1966 *Refugee Act*, strengthened the legal basis for the repatriation of refugees. The Tanzanian government began to expel refugees under threat of force, in similar ways as the Kenyan government tried to deport Somali refugees (Mogire 2011). The massive inflow of Rwandan refugees in 1994 compromised limited public resources and increasing competition for land and other natural resources created more tensions. Moreover, the long economic depression, in large part due to the failure of *Ujamaa* policies, had caused severe hardship in the countryside. The shift in migration policy in Tanzania may be seen as a response to several mechanisms that applied more widely to African host societies: persistent rural poverty, growing youth unemployment, and gradual closure of open land frontiers (Felleson 2003). The recent expansion of the *Nduta* and *Mtendeli* camps for Burundi refugees in Kigoma district, whose numbers grew from about 50,000 in May 2015 to over 250,000 by September 2017, has produced major grievances among Tanzanian farmers who had previously used the land for agricultural purposes (Felix Da Costa 2017, 31). Calls for border controls and repatriation were growing louder.

There are also examples where local perceptions of refugee problems differ significantly from the views held by the central government. Angolans who fled to northwest Zambia after the outbreak of the independence war in 1966 were long allowed to self-settle in the border area and lay claim to the land they occupied. Some of the villages in the Mwinilunga district held a majority population of Angolans, or children from Angolan parents. Local inhabitants had grown accustomed to these refugee settlements and did not experience major problems with newcomers. The efforts undertaken by the Zambian government to repatriate Angolan refugees in the late 1990s, in cooperation with the UNHCR, were largely motivated by politicians' desires to be recognized as "problem solvers" and could reckon with little support of locals (Bakewell 2000).

Yet, there were also many cases where local attitudes toward refugees hardened over time. For instance, the Liberian refugees who found shelter in the *Buduburam* camp in Ghana have been exposed to growing distrust and resentment as their expected temporary stay turned into permanent settlement. The camp, located in the Gomoa district some 35

kilometers west of Accra, was established in 1990 with assistance of the UNHCR to accommodate the influx of thousands of Liberian refugees who fled the first Liberian civil war (1989–96). The camp was situated in a poor rural environment. Attempts in the late 1990s to close the camp and repatriate the refugees to Liberia, after the war had ended, had little effect. During the second Liberian civil war (1999–2003) the camp expanded again. As humanitarian aid by the UNHCR was scaled down, camp-dwellers became more self-reliant and in interviews they emphasized their economic independence as a precondition for integration (Dick 2002; Porter et al. 2008). In 2007 the UNHCR joined the Ghanaian government in their call for voluntary repatriation, but the majority of the then approximately 40,000 inhabitants refused to leave. Other examples of refugee camps that have grown into quasi-self-sustaining cities are the *Dadaab* and *Kakuma* camps in northern Kenya. Because of their isolated location these camps developed even stronger features of ghettoization than *Buduburam* (Pérouse de Montclos and Kagwanja 2000; Jansen 2016).

Field interviews have revealed a variety of factors playing a role in refugees' preferences to stay, including their access to social networks and illicit employment opportunities, the depth of war trauma, their personal resources, and access to diaspora networks (Porter et al. 2008; Omata 2013). Among the Liberians in Ghana there were hopes that some camp-dwellers would be selected for resettlement in a third country, especially the US, where a number of refugees had Liberian relatives who supported them financially. Such third-country resettlement schemes also played a role in the Kenyan camps, where people have been observed to claim insecurity and negotiate vulnerability (Jansen 2008). Another oft-mentioned coping mechanism among the *Buduburam* refugees is investment in the education of their children, a mobile asset that can help to secure livelihoods in varying environments (Hardgrove 2019).

Over time, the growing concentration of Liberian refugees relative to the resident population raised the competition over scarce resources such as land, fuelwood, water, and waste disposal. The predominantly urban background of the *Budubaram* refugees led to growing distrust and feelings of alienation expressed by the resident farmer population. The Libero-American youth identity is characterized by "big dressing," lack of reverence for traditional authority (e.g., the elderly), and explicit social codes that were perceived by local Ghanaians as testimonies to violence, robbery, and general disrespect. The connections with relatives in the US and the financial assistance some Liberians received further compounded such perceptions (Porter et al. 2008, 243–5). Research has also shown that large-scale provisions of food and other goods to camp-dwellers incited envy in host communities, where people wonder why public welfare programs would prioritize "strangers" over impoverished, tax-paying citizens (Lawrie and van Damme 2003).

5 The age of mass expulsions

The broad historical shift from integration to repatriation of aliens not only applies to refugees, but also to the millions of "illegal" immigrants, who voluntarily migrated into host countries, to then be expelled under the threat of force. Between the late 1950s and early 2000s, a wave of mass expulsions occurred (Peil 1971; Adepoju 1995). While refugees entered into host countries under threat of violence, labor migrants moved largely on a voluntary basis, attracted by prospects of employment, commerce, forest resources, or land. However, once settled, refugees could count on the legal protection associated with

their official refugee status, while the "illegal" immigrant had few alternatives but to go into hiding to prevent deportation.

At the eve of independence, virtually all African states held groups of labor immigrants within their borders, but some countries had been particularly attractive (see also Juif, Chapter 10; De Haas and Travieso, Chapter 11, this volume). Large flows of voluntary labor migration continued unabated in the early post-colonial era, although employment opportunities partly shifted from the cash-crop and mining areas, toward the expanding urban and industrial zones where all sorts of service sector activities (e.g., domestic services, commerce, transportation) relied on the availability of cheap labor. Without a valid residence or labor permit, these immigrants were formally "illegal" residents. In many cases the bureaucratic procedures to obtain a permit were so complicated, and strangled with red tape, that immigrants would not bother to apply, but this began to matter when media or politicians started to frame "illegality" as a social problem.

Table 15.2 presents a selection of some of the largest mass expulsions between 1950 and 2000. This table is by no means exhaustive and the estimates have large margins of error, but they do illustrate the sheer weight that mass expulsions have had in Africa's post-colonial migration history. The table draws on a survey by Sylvie Bredeloup (1995) of about 50 episodes of expulsions between 1954 and 1995 involving the expulsion of West Africans, and the list compiled by Aderanti Adepoju (1995) for all of sub-Saharan Africa. Some of these expulsions involved a few dozen people, but the largest instances, such as the Nigerian expulsion of immigrants from Ghana, Chad, and Niger (amongst others), involved an estimated 1.5 million people at once.

There were differences in the degree of force and the nature of the sanctions deployed to expel such large numbers of people. For example, when in 1955 the *Sierra Leone Selection Trust* (SLST) abandoned its smaller mining concessions, an estimated 200,000 prospectors from French West Africa poured into the country looking for opportunities of artisanal diamond mining. The event is remarkable because of the speed with which the retreat of SLST provoked large-scale migratory inflows from Guinée, the Soudan (Mali), Senegal,

TABLE 15.2 Selection of mass expulsions in Africa, 1950–2000

Country	Year	No. expelled	Main destinations
Sierra Leone	1956	50,000	AOF
Ghana	1969	500,000–1,000,000	Nigeria, Togo, Burkina Faso, Niger
Zambia	1971	150,000	Zimbabwe, Congo, Botswana, Tanzania
Uganda	1972	50,000	India, UK
Nigeria	1983	1,500,000	Ghana, Niger, Chad
Nigeria	1985	700,000	Ghana, Niger
Senegal, Mauritania	1989	360,000	Senegal, Mauritania
South Africa	1992–94	270,000	Mozambique, Zimbabwe, DRC, Nigeria
Gabon	1995	55,000	n.a.
Ethiopia	1998–2000	80,000	Eritrea

Sources: Estimates taken from Bredeloup (1995) and Adepoju (1995). For Uganda the data are from Mutibwa (1992, 67, 93); for Ethiopia from Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 2001 - Africa Overview*, 7.

and Côte d'Ivoire. In 1956, the colonial government called upon the immigrants to leave the country voluntarily, without announcing sanctions in case of non-compliance. Ultimately, about a quarter of this group returned back home, possibly motivated by the realization that swelling numbers of competing miners made it increasingly unlikely to amass a fortune (Bredeloup 1995, 118). Yet, the great majority stayed in Sierra Leone. In many other cases, however, threat of force was used to deter immigrants and ensure their departure.

Mass expulsions were especially common in the wake of economic depression. The expulsions in Nigeria in 1983 and 1985 occurred right in the middle of one of the countries' most severe economic crises. During the 1970s, when oil prices went through the roof, the rapid accumulation of wealth and related growing consumer expenditures attracted many workers from neighboring West African countries who tried to tap into growing opportunities of urban commerce and to do the "dirty" low-paid jobs that Nigerians no longer wished to take up. Yet, by 1983, Nigerian GDP had shrunk to about 15% to 20% compared to 1980 (World Bank, 2014). The political response was to close the borders and expel foreigners to "preserve" jobs for Nigerian citizens. The government imposed an employment freeze and announced, on 18 January 1983, that all "illegal" residents were given two weeks to leave the country (Adepoju 1995, 168). A similar combination of rising economic nationalism in the context of economic depression had led to the mass expulsion of more than 0.5 million Nigerians, Burkinabé, and Togolese, amongst others, from Ghana in 1969. Ghana's economy had been stagnant for almost a decade in the 1960s, closing a long period of growth with tangible improvements in living standards from the 1900s onward (Frankema and van Waijenburg 2012). The Ghanaian government started to accuse immigrants of draining the Ghanaian economy, blaming part of the long depression on their presence (Adomako-Sarfoh 1974).

Whereas in West Africa immigrants were attracted to Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, as well the diamond fields in Sierra Leone and Guinée, and the oil-rich areas in Cameroon, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea, the largest economic magnet in sub-Saharan Africa was (and is) South Africa. A series of expulsions in the early 1990s included immigrants from Zimbabwe and the Congo who had migrated back and forth for decades, and Mozambicans who had even moved back and forth for centuries (Harries 2014; Juif, Chapter 10, this volume). Unemployment rates in South Africa had increased to double digit figures in the 1980s as a result of long economic stagnation and international sanctions. According to national opinion surveys the intolerance against the approximate 2 million foreigners residing in South Africa around the turn of the millennium has escalated since 1994 (Crush 2000). The surveys reveal that abuse of migrants and refugees rose dramatically and that the idea of migrant rights was highly unpopular. Meanwhile, labor migrants kept entering in search for work. One of the key objectives of the *Immigration Act* of 2002 was "to ensure that the borders of the Republic do not remain porous and illegal immigration through them may be effectively detected, reduced and deterred."[9] Since then, the capacity of its network of detention centers that are used to detain illegal foreigners has expanded, and the issuing of residence permits has been made contingent on possession of occupational skills and knowledge deemed essential for the South African economy.

Asians and Europeans were expelled too. The best-known example is probably the forced departure of about 50,000 Asians – the majority from (British) India – from Uganda, ordered by Idi Amin in 1972. The expulsion of Asians was a clear example of aggressive identity politics, offering a "golden" opportunity to confiscate assets for redistribution among the

political and military supporters of the Amin regime (Mutibwa 1992, 93). The position of Indians as commercial middlemen, many of whom had accumulated more wealth under co-lonial rule than the great majority of Africans, made them an easy target (Jamal 1976). Also, in "tolerant" Tanzania resentment against Indians surfaced, varying from open forms of dis-crimination (Indians depicted or referred to as "parasites" or "blood suckers" in government communication), to dispossession of real estate owned by Indians. According to Nyerere, one of the aims of the *Building Acquisition Act* of 1971 was "to prevent the emergence of a class of people who live and thrive by exploiting others" (Brennan 2012, 4). It was widely understood who he was referring to.

A final pattern are the two-way expulsions in the context of border wars and negotiated repatriations. Such a two-way exchange occurred in 1989, when the governments of Sen-egal and Mauritania agreed to repatriate, with foreign help, about 170,000 Mauritanians living in Senegal for 75,000 Senegalese in the middle of an explosive war (Parker 1991, 160). This border war had started with clashes between Fulani herders and Soninke farmers over grazing rights in parts of the degrading Senegal River basin, but it spiraled out of control when state-controlled military forces began to back up these groups and invade into foreign territory. This conflict illustrates how increasing scarcity of water-rich agricultural land led to an ethnic conflict, which in turn escalated into a full-fledged interstate war. Expulsions during the border war of Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998–2000 provide another example. The Ethiopian government deported thousands of Eritrean residents as well as Ethiopians with Eritrean roots who were considered a security threat. Arrests were followed by detention, by stripping people of their Ethiopian identity papers and property rights, and finally by transportation to the border. The Eritreans, in turn, were accused of incarcerating and expelling Ethiopians, although evidence of the scale of these retaliations remains contested (Wilson 1999).

6 Gazing into the future

To date, in 2021, Africa still hosts a disproportionally large share of the world's refugee population, a situation that emerged in the 1960s, with clearly visible peaks in the 1970s, the mid-1990s, and, again, in the 2010s. The recent upsurge has to be attributed to the Suda-nese crisis. In 2017–18 there were an estimated 6.7 million African refugees, of which about 2.2 million were from South Sudan alone. On a total estimate of 19.4 million cross-border migrants in Africa in 2017, refugees take up about one-third (34.5%).[10] Outside Africa, numbers of refugees have surged in the 2010s as well. In 2019, the UNHCR counted about 26 million refugees, 46 million IDPs, and 4.2 million asylum-seekers worldwide. The crises in Syria (6.6 million), Venezuela (3.6 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million), and Myanmar (1.1 million) have especially contributed to a global resurgence of forced displacement.

For the future, the historical analysis presented in this chapter offers several reasons for pessimism and a few sparks of hope. First, as argued above, there are a considerable number of conflict hotbeds that keep smoldering in times when the fire seems to have extinguished. Fragile states such as Somalia or South Sudan do not stabilize overnight. Large states such as the DRC, Ethiopia, Mali, and Nigeria continue to experience problems with regional destabilization. At the time of writing, a mass exodus occurred from Tigrayans in the north-ern regions of Ethiopia into Sudan to escape excessive violence, murder, rape, and man-made famine conditions in a renewed attempt by the incumbent Ethiopian government to

eliminate the *Tigray People's Liberation Front* as a political force. State repression continues to provoke opposition that is not mediated via democratic participation and freedom of speech, but tends to come in eruptions of (violent) protest and counterreactions. Peace agreements may be signed, but these do not take away the memories, distrust, and resentment that are associated with the hardship experienced by so many Africans. The perpetual cycle of ingrained distrust and outbursts of violence are hard to break.

Second, natural resources including land, fuelwood, and water are becoming scarcer under pressure of continuous population growth and increased consumer demands. The African population has grown from about 220 million in 1950 to 1.3 billion in 2020, and the current population is expected to double to a predicted 2.5 billion in 2050 and may be set to grow to 4 billion in 2100, when its share in the world population approaches 35%–40% (UN 2019). It does not require much imagination to see that these demographic prospects will aggravate competition over natural resources within as well as between states. Resource scarcity and resource competition increase the likelihood of future wars, refugee flows, repatriations, and expulsions.

Third, the economic development trajectories of African countries will continue to diverge and converge, as they have done in various episodes of growth and contraction during the 20th century. When cross-country gaps in income levels grow, the incentives for labor migration rise. However, in times of crisis and rising unemployment rates, this can lead to mass expulsion of "illegal" labor immigrants. Politicians have used the presence of "strangers" to divert attention from their own failure to adequately address economic downturns, or worse, to expropriate assets in favor of their support bases. The drivers of this process of attraction and expulsion are likely to remain in place, spurred by ongoing expansion of new generations of un(der)employed youth.

What then are the sparks of hope? First of all, there are reasons to presume that, just as in the Asian and Latin American decolonization experiences, the culmination of violence and humanitarian crises witnessed in the closing quarter of the 20th century was a one-time phenomenon. The era of the "big men," single-party rule, and Cold War proxy wars has been slowly giving away to a rediscovery of popular voice, multipartyism, and a slow but steady widening of civil society. Even though elections can be manipulated and their outcomes can lead to violence, the record of peaceful transfers of power is expanding (Nugent 2012, Chapter 9).

Second, the power of social media is clearly manifesting itself, even though it is a mixed blessing. Social media supports terrorist groups in their recruitment of new members, contributes to the spread of hateful ideologies, and has also been effective in organizing violence. On the other hand, social media has proven to be a powerful tool to uncover acts of violence and state repression to the rest of the world, to extend popular and international engagement with those suffering from violence, and to organize peaceful resistance and civil action. It can serve as an additional check to the arbitrary use of state power as well as a warning device for crises in the early stage of unfolding: it broadens people's abilities to call for change.

Finally, there is a growing recognition that African countries need to cooperate, which is expressed in the recent establishment of a pan-African free trade zone, i.e., the *African Continental Free Trade Area* (AfCFTA). A free trade area does not mean the lifting of barriers to migration, let alone prevention of forced displacement, but it does force African governments to negotiate a joint approach to labor migration instead of ruling through ad

hoc decrees. The negotiation of institutions guiding free trade can set an example to design more fine-grained regulations of labor permits, unrestricted intra–African traveling opportunities, and mutual funds to support the development of the private sector (e.g., via the African Development Bank). If such processes gain sufficient traction, the political stakes to promote stability will rise. Should these forces prevail in the decades to come, then it is possible to imagine a dwindling of forced migration, in an era where international labor migration reaches new heights.

Acknowledgment

Notes

1 French repression forced tens of thousands of Algerians to seek refuge in Morocco and Tunisia. The *pieds-noirs,* also called *colons*, were settlers of French or European descent, most of whom were born in Algeria during French rule (1830–1962). The group consisted mainly of Catholics and Sephardic Jews and made up about 10% of the Algerian population in 1960.
2 These categories are often overlapping. For instance, Ethiopia's civil war transformed from an intrastate into an interstate conflict after the international recognition of Eritrean independence in 1993, which was, in turn, the result of an independence war.
3 Based on data from UNHCR *Population Statistics Database* and Centre for Systemic Peace *Forcibly Displaced Populations Database*, accessed 10-10-2020.
4 In recent years the registration of IDPs has improved, partly due to specialized agencies that are established to monitor instances of displacement worldwide. See UNHCR, *Population Statistics Database*, https://www.unhcr.org/data.html.
5 https://www.unhcr.org/south-sudan-emergency.html, accessed 01-07-2020.
6 RENAMO refers to Resistência Nacional Moçambicana; UNITA to União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola; FRELIMO to Frente de Libertação de Moçambique; and MPLA to Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola.
7 https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/libyan-war-where-key-international-players-stand-37488 (22-06-2020).
8 Estimate based on UNHCR, *Population Statistics Database,* accessed 29-03-2020.
9 Government Gazette Vol. 443, Cape Town 31 May 2002, No. 23478: Immigration Act, 2002, p. 2.
10 Estimates based on UNHCR, *Population Statistics Database*, accessed 29–03–2020.

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