Dealing With the "Migrant With Poor Prospects" Discourse

Traditional and New Somali Migrant Organizations' Integrational Practices in the Netherlands

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Glossary

AZC	Asiel Zoekers Centrum	Asylum Shelter
DUO	Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs	Education Executive agency
FSAN	Federatie van Somalische Associaties Nederland	Federation of Somali Association Netherlands
VW	VluchtelingenWerk	The Dutch Council for Refugees
CBS	Central Bureau voor de Statistiek	Central Bureau of Statistics
SCP	Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau	Social and Cultural Planning Office
CIP	Inburgerings Programma	Civic Integration Program

Executive Summary

This research aims to understand how Somali organizations contribute to the integration of Somali immigrants in the Netherlands. It also focuses on the "migrant with poor prospects" discourse that underlies the functioning of such organizations. The Somali community is described as the least integrated immigrant group in the Netherlands. While most studies examine integration from a top-down perspective, this research intends to better understand the experiences and integration-related expectations of the Somali community through Somali migrant organizations. The methods used to conduct this research are integration policy analysis as well as semi-structured interviews and informal conversations. The semi-structured interviews were conducted with 12 board members of Somali organizations. The explorative informal conversations were with one integration policy advisor and an integration expert in the Netherlands. The findings illustrate that migrant organizations play different roles depending on whether they are traditional or new organizations. The traditional organizations have a broad target group focusing on representing all clans and age groups. However, the new organizations focus more on the representation of Somali youth. These two types of organizations also differ when it comes to cooperation with the Dutch government. The new organizations are more independent and do not cooperate with the government in the way that traditional organizations do. In addition, the results indicate that traditional Somali organizations to a certain extent reproduce the dominant discourse of the "immigrant with poor prospects." Using Foucault's governmentality theory, this study reflects on the practices of Somali organizations, finding that traditional organizations frame their activities so as to fit into the national integration framework and be eligible for government funding. However, new organizations focus on networking opportunities, the provision of professional assistance to the Somali community and role models for the Somali youth in the Netherlands. Nonetheless, both types of organizations advocate for a more durable and effective two-way integration process that actively includes migrant self-organizations in integration policy making. As such, this study advocates for the collaboration of the different organizations to strengthen their integrational practices.

Keywords: Migrant self-organization, Integration, culturalization of citizenship, governmentality.

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Acknowledgments

"Far kaliya fool ma dhagdo, gacmo wadajir bay wax ku gooyaan" – Somali proverb

This Somali proverb states "one finger alone cannot wash your face, but with both hands, you can achieve a great deal," which refers to the importance of working together to achieve one's goal.

While writing this thesis, I have received a great deal of support. It was a tough process that would not have been possible without the close guidance and support of a few people.

Firstly, I would like to thank all the board members of the Somali organizations that took part in the interviews in trusting me with their stories and welcoming me with open arms. Without their input, this project would not have been possible.

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1. Introduction

Since the outbreak of the Somali war in the 1991 following the fall of the Said Barre regime, many Somalis have sought refuge elsewhere. Most Somalis went to neighboring countries, such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti (Hammond 2014), whereas others sought refuge in Europe. Somalis that migrated to the Netherlands typically came during two different time periods, the late 1980s or early 1990s and later in 2006, where the latter influx resulted from Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia (Boom and Seidler 2017). According to the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), 40,000 Somalis are officially registered in the Netherlands in 2020 (CBS 2020). In the Netherlands, the Somali community is seen as the least integrated immigrant group (Boom and Seidler 2017).

After various critics about the functioning of the Dutch integration system, a new civic integration policy was adopted by the Dutch government in July 2020.[1] In the new policy, more customized, city-led integration practices are encouraged to help integrate migrant communities (Rijksoverheid 2020). Municipalities with a dense Somali population, such as Rotterdam, the Hague, Amsterdam, Eindhoven, and Breda have large numbers of Somali organizations which assist the Somali community (San 2016). There are 160 active organizations in the Netherlands, 56 of which are local Somali entities functioning under the umbrella of the Federation of Somali Associations in the Netherlands (FSAN) (FSAN 2020; van Liempt and Nijenhuis 2020). FSAN is an organization that helps local Somali organizations in the Netherlands cooperate with the Somali community to tackle the problems they face. They also lobby to influence various issues, such as the integration policy, by reacting to national campaigns, projects, and activities (FSAN 2020). These organizations are typically very diverse and have different aims, with some focusing on topics such as Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), healthcare, peacebuilding, and social and economic development in Somalia. However, others work specifically on the integration of Somalis in the Netherlands, including FSAN (van Liempt and Nijenhuis 2020). These Somali organizations assist the municipalities

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[1] The integration policy adopted in July 2020 has been postponed to January 2022.

with civic integration programs (CIPs) by, for example, funding and providing free language courses. CIPs help newcomers to obtain citizenship while preparing them to live in a new society and access existing services (Gebhardt 2016) CIPs are also a mechanism referred to as "civic hardware" that is put in place to foster successful integration outcomes (Goodman 2010). However, this one-way understanding of "successful" civic integration outcomes and one-way integration process does not reveal a great deal about how integration is experienced by immigrants or their expectations.

This thesis therefore aims to investigate the role of Somali organizations in contributing to the integration of Somali immigrants by looking into their experiences and expectations regarding civic integration outcomes. The different Somali organizations each in their own ways cater the Somali community. In addition this study looks at the underlying logic behind these integrational practices. As mentioned by Joppke and Morawska (2003), integration is a practice that requires migrants to become citizens (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 3). However, defining what it means to become a "full member" of Dutch society requires the terms "Dutch society" and "integration" to be delineated as well. Nonetheless, it is impossible to measure integration as a whole, especially the cultural facets of a "society" because an integrated and unified society does not exist in reality. Hence, different understandings of integration need to be examined (Council of Europe 1997).

1.1 Research Problem

The Dutch government expects immigrants to integrate into Dutch society. The integration of Somali immigrants is said to lag behind that of other immigrant groups, as indicated by various studies conducted by the SCP (Social and Cultural Planning Office) and the CBS (Central Bureau of Statistics). Siegel (2011) argues that one of the factors used to measure individual integration is the length of time that a person has lived in the Netherlands, whereby the longer an immigrant has lived in the Netherlands, the more integrated he or she is (5). Somali people immigrated to the Netherlands after ethnic groups, such as Moroccans and Turks. Therefore, when comparing them, a significant difference in their socioeconomic integration is observable in their integration level (Ibid.). Nonetheless, according to van Liempt and Nijenhuis (2020), when comparing the integration of Somali immigrants with other groups,

such as the Syrian immigrants who arrived more recently, the Somalis score lower when it comes to socioeconomic integration (268). Figure 1 shows that in comparison to autochthonous and other immigrants, Somalis have very high unemployment rates, as 34% are unemployed compared to 15% of non-Western immigrants and 6% of autochthonous communities between 2014 and 2016.


Figure 1. Unemployment figures for autochthonous people, Somalis, and the total of non-westerners in the Netherlands between 2003 and 2016 (Andriessen et al. 2017)

Since the start of the integration policy in the 1990s, socioeconomic integration was the main indicator through which integration was measured. Sociocultural integration factors were introduced later in the early 2000s due to various events, such as debates about failed multiculturalism, the rise of populism, and anti-immigrant parties in parliament (Scholten 2017). Boom and Seidler (2017) attribute the low socioeconomic integration of the Somali people to the wide cultural gap between Somali and Dutch culture, specifically characterizing the former as a "closed culture." This means that the Somali community establishes strong networks among themselves within and outside the country of origin, but less so with a host society (van Liempt and Nijenhuis 2020). As a result, it is difficult for most Somalis living in the Netherlands to network and build on their social capital outside the community (Ibid.).

While there is a cultural gap between the Dutch and Somali communities, a generational gap also exists within the latter as the Somali elderly cling to their cultural traditions as many expect to return homeland at some point in time (Boom and Seidler 2017). The young generation, however, seem to more greatly involved in Dutch society. Nonetheless, the

dynamics within the Somali community itself need to be mapped out. Moreover, the SCP annual reports the most recent one published in October 2020 discusses the integration policy on the labor market of all migrant groups in the Netherlands. The SCP publication in 2017 called 'Gevlucht met weinig bagage' (fled with little baggage) is the most recent report that more specifically focusses on the Somali immigrants and their living situation in the Netherlands. This report takes a top-down approach that discusses integration as an one-way process, focusing more strongly on the role of the migrant and less so on the host society, despite integration being defined as a two-way process and a contract agreement between migrants and their host society (Kostakopoulou 2010; Bakker, Dagvos and Egelsbergsen 2014; Korac 2003).

1.2 Research Objective and Questions

The aim of this study is twofold, whereby the first is to provide an in-depth analysis of how Somali organizations operate and organize themselves to contribute to the Dutch integration system. This involves several factors, including Somali organizations' representation of diverse groups within the Somali community based on when they came to the Netherlands and their gender, age, and education level. The second factor relates to cooperation between these organizations and the Dutch government, seeing as this is often lauded as necessary for integration practices. While some Somali organizations cooperate more extensively with the Dutch government, others do not. This study seeks to understand how this affects the role of the Somali organizations in contributing to integration practices. The third factor is the perspectives of the Somali organizations on the Dutch integration system and how this influences the integration of the Somali community. This analysis enables a better understanding of Somalis' experiences and expectations when it comes to integration in the Netherlands.

The second aim of this thesis is to determine the discourses that underlie the Dutch integration system and the functioning of Somali organizations. Using Michel Foucault's governmentality theory, I demonstrate how certain dominant discourses are put in place and mobilized by the Dutch state, subsequently being reproduced by Somali organizations. More specifically, I investigate how the dominant discourse of the "immigrant with poor prospects"

has been reproduced or contested by Somali organizations. To have a better understanding of how this dominant discourse came into being, I also investigate how the culturalization of citizenship has framed the Dutch integration policy and affected the Somali immigrants' sense of belonging to Dutch society. This will be shown in this study through an analysis of Somali organizations' integration perspectives and concerns.

As such, this thesis seeks to answer the following research question:

(1) How do Somali organizations contribute to the realization of Somali civic integration in the Netherlands and what is the rationale behind such civic integration practices?

1.3 Thesis Outline

The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 describes the theoretical framework, focusing on the main concepts of integration and citizenship as well as the key theories of the culturalization of citizenship, the politics of belonging, and the theory of governmentality. Chapter 3 discusses the data collection methods utilized in this study. Next, Chapter 4 presents the political historical context of integration policy in the Netherlands and offers some background information on Somali organizations therein. In chapter 5, the research findings are presented, focusing on the representational role of Somali organizations, organizational-governmental cooperation, and organizations' perspectives on Dutch integration policy. Moreover, this chapter delves into the differences between the so-called 'traditional Somali organization' and the 'new Somali organization.' Lastly, Chapter 6 includes the discussion and conclusion of the analysis presented in the previous chapters.

2 Theoretical Framework

To examine how the actions of Somali organizations tie into broader power relations in the Netherlands, I investigate whether the power relations between the Dutch government and its institutions and the Somali organizations can be seen as governmentality, or a network of power relations in which full citizenship through integration is defined, redefined, and normalized as a logical and attainable goal. As such, the culturalization of citizenship is discussed, followed by the institutionalization of moral citizenship through the politics of belonging. Lastly, the theory of governmentality is used to analyze how certain discourses and techniques are mobilized by the state and reproduced or contested by migrant self-organizations, such as Somali organizations.

2.1 The Culturalization of Citizenship

Integration is defined as a two-way process and a contractual agreement between immigrants and their host society for the purpose of attaining citizenship (Kostakopoulou 2010). Citizenship is defined as a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion or a reciprocal relationship between the state and its citizens. The state provides citizens with services, and in return, citizens have rights and duties toward the state (Schinkel 2008). This study follows the understanding of integration and citizenship as kostakopoulou (2010) and Schinkel (2008) define it. Historically, citizenship was either acquired by birthright or through the nationality of one's parents (Etzioni 2007). Due to globalization and immigration, the overlap between a nation and society has been challenged. A society no longer consists of people that are tied through nativity to a nation (Schinkel 2008). This has caused for the appraisal of various new understandings of the concept of citizenship. Schinkel (2008) analyzes the concept of citizenship and makes an analytical distinction between formal and moral citizenship. Formal citizenship refers to the juridical rights and duties of citizens of a state, such as obtaining a residence permit, whereas moral citizenship refers to the participation of individuals as "good" and "active" citizens. Moral citizenship refers to newcomers' willingness and ability to learn and abide by the culturally dominant values and norms in the Netherlands. Moral citizenship infers the belief that certain "cultures" are lacking in their adjustment to the dominant Dutch "culture" (Ibid.) As such, while a differentiation is made between formal and

moral citizenship, the two are inseparable. In the 1990s, formal citizenship was the main objective. However, this has changed as newcomers are first required to obtain moral citizenship before being crowned with formal citizenship as a reward (Schinkel and van Houdt 2010, 704). The framing of the "good" citizen through moral citizenship is a way to persuade citizens to behave in a desirable way, which is a discursive practice that originates from the concept of governmentality. Duyvendak, Hurenkamp, and Tonkens (2010) discuss moral citizenship as the culturalization and emotionalization of citizenship, arguing that citizenship is less about political and social rights and duties but more so about the culturally defined norms and values of a society. While some scholars argue that citizenship should be granted immediately after the naturalization of newcomers, others posit that formal citizenship is not equal to full citizenship status and advocate for its culturalization. However, the Dutch state is a proponent of moral citizenship, where the integration of immigrants as full citizens is obtained through their acculturation. The culturalization of citizenship has a significant impact on Dutch integration policy and also influences the practices of migrant self-organizations.

2.2 Politics of Belonging

The moralization and culturalization of citizenship have influenced the notion of belonging. Being part of Dutch society is not only tied to economic and political participation and integration, but also with individual commitments to characteristics typifying national citizenship, such a country knowledge, language proficiency, and liberal and social values (Goodman 2010). In other words, citizenship has become increasingly associated with national belonging. The government has further classified immigrants who are likely to integrate "fully" as "immigrants with high prospects" and those who are less likely to integrate "fully" as "immigrants with low prospects." A state's classification of citizens is embedded in the theory of the politics of belonging. According to Bonjour and Duyvendak (2018), the term "politics of belonging" refers to the soft power that states exercise through migration and integration policy through which they classify people on the basis of who belongs to "us" and who belongs to "them." This eventually reproduces the idea of who "we" are in relation to who "they" are. This has affected the government's decision to either see immigrants as immigrants who are likely to integrate fully into the Dutch society and immigrants that are less likely to integrate fully. Geschiere (2019) defines autochthony as being "born from the soil," which relates to a

primordial truth claim about belonging to the land (Geschiere and Jackson 2006). The culturalization of citizenship in the Netherlands is informed by autochthony and has resulted in new citizens needing to prove their "integration" in relation to their the Dutch cultural understandings. Duyvendak, Geschiere and Tonkens (2016) argue that Dutch citizenship is tied to modern Western values. To establish these cultural integration requirements in the Netherlands, the government has put in place "civic hardware" criteria, such as integration contracts, courses, tests, and ceremonies (Goodman, 2010). These are instruments used to measure the integration of immigrants and assign them moral and formal citizenship. The discourse of the feeling of belonging is very much embedded in Dutch integration policy, especially by expressing the notion that immigrants should mold themselves to the culture of national groups that do belong. What is evident is that the cultural or social notion of belonging is gaining more prominence in Dutch integration practices. However, immigrants might have a different understanding of the notion of belonging. According to Duyvendak, Geschiere and Tonkens (2016), a distinction can be made between an economic and social sense of belonging. Social belonging is described as being familiar with a country's culture and language, interacting easily with friends and family, and being accepted by society. Economic belonging includes having access to employment and social services, especially accessibility to white -collar jobs and without experiencing discriminatory treatment. To conclude, the culturalization of citizenship in the Netherlands has privileged sentiments of national belonging, which is done by applying an autochthonous understanding of exclusion and inclusion criteria when determining citizenship. The framing of citizenship based on autochthonous characteristics of citizenship has consequently limited immigrants' ability to have an emotive or cultural identification with the host country (Ibid.). The inclusion and exclusion of immigrants based on social belonging has a significant impact on the functioning of immigrant self-organizations' integration practices.

2.3 Governmentality

The narrative of the Somali immigrant as the "immigrant with poor prospects" dominates Dutch integration policy and practices. It refers to specific negative characteristics which are presumed to be connected to some socioeconomic factors and cultural backgrounds (Bonjour and Duyvendak 2018, 893-94). Examples of such prejudices are that people with a certain

cultural background have low education levels, are dependent on welfare subsidies, and have an overall passive attitude towards socioeconomic independence compared to the "hardworking" Dutch citizen. The narrative of the "immigrant with poor prospects" is the opposite of the narrative of the "high potential" immigrant, depicting the latter as an active, hardworking citizen who is eager to learn and has a can-do attitude. These cliché-driven oppositions between categories of immigrants, however, attribute the possible success factors to cultural and individualistic qualities, thereby failing to acknowledge the systematic barriers that immigrants encounter in their efforts to settle and integrate in the Netherlands (Ibid.).

This study utilizes the Foucauldian line of thinking with regard to the notion of complex power and network relations which function according to a certain logic that is reproduced and contested in different instances (Fimyar 2008; Lemke 2001; Mckee 2009). In relation to this study, Somali immigrants are portrayed by the Dutch government as "immigrants with poor prospects" which need to be culturally emancipated (Bonjour and Duyvendak 2018). This speaks to the implicit values that are produced and reproduced by government institutions and institutions that work closely with the government in the process of integrating Somali immigrants. Foucault's governmentality theory examines the ways in which people are instructed to govern themselves, which suggests that the state shifts its power from the center and distributes it amongst its population. Foucault explains it as conducting the conduct of the people (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, p. 220-221). In other words, the state instructs its population to conduct itself without having to intervene. Foucault further examines the ways in which the state exercises its power over its populace in direct and via indirect means, or what is known as the art of governance. He further differentiates between three powers that the state could acquire. The first is traditional power, where the state disciplines the subject through its monopoly of rule of law (Lilja and Vinthagen 2014). This power is centralized and it transforms the public into subordinate subjects who fear to be punished if they do not follow rulers' orders (Ibid.). The second power is disciplinary power, which is power exercised through institutions which represent an authority. Through institutions, subjects are shaped and normalized as they learn to speak, think, and act similarly to one another, consequently becoming "good citizens" as they behave in the way that the state wants them to (Ibid.). The third and most important power is governmentality, or "biopower," which is decentralized

and involves the way in which people are instructed to govern themselves without the interference of the state (Ibid.). Biopower is further defined as "…the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power"(Foucault 1977-1978). In addition, biopower revolves around power that makes the subject more manageable, which is not just about repressing the subject but managing and structuring the possibilities and actions of others. He discusses the aforementioned three powers as different forms of powers that do not replace each other but coexist simultaneously (Fimyar 2008; Lemke 2001; Mckee 2009).

This study examines the normalization of the network of power between the state and civil society organizations (CSOs), such as the Somali organizations. Governmentality consists of a discursive field that rationalizes the exercise of power and practice in which individuals and groups are governed according to the logic of the discursive field (Mckee 2009, 466). In this research, the dominant narrative of the "immigrant with poor prospects" in the Dutch integration system is regarded as the disciplinary or discursive power through which Somali immigrants-self organizations are governed, according to the theory of governmentality. As Foucault notes, the state is not the sole actor that defines the discursive field, but rather it does so in conjunction with other actors (Mckee 2009), such as the Somali organizations in this context. The discourse of the Somali immigrant as the 'immigrant with poor prospect' has dominated the Dutch integrational agenda which the Somali organizations that are dependent on government subsidies need to adhere to.

In sum, through the culturalization of citizenship and the politics of belonging, Dutch integration policy divides immigrants into those with "high prospects" and "poor prospects," where the latter type dominates the integration discourse that is further reproduced or contested by Somali organizations.

3 Methodology

3.1 Data Collection Methods

Informal conversations, semi-structured interviews, and the analysis of policy documents are the data collection methods used in this study. I chose these methods to obtain different types of data from three different actors. First, I interviewed 15 individuals of which one individual actively assist the Somali community by himself, the other 12 were board members of Somali organizations. I interviewed the board members of Somali organizations because such entities are viewed as the cultural knowledge brokers that assist Somali immigrants in successfully integrating into Dutch society. Second, I spoke to one policy advisor and one expert on Dutch integration research so as to provide me a deeper understanding of the existing literature and what could be relevant entry points for research. Based on these conversations I came to an understanding that the practices of the Somali organizations are vital for the Somali immigrant integration but also that a better understanding of what these integrational practices are needed to be highlighted in research. The list of participants can be found in appendix 8.2. The data collection period can be divided into two phases. The first phase was explorative, whereby I discussed matters with a integration policy advisor and experts on the Somali community. The second phase focused on the Somali organizations, where I examined the most recent policy reports produced by the SCP, an interdepartmental scientific institute that conducts solicited and unsolicited social research. They report to both the upper and lower houses of the Dutch parliament, mainly to the minister of health, welfare and sport, but also to other ministries and social and governmental organizations (SCP 2017). The SCP reports were examined as they have a powerful impact on how Somali immigrants are perceived in the Dutch integration system (Pykett et al. 2010). The data collection period for this thesis took place between December 2020 and April 2021. Due to COVID-19, I conducted all my interviews online.

3.2 Access

Before gathering any data, I familiarized myself with important Somali organizations in the Netherlands. Building trust and networking to obtain more information about their work and who they work with proved to be a crucial step. My background being Somali also helped me

to get access as they often expressed how proud they were of me doing this research. I used small talk and informal conversations in both Somali and Dutch to build trust and obtain information that otherwise would not have been shared. Small talk is the initial step leading up to the interview process which helps in building trust before the interview takes place (Driessen and Jansen, 2013). As such, I engaged in informal conversations by online video calls after participating in two online networking events organized by the Somali organizations HIRDA and Xidig. Both events were dedicated to International Women's Day and involved discussing the role of women in the African diaspora in the Netherlands. During these two events, I was introduced to additional Somali organizations. As such, I made use of the snowball sampling approach to contact different organizations through the recommendations of interview participants. In the early stages of the research, I spoke with a former Somali organization board member who helped me reach out to a representative of the first Somali organization, whom I interviewed.

3.3 Data Analysis Methods

During the data gathering period, I analyzed the notes I made during the first few interviews. Going through these notes gave me a better idea of what themes to focus and elaborate on for the next interviews. I analyzed all the data that I gathered by mapping out the most important themes after familiarizing myself with the data and going through all the notes and interview recordings. In this first round, I used intelligent verbatim transcription to familiarize myself with what was said during the semi-structured interviews and the informal conversations. During the second round of data analysis, I assigned preliminary codes to the data that was collected. In the third round, I searched for patterns and themes in the codes across the different interviews. Since I adopted an inductive approach for this thesis, I also reflected upon possible theories to analyze the data collected. In the last round of data analysis, I reviewed the formulated themes and definitively named theme. I present these themes in my report to make sense of my collected data.

3.4 Code Categorization

To categorize my data into codes I used the Atlas.ti software. This tool has helped me to analyse, examine, discover patterns and meanings within my collected data and as such answer my research question and reach a conclusion. The tool offers different ways to categorize codes. I have used the open coding method where I marked the passages from the interview transcripts and notes from the informal conversations and linked them to a code that I created. As such by doing so, I have connected quotations of the transcripts and notes to different codes. I have used a variety of different codes. Such as the integrational activities of the organizations, the target group, representation (youth, clan, newcomers), funding dependency, social capital (network platform/ outreach in and outside the community), cooperation with government institutions and founding year. Then I proceeded with identifying the most prominent codes. When looking at the data categorization for the second time I found that there were certain repetitive patterns within the data connected to the founding year of the organizations, target groups, cooperation with the Dutch government and funding dependency. On the basis of these codes I further analyzed the data and synthesized the information to answer the main research question.

3.5 Limitations

Several limitations affected this research. First, as I conducted my research in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, most interviews and meetings were online. Since remote interviews are prone to be more artificial, I was more aware of my perceived approachability and made sure to be friendly and open before asking any interview questions. At times, I had multiple conversations with the research participants by calling them before conducting the interviews, which helped me to get acquainted with them and helped build trust relations. Second, I used SCP report from 2017 to get insight on how the Somali immigrant are portrayed in advisory report for integration policy. The latest report I could find was published in 2017, which might not give the most up to date information. Third, as I was conducting interviews with different Somali organizations, I was aware of existing power and trust-related issues. Since my research focuses on mapping out differences between organizations, I asked the participants open questions about their practices and criticization of how the current integration system

works. When they provided me with sensitive information, they would tell me about their experience it and that I should not generalize this particular perspective. Lastly, I was aware of the issue of confirmation bias, which can be an issue when discussing this topic. Therefore, looking for contradicting evidence and questioning why such contradictions challenge my assumptions proved to be important to reflect on my analysis methods and outliers among my participants.

3.6 Ethics

During my research, I intentionally presented myself as independent individual and master's student conducting research for my thesis. In addition, I obtained the informed, verbal consent of all the participants of my research before asking any questions. In every interview, I asked permission to record the conversation. While most of the interviewees agreed, some also asked what would happen to the recordings, which made me aware of the sensitivity of the information provided. As such, to guarantee the anonymity of the participants, I made sure to use pseudonyms and to refer to either "traditional organizations" or "new organizations" to provide the reader with the necessary context. Secondly, I paid attention to my own positionality in the research process. My background as a young, black, women who grew up in a dominantly white city in the Netherlands and brought up with both Somali-Islamic and Dutch cultural norms and values, has an impact on my research. Being in between two different cultures and therefore having an overlap of understanding of both cultures is both a curse and a blessing for this particular study. My background, values, beliefs, and attitudes influenced the results and research and how others perceived me, in addition to how that might have affected their answers to my questions. As such in the following subchapter discusses how I analysed my positionality by being self-reflexive.

3.7 Self-Reflexivity

To conduct a critical examination of my data, I took a self-reflexive position throughout the research process, from the preparation to reporting stages. Reflecting on how my positionality further shaped my research experience and data collection process. I felt that my positionality status was in constant flux as at times, I served as an insider, whereas at other times I was also

an outsider. Self-reflexivity is shaped by the sense of being part of those being researched and sharing in their experience (Adu-Ampong and Adams 2020). Initially, it seemed easier for me to interview the Somali organizations as I am part of this very same community. However, I soon found out that being perceived as an insider could also create problems. When the researched assume that I am an insider, they might also presume that I am aware of certain cultural codes, which can limit the information they provide me with. However, I am also aware that my sense of being part of the Somali community and their experiences might not complement one another (Adu-Ampong and Adams 2020). To grasp a better understanding of my position, I examined my preformed and perceived credibility and approachability. To construct my own credibility and approachability, I also adapted my insider and outsider status. To enhance my performed credibility, I highlighted my insider status through, for example, my cultural knowledge and downplaying other characteristics such as: my role as an academic researcher, to appear more like an insider (Adu-Ampong and Adams 2020). As such, "the individual is engaged in both conscious and unconscious presentations of the self that seek to create and sustain particular impressions of the self in congruence with their social roles" (Goffman 1959). Moreover, to increase one's preformed approachability, the "socially acceptable incompetent" strategy can be used to downplay one's insider status to get more information by taking on the role of someone who is "ignorant" and is in desperate need of being "taught" (Adu-Ampong and Adams 2020). Mayorga-Gallo and Hordge-Freeman (2017) have defined approachability in a research encounter as attempting "to come across as nonthreatening and safe". In my research, my preformed approachability is highlighted through me speaking the same language and having the same cultural background. However, my perceived approachability as a researcher from the Netherlands may define me as an outsider. For these reasons, I have been conscious of my positionality in this study.

4 Context

This chapter initially provides a broad overview of various Dutch integration policy changes that took place over time, before discussing when and how the Somali organizations were established in the Netherlands.

4.1 Evolution of Dutch Integration Policy

Dutch integration policy has gone through several changes over the years, further influencing the relationship between the national and local governments as well as immigrant-self organizations. In literature, Dutch migration policy has been characterized by a so-called multiculturalism (Duyvendak and Scholten 2011), where the migration that took place in the 1960s and 1970s was perceived as temporary. The migrants were considered guest workers and were expected to leave again to their home countries. Hence, policies aimed at integration would hamper their return to their home countries (Scholten 2012). As a result of this multiculturalist paradigm, the Ethnic Minorities Policy was created in the 1980s (Scholten 2017). This policy referred to a "formal recognition of specific immigrant minority groups in the Dutch society and an intensive government approach aimed at sociocultural emancipation and socioeconomic participation" (Ibid.). The policies developed during this time were the so called "two-track" policies, which implied that although migrants were expected to actively participate in the socioeconomic sphere, they were to be differentiated from the rest of Dutch society (Scholten 2017).

Since the mid-1980s, the neoliberal ideology of having "individual responsibilities" has dominated duties that accompany the rights of citizens (Entzinger 2003; Scholten 2012; Bonjour 2009, 192-198). However, in the early 1990s, a shift took place as the Dutch government realized that ethnic minorities would stay permanently in the Netherlands. This realization led to a move away from the Ethnic Minorities Policy toward a more integrationist policy agenda, whereby immigrants were expected to participate in the Dutch society (Bonjour 2013; Scholten 2017). The integration policy aimed at encouraging the socioeconomic independence of migrants rather than their cultural emancipation. At this time, cultural emancipation efforts were not considered to be concerns of the state. In 1996,

as part of the abovementioned shift, the first civic integration policies were formulated and two years later, the Law on Civic Integration of Newcomers (*Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers*) was introduced as a solution to the issues that had resulted from the former multiculturalist, exclusionist, and assimilationist policy (Goodman 2010). With the establishment of this new law, migrants were obliged to take language courses and enroll in professional orientation programs (Bonjour 2013). These civic integration courses were obligatory and initially free of charge. However, this later changed as any company or organization was allowed to teach the courses. As such, the responsibility to succeed was placed in the hands of the individual, who became responsible for paying for civic integration courses or withdrawing a loan from the government institution called *Dienst Uitvoerig Onderwijs* (Education Executive agency) (Bonjour 2013). In the mid-90s also the first Somali immigrant self-organization were at that time established and professionalized in order to assist the first Somali immigrants in the Netherlands. The organizations also functioned as an extended arm to reach out to the Somali community. The organizations were responsible for informing the Dutch government about the needs of the Somali community.

In the 2000s, the Dutch professor and author Paul Scheffer argued that one could speak of a so-called "multicultural tragedy" in the Netherlands (Scholten 2012, 97). Scheffer pointed out that the multicultural society has failed in the Netherlands, as people from different cultural backgrounds were living alongside each other without engaging with the wider society. The media added to this debate by speaking of a "clash of civilizations," which referenced an infamous book published by Samuel Huntington in 1996 (Scholten 2012). In addition, the populist politician Pim Fortuyn was assassinated in 2002. This event strengthened the development of a center-right government in the Netherlands leading towards a stricter policy towards immigrant integration. At this time, Minister for Integration and Asylum Affairs, Rita Verdonk was seen as the key driver behind the adoption of a more assimilationist policy approach (Scholten 2012). Under her leadership, the existing integration policy shifted from its focus on socioeconomic participation to one that prioritized sociocultural integration. Developed in 2002, this integration policy was also known as the "new-style integration policy," which emphasized individual commitments typifying national citizenship, such a country knowledge, language proficiency, and liberal and social values. To establish these new

integration requirements, the government put in place a set of "civic hardware" criteria, such as integration contracts, courses, tests, and ceremonies (Goodman 2010).

Generally speaking, the Netherlands and other European countries' integration policies have been fused with immigration policies. The traditional 1998 civic integration system intended to "enable membership" while the civic integration system adopted in the Netherlands in 2013 was more conditional in its aim to limit and control the inflow and settlement of immigrants (Bonjour and Duyvendak 2018, 883). This phenomenon where civic integration became conditional is also known as the "civic integration turn." The integration system is designed in such a way so as to select those who will or will not smoothly integrate into Dutch society (Ibid.). Bonjour and Duyvendak (2018) further elaborate that there is a dominant discourse in the civic integration system which divides immigrants into two categories: "immigrants with poor prospects" and "immigrants with high prospects." By doing so, the state divorces itself from the responsibility of putting additional effort to integrate those who struggle with integrating, which can be seen as a neglect of state responsibility for the successful integration of immigrants (Ibid.). Gebhardt (2016) mentions that a "local turn" in civic integration programs is needed, including the involvement of cities, which will help such programs to become more effective (743). Hence, the integration of immigrants became their own responsibility through the establishment of the "Wet Inburgering" (Civic integration Act) law, which has been modified in 2013.

The late 2000s is also known as the start of the mainstreaming or generalization of the Dutch integration policy. This meant that immigrants were expected to be responsible for their own integration, and policies no longer focused on cooperating with immigrant groups or assisting distinct migrant groups (Scholten 2017). In 2013, Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, Lodewijk Asscher, presented an "integration vision," outlining the necessary steps that newcomers would need to take to succeed in integrating. Several agenda points were highlighted by the minister, including participation and self-reliance, living together and cooperating with others, and internationalization of Dutch values (European Website on Integration, 2019). In October 2017, in the new coalition agreement, newcomers were urged to become "active" citizens. This vision aimed to focus on newcomers' entry into the labor market as well as the enhancement of their literacy rates (European Website on Integration,

2019). Based on this agreement, a new integration policy was adapted in 2020 (Rijksoverheid 2020). Although the new integration law was expected to take effect first in July 2020 it has been postponed several times because more time was needed to properly prepare for the introduction of the law as well as due to COVID-19 related issues. First to January 2021 then to July 2021 and currently it has been postponed to January 2022 (Immigratie en Naturalisatiedienst 2020). The main difference with the previous integration law is that this one urges municipalities to take responsibility for the integration of the newcomers. The law was also adopted in order to enable immigrants to learn the Dutch language at a quicker pace due to higher language standards. The current law is focused on providing language lessons to newcomers in combination with (voluntary) work or internships. The youth is allowed to take a different route: by receiving intensive language lessons as well as following subjects on Mathematics, English, study- and career counseling courses. They are expected to complete their integration process in an average of 18 months and enter higher education afterwards. For people who for some reason cannot take this path they are expected to spend more time to learn the language, to be self-reliant and learn about participation in society. In the new system this group does not get an exemption and will also need to acquire the certificate to conclude their civic integration process (Rijksoverheid 2021).

However, the delay of the new integration law could be detrimental as "the current integration system takes too long, and individuals are not sufficiently encouraged to achieve the highest possible language level" (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2016). In addition, the language classes differ in education quality and some are also more susceptible of fraud. While Gijsberts and Dagevos (2016) are mainly positive about the new integration law and advocate for its speedy implementation, they argue that municipalities need to supervise the newcomers as they acquire the ability to organize better language courses. In addition, through meetings, the municipalities should gain a better understanding of the individual needs of the newcomers in order to better advise them on their integration process.

Moreover, Engebersen et al. (2015) formulated several recommendations focused on bringing relevant stakeholders together, including CSOs. This is because they often play a very important role in the integration and reception of immigrants, such as through civic integration programs, in addition to creating effective and practical networks. However, since

the Dutch government abandoned its *doelgroepenbeleid* (target group policy), integration has increasingly become part of a mainstream policy. The abandonment of *doelgroepenbeleid* means that migrant groups are no longer targeted specifically based on their national background, but rather are targeted using a more general approach (van Liempt and Nijenhuis 2020). The following section discusses when, why and how the Somali migrant organizations were established.

4.2 Somali Organizations

The very first Somali organizations were established in the early 1990s when the first Somali immigrants arrived in the Netherlands as a result of the fall of the Siad Barre regime that resulted in a decades long civil war. After the 90s Somali mass migration a new influx of Somali immigrants appeared after 2006 as a result of the Somali-Ethiopia conflict that went on for two years resulting in another wave of Somali organizations (San 2017). Most of the Somali community organizations were set up by key figures in the Somali community who were seeking to formalize the assistance they provided to immigrants, especially the uneducated Somalis required help with basic services, such as translation which were part of the policy of the Dutch government (Ibid.). Other objectives behind the establishment of Somali organizations was to get the Somali community acquainted with the host country, although they later served as the professional contact of the Dutch government. The Dutch government knew little to nothing about this new migrant group, thereby needing the organizations to give them insight into the needs of the Somalis. Different government institutions (healthcare, welfare, education) were also asking for advice on how to deal with this new group. The Somali organizations were provided with subsidies to finance their activities to inform the Somali community and to advise different institutions (San 2017). The ethnic or national specific migrant organization contribution to the settlement of newcomers in host countries has been recognized for a long time (Rex et al. 1987; Salinas et al. 1987; Griffiths 2000) In the UK and Canada where many Somali immigrants are settled the government has strategically used the ethnic specific community organizations for the integration and settlement of newcomers (Hopkins 2006).

From all migrant self-organizations in the Netherlands the Somali migrant organization have the highest density in proportion to the amount of Somali immigrants living in the Netherlands (Boom and Seidler 2017). Boom and Seidler (2017) and van Liempt and Nijenhuis (2020) give multiple reasons for the high density of Somali organizations, indicating that the first few entities were established along the lines of clan structures. The complex clan system dominates the Somali political structure but also serves as an important channel for social support. The clan system has a lasting influence on the Somali community through its support networks, whereby the clan is obligated to assist the newly arrived refugees. The Somali clan structure is also active transnationally in Somalia through, among others, political, social, and economic remittances (Boom and Seidler 2017). Hopkins (2006), has mentioned that despite the high amount of Somali community organizations many Somalis have felt marginalized in terms of collective representation and service provision. The aspects that have led to the marginalization are related to the persistent clan dynamics in the Somali organizations. This has resulted in in the lack of united objectives and directions amongst the Somali community in the host countries which acts against the wider representation of the community (Hopkins 2006). In addition, Somali organizations were also used as a way to make jobs out of participating in Somali organizations. Moreover, the lack of collaboration and coordination amongst such entities resulted in multiple organizations performing the same activities, which has also increased the emergence of new organizations (van Liempt and Nijenhuis 2020).

Somali organizations are often mainly categorized in literature as those focusing on the host country or on the country of origin, with the former type assisting the Somali community in integrating into Dutch society. Through thematic events, they offer information pertaining to healthcare, education, and childcare, while also providing basic services, such as translation. A few examples of these kinds of organizations are FSAN, Himilo, Somalische vereniging Zwolle, Stichting Somaliers Groningen, and Somali for All. Others mainly focus on issues in Somalia and discuss topics such as peacebuilding, healthcare, FGM, and socioeconomic development, such as HIRDA (van Liempt and Nijenhuis 2020). As a result of their large numbers, the need for coordination between the entities has increased.

The Federation of Somali Associations (FSAN) is an umbrella organization that was founded in 1994 to provide coordination. Currently, 56 Somali organizations are associated with FSAN.

The organization was established with the purpose of providing coordination of the associated organizations but also to improve the cooperation of the local Somali organizations. When the problems transcend the local level, FSAN would lobby for policy changes and advocate for project and activity needs of the community. FSAN is also established to act as the national advocate and spokesperson for the Somali community in the Netherlands. The organizations' main goal is to optimize the participation of Somalis in Dutch society and the overall strengthening of the position of the Somali community in the Netherlands. The main objective of FSAN is that the Somali people should take care of their fellow compatriots. The organizations consists out of key figures of the community and for a large part out of professionals that acquire a particular field of knowledge and are committed in contributing to the development of Somali integration in the Netherlands. Some of the organizations also encourage diaspora activities that are aimed for the development and peacebuilding of Somalia (FSAN 2021).

In addition to being divided based on their goals, organizations also differ based on their year of founding. Generally speaking, I have found that the Somali community in the Netherlands has three waves of Somali community organization. The first two waves of community organizations are in parallel to the waves of arrival. The third wave of Somali community organization has not been in parallel with the wave of Somali immigrant arrival. I will refer to these two main differences in organizational type as 'classic organization' and 'new organizations. The establishment of Somali organizations began around 1994 initially alongside the first influx of immigrants, and then increased again in 2006 when the second wave of Somali immigrants arrived in the Netherlands. The founding period of the new organizations was around 2016. I label the organizations established during the first two waves as "traditional organizations" because they have continued with the integration-related activities that they had begun since their founding, which mainly focus on the reception of newcomers. However, I label the organizations established a decade later around 2016 as "new organizations" because they focus instead on youth that grew up in the Netherlands. Additionally, their main focus is to establish a strong network within and beyond the Somali community, especially since external networking is deemed to be a struggle issue for many (van Liempt and Nijnenhuis 2020). In line with van Liempt and Nijenhuis (2020), the interviews I conducted show, that young, educated Somalis are increasingly creating new migrant

organizations to stay connected to and work toward having a better life in their host country as well as in Somalia.

4.3 Conclusion

In sum, in the wake of the alleged failure of multiculturalism in the Netherlands, the Dutch government has made important shifts in its integration policy over the past twenty years. These changes were amplified by the rise of populism, the occurrence of 9/11, and anti-immigrant parties in the Dutch parliament, leading to greater calls for assimilation and sociocultural integration in the first half of the 2000s. Although the government has individually targeted the migrant groups based on their ethnicity and needs the late 2000 has marked an era of mainstreaming integration policy. Leading to structural issues in the Dutch integration policy to remain. The Somali immigrant groups have for long been considered the least integrated group in the Netherlands, which was ascribed to their closed network and the difficulty this group supposedly had to interact with networks outside of the community. To assist the Somali community with integrating Somali organizations were set up by key figures in the Somali community. The main finding of this research looking at the establishment of the Somali organizations is that there have been three waves of Somali organizations. While the first two were established in parallel to the first two waves of Somali immigration to the Netherlands, the last wave of Somali community organizations around 2016 was not in parallel with the Somali migration wave. Next to the link of the establishment of the Somali organizations with the migration waves the founding of the Somali organizations can be linked to the changes in the Dutch integration policy. In the mid-90s to the late 2000s there has been a strong cooperation with the Somali immigrant groups as a result of the *'doelgroepenbeleid'*. The Somali organizations that were founded in this period were especially focused on helping the Somali community integrate into the Dutch society by   providing mainly language related assistance. The third wave of Somali organizations has been very different from the first two waves because the integration agenda at that time encouraged immigrant to be responsible for their own integration. Moreover, with the abolishment of *'doelgroepenbeleid'* the integration agenda took a more general approach. This finding formed the basis of the analysis of my results, that I will in the next chapter, examines in greater detail.

5 Results

The discourse of the Somali immigrant as the "immigrant with poor prospects" is grounded in Dutch integration policy. This chapter discusses how this discourse has been reproduced and or contested by the Somali organizations themselves. The following subchapters discuss the data gathered through the interviews with both traditional and more recent Somali organizations, focusing first on their representational role in order to better grasp insider-outsider dynamics. Next, the cooperation and negotiation positions of the Somali organizations is discussed, before lastly addressing the integrational activities perspectives and concerns of the organizations.

5.1 Representing the Somali Community

Through the interviews conducted, I understood that the Somali communities' insider-outsider dynamic is organized along the lines of clan structures, age, gender, and time of immigration. Somali organizations are seen as cultural knowledge brokers who could assist any immigrants with their successful integration into Dutch society (Egblomassé and Boubaris 2009). The idea that migrant self-organizations should represent the migrant community because they understand them best is widely shared (Egblomassé and Boubaris 2009; Haas 2015; Williams 2007), which involves helping them meet their needs through integration activities. However, the representation of the Somali community through Somali organizations has been criticized by subsidy providers as such entities were mainly said to be organized along clan structures (van Heelsum 2006). Van Heelsum (2006) mentions that the large number of Somali organizations is attributed to the clan structures, which were not communicated with the subsidizers. Assuming that only clan members would be represented and assisted by these organizations. This issue has not been observed in this study rather issues concerning the representation of youth was noticeable.[2]

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[2] Interview with Mariam, a policy officer, 16-02-2021; Interview with Muna, a board member of a new organization, 11-02-2021.

Abdi, a member of a traditional organization, notes that his organization represents all Somali people regardless of their clan. He also explains that the name of the organization "Stichting Somali4All" indicative of its inclusive stance.[3] Aziz, who has been a board member and chair of a traditional organization for 13 years mentions that because he is from Hargeisa, people would call him Aziz Hargeisa, which is a reference to the northern part of Somalia called Somaliland. His organization was accused by subsidy providers of exclusively representing Somalis from Somaliland. While he agrees that issues pertaining to clan representation existed in the past, he argues that matters are resolved and that his organization focuses on all people with Somali ethnicity, regardless of whether they are from Djibouti, Kenya, or Ethiopia.[4] When asking Somali organizations about their representational role, traditional Somali organizations' spokespersons argue that clan-associated representation no longer takes place and that they now focus on all Somali people regardless of their clans. However, new Somali organizations are not concerned with such issues as they argue that this is mostly associated with traditional organizations.

As of 2021, the insider-outsider dynamic based on clan structures is not as manifest and organizations increasingly focus on representing Somali youth, the elderly, and newcomers in the Netherlands. As such, integration-related activities can help bring these different groups together. To include youth, Aziz's traditional organization, for example, formed a special youth board to discuss the needs of young Somalis. Aziz notes that youth would be disinclined to join their events previously because they were all in Somali and the topics did not interest them.[5] Hence, the youth board address topics that they would like to discuss in Dutch and host events together with older members of the organization's board to encourage youth participation. Aziz's organization was the only one to set up a youth board,[6] with other traditional organizations focusing more so on including youth through events, such as the

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[3] Interview with Abdi, a board member of a traditional organization, 28-02-2021.

[4] Interview with Aziz, a board member of a traditional organization, 21-02-2021.

[5] Interview with Aziz, a board member of a traditional organization, 21-02-2021.

[6] Interview with Aziz, a board member of a traditional organization, 21-02-2021.

annual Eid celebrations, sport events, and information events on education and job opportunities in the Netherlands.[7]

Both Muna, a member of a new organization, and Aziz, a member of a traditional Somali organization, emphasize that there is generational clash, where the youth have different perceptions concerning integration than the elderly. This clash has been caused by an identity crisis in which older generations still believe that they will someday return home and their sense of social belonging is tied to their country of origin. The youth who are brought up by the older generations in the Netherlands also tend to struggle with their identities as they are often more socially attached to the Netherlands.[8] According to Muna,

> Parents say that their child is too westernized, while the child only thinks "I am participating in the society I am living in." The older generation focuses on the home country. Their head is in Somalia, but their body is here. With politics, for example, they are really focused on what is happening in Somalia, while when it comes to subsidies etc., then they are here. I think it is underrated how much trauma these people are carrying. They came here in survival mode. They have only tried to have a better life for their children, and they never had the time to invest in themselves.[9]

Muna signals here that the problem is far more complex, noting that a simple youth board within an organization will not help. According to her, more time and effort is needed to understand the underlying trauma that has caused the identity crisis of the elderly. She emphasizes that efforts should be made to connect the different generations, further stating "The elderly Somali people hold on to the belief that they will only stay here temporarily. The younger generation is willing to participate in Dutch society but is often reminded by their elders that they should also be connected to their own culture and community. If not, they will be sent back to Somalia."[10] The phenomenon that Muna mentioned is also referred to as

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[7] Interview with Hamza, a board member of a traditional organization, 11-02-2021; Interview with Fardusa, a board member of a traditional organization, 14-03-2021; Interview with Abdi, a board member of a traditional organization, 28-02-2021; Interview with Zamzam, a board member of a traditional organization, 31-03-2021.

[8] Interview with Muna, a board member of a new organization, 11-02-2021; Interview with Aziz, a board member of a traditional organization, 21-02-2021.

[9] Interview with Muna, a board member of a new organization, 11-02-2021.

[10] Interview with Muna, a board member of a new organization, 11-02-2021.

"*dhagan celis*" in the Somali language, which is literally translated as a "return to culture" (Bakaari and Escandell 2021). The idea of returning to Somalia has a significant impact on the function of Somali organizations. Somali older generations, who are often also members of traditional Somali organizations, mainly intend to mobilize the youth through integration in the host country in order to bring the acquired knowledge back to their country of origin.[11] Muna mentions that the older generation specifically can hinder the full integration of the Somali youth, which is why reducing the gap between the two will result in better integration. However, she also notes that the current culture-focused Dutch integration system obliges individuals to adapt to the norms and values of the dominant culture. This phenomenon has intensified the identity crisis of the Somali community living in the Netherlands. While young Somalis are told by their families to stay true to their cultural beliefs and values, they are also told by the state that to fit into Dutch society, they must strip away from their ethnic cultures. This phenomenon enhances the complexity of the Dutch integration system and adds a cultural layer to the image of the "migrant with poor prospects**."**

Other board members of new Somali organization focus on the youth because they believe that especially the youth can benefit from getting more assistance. The Somali youth often does not have the assistance from their parents when it comes to education and career choices for example. New Somali organizations mainly focus on recruiting professional Somalis who can assist the community and its youth in participating in Dutch society. The working professionals also serve as role models, according to Ali and Iftin, both of whom are members of different new Somali organizations.[12] Ali mentions that the image that people have about Somalis has been created by policy reports that specify how Somali immigrants have the lowest rankings in education and employment rates compared to other immigrants. He argues that this narrative has had a negative impact on the self-image of the Somali community. According to Iftin, getting rid of this image necessitates changing the negative narrative used to describe Somalis, whereby showing that the community is capable of successfully

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[11] Interview with Muna, a board member of a new organization, 11-02-2021; Interview with Fardusa, a board member of a traditional organization, 14-03-2021.

[12] Interview with Ali, a board member of a new organization, 28-01-2021; Interview with Iftin, a board member of a new organization, 04-03-2021.

participating in Dutch society will subsequently motivate the people to become more active. Ali and Safiya, who is also a board member of a new Somali organization, holds the same belief about the importance of the narrative that is dictated by the immigrants themselves. According to Ali,

> A coin has two sides. You can focus on the things that are going wrong and you can focus on the things that are going well. We decided to focus on the things that are going well. We recruit a wide variety of Somali professionals, for example. We want to build up the social capital of the Somali community through these Somali professionals. Before I joined the organization, I did not know that there were so many Somali people doing so well at participating in Dutch society. Being surrounded by all kinds of [working] professionals feels empowering and like we are developing ourselves. The negative images that are dominant in the news and in reports are only leading us to develop a negative self-image. To move forward, we need to see positive examples – and that is what we are doing with our network.[13]

Similarly, Iftin mentions that she does not believe in solving problems by writing down problems. She argues that the traditional organizations in particulair go along with reproducing the Somali immigrant as an "immigrant with poor prospect" by discussing only the negative narratives. She further explains that the traditional organizations go along with this narrative because of their financial dependence. According to her, her children need positive images and not only stereotypical depictions of Somali people as pirates and criminals in media and reports. She explains that she wants her children to be proud of being Somali and to see that many of them are doing well and are participating in Dutch society. She adds that all the Somali youth should see these role models and be surrounded by them. Iftin explains that, "Somali professionals are positive examples of successful, integrated and participating immigrants."[14]

For this reason, new Somali organizations serve as networking platforms where Somali professionals as well as non-professionals can meet each other. The new organizations' focus on the Somali professionals is because they have the empirical knowledge that is needed to translate the needs of the Somali community to the Dutch institutions. This is seen as a unique

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[13] Interview with Ali, a board member of a new organization, 28-01-2021.

[14] Interview with Iftin, a board member of a new organization, 04-03-2021.

strength of the migrant self-organizations as they acquire in-depth experiences and knowledge of professional fields, which they can use to contribute to the integration debate by pinpointing the difficulties they encounter in their professional lives. The new Somali organization have found this to be a major asset for improving the integration of the Somali community. Ali mentions that his organization currently focuses mainly on healthcare issues because it is composed of multiple individuals with a medical background. They also encounter multiple hurdles in their interactions with the Somali community as healthcare providers observed that Somalis often tend to avoid the healthcare sector. The organization has therefore started a project called "healthcare-avoiders," which attempts to pinpoint the reasons why the Somali community avoids receiving medical treatment. Their findings indicate, for example, that Somali immigrants tend to struggle with the linguistic terms needed to explain their problems.[15] However, according to Ali, the members of his organization have greater insight into what causes certain problems by uncovering the underlying problems that the Somali community is facing within a given context and to provide them with guidance. However, the new Somali organizations emphasize that their approach does not involve providing translation services, for example, but rather encompasses activities that prioritize structural contributions to the integration debate through the provision of a different perspective.[16]

When it comes to the representation of more recent Somali immigrant groups also referred to as 'newcomers', no specific attention has been given to this specific group at the time of writing. However, interviews with representatives of both traditional and new organizations indicate that this group needs special (trauma sensitive) attention.[17] According to Mariam, a integration policy advisor, the people who immigrated to the Netherlands after 2006 have stayed in a war-affected region for a longer time, which is why some still struggle with and

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[15] Interview with Ali, a board member of a new organization, 28-01-2021.

[16] Interview with Ali, a board member of a new organization, 28-01-2021; Interview with Iftin, a board member of a new organization, 04-02-2021.

[17] Interview with Mariam, policy officer, 16-02-2021; Interview with Muna, a board member of a new organization, 11-02-2021; Interview with Abdi, a board member of a traditional organization, 28-02-2021.

require special care to overcome war-related trauma.[18] Fardusa, who has been in the Netherlands since 1992 and has been the chair of a traditional organization since 2008, notes that the Somali people who arrived after 2006 had a hard time adjusting to the Netherlands because they lived in a war zone for a longer period than the Somali immigrants who fled Somalia in the early 1990s, such as herself.[19] As such, her organization has set up a project called "Link to Connect" where immigrants who stayed longer in the Netherlands help newcomers with, for example, learning the Dutch language. However, she mentions that this project ended shortly because the organization did not have the financial means to continue its sponsorship.[20] Other traditional organizations also noted such problems and are willing to set up projects similar to "Link to Connect" if they find those who support it because the municipality often does not finance projects that fall outside of their more general integration agenda.[21]

In sum, when it comes to the representation of the Somali community through the traditional and the newer Somali organization, several matters are observable. First, while the organizations were initially criticized for their clan-based representation, they have typically shifted their focus to represent all Somali Immigrants. In the interviews, the generational clash between Somali elders and youth was often mentioned as a significant issue affecting integration. In addition, new Somali organizations emphasized the negative image of Somali immigrants portrayed in policy reports and media, arguing that it is their responsibility to not reproduce this image but actively challenge, contest and change the narrative of Somali "immigrants with poor prospects." They attempt to do so by providing a platform where members of the diverse Somali community can connect to one another and receive assistance

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[18] Interview with Mariam, policy officer, 16-02-2021.

[19] Interview with Fardusa, a board member of a traditional organization, 14-03-2021.

[20] Interview with Fardusa, a board member of a traditional organization, 14-03-2021.

[21] Interview with Abdi, a board member of a traditional organization, 28-02-2021; Interview with Aziz, a board member of a traditional organization, 21-02-2021; Interview with Zamzam, a board member of a traditional organization, 31-03,2021; Interview with Hamza, a board member of a traditional organization, 11-02-2021.

from highly educated Somali professionals who also serve as role models for the community due to their understanding of both cultures.

5.2 Cooperation between Somali Organizations and the Dutch Government

Cooperation between national and local governments and migrant self-organizations is increasingly seen by the Dutch government as necessary to achieve successful integration (Egblomassé and Boubaris 2009). Since migrant self-organizations are close to the community, they can observe earlier what is going on with the community than other institutions, such as schools and healthcare facilities would do (Ibid.). Cooperation between the government and such organizations is said to benefit the two-way integration process because the former can also outline what it expects from the organizations through their integration agenda (Ibid.).

Cooperation between Somali organizations and the Dutch government began in the mid-90s when the first Somali organizations were founded as Somalis arrived in the Netherlands.[22] FSAN was the first organization that closely worked with the national level government, as it would bring different Somali organizations together to discuss issues and opportunities that go beyond the local level in order to formulate actions and projects on a national level.[23] Zamzam, a board member of FSAN, explains that it cooperated more closely with the government as the main spokespersons of the Somali community and its organizations. Since the mainstreaming of the integration policy, other organizations like VluchtelingenWerk (VW) are invited to discuss issues regarding the integration of migrant groups and FSAN is sidestepped in favor of more general organizations that do not have an ethnic focus. [24] She explains,

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[22] Interview with Zamzam, a board member of a traditional organization, 31-03-2021.

[23] Interview with Zamzam, a board member of a traditional organization, 31-03-2021.

[24] Interview with Zamzam, a board member of a traditional organization, 31-03-2021.

There is a list of organizations like VluchtelingenWerk that the national government now works with to develop [Dutch] integration policy and activities. We only get assigned small tasks, such as recruiting [members of] the Somali community that are eligible for such activities. [25]

While she notes the significant decline in cooperation with the Dutch government and municipality, other traditional organizations have said that they still work closely with the municipality. For example, Aziz, as a board member of a traditional organization operating under the umbrella of FSAN, noted that his organization works and communicates closely together with different local welfare, healthcare, and education institutions to achieve their goals. He notes that the main aim of organizing themselves in this way is to become a serious partner.[26] When I asked about his organization's cooperation with the municipality, he stated:

Our organization looks at the integration agenda of the municipality. With the elderly board, we look at it and we ask ourselves what themes are discussed in the agenda that could help us. Once we find out, then we will put it to work and then we will implement it. If the municipality has a policy, we look at what suits us to reach our target group and do something important for them. All we do is we look at the policy and we take the things out of it that we can use, and we discuss it with the elder members. If we agree, we implement it. The elderly council is a mixed group and for us, it is important that we listen to their advice, [which is] also called Somali wisdom [or] "under the tree wisdom." If certain things have happened between the Somalis, it will be solved that way.[27]

The members of traditional Somali organizations oversee integration activities, which are determined by a fixed national integration policy. This mediation falls, therefore, within the national integration framework, thereby preventing the adaptation of the integration agenda. While the Somali organizations have a very good understanding of the form of integration activities that would suit their community, they often cannot offer them due to their lack of resources and therefore must work within the abovementioned set framework. However, the national integration policy remains rigid, as so does the negative image of Somali immigrants.

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[25] Interview with Zamzam, a board member of a traditional organization, 31-03-2021.

[26] Interview with Aziz, a board member of a traditional organizations, 21-02-2021.

[27] Interview with Aziz, a board member of a traditional organization, 21-02-2021.

Hamza, who is also a board member of a traditional organization, says that his organization has good relations with the municipality because his organizations include people from different ethnicities.

> Turks, Antilleans, [and] Moroccans are all welcome. To speed up [the] decision-making [of the municipality to grant them subsidies for their activities], we say that it is for everyone. Sometimes the municipality also gives us a topic that we should discuss, such as "Black Lives Matter." We have [a] very good relationship with the municipality. We work closely with the neighborhood manager who provides the information to the councilor.[28]

As Hamza and Aziz indicated, traditional Somali organizations often cooperate closely with local governments. Among all five representatives of traditional organizations who were interviewed, only one mentioned that hers did not collaborate closely with the Dutch government, largely because the organization does not depend on governmental funding. Instead, they would finance their activities through their members, who pay membership fees.[29] All representatives of both traditional and new organizations that were interviewed mentioned that such close cooperation requires strict adherence to the guidelines of the Dutch national integration policy framework.

According to Aziz, the municipality's assistance in integrational practices is needed, although there remains much to be learned when it comes to aiding the Somali community. He says that this is because the government and its institutions do not have a good understanding of Somali culture,[30] as their customs are unknown in the Netherlands. He further stated "When the Dutch say "what can I do for you?" Somalis often say "no, you don't have to do anything for me." In our culture, "what can I do for you?" is a very negative question. "[31] He explained

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[28] Interview with Hamza, a board member of a traditional organization, 11-02-2021.

[29] Interview with Fardusa, a board member of a traditional organization, 14-03-2021.

[30] Interview with Aziz, a board member of a traditional organization, 21-02-2021.

[31] Interview with Aziz, a board member of a traditional organization, 21-02-2021.

that this in particular created problems because the authorities indicated that the Somali people did not want to be helped. He elaborated by indicating that:

> Sometimes we would have fights with the institutions because they would say "those people don't want to be helped!" We would tell them "yes, they do want to be helped but it has to do with the way you approach them. They don't want to be seen as a problem." In the Somali culture, you do things differently and you don't loudly say that you need help because that is a taboo.[32]

Similarly, to Aziz, Zamzam mentions the importance of assisting the community through people that understand how to approach its members. She says that within Dutch integration policymaking, migrant self-organizations have not been provided an important position,[33] and that they are not being heard. She explains that this is because there are too many organizations that advocate for immigrant integration, but do not consist of immigrants who understand the cultural codes of a certain community. These organizations treat all migrant groups similarly without taking their different needs or cultural sensitivities into account. Unlike traditional organizations, most new Somali organizations do not cooperate with the Dutch government at all, with four out of six representatives indicating that do not work together with the Dutch government. The remaining two only cooperate with the government to a limited extent. Ali mentions,

> If I have to describe the relationship between the national and local government and our organization, I would say that it is lukewarm. What I mean by this is that it is not instantly warm, but they also do not neglect us. The government, both local and national, deal with so many Somali organizations that are representing the community and then they need to select whom they want to work with. They often choose the ones that they have worked with before because they already established trusting relationships with them. However, in order for a drastic change in integration [practices to take place], the local and national Dutch governments should also work with network organizations.[34]

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[32] Interview with Aziz, a board member of a traditional organization, 21-02-2021.

[33] Interview with Zamzam, a board member of a traditional organization, 31-03-2021.

[34] Interview with Ali, a board member of a new organization, 28-01-2021.

According to Ali, increased cooperation with a diverse number of organizations will result in better integration outcomes. He also mentions that working exclusively with traditional organizations due to longstanding relations with them hinders the development and improvement of the integration process of the Somali community in the Netherlands. Traditional organization also have a different approach to integration than the new organizations, whereby the latter attract the younger generation, which the older entities find hard to reach. In order to involve the whole Somali community in integration, Ali mentions that the Dutch government should also cooperate with the new organizations. According to Iftin, a member of a new organization, cooperation with the municipality is not as important because organizations like hers are self-reliant. She mentions that the new Somali organizations' contributions to integration are different as they want to directly invoke change using their own resources. For example, the entrepreneurs that are members of the organizations may provide internship opportunities to Somali students who are struggling to find an internship by themselves due to their background. Additionally, people that would like to work but do not speak Dutch well enough are offered a job by the entrepreneurs. Iftin mentions that this way, people who have not been employed in the Netherlands get to experience the work environment therein. She says that opportunities to participate in Dutch society are very important for the motivation of Somali immigrants, and her organization attempts to help the Somali community meet its needs.

Overall, unlike the traditional organizations, the new entities have mentioned that they do not or rarely work together with the Dutch government. However, traditional organizations also noted that their cooperation with Dutch local governments has also weakened following the mainstreaming of the integration policy, where integrational activities that are designated for a particular ethnic group are not funded. Instead, most funding goes to organizations that provide assistance to immigrants with different ethnicities. As such, traditional Somali organizations have attempted to widen the scope of their projects to include a diverse range of immigrants.[35] The new Somali organizations, however, believe that this approach is not conducive to redressing the structural challenges faced by specific immigrant group. Since

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[35] Interview with Muna, a board member of a new organization, 11-02-2021.

Somali immigrants have been struggling with integration for a long time, intensive specific assistance is needed to overcome these issues. As such, the main objective of new Somali organizations is to function as independent networking platforms. They further value their non-dependence on the financial support of the Dutch government when it comes to their activities because this provides them with more freedom to host those which they find important. Nonetheless, as indicated by a board member of a new organization, greater structural changes in the integration policy do necessitate some form of cooperation with the local and national governments to reestablish ties and maintain communication between the Somali community and the Dutch government. This is because increased customization of the integration system also requires the input of the migrant self-organizations on integrational policymaking.

5.3 Concerns and Perspectives about the Integration Policy

Over the past 30 years, many changes have taken place in Dutch integration policy. Although the Dutch government has striven to solve issues with migrant integration, the discourse of the Somali immigrant as the immigrant with the 'poor prospect' has remained. Traditional Somali organizations have discussed integration through a fixed framework, which is a concern because it has prevented them from addressing matters that are more important to the Somali community. The national integration policy influences the activities of the traditional Somali organizations. For instance, once the Dutch government defined FGM as a priority, FSAN was instructed to hold local gatherings with all its member organizations concerning this issue (van Heelsum 2006). While the previous chapter has shown that the Somali organizations have a clear target group, goals, and set tasks, these are dismissed in favor of activities that are on the national integration agenda funded by the government. Often, traditional Somali organizations are dependent on governmental funding. All five representatives of traditional organizations mentioned that with *doelgroepenbeleid* (target group policy), they use their stream of income to fund activities they think are important. For example, Zamzam stated "I really liked the *doelgroepenbeleid* because it would feed our needs [would respond to our needs]. Now we are being treated like the Eritreans and other migrant

groups [Somali and Eritrean immigrants are often seen by Dutch institutions as having similar needs when it comes to integration] ."[36]

In addition, the representatives of all 12 Somali organizations indicated that they want to have a long-lasting impact through their activities by tackling issues that are important to the Somali community. They explain that the different treatment of every migrant group would help lead to more customized integration as "previously, the focus was on the Somali community but now, we focus on all immigrants because of the abolishment of the *doelgroepenbeleid*." [37] However, this has not changed the discourse of the Somali as the immigrant with the 'poor prospect'. Instead, other immigrant groups like the Eritrean immigrant are compared to the Somali immigrant when it comes to their level of integration. Its abolishment has led half of the traditional organizations in this study's sample to focus not only on Somali immigrants but also on all kinds of immigrant groups to fulfil the subsidy requirements. However, reaching out to other immigrant groups proves to be harder than reaching out and connecting with one's own community due to cultural differences or language barriers. Hamza, a member of the traditional organization, mentions,

> In the 90s and early 2000s, there was a totally different political climate. It was more focused on how we behave towards each other and on getting to know one another. Now, this has completely changed.[38]

Hamza, refers to the radical changes to the political climate that took place from the early 2000s onwards. The hostility to migrants that was prevalent at that time has radically affected the integration policy, where the abolishment of the *doelgroepenbeleid* is only a fraction of the policy changes. The impact of policy changes has a major effect on integration activities and has led to the adoption of a more general approach and individualistic approach toward integrational activities. Immigrants are perceived as responsible for their own integration,

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[36] Interview with Zamzam, a board member of a traditional organization, 31-03-2021.

[37] Interview with Muna, a board member of a new organization, 11-02-2021.

[38] Interview with Hamza, a board member of a traditional organization, 11-02-2021.

which has been emphasized through the "immigrant with poor prospects" discourse that dominates the Dutch integration policy and reflects the image of the Somali immigrants (Bonjour and Duyvendak 2018). Ali, a board member of a new organization, says

> The national government continuously changes its integration policy, but the functioning of the models stays the same. It doesn't work... I think that increased inclusion of network organizations would add to the integrational domain. Network organizations like ours can go beyond providing basic assistance such as applying for subsidies and translation of letters.[39]

Ali explains that the new integration policy that advocates for the customization of integration by municipalities represents a cyclic phenomenon. The target group policy has made space for the new integration policy that focusses on more municipality customization of the integration policy. Leading to decentralization from national level to municipality level. However, this decentralization does not entail the active inclusion of migrant self-organizations. Since these changes have happened over the past years, Ali indicates that they are not revolutionary. Although the past years have witnessed changes to the integration policy, the active involvement of migrant self-organizations in integration policy making remains missing. Therefore, Somali integration has remained stagnant because Somali immigrants did not receive the assistance that they needed during the past 30 years. Ali adds that with every new approach, there are pros and cons. The new integration policy that was adopted in 2020 and will be in effect in 2022 focuses on providing the municipalities with a greater responsibility toward integration, leading to the decentralization of integrational practices from the national to local levels. However, the negative side of this is that within the municipalities, there is a dearth of knowledge on how to actively assist the Somali community.[40] According to Ali, no efforts are being made to involve migrant self-organizations who do possess this knowledge.

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[39] Interview with Ali, a board member of a new organization, 28-01-2021.

[40] Interview with Ali, a board member of a new organization, 28-01-2021.

Mariam, an integration policy advisor and former member of a Somali network organization, agrees with Ali that more inclusion is needed, and has more recently introduced key figures to her municipality, or individuals with the same background as immigrants, to help coach immigrants through the integration process. She mentions that municipalities currently refer to her organization as their main contact, such as the VW, in order to offer more customized integration since they typically lack the cultural sensitivity that is needed at times and use a more general approach.[41] Hence, the inclusion of key figures or migrant organizations to evaluate and contribute to integration policy is important. Mariam explains that it is very important to enable newcomers to become acquainted with their new environment at the Asiel Zoekers Centrum (AZC) (Asylum Shelter). She further notes that there is a lengthy waiting period before newcomers are allowed to work or study. She also explains that since immigrant groups such as Eritreans, Syrians, and Somalis move to the Netherlands because of the severe situations in their countries of origin, it is better to start early with the integration of these groups.

In sum, this chapter illustrates that the main concern of Somali organizations is that there should be more inclusion of Somali organizations in order to find a more sustainable approach to integration process. The organizations all agree that they have the cultural knowhow to assist the municipalities and pinpoint the main hurdles to integration. In addition, traditional organizations have advocated for the return of the *doelgroepenbeleid*, which enables them to use their income stream to fund the activities of their choice. The current mainstreaming of the integration policy has forced them to focus on a wider group of immigrants. This has proved to be difficult as they do not have insight into the cultural backgrounds of other immigrant groups. According to traditional organizations, a hostile political climate and an individualistic approach due to the mainstreaming of the integration policy are key concerns. However, new organizations mention that the integration system has never actively addressed immigrants' needs as neither the *doelgroepenbeleid* nor the new integration policy is inclusive of immigrants.

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[41] Interview with Mariam, municipality policy officer, 16-12-2021.

6 Conclusion and discussion

This thesis illustrates how different Somali organizations target multiple groups within their community with the purpose of being representatives of the Somali community. Both old and new organizations have different perceptions of their role in the Dutch integration system. Using Foucault's governmentality theory, it was noted that traditional Somali organizations to a certain extend are involved in reproducing the discourse of the Somali immigrant as the "immigrant with the poor prospect". By going along with the state's problematic "migrant with poor prospect" discourse the traditional Somali organizations reinforce the dominant discourse. The traditional Somali organizations reproduce the problematic discourse because they are financially dependent on the subsidiaries for integrational activities. Reproducing the discourse of the "migrant with poor prospect" in integrational activities proposals results in financial assistance from subsidiaries. The newer Somali organizations however are financially independent and therefore also have the freedom to focus on activities such as network building. This study has undertaken a brief policy analysis of the Dutch integration policy over the years and semi-structured interviews with predominantly board members of Somali organizations as well as with one integration policy advisor and one expert in the field were conducted. These methods were employed to answer the following research question:

(1) *How do Somali organizations contribute to the realization of Somali civic integration in the Netherlands and what is the rationale behind such practices?*

Prior to answering the first question of how Somali organizations contribute to Somali migrant integration, an understanding of integration in relation to citizenship and how the literature has described Dutch integration is necessary. In line with Schinkel and van Houdt (2010) I have found that the Dutch integration system has been mainly focused on moral citizenship. Especially concerns have been shared about the relation between moral citizenship and integration practices. Muna explained that moral citizenship is mainly a one-way integration process where the migrant needs to learn about the dominant culture and instead advocates for a two-way integration process that stimulates also the host society to actively participate in the integration process. This way the integration activities should be addressing the strengthening of the relationship between the immigrants and the host society. The other

board members of the Somali organizations also agree that the culturalization of citizenship has caused them to feel less connected to the Netherlands. However, they all mentioned that understanding each other's culture is important to live together in one country. Integration policy is therefore seen as desirable but needs to adapt from a one-way approach to a two-way approach. According to Bonjour and Duyvendak (2018), through the moralization of citizenship, immigrants are designated as those with either "poor prospects" or "high prospects." As such, certain immigrant groups with distinct cultures will never be seen as fully integrated immigrants. Therefore, integration is measured along the lines of cultural adaptation rather than on a more formal level, which has affected the sense of belonging of the Somali community. The ramification is that the Somali communities' motivation is hampered to further invest in integrating into the Dutch society.

In line with Duyvedak, Geschiere, and Tonkens (2016), the interviews with the Somali organization board members reflected a distinction between a social and economic sense of belonging. While the elderly generation especially feels more connected to Somalia, they do feel economically linked to the host country, which is often the only form of connection they have with the Netherlands. The younger generations feel more connected and experience a greater level of social belonging having grown up in the Dutch culture, speaking the Dutch language, and having friends in their host country. However, the fact that their elders encourage them to stick to their own culture can create an identity crisis that further distances the youth from the older generations and Dutch society. The representatives of Somali organizations have also said that the youths' sense of belonging to the Netherlands has also significantly decreased with the culturalization of citizenship. The ramifications of this is that the culturalization of citizenship has further widened the gap between the immigrants and the host society. This therefore makes integration even more difficult for the immigrant because they are expected to adapt to the dominant culture. This is also in paradox with the definition of integration as a contractual agreement between the migrant and their host society (Kostakopoulou 2010; Bakker, Dagvos and Egelsbergsen 2014; Korac 2003). This leads to generational clashes between the youth and the elderly which also further hamper the integration of the Somali community. The Somali organization have been very active in pinpointing this issue and addressing it through dialogues between the youth and elder in order to close the gap between the two.

During the data collection process, it was important to examine different migrant organizations as they all have a different way of practicing integrational activities and reaching out to different groups within the community. Upon examining the founding years of the Somali organizations, three periods of establishment of Somali community organizations can be identified. The first two founding periods are in parallel with the Somali migration to the Netherlands in the early 90s and after 2006. The third founding period for the Somali organization has been mainly after 2016 and has no link with Somali migration These have been categorized as "traditional" and "new" Somali organizations based on their role and function. An important distinction between the two is that the former seems to have accepted that the Somali community is always reported as the least integrated immigrant group in the Netherlands and have responded with integration activities in line with the Dutch integration agenda. However, new organizations prefer to focus on networking and building social capital of the Somali youth community and aim to challenge this idea of being part of a group with poor prospects. In relation to economic integration, new Somali organizations emphasized that they do see a change in the integration of the Somali community as more individuals are educated and aspire to have careers. However, this is not mentioned in the SCP's or CBS's statistical reports. Instead of working within the Dutch integration framework and reproducing the dominant narrative of the Somali as the "immigrant with poor prospects", the new organization invest in activities that highlight the positive aspects of the Somali society. An increasing group of Somali working professionals is used by the new organizations to assist the better integration of the Somali community and especially its youth.

In answer to the first part of the research question, I have examined which groups that organizations target within the Somali community. It is evident that traditional Somali organizations attempt to represent the Somali community more broadly, including all clans as well as youth more recently. Since there have been generational clashes within the Somali community, more traditional Somali organizations are focusing on events that would bring the two generations together. Alternatively, some organizations have created particular youth boards that partake in brainstorming about which possible events can bring the two generations together. However, new Somali organizations have targeted youth since their founding because they believe that this age group needs assistance that the older generation cannot provide. What has been particularly remarkable is that when it comes to

representation, traditional organizations have mainly argued that a special focus on the representation of the newcomer group (who suffer more often from war trauma effecting their health and integration progress) is needed. None of the organizations have paid special attention to the newcomers, with the exception of one traditional organization which tried to do so by connecting the "newcomers" with established and integrated Somalis to provide them with assistance in learning the Dutch language. When asked why the Somali organizations did not provide assistance to this particular group, they said that it was too costly to help this group meet their needs since the newcomers suffer from psychological trauma caused by what they have experienced due to the war. For the further improvement of the effectivity of the integration activities it is important to customize the activities to the special needs of the immigrant communities. However, with the current integration policy there is no special attention to particular immigrant groups let alone the specific needs within each immigrant group.

In addition, regarding cooperation with the government, traditional organizations have indicated that they work with the Dutch government and its municipalities. FSAN is the only Somali organization that cooperates with the government on a national level. However, this cooperation is still weak. Due to the mainstreaming of the integration policy and the abolishment of the *doelgroepenbeleid*, the Dutch government does not listen to specific needs of immigrant groups. While traditional organizations are concerned about this development, they have not contested it and instead found ways to reframe their objectives to cover a wider group of immigrants when they need the municipality's assistance. This is problematic because the actually needs are not being addressed and therefore the integration of the groups that already experienced difficulties with integration such as the newcomers and the elders are further hindered. However, newer Somali organizations have no intention of working with the government on either the local or national level. One of the board members of a new organization thinks that cooperation in the form of inclusion in the making of integration policy could help in achieving structural change. However, other newer Somali organizations have argued that is unlikely to happen as cooperation has always meant being awarded a minor role as integrational agenda are established at the top level. To achieve structural changes in integration of immigrant groups such as the Somali immigrant groups both the immigrant self-organization as well as government institutions are needed. The

cooperation with the government can lead to making more structural and sustainable changes in the integration policy. The different Somali organizations have different target groups within their own community and therefore deal with different issues. To address the issues more accurately the Dutch government should involve these different organizations in the assistance with integration activities but also actively involve them in integration policy making. An active inclusion of the Somali organization in the integration policy making could potentially result in the change of the dominant discourse of the Somali immigrant as the "immigrant with the poor prospect" to the "immigrant with the high prospect".

In addition, most traditional organizations have confided their concerns about the discursive power that the government exercises through funding provision for integrational activities. Since the government dictates the integration activities implemented by traditional organizations, contestation can result in the end of their cooperation. This has mainly been a concern from the traditional organizations because of their financial dependence. On the other hand, new organizations are mainly concerned with the new notion of customization that the new integration policy focuses on. They argue that such customization shifts the responsibility of adopting integrational practices to the local government level but that this does not result in the necessary active inclusion of migrant self-organizations. One representative of a new organization also explains that the government always works with the same Somali organizations, such as FSAN and its members. However, other new organizations exist which have a different approach and target groups. The new organizations do not prefer close cooperation with the government as they like to stay independent to focus on integrational activities of their choice. The new organizations, however, do agree that a structural change of the integration policy that would include migrant groups is needed and that their advisory input on the integration policy would be valuable.

To answer the second part of the research question, I argue that the underlying logic behind the Somali organizations' practices is embedded in governmentality. The dominant discourse of the "migrant with poor prospects" has been rooted in Dutch integration policy and has to a certain extent been reproduced by the traditional Somali migrant organizations. The mainstreaming of Dutch integration policy has made the integration agenda more rigid, compelling traditional Somali organizations to implement the government's integration

agenda as a prerequisite for funding. There is no room for such an organization's own input unless it can fund itself. This form of soft power has pushed traditional Somali organizations to reproduce the narrative of the Somali as the "migrant with poor prospects" in order to obtain funding for their activities. However, the aforementioned was not evident amongst the new organizations as they work independently from the government and have no interest in obtaining funding. Moreover, these organizations focus instead on building networks to assist each other in finding jobs. The new Somali organizations contest the "migrant with poor prospects" discourse by not accepting it as a given but focusing on what goes well. The professionals that are linked with the new organizations are used as role models to motivate Somali youth and demonstrate that there is a different side to the story and that they can integrate successfully in Dutch society. In other words, they are more focused on changing the dominant image of the Somali as the "immigrant with poor prospects."

This research has aimed to contribute to the literature on migrant self-organization and Somali immigrant integration in the Netherlands. The study also maps out the different Somali community organizations and their role in integrational practices. Future research is needed to map out all Somali organizations in the Netherlands, which can function as an informative road map for understanding and coordinating integrational activities by Dutch state institutions and Somali organizations. Another avenue for further research is to focus on establishing a successfully two-way integration system in the Netherlands. The activities of both traditional and new organizations match their capabilities as they are, in their ways, attempting to do their best to serve the interest of the Somali community (despite the limited financing, in the case of the traditional organizations). They also appear to cater to different groups with the traditional organizations focusing more on a wider group of immigrants and the new organizations focusing more specifically on the Dutch-Somali youth. The two organizations work on different activities, but both ultimately are intended to serve the Somali community. Therefore, working together could potentially result in a united direction and objectives for further integration of the Somali immigrants in the Netherlands.

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8 Appendices

8.1 Founding Year of Somali Organizations

Traditional Somali Organizations

Organization Name	Year of Founding
FSAN	1994
Somalische vereniging Zwolle	1997
HIRDA	1998
Stichting Somaliers Groningen	2006
Stichting Somali4All	2006
Himilo	2006

New Somali Organizations

Organization Name	Year of Founding
SAHAN	2016
Stichting Mandeeg	2016
Netwerk Somalische Ondernemers (NSO)	2017
Xidig organization	2018
Geeska	2019
Somali Millenials	2020

8.2 Research Participants

Pseudonym	Gender	Organizational type/ Occupation	Date of Interview
Mariam	F	Policy officer	16-12-2020
Sharif	M	New	28-01-2021
Iftin	F	New	04-02-2021
	M	Traditional	21-02-2021
Yolanda	F	Expert	09-02-2021
Hamza	M	Traditional	11-02-2021
Muna	F	New	11-02-2021
Shermake	M	New	16-02-2021
Yusuf	M	Job hunter[42]/ key figure	16-02-2021
Aziz	M	Traditional	21-02-2021
Ali	M	New	28-02-2021
Abdi	M	Traditional	28-02-2021
Fardusa	F	Traditional	14-03-2021
Samira	F	New	28-03-2021
Zamzam	F	Traditional	31-03-2021

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[42] His job requires him to match refugees with a residency permit with employers.