7

THE ARAB NATION, THE CHINESE MODEL, AND THEORIES OF SELF-RELIANT DEVELOPMENT[1]

Max Ajl

During the Bandung era, c. 1955–1980, it was widely understood that state sovereignty was the treasured achievement of the national and nationalist liberation struggles and that the denial of sovereignty through colonialism had been central to the political history of capitalism and underdevelopment. In the new millennium, such talk is now considered passé. The notion of any synergy between the state, sovereignty, nationalism, and development in the periphery of the world system has been all but erased in most social theory. Theorizing about the South often reduces it to autogenetic rentier states, neo-patrimonial entities, or blossoming "regimes". There is a diffuse and seldom-stated stance that history has surpassed the national question and turned it into a curio of interest for antiquarians or raw cultural putty that is only of use for demagogues (Patnaik 2020) or, from a different perspective, that national-popular politics shatters internationalism into a myriad of jagged territorial fragments.

The argument for sidestepping state and nation is that nation-states and calcified core-periphery distinctions no longer help us understand development and maldevelopment. Instead, we are, supposedly, in an era of helter-skelter accumulation, a scattering of nodes that does not map onto core-periphery or North-South coordinates. It is then best, in the words of Marxist geographer David Harvey, "to abandon the idea of imperialism" (Harvey 2016: 171). It would then follow that the national question is not helpful in organizing thought and practice toward popular development.[2]

Such reflexive anti-nationalism is methodologically anti-materialist and ahistorical in five ways. First, it suggests that nationalism is identical over time and space, rather than one component of a series of historically bounded sequences, and that, at high noon, it was part of a national liberation politics that enveloped Africa (Neocosmos 2016: 112ff, 158–159, 173). Second, it a priori excludes the notion that nationalism could again be emancipatory, on the grounds that it has

been repressive, a statement as logical as claiming that because knives cut throats, they cannot cut bonds. Third, it runs against the grain of struggle in modern history: nationalism has been a key political grammar for the major anti-systemic struggles of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (Gilbert 2015, Moyo and Yeros 2011: 3–31). Fourth, if imperialism rests on foreclosed autonomy over national decisions and non-existent self-determination, the resulting flows of value from the periphery and semi-periphery to the core and the uneven accumulation such flows forge and reinforce, the national question is necessary to organize thinking about the relationship between anti-imperialism and popular development. Indeed, as a rapidly swelling mass of research attests, imperialism still separates the world into zones of unequal accumulation (Cope 2019, Smith 2016, Suwandi 2019). And fifth, the core uses its own states' mechanisms to reshape if not shatter state mechanisms in the periphery to protect and expand the gap between such zones, either turning the state against the nation or ripping the state from the nation. It would be odd to suggest that national and nationalist logics for organizing struggles for human emancipation and structures for human social reproduction and flourishing should be abandoned as imperialism seeks precisely that abandonment through the political shattering of states by the dismantling of institutions and dissolution of ideas of state and nation.

It is, then, necessary to consider the role of state and nation in popular development. We ought to do so with an understanding of the past, present, and possible futures, aware of the capacities and limits of the state and aware that nationalism cuts both ways. Just as we ought not forget that merely because knives cut throats, they cannot also cut bonds, we also ought to remember that knives can, still, cut throats.

The broad political-spatial arena in which I consider such questions is the Arab region.[3] Within that zone, amidst an agenda of externally induced fracturing, especially along sectarian lines, "capital" is "assaulting the state as reason and as an idea" of pluralism and as an institutional platform capable of giving heft to popular demands (Kadri 2015: 110).[4] It does so not merely through the fractionation of sodalities into ever-more-minute units.[5] It also evaporates the very physical and political institutions that compose the state, including by inflating a ballooning civil society that privatizes traditional state functions, by externally fueled post-war reconstruction that engineers the state as a sectarian structure, and by devastating de-development, which literally disappears state institutions – from statistics-gathering services to public health networks to agricultural extension (Mundy et al. 2014: 155).

In this context it is critical to remember that the state is not just the political baton protecting accumulation, nor is it the night watchman who oversees, organizes, and regulates the piling up of profit. Indeed, almost every state, no matter how shattered, gutted, or debilitated, is the crystallized socialization of past human labor. It is the enabler and guarantor of social reproduction. It is often the major employer. It is the owner of hospitals (Sen 2019), pharmacies, and the policy instrument for negotiating the prices of pharmaceuticals. It is the

engineer of macroeconomic and fiscal policy. It plays an enormous role in human affairs and is very often the sole repository of collective human responsibility for well-being in the North and South alike. Furthermore, the state has two faces: as idea, and as an ensemble of institutions (Abrams 1988). As an idea the state can suggest a community of belonging in places where externally fostered sectarianism rips apart even the possibility of class-based solidarity. Furthermore, the idea of a welfare or developmental state can be the aspiration for a certain set of institutions. I am thinking of national healthcare systems in states that lack them or in which they are starved of funds, or the national production of medicines, or national and socialized support for decentralized popular agronomic research. Aspiring to such institutions does not imply any particular theory of political change other than the realist-pragmatist recognition that the state has been excellent at providing such services. At the ideological level, in the Arab region the state's "mediatory role and responsibility to govern are ideas that may pull together shredded Arab societies" (Kadri 2015: 110). That is, the idea of a secular republic is actually a utopian horizon in such contexts, with a clear anti-systemic character that forces us to push back against reflexive anti-statism, which, when placed in front of a chiaroscuro, insists only on seeing shadows.

The history of radical Arab developmental thought is a lens through which we can reexamine the state, nationalism and internationalism, and the horizons and afterlives of national liberation. Precisely because such thought effloresced almost purely as ideology, it remains an untrod path in the theory and practice of popular development. It also criticizes by now-overwhelming discourses that consider development merely a mask for accumulation, a social-counterinsurgency operation, or something which the state inevitably warps and mangles.[6] And precisely because it resolutely upheld the banner of a form of Arab nationalism while remaining attentive to how insufficient attention to social and democratic questions (internal nationalities and gender were not generally examined in this literature) had crippled its past bearers, it provides an excellent ground upon which to consider questions of sovereignty, nationalism, and the state. And because much of it was modeled on the historical experience of China, which is chock-full of lessons, it reminds us that neither nationalism nor state is so easily chucked into the waste bin.

The chapter is structured as follows. It first reasserts that national liberation was less a failed than an aborted process. Its original vanguard theorists imagined it as a way to bring the national productive forces under sovereign and national-popular control, which led to sharp improvements in development indicators. It then grounds the discussion of national-popular development in the history of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Arab republics more broadly, illuminating the relationship between statist nationalism, pan-Arabism, the class basis of peripheral developmentalism, and the achievements and limits of national liberation. I then show how the national-democratic revolution in China was the basis for a sharp auto-critique of those models – less rejection than selective transcendence. I historicize that critique, clarifying that the condition of possibility

for such thinking was national sovereignty itself. I then move on to the human costs of foreclosed or shattered sovereignty in the Arab world in the post-1991 period, as de-development's umbra darkened not merely social outcomes but even the possibility to think liberation. Using this example, I reassert the relevance of nation, state, and sovereignty as the crystallized and socialized gains of the national liberation struggles that ought to be conceived of as the basis for a renewed struggle for social liberation rather than as a cage – or, if a cage, one that provides safety from predators more than confinement for prisoners. For material, I primarily draw on a set of articles by the leading Egyptian development economist, Ismail-Sabri Abdallah, and work from a conference on *al-tanmīyya al-mustaqila*, or independent development, hosted by the Center for Arab Unity Studies.

This chapter is not quite a history of ideas and is only partially genealogical. Much more, it draws on the intellectual work of the past in order to illuminate a crucial cluster of ideas on Arab independent development and how they interlock with slightly earlier sub-Saharan African thinking about nation, national liberation, and sovereignty. The aim is to bring to light such thinking not merely as an exercise in intellectual history, but as a beacon that illuminates developmental dead-ends and paths to popular and independent development, the pitfalls and promises not merely of yesterday but also of tomorrow.

National liberation

National liberation continues to receive a bad rap, perhaps in part because in some ways, it was never achieved. National liberation was never reducible to the veneer of formal state sovereignty. It was a vision partially dashed on the shoals of neocolonialism. But it was also a process. Guinea-Bissau's Amilcar Cabral, arguably the most scintillating and sensitive thinker of national liberation, laid out how the far horizon of the restoration of the nation's people to history was always within the sight of slices of such struggles for freedom. For Cabral, sovereignty was never about the paraphernalia of statehood but about restoring to the people-nation the right to determine the "process of development of national productive forces" (Cabral 1979: 129–130).[7] National productive forces included labor and the kinds of schooling people had and how that interacted with their engagement with the productive forces, as well as decisions over what to grow and when, where, and how to industrialize. Cabral did not *conflate* national and democratic liberation but rather suggested that severing the links that bound decisions about how to deploy the land and labor of a given colonized country from external domination allowed for a people to *regain*, or, in the words of Cabral, "*Return to history*" (130).[8] In the process, "the victims of primitive accumulation [become] fully human, thereby closing the circle which began with imperialist partition and ideological dominance" (Moyo et al. 2013: 110). Cabral also cast this in uniquely precise terms. He equated national liberation with "national productive forces [being] completely free of all kinds of foreign domination" (Cabral 1979: 130).

He was not alive to oversee postcolonial technological choices, macroeconomic management, or agrarian planning. Thus he could not have easily foreseen issues such as new dependencies born of technology transfer, although he certainly would have known that debt was equivalent to a priori claims on the fruit of national production and thus not merely an afterlife but a continuance of "foreign domination" through its claim on revenue streams and the continued enclosure of the actual labor and wealth of the land.

Cabral brought nationalism and the national question to the fore, not as transhistorical romantic belonging or blood-and-soil organic communities but in material terms, a kind of parenthesis or parameter around a given set of productive forces and a way of reorganizing who was to benefit from them. He was obviously aware of how, under colonialism, the bounty of the land had constantly streamed outwards from colonized nations, with the soil and rain and labor not creating use value for domestic prosperity but exchange value for foreign capitalists who had taken hold of the colonized people's historical process. Nationalism and national liberation were historical struggles to restore land to a given people, and if they were insufficient for tasks of socialist construction, they were absolutely necessary in order for any people (or collective that chose historically to become a people) to carry forward suitable forms of popular development.

Cabral also made clear that national liberation was a description of a type of struggle that emerged against the specter of imperial accumulation. For him, national liberation was necessarily anti-imperialist. Latent in his formulation was the idea that national liberation was a tantalizing promissory note on a future freedom for a previously colonized population. Such a rupture set the terms within which such a people could exercise their right to choose how to develop their own productive forces. Such a right turned on the abrogation of the colonial system within which Guinea-Bissau, but more broadly Africa and Asia, had been raw commodity producers, exporting mineral and agricultural wealth to the North, and sites for monocrop plantation economies structured to complement the consumption and industrial sectors of the core states with attendant soil degradation, of which Cabral was well aware and which he saw as a socio-natural process that humankind had the power to stop (1954).

In sum, decolonization was a partial but successful attempt to break the patterns of primitive accumulation, secured by colonial violence and manifest in ongoing colonial drain and unequal exchange, through which the core countries continued to extract wealth from the periphery. National liberation's limited achievements were still *achievements*, something missed in chatter eager to assimilate one nationalism to the next, one set of capitalist contradictions to the next, and one passel of elites to their successors. National liberation very frequently stanched outflows of value, which manifested socially as enormous human suffering. Gains for human dignity occurred because decolonization was seldom just about hoisting a flag over an alabaster statehouse. While it has become increasingly common to suggest that decolonization left domestic, peripheral,

macroeconomic structures largely intact, the postcolonial dependent states put a stop to colonial income deflation.[9] Colonial famines ceased (Patnaik 2018). Investment in enhancing agricultural productivity by national governments was one of the harvests of decolonization, and it arrested and reversed secular declines in food-grain availability, and stopped deindustrialization (Destombes 2006, Patnaik 2007: 27–30, 128).[10] Public health networks spread and per capita food-grain absorption gradually increased (Davis 2002, Hansen and Wattleworth 1978).[11] This occurred by putting the "process of development of the productive forces" under the control of petty bourgeois elements that tended to the basic needs of the formerly colonized population – usually putting an end to absolute starvation and enfolding peasants into nationally secured and politically regulated social reproduction.[12]

National peripheral developmentalism in the Arab world

The broad sweep of states that emerged in the formerly colonized world went to various lengths to turn national wealth to social well-being. The breadth, depth, and intensity of such experiments was not determined merely by the to and fro of domestic struggle. The new governments' harnessing of popular will and energy and the state institutions toward popular development occurred amidst the Cold War, a US organizing schema for throttling, if not throwing back, such experiments (Amin 1983, Kolko 1986). Such endogenization was most often based on import-substitution industrialization. State elites broke the backs of the feudal bourgeoisie, setting in motion redistributive agrarian reforms that envisaged medium and large farmer paths to rural agrarian development and sometimes imagined more radical ruptures with rural inequality, as well. Their policies generally reflected the vacillations of an emergent petty bourgeoisie, caught in the eddies and flows of world-historical currents.

In the Arab world, these were the children of Arab nationalist developmentalism during the *belle epoque* of 1952–1970 – still later in Algeria and Libya – whose temporality of decolonization was more in sync with the African continent than the slightly earlier decolonization of South Asia and the eastern Arab world (Mansour 1992). In Egypt under Nasser, pragmatism in macroeconomic management merged with a diffuse populist ethos, and internal redistribution and incorporation of "the people" into a group for whom the state was responsible.[13] Sovereignty and redistribution went hand in hand with the nationalization of an industrial plant previously the property of colonists or the large bourgeoisie. In the most radical experiments in Syria, South Yemen, and to a lesser extent Algeria, explicitly Marxist ideologies informed these planning processes at their apex, leading in Syria, for example, to massive advances toward shattering the feudal landownership structure. More broadly, the Chinese and Soviet models exerted developmental pressure across the Arabophone arena and at the fringes of state planning well before Maoism began to mold the critique of state planning in the Arab republics (e.g., Younes 1964: 27–52).

Arab nationalism also sought to go beyond the nation-state. In most of the Arab nationalist governments, and within Arab populations, unity was an alluring alternative political architecture (Higgins 2018). In this way, they would perhaps be able to crystallize sentiments of republicanism, new ideas of the people, new ways of imagining political belonging, and new ways to exit from developmental cul de sacs. Certainly, the ambition for unity predated the republics. Pan-Arab nationalism had long informed Arab state policies and interstate or popular solidarities. The Arab nation in its widest sense was partially constituted through and against colonialist intervention (Abu Nadi 2015, Behar 2001, Watanabe 2017). And national decolonization leaned on regional defeats of colonialism: Tunisian national liberation turned on a sequence of decolonization that rested on the Free Officer's Coup in Egypt in 1952 and the slightly earlier decolonization in Libya, alongside nascent or explosive mass popular insurrection and guerrilla mobilization in Algeria, which equally floated over scarcely annealed state borders (Ajl 2019a). Arab economic fusion had been mooted in theory in the 1950s – for example, in the Tunisian nationalist trade union's (UGTT) "Economic and Social Report" (1956). Arab unity had taken form through Egyptian-Syrian unity in the United Arab Republic (Kerr 1971). Arab unity also took shape in the national liberation and decolonization period, through direct material support for wars of liberation, from Palestine to Tunisia to Algeria, or mass solidarity actions against colonial incursions. And Cairo and Algeria provided consistent support for sub-Saharan African liberation movements during this period, as well (Sharawy 2011a, 2011b). Furthermore, such ways of reimagining unity also came to imply new ways of imagining what it meant to be Palestinian, or Egyptian, or Algeria, in that support for national liberation or internationalist solidarity was conceived as inseparable from being, say, Algerian (El Nabolsy 2020).

As Samir Amin observes, in Egypt these elements marked a "radicalization of national liberation" against the headwind of imperialist intrigue, but they were also marred by ambivalence and uncertainty, traits linked to the class orientation of the political project and its distance from more explicitly redistributive popular orientations that would have vested effective control of the society and its productive forces, its fields and factories, into the hands of the workers and *fellahin* (Amin 1990: 6, on the Syrian case, see Matar 2016: 9–19, 57–89). There was no place for popular participation in politics or decisions over production. The people were wards of the state (Ajl 2019b). Furthermore, Egypt like the rest of the Arab states never dealt fully with internal national questions, from the Nubians of Upper Egypt to the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds (Nakhal 2016), or gender oppressions (Kallander 2020).

Additionally, capitalist elements were growing through deals with the state even during the heyday of Arab nationalist populism (El-Issawy 2010). External assault turned the tide in the Arab heartland in 1967, as Israel's attack on the Arab states left the radicals "completely deflated", in the words of the British Foreign Office (Cited in Mitchell 2011: 158). Amidst external assault, they slowly

discarded all the calling cards of the Arab nationalist heyday, slowly shattering the links binding the domestic productive forces to domestic needs and relinking them to external and especially northern economies.

The auto-critique of Arab nationalism

From 1967 onwards, two kinds of critiques emerged in response to this defeat – the *naqsa* or "setback". These critiques did not reject the history of Arab radicalization or the socializing tendencies that had been present through the 1960s. They sought to transcend the problems of that period, taking what was good and tossing out what was not. In essence, their criticisms revolved around the role of the popular classes in actually existing Arab nationalist state politics and how the entire suite of decision-making and social base could lay the path for the peoples of the Arab region to walk to a different future.

These critiques took issues with the class and technological bases of Arab developmentalism, including (at times) their contempt for and distance from the people upon whom development rested (Amrani 1979, Zamiti 1973). A parallel strand focused on the chasms between the leadership and the base, which deprived the leadership of its own pillars of support, structurally undermining it. A third critique focused on the risk of political and economic development falling into isolated national siloes, vulnerable and easy to topple. The move to self-reliance (*al-iya'tamād 'ala al-thati/al-iya'tamād 'ala al-nafis*), or, alternatively, independent development (*al-tanmīyya al-mustaqila*), another less precise term deployed to describe self-reliant development models, rested on three interlocking notions, each of which built on these earlier critiques. Each generally informed one another. Each manifested in different ways depending upon attitudes toward technology, environment, or the heritage of Marxist thought and practice.

First was an increasing awareness of how any nation-state trying to escape from world-capitalist underdevelopment on its own could not possibly generate the needed escape velocity, especially when fueled and steered by anyone other than the popular classes. Reaching from reformists to radicals, such thinkers saw the need for some sort of rupture with the dream of co-dependent integration with a system of accumulation that sang lullabies of inclusion that merely lulled national leadership into the cul de sac of dependent development.[14] They thought Arab nations had to support one another, if not move toward fusion. In that way, each bundle of national resources and each attempt to put in place technically tricky and economically risky industrial plants would not have to stand on their own as an all-in bet. They could compensate for one another's shortfalls. They would pool resources and risks. Scale was central. Pioneering Arab development economists understood that the very size of the market could allow for complementarity between given factors of production and smooth out perturbations caused by planning errors and allow for sovereign industrialization through beneficial upward spirals of specialization rather than downward spirals

of competition and redundancy. Joint enterprises would have politically secured markets, with reduced transportation costs, locking in value locally rather than hemorrhaging it outwards. Sufficient resources could be allotted to necessary and partially defensive heavy industrialization without unduly sapping the wealth of the popular classes.

Second, the class basis of Arab unity deviated sharply from the Romantic nationalist period, wherein the nation was the chief imagined community, and class was an unruly and often unwelcome visitor. Marxism was an explicit touchstone rather than an antagonist or an embarrassing advisor, alternatively consulted and jailed, as some Marxists were under Arab nationalist planning. Poor people were the bricks to build up national blocs. Marxism was the joining. Rather than ill-fitting blocks of different and antagonistic classes joined by the poor-quality paste of pragmatism and Romanticism, the poor of the Arab world would compose an immensely strong economic, political, and social structure for building toward pan-Arab popular renaissance. Because such plans rested on increasing the well-being of exactly those poor people, questions of uneven development and exploitation intra-nationally or internationally would not arise. Correspondingly, the social base of popular development was likewise the social base of a political project of Arab unity or at least joint self-reliance. This was so because the "vested interest in division" did not extend to the "peasantry and proletariat", in the words of Palestinian development economist Adel Samara (1986). Scale and capacity for complementary needed to address why previous attempts at unity had failed, if such failures had a class basis, and what would be the class basis for successful unity: this was the political intermediation of the process of self-reliant development. Third, political unity was not the output of radical development or socialism. It was its precondition. Unity was part of the national-democratic revolution and of Arab socialism (Murqus 1975: 182).

These strands combined into a very different notion of what Arab socialism ought to be: it would overcome colonial-imperial fragmentation and shattering, and it would not err into attempting unity on false grounds, such as the Egyptian-Syrian union wherein the former sought to industrialize at the expense of the latter (Heydemann 1999: 87–96). It would not accept self-interested blocking of unity. It would ground itself in the people. Against this background, the Chinese experience offered a compelling model and a blizzard of lessons for another development, one enriched by the lessons of the past and one that saw a radical break with what was bad in and of the past in the search for a different future.

Arab developmental thought in the light of China

The prominent heterodox theories of development in the Arab world during the apex of postcolonial economic thought in the 1970s and 1980s were the product of several historical forces. They were above all rooted in the Arab experience of colonization and colonial and imperial subjugation and engorgement of their lands, mines, peoples, and trade flows. They likewise clearly emerged from a long

history of nationalist and pan-Arab struggle. But learning processes within the South and the long renaissance of the South had their place in affecting how such thought shifted. And furthermore, the atmosphere within which these modes of thought gestated was thick with hope and possibility well before local and global defeats would transform a possibility into an impossibility. In this heady context, the region's most radical thinkers moved beyond a negative critique of earlier Arab nationalist economic development efforts to a positive plan for revolutionary reconstruction.

China was the most potent fertilizer for this efflorescence of thought. Even amidst post-1978 counterrevolutionary retreat, China had cleaved open and kept open massive world-systemic space for people to think about what development could be. The Arab approach toward self-reliance at multiple and interlocking scales, from the village to the nation-state, to the Arab nation, drew several lessons from the Chinese model. While Soviet models had beguiled earlier generations of planners, China's success was distinct, in part because pre-1949 China was different from Tsarist Russia. The former had been subject to colonialism; the latter had not. The success of China showed that nations in the formerly colonized or Third World could develop. They were not fated to a future of stagnancy, decay, immiseration, or dependency. These thinkers focused above all on self-reliance. Such a call has a long history in non-Western and Marxist developmental thought. Its most proximate source, though, for Arab theories of development was the theory and practice of Mao Tse-Tsung, articulated most pithily in the statement that "We stand for self-reliance" (Tse-Tsung 1945: 241). Mao had put that principle into practice during the guerrilla war against the Japanese occupiers through maximizing local production of goods. Local did not merely mean within a given nation-state, or even a province; it meant devolving production down to the smallest possible unit. Such a cellular approach to development continued to mark China's post-1949 efforts toward radical nationalist development.

China also became an example by offering a schema for a statist developmentalism that catered to the needs of the population, not merely through redistribution or through the important steps of shattering the spine of the feudal aristocracy and creating new and more productive rural social layers. Most importantly, China had put peasants at the core of development theory, not merely in thought – as had radicals in the Nasser administration, within the 1966–1970 Syrian Ba'ath, or amidst peasant control of farming within cooperatives – but in a fresh synthesis of theory and practice. This new stage of development thinking, usually drawing on a heritage of Communist thought illuminated by the lessons of the Chinese experience and chastened by the limits of radical Arab nationalism, sought not to dismiss pan-Arabism or the state as a protective cocoon for popular development but to fix the flaws of the earlier attempts.

China became a lodestar for Arab theories of development. It combined national and social liberation. It was a nationalist experience of development. It exemplified rapid industrialization in a poor and agrarian country. It linked

technological mastery to the national project. It melted and remolded the economic and social structure, all the while tending to the basic needs of the popular classes. And it was rooted in the people (Fergany 1987: 300–316). The state was master coordinator of the entire economic production process. At the same time, it encouraged self-reliance not merely at the national level but at the sub-national and even village level, which in turn encouraged massive experimentation with enhancing traditional farming practices so as to maximize yield without having to truck in tremendously pricey inputs (Schmalzer 2016).

China was not merely crucial for having successfully developed. It was critical for having done so in a way attentive to the distinct constraints of Third World development and for doing so on the heels of a war of national liberation. The national element enchanted a generation of Arab thinkers, activists, revolutionaries, and the broadest swathes of the people themselves who lived in a world pocked by colonial settlement and the experience of defeat. China, if not uniquely, then with unprecedented élan and effectiveness, had consummated its national liberation. Furthermore, it had emphasized that one had to delink (Amin, in Fergany 1987: 326–327). The model shattered the notion of technological neutrality and grasped at the idea of a more decentralized administration of society (Amin, in Fergany 1987: 327–328). Others emphasized that decision-making was truly independent, exemplifying a true alternative path (Adel Hussain, in Fergany 1987: 352–354). And still others pointed out that China had successfully stanched the outward flow of surpluses, the wound of colonial drain festering under postcolonial/neocolonial developmentalism alike (Khaled el-Manoubi, in Fergany 1987: 355). It was against the background of the Chinese achievements and blights and the lights and shadows of Nasserism and the United Arab Republic, that Arab developmental thought began to shift in important ways. It moved beyond even while building upon the nationalist heterodoxies that had been common coin before 1967 and laid bare the strengths and limits of national capitalist development for smaller states in the formerly colonized world.

Ismail-Sabri Abdallah and the echoes of China

While ideas of delinking were common, and the importance of Maoism to Arab developmental thought was widespread, it is useful to hone in on an exemplary thinker, former Egyptian Minister of Planning and repeatedly jailed long-time Communist intellectual, Ismail-Sabri Abdallah, in part because of the degree to which he had been directly involved in Egyptian planning and had seen with his own eyes the many shadows and lights of that experiment in attempted socially oriented, nationalist-capitalist development.[15] We see the heavy imprint of the Chinese experience in a set of three articles penned by Abdallah from the late 1970s to the late 1980s, time enough for the fruits of China's successes to have ripened, and time enough for those interested in the details of macroeconomic

development to be able to draw directly on analytical work detailing what China had accomplished.

The first two, "Dépaysanisation Ou Développement Rural ? Un Choix Lourd de Conséquences" and "Arab Industrialization Strategy Based on Self-Reliance and Satisfaction of Basic Needs", appeared in that unknown treasure of Third World development planning, the dossiers of the International Forum for Development Alternatives. There, Abdallah detailed the appropriate strategies to be used amongst the peasantry and toward sovereign industrialization. The third, "Al-tanmīyya al-mustaqila: muḥāwala litaḥdīd mafhūm mujahal" (Independent Development: An Attempt to Define an Unknown Concept), appears in a conference volume of the Center for Arab Unity Studies entitled, *Al-tanmīyya al-mustaqila fī al-waṭan al-ʿarabī* (*Independent Development in the Arab Nation*).

I will take them chronologically. In the first, Abdallah called for development based on taking the rural village as the cellular structure for popular planning (1979: 11). He considered the peasantry to be more skilled than urban industrial laborers as they worked with the slowly accreted knowledge built up over centuries or millennia. During this time, the peasantry "acquired the art" of working not just with the land but with the entirety of the environment and its ecosystems. Because humans were central to agriculture, continuing and increasing agricultural production rested in "the last analysis on the motivations of the peasants" (12). On these grounds, he called first for an agrarian reform and second for taking the village as a unit for development. This would occur through economic diversification within the village itself. Those engaged in such diversification – teachers, masons, blacksmiths, carpenters, doctors – were or would be a part of the village community. Furthermore, such linkages would include the industrial processing of agricultural or biological material. They would turn human or animal waste into fertilizer, develop irrigation and drainage canals, maintain and repair tools and machines, carry out artisanal transformation of agricultural byproducts and the processing and storing of food products, and, finally, examine local traditional industries to see how they could be developed. Such a policy would have three goals: one, it would sponge up surplus labor. Two, it would enrich the village itself. Three, it would fortify the village as the "nucleus" for a national policy of "self-reliance", freeing up the maximum amount of resources for heavy industrialization (13).[16]

The imprint of China is heavy here on multiple levels. First, the village community as the base community for development was a radical break from then-dominant patterns within development economics of rural-urban population transfers. It can also be described as a gestalt shift: whereas dominant patterns of economic planning in the Third World took the nation-state as an integrated unit within which goods would flow freely, the Chinese model and the Arab schemas slightly torqued that approach. While the nation-state was still central, a still more supple model would rest on maximizing self-reliance to the smallest molecular unit while holding onto the concept of a modern and socially interdependent economic structure. Second, they shifted to extolling

the peasant as the subject rather than object of development planning. The third level of inspiration is taking the agronomic innovations and changes in practices enabled by cooperativization as the basis for investing labor to higher returns in production while focusing on an element of Mao-era agriculture underemphasized in the macroeconomic planning literature: a refined return to "traditional" farming practices.

By taking the overwhelmingly rural Arab countryside as the basis for an organic buildup of use values from below, Abdallah sought to take the best of the Chinese experience and to use its lessons as the basis of a popular pan-Arab development strategy. His approach did not merely echo the Chinese model with lessons learned in the interim; it enhanced it: the ecological approach to development, building on a rising ecological consciousness in the development community, went beyond China's pragmatist approach toward self-reliance and began to genuinely integrate ecological thinking into planning.[17]

The second article focused on rethinking: "Arab Industrialization Strategy Based on Self-Reliance and Satisfaction of Basic Needs" (Abdallah 1980). Abdallah did not mimic the USSR strategy of industrialization at all costs – substantially, a justified reaction to the threat of war on the USSR's western flank. Nor did he simply echo the much softer version of the policy that prevailed in China. Instead, in line with other Egyptian development economists of the era, he asked: industrialization to what end and for whom? It was a question that was part and parcel of a then-waxing concern amongst a range of North African economists, most especially Tunisia's Azzam Mahjoub.[18]

Abdallah called for a strategy oriented to the "satisfaction of the needs of the broad majority" (Abdallah 1980: 9). Based on what the widest spectrum of the poor needed, one could then measure the "gap" and go on to "fill it" (10). Such a strategy was part and parcel of a broader strategy of industrialization, including producing capital goods or sector two. Furthermore, identifying needs would mean coordinating "industrial and agricultural growth" from the outset (10). Abdallah went on to argue that collective self-reliance could balance out lopsided distributions of resources and populations, the fruit of a long, natural, and social history, and allow for a large regional market. At the same time, such an approach would prevent internal developmental unevenness. He emphasized appropriate technologies and participatory planning, folding into the self-reliant model the late 1970s and early 1980s understandings of the perils of technology transfer and the associated notion that distinct technologies needed to be implanted for distinct patterns and priorities in the process of development. Once again Abdallah insisted on the same ensemble of techniques for self-reliant rural development. He also suggested industrial "inputs into agriculture" but noted that this should be accomplished as part and parcel of a maximally decentralized, rural industrialization strategy based on the scattering of small and medium strategies alongside the study of technologies called "traditional" (11). Furthermore, Abdallah severely questioned the large, industrial development strategy that had underpinned ISI-EOI maldevelopment. He praised the development of

"handcrafts" for export and domestic use alike and sharply questioned the entire calculus of the economy of scale that justified breakneck industrialization as normative, adding that "modern industry should never equate with huge plants" and that the latter's justifications stood "only when economic calculation is done on the micro-level and for the medium term" (12). Abdallah knew that certain kinds of consumption could damage the environment, and he was presciently aware of how such big plants could damage the physical environment, which he wished to protect (8, 12).

Finally, Abdallah discussed that knotty problem of development: who would call the shots? Building on Mao, although with little attention to other internal contradictions amongst the poor peasantry, such as gender oppression, which Maoist thought had raised, Abdallah placed poor, rural people as the subjects of his theory of development, politically, socially, economically, and technologically. Although he recognized that history had placed people in prisons that needed to be dismantled, he insisted that once freed, the peasants could express themselves, "think of their future, take their destiny in hand" (Abdallah 1979: 15). This was not to lapse into a knee-jerk rejection of technocracy that spurned "outside" expertise but rather to form a dialogue between the helpers and helped when it came to technical coordination and support and to leave the power of decision-making with the peasants and their democratically chosen representatives. Here the development of the peasant herself was tied to production increases and each could only be achieved through deepening local democracy. He was aware, then, of how China's oscillations between decentralization and centralization had not truly resolved the question of the political process of planning and where power would lie, and he sought to go beyond these problems by proposing a bottom-up democratic process (Fergany 1987: 314ff).

In the third article, Abdallah synthesizes earlier reflections, dealing with national, social, and ecological questions and reaffirming the centrality of the nation to popular development. Abdallah called independent development a "natural extension" of national liberation and the national struggle to the realms of "economic and social liberation" based on "turning inwards" rather than leaving the national task languishing at the stage of achieving political sovereignty (Abdallah 1987: 36). He wrote that true "independent development" was essentially the battle to "complete national liberation" (47). This was to be based on national and appropriate technology and selective delinking, as well as Arab unity (37, 47). In this way, we come full circle to the organic sequencing between national and social liberation and how the former was not merely the precondition for the latter, but the latter was a way of completing former's mission.

Conclusion: The loss of sovereignty and the loss of the future

In April 1991, Marc Nerfin, a development economist and editor of the IFDA newsletter, tolled the bell for the dossier, stating that "*today's world bears little*

resemblance to that of 1978". Amidst the "*ruins*," Nerfin included "*Iraq and the whole Arab community*", "*the South as a whole, and the Non-Aligned Movement, marginalized beyond imagination*", as well as "*the peace movement, incapable of mobilizing itself against a real North-South war*" (Nerfin 1991: 2).[19] Nerfin saw instantly that the inability to defend the postcolonial states would have immediate implications for knowledge production; one of these implications was a systemic loss of faith in the idea of alternatives (Ajl 2020b, 2018). There was a shift away from materialist social science, never mind utopian planning. Part and parcel of this process has been the erasure of the Arab world not merely as a site of knowledge production but as a site of knowledge production capable of speaking to popular-national development. As a consequence of the serial assaults that the Iraq War inaugurated, the region has seen massive dis-accumulation and de-development, even in the elusive terms of, for example, agricultural Gross Domestic Product. Since 1990, and even more so since 2000, we scarcely know what happened, let alone do we have the material upon which to imagine changes for the better, as amidst the midnight of developmentalism, states abandoned investment in statistical services and even social science altogether. Exterior agendas increasingly set the tempo and direction of research, evaporating Arab social theory as something emanating from internal needs and desires. Worse, amidst US wars, a great many regional states have lost their grasp on that great prize of decolonization: state sovereignty itself. Region-wide de-development reigns amidst de-industrialization and loss of agricultural capacity born of war, colonialism, and neoliberalism.

Such facts cast into stark relief that paradigms that sidestep the state and national questions cannot account for key determinants of social change in the Arab region. Furthermore, the need for theories of development that pay heed to questions of state and nation while not allowing such questions to become fetters brightly illuminates the enduring centrality of the thinkers and the type of thinking treated in this chapter. These thinkers highlight the importance of recovering the national-popular smallholder path sketched out by regional intellectuals but scarcely walked upon within the region by planners. Resurrecting such intellectual labor is, finally, part and parcel of writing back against the erasure of the Arab world as a place where knowledge has been produced, an effort to which this chapter has been a small contribution.

Notes

1 Thanks to the editors and Zeyad El-Nabolsy and Ali Kadri for attentive comments.

2 Definitions of development are contentious. I find value in holding onto the term and understanding it as the process of changing "*the socioeconomic* so as to (re)build the productive forces to benefit the majority in various countries" (Valiani 2020: 156).

3 I am aware and sensitive to the historic questions that national or linguistic minorities within the Arab region have posed to Arab nationalism in theory and practice. Because this chapter is primarily focusing on the broad sweep of ideas about development and less their political implementation, I do not focus on those important questions.

4 Working on this region, it becomes difficult to simply transpose justified criticisms of practices and categories like "development" when the region is, by any indicator, so clearly undergoing *de*-development. Nor can one simply accept criticisms of the role of the state when state institutions and the idea of a non-sectarian state are being systematically dismantled in the region.
5 Such shattering of the state and nationalism as a horizon of unity has also been active in the African context (Sharawy 2015: 193–194).
6 E.g., Fishwick and Selwyn (2016) advance a useful understanding of popular development that is reminiscent of some of what I chart below but that casts enormous and undue blame on the Latin American left states without accounting for the geo-economic and geo-political constraints that hampered their capacity to change the relations of production.
7 Cabral was exceptional but not alone in this doctrine of economic nationalism focused on the reacquisition of control over the productive forces; it was the common vernacular post-Bandung, cf., (Nkrumah 1963: 29, 59ff) who himself was criticized by Cabral for articulating the goal but with inadequate attention and theorization of the internal balance of forces that could block the march to that horizon (Cabral 1979: 114–118).
8 My italics. On Cabral and historical materialism, see (El Nabolsy 2019).
9 I take this formulation from (Mansour 1992: 113–114).
10 Such productivity-enhancing investments came with massive social and ecological costs, for example, India's Green Revolution, on which, see (Sharma 2017)
11 Hansen and Wattleworth shy away from the obvious conclusion that the c. 1952 inflection point in food-grain absorption coincides with the populist Free Officer's movement in Egypt.
12 For this process in Tunisia, see (Ajl 2019a).
13 E.g., Reem Saad gives textured evidence showing the enormous and enduring popularity of the Nasser-era agrarian policies in Egypt (1998: 67–94).
14 From a radical nationalist but not communist or socialist perspective, consider (Sayigh 2002).
15 Within the pre-1967 Arab left especially, Maoism was a very small minority tendency, including under Nasser, aggravated by the Sino-Soviet split. However, at the level of developmental thought, Maoism had a larger influence, whether through figures like Samir Amin in the lower ranks of the Egyptian planning bureaucracy from 1957–1960 or through the very widespread awareness of China as a planning option amongst practicing planners and economists, which often went unmentioned due to the alliances between the Arab republics and the USSR. Thanks to Ali Kadri for clarifying my understanding on this point.
16 See also (Fergany 1987: 300).
17 I am grateful to Azzam Mahjoub for sharing with me how Abdallah had helped develop his own insights into ecology.
18 I consider some of that thought in (Ajl 2020a, 2019c). For an epistemological and programmatic statement on the need for alternative technology in the periphery, see (Mahjoub 1983).
19 His italics.

References

Abdallah, I.-S., 1979. Dépaysanisation ou développement rural ? Un choix lourd de conséquences. In: *IFDA Dossier.* International Foundation for Development Alternatives, Nyon, 1–15.

Abdallah, I.-S., 1980. Arab Industrialization Strategy Based on Self-Reliance and Satisfaction of Basic Needs. In: *IFDA Dossier.* International Foundation for Development Alternatives, Nyon, 1–12.

Abdallah, I.-S., 1987. Al-Tanmīyya Al-Mustaqila: Muḥāwala Litaḥdīd Mafhūm Mujahal [Independent Development: an Attempt to Define an Unknown Concept]. In: Fergany, N. (Ed.), *Al-Tanmīyya Al-Mustaqila Fi Al-Waṭan Al-'Arabī [Independent Development in the Arab Nation]*. Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 25–56.

Abrams, P., 1988. Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977). *J. Hist. Sociol.* 1(1), 58–89.

Abu Nadi, S., 2015. *Al-Tūnisiyūn w Al-Qadhīyya Al-Falasṭīnīyya Ḥata 'Ām 1948 [The Tunisians and the Palestinian Cause until 1948]*. Dār Ḥanīn Lilnashur w Al-Tawzīya.

Ajl, M., 2018. Delinking, Food Sovereignty, and Populist Agronomy: Notes on an Intellectual History of the Peasant Path in the Global South. *Rev. Afr. Polit. Econ.* 45 (155), 64–84.

Ajl, M., 2019a. *Farmers, Fellaga, and Frenchmen (PhD)*. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.

Ajl, M., 2019b. The Political Economy of Thermidor in Syria: National and International Dimensions. In: Matar, M and Kadri, A (Eds.). *Syria: From National Independence to Proxy War*. Springer, Cham, Switzlerland, 209–245.

Ajl, M., 2019c. Auto-Centered Development and Indigenous Technics: Slaheddine El-Amami and Tunisian Delinking. *J. Peasant Stud.* 46(6), 1240–1263.

Ajl, M., 2020a. Delinking's Ecological Turn: The Hidden Legacy of Samir Amin. *Rev. Afr. Pol. Econ.* https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2020.1837095.

Ajl, M., 2020b. Does the Arab Region Have an Agrarian Question? *J. Peasant Stud.*. https ://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2020.1753706.

Amin, S., 1983. *The Future of Maoism*. Monthly Review Press, New York.

Amin, S., 1990. *Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a Global Failure*. United Nations University Press, Tokyo.

Amrani, F., 1979. *La réforme agraire* (Dissertation). FDSE, Tunis.

Behar, M., 2001. *Nationalism at Its Edges: Arabized-Jews and the Unintended Consequences of Arab and Jewish Nationalism, 1917–1967* (PhD Thesis). Columbia University.

Cabral, A.L., 1954. Para o conhecimento do problema da erosão do solo na Guiné. *Bol. Cult. Guiné Port*, 9(33), 163–193.

Cabral, A., 1979. *Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings of Amilcar Cabral*. Monthly Review Press, New York.

Cope, Z., 2019. *The Wealth of (Some) Nations: Imperialism and the Mechanics of Value Transfer.* Pluto Press, London.

Davis, M., 2002. *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World*. Verso Books, London and New York.

Destombes, J., 2006. From Long-Term Patterns of Seasonal Hunger to Changing Experiences of Everyday Poverty: Northeastern Ghana c. 1930–2000. *J. Afr. Hist.* 47(2), 181–205.

El-Issawy, I., 2010. *Oral History Interview of Ibrahim El-Issawy*, http://dar.aucegypt.edu/handle/10526/136.

El Nabolsy, Z., 2019. *Cabral's Interpretation of Historical Materialism*, ms.

El Nabolsy, Z., 2020. Lotus and the Self-Representation of Afro-Asian Writers as the Vanguard of Modernity. *Interventions*, 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2020 .1784021.

Fergany, N., 1987. Min Al-Kitāb Al-Aḥmar Ila Al-Kitāb Al-Aṣfar: 'Arḍ Tajruba Al-Ṣīn Al-Tanmūwīyya [From the Red Book to the Yellow Book: Presentation of the Chinese Development Experience]. In: Fergany, N. (Ed.), *Al-Tanmīyya Al-Mustaqila Fi Al-Waṭan Al-'Arabī [Independent Development in the Arab Nation]*. Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 291–322.

Fishwick, A., Selwyn, B., 2016. Labour-Centred Development in Latin America: Two Cases of Alternative Development. *Geoforum* 74, 233–243. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.06.013.

Gilbert, C., 2015. To Recover Strategic Thought and Political Practice [WWW Document]. *MR Online*. https://mronline.org/2015/09/29/gilbert290915-html/ (accessed 12.25.17).

Hansen, B., Wattleworth, M., 1978. Agricultural Output and Consumption of Basic Foods in Egypt, 1886/7-1967/8. *Int. J. Middle East Stud.* 9(4), 449–469.

Harvey, D., 2016. A Commentary on A Theory of Imperialism. In: *A Theory of Imperialism*. Columbia University Press, New York 154–172.

Heydemann, S., 1999. *Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946–1970*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.

Higgins, P., 2018. The Enemy at Home: U.S. Imperialism in Syria. Viewpoint Magazine. https://www.viewpointmag.com/2018/02/01/enemy-home-u-s-imperialism-syria/ (accessed 7.17.20).

Kadri, A., 2015. *Arab Development Denied: Dynamics of Accumulation by Wars of Encroachment*. Anthem Press, London and New York.

Kallander, A., 2020. *Tunisia's Modern Woman: Nation-Building and State Feminism in the Global 1960s*, ms.

Kerr, M.H., 1971. *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Kolko, G., 1986. *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1980*. Pantheon Books, New York.

Mahjoub, A., 1983. Technologie et développement: Crise et alternatives. *Afr. Dev. Dév.* 8, 31–57.

Mansour, F., 1992. *The Arab World: Nation, State, and Democracy*. United Nations University Press, Tokyo.

Matar, L., 2016. *The Political Economy of Investment in Syria*. Palgrave Macmillan UK, London.

Mitchell, T., 2011. *Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil*. Verso, London and New York .

Moyo, S., Jha, P., Yeros, P., 2013. The Classical Agrarian Question: Myth, Reality and Relevance Today. *Agrar. S. J. Polit. Econ.* 2(1), 93–119.

Moyo, S., Yeros, P., 2011. *Reclaiming the Nation: The Return of the National Question in Africa, Asia and Latin America*. Zed, London.

Mundy, M., al-Hakimi, A., Pelat, F., 2014. Neither Security nor Sovereignty: The Political Economy of Food in Yemen. In: Babar, Z and Mirgani, S (Eds). *Food Security in the Middle East*. Hurst Publishing, London.

Murqus, I., 1975. *Al-Marksiyya*. Dar Al-Talia, Beirut.

Nakhal, J., 2016. *Al-Nūba Bayn Fuqdān Al-Intimā' Al-Thaqāfi w taslī'aiha: ta'mu Al-Ardh w Al-Nīl w Al-Lugha w Al-Bīyūt [Nubia between Loss of Cultural Belonging and Its Commodification: the Taste of Land, and the Nile, and the Language, and the Homes]*. Al-Adab. https://al-adab.com/article/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%90-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%91-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%90%D9%87-%D8%B7%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%8F-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%B6-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AA

Neocosmos, M., 2016. *Thinking Freedom in Africa: Toward a Theory of Emancipatory Politics*. Wits University Press, Johannesburg.

Nerfin, M., 1991. Editorial: to the Reader. In: *IFDA Dossier*. International Foundation for Development Alternatives, Nyon, 1–4.

Nkrumah, K., 1963. *Africa Must Unite*. F.A. Praeger, New York. .

Patnaik, P., 2020. The Uses of "Populism" [WWW Document]. *Peoples Democr.* https://peoplesdemocracy.in/2020/0301_pd/uses-%E2%80%9Cpopulism%E2%80%9D (accessed 3.3.20).

Patnaik, U., 2007. *The Republic of Hunger and Other Essays*. Merlin Press, Monmouth, Wales.

Patnaik, U., 2018. Profit Inflation, Keynes and the Holocaust in Bengal, 1943–1944. *Econ. Polit. Wkly.* 53, 33.

Saad, R., 1998. *Social History of an Agrarian Reform Community in Egypt*, Cairo Papers in Social Science. American University in Cairo Press.

Samara, A., 1986. Arab Nationalism, the Palestinian Struggle and an Economic Scenario for a Potential Arab Unity. *Khamsin* 12, https://libcom.org/library/arab-nationalism-palestinian-struggle-economic-scenario-potential-arab-unity-adel-samara.

Sayigh, Y.A., 2002. *Elusive Development: From Dependence to Self-Reliance in the Arab Region*. Routledge, Milton Park, Abingdon.

Schmalzer, S., 2016. *Red Revolution, Green Revolution: Scientific Farming in Socialist China*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Sen, K., 2019. The Political Economy of Public Health in Syria: Some Global and Regional Considerations. In: Matar, L., Kadri, A. (Eds.), *From National Independence to Proxy, Syria War*. Springer International Publishing, Cham, 185–207.

Sharawy, H., 2011a. Memories on African Liberation (1956 - 1975) Part I [WWW Document]. *Pambazuka*. /pan-africanism/memories-african-liberation-1956-1975 (accessed 3.16.20).

Sharawy, H., 2011b. Memories on African Liberation (1956 - 1975): Part 2 [WWW Document]. *Pambazuka*. /pan-africanism/memories-african-liberation-1956-1975-part-2 (accessed 3.16.20).

Sharawy, H., 2015. *Political and Social Thought in Africa*. Codesria, Dakar.

Sharma, D., 2017. *Techno-Politics, Agrarian Work and Resistance in Post-Green Revolution Punjab, India* (Dissertation). Cornell University.

Smith, J., 2016. *Imperialism in the Twenty-First Century: Globalization, Super-Exploitation, and Capitalism's Final Crisis*. Monthly Review Press, New York.

Suwandi, I., 2019. *Value Chains: The New Economic Imperialism*. Monthly Review Press, New York.

Tse-tung, M., 1945. We Must Learn to Do Economic Work. In: *Selected Works*, Vol. III. Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, 239–245.

UGTT, 1956. Rapport Economique, 6eme Congres National, 20-23 September 1956.

Valiani, Salimah, 2020. Sumak Kawsay beyond Latin America: A Proposal for Debate and Action in South Africa. *Cuad. Econ. Crit.* 6, 155–165.

Watanabe, S., 2017. A Forgotten Mobilization: The Tunisian Volunteer Movement for Palestine in 1948. *J. Econ. Soc. Hist. Orient* 60(4), 488–523. https://doi.org/10.1163/15685209-12341428.

Younes, Y., 1964. Note sur le Calcul Economique. *Rev. Tunis. Sci. soc.* 1, 27–52.

Zamiti, K., 1973. *Culture, idéologie de la modernité et obstacles au développement en Tunisie*. Paris V, Paris.