



Voting and the rise of populism: Spatial perspectives and applications across Europe

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Abstract

Populism has expanded over the past decade, especially far-right parties and their respective voter bases. Voting patterns are often unevenly distributed over space, which makes it very relevant to explore, along with other relevant factors, the spatial dimension. This will increase our understanding of the rise of populist parties, and accordingly, policy implications.

First, an introduction to the rise of populism is given, especially in the context of Europe, followed by introducing a conceptualization of the spatial dimension of populism. Then, the contributions of the special issue are highlighted. A clear conclusion is that economic development is an important factor in explaining populist voting, but that regional factors such as local public spending on culture, broader welfare and local unemployment, play an equally important role. Instead of more policies, more attention to the context-specific regional needs are urgently required, resulting in a call for place-sensitive policies that take into account regional economic and socio-demographic differences. Finally, ideas on further research directions are proposed.

JEL CLASSIFICATION

D72; R11; R23; R58

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1 | INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF POPULISM IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT

The rise of populism has become widespread over the past decade, especially parties (factions) towards the far-right and their respective voter bases.¹ There is not an overarching definition of what populism, sometimes referred to as anti-establishment politics, is. Partly because it is difficult to pinpoint it over time as political landscapes are dynamic, and a party that once was labelled as populist can be fairly mainstream in the following elections due to internal and external shifts. However, in general, populist parties are opposing the establishment (Canovan, 1999; Vossen, 2012). This establishment can be the bureaucratic elite, as well as the capital elite. Populist parties come into different flavours such as rightwing and nationalistic populism, liberal populism, or left populism (Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013).

Next to this dividing of society into (corrupt) elites and (pure) people, populist parties also often highlight an authoritarian belief in a strictly ordered society, expressed by a charismatic leader that appeals to the discontent and worries of the ordinary people (Albanese et al., 2019; Mudde, 2007). These so-called ordinary people are not evenly spread over countries. Increasingly, we see a segregation of low- and high-income people, with more knowledge and practice-oriented jobs and their associated attitudes, at national, regional and also city levels.

As voting can (partly) be a manifestation of *discontent*, the topic is also related to the spatial dynamics of social unrest. Along with a surge of protest movements around the world, such as the George Floyd protests and anti-government protests from France to Chile to Lebanon, a powerful way to voice discontent is via the polling booth. There is a myriad of reasons for these outcomes, but a common thread among them are rising social inequalities—the dominant economic model is not working for the mass of the people. Moreover, crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, climate crisis, economic and socio-political crises with multiple ratcheting costs (e.g., health impacts, job losses, inadequate public services, and a deterioration in wellbeing), are set to reinforce existing social inequalities.

As a result, this backdrop of crises, governing parties and institutions that have largely abandoned working- and middle-class interests, provides a fertile environment for populist discourse with leaders excoriating dominant institutions. Marine LePen, for example, portrayed Emmanuel Macron as an elitist representative of a political class during the 2017 French presidential election campaign. In an infamous occurrence in Amiens, LePen told angry crowds facing imminent job losses due to a factory relocation to Poland: “Macron is with the oligarchs, with the employers. I am where I should be, with the employees of Whirlpool who are fighting this uncontrolled globalisation, this shameful economic model – not eating petits-fours with a few representatives who only represent themselves” (Henley, 2020). Paradoxically, such leaders are also often elite (falsely) claiming to be a voice for ‘the people’ – Trump being one of the most emblematic demagogues. Another case in point is the Conservative Party (UK), an elite establishment.

This kind of rhetoric is non-trivial and prevalent, and in the European context is connected to a surge in anti-EU sentiments.² Even though economic growth and productivity has generally increased – albeit taking a hard hit due to the COVID-19 pandemic—wealth generated is ending up in a few pockets.³ The productivity-pay gap has been growing as real wages have been declining especially since the late 1970s.⁴ In Europe, on top of this, as decision-making on major issues is made in large part by an unelected Troika, this adds fuel to the fire (see e.g., Dinan et al., 2017).

The role of “cultural backlash” and nationalist sentiments has been highlighted in explaining the wave of populism (e.g., Dorling & Tomlinson, 2019; Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Rensmann, 2017). This especially concerns social value change and immigration. The blame game with culpability often falling on already vulnerable factions of society (e.g., ethnic minorities and immigrants) usually takes away focus from the root of problems driving vulnerabilities, such as the underlying systems that perpetuate crises and structural inequalities. A myriad of potential (intricately interrelated) underlying factors thus comes into view. The non-trivial nature of rhetoric, for example, can be related to education as it can proxy the role of anti-EU propaganda in swaying opinions (cf. Becker et al., 2017). In addition, it can also relate to lack of opportunities, as those with less education and skills are often among the most adversely affected by crises, which can worsen regional divides (Becker et al., 2017; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). Thus, besides an



overall trend in wealth polarization, many countries are also marked by stark regional divides. Interestingly, from observing election results, it often emerges that voting is not randomly distributed across space. This makes it very germane to consider the spatial dimension along with *inter alia*, political, social, economic and wellbeing factors, as it can enhance the understanding of voting patterns and the formulation of policy implications. Consequently, growing attention is being paid to this topic in the regional science literature and related fields (see e.g., Becker et al., 2017; Dijkstra et al., 2020; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018).

2 | THE SPATIAL DIMENSION OF POPULISM

Territorial inequalities are often related to social and economic changes (e.g., de-industrialization), government negligence, corruption and mismanagement, that is, so-called *contextual factors*. In the case of the UK referendum in 2016, votes in favour of leaving the EU were concentrated in many industrial declining and disadvantaged areas of the North and the East of England (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). In particular, voting patterns coincided with geographical patterns of education, income, (below-average) public services, unemployment, and dependence on the manufacturing sector (Becker et al., 2017). Rodríguez-Pose (2018) connected this voting behavior to a feeling of discontent that is increasing in certain regions, labelling recent ballot outcomes across the EU as “the revenge of the places that don't matter.”⁵

Sandhu (2020) also refers in this context to the “the economics of belonging,” where belonging captures the fallout from economic change. In this respect, geographical factors can be important to address when analysing voting outcomes and policies. However, it should also be noted that more affluent areas (e.g., in the South of the England) also voted in favour of Brexit. Relatedly, in their EU-wide study, Dijkstra et al. (2020) find that once job prospects, economic and industrial change, and education are controlled for, it is wealthier places that are more opposed to European integration than poorer ones, in particular if they have witnessed better times.⁶

The role of regions and resulting spatial voting patterns first of all depends on the political system and the design of the representative democracy in place. In most of Europe, politicians are chosen from large districts with multiple winners, and parties are represented in proportion to the share of votes they received (Rodden, 2019). On the other side, in the UK and the US, representatives are chosen from relatively small districts with only a single winner. In this case, the geography of a party's supporters is extremely important (Rodden, 2019).

Spatial patterns of this support can be explained by both *compositional and contextual differences* between regions. As such, there are clear interrelationships between spatial characteristics and differences, discontent and populist voting (see Figure 1). An important mediator for populist voting is a feeling of discontent. This feeling can prevail both at the individual, and at the regional level. Furthermore, we need to be aware of reverse causality or endogeneity when voting for anti-establishment parties fuels discontent and through contextual factors also impacts regional differences. This is something that has already been recognized in political science (e.g., Wlezién et al., 1997), but less so in regional science.

2.1 | Compositional effects

People with similar characteristics and/or attitudes often sort themselves in similar residential areas based on socio-economic conditions and resources, as well as lifestyle preferences (van Leeuwen, 2020). Different concentrations of people with certain characteristics, so-called compositional effects, partly explain voting patterns. Areas with a high concentration of manufacturing labourers are more likely to have high shares of vote for a labour party; areas with many farmers receive probably more votes for farmer-oriented parties. But there is more. For example, people with positive attitudes towards multiculturalism tend to sort in larger cities (Cavaille & Marshall, 2019). This sorting can




FIGURE 1 Conceptualization of the spatial dimension of populism through composition, context and institutions

be explained both by the cultural characteristics of the city (i.e., diverse population, multicultural influences, presence of international gastronomy); but also by education or job opportunities, as well as resources, such as the availability of (un)affordable housing (Huijsmans et al., 2021).

Sorting not only happens because people move to a place or environment they prefer, but also because some do not have that possibility: they are locked in their (less desirable) context. Inner cities, for example, were abandoned in the 1970s, but were rediscovered from the 1980s onwards particularly by middle- and upper-class people. Housing prices increased, and lower income households were pushed out of this thriving and vibrant part of the city (Huijsmans et al., 2021). Amongst others, this contributed to larger regional inequalities, as well as within-city inequalities (Hochstenbach & Arundel, 2020). People in other areas, for example regions that face population decline, can be locked into certain areas because it is impossible to sell their house (Franklin & van Leeuwen, 2018). Both processes can fuel regional differences of discontent.

Several studies find that spatial differences in attitudes cannot only be explained by sorting effects, but also by the local context, such as urban–rural differences. According to Huijsmans et al. (2021, p. 3), who focus on urban–rural differences in cosmopolitan attitudes, “This implies that it is not just self-selection ... but that an urban or rural context can also *make* people cosmopolitan or nationalistic.” The question to which extent this sorting also contributes to different contextual situations in terms of economic development or wellbeing is both a challenging and intriguing one.

2.2 | Contextual effects

Different regions offer different opportunities and face different growth patterns, providing different outlooks to their populations. Literature on these contextual factors generally take into account the physical, social and/or economic dimension. In case of the physical dimension, that is, in terms of living environment, for example, the level of density, quality of housing, or outer space plays an important role. The feeling of being left behind can occur both in urban and rural areas, when quality of housing or public space is low. Regions facing population or economic decline might also face deteriorating buildings or factories. Furthermore, accessibility, in terms of both mobility and internet impacts the context of voters.

Second, the social environment, that is, income inequality, ethnic diversity and trust are factors that provide a different context to otherwise similar persons. Higher social diversity, often found in cities can result in more diverse personal networks and associated tolerant and cosmopolitan attitudes (Huggins & Debies-Carl, 2015). Huijsmans et al. (2021), who looked at the divergence between urban and rural areas in terms of attitudes towards immigration, multiculturalism and EU integration, found an increasing gap between very urban areas and the less of the Netherlands in the period 1994–2017.



Also, local cultural values play a role. Communities with more traditional values in terms of gender roles, for example, face more difficulties in adapting to a more service-oriented society in which physical labour and strength has become less important (see e.g., Sandbu, 2020). Here, compositional effects are enforced by cultural contextual factors (community norms).

Finally, the economic environment also matters. This includes both sectoral composition, such as economic development and employment trends, both in the short- and long-term. Lind (2020) concludes that regions with more knowledge-based sectors are more positive about globalization, the EU, and immigration. While Dijkstra et al. (2020), find a relationship between long-term economic and industrial decline and anti-EU sentiments when analysing 63,000 European Electoral districts, they also find population composition to matter, namely, age, education and income, the impact is much lower.

2.3 | Reverse causality

It is widely agreed that economic conditions are important determinants of voting choice. However, the extent to which this is based on facts or perceptions of these conditions is increasingly under debate. Some scholars stress the fact that it is not the actual economic conditions that matter, but the interpretation of this by political parties that shapes these perceptions (Bartels, 2002). As such, there might be reverse causality in play, in which (populist) partisanship impacts the perceptions of the economic conditions (Evans & Pickup, 2010; Wlezien et al., 1997). Nevertheless, De Vries et al. (2018) concluded that in the case of British voters partisan biases do exist, but overall perceptions are rooted in the real economy.

Another case of reverse causality is highlighted by Charron et al. (2020) in their study on (political) trust and COVID-19 related mortalities (measured by excess deaths). They find that in polarised regions⁷ it is more difficult to develop a joint, widely supported, action plan and that policies become more populist and less based on expert's criteria. In these regions, excess deaths were significantly higher. This shows how populism, through institutions as political parties, can fuel regional differences.

3 | THIS SPECIAL ISSUE

This themed issue contributes to this burgeoning and increasingly relevant literature on the rise of populism and voting patterns, with special attention to the spatial context and recent and ongoing developments across Europe.

The contribution of Koeppen et al. (2021) builds on some of the influential work discussed above, combining geographical and associated socioeconomic factors with “emotional dynamics” relating to perceptions of threat and vulnerability. In particular, another measure of discontent is included by bringing subjective happiness to the forefront. It is argued to be a more explicit measure of discontent and thus a potentially key explanatory factor, which has received less attention in this line of research. Using a multilevel modelling framework and individual-level data from the European Social Survey and regional data from Eurostat covering 18 European countries, they appraise to which extent voting for anti-political establishment parties (APEP) are a result of the “places – or people – that don't matter,” or an interaction between the two. A key interesting finding is that subjective happiness in itself does not explain APEP votes, but rather the link with social and political attitudes, as well as geographical factors.

The other contributions explore recent and current developments in specific European countries, as well as distinct populist and nationalist parties. The most recent and momentous manifestation of anti-EU sentiment is reflected in UK developments. Tubadji et al. (2021) focus on the Brexit votes and take a new perspective by applying their “Tiebout–Hirschman–Rothschild mechanism.” They estimate perceived relative deprivation as an interaction between local public spending on culture and relative net-outward-mobility attractiveness. Due to this perceived depreciation, people vote with their feet, namely, they move out, or they express their concerns through casting a



protest vote. Here, protest voting is seen as a radical act by those being unable to vote with one's feet, but who do live in areas that are left behind. Tubadji et al. (2021) explore the effects on the share of pro-Brexit votes at the local authority district-level of shares of public spending on culture and a particular type of migration dynamic that triggers social closure. Their findings reveal that strong support for the Leave campaign was encountered in areas with lower local government expenditure on culture and in areas with higher outflows of UK residents.

van Leeuwen et al. (2021) explore the outcomes of the Dutch national elections in 2012 and 2017, linking shares of populist votes for the two most dominant populist parties PVV (right-wing) and SP (left-wing) to indicators of population decline, compositional, and contextual effects to appraise the drivers of higher rates of populist votes in regions of decline. The importance of distinguishing between different parties due to distinct party programmes clearly emerges, for example, the focus on immigration (PVV) and jobs (SP). With respect to declining areas, a "populist voting mark-up" is not found, which could partly be due to relatively low levels of population decline in the Netherlands compared to regions in, for example, Italy and Spain. However, it is found that both compositional and contextual factors in areas of population decline are in such a way that they provoke discontent expressed in voting. Related to Koeppen et al. (2021) integrating subjective wellbeing, they also find that the broad welfare indicator that encompasses liveability by capturing various factors reflecting quality of life at the regional level is an especially significant driver of PVV votes.

The contribution of Reháč et al. (2021) provides an interesting contrast to other studies both in the recent literature and this special issue with a different context for Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. CEE countries benefited more from FDI and faced outmigration, in addition to being a major recipient of European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF). In particular, they analyse the relationship between the ascent of the voter base for the radical right and the regional dimension of socioeconomic processes related to the integration of Slovakia into the EU, focusing on recent parliamentary elections of 2016. Notably, different results are found in terms of voter support for the traditional and new radical right—the SNS and L'SNS, respectively where the latter has grown more in recent years. The support for L'SNS is strongly associated with long-term regional economic factors such as unemployment and wages, while SNS with cultural and nationalist sentiments.

These longer term factors, including institutional changes on top of economic shocks can lead to profound grievances and political protest. Greece is a clear example of a country that experienced a very hard period from the 2008 financial crisis and onwards. The implementation of a prolonged financial aid programme came with harsh austerity measures and deep structural reforms; more than one quarter of Greeks' disposable income over the period 2009–2015 was lost (Artelaris, 2017). Artelaris and Mavrommatis (2021), in their contribution, evaluate to what extent the spatially differentiated gains during the national elections of 2015 of Golden Dawn, one of the most anti-establishment, anti-migrant and anti-EU political parties in Europe, can be explained by either (socio)economic or cultural changes that took place in the country in recent years, or by both. Their results show that it is the combination of (socio)economic and cultural grievances that explains larger shares of votes for the populist party Golden Dawn, with the socio-economic grievances taking precedence over cultural discontent.

Deniz et al. (2021) do not focus on a populist party, but on the biggest party of Turkey, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)—Justice and Development Party, which has governed since winning the elections in 2002 following the early 2000s recession. They follow voting patterns in 81 provinces over a 16 year period, between 2002 and 2018. Although they find a path dependency in shares of votes, they also find that regions respond to economic conditions: where voters reward the AKP-based improvements. This happened also in regions that traditionally vote less for AKP, such as the less developed Kurdish provinces. On the other hand, AKP stronghold regions appeared to be less responsive to economic downfalls. Overall, the authors highlight the importance of local cultural, ethnic, and economic landscapes to understand regional voting patterns.

Finally, there are three diverse contributions on recent developments in Italy. Di Matteo and Mariotti (2020) focus on geographic patterns of populism at municipality level and analyse the drivers of, in particular, the rise in right-wing populism in the European elections of 2014 and 2019. They calculate a right-wing populism intensity score for Lega and National Alliance (currently FdI) and use a parametric approach with linear models to explain



changes in this populism intensity: *inter alia*, mid-term change in abstentionism, long-term environmental change (indicators to proxy human intervention in cities and connectivity among cities and regions), long-term cultural change in education among younger individuals, economic and demographic changes. Results demonstrate that main drivers of right-wing populism intensity growth are (un)employment, long-term cultural change and immigration. They also offer specific examples and challenges on other ways to attenuate drivers that generate discontent vis-à-vis the center-periphery and owner-worker dichotomies.

Faggian et al. (2021) focus on the Italian municipal elections of 2018 and on two parties, Lega and Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S), that compete for “different shades of populism.” Although both are labelled as populist, their party programmes are quite different: while Lega focuses more on anti-EU sentiments and can be classified as a right-wing party, M5S focusses on anti-elite feelings and is seen as an anti-establishment party. The aim is to highlight those factors that are mainly correlated with the positioning characteristics of the two parties. Based on shares of votes per municipality, they find some similarities: low-income municipalities and areas with higher shares of workers in industry and services tend to vote more populist. Moreover, factors linked to the content of the party programmes, that is, migration and (un)employment levels, explain differences in voting patterns. The additional insights attained from distinguishing between parties was also highlighted in the study of van Leeuwen et al. (2021). The combination of both results in strong geographical differences: namely, a North–South divide, with the North voting more for Lega and the South for M5S, as well as sharp urban–rural differences, where metropolitan areas tend to vote less for Lega. As such, both people and places matter.

The final contribution of Truglia and Zeli (2021) provides a different angle. They focus on the fall of left-wing parties, particularly the *Partito Democratico* (PD), in the last eight general elections in Tuscany—a region that has historically had a more democratic stronghold with a leftist political culture along with an economic culture based prevalently on co-operative small business. Related to this, the social capital helped to develop and strengthen the political identities of the region. Given these important factors of culture, identity, social attitudes, it is of interest to question what has led to a diminution of the left in this region and a shift towards liberalist positions. A central aspect of the framework they propose is to address the spatial context, that is, to establish the relationship between electoral and social movements at the territorial level. This is also crucial because of the likewise rise in right populist movements with for example, Lega—highlighted also in the other contributions in this special issue—having a profound territorial link as well. From their spatial analysis using municipality level data on the past general elections between 1982 and 2018, they find that the fall in the PD can be attributed to the erosion of past social values and unresolved effects from past economic crisis including high (youth) unemployment and manufacturing industries being especially hard hit.

4 | CONCLUSIONS

Altogether, this special issue provides germane policy implications and contributes to the ongoing conversation on voting, the rise of populism, and the non-trivial spatial dimension. It also relates to the more general subject of the spatial dynamics of social unrest and rising discontent. Therefore, we highlighted the interdependence between spatial differences, discontent and populist voting, and the role of compositional and contextual factors. Regardless of own political affiliation or opinions, understanding factors underlying discontent and how it can be attenuated is of great importance.

Subjective happiness (related to quality of life), although in itself, is not found to explain populist votes, is still a key factor when linked with political attitudes, social and geographical factors. In this sense, broader welfare deserves more attention and relatedly, it is recommendable to focus on *what concerns people have* instead of only on votes. Given that both people and places matter, policy also needs to acknowledge individual effects and (interactions) with developments at the territorial level. In the case of Brexit, the contribution here highlighted that areas with lower local government expenditure and areas with higher outmigration of UK residents strongly supported the Leave campaign.



In the case of Slovakia, although EU accession and ESIF targeting lagging regions has been expected to have positive results, regional social and economic disparities remain and thus, one main policy implication is to address that these funds are better used—as in EU-wide studies (see e.g., Dijkstra et al., 2020) and other country-specific contributions in this special issue. However, instead of more policies, more attention to the context-specific regional needs seem to be urgently needed, that is, place sensitive policies (Dijkstra et al., 2020). Still, “emotional dynamics” can be a key factor, as also reflected in the significance of nationalist sentiments in the case of the SNS results for Slovakia. The opportunity for place-sensitive policies is also emphasized in the Italian case.

Another insight underlined is that especially when populist parties have quite distinct *programmes*, additional valuable information is obtained when treating them separately. In addition to the programme-specific content that resonate more or less in regions with a certain composition or context, political parties can also have regional strongholds. This thus reinforces the importance of addressing the spatial context. Along with economic and broader welfare factors, social and cultural factors have also been highlighted. In the case of Greece, for example, it is found that socio-economic grievances are more significant than cultural discontent in explaining a rise in votes for Golden Dawn. In the case of Tuscany, it is found that it is both an erosion of social values and consequences of past economic crises that have contributed to a fall in the left-wing PD party. In the European-wide study of voting behaviour for APEP, it is found that personal socio-economic, political and cultural characteristics are all important, but are only part of the picture—the role of regional contextual factors (e.g., unemployment rates) is also important. It is thus clear that in addition to addressing individual and community needs, territorial development policies are also important, but require better targeting.

5 | FUTURE RESEARCH

Finally, we conclude with ideas on further research directions. First of all, work on the compositional aspects would benefit from looking further into different “social classes” as the three kinds of classes is outdated, as well as specific sub-groups. For example, in relation to technological changes and increased automatization, there is substantial literature on its labor market impacts (see e.g., Autor, 2011; Sandbu, 2020), leaving some groups more vulnerable with their jobs replaced. As the quality of jobs is an essential element and employment prospects was a key common thread among studies in this special issue, this can have extremely meaningful implications for wellbeing and in turn, outcomes regarding populism and more generally social unrest.

Second, and related to the conceptual framework offered in Section 2, more insights into how compositional and contextual factors can reinforce or mitigate each other is an important avenue. For example, by looking at regional factors, such as youth unemployment, in regions with either more elderly or a younger population, to what extent does this impact voting behavior? Also, reverse causality, so the impact of polarization and a populist political landscape on the economic, social and environmental performance of regions, or even the composition of regions. Could high levels of polarization be a motive for people to move, and thus to sort differently? And what is the (potential) role of institutions in this?

Furthermore, more attention is needed on place-sensitive approaches, especially in practice. Second, although behavioural aspects are often challenging to capture, including more subjective measures such as social, cultural, and political attitudes would be germane. This also connects with going even more in-depth on how to conceptualize and measure “discontent.” Here, the role of the media in feeding perceptions, feelings of discontent, and the spread of potentially dangerous misinformation is playing an increasingly important role. To some extent, this might add “noise” to the spatial patterns we see today. New insights on how to measure and incorporate media coverage and influence in empirical analyses, as well as on different types of media and at different spatial levels could also add a pertinent dimension.

Moreover and relatedly, it would be relevant to investigate more on *trust*. Although the present challenges and crises can be extremely difficult, they are also historically often the times of biggest change, creating opportunities



to open up dialogues and address problems. This requires good quality institutions, as well as trust within and between societies. This is also related to issues on perceived collective threats, vulnerabilities, group dynamics and network effects.

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ Populism certainly existed beforehand, but recently has spread globally with unprecedented developments such as the results of the 2016 US presidential election, Brexit vote in the UK, 2017 Austrian legislative election, 2018 Brazilian general election, as well as the ascent of Lega in Italy, Vox in Spain, the Forum for Democracy (FvD) in the Netherlands, and the Alternative for Germany (AfD).
- ² As pointed out by Dijkstra et al. (2020), these anti-EU sentiments predate Brexit, with an increasing share of votes for parties against EU integration across several member states over the past decade.
- ³ There have of course been earlier notable crises such as the global financial crisis starting in 2007.
- ⁴ See e.g. Cohen and Simet (2018).
- ⁵ This is related to recent research vis-à-vis the 'geography of discontent' (see e.g., Cramer, 2016; McCann, 2018; Dijkstra et al., 2020, and references therein.)
- ⁶ This is also found by van Leeuwen (in this issue), where the share of votes for the populist party PVV is higher in neighbourhoods located in regions with higher regional economic growth.
- ⁷ With exacerbated ideological differences among political parties.

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Resumen. El populismo se ha expandido en la última década, en especial los partidos de extrema derecha y sus respectivas bases de votantes. Los patrones de voto suelen encontrarse distribuidos de forma desigual en el espacio, lo que hace muy pertinente el estudio, junto con otros factores relevantes, de su dimensión espacial. Esta puede añadir un aspecto importante para comprender mejor el auge de los partidos populistas y, en consecuencia, las implicaciones políticas. En primer lugar, se ofrece una introducción al auge del populismo, en particular dentro del contexto de Europa, seguido de la presentación de la conceptualización de la dimensión espacial del populismo. A continuación, se hace una reseña de las contribuciones de este número especial. Una conclusión clara es que el desarrollo económico es un factor importante para explicar el voto populista, pero que los factores regionales, como el gasto público local en cultura, el bienestar en general y el desempleo local, desempeñan un papel igualmente importante. En lugar de más políticas, urge prestar más atención a las necesidades regionales específicas de cada contexto, lo que se traduce en un llamamiento a políticas conscientes del lugar, que tengan en cuenta las diferencias económicas y sociodemográficas regionales. Por último, se proponen ideas sobre nuevas direcciones de investigación.

抄録: 過去10年の間に、ポピュリズム、特に極右政党とその選挙基盤が拡大している。投票パターンは空間的に不均一であることが多いため、空間的な側面とその他の関連因子を探索することが非常に重要である。これにより、ポピュリスト政党の台頭、さらには政策的含意の理解を深めるための重要な見方を得ることができる。まず、ポピュリズムの台頭、特にヨーロッパにおけるその状況を提示し、それに続いてポピュリズムの空間的側面の概念化について述べる。その次に、特別号の貢献に注目する。結論として明らかなことは、経済発展はポピュリスト政党の得票を説明する重要な要因であるが、文化への地方公共支出、福祉の拡大、地方の失業などの地域的要因も同様に重要な役割を果たすということである。より多くの政策ではなく、状況に応じて地域のニーズにより多くの注意を向けることが緊急に必要とされており、地域経済および社会・人口統計学的な差を考慮した、地域に合わせた政策が求められている。最後に、更なる研究の方向性に関する考えを提案する。