

Dreams and Realities: Do-It-Yourself (Autonomic) Reincorporation by Ex-Insurgents in Colombia

Beyond Nationalism and the Nation-State - Radical Approaches to Nation

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DREAMS AND REALITIES

Do-it-yourself (autonomic) reincorporation by ex-insurgents in Colombia¹

Julián Cortés Urquijo and Gerard Verschoor

“[N]ot every power needs to be a separate body above society. It is possible to build the other world we long for without going through that which has always been a nightmare for libertarians throughout history, beginning with Karl Marx: the state”

(Zibechi 2010a: 1)

“A spectre is haunting the continent, the spectre of autonomy”

(Escobar 2018b: 59; own translation)

Introduction

After more than 50 years of armed conflict between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC–EP), the National Liberation Army (ELN), paramilitary groups, and the Colombian army, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and millions of displaced people, the FARC–EP and the Colombian government signed peace accords in November of 2016. Peace building, however, as Lalli (2006), Subedi (2014), Munive (2014), and Pugh (2005) argue, often faces difficulties and obstacles. One such difficulty is that, in the post-war situation, the Colombian government and FARC² (now a political party) hold different views about the implementation of the accords. Underlying FARC’s position is their former national modernization project that involved institutional and agrarian reforms. In the context of what many consider a failed implementation of the peace accords, this project is presently being adapted and reshaped by ex-insurgents in different parts of the country – especially in the Territorial Spaces for Training and Reincorporation (ETCRs)³ and the New Areas of Reincorporation (NARs),⁴ the sites where ex-insurgents

were relocated to. Echoing Richmond (2011), we argue that this reshaping and adaptation is not a haphazard, pragmatic way of solving needs; rather, it points to an infra-politics of peace building in which former rebel groups, drawing on their previous revolutionary practices and experiences, exercise a (local) politics beyond the State.

During the war, the FARC-EP insurgency used to interact with peasant communities in different ways. In most cases, they put in place a rebel governance system based on selective incentives, justice adjudication, conflict resolution, and community policing that was co-designed with rural communities. This governance system, which was anchored in a nation-based political project aiming to take over the Colombian State, allowed FARC-EP to effectively govern the regions under their control (Cortés 2017). This is the frame of reference of most ex-insurgents, and they hope that their new Party will continue to rally in support of this type of governance system. What is less clear to them though is how to materialize their political dream of “making a revolution” – especially when considering the less-than-favorable situation they now find themselves in (e.g., absence of weapons, losing popular bases due to their displacement to unfamiliar regions, losing local power, and so on). Going by experiences of other post-insurgencies (Sprenkels 2014), reincorporation of ex-insurgents in Colombia will probably entail a range of different survival strategies to cope with the uncertainties related to the government’s lack of commitment to implement the peace accords. For many of the ex-insurgents who pursue FARC-EP’s collective project, this practically means how to collectively obtain a sustainable income *without* official governmental support. In this context, ex-insurgents ask themselves important political and existential questions: will they have the time to make a revolution? Will they have the time left to think about revolution or a new society? These questions are especially expedient for ex-insurgents living in rural areas, who most probably will not participate in State or political party bureaucracies.

The difficult circumstances notwithstanding (which include mounting and unpunished violence against ex-guerrillas and social leaders), ex-insurgents hope they will be able to revitalize the nation-based political project of the former guerrillas, including elements of the latter’s agrarian program (FARC-EP 1993), which can presently only be implemented locally and “beyond the state”. Ex-insurgents are keenly aware of the current Colombian government’s “hidden” (but easily perceptible) reincorporation agenda that follows standardized reintegration protocols but disregards or downplays important elements of the peace accords that are dear to the ex-rebels (e.g., collective approaches to reincorporation with a focus on gender and ethnic issues). Also, ex-insurgents are very worried about the clear intention of inserting them into neoliberal market logics on an individual basis, and there is mounting evidence that the country’s elites go out of their way to block the FARC’s political influence at the local and national level.

This chapter describes and analyses an effort by ex-insurgents to put into practice an autonomous collective project beyond the State. This “do-it-yourself”

reincorporation project, which plays out in the La Fortuna cooperative (henceforth La Fortuna) in the Department of Antioquia, is based on an alternative vision of Nation in which both the practices and discourses of the former peasant guerrillas and the perceived betrayal of the peace accords by the State figure centrally.⁵ To describe the case, we use three concepts developed by the Educational Committee of Social Economies of the Common (ECOMUN)⁶ to give meaning to the process of reincorporation: “awakening”, “learning”, and “producing”. Theoretically, we draw on Scott’s (1990, 2008) “everyday forms of peasant resistance” and “infra-politics”, Rancière’s (1999) “disagreement politics”, Zibechi’s (2010a, 2010b) concept of “autonomy”, and Escobar’s (2018a) notion of “autonomic design”. We posit that the search for autonomy cannot be seen as “just” a local strategy to “resolve the problems” of the economic reincorporation of ex-insurgents; rather, this collective search is effectively a means for peasants and ex-rebels to resist neoliberal forces on the basis of FARC-EP’s alternative model of society⁷ – but now, without pursuing the control of managerial state apparatuses – and their own, contingent, experiences of the post-agreement.

To gather information for this chapter, the first author undertook ethnographic fieldwork in La Fortuna and carried out in-depth interviews with key ex-insurgents from the cooperative.⁸ This was complemented by collective discussions with members of the Educational Committee of ECOMUN⁹ and ECOMUN’s board (of which the first author participated as a substitute board member). In what follows, we present our theoretical framework, a detailed description of the development of La Fortuna, a brief analysis of the case, and our conclusions regarding the local reshaping of the nation-based political discourse of the FARC through the development of autonomic experiences of reincorporation.

Reimagining peasant resistance and autonomy in peace-building contexts: A theoretical framework

Reintegration of ex-insurgents into society after armed conflicts has typically followed traditional discourses of development in which

[D]evelopment policy and planning, as well as much of what goes on under the banner of design, are central political technologies of patriarchal capitalist modernity and key elements in modernity’s constitution of a single globalized world. (Escobar 2018a: xiii)

This particularly holds for Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) policies and programs that are “in line with the evolution of global peace, security, and development agendas” (Muggah and O’Donnell 2015: 3) and that assume that the market and (individual) entrepreneurial projects are essential, magic tools for the economic reintegration of ex-combatant populations (Jennings 2009, Subedi 2014). In general, peace building has been conceived and

planned through a neoliberal lens (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, Pugh 2005, 2011, Ramnarain 2013, Munive 2014, Selby 2016), making local populations “subjects of peacebuilding, state building, modernization, and development” (Richmond 2011: 1).

However, in reintegration programs involving former insurgencies – especially those that are Marxist-inspired – it can be expected that some kind of contestation to neoliberal programs and developmental discourses will take place, particularly if ex-insurgents have a real interest in continuing the former struggle. Under peace-building conditions insurgencies usually change their political strategies (Sprenkels 2014) and their contestations may take different political forms, varying between the center (urban and globalized contexts) and the periphery (rural and localized contexts) – especially in the case of former agrarian armed movements.

Thus, one can suggest the possibility of a transformation of the political dream to take over the State toward more localized and pragmatic political projects. In line with this suggestion, some scholars and activists have questioned the idea that national liberation movements are always “trapped” in their commitment to take control of the state or state-making (Öcalan, cited by Akkaya and Jongerden 2013: 192). Rather, they have argued that these movements may evolve into more locally rooted ones not necessarily in pursuit of prior ideals. But to what extent can these localized, political projects be seen as real alternatives to current neoliberal societies? Scott (2008), in exploring this question, has made visible the frequently unnoticed (but relevant) elements of social struggle that can nevertheless be seen as concrete political actions. According to Scott (2008: xvi), these elements “require little or no coordination or planning; they make use of implicit understandings and informal networks; they often represent a form of individual self-help; they typically avoid any direct, symbolic confrontation with authority” and, more often than not, they aim to reinforce local autonomy and, importantly, land ownership.

Looking back at the former FARC-EP demands, it is clear that they were rooted in their negative perception of the level of development of Colombian society, based as they were on an orthodox Marxist view and inspired as they were by the Russian and Chinese revolutions and their systematized efforts in modernizing their countries. The nationalist thought of the FARC-EP and their continuous search for a “developed nation” have their roots in the reaction of leftist-Marxist movements towards uneven development (Nairn (1997) referring to the Gellnerian theory) between the center (European countries and North America) and the periphery (the Global South). From this perspective, nationalism can be seen as a form of resistance to underdevelopment. In fact, most Marxist discourses of Latin American guerrillas of the past century used the same *leitmotif*: development, and more specifically, rural/agrarian development. The political aim of the former FARC-EP as regards rural development was thus linked to the idea of modernization by “introducing modern agricultural techniques and marketing strategies” (Petras and Veltmeyer 2001: 106), the

construction of infrastructure (roads), and technical assistance to the peasantry, as well as the most important demand by agrarian movements – land redistribution (FARC-EP 1993).

Since the Colombian guerrillas did not accomplish their stated objectives, one could argue that their fifty-year struggle was unsuccessful. Even if the peace accords would have implemented the policies included in the agreement, implementation would not actually have meant fulfillment of the FARC-EP's political dream. However, unfulfillment does not necessarily mean failure. As Scott (2008: 29) suggests, "even a failed revolt may achieve something: a few concessions from the state or landlords, a brief respite from new and painful relations of production and, not least, a memory of resistance and courage that may lie in wait for the future". What kind of development, then, is at stake after signing the peace accords in 2016? What kind of new societies are being created in the post-conflict era by those who were attempting to create a Marxist-Leninist revolution in Colombia? Are local, ex-rebel communities in the process of reincorporation desiring their past dreams?

We perceive that social movements have increasingly put autonomy at the center of their political claims. Likewise, many communities throughout the world have discovered that calls for autonomy could contest conventional development and modernization discourses, thus challenging the State as we know it (Zibechi 2010a, Akkaya and Jongerden 2013). In this chapter, we argue that ex-insurgents' political struggles can also be seen as struggles for autonomy in that these offer an alternative to the traditional development and modernization discourses of reintegration programs. It is clear that, in light of this struggle for autonomy, conventional reintegration interventions will do all that lies within their reach to prevent this:

These [development] programs seek to neutralize or modify networks and forms of solidarity, reciprocity, and mutual assistance that were created by the poor (*los de abajo*) in order to survive neoliberalism. Once the social ties and knowledge that assured their autonomy have disappeared, these sectors are easier to control. (Zibechi 2010a: 7)

In defining autonomy, Zibechi (2010a) identifies two different ways of doing politics: one based on the limits imposed by the State and pursuing State power and another based on the strategies of *los de abajo*. In the first, the State essentially establishes the rules of the game, and achievements are obtained through interaction and negotiation between social organizations (political parties and other grassroots organizations) and the State. In the second, politics are carried out by practicing new forms of relations among men and women *at the grassroots level*.

It is frequently assumed by policy makers and politicians that, in peace processes involving leftist movements, only a small number of ex-insurgents will eventually be involved in politics through participation in democratic elections within the concrete spaces given by the state apparatus (municipalities,

presidency, Parliament, and so on). However, participation in this type of politics does not exhaust the political; indeed, the political often encompasses a local politics *beyond the state* (Rancière 1999). These politics become especially evident in the infra-politics (Scott 1990) of peace building “as a way of representing the local, everyday context” (Richmond 2011: 16) by way of, for example, the daily activities through which communities of ex-insurgents pursue autonomy – autonomy in the political sense in that it opens “fissures in the mechanisms of domination, shred[s] the fabric of social control, and disperse[s] institutions” (Zibechi 2010a: 11). Along with Scott (2008), then, we see autonomy as a structured form of (peasant) resistance that requires little or no manifest organization and that “confers immediate and concrete advantages, while at the same time denying resources to the appropriating classes” (Scott 2008: 296); its objective “is not directly to overthrow or transform a system of domination but rather to survive” (Scott 2008: 301).

In his rendering of autonomy, Escobar (2018a) has recently addressed the design of autonomic processes, terming them “design for the transitions”. This design embodies an ontological approach in which “all design-led objects, tools, and even services bring about particular ways of being, knowing, and doing” (Escobar 2018a: x). Escobar also suggests that “the design for these transitions must involve a shift from traditional dualist ontologies (human-animal, developed-underdeveloped, men-women...) toward relational ontologies in which “all creation is collective, emergent, and relational; it involves historically and epistemically situated persons (never autonomous individuals)” (ibid, 2018a: xvi). In this sense, one can view Escobar as trying to reformulate Scott’s individual self-help concept of autonomy by imbuing it with collective and organizational elements that coalesce in a search for new possibilities and worlds. This chapter attempts to describe one such effort.

Designing an autonomic process of reincorporation: The “La Fortuna” Cooperative of Mutatá

The peace accords, with respect to the process of reincorporating¹⁰ FARC-EP insurgents into society, basically involve a combination of cash incentives (90% of the minimum wage for two years¹¹), vocational training, and individual or collective productive projects through cooperatives in which the State provides 8 million Colombian pesos (approximately 230 Euros) of seed capital to each ex-insurgent. Additionally, the peace accords include “incentives to farming and to the solidarity and cooperative economy” through ECOMUN (Acuerdo General 2017: 16). By the middle of 2020, approximately 130 cooperatives had been established in areas where ex-insurgents were located; these cooperatives are intended to provide farm products, agricultural supplies, handicrafts, and services – for example, related to culture, tourism, trade, communication, and video production. To have a more detailed summary of the different moments of the reincorporation process, see Figure 3.1.




FIGURE 3.1 Key moments of the reincorporation process of ex-insurgents of the FARC-EP. *Author elaboration*

Following the signing of the peace agreement in Colombia, in January of 2017 the 58th guerrilla front was instructed to settle in the Gallo *vereda* (rural district) in the municipality of Tierralta, in the Department of Córdoba (see Figure 3.2). In October of that year, 60 of the approximately 100 members of this group (including 20 women) decided to move to a rural area in the municipality of



FIGURE 3.2 The arrival of the 58th guerrilla front to Gallo. *Courtesy of Lilia Tavera*

Mutatá, in the Department of Antioquia, where they created a NAR. As Rubén Cano – the front’s former commander – told us, this was due to several factors: their general distrust in the Colombian government, considering the absence of infrastructure in Gallo (see Figure 3.3) to support reincorporation; the legal impossibility of developing economic endeavors due to environmental restrictions; the existence of paramilitaries in Córdoba; lack of electricity and potable water; and the existence of better social and material conditions in Mutatá, where the guerrillas had a strong influence during the war. As a consequence of this decision, the State temporarily suspended food supplies to the group, reinitiating supplies almost a year after relocation.

In Mutatá, the group bought 21 ha of forest and agricultural land using a collective fund of one million pesos per member, which came from the State at the beginning of the reincorporation process. This land is located in the San José de León *vereda* in a rural area of the municipality of Mutatá, 230 kilometers from Medellín – the capital of the Department of Antioquia. They chose this land because it included the right to use water from the river and because of its proximity (2 km) to the main road that leads to the towns of Chigorodó, Mutatá, and Apartadó.

Upon settling, they distributed the land into three *barrios* (neighborhoods). Each of the *escuadras* (crews) they formed as guerrilla fighters designated one delegate to form a team to distribute the land among ex-insurgents. The design of the farm includes collective spaces such as the community house and the school and several small plots for fishing ponds. Similarly, they chose a collective 2 ha plot at the foot of the mountain for growing food (see Figure 3.4). Most of the ex-insurgents formed families after the signing of the peace treaty, and some now have children who are part of the community.



FIGURE 3.3 Lack of infrastructure in Gallo. *Courtesy of Maria Quiroz*




FIGURE 3.4 Overview of the farm. *Author photo*

Once each community member (or family)¹² was allocated a plot of approximately one-third hectare, each family designed their home, and collectively built their wooden houses, beginning with those families with children or people with special needs. A team of five people felled trees located on their plots or nearby and distributed the lumber among all families, while approximately 10




FIGURE 3.5 Improvised wooden beds (*Caletas*). *Courtesy of Maria Quiroz*

ex-insurgents built the houses. While their homes were being built, they lived in plastic huts with improvised wooden beds (*caletas*) such as they had used in the mountains during the war (see Figure 3.5).

While building the houses, each family also prepared their agricultural plot, in most cases clearing virgin forest. In these plots, they removed many stones and prepared the soil for planting mainly plantains and cassava, and they constructed reservoirs for fish and sheds for chickens and pigs. Once most of the homes were built, they began to build a road covering approximately 2 km (see Figure 3.6) between the main road and their village with the help of construction materials and equipment supplied by the municipality (Misión de Verificación de la ONU en Colombia 2019, May 29).

In their new territory, 60 ex-insurgents and their family members (a total of 80 people) from the Gallo *vereda* formed the “La Fortuna de Mutatá” cooperative to serve the organizational demands of enacting its reincorporation process. Currently, the cooperative has 65 associates (including 13 women and 14 members who were not insurgents). Its board of directors consists of a president, treasurer, secretary, and two advisors, as well as their substitutes. The cooperative also has the following committees: education, oversight, road construction and maintenance, crop agriculture, poultry raising, and fishing.

The community leaders are Rubén, Ferley, Adriana, and Nader (some of them belong to the board of directors), who previously directed the guerrilla front and were easily approved by the ex-insurgent community. According to Adriana, the leaders’ role has been “fundamental to understanding collective



FIGURE 3.6 Aerial picture ex-insurgents working on the road. *Author photo*

work (...) Going to ask for services representing an individual is not as powerful as representing a collective”. When speaking of Rubén – who is not on the cooperative’s board but rather is a moral leader – she told us: “We know he’s not going to abandon us. He fights for us. He doesn’t work for himself; he wants the people to be OK”.

Although Rubén is not the cooperative’s president or manager, due to his natural leadership, humbleness, commitment, experience in the war, and honesty with the community, he is held in high esteem. He points out that such a position must be won. Labor legitimizes leadership and authority; no one who has not successfully carried out a variety of community tasks such as farming, building houses, or constructing roads can assume a position of authority. Thus, labor practically legitimizes leadership and authority. In his experience, Rubén exhibits three traits of good leadership: speak the truth, lead people to success rather than failure, and listen to the people rather than ignoring them. In assessing his leadership difficulties, he explains:

Human beings are difficult to lead. There are cultural differences depending on the region. In addition, the enemy has tried to divide us not only to win our grassroots supporters but also to force our leaders to make mistakes. Some of our people associate abandonment [by some of the cadres of

the FARC] with the accommodation of other leaders living comfortably in the cities. The enemy is everywhere and benefits from our mistakes (...) People value leaders who accompany them more than those who just give orders.

The cooperative's board of directors works as a consulting service. While they listen to and analyze problems, only the Assembly has the authority to make decisions; the board of directors only implements these decisions. Thus, decision-making, planning of relocation, and development of the cooperative are collective processes. As Ferley states, "The community discusses matters and places the final seal on decisions made". The cooperative's board focuses on collective productive projects, member education, and legalization of the cooperative, as well as relations with government agencies, national and international NGOs, the FARC political party, and other actors. According to Ferley, two basic qualities distinguish their cooperative from those of other ex-insurgents' communities: democracy and good leadership – exemplified by Rubén and his network of contacts in the region of Urabá, including grassroots organizations, which help him achieve a variety of objectives. Meanwhile, Soranyi highlights discipline, unity, cohesion, and democracy as the community's most important values.

Adriana notes that in assemblies and other meetings, problems and conflicts among members are addressed by a reconciliation council or the community as a whole, seeking a democratic solution by consensus. One guerrilla practice still used to help solve conflicts is the Leninist practice called "criticism and self-criticism" to identify and censure members' mistakes and faults. During wartime, this practice was grounded in guerrilla ethics and statutes, and it now appears to be regulated by the community's common sense.

For a more comprehensive description of the process of designing and implementing this autonomic process, we use the emergent concepts of "awakening", "learning", and "producing" developed by the Educational Committee of ECOMUN (for which the first author has been carrying out an action research project) as part of a collective academic process of analysis of the general experience of ECOMUN cooperatives. These concepts are used here as sub-processes of this design for the purposes of description.

Awakening

In this case study, awakening involves the ex-insurgents realizing that they must develop their collective path of reincorporation. As Rubén emphasizes, "If we do not seek solutions to these difficulties by ourselves, then we could fail". Awakening implies recognizing the elitist nature of those in power and the expressed interest of the current far-right-wing government and its supporters, who wish to "shatter" the peace agreement.¹³ Critical of the policies designed to implement the peace agreement, Rubén questions the fact that the

ZVTN was located in Gallo, arguing that the location was apparently chosen to “lead us on the road to failure”. They decided to leave Gallo during the Santos administration. When they realized that the peace process was being threatened, they decided they should rapidly take action. Adriana Tabera – former commander of the 58th front and cooperative member – expresses her mistrust of the Colombian government:

[W]e were worried because time was passing (...) We have to take advantage of the basic stipend we have now. We have to do everything to survive, because if we believe that the government will give us eight million pesos, or land, or houses (...) you know the government isn't going to fulfil its commitments.

However, ex-insurgents differ in their perception of these problems and their necessary responses. Their perception of the fragility of implementation of the peace accords also generated discussion, debate, and tension, and decisions were made. In fact, in August 2019, a group of ex-guerrillas guided by the former leader of the peace delegation to Havana, Cuba – Iván Márquez – again took up arms, reviving the FARC-EP in response to what they called a “betrayal of the peace treaty by the Colombian government” (FARC: Iván Márquez, *exjefe* 2019; 158 *excombatientes retomarán* 2020). Whereas the current leadership of the FARC perceives that implementation of the peace treaty has confronted “difficulties”, others – including Rubén – express concern regarding “obstacles” such as stagnation of the reincorporation process and other transformations promised by the peace treaty. Ferley similarly warns that the government’s intention is to “*mamar*” them (from the term “to breastfeed”, implying the intention of tiring them out). However, Rubén, Ferley, and most of the ex-insurgent population continue to be involved in the reincorporation process. “We do not trust the Colombian government, but we do believe in the peace process”, says Rubén.

However, community members remain optimistic. Rubén stresses that the role of the United Nations has been to demand fulfillment of the agreement, and he emphasizes that despite current stagnation, the peace process will not fail: “We have already set roots with the local population and we believe in the commitment of some national and international sectors in defending the peace process”. Bladimir also highlights the need for raising awareness among the ex-insurgent population so that they continue to struggle for fulfillment of the accords. Adriana emphasizes that lack of access to land is a critical problem: “So many ex-guerrilleros do not have land. At least we have a place to live, but the rest have nothing”. She proposes, “We have to resist. We cannot leave new generations with the failure of this process”. Nader concludes:

Whether or not the peace accords are fulfilled, we will continue forward. The only thing we request is that they [the government and paramilitaries]

not prosecute us or kill us. That is enough. If we fall two or three times, we wake up two and three times.

Awakening implies recognition of the reality of the current stagnation of the reincorporation process and of the need to prepare themselves to face the worst possible scenario – in this case the Colombian government exercising almost total carelessness of the reincorporation process.¹⁴ Ferley describes the La Fortuna community's perception of the government in this manner: "We have said to our people: 'We cannot bow our heads if the government does not fulfil its commitments'. We also cannot keep expecting father government to resolve our problems". Thus, awakening implies raising awareness that being autonomous could be more effective in the reincorporation process than simply asking and waiting for international cooperation or State support. However, this does not exclude the possibility of receiving economic support at some point. It has to be clarified that this search for autonomy is not a mere consequence of the current situation in the territories; rather, it also represents traditional practices of the guerrilla in the territories in a time of war in which they sought to solve community necessities by their own means (Cortés 2017).

Awakening also entails moving out of the comfort zone, which in this case involves breaking informal norms and defying government expectations. When the community decided to leave Gallo, government agencies were not prepared to accept such a decision to the extent that they initially banned the community from moving until it was pointed out that ex-insurgents had the same mobility rights as any Colombian. However, the decision to move had negative consequences for the entire group: disruption of services such as food supply, healthcare, and security provided by the Colombian army, and accompaniment by Colombia's Office of the High Commissioner for Peace. However, other services such as vocational training programs and the work of the Reincorporation and Normalization Agency continued.

Another interesting aspect of this community's awakening that indicates autonomy is that no highly knowledgeable political actors from the FARC Party advised the community to make a certain decision. People made critical life decisions based on the knowledge they acquired during the war and thanks to the political ability of Rubén's team of leaders. As Rubén described, "We did not call Pastor¹⁵ to ask for permission. We called him just to inform him about our decision". The community realized that, at this stage of post-insurgency, they must make decisions by themselves without waiting for instructions as they did during the war. Later on, this community, as well as other ex-insurgent communities, began to interact with other national organizations such as ECOMUN without losing their autonomy, and they generated connectivity within a network of like-minded communities.

The awakening of ex-insurgents determines their aspirations. Most speak of a future stage in which they will have everything they need. Bladimir expresses, "My dream is to work united to make productive projects work". Others express

their dreams in terms of access to education and land and living a dignified life (*buen vivir*). Many expect that, within a decade, San José de León will become a municipality recognized by the state. They also have great expectations of being successful in their productive projects, and most hope to avoid being employed, so as to have the freedom provided by autonomy.

Learning

We understand learning as a sub-process of designing an autonomic process of reincorporation by which ex-insurgents carry out a variety of activities to acquire technical skills in order to develop their entrepreneurial capacities, obtain a job, or in general, earn a living. Learning also involves “reusing” knowledge acquired during the war – or learning to adapt and apply it – to survive during the reincorporation stage. Upon asking Rubén what they learned as insurgents, he states,

We learned so much, to the extent that if we had not learned how to sleep under a piece of plastic and manage in the rain, in the swamp, we wouldn't have become accustomed to these conditions in San Jose de León. Living under extreme conditions helped us deal with the temporary conditions of our new space (...) People who came here said that this place was not adapted to human beings, but people who have been in the war know very well that these conditions are normal. We know that a piece of plastic is our house (...) The knowledge we have was useful during the war and is still useful during peacetime.

In general, ex-insurgents have a wide variety of knowledge and skills, including traditional medicine, basic construction, social work, social organizing, surviving difficult climatic conditions, making clothes, radio operation and other forms of communication, cooking, discipline, and collective work. Members of the La Fortuna cooperative highlight that unity, teamwork, planning, democracy, organization, management, independence from the government, and the capacity to work hard are their principal skills.

When the State, NGOs, or other international agencies provide training – for example, basic education, vocational training, or in cooperativism – community members participate and make use of what they feel they need. As we witnessed in other ex-insurgent communities, at the beginning of the peace implementation process, such training appeared to be attractive and many people participated, but over time, some tired of traditional models of learning, as such educational models (for example, sitting inside in front of a teacher) were different from their way of “learning by doing” in the guerrilla. Furthermore, ex-insurgents found most of the training to be impractical due to a lack of infrastructure to put it into practice. This led to a loss of motivation and optimism regarding reincorporation. Nevertheless, interviewees highlight that the Confiar cooperative from Medellín,¹⁶ ECOMUN, and the government's

National Learning Service (SENA) provided them with valuable practical knowledge.

Ex-insurgents learned other types of knowledge “by doing”, without receiving specific training. Building houses in San José de León was just such a case of ex-insurgents learning from experience.

As part of this learning process, ex-insurgents needed to make individual and collective decisions and to earn a living. This is expressed by Rubén: “We now have to seek a daily wage for our clothes, to go to the doctor by ourselves (...) Our people were used to these things being resolved by the cadres”. Ex-insurgents therefore learned to no longer place their lives under the charge of their former commanders. During the war, boots, clothes, food, and weapons were somehow provided by their commander however they could, but in most cases, no one worried about earning a living. Ex-insurgents learned to earn a living in different ways depending on context and the internal arrangements of the ETCRs. In some areas, where former commanders had to go to urban centers to attend to political responsibilities, ex-insurgents felt abandoned and were forced to learn to make decisions by themselves. In other communities – such as that of the cooperative San Jose de León – as they did not feel abandoned by their leader, they assumed this process more slowly and in an “affective” manner. In such contexts, ex-insurgents put the “communist” qualities of their highly respected and even beloved commanders to the test. Thus, some ex-insurgents experienced a sort of “emancipation” involving personal and collective autonomy as well as a redefinition of their imaginaries of their former commanders. Such was the case of the troops led by commander Byron in the Meta region;¹⁷ his troops redefined their perception of him, rating him low due to their feelings of abandonment.

Rubén and his team also learned to encourage community members to participate in developing their cooperative and in decision making, empowering them by making them more aware of their important role in the cooperative. As Ferley stated, “Here, the leadership was multiplied. We are no longer a small group of leaders; we are now a collective”.

In general, the role of the cooperative assemblies in the learning process was first to guide the community in deciding what knowledge they wanted to acquire, who would provide them with training, and who should take any given education program. Second, assemblies helped the cooperative to define norms to promote harmonious coexistence within the community as insurgents did in the past in rural areas (Cortés 2017: 70).

Ex-FARC communities also made a point of learning about cooperativism and solidarity economies. However, no comprehensive study of the myriad of solidarity economy practices (Gibson-Graham et al. 2013, Miller 2010) among ex-combatants exists. Although the guerrilla movement had formerly used practices such as barter, care economy, and alternative currencies, initially, all efforts were focused on legalizing their cooperatives and establishing productive projects, without incorporating other solidarity economy practices.

Although ex-FARC cooperatives are involved in quite a few solidarity economy practices, they still have an excessively optimistic view of entrepreneurial, market-oriented schemes sold to, and naively accepted by, FARC-EP's delegation during the Havana peace talks. In our opinion, this naiveté can partially be attributed to FARC-EP's lack of understanding of daily life in urban areas – a life which differs radically from the necessity of making ends meet so characteristic of the Colombian countryside – as well as to their apparent lack of awareness of the mechanisms by which neoliberalism impacted the Colombian economy. Cases of small ex-insurgent businesses – such as “La Roja” artisanal beer company in the municipality of Icononzo, department of Tolima and “La Montaña”, a manufacturer of bags produced in the municipality of Anorí, department of Antioquia – that have been publicized as successful by the mass media (Forero 2019) have thus far not provided a steady income for those involved. However, these *not yet* successful business attempts are also part of the learning process by which ex-insurgents understand the logic of neoliberal markets. They bring about a change in attitudes, not only developing a pragmatic approach to earning a living but also reformulating the praxis of the solidarity economy to involve more radical practices, which – as in the case of La Fortuna – include agroecological production of their own food and building their own homes.

Producing

A third sub-process of designing autonomic reincorporation processes (depending on the context) involves community members using their labor to produce goods and services for self-consumption and the sale of overstock. Initially, all community members focused on working collectively to build their houses and set up common spaces. Following this, collective labor began to give way to family and individual efforts to improve their families' plots and productive projects.

One issue discussed collectively was the division of labor; each member decided in which productive line (road building, agriculture, poultry raising, or fishing) they wished to work. Each of these areas was organized by a committee. In early 2018, they agreed to collectively work one day per week in their respective areas, and they designated a few people to feed the animals and care for the crops daily. Those who are unable to participate in the collective workday for whatever reason must pay a penalty fee to the cooperative. Women were complaining in recent assemblies regarding the amount of work they have to carry out, especially because, in the guerrilla, they used to do the same activities that men did, and considering that some women work additionally at home doing childcare, housework, and in family-productive projects, the community decided that the collective workday would only be compulsory for men, and single women who do not need to carry out these activities may join voluntarily. In addition, women (and some men) formed a gender collective to learn about and discuss feminism and new masculinities. In the near future, the community expects to implement several mechanisms to promote gender equality.

Planning of family economic activities (such as poultry production at home and backyard agriculture, among others) is not collectivized but rather depends on free will. As of October 2019, there were 55 fishing ponds – nine of which are collective – with a total of 42,000 fish; 5 ha of plantain, cassava, and vegetables; 600 chickens; and nine pigs. Food provided by the government’s reincorporation food supply program supplements their family and collective food production. Each family provides their basic food supply and may sell overstock in nearby small towns with the support of the cooperative. The community has several small businesses such as a grocery store, a pub, a cooking gas store, and several small family-owned handicraft or clothing stores, all of which contribute to the local economy.

The municipality pays a teacher from elsewhere to teach the children in a school built by the community. While healthcare is provided by government agencies, it does not compare to the former guerrilla healthcare system in which a physician was always available for the troops; currently no community members possess medical knowledge.

Considering that the ECOMUN cooperatives have had little profit, they have not fully discussed the distribution of profits. However, in the case of La Fortuna, members have agreed on some general guidelines. First, as the State supplies a monthly stipend to ex-insurgents, they initially decided that no one should receive additional wages from the cooperative; however, this was recently modified in an assembly, allowing a few people to receive a small daily wage or a percentage of production for caring for the poultry or the crops. In this case, Ferley and Rubén support the idea of voluntary work by community members, especially given that a minimal stipend is provided by the State. Ferley emphatically states, “We cannot create a cooperative and believe that the cooperative is going to immediately resolve our economic situation; we first have to strengthen it”. Second, once sales of overstock increase, the cooperative may begin to pay more people. Third, earnings from collective projects should be reinvested in collective needs (maintenance of productive infrastructure, tools, supplies, etc.). Finally, those goods produced by families may be sold directly through the cooperative, raising the sale price to benefit the cooperative.

Finally, discussing the benefits of autonomy, Rubén speaks of the advantages of not having a boss: “We work if we want to. If the day is rainy or too sunny we are not obligated to work. This is independence”.

Concluding discussion

This chapter attempts to answer the following question: How do ex-insurgents’ local political projects compare with their former guerrilla political projects, and how does this affect current practices meant to develop (political, social, and economic) reincorporation into civilian life? The term *autonomy* best captures the answer to this question, as it represents a structured tactic of ex-rebel and peasant resistance that effectively faces the obstacles of the reincorporation process while

revitalizing previous political imaginaries. Using the concepts of “awakening”, “learning”, and “producing”, we described how the design and implementation of this autonomic experience of reincorporation was carried out, and how ex-insurgents’ interests, life aspirations, knowledge, and political consciousness shaped La Fortuna as a collective life-form catering for the provision of goods and services. This implicitly represents the continuity of politics and the search for possible and alternative worlds.

Our case illustrates that, since the signing of the peace agreement, communities and individuals in the process of reincorporation have experienced a process of awakening, challenging traditional schemes of neoliberal, top-down, and State-driven reincorporation processes, while at the same time contesting forms of domination. For ex-insurgents, awakening has involved a political analysis of the community’s (and individual) aspirations based on dreams, desires, previous struggles, and a keen level of awareness of the concrete situation. This tallies with Escobar’s (2018a) observation that collective determination is crucial for transitions towards the creation of non-exploitative forms of life.

Collective processes in La Fortuna furthermore show that ex-insurgents adapted their previous political discourses and practices to actual circumstances (i.e., the imposition of a neoliberal type of peacebuilding, the structural conditions of a neoliberal economy, local realities, internal dynamics of the ex-insurgent movement, and the local agency exercised by local actors in the process of reincorporation). The nation-based political dream of the FARC-EP, then, seems to have been adapted to current realities, incorporating previous demands – the former agrarian program of the FARC-EP – to feed a novel, localized political project built through trial and error, reflected in continuous meetings, and evidenced in the everyday communitarian practices of learning-by-doing. As the ex-rebels in La Fortuna show, the subaltern definitely can speak – and they speak through their political actions.

Currently, the post-agreement political identity of ex-insurgent communities is closer to the development of local experiences of autonomy than to that of pursuing the control of the State apparatus. This is a big difference. As one can infer from La Fortuna, the State is perhaps the dream of the political party in urban centers – but not that of ex-insurgents in the territories. The latter now propose a new nation based on a political aspiration in which autonomy seems to be one of the main features. It thus seems that the tactics (and strategies) of the political party and rural ex-rebels are in tension. While the Party in the center (the capital city) is focused on parliamentary activity and its consolidation in terms of bureaucratic organization, the ex-FARC communities in the periphery are carrying out political activities that are much more locally focused and more oriented towards the creation of autonomy and solidarity economies.

It could be argued that the practices we describe for La Fortuna are but mere reactions to the current contingency or simply a pragmatic way of solving problems that are not dissimilar to those of communities in sort-like contexts. Be that as it may, one cannot reject the idea that ex-insurgents’ practices are highly

politically inspired. As Scott (2008: 295) observes, “everyday peasant politics and everyday peasant resistance (and also, of course, everyday compliance) flows from these same fundamental material needs”. We argue that this whole array of practices is part of a sort of peasant resistance in which other realms of political action have become more important; that is, we are witnessing the continuation of guerrilla resistance by other means. These practices are not evident enough to attract the attention of the State, yet they are hidden forms of resistance that come together to nurture a covert, anti-state struggle and to symbolize an elaborated form of self-determination. Since these practices are not fully advertised, they tend to pass as apparently innocent and unarmful. In line with Scott (1990) and Richmond (2011), one can suggest that these practices represent the infra-politics of reintegration programs in which “everyday life is representative of agency, of compliance, of resistance, and so often of hidden capacities” (Richmond 2011: 16).

A possible interpretation of ex-insurgents’ practices would entail seeing these as a continuation of the class struggle under circumstances (i.e., the need to survive) that have decreased class consciousness and temporarily put on hold the goal of seizing State power. We would not agree with such a view, though. Ex-insurgents worry about material demands, yes, but they also struggle for the meanings and symbols of reincorporation. For the State, these are about showing that they can control ex-combatants by, in the end, disarming and defusing a “terrorist organization” and assimilating it into a neoliberal agenda through the different means it has at its disposal: by homogenizing the solidarity economy project and demanding cooperatives conform to complex protocols and statutes; by regulating the function and the development of the cooperatives; by introducing technologies to rule cooperatives (e.g., compulsory accountancy software, the obligatory issuing of invoices for all sales); by luring ex-rebels into all sorts of consumerism; or by spreading a free market mentality, individual competition, and entrepreneurial logics through training programs. But for the ex-insurgents of La Fortuna, the meanings and symbols of reincorporation are quite different: they are about the possibility to launch new political discourses – in this case, of solidarity economies and autonomy. Indeed, most of the practices we described point in this direction: the decision to move the settlement from one place to another without the State’s consent; the building of houses without construction permits; the design, layout, and construction of the road without authorities’ approval; the setting up of productive lines that did not follow traditional rules of entrepreneurship (e.g., producing what ex-insurgents need and want, rather than what the market needs); the artisanal and informal production of fish without institutional licenses; the building of their own school without the State’s intervention; the rejection of their subordination to anyone else (whether State or political party); and the refusal to engage in traditional employment opportunities (as they represent some sort of slavery which sacrifices personal freedom).

As we see it, these local autonomic practices represent an outright rejection of the State’s and local and national elites’ agendas behind the implementation

of the peace accords. In effect, ex-insurgents' practices challenge State power and its incidence over communitarian life. Nation States have, since their inception, "displaced and then crushed a host of vernacular political forms" (Scott 2012: 82) that were very well able to address problems without a need for State intervention. When ex-insurgents tell the State "we need you to leave us alone" or "let us work", they are somehow displacing their former guerrilla political assumptions in which, in the traditional Leninist approach, taking over the State was the major goal. In fact, comparing FARC's (the Party) continuous calls to accomplish the implementation of the peace agreement with the practices of La Fortuna's ex-insurgents, one can assert that these practices represent a fissure in the traditional political discourse of the insurgency – a fissure that is crying out: "we do not need anybody to tell us what to do".

As we recounted, other important elements underlying the infra-politics of this autonomic alternative are the territory, leadership, women's participation, and creativity. For La Fortuna's associates, their most immediate problem was lack of access to land, and, more broadly, territory. They could not visualize themselves in another scenario (such as in an urban environment, where they would likely feel lost). This search for territory represents a "strategy of relocalization" (Escobar 2018a: 74) in which ex-insurgents actively seek to settle in a specific territory in which they can realistically visualize a future for themselves. Importantly, the quality of leadership has helped ex-insurgents in La Fortuna make decisions about their lives and channel their collective dreams and desires through a process of co-design involving leaders and community members. As Escobar (2018a: 184) suggests, "Every community practices the design of itself". In this case, the group of leaders was not a foreign team that imposed a pre-designed formula. Its "experimental and open-ended qualities of prototyping" (Escobar 2018a: 55) allowed ex-insurgents to discover and develop innovative solutions to their problems. This experience of leadership is interesting, as it contradicts Zibechi's (2010a) insistence on the relatively minor importance of leaders in autonomic processes.

Regarding women's participation, women have shifted the tasks they carried out as insurgents – typically the same as those of men – to engage in childcare, housework, raising crops, or caring for small livestock in their yards. While this would seem to push women back to the domestic sphere, women in La Fortuna nevertheless asked the Assembly to recognize their domestic labor and allow them to refrain from participating in the collective workday – thus demanding their reproductive labor be considered useful and valuable input to the community's development and indeed an important step towards autonomy.

Likewise, creativity in designing La Fortuna's autonomic experience was important to challenging conventional models and practices of reintegration, and this often meant letting go of "acting as insurgents". They did so, first, by replacing conventional communist party organizational practice (known as "democratic centralism") with a more overt form of communitarian participation,

shifting their pyramidal decision-making structure (useful in armed resistance) to horizontal decision-making by the Assembly. The leaders involved cooperative members in the design of the cooperative project, thereby disrupting the “distinction between expert and user/client” (Escobar 2018b: 34) – in this case between ex-commanders and troops. Second, the community stopped following orders from the FARC’s central leadership to the letter. Instead of being fully obedient, they prioritized their concrete situation over others’ considerations regarding their future. This allowed for a more open-minded approach to imagining other, possible worlds that are different, more locally rooted, or improved from those previously envisioned by the communist-socialist-nationalist project of the guerrilla movement. Third, they rejected the idea of State paternalism by recognizing its vertical and authoritarian political nature, and they appreciated their own efforts and previous experiences of autonomy and rebel governance in times of war (Cortés 2017). Fourth, the group of leaders began to consider community members not as simple followers of orders (as in the guerrilla movement) but rather as human beings with dreams and desires that should be attended to in order to achieve collective happiness. Fifth, ex-insurgents had to shift from an itinerant form of food production or gathering to a sedentary one in which food sovereignty is perceived to be critical to their survival. Finally, collective work diminished inasmuch as collective and individual needs were satisfied, but, in general, ex-insurgents attempted to maintain their collective organization as this provides them with confidence, trust in others, and mutual support.

With respect to the difficulty of grassroots organizations to achieve autonomy, Zibechi (2010b) has discussed the subordination of local social movements by recent, progressive, leftist Latin American governments that have resulted in the appearance of new forms of domination. The subordination of ETCRs to the FARC can be seen as one such new form. However, in the present case, La Fortuna developed a high level of independence from the political party, which to some extent allowed it to avoid domination and renegotiate power relations. This independence, however, does not mean there is no room for future networks to articulate and coordinate different experiences in which respect for local processes and autonomies are needed. Such a network could challenge attempts by the current direction of the FARC party to develop an extremely hierarchical and centralized political organization.

The experience of La Fortuna seems to open a post-accord scenario in which new forms of resistance flourish in the voids left vacant by the State. Yet this is a difficult and often contradictory process as many communities in the process of reincorporation find themselves trapped in a tug of war between having to totally respect State norms or being totally independent from State rules (without being seen to violate the law). In the process, post-insurgencies (having been in illegal spaces for so long) may be tempted to blindly follow the norms of the State; conversely, by seeing and learning how their neighbors – peasants and local small merchants belonging to their social class – deal with the State’s rules, and in realizing that there seem not to be other alternatives, ex-insurgent may pursue or

even copy practices that do not abide by the rules – but that are not necessarily illegal – just in order to survive.

We feel that the development of practices of autonomy as a form of peasant resistance could greatly contribute not only to the successful economic reincorporation of ex-insurgents but also to the transition to other forms of living and to other political discourses somehow addressing, in a local manner, former revolutionary dreams. The current, apparently inoffensive activities of ex-insurgent communities are opening new springs of resistance; perhaps these will have strong and unanticipated effects on the imagination and extend their influence to develop organized, autonomous forms of peasant resistance – first in the terrain of infra-politics and later in a more open and visible ex-insurgent resistance.

Notes

- 1 Research for this chapter was partially funded by the Confiar Foundation through the Jorge Bernal Social Research Award granted to the first author.
- 2 There is a distinction between the FARC (the political party) and the FARC-EP, (the 2.0 version of the armed guerrillas founded in August, 2019). Militants of the political party presently debate whether or not to continue using the same acronym because of the association with the new guerrilla movement.
- 3 These were first called Transitional Zones of Normalization (ZVTNs).
- 4 NARs are new places that ex-insurgents decided to go to for reasons to do with security and distance to markets and their families.
- 5 A documentary entitled “Tejiendo Autonomía” on the case of San José de León has been produced by the first author; it is available at <https://youtu.be/4aITQaL-bbk>.
- 6 ECOMUN is the national cooperative umbrella project guiding social and economic reincorporation of ex-insurgents.
- 7 This dream started to take shape in the region of Marquetalia, Department of Tolima, where Manuel Marulanda and others were developing autonomic models of society (supported by peasant self-defense groups) in the early 1960s. Influential Conservatives considered these initiatives (which they called “republicuetas” or “little republics” and which were also developed in El Pato, Riochiquito, Guayabero, Natagaima, Coyaima, and Purificación) as threatening public order. Eventually, the Colombian Air Force bombed Marquetalia, killing many. A group of 48 peasant men and women who fled from the attack led by Manuel Marulanda formed FARC-EP in 1964.
- 8 Jhoverman (Rubén Cano), Lilia (Adriana Tabera), Bladimir, Julio, Ferley, and María (real names) are all ex-insurgents.
- 9 The Educational Committee of ECOMUN is comprised of ex-insurgents and ECOMUN advisors to productive projects, land access, and capacity building. As all committee members are *Ad Honorem*, the committee has not been able to achieve all their goals since created. However, they have produced some educational videos that have helped to clarify ex-insurgents’ doubts regarding issues such as the legalization of cooperatives and the peace agreement.
- 10 The Colombian government and the FARC debated use of the terms “reintegration” and “reinsertion”, which were used by a government agency in charge of demobilizing the paramilitaries (Colombian Agency for Reintegration of People and Armed Groups, ACR; currently Reincorporation and Normalization Agency, ARN). The FARC proposed the term “reincorporation” to differentiate the peace process from previous processes, and both parties agreed to use it in the final agreement instead of

- “reintegration” or “reinsertion”. In line with the Colombian peace accords, we use this term except when citing academic references that use another term.
- 11 Approximately 200 Euros. After the second year, the Colombian government decided to continue providing this monthly allowance for an undefined period of time.
 - 12 From here on, when speaking of families, we include single members with the right to a piece of land in San José de León.
 - 13 One of the most famous far-right-wing politicians declared that his political party (Democratic Center) should “shatter the peace accords” as it did not represent its interests.
 - 14 That the government has been careless is not completely true, as it has developed some policies regarding reincorporation and invested economic and human resources in achieving some of its goals. However, these policies often fail to be implemented or fall short of what is needed, and much funding is lost to corruption or used for bureaucratic purposes.
 - 15 Pastor Alape is the FARC-EP ex-commander in charge of the reincorporation process.
 - 16 Confiar is a national financial cooperative which has strongly supported development of ex-insurgent cooperatives in different regions.
 - 17 Byron was a commander of the East Block of the FARC-EP (one of the regions in which the FARC-EP was militarily divided). After disarming, he had to move to Bogotá to take charge of several political and logistical tasks and thus had to leave the ETCR.

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