Cabildo-making in Santiago, Chile; a first step towards constitutional change?

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Title: Cabildo-making in Santiago, Chile; a first step towards constitutional change?

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Abstract

Since October 2019, Chileans have been demonstrating due to many reasons. Mainly, the 1980 Constitution and neoliberalism, both inherited from Chile's dictatorship by Pinochet, are under attack. Besides, many Chileans have come to distrust the conventional political system and its politicians and have withdrawn from political participation, like voting. The discontent of the people turned into specific demands when the protestors started to organise themselves in so-called cabildos. In these cabildos, citizens had the opportunity to share their feelings and listen to one another, especially regarding the proposition for a new constitution. In the cabildos, members discuss their demands concerning the Chilean economic and political system. This research aims to explore the desires, demands and perceptions of the participants of these cabildos that operate in Santiago, Chile. Furthermore, it takes into account how the process of cabildo-making has transformed due to the entrance of the corona pandemic. Finally, the participants perceive the cabildos as a form of repoliticization. This research tests the cabildos as a political tool for recapturing civil society again in the political system. In studying the Chilean mobilisation, the theory of contentious politics provided by Tilly and Tarrow (2015) is centred. The data is gathered through a literature review, semi-structured virtual interviews, and a survey. This research has shown that the majority of the participants take the plebiscite for a new constitution as a starting point for further economic and political (systemic) change. Due to the corona crisis, the cabildos have been highly adaptive to emerging needs among civil society. These initiatives aimed to reinforce their position within the community. They function as a replacement of or addition to social services provided by the state. In the discussion comes forward that incorporating cabildos into the conventional political system could have repercussions for its legitimacy and popular support.

Keywords: *Contentious Politics, Collective Action, Mobilization, Representative Democracy, Santiago Cabildos, Constitutional Change*

Resumen

Desde octubre de 2019, los chilenos se han manifestado por muchas razones. Principalmente la Constitución de 1980 y el neoliberalismo, ambos heredados de la dictadura de Augusto Pinochet, están bajo un constante ataque, lo que ha llevado a que muchos chilenos desconfíen del sistema político convencional y también de sus políticos, esto se ha visto reflejado en que se han retirado de la participación política, como el votar. El descontento de la gente se transformó en demandas concretas cuando los manifestantes comenzaron a organizarse en los llamados cabildos. En estos cabildos, los ciudadanos tuvieron la oportunidad de compartir sus sentimientos y escucharse, especialmente en lo que respecta a la propuesta de una nueva constitución. En los cabildos, los miembros discuten sus demandas sobre el sistema económico y político chileno. Esta investigación tiene como objetivo explorar los deseos, demandas y percepciones de los participantes de estos cabildos que operan en Santiago de Chile. Además, se tiene en cuenta cómo se ha transformado el proceso de cabildo con la entrada de la pandemia del Coronavirus. Finalmente, los participantes perciben a los cabildos como una forma de repolitización. Esta investigación pone a prueba a los cabildos como herramienta política para reconquistar a la sociedad civil en el sistema político. Al estudiar la movilización chilena, se centra la teoría de la política contenciosa provista por Tilly y Tarrow (2015). Los datos se recopilan a través de una revisión de la literatura, entrevistas virtuales semiestructuradas y una encuesta. Esta investigación ha demostrado que la mayoría de los participantes toman el plebiscito para una nueva constitución como un punto de partida para un mayor cambio económico y político (sistémico). Debido a la crisis de la pandemia, los cabildos se han adaptado mucho a las necesidades emergentes de la sociedad civil. Estas iniciativas tenían como objetivo reforzar su posición dentro de la comunidad. Funcionan como un reemplazo o una adición a los servicios sociales proporcionados por el estado. En la discusión se adelanta que la incorporación de los cabildos al sistema político convencional podría repercutir en su legitimidad y apoyo popular.

Palabras clave: *Política contenciosa, Acción Colectiva, Movilización, Democracia Representativa, Santiago Cabildos, Cambio Constitucional.*

Acknowledgement

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Chapter 1   Introduction

1.1   Research background

Multiple papers declared 2019 as the year of the global street protest (Brown, 2019; Johnson, 2019; Rachman, 2020). Worldwide, people are assembling to show their dissent in public spaces. In Hong Kong, thousands of students are rebelling the increasing influence of China. In India, citizens are protesting a new 'anti-Muslim' citizenship law. In Iran already more than 200 demonstrators died due to civil unrest as a response to the increasing fuel prices. Though worldwide a lot is going on and it is impossible to cover every story, especially in Latin America contention is spreading. 2019 started with the Venezuela turmoil, where due to massive civil unrest and an unstable political system, a conflict erupted between the self-proclaimed president Guadió and the ruling president Maduro. Moreover, in Ecuador, civil society expresses its anger through demonstrations and riots fighting the reforms announced by the government, like the cut of fuel subsidies. Bolivia destabilized in October, due to possible fraud committed by Morales in the last elections, resulting in a temporarily overtaking of the state's control by an interim president. Even though diverse claims are made among the countries, Michael Reid identifies three key determinants in Latin American's disruption: "*economic discontent of an emerging middle class, fury over political roguery, and the influence of other global protest movements*" (Philips, 2019). Another country that encompasses these determinants and also has been experiencing massive mobilization is Chile.

At the beginning of October, 'Chile despertó' (Chile woke up!) was being chanted by thousands of protestors marching on the streets. The place where Pinochet overthrew Salvador Allende, where students in 2006 overtook their schools and subsequently in 2011 fought the hegemonic neoliberalist unequal society. However, they have returned. As in every exciting story, a sequel appears. Fuelled by an increase in subway fares, students have undertaken collective action. This collective action started on the 6th of October when the ministry of Transport and Telecommunication introduced a subway fare rise of 4 per cent (30 pesos), increasing the price from respectively $1.12 to $1.17 (Barlett, 2019a). While this increase can be considered minimal, the consequences were enormous. Thousands of students stormed the metro stations and started a 'fare-dodging' campaign, evading to pay for the metro tickets. Over a few days, support of this campaign grew, while the confrontations between students and the authorities became more intense and violent. Turnstiles and ticket machines were destroyed, which led to the temporary closure of some metro stations (Filo News, 2019).

Since the first outbreak of social upheaval, multiple protests, marches and alternative acts of resistance appeared in Chile (M. Garcés, 2020). The government answered the manifestations by declaring a 15-day 'state of emergency' and the deployment of more than 20.000 soldiers and carabineros (police officers) on the streets to put the demonstrations to a halt (Larsson, 2019). Moreover, in assistance of the 'state of emergency', the government introduced a curfew on the following day, prohibiting citizens from being in public spaces between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. These measures were perceived as disproportionate by the population, encouraging more social upheaval, which resulted in a massive demonstration on the 25th of October, with around 1.2 million people on the streets in Santiago alone.

Though the discontent started with the increase of the subway fare rise, analysts agreed that its roots lay in more systematic processes (Zuniga, 2019). In the current outbreak, two 'systematic processes' are visible when analysing this contention. First of all, many Chileans believe that this 'systematic' inequality is rooted in the economic model of neoliberalism, a legacy of the authoritarian Pinochet regime (Rapalo, 2019). During the demonstrations, this was reflected in the presented complaints: low pensions, increased loss of living, privatization, unequal access to healthcare and education and the worsening perceptive standard of life (Rapalo, 2019), corruption and inequality in general (Kornbluh, 2019). Another systematic process that seems to be causing these grievances and mobilizations is the Chilean constitution. Pinochet rewrote this constitution in 1980 (the so-called *1980 Constitution*) to preserve and extend his rule *so that* he could remain involved as commander-in-chief until 1998 (Barros, 2001; Wedgwood, 1999).

Still to this day, the "*numerous high-quorum provisions and supra-majoritarian mechanisms . . . guarantee no fundamental change in key areas*" (Heiss, 2017, p. 471). Moreover, in doing so, these regulations have prevented the democratically chosen parties to modify the constitution (Nef, in Bresnahan, 2003). The 1980 Constitution functions as the embodiment of the neoliberalist tendencies in contemporary Chilean society (Barlett, 2019b). With this constitution enforced, neoliberalism remains protected. Both the 1980 Constitution and its neoliberalist discourse are now known as the 'Pinochet legacy'. In the meantime, withdrawal from conventional politics is taking place. Since the first (presidential) election after the Pinochet dictatorship in 1989 and the last election (municipality) in 2016, voting's participation levels decreased from 85 to 35 per cent (Castiglioni & Kaltwasser, 2016). Especially among the youth (18-29 years old), in the time-span of 1989 to 2009, electoral participation number declined from approximately 35 to 9 per cent (Scherman et al., 2015). Furthermore, Diego Portales University conducted surveys on a national scale to political representation and found that the majority of the voters do not feel represented by any politician or political party, from 53 per cent in 2005 to even 81 per cent in 2015 (Castiglioni & Kaltwasser, 2016).

In the state of emergency, the population started on the 19th of October to discuss their resentments and demands in so-called cabildos (abiertos) (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores, 2019; Zazo-Moratalla, 2019). Cabildos (abiertos) directly translates into 'open councils'. Moreover, these cabildos serve a space in which the population expresses alternative ways of socio-political and economic organization and has meant a revival of political participation by the public. Consequently, Zazo-Moratalla, asserts that these cabildos provide an essential platform for reflecting on "*the diverse problems, either structural or specific in nature, that affect us as people living in Chile today*" (2019, p. 7). The cabildos were the first prevailing structured initiative in which the population shared their demands with institutions and the government while representing civil society. On 1st of November, the union federation Central Unitaria de Chile (CUT) pronounced that in the previous week, more than 10.000 persons in 73 Chilean 'comunas' (communes) were involved in the cabildos (as cited in "Más de 10.000 personas participan en cabildos abiertos en Chile," 2019). In these cabildos, a variety of demands were discussed and prioritized. Some of the significant demands that came forward included a new constitution (through a constituent assembly); environmental protection; a new retirement system; and the nationalization of public and private goods ("Más de 10.000 personas participan," 2019).

Due to the significance of the mobilization, president Piñera promised a referendum to accommodate at least one of the portrayed claims. In October (2020), Chileans can vote whether they want to preserve the 1980 Constitution or to alter it. If the 1980 Constitution is suspended, Chileans

can determine whether they want a new constitution composed of a citizen-legislator convention or one consisting solely of elected civilians (Cuffe, 2019). To assist this process, all parties in Congress (except the communist party and the centre-left party FREVS) presented an 'Agreement for Social Peace and a New Constitution', composed of twelve points to assist the move towards a more citizen inclusive constitution (Gobierno de Chile, 2019). Pasache, a representative of the Ministry of Education workers' union, argues that *"[a] constitutional assembly could establish a constitution that guarantees human rights, which do not exist today"* (Cuffe, 2019). Based on the multiple (massive) protests and the distrust of people in formal politics in the last decade, the expectations rise that a new constitution will be composed. A national platform for public opinion (Cadem) predicted that 72 to 87 per cent of the population would vote in favour of constitutional change ("72% votaría 'apruebo' en plebiscito," 2020).

Since the government approved with a referendum to measure whether the population desires a new constitution, the cabildos started to organize around the theme of a new constitution. Instantly was examined how a new constitution should take shape, and what rights, demands and desires it should encompass. Nevertheless, it is even unknown if these cabildos' participants recognize a constitutional reform as a solution/a way forward, or just as a tactic of the government to prevent radical change to happen. Moreover, do they envision the cabildos themselves to have a particular role in defining the content of a new constitution or a position in the political system itself? In the end, much is unknown about how the participants envision the decision-making concerning this new constitution to take place.

Given that the political systems' legitimacy has been weakening for decades now, political reorganization seems necessary for the (conventional) political system to secure its legitimacy once again. A new constitutional reform might be a way forward to democratize the Chilean society further. Transformation of the constitution provides new opportunities for the inclusion of civil society in the political sphere and the reformation of the current illegitimate political system. Primarily, space surfaces to organizations that have its roots in civil society, as citizen inclusiveness is desirable, like the cabildos. This research herein perceives the participants of the cabildos as practitioners of unconventional politics. The cabildos have proven to be of importance to civil society in both claim-making and mobilization and might have power as well in the process of a new constitution. So, even though increasing distrust in conventional politics seems apparent, this does not mean, however, that people are not involved in politics at all.

This research aims to grasp these desires, demands, and perceptions of participants of Santiago's cabildos in the foresight of a new constitution. In the Guardian newspaper, politics professor Cristóbal Bellolio claimed that the plebiscite for a new constitution: "*means that for the first time in our history we will have a constitution that belongs to all of us, which is the product of a true democratic process*" (Barlett, 2019b). This quote illustrates the current view of high hopes and raised expectations. Still, there first need to be figured out how "*all of us*" portrays another constitution. As pointed out earlier, the "*us*" in this research refers to cabildos' participants. When taking into account the desires, demands and perceptions of participants, this research takes upon the perspective of alternative forms of democratic organization. How do these participants envision a (new) political system in society, and could there be a role for the cabildos as participatory pioneers in the Chilean context?

Amid the research process, Chile, but also the world in general, was struck by the coronavirus. This virus rapidly crossed borders and turned into a global pandemic. From March 2020 on, this development of the virus started to be visible in Chile when the government implemented its first measures. One of these measures was postponing the plebiscite announced for April, to October 2020. This postponement profoundly affects the development of the referendum for a new constitution and the performances of collective action by the participants. This research takes into account the transformation of the daily lives of these participants and the decreasing opportunity of these participants to assemble in public spaces. Moreover, this research also incorporates how the implemented measures and the coronavirus itself affect the process of cabildo-making.

1.2   Research outline

Due to the social unrest in Chilean society and the subsequent proposition for a new constitution, intriguing sites for research occurs. This research explores the cabildos that represent the voices of 'civil society' in Santiago (Chile) and its activities in the prospect of the plebiscite on constitutional reform in October 2020. Initially, it is necessary to understand where these cabildos came from, how they became so prominent in the 2019 demonstrations and what their presumable role is in the upcoming referendum. Moreover, do the participants envision the political role of the cabildos? This research aims to find out the reasons for the participants' grievances, collective action performances and the organization into cabildos. Afterwards, an in-depth perspective will probe what the cabildos' participants claim with the development of a new constitution; what are their demands and desires of how this new constitution should take shape? The corona pandemic turned Chile upside-down. The changing societal context adds an extra layer to this research. Eventually, it is essential to understand how these people perceive the proposal of a new constitution in general, as a victory or just a first step towards broader reform measures. Finally, despite how the participants envision a new constitution, they also likely act upon the constitutional transformation, which should be adopted as well. For this research to be practically enforceable, the central question of this thesis is:

> *"How do participants of the Santiago cabildos envision and engage with the upcoming referendum for a new constitution in the context of the 2019th contention, collective action and the corona pandemic?"*

This main question subdivides into the following sub-questions:

I.   *What are Santiago's cabildos, and how did they emerge?*

II.   *What are the demands of the participants of the Santiago cabildos around a new constitution, and what would they like to achieve?*

III.   *How do the participants of the Santiago cabildos perceive the referendum to implement a new constitution in times of the corona pandemic?*

IV.   *How do Santiago Cabildos' participants act upon the referendum to implement a new constitution in times of the corona pandemic?*

Chapter 2　How people mobilize, contentious politics and democratic alternatives

The Chilean societal outbreak consists of two phases. Phase 1 is the mobilization of the Chilean population, primarily focussed on protests and other manifestations that were performed and extended over time. This process is explicitly mentioned in chapter 4. Additionally, in phase 2, more attention is paid to the cabildos that emerged in times of the upheaval and how people started to participate in these cabildos, which is foremost described in chapter 5. For these two phases, two different theories are picked to analyse and support these phenomena. The first part presents an approach to explore the elaboration of the mobilization in Chile, called contentious politics. In the second part, the cabildos are scrutinized, based on a theory of participatory democracy.

2.1　Theory of Contentious Politics

The introduction revealed that the 2019th social unrest stands in line with earlier significant outbreaks like the one's of 2006 and 2011. Subsequently, the 2019th episode has even mobilised more people than ever before. In aiming to understand why mobilization appeared in Chile, why people started protesting and took over public space, a theoretical input seems helpful. In exploring the Chilean conflict, the theory of contentious politics is chosen, based upon the eponymous book by Tilly and Tarrow. They comprehensively examine contentious politics and additionally present a general handbook/ framework of how to research societal conflicts in specific case studies. There is chosen to apply contentious politics, as Tilly and Tarrow narrowly deconstruct the underlying phenomena that clarify how mobilization erupted and how it dispersed among society. This is important to apprehend why people started to make themselves visible, specifically now, and how other participants joined.

Tilly and Tarrow define contentious politics as: "*interactions in which actors make claims bearing on other actors' interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties*" (2015, p. 7). Contentious politics then encompasses three different components: contention (1), collective action (2) and politics (3). Contention comprises the interactions wherein an actor makes a specific claim (the subject) on another actor that receives this particular claim (the object) (2015). Civil society is herein the subject, whereas the Chilean government and the political and economic elite are the objects of these claims. In this research, the contention is visualised by claim-making processes concentrated predominantly on the demands for a new constitution. When contention manifests itself, it turns into collective action. The claim then spreads and becomes a collective good, based on shared interests or programs (2015). In this case, the collective action is illustrated by the many demonstrations and actions organised targeting the government and neoliberalism. The cabildos are the main form of collective action studied. Finally, the political area is illustrated, as this claim-making needs to take place in a political field. This means that claim-making turns into contentious politics under the condition that a direct or indirect interaction with (agents of) a government or multiple governments is established (2015).

In their work, Tilly and Tarrow scrutinize a whole case of contentious politics to fully understand why people are protesting and how these protests advance over time. However, this research goes beyond solely examining the Chilean episode of contentious politics. It also aims to investigate the cabildos and their participants' perceptions upon the proposal for a new referendum.

Therefore, in this research, the theory of contentious politics is not depicted elaborately as by Tilly and Tarrow. Even though they are predominantly focussing on the bigger picture (the overall episode), it is still beneficial to adopt (partly) their framework and primarily zoom in to the concepts like contention and collective action. In their approach, Tilly and Tarrow stress that "*explaining contention means identifying the mechanisms and processes that lie behind it*" (2015, p. 231). To make this operational, they propose the adoption of a mechanism-process approach, which contributes to describing and explaining contention in a specific case (2015). However, in this research, it is not the central purpose to describe and explain contention in general, rather mobilization.

Mobilization is the leading process in this research as it explains the emergence of the protestors and the upsurge of the people participating under the state of emergency. Their mobilization influenced the trajectories of how contention and collective action were formed and transformed over time. Additionally, it also has its share in the government's proposal for a plebiscite. Thus, mobilization refers to how people who were not actively practising claim-making on the government before, started to do so (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). As a process, mobilization is the output (a composition) of different interrelated mechanisms (2015). By using this proposed mechanism-process approach and adapting it onto the process of mobilization, other underlying mechanisms are demarcated. Mechanisms then signify underlying groups of changes that altogether bring about a transformation (called the process) (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). In this case, that means that in understanding mobilization, attention needs to be paid to underlying mechanisms. There is not just one mechanism responsible for the initiation of the mobilization and its expansion. However, multiple interlinking mechanisms resulted in the organization of protestors and subsequentially claim-making and collective action. Therefore, this mechanism-process approach is a useful tool in examining this case and explain how the different underlying mechanisms eventually resulted in the observed mobilization.

Though Tilly's and Tarrow's mechanism-process approach contains eight steps, in this research, it is narrowed down to just two (see figure 1). It was necessary to disregard some of these steps, as competently examining the case solely through the full eight steps is not the main objective of this research. For understanding how the 2019th mobilization evolved, only the following two steps are essential. The first step in this research is similar to the first step in the process-mechanism approach, which involves adopting the major descriptive concepts onto the case. The second step in this research is a combination of steps 6 and 7 in the mechanism-process approach. First, this encompasses identifying the mechanisms of the mobilization (step 6) and subsequently, reconstruct those into the process of mobilization (step 7) (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). These steps will now be further elucidated.

Step 1. The first descriptive concept defined that is relevant for this case is the site of contention. The site of contention is the social setting in which contentious politics is taking place (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). This site of contention is relevant in understanding the social context where the mobilization originated, and eventually, the formation into cabildos occurred. Moreover, the following concepts, provided by Tilly and Tarrow, are essential in depicting the process of mobilization within the broader picture of collective action and claim-making: *political actors; political identities; contention performances; contentious repertoires; contained contention; and transgressive contention* (2015). To this specific case, these concepts can be categorized into first the actors involved and their attributed identity (1), and second, in their decision-making practices (2): *contention performances;*

contentious repertoires; and contained and transgressive contention. These descriptive concepts assist in finding out who are responsible for the mobilization in the first place, how they profile themselves, and what protests and other forms of manifestations they perform.

So, who are the ones protesting? Political actors are the recognizable groups of people that are (in)directly involved in the collective action (and its claim-making) (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). In this case, the political actors examined are the protestors of civil society. They are responsible for the mobilization and claim-making practices. Equally important is to address how this political actor has a political identity: "*the collective names political actors give themselves or that other people give them*" (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 12). According to the authors, It is essential to recognize the political identities of different actors as they demarcate '*us*' from '*them*', the boundaries between the groups (2015). This identity helps to understand why (some) people choose to participate in the mobilization and others do not. Therefore, it is essential to understand how these participants identify themselves, and how they identify the '*them*', the (political) elite in this case. These identities are determined on an interplay between both the '*us*' and the '*them*'. However, in this research, only the perception of protestors is regarded to be significant. This research focuses on the narrative of the mobilizers, rather than both sides of the story.

When mobilization is successful and turns into collective action, political actors turn to contentious performances. Contentious performances are: "*relatively familiar and standardized ways in which one set of political actors makes collective claims on some other set of political actors*" (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 14). Contentious performances are necessary to understand how claim-making takes place amid the civil unrest. As will turn out in chapter 4, different performances are adopted by the Chilean protestors. Moreover, in this research, the cabildos initiative is perceived as a (relatively newer) contentious performance of claim-making. It is investigated how different performances co-exist next to each other and how that resulted in cabildo-making as new performance. Thus, cabildos are then not just recognized as an actor, rather a performance of how people display their discontent.

Eventually, these performances can be put in something bigger called contentious repertoires: "*arrays of contentious performances that are currently known and available within some set of political actors*" (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 14). Tilly and Tarrow separate these performances (embodiment of collective claim-making) into the following categories: contained and transgressive contention (2015). What is tolerated by the government (in terms of contentious performances) is called contained contention; the more moderate forms of claim-making (2015). In opposition, there is transgressive contention, claim-making that is not tolerated/accepted and therefore "*contention crosses institutional boundaries into forbidden or unknown territory*" (2015, p. 62). Choosing for either contained or transgressive contention has its repercussions for the evolvement of the mobilization. It might frighten or distance some participants, or attract new ones, depending on the chosen strategy. Thus, these strategies contribute to the rapid rise of the mobilization too.

Step 2. Now the research setting is theoretically disintegrated into researchable and analysable items; the process (of mobilization) need to be decomposed into its mechanisms (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). The main relevant mechanisms chosen are *brokerage, diffusion and coordinated action*, as those are the main mechanisms that describe the growth of mobilization (2015). First off, brokerage is a mechanism within mobilization which describes the "*production of a new connection between previously unconnected sites*" (2015, p. 31). *Brokerage* in this research refers to how different actors and (social) organizations allied or cooperated, that previously did not. Second, *diffusion* is

critical in mobilization as it concentrates on the "*spread of a form of contention, an issue, or a way of framing it from one site to another*" (2015, p. 31). Diffusion in this research means then how contention spread among civil society and how the students got other citizens to join. Third and last mechanism that belongs to mobilization is coordinated action: *"two or more actors' engagement in mutual signalling and parallel making of claims on the same object"* (2015, p. 31). One could say the homogenization of claim-making in collective action. With homogenization is not meant 'the same claims', instead, belonging all to the 'claim-making' collective against the same object.

Next to the mechanisms underlying the mobilization, the transforming social setting amid the mobilizations needs to be taking into account, while explaining how and why brokerage, diffusion and coordinated action developed as it did. The interplay between civil society and the government changed over time. During collective action and their performances, different actors participated and responded and all along created new opportunities, or as referred to '*political opportunities*'. The research field is very hybrid and (especially in the beginning) drastically changed over a couple of days. Political opportunities explain any further how the mobilization evolved.

The political opportunity structure derives from "*consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure*" (Tarrow, 1994, p. 85). The behaviour of the government during the social upheaval has influenced the mobilization process (and its mechanisms). The claim-makers perceive the interaction with the government in a specific way, for instance, as repressive. Therefore, more knowledge is needed on how this reciprocity between the government and civil society affected and redirected the mobilization and its claim-making performances. In short, to get a comprehensive overview of how the theory of contentious politics is applied in this research, see figure 1.

In general, exploring the Chilean episode of protests through the theory of contentious politics provides two beneficial insights. First of all, it helps to demarcate the social context in which the cabildos emerged, and it demonstrates the mechanisms responsible for the mobilization. Through the theory of contentious politics, it becomes clear that this mobilization needs to be put into the bigger picture of earlier upheavals. This historical, theoretical approach is essential as it also explains why the cabildos emerged, which brings us to the second valuable insight, defining the cabildo initiative. In line with the theory of Tilly and Tarrow, cabildos are considered to be a contentious performance. In chapter 5, where the participants delineate the cabildos, the cabildos are (as contentious performance) recognised to be just a piece of a much bigger puzzle and coexist to other initiatives. Moreover, it aids to apprehend that since the cabildo is just one performance of many, it needs to be placed in the social context of the mobilization. Thus, in this research, the cabildos are an extension of the overall mobilization and not a separate phenomenon.

Figure 1: The mechanism-process approach applied in this research

2.2. Democratic Alternatives

Since the Chilean episode is analysed utilizing contentious politics, the cabildos are identified as a contentious performance in which participants perform claim-making against the (political) elite. From a governance perspective, with the diminishing legitimacy of the current democratic pollical system, an incentive arises to search for alternative ways to organize society. The cabildos performances have proven to be important in listing the demands of civil society and engaging citizens again with political concerns. The final part of this theoretical framework focusses on how the cabildos as contentious performance now, have the potential to become a democratic, participatory tool. As this thesis aims to investigate the cabildos' potential to alter the current Chilean democratic political system, more information is needed for alternative democratic initiatives. A theory of participatory democracy might be a way out. From this theory, the cabildos are perceived as a base for a new source of popular politics. First, the dichotomy between participatory democracy versus representative democracy is discussed. In support of participatory democratic governance models, an example of participatory budgeting is given, Chileans' history with participatory governance presented, and a side note of participatory projects is highlighted. To conclude, this theoretical framework ends with how the cabildos are interpreted based on the theory of participatory democracy.

With the plebiscite in prospect, a political opportunity appears for the Chilean population to alter the constitution. According to Zazo-Maratalla, this new constitution can be considered as "*a chance of building a new State from scratch*" (2019, p. 7). Thus, in practice, this could mean a (first) step into political reformation. Nevertheless, there is still much doubt about whether the government is willing to meet civil societies' political appeals. This plebiscite for a new constitution is just one out of many demands appealed by the demonstrators as part of a desire for broader socio-political and economic reform. According to the theory of contentious politics, contention and collective action take place in a political field. Moreover, as the central question states, the primary focus of this research is on how participants envision and engage with the realization of a new constitution. In this research envisioning is defined: "*to imagine or expect that something is a likely or desirable possibility in the future*" ("Envisioning," n.d.). The Chilean political system then functions as a guideline in exploring this '*desirable future*'. In doing so, it takes the current legitimacy crisis (as pointed out in the problem statement). Subsequently, it examines how this can be overcome (conforming to the participants believes) taking into mind alternative models of democracy.

Representative democracy is the most common form of democracy in the modern world (Santos & Rodriguez Garavito, 2005). According to Urbinati, representative democracy means that "*authorisation and legitimacy to a government that relies upon consent, yet not on the direct presence by the people in the lawmaking process*" (2011, p. 1). However, due to the discontent of the representative model, alternative forms of democracy have emerged. The development of alternative forms of democracy is herein the counterpower to the global hegemonic representative democracy. These alternative forms, known as *participatory or deliberative democracy*, are comprehensively called grassroots democracy. Grassroots democracy comprises "*pragmatic conception of the relations between representative democracy and participatory democracy which may include confrontation as well as complementarity*" (Santos & Rodriguez Garavito, 2005, p. 313). Those alternatives aim to restore legitimacy through the absorption of residents into the political system, providing spaces for public debate and including them in the sense of participation and public deliberation (Vitale, 2006).

Before it becomes possible to translate the desires and wishes of the participants into a participatory democratic modification, the case of participatory budgeting (PB) is presented.

One of the social scientists involved in providing models to pursue more participatory democracy is Archon Fung (2011). In his work, he analyses and compares four books concerning participatory governance models in Latin America (and especially Brazil). One of these participatory governance programs originated from Porto Alegre, Brazil, and is called participatory budgeting (PB). PB is an institutional and policy measure implemented by the leftist party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) that "*engages ordinary citizens in the allocation of municipal investments*" (Wampler, as cited in Fung, 2011, p. 859). Herein, some infrastructure investment budget is made available for the PB, so local forums can determine which projects and programs are considered '*relevant*' or prioritized and need to be invested in (Fung, 2011). The primary project proved to be successful, and participatory budgeting spread rapidly to more than 200 cities in Brazil alone (Fung, 2011). The observed results from the PB program in Porto Alegre: more budget was made available for the poor neighbourhoods (Baiocchi 2003, as cited in Fung, 2011); corruption declined (Wampler 2010, as cited in Fung, 2011); and political support for ruling party maintained from 1986 to at least 2005 (Avritzer 2009, as cited in Fung, 2011)

In his work, Fung affirms how participatory and representative democratic models can be complementary, as posed by Santos and Rodriguez Garavito (2005). The population that participates in the local forums discusses topics that are of their relevance. Furthermore, they also have to vote for a representative to fight for these desires and interests (2011). In 2011 already around more than 200 of these PBs existed. However, these vary enormously in the number of allocated resources and their' organizing tendencies (2011). They thus need to be considered as different entities that organize and operate in different ways, while still belonging to a form of participatory governance. From his analysis, Fung argues that there are two main reasons for the democracy innovative success in Latin America, that comes short in other parts of the world, like (North) America. *First*, the presence of '*political leadership*' that aims to pursue more self-governing of the population. The *second* fundamental aspect is a civil society organization that is not only determined to increase inclusion, to be independent and is large but is also committed to a participatory form of government (2011).

As a participatory democratic model has proven to have success in Latin America, there is chosen for this theory to investigate further opportunities for Chilean governance model to enhance its participative character. Though in Chile, there might not be *'political leadership'* in favour of self-governance at the moment, previous governments tried to implement participatory democratic measures, like Bachelet in 2005 (Navia, 2010). When she was in power, she aimed to enforce legislative initiatives, like installing participatory budgets and decentralize the power of the government (Bachelet 2005, as cited in Navia, 2010). However, due to various reasons, she did not follow up her words with deeds. Moreover, the second fundamental of a successful innovative participatory approach, which applies to Chile today, is a strong civil societal base. This base is well-emphasized by the Chilean upheaval in which civil society massively took over public spaces, and the cabildos were initiated. In his review, Fung declares that "*policymakers and advocates should build schemes of participation that will flourish under particular political and social constraint*" (Fung, 2011, p. 866), as the success of these initiatives depends on the local context. Therefore, these initiatives should encompass this local context, in which currently, the cabildos flourish. Considering the participatory democratic experience in Latin America, this thesis aims to contribute to this theory to

comprehend whether the cabildo initiative has the potential to turn into a participatory democratic tool.

When discussing the possibility of alternative models of democracy to apply to this case, some dangers concerning their practical applications need to be discussed. Participatory, as in participatory budgeting, becomes a buzzword and now even becomes diverted from its initial ideology. With the upscaling of participation and its diffusion from the political field to other disciplinary fields (like the development one), there is a possible threat. As pointed out by Pateman, modification of participatory budgeting to make it fit in another socio-political context might aim to restore the current political systems' legitimacy. At the same time, it does not further democratize its democracy (2012). Thus, PB and broader taken participatory governance, in general, need to be divided into on the hand PB as a process of further democratizing, and on the other hand, participation policies and programs that aim to extend citizenship and spread participation (Pateman, 2012). Pateman concludes that for BP's to be applicable as participatory democracy, the involvement of local or municipal budget is necessary (2012). Though this research does not focus on participatory budgeting per se as a participatory democratic model, it acknowledges that for a democratic model to be 'participatory', the power to decide needs to be transferred to the people.

In this research, the demands of the cabildos' participants are placed into the political context of the diminishing governmental legitimacy. The cabildos do not only provide space to discuss resentments and how to deal with those. They also provide space to openly criticise the political system, how the process of law-making and enforcement is established. In this research, the participants of the cabildos present whether they still have trust in the democratic system as it is today or whether they see an alternative way of organizing is necessary to fulfil their desires and wishes. Moreover, do they perceive the cabildos initiative as a way forward to regain their trust in the political system, and if not, what else do they desire? While taking these questions into account, this thesis brings together the dissatisfaction of the Pinochet legacy, existing out of the 1980 Constitution and neoliberalism, next to the political dilemma of decreasing legitimacy of conventional politics. Moreover, it combines the envisioning of how they would like the political system to look like, and the act upon; how are people performing to realise this political system?

Chapter 3   Methodology

This chapter outlines the methodological approach to operationalize this research. In aiming to answer the sub-questions and eventually, the main research question, a qualitative approach is needed. According to Mills and Birks in qualitative research the purpose is "*to examine phenomena that impact on the lived reality of individuals or groups in a particular cultural and social context*" (2014, p. 9). In contrast, a quantitative methodology initially is more applied in natural sciences or positivist social research (Bryman, 1984). The explicit phenomena that Mills and Birks refer to, in this research concerns the mobilization of people into cabildos amid the 2019th episode. Data is collected to find out what cabildos' participants envision concerning a new constitution and how they engage with it. Therefore, this first section points out what methods are performed in collecting data and what choices are made to increase validity. The methods applied in this research are a literature review, qualitative survey and (online) semi-structured interviews through Skype and Zoom. Afterwards, the obtained data is systemised, which contains transcribing and subsequently coding. Finally, collecting personal information of cabildos' participants as researcher brings a particular responsibility. Therefore, it is essential to discuss the ethical dangers of doing research and how to make sure that this research does not cross any (scientific) ethical boundaries.

3.1 Data collection

3.1.1   Literature review

The literature review is the foundation for this research. It provides scientific knowledge about the social context in Chile (especially Santiago), history and theory on collective action and contention, and socio-economic and political data about current society. This literature is both qualitative and quantitative. For scientific information, peer-reviewed articles and scientific books are consulted. However, as the claim-making and mobilization take place now, news broadcasts, newspapers and social media have proven to be valuable sources as well. Google scholar is the leading search engine using the following key terms: 'collective action', 'contention', 'alternative democratic governance models', and much more. Moreover, I chose to search in both the English and Spanish language. Some sources are solely available in Spanish. This literature review is necessary to gain more insight into how the 2019th episode erupted, where people demonstrated against and what they desire.

Moreover, information is obtained concerning how cabildos operate, and what the main demands are of people participating in cabildos— the obtained information derived from cabildos' meetings, existing surveys' outcomes and opinion panels. Subsequently, Facebook groups are viewed as a source of virtual public space in which content spreads and people motivate each other to participate in mobilizations. Facebook groups like la Mesa de Unidad Social (a Union organization that operates by Facebook) and junta de vecinos Villa Olímpica Nº32 (one of the cabildos active on Facebook) are consulted and some posts reviewed. First, they serve as platforms in which participants can be motivated to take part in gatherings (even though online), to think about what they desire and to discuss their concerns and demands. Moreover, these platforms serve as a tool for the researcher to communicate with the target population. In this research, the role of literature then transcends from solely offline to online resource methods.

3.1.2 Interviews

Existing literature alone does not answer the main research question. In this research, I have chosen for virtual semi-structured interviews, enacted through skype and zoom. Blee and Taylor propose some arguments on why semi-structured interviews suit in social movement research. They argue that in structured interviews, scholars predefine their questions and corresponding categories in which the given answers suits (2002). However, flexibility is necessary for this research, and so the preference goes to semi-structured interviews. Just as in structured interviews, the interviewer still determines some questions or topics to ask during the interview. However, in a semi-structured interview, space is given to the interviewer to deviate from the pre-established questions, based on how the interaction endures (Blee & Taylor, 2002). According to Blee and Taylor, semi-structured interviews are primordially useful in social movement theory when the research is about "*loosely organized, short-lived, or thinly documented social movements*" (2002, p. 93).

Moreover, they argue that through multiple semi-structured interviews, predominant themes and categories can be discovered (2002). The semi-structured interviews have been profoundly helpful in determining leading trends among the participants' demands and their perceptions and actions concerning the new constitution. Before I started to conduct data, I created a topic guide presenting open questions based on my research (sub-)questions. However, as the interviews were semi-structured, the participants had room for manoeuvre to discuss topics that they thought to be relevant. Due to this approach, sometimes more information was collected than beforehand expected. For instance, participants 3a and 3b had many sources of discontent to discuss, that eventually showed their underlying emotions, which they probably would not address if this space were not available.

For this research, 13 participants participated in 12 semi-structured interviews. Interview 3 was with a married couple (3a and 3b). The first four interviews took place in English, as these were predominantly English teachers (except 3b) and thus were fluent in the English language. Participant 8 also spoke English during the interview. He also has an educational background, and he lived in the United States 10 years ago. The other 9 participants (5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 12) however, did speak Spanish. All the participants approved the meetings to be recorded and subsequently transcribed. The recordings were helpful as I am an intermediate Spanish speaker, and I did not fully understand the respondent's answers during the interview. Still, it was possible to have a proper conversation. While conducting data, I also studied the Spanish language. Though, when more political or sophisticated subjects were discussed, it got more and more difficult for me to understand. The language barrier also needs to be considered a limitation for this research as I sometimes was not able to ask the right questions at the right moment to gather some more in-depth information. Therefore, some more profound understanding of how a cabildo is organized misses in this research. Nevertheless, with the help of a software called Sonix, it became possible to transcribe and translate the interviews (5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 12). Unfortunately, as one of the recordings failed, I almost obtained none (usable) data of interviewee 9 and limited data of participant 7.

Despite these inconsistencies, the semi-structured interviews validly obtained knowledge of how participants give meaning to their actions and how they understand those. The data collected is of "*individual and collective visions, imaginings, hopes, expectations, critiques of the present, and projections of the future on which the possibility of collective action rests and trough which social movements form*" (Blee & Taylor, 2002, p. 95). Especially in this research, this has to do with

participants' expectations about future mobilizations, government interaction, but as well the meaning of the collective action and participating in a cabildo. Furthermore, the performed semi-structured interviews provided significant insights into the perspectives of the cabildos' participants for both the perception of the new constitution and especially the interruption due to corona.

3.1.3   Participant Observation

Initially, I planned to perform participant observation as an additional research method. Unfortunately, as it became irresponsible to travel to Chile amid the corona pandemic, the trip got cancelled. In contrast to semi-structured interviews, (offline) participant observation becomes difficult when operating from a distance. Balsiger and Lambelet outline the three "*core aspects*" of participant observation: collecting "*firsthand data*" (1); moving the observation scale (2); and experiencing (3) (Balsiger & Lambelet, 2014). Participant observation then means being in the specific context in which the social phenomenon you are studying is taking place, thus in one particular social setting. With moving the observation scale means going into the 'research field'. Due to legislation in place, the organization in cabildos and travelling were restricted. This was for my research not a possibility anymore or at least not in line with what I desired to analyse, as digital ethnography would be an alternative. Another method was required to increase the validity of this research. I chose to switch participant observation for a survey, further examined now.

3.1.4   Survey

The survey in this research aimed to add further knowledge to the already conducted data from the interviews. As not all the participants desired to be interviewed, some participants were willing to fill in a survey. Kuechler defines a survey as "*the collection of data for the purpose of scholarly inquiry by use of a standardized questionnaire*" (Kuechler, 1998). For this research, I constructed a standardized questionnaire based on my previous determined interview topic guide and improved it with the gained experience of the first conducted interviews. I chose to make two versions: one especially for organizations and another one for participants and organizers of the cabildos (individuals). The questionnaires are composed of open questions regarding participants' attitudes toward the mobilization (episode of 2019), their demands for a new constitution and their perceptions and actions related to these cabildos. Additionally, I included a question concerning the corona crisis and how they think this pandemic impacts this constitutional process. Finally, some space was provided for the participants to add some more information if fancied. The questionnaires are both sent in English and in Spanish to allow more people to take part in this research.

Four persons replied and filled in the questionnaires. One of them was also willing to take part in a semi-structured interview. She possessed much knowledge about the cabildos; thus, a meeting would provide more insights. This participant (6) is a young adulthood teacher and resides in Santiago. Participant 13 is also a young adult whose profession is a lawyer. Participant 14 is also active in law enforcement as a social worker and law graduate. Just as the other participants, she is a young adult too. Finally, participant 15 is a middle-aged professor of History, Geography and Social Sciences. Thus, one of the subjects of this research (6) both filled in a questionnaire and took part in an interview. Overall, 16 persons were involved in this research, numbered from 1 to 15. I removed participant 9 from this research due to the lack of reliable data.

3.1.5 Sample and sampling method

In previous sections is declared that semi-structured interviews and qualitative surveys are conducted to gather the data needed for answering this research question. Essential for a study is how a researcher attains participants in his or her research. For this research, two methods of sampling are applied. Initially, snowball sampling was used to get access to the target population. Snowball sampling originally was developed as a "*nonprobability approach to sampling design and inference in hard-to-reach, or equivalently, hidden populations*" (Heckathorn, 2011, p. 356). Though many people were supposedly involved in the cabildos, the restricted amount of information of those on the internet, and the rapid disappearance of the cabildos visual presence, made it hard to find these participants. It specifically became problematic as the research is done from a distance. After a search of a few weeks, a gatekeeper was found in a Facebook group called Nederlanders in Chili (Dutch in Chile), who brought me in touch with some participants who on their turn provided me with some more contacts. Next to the snow-ball sampling, I aimed to perform purposive sampling in this research: "*the deliberate choice of an informant due to the qualities the informant possesses*" (Tongco, 2007, p. 147). While conducting data (through semi-structured interviews), I heard that in particular two organizations have had an essential role in the facilitating and supporting the operation in cabildos: *la Mesa de Unidad Social (MUS)* and *las Coordinadora de Asambleas Territoriales (CAT).* To both, I sent an interview request. After I did not receive a response, I asked them to fill in this questionnaire. Unfortunately, they were not willing to participate.

In this research, the distribution of the questionnaires was facilitated by email and Facebook. The MUS and CAT were targeted, which are involved with assisting and systemizing cabildos. Furthermore, these are sent to organizers and participants of different cabildos operating in Santiago. Though MUS did not cooperate, they provided a list with contact information of leaders from various cabildos initiatives online (around 53 subjects). I used this list to send interview requests and questionnaires. Eventually, just a few people responded, even after sending multiple messages. At the same time, I started to search for specific cabildo Facebook groups operating online and contacted them through Facebook message or email (if presented). As well here, it has proven to be challenging to find people willing to participate. However, this resulted in a few more people willing to collaborate in an interview (participants 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12). As these people came from different neighbourhoods and had no link to each other, this increased the validity of the research. Important to note is that in this research, many participants turned out to be young, with an educational profession or have an essential role within their cabildo initiative.

3.2 Data Analysis

After the data is collected and transcribed, it needs to be analysed. As the collection of data happens (predominantly) qualitatively, the analysing takes place qualitatively as well. In this research, thematic analysis is the primary method in processing the collected data. Thematic analysis means "*systematically identifying, organizing and offering insight into patterns of meaning (themes) across a data set*" (Braun & Clarke, 2012, p. 57). Subsequently, Braun and Clarke clarify that patterns in themselves do not substantially contribute to the research, but overarching trends need to be of meaning to a specific research question (2012). To make sure that profound concepts, trends, and patterns are covered in the analysis, both the inductive and deductive approach is adopted. First, the data is deductively coded. Deductive coding is a top-down approach, whereby codes are identified by

the researcher based on his vision and interpretations and thinking (Braun & Clarke, 2012). Based on the defined research questions, I created a code tree with all the relevant topics and themes to information was needed to answer the main (and sub) research question(s). In the meantime, data was also coded inductively. Inductive coding is creating codes based on the acquired data and is also known as the bottom-up approach (Braun & Clarke, 2012). While researching, I found out that some topics seemed relevant that I had not anticipated on in my code tree, so then these codes were added.

3.3 Ethics

Doing research goes hand in hand with ethical dilemmas. Conducted (personal) data needs to contribute to scientific knowledge, without harming any of the participants involved. To be more aware of how to diminish the societal consequences of doing research, the following section is about ethics. According to Ryen, a professor in sociology, there are three main questions raised in Western social sciences when speaking about dealing with ethics: *codes and consent; confidentiality and trust* (2016). Codes and consent, as such, imply 'informed consent'. The investigated population has multiple rights: "*the right to know that they are being researched, the right about the nature of the research and the right to withdraw at any time*" (Ryen, 2016, p. 32). In this thesis, it is also important to explicitly communicate these rights to the research participants. To defend these rights, I offered the participants an informed consent form. This form is for as well the researcher as the participants a useful tool. Both parties have been aware of the expectations of the other.

The second crucial ethical consideration is confidentiality. Ryen proposes that "*we are obliged to protect each participant's identity, places and the location of the research*" (2016, p. 33). Uphold confidentiality in this research means that transcripts and records of data are available to no one, except the researcher himself. Sensitive data is protected with a password, and all the transcripts are locked. The participants are numbered, so their names do not appear on the transcripts. The studies' participants are anonymized, as this research contains sensitive information. Therefore, in the study, the participants are described from participant 1 to 15. If others get the opportunity to read this research, participants will not be recognized.

Trust is the last concept that has to be taken into account when considering ethics. "[Trust] *refers to the relationship between the researcher and the participants*" (Ryen, 2016, p. 33). However, as noticed by Ryen, it goes beyond the relationship between the researcher and the researched group. It also encompasses that it is the researcher's responsibility to stay on good terms with the subjects (2016). The subjects' previous encounters should not endanger potential future research. To make sure that the researcher is considered honest, open, and truthful communication is vital. In this study, I emphasized that al the subjects were allowed to quit and withdraw from the research whenever they desired. Moreover, I offered them the opportunity not to answer questions if they did not feel comfortable doing so.

Chapter 4   Episode of 2019

Chile is a interesting country that experienced a political transformation in the past and currently is known for significant inequality. Current mobilizations need to be understood within this socio-political context, which is what this chapter first aims to illustrate. Second, this chapter explores the 2019th mobilization, its initiation and expansion over time. In the historical approach, the primary attention is paid to Pinochet legacy (the neoliberal model and the 1980 Constitution) which will be further scrutinized. Though Chile returned to democracy in 1990, the Pinochet discourse is still carried on by ruling parties, which will be reflected on too. However, since the 21st century, civil society is actively mobilizing to show the world they do not longer accept Chile's history to determine their future. The two biggest mobilizations (in 2006 and 2011) are addressed, and their relevance is shown for the current societal outbreak. Alongside, former president Bachelet initiated some cabildos already in 2015 to map the desires of the Chilean population, which will be further elaborated. In the second part of this chapter, the 2019th episode itself is outlined. While utilizing the theory of contentious politics by Tilly and Tarrow (2015), the mobilization examined. In doing so, it is necessary to trace back its origin; where did this idea come from to assemble and perform collective action? Subsequently, the development of this contention within Chile and especially Santiago is investigated. Special attention is paid to how the contention spread from one social group to another and how these manifestations turned to big that they eventually led to a referendum for a plebiscite. Finally, this chapter expresses how demobilization took place (partly) due to the corona pandemic.

4.1   Historical timeline of contention and mobilization

As previously mentioned, the first section of this chapter entails Chile's history, further divided into Pinochet legacy, return to democracy and autocracy in sheep's clothing.

4.1.1   Pinochet Legacy

Civil activism and mobilizations are nothing new in Chile. One of the authors that looked into Chiles history of (popular) mobilization is Somma. Somma argues that the prominence of Chilean civil activism was already visible in the 19th century, 1880s to be exact when the Chilean labour movement was the most advanced in Latin America (2012). At the beginning of the 20th century, movements and political parties started to collaborate when the Social and Communist parties initiated to politically back the labour movement (2012). Later on, in the 1960s, the Christian Democrats and leftist parties tried to seize the vote the (previously) abandoned rural peasant populations; therefore political mobilization dispersed to the rural areas and so expanded broadly (2012). This activism peaked when Salvador Allende was ruling (1970-73), and workers created *"independent centres of collective democracy (cordones industriales)"*, assembling neighbourhoods to provide and divide 'basic food supplies' in times of scarcity (2012, p. 297). It all changed in 1973, when Pinochet, head of a military junta, took over the power through a coup in which Allende was killed and turned the democracy into a dictatorship.

When Pinochet came into power, political opposition was directly ruled out. Especially politicians linked to the leftist parties (in support of Allende) were tortured, imprisoned, murdered or just disappeared (Loveman, 1986). Powerful labour unions were replaced by atomized unions that had no bargaining power (Valdés, 1995). Subsequently, the regime repressively forbade the operation of civil organizations, unions and parties and highly restricted the space for activism to take place

(Somma, 2012). Even though activism was restrained, it did still occur. One of these rare events were organized by women promoting 'Democracy in the Country and in the Home', fighting for *"human rights, economic justice, and women's equality"* (Noonan, 2004, p. 1). However, while political and social space was profoundly narrowed down, economic space was created. Pinochet implemented, under the advice of Latin American Economists (the 'Chicago Boys'), *neoliberalism*: "*privileging the free market, debilitating the role that the State played in society and promoting individualization and competitiveness in social relations*" (Cabalin, 2012, p. 220). The state diminished its control on the economic sector, creating space for businesses and enterprises to flourish and develop.

After some years in control, at the beginning of the 1980s *"most Chileans favoured a "return to democracy," but with widespread disagreement over the precise definition of 'democracy'"* (Loveman, 1986, p. 4). To 'meet' with civil society, in 1980, Pinochet introduced the earlier mentioned 1980 Constitution, supported by a staged plebiscite, to "*formalise and consolidate the new political system*" (Loveman, 1988, p. 260) and which is still installed today. In practice, the 1980 Constitution guarantees the right-wing to be legislatively overrepresented (Bresnahan, 2003; Nef, 2003; Olavarría, 2003; Roberts, 2016). Besides, the constitution ratifies the military (in important areas) to be removed from civilian authority (Nef, 2003). So, the police forces and military do not have any accountability to the Chilean population, are more or less autonomous and function as an instrument in the political sphere. This privileges *"a vertical and highly repressive view of the political process"* (Nef, 2003, p. 23), called 'protected democracy' (Heiss, 2017). Due to the implementation of the 1980 Constitution that also legitimized the re-election of Pinochet, it eventually took ten years for Pinochet to step down as 'president' in 1990 and it even took until 1998 before he was totally out of power (Barros, 2001; Wedgwood, 1999). Even though a lifelong position was provided for him in the Senate (Barros, 2001), he resigned in 2002 (Olavarría, 2003). For the first time in seventeen years, an elected government gained power and democracy were restored. Nevertheless, it is debatable whether the damaged socio-political system of Chile is fully recovered. To come back to Loveman's statement, it might even be upon today that the definition of democracy is still under revision by civil society.

4.1.2   Return to democracy

With the return to democracy in 1990, political space appeared for other political powers. The Concertación, a coalition of centre-left political parties, then entered the field. This coalition continued to embrace neoliberalism to improve and sustain relations with foreign powers, to gather more (international) support and gain access to transnational capital and international financial institutions, like the United States (Roberts, 2016). Initially, according to the World Bank, these neoliberal policies stimulated the economy leading to the sharp fall of poverty rates, on the longer-term inequality rates persisted and enlarged (2016). Neoliberalism will be explicitly scrutinized further in the research. In the meantime, from 1989 to 1999, political and social demobilization had taken place (Pleyers, 2016).

One of the sectors profoundly affected by the transformation towards neoliberalism is the educational landscape. The introduced voucher system in 1981, subsidized by the Ministry of Education encouraged the private sector to engage in private education, launching secondary and tertiary schools, for the sake of making a profit (Bellei et al., 2014). As it became more and more popular for private institutions to enter the education market, the distribution looked as follows: public schools, subsidised private schools, and private schools that did not receive state funding (Donoso, 2013). The quality within the market became dispersed (disadvantaging attendees of public

schools), not solely stimulating inequality in education, but as well affecting the opportunities later in life and affecting income distribution (Donoso, 2013). With the return to democracy and the seizure of power from Pinochet by the Concertación, they promised to fight for equal opportunities for secondary students. While they did improve the system through better infrastructure; more students than ever attending high school; better working conditions for teachers; an increasing amount of hours taught on a school day, equity within the system was not realised (Donoso, 2013). This inequity eventually contributed to the eruption and reappearances of multiple streams of collective action. The biggest ones, until now, are the so-called 'Penguin Revolution' in 2006 and the 'Chilean Winter' in 2011. Both were subsequently known to be *"the most significant set of demonstrations in Chile since the return of democracy"* (Bellei & Cabalin, 2013, p. 112; Donoso, 2013). In 2006 the *Pingüino* movement emerged and was named after the protesting students' uniforms that corresponds with the black and white colours of a penguin. Though the students at first demanded a free bus pass, they additionally demanded educational reform. As proper education being a *"right rather than a commodity"* and *"an end to the subsidiary role of the state in its provision and delivery"* was necessary to achieve this (Larrabure & Torchia, 2015, p. 255).

To express their discontent, the primordial 15 to 18 years old students organised marches as a form of protest and subsequently occupied their schools, visualised by piles of chairs in front of the gate or the main entrance of the school. They organised themselves in the Asamblea de Estudiantes Secundarios Metropolinata (Metropolitan High School Student Assembly). This student organization functioned as a form of direct democracy (/participation) in which spokespersons rotated to communicate the assembly's decisions and agenda outwards (Larrabure & Torchia, 2015). It conflicted with conventional democracy in which *"political leaders can make decisions without consulting the base"* (Larrabure & Torchia, 2015, p. 255). Eventually, around 500.000 students were involved in a general strike, which included the occupation of the schools and collective action on the street (Larrabure & Torchia, 2015). Bellei and Cabalin captured the four central claims of the students: (1) demand for free education; (2) defence of public education; (3) rejection of for-profit educational providers; (4) elimination of schools' discriminatory practices (2013). Nevertheless, after six months of negotiations with the government, the students started to demobilize after endless negotiations with the government. The government responded by composing an agreement to initiate an ad-hoc education committee with the possibility of students to participate in decision-making (Larrabure & Torchia, 2015; Somma, 2012). Eventually, the reform had little to no effect on the educational system of Chile (2012).

As slightly mentioned in a previous paragraph, in the extension of 2006, conflict erupted again between students and state in 2011. It occurred after the government announced that year to be the 'year of higher education'. This upheaval earned the name 'Chilean Winter' and owes it to the political unrest worldwide, especially in the Middle East where the 'Arab Spring' was taking place (Valenzuela et al., 2012). Instead of the high school students in 2006, university students now were leading in the 2011th collective action. The mobilization increased from merely 8000 students on April the 28th to 20.000 two weeks later, to 100.000 people protesting on June the 16th (Bellei et al., 2014). Eventually, on August the 21st, the movement attracted 1 million people during the *"families for education"* meeting consisting of both students and non-students (Larrabure & Torchia, 2015). Estimation indicates that around 500.000 out of the 4 million available students had participated at least once in one of these protests (Larrabure & Torchia, 2015). The claims of the 2011 students, mainly overlapped the claims made in 2006, critiquing the five main areas of the educational model:

"financing [and expenditure], profit, quality, access and equity, and the role of the State and changes in institutionality" (Espinoza & González, 2013, pp. 9–10).

This time the orchestration of the demonstrations was organised by the CONFECH (Confederation of Chilean Students). They represented more than thirty public and private universities, all represented by one delegate (Somma, 2012). The CONFECH was responsible for organizing all kinds of demonstrations and alternative protest performances. The prominent spokespersons of the CONFECH were Camila Vallejo, President of the Student Federation of the University of Chile (FECH) and Giorgio Jackson, President of the Student Federation of the Catholic University (FEUC) (Wubbena, 2017). While demonstrating, the students both adopted traditional as innovative strategies. The traditional strategies varied from massive marches to the takeover of educational facilities, initiating assemblies and work and hunger strikes (Bellei et al., 2014, p. 434). Meanwhile, the innovative strategies varied from flash-mobs and a *dance-a-thon* on a song of Lady Gaga to el besatón, which were massive kiss-ins and other forms of artistic interventions and campaigns, like costume gatherings (Bellei et al., 2014; Larrabure & Torchia, 2015). This process of mobilization and corresponding collective action performances contains according to Somma two important visible features*: "autonomy from institutional politics and a horizontal style of internal organization"* (2012, p. 298), which coincides with Bellei et al., expressing a *"continuing trend of internal democratisation"* (2014, p. 433). The government, and specifically, president Piñera responded on this mobilization by limiting the available space for public demonstrations and activism to take place, sending new bills to the Congress (Larrabure & Torchia, 2015). Another strategy of Piñera was to be patient for the demobilization to happen, as a mobilization cycle naturally turns from eruption into implosion (2015). Although the political parties in power promised change (Bachelet, on behalf of left-wing, as Piñera on behalf of right-wing), in both 2006 and 2011, systematic inequality remained (Somma, 2012).

Even though in general no significant efforts were made to change the 1980 Constitution and create an equal society, in 2015, former president Michelle Bachelet announced an initiative to explore how an alternative constitution could be composed. This plan that aimed to support a 'multi-level legitimation model', started "*with a phase of a civic education, followed by a stage of public deliberation at the local, intermediate, and national level: the "cabildos" or citizen dialogues*" (Heiss, 2017, p. 473). A 15-member Council of Observers was introduced at the end of 2015 to assure that this deliberative process would happen in a transparent way (2017). So, as it seems that in the 2019-episode cabildos spontaneously emerged from 'nothing', the first experience of people with cabildos derived from 2015. Subsequently, Heiss argued that all these deliberations (outcomes) would be documented and consulted for the foundation of a proposal for a new constitution. In this plan four options for constitutional change would be sent to Congress*: "(1) a bicameral commission composed of a group of senators and deputies; (2) a Constituent Convention including legislators and citizens; (3) a Constituent Assembly and (4) a plebiscite to allow the citizens to decide among the previous options"* (Heiss, 2017, p. 473). Despite de rigidity of the 1980 Constitution and its inherent right-wing veto power, Bachelet pursued, as called by Fuentes "*political suicide*" and promised that a new constitution would be put into place, even though the odds were highly against her (2018, p. 473). As the plan was set in motion, Heiss argues that the first questions were immediately raised, for instance, which actors should be consulted and what kind of relationship these actors should hold to political parties (2017). She mentions that even though not many people were participating, more than 9000 cabildos took place, with approximately 10 or 20 participants each. However, their role was less representative but

rather more expressive, as these cabildos had no power in or impact on Chilean politics (2017). When in April 2017 a new bill was submitted to Congress, 2/3rds consensus was need of the deputies in both the lower and the upper house, to go into the next stage and proceed the reformation of the 1980 Constitution (Fuentes, 2018). Nevertheless, the right-wing parties rejected this proposal and therefore, Bachelet's project stranded.

4.1.3 Autocracy in sheep's clothing

So where does this Pinochet legacy leaves Chile now? While the Pinochet dictatorship has ended already for 30 years, its impact on current society is still huge. One of the consequences of the neoliberal discourse can be illustrated by the World Bank's Gini index, which indicates that the current inequality prevails persistently (Roberts, 2016). In 2018 Chilean's Gini coefficient reached 0.46, therefore being one of the most unequal societies of the countries partaking in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the OECD) (OECD, 2020). Moreover, Santos and Rodriguez Garavito affirm that with the introduction of neoliberalism a new mode of regulation emerged "*in which the public goods up until now produced by the state (legitimacy, social and economic welfare, security, and cultural identity) are the object of permanent contention*" (2005, pp. 311–312). Moreover, Heiss argues: "*the 1980 Constitution is fundamentally incompatible with the consolidation and deepening of democracy in Chile because it establishes an insuperable barrier that impedes the democratic process by which the will of the people translates into law and public policy*" (2017, p. 471), what she has called *"flawed democracy".* While it is a simplification to acknowledge all these different protests and demonstrations are outcomes of these systematic processes, both neoliberalism and the 1980 Constitution are essential to take into account when researching this 2019 episode.

Alongside the Pinochet legacy, another visible trend is visible, the increasing distrust in conventional politics. The post-authoritarian political system is in a deadlock. Due to the "frozen" political structure of Chile, more and more people disassociate themselves from conventional politics (Heiss, 2017). Olavarría already noticed in the 1997s parliamentary elections a tremendous low number of voters with voice preference, namely 40 per cent. She stated that this decline represents a "*conscious rejection of the political system and the institutional order inherited from the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet*" (2003, p. 10). Some authors, like Bennet and Dalton, even argue that this phenomenon ensuing in the last twenty years means a shift from more 'obedient citizens' to 'self-actualizing citizens', reflecting a change in how citizenship is defined and practised by individuals (Scherman et al., 2015). Heiss adds that in Chile exists "*specific problems of institutional legitimacy due to the authoritarian enclaves that impede the normal functioning of democracy*", which contributes to this mobilization (2017, p. 472). However, this withdrawal from conventional politics is not exclusively due to the 1980 Constitution, as on global scale democracies are struggling to represent their subjects in a highly internationalised financial order (Heiss, 2017). It is important to note that there seems to be a shift from conventional politics to unconventional political participation, and this is confirmed even more in the current societal outburst of 2019.

As mentioned earlier, it is essential to place the contemporary events in the context of the episodes of 2006 and 2011 and Bachelet's proposal of 2015. First of all, according to Camila Vallejo, one of the foremost leaders of the movement in 2011, the 2006 student movement "*makes us aware of the cooptation strategies by the political class*" (as cited in Somma, 2012, p. 300). Her statement only affirms that it is of high importance to analyse current activism in the context of its history and previous experiences of collective action and contention and not as exclusive events independent

from each other. The demonstrators and students of the current episode (sub)consciously learned from previous ones and how the government interacted with these movements (their tactics). Second, mobilization is a continuous process and vicious cycle, in which, according to Larrabure and Torchia, "*intergenerational learning*" is experienced. Thus, the newer generations (the students) have learned from the women's movement that fought against Pinochet's rule, and thus acquired "*critical social consciousness*" (2015, p. 258). Therefore, it is not solely among students of the 2006- and 2011-episodes experiences are shared, and knowledge is gained, but also among generations. Parents share their experiences with performing collective action in the past with their children.

Though in this thesis, the societal outbreaks of 2006, 2011 and currently, the episode of 2019 are predominantly highlighted, mobilizations in the intermediate timeframes should not be underestimated. Gárces expresses some other massive uprisings over the past that acquired much support over the years, like the Mapuche movement (since the 90s), the student upheaval of 2002 (*mochilazo*), the 'NO+AFP' movement; and multiple environmentalists and feminists movements (2020). Finally, he mentions the social activism of professors in 2018 through significant strikes (2020). In this research is recognized that between these peaks of contention, collective action was taking place and stand in relation with previous explored episodes, even though these actions are not or slightly mentioned.

4.2 Site of contention

Now Chile's past is clarified, and the socio-political context is depicted, it is time to go more in-depth on how the current episode emerged and evolved. According to El Líbero, a local Santiago news media, the first act of collective action that triggered the mobilization can be found on social media and to be precise, on Instagram (B. Garcés, 2019). An Instagram page called 'Cursedin', initiated by students of the secondary-school Instituto Nacional (a public school), had more than 19.000 followers before the fare-dodging campaign happened. Rodrigo Pérez, the president of the school student centre, declared that this fare-dodging campaign was an initiative of the grassroots and emerged from some memes. A meme consists of a video, a picture or a phrase that is massively sent by people over the internet (B. Garcés, 2019). On the Instagram page, a meme was uploaded that motivated students to participate in a massive subway evasion. The first campaign started the following Monday on 14:00 hours at the metro station of Chilean University, called San Diego (B. Garcés, 2019). Though it started as an online joke (like project X), this Monday the 7th, students embraced this message and stormed the metro station. This moment was when the collective action started to happen, "*coordinating efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs*" (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 8). In the following days and weeks, the page was overwhelmingly full of videos and pictures of students evading and protesting. Though the students of the Instituto Nacional started with the fare-dodging campaign, Pérez asserted that students of other schools and university students joined this initiative (B. Garcés, 2019). These (secondary school) students can be considered the first actors were openly expressing their contention in collective action.

Since the first act on Monday the 7th, others followed. On social media, students posted memes, pictures and videos of the fare-dodging campaign and even were vlogging the whole process (B. Garcés, 2019). Moreover, Rodrigo Pérez argued that they were in contact with other student centres and organizations and the internet page Cursedin to coordinate their actions (B. Garcés, 2019). While the number of institutions involved, like the Lyceum 1, Liceo Carmela Carvajal and INBA, grew,

so did the number of students protesting (B. Garcés, 2019). A week later, from the 14th on, the mobilizations became bigger and intensified. While chanting "*evader, no pagar, otra forma de luchar*", (meaning: evade, do not pay, another way of fighting), around three hundred students stormed Pedro de Valdivia metro station, leading to the closure of various stations on Line 5 ("Metro cierra varias estaciones de la Línea 5," 2019).

The following day, around 150 students from different educational institutions clashed with the police and the Carabineros on metro station Santa Ana (Tironi, 2019). On October the 16th the demonstrations continued as hundreds of students demolished the gates and entered Franklin station, Santa Ana, and afterwards invaded Plaza de Armas. Conflict erupted again on the 17th, when more stations were closed, like San Joaquín, as turnstiles were destroyed. The students stood in front of the turnstiles preventing the police forces from entering and 'protect' passengers so these could travel for free (Glaser, 2019). Eventually, on the 18th of October, mainly female students massively undermined public transport regulations and occupied all 136 metro stations, under the slogan #EvasionMasiva (massive evasion) (Filo News, 2019).

During these contentious performances, the students positioned themselves not solely as student or youth movement, but rather as ordinary residents, as they were protesting a fare hike that was not even applying for them. Garcés pointed out that students argued that while they were not personally affected by this regulation, "*it affects our families*" (2020, p. 4). The youth constructed a wide-ranging political identity, to enlarge this space, they opened up for more actors to enter the field. Political identity is "*the collective names political actors give themselves or that other people give them*" (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 12). This extension meant a narrative shift from students under pressure, as mainly was the case of previous 2006 and 2011 student activism (Bellei et al., 2014), to the 'general population' grievances such as "*improvement in pensions, health care reform, better salaries, and a new constitution*" (Somma et al., 2020). In an interview with the Guardian, an evasion' bystander argues that "*they are [indicating the students] protesting in a way that those of us who work cannot. So in some ways, it becomes representative*" (Guardian News, 2019). Alternatively, as put by some participants of a cabildo examined: *"it favours the development of empathy from experienced repression"* (personal communication, 31 July 2020).

As the youth initiated the first performances of collective action and identified themselves not solely as students, rather ordinary citizens under attack, new spaces appeared for other actors to join the manifestations. Therefore, the youth are the early risers of contention, lowering the social transaction costs for weaker actors' contention to manifest (Tarrow, 1994). In this case, the "*weaker actors*" refer to the workers who have more at risk when demonstrating. The fare rise, even though limited in scope, was considered as a political opportunity for the students to coordinate and cooperate and express their prevailing resentments. By political opportunity is meant: "*consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure"* (Tarrow, 1994, p. 85). The students affected the political field in such a way that others felt attracted to join the protests and manifestations.

As these events rapidly increased and attendance bolstered, the government was caught out of the blue (Kornbluh, 2019). The demonstrators adopted both contained and transgressive contention in their repertoires. On the one hand, many of the collective action was contained, like the

massive marches, pot-bangings (cacerolazos), the assembling in cabildos, the release of new (and old) symbolic music (Somma et al., 2020). Nevertheless, transgressive contention appeared as well as the massive widespread contention was accompanied with some of its violent repercussions. Lootings, burning of metro stations and buildings, and clashes with the police 'had to be stopped'. These violent actions were challenging the government, the regime. To counter these demonstrations and restore 'normality', Piñera decided on the 19th to first enact a 15-day "*Estado de Excepción Constitutional de Emergencia*" (a state of emergency) in the provinces Santiago y Chacabuco (Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2019).

The government adopted a security frame. According to the state of emergency, the government granted "*additional powers to restrict freedom of movement and right to assembly*" (Larsson, 2019). To ensure that people act according to this state of emergency, Piñera stationed more than 20.000 soldiers and carabineros in public places (Larsson, 2019). Moreover, a curfew was installed, countering the assemblage and peoples' street presence from 10 p.m. to 7 a.m (2019). To defend his newly installed regulations on the 20th of October, President Piñera labelled the demonstrators as a significant threat to the Chilean society. On national television, Piñera declared "*estamos en guerra*", meaning we are at war (teleSUR tv, 2019), appointing the demonstrators a threat for the country "*a powerful and relentless enemy who does not respect anyone*" (teleSUR tv, 2019). This securitization frame embodies itself into repression of civil society: "*the attempt by a state or its agents against challengers in order to end their challenge by arresting them, harassing them, or destroying their organizations*" (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 37). While positioning the protestors to be a threat to the state, violence became legitimized by governmental law enforcement.

Since the first encounter, the enforcement troops have been using excessive force (OHCHR, 2019). Carabineros and soldiers act violently; usage of teargas, deployment of tanks with water cannons, and shooting with rubber pallets (Mendoza & Jara, 2019). Furthermore, according to human right organisations and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, human rights have been violated. The stationed law enforcement are even accused of deliberately shooting at protestors' heads (Mendoza & Jara, 2019; OHCHR, 2019). Additionally, already more than a thousand cases of abuses committed by the police forces and military are under investigation, varying from torture to sexual violence (Romer, 2019). The death number added up to 26, thousands had been detained, and more than 13.000 people injured. At least 240 of those injured, suffer from eye mutilation (Laing & Donoso, 2019). Altogether, the deployed soldiers on the street, the enacted 'state of emergency' and imposed curfew reminded the population of the Pinochet dictatorship and its numerous violations of human rights resulting in "*fear, anger and consternation in the population, and radicalizing protestors*" (Somma et al., 2020, p. 4).

The violent attitude of the police forces towards the students generated even more support for the students and their collective action. Thereby, as the students as early risers already created some space, (the lowering of the social transaction costs), it resulted in the mobilization of new actors. Next to the students, other actors entered the arena of collective action, like the Mapuche movement, the 'NO + AFP' movement, women movements, and others (M. Garcés, 2020). These new actors contributed to the assemblage of people, who previously were disconnected from each other into the same campaign, which is called brokerage (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). Mónica González argued that due to these protests: "*Chileans have found their identity with people they did not even know*". (Kornbluh, 2019) This heterogeneity within the collective action raises another problem for the government. Whereas in the demonstrations of 2006 the Assembly of Secondary School Students of Santiago (AES)

was the responsible actor for mobilization (Donoso, 2013) and in 2011 the Chilean Student Confederation predominated (Wubbena, 2017), in 2019 there is not just one subject that performs claim-making. Chilean feminist leader Alondra Carillo Vidal defines the 2019th episode as an "*inorganic tendency of people to occupy the streets . . . [without] any lists of demands*" (DemocracyNow, 2019). Due to the sudden outbreak and the new way of organization, the government has not just *one* single actor to negotiate or to discuss grievances with, contrasting previous events. Claim-making is now spread among a wider audience, rather than just one specific group.

The state of emergency also meant the suspension of classes in many schools and universities of Santiago city on the 21st (Filo News, 2019). Nevertheless, the manifestations continued as civil society was demanding the removal of the military from the streets ("*militares afuera*") and we are not at war ("*no estamos en guerra*") (2019). That same night, on one of the balconies in Santiago, a woman sung '*Te Recuerdo Amanda*' by Victor Jara, followed with loud applause of bystanders, which went viral on social media. Victor Jara was one of the residents that were killed by the Pinochet regime during the coup. So multiple forms of protests were performed to express contention towards the government's response and attitude. On the 22nd, Piñera announced to increase low pensions and the freezing the electric tariffs to overcome further contention of the population (2019), though proven to be unsuccessful.

As a response to the announcement of the government, social movements and unions call for an immediate general strike, to reveal the population's grievances. The next day, people mobilized and protested against the power of the military. Once more, they demanded the government to lift the state of emergency, the curfew and the return of the militaries to the barracks (2019). To cope with the discontent of civil society, Piñera disclosed his plans to end both the military enforced curfew and the state of emergency (2019). The next day, October the 25th might be considered the peak of the mobilizations in which approximately 1.2 million people participated on Plaza Italia, called '*la marcha más grande'*, with Plaza Italia earning the name of 'la Plaza de la Dignidad' (2019). Since then, the government got rid of the curfew (26th) and the state of emergency (27th) (2019). Furthermore, the government reshuffled a third of its cabinet, to "*confront these new demands*", as declared by Piñera in an interview (Franklin, 2019).

Amid these protests, the first cabildos started to emerge as a new contentious performance of claim-making. In the introduction is mentioned that the cabildos were spaces in which people would reflect upon current society and share their resentments. Zazo-Moratalla declared that in cabildos, both local and national issues were expressed (2019). First of all, neighbourhoods had the opportunity to list their local concerns. Second, "*thematic meetings are reflecting about concrete matters like gender, the environment, heritage or food sovereignty, with the goal of generating a new civil consciousness and summarizing the core issues that should be included within a new constitution*" (2019, p. 7). As previously in the protests, no organizational structure was observable, now structure emerged. Garcés affirms the decentralization of the mobilization and argues that *"the mobilisation(s) that brought on this "uprising" were not convoked by a single, central organisation, and certainly none of the establishment groups*" (2020, p. 2). Moreover, Somma et al. asserted that due to the movement's poor leadership, it was tough to communicate with the political class (2020).

The cabildos have been essential since November the 15th as the government voted in favour of a referendum for a new constitution (Cuffe, 2019). The cabildos are one of the primordial attempts to map what civil society demands to change about Chile, as they represent civil society—particularly

now, concerning a new constitution. Though Somma et al. wrote their article in the heat of the moment, when contentious performances were still proceeding, they did mention the cabildos' potential (2020). Now, it turns possible to list and prioritize the claims presented on a bigger scale. In the next chapter, these cabildos are further investigated from the perspective of their participants.

Chapter 5   Cabildo-making as collective action performance

Before it is possible to explore what demands the cabildos' participants propose and whether it would suit as a participatory democratic model, a closer look is needed on what defines a cabildo. Therefore, chapter 5 aims to answer the research sub-question: "*what are Santiago's cabildos and how did they emerge?".* In doing so, this chapter will first explore how the process of cabildo-making as a contentious performance takes place. Special attention is paid to its emergence in the context of societal upheaval. Especially concerning the organizations behind the cabildos and the varieties of the concept 'cabildo' presented, including as contentious performance. Moreover, when looking at the cabildo-making process, one needs to understand how mobilization diffuses overtime during the episode. Subsequently, there is presented how a cabildo progresses and who is participating in the cabildos. After depicting the cabildo-making process, the perceived impacts of the cabildos are revealed. Finally, this chapter describes the experiences of the participants acting in a cabildo and the meaning they attribute to the cabildos.

5.1   The process of cabildo-making

Cabildos' emergence and its meaning are inseparable. How and why cabildos emerged, go hand in hand with what they are and how they are constituted. Both the emergence of the cabildo and its meaning are referred to as cabildo-making processes. So, how the cabildos currently are defined by the participants stands directly in line and is interrelated with how they emerged. To explain this more into detail; first, we delve into its emergence.

5.1.1   The emergence of the cabildos

Among the participants, there is a discrepancy about where the initial roots lay for these cabildos to emerge. Though the majority of the participants described the cabildos to develop in time of the state of emergency, participant 2 takes a more historical approach. Participant 2 is a university teacher and has some experience in politics. During his study, he was part of a student union. According to him, it might be possible that the initial roots of these cabildos go back to 2015 when the new Bachelet government was in power and made the first attempt to displace the 1980 Constitution:

> *"[the cabildos] started like a process which from the government allowed every single citizen to get organized with around eight to fourteen people . . . and they gave you like a guideline with certain questions, and you could discuss what would you change in the Constitution in terms of rights and duties. . . . I remember, I gathered with my neighbours, whom I did not know before and we started discussing politics. . . . I think that was like a first a spark of OK; we can get together with more people and start discussing these issues.".*

Other participants argued that the cabildos need to be understood in the context of collective action, the manifestations and protests that started in October. They argue that initially the demonstrations and the following government's proposals to introduce a plebiscite triggered the formation of the cabildos. Participant 6 is a 30-year-old teacher from Santiago, and she has been involved in the preparation stage of one of the first cabildos in her neighbourhood. She talks about the relevance of the demonstrational performances in October:

> *"I would say that the moment when the Assembly is born is in the protest. On a corner, on a specific street where. I know how to do like the demonstrations here, which is the corner of Salvador and Greece. Many of us who did not know each other began to identify ourselves as neighbours and to say today we could make an assembly; we could*

call a cabildo. That is when the organization emerged. It is a bit in the heat of the revolt."

Participant 1 got involved in her neighbourhood, the Providencia district, in the same manner. She mentions that people were exchanging ideas, which led to the exchange of phone numbers and other contact information. (WhatsApp) groups were created consisting of people who were interested in participating and subsequently, people were invited for one of these meetings. Furthermore, she argues that "*it is continuous like it has just happened as a natural way of organizing*". Participant 6 explains the formation by stating that "*in some way, the organization was not possible in the unions or that it happened in our spaces as workers. That is why naturally the neighbourhoods and towns where we live generated assemblies".* With assembly, she refers to a cabildo initiative, which will be examined later.

These initiatives "*have been installed outside the institutional framework*" (participant 6). The fundament of this quote is that people felt something missing; they felt a necessity to organize; however, the existing organisations and cooperatives that likewise were involved did not completely fulfil this desire. Next to participant 6, participant 1, 2 and 10 also address this necessity. Participant 1: "*maybe they felt that there was this need, an urgency to meet together, you know, to start being more politically active, not through political parties, but as citizens".* On the other hand, participant 2 talks about "*they were desperate to be heard and to participate*". From the quote of participant 6 comes forward that accessibility is one of the reasons that a new form of organization emerged. Later on, trust in these institutional organizations will be depicted as another reason for civil society to launch the cabildos. Though, this necessity to organize and the feeling that something missing, have to put in the particular context of people already marching the streets and showing their discontent in the political system. Therefore, these feelings are placed in a broader perspective of mobilization and discontent.

Some participants emphasized not just the demonstrations and manifestations, but rather the announcement of the government in March to install a plebiscite for a new constitution. As of participant 4: "*When the constitution process was accepted by a group of politicians, immediately we as a society started to meet and to organize important facts that have to be present in the new process of the new constitution".* According to participant 1, this proposal for a new constitution directly triggered some people to become involved: "*of course, there are people who are natural leaders, and they start organizing through the stuff of social media like Facebook and lots. Moreover, these people then set up meetings like spontaneous gatherings between people*". As pointed out in the last quote, cabildos are described to be "*spontaneous gatherings between people*". The majority of the participants described the upraise of the mobilization and subsequently, the cabildos, to be spontaneous and immediate (participants 2, 5, 6, 9 and 12)

Even though the participants stress different reasons for the cabildo-making processes to emerge, in overall, they describe some developments in society that encouraged its process. On the one hand, the participants refer to the performances of collective action that started in October. On the other hand, participants discussed the government's response by facilitating a plebiscite for a new constitution. Both these developments affected the political opportunity structure, as the political environment drastically changed. The proposal for a new plebiscite was perceived as an opportunity to transform the 1980 Constitution and the neoliberal system. Since then, the cabildos as contentious performances changed shape and significant attention was paid to the 'process of a new constitution'.

Participant 6 already stressed the relevance of social networks in the uplift of cabildos. The manifestations and protests brought people closer to each other, which eventually resulted in the organization of the cabildos. However, as participant 3a declares, the mobilization of the people and creation of the cabildos did not happen systematically and thus differed per region, per neighbourhood. Moreover, in his own words, participant 10 describes how the collective action in October eventually resulted in the organization of the cabildos in which he participated:

> *"So, of course, with this social effervescence, many people find themselves, are in the street, are in a vacuum or in a business and start talking about what is happening then. We realize that deep down, there are many things we have in common and that finally makes this explosion. It makes us start talking about something we have in common, that is inequality. That is where we are now, and that is where an endless number of spaces began to emerge."*

Thus, next to the importance of social networks, as well a feeling of communality, a shared feeling of inequality, by which 'spaces began to emerge', in which the participant is referring to the initiation of cabildos. So, this collective action brought people together and influenced the further trajectory of the formation of the cabildos. There is pointed out that the cabildos emerged spontaneously.

Though most of the participants describe the cabildos to emerge spontaneously, they do acknowledge that they were to a certain extent, organized. These cabildos were facilitated and/or promoted by different actors and or organizations. Participant 4 affirms this, stating that *"these cabildos were mainly organized by social organizations . . . [and] they were led by neighbours, in the neighbourhood. "*. During this research, multiple social organizations are outlined to be responsible for cabildo-making. However, as pointed out by participant 3a, in some communes and neighbourhoods people decided to organize their own cabildos autoconvocados (self-convened cabildos). This is due to the absence of social organizations and structures that are involved in cabildo-making, or due to the lack of representation. This is confirmed by participant 1, who claims that*: "if they [(the cabildos)] were not there because some districts didn't have any of those representative people. So, what they did was to join other groups or to start their own organizations anyways."*. Though, it differed per region how the cabildos were constructed (participant 6). From these participants, it becomes clear that almost anyone can facilitate a cabildo. Nevertheless, more attention needs to be paid on what a cabildo entails.

5.1.2 Cabildo-making as contentious performance

Above the emergence of the cabildos was described, now the meaning of the concept 'cabildo' is further scrutinized. Initially, in the proposal phase, this research assumed that a cabildo is a delineated contentious performance. Soon it became visible that this was not the case. Participant 6 discussed how beside the emergence of the cabildo, also a societal space called territorial assembly erupted in times of the collective action:

> *"There are two organizational spaces in Chile after the revolt that were at their peak: the territorial assemblies [(asambleas territoriales)] and the cabildos. It could be said that they are different in nature, although both have the intention of promoting territorial organization. I would dare to say that the first has among its intentions to generate support networks in the community where it lives and to raise discussions in the event of a contingency, although there are cabildos that have maintained this logic of functioning as well."*

The (territorial) assemblies are considered to be (almost) the same to a cabildo. The participants that aimed to distinguish one from another experienced some difficulties, just as in the case of participant

6 in the abovementioned quote. She additionally asserts that when a cabildo functions as a territorial assembly, neighbours meet "*on many occasions with commissions that cover areas that belong to the concerns of this period, for example, health, politics, supply and food, self-education, human rights and law, among others*.". In contrast, cabildos (in general) "*aim to deepen the discussion on a topic, such as the demands of the revolt, the constituent assembly, water*". Here it is insinuated that while cabildos serve a more short-term goal, territorial assemblies aim to be more lasting organizational spaces.

For participant 10, the difference between a (territorial) assembly and a cabildo is deviating from participant 6 her vision. This middle-aged man is the president of a junta de vecinos in one of the municipalities in Santiago. Moreover, he is a union leader and so very politically active and involved. According to him: "*the Assembly is like a more vertical space where there is no structure, where nobody leads, or everybody is a leader. On the other hand, in a cabildo, it is more structured, let us say, as there is a leader*.". However, some participants argued that the cabildos were already somewhat horizontal (like participant 1). The cabildos in which participant 10 participated, turned over time into a territorial assembly. They changed the name from cabildo to territorial assembly as they wanted to be more horizontal. However, he appoints that "*deep down it was the same space and we arrived with the same persons*". Besides, participant 12 argues that the difference between a cabildo and an assembly is more "*semantic*". Some participants did not recognize or call upon any difference between these two organizational spaces, which is also expressed in figure 2 (Union Comunal de Juntas de Vecinos de Ñuñoa, 2019). Both assemblies and cabildos need to be considered newly initiated structures, that originate from the collective action in October and the context of an upcoming plebiscite.

Except for the 'organizational spaces' the cabildo and the assembly, a third organizational space is present, a junta de vecinos (a neighbourhood council). A junta de vecinos is essentially different from an assembly and or cabildo. Participant 11 argues that "*These organizations are, they are created by law. They are non-profit organizations whose purpose is to channel all the demand from the local population to the central government and vice versa.*". Moreover, participant 10 stresses that junta de vecinos are already existing for more than 50 years. However, they are "*institutionalized organizations . . . They are part of the administration, as they are at least within the administration of the State. These organizations already existed to bring together neighbours from a sector that is delimited, an assigned territory*". Thus, a junta de vecinos is involved in cabildo-making processes through the mobilization of an already established structure, opposing to the assemblies and cabildos. The Chilean government defines a junta de vecinos in its constitution as:

Figure 2: Poster of an assembly/cabildo organized by a Junta de Vecinos

> "*community organizations of a territorial nature that represents the people who reside in the same neighbourhood unit and whose purpose is to promote the development of the community, defend the interests and protect the rights of the neighbours, in addition to collaborating with the authorities of the State and of the municipalities*" (LEY Nº 19.418, 2002).

A junta de vecinos is then institutionalised and functions as a prolongation of the political system. As these junta de vecinos are institutionalised, they inherently are involved in conventional politics. Nevertheless, these organizations also perform cabildo-making within their existing networks, like in the case of participants 3a and 3b. Their junta de vecinos organised some cabildos. This third organizational space (the junta de vecinos) thus also performed cabildo-making, organised cabildos as an activity, form of action. However, as the junta de vecinos have more legal responsibilities than the assemblies and cabildos, it is wrong to assume that all juntas de vecinos are consistently involved in cabildo-making. While searching for participants, and mailing different juntas de vecinos, once the next answer was received: "VERY GOOD AFTERNOON, WE ARE A JUNTA DE VECINOS, WE DO NOT HAVE A LOT OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE CABILDOS. EXCUSE ME FOR NOT BEING ABLE TO HELP YOU". This response stresses that some of these spaces are not involved in cabildo-making, which is recognized by participant 11. He is the treasurer of a junta de vecinos and is responsible for raising funds and its assets.

Nevertheless, this research is not interested in the exact differences between these 'societal organizations' and corresponds to how participant 6 explains how these different spaces operate in the same field:

> *"I believe that within these differences between forms of organization, it is important to emphasize that they are not contradictory; on the contrary, they complement each other. For example, I participate in the Villa Olímpica Territorial Assembly and, as an assembly, a cabildo was called to discuss the constituent assembly during November 2019. More than 150 people attended the meeting."*

Participant 6 does not only refer to a cabildo as an 'organizational space' in comparison to a territorial assembly. In the abovementioned citation, another reference is made: "*a cabildo was called*", in which she touches upon the cabildo as contentious performance. Thus, the cabildo-making as contentious performance is carried out by multiple organizational spaces (like the cabildos (autoconvocados), assemblies (territoriales), and junta de vecinos). The cabildo-making processes in different societal spaces will be depicted, examined, and compared. Therefore, in researching these cabildos performances, participants were engaged in different organizational spaces.

5.1.3   Diffusion of the mobilization

It has been pointed out that multiple 'organizational spaces' have been performing a role in the organization and the facilitation of the cabildos. In this section is presented how this form of collective action diffused and broadened in just a few weeks. When looking at diffusion, the following definition is adopted: "*[a] spread of a form of contention, an issue, or a way of framing it from one site to another*" (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 31). In this research, diffusion does not solely mean the spread of contention, but rather that of mobilization. For this diffusion among Santiago's and Chilean residents, multiple reasons were mentioned. These underlying motives for its velocity can be categorized into bottom-up and top-down manners of diffusion. Even though these two categories are just a simplification, it creates a clear overview of different sources of diffusion.

From a bottom-up point of view, participant 4 argued that the explosion of the emergence of the cabildo just "*started as a snowball*". This vision coincides with how participant 1 argues the diffusion of the mobilization to happen:

> *"When it all started, of course, there were very few people. . . . So very few people started participating. We would join in public spaces, the local square, or a park. People would go by and then see you talking and see more people talking. And then they would*

just out of curiosity, they would join you and ask you, how are you doing? I would like to participate. And then it was all mouth to mouth. So, people started inviting others and then you got to see many people at the next gathering. So that is what, when I say that it was all spontaneous, it actually was spontaneous, you see."

In this storyline of participant 1 argues that from bottom-up the 'recruitment' of new participants and the spread of the awareness of cabildos, was based on getting in touch in public spaces. The public spaces here were fundamental, as many people passing by got to know of its existence and its function and meaning. Furthermore, what neither should be underestimated is the power of the social networks that were created in times of the protests: "*And then, the use of social networks has been key. And it has also happened that there have been, as comrades, people who knew each other before and that have allowed to generate links between other places*" (participant 6). The social networks were not only responsible for the cabildos' emergence but also the fast spread of its awareness, and so the number of people joining. Participant 1 further clarifies how, in her experience, social networks had become valuable. She argues that after one attended the protests, people started to recognize others and started sharing. Phone numbers were exchanged, and WhatsApp groups created. That is how the organization and diffusion started. Moreover, the possibility to bring along other people made the cabildos very popular.

In addition to more bottom-up sources of diffusion, top-down structures also are responsible for the diffusion. Primordially, the national unions and umbrella organizations have been involved in the diffusion of the cabildos. Participant 6 emphasizes the importance of the role of more prominent unions and cooperatives behind these social organisations. According to her, it is not solely notable for focusing only on the cabildos to explain this rapid diffusion of the cabildo initiatives, but on how other organizations created the infrastructure to incentivise civil society to develop their cabildos:

> *"However, I believe that above the cabildos, I would highlight the organizations behind them. Those are the assemblies or collectives that were armed in the heat of the revolt and have had until today, six months after the social explosion, the capacity to sustain themselves. These continued to call for instances such as discussion, political reflection, and mobilizations.*

Especially, attention is paid to the organization la Mesa de Unidad Social: *"While the cabildos were a spontaneous form of popular organization, the moment when they became most relevant was when Unidad Social (US) called for them to be made and their results delivered to them."*. Despite participant 6, other participants mentioned MUS's relevance in the processes of cabildo-making, too (*1, 2, 4 and 10*).

According to participant 1, la Mesa de Unidad Social (MUS) is one of these organizations that operate as a mediator to represent the population from different social groups:

> *"Unidad Social is like a very big group and is organized by people who are leaders in different areas. Like for example, we have the workers unions. We have students unions, their teachers unions . . . [and] they were like sort of setting up the gatherings and also collecting information and retrieving the information that was discussed"*

This collaboration was established in September, as a response to the increasing contention in society. On its website, MUS enumerate all the organisations and unions that are united in this collective, adding up to 180 different bodies (Unidad Social, 2020). Therefore, due to the fusion of so many social organizations and unions, brokerage took place: "*production of a new connection between previously unconnected sites*" (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 31).

The MUS does not aim to replace the emerged social movement, but rather "*try to represent them in a way*" (participant 2). La Mesa de Unidad Social called for the assembling in the cabildos, "*intending to gather the demands that arose during the mobilization*" (participant 6). Alternatively, as presented by the organization: "*We encourage to meet in clinics, schools, universities, cultural centres, neighbourhood councils, workplaces and anywhere that allows collective reflection on the current moment in Chile.*" (Unidad Social, 2020). In many instances, this message was picked up by civil society (participant 6), implying that this organization has been (partly) responsible for the diffusion of cabildo-making processes. However, due to the many initiatives of people to establish self-convened cabildos, it is unclear whether MUS has been involved in every single cabildo (participant 1).

Additionally, participant 6 argues that another organization is relevant, namely the Coordinadora de Asambleas Territoriales (CAT):

> *"which brings together more than 50 assemblies and cabildos of Santiago, all of them gestated in light of the mobilization that began in October … [as] it has been the only space that convenes, gathers and articulates the assemblies and cabildos. They are also working on a call for national articulation of the assemblies and cabildos."*

It should be put forward that participant 6 has been the only participant pointing out CAT's existence and importance in the interviews. Moreover, she has been involved in its foundation and organization. Although other participants do not validate the CAT's relevance, it still depicts that multiple organizations created an infrastructure in which multiple assemblies and cabildos initiatives have been connected.

In the next recollection is stressed how schools needed cabildo-making as practice and how top-down initiatives provided an opportunity to do so. Participant 8 works for an organization that provides education for the most vulnerable. He is involved in school management (of multiple schools), and in his position, he keeps close contact with the principles of these schools. He describes that after the revolt in October, the schools opened again in November. It was difficult for these schools to go back to normality: "*the majority of the young students are with this energy that you want to express yourself*". As a response to the changed behaviour of the youth, some discussions took place between the principles and the main office of these school of how to deal with this specific situation. Eventually, they came with the idea to organise a cabildo within the school. They planned some activities like committees with dialogues in which the students could address their concerns and answer questions on particular topics. However, it is not mentioned how cabildo-making happened in the school, and it is unknown to what extent they used the methodology of the Ministry of Education, it proves there is a demand for these initiatives. Already by providing a methodology, especially for education, in this case, it at least becomes plainer how to organize a cabildo.

Finally, these more prominent social unions and spaces have been taking advantage of the virtual social networks created by Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter. Social media has been of great importance for social organizations (like unions) to gather more followers. As mentioned by participant 1: "*It was like a sort of I do not know, and when you know, about parties on Facebook, for example, or public events.*". Thus, the role of these social organizations on social media should be taken into account, as they have a substantial number of followers. For instance, in this case, while writing, la Mesa de Unidad Social has 14.288 likes and 17.660 followers on Facebook (10/6/2020), meaning that they have a big network to influence while interacting with their followers.

To conclude, interactions on the ground are shown to be important in the diffusion of cabildo-making and the expansion of people participating. Next to this bottom-up diffusion, also top-down diffusion occurs. In this research, it is acknowledged that more conglomerates and organisations (co)exist and are involved in 'cabildo-making', rather than those examples illustrated. Solely the organisations and institutions that came forward in the conducted interviews and questionnaires are mentioned here. These examples are provided mainly to exhibit how cabildo-making is influenced by top-down instead of solely bottom-up and is widely apparent in the public spaces.

5.1.4   A cabildo in progress

Though cabildo-making is defined by many participants as spontaneous, amid the protests, an incentive occurred to systemise the initiative. It is not explicitly mentioned by the participants why, but this might have to do (to a certain extent) with social organizations intervening in the process. Previously was mentioned that la Mesa de Unidad Social aimed to collect the demands of civil society that arose from the mobilization. In doing so, the MUS intended to create a "*basic systematization*" of the cabildos to list and prioritize the demands of the society and what kind of actions are necessary for achieving these demands (Unidad Social, 2019). In line with their goal, they created a "methodology" and presented this online on their website, to give interested citizens an idea of how to organize a cabildo.

Next to the methodology of the Mesa de Unidad Social, that functions as a top-down initiative, in this research, two methodologies are obtained that derived from the bottom-up. One of the participants shared the methodologies of two cabildos in which she is involved. The first methodology is derived from a cabildo called Barrio República (BR) and the second methodology derived from the Villa Olímpica Assembly (VOA). Alongside, it has to be mentioned that also other organizations and institutions provide (different) methodologies of how to organize a cabildo. On the internet, the Chilean Ministry of Education even provided a methodology, meaning that even the government intends to organize these initiatives (Ministerio de Educación, 2019). None of the participants did mention this methodology. For a global overview of these methodologies, see Appendix A. Now, it is time to discuss further how a cabildo takes shape. In doing so, information gathered from the participants and the three methodologies mentioned above, including their proposed agenda's, will be depicted, and compared.

Initially, a cabildo needs to be organised, and therefore preparation is where it starts. Participant 6 asserts that the time needed to prepare differed whether an organization already existed or was just founded. In general, newly composed cabildos needed 3 or 4 days to prepare the cabildo (participant 6). However, there are also cases in which preparation was overlooked due to its spontaneous character (participant 2). Again, here is portrayed how contradicting cabildo-making processes are. After the preparation phase, participants were called to attend the cabildo. In the junta de vecinos of participants 3a and 3b, it was up to the president to call upon its people that a cabildo was held. Participant 6, who is a leader herself in the VOA, primordially prepared working groups with particular themes, so to say demands, and subsequently informed members who were interested in participating in a cabildo (see Appendix B). She further argues that a cabildo could take a whole day. Consistent with the methodologies of VOA and BR, there were respectively 3 to 5 hours reserved for the cabildos (see Appendices B and C).

According to the methodologies in some cabildos, the participants have to register themselves with their name and RUT (Rol Único Nacional), which stands for a fiscal identification number (according to the methodology of MUS and VOA). In the methodology of the BR, there is

nothing mentioned concerning the registration of its participants, so indicates a less formal organized cabildo (see Appendix C). Moreover, in a cabildo, groups are formed. A group consists of around 6 to 15 people. Participant 4 was responsible for the organization of the cabildo in her junta de vecinos (not corresponding to one of the methodologies) and stated that sometimes there were many groups (like 20 or 30) and sometimes there were less, approximately 10 or 12. Participant 6 mentioned that in their first cabildo, about 150 people attended. Subsequently, roles were assigned. In the methodologies analysed, the name of the tasks differs per cabildo, altogether one role is observable that is brought upon by different names, that of a secretary, manager, moderator, and a facilitator. Its task is so all the participants "*have similar times to expose*" (see Appendix D). According to participant 4, this means as well *"giving instructions and modelling some answers"* which also meant dividing the (sub)questions among the groups. Moreover, she asserts that a friend of her recorded and synthesized the sessions' agreements and disagreements.

Then the cabildo starts in which a discussion is arranged, and demands are prioritized*.* These approaches vary per methodology proposed, including the topics of concern. In the methodologies of the MUS and VOA, sources of discontent are firstly discussed, before they continue considering the general demands of the participants. In the BR methodology, this is not the case as the envisioning change stands central in the discussion. Though the approaches differ, demands are defined and arranged. Participant 4 explained that in her cabildo, each group had a specific question or a topic. Each group had an hour and have to write down a summary of the answers. One of these examples could be: "*how could the pensions change in Chile?*". This procedure corresponds with the experience of participants 3a and 3b in their junta de vecinos, in which each group answered five questions like: "*what is your opinion regarding a new constitution? How do you feel with it? And what do you think to have to be changed?*". Subsequently, some demands were discussed, like police abuses, the constitution, free education, essential services, and prioritized by each group (participants 3a and 3b). In the methodology of the VOA, a flip chart is advised to prioritize the demands (see Appendix B). The three levels depicted express the importance of each chosen demand.

Eventually, these demands are put forward in a plenary session and closure. In a plenary session, all the divided groups reunite and have the opportunity to present and share their findings with the other groups (as stated by MUS, see Appendix D). In the cabildo of 3a and 3b, it went as follows. When all the demands were collected, they were written down on a big piece of paper. Then, every group had to present their findings and discuss what other groups thought about these demands. Eventually, out of this discussion, a list of demands was composed and afterwards posted on Facebook. So, in this case, they published the output on Facebook, in which all the members of the junta de vecinos has access to it. Also, participant 4 highlights here the role of an 'organizer', who asks groups to come forward to present their findings and ask why those were their concerns.

Participant 6 revealed that in her cabildo, this list contains 10 to 12 demands. In the methodology of the MUS, there is requested to send the results and minutes by mail to "*elaborate an inclusive systematization*" (see Appendix D). Participant 4 declared that in her cabildo, these findings were shared with the contributors by mail but also forwarded to the MUS. Due to this process, it became evident that civil society called for a Constituent Assembly (CA) (participant 6). Though, due to the velocity of the whole process, the MUS was not able to provide an explicit document of demands. Still, there are collectives and other organizations that assisted in doing so, like the *Caracol Collective* or *Ayudar* (participant 6). Other participants do not mention these

organizations. Since the interview is conducted amid the mobilizations (29 April 2020), still no information is found of a concrete list of demands.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that all cabildos' results are sent to more influential organizations and institutions. In the methodology of BR, no information is specified concerning the output of the session. At the same time, in the VOA cabildo is stated that the output is transcribed in a document, but not published and shared in a report. So even though people are registered, it does not essentially mean that these findings are shared with (other) social organizations/unions or ministries. In the case of the cabildo of participant 3a and 3b, this was not the case.

From the acquired data, concerning cabildos performed in different organizational spaces, some overall features of the cabildos are observed. By comparing three methodologies and experiences of the participants, it is now evident how a cabildo is organized and operates. In the analysis comes forward that in systemizing a cabildo three stages have shown to be essential: introduction and discussion of the methodology (1); a discussion in which demands are projected and prioritized (2); and a plenary session and closure to finalize the cabildo (3). Though some divergences appeared among the methodologies, mainly based on the content of discussion in each cabildo, the cabildos had a lot in common. In a cabildo, a task division takes place, in which one or multiple moderators, facilitators, speakers and secretaries are appointed. These roles have the task to record the meeting and distribute the time of speaking among its participants. Though some cabildos urged to discuss the social upheaval, others were primordially interested in the demands of the population, and its prioritization. All cabildos did lead to an output whatsoever. The results were shared with the participants of the neighbourhood and in some cases forwarded to a social organization and union like la Mesa de Unidad Social. To conclude, though the cabildos were organized in different organizational spaces (in as well cabildos, assemblies and junta de vecinos), their structure and organization appear to be similar. Nevertheless, it should be argued that not each cabildo suits this structure as many cabildos have been organized, increasing the possibility of cabildos deviating from the structure provided here.

5.2   Cabildos participants

After exploring how a cabildo is organized and operates, the question arises, who are participating in these cabildos? Participant 2 argues that the participants in contemporary social upheaval highly vary from the one's involved experiment in 2015: "*So about poor people not really got involved in these type of instances, which now with this social movement kind of changed*". He expresses that nowadays, people from different social classes were involved in cabildos. Furthermore, participant 1 states that:

> "*Depending on where you live, you may go, but it does not mean that if you are from somewhere else, you are not allowed to participate. . . if you did not live in that district, that did not mean that you could not participate . . . you just freely participate. They are not exclusive, you see*".

So even If a resident is not from around, the cabildo is still open for him or her to participate. The view that everyone is tolerated and encouraged to participate also comes forward when analysing the documents published by the territorial assembly Villa Olímpica. As already addressed in an earlier mentioned quote, "*The cabildo is a space open to the entire community*". Moreover, in their invitation is put as follows:

> "*We invite all the neighbours, children, young people, adults and seniors, and anyone who feels called in this territory, to participate this Saturday, November 2, between*

What we can say from this quote, is that inclusiveness is pursued, and no age restrictions were put into place. This inclusiveness is further elucidated by participant 6, who is active in a junta de vecinos in which even a methodology was prepared for children. The methodology was proposed to "*use games to talk about what was happening in the country and how they hoped to build a new country*" (participant 6). Moreover, it was a place of discussion in which children could discuss what they experienced to be right and wrong in times of social mobilizations. Participant 3a also participated in a cabildo in which a methodology was raised for children. Her experience in the cabildo and its role for the children defines she as follows:

> *You know, what the most beautiful thing I have observed from that situation … on that day. I remember there were a lot of children, and they also participated. We had the opportunity to listen to what the children were thinking about the moment. Imagine for many of them, their childhood stopped because they started seeing other types of information on TV and on social media. So many children finished their childhood at some point.*

This methodology, therefore, was not solely for the children to have a say and talk about what has happened, but also to create more understanding among the adults how they had experienced the episode.

According to the participants, the number of people involved in the cabildos changed over time. In the beginning, participant 6 addresses that in the first meeting, more than 150 people were gathered in her cabildo, solely by putting a simple sign outside. However, as addressed by participant 1, after the first initiative, the number of people participating reduced. Even though people continued to organize cabildos, the number of participants declined over time. Still, she claims that people were coming to these initiatives and therefore, the cabildos sustained. Moreover, while some people left the cabildos, new people did still enter, though lower in numbers.

While a lot of the organized cabildos are open to the neighbourhood as a whole and so aim to identify the general demands of these citizens, some cabildos are primarily focused on a specific topic or targeted to a specific audience. Previously, it was discussed in section 5.1.3, how cabildos were organized in a school. The participants involved then depend highly on the main objective of the specific cabildo. In the case of the cabildos organised by schools, participants were mainly school students. Besides, as proposed in the methodology of the Ministry of Education, "*parents and guardians*" were mainly involved. Thus, the objective of the cabildo stands in line with who engages in it (Ministerio de Educación, 2019). Still, in the primary methodologies discussed and the conducted interviews, participants were mainly neighbours.

5.3   Perceived impacts of the cabildos

According to the participants, multiple impacts of the cabildo-making processes that are perceived can be distinguished. While it is difficult to demarcate impact into different disciplines as they are interrelated, the impact varies significantly in social, educational, and political origin. First of all, cabildos had a social impact. Even though this has already been slightly mentioned, its importance should not be underestimated. As presented by participant 7, cabildos are considered to be very important: "*because it is an instance, it is an instance of dialogue. It is also an opportunity to get to know each other as a community*". Participant 1 enhances:

> *"the idea is to talk, you know, like to interact with your neighbours. This is also to get to know them and also talk about some central aspects of interest . . . I mean, that is why people are interested in participating, because obviously, you want to discuss and talk about these things that we have in common, but it also is a way of socializing and getting to know who you live next to, like your neighbour."*

Additionally, she mentions that due to the expansion of new buildings in the city, people do not know their neighbours anymore. The cabildos initiative functions as a reintegration of the population in their neighbourhood and constructs (new) social networks among its residents.

Participant 4 stressed in the interview that with the organization of a cabildo: *"all the neighbours had to bring food or had to bring some beverages to share. My friend organized to bring some musicians to the final part of the cabildo"*. While it is dangerous to presume it to be a festivity as it is not further explicitly clarified by the participant whatsoever, the concept of sharing food and listening to musicians does indicate the social importance of the gathering, bringing a neighbourhood together. Moreover, participant 1 explained the impact of her involvement in a cabildo on her social life and how she experienced moving to London and watch from a distance, as these cabildos were still interacting (on social media):

> *"Well, even though I'm far from home, I still am in this group WhatsApp with my neighbours, and they are still organizing. So, this is still going on. See, from the cabildos you got a not a new social network. You had these topics and areas of interest in common. So now new bonds were formed like we were attracted to each other or we were bonding because we were interested in changing things in our country and participating politically . . . So, it was a very hard period for me, getting detached from what was happening. And it is still really hard whenever I see all of the messages here because people pass on information all the time. I mean, they are sharing news articles and videos, an overwhelming amount of information. And I cannot read everything because I am not there. I also have a life here, so it is tough. It is really tough. I was there to experience all of this first-hand, you know? But I am here, and there is not much I can do from here. Instead of sharing with people like you."*

She further adds that she met new "*fascinating people and very well-informed people as well*", with whom she was cooperating in the cabildos. She thus affirms that cabildo-making had impacted her social network as she met new people, and "*new bonds were formed*". Due to the cabildos, brokerage has been taking place: "*the production of a new connection between previously unconnected sites*" (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 31). The neighbours, who have not been connected (or limited), now started to collaborate. Although she left, these others were still frequently interacting with each other. As previously mentioned, this quote also illustrates how the different disciplines are interrelated, as much what happened in the cabildos was also politically engaged, or as mentioned "*participating politically*". Let us not jump ahead so fast.

Second, the cabildos are perceived to have an educational impact on its members/participants. Participant 3b argues how, in his experience, the cabildos also performed an educational role:

> *"Yeah, [they] raise awareness, and they produce a change of perception on the constitution. Because a lot of people said that the constitution is in its right as the constitution protects the people. Therefore, the constitution is well-founded. But the thing is that the constitution, in this particular moment, is not oriented to protect the common people. And it is a hard-redundant topic because in Chile the last word will always come from a company or a millionaire, not from the people.".*

In the cabildos in which participant 3a and 3b participated, an expert was invited to talk about the constitution and answer questions. This participant claims that the cabildos educated people concerning the constitution, its current role in Chilean society, why it is so under attack and what good alternatives would be.

Third, the participants experienced the cabildos to have a political impact. First of all, cabildo-making processes inherently have a political impact. As participant 5 addresses, the cabildo-making processes meant the reintegration of civil society in the political debate:

> *"Chilean families are discussing political issues that have never happened in this way before. So, I would say that the experience of the cabildos was an experience of re-politicization of the city where we went, we met spontaneously, without much organization, without so much convocation. It was rather called self-convened cabildos, to discuss society about us. This is something that has not been done in Chile in recent times."*

Participant 5 even uses the term "*repoliticization*" to refer to participants of the cabildos that made themselves be heard, who did not so in the past and discuss concerns among society. Moreover, due to this repoliticization, participant 1 claims that participants are now studying policies as a response to the social revolt and the rise of different demands, requirements and needs. This repoliticization will be examined more in detail in chapter 7.4. These spaces function as a social network in which political concerns can be discussed, addressed, and researched.

Due to so many people now being involved in political debates, it became possible to list and prioritize demands. That has been the second impact of the cabildos. As pointed out by the different methodologies and agendas presented previously, during the cabildos, much time was spent on these political concerns. The aim of the cabildos to list and subsequently prioritize the demands has had a political impact according to participant 6:

> *"The cabildos made it possible to make known more clearly the demands of the revolt, which until then had only been a sum of proposals and criticisms by productive sectors. Education had demands, health, on the other hand, feminism, retired people. Both the cabildos and the social organizations made it clear that this sum of demands was centred around two problems: the constitution and the neoliberal economic model."*

Thus, the cabildos did not only adopt the civil society back in political discussions but also aimed at listing and prioritizing these demands. Due to the emergence of the cabildos (and various social organizations), demands from all corners of civil society could be bundled. Eventually, by assembling all sources of discontent, it was possible to deconstruct those into two principal targets of critique: the constitution and the neoliberal economic model. The strength of interdisciplinary collaboration is also visualised by the organization of la Mesa de Unidad Social. As previously mentioned, this organization consists out of respectively 180 different unions and organizations merged to determine the predominant demands of civil society. The plan was then, as presented by participant 6, to negotiate with the government, "*which is something that never happened because the government did not want to negotiate with them*.". The MUS aimed to represent civil society through institutionalization, though they are not recognized by the political establishment, as they neglect them in discussing political concerns.

Participant 1 argues that the cabildos not solely make people more "*politically speaking*" but are also a space to make people more "*politically active*". She further clarifies this as follows:

> *"democracy is reduced to its act of voting, and people thought that this was not our role, that we had to change that. So voting is only one thing. But then how can you*

involve them and engage them in politics in different ways? So, cabildos were giving people that space to participate . . . and what we wanted was a more direct way of democracy".

For participant 1, the cabildos were a space in which people could present themselves democratically. Moreover, she asserts that these cabildos provide an opportunity for neighbours to plan new activities as well: "*So it was not only exchanging ideas but also organizing new events and new means of protest*" (interview 1). Some of these performances that are orchestrated by the cabildos are protests, demonstrations, or cultural activities, like a festival recitation (participants 1, 7).

Important to stress is that while the participants argue that the cabildos have a political impact and the demands discussed are politically charged, they declare that in the cabildos, it goes beyond conventional politics. Though the topics discussed are political, politics itself is highly neglected, as participant 2 explains:

"that it was not politically guided by any specific party, no matter how certain coherent demands maybe, because … many people criticize like politicians; there is alike a certain generalization that they are all corrupted. They are all betraying us. They are all the same. So, I also would say that the same people do not like to be associated or linked to these political parties, which is something that happens, which I personally disagree with."

Participant 3a and 3b ratify the absence of political parties in this whole process. The cabildos are not related to any political party nor ideology. Participant 3a argues that this is not only in the cabildos but also during other forms of collective action: "*what you never see in protest is the sign or the symbol of any party*". Moreover, when a politician even dares to go to a demonstration, she argues, the politician gets kicked out. Participant 12 even mentions a *"very anti-political discourse, at most, much rage against politicians"*.

Nevertheless, this does not mean there is no space for active politicians at all. Participant 5, who is an active politician, affirms that he participated in a few cabildos himself. However, he participated as an active citizen, rather than as a politician. So even though the participants acknowledge there is a need to discuss political concerns, there is an immense distrust towards conventional politics. Therefore, the cabildos aim to be as much dissociated as possible from conventional politics.

It does not mean though that the cabildos had no political impact at all. Participant 1 addresses that since many people participated in the cabildos, also people with political ties were aware of these demands.

So, what they would do was to present these demands to their political leaders, and then they would negotiate with the government. So somehow, they saw themselves pushed. They had this pressure on responding to people's demands, even though they are not ventilating.

Thus, coerce to pursue political change did not emerge solely from outside the political system, like through the MUS, but also from inside out.

5.4   Cabildo-making experiences

Besides understanding what cabildos objectives have been and how they impact society, it is also required to consider how participants themselves experienced the cabildos. Almost all the interviewees who had been participating in the cabildos were highly optimistic about these initiatives.

For participant 5, it was a "*fascinating experience; it is a very good, wonderful experience*". Participant 3a described her experience as follows:

> "*These meant for us a lot. I think for me was particularly important related to the feeling of community. We could express ourselves. We were all outraged, and nobody was listening. So, we created the opportunity and the place to share. It was good for the soul, for the mind and also for what we expect in the future. Because all the people with this system, with a neoliberal system, we are very individualistic. I think it is not something that is only affecting our part of society, but it is a problem in the whole world. Also, we now could see that everything is wrong here.*"

In support of the opinion of participant 3a, participant 7 argues that there was not much interconnectivity between the social classes in Chile before the social outbreak happened. In the quote, participant 3a is disserted that the cabildos had different meanings to her. Mostly, it is about the "*feeling of community*", people coming together and in which the cabildos function as a counter-power of the individualist neoliberal society. It coincides with participant 15, who argues that a cabildo meant for her: "*An opportunity to open spaces, to generate relationships, to reweave the social fabric that we lost in the 90s*". Participant 10 argued that: "*It was a very enriching space . . . it was like a space for self-management and self-organization*".

However, it is dangerous to ascribe all these positive meanings mentioned by the participants to solely the establishment of the cabildos, but rather the overall experience with the mobilizations that started in October. Participant 4 affirms this:

> "*I would say that after what happened last year, we as a country have united more. So now you can see that people smile to one another and that you support the other's ideas and struggles and fights. I think that we have changed, as Chileans. Something touched us in our heart. So now it is impossible to find anyone who is indifferent to the situation. Before October, you could listen to different adolescents, elderly, adults saying that they do not know. They did not trust politicians, but they had to work anyway. But now, after the social demands of October the 18th, now everyone has an opinion, and I think that is a huge achievement and I am proud of that.*"

As the participant is referring to "*October 18th*" and "*last year*", this meaning attributed to the cabildos needs to be understood in the bigger picture of collective action that already started to reunite the population. However, the cabildos are just a deepening phenomenon of this process, an extension and perhaps even an intensification of this process.

While all the participants interviewed in this research argued the cabildos to be of relevance and importance, there also exists some criticism concerning these cabildos. Participant 8, who never participated in a cabildo, but was involved in the school institution in which cabildos were organised, has been the most pessimistic. In his experience, when there was "*a positive democratic initiative*" radicals and activist both belonging to (non-)political parties have taken advantage of these spaces to pursue their agenda. However, the participant's criticism is not directly focussed on the cabildos, instead of on the possibility that it got captured by radicals (belonging to a political party or not). This criticism thus is not directly related to the cabildos as a contentious performance, rather radicals within society to misuse it for own purposes. To put his criticism in a bigger picture, other participants were not questioning the possibility of exploitation of the cabildos, rather its impact or consistency. As demonstrated by participant 1:

> "*Well, actually that was one of the things that we tended to touch on in the coming days as well because many people were complaining by in the last sessions. A lot of people complained about like what the impact of that discussing was and how all of the things*

that were being touched on would somehow have any effect on the social demands and the changes that we were asking for. So, when I saw people complaining, I was like, yes, how are we going to make this work? I mean, why are we, what is the point of meeting? What is the point of, you know, like proposing new things and planning new ways of tackling the problems? If this is not going to come to terms, you see."

Thus after a few meetings, people started to question the cabildos' impact. Why would the participants continue to gather if their discussions and proposed demands led to nothing? Despite the cabildos impact, participant 1 also argued that in her cabildo inconsistency was considered problematic. Moreover, participant 1 addresses that not all participants took the cabildos as serious. For some of them, it was just a pleasant social endeavour to encounter with neighbours. These participants demotivated others to participate in the cabildos.

Finally, participant 11 was not critical about the cabildos initiative, but mainly about people just now turned into (political) active citizens. As treasurer of his junta de vecinos, he has been involved in politics for quite long before the cabildos emerged:

"So, what strikes me is that there are neighbours who have never participated in the junta de vecinos. Since it is the organization that has to inform the authorities of what is happening, that has to organize the neighbours. All this social outburst that today is demanding a new Constitution, new social laws and all these people, the first thing they should have done is participate in their neighbourhood councils. But they never did. So, I think that suddenly there is a part of the Chilean population that is demanding, which is also a little unfair and uncomfortable. Because they are demanding change from the comfort of their comments on WhatsApp or Facebook. Do you understand me? Without having a job on the ground. Without going out to talk to their neighbours, without going to vote. Many have not even gone to vote in the last elections, because they cannot explain that a right-wing government like Sebastián Piñera has gotten more votes in the second round than Bachelet's and Lagos'."

As pointed out, participant 11 is disappointed in people not participating in the junta de vecinos, instead initiate their form of organization out of the blue. He feels that the junta de vecinos is undermined by civil society, while it is their job to bring them in touch with the political establishment. He thinks it is kind of controversial that people who have not been politically involved, now start to do so, and start raising demands.

In conclusion, the majority of the participants experienced cabildo-making to have a positive impact on society and their well-being. Cabildo-making restores the "*feeling of community*" or the "*social fabric*" and reconnects people who have been separated due to the neoliberal way of life, read: individualism. However, it is important to emphasize; this has to be placed in the bigger context of social upheaval and collective action. Collective action as such already emphasizes the people "*collectively*" coming together and assemble in the streets. However, there are some concerns with the cabildos, whether they can be sustainable and to what extent they can generate impact. Moreover, another threat for these cabildos is to be captured by (non)political parties which purposes overshadow people connecting.

Chapter 6   Participants' contentions and distrusts towards the system

In times of the revolt, demonstrators massively started to express their discontents on the streets. It started with the upraise of the students, as thoroughly examined in chapter 4.2. Rodrigo Pérez, the president of the student association at the Instituto Nacional, argued that "*we do not have a request, that is part of what we can discuss with the students, neither there are spokespersons or a coordinated space*". Moreover, he states, **"estamos juntos, pero no revueltos",** which is an expression to designate that there is no obligatory link with the other (B. Garcés, 2019). The students that initiated the episode started without any form of organization and so without any list of demands. They only shared a feeling of discontent. In this section, sources of discontent available online will be presented and compared to the findings of the interviews to create a comprehensive image of sources of complaints. Moreover, as this has not been the first mobilization since the Pinochet era, the trust relationship between the government and civil society will be examined. Finally, this chapter ends by explaining how the corona crisis and government response impact this already complicated mutual trust.

6.1   Discontents outlined

During the interviews, the participants were asked: "*why did according to you the mobilizations take place?*". Many participants took this question as an opportunity to share their dissatisfaction experienced. In this section, these sources of discontents will be discussed and compared to the outcome of the cabildo of the Villa Olímpic Assembly (VOA).

From all the interviews conducted, none of the respondents appointed one primary source of discontent responsible for the outbreak of the mobilization. All respondents declared multiple sources of discontent to be relevant. Nonetheless, the attributed weight to these sources varied per respondent. So, some of them prioritized, for instance, health problems above education, while others prioritized them vice versa. One of the interviewees, participant 5, even referred to the versatility of the underlying roots of discontents: "*There is a feeling that one, accumulated tiredness, an accumulated dissatisfaction for many reasons. There is never just one reason.*" (participant 5). While participant 2 defines this to be the "*accumulation of rage*". For this accumulation of rage, many different factors are addressed. This coincides with the output of the VOA cabildo in which more than 50 reasons for discontent are shown (personal communication, 31 July 2020).

The neoliberalist system that stands as the primary safeguard for the protectionism of the rich is (in)directly mentioned quite often. To illustrate this, respondent 6 reached out to one of the slogans that became symbolic during the October demonstrations: *"no son 30 pesos, son 30 años".* With this slogan is meant that people are not mobilizing due to the announced fare raise of 30 pesos, more accurately the past 30 years of deepening neoliberal measures. Participant 13 confirms this:

> "*the reason for the citizens' mobilizations, and particularly that of 2019 in Chile, is the discontent with the State's treatment of the citizen, manifested in public measures that directly affect different areas of human life. It has been protecting the political elite and the business community, segregating citizens, and increasing the historical inequality that exists in our country.*"

Also, in the media, this neoliberalism is emphasized a lot. For instance, by Mónica González, an honoured journalist in Chile, who describes the system in Chile as "*a system of accumulation and*

monopolies where multinational economic groups play a huge role" (Kornbluh, 2019). However, Manual Agosin, an economic professor thinks different: *"I do not think people who are protesting are protesting against a free market [which is the equivalent of neoliberalism], they are protesting against a lack of opportunities"* (Rapalo, 2019). Instead, as addressed by Al Jazeera, it is the exacerbation of the problem by the political and economic class (Rapalo, 2019). With this in mind, the impacts of Chilean neoliberalism will be evaluated. The neoliberal system is repeatedly mentioned by different groups (2, 3-A, 10) within the VOA cabildo (personal communication, 31 July 2020).

One of the impacts of this exacerbation of Chileans neoliberalism is expressed by the privatisation of almost all (natural) resources and social services in Chile. Almost all participants mention privatization. Privatization of primary (natural) resources involves water, mining, timber or even fish, but as well other resources like energy. Privatization of social services, together with the subsidiary role of the state, indicates that profit-driven companies are benefitting from this dispersion of institutions into public and private ones. The participants mentioned three sectors in which the separation of institutions (into public and private) is problematic: *the current health system*, *the educational system,* and *the pension system (AFP)*. None of the participants argued something different, and the majority even acknowledged this privatization to be problematic. From the articles already made available, Somme et al. likewise argue that the neoliberal socio-economic model is one of the most apparent popular discontent (Somma et al., 2020). Though this division of privatization into health, pensions and education is less apparent in the VOA cabildo, privatization is multiple times discussed. Group 8 stated the "*commercialization of basic human rights"* (personal communication, 31 July 2020).

Due to the privatization, a dispersion emerged in the Chilean health system, between public provided health services (hospitals) and private companies providing these services (clinics).

> *"Many of us pay for clinics. These are the Isapres, and clinics are like hotels that offer you excellent service with excellent practitioners and everything. Nevertheless, hospitals are meant for people who cannot afford private health."*

While the Isapres are well-functioning and possess proper equipment, participant 1 adds that the public hospitals, on the other hand, have little resources to take care of patients. Therefore, "*Many people die in the waiting rooms, in emergency rooms because they do not get their medical check-ups on time."*. Due to privatization, a significant quality gap emerged between public and private organised institutions. Subsequently, participant 2 explains how this dissatisfaction of the population with the public system results in people moving to private institutions *"which are very overly priced"* and for which the state in some instances provides grants. These grants result in a double burden for the (subsidiary) state. On the one hand, they have to pay for the service provision of the public institutions, while they, on the other hand, provide subsidies for people to get access to private hospitals, that are even more expensive.

Privatization is also happening in the educational sector, in which the private sector is dominating the industry. Participant 2 even argues that while a public school would get $50 a month for a student, a private institution would even demand ten times that tuition price. The former government, as indicated by participant 2, did aim to overcome this inequality gap among social classes in Bachelet's second period. In her time as president, a law was adopted that provided grants for low-income families to study for free at a university of their choice. While this is great as more youth have access to tertiary education, it still upholds the neoliberal paradigm, the system in which

private actors dominate. In doing so, the state itself functions as a promoter of the private industries, in which, power goes to the market, as private is considered to be better than public. Some participants also refer to earlier mobilizations in 2006 and 2011. Gonzálo argue that since the protests and marches against the neoliberal education system in 2011, no policies or legislation are installed to fight the private education highly profiting from university students (Kornbluh, 2019). Despite access to (affordable) educational institutions, in the VOA cabildo, group 5 addressed "lack of civic education" to be a reason for distress (personal communication, 31 July 2020).

The final privatized service provision is the pension system, called the AFP. According to an interviewee 1, the AFP is the private corporation that is in charge of the pension money in Chile. However, people would rather not see their money administered by this company as they have stolen so much in the past, and their trust in it is lost. To exemplify how this trust is lost, participant 3b addresses that AFP lost 20 per cent of its rentability as all their resources are invested in one company, the LATAM. Moreover, participant 1 further clarifies why in Chile many people are involved with and fight for a better pension system, as *"this is something that really concerned us all because at some point we will all be old"*.

Moreover, participant 7 argued that many retired people are living in horrible living conditions as what they receive of the AFP is minimal. The participants have pointed out that the pension system is a significant source of dissatisfaction. Mónica González argues that before the coup of Pinochet in 1973, a social security system was available for the elderly (Kornbluh, 2019). Nevertheless, since the return to democracy, seven private AFPs (pension funds) are taking care of the obligatory savings of the working class. However, the money people gain after retiring is so little that many elderlies are not able to take care of themselves. The people thus have known a better pension system in the past. Side note, the participants, have not mentioned this during the interviews.

Though the sources of discontent regarding the privatization of the health, education and pension system are made very clear, the participants do not precisely define what they consider as neoliberalism. Moreover, they do not clearly define how these contentions are related to neoliberalism inherently. The topics of concern mentioned above are a quality gap between private and public services; unequal distribution of tuition fees; and private companies stealing from or 'gambling with' public provided resources (like the AFP). Despite neoliberalism, these forms of privatization do have another thing in common with each other: exploitation. In the opinion of the participants, neoliberalism is the reason for these exploitations to take place.

One should ask him-/herself if the real contention derives from neoliberalism (the free market ideology), or lack of protection within this system. The government is the actor responsible for defending the civil society in these spaces in which these 'profit-driven' companies operate. This lack of governmental support stands in line with the perspective of economic professor Manual Agosin that even though neoliberalism is often referred to, it might not be the concept of neoliberalism itself people are angered at (Rapalo, 2019). Just as appeared from the conducted data, it becomes clear that the participants feel betrayed by the government and the economic elite, which is also addressed by participant 3a:

> *"We have a social fight. It is not related to right-wing or left-wing. You maybe could say yeah, it is more related to the left-wing because it is social demands, but in general, it is not Communists against the right-wing. It is the people against the powerful."*

The people feel they are fighting against the powerful, the establishment. This anger coincides with Bargsted and Maldonado, who already recognized in 2018 that in Chile *"the political system has become increasingly elitist and detached from society"* (Somma et al., 2020, p. 2). Alternatively, in the cabildo, group 3-A call this the "*crisis of representativeness*" (personal communication, 31 July 2020). Maybe there is where the actual problem comes forward, how the Chilean government puts companies before its people. Participant 6 criticises the government: *"add and follow the measures that are in line to protect and care for the entrepreneurship over the workers"*. Though this exploitation reaches further than solely the privatization of social services, first the 1980 Constitution and its role in this exploitation will be detailed.

The 1980 Constitution protects this neoliberalist system**,** or as asserted by participant 5: *"it is a guardian of neoliberalism"*. This 1980 Constitution has prevented governments from prosecuting new laws and social reforms due to *"numerous high-quorum provisions and supra-majoritarian mechanisms"* (Heiss, 2017, p. 471). Participant 2 stresses that a 2/3 majority is necessary for constitutional change to take place and that privatization of services mentioned above are installed in the current 1980 Constitution. According to participant 8, another two reasons are essential for the contention towards the 1980 Constitution. First, the constitution is written in a time of military dictatorship. Therefore the *"symbolic weight is very, very heavy"*. Second, since the return to democracy, the 1980 Constitution had so many amendments in the 1990s and 2000s that is no longer the constitution it is used to be. The constitution voted for in 1980 does not look any more like the constitution it is now. However, participant 8 argues that he thinks that the symbolic weight alone is already so substantial in Chile, that it would be already a great initiative to create a new *"democratic dialogue"* to discuss a constitutional change. The state structure as of today, does not guarantee a dignified life, due to an illegal constitution (VOA cabildo, group 8) (personal communication, 31 July 2020).

Except for privatization, other forms of exploitation are significant grievances in Chile, like corruption. To articulate how big corruption is entwined in the system, participant 5 declares that scandals are nothing new to Chileans institutions. The institutions in which corruption scandals manifested: the police, the army, the Catholic Church, and the illegal financing of political campaigns (both on the left and the right). Some of these scandals even contain allegations of significant abuses, like sexual abuse. Despite the scandals of the government officials, there is also a belief that they are not able to cope with the criminal organizations and crimes performed by individuals. The private sector also has a significant share in these corruption scandals. Within the political system, participant 3b primarily argues the role of lobbying to bring about corruption. Through this lobbying, big companies can bribe ministers in the government to vote in favour of new laws, in exchange for a percentage of sales or profits. This position provides big companies and the powerful economic elite in the country a position in decision-making in the national parliament and reinforces their powerful position in society. According to the participant, this takes place in many sectors, like the fishing industry, mining, agriculture, water management and more. At the same time, participant 2 argues that most ministers now also are linked to illegal practices or even are related to violations of human rights in times of the dictatorship.

These same big companies have been brought to trial due to the establishment of price collusions. Competing companies agreed to put a higher price on products like medicines or drugs (participant 10), but as well in necessities, like food commodities (chicken) and even toilet paper (participant 2). Though this is offending the law, they are protected by the same law enforcement:

> *So many companies colluded. But then when you see the penalties that they received; they were not even equal to the incomes that they obtain. So, if they let us say if they won through all these crime 10 million dollars, then the penalty was like a million dollar. (Participant 2).*

Also, in this case, the neoliberal system is exploited by companies, and the government chooses the side of the entrepreneurs, rather than the side of civil society. Many groups within the VOA cabildos expressed their disgust towards, as what they defined "impunity" (groups 5, 8, 12a, 12b, and 16). (personal communication, 31 July 2020).

Another manifestation of the inadequate enforcement of the law is pollution. One of the participants (3b) argued how, in 2014, seas were contaminated due to excessive production processes of the big fishing industries. As a result, tones of dead salmons which created Mareas Rojas (Red Tides), which is a form of biological contamination. However, the firms behind the Mareas Rojas have always discharged it to be a natural process and claimed not to be responsible for this occurrence. Due to this phenomenon, people lost their jobs, and people got sick. This sickness has mainly to do with the enormous amount of antibiotics that are used in the aquaculture. Eventually, the businesses can continue their practices as it is legislated by law. As well here, the law serves the big companies and not the people. Overall, the privatization of natural resources, brings about a discourse of *"extractivism"* as appointed by group 12 from the VOA cabildo (personal communication, 31 July 2020).

Price rises are another grievance turned out in the interviews. Participants 3a and 3b aim to stress how the current system is taking advantage of the general population and how this generates anger among its citizens. Participants 3a and 3b argue that in a "*collapsing system*" it is a violent act of a company to raise its prices, without any benefit for this raise in return. In the next dialogue, the participants referred to the example of rising prices in a supermarket:

> *"Participant 3b: So when you attack a supermarket, for example, you are the terrorist, but when the supermarket increases the price of…*
> *Participant 3a: Everything!*
> *Participant 3b: When people do not have money, the supermarket is in the right."*

The underlying message of this quote is that price rises can be an aggressive tool for big companies. Price rises can even be perceived as an attack on civil society when the population is already living under immense pressure. Price rises do not only take place in supermarkets or the metro system but as well in the private health institutions (as pointed out by participant 4), where prices are structurally raised every year.

These acts of raising prices are even presumed to be more violent, considering the circumstances in which many people are already living their daily lives. The violent trait of these rises is affirmed by participant 7, who asserts that many people already spent around 70 per cent of their monthly salary to pay debts. Further on, participant 3a even dares to attack the use of the term of a Chilean middle class:

> *"The thing is that they have made us think that in Chile, we have poverty, middle class and high class. But in reality, there is no middle class. We are just people who can have debt. And we are all in it with big debt, because of University, of your Masters. You can have your PhD, but like everything you must pay is really expensive. You can have a house, but obviously a thousand months it is not yours until 25 more years that you pay to the bank. You can get access, so they think you are middle class, but you still are a poor person with access to credit but be honest in this."*

In this quote comes forward that she even if she is described as a middle-class citizen, she does not feel this way. While most of the population appears to be middle-class, they are instead a slave of the exploited neoliberal system in which credit is the leverage of the big companies on the 'middle class' population. This fallacious concept of the middle class is confirmed by participant 12, who mentions that from some indicators and figures, Chile has the potential to become a developed country. However, "*in the end they are averages, and there are a very rich group and a large, impoverished mass*".

These price rises and the unstable middle-class altogether form another highly significant considered contention, namely inequality. Participant 8 had discussed how economic prosperity has been taking place in the country, with substantial development in infrastructure and the acquiring of economic resources. Despite economic prosperity, inequality remained the same or even grew. Moreover, participant 3b agrees that inequality is happening everywhere and there will always be millionaires, however as he puts it: "*how to use the resources and how to give back to the population is an important thing, that here in Chile does not happen*". So, it is about the balance of the rich to acquire resources themselves (and the political system) and how to use these resources for the common good. Group 3-A describes this as the "*abuse of political and economic power*" (personal communication, 31 July 2020). This disbalance is why people are so upset. He further clarifies this disbalance and inequality by arguing that Chile is now for the majority owned by just seven families.

Moreover, inequality goes beyond the solely economic marginalized, as in Chile, social inequality is also very prevailing. Multiple participants refer to social minorities like the indigenous community Mapuche (participant 2 and 6), who are considered "*invisible*" (group 5). While group 8 reasons that Chile still has a "*historical debt to the original people*" (personal communication, 31 July 2020). Moreover, from a retrieved output form of an organized cabildo, patriarchy is another form of social inequality that persist in Chile (personal communication, 31 July 2020). Chilean patriarchy is confirmed in the literature. In their article, Somma et al. declare that "*traditional hierarchies based on gender, sexual orientation, ethnic status, and age are becoming increasingly contested*" due to a rapid cultural change in Chile (2020, p. 2). Structural inequality is also defined by group 12b of the cabildo and manifests itself into a "*loss of fundamental rights and system of privileges*" (personal communication, 31 July 2020).

Furthermore, this persisting inequality in society and the neoliberal model has partly been responsible for an increase in crime rates. According to participant 11, Chile has become criminalized due to the marginalization of the population. This criminalization became very visual during the demonstrations.

> *"the crime that has skyrocketed, the levels of delinquency, of violence, of drug trafficking, which was a situation that I think was often commented on, but which was like an undercurrent, an underhand reality. That you knew that in certain sectors of Santiago the police did not enter. But we never thought that this situation could be so serious as to think that we were at the level of the favelas of Brazil or of the populations where the narcos, the narco-states of Mexico, and overnight we were confronted with this reality. Surely it is clear that it had been building for a long time."*

This overnight confrontation participant 11 speaks about, emphasises the violent turn of the protests. From 17 October on, turnstiles and metro stations were destructed (M. Garcés, 2020; OHCHR, 2019), supermarkets looted, and a building of an energy company called ENEL lit on fire (Filo News, 2019). As well an office of the Chilean Bank was one of the targets of these violent repercussions (Filo News,

2019). Supermarkets were also a good target for the lootings, especially Walmart, with around lootings on 140 locations on October the 20th (Somma et al., 2020). Participant 11 expresses here that these contentious performances have proven to him how deeply rooted organised crime has been in Chilean society.

Primarily, it has proven the government's enforcement troops incapability to deal with (and combat) criminals and their activities. Somma et al. consider that these institutions and companies have been purposely attacked. The "*metro represents the State, then the network of supermarkets and pharmacies the "market" and this "social uprising" created the change to pass the cost along to them*" (Somma et al., 2020, p. 5). Participant 12 expresses that the Metro of Santiago is one of the most modern in the world and therefore obtained a symbolic meaning. Moreover, he argues that many anarchist groups were involved in performing violence, but "*overall, it was a cross-cutting social explosion involving ordinary people and militant currents from non-party parties*" (participant 12). Anarchist violence is also confirmed by Jiménez (2019). According to him, anarchists, gangs and other crime organizations were looting by use of vans or trucks, but regular civilians joined these lootings too (Jiménez, 2019). They perceived the social upheaval and the inability of the enforcement troops to deal with these outburst "*to make an easy and unexpected profit*" (Albert et al., 2019; in Jiménez, 2019, p. 11). Indeed, some of these protests turned violent, and lootings and destructions took place, but most of the protests remained peaceful.

Another contention mentioned by the participants is the role of official media services in Chile. The contention concerning the media is on the hand on how they portray reality, and on the other hand, the presence of fake news. Primordially the first source of discontent is called by a few participants and by participants of a cabildo examined. Participant 2 argues that during the revolt, the media presented the roots of the demonstrations to be the raise of 30 pesos in subway fares and not as an accumulative feeling of anger. Also, in the VOA cabildo, group 10 criticised the media attempting to criminalize the movement (personal communication, 31 July 2020). Moreover, groups 5, 10 and 16 assert there is not enough counter-information, or room to question the predominant media stations (personal communication, 31 July 2020). Al Jazeera produced a short documentary concerning media coverage of Chilean news networks during the mobilizations. In this documentary Paul Rodriguez, a community radio host, condemn the television channels to be spending too much air time on the violent character of the mobilization (Al Jazeera English, 2019).

Moreover, the actual underlying deprivations and feelings of discontent are not illustrated by these networks. Media networks had a principal role during Pinochet's coup in the past, especially one of the most prominent media groups *El Mercurio,* which is considered to be extra painful (Al Jazeera English, 2019). Additionally, in Chile, private media ownership has the highest concentration in the whole of Latin America (Al Jazeera English, 2019). This concentration expresses the role of privatization again, in this case of the media networks and how concerns arose, whether the elite attempts to defend their position in society. As a response, civil society responded on social media by posting and sharing messages with the hashtag #apagalatele (=turn off the television) or do not trust the elite (Al Jazeera English, 2019). Despite the role of the official media networks, participant 11 discusses his contention with false news circulating on social media. As an example, he refers to a news message of Carabineros that would have killed some citizens. Participant 11 is the only one referring to fake news circulating and to put his story in perspective, some demonstrators actually have been killed by the Carabineros (OHCHR, 2019). Therefore, it is still arguable to what extent fake news has dominated the Chilean social media.

Finally, the Last contention mentioned is police violence. The enforcement troops well illustrated this throughout the episode. Participant 3a describes in the next quote how she experienced the deployment of police officers as a response to the student subway evasion:

> *"And so, when you enter the metro . . . I felt really angry when I saw so many police officers in the stations. It is really stupid that you need the police to be taking care of this problem and I really feel angry when I am telling you this, because I remember, that day everything changed."*

The participant's anger here is targeted to the government as its response to the (initial) demonstrations is perceived to be disproportionate: how the police were deported among the metro stations to take care of demonstrating children. Participant 4 argues that every time the government reacted to the demonstrations, the next day, they became bigger and bigger.

> *"Ok, first of all, he decreed a state of emergency. He decreed a curfew. He decreed that the military forces were outside in the streets, pointing us with their guns. You know, it was super provocative. So, when the government answered with violence, the people, of course, organized and responded worse" (participant 4).*

Though examined thoroughly in chapter 4.2, the violence continued and accumulated over time. The enforcement troops started to use teargas, water cannons and shot at demonstrators with rubber bullets (Mendoza & Jara, 2019). Human rights were massively violated, with more than 13.000 people injured (Laing & Donoso, 2019). Many people lost their eyesight (partly) as more than 445 people suffered eye injuries, with approximately 34 victims losing at least one eye (Larsson, 2019). After so much blood was shed, a bandaged eye became a new symbol of the movement (see figure 3). Participants of the cabildos called this "politics of fear: state terrorism" (group 8) (personal communication, 31 July 2020)

The contentions mentioned are the ones presented by the participants and derive from a cabildo organized by the Villa Olímpic Assembly. However, this does not mean that there are no other contentions among the Chilean civilians that motivated them to go onto the streets. In the contentions outlined above two trends are visible: the installation and protection of the elite (1), and the (increasing) pressure on the 'middle class' and the marginalised (2). The neoliberal

Figure 3: The eye as symbol of the Chilean social outbreak (Larsson, 2020)

system in its current form is pushing for privatization in the Chilean economy and the social sector, that gives the rich only more power and resources. On the other hand, rising prices and the violent acts of the government (both by repression of the population and their corruption scandals) put extra pressure on the already marginalised and vulnerable middle class. Eventually, this feeling of inequality only adds fuel to the fire.

6.2   Distrust of the participants in the (political) system

"Trust takes years to build, seconds to break and forever to repair" (Mann, n.d.)

In chapter 6.1 is examined that the government and the economic elite are under attack. Currently, there rules a feeling of distrust among civil society towards the government and the companies. In continuation of chapter 6.1, chapter 6.2 is going to go more in-depth on this trust relationship

between the population and the government. Trust is something that cannot be placed in a precise moment, but rather in a broader context of mutual interactions over the years. Recognizing trust, in the long run, means that the relationship between civil society and its government first need to be examined before its current relationship can be evaluated. By scrutinizing the history of the social contract, its current state is portrayed more comprehensively. In the following section will be explained how the participants experience Chile's past to have impacted trust in the government. Moreover, the reasons for distrust towards the current government are outlined and subsequently, its effects on civil society and participants' attitudes towards politics.

According to participant 11, the current lack of trust in politics stands well in relation to the dictatorship of Pinochet in the 1970s. He argues as follows:

> "[people nowadays] are not very interested in public affairs. There is a certain apathy or mistrust of politics, which is something that is inherited. Pinochet discourse was that politicians were corrupt . . . and that permeated all layers of the population. After the end of the crisis in the 1970s, a large part of the Chilean population did not want to know any more about politics."

The corruption asserted before is thus nothing new but goes way back. Next to corruption, neoliberalism too (as already discussed) belonged to Pinochet's discourse. However, this neoliberalism had another objective than solely privatizing society. It was to "*depoliticize society*" (participant 5). According to participant 5, this depoliticization meant that people started to fear politics. This fear of politics is also stressed by participant 3a. This fear prevented the population from mobilizing and demonstrating for more rights and equality in the past (before the 21st century). In the meantime, "*now we are the sons of the people who lived in the dictatorship, seeing that nothing has changed*". This distrust towards the political system, alongside the notion of political 'inactiveness', became the norm. Participant 4 explains how this distrust has become visible in the last 16 years. According to her, people neither feel represented by a political party, nor a politician. That is why there has been a considerable part of the population that did not show up to vote in election time, resulting in less than 50 per cent of the entitled voters to participate (participant 10). However, many of these non-voters were present and participated in the demonstrations of October.

Participant 1 is one of the interviewees whom herself was involved in a political party, but withdrew when the mobilization began:

> "I noticed that most people were actually very upset not only with the government but also with political parties in general. So that is when I decided to just walk out and say, bye, I am not going to participate anymore political, like in a political party."

So, what is expressed here is that the people's contention towards the government is not depicted towards just a party, rather the whole conventional political system. This feeling is shared by multiple participants, for example, participant 2. He also acknowledges this when discussing the feeling of dissent that overshadows Chilean politics. According to him, the general attitude toward the political system is:

> "I cannot believe that politicians really do not do anything. They are only there to steal money. So, there is like this populism going around that it is not possible to change anything through politics. I even have these discussions with friends or people that I know who are highly critical of the system too."

This quote also illustrates that people not only distrust the political system but also do not believe that it is possible to change the system from inside out. In the opinion of participant 5, "*there is discontent with politics in general, with the Republic, so to speak*".

Despite corruption, another cause made the Chilean population lose trust in their political system. Political parties from both left and the right have been, to a certain extent, defending the big companies (participant 3). As an example, he argues that when a socialist politician was in power, he signed a law that stands in direct opposite of defending the rights of the people. This law entails that in case a drop in the pension fund appears, responsibility transfers from the companies and the government to the employee to fill this gap. This law is an important example as this law is supported by a socialist, who according to his political standpoints, should be against this type of regulations.

Moreover, he argues that this law functions as a protection mechanism for the companies and politicians to receive "*all the profits of everything*". Participant 6 continues, as she argues that: "*there is a weakened opposition . . . Because it seems that both the institutional right and left have maintained the same logic of government and have deepened a model that privatizes and has us today.*". So, no matter what an individual votes for, the same discourse in society will be re-instated, specifically the neoliberal model with privatization in its centre. It is remarkable as, since the 2011 mobilization a political coalition was founded called *Frente Amplio* (Broad Front) in 2017, that proposed many of these changes (participant 2). However, participant 2 continues, the people protesting now do not want to be associated or linked with these political parties.

This discontent in politics is according to the participants illustrated by the election results. For participant 2, Piñera is the embodiment of what the population is now fighting against, as he probably is the "*most famous person in Chile that has not paid taxes because of his companies*" for approximately thirty years. After exposure by the institutions, they have "*forgiven him*" for this behaviour. This case exemplifies the inequality in current society, as regular citizens lose their houses when they do not pay taxes. In the perspective of participant 2, this is relevant as it shows how unfair society is now. Besides, it illustrates how controversial it is that people voted for a man that stands for exactly what they are demonstrating against right now and even did in the past (like 2006 and 2011). He argues this is "*because most of society just do not get involved in politics or they do not care*". Though participant 2 argues that this is not just a Chilean phenomenon but arises worldwide and manifests by elected presidents like Trump, "*I mean, because just people do not care*". For this same reason he believes, Piñera is chosen by the Chilean population. Ironically, it is precisely due to the consumerist and individual ideology in Chile that at the same time entrepreneurs are recognized to be successful people and thus can provide the country jobs and wealth (participant 2). Moreover, participant 2 addresses that this distrust to the government is also represented in the polls shown in the media (on the news). Even though he argues that the methodological validity of these polls is low, none of the politicians or political parties obtains like more than ten or fifteen per cent of support.

This abundance of the political system results in a feeling of individuality described by participant 5:

> *"The feeling in Chile is that to progress, you have to make an individual effort because the Chilean state is really a very minimal state, very small, where it does no guarantee social rights . . . [and] we are fighting in a system, we are fighting against a system that leaves us quite unprotected, quite alone.*

Neoliberalism tended the population to care about "*me, my family and I care a little about what is happening in my country*" (participant 5). In contrast, the government does not only leave its population unprotected; instead, they abuse them as well, their strength and their work (participant 5). The people feel that they are themselves responsible for gaining economic resources, having access to good education or health, and so people lose faith in the political system. This quote explains how in Chile attention is aimed at the individual effort, rather than the collective and could be a part of the answer why people have not been taking the responsibility to vote. Alternatively, as put by participant 11, the economic model "*is based on access to goods rather than on the common good. This has deepened individualism and certain practices that basically do not contribute to the unity of neighbours or the strengthening of organizations*". This discontent is also affirmed by participant 10, who claims that this individualism is so strong in Chile that participation is not only low in politics but as well in social organizations and political organizations (both in political and non-political parties). To conclude, this stands in line with the opinion of participant 2; "*that if you want to survive in this system, you need to do it all by your own*". This individualism stands in contrast to collectivism and might endanger the legitimacy of the government.

The social contract has been so under pressure, that it even has impacted on how society organizes (in daily lives). Multiple participants argued that these cabildos were therefore as well a countermovement to this growing sense of individuality and unfair political system.

> *"Yes, I think that the political parties were not the ones that called the people. They were rather part of the problem. The people on the street saw the political parties as representatives of the problem because they are the ones who should see me. But no, they do not. They are the ones who should defend me from the abuses of the market, but they do not. They are the ones who should be worried about me, having better health, but they do not." (participant 5)*

Politics being part of the problem, would explain why it is deemed unacceptable to identify oneself in a cabildo with a political party or a particular politician (as pointed out by participants 2, 3a, 3b and 5 in section 5.2). Participant 3b even argues that the power of the cabildos increased when the people lost their faith in the political system and politicians. He states that at this moment "*we have not a politician that represents the common sense of the people, we have no leaders*". According to participant 6, distrust reaches even further: "*I would say that there is deep mistrust in the country on the part of the people towards the institutions. And we are not only talking about the government of the Carabineros State.*" Moreover, she asserts that these spaces for social organizations are the spaces Chileans must trust in and are the way forward.

Nonetheless, there might be another explanation for people to be less involved in (political) organizations. One should not solely focus on (political) discontent in drawing hasty fallacious conclusions. According to participant 11, low participation might also have something to do with "*work schedules*". Due to the low wages in Chile, many people work many hours and have multiple jobs. This lack of time makes that many Chileans are away from home, from early in the morning to late at night. All this time that people spent working diminishes the opportunity to be active in, for example, a sports club, a church, or any other organization. Moreover, participant 11 believes that since the nineties and the introduction of women into the working environment, meant a high decline of organizational instances, as women were mainly responsible for those.

Participant 5 attempts to nuance the whole discussion and gives credit to the government for at least one thing:

"If you look at the rest of the conflicts in the world, when there are these kinds of things, even in Latin America, they do not always end well. In the Chilean case, it is difficult to say how it will end. However, we had a comprehensive institutional agreement in Congress, from almost all the political parties in Chile for a process of a constituent process, of a new constitution. That is quite rare. In general, there is not much experience, and that was relatively quick. It took us a month to sign an agreement."

It should indeed be mentioned that since the mobilization was put into motion, it did not take much time before the government agreed with the plebiscite for a new constitution. This fast response of the government means there is space, a political opportunity, for change. Nevertheless, it is so far unknown how substantial this opportunity is and to what extent they will 'cooperate', as participants already earlier mentioned some defiance. The proposition for a new constitution and the perceptions of the participants upon it will be examined later. Only participant 8 argues that he is proud of some politicians and how they have dealt with conflict resolution in the past, in proposing and signing agreements. Though he admits that more democratic dialogue is necessary with the political forces, as they now "*are lacking the capability to dialogue*".

To conclude, participant 4 states that while the political parties have been disappointing the Chilean population so much, currently and in the past, that it is now really time for the political establishment to listen to the people. She even goes so far to say that: "*if we do not have like everything that we are asking for, we are not going to trust again*". She mentions that the plebiscite for a new constitution is a good signal and a good opportunity for the government and ruling political parties to restore this trust, though it is not enough. The question remains whether the government is willing to and can accede all these demands. Participant 6 presumes that the government is not able and will not be capable of responding to the demands presented by the people. Before all the demands listed by the participants will be portrayed, first more information is needed on the appearance of corona and how the government has been dealing with it.

6.3   Corona crisis and government response

If one had argued a year ago that the world would turn upside-down due to a virus, people would have made fun of this person. Unfortunately, this is what has happened in the last half-year. Even this research has experienced quite some difficulties because of the emergence of the coronavirus and the impact it has had on society worldwide. Since its entrance, the coronavirus has changed the daily lives of billions of people, therefore also in Chile. In this section will be explained how corona entered Chile and how it disturbed the campaigns for a new constitution. Additionally, how did the government put measures into place and dealt with the virus its impact on civil society? While doing so, the perspectives of the participants are considered in how these measures are interpreted. Finally, it is stressed what the corona crisis means for the organization of civil society (in public).

On Wednesday, February the 26th, campaigns for and against a new constitution in Chile officially started (Cuffe, 2020a). For these campaigns, the government had reserved public locations for proponents and opponents of a new constitution nationwide. In the meantime, radio and print advertisement also began (2020a). A collaboration between some left-wing political parties and social organizations occurred, called 'Chile Digno' (Dignified Chile) (Peoples Dispatch, 2020). Their main objective is to show that they *"supported and will continue to support the social movement and the demonstrations that have been taking place since October 18, 2019"* (AprueboChileDigno,

2020a). By doing so, their campaign has been focussed on the approval for a new constitution and drafted by a Constitutional Convention.

Moreover, they announced a broadcasting campaign on March the 27th (Cuffe, 2020a), in which more than 130 social organizations were registered to participate (ApruebaChileDigno, 2020b). Nevertheless, on the 19th of March, the government announced to postpone the referendum to October the 25th, meaning the disruption of the campaigning process (McGowan, 2020). On April the 26th Chile Digno, published to temporarily put down their activities and adhere to the call of the labour unions CUT and ANEF (ApruebaChileDigno, 2020c). While writing this section [27-08-2020], (political) organizations resumed their campaigns in foresight of the plebiscite on October the 25th ("Chile: The Campaign for the Constitutional Plebiscite Kicks Off," 2020).

While the victims of the mobilizations are still recovering from their wounds, Chile experienced another attack, that of the coronavirus. The first case confirmed in Chile was on 3 March 2020, when a doctor who had resided in Singapore for one month, returned home (Aguirre et al., 2020). Since then, the number of people infected started to multiply. On 13 March, 43 people were registered sick nationwide, and the first measures were installed (Garrison, 2020). First of all, President Piñera announced that from Monday the 15th, large public events were banned that consisted of more than 500 people (Garrison, 2020). From that Monday on, more measures were put into place. On the 15th, the schools were closed for two weeks (Reyes, 2020). The following day, the 16th, Chile entered phase 4 of the corona as the contamination peaked at 156 (Latorre, 2020). Phase 4 means a *"verified human-to-human transmission of animal or human-animal influenza reassortant virus able to cause 'community-level outbreaks'"* (*Emergencies preparedness*, 2020). The government was forced to launch some more strict measures. The borders were closed for 14 days, and public events were restricted to 50 persons (Latorre, 2020). Since then, the measures intensified, as on March the 18th the President issued a state of catastrophe ("*estade de catástrofe nacional*") that would last for 90 days (Jara, 2020a). With this state of exception, the armed forces are "*in charge of public order and security and enable military control of movement of people and goods*" (Cuffe, 2020b).

Two days later, in the provinces of Las Condes, La Reina and Vitacura, a quarantine was enforced, preventing the disease from spreading, as around 50% of the contaminations had taken place in the Metropolitan Region (Jarpa, 2020). Subsequently, these measures were extended to the country. On 22 March, a night-time curfew was installed, just as in times of the mobilizations previous (from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m.) in order to prevent the 632 cases to increase any further (Sherwood, 2020). Nevertheless, it took until the 26th for the government to implement a complete lockdown in the most affected regions (in the Metropolitan Region (MR)) (*Coronavirus en Chile*, 2020). Under lockdown, the population is only allowed to leave home in order to acquire necessities and essential services (like medical reasons), for which a permit is obligatory (*Chile: Total quarantine to be expanded*, 2020). This lockdown then was extended to 38 communes by May the 15th, covering 90% of the population living in the MR (Jara, 2020b).

The government had chosen for "*dynamic*" lockdowns in which strategically quarantines were introduced and subsequently lifted when were seemed unnecessary. Though these policies had proven to fail, as "*commuter travel between unrestricted regions continued to proliferate the spread of the virus*" (Barlett, 2020b). On 6 June, the trespass of 100.000 cases was surpassed, and due to a high increase of registered cases the minister of health, Jaime Mañalich had to resign on the

13th (Barlett, 2020b). At that time, Chile had one of the highest percentages of cases per thousand habitants (Barlett, 2020b). To put the rapid increase to halt, the government severed the measures that were already in place on the 17th. Those entailed stricter policing by enforcement troops and higher penalties for violating quarantine and curfew ("Chile tightens lockdowns as coronavirus cases surpass 200,000," 2020). Moreover, the state of catastrophe has been prolonged for 90 more days.

At the time of writing (August 2020), more than 360.000 cases have been confirmed with more than 9.700 fatalities registered (Organization, 2020). Nonetheless, these measures have not prevented the population from performing collective action. The last massive performance of collective action was organized in Santiago joined by tens of thousands of women, on March the 8th. Since the first policies and the installation of the state of catastrophe, civil society had to change their performances. Pots-and-pans demonstrations (cacerolazos) have re-enforced their essence in society (Cuffe, 2020b).

Moreover, Intermediate Depression (an artist's collective) posted on Instagram a manual "*protesting from home*" and shared some ideas how to do so, like projecting protests signs on balconies, through the engagement in cyberactivism and by sharing music (Faiola et al., 2020). However, amid the lockdown in May, in El Bosque (a poor municipality in Santiago), protestors filled the streets. Under the slogan: "*it is not against the quarantine, it is against the hunger*", they marched in their neighbourhood. Participant 10 argues as follows:

> *"I think that what is happening today with the coronavirus is, is being a catalyst for mobilizations. In fact, there are many places, many communes, where they are already mobilizing. Of course, they are not mobilizing to change the Constitution, they are mobilizing because they are hungry, but they also know that deep down, as a result of this structure, of this model, it is because they are hungry."*

These demonstrators were clashing with the police forces, throwing stones, and enlightening fires, while the police responded with deploying water cannons and tear gas. Food shortages during the lockdown had pushed these marginalized population on the street. So even though, the manifestations continued (to a smaller degree), these were not focussed on the constitution anymore. The manifestations were more centred around basic necessities to prevent people from hunger and losing their income (*Chile protesters clash with police over lockdown*, 2020). Moreover, the governmental aid provided (2.000 aid packages) did not meet the demand (2020).

According to many of the interviewees, the government response has exactly exposed what has been wrong with the current political and economic system. Participant 4 argues that at the beginning of the rise of the coronavirus, initially, the necessary measures were delayed by the government. Moreover, she states that the municipalities decreed locked down primordially on the wealthy neighbourhoods, which was part of the "*dynamic*" lockdowns mentioned earlier. This unsuccessful strategy spread the virus from wealthy neighbourhoods to the poorer ones, which is affirmed by participants 3a and 3b. They point out that the wealthy population that lives in these neighbourhoods are the ones able to travel to Europe and other countries. They are depicted as the ones that brought the coronavirus to Chile in the first place. One of these neighbourhoods is Las Condones, where there live a lot of influential people.

Moreover, the workers in the more impoverished neighbourhoods work for these wealthy citizens and subsequently take the virus back home to their vulnerable neighbourhoods. Then, the virus spreads among a more exposed population. Alternatively, it is part of the commuter travel, as mentioned by the Guardian (Barlett, 2020b). Mostly, due to the high density of Santiago's poor

neighbourhoods, the high dependence of public transport and the many "*cramped houses*", the virus could spread quickly (Shelter, 2020). Furthermore, Dr Álvaro Erazo (also former health minister) argued that the government enforced a controversy communication strategy, to persuade the population to return to normality, while the cases increased (Barlett, 2020b).

Despite the lack of appropriate action in the beginning and the enactment of a misfit communicational strategy, the participants had shown some other dissatisfaction with the governmental approach. As presented by participant 4, the president allowed companies to stop paying the salaries of the workers that have been in quarantine. To refer to the sources of discontent, also here the responsibility is transferred from the companies to the individuals.

> "*That means that today there are families who are without pay and who do not know if they will be able to, if they will continue working, no. And it adds that in Chile the percentage of workers who do not have a contract is very high. And they do not have any job security that allows them to either stay in their homes or that they were given unemployment insurance that allows them to remain economically stable during these times when many of them cannot leave.*" (participant 6)

This government response to the crisis highlights how the Chilean political system operates. The government does provide no or limited access to resources for the working class, and there is (almost) no safety net. The people and their families become responsible for their survival when they lose their income.

Nevertheless, this does not mean, the government has not provided any resources for its population. On May the 17th, president Piñera announced that 2.5 million food boxes would be distributed in Chile, especially among the most vulnerable and contains "*essential elements*" (Azócar, 2020). Though participant 11 celebrates this initiative, he brings into perspective that one family box would last 10 to 15 days, depending on the family composition. Therefore, it is a temporary solution for basic needs, but not structural. Next to the distribution of boxes, the government revealed that money was made available for better healthcare. This money has been used to expand and strengthen "*the existing network of health residence nationwide to accommodate people in need*" (Piñera 2020, as cited in Azócar, 2020).

However, in preparing the facilities to hospitalize the infected population, participant 3b demonstrates the inequality between public and private health care. On the one hand, the government pays for basic gyms to receive poor people who are not able to pay for private health, though empty hospitals are available. On the other hand, private clinics have much more equipment and resources, like mechanical respirators. These patients are well accommodated and are screened regularly, which may cost around 40 million pesos a day. This discrepancy is typical for a society in which significant class differences exist: "*where the rich have many commodities to live, and the poor have to survive*" (participant 3b). Thus, even if we look at the resources provided by the government, no structural measures are incorporated to provide help for the marginalized. Even during corona, the participants experience the government to reinforce the power of the private sector, just as in the case of the flexibilization of workers' contracts.

According to participant 12, this pandemic and the corresponding government response have had an impact on the social contract between government and population:

> "*In short, I think that both the social explosion and now the pandemic has demonstrated the fragility of much of what was here, who believed that we were far above another Latin American country, and that has been proven not to be the case. That we may*

have some advantages over our neighbours, but we also have many weaknesses that are complicated and need to be resolved more structurally. . . [and this crisis proves there is] a middle class that easily becomes impoverished when things like a tragedy happen, like a pandemic."

Besides, participant 3b mentions that the people in Chile do not have buffers, "*the people do not have money, or they have to work every day to eat*". So, this means that when people are fired or are not allowed to continue working, they have no income and thus no necessities. This lack of resources eventually put people on the streets on May the 8th when people lost their jobs and had no income to provide food for their families. On the longer term, people will not be able to pay their houses and eventually this will lead, he expects, to a substantial increase in poverty. The quote of participant 12, together with the argumentation of participant 3b, seem to clarify how fragile the Chilean 'middle class' is and how fast these people can turn into poverty. This fragility coincides with how participant 3a earlier criticized the existence of a Chilean middle class. The current pandemic only further shows the people how vulnerable the system is when dealing with a shock. It has destabilized by the coronavirus, and now the government turns its back to the population.

The corona crisis and the government response both expose how acute this problem is in Chile (participant 6). Both the participants 10 and 6 show that the government legislature in times of corona only reaffirms to the population why they have been mobilizing in the first place. During the corona crises, structural and systematic inequality have become prevalent again in Chile. Participant 10 even takes it so far as to say that today there are even people who have not eaten for five days, which makes him sad and angry. Participant 4 thinks that the limited support for the population and in particular, the workers that lost their job, forced the people again onto the streets. In her argumentation, without salaries or support of the government, these people are not able to pay their rent and their bills for necessities, like food. While she understands that Chile is not as rich as other countries, she does believe there are more actions the government should and could take to protect its citizens, like freezing bills (gas, light, electricity and gas). Nevertheless, the president claims that this would not be possible, and this legislation would not be accepted in parliament (participant 4). Moreover, she states that other economic and social problems are again highlighted, like credits, debts, and mortgage. She finalises her argument by stating that again, during the corona crisis, companies and millionaires are put on the first place, for instance, by allowing big firms to fire workers in these difficult times.

While participant 5 agrees that the government has made mistakes in dealing with the corona crisis, he depicts the importance of Chilean politics to reunite. Therefore, even though the opposition (he is part of) affirms that the government has made mistakes in dealing with the crisis, he advocates "*unity*". The opposition aims to respond less harsh to the government and attempts to "*move forward together*" to a "*more collaborative spirit*". Though not mentioned by the participants, still noteworthy, the government did act appropriately in some terms. Shelter argues that the government has been testing a lot in the population to get track of the virus (2020).

Moreover, in this article is mentioned that it has bolstered the amount of available capacity, by increasing the number of ventilators and hospital-beds. Finally, though initiated late, the quarantine restrictions and lockdowns did impede the spread of the virus and prevent the number of cases to increase even faster (Shelter, 2020). Participant 4 argues that the only solution to make this move forward successfully and to restore this distrust towards politics can be said in one word:

"*support*". It is about the political establishment to support the social changes and demands raised by the people. They are supporting people rather than big companies.

Finally, they should support by accommodating all the changes proposed for the new constitution. Chapter 7 continuously considers the corona pandemic, when discussing the meaning of a new constitution, the process of creating a new constitution and the demands of the participants. Moreover, the role of the cabildos within the cabildos will be illustrated and further examined.

Chapter 7   Participants' demands and desired impact

During the current episode, the cabildos have been the spaces in which claim-making processes have emerged, and so demands were registered. One of the expressed demands is a constitutional change. From section 6.1 became clear that the *1980 Constitution* is highly contested, mainly as it both protects the neoliberal ideology and contains a symbolic weight of the Pinochet era. As this research objective is to find out how people are envisioning a new constitution, it is first useful to understand what a (new) constitution means to the participants. Later, the demands addressed by the participants and the cabildo outcome will be discussed. However, the plebiscite also raises some concerns among the participants. Especially now in times of corona, the whole debate has changed and therefore need to be investigated. Finally, the expectations and desires of the participants will be portrayed, and the specific task the participants envision for the cabildos in this change.

7.1   Constitutional meaning

In chapter 6.1, participant 5 and 8 argued their discontent towards the 1980 Constitution, especially its role in protecting the neoliberal discourse and its symbolic weight of dictatorial descent. As one of the participants' aspirations is to alter the 1980 Constitution, or at least to establish a new democratic dialogue, for the participants in this research, a new constitution means many things. Participant 15 views a new constitution as "*the possibility of building a different country*". Participant 3a also understands a new constitution to be of importance as she refers to it as a "*foundation, that gives us the principle values of the country*". For participant 8 himself "*the process is more important than the outcome*", with which he means that for a new constitution to be legitimate, it must be agreed by and supported by its society. Participant 6, however, declares as follows:

> "*I understand that it orients the functioning of the country in generic terms. However, a new constitution worked in a popular and sovereign way would mean a lot to me, since it represents the interests of the people and their capacity to organize.*"

For participant 4 it is even more than that: "*it is a signal, a powerful signal for political forces, for economic forces, for social forces, even for political parties in Chile, so it is huge*". Moreover, the realisation of a new constitution would mean "*a sense of hope*". These quotes indicate that a new constitution for the participants means something more than just a piece of paper, preferably as a tool to pursue further economic and political change.

Participants 13 and 14 take a more lawful, political approach in signifying the meaning of a new constitution, as they are both more related to law. Participant 14 is a social worker and a law graduate of 28 years old. She argues that the constitution needs to be understood as the "*mother law*" that regulates the rest of the laws of a country. Therefore, it seems to her relevant that while searching for necessary improvements in society, the constitution needs to represent "*the popular feeling in all areas*". While people do not find themselves represented by the current constitution, a new constitutional process is obligatory as a first step into the 'good' direction. In section 4.1, Heiss argued how the authoritarian character of the 1980 Constitution had harmed the institutional legitimacy of the government (2017). Besides, Garcés has observed that during this specific episode, all governmental institutions in Chile have low credibility and legitimacy (2020). This has to do despite the corruption, to "*their abysmal distance form an indifference toward society, particularly to the people*" (2020, p. 2). Therefore, a new constitution could regenerate a sustainable social contract.

Participant 13 is a lawyer of 31 years old and addresses how, in her opinion, a new constitution is a first attempt to close this gap.

> *"It means building a political-social system, that is a new democratic system, setting the guidelines of the same, ordering the powers of the State, nourishing with content the individual rights, legitimizing what is expressed in it, which will finally allow to appease and eliminate the abuse and inequalities existing today in Chile."*

In this meaning, the rebuilding of the legitimacy of the functioning state is put central. A new constitution could mean the reconfiguration of the social contract between the Chilean population and the Chilean government and even overcomes abuses (like corruption) and inequality. With a new constitution, the "*high-quorum provisions and supra-majoritarian mechanisms*" (Heiss, 2017, p. 471) addressed earlier can be altered, restoring the legitimacy of democracy. Moreover, the individualist mentality that is stored in the neo-liberal model and so in the 1980 Constitution could be countered.

At the same time, others expect the new constitution not really to change Chilean society, but still express the importance of the process of developing a new constitution to gather civil support. Additionally, many participants envision a new constitution to be the first step toward systematic change, like participant 4. She argues that she is not sure whether a new constitution will resolve the current dissatisfactions within civil society, though she acknowledges its importance. Nevertheless, with the government's approval for a plebiscite, a new opportunity is created for the population to put this process for systematic change in motion.

7.2   Demands for a new constitution

In this section, the following sub-question will be examined: "*What are the participants' demands around a new constitution and what would they like to achieve?".* This question will be answered, adopting the opinions and views of the participants, and the output generated from the assembly Villa Olímpica (VOA). In this cabildo, participants discussed their reasons for discontent and raised some demands for a Chile that they desire.

To understand what the participants demand from a constitution; it is first of importance to have full awareness of how the plebiscite is organized. The proposed plebiscite consists of two questions. The first question raised is whether the Chilean population desires a new constitution. People can vote in favour of or against it. If most of the population vote in favour of a new constitution, the second question will become relevant. The second question entails: how should this new constitution be composed? Also, if agreed on a new constitution, there are two options. People can choose for a constitutional convention or a mixed convention accompanied by parliamentarians. For a constitutional convention, citizens will be elected to compose this new constitution. In contrast, in a mixed convention, half of the participants will be elected from sitting Parliament members, and the other half will consist of elected citizens (Cuffe, 2019).

In this research, the participants were asked what their demands are regarding a new constitution and what they would like to achieve. Nevertheless, many participants took this question broader and answered both demands concerning the constitution, but as well demands on society in general. The first demand suggested in the interviews is the realisation of a new constitution. Participant 6 argues that in her view, a new constitution is needed to get rid of neoliberalism "*that allowed to continue reproducing an economic model that had already been installed by means of repression and force*". Moreover, she calls for a popular constituent assembly (a constitutional

convention), as this is sovereign and as well "*is having the main characteristics of equality, inclusiveness, and integration of indigenous minorities*". Though in this research, all participants were in favour of this plebiscite, it is unclear whether they favoured a constitutional convention. Many of the participants did argue, just as participant 6, to prefer a constituent assembly. Meanwhile, no participant positioned him-/herself to be in favour of the 1980 Constitution or a new constitution with a mixed Convention. However, as not all participants of this interview presented their political position, it does not mean that there undoubtedly exists consensus. Despite this uncertainty of an existing consensus, the subsequent demands are discussed by the participants.

As all the participants were enthusiastic for a plebiscite to be called, it remains the question if the plebiscite triumphs, what should be incorporated. Participant 15 is a middle-aged professor in History, Geography and Social Sciences and resides in Santiago. She defines this new constitution should "*enshrine collective rights such as water, an economy of scale, sustainable and humane, the protection of social and cultural rights as well as political rights, with institutions that harmoniously regulate public offices and services*". In this quote, participant 15 focusses on (political, cultural, and social) rights, sustainability, humanity, and a new attitude (harmonious) of the ruling institution. Participant 15 illustrates very well how all-embracive these demands are and cover both the economic model and the political system. Multiple participants share this vision. In the case of the economic model, participant 14 acknowledges that a new constitution should support an economic model which is not abusive. In the case of the political system, many more claims are made.

For participant 13, profound modifications of the constitution are required, regarding individual rights to enhance citizens' protection. Moreover, she states that a new constitution should encompass limitations respecting the power of the President of the Republic, to rebalance the power distribution from the government to the people. This new balance could be achieved, for instance, through the "*elimination of certain quorums in legislative procedures*" (affirmed by participant 14). Additionally, she believes that a new constitution must include criteria that promote representation in Congress, like gender and parity criteria. Concluding, she summoned that the constitution should embrace "*mechanisms of real and effective citizen participation*" to prevent mobilizations in the future to happen. Participant 14 even goes further in political transformation as she suggests a "*bicameral legislative system*" should be implemented in the Chilean political system. Additionally, she argues that international treaties should be pursued concerning the development of fundamental rights. The following specific demands are presented, to illustrate more in detail what these transformations entail.

Predominantly the transformation of service provision by the government was mentioned, like participant 2. Participant 1 argues that according to her, the "*social demands*" encompass the health, education and pension system and housing. These social demands suit the sources of discontent specified in the previous chapter (6.1). For altering the system of social service provisions, three themes appear to be relevant. First, *access* to these services: "*So I will not have to pay for anything that I deserve for the fact that I was born, you know*" (participant 4). Access does both refer to the availability of resources, but also an acceptable price for these resources. One of the presented outputs by the cabildo analyses is that older adults should not pay for these services (personal communication, 31 July 2020). Participant 6 mentions a "*free public education*", entailing the opportunity for, and access to, educational resources. In the perspective of participant 4, this means in practice that "*if you want to study and if you do not have the money to study a professional career, you choose to study anyway*". Additionally, an indisputable demand that resulted out of the VOA

cabildo was that the minimum wage must be lifted to 500.000 pesos per month. By increasing the minimum wage, it becomes easier for the population to afford these social services and decreases the dependence on governmental support.

The second theme presented is quality. Participant 6 refers to education *"that is of quality"*. She further mentions "*decent health*" to be one of her demands. Participant 1 declares pensions of better quality, meaning a general increase of pensions for all, to whomever those are applicable. The third and final theme that repeatedly is touched upon is the 'how' to realise these accessible and high-quality social services. Participant 1 refers to it as "*system reformation*" or *"renovation"*. For this reformation to be successful, the industries that offer these services (health, education, and pensions (the AFP)) need to be reformed. Moreover, the "*recovery of [privatized] companies*" that exploit natural resources (like copper or water) for the sole objective of generating profits (participant 6). The end of this exploitation is also declared by the VOA cabildo, that the "*State must guarantee access to basic services (cannot be in private hands)*" (personal communication, 31 July 2020).

The "system reformation" does not only entail the sector responsible for social services but applies to the whole Chilean economic, social, and political structure. As put by participant 10:

> *"So, in short, we need to change everything. All the social relations of the State must be different. Let us say today, there is idolatry to the market already and to the detriment of social welfare. So, I think that it must be changed from the root, let us say, from the bottom up".*

Participant 10 even pleads for a change from bottom-up, which is in line with the outcome of the VOA cabildo in which the participants demand to "*deconstruct capitalism/decrease inequality by strengthening the social fabric*" (personal communication, 31 July 2020). Moreover, they are in favour of "*creating a solidarity system*", countering the individualism that is now experienced in society (personal communication, 31 July 2020).

This demand indicates that the cabildos to a certain extent perform prefigurative politics: "*the embodiment within the ongoing political practise of a movement, of those forms of social relations, decision-making, culture, and human experience that are the ultimate goal*" (Boggs, 1977, p. 100). It seems that what the people demand and desire, is what they create themselves already when assembling in a cabildo. This demand for a solidarity system is already partly achieved by performing a cabildo, as illustrated in section 5.4, a "*feeling of community*" is established. Alternatively, as put by Maeckelbergh: "*Prefiguration is a practice that assumes the ends and the means to be inextricably linked*" (2011, p. 8).

Another domain to which systematic reformation is desired is the current prison system. Some participants request a whole new system, while others are just demanding more dignified conditions in prisons (personal communication, 31 July 2020). Systematic change is also needed to cope with a more resilient Chile and encompasses environmental issues. Participant 1 believes it is crucial to consider how to make Chile a more sustainable country. Sustainability is also put forward in the VOA cabildo: "*responsibility with the ecosystem*" (personal communication, 31 July 2020). Finally, during the VOA cabildo, participants emphasised that a new role of the media in the society would be preferred: "*democratization of media and non-criminalization of community media*" (personal communication, 31 July 2020). There is no further explanation given why this is a composed demand.

To conclude this section, many demands are presented. It would be inappropriate to generalize these demands to all participants of all cabildos. These demands are put forward by

individuals, who sometimes referred to the same claim. Due to the research design, there were no interactions possible between the participant to let them evaluate each other demands. Still, this chapter visualises how in-depth and comprehensive these demands are within society. Some demands are practical, like the minimum wage, while others are more systematic and radical, as the desire to deconstruct society and establish a new socio-political system. However, many of the demands exhibited are general and not specified. Moreover, in the cabildo output document was neither reasoned through which steps these demands needed to be fulfilled. Finally, it is also remarkable that the demands cover a wide area in the socio-political and economic field. They embody law (enforcement), economic resources and social service provision and transformation. How people envision and desire their new country to look like, will be further discussed in 7.5

7.3   Constitutional concerns in times of corona

The participants are delighted by the plebiscite for a new constitution. However, they still have some concerns regarding the process of determining whether a new constitution is pursued and if so, how. One of the main concerns of the participants defined relates to how people will vote during the plebiscite. In the previous section is displayed that participants can choose between a constitutional convention or a mixed convention. If there is chosen for a mixed convention, this means that politicians do have a say in how a new constitution will be developed. Therefore, the outcome of this vote could mean a lot to what a new constitution will entail. Participant 1 asserts that the choice for a constitutional convention or a mixed convention is a hot topic now and concern. Who are the ones to write this new constitution? Is it solely with (citizen) experts, or are politicians also allowed to play a role in decision-making? In continuance, for both options, more concerns are discussed.

In both case scenarios, participant 2 emphasizes representation to be problematic: "*So how are we going to make sure to include like indigenous voice or minorities voice?*". Inequality has been highlighted as one of the prevalent sources of discontent, and therefore this constitutional process must promote equality. Moreover, he addresses socio-economic classes as a problematic representative dilemma. How to prevent the poor to be excluded from this process? As well, how are different political standpoints considered, like left and right-wing? These questions show that establishing a genuine representation of Chilean society in a convention already is a whole challenge. However, one of the desires has already been fulfilled and is perceived as a big success, which is an accepted bill by the parliament to oblige a gender parity of representatives. Gender parity is one of the concerns acted upon by predominantly women and feminist groups (participant 2). Participant 2 describes this as "*something historical*".

In participant 3a's opinion, the plebiscite in which people can choose for either **c**onstitutional or a mixed convention also triggers another principal concern:

> "*So that is the first problem that we have because the people who will vote for rejecting the change will also have the possibility to vote for these two options. They can vote. Now. So maybe I reject the change but in the case, change wins I decide that it is mixed because I want my politicians working there. Yeah, you see. So, it is really tricky we do not know really if, first changing the Constitution wins, and second, will we do it with politicians or not? Just that is another thing.*"

Thus, participant 3a is mainly afraid that the people who are not in support of the constitutional convention, will eventually all choose for the mixed approach so that politicians still have the opportunity to hold decision-making in writing a new constitution. Participants 3a and 3b further on

discuss how they believe this interference of politicians in the installation of a new constitution could become problematic. According to them, Chilean politicians are competent in the creature of "*a grey area*". This grey area represents loopholes in the law that creates spaces for politicians to manoeuvre when a newly approved law does not suit their interests. Therefore, both participants are afraid that when a mixed convention triumphs in the plebiscite, the political elite captures this process to establish a new constitution. Though not explicitly mentioned by the participants, a concern presented by Sanín-Restrepo is "*whether a new constitution is not also 'ontologically' loaded as a trap of simple 'reformism'*" (2020, p. 46). Though it seems that a new constitution would mean the end of neoliberalism or at least some other contentions like inequality, governmental bribing, and privatization, it might turn out to be the "same" constitution, but then in different shape.

Moreover, since coronavirus has entered Chile, the whole socio-political field has radically changed. This new context is also responsible for some other concerns regarding the development and facilitation of a new constitution. The plebiscite for a new constitution is rescheduled to October the 25th of 2020. Due to this plebiscite postponement and the radical changing socio-political context in Chile (and the world in general), attention is derived from the plebiscite. It is directed to instant needs and urgencies. The role of the plebiscite and this whole political debate have vanished to the background, while the emerging essential needs of the society appeared front stage.

Participant 5 affirms this change of the political debate. In his opinion, the country postponed not only the plebiscite but also its discussions together with the whole constitutional campaign. Somewhat, the coronavirus and its consequences for society have become a topic of today. However, in his opinion, this does not mean that in the future, the constituent debate will not return. Though, when this process is going to be resumed, it is still unknown how the expired time affects the perceptions of Chileans towards a new constitution:

> *"I do not know. I am also scared that people will start giving more thought to change. Many people will think that probably this will take up much time, and it will be complicated. How will we decide the who is going to write a new constitution if that option wins? So many people are in doubt now" (Participant 3a).*

So, participant 3a fears that time endurance will demotivate people to vote in favour of a new constitution or to vote in general as their aspirations for a newer Chile vanish over time. This process is stressed, primarily since Chileans' freedom of movement is restricted due to the lockdowns established.

The coronavirus does not only impact people's perspectives towards the constitution but also totally affects people's daily realities. Many people lost their jobs and their incomes due to the political restrictions put in place by the government (like quarantines and lockdown). Alternatively, they lost their jobs due to the worldwide economic setback thanks to the virus. According to the IMF, the projected real GDP of 2020 would be an expected -4.5% (2020). As a consequence, the unemployment rate for the March-May quarter had already reached 11.2% according to the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (2020), which is the highest since 2010 (as cited in "Desempleo en Chile llega a 11,2%," 2020). While Chile does not provide a (sufficient) social security system for its population, interviewees expect that many people will go to poverty.

According to these participants, the increasing unemployment alongside the worsening health circumstances in the country, the power of the wealthiest of Chile has been increasing. Participant 3b mentions that he thinks that these wealthy companies and elite will use that power to

persuade the people in the prospective plebiscite to impose their interests. Participant 3b is mostly of the extreme right-wing convinced that they use their powerful position to alter civil societies convictions. If not through word, then by money, which will negatively impact the validity of the socio-political process and the plebiscite result, as displayed in section 6.1.

When asked participant 1 how she believes the government is dealing with this current corona crisis, her response was in line with how participant 3b described it above: "*That is a tough question. Whenever I think about a virus and the impact it has had today in politics in Chile, I think this is being used as a political tool by the government.*". Politician, and interviewee (5) affirms how the Chilean coalition aimed to utilize this corona crisis to alter the plebiscite:

> "*Monday [27/04/2020] there is a discussion because the president said that the plebiscite could be changed. Again, for economic reasons, for an economic crisis, which could come after the coronavirus. In the face of that, we have reacted by saying no. The opposition has said no that we are not about to change the new term of the plebiscite, but it remains to be seen what the health conditions will be at that time.*"

In support, participant 6 argues that since the corona outbreak, (a specific part of) the government has been refusing a new constitution to be the solution for the earlier mentioned discontent. They have already prepared "*a permanent political play*" in which they deny the existence of documents and agreements they have signed themselves. Moreover, the government has taken advantage of the quarantine that was in place to cover all the reminders of the previous protests. The Plaza de la Dignidad, which has been a vital square during the mobilization, has been overpainted. Furthermore, walls in the city and the Gabriela Mistral Centre are covered (participant 3b). President Piñera even posed on a picture in front of the Plaza Italia (another critical place for the protestors) when the lockdown was installed, with anger among civil society as a result (Barlett, 2020a).

Another concern presented has to do with the uncertainty if a constitutional change would be accomplished. Participant 12 addresses in the interview how opponents of the (constitution) convention generate fear by scaring people, expressing a new constitution to be "*a leap in the dark*". Participant 12 argues that uncertainty of the future is constructed as a threat to which the population should prevent itself from happening, through voting against the new constitution. Moreover, he argues the rigidity of people both in favour of a new constitution and against which could become problematic. The polarization of Chilean society is the last concern exhibited by the participants. Tilly and Tarrow define polarization as: "*[the] increasing ideological distance between the wings of once a unified movement sector*" (2015, p. 130).

Polarization is nothing new in Chile, as in the last 10 or 15 years the political parties in Chile have been polarized (participant 8). Nevertheless, according to participant 5, due to the rigidity of Chileans' standpoint (in favour or against a new constitution), polarization has highly increased between both 'parties'. While during the protests, civil society was united, participants are afraid that the possibility of choice (constitutional versus mixed convention) will drive them apart. Additionally, participant 11 affirms polarization to be noticeable in current society. He believes that the rise of violence in society is a manifestation of this polarization. Further, he argues that the current polarization "*is a situation I have not seen for many years*" (participant 11). Participant 8 adds that he is concerned as there is much at stake with the upcoming plebiscite, and polarization prevents a real dialogue from taking place. Though participant 12 is also concerned with this polarization, he hopes it eventually will end up peaceful, and people from both sites can be reunited.

7.4   Expectations

Unfortunately, what one desires to achieve is not always what one will gain. As well in this research, it would seem unlikely for the government to fulfil all these demands described above. In this section, an attempt will be made figuring out to what extent the participants expect their demands to be met. Alongside, this section does also aim to find out how these participants expect this process of a new constitution to be continued. Especially in current times, as the corona crisis drastically changes the socio-cultural, economic, and political context of the plebiscite.

The participants exert many expectations concerning the process of a new constitution. These visions are positioned in the moment of the corona crisis and the corresponding governmental measures enforced. Participant 2 addresses that it is for him challenging to express what he expects, mainly due to uncertainty:

> *"So, it really depends on how things evolve. I would say maybe in the future if we still have like I minimum Constitution, many changes can be achieved in parliament. But it will depend a lot on how the whole process is carried on because it is still a question of how independent this process will get"*

Despite the uncertainty, patience is also considered to be expected (by participant 3a and 7). Participant 7 argues "*that it is not an overnight thing*". Still, the foundation now is laid for further transformation to take place. These mobilizations only made a path, a path that needs to be continued over the years. The first step is made, though even more steps are needed. Participant 3a agrees with this vision. She mentions that a new constitution would be the first necessary thing to happen before another change is possible. The perspective of participant 4 agrees: "*Of course it is not enough. I know it is not enough . . . But with a new constitution, at least we will be achieving a new one that is not created under dictatorship*". The participants acknowledge it is difficult to generate systematic change, but they all believe a new constitution is a beginning.

In general, participants expect the mobilizations to reappear after the corona crisis is under control. Following participants 3a and 3b perspectives, newer mobilizations could turn even bigger and more violent, compared to the demonstrations of October. They argue that it is because of the season as in Chile winter endures from June to August. Participants 3a and 3b believe that there were so many victims in October due to the summer weather. People were just wearing a t-shirt. From June on, demonstrators will wear more clothes and utilize those as protection when confronting the police. Therefore, they think the protests will become more violent, as demonstrators feel more protected by their clothing; "*your clothes are your armour*".

Participant 3b even argues: "*I do not know if we go to civil war. I do not think that will happen, but I think that the protest will be more violent and more extended*". The seriousness of these expectations can be derived from the latter quote, comparing newer demonstrations to a civil war. To conclude, participant 3b asserts: "*I am scared*", after which participant 3a answers: "*Yes, we are all.*". Other participants also expect new demonstrations to initiate after the lockdown but are less catastrophic, like participant 5 and 6 and 12. Participant 10 is also in full support of new public demonstrations when these are legitimate again. According to him, the government and its response to the crisis only demonstrated why further mobilizations are required: "*we will continue to demonstrate in the streets because we need to change [the country], let us say, and I think we are right*". None of the participants mentioned differently. It should be considered that the majority of the interviews have taken place at the beginning of the coronavirus. Back then, collective action was

fresh in peoples' memories, and some performances even still happened on a regular base. Alejandra Fuentes-García, a sociologist at the University of Chile, thinks that the corona crisis will "*deepen the inequalities*" in, especially healthcare. So, when people start to protest again, she believes and expects that health care will even become even a more important theme than ever before (Barlett, 2020a)

A few participants believe that the protests which started in October have had a lasting impact on how politics is performed in Chile. Participant 5, for example, he addresses the phenomenon of repoliticization. He describes the process of repoliticization as follows:

> "*although people are very suspicious of political parties, today for the first time they are asking themselves a more serious political question and are having non-partisan political conversations. Not about political parties, but about society, about the laws, about the political constitution. For the first time, the truth is being discussed. There was always discussion, but they were rather small discussions in Chilean society. But now all Chilean families are discussing political issues that have never happened in this way before.*"

Due to this repoliticization, this participant expects in the next election to have an upsurge in the number of voters. He believes that the people now feel a "*democratic commitment, a civic commitment to go and participate*". Moreover, in his perspective, people do not want others anymore to decide for them. The people would like to regain their sovereignty, and thus he expects them to re-enter conventional politics. Participant 11 does also expect that this process will substantially affect next elections, especially as social injustice has become such a dominant topic. Participant 6 states that the mobilizations resulted in "*politicization*", rather than "*repoliticization*". In her definition, politicization is about discussions of "*open and deliberate criticism on the governmental action . . . [which] maintains and sustains a neoliberal policy*". From this definition, this does not essentially mean a reappearance of civil society in the next elections.

So, in his argumentation, participant 5 emphasizes how political actions, like the mobilizations and cabildo-making processes, eventually will turn people back to vote. People desire to regain their agency by participating in decision-making, and he envisions this to happen through the formal political system, thus conventional politics. With re-politicization participant 5 then means not solely the reintegration of civil society in the political debate, through the reinstatement of consciousness and practice (as for participant 6).

Moreover, he means the re-integration of civil society in political institutions. Somma et al. argue that some studies, like Galais (2014), suggest there is a trend that people who participate in "*social movements tend to increase their sense of civic duty in regard to voting*" (Somma et al., 2020). Therefore, they suspect a higher turnout on the next elections as well. In continuation, participant 5 noticed that in his party, which is a younger and newer party compared to the conventional ones, many people have been joining since the social explosion. So, some people feel that they must retake a stand, "*a political position*" and join a political party. Moreover, this participant expects there will only become more and more people joining them in eyesight of the future plebiscite.

The participants have some expectations on how the government will position itself to a changing system and country. At this moment, the participants observe the government to pursue a technic they refer to as a "*push to normality*". With normality, participant 12 refers to the time before the societal outbreak in October. He believes that there are many Chileans nowadays that do not accept this push and will rise again when the circumstances permit it. As explained in chapter 7.3, in the eyes of the participants, the government exploits the impacts of the coronavirus and the imposed

measures (like quarantine and lockdown). These serve as a political tool to prevent a new constitution from being approved (participants 3b, 5 and 5). Even though multiple participants acknowledge this, people still believe that a further rise will be established if deemed necessary. Alternatively, as put by participant 3b, the protestors now "*use this time to re-arm, re-group their forces to return to fighting*" when quarantine is lifted.

Participant 5 does not believe that the ruling right-wing government is willing to adopt the demands presented by the people, as he believes they would not abandon the neoliberal model. Moreover, he addresses that the government does not identify the contentions to be a collective or social, preferably as an individual problem. He believes that the government indeed is willing to change the constitution but will never allow their neoliberal model to be transformed. However, participant 5 is still hopeful, as he thinks that in the new elections in two years, people will return voting. A newly elected government then has the responsibility to incorporate the demands presented by society. Though, important here to note is that participant 5 himself is a politician in the opposition on the left and therefore he has a specified bias towards the current government. While he has trust in another government to change the system, many participants lost faith in conventional politics in general, therefore expect less of future parties and politicians in power.

7.5 Envisioning and desiring systemic change

Previously, it is clarified that the participants desire something more than just a new constitution. This constitution is just part of a more extensive systemic transformation they have in mind. In this last section of this chapter, space is reserved for the participants to express their desires concerning systemic change. It entails what the participants envision to change about society and what is needed for it to be realised. Considerably, the role of political institutions is highlighted when discussing these desires and demands. Finally, is stressed what cabildos' role is in desiring this change and in this new vision of society.

7.5.1 Envisioning and desiring systemic change

Participant 2 desires a shift towards something that suits with a welfare system: "*I truly believe that, if we could have a more equal society, states can guarantee more equal conditions and rights for everybody. I think that would make a huge impact*". A welfare system is also addressed by the outcome of the cabildo (personal communication, 31 July 2020). The current problem is not the lack of resources of the government, but the incentive to use those to distribute those more equitably. Participant 4 continues in this discourse and pleads for a welfare state, meaning the end of the subsidiary state. The taxes paid by the population will then be invested in qualitative and accessible health, education, and pensions, instead of the military forces and politicians their salary (participant 4). Sociologist Alejandra Fuentes-Garcia emphasizes what a welfare state could mean for the current health system: "*this is a great opportunity to build a health service with a single funding source that covers everybody*" (Barlett, 2020a). A welfare system will eventually result in more security for the Chilean population. According to participant 4, this is clear: "*all the citizens want to achieve the same, ok? So, to have the security to live comfortably and that you are assured a good pension, that you will have good social care, so you do not have to wait years for cancer treatments*". Moreover, she addresses that when she is old, she would like to be able to rent something, have money to travel or to go to the doctor. Therefore, security that one should not have to be worried about receiving enough money and social services.

Participant 4 argues that at this moment Chile is "*absolutely, marked by social classes, by political power, by economic power, by your last name, the colour of your of your skin, where you live, where you studied*". She desires a society in which people have equal opportunities, and one's future does not depend on who "*you are and where you are from*". According to participant 2, this is possible through a new welfare system as a welfare system would not only strengthen the public services but also mean closing the gap between social classes and contribute to a less individualistic society. Participant 2 proposes an alternative welfare system in which a better educational system could be realized. If general taxation assured good quality education, the difference between public and private sector diminishes. The private educational institutions should adapt to high qualitative standards of the public services, so their quality rises as well. Participant 2 envisions this change to happen through changing how the state is administrated, for instance, put vital companies, like electricity or water administration, back into control of the government, instead of vice versa. Thus, the government should retake its responsibility on the sectors they outsourced in the 1980s. In perspective op participant 14, this equal society means the elimination of the social gap and argues beside equality, ethics, justice, and respect also need to be established with this new socio-political system. This new socio-political system needs to emphasize, according to participant 6, feminist traits and contain an anti-neoliberal character.

Participant 5 observes another desire that even though not explicitly mentioned by proponents of societal change, he still believes to be of importance, so-called dignity. Dignity "*has been a keyword . . . which does not depend on my well-being, does not depend solely on my ability to make ends meet, but in which there are certain more general social rights*." (participant 5). Dignity then concurs with the earlier mentioned desire for security. Dignity has also been a valuable feature during the performances of collective action that started in October. Elicer Flores lost vision to one of his eyes amid the manifestations. In an interview with Al Jazeera, he stated: "*When my boy grows up, he will ask me, how did you lose your eye? And I will say, I lost it fighting. Fighting for us, fighting for a justice that did not exist, for dignity that did not exist*" (Larsson, 2020). Moreover, as pictured in section 6.3, the campaign in approval of constitutional reform operated under the name 'Chile Digno', meaning they argued fighting for a 'dignified' Chile (Peoples Dispatch, 2020)

It is now clarified that the participants desire a (welfare) system in which security, equality and dignity are put central, considering ethics, justice, and respect. How do the participants envision this to be facilitated? Multiple participants mentioned the role of (political) institutions in the realisation of systemic change, like participant 2. He argues that institutions are essential in this process. In his perspective, an institution would be able to represent the cabildo initiatives. He is in favour of institutionalisation of the social movements: "*the substitution of the routines of organized politics for the disorder of life in the streets, buttressed by mass organizations and purposive incentive*" (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 130). Participant 12 is more critical than participant 2. He critiques the representative democratic model that is now implemented in Chile and believes that to implement the social demands, citizens need to be involved again in the decision-making process. As he mentions:

> "*Today, people want not only to delegate, but they want to be kept permanently informed and be taken into account. They also want to have the possibility to remove the people in charge if they do not respond to their expectation. So, institutionality is going to have to change somehow so that people feel there is more to pass from what is called representative democracy to participatory democracy.*"

Though the institutions are essential to facilitate change, the current institutions are not able to cope with the demands determined by society. For participant 12, this means thus that more participatory democracy is needed, though he does not further argue how this could be implemented. Many participants who summarised their contentions, demands and their desires did not specifically explain how they think this systemic change to be realised. In the interviews, many participants predominantly focused on constitutional change, rather than political change. Therefore, many participants still perceive the solution to be within the current political system or are not able to define an alternative.

7.5.2 Role of the cabildos

In envisioning a new (political) system, special attention needs to be paid to the cabildos initiative. In this research is asked to the participants what the role is of the cabildos in the process of systemic change. According to participant 15, they are "*spaces of observation to give transparency to the process*". When asking this question to participant 12, he answered: "*I do not believe that voluntarism alone will solve the problems, but I hope that we can at least have one, a new constitution that is more horizontal*". With this quote, he means that the cabildos alone will not solve the problems that Chile is facing at this particular moment. A new constitution then is seen as the first step in the right direction. Remarkably, many participants did not even mention the cabildos in the formation of a new constitution but did mention how the cabildos as organizational space transformed over time, especially since the pandemic.

In times of corona, the process for a new constitution faded to the background, as the crisis severely impacted many lives as described in section 6.3. Many people lost their jobs, and governmental measures (like quarantine and lockdown) obliged the workers to stay at home. Participant 6 explains how, in their societal, organizational space, its network changed purpose in times of corona:

> "*And to this day [27-04-2020], those assemblies are still in operation in a period of the pandemic. They have been focusing more on solidarity and mutual aid (especially in food), getting large purchases so as people do not have to go to the supermarket. Moreover, they provide help with gender violence, that has been increasing because of the confinement. More issues that have to do with supporting neighbours who may have contaminated by the coronavirus . . . In this sense, while they [the assemblies] continue to maintain forms of support and provide solutions to the problems of the communities, they can be sustained on their feet. For instance, with common pots, popular schools, cultural collectives.*".

The assembly, in this case, modified its practices to provide aid for what the neighbourhood needed at that moment in time. Participant 6 argues that these "*supply networks*" within these assemblies have grown the most since the entrance of the coronavirus. These networks now have been utilized to distribute necessary resources and function as a broader support system. This development is affirmed by participant 7, who sees even new opportunities for the cabildos to maintain their position in the neighbourhood. Even though "*especially now with the coronavirus [this is] making it more difficult, we are also seeing the possibility of doing more concrete things*". In the meantime, these more concrete activities have become complicated by the travel restrictions and obliged quarantine. Still, these initiatives prove themselves to be resilient. The cabildos initiatives, therefore, are dynamic and adapt themselves to what is needed at a particular time in place.

Participant 6 noted in the quote above that these supply networks also protect domestic violence. Due to the corona crisis and the confinement measures, domestic violence has been a big

topic. In her neighbourhood, Villa Olímpica, victims of gender violence are moved from their homes to make sure the women will not be hurt anymore. Furthermore, the neighbourhoods make online appointments for these women with psychologists to give them a chance to discuss their issues. Other actions these assemblies take, declared by participant 6 are common pots (the distribution of food among the poor), or sanitizing the neighbourhood.

Moreover, participant 12 explains that due to the pandemic, the youth obtained a more critical role in these organizations. He argues that due to the vulnerability of the elderlies, the elderlies try as much as possible to obey the quarantines and stay at home. In his junta de vecinos, youth have started to take over these responsibilities, even though they are not registered in these junta de vecinos. He believes that though some of these youngsters did not felt motivated to participate in the junta de vecinos, they do acknowledge the institution and its meaning for the community. Therefore, since the pandemic, many people started to show up and help with the organization of food collections. This collected food will then, later, be distributed among the people who have lost their jobs or their incomes. In participant 12 argumentation, a significant development is stressed. Though people did not feel motivated to participate in the continuous practices of the junta de vecinos (like local elections), people (mainly the youth) started to collaborate when they felt needed. The youth put aside their political ideology to help their neighbours.

To conclude, some participants acknowledge the importance of the institutions in accomplishing systematic change, though transformation is necessary from a representative model to a participatory one. Also, the function of the state is addressed, in which the state must go from a subsidiary to a welfare state. This welfare system would also help fight the individualistic tendencies in society. Moreover, for the cabildos, there is a role as "*space for observation*" in which the population can reflect on this societal process. Eventually, though restrictions were put into place that impeded the organizational spaces to operate during the pandemic, the social networks maintained their role. With innovative and creative solutions, these networks aim to re-function themselves to serve a new (immediate) purpose and even to increase their presence and importance in society.

Chile is a country of extremes, and even though the middle-class has been rising in the last twenty years, they still have much to suffer and are still highly vulnerable to shocks. The political context and Pinochet legacy are predominantly responsible for this gap between socioeconomic classes. Since the introduction of neoliberalism, the market became responsible for social services, with much discontent as a result. One of the developments that stand concerning the increasing dissatisfaction is the distrust in the political system, as Chileans stopped being involved in politics and voting numbers went down. The October social outbreak is the most significant manifestation of this discontent since the return to democracy, though not the first one. Already in 2006 and 2011, Chilean civil society showed the world how dedicated they are to transform the political and economic system in Chile. Though previously they have had no or minimal effect, Chileans did not give up as third time is the charm. In contrast to earlier claim-making, a new performance of collective action emerged, the cabildos. In this research, the cabildos are the main object of attention. Therefore, the main question investigated is: "*How do participants of the Santiago cabildos envision and engage with the upcoming referendum for a new constitution in the context of the 2019th contention, collective action and the corona pandemic?*"

In an attempt to answer this question, it is first necessary to examine what a cabildo is and how they emerged amid the episode of 2019. The cabildos are an outcome (a response) to the mobilizations that erupted on the 7th of October. Some participants argue that the cabildos started to emerge when the government announced a referendum for a new constitution. Others state that these networks were already born in the times of protest when people collaborated on the streets. A cabildo is both an 'organizational space' and a contentious performance. Many organizational spaces (like assemblies and junta de vecinos) are active cabildo-makers that this research also embraces. In general, a cabildo consists of three stages. First, a discussion of its methodology and a division into groups (1), followed by the projection of demands (and its prioritization) (2) and eventually a plenary session takes place to finalize the cabildo (3).

The cabildos as initiative are spread widely within Chilean society and have had different perceived impacts, varying from educational, to social and political. The cabildos taught residents about the 1980 Constitution/ constitution and its implications for society. Moreover, these cabildos were a social space, "*an instance for dialogue*" (participant 7) that brought together the community. Alternatively, as put by participant 1, it is about interacting with one's neighbours, socializing. The political perceived impacts in society are that Chileans were discussing political issues on quite a big scale, which had never happened before, as mentioned by participant 5. He referred to it as "*re-politicization*". Overall, the participants were enthusiastic in describing their experiences about the cabildos, and almost all participants cheered these spaces. The cabildos contributed to the "*feeling of community*" (participant 3a).

In this research is analysed what the participants of the cabildos considered to be essential demands and what these participants would like to achieve with these demands. Though questions raised were mainly regarding the new constitution, the participants positioned their needs towards the society as a whole, not just the constitution. The primary demand presented is a total system reformation. The participants want to get rid of the neoliberal economic model inherited from the Pinochet era. This reform would mean better access and quality to education, healthcare, and pensions. Moreover, the participants discussed the democratization of society. To successfully achieve

this democratization, "*certain quorums in legislative procedures*" need to be lifted (participant 13). Instead, more "*citizen participation*" is necessary to restore the government's legitimacy (participant 13). Another essential feature of this democratization of society is the installation of more citizens rights, like "*water*", "*social and cultural*" and "*political*" rights (participant 15). To further democratize society, media also should be incorporated. Finally, for further systemic reformation, in an output of a cabildo is mentioned the "*deconstruction*" of capitalism. Participant 10 argues for the creation of a "*solidarity system*".

With these demands, the participants aim to achieve the following. First, a country that suits more with a welfare state. The next keynotes therein are essential: security, equality, and dignity. Security is vital as it means stability: "*to live comfortably*". Equality is another keynote put forward, so people have equal opportunities on a secure livelihood. Dignity means that people have more dignified lives, supported by social rights. A new socio-political system should also consider justice and ethics. For the participants, it is not clear what the role would be of the cabildos in this new socio-political system. One participant speaks about an institutionalization (participant 2), while other thinks that a transition toward a more participatory democracy should be desirable (participant 12). Nevertheless, what practically the role would be of the cabildos is still unclear.

In chapter 7, this research analysed how the participants perceived the referendum to implement a new constitution. The participants who did explain what (a new) constitution means for them, understood the constitution to be of importance for a variety of reasons. Some argued it to be a "*foundation*" (participant 3a) or a "*mother law*" (participant 14). A new constitution is primarily perceived as a first step in the right direction, stimulating further economic and political change. Like participant 15, who described it as "*the possibility of building a different country*". Nevertheless, many concerns were mentioned and specifically with the entrance of coronavirus in Chile. First, participants indicated the matter of representation; how does the government ensures that minorities and indigenous communities are represented in the convention. Second, the threat of political capture of the constitutional process by the elite is displayed.

Due to the coronavirus, the government postponed the referendum for a new constitution (and will take place in October now). People have now more time to change their stands towards the plebiscite. In the meantime, the living conditions are worsening in Chile, which would make people more sensitive for bribing by politicians. Furthermore, the government is using quarantine and lockdowns to get rid of all protest's signs and symbols of recognition in the public sphere. Uncertainty is also a tool adopted by the opposition of a new constitution to make people doubt constitutional change, as Chileans do not know what to expect when constitutional reform is approved. Finally, polarization is feared as people have a firm position concerning the plebiscite for a new constitution.

What is evident in this research is that participants have lost the constitution in eyesight, or at least put it in the back of their minds. One participant argues that the cabildos must become "*spaces of observation*" to which the politicians need to justify themselves. Nevertheless, all the activities concerning this plebiscite are postponed, due to the drastically changed societal context in Chile. The pandemic has put a significant burden on the Chilean population. Many lost their jobs and became vulnerable. Too, the epidemic has stressed how fragile the Chilean middle-class is. The participants have shown that these networks have changed purpose. The cabildos have proven civil society to be dynamic and flexible to adjust to the immediate needs of the community. Alternatively, the cabildos have been adaptable as put by participant 7, by "*doing more concrete things*", like the initiation of

supply networks. Furthermore, the youth obtained a more critical role within these cabildos. As the elderly are more vulnerable to the virus, the youngsters take over their responsibilities in the distribution of the resources.

To conclude, most of the participants of the cabildo envision the upcoming referendum to be the first step for further systemic political and economic transformation. None of the participants thought a new constitution to have no overall effect, though the expected impact varied from participant to participant. Some were more hopeful than others. The participant's action now is mainly focused on the corona pandemic. They transcended the networks that erupted in times of the revolt (of the cabildos) and turned those into supply networks. These networks are applied by many participants to provide necessities for people who are struck by the significant economic and political consequences of the pandemic. The participants agree that the constitution at this moment [August 2020] is less important, and they have some concerns. However, most of the participants emphasized that the collective action returns, when the governmental measures are lifted, and the pandemic is over. Though, even when asked the participants how they envision the cabildo to be placed within this new 'desired' political system, not many practical ideas were proposed.

8.1 Discussion of Results

In chapter 4, this research addressed how the mobilization of 2019 is an accumulation of discontent, which is a continuation of the previous episodes of 2006 and 2011. These previous episodes are depicted and its (de)mobilization outlined. During both last events, the governmental elite put these mobilizations to a halt by having endless discussions with the organizations behind the movements. Nevertheless, as addressed in this chapter, intergenerational learning and learning in between these movements have taken place. It seems that current protestors have learned from mistakes and failures made in the past. Recognizable in this current societal upheaval is that there is no *central* organization responsible for the collective action and further mobilization.

Social media provide the networks wherein ideas are shared, and students and ordinary citizens are called upon to protest and take part in manifestations. Since the mobilizations are decentralized, it is far much difficult for the government to discuss and negotiate with the protestors. While organizations and institutions still have a significant role in the mobilization, they are not '*possessing*' the mobilization or dominate the narrative. Rodrigo Pérez, the president of the school student centre of a public school called Instituto Nacional, expresses this. He affirmed to be in contact with other schools' student centres that were willing to collaborate. Though, none of these student centres claimed the mobilization. In contrast, the students protested in the name of the people, rather than just the students.

Moreover, as decentralization of the movement seems visible, social media has a central role in these mobilizations. In the case of Santiago (Chile), the mobilizations erupted when students online (like via Instagram) encouraged the youth to join the fare-invasion performance. The contesters have learned from previous experiences how interactions with the government (through centralized and dispersed institutions) resulted in demobilization. Even though collective action took place, the contesters portrayed themselves as an accumulated group of individuals each with their demands and desires. This approach increased the political identity of the group. Moreover, these protests coincide with protests and discontent worldwide, like in Hong Kong, India, Venezuela,

Ecuador and many more. Though this growing international discontent is almost not mentioned in this research, it does not undermine the interrelatedness between these cases.

The participants that participated in this research argued that the cabildos have some limitations. In its current state, the main criticism presented is the low impact these meetings have in political terms and the inconsistency of people participating. Some participants desire cabildos to have more impact. In this way, the institutionalization of this cabildo initiative would be a way forward to have more political implications. The definition of institutionalization in this research encompasses the "*substitution of the routines of organized politics*" (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 130). Institutionalisation then would mean a political reformation, in which a new organization is formed, or already existing (governmental) organizations altered/changed. This tactic could, to a certain extent, be helpful. The cabildos are interpreted as a form of re-politicization, a space in which people discuss political issues. However, from the conducted interviews and the output of an examined cabildo come forward that people distrust conventional politics. This distrust is not solely targeted to a specific political party or politician, but the overall political system.

An opportunity for these cabildos exists to develop themselves as a tool for participatory democracy that is desired, as a form of participatory governance. In the theoretical framework is stated by Fung that there are two conditions under which participatory democracy in Latin America flourishes. Those are: *political leadership aiming for more self-governance (1), and a strong civil societal base that is independent and pursues inclusion (2)* (2011). Furthermore, the final power to decide needs to be by the people, rather than the political and economic elite (Pateman, 2012). Institutionalization then, to a certain extent, seems inevitable. However, there arises a threat if institutionalization (as proposed by participant 2) takes place wrongly. The participants have clearly stated that they distrust the conventional political system. Therefore, the cabildos could lose its support and legitimacy from its popular base when it would get incorporated in conventional politics.

It is just as in the case of the new political coalition Frente Amplio (mentioned in section 6.2) that was born after the societal explosion in 2011. Though they derived from a grassroots movement, they positioned themselves within conventional politics. While they meet the two conditions mentioned by Fung, they lost its legitimacy when they entered conventional politics. This incorporation meant the loosening of its ties with civil society and thus lost a big part of their popular base. It would not mean that institutionalization is per se a bad thing. Participants do envision political transformation and do want to have an impact (through these cabildos). An alternative that seems more successful would be the initiation of an institution outside the political system, but with more power. To meet with the second condition of Fung, La Mesa de Unidad Social could be an institution to take upon this responsibility sustainably. As a collaboration of more than 180 bodies and unions la Mesa de Unidad Social represents a significant part of the population and therefore seems suitable for this job. Moreover, many participants stressed its importance and supported its intention to represent the cabildos (participants 1,2, 4, 6 and 10). This organization can put political pressure from outside the political system but still pushing for further desired reconfiguration.

Still, this would mean the unification of the cabildo initiatives and therefore, might still negatively affects its popular base. The power of the cabildos originates from its inclusive and diverse traits. Now, cabildos are performed by both left-wing as right-wing residents, from different

cultural and social classes and all ages. This inclusiveness and diversity will vanish if most of the society does not feel anymore represented by the cabildos initiatives. Political incorporation would mean the demarcation of what the 'majority' of society desires, and a losing 'minority'. It means that incorporation of cabildos, in any form whatsoever, could mean diminishing trust in this new 'democratic' initiative. Moreover, as already presented that government officials are known to bribe and lobby, political capture of these initiatives lurks.

Though this research predominantly looks at the political objective of the cabildos, those have proven to be as well socially and economically meaningful. The cabildos bring together neighbours in communities and strengthen the ties between them. For this reason, it would be as important as possible to maintain their inclusive and horizontal approach to prolong the social function of the cabildos on the local level. Moreover, now in times of corona, they offer online support networks for the poor and the vulnerable and reinstall their position in society, which coincides with the prefigurative theory mentioned earlier. How the cabildos operate, bring people together and its impact on participants, is what these people desire to change nationally. The cabildos functioning now in the time of the pandemic, supporting the local community, is what they desire from the government. In such a way, the participants already are providing this welfare state on a local scale themselves, for instance, through their support networks. Though these social services are provided outside of the government, they are already initiating a welfare '*community*'.

8.2 Reflection

Like any other research, this research has some strengths and weaknesses, which are now reflected on. The corona pandemic is this research' primary disturbance and, at the same time, its enrichment. It is enriching as it has been possible to see how social networks (illustrated by the cabildos) changed shape and its function to adapt to new appearing needs. However, it was also a disturbance as fieldwork was impossible to perform, and the only way to pursue this research has been from a distance, through the internet. The distance has negatively impacted the research' quality. First, some reflection is done regarding how the research developed over time and how, during this research, some changes are made.

The cabildos have a unique position within this research. Initially, in the proposal phase of this research, not much information was available concerning the cabildos. A few newspapers wrote an article about these cabildos initiatives. While doing this research, I found out after conducting a few semi-structured interviews, that the concept cabildos is more complicated than expected beforehand. Due to this complex concept, I had to decide how to define a cabildo to make this operable in this research. As described in chapter 5, the cabildos are both an "*organizational space*" and a *"contentious performance"*. Both were examined profoundly to create awareness about the cabildos' complexity. I chose to emphasize the instrumentality of the cabildos; how a network is established, and people together perform collective action. Therefore, it is less noticeable whether people call it a cabildo or an assembly and what organization is behind those. This research has focussed on the cabildo itself, the processes of people discussing their discontent, and listing and prioritizing their demands.

Moreover, the functioning of the cabildos changed over time, due to the corona pandemic. Before I started to conduct this research, I intended to solely look at cabildos as an opportunity for political transformation, whether the cabildos would suit in a participatory democratic model.

Nevertheless, since the plebiscite for a new constitution is postponed, cabildos started to be less politically loaded and more socially embedded. Supply networks were initiated, and politics vanished to the background. The participants started to emphasize the new roles of the cabildos, as perceived for them to be necessary. Therefore, I chose to incorporate the new performances of the cabildos and so also in this research, the political importance of cabildos diminished, though still seemed to be relevant.

For this research, the theoretical framework entails two parts. In the first part, contentious politics by Tilly and Tarrow (2015) is examined. In the second part, attention is paid to participatory democracy as an addition to the current conventional political system in Chile. In this research, Tilly and Tarrow's contentious politics has proven to be a useful theory in describing and explaining mobilization in Chile. While adopting this theory, the concept of mobilization has been essential in determining how and why people started to take part in collective action. However, since the theoretical model provided by Tilly and Tarrow in their book is too comprehensive, I chose to select the leading and most applicable concepts provided, like *collective action, political identity, political opportunity, and diffusion.* This research did not aim to integrate the model as provided in their book totally, but just the central concept to investigate the 2019th episode, its emergence and diffusion (of mobilization). On the other hand, the theory of participatory democratic initiatives (like participatory budgeting) diminished its relevance but remained valuable in the discussion.

Just as previously mentioned, this research has some limitations. The methodological approach of this research is mainly limited due to the coronavirus and the travel restrictions put into place by both the Netherlands and the Chilean government. These travel restrictions meant that I had to take a considerable risk in moving to Chile. It was inadvisable, and in a matter of time, it even turned impossible to leave the Netherlands and visit the cabildos in Santiago. By choosing to stay in the Netherlands, I changed my earlier determined methodologies. I had planned to do participant observation alongside semi-structured interviews. Even if travelling were possible, this would be highly unlikely to proceed due to the lockdown and quarantines that were installed in Santiago. Unfortunately, this meant that this research had to be taken place from a distance. Especially for social research, this can be highly criticized due to its *'ivory tower'* tendency. Every step within this research, I have been aware of this limitation, but this does not mean I have not tried to diminish the negative consequences of researching from a distance.

The semi-structured interviews were still possible to pursue, though had to be performed virtual, through Skype or Zoom. In replacement for the participant observation, I chose to do some qualitative surveys to gather more information on the cabildos, and I received some methodologies (from participants) over their cabildos. From one participant, I even acquired the outputs of an organized cabildo (in which she was active). Another limitation of this research is that it was highly challenging to find participants willing to cooperate in this research. Eventually, the data collection took almost 3.5 months. The context has drastically changed over time as the first interview has been conducted on the 23rd of March and the last received questionnaire was on the 5th of June. With the development of the corona crisis, the context of these participants changed, while conducting the interviews and questionnaires.

The language barrier was also a constraint for this research. I am an intermediate Spanish speaker so that I can have a conversation in Spanish, but it was quite challenging to understand everything the respondent said while interviewing. It made it sometimes hard to ask the right

questions. The positive side of this story though is that I could record all the interviews (of course if permission were given). Subsequently, with Sonix software, I was able to transcribe and translate most of the research. Due to the dreadful internet quality, one interview was lost entirely (interview 9), and another was partly damaged (interview 7). Nevertheless, the other interviews had good quality, and the software translated the interviews appropriately. Thus eventually, a lot of conducted data turned out to be qualitatively substantial.

Important to consider is that many of the respondents of this research are predominantly organizers and active citizens in the cabildos and neighbourhood organizations. Their involvement in a political organization might have influenced the outcome of the research. As active citizens, their opinions, perceptions, and envisioning might be different from a 'regular' citizen. 'Regular' citizens might not even think about political reformation, but rather just are satisfied with higher incomes or better working conditions. It does not mean that all participants involved are organizers of the cabildos, like participant 1, 3a and 3b. Moreover, most of the participants are young adults, which also might impact the results of this research. Nevertheless, I aimed to increase external validity as much as possible by also including some participants who are middle-aged adults like participant 15 and older-aged adults like participant 9. Finally, the danger of choosing for a snow-ball sampling is as well, that your participants belong to the same social network. In this case, many participants in this research have or have had an educational profession, like participant 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8. Still, many other participants have a different profession or social background (like law, politics, social work, history). Therefore, this compensates the domination of education.

Though it was hard to find participants for this research, while interviewing many participants showed their thanks for me as a researcher to listen to them. Participants were thankful for the interview. After conducting a few interviews, I started to realise that my position as a researcher, overlaps with how the cabildos operated. I had the feeling that the interviews had kind of the same function for some of these people as operating in a cabildo, as people wanted to be heard and share their discontent and demands. In these interviews, listening and an equal ground were important, just as in the cabildos. Of course, partaking in research is something different than partaking in a cabildo; still, many participants were appreciative.

I was aware that staying in the Netherlands would mean a loss in value as researching from a distance is highly contested. Nevertheless, taking into account how corona developed last year and especially in Chile; afterwards, it has been the right decision. From the semi-structured interviews, some participants addressed how the health system in Chile was collapsing. Moreover, discrimination started to appear against foreigners, especially Europeans, as foreigners brought this disease to Chile, just like the elite. My gatekeeper also emphasizes this. Thus, staying in the Netherlands was the right decision.

Nevertheless, some things I would redo if I would have had the opportunity. While searching participant, I contacted many people through Facebook and social media. Moreover, I contacted organizations via email. Unfortunately, not many people responded to those. In the beginning, I was quite careful in contacting people and organizations, as I was afraid to gather too many participants that I had to cancel people afterwards. With the current knowledge, this is laughable, as it has proved to be demanding to find participants. People felt too much disconnected to a foreign researcher; they only know from an email. I have learned not to be shy contacting organizations and participants online, but just send as many messages as possible.

Moreover, sometimes the semi-structured interviews did not go as planned, as participants at the last moment announced not to have skype. Changing the software in the last moment meant that sometimes I had some problems with recording the sessions, as not all software programs provide recording services. I could have been prevented this problem by directly installing a recording service on my computer, regardless of which software used so that all sessions could be simply recorded. Moreover, primarily at the beginning, I found out that I experienced it very hard to ask participants another question while they were still talking. Sometimes participants went off track, and I should have asked them another question to keep the conversation ongoing. I especially experienced this to be difficult when the interview was in Spanish.

The cabildos are a very new phenomenon, and almost no academic literature exists yet. This research explores the concept of a cabildo, what it entails and how they were launched in Chile during the social upsurge in 2019. The cabildos are a valuable form of organizing in contemporary Chilean society and are understood as an outcome of mobilization processes. Though multiple cabildos are compared (in)directly, it is falsified to generalize the cabildos. Many cabildos initiatives emerged and as pointed out in this research, different methodologies of how cabildos operate and function co-exist. It means that it would be fallacious to contemplate this research as an outline of how all the cabildos operate and function.

Nevertheless, it provides a good upset for future research. Moreover, in this research withdrawal from formal politics is perceived from the perspective of the cabildos. It should not undermine their social impact on the community, as also expressed in chapter 5 and is more than just a new form of political expression. The cabildos have proven that people are still interested in practising politics; however, they have not felt willing to participate in conventional politics. This research aimed to find out whether the cabildos as initiative could function as an alternative system of practising politics. It seemed to be hard for the participants to observe these cabildos operate in practising politics, especially since the corona pandemic. Institutionalization is necessary for these cabildos to be part of the democratic political system, but that is what the participants would like to prevent as that system is distrusted. There seems to be a deadlock, which should be researched any further by other researchers.

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Appendices

A. Table Methodology per Organization

	Methodology per Organization		
	Villa Olímpica Assembly (see Appendix B)	Barrio República (see Appendix C)	Mesa de Unidad Social (see Appendix D)
Agenda			
Introduction	Reception and start activity (square) -> dinamica *(30 minutes)* Presentation of the methodology and organization of the groups (8-10 people) *(10 minutes)*	Reception and starting activity (dynamic to get to know each other) *(30 minutes)* Presentation of the methodology and organization of the groups (8-10 people) *(10 minutes)*	Moderator welcomes and requests brief introduction *(N.t.m.)* Group formation (into groups of 6-10 people) where each group will have a moderator *(N.t.m.)*
Discussion and Prioritizing demands	Diagnosis of malaise *(40 minutes)*	Discussion n°1: The Chile we want *(45 minutes)*	Sit in a circle for a fraternal and equal dialogue, including the children. *(N.t.m.)*
	Prioritize demands *(30 minutes)*	Discussion n°2: How to achieve the Chile we want *(45 minutes)*	*Group* conversation *(N.t.m.)*
	Towards the people's constituent assembly *(30 minutes)*		
Plenary and Closure	Plenary *(20 minutes)*	Plenary *(50 minutes)*	Presentation of conclusions in plenary *(N.t.m.)*
	Closing	Closing	In order to elaborate an inclusive systematization, we request that you send reports of conclusions and assistance to the following e-mail: unidadsocialnacional @gmail.com *(N.t.m.)*

Note. N.t.m. = No time mentioned.

CABILDO POPULAR CONSTITUYENTE

VILLA OLIMPICA – COMUNIDAD ORGANIZADA

SÁBADO 2 DE NOVIEMBRE

Propósito: Generar un espacio de encuentro y diálogo abierto entre les vecines de la Villa Olímpica para identificar las razones, identificar y priorizar demandas y discutir sobre el rol que las Asambleas Populares Territoriales tienen en el proceso de la Asamblea Popular Constituyente.

Invitación: Invitamos a todos les vecines, niñes, jóvenes, personas adultas y adultas mayores, y a cualquiera que se sienta convocade en este territorio, a participar este **sábado 2 de noviembre, entre las 11:00 y las 14:00 hrs en el Cabildo Popular Constituyente** que se realizará en la **plaza central de la Villa Olímpica**.

El Cabildo es un espacio levantado a partir de la necesidad de organizarnos, conversar y compartir visiones sobre la movilización social que vivimos; es un espacio de comunicación y deliberación donde buscaremos identificar las razones del conflicto social, priorizar las demandas y discutir sobre el rol que las Asambleas Populares Territoriales tienen en el proceso Popular Constituyente.

El Cabildo es un espacio abierto a toda la comunidad, donde tendremos metodologías que incluyan la participación de niñes, y el llamado es a la participación activa y respetuosa.

Ven con tu voz y tus ideas, construyamos juntes nuestra nueva realidad

Villa Olímpica – Comunidad Organizada

Participantes: Vecinas y vecinos de la Villa Olímpica de todas las edades.

Roles:

- **Facilitación por grupo:** cada grupo designa un encargado/a

- **Sistematización por grupo:** cada grupo designa un encargado/a

- **Moderación plenaria:** por definir

- **Sistematización general:** Comisión Política y Contenidos

Agenda:

11:00 – 11:30	Recepción y actividad de inicio (plaza) → dinamica
11:30 – 11:40	Presentación de la metodología y organización de los grupos
11:40 – 12:20	**1. DIAGNÓSTICO DEL MALESTAR** ¿Cuáles son las razones que han dado origen al malestar que se ha expresado en las calles?
12:20 – 12:50	**2. DEMANDAS PRIORITARIAS** A partir del comunicado de la Asamblea popular de la Villa Olímpica: ¿Existe alguna demanda prioritaria que no esté planteada? ¿Cuáles son las demandas prioritarias para la población?
12:50 – 13:10	Café, té y frutas (15)
13:10 – 13:40	**3. HACIA LA ASAMBLEA POPULAR CONSTITUYENTE** ¿Qué acciones y estrategias deben llevar adelante las asambleas territoriales de vecinos y vecinos para avanzar hacia la Asamblea Popular Constituyente?
13:40 – 14:00	**PLENARIA** Se presentan las principales conclusiones de los grupos
14:00.-	Cierre

Actividades y metodologías:

Duración	Actividad	Materiales y roles activos
30 min	**RECEPCIÓN Y ACTIVIDAD DE INICIO** Propósito: Romper el hielo, favorecer que nos conozcamos entre vecinos/as. Dividir las personas en grupo de entre 8 a 10 personas. Preguntar a las vecinas que estén interesadas en participar de la discusión en un espacio separatista. Dinámica: a) contar una historia sobre un objeto b) ordenar las personas por edad (se necesitan sillas) c) Preguntas para todes les asistentes (se hace una lista de preguntas y se les pide que vayan levantando la mano quienes cumplan con la condición de la pregunta). Ej: ¿Quién está estudiando? ¿Quiénes están trabajando? ¿Quiénes están jubilades? /	Facilitadora

	¿Quiénes han participado de los cacerolazos? ¿Quiénes han ido a la manifestación de Salvador con Grecia?	
10 min	**PRESENTACIÓN DE LA METODOLOGÍA Y ORGANIZACIÓN DE LOS GRUPOS** Los grupos se conformarán con un mínimo de 6 personas y un máximo de 10. Una vez conformados los grupos de trabajo, se presenta la metodología de la jornada y se pide que cada grupo designe entre sus integrantes dos roles diferenciados: **Facilitador/a:** integrante del equipo que velará por la circulación de la palabra y el cumplimiento de los tiempos **Vocero/a:** será quien registre y sintetice la discusión (acuerdos y desacuerdos) llevada a cabo por el grupo para comunicarlo luego al plenario.	Facilitación general
40 min	**DISCUSIÓN N°1: DIAGNÓSTICO DEL MALESTAR** Cada grupo discutirá en torno a la pregunta *"¿Cuáles son las razones que han dado origen al malestar que se ha expresado en las calles?"* Paso1: Las y los participantes podrán apoyarse en la escritura de tarjetas, de forma individual primero, las que luego de expuestas guiarán a los participantes en los puntos en común y en las divergencias que puedan tener. Paso 2: A los 30 minutos se pedirá que el grupo reelabore sus ideas iniciales individuales y sintetice prioridades.	Materiales - Papelógrafo con la pregunta - Tarjetas - Cinta adhesiva - Lápices/ plumones Roles: - Facilitación por grupo - Vocero/a
30 min	**DISCUSIÓN N°2: DEMANDAS PRIORITARIAS** Propósito: Encontrar puntos comunes entre las demandas planteadas en el **Comunicado de la Asamblea Popular Villa Olímpica,** más inquietudes sociales que se puedan plantear en la discusión. Pregunta: A partir del comunicado de la Asamblea popular de la Villa Olímpica: ¿Existe alguna demanda prioritaria que no esté planteada? ¿Cuáles son las demandas prioritarias para la población? Se plantea generar una discusión en torno a la prioridad de las demandas planteadas por la asamblea popular y/o nuevas demandas que se planteen en el grupo. Se entregarán 21 tarjetones, 18 temas planteados en el comunicado y 3 en	Materiales: - Papelógrafo con triángulo invertido. (VER ANEXO) - 21 Tarjetas por grupo (3 en blanco) - Cinta adhesiva - Lápices/ plumones - Notebooks *Roles*:

	blanco para que el grupo pueda proponer temas no abordados. Cada grupo trabajará con un papelógrafo que contenga un triángulo invertido dividido en tres. Estas divisiones se plantean como niveles de priorización (3 Niveles). Cada grupo deberá tener 7 tarjetones por nivel de prioridad. (VER ANEXO TRIÁNGULO DE PRIORIZACIÓN).	- Facilitación por grupo - Vocero/a
30 min.	**DISCUSIÓN N°3: HACIA LA ASAMBLEA POPULAR CONSTITUYENTE** Cada grupo discutirá en torno a la pregunta *"¿Qué acciones y estrategias deben llevar adelante las asambleas territoriales de vecinos y vecinas para avanzar hacia la Asamblea Popular Constituyente?"*. Las respuestas deben ser escritas en el papelógrafo numerado del 1 al 10.	Materiales: - Papelógrafo con la pregunta y lista numerada del 1 al 10. - Lápices/ plumones
20 min	**PLENARIA: PROYECCIÓN DE LA MOVILIZACIÓN** Una vez terminado el trabajo por grupos, cada vocero/a expondrá al conjunto de les asistentes las respuestas que su grupo dio a ambas preguntas. Cada grupo tendrá un tiempo estimado de 3 a 5 minutos para exponer (de acuerdo con la cantidad de grupos). Terminada la síntesis de las discusiones, se abre la palabra para marcar énfasis, abrir disensos, etc.	*Materiales*: - Computadores *Roles*: - Vocerías por grupo - Moderación plenaria - Sistematización general

ANEXO: Formato de registro de asistentes

Nº	Nombre	Rut	Teléfono	Mail	Firma
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					

6				
7				
8				
9				
10				

## ANEXO: Triángulo de priorización

a) **18 tarjetas con los siguientes temas:**

1. Recuperación de los recursos naturales (aguas, cobre, litio, bosques)
2. Aumento del sueldo mínimo con cargo al empleador ¡No más subsidios a grandes empresas!
3. Rebaja en los precios de los servicios básicos, incluido el transporte (gratuito para estudiantes y para la tercera edad).
4. No más AFP. Proponemos un sistema público, solidario y de reparto. Pensiones mínimas no inferiores al sueldo mínimo.
5. Fortalecimiento a la educación pública integral estatal, inclusiva, feminista, antirracista y anticolonial. Con respeto a la diversidad de género y funcional.
6. Fin a la deuda del CAE.
7. Ley de identidad de género.
8. Fin del SENAME y más políticas de protección hacia la infancia.
9. Inclusión efectiva de las Personas en Situación de Discapacidad.
10. Derecho a la vivienda y a ciudades equitativas.
11. Garantizar el derecho al trabajo y a la sindicalización. Fin a la cesantía.
12. Fin a la reforma migratoria y creación de nueva Ley de Migración.
13. Fortalecimiento a la salud pública integral (recursos e infraestructura).
14. Reforma tributaria e impuesto a la riqueza y al capital.
15. Nueva ley de transparencia y acceso a información pública.
16. Autodeterminación de los pueblos indígenas.
17. Aborto legal, libre y gratuito.
18. Apoyo a la movilización de las personas presas y condiciones dignas en las cárceles.

b) **3 tarjetas: "otros"**

Cada grupo deberá colocar 7 tarjetas por nivel de prioridad.

Diseño Metodológico
Cabildo Barrio República
Jueves 24 de octubre de 2019
Museo de la Solidaridad Salvador Allende

Presentación

Las protestas iniciadas en Octubre 2019 con motivo del alza del pasaje del transporte público en Santiago, condujeron a un estallido social que se materializó el Viernes 18 de Octubre (18-O). Desde ese día el Barrio República, al igual que todo el territorio nacional, vivió una transformación social para volcarse a producir mayor organización social. Después de 2 asambleas barriales se decidió formar un espacio de reflexión y síntesis para las demandas e intereses del Barrio República. El diseño metodológico se construyó con los propios vecinos reunidos en la plaza Manuel Rodríguez.

Propósito

Generar discusión abierta entre las y los vecinos del Barrio República sobre el contexto político del país y del barrio, con miras a una posición conjunta de los actores territoriales.

Participantes:

Vecinas y vecinos del Barrio República de todas las edades.

Roles:

- Facilitación por grupo: cada grupo designa
- Sistematización por grupo: cada grupo designa
- Moderación plenaria: Algún dirigente social del territorio
- Sistematización general: Escoger equipo técnico de 3 o 4 personas

Cronograma

16:00 – 16:30	Recepción y actividad de inicio (dinámica para conocerse)
16:30 – 16:40	Presentación de la metodología y organización de los grupos
16:40 – 17:25	Discusión n°1: El Chile que queremos
17:25 – 18:10	Discusión n°2: Cómo lograr el Chile que queremos
18:10 – 19:00	Plenaria
19:00	Cierre

Plan de Trabajo

Duración	Actividad	Materiales y roles activos
30 min	**RECEPCIÓN Y ACTIVIDAD DE INICIO (HALL)** Dinámica que involucrará la participación activa de todas las personas asistentes. Tendrá del propósito de romper el hielo, favorecer que nos conozcamos entre vecinos/as y que se conformen grupos de forma aleatoria de entre 8 a 10 personas.	Facilitadoras
10 min	**PRESENTACIÓN DE LA METODOLOGÍA Y ORGANIZACIÓN DE LOS GRUPOS** Una vez conformados los grupos de trabajo en el salón, se presenta la metodología de la jornada y se pide que cada grupo designe entre sus integrantes dos roles diferenciados: • Facilitador/a: integrante del equipo que velará por la circulación de la palabra y el cumplimiento de los tiempos • Vocero/a: será quien registre y sintetice la discusión (acuerdos y desacuerdos) llevada a cabo por el grupo para comunicarlo luego al plenario.	Facilitación general
45 min	**DISCUSIÓN N°1: EL CHILE QUE QUEREMOS** Cada grupo discutirá en torno a la pregunta *"¿Cómo es el Chile que queremos?"*. Paso 1: las y los participantes podrán apoyarse en la escritura de tarjetas, de forma individual primero, las que puestas en común guiarán a los participantes en los puntos en común y en las divergencias que puedan tener. Paso 2: A los 30 minutos se pedirá que el grupo reelabore sus ideas iniciales individuales y sintetice siete prioridades.	Materiales: - Papelógrafo con la pregunta - Tarjetas - Cinta adhesiva - Lápices/plumones - Roles: - Facilitación por grupo - Vocero/a
45 min	**DISCUSIÓN N°2: CÓMO LOGRAR EL CHILE QUE QUEREMOS** Sobre la base de las prioridades resultantes de la pregunta anterior, se conversará sobre *"¿Cómo lograr ese Chile que queremos?"*. Esta pregunta apunta a orientaciones generales que nos permitan ir dibujando caminos comunes, por sobre mecanismos técnicos eventualmente requeridos para ello. Cada grupo podrá guiar la discusión con las siete prioridades anteriores. Se insta a marcar los acuerdos, así como también los disensos y los matices que existan en las propuestas. Papelógrafos y tarjetas estarán a disposición de cada grupo para facilitar la organización de las ideas.	- Materiales: - Papelógrafo con la pregunta - Tarjetas - Cinta adhesiva - Lápices/plumones - Notebooks *Roles:* - Facilitación por grupo - Vocero/a

50 min	**PLENARIA**	*Materiales:*
	Una vez terminado el trabajo por grupos, cada vocero/a expondrá al grupo principal la respuesta que su grupo dio a ambas preguntas.	- Computadores
	Cada grupo tendrá un tiempo estimado de 3 a 5 minutos para exponer (de acuerdo con la cantidad de grupos)	*Roles:* - Vocerías por grupo - Moderación plenaria
	Terminada la síntesis de las discusiones, se abre la palabra para marcar énfasis, abrir disensos, etc.	- Sistematización general

El pueblo de Chile decide sobre su futuro

Instructivo de Asambleas Territoriales Jornada de Huelga General Jueves 24 de Octubre, a horario de libre elección, en todos los rincones del país.

Se convoca a reunirnos en consultorios, escuelas, universidades, centros culturales, juntas de vecinos, lugares de trabajo y en todo lugar que permita reflexionar colectivamente sobre el momento actual en Chile.

Es este un momento histórico es fundamental que sea la población chilena quien resuelva democráticamente sobre cómo avanzar en mayor justicia y recuperación de derechos sociales.

Preguntas:

1. ¿Cuál es el origen del conflicto actual?¿Qué ha generado el malestar ciudadano?¿Qué oportunidades ofrece esta movilización nacional? 20 min.

2. ¿ Cómo es posible avanzar en mayor justicia social a partir de esta coyuntura? ¿Existen demandas prioritarias para la ciudadanía? ¿Se necesita una Asamblea Constituyente para transformar Chile? 40 min

3. ¿Qué tipo de acciones se pueden realizar la ciudadanía y las organizaciones sociales para conseguir sus objetivos? 20 min.

Metodología:

- Hora opcional durante todo el día de jueves 24
- Inscripción de participantes en la entrada:
- Nombre
- Rut
- Moderador(a) da la bienvenida y solicita breve presentación
- Se divide la asamblea en grupos de mínimo 6 y máximo 10 personas en donde cada grupo tendrá un moderador o moderadora.
- Discusión grupal
- Exposición de conclusiones en plenaria
- Solicitamos para elaborar una sistematización inclusiva enviar informes de conclusiones y asistencia al siguiente correo: unidadsocialnacional@gmail.com

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