



Countering the Perceived Terrorism Threat in European Cities

The ways authorities in Brussels and Berlin are responding to influence safety perceptions of tourists

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Abstract

London (2005), Oslo (2011), Paris (2015), Brussels (2016), Berlin (2016) and Barcelona (2017) are all examples of recent terrorist attacks on European soil, making terrorism a central issue in Europe and worldwide. The last years have shown that terrorism attacks in Europe are declining. However, the terrorism threat in Europe remains on a high level, creating a feeling of insecurity and fear throughout the world. Terrorism attacks do not only cause human losses and destruction, but also impact a city's society as well as economy including the tourism industry due to changed risk and safety perceptions of tourists. This causes authorities to act on international level, European Union level, national and even local level. However, research has not extensively addressed the counter-terrorism measures implemented on the local level. Therefore, this research project investigated measures taken on the local level to counter the perceived threat of terrorism in European cities that have been struck by a terror attack. Special attention was given to exploring counter-terrorism measures in relation to changing tourists' perceptions of security and safety. Brussels and Berlin serve as case studies to the research. The findings of the research are based on qualitative data collection methods in form of semi-structured expert interviews, participant observation, database analysis and semi-structured tourist interviews in Brussels and Berlin. The research shows that both research destinations implemented a variety of counter-terrorism measures in different domains including on the political level, the build environment, local airports and event safety. Furthermore, in Brussels the DMO played an essential role in rebuilding a positive and safe destination image by developing destination-specific strategies and promotional marketing campaigns. In regard to the motivation for the implementation of these counter-terrorism measures taken in Brussels and Berlin, the findings suggest that tourism is only playing an indirect part. Tourism is only central to the steps the DMOs have taken. The study further discovered that in general, counter-terrorism measures implemented in Brussels positively influence the safety perception of the majority of tourists interviewed, while in Berlin nearly all tourists interviewed stated that security measures do not impact their safety perception Berlin as they perceive the city generally as being safe. The study concludes that European cities respond very differently to the perceived terrorism threat by implementing a variety of counter-terrorism measures in various fields. These measures highly differ in their rigour and are highly dependent on the type and impact of a terror attack as well as on the legal regulations and organisational structures of security authorities within a country and city.

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List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Explanation
CCTV	Closed-circuit Television
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
COO	Chief Operations Officer
DMO	Destination Marketing Organisation (also Destination Management Organisation)
ECTC	European Counter Terrorism Centre
ESICS	European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
EU	European Union
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (also known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and Daesh, its Arabic-language acronym)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OCAD	Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (also OCAM)
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PNR	Passenger Name Record
UK	United Kingdom
UNWTO	United Nations World Tourism Organisation
USA	United States of America
WTCF	World Tourism Cities Federation

1 Introduction

Terrorism has been an omnipresent topic throughout the world including Europe as major and well-known European cities have been struck by attacks in the last decades. London (2005), Oslo (2011), Paris (2015), Brussels (2016), Berlin (2016) and Barcelona (2017) are only some examples of recent terrorist attacks on European soil. According to the European Parliament (2018), despite the declining numbers of attacks, the threat of terrorism incidents in Europe is still high, creating a feeling of insecurity and fear throughout the world. This has also direct effects on cities' tourism industries as terror incidents change the risk and safety perceptions of tourists, affecting their decision-making process in travel destinations with negative effects on visitor numbers in cities struck by violent attacks (Arana & Leon 2008; Sönmez, Apostolopoulos & Tarlow 1999). Therefore, besides human losses, terror attacks impact a city's society and economy causing politicians and authorities to act on European Union level, national and even local level in order to retain and increase the feeling of safety and security of a city's inhabitants and tourists. This research project will investigate measures taken on the local level to counter the perceived threat of terrorism in European cities that have been struck by a terror attack. Therefore, Brussels and Berlin will serve as case studies to the research. More specifically, the research will explore counter-terrorism measures in relation to changing tourists' perceptions of security and safety.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon but can be traced back centuries (Coca-Stefaniak & Morrison 2018). However, it has changed constantly over the last decades. What began as a domestic phenomenon, has transferred into a transnational dimension since the 1960s (Richardson 2006). Transnational terrorism is defined as an incident in one country executed by a perpetrator and/or caused victims from another country (Sandler 2015) and therefore, transcends national boundaries. With the terror attacks in New York in 2001, terrorism was related to religious acts of Islamic extremism instead and not only seen as a criminal act anymore (Abdelsamad 2018). Terrorism in that form has arrived in the Western world. Since then religious inspired organisations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (or Daesh as it is known in the Arabic language) are associated with terrorism in the West (ibid.).

Also Europe can look back at a history of terrorism due to anarchist groups in the 19th century and ethno separatist and far-left groups in the 20th century including the Irish Republican Army and Germany's Red Army Faction. However, even though in the 1970s and 1980s Europe experienced more terrorism attacks and victims than today, the overall threat of terrorism has never been

perceived higher than in the recent years (Renard 2017). In 2016, terrorism was the main concern for 40% of European citizens (European Commission 2016).

According to Statista (2018), the recent terrorist attacks in European cities and especially the media coverage of these attacks had an influence on the travel behaviour of tourists in Europe. The World Travel and Tourism Council (2017) states that inbound tourism spending in Belgium decreased by 4.4%, in France by 7.3% and in Turkey by 22%. In the academic literature, the relationship between terrorism and tourism has increasingly been researched over the past two decades. It has been found that targeting tourists deliberately is profitable for terrorists in achieving strategic and ideological objectives, and thus provoking a downturn in the local and national travel and tourism economy in order to hurt countries and cities (Sönmez, Apostolopoulos & Tarlow 1999). Furthermore, do terror attacks negatively impact the image of a city as a safe travel destination (Teoman 2017). According to the Global Terrorism Database (2018) between 1970 and 2018, 481 terror incidents were targeted at tourists worldwide. As globally experienced, the tourism industry in general is highly sensitive and vulnerable to man-made crises and disasters. Therefore, terrorism presents a great threat to tourism. Particularly in destinations and regions heavily relying on tourism as their main economic sector unforeseen crises and disasters can have a severely negative impact such as in Bali in 2002 and in Tunisia and Egypt. In the last decade, also Europe and its tourism industry was challenged with risks, threats and negative impacts of the violent terrorist attacks in various countries.

Throughout the last two decades the tactics and use of technology of terrorism attacks has evolved. Religiously inspired terrorism has been associated with groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS which are carrying out attacks worldwide and are, therefore, seen as a “global threat” (Abdelsamad 2018; Teoman 2017). However, recent attacks have been performed by terrorists coming from and grown up within the European Union (Teoman 2017). Furthermore, the threat of lone actors of terrorism increased in the last two decades, being responsible for attacks in Madrid (2004), Toulouse (2012) and Strasbourg (2018) and are, therefore, a primary danger the West is facing (Abdelsamad 2018; United States Department of State Publication 2019). Besides, terrorists have also continued to develop their tactics and modes of operandi. “From the spectacular large-scale coordinated attacks (New York, London, and Madrid), they have returned to random smaller-scale outrages (Paris, Lyon) still using guns and homemade bombs (Paris, Brussels, Manchester), or attacking bystanders with knives, rented vehicles (London, Barcelona), trucks (Nice and Berlin), or even an unattended truck (Stockholm) that gets hijacked” (Lasoen 2019 p.957). This evolution challenges counter-terrorism efforts of European countries and globally.

However, despite the evolution of terrorism forms and tactics, the number of religiously inspired terrorist attacks and victims have decreased in Europe over the last years (EUROPOL 2018). Counter terrorism measures of European countries including military deployments have led to the nearly defeat of ISIS (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung n.d.). Furthermore, intelligence and security authorities increasingly managed to foil attacks and arrested hundreds of individuals on suspicion of criminal acts related to jihadist terrorism. Figure 1 shows the evolution of religiously inspired terrorism in the EU from 2014 to 2018 including the number of attacks, arrests and deaths.




Figure 1: Religiously inspired terrorism in the EU, 2014-2018 (European Parliament 2018)

The downward trend in religiously inspired terrorist attacks shows the effectiveness of efforts by European countries to counter terrorism. However, it also indicates that European countries are still facing an internal threat to security. This threat is still emanating from so-called 'lone wolf' attackers as well as far-right extremism. EUROPOL (2018) stated that the violent right-wing scene is increasing which can be related to for instance anxiety of a perceived Islamisation of society. However, across the EU member states, the violent right-wing extremism spectrum is heterogeneously spread (ibid.)

Consequently, authorities of European countries have implemented defensive and military strategies to counter the threat of terrorism. Besides the European Union, NATO and INTERPOL, 39 European states are actively supporting the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (United States Department of States Publications 2019). In 2016, the EU Council and Parliament adopted a directive on Passenger Name

Record (PNR) which allows air carriers to share data of their passengers including names, contact details and travel dates with specific authorities of EU member states (EU Directive 2016/681). These authorities can process the data “to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute terrorist offences and serious crime and thus enhance internal security, to gather evidence and, where relevant, to find associates of criminals and unravel criminal networks” (EU Directive 2016/681 p. 132). Many European countries have made efforts to implement PNR programmes such as Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Spain and Sweden. Moreover, states amended their Criminal Codes and increased the monitoring of people classified as posing a potential terrorist threat (EUROPOL 2017).

These counter-terrorism measures mentioned above were implemented on a European Union– and state level. However, information on measures implemented on a local level to counter the perceived terrorism threat is not widely propagated.

For this research project two case study cities in Europe have been chosen – Brussels, the capital of Belgium, and Berlin, capital city of Germany. Due to the European Union headquarters and the NATO being located in Brussels, the city is also seen as the “capital of Europe” (p.2) and therefore, a prime target for attacks (Vanneste et al. 2017). Consequently, Brussels is a business tourism destination visited by politicians and businessmen (Teoman 2017). However, Brussels is also attracting domestic and international leisure tourists, being famous for Belgian fries, chocolate, beer and waffles besides hosting the European Institutions (Lasoen 2018). Berlin is placed third after Paris and London as the most popular city tourism destinations and counted as one of the prime cultural metropolises in Europe (UNWTO & WTCF 2017). In 2016 the cities became famous for something else as both, Brussels and Berlin, were hit by a terrorist attack performed by adherers of ISIS. In March 2016 suicide bombs exploded at Zaventem Airport and Maelbeek Metro Station, located close to the European District in Brussels, killing 32 people and injuring more than 300 (Vanneste et al. 2017). These attacks in Brussels were closely related to the attacks in Paris (2015) and Nice (2016) (ibid.). At the end of the year, in December 2016, a Tunisian extremist and asylum-seeker hijacked a truck, killing its driver, and drove it into a Christmas Market located at Breitscheidplatz in Berlin (Heil 2017). During this attack, 12 people lost their life and over 50 were injured (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2016). The attack in Berlin is the worst act of Islamic-motivated violence in Germany (ibid.) and the first one which lead to fatalities (von Münchow & Hantschke 2017).

The bombings in Brussel and already the attacks in Paris had significant impacts on the economy of Belgium through increased security measures (Ruiz-Estrada & Koutonas 2016). Even before the attacks in Brussels, the city and especially one of its municipalities, Molenbeek, became the centre of attention in relation to terrorism in Europe. Molenbeek was the base of operations in planning and

launching the attacks by gunmen and suicide bombers in Paris in November 2016 (Lasoen 2018; Rathore 2016). Moreover, one of the perpetrators of the Paris terrorist attacks was caught and arrested in Molenbeek, where he grew up, only days before the attacks in Brussels 2016 (Lasoen 2018; Rathore 2016). In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Brussels, not only was Brussels airport closed for longer than a week (Corbet et al. 2018) but the number of departing and arriving passengers was in decline until November 2016 (Vanneste et al. 2017). As the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels affected the city's image as a safe travel destination, tourism numbers decreased after the attack with a 11% drop in overnight stays (Visit Brussels 2017). In Berlin however, a significant decrease in tourism numbers was not recorded. In 2017 overnight stays increased by 0.3% compared to 2016 (Visit Berlin 2018).

Even though the terrorism threat is still ongoing in Belgium and Germany and travel warnings to both countries are issued by other countries (Government UK n.d.; United States Department of State 2020), tourism numbers in Brussels and Berlin fully recovered and are even higher than before the attacks (Hope 2019; Visit Berlin 2019). Therefore, it is of great interest to look at what counter-terrorism and security measures Brussels and Berlin have implemented to tackle the perceived terrorism threat in the city. Previous research in the area of terrorism in relation to tourism including security measures to counter terrorism focusses on the international - /EU- and state level, whereas counter-terrorism measures on the local level have not been addressed extensively, especially not in relation to influencing negative safety perceptions of tourists. Therefore, this research project aims to fill this gap and expand the knowledge of measures implemented by cities to tackle the perceived terrorism threat with the case studies of Brussels and Berlin. Special attention is given to the investigation if and in what way tourism is playing a role in motivating the implementation of such measures. Furthermore, this research project will also explore the knowledge of tourists if these measures as well as how they influence the tourists' safety perceptions.

1.1 Research Questions

In order to reach this research project's aim, the following research question has been formulated:

In what ways are authorities responding to address the perceived threat of terrorism in European cities, and specifically to influence the perception of tourists?

To answer the main research question, the following three sub-questions will be addressed:

1. *What measures have been implemented to address the perceived terrorism threat in the two research locations?*

2. *To what extent is tourism central to the steps authorities are taking against the perceived terrorism threat in Brussels and Berlin?*
3. *In what ways do the counter-terrorism measures influence the safety perception of tourists in the two research locations?*

1.2 Outline of the Thesis Research

This thesis is divided into seven chapters in total which comprise the introduction, the literature review, the methodology, an in-depth presentation of the findings of the research study, a discussion and the concluding chapter.

Chapter 2 forms the literature review which will position the research project and introduce the research topics. It presents existing scientific literature on terrorism in general, terrorism in Europe and its relation to tourism. Special attention is given to counter-terrorism measures which have been implemented by states and cities. These concepts, theories and studies presented in the scientific literature form the theoretical framing of the research.

Chapter 3 describes the methodological framework guiding this research project. Furthermore, an overview of international, European and national counter-terrorism efforts of Belgium and Germany is given.

Chapter 4 constitutes the first chapter of the research findings and puts the research into context by introducing the two case study locations, Brussels and Berlin. Furthermore, it presents influences and impacts of the terrorist attacks on the cities in general and on their tourism industries.

Chapter 5 presents the findings of expert interviews, observations, database analysis as well as tourist interviews.

Chapter 6 forms the discussion in which the findings of the research are analysed in relation to the academic literature presented in the literature review. Moreover, the findings from both research locations, Brussels and Berlin, are compared.

Chapter 7 concludes the research project and presents the main findings by answering the research questions. Furthermore, shortcomings of the research project and recommendations for further research are discussed.

2 Literature Review

To further position the research project and introduce the research topic as well as to establish the theoretical framing, a review of the existing scientific literature was conducted. Therefore, the review covers literature on terrorism in the 21st century, terrorism in Europe and European cities, the impacts of terrorism on tourism and counter-terrorism measures.

2.1 Terrorism in the 21st Century

Since the beginning of the millennium, terrorism was among the themes that have predominantly contributed to shaping the global discourse. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR 2008) gives a common definition of terrorism as “acts of violence that target civilians in the pursuit of political or ideological aims” (p.5). However, defining terrorism is not straightforward and easy. For years, scholars have not found an agreement yet of an international comprehensive definition (OHCHR 2008; Paraskevas & Arendell 2007) due to the subjective understanding of the term and different approaches to classification of terrorism actions (Abdelsamad 2018; Ferreira et al. 2019). Even though numerous definitions of terrorism exist, nearly all “include violence or the threat of violence by one group upon another based on political or ideological goals” (Henkey 2017 p.59). Therefore, the term ‘insurgency groups’ might be preferred in order to circumvent the question of how to define terrorism and make judgement calls about whether certain actions are justified as acts of terrorism or not.

As Richardson (2006) states “Terrorism, in fact, is a complex and multivariate phenomenon” (p.2). It has happened or is still happening in many parts around the globe (ibid.) and varies not only in the form of (violent) attacks (Corbet et al. 2019; Savitch 2008) and political demands (Savitch 2008), but also in objectives and motives of the terrorist groups – politically, religiously or social (Paizs 2013; Sandler 2015). Over the last decades, terrorism has changed constantly. Therefore, terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Coca-Stefaniak and Morrison (2018) state that “the concept of organised terror on a wide-scale” (p.409) can be traced back by centuries. Historically domestic, terrorism became a transnational phenomenon since the late 1960s (Richardson 2006; Sandler 2015). Transnational terrorism is defined as an incident in one country executed by a perpetrator and/or caused victims from another country (Sandler 2015) and therefore, transcend national boundaries.

Also European countries can look back at a history of terrorism including Ireland and the IRA (Irish Republican Army), Spain and the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) fighting for an independent Basque State, and the Balkan wars (Teoman 2017). These attacks, however, were performed by groups within a nation but did not create a sense of fear internationally (ibid.).

Nowadays, this has changed, especially since the New York terror attacks on 11 September 2001. Since the attacks on the World Trade Center, the public started to relate terrorism to religious acts of Islamic extremism instead of perceiving it as a criminal act (Abdelsamad 2018), thus framing terrorism now as an issue also concerning and threatening the Western World (Teoman 2017). This religious inspired form of terrorism associated with groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS has been labelled as the 'new terrorism' in the academic world (Abdelsamad 2018). According to Gofas (2012) the new terrorism is a "radical transformation in the character of terrorism, which, compared to 'traditional' terrorism is structured in loose networks, instead of organisational hierarchies; is transnational, rather than localised, in its reach; deliberately targeted at innocent civilians; motivated by religious fanaticism, rather political ideology; and aimed at causing maximum destruction" (p.18). Especially the character of being a global network makes terrorist groups such as ISIS very difficult to control and to predict their further actions (Teoman 2017). However, even though perceived as being a 'global threat' as attacks happened internationally, the latest terrorism attacks have been performed by terrorists coming from within the European Union (Teoman 2017) and are, therefore, 'homegrown' (Monaco 2017). Moreover, the threat of so-called 'lone wolf' terrorism increased in the last two decades, being responsible for attacks in Madrid (2004), Toulouse (2012) and Strasbourg (2018) and are, therefore, a primary danger the West is facing (Abdelsamad 2018; United States Department of State Publication 2019). Spaaij (2010) defines lone wolf terrorists as single operators who execute an act of violence without assistance and command. Even though they might sympathise or identify with terrorist organisations such as ISIS, lone operators are not part of them (ibid.). Therefore, the question 'if' a terror attack will happen is no longer the focus anymore, but 'when', 'how' and to what extent a destination is prepared (Paraskevas & Arendell 2007). This new form of terrorism is leading to an increased feeling of insecurity and fear throughout the world (Khan & Ruiz Estrada 2015, cited in Liu & Pratt 2016).

As mentioned above, even though terrorist attacks in Europe and also worldwide are declining, the threat is still high in Europe (European Parliament 2018; United States Department of State Publication 2017), especially due to right-wing and jihadist extremism. Attacks performed by separatist and left-wing extremism have declined steadily for years (European Parliament 2017). Furthermore, as the United States Department of State Publication (2019) observed, terrorists continued to develop their tactics and the use of technology for instance by using drones which are commercially available, encrypted communications and knife attacks. This evolution challenges counter-terrorism efforts of European countries and states worldwide.

2.2 Terrorism in European Cities

Madrid (2004), London (2005), Paris (2015), Nice (2016), Berlin (2016) and Barcelona (2017) are all examples of recent terrorism incidents in European urban settings. However, European cities have been targets of attacks for decades (Burke 2018; Ruiz-Estrada & Koutonas 2016).

In the early 1990s urban areas and especially financial centres came into focus for terror attacks due to their economic and symbolic value as well as growing cosmopolitan communities, the disruption of commercial activities and extensive media attention such as in New York 1993, London 1992 and 1993, and Tokyo 1995 (Coaffee 2009). According to Godschalk (2003) "Cities are complex and interdependent systems, extremely vulnerable to threats from both natural hazards and terrorism" (p.136). Especially their importance of physical and social infrastructure makes cities an attractive target for terrorist attacks as well as the subsequent media attention, creating public commotion and spreading of the terrorists' motives (Coaffee 2009; Paizs 2013). Moreover, cities are advantageous for terrorists to plan attacks as they offer anonymity and proximity to suppliers helping terrorists to decide on and get access to potential targets, ensuring a high number of potential victims, resources and media attention (Savitch 2008). Therefore, not only are traditional targets including governmental, financial or military environments attacked by terrorist, but also increasingly public, crowded places and "soft" targets (e.g. restaurants), transport systems as well as culturally valuable and symbolic buildings as these are difficult to protect and defend and offer a higher number of vulnerable victims (Coaffee 2009; Coaffee et al. 2008; Ferreira et al. 2019; Paizs 2013). Moreover, cities can be seen as a "place of moral and political contest" (Burke 2018); during the London attacks in 2005 all places where bombs detonated in tube trains or on a bus are representative of the city's cultural diversity (ibid.).

Most of the European cities struck by attacks, such as London and Paris, are located in and are even the capital city of powerful nations involved in for instance conflicts overseas or controversial foreign politics (Savitch 2008). Furthermore, immigration problems do sometimes play a role such as in France and Belgium, which leads to their cities being in the focus of foreign intrigues (Rathore 2016; Savitch 2008).

2.3 Relation of Terrorism and Tourism

Tourism is one of the world's biggest economic sector contributing to economic growth and wealth as well as employment and regional development (Guerrero 2019). According to the UNWTO (2020) numbers of worldwide international tourist arrivals increased to 1.5 billion in 2019, and this number is forecasted to grow even more during the next years. However, in the last decades, the tourism industry has been challenged with risks and negative impacts including domestic and international

terrorist attacks. Tourist destinations around the world have been hit by attacks committed by terrorist cells (Adeloye & Brown 2018).

According to Baker (2014), the connection between terrorism and tourism was first internationally recognised as a consequence of the 1972 Palestinian attack on Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympic games. Parallels have been identified between transnational terrorism and tourism as both share the same characteristics including the transgression of national borders, the involvement of citizens from different countries and the utilisation of travel and communication technologies (ibid.).

Over the past two decades scholars have been researching the relationship between terrorism and tourism (Arana & Leon 2008; Baker 2014; Sönmez & Graefe 1998). It has been shown that the deliberate targeting of tourists is advantageous for insurgents to achieve strategic and ideological objectives, and consequently to provoke a downturn in the local and national travel and tourism economy in order to hurt countries and cities (Sönmez, Apostolopoulos & Tarlow 1999). Moreover, besides the victims of an attack and damaged or destroyed infrastructure, also other economic sectors are affected (Goodrich 2002; Ruiz-Estrada & Koutonas 2016). In the direct aftermath of a terrorist attack an increase in security and policy spending as well as effects on the tourism sector, consumption behaviour and airline demands have been observed (Goodrich 2002; Ruiz-Estrada & Koutonas 2016).

Terror attacks negatively influence the tourism sector and visitor numbers due to changes in perceived risk and safety and tourists' decision making. Therefore, risk and safety perceptions are closely bound to tourism, also in relation to terrorism. However, they are very difficult to measure as perceptions vary from person to person (Teoman 2017). Negative perceptions of risk, safety and security can influence tourist behaviour (Hall, Timothy & Duvall 2003), whereby according to a study by Gray and Wilson (2009) political issues including terrorism are seen as a greater threat by tourists than social and physical dangers. The reason might be that terrorism is seen as an uncontrollable risk which is difficult to avoid or to protect themselves against (Hoffman & Shelby 2017). Sönmez and Graefe (1998) found that safety concerns in general and related to terrorism risk play an influential role in the decision-making process of tourists. This is attributed to the fact that "being safe on vacation is an expected requirement for any visitor in a tourist destination or city" (Baker 2014 p.58). Therefore, due to actual and perceived risk, tourists might alter their travel plans and decide on an alternative, safer destination than a risky one (Arana & Leon 2008; Sönmez, Apostolopoulos & Tarlow 1999). Thereby, the perceived risk might even have a greater influence than the reality (Baker 2014). However, it should be kept in mind that this does not apply to all forms of tourism as for instance for adventure tourism a certain level of (perceived) risk acts as a pull factor (Fletcher 2010). This risk, however, is not related to terrorism.

Also the image of a destination plays an essential role. As Arana and Leon (2008) write, due to its intangible characteristics, tourism depends heavily on a positive image. This image can be negatively affected through terror attacks (Teoman 2017). Furthermore, the perceived risk of terrorism in one destination or city might have a spillover effect and negatively influence other destinations in the same country or neighbouring countries which are not directly exposed to terrorism (Baker 2014). Especially as terrorism is given a great amount of attention throughout the world, the media can damage a destination's image and is contributing to people's attitude towards and the perceived risk of a destination (Pizam & Smith 2000; Sönmez, Apostolopoulos & Tarlow 1999; Vanneste et al. 2017). According to Pizam and Fleischer (2002), recovery periods of destinations hit by a terrorist incident last six to twelve months if a terrorist event does not happen again, as the frequency has a greater impact on tourist arrivals than the severity of terrorist acts.

The impact of terrorism on tourism is not the same in every destination but varies due to the severity of the attack (Bassil 2014) and the political stability of the country (Korstanje & Clayton 2012). Whereas in the early years of the 21st century terrorist attacks in cities had a severe and longer-term effect on tourism, cities and their tourism industry have become increasingly resilient during the last years. In the aftermath of the New York attacks in 2001, the USA faced a 20-50% decrease of hotel bookings in the first three months after the attack (Goodrich 2002) and the duration of the recovery period to occupancy levels as high as prior to the attack in New York accounted for 34 months, while in 2005 after the London bombings this recovery period took nine months (Pennington-Gray 2016). Paris 'only' faced a decrease of 4.7% of international and domestic tourists in 2016 compared to 2015 (N-TV 2017).

However, besides these negative impacts, terror incidents can also entail new markets of tourism to the destination and city due to the strong resilience and adaptability of the tourism industry. Destinations hit by a terrorist attack can themselves become tourist attractions and open up the market for the so-called "dark tourism" resulting in increasing tourism numbers (Korstanje & Clayton 2012). One famous example is Ground Zero and the 9/11 memorial in New York with more than 37 million visitors since its opening in 2011 (9/11 Memorial and Museum 2017).

2.4 Counter-Terrorism Measures

"Providing security for the nation and for its citizens remains the most important responsibility of government" (p.3) was stated as Paragraph 1.1 in the National Security Strategy by the UK Government (Cabinet Office 2008). The terror attacks in New York in 2001 and in European cities in the last decades have led to the adoption and change in security policies and the implementation of counter-terrorism strategies in which the protection and defence of the city as the place where people

live, work and relax is central (Coaffee, O'Hare & Hawkesworth 2009). According to Stohl (2015), as one of the aims of terrorists is to create fear and uncertainty, counter-terrorism measures must consequently not only concentrate on responding to an attack and preventing future ones but also address reactions of citizens and the wider audience to terror acts and threats. Therefore, besides taking measures to secure the public, authorities also have to take action to "make the public subjectively believe that they are more secure and must create confidence that [they] (...) are acting toward that end" (p.57); the wider audience may include the local, national, regional or international level (Stohl 2015). Due to the transnationality of recent terrorist attacks, international counter-terrorism networks are of importance (ibid.).

The terror attacks in New York in 2001 had major effects on national and international security and safety measures worldwide. Especially international travel safety and controls at airports have been tightened even though the attack was not targeted at tourists (Ferreira et al. 2019).

The European Union and European states saw the importance of establishing measures against the terrorism threat. Even though the European Council highlighted the fight against terrorism as a priority shortly after the New York attacks in 2001, it was handled as a measure external to the European Union (European Parliament 2017). This position changed with the bombings in Madrid 2004 and London 2005. Not only did the focus change from terrorism threats emanating from Al-Qaeda to home-grown terrorism through terrorist radicalisation and recruitment within the EU, but also security measures were taken by European countries including "the improvement of border control, judicial cooperation, and information exchange, as well as the appointment of an EU counter-terrorism coordinator" (p.33) and the introduction of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the Strategy for Combatting Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism (European Parliament 2017). Generally, counter-terrorism policies have been implemented and proposed in several areas such as border security, terrorism finance, criminal record exchange and re-defining terrorist offences. However, despite terrorism attacks in European cities, there has not been a significant change in the counter-terrorism programme of the EU until 2013, the rise of ISIS, and the attacks in Paris and Brussels (ibid.). Therefore, the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism was revised in 2014, other strategies were updated and implemented as well as the main acting bodies of the EU have been extended by for instance Europol's European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) (ibid.).

Besides the efforts of the European Union to counter terrorism, European countries and localities are responsible for taking and implementing measures against the terrorism threat. Therefore, they make use of both proactive and defensive counter-terrorism measures. Whereas proactive measures include the direct confrontation of targeted governments on terrorist groups and its allies for example

through destroying resources and killing members of terrorist groups, defensive counter-terrorism actions are related for instance to a city's build environment and increased security at airports (Sandler 2015).

2.4.1 Proactive Counter-Terrorism Measures

As a response to the 9/11 terror attacks in New York 2001, the administration of George W. Bush introduced the strategy known as "the global war on terrorism" (Monaco 2017). This military campaign involves the USA and its allies waging war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein in Iraq (Der Spiegel n.d.) and nowadays against the terror organisations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in order to "disrupt plots and kill or capture terrorist operatives and leaders, including with drone strikes and daring special operations raids such as the one that killed Osama bin Laden" (Monaco 2017 p.23).

In 2014, the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria was formed and nowadays counts 82 member states (Global Coalition 2020). Besides countries such as the USA, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany are active members of the Coalition (ibid.). In 2018 the war on terrorism led to the liberation of almost the full physical territory ISIS previously occupied in Syria and Iraq (United States Department of State Publications 2019). However, ISIS is not yet defeated (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung n.d.).

Besides security missions overseas, in some countries the military is also responsible for supporting the police in internal security efforts. For instance, in Paris armed forces were employed after the terrorist attacks to patrol along the city centre, transportation hubs and sensitive areas such as around embassies (Ferreira et al. 2019).

2.4.2 Defensive Counter-Terrorism Measures

In the direct aftermath of terrorist attacks immediate defensive security measures are implemented by police and military presence in the streets as in Paris and Brussels (Ferreira et al. 2019; Lasoen 2019). Furthermore, terrorism prevention can also be observed in the form of the build environment. Such measure include visible and hidden special barriers and permanent bollards for the protection of pedestrians (Casciani 2016) as can be observed in London by the "Ring of Steel" which circles the centre of the city with checkpoints, roadblocks and CCTV camera systems (Nussbaum 2007). Furthermore, bomb-proof litter bins have been erected in Manchester (Coaffee & Bosher 2008). Other physical barriers have been installed to hinder or stop an attack from reaching its potential target including vehicle and retractable steel bollards and barriers to pedestrian entry controls (Figure 2) (Coaffee & Bosher 2008).



Figure 2: Retraceable bollards encircling the city of Manchester (Coaffee & Bosher 2008)

Furthermore, also technical and personal security measures such as entrance controls or detectors are used for instance in Oslo and Manchester (Paizs 2013). However, not only has safety technology advanced throughout the years, but also terrorists have shown determination for innovation to outsmart these (Monaco 2017).

The diverse character of terrorist attacks (tactics, motives, approaches) represents a great challenge for homeland-security, emergency-management and governmental professionals and agencies in the detection, intervention and preparedness of terrorist attacks (European Parliament 2017; Henkey 2017). Nowadays, in cities around the world especially visible security measures in and around places that might be potential targets of terrorist attacks are increasingly becoming a common element shaping the urban landscape (Dalgaard-Nielsen, Laisen & Wandorf 2016). However, in the academic literature (Coaffee, O'Hare & Hawkesworth 2009; Dalgaard-Nielsen, Laisen & Wandorf 2016; Graham 2006; Hoffman & Shelby 2017) the use of these defensive security measures is criticised. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Laisen and Wandorf (2016) state that visible defensive measures provoke a feeling of safety and security which is superficial as it only relieves immediate anxiety. Moreover, as mentioned by Hoffman and Shelby (2017) and Savitch (2008), security measures do not necessarily create a perception of safety as "Every protective measure conveys a message that the public should beware and inadvertently promotes the very fear terrorists seek to inculcate" (Savitch 2008 p.13), therefore reminding the public of the perceived threat of terrorism. Coaffee, O'Hare and Hawkesworth (2009) go even further by stating that visible security measures are actually not protecting people in the cities but are a mean to control them through manipulating their perception of the threat. Therefore, it is vital that cities implement measures that increase the feeling of security but also keep the spirit of a

free society and a lively urban design (Savitch 2008; Paizs 2013). Coaffee, O’Hare and Hawkesworth (2009) write that security measures should “provide perimeter security in a manner that does not impede the city’s commerce and vitality, excessively restrict or impede operational use of sidewalks or pedestrian and vehicular mobility (...)” (p.503). Nowadays, architects and urban designers work on ‘designing-out’ the terrorist threat at public places and transportation hubs including airports (Coaffee & Boshier 2008). Furthermore, security measures are increasingly camouflaged, made invisible or aesthetically appealing so that they blend into the city landscape (ibid.). This can be observed in the city of London. The stadium of the Arsenal football club can be seen as a model of build-in counter-terrorism features with its reinforced benches and large concrete letter spelling out the club’s name which act as a massive shield (Figure 3) (ibid.). Furthermore, the balustrades along Whitehall (Figure 4) in the Government Security Zone are aesthetically build into the architecture of the streetscape (Coaffee, O’Hare and Hawkesworth 2009) so that they are not automatically recognised as a security measure.



Figure 3: Concrete barriers at Arsenal Football Club (Casciani 2016)



Figure 4: Security balustrades along Whitehall in London (Coaffee, O’Hare & Hawkesworth 2009)

2.4.3 Destination Marketing Organisations

Destination Marketing Organisations (DMO) can also play a vital role alongside counter-terrorism measures to rebuild a positive and safe destination image through crisis management, destination-specific strategies and marketing campaigns aimed at international and domestic tourists as previous research has shown (Paraskevas & Arendell 2007; Sönmez, Apostolopoulos & Tarlow 1999). Pizam and Smith (2000) write “People will continue to want to travel, and they appear to be willing to consider a place secure again following a terrorist act if proper marketing/image and crisis management occurs” (p.136). Especially tailor-made marketing strategies and emotional components in marketing messages can be successful to reattract tourists to a destination (Mair, Ritchie & Walters 2016).

During the last years social media has become increasingly present in people's life and also in relation to their travels. According to Ketter (2016), tourists make use of social media prior and during their trips as a source of information and support for travel-related decisions. The heavy usage of social media platforms as well as other advantages such as cost-efficiency and a wide reach have led DMOs to make use of platforms including Facebook and Instagram for their marketing and promotional activities. Moreover, in the aftermath of crisis such as a terror attack, social media platforms can play a vital role not only in regard to rebuilding a destination's image but also in information sharing. In his study, Ketter (2016) discovered that Facebook offered DMOs a platform to directly communicate with people, share valuable information such as emergency phone numbers and counter negative and undesirable media releases, resulting in immediate image restoration efforts.

2.5 Implications of The Literature Review on the Research Project

The scientific findings of the literature review were used as background information to define the problem and goal of this research project as well as to define the research questions. The literature review gave ideas and examples on different counter-terrorism measures implemented by cities which served as a basis for the development of data collection methods including interview guides. Moreover, the scientific findings were considered as assumptions and used as a basis for the discussion of the project's findings in which the findings are compared to these assumptions.

3 Methodology

This chapter explains the methodological framework guiding this research project. In this empirical research, four forms of qualitative data collection have been applied. Data was drawn from semi-structured expert interviews, participant observation as well as the World Terror Watch Database and semi-structured tourist interviews in Brussels and Berlin to subsequently answer the research question from a qualitative point of view. This chapter first describes the research design and the locations chosen. Further, the data collection and data analysis methods which have been applied in the research project are addressed. Furthermore, this section explains the research ethics and limitations to the research project.

3.1 Research Design

The approach taken for this research project can be characterised as a qualitative research design using two case studies. Qualitative research designs place emphasis on “studying things in their natural settings, interpreting phenomena in terms of meanings people bring to them, humanising problems and gaining an “emic”, or insider’s, perspective” (Phillimore & Goodson 2004 p.4) and therefore enable a close contact between the researcher and the field of study. The qualitative research design enables me as a researcher to thoroughly explore and understand the measures implemented by Brussels and Berlin to counter the perceived threat of terrorism. Being described as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2009 p.18), the case studies of Brussels and Berlin gave distinct and detailed answers to the research question. In this research project, data triangulation has been applied through the use of multiple and complimentary data collection methods including semi-structured expert interviews, participant observation as well as the World Terror Watch Database and semi-structured tourist interviews. According to Creswell (2016 cited in Ferreira et al. 2019) and O’Leary (2004), triangulation of data and sources ensures the reliability and validity in qualitative research and therefore, the accuracy and trustworthiness of conclusions drawn.

3.2 Research Locations

After elaborating on the general research design, this subchapter sets the research into context by introducing international, European and national counter-terrorism efforts of Belgium and Germany.

3.2.1 Brussels, Belgium

The first case study location chosen for this research project is Brussels, the capital of Belgium. On 22 March 2016 the city was hit by terror attacks at Zaventem Airport and Maelbeek Metro Station, killing 32 people and injuring 300 (Vanneste et al. 2017). These attacks were closely related to the attacks in Paris and Nice (ibid.). The bombings in Brussel and already the attacks in Paris had significant impacts on the tourism industry and the economy of the city which have recovered. Even though Brussels experienced no major terror incident after 2016, the threat is still high.

In the years after the terror attacks in Brussels in March 2016 there have been some smaller incidents related to terrorism in Brussels and other cities in Belgium. Attacks on police officers or soldiers with a knife or machete happened in 2016, 2017 and 2018 in Charleroi, Schaerbeek and Brussels (Government UK n.d.; Lasoen 2019). In June 2017 a bombing attack on Brussels central station failed, prevented by Belgian security forces (Government UK n.d.; Lasoen 2019). Moreover, in 2018 a radicalised attacker inspired by ISIS shot two policemen and a passer-by in the city of Liège (United States Department of State Publications 2019). In all of these incidents mentioned the attacker was killed (Lasoen 2019; United States Department of State Publications 2017; United States Department of State Publications 2019). As stated by the United States Department of State Publication (2019), these attacks indicate that homegrown terrorism, mostly inspired by ISIS or al-Qaeda, pose the greatest terrorism threat in Belgium.

Brussels is actively combatting terrorism on an international as well as national level through the implementation of counter-terrorism measures. Thereby, the focus lies on prevention, prosecution and rehabilitation (United Kingdom of Belgium – Foreign Affairs n.d.). Contributing to international efforts of countering terrorism, Belgium is an active member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and its military mission in Iraq and Syria, supporting various of its working groups (Renard 2017). Furthermore, Belgium is an involved member in European co-operations such as the EU, NATO, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and actively takes part in Europe's counter-terrorism endeavours (United Kingdom of Belgium – Foreign Affairs n.d.). Neglected for some years by Belgium, the fight against the financing of terrorism was eventually seen as a priority so that the country joined the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (Renard 2017; United States Department of States Publications 2017). Moreover, in 2016 the Passenger Name Record (PNR) was adopted by the European Parliament after the terrorist attacks in Brussels which allows member states to collect and safe passenger flight information and travel itineraries (Renard 2017). Belgium joined the programme and even expanded the information collection to maritime and international high-speed train travel (ibid.).

Besides these counter-terrorism efforts taken at European and international level, Belgium also implemented security measures nationally. As stated in the Strategic Vision for Defence (Minister of Defence 2016), the defence is also responsible for the internal security of the country. Therefore, the Belgian military was deployed by the government after the Paris attacks in 2015 to support the police in Brussels to protect sensitive targets including the European Union buildings (Lasoen 2019). Despite the military presence, in March 2016 terrorists attacked Brussels Airport as well as a subway station close to the European Union buildings. The threat level was increased to the maximum, Level 4, leading to the operation codenamed 'Vigilant Guardian' and the deployment of more Armed Forces patrolling in public places such as the airport, train stations, the city centre and crowded places (Lasoen 2017; Lasoen 2019). Even though the military presence in the city of Brussels was only planned as a temporary measure to increase security, armed forces are still patrolling around the European Quarter and the airport (Lasoen 2019).

Furthermore, to counter terrorism, the Belgian government launched a database to centralise foreign terrorist fighters which can be accessed by all Belgian law enforcement and intelligence agencies in order to summarise identities of known and suspected terrorism fighters (United States Department of States Publications 2017). Also the 'Actieplan Radicalisme' (translates to: Actionplan Radicalisation) implemented in 2005 was revised in 2015 for the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism (Kingdom of Belgium – Foreign Affairs n.d.). In addition, Belgium undertook some constitutional changes as for instance an increase in duration of terrorism related administrative detention, the prohibition of websites distributing hate speech as well as making the consultation of jihadi websites a criminal act (EUROPOL 2017; Renard 2017).

Even though a National Security Council was established in 2015 to improve the coordination between security services and agencies (Kingdom of Belgium – Foreign Affairs n.d.), Belgium's decentralised governing structure and the presence of six separate policing districts in the region of Brussels is restraining and challenging the internal communication between law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, and radicalisation prevention (Lasoen 2018; United States Department of State Publications 2019).

Belgium has taken several measures on the EU- and national level as presented above, but information on security measures Brussels has implemented on the local level is quite rare. Moreover, even though a threat of terrorism still persists, Brussels did recover its tourism numbers. Therefore, this research project will explore counter-terrorism measures implemented on the local level in Brussels in general and in relation to changing tourists' perceptions of security and safety.

3.2.2 Berlin, Germany

The capital city of Germany, Berlin, was selected as the second case study location. On the 19 December 2016, a vehicle attack at the Christmas Market at Breitscheidplatz killed 12 people and injured more than 50 (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2016). The attack in Berlin is the worst act of Islamic-motivated violence in Germany (ibid.) and the first one which led to fatalities (von Münchow & Hantschke 2017). Unlike Brussels, Berlin did not record a significant decrease in tourism numbers in the aftermath of the attack.

Since the terrorist attack in 2016 at the Breitscheidplatz Christmas market in Berlin, nine Islamic motivated terror attacks have been prevented in Germany (Tagesschau 2019). However, during the last years, there have been several violent attacks in Germany targeted at innocent people on the streets. In 2017, an Islamic terrorism motivated attack happened in a grocery store in Hamburg; the attacker killed one and injured five people with a knife (Bundesministerium des Innern 2018). Furthermore, in 2018 four people were injured during an arson attack and hostage-taking at the main train station in Cologne (United States Department of State Publication 2019). The attacker is said to indicate a radicalised Islamist background (ibid.). In 2019, a right-wing extremist and antisemitic motivated German killed two people in Halle after unsuccessfully attempting to enter a synagogue during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur (Tagesschau 2019b). The German Federal Minister of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern 2019) warns that Islamic motivated terror threat remains due to the fact that Germany continues to be a target of jihadist organisations such as ISIS or al-Qaeda. Furthermore, violence-oriented right-wing extremists also pose a risk to radicalise themselves through the emotionalised debate and thus, commit acts of violence (ibid.). However, despite these threats and former attacks, Germany does not have a so-called threat or alert level as other countries such as Belgium and France have with the reasoning that “The situation can vary from region to region, and even within a city the threat situation can vary. ‘Warning levels’ give the unfounded feeling that the danger is the same everywhere. Warning levels can, therefore, also help to unnecessarily increase the feeling of insecurity” (Bundesministerium des Innern 2020).

Also Germany has introduced several counter-terrorism measures, especially proactive security actions. Following the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, the German Armed Forces ‘Bundeswehr’ became a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and started to provide military support in Syria, Iraq and Jordan (Bundeswehr 2019). Being one of the founders of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), Germany is co-leading the GCTF Initiative to Counter Unmanned Aerial System Threats together with the United States (GCTF 2020). Furthermore, Germany is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) working to counter the financing of terrorism (United States Department of State Publications 2019) and is pursuing the international endeavours

to enhance border security through for instance introducing the Passenger Name Record (Aerne 2018). On a federal- and state-level, law enforcement agencies, coordinated through the Joint Counter-Terrorism Center, are making an effort to continue with terrorism-related investigations, monitoring, arrests and prosecutions and deradicalisation work (Verfassungsschutzbericht 2019).

While counter-terrorism efforts on the EU- and national level in Germany are presented by various sources, information on local counter-terrorism measures Berlin has implemented are hard to be found. Furthermore, besides the continuing terrorism threat, Berlin was able to increase tourism (Visit Berlin 2019). Therefore, this thesis will research measures implemented by Berlin to tackle the perceived terrorism threats and investigates if and in what way tourism is playing a role in motivating the implementation of such measures.

3.3 Data Collection

This sub-chapter describes the qualitative data collection methods used in this research. Data was drawn from a combination of semi-structured expert interviews, participant observation as well as a database and semi-structured tourist interviews in Brussels and Berlin.

3.3.1 Semi-structured Expert Interviews

According to Boeije (2010), “the goal of an interview is to see a slice of the social world from the informant’s perspective” (p.63). In this research, semi-structured interviews have been conducted which were “neither fully fixed nor fully free, and are perhaps best seen as flexible” (O’Leary 2004 p.164). This specific type of interview was selected as it offered the interviewees to formulate and express their thoughts, knowledge and experiences freely. Furthermore, it allowed me as a researcher some structure in form of pre-determined open questions while at the same time the opportunity to follow up on the in the interviewee’s response and to gain more detailed knowledge on topics which emerged during the interview. This created a more conversational style atmosphere leading to a more natural flow of the interview and therefore, rich and candid data (O’Leary 2004). For this research project expert interviews were conducted, which relate to interviews with people who have factual and extensive knowledge and expertise on a certain subject (Boeije 2010).

The sampling approaches used for this research project can be classified as non-probability sampling method which relied on my judgement as the researcher whom to choose as an expert for the research. Furthermore, besides purposive sampling, the snowball sampling method was of help to identify or access further interview partners. Therefore, all contacted (potential) interview partners were asked for further experts to contact. These sampling methods allowed me to gain a wide range of perspectives, expertise and experiences.

For the interviews an interview guide was developed beforehand with a range of questions covering selected topics related to the thesis project which were collected and established on the basis of the focus of the project as well as assumptions and theories revealed in the literature review. As mentioned above, the interview questions were designed in an open-ended style allowing the interview to have a natural flow and personal engagement with the interviewee. As interviews were conducted in English and German, two interview guides were developed before the fieldwork. These are attached to the report in Appendix 1.1 and 1.2. Depending on the field of expertise of the interviewee, the interview guide was slightly adjusted.

In total, eight expert interviews were conducted in Brussels and Berlin with representatives of Brussels Airport, the Berlin Senate of the Interior, Berlin Fire Brigade and the destination management organisations Visit Brussels and Visit Berlin as well as security experts and a security consultant of Brussels Police. The interviews are listed in Appendix 2. Nearly all interviews were conducted personally during a meeting with the interview partner in Brussels or Berlin. The interview location was selected by the interview partner; most of the times I was invited to the interviewee's workplace. Letting the interview partner choose the location was of advantage for the interview itself as it was more convenient for the interviewee in regard to time and organisation and every time a quiet office was selected without the disturbance of background noises resulting in an open, honest and comfortable interview setting. In one case, the interview was done over the phone upon request by the interview partner as a personal meeting was not feasible due to time limitations. Ranging from 30 minutes to just over one hour, the interviews were all recorded. The interviews were conducted between 22 November and 28 November 2019 in Brussels and between 9 December and 19 December 2019 in Berlin.

Moreover, one additional interview partner in Brussels answered the questions in writing as due to time constraints and preference from the interviewee's side it was not possible to meet or conduct the interview via phone.

3.3.2 Observations

Besides interviews, observations were used for data collection in order to gain an understanding of the security measures tourists might encounter while exploring the city of Brussels or Berlin. O'Leary (2004) defines observations as "a systematic method of data collection that relies on a researchers ability to gather data through his or her senses" (p.170). Therefore, in both cities, Brussels and Berlin, I walked around the city and, furthermore, took a trip on a tourist bus visiting important tourist sights. At the pre-selected tourist sights mentioned below I got off the bus and observed the area and its visible counter-terrorism and security measures. During the observations, notes were taken.

On the basis of Brussels' and Berlin's most-famous tourist sights according to the DMO Visit Brussels and Visit Berlin, places for observations were selected. In Brussels these tourist sights were the Grand Place, Atomium, Mannekin Pis, the Royal Palace, the Belgian Royal Museum of Fine Arts and the Opera Square. Furthermore, observations were done while walking through the pedestrian area in the city centre, the central station and the Christmas Market at and around the Grand Place. In Berlin the following tourist attraction were chosen: the Reichstag building, Brandenburg Gate, German Historical Museum, the TV Tower at Alexanderplatz, Potsdamer Platz and the Christmas Markets at Gendarmenmarkt and Breitscheidplatz.

Observations were done between 27 November and 30 November 2019 in Brussels and between 9 December and 12 December 2019 in Berlin.

3.3.3 Database

Through the interview with an International Security and Terrorist Threat Analyst in Brussels, I was granted access to the World Terror Watch Database of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC) for 24 hours. The World Terror Watch Database contains worldwide incident reports, alerts and analyses "of the threats posed by international organised violence, whether linked to terrorism, organised crime, maritime piracy, civil unrest or insurgencies" (ESISC n.d.). The database was accessed on 6 March 2020 and used to complement the findings of the expert interviews.

3.3.4 Semi-structured (mini) Interviews with Tourists

Besides conducting interviews with experts to research measures that have been implemented to counter the perceived threat of terrorism in cities, I also interviewed tourists in Brussels and Berlin to investigate their knowledge of these measures as well as if and how their perceptions of risk and safety in the cities have been influenced.

By means of convenience sampling, tourists were approached on the street close to touristic sights and interviewed based on accessibility and their willingness to participate. In Brussels the chosen tourist sight were the Grand Place, Atomium, Mannekin Pis and the Belgian Royal Museum of Fine Arts. In Berlin tourist were approached at the Reichstag building, Brandenburg Gate, German Historical Museum and Gendarmenmarkt.

For the interviews with tourists a different interview guide than for the expert interviews was created before the fieldwork. This interview guide also included some questions arranged by topic which relate to the focus of the research project and the literature review. This interview guide contained three topics, namely 'the influence of terrorism threat on travel behaviour', 'knowledge of counter-terrorism measures' and 'influence on safety perception'. Complying to a qualitative research

approach, the interview questions were open-ended which resulted in a conversational-style interview and flowing, personal engagement in which the interview partners freely shared their opinions and beliefs. The interviews with the tourists were held in English and German, depending on the preference of the tourist. Therefore, two interview guides were developed before the fieldwork. Please refer to Appendix 1.3 and 1.4 for the English and German version of the interview guide for the (mini) tourist interviews. Tourists who were not able to conduct an interview in English or German were not interviewed.

In total, 40 tourists from all over the world were interviewed in Brussels and Berlin. These interviews were conducted between 25 November and 29 November 2019 in Brussels and between 9 December and 19 December 2019 in Berlin.

3.4 Data Analysis

Through the use of multiple data gathering methods, a range of data was collected such as audio-taped interviews with experts, as well as written notes from observations and interviews with tourists. After transcribing the interviews and digitalising the written observation and interview notes, the data was coded during the analysis phase. Coding was also used for the data drawn from the World Terror Watch Database.

During the data analysis phase the collected data was transformed and processed in order to draw conclusions and answer the research question (Boeije 2010). In preparation for the data analysis, audio recordings and notes from all expert interviews and interviews with tourists were transcribed in Microsoft Word. This process was followed by segmenting and reassembling the data through coding as the first step in the data analysis. Therefore, deductive and inductive codes were used. In order to segment the data, open and axial coding was used followed by axial and selective coding for reassembling the data. Coding (deductive and inductive) was also used to analyse the observation notes and the information gained from the data base. Therefore, codes derived from the interviews as well as from the observations and the data base were aimed to supplement each other. For instance, codes derived from interviews were applied to the content of the data base. Through coding the findings could be grouped so that themes emerged.

3.5 Ethics

Taking into account ethical considerations of the research, I believe transparency of the whole research project including my role as a researcher is essential. As the research must be conducted fairly and honestly (Ketefian 2015), being transparent ensures the establishment of trust, respect and accountability (Miles, Huberman & Saldaña 2013). It was vital to make sure that the interviewees

clearly understand the purpose of the research project, and to communicate that they participate in their free will. Informants had the option to stop the interview at any time. Only if permission was granted by the interview partner, the interview was audio taped. Furthermore, I aimed to assure confidentiality and anonymity by not stating names or other personal identifiers which can be connected to the data.

3.6 Limitations

Throughout the research project, a couple of factors evolved which formed limitations to this research.

The overall topic of the research project, counter-terrorism measures, presented itself to be a limitation in receiving detailed and clear answers from the respondents on what measures have been implemented to counter terrorism in Brussels and Berlin. Due to the sensitivity of the topic respondents were occasionally not allowed to reveal certain measures or go too much into detail with counter-terrorism precautions, especially on the political and security level. This resulted in sparsely and vague data to be used in the data analysis.

Another factor constituting a limitation to the research project was the difference in expert interviews in regard to the experts' occupation and field of expertise in Brussels and Berlin. Whereas in Berlin I was able to interview a representative from the Senate who gave valuable information regarding political counter-terrorism measures, for Brussels the political side is very limited as no interview with local political authorities could be arranged. This does also apply to information about security measures at local airports and events. Therefore, the focus of the answers given by the respondents were different in Brussels and Berlin which made a comparison of some implemented counter-terrorism measures very difficult or even impossible. Moreover, one interview was conducted in writing. The interview partner received the interview questions in a text document and respondent with answers in form of written text for each question. Therefore, I as the researcher had no opportunity to spontaneously follow up on the interviewee's responses to gain more detailed information. Consequently, the responses were shorter and less detailed resulting in a limited form of data available for the analysis.

Additionally, the research project is exclusively focussed on urban destinations in Europe, more specifically capital cities in countries which are less dependent on tourism than smaller destinations outside Europe. Therefore, the findings and conclusions of this research project are most likely less transferrable and applicable to destinations which are highly dependent on tourism income.

For the research project only qualitative data collection methods have been used and thus, no quantitative research method. Especially the responses from tourists cannot be generalised due to the small sample size.

4 Influences of the Terror Attacks on Brussels and Berlin

This first chapter of the research results puts the research into context by introducing the two case study locations: Brussels, Belgium, and Berlin, Germany, and further explains the influences and impacts the terrorist attacks in 2016 had on the cities in general and their tourism industries. The data was mostly drawn from the expert interviews.

4.1 Brussels, Belgium

On 22 March 2016 at around 8 o'clock in the morning, the first two bombs detonated in the departure hall of Zaventem Bruxelles International Airport (Renard 2016). One hour later, a third explosion happened in the Maelbeek metro station in the European quarter of Brussels. The terrorist attacks in Brussels killed 32 people and injured more than 300 (ibid.).

4.1.1 Impact of the Terrorist Attacks on Tourism in Brussels

The terrorist attacks in Brussels, as well as preceding attacks in Paris, had significant impacts on the economy of Belgium through increased security measures (Ruiz-Estrada & Koutonas 2016). Not only was Brussels airport closed for more than a week (Brussels Airport Security Expert, Interview 22/11/2019) but the number of departing and arriving passengers was in decline until November 2016 (Vanneste et al. 2017). The attacks in Brussels, but also the attacks in Paris in 2015 and their relation to the quarter of Molenbeek in Brussels and the lockdown of the city in 2015, caused the tourism industry in Brussels to suffer greatly. As the attacks in Paris and Brussels as well as their media coverage affected the city's reputation and its image as a safe travel destination, tourism numbers decreased after the attack in Brussels with a 19% drop in overnight stays (Visit Brussels, Interview 28/11/2019). The drop was even higher for leisure tourism specifically, accounting for 25%. However, also the business tourism sector in Brussels was hit by the attack with a decrease of 10% of business tourists arrivals in 2016 (Visit Brussels 2017b), as international organisations and institutions cancelled meetings and advised their employees and partners not to come to Brussels as they were not able to safeguard certain security standards, and furthermore, they did not want to put an additional burden on the already very busy security and law enforcement agencies (International Security and Terrorist Threat Analyst, Interview 26/11/2019). Moreover, the airport was closed for 12 days and flights were cancelled or rerouted to other airports close by such as Düsseldorf or Schiphol in Amsterdam (Brussels Airport Security Expert, Interview 22/11/2019), affecting the travel to and accessibility of Brussels.

The decrease of tourism numbers in Brussels negatively affected the entire travel sector of the city. Organisations directly and indirectly associated with the travel industry, such as hotels, museums, restaurants, taxis and travel agencies, experienced a decline in revenue (Security Consultant – Brussels

Police, Written Interview 29/01/2020). Besides international and domestic tourists, also the local population limited their spending and travel to essentials in the direct aftermath of the attacks.

Even though the threat of terrorism-related attacks in Belgium is still ongoing and other nations such as the United Kingdom and the United States are issuing travel warnings for Belgium (Government UK n.d.; United States Department of State 2020), the tourism industry fully recovered. However, the recovery of tourism numbers was a long and labour-intensive process that required new strategies to convince the international tourism industry that Brussels is a safe place and worth visiting (see Section 5.2). Especially the American and Japanese markets were difficult to influence in terms of their safety perceptions of Brussels (Visit Brussels, Interview 28/11/2019). From October 2016 on the tourism numbers started to recover, mainly due to growth in business tourism (Visit Brussels 2017a). According to Visit Brussels (Interview 28/11/2019), Brussels nowadays is attracting even more tourists than before the attacks. In 2019 Brussels recorded a record year with an overall growth of 7% from 2018 to 9.4 million overnight stays 2019 (Hope 2019). Moreover, Brussels was listed in the top 10 business destinations worldwide and top three within the European Union together with London and Frankfurt (Papadopoulos 2019).

The tourism industry is very important for Brussels and is increasingly getting even more important. “Brussels has historically always been a very important city for business tourism due to the presence of the European Institutions and the European Parliament and of course also the NATO and different international associations” (Visit Brussels, Interview 28/11/2019). Therefore, Brussels hosts a lot of congresses and meetings. However, during the last years the share of business and leisure tourism is becoming equal: “what we are seeing now is that leisure tourism is getting as important as professional tourism in Brussels” (Visit Brussels, Interview 28/11/2019).

4.1.2 Impacts and Influences of the Terrorist Attacks on Brussels

Level of Security

The level of threat in Brussels was raised to Level 4 by the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAD/OCAM) on the day of the terror attacks in Belgium (Belgian Federal Government 2016). Level 4 is the highest level of threat and is described as “VERY GRAVE: a threat is serious and very near, with indications of time and place” (Lasoen 2017 p.931). The rise of the security level to the top of the scale involves immediate security measures to be taken including strengthening controls at country borders, imposing restrictions on the public transport and strengthening the presence of the military at certain sites (Belgian Federal Government 2016). According to an International Security and Terrorist Threat Analyst (Interview 26/11/2019), the alert Level 4 remained for at least six months highly impacting for instance the public transportation such as the metro and thus people’s lives. After

gradually being lowered, the threat level in the city of Brussels is now at Level 2 while critical infrastructure such as the airport is set at Level 3 (Brussels Airport Security Expert, Interview 22/11/2019). While a Level 2 threat alert indicates “MEDIUM: a threat is not very plausible” (p.931), Level 3 stands for “GRAVE: a threat is possible and likely, without indications of time and place” (Lasoen 2017 p.931). Therefore, military is still patrolling at Zaventem Airport, but not anymore in the city centre of Brussels (Brussels Airport Security Expert, Interview 22/11/2019).

Life of the People

In the aftermath of the attack, the city was in chaos and in a state of emergency. A Security Consultant of Brussels Police (Written Interview 29/01/2020) described the situation in the city of Brussels as a lockdown. Due to the restrictions on public transport, services were only running at a minimum, very limited form. In the Brussels capital region schools were closed for a few days while people were advised to work from home if possible. These precautions were taken also for organisational reasons as if further attacks would follow, a lower density of people and vehicles on the streets should result in faster and more adequate assistance. Hospitals limited their opening times and prohibited free entrance; only personnel and patients were allowed to enter. Furthermore, many sport and cultural events were cancelled. Disrupting lives of people living and visiting Brussels, the attacks had a great psychological effect. People were scared to continue with their normal lives. Public places were avoided where people normally came together and met. People were afraid to use the metro and started to avoid public transportation, also as they got increasingly suspicious of ‘Arabic-looking’ individuals which could become problematic in a multi-ethnic city as Brussels (International Security and Terrorist Threat Analyst, Interview 26/11/2019).

The attacks and the lockdown of the city have resulted in a change in mentality of the people in Brussels regarding security and security measures. A Security Expert (Interview 27/11/2019) described security measures in Belgium and Brussels as rather lenient and not being the primary concern as the country was seen as a safe, happy and free place by its inhabitants and visitors who tended not to think about eventualities and evil intentions of others. This has changed to the point that people now are a lot more cautious, start to take threats seriously and consider them when for instance attending a festival. Furthermore, contrary to the situation before the attack, they might even complain if no security measures such as bag searches or metal detectors are put in place (Security Expert, Interview 27/11/2019).

Zaventem Bruxelles International Airport

As mentioned above, the first attack in Brussels happened at around 8 o’clock at the Zaventem Airport departure hall executed by two suicide bombers carrying explosives (Renard 2016). At Zaventem

Airport several people were killed and injured, and the departure hall was damaged. As a consequence, the airport was closed for 12 days with no flights and zero passengers operating (Brussels Airport Security Expert, Interview 22/11/2019). After the close down, the day-to-day business was resumed gradually. “Day by day we increased the number of flights and within ... let’s say 2 months later ... in the beginning of June I would say, we were operating again almost all flights scheduled” (Brussels Airport Security Expert, Interview 22/11/2019). As mentioned before, the level of alert was raised to Level 4 immediately after the terrorist attacks struck Brussels but have then been lowered to Level 3 which still implies military operation at the airport.

The reason for the rather quick recovery of passenger numbers at Zaventem Airport in comparison to the recovery of tourism numbers of the city accounted for its significance as a transportation hub in Western Europe and the city’s business tourism due to the European Institutions and other international organisations. According to the Brussels Airport Security Expert (Interview 22/11/2019) passengers choose the best connection and the best price when travelling, and therefore, the airport and destination offering the most convenient destination to travel to and from.

4.2 Berlin, Germany

4.2.1 Impact of the Terrorist Attack on Tourism in Berlin

Although, on 19 December 2016 Germany faced its worst Islamic-motivated act of violence during the vehicle terror attack at a Christmas market located at Breitscheidplatz with 12 fatalities and over 50 injured people (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2017), a significant decrease in tourism numbers was not recorded. Overnight stays increased by 0.3% in 2017 compared to 2016 (Visit Berlin 2018).

The attack in Berlin had a very limited impact on flight bookings. Flight bookings in January decreased slightly below average but recovered very quickly so that it was not noticed (Visit Berlin, Interview 10/12/2019). The decrease in flight bookings was rather treated as a postponement of bookings as people waited to see how the situation evolved and booked flights later in February, for instance.

Visitor numbers show that there was only a limited uncertainty in safety perceptions. Even though a terror threat remains, and governments advise travellers to be increasingly cautious especially in public places which are visited by tourists and foreigners (Government UK n.d.; United States Department of State 2020), tourism in Berlin is increasing. In 2018 around 13.5 million people visited Berlin with the main cause of travel being the city’s sights, art, culture and architecture (Visit Berlin 2019). Therefore, Europe-wide, Berlin as the capital city of Germany, is the third most popular travel destination, only London and Paris have more visitors (Visit Berlin n.d.). The tourism industry is essential for the city’s economy. In 2016, the gross revenue generated by incoming visitors has

increased significantly to 11.58 billion euros per year; roughly 235.000 people earning their income through the tourism sector (Visit Berlin n.d.^b).

4.2.2 Impacts and Influences of the Terrorist Attacks on Berlin

In the immediate aftermath of the vehicle attack in Berlin, the police shared an appeal to people in the city to stay at home and away from the Breitscheidplatz where the incident happened and to keep the streets free for emergency vehicles (Berliner Polizei Einsatz 2016). Furthermore, no rumours about the attack should be spread (ibid.). During the following hours and days, the police in Berlin actively used their Twitter account to remind people in Berlin to be alert and shared information about the situation and the state of investigations.

During the next days after the attack, the Breitscheidplatz was closed for several days due to police investigations. All other Christmas markets in Berlin were asked to remain closed one day after the attack in consideration of the victims and their relatives (Bundesministerium des Innern 2016). Not only at Christmas markets but also in the city centre as well as at railway stations and both airports (Tegel and Schönefeld) the police increased their staff and presence (Der Spiegel 2016). The officers were partly equipped with machine pistols and body armour, showing these openly. Furthermore, bollards were installed at the entrance to Christmas markets (ibid.).

In order not to let the attack affect people's life and not to show fear, the Berlin football team did not cancel their home match two days after the attack (Der Spiegel 2016). Moreover, the New Year's Eve Party at the Brandenburg Gate took place in 2016 (Berliner Morgenpost 2016).

5 Findings of the Research

In this chapter of the thesis research, the findings of expert interviews, observations, database analysis as well as small tourist interviews are presented.

5.1 Measures Implemented to Counter Terrorism at the Local Level

This sub-chapter presents the security measures implemented at the local level by Brussels and Berlin to counter the perceived threat of terrorism. A focus is put on the relation of these measures to changing the security and safety perceptions of tourists in both cities. Data was mainly drawn from expert interviews but complemented by observations and information presented in the World Terror Watch database.

5.1.1 Political Counter-Terrorism Measures

Military Presence and Lockdown in Brussels

One of the immediate measures in Brussels in the direct aftermath of the terrorist attacks in 2016 were the raise of the alert level to the highest, Level 4, by the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis and a lockdown of critical infrastructures, government buildings and public transportation in the city. Already in 2015 after the attacks in Paris, armed forces were engaged to protect sensitive, hard and non-public targets including the European Union headquarters and council buildings (Security Expert, Interview 27/11/2019). Only after the attacks in Brussels in 2016, it was decided that the military also patrols through the streets of Brussels and at the local airport. “‘Operation Vigilant Guardian’ started with the 24/7 presence of military personal in the cities” (Security Consultant – Brussels Police, Written Interview 29/01/2020). Around 1.800 military forces were patrolling in the streets of Brussels as part of the ‘Vigilant Guardian’ operation (World Terror Watch Database, Alert/Briefing published on 24/01/2018). According to an International Security and Terrorist Threat Analyst (Interview 26/11/2019), the alert Level 4 remained for at least six months before being lowered. From January 2018 on, the threat level is at Level 2 in the city of Brussels. However, critical infrastructure such as the airport, the European Institutions or places of worship including churches and synagogues is set at Level 3 so that Armed Forces are still patrolling around these buildings. Moreover, the deployment of military forces at large sport events and other big gatherings in the city will continue (World Terror Watch Database, Alert/Briefing published on 24/01/2018).

Berlin Prevention and Safety Package

As a reaction to the terror attack at the Breitscheidplatz in Berlin in December 2016, the Berlin Senate launched the ‘Berlin Prevention and Safety Package’ (Berliner Präventions- und Sicherheitspaket) on

9 January 2017 (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019). This package comprises a set of counter-terrorism measures, 13 measures in total, which include actions and efforts to prevent terrorism and increase the security of the Berlin society. An overview of the measures included in the ‘Berlin Prevention and Safety Package’ is given in Table 1. In the following sections, some of these measures will be explained in more detail.

Berlin Prevention and Safety Package
1. Improve the equipment of the security authorities
2. Give special attention to the security of major public events
3. Clearly identify identities of asylum seekers and refugees
4. Conveying legal knowledge and ethnic values to asylum seekers and refugees
5. Immediate integration of young refugees in the fields of youth, family, education and sports
6. Strengthening prevention through urban planning
7. Deradicalisation and prevention of radicalisation
8. Support the voluntary return of refugees
9. Consistent deportation of anyone who endangers the security of the society
10. Prohibit unconstitutional clubs and associations
11. Know the whereabouts of people registered by the threat analysis services
12. Ensure police presence in public places classified as being of high risk
13. Securing vital infrastructure (e.g. water, gas, electricity)

Table 1: Counter-Terrorism measures included in the ‘Berlin Prevention and Safety Package’ (Hauptstadtportal des Landes Berlin 2017)

Terrorist attacks in European cities have shown that terrorists make use of for instance assault rifles. As the Berlin security authorities mainly had to deal with attacks by knives or guns, their equipment and protective gear was not designed for heavily armed attacks. Therefore, the ‘Berlin Prevention and Safety Package’ earmarked investments in improving the equipment of the Berlin police as well as Berlin Fire Brigade and emergency services. “It was invested in protective equipment; better weapon systems have been bought; helmets have been bought which also offer protection against Kalashnikovs. That was not there before. Vehicles have been procured which can now be driven into the danger zone during an attack” (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019).

Measures implemented to increase the event security as well as preventive and security measures in urban planning and the build environment in Berlin are described in section 5.1.5 and section 5.1.2.

Another measure to counter terrorism are radicalisation prevention and deradicalisation efforts. Authorities have to deal with questions such as why people radicalise themselves and if they are

radicalised, how can they be deradicalised? Therefore, a Berlin State Commission has been founded consisting of different departments of the Berlin Senate including the Interior, Justice, Youth and Health. This committee jointly considered for instance how to deal with radicalised people, in prison and outside, measures how to deradicalise them and which organisations will be able to offer support and to carry out deradicalisation work. For authorities, the support of organisations is valuable as it has been established that the radicalisation of people is often grounded in psychological or other problems related to their personal life. “For many semi-radicalised young people, not faith is the reason for radicalisation, but rather a ‘normal’ reason that is quite easily understandable, for instance frustration or problems at school, in the family. You can simply talk to them; you can advise them. It is partly a pedagogical approach in parts and that is very valuable” (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019).

A further point in the ‘Berlin Prevention and Safety Package’ is that authorities need to know the whereabouts of people classified as posing a potential terrorist threat, so-called ‘Gefährder’ in German. Besides implementing standard measure throughout Germany, authorities of all federal states coordinate their measures so that no sight is lost on an ‘Gefährder’ when he/she moves inside Germany (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019).

Furthermore, police presence at public places which are classified as being a potential target of attacks should be increased. This includes for instance the establishment of a so-called ‘combined police stations’ (Federal Police and an office of public order) at Alexanderplatz (Hauptstadtportal des Landes Berlin 2017). Moreover, also at public events such as the Christmas markets in Berlin the police presence was increased in the aftermath of the attack with both police officers in uniform and in civilian clothes present. The Berlin Senate, however, rejects to extend the legal base for the deployment of the German Armed Forces in the interior (Hauptstadtportal des Landes Berlin 2017).

Establishment of a Task Group in Berlin

In the Department of Public Safety of the Berlin Senate of the Interior, a new task group was developed as a consequence of the vehicle attack at the Breitscheidplatz. The task group not only deals with deradicalisation and prevention efforts and general measures to counter terrorism but is also identifying future trends related to terrorism. Their main focus, however, is the strategic management of returnees from combat areas related to Islamic terrorism. Furthermore, the task group is developing a comprehensive concept and strategy to counter terrorism. “Our task is simply to draw up a concept, a strategy, which includes all the measures of this extremely complex subject that we are implementing to combat terrorism. These are not just repressive measures, but also deradicalising

ones. They can also be urban planning measures, preventive measures and so forth” (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019).

Terrorism as Accelerator and Reason for Security Measures

In Brussels and Berlin, experiences have been made that the threat or the experience of terrorism incidents have accelerated or enabled the implementation and funding of security measures which were requested and needed before. In Brussels the terrorist attacks in Europe has resulted in the approval of resources for the monitoring and recording of people presenting a possible security and terrorist threat which a decade ago were not granted due to the absence of a political pressure to take measures in form of potential terrorist observations. “The moment that something like a terrorist attack happens, the political side feels the urge but also has the backing to take some steps in this direction” (International Security and Terrorist Threat Analyst, Interview 26/11/2019).

In Berlin, the same situation can be observed. “We've been given opportunities since the attack that we didn't have before (...) The police were able to hire more staff. Departments in which Islamist assessments are made, or which deal with the fight against terrorism, there has been a doubling of staff” (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019). Even if security measures were not requested in regard to countering terrorism, the issue presents a reasonable cause for implementing or approving certain measures. “With terrorism it can be well argued. For public events, we have long required a fence due to the issue of overcrowding. It was not granted as it contradicts the character of the festival, it is impractical, it costs a lot of money, is not proportional to the benefit, and so on. Then, terrorist attacks happened in Europe and suddenly the need for access controls was recognised and the fence was granted” (Event Safety Staff – Berlin Fire Brigade, Interview 18/12/2019). Moreover, the practise of threat scenarios including terrorist attacks by the Berlin Fire Brigade and police is now seen as a matter of course which was not the case before the attack (Berlin Fire and Rescue Academy – Berlin Fire Brigade, Interview 09/12/2019).

5.1.2 Changes to the Build Environment

Brussels

Nowadays, in cities around the world especially visible security measures in and around places that might be potential targets of terrorist attacks are increasingly becoming a common element shaping the urban landscape (Dalgaard-Nielsen, Laisen & Wandorf 2016). This can also be observed in Brussels as in the aftermath of the attacks some visible changes to the build environment in the city centre were made in order to increase security. These material measures were primarily taken after immediate defensive security measures were implemented by police and military presence in the streets of Brussels (Security Consultant – Brussels Police, Written Interview 29/01/2020). As public

places and squares as well as shopping streets count as soft targets for terrorist attacks, concrete blocks and bollards have been put along roads, around squares and at entrances to pedestrian zones in the city of Brussels to interrupt, divert and inhibit vehicles the access and entry to pavements and pedestrian areas (Security Consultant – Brussels Police, Written Interview 29/01/2020; Security Expert, Interview 27/11/2019). Concrete blocks and bollards can also be observed around the Railway station in the centre of Brussels and in front of entrances to metro stations (Figure 5).

Moreover, around the European Institutions the build environment was changed due to material security precautions. However, considerations of these security implementations already started in the aftermath of the truck attack in Nice in 2016. This truck attack not only became iconic for terrorist, it also caused cities around the world as well as in the EU to consider safety measures and obstacles in public places where such an attack could happen (International Security and Terrorist Threat Analyst, Interview 26/11/2019). “Today there is the European Parliament with its big esplanade, substantially everything is blocked, it wasn’t before. The real titanic moment for this in which they [EU institutions] also decided carefully to put in place some obstacles was not just normal administration, like the precautions you see more or less everywhere, but actual measures which will avoid something like that [terror attack] to happen, it started after the terrorist attack” (International Security and Terrorist Threat Analyst, Interview 26/11/2019).

Security measures are increasingly camouflaged, made invisible or aesthetically appealing so that they blend into the city landscape and are not automatically recognised as a security measure (Coaffee & Boshier 2008). This can be observed in Brussels as large and heavy plants and tree pots were installed in roads and squares, blocking the entrance to pedestrian zones (Figure 6).

Even though bollards and concrete blocks increase the security of pedestrians, they are predominantly installed to react to the perceived threat felt by the people. “It has more a placebo effect than real effect (...) So, it would help in tackling caravan attacks, but it is mostly to show people: we are doing something” (International Security and Terrorist Threat Analyst, Interview 26/11/2019).




Figure 5: Bollards in front of Maelbeek Metro Station (Observation Photo 2019)



Figure 6: Plants and tree pots blocking the entrance to pedestrian zone (Observation Photo 2019)

Although not solely related to the terror attacks, Brussels extended the pedestrian zone in the city centre, limiting or prohibiting the access to some roads for vehicles (International Security and Terrorist Threat Analyst, Interview 26/11/2019). The pedestrianisation on the one hand can be related to environmental reasons, but on the other is a means of increasing security standards, making it easier to monitor pedestrian areas. Besides some roads were closed completely for vehicles, others have been secured by retraceable bollards (Figure 7) permitting the entrance to registered and licenced vehicles and drivers such as delivery vans, sometimes only at certain hours during the day (Security Expert, Interview 27/11/2019).



Figure 7: Retractable bollard restricting the entrance to a road in central Brussels (Observation Photo 2019)

Berlin

Berlin is actively and constantly examining and considering material security measures in the streets of the city as terror attacks in Europe have shown the importance of protecting public places with crowds of people including fairs and events (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019). However, as far as the regular, public life of the people is concerned, Berlin seems to hesitate to actively intervene with security measures implemented in the build environment (Visit Berlin, Interview 10/12/2019). Therefore, not many security measures such as concrete blocks can be observed around the city centre besides the ones implemented by embassies to secure themselves. “We just want to prevent Berlin from being completely blocked with bollards. So, where do we start? We have the Brandenburg Gate, if you go down the street, Berlin Mitte ... you can start here and you can walk up to Kurfürstendamm and you will see so many hotspots, so many tourist spots, so many places where we always could say: there a vehicle could go; and where do we want to start, where do we want to end?” (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019).

Especially in new or renovated buildings in Berlin such as the reconstructed Berlin Palace, now called ‘Humboldt Forum’, located at the Museum Island, solid, aesthetic and structural measures are planned from the beginning which increase security and effectively stop vehicles. However, having aesthetic and effective security measures is not straight forward as “If we really want to have 100% protection, these measures must be very ugly and very big. So, we have to do a balancing act, as little un-aesthetic as possible, but as much protection as possible, and people should not be put off by the measures either” (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019). Hoffman and Shelby (2017) and Savitch (2008) state that security measures do not necessarily create a perception of safety as “Every protective measure conveys a message that the public should beware and inadvertently promotes the very fear terrorists seek to inculcate” (Savitch 2008 p.13), therefore reminding the public of the perceived threat of terrorism. This kind of experience was made by Berlin due to temporary counter-terrorism measures such as barriers implemented around the Christmas market at the Breitscheidplatz which have discouraged people as they were reminded of the terror incident. Therefore, Berlin is reviewing measures implemented temporarily as pilot projects to test how people react to them first and then decide what kind of security measures will be implemented permanently. “That is the great art, not to scare people away too much; they still have to feel comfortable here, because that is above all. People should be able to move freely and should be able to relax when they are at the Christmas market or somewhere else and should not be reminded of any attacks” (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019). However, as Berlin is a big city which should not be completely blocked with bollards, the city has to

prioritise in which locations material security measures will be installed. “Berlin is dealing with this question - where does it make sense; where are the places where we have to implement appropriate measures? In the meantime, there are considerations with lists, where we say: these are the places where we want to take action. And I think in two years' time, probably more can be observed” (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019).

5.1.3 Counter-Terrorism Measures Implemented at Local Airports

The terror attacks in Brussels started with the detonation of two bombs in the departure hall of the public terminal at Zaventem Airport at 7:58 am on 22 March 2016. Not only was the departure hall severely damaged, but also several people died and hundreds were injured.

According to the Brussels Airport Security Expert (Interview 22/11/2019), European regulations laying down common rules and basic standards on aviation security exist for air carriers and airports which every airport has to comply to. However, these European regulations only covered the security of the airside part of an airport, but not how the landside area needs to be protected. Security provisions did exist at Zaventem Airport prior to the attack but were criticised as being quite low (International Security and Terrorist Threat Analyst, Interview 26/11/2019). In the aftermath of the attack, Brussels Airport implemented several temporary and long-term measures including the change of the airport's physical structure to increase the security.

In Berlin, the Federal Police is responsible for the landside security measures at Tegel Airport and Schönefeld Airport. “It can be assumed that all security measures have been checked of course, and that they have been upgraded accordingly” (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019). For the new airport in Berlin, Berlin Brandenburg International Airport, which is still under construction, architectural security arrangements and other security measures will be implemented. Moreover, anti-terrorism operations were trained by the police at Tegel Airport and Schönefeld Airport two years ago (Berlin Fire and Rescue Academy – Berlin Fire Brigade, Interview 09/12/2019). During the interviews no concrete information about security measures at the airports in Berlin could be given.

Zaventem Airport – Immediate Measures

As an immediate measure after the terrorist attack, Zaventem Airport was closed for 12 days. During these days, Zaventem Airport started negotiations and discussions with different government stakeholders regarding the security of the airport. As the attack happened in a public terminal, the departure hall, the issue was concerning the Ministry of Home Affairs including the police. Zaventem Airport was allowed to open again under the condition to install a screening of everyone entering the

airport. “It was made clear by the government, the minister of home affairs and the police that we could reopen again only by screening for 100% all passengers and staff members entering the public area” (Brussels Airport Security Expert, Interview 22/11/2019). This screening also included the controlling of every bag people brought to the airport before being allowed to enter the building. As the day-to-day business was resumed gradually, starting with three flights on the first day of the reopening, the complete screening was feasible. However, as flight numbers increased and consequently, also the number of passengers, the screening became a challenge with long queues building up in front of the terminal and waiting hours being as long as one and a half hours. Due to the crowd of people in front of the terminal waiting for the screening and entering the building, the Airport Security Management saw a risk of an additional attack and negotiations started again with the government, the Ministry of Homes Affairs and the police. As a consequence, the screening was restricted to controlling only people and their luggage who landed at Zaventem Airport.

Zaventem Airport – Multi-layered Security System

As a long-term counter-terrorism measure in order to increase the security at the airport, a multi-layered security system was implemented which is related to infrastructure, technology and special-trained manpower.

Besides rebuilding the damaged departure hall, the parking, as well as pick-up and drop-off zones at the airport was restructured in order to increase security and prevent or reduce the risk of for instance vehicle attacks. Before the bombings in 2016, the drop-off and pick-up zone was located directly in front of the terminal departure hall. Nowadays this is not possible anymore as immediate restrictions were implemented that did not allow unknown and unregistered cars in front of the terminal building. Therefore, the parking, pick-up and drop-off zones had to be re-organised. However, besides security measures, the passenger experience had to be kept in mind. “You have to think about the passenger experience, people should still be happy to travel through the airport, you cannot build too much, because then people will go to other airports. (...) So, for example if people arrive at the airport and they want to have a taxi, with their luggage they cannot afford to walk for what kilometres. So, we had to organise the pick-up taxi zone in a way that this could still happen in the front of the terminal” (Brussels Airport Security Expert, Interview 22/11/2019). Therefore, measures have been taken to control these taxis. To be able to access the pick-up area in front of the terminal, a taxi has to have a build-in transponder as well as the driver needs to be registered. “Before they [taxis] enter that area at landside the whole access control system requires to check the licence plate, the transponder and the details of the driver and if that matches, then they allow you to go to the pick-up stop” (Brussels Airport Security Expert, Interview 22/11/2019). However, such a control system is not possible for

drop-off taxi services as taxis not only from the region of Brussels, but the whole of Belgium and even France and the Netherlands bring passengers to the airport. Therefore, the drop-off zone was re-organised 200 meters away from the terminal so that no unregistered cars can access the front of the terminal. Moreover, bollards and fences are used for further security.

In order to increase security, intelligent cameras at and around the airport were installed. All roads leading to the airport have been equipped with intelligent cameras and a software for licence plate recognition to detect cars already registered as suspicious. Moreover, cameras at the entrance to the terminal as well as inside the terminal have a facial recognition feature which is directly linked to the police database of the terror watchlist. Furthermore, police officers who received special training on behaviour detection were employed, monitoring the parking lot, the railway station and the public terminal buildings. The intelligent cameras and behaviour detection is aimed to detect suspicious persons in an early phase and therefore, reduce the risk of an attack. Furthermore, the level of alert was raised to Level 4 immediately after the terrorist attacks struck Brussels but has then been lowered to Level 3 which still implies military operation at the airport.

Contributing to the security at the airport, Zaventem Airport aims to have continuous flow of passengers as queuing and waiting people produce a risk.

However, despite the implementation of various security measures to counter terrorism and other incidents, there is some criticism that the security at the airport can still be improved. Due to administrative complexity, the implementation of security measures is a process which is difficult and takes too long. Furthermore, not the government is solely responsible for the security at Brussels airport, but the company who owns Brussels airlines. “Zaventem Airport does not sufficiently enforce security guidelines that have been asked or that actually should be implemented. By which I mean that they have a security office, they have a particular budget that is solely meant for security and we know that that budget is not being used. So, it appears that the people who are responsible for doing something with that budget don’t do it, but we don’t know exactly why. So, there is still a lot of room for improvement as regards to Brussels Airport” (Security Expert, Interview 27/11/2019).

5.1.4 General Security Measures Taken by Authorities and Organisations

Brussels

Throughout the city, administrations, organisations and companies reviewed and updated their access policy and generally, the term ‘access control’ was introduced (Security Consultant – Brussels Police, Written Interview 29/01/2020). Especially the implementation and deployment of surveillance and security personnel became common or was increased when already implemented. Moreover, organisational measures were taken, including reducing the number or entrances to a building or

closing entrances completely outside the opening hours. Some companies and organisations also made use of concrete blocks, retraceable or temporary bollards and fences.

Museums have increased security measures and safety controls at the entrance with bag searches becoming more frequent (Visit Brussels, Interview 28/11/2019). At the Belgian Royal Museum of Fine Arts, immediately after entering the museum, before reaching the ticket counter, visitors have to walk through a metal detector as well as their bags are searched by museum staff. The rule that visitors are not allowed to take their coats and bags into the museum exist, however, due to fire precautions and not due to counter-terrorism measures (Security Expert, Interview 27/11/2019). Also the Jewish Museum of Belgium in Brussels has severe security precautions. However, they were implemented after a foreign fighter attacked the museum in 2014 (Security Expert, Interview 27/11/2019).

Berlin

Emergency services are essential for the treatment of victims in the direct aftermath of a terrorist attack. After the attack, the fire brigade in Berlin revised their deployment plans and tactics as well as instructions. The operational concept 'Mass Casualty Incident' (German: Massenanfall von Verletzten) which already existed before the attack in Berlin was adapted and optimised for terror incidents after gaining experience in regard to the treatment of injured persons in case of a terror attack (Berlin Fire and Rescue Academy – Berlin Fire Brigade, Interview 09/12/2019). For instance, emergency services should try to keep their stay at the scene of the terror incident as short as possible in order not to offer another target. Furthermore, patients should not be brought and treated in so-called stand-by rooms in order to decentralise the scene. Moreover, terror attacks in other cities such as Paris and Nice have shown that not emergency services, but people present at the scene were the first ones offering help and first aid to the casualties of a terror incidents with only handkerchiefs or their t-shirts. Ambulances have the appropriate equipment, but only for one or two patients in a transportable unit. However, in case of a terrorist incident several, sometimes even hundreds of people can be injured. Therefore, the German Fire Brigade and police developed backpacks in cooperation with the German Armed Forces which each include eight first aid kits. In Berlin, around 700 of these backpacks were distributed on police vehicles, the fire brigade and other rescue services (Berlin Fire and Rescue Academy – Berlin Fire Brigade, Interview 09/12/2019) so that they are able to offer first aid to a number of injured people and share the kits with other helpers. Furthermore, the fire brigade in Berlin is determined to train their employees regularly for special emergency situations such as terror attacks. However, due to the number of employees and the fact that most of them are regularly working in the operational rescue service, getting everyone to participate in training courses is a challenge. "We can only reach about 5% of our staff per year. (...) We cannot train 5000 people;

we really need years. So, there are always only small training courses, or just for a few emergency services” (Berlin Fire and Rescue Academy – Berlin Fire Brigade, Interview 09/12/2019).

Main tourist attractions such as the TV Tower at Alexanderplatz and the Reichstag building have increased security measures. In front of the TV Tower, a tent was put up with security staff controlling the entrance and restricting the access to people with big bags including backpacks and shopping bags. Moreover, after purchasing a ticket for the TV Tower, visitors have to show their bags to security staff. At the Reichstag building, the visitor centre where people have to register and get their ID checked in order to visit the glass dome was moved further away from the actual Reichstag building (Visit Berlin, Interview 10/12/2019). However, the Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior (Interview 19/12/2019) argues the move of the visitor centre was a measure to control the crowds of visitors but not related to the terrorist attack.

5.1.5 Event Safety

The terror incidents in Brussels and Berlin had implications on the safety requirements for public events.

Brussels

In Brussels, “event organisers are obliged to invest in safety, both in terms of equipment and certified personnel, and this outside their own order service” (Security Consultant – Brussels Police, Written Interview 29/01/2020). If these safety regulations are not met by the event organiser, the municipality will cancel the event.

Berlin

As already mentioned above, Berlin prioritises its places where security measures are taken. One of these priorities is given to public events in the city: “We cannot prevent every attack, but where we have events like marathons for example, Christmas markets or the New Year's Eve fireworks we take appropriate measures, of course” (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019) as terror attacks in Europe have shown the importance of protecting public places and crowds of people such as during events and festivities. Event safety to the extent as it is now is a relatively new activity at the Berlin Fire Brigade with the department responsible for public events and event safety being doubled in the number of personnel as it was recognised that events have to be considered in more detail in order to be optimally prepared in case of emergencies such as terrorist attacks.

Due to the vehicle attack in Nice and in Berlin, a main focus is put on vehicle blockages as a security and counter-terrorism measure at events in form of concrete blocks, bollards and metal grid baskets filled with sand which are screwed together. This can be observed at Christmas markets in the city (Figure 8 and 9). However, it was also recognised that not only the event itself, but also the crowd of people waiting for instance at the entrance to an event can present a potential target of terrorist attacks. “The tendency is to move the perimeter protection to where I have a crowd of people, where I can really prevent effectively and not only where the actual event begins” (Event Safety Staff – Berlin Fire Brigade, Interview 18/12/2019). An example is the Olympic Stadium in Berlin; during a large public event in the Olympic Stadium, barriers are placed 300 meters in front of the entrance to the Stadium in order to protect the people outside the stadium. Moreover, at the Christmas market at Gendarmenmarkt, concrete blocks are placed alongside the road, nearly 50 meters in front of the entrance to the Christmas market.



Figure 8: Concrete Blocks around a Christmas market in Berlin (Observation Photo 2019)



Figure 9: Vehicle blockages in form of metal grid baskets filled with sand and concrete blocks around the Christmas market at Breitscheidplatz, Berlin (RT Deutsch 2018)

Another security measure implemented at events in Berlin is the increased police presence. This can again be observed at Christmas markets. “Heavily armed police officers are now part of the street scene at Christmas markets, this was not the case before the attack” (Berlin Fire and Rescue Academy – Berlin Fire Brigade, Interview 09/12/2019). However, it might also be that the police in Berlin at events is not recognised as the degree of presence is dependent on the classification of the safety criticality of an event (Event Safety Staff – Berlin Fire Brigade, Interview 18/12/2019).

Bag controls at the entrance to events are already a naturalised security precaution, but restrictions to the size of bags allowed at event grounds is a new safety measure which is becoming increasingly popular not only at concerts or the New Year’s Eve celebration at the Brandenburg Gate, but also at privately organised Christmas markets such as the Gendarmenmarkt. “People are increasingly getting used to the A4 format. Word has gotten around that for events you take a small bag with you and not the backpack. People inform themselves beforehand, it is slowly accepted” (Event Safety Staff – Berlin Fire Brigade, Interview 18/12/2019). Also metal detectors are used occasionally in addition to bag

controls. However, these measures are individually used when it is seen as necessary but are not a common measure at every public event in Berlin (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019). Especially restrictions and controls of bags are only feasible at events on private grounds such as the Olympic Stadium or the Christmas market at Gendarmenmarkt, but not on public ground as for instance the Christmas market at Breitscheidplatz.

Furthermore, the ‘Berlin Prevention and Safety Package’ allows the Berlin police to make use of video surveillance in special cases (Hauptstadtportal des Landes Berlin 2017).

However, in event safety, a terror attack is still handled as an exceptional case, also in regard to mega events. Therefore, terror attacks do not belong to likely safety-related scenarios which are practised by security and emergency services in preparation for the 2020 UEFA European Football Championship in Munich (Event Safety Staff – Berlin Fire Brigade, Interview 18/12/2019). Even though this example concerns to Munich, it can be referred to Berlin.

Event Visitors and Expectations of Safety Measures

Due to the perceived terrorism threat, event visitors have developed an expectation to see safety measures and precautions at events such as vehicle blockages and police presence. According to the Event Safety Staff – Berlin Fire Brigade (Interview 18/12/2019), it is important that visitors understand the infrastructural event ground and know where emergency exits are in order for them to feel secure. Therefore, the visual communication of the safety concept has to complement the verbal one through simple and basic signage for orientation. “It is a very important step for panic prevention. If people know where they can find safety, this let me say, Central European-influenced degree of self-determination, that people can determine what happens to them, we are used to that, that is our culture. Event organisers have to correspond to that and give orientation. That's why this clear signage and lighting has become a basic requirement at events” (Event Safety Staff – Berlin Fire Brigade, Interview 18/12/2019). Moreover, expectations of event visitors in regard to bag controls have been recognised as people start to feel insecure if security staff does not check bags thoroughly.

5.2 Measures implemented by Destination Marketing Organisations

As mentioned in the literature review, scholars identified the essential role DMOs can play to rebuild a positive and safe destination image. Paraskevas and Arendell (2007) and Pizam and Smith (2000) state that destination-specific strategies and marketing campaigns aimed at international and domestic tourists as well as crisis management can persuade tourists to travel to a destination.

The tourism industry in Brussels was heavily impacted by the terror attacks in Brussels in 2016. However, even before, in the aftermath of the attacks in Paris in 2015 and their connection to Brussels

and its commune Molenbeek leading to a lockdown of the city in 2015, the city's reputation has been affected and slowed tourism numbers down. Due to the attacks in Brussels and in Paris, Brussels experienced a loss in the image as a safe travel destination. Consequently, overnight stays by tourists decreased by 19% (Visit Brussels, Interview 28/11/2019). To counter the decline in tourism numbers and bring tourists back to Brussels, the Destination Management Organisation of the city, Visit Brussels, developed new strategies to convince the international tourism industry that Brussels is a safe place and worth visiting. "We invested a lot of money in campaigns after the attacks (...) to really demonstrate that life goes on and that Brussels is an interesting city to visit" (Visit Brussels, Interview 28/11/2019). With financial support of the regional government of Brussels as well as the national government of Belgium, Visit Brussels created an international destination-specific marketing campaign called "Where will Brussels take you?" (Take me to Brussels) which was part of a four-stage strategy to regain a positive image in the world (Visit Brussels, Interview 28/11/2019). This strategy was put in place immediately after the attacks in Brussels and included smaller informational measures as well as several smaller digital promotional campaigns worldwide and in the streets of Brussels which immediately yielded a positive result.

Berlin, however, did not experience a major decrease in tourism as Brussels did, although the vehicle terror attack at the Christmas Market at the Breitscheidplatz in 2016 was the worst Islamic-motivated act of violence in Germany. Due to the fact that the terror attack had nearly no impact on tourism numbers in Berlin, Visit Berlin did not feel the need to implement specific actions and develop a promotional campaign in order to reassure tourists that it was still safe to travel to Berlin. "Maybe if we had seen that tourism numbers were negatively affected ... But it didn't, so there was no need for us to launch a campaign" (Visit Berlin, Interview 10/12/2019). Shortly after the vehicle attack happened at the Breitscheidplatz, Visit Berlin activated its crisis management plan.

According to the Visit Berlin several factors played a role in the fact that the terror attack in Berlin had nearly no impact on the city's tourism numbers. On the one hand, Berlin stated clearly in the media that the terrorist attack will not affect people's life, it does not scare Berlin. This message was immediately and repeatedly communicated locally, nationally and internationally. On the other hand, Berlin was not the first city struck by a terror incident. London, Paris, Nice and Brussels experienced attacks before Berlin. "There have been so many incidents before Berlin and we know how people tick psychologically, they lose their fear. Unfortunately, it evolves into normality or at least people no longer want to be dissuaded from travelling and accept the risk" (Visit Berlin, Interview 10/12/2019). The influence on tourism in Berlin might have been different if Berlin would have been one of the first cities struck by a terrorist attack. Moreover, Berlin was 'only' hit once and to a smaller extent than Paris or Brussels. As Basil (2014) and Pizam and Fleischer (2002) write, the impact of terrorism on

tourism is not the same in every destination but varies due to the severity of the attack; whereas frequency has a greater impact on tourist arrivals than the severity of terrorist acts.

5.2.1 Visit Brussels' 4-Fold Strategy

Stage 1: Inform, Reassure, Support

The first stage of the strategy was immediately initiated after the attacks in Brussels in 2016. Visit Brussels aimed to make essential information available to travellers and the public. The website of Visit Brussels was kept up to date with information regarding the attacks and happenings within the city. Furthermore, facts and figures about Brussels were published as well as call centres for congress delegates and Information desks in every Belgian Airports were implemented. Moreover, Visit Brussels immediately took measures to counter the loss of reputation and image as a safe city by implementing live webcams on the Grand Place and the Atomium, two of Brussels main tourist attractions. The webcams have been installed to show and reassure people that Brussels is actually a safe place. The webcam at the Grand Place is still installed. Moreover, Visit Brussels uploaded testimonial videos on social media in which people living in Brussels share their view on what makes the city special.

Furthermore, Visit Brussels made an effort to convince event organisers to continue hosting their events in Brussels and not to cancel them which was quite a challenge due to the uncertain safety situation and the lockdown of the city. Due to their long relationship with Brussels, the Seafood Expo Global, the biggest exhibition in Brussels, took initiative and reassured their members that Brussels is a safe city to host the event in April 2016, not long after the terror attacks. Also the big international gay event "La Demence" did not cancel their event organisation.

Stage 2: Amplify Solidarity

These two big events started a domino effect with an increasing number of events not cancelling but hosting their events in Brussels. The aim of Visit Brussels was to turn fear and rejection of the city into a feeling of empathy, sympathy and a general positive feeling towards it. "I think what we see now is that the attacks had, maybe it's a bit morbid to say it, but had a very positive influence on Brussels as a vibrant, lively city because since then there are many, many more initiatives, cultural initiatives, party initiatives and so on. So, now there is a certain feeling of solidarity after the attacks that wasn't there before" (Visit Brussels, Interview 28/11/2019).

Stage 3: Demonstrate That Life Goes On

A study was conducted on the safety perception of Brussels after the terror attacks of key tourist markets. The result showed that perceptions were quite negative, especially of the Italian market (Visit Brussels, Interview 28/11/2019). Therefore, the third stage focusses on demonstrating the world and especially Brussels' key tourism markets Belgium (domestic tourism), United Kingdom, France,

Germany, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands that Brussels is alive, that life goes on and Brussels has a lot to offer. “We [Belgium] are still the land of chocolate and fries and waffles and beer, just come in and be happy here and we will take care of the rest. That was the message” (Security Expert, Interview 27/11/2019).

2017 was the year themed ‘MIXITY.brussels’, celebrating the diversity Brussels has to offer. Around 183 nationalities present in the city make Brussels the second most cosmopolitan city; nearly half of its population has roots other than Belgian (Visit Brussels 2016a). However, Brussels’ diversity does not only refer to nationality, but can also be discovered in cultural, religious, sexual, historical, or artistic attributes. This hybrid and diverse ‘identity’ of Brussels was celebrated for a whole year by Visit Brussels with different events held every month such as contests, music festivals and art expositions. Figure 10 shows a poster of the MIXITY.brussels campaign for the Summer 2017. The campaign was already started in September 2016 with a free concert ‘Hello MIXITY.brussels’.

Implemented in 2014, Visit Brussels expanded the network of ‘greeters’ in the city after the terror incident in 2016. ‘Greeters’ are inhabitants of Brussels who offer tourists a unique and passionate tour through the city of the beaten track, sharing their favourite spots as well as greeting congress participants (Visit Brussels 2016a).

Moreover, in May 2017 Brussels-Capital Region launched a major international promotional campaign called “Where will Brussels take you?” (Take me to Brussels) aiming to reinforce and boost Brussels’ image. The campaign included the Smurfs which were created by the Brussels comic strip designer Peyo and are known around the world. The Smurfs acted as ‘Brussels-ambassadors’ promoting the city and its assets in the region with playfully designed activities in European cities of the essential tourism market countries (Figure 11). Furthermore, a website was created as part of the campaign which enabled visitors to personalise their stay in order to experience a unique Brussels and therefore, allows them to call Brussels “their own” (Brussels Regional Public Services n.d.).

Stage 4: Let Others Speak

In the fourth stage, creating trust and credibility is key. Therefore, Visit Brussels aimed to collaborate with the international press and influencer on social media to spread a positive vibe and image of Brussels. Visit Brussels organised so-call press-events inviting international journalists to Brussels to show them around and let them discover tourist and cultural attractions so that they publish articles, stories and documentaries about the city. “With success. So, we have many articles written about Brussels that were extremely positive and had an extremely positive effect on tourism” (Visit Brussels, Interview 28/11/2019). Recognising the influence blogger and famous people have on social media sharing information, visuals and travel stories, Visit Brussels also started a collaboration with

influential actors to increase the conspicuity and reinforce promotional campaigns and consequently to increase the number of incoming tourists.



Figure 10: MIXITY.brussels campaign for summer 2017 (Visit Brussels 2017c)



Figure 11: "Take me to Brussels" action, Paris 2017 (Visit Brussels 2017c)

5.2.2 Smaller Promotional Initiatives on Social Media by Visit Brussels

Already in the aftermath of the Paris attacks and due to the lockdown of Brussels in 2015 the international press represented Brussels as a dangerous 'war zone' that tourists should avoid (Visit Brussels 2016). Consequently, tourism numbers started to decrease. In order to reassure tourists about the security situation and that the commune of Molenbeek is not a 'no-go' zone, Visit Brussels created smaller promotional campaigns. The international #CallBrussels campaign was aimed to facilitate an exchange between the main tourism markets of Brussels and the people living in the city. Therefore, telephone boxes (Figure 12) have been installed by Visit Brussels in three 'emblematic' locations in the city: at the Mont des Arts, on the Place Flagey and on the Place Communale in Molenbeek (Visit Brussels 2016). Via a website foreign tourist could call these three telephone boxes which people in Brussels passing by were able to answer and respond to the tourists' questions. A webcam filmed the surrounding and the conversation which was then broadcasted live on the website of the campaign and released on social media. This campaign was launched to show and reassure people outside Brussels "Hey, it's just a lot safer here than you might think, than the media suggest, and they're not all somehow serious criminals or terrorists who live here" (Visit Berlin, Interview 10/12/2019).



Figure 12: Telephone Box at Mont des Arts, Brussels (Visit Brussels 2016)

Another campaign called #relaxinbrussels was started on social media platforms in 2015 which included the sharing of quotes from internationally well-known people related to Brussels such as Madonna and Howard Gutman, the former US ambassador to Belgium (Figure 13 and 14).




Figure 13: Quote by Madonna, #relaxinbrussels campaign, 2015 (Trauwaen 2017)



Figure 14: Quote by Howard Gutman, #relaxinbrussels campaign, 2015 (Trauwaen 2017)

The hashtag campaigns were also pursued after the terror attacks stroke Brussels in 2016. Under the hashtag #brusselsalive visuals of Brussels were posted on social media such as Instagram “to promote Brussels or to make life easier and more liveable in Brussels. (...) I think tourism is extremely important to show or to make a city alive” (Visit Brussels, Interview 28/11/2019).

5.2.3 Visit Berlin – Crisis Management

Prior to the terrorist attack at the Breitscheidplatz in 2016, Visit Berlin had established a comprehensive internal crisis management which was activated for the first and only time after this terror attack. Therefore, the crisis management was seen as a ‘test’ to check what Visit Berlin thought of in theory would actually work in practice (Visit Berlin, Interview 10/12/2019). Within one hour /

one and a half hours after the terror attack, the crisis management plan was activated by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Visit Berlin, calling together a crisis management team consisting of the CEO, Chief Operations Officer (COO), Crisis Manager, Spokesperson, IT Manager as well as an operational unit for communication. Following the crisis management plan, Visit Berlin focussed on communicating with tourists, international partner organisations, the city of Berlin and the press. Visit Berlin immediately started communicating with tourists including sharing the contact phone number and twitter account of the police and updates of the situation via their website and Facebook as through these platforms most of the tourists could be reached. As the attack took place in the evening, tourist information offices around the city were closed. Therefore, Visit Berlin opened a service centre phone-line offering support and accurate information to tourists. During the next step, international partner organisations were contacted and informed about the happenings and the situation in Berlin. At the same time, the operational unit for communication was monitoring the press as well as Visit Berlin's social media platforms not only to communicate with tourists but also to check if there is anything Visit Berlin needed to react to immediately, or to notice an insecurity of tourists regarding the safety situation in Berlin. For the latter aspect, Visit Berlin was in constant exchange with accommodation providers and the airports in Berlin. Moreover, a dialogue with the press was essential for Visit Berlin in order to share accurate information, answer questions concerning the crisis and situation in the city as well as to communicate that Berlin still is a safe place. Therefore, the CEO of Visit Berlin was giving interviews to the local and international press.

In the aftermath of the attack, the crisis management plan related to terror attacks was revised and updated according to feedback of what worked in practise and what needed to be changed. Visit Berlin also met with the Berlin Senate of Interior which is responsible for the safety in Berlin. Furthermore, Visit Berlin was regularly communicating with tourism organisations and accommodation providers regarding tourism numbers, cancellations, occupancy rates and tourists' perception of the safety and security in the city. As no major decrease in tourism numbers was recorded, no need was seen to implement specific actions and develop a promotional campaign.

5.3 The Use of Media to Inform About Counter-Terrorism Measures

Authorities and organisations in Brussels and Berlin made use of media to inform the public and travellers about counter-terrorism measures implemented in the cities to a different degree.

In Belgium, policy maker are obliged to communicate with the media in order to inform citizens (Security Consultant Brussels Police, Written Interview 29/01/2020). However, in the case of concrete counter-terrorism measures the government was reticent in communicating so that not too many information and details are given to the terrorist. "If the enemy knows what measures are in place,

they can adjust their tactics. So, that is what the government was trying to avoid” (Security Expert, Interview 27/11/2019). Also Zaventem Airport was hesitant to cooperate with the media regarding safety and security precautions in order not to give away too many details. “We don’t communicate on the details of security procedures in the press. We tried to explain that we have security concepts. But more important is that we make people feel safe and secure when they see the flow of people, infrastructural changes, the military and police at the airport” (Brussels Airport Security Expert, Interview 22/11/2019). However, for the DMO of Brussels, Visit Brussels, the media including social media played an essential role. In the direct aftermath of the attack Visit Brussels used their website to inform and keep tourists up to date with the happenings in the city. Moreover, the media and social media was a vital platform to share their promotional campaigns to advertise Brussels to domestic and international tourists in order to change tourists’ negative safety perception of the city. Furthermore, Visit Brussels invited the international press to Brussels in order to have articles, stories and documentaries published about Brussels around the world.

In Berlin, the government is using the media to show citizens and tourists that measures are taken to increase the security in the city, that authorities are prepared, and people can feel safe. “We have a high interest in communicating what kind of measures we are taking, why these measures are taken, in which way they are taken. We inform the public for instance how the Breitscheidplatz is protected and that police forces are on site, even without their uniform” (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019). In case of big public events such as the New Year’s Eve party in Berlin, a press conference is organised prior to the event to inform the public of the main safety precautions. These press conferences are also held to respond to the perceived threat felt by the public and their expectation of implemented security measures.

In the direct aftermath of the attack at Breitscheidplatz, Visit Berlin shared the contact phone number and twitter account of the police on their website and social media platforms such as Facebook in order for tourists to be informed. Moreover, the website was kept up to date with information of the situation in Berlin.

5.4 The Role of Tourism in Motivating the Implementation of Security Measures

In Brussels, the opinion what role tourism plays in motivating the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in the city varied between the respondents. According to the Security Consultant of Brussels Police (Written Interview 29/01/2020), tourism is not a primary motivation for taking measures against terrorism as tourism cannot be a driver due to the fact that otherwise, Brussels own population would be subordinated. In the Security Consultant’s opinion, a terrorist makes no distinction between homeland citizens or foreigners as a terrorist is mainly concerned with disrupting

society by creating human suffering, chaos and fear. The International Security and Terrorist Threat Analyst (Interview 26/11/2019) stated that especially business tourism due to the international and European institutions can be related to the implementation of precautions to counter terrorism in Brussels. “The measures were also a way to show people related to international institutions that security was something that the government was taking care of” (International Security and Terrorist Threat Analyst, Interview 26/11/2019). Visit Brussels did not make a distinction between business and leisure tourism but finds tourism in general extremely important in the motivation for counter-terrorism measures. The Security Expert shares the same view. Brussels suffered a great loss of reputation through the terrorist attacks leading to a severe drop in tourism numbers in the city. Therefore, security measures were implemented to clearly communicate to the world that Brussels is still a safe place to visit. “We need to send out a very clear message to the world that our defensive measures against any possible threats are adequate to allow anyone who comes here to just go about their business, or go about what they want to do in the full confidence that there is a government or that there is a police or security force that is managing all the risks that it entails” (Security Expert, Interview 27/11/2019).

In Berlin, tourism is seen as not being the primary motivation for implementing counter-terrorism measures but is still playing a part indirectly. In regard to safety precautions and counter-terrorism implications, Berlin is taken a holistic approach. “For us, the safety of all people whether they live here or are visiting is of central importance. Everyone should feel comfortable and safe here” (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019). However, tourism is very important for Berlin as it is one of the city’s primary source of income. Therefore, measures should not negatively affect experiences of tourists in Berlin. “All our measures must be as aesthetic and discreet as possible so as not to discourage people to visit” (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019).

5.5 Cooperation with Other European Cities

Since European cities have been hit by terrorist attacks, experts have thoroughly analysed every attack. Relevant ministries have exchanged experiences and information during European Summits, as well as the police and judicial services communicate with each other through organisations such as EUROPOL, EUROJUST and INTERPOL and maintain a personal contact with neighbouring countries (Security Consultant – Brussels Police, Written Interview 29/01/2020). However, European cities are not equal to each other in many respects and are, therefore, unique. This makes it difficult to consider other European cities as role models. “There are large differences in the geographical location, in numbers of inhabitants and the density of habitation, in the classification or distribution of habitation,

governmental administrations and ministries, public transport, train and metro, airports, industry and technology or financial institutions – every capital is unique. (...) So, I would rather argue that there is no question of a role model, but rather of consultation and especially of ‘lessons learned’” (Security Consultant – Brussels Police, Written Interview 29/01/2020).

Visit Brussels stated that they especially looked at Paris, but actually did not take other cities as examples. “I think we really started from our own strength and our own qualities” (Visit Brussels, Interview 28/11/2019). Zaventem Airport on the other hand had a lot of exchanges with other airports such as Heathrow Airport in London and Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv about how to manage the landside security in the future. The association Airport Council International which represents several airports within Europe formed a security committee where guidelines of how to organise the landside security were discussed.

In Berlin, respondents gave more specific information regarding the exchange with other European cities and in what way their counter-terrorism measures are taken as a role model for Berlin. The task group which was established after the Berlin terror attack to specifically develop counter-terrorism and deradicalisation strategies, as mentioned in 5.1.1, is strongly participating in international networks and conferences, especially in Europe. Examples of counter-terrorism measures implemented by other cities are of great importance to them. The task group is travelling to other European countries including Great Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden, but also to countries overseas such as Canada to get to know other strategies and best-practice examples of measures to counter terrorism in order to evaluate the possibilities of adapting these strategies and measures in Berlin and Germany. They have recognised that other countries are already further developed in counter-terrorism measures so that Germany does not have to come up with new measures but can take other cities as examples. “We are not reinventing the wheel as we experienced that other countries are one step ahead of us. For instance, is London and England in general quite advanced in their deradicalisation efforts” (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019). However, as mentioned by the Security Consultant of Brussels Police (Written Interview 29/01/2020), not every strategy and measure can be adapted in Germany in the same way as in other countries. The context has to be kept in mind that Berlin and Germany have other legal requirements, including data protection requirements, a different political structure and different competences. “That is the reason why models and strategies are not transferable one to one, but elements of them always are” (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019). This does also apply to security measures at public events. Some event organisers such as the ones of the six famous world marathons in Berlin, Boston, London, Chicago, New York City and Tokyo have a good relationship and are regularly exchanging information about security measures and are visiting each

other. Nonetheless, the way rescue and emergency services are organised for instance in Paris cannot be adapted to Berlin due to a difference organisational structure. In Paris as well as in Marseille, the fire services are part of the armed forces, whereas in Germany, the military and security authorities are strictly separated. In Germany, the Federal States are generally in charge of the police and the fire brigade. However, according to the Event Safety Staff – Berlin Fire Brigade, regarding the exchange of safety measures for public events there is still room for improvements as “I think we do not really look to the right and left and consider what measures are already standard in other cities. Both in Berlin and other European cities, the focus is put on the own city” (Event Safety Staff – Berlin Fire Brigade, Interview 18/12/2019).

Visit Berlin generally has a close contact to other DMOs, even though the degree of the contact varies. In the aftermath of the terror attack, Visit Berlin looked at how other DMOs and destinations reacted to terror incidents and what kind of promotional campaigns they developed. However, due to the fact there was nearly no decrease in tourism numbers, Visit Berlin did not feel the need to implement a campaign itself.

5.6 The Changing Nature of Threat

According to the respondents, the chance of Brussels and Berlin to experience a terror attack again such as the ones in European cities in the last decade, is very small nowadays. This is due to the loss of territory of ISIS. “The Islamic State and other organised terrorist organisations do not have the same structure, the same cells active on the territory they had five to seven years ago. And this is because the secret services have actually been really good at dismantling this cells and organisation. So, this counter-terrorist strategy put in place actually worked” (International Security and Terrorist Threat Analyst, Interview 26/11/2019). However, even though the threat posed by ISIS terrorists decreased, it does not mean that there is no threat at all. In Brussels the threat has changed and is not related to the kind of attacks Paris or the city itself have experienced, but to so-called ‘lone wolf’ attackers using a knife or even a military rifle as in Strasbourg. Lone wolf attackers are radicalised people who are not in direct contact with terrorist groups and never travelled to combat zones. This different form of threat poses new challenges to the authorities in terms of security measures. “Lone wolves are very difficult to spot because most of the time this people are not people who have engaged with Islamic State official members, but they are just people who radicalise by themselves through YouTube or the media, and they go by themselves. So, it is the definition of lone wolves. To conclude, the threat is still there, even though it is not the same as it was years ago and much less strong” (International Security and Terrorist Threat Analyst, Interview 26/11/2019). Furthermore, imprisoned foreign fighters who returned to Belgium from conflict zones in Syria and Iraq present a high risk of further radicalisation

in prison and recreation of terrorist cells after their release (World Terror Watch Database, Alert/Briefing published on 07/02/2020). Far-right extremists, however, do not pose a terrorist risk so far (World Terror Watch Database, Alert/Briefing published on 15/01/2019).

The change in strategy of ISIS due to the territorial loss and that the threat now is coming from lone wolf attacks is also recognised in Berlin. “I have a great deal of confidence in the security authorities that they can curb terrorist groups, which we see in the headlines. The problem are simply radical lone wolves” (Berlin Fire and Rescue Academy – Berlin Fire Brigade, Interview 09/12/2019). In Berlin, radicalisation is increasing (World Terror Watch Database, Alert/Briefing published on 15/02/2018). In the last two years the inhibition threshold to make use of a knife and hurt or kill people became very low. This also creates a challenge for authorities and their safety strategies and structures. “We have the realisation, as every big city has, we will not be able to stop these lone wolves one hundred percent. (...) The lone wolf attacks go more in this spontaneous direction. As we have now seen in London [London Bridge Stabbing], it is no longer possible to create protection with these blocking measures. (...) Therefore, we must always be motivated to do more and adapt our strategies” (Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, Interview 19/12/2019). This statement refers to the stabbing on the London Bridge and the big bollards at the end of the bridge which were installed as a security measure for vehicle attacks. Therefore, it is a challenge for authorities to continue their motivation to invest money for prevention measures on the political level. According to the Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior, prevention is the best measure to prevent attacks, even more than bollards, because if someone is deradicalised, the person does not commit an attack. Also in Germany, returnees of combat zones who are glorified by domestic radical Islamic groups may commit crimes (World Terror Watch Database, Alert/Briefing published on 10/07/2019). Furthermore, right-wing extremism is growing in Germany and increasingly presenting a threat (World Terror Watch Database, Alert/Briefing published on 27/02/2020).

Even though Brussels and Berlin are still experiencing a threat of attacks, nowadays by lone wolves, all respondents share the opinion that both cities are safe. The Security Consultant of Brussels Police (Written Interview 29/01/2020) and the Security Expert (Interview 27/11/2019) both state that Brussels might be even safer than other European cities such as London and Paris due to its small size. In Brussels, no no-go zone exist where it might be dangerous for people to go. Furthermore, Brussels is secured by a large police force which is very present in the city centre, even though they are not recognised. Especially in touristic areas, the public areas are guarded by cameras with a permanent surveillance of a control centre. However, for a security evaluation of a city, not the terrorism threat but murder rates should be considered. “I think that the federal prosecutor tends to always put it like that: if we want to make real comparison between capital cities around the world, even in Europe,

look at murder rates and you will find that Brussels, the whole area even, not just Molenbeek, the murder rate is about 36 per year or something like that. Go and look in any other capital and they are in the hundreds. So, if that is a certain measurement that can be used to think about how safe the place really is then I think we are scoring pretty good” (Security Expert, Interview 27/11/2019).

A general feeling of high security is also present in Berlin. Looking at the police crime statistics, Berlin is always scoring worse than other cities in Germany due to its size, the population structure and the fact that the city is the capital. In relation to the Islamist spectrum, an increased number of people belonging to the spectrum has been noticed in Berlin, but there is no relation to an increase in crimes in the city. Therefore, also in this sense Berlin can be classified as being safe.

5.7 Awareness of Counter-Terrorism Measures and Safety Perceptions of Tourists

Tourists in both destinations, Brussels and Berlin, gave mixed responses to the question how present the terrorism threat is in their mind when travelling. Most of the tourists interviewed in Brussels think about the threat of terrorism, but not as much as it would keep them from travelling, choosing a travel destination or walking around the city centre of Brussels. One tourist stated: “The threat is present in our mind, we do think about the threat, but it does not keep us from travelling. However, I think about what happened here in Brussels three years ago when I am walking around” (Tourist Brussels 1, Interview 27/11/2019). Only a few respondents stated that the threat of terrorism influences their travel choices or the other extreme, that while travelling terrorism is not in their mind at all. Furthermore, distinctions in destinations were made where people perceived the threat of terrorism to be higher as shown in this quote from one tourist: “Here in Brussels I do not think about terrorism at all, but Paris and London is a different story” (Tourist Brussels 2, Interview 27/11/2019). In Berlin responses were slightly different with the majority indicating that they are not scared of terrorism and therefore, not thinking of the treat when making their travel choices or walking around Berlin. However, also in Berlin distinctions between destination were made: “Here in Berlin it does not have any influence, otherwise I cannot go anywhere. But I would not travel to Turkey for instance.” (Tourist Berlin 1, Interview 10/12/2019). In Berlin, some kind of a defiance towards the terrorism threat could be felt: “Above all, I do not let myself forbid to go to concerts, to the Christmas market or travel wherever I want to by anyone” (Tourist Berlin 2, Interview 11/12/2019).

Regarding visible counter-terrorism measures in the streets and at public places around the city centre, most of the tourists interviewed did not recognise any of them. Only a few people stated that the military presence at the airport or around the European headquarters, and concrete blocks besides roads attracted their attention. Besides the police presence at Christmas markets no counter-

terrorism measures were recognised in Berlin. In both destinations no tourists knew any policies implemented to counter the terrorism threat.

The majority of tourists interviewed in Brussels stated that the counter-terrorism measures implemented positively influence their safety perception in the city, even though seeing military in the streets and at the airport causes an unpleasant and rather insecure feeling about safety. In Berlin nearly all tourists interviewed indicated that the measures do not impact their safety perception neither positively nor negatively as they think Berlin is generally safe. However, in relation to Christmas markets, some respondents stated that security measures positively impact their perception of safety, even though they know that bollards might not fully prevent attacks: “Berlin is very safe. The bollards at the Christmas markets make me feel safer, but how much they actually contribute to the public’s safety is questionable” (Tourist Berlin 3, Interview 10/12/2019).

6 Discussion

This chapter will analyse the findings in relation to the existing academic literature as well as compare the findings of the research in the two cities, Brussels and Berlin.

The research project shows the uniqueness and complexity of each terrorism incident also in relation to impacts on tourism and travel behaviour as well as to counter-terrorism measures implemented by European cities. Both case study locations, Brussels and Berlin, experienced some kind of impact by the terror attacks in the two cities. Brussels was even impacted by attacks in another European country from 2015 on. In the aftermath of the attack, Brussels and Berlin implemented several counter-terrorism measures. However, both destinations took very different security precautions. A variety of counter-terrorism measures implemented by Brussels and Berlin are rather popular security measures and already acknowledged in the academic literature. However, other measures taken such as counter-terrorism measures at local airports or in event security complement the literature review.

The general impact of the terror attack on the life of people in Brussels and Berlin was very different. In Brussels, the public life was severely restricted in the aftermath of the attack due to a lockdown of the city with for instance only limited public transportation services running, closure of schools and cancellation of cultural events. Furthermore, the terror attacks negatively influenced the safety perception of people living in and visiting Brussels. In Berlin, the situation after the vehicle attack was very different. Only Christmas markets were closed for the day after the attack, the Breitscheidplatz remained closed for several days due to the ongoing investigation. No events were cancelled and people were not advised to stay at home, but able to continue their daily life.

The academic literature states that the impact of a terror attack on tourism is not the same in every destination but varies due to the severity of the attack; whereas frequency has a greater impact on tourist arrivals than the severity of terrorist acts (Bassil 2014; Pizam & Fleischer 2002). Findings of this research project confirm this statement. Brussels experienced two attacks in different locations at the same day while Berlin was shocked by one attack. Fatality and casualty numbers were much higher in Brussels than in Berlin. In the aftermath of the attack, tourism numbers in Brussels dropped considerably, but in Berlin a significant decrease was not recorded. Even prior to the attacks in Brussels, the city experienced a decline in tourism numbers as a spillover effect of the attacks in Paris (2015) and Nice (2016), confirming the theory of Baker (2014).

However, a negative influence of the terror attacks on tourism safety perceptions in Berlin which consequently led to an alteration of travel plans and, hence, cancellations was not experienced in Berlin. These findings contradict the studies presented in the literature review. For the fact that Berlin

had nearly no impact on tourism numbers, a few reasons were named. A factor playing an important role according to Visit Berlin was that tourists are increasingly getting resilient to terrorism in European cities. The number of terrorist attacks in Europe seemed to have influenced tourists' fear of terrorism as an attack might happen in every European city. Therefore, they accept the risk of experiencing an attack rather than not travelling at all. This was also confirmed by the tourists interviewed in Brussels and Berlin. In both destinations, the majority of tourists interviewed stated that they are not scared of terrorism and, therefore, terrorism is not affecting their travel choices. However, due to the small sample size of interviews with tourists, a generalisation of this finding cannot be made.

As an immediate reaction to the terror attacks in Brussels, the alert level in the city was raised to Level 4, the highest level, by the OCAD and military forces were deployed in the streets and at the local airport. In Berlin, such a scenario is not possible due to a different legal regulation and organisational structure of security authorities. The deployment of the German Armed Forces, the 'Bundeswehr', in the interior of Germany is permitted according to German Basic Law. In Article 87a, paragraph 2 of the German Constitution it is stated that "Except for defence purposes, the armed forces may be deployed only to the extent explicitly permitted by the Basic Law". Exceptional cases for the deployment of the armed forces in the interior of Germany are for instance natural catastrophes; however, this does not account for terrorism threats. Furthermore, the military in Germany is strictly separated from security authorities; the Federal States of Germany are generally in charge of the police and the fire brigades. However, for instance in Paris and Marseille, the fire services are part of the armed forces. Therefore, this research shows that the deployment of armed forces in a city, and thus, in the interior of a country, as a counter-terrorism precaution is highly dependent on the legal regulations and the organisation of security authorities of each country and is consequently not feasible in every European city. Furthermore, a so-called threat or alert level does not exist in Germany.

The literature review showed that security measures in the streets and at public places of cities are criticised as they do not necessarily create a perception of safety (Hoffman and Shelby 2017; Savitch 2008). "Every protective measure conveys a message that the public should beware and inadvertently promotes the very fear terrorists seek to inculcate" (Savitch 2008 p.13). Berlin made such an experience as temporary counter-terrorism measures such as barriers implemented around the Christmas market at the Breitscheidplatz discouraged people as they were reminded of the terror incident from 2016. Therefore, Berlin seems to be hesitant to implement security measures to the build environment in order not to restrict the spirit of a free society. Brussels, on the other hand, has taken efforts to increase the security in the city by concrete blocks and bollards along roads, around

squares and at entrances to pedestrian zones in the city to interrupt, divert and inhibit vehicles the access and entry to pavements and pedestrian areas. The findings of the research imply that authorities in Brussels and Berlin take into account best practice examples as provided by Coaffee and Boshier (2008) to 'design-out' the terrorist threat and increasingly camouflage counter-terrorism measures, make them invisible and aesthetically appealing so that they blend into the cityscape. However, during the interviews in both destinations it was mentioned that these counter-terrorism measures are predominantly installed to react to the perceived threat felt by the people which confirms the critique made by Coaffee, O'Hare and Hawkesworth (2009). Furthermore, it seems that these security measures taken by Berlin and especially by Brussels are focussed on the threat of vehicle attacks, which are only one mode of operandi used by terrorists. However, counter-terrorism measures against vehicle attacks do not provide security against knife and shooting attacks, which have been increasingly experienced by European cities in the latest lone wolf attacks and are nowadays posing a (terrorist) threat.

The DMOs of both destinations, Visit Brussels and Visit Berlin, put an emphasis on immediate crisis communication in the direct aftermath of the terror attack. In such a situation, open and immediate communication is expected by trustworthy sources such as DMOs to avoid the spreading of false information. Visit Brussels and Visit Berlin immediately started sharing information and communicating openly with the public and tourists via their own websites and social media accounts such as Facebook. These results indicate that online and social media platforms are a vital tool in crisis communication and management due to their wide reach. Also in destination marketing, social media is playing an essential role. To counter the loss of reputation and image as a safe city and consequently attract tourists to Brussels, Visit Brussels created several promotional and hashtag campaigns which were launched on social media platforms such as Instagram. Due to nearly no decrease in tourism numbers in Berlin, Visit Berlin did not see the need to implement specific actions and promotional campaigns. However, shortly after the terrorist attack Visit Berlin continued their destination marketing activities such as sharing pictures of Berlin on their social media accounts.

The research confirmed the findings of the academic literature mentioned in the literature review, that DMOs play an essential role in rebuilding a positive and safe destination image. It implies that destination-specific strategies and marketing campaigns aimed at international and domestic tourists as well as crisis management can persuade tourists to travel to a destination, which was already stated by Paraskevas and Arendell (2007) and Pizam and Smith (2000). Furthermore, the research shows the same result as the study by Ketter (2016) in regard to advantages of social media platforms for DMOs to post-crisis information sharing and image rebuilding.

This study also showed that authorities in both case studies put a great emphasis on keeping the number of tourists high which can be related to the sector's economic contribution. Visit Brussels and Visit Berlin immediately started with crisis communication and information sharing. Moreover, Visit Brussels developed several promotional campaigns in order to attract tourists back to the city. Visit Berlin stated they would have done the same if Berlin had experienced a decrease in tourism number. As this was not the case, Visit Berlin did not see a need for extra tourism marketing actions. This implies that authorities are mostly concerned about having a continuous tourism growth.

The role of tourism in motivating the implementation of security measures cannot clearly be defined as respondents have a different view on the degree of tourism as a motivating factor. The findings in Brussels and Berlin suggest that tourism is playing a part in motivating the implementation of counter-terrorism measures, even though it is not a primary one as the cities' populations are at least as important as tourists. However, counter-terrorism measures should not discourage people to visit, so therefore, all measures in Berlin must be as aesthetic and discrete as possible. In Brussels one respondent stated that in his opinion especially business tourism is a motivating factor due to the presence of international institutions. Whereas two other respondents including one from Visit Brussels saw tourism in general as being of high importance in the motivation of counter-terrorism measures in order to clearly communicate worldwide that Brussels is still a safe place to visit. These findings suggest that tourism is definitely playing a part indirectly as the industry is an important sector for Brussels and Berlin's economy. However, views are very subjective on this matter.

This research study investigated the tourists' knowledge of counter-terrorism measures implemented in Brussels and Berlin as well as the influence of these measures on the tourists' safety perceptions. In both research locations, the majority of tourists interviewed did not recognise any visible counter-terrorism measures. Only few were aware of the military presence at the airport or around the European headquarters and concrete blocks besides roads in Brussels as well as police presence at Christmas markets in Berlin. However, in both destinations no tourists knew any policies implemented to counter the terrorism threat. The counter-terrorism measures implemented in Brussels generally had a positive effect on the tourists' safety perceptions of the city, just the military patrolling in the streets and at the airport caused an unpleasant and rather insecure feeling about safety. In relation to counter-terrorism measures at Christmas markets in Berlin, some tourists stated that that security measures positively impacted their perception of safety. Therefore, the findings are not in line with the critique expressed by Hoffman and Shelby (2017) and Savitch (2008), that security measures do not necessarily create a perception of safety, but rather remind the public of the perceived threat of terrorism. These findings complement the existing academic literature. However, the sample size of

tourists interviewed for this research is too small to generalise the findings. Therefore, further research on this matter is needed in order to be able to draw relevant conclusions.

7 Conclusion

In the last decades, terrorism has been a central issue to countries worldwide and especially to European states as major and well-known European cities have experienced different kind of attacks. Even though the number of terror attacks on European soil is declining, the threat of terrorism incidents is still high in Europe, creating a feeling of insecurity and fear throughout the world. Terrorism attacks do not only cause human losses and destruction, but also impact a city's society as well as economy including the tourism industry due to changed risk and safety perceptions of tourists. Therefore, this research project investigated measures taken on the local level to counter the perceived threat of terrorism in European cities that have been struck by a terror attack. Special attention was given to exploring counter-terrorism measures in relation to changing tourists' perceptions of security and safety. Therefore, the following main research question guided the research:

In what ways are authorities responding to address the perceived threats of terrorism in European cities, and specifically to influence the perception of tourists?

Brussels and Berlin served as case studies to the research project as both cities experienced a terror attack in 2016. Brussels' image as a safe travel destination was highly damaged, leading to a decrease in tourism numbers. Berlin, however, did not experience a significant drop in visitors. In both destination tourism numbers fully recovered, even though a terrorism threat is still present.

In order to answer the main research question, three sub-questions have been formulated. The first part of the research investigated what measures have been implemented to address the perceived terrorism threat in the two research locations. The research shows that Brussels and Berlin implemented various counter-terrorism measures in different domains. However, these measures are highly dependent on the type and impact of a terror attack as well as on the legal regulations and organisational structures of security authorities within a country and city. Authorities in both research destinations have implemented counter-terrorism measures on the political level. In the direct aftermath of the terror attacks in Brussels, the city raised the alert level to the highest, Level 4, as well as went into a lockdown. Moreover, military forces were patrolling in the streets and at the airport. Even though the threat level has been lowered, the military is still present at the airport and around critical infrastructure. Due to a different legal regulation and organisational structure, such a scenario is not possible in Berlin. In Berlin, the Senate launched the 'Berlin Prevention and Safety Package' with a set of counter-terrorism measures addressing actions and efforts to prevent terrorism and increase the security of the Berlin society. In both cities, public spaces are protected by visible counter-terrorism measures such as concrete blocks and (retraceable) bollards. However, these protective

measures are limited to critical infrastructure and locations rated as possible terrorism targets. While in Berlin security measures at local airports have been checked and upgraded if necessary, Zaventem Airport in Brussels implemented several temporary and long-term measures including the change of the airport's physical structure and a multi-layered security system to increase the security. Furthermore, security measures have also been taken by organisations and museums in Brussels, and emergency services and tourist attractions in Berlin. The terror incidents in Brussels and Berlin also had implications on the safety requirements for public events. A main focus is put on vehicle blockages as a security and counter-terrorism measure at events in form of concrete blocks, bollards and metal grid baskets filled with sand which are screwed together as it can be observed at Christmas markets in Berlin. Further security measures implemented are an increased police presence at public events as well as restrictions to bag sizes.

Some of these counter-terrorism measures implemented are predominantly installed to respond to the perceived threat felt by the people, especially security measures in regard to the build environment and event security. Moreover, the study implies that measures taken by Berlin and particularly by Brussels have been installed as a protection against vehicle attacks. However, vehicle attacks are only one mode of operandi used by terrorists and do not provide security against knife and shooting attacks, which have been increasingly experienced by European cities in the latest lone wolf attacks.

In Brussels, the DMO played an essential role in rebuilding a positive and safe destination image. With the development of destination-specific strategies and promotional marketing campaigns, Visit Brussels demonstrated that life goes on, the city is alive, safe and has a lot to offer. In Berlin, Visit Berlin activated its crisis management plan shortly after the attack happened at the Breitscheidplatz. However, as the terror attack had nearly no impact on tourism numbers, Visit Berlin did not feel the need to implement specific actions and develop a promotional campaign.

The second research sub-question explored to what extent tourism is central to the steps authorities in Brussels and Berlin are taking against the perceived terrorist threat. The findings of the research show that opinions on the role of tourism in motivating the implementation of counter-terrorism measures are very subjective and varied between the respondents. In general, the findings suggest that tourism is not central to authorities' motivation for security measures, but indirectly playing a part due to the importance of the tourism sector for the cities. Therefore, for instance in regard to the design of counter-terrorism precautions in Berlin all measures must be as aesthetic and discrete as possible in order not to discourage people to visit. In Brussels and Berlin it was stressed, though, that the cities' population is at least as important as tourists in the motivation of security measures.

However, in regard to DMOs and their efforts in crisis management and to rebuild a positive and safe destination image, tourism is playing a very central role. To counter the decrease in tourism numbers in the aftermath of the terror attack, Visit Brussels developed new strategies and promotional activities in order to convince international tourists that Brussels is still a safe destination and worth visiting.

The third sub-question of the research took the views of tourists on security measures into account. It was investigated in what ways the counter-terrorism measures influenced the safety perception of tourist in the two research locations. In general, the counter-terrorism measures implemented in Brussels positively influenced the safety perception of the majority of tourists interviewed. Only the presence of the Belgian Armed Forces in the streets of Brussels and at the local airport caused an unpleasant and rather insecure feeling about the safety of the city. In Berlin, nearly all tourists interviewed stated that security measures to counter terrorism did not impact their safety perception neither positively nor negatively as they perceive Berlin as generally being safe. Only the safety measures at Christmas markets in Berlin had positive effects on safety perceptions of some tourists. However, in both research destinations visible counter-terrorism measures were not necessarily recognised by tourists. Only a few tourists indicated that the military presence at the airport in Brussels and around the European headquarter, and concrete blocks besides roads attracted their attention. In Berlin, tourists only pointed out the presence of police at Christmas markets.

To conclude and give an answer to the main research question of the thesis project, the findings of the two case studies show that cities in Europe respond very differently to the perceived terrorism threat by implementing a variety of counter-terrorism measures in various fields, as summarised above. However, these counter-terrorism measures highly differ in their rigour ranging for instance from a lockdown of the city of Brussels to no restrictions on the society of Berlin. Furthermore, the study shows that the implementation of counter-terrorism precautions are highly dependent on the type and impact of a terror attack as well as on the legal regulations and organisational structures of security authorities within a country and city. Some of the counter-terrorism measures implemented in Brussels and Berlin are predominantly installed to respond to the perceived threat felt by the people, especially visible security measures in regard to the build environment and event security. Whereas only indirectly influencing the authorities' motivation to implement counter-terrorism measures, tourism is playing a very central role in crisis management and image rebuilding by DMOs. All these measures have been implemented to protect citizens and visitors in cities against the perceived terrorism threat. However, these precautions to counter the perceived threat of terrorism have no influence and present no help to deal with and counter the new, global threat to societies, to

tourism and a lot more, which no one seems to have seen coming and is challenging the world since the turn of the year.

7.1 Limitations to the Thesis Project and Recommendations for Further Research

The findings on counter-terrorism measures implemented in Brussels and Berlin were very dependent on the occupation and field of expertise of the expert interview partners. Therefore, the measures implemented in both destinations cannot be limited to the ones mentioned in this study. A repetition of the research project with different experts as interview respondents will likely result in different and additional measures implemented to counter the perceived threat of terrorism in Brussels and Berlin. Moreover, due to the sensitivity of the research topic, certain security measures and details of counter-terrorism precautions were not allowed to be mentioned and revealed. Therefore, some research findings are lacking depth and are rather vague. Additionally, this research exclusively focussed on European (capital) cities. These urban destinations are less dependent on tourism than smaller destinations outside Europe. Thus, the findings and conclusions of this research project are most likely less transferrable and applicable to destinations outside Europe and/or which are highly dependent on tourism income. Therefore, further research on counter-terrorism measures in other urban destinations outside Europe in general and which are highly relying of tourism as their main economic sector could enrich and extend the knowledge in this field.

The sample size of tourists interviewed for this research in Brussels and Berlin is too small to generalise the results and thus, forms a limitation to the research project. Furthermore, only qualitative data collection methods have been used. Therefore, further and extended research on this topic is needed with an appropriate sample size in order to be able to draw relevant conclusions. As the research indicates that perceptions on the safety of Brussels varied between nationalities, further research could investigate this matter in more detail by studying safety perceptions in relation to the threat of terrorism and the ways they are influenced by counter-terrorism measures in the context of different nationalities and also other demographic data.

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Appendix 1 – Interview guides

Appendix 1.1 Interview Guide Expert Interviews (English)

	Instruction
Introduction	Introduce Researcher (myself)
	Thank participant for taking part in the research
	Explain structure/layout and inform about the duration of the interview
	Introduce Topic: Counter-terrorism measures in European cities
	Purpose: to expand the knowledge of measures implemented by European cities to address the perceived terrorism threats and, specifically to influence the perception of tourists
	Ask permission to record the interview and to take notes
	Inform the interviewee that the interview is confidential, meaning that they can stop the interview when needed, they do not have to respond to questions if they do not feel comfortable answering the question or are not allowed to, and their name will not be stated in the research. Explain what will be done with the answers given.
	Ask if the interviewee has any questions before the interview starts.
Opening	What is your profession?
	How important is the tourism sector for the city of Brussels/Berlin?
Topics	
<i>Impacts of Terrorism attack on tourism</i>	Question 1: What impacts did the attack have on the tourism industry of Berlin/Brussels? Keywords: response of tourists, cancellations, economy of city
	Question 2: Why has there not been a significant drop in tourist numbers in Berlin in the direct aftermath of the attack? (Berlin only)
<i>Measures taken against perceived threat</i>	Question 3: What measures have been taken after the terror attack? Keywords: temporary measures, permanent measures, security measures (technical/personal), measures taken prior to attack
	Follow up questions: 4: What policies have been implemented? Keywords: local level, federal state level (Berlin) 5: Has the build environment been changed? 6: What is the role of the police? Keywords: security measures 7: What measures have been taken to specifically tackle the perceived terrorism threat? Keywords: public relations campaigns
	Question 8: What role does tourism play in motivating the implementation of counter-terrorism measures?
	Question 9: What has been done to rebuild a positive and safe destination image of the city? Keywords: destination-specific marketing campaign
	Question 10: To what extent have the counter-terrorism measures and policies influenced the tourists in their safety perception of the city? Keywords: own opinion, study; To what extent do they come into conflict?
<i>Role Model</i>	Question 11: To what extent have other European cities and their measures to counter terrorism served as a role model?

<i>Media involvement</i>	Question 12: To what extent do the policy makers interact with the media to inform about measures taken? Keywords: press releases, relationship with media,
<i>Results</i>	Question 13: How do you investigate if the counter-terrorism measures are successful in changing safety perceptions of tourists? Keywords: surveys / study, Question 14: How do you investigate if the counter-terrorism measures are successful in reducing terrorism? Keywords: surveys / study
	Question 15: How safe in relation to terrorism do you think Brussels/Berlin is now with the measures implemented? Keywords: in comparison to other European capital cities
Ending	Thank interviewee for participating.
	Ask the interviewee if he/she likes to mention any final remarks.
	Ask the interviewee if he/she has any questions.
	Ask the interviewee for permission to contact him/her again in the case that further questions arise as well as to publish the results of the research. Offer the interviewee after having analysed the data to send him/her the report in order to get the permission for publishing.

Appendix 1.2 Interview Guide Expert Interviews (German)

	Anweisungen
Einführung	Vorstellen
	Dank an den Interview Partner für die Teilnahme
	Erläuterung der Struktur/Layout und Information über die Dauer des Interviews
	Thema vorstellen: Maßnahmen zur Terrorismusbekämpfung in europäischen Städten
	Zweck: Erweiterung des Wissens über die von den europäischen Städten durchgeführten Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der wahrgenommenen Bedrohungen durch den Terrorismus und insbesondere zur Beeinflussung der Sicherheitswahrnehmung von Touristen.
	Um Erlaubnis fragen, das Interview aufzuzeichnen und Notizen zu machen.
	Den Befragten informiere, dass das Interview vertraulich ist, d.h. er/sie kann das Interview bei Bedarf abbrechen, muss nicht auf Fragen antworten, wenn er/sie sich nicht wohl fühlt oder nicht antworten darf, und sein/ihr Name wird in der Studie nicht genannt.
	Erklärung, was mit den gegebenen Antworten geschehen wird.
	Den Interview Partner fragen, ob er/sie noch irgendwelche Fragen hat bevor das Interview losgeht.
Eröffnung	Was ist Ihr Beruf/Tätigkeit?
	Welche Bedeutung hat der Tourismussektor für die Stadt Brüssel/Berlin?
Themen <i>Auswirkungen der Terroris­mus­attac­ke auf Tourismus</i>	
	Frage 1: Welche Auswirkungen hatte der Terrorangriff auf die Tourismusbranche in Berlin/Brüssel? Stichworte: Reaktion der Touristen, Stornierungen, Wirtschaft der Stadt
	Frage 2: Warum ist die Zahl der Touristen in Berlin unmittelbar nach dem Angriff nicht deutlich zurückgegangen?

<i>Maßnahmen gegen wahrgenommene Bedrohung</i>	Frage 3: Welche Maßnahmen wurden nach dem Terroranschlag ergriffen? Stichworte: temporäre Maßnahmen, permanente Maßnahmen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen (technisch/persönlich), Maßnahmen vor dem Anschlag
	Folgefragen: 4: Welche politischen Maßnahmen / Richtlinien wurden umgesetzt? Stichworte: lokale Ebene, Landesebene (Berlin) 5: Wurde die gebaute Umgebung geändert? 6: Was für eine Rolle spielt die Polizei? Stichworte: Sicherheitsmaßnahmen 7: Welche Maßnahmen wurden ergriffen, um gezielt der wahrgenommenen Bedrohung durch den Terrorismus entgegenzuwirken? Stichworte: Öffentlichkeitskampagnen
	Frage 8: Welche Rolle spielt der Tourismus bei der Motivation zur Umsetzung von Maßnahmen zur Terrorismusbekämpfung?
	Frage 9: Was wurde getan, um ein positives und sicheres Image der Stadt wiederherzustellen? Stichworte: Destinationsspezifische Marketingkampagne
	Frage 10: Inwieweit haben die (politischen) Maßnahmen zur Terrorismusbekämpfung die Touristen in ihrer Sicherheitswahrnehmung der Stadt beeinflusst? Stichworte: eigene Meinung, Studie; Inwieweit geraten sie in Konflikt?
<i>Vorbilder</i>	Frage 11: Inwieweit haben andere europäische Städte und ihre Maßnahmen zur Terrorismusbekämpfung als Vorbild gedient?
<i>Involvierung der Medien</i>	Frage 12: Inwieweit interagieren die politischen Entscheidungsträger mit den Medien, um über die getroffenen Maßnahmen zu informieren? Stichworte: Pressemitteilungen, Beziehungen zu den Medien
<i>Resultate</i>	Frage 13: Wie untersuchen Sie, ob die Maßnahmen zur Terrorismusbekämpfung erfolgreich sind in der Reduzierung des Terrorismus? Stichworte: Umfrage / Studie, Frage 14: Wie untersuchen Sie, ob die Maßnahmen zur Terrorismusbekämpfung erfolgreich sind, um die Sicherheitswahrnehmung von Touristen zu verändern? Stichworte: Umfrage / Studie
	Frage 15: Wie sicher sind Ihrer Meinung nach Brüssel/Berlin mit den umgesetzten Maßnahmen im Hinblick auf den Terrorismus? Stichworte: im Vergleich zu anderen europäischen Hauptstädten
Schluss	Dank den Befragten für die Teilnahme.
	Frage den Befragten, ob er/sie irgendwelche Schlussbemerkungen machen möchte.
	Fragen den Befragten, ob er/sie Fragen hat.
	Den Befragten um Erlaubnis bitten, sich für den Fall, dass weitere Fragen auftauchen, erneut mit ihm/ihr in Verbindung zu setzen sowie die Ergebnisse der Forschung zu veröffentlichen. Dem Befragten anbieten, nach der Analyse der Daten, ihm/ihr den Bericht zu schicken, um die Erlaubnis zur Veröffentlichung zu erhalten.

Appendix 1.3 Interview Guide Tourist Interviews (English)

	Instruction
Introduction	Introduce Researcher (myself)
	Introduce research topic: Counter-terrorism measures in European Cities to address the perceived terrorism threat
	Research purpose: to explore the knowledge of tourists of these measures and how they influence their perceptions
	Explain structure/layout and inform about duration of interview
	Inform the interviewee that the interview is confidential, meaning that they can stop the interview when needed, they do not have to respond to questions if they do not feel comfortable answering the question, and their name will not be stated in the research. Explain what will be done with the answers given.
	Ask permission to take notes
	Ask if the interviewee has any questions before the interview starts
Opening Questions	Where are you from?
	How long have you been here and how long are you staying?
	Why did you choose Brussels/Berlin? What is the reason of your trip?
Topic	
<i>Influence of terrorism threat on travel behaviour</i>	Question: How present is the terrorism threat in your mind when travelling? Does it influence your travel behaviour? Keywords: choosing travel destination, at destination – choose sights in city/places to go to,
<i>Counter-terrorism measures</i>	Question: What kind of counter-terrorism measures have you noticed in the city? Keywords: security measures (technical/personal), build environment Questions: What kind of policies implemented to counter the terrorism threat do you know about?
Influence on safety perception	Question: How have these measures influenced your safety perception of Brussel/Berlin? Keywords: feeling of being safe in city, Question: How safe does this city feel relative to other European cities?
Ending	Thank interviewee for participating.
	Ask the interviewee if he/she likes to mention any final remarks.
	Ask the interviewee if he/she has any questions.

Appendix 1.4 Interview Guide Tourist Interviews (German)

	Anweisungen
Einführung	Vorstellen
	Einführung des Forschungsthemas: Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der wahrgenommenen Bedrohung durch den Terrorismus
	Forschungszweck: Erforschung des Wissens der Touristen über diese Maßnahmen und wie sie ihre Wahrnehmungen beeinflussen.
	Erläuterung der Struktur/Layout und Information über die Dauer des Interviews
	Informiere den Befragten, dass das Interview vertraulich ist, d.h. er/sie kann das Interview bei Bedarf abbrechen, er/sie muss keine

	Fragen beantworten, wenn er/sie sich bei der Beantwortung der Frage nicht wohl fühlt, und sein/ihr Name wird in der Studie nicht genannt. Erklären Sie, was mit den gegebenen Antworten geschehen wird.
	Um Erlaubnis bitten, Notizen zu machen.
	Fragen, ob es vor Beginn des Interviews noch Fragen gibt.
Einführungsfragen	Wo kommen Sie her? Wie lange sind Sie schon in Brüssel/Berlin und wie lange bleiben Sie? Warum haben Sie sich für Brüssel/Berlin entschieden? Was ist der Grund für Ihre Reise?
Thema	
<i>Einfluss Terrorismusgefahr auf Reiseverhalten</i>	Frage: Wenn Sie reisen, wie präsent ist die Terrorismusgefahr in Ihrem Kopf? Beeinflusst es Ihr Reiseverhalten? Stichpunkte: Auswahl des Reiseziels; vor Ort – Sehenswürdigkeiten aussuchen, Plätze besuchen
<i>Anti-Terror-Maßnahmen</i>	Frage: Welche Art von Anti-Terror-Maßnahmen haben Sie in Brüssel/Berlin bemerkt? Stichworte: Sicherheitsmaßnahmen (technisch/persönlich - Sicherheitsleute), bebaute Umgebung Frage: Welche politischen Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Terrorismusgefahr kennen Sie? (Regeln, Richtlinien)
<i>Einfluss Sicherheitswahrnehmung</i>	Frage: Wie haben diese Maßnahmen Ihre Sicherheitswahrnehmung von Brüssel/Berlin beeinflusst? Stichworte: Sicherheitsgefühl in der Stadt Frage: Wie ist Ihr Sicherheitsgefühl gegenüber dieser Stadt im Vergleich zu anderen europäischen Städten?
Schluss	Den Befragten für die Teilnahme danken. Den Befragten fragen, ob er/sie irgendwelche Schlussbemerkungen machen möchte. Den Befragten fragen, ob er/sie Fragen hat.

Appendix 2 – Expert Interview List

Interview Partner	Date	Location
Brussels Airport Security Expert	22/11/2019	Interview via Telephone
International Security and Terrorist Threat Analyst	26/11/2019	Brussels
Security Expert	27/11/2019	Brussels
Visit Brussels	28/11/2019	Brussels
Berlin Fire and Rescue Academy – Berlin Fire Brigade	09/12/2019	Berlin
Visit Berlin	10/12/2019	Berlin
Event Safety Staff – Berlin Fire Brigade	18/12/2019	Berlin
Department of Public Safety – Berlin Senate of the Interior	19/12/2019	Berlin
Security Consultant – Brussels Police	29/01/2020	Written Interview