The Discursive Construction of Climate Migration in the EU

A Critical Discourse Analysis of Climate Migration in EU Legislative Institutions

M.Sc. Thesis

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Abstract

Recent decades have seen dramatic and alarmist narratives of climate migration in the public debate. Projections have often estimated of millions of people fleeing adverse environmental impacts. However, such projections seems to largely lack empirical evidence. This study explores how this alarmist narrative in the public debate has influenced discourses surrounding climate migration in the legislative institutions of the European Union. In order to explore these discourses, documents published by the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union are analysed on their discursive framing of climate migration. The analysis is performed over the time period 2010-2018, with the aim to capture changes and developments over time. The results reveal a similar discursive construction of climate migration over time in all legislative institutions of the European Union. Following the year 2015, climate migration becomes increasingly framed in an alarmist manner, and as an issue of security for the European Union. To tackle this constructed threat of climate migration, humanitarian solutions are proposed, which are focused on climate adaptation and resilience. The findings shows a development of an increasingly alarmist discursive construction of climate migration in recent years, which correlates with the events of the 'refugee crisis' following 2015. By uncovering these discursive tendencies, this research aims to foster more egalitarian discourses surrounding climate migration within the European Union.

Key Words: *climate migration, climate refugees, European Union, discursive framing, Critical Discourse Analysis, Securitisation Theory.*

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This journey has offered highs and lows. At times, the effort of this process has felt beyond overwhelming. Arriving at the final product however, I can look back and see the heavy episodes as incredibly developing, both academically and personally. For the insights this process has brought with it, I feel nothing but gratitude.

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Felicia Matz Wennerhed

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1 Introduction

Climate induced migration, hereafter referred to as CM, is not a new phenomena. Human mobility spurred by environmental changes and degradation has occurred throughout history. However in recent decades, anthropogenic climate change has emerged as a new factor to affect migration (Biermann and Boas, 2010). Consequences of anthropogenic climate change can already be observed. For example, most regions in Africa are currently experiencing an increase in average temperatures. Over the last 50 to 100 years near surface temperature has on an average increased with 0.5°C. Near surface temperatures anomalies have also increased throughout the period of 1995 and 2010. These consequences are in turn likely to impact ecosystems, natural resources and economic sectors (IPCC, 2014a). As some impacts can already be observed, more adverse impacts are expected. Disrupted ecosystems, extreme weather conditions and rising sea levels are only some of the projected consequences of climate change that may put a strain on economies all over the world, or even make certain regions uninhabitable.

As environmental conditions are changing, projections have often estimated a high number of people migrating as a consequence. The public debate has not been shy of alarmist predictions and apocalyptic imageries of future migration as a consequence of climate change. The phenomena has increasingly been a focus in the international debate since the 1980s (Piquet et al., 2011), with projections of many millions environmental refugees in a not too far future, situated in a security context. In the year 1990 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published a report stating that millions of people will be displaced as a consequence of climatic change (IPCC, 1990). Similar projections have been given by economist Nicholas Stern and environmentalist Norman Myers, both foreseeing hundreds of millions of people migrating due to the impacts of climate change (Myers, 2002; Stern, 2016). Such large-scale 'waves' of climate migrants has by Myers been framed as 'threat multipliers', implicating both regional and international stability (Myers, 2005). The media and various NGOs have joined this rhetoric, reinforcing a crisis narrative surrounding CM (Christian Aid, 2007; Greenpeace 2008; Environmental Justice Foundation, 2009). Variations of this storyline have also been replicated within higher political organs, such as for example the European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN). Here, migration has been included in a security rhetoric surrounding climate change (Council of the European Union, 2008; UNDP, 2009; WBGU, 2008). With this, dramatic and alarmist framings of CM have reached the highest instances of international climate politics.

These alarmist predictions are powerful ways of catching the attention of the public and enable political action. The image of massive flows of climate migrants is a play on fear, easily mobilised by politicians. However, alarmist predictions appear to largely lack robust empirical evidence and analysis of already existing migration flows (Piquet et al., 2011; Boas, 2015:7; Abel et al., 2019). This has resulted in raised voices of critique from various scholars, pointing towards poor evidence for numerical projections of CM (Black 2001; Castles, 2002). Many

emphasise that drivers of migration are multiple and indirect, and that it is difficult to find causations and correlations in such complexity (Black et al., 2011; Gemenne, 2011a). The IPCC even acknowledged that their estimate of future CM in their report from 1990 was not much more than mere guesswork (IPCC, 2007). Alarmist forecasts of millions of climate migrants thus tend to lack consideration and understanding of the complex and multiple drivers that interact with migration. Although the accuracy of these predictions remains contested, they still appear in the public debate to this day, illustrating their tremendous impact (White, 2011:59).

The fact that alarmist narratives surrounding CM have shown to have been included in the highest instances of international politics could hold certain political consequences. Critics have warned about the potential political impacts of a dramatic and alarmist storyline of CM. Hartmann (2010) argue that alarmist framings of CM and its inclusion in a security context, could result in militarisation of climate policy and developmental aid. Trombetta (2014) has pointed towards the framing of CM in EU practices, leading to the inclusion of CM in border control measures and restrictive migration policy. Within the EU both climate change and migration are firmly embedded in so called 'high politics', and increasingly framed as a security threat (Huysmans, 2006; Dupont, 2018). Building on this, it is relevant to further investigate discursive constructions of CM in high international politics. This research focus on framings of CM within the EU, in order to explore if, and in what extent alarmist narratives of CM emerge from EU institutions.

1.1 Research Objective

This study focuses on discursive constructions of CM within the EU. The aim is firstly to explore and outline discursive constructions of CM in EU institutions. Outlining CM discourses allows for a critical assessment of framings of CM which emerge from these institutions. Critical assessment of the discursive framing of CM in this context allows for an understanding of the knowledge, social meanings and practices which are produced through a distinctive use of language, which takes the analysis beyond descriptive observations. The aim becomes twofold; the study seeks to describe and outline the discourses surrounding CM in the EU, and to critically assess these discourses.

In sum, the overall aim of this research is *to outline and critically assess discursive framings of climate migration within the European Union.*

1.2 Research Scope

The scope of this research is limited to the EU. Specifically the three institutions which forms the legislative machinery of the EU: the *European Commission*, the *European Parliament*, and the *Council of the European Union*. The Commission, the Parliament and the Council of the EU are the three highest decisive and legislative instances in the EU, and they largely set out the political direction and strategy of the Union as a whole (European Union, 2018a).

A discourse analysis is performed of official documents published by these three legislative institutions of the EU. Documents include communications, reports, press releases, statements, fact sheets, policy memos and transcribed speeches, in order to include a wide array of different types of documents. Studying discourses emerging from these institutions is suitable when striving for findings on a general level within the EU. The knowledge produced by these discourses can be expected to have a substantial political impact, as they emerge within so called 'high politics', and institutions with a level of decisive authority. Analysing discourses in these three institutions can furthermore enable a deeper understanding of the formulation of CM discourses, as it allows the analyst to see how discourses differ and converge between the different legislative institutions.

The research is limited in its scope to a certain time frame. Only documents published in the time frame 2010-2018 are included in the analysis. Studying discourses over time allows the analyst to capture changes and developments of discourses surrounding CM. This particular time frame illustrates the most recent developments of CM discourses in the EU. It is also recognised that within this time period, starting 2015, the EU saw a significant increase of refugees seeking protection in Europe. These events became publically known as the 'refugee crisis' (European Commission, 2017b). The EU responded to the 'refugee crisis' as a high security threat, and prompted tighter border controls, patrolling and surveillance (Fakhoury, 2016). Arguably, these events may have further strengthened the migration-security nexus within the EU. Entering into this research, the 'refugee crisis' is taken into consideration as potentially having affected the discursive construction of CM.

Figure 1.1 below illustrates how the analysis of CM discourses takes place over time within the three legislative institutions of the EU:



Figure 1.1 – Illustrating the analysis over time and in each legislative institutions of the EU (own graphic).

1.3 Research Questions

The main research question for this research is formulated as follows:

How is climate migration discursively constructed within the legislative institutions of the European Union over the time period 2010-2018?

Sub-research questions include:

How do climate migration discourses change and develop in the legislative institutions of the European Union over the timeframe 2010-2018?

How do climate migration discourses differ and converge between the legislative institutions of the European Union?

How do the events of the 'refugee crisis' influence the discursive construction of climate migration in the legislative institutions of the European Union?

How are relations of power expressed in climate migration discourses in the legislative institutions of the European Union?

1.4 Relevance of Research

Studies on discursive framings of CM within the EU have previously been conducted (see for example White, 2011; Trombetta, 2014). This study however brings a new dimension to the debate surrounding CM in the EU in several ways. Firstly, discourses surrounding CM are studied over time. This unveils patterns and developments of these discourses, and it also provides an opportunity to further explore the potential discursive influence of the 2015 'refugee crisis'. The 'refugee crisis' is a relatively recent event, and studies on how this has influenced discourses within the EU is lacking. Here, this research can contribute with insights on how CM has been framed in the EU in recent years, and how the external events of the 'refugee crisis' may have affected this framing. In addition to this, the discourses are analysed separately as they emerge within the three legislative institutions of the EU. This allows for an understanding of how discourses surrounding CM differ and converge between the three highest decisive institutions of the Union. All these components give a deep, thorough analysis which considers both the aspect of time and institutional context.

This study furthermore goes beyond a descriptive outline of CM discourses analysed institutions. It also seeks to critically assess these discourses, and how a certain discursive framing affects society on a broader level. This approach provides yet another dimension to this research. The value of this research thus lies in the comprehensive, encompassing outline of CM discourses over time, and the critical assessment of these discourses.

1.5 Towards a Definition of Climate Migration

Before proceeding with this research it is necessary to further discuss the concept of 'climate migration' and what this term entails. There is today no clear-cut universal or legal definition of the concept of CM (IOM, 2016). When in use the concept is seldom defined or reflected upon, and it is often interchangeably used with other terms such as 'environmental migration', 'climate refugees', 'environmental refugees' or 'climate induced displacement' (IOM, 2009). Although these concepts could carry more or less the same meaning, they also differ from each other.

Climate migration or *climate refugees*, are both concepts which refers to human movement specifically induced by impacts of climate change. *Environmental migration* or *environmental refugees* refers to movement spurred by a broader category of environmental changes and degradation (Rigaud, et al., 2018). Between the 1980s and the early 2000s *environmental migration* was the most commonly used concept regarding human mobility spurred by environmental change and degradation (White, 2011:14). IOM (2009) has outlined a definition of 'environmental migrant' as follows:

> *Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad (IOM, 2009:19).*

This encompasses all forms of migration, internal as well as international, forced and voluntary. At the same time it encompasses all forms of adverse environmental changes which could spur migration. Focusing on all adverse environmental changes gives an indication of the dynamics of climate induced migration, as a wide variety of environmental changes are expected as a consequences of climate change.

Climate migration is one *aspect* of environmental migration, referring solely to migration induced by adverse effects of climate change. This concept became more commonly used in the early 2000s, coinciding with the increasing attention directed towards climate change in the public debate (Boas, 2015). It is difficult to isolate environmental impacts which strictly are a consequence of climate change, as a result the two concepts are at times used interchangeably in different contexts (IOM, 2009).

The concepts of *climate refugees* or *environmental refugees* also lack legal definitions. Many have called upon their inclusion in the existing 1951 Refugee convention. The Refugee Convention is today restricted to protection of people who flee due to warfare, civil disturbance or persecution related to ethnicity, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of other social groups. It does not explicitly encompass people fleeing due to adverse environmental impacts, or impacts of climate change (Sarjana, 2018; Apap, 2018; Docherty and Giannini, 2009). Neither has the EU formally recognised the concepts of 'climate refugees' or 'environmental refugees', though both of these concepts have been in the public discourse since the 1970s. The meaning of climate refugee or environmental refugee is thus uncertain in the context of the law (Apap, 2018). Possible legal definitions have however been proposed by scholars. For example, Docherty and Giannini (2009) argue that a definition of 'climate

refugee' must be sensitive to the particularities to climate change. They propose that a legal definition should include the following:

> *[…] climate change refugee as an individual who is forced to flee his or her home and to relocate temporarily or permanently across a national boundary as the result of sudden or gradual environmental disruption that is consistent with climate change and to which humans more likely than not contributed (Docherty and Giannini, 2009:361).*

The definition of the broader class of environmental refugees has also been debated in academia. One of the first definitions of environmental refugee was formulated by Essam El-Hinnawi for the United Nations Environment Programme and is stated as follows:

> *[T]hose people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life [sic]. By "environmental disruption" in this definition is meant any physical, chemical and/or biological changes in the ecosystem (or the resource base) that render it, temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human life (Docherty and Giannini, 2009:363).*

This is a broad definition which goes beyond solely the adverse effects of climate change. There is of course a difficulty in isolating environmental factors from other migratory drivers, which have led to a lively debate and tension in the desire to establish the environment and climate change as a specific field in the context of migration. Opinions diverge in whether to use *migrants* or *refugees* in the context of environmental or climatic change. Some argue that the term 'refugee' has less negative connotations than 'migrant' and is therefore the more appropriate term. Others claim that many people risk being excluded from a legal definition of 'environmental refugee' (IOM, 2009).

Finally, there is the concept of 'climate induced displacement'. Displacement generally refers to people who are forced to leave their homes, and is usually associated with severe risks and sudden disaster events. Climate change induced natural disasters could serve as an example of events which could lead to displacement. However, also slow-onset environmental changes, such as desertification and sea level rise could lead to displacement. Migration and displacement are held as two separate categories, displacement being coerced rather than a matter of choice. In reality however the line between the two is seldom clear, and many people could not necessarily be categorised in one or the other. Choice and coercion could simultaneously influence in human movement (Wilkinson et al., 2016).

The above discussed concepts are often used in the same context and interchangeably in the public debate. The analysis of this research will therefore consider all of the above terms as they emerge in official EU documents. In order to truly capture and outline the discourses surrounding the phenomena of CM it is important to take all these concepts in consideration when exploring CM discourses.

1.6 Disposition of Thesis

This thesis consists of this introduction, two chapters presenting the methodology and the theoretical framework, a chapter which presents the findings of the analysis, a discussion surrounding these findings, and a final conclusion. The *methodology* chapter gives the reader an overview of Critical Discourse Analysis and how this framework will be applied in this particular study. The *theory* chapter presents the ontological and epistemological assumptions on which this study builds, to then give a comprehensive overview of the Securitisation Theory. The following *background* chapter provides a literature study of previous research on the discursive framing of CM. The chapter also further explores the embeddedness of CM discourses in other discourses surrounding climate change and broader migration. This contextualises the research, and provides a firm academic foundation on which this study is built. In the *analysis* chapter the findings of the critical discourse analysis are presented. Following this is the *discussion* chapter in which these findings are discussed on the basis of the theoretical framework. The final chapter presents the conclusions of this research.

2 Methodology

This chapter presents the methodology of this research. Firstly, the research design is presented. Secondly, the data collection of this study and how it was conducted is described. Thereafter, the chapter goes deeper into discourse analysis as a method, and specifically describes the approach of Critical Discourse Analysis. The chapter is concluded with a discussion on reflexivity of the analyst.

2.1 Research Design

This study applies a qualitative research design. To provide a general definition of qualitative research in social sciences, one can refer to it as a naturalistic, interpretative approach, which looks towards attitudes, beliefs, values and understandings of social reality (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:1-3). The main focus is to understand, explore or clarify a phenomena, rather than measuring it. While a quantitative research design is well structured, inflexible, have a strong and tested validity and reliability, and is explicitly defined and structured, the qualitative design is flexible and emergent in nature. The researcher constructs and re-constructs the design to suit a specific study (Kumar, 2014:193-194). The flexible and evolving nature of the qualitative design leaves room for a deeper exploration of the studied topic as it unfolds, and gives the researcher an opportunity to investigate new aspects that emerge throughout the research process. This is an advantage when studying discourses, as it enables the consideration of new elements and aspects which could be revealed throughout the research process.

This research sets out to explore and critically assess CM discourses within the legislative institutions of the EU. The aim is to gain a deeper understanding of these discourses, and the knowledge, meanings and relations of power they produce. This study thus seeks to *explore* a phenomena rather than measure it, aligning it with the aim of a qualitative research design. This, in combination with the flexible and emergent nature of the qualitative design, makes it an appropriate approach for this study.

2.1.1 Case Study

The specific qualitative design of this research is a case study. A case study is a form of qualitative research design which is suitable when the aim is to create a holistic, in-depth exploration of a phenomena. A case study is characterised by a flexible and open-ended approach in data collection and analysis, where one or several cases are chosen and studied intensively. To qualify as a case study, the chosen case must be a bounded system, with the possibility to be characterised as an entity. The focus of attention is on the complexity and depth of the certain case, and not on a whole population of cases. The advantage of this is the possibility to be more detailed and in-depth, opposed to when studying a larger sample (Kumar, 2014:215).

The case study in this research consists of the three legislative institutions of the EU: the European Parliament, The European Commission, and the Council of the European Union. These are the three main institutions of the EU which are involved in the process of EU legislation, and can therefore be characterised as forming an entity. Together, these three institutions produce legislative acts which are applied throughout the Union and form the so called 'Ordinary Legislative Procedure'. The Commission, Parliament and the Council of the EU are key actors in policies, international agreements, external relationships and the strategic and political direction of the EU. They can be considered central and impactful institutions of the EU, extensively influencing the overall political actions of the Union (European Union, 2018a).

The findings of this research are considered context-specific to the legislative institutions of the EU, and do not claim to provide any generalisations outside of this context. Instead, the aim is to provide generalisations within EU as a whole. As the purpose is of this study is an in-depth exploration and assessment of CM discourses in the context of the EU, a case study is suitable. Below, each of the legislative institutions of the EU are presented separately, in order to provide the reader with an understanding of the context in which the analysis takes place.

2.1.1.1 The European Commission

The European Commission is the executive branch of the EU, and is politically independent (European Union, 2018b). The Commission is divided into different departments which develop policies in specific areas. These departments are known as Directorates Generals (DGs). The DGs are steered by Commissioners, all under the leadership of the President of the Commission. In total, 28 Commissioners from each Member State together steer the work of the Commission (European Commission, 2018), and each Commissioner is appointed by the Commission President. The Commission President is in turn put forward as a suggestion by the Council, and then voted upon in the Parliament, where a majority of the votes is needed to be elected (European Union, 2018b).

The Commission has four main tasks: to propose new laws, manage EU policies and allocate funding, enforce EU law, and finally to represent the EU internationally. This body is the only EU institution which can propose laws to the Parliament and the Council, although the Parliament can request the Commission to propose laws in certain areas. These proposals should protect the interests of EU and its citizens on issues which cannot effectively be dealt with on a national level. The proposals are in addition to this advised by experts and the public. The Commission ensures that these laws are applied in each Member State, in cooperation with the Court of Justice. The Commission furthermore sets the spending priorities of the EU and suggests annual budgets, and speaks on behalf of EU Member States on the international arena (European Union, 2018b). A central task of the Commission is to decide the overall strategic and political direction of the EU as whole (European Commission, 2018). The Commission President decides the policy direction of the Commission, to thereafter layout strategic goals and annual work programmes of the EU (European Union, 2018b). This makes the Commission a central body in deciding the political direction of the Union, and how the EU decides to act

in certain policy areas. It can be concluded that the Commission contributes to steering the overall political direction of the Union.

2.1.1.2 The European Parliament

The European Parliament was established in 1952, then known as the 'Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community'. Firstly in 1962 it became known as the European Parliament (European Union, 2019). The Parliament acts as co-legislator, together with the Council of the European Union. The two institutions share the power to adopt and amend legislative proposal put forward by the European Commission (European Parliament, 2018). Together with the Council, the Parliament establishes the EU budget, and decides on approving the EU's long-term budget known as the 'Multiannual Financial Framework'. In addition to this, the Parliament has a supervisory role, where it exercises a democratic scrutiny of all EU institutions. The Parliament conducts a special supervision of the Commission, and has the power to vote for a motion of censure, which obliges the Commission to resign. The Parliaments role is thus mainly legislative, budgetary and supervisory (European Union, 2019).

The Parliament is the only directly elected body of the EU. Every five years the EU citizens elect the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The number of MEPs are proportionate to the population of the country they represent, and today the Parliament consists of 751 people in total, including the president of the Parliament. The MEPs are positioned in their political affiliation, not by country. The legislative process in the Parliament works as follows: the Parliament numbers 20 committees which each handles a specific policy area. The committees examine the proposals put forward by the Commission, after which the MEPs can propose amendments or reject the bill. After this process the MEPs gather in the chamber to give a final vote on the proposed legislation and the proposed amendments (European Union, 2019). To conclude it can be emphasised that the Parliament, together with the Council, has the ultimate decisive power in EU legislation and budget. Its supervisory role shows the Parliaments influence on all institutions of the EU.

2.1.1.3 The Council of the European Union

The Council of the European Union is the third essential body of EU legislation (The Council of the EU, 2018a). The Council was established in 1958 and consists of government ministers from each EU Member State. In the Council, the ministers meet to discuss, amend and adopt EU law, as well as to coordinate policies between the Member States. Each minister has the authority to oblige the Member State they represent to what is agreed on in the Council meetings. There are no fixed members in the Council meetings, instead the participants are there on the basis of which particular policy area is being discussed. Depending on the meeting, each Member State send a minister which is responsible for relevant policy area (European Union, 2018c).

Together with the Parliament, the Council negotiates and adopts EU legislation, on the basis of proposals presented by the Commission. The Council adopts the annual EU budget together

with the Parliament. In addition to this, the Council is responsible for coordinating the policies of the Member States in specific fields. These fields include economic and fiscal policies, employment policy, and policies surrounding education, culture and sport. In these policy fields the Council develops guidelines, recommendations, work plans, and priorities. Agreements with non-EU countries and international organisations as negotiated with the Commission, are furthermore concluded by the Council with a signature, conclusion, and consent of the Parliament. Finally, the Council both defines and implements EU foreign and security policy. Thus the Council decides, together with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, on EU external action (The Council of the EU, 2018). This makes the Council a key actor of policy and international agreements in areas of both migration and climate change (The Council of the EU, 2018b).

2.2 Data Collection

The data used in this research is official documents published by the three legislative institutions of the EU. The documents vary in type, and include for example communications, recommendations, reports, statements, policy memos and transcribed speeches. Some of the documents are communications between the three legislative branches, and some are joint statements and declarations signed by the Commission, Parliament and the Council of the EU. The analysed material consists solely of naturally occurring data, meaning data which are produced without the intervention of a social researcher (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:45).

Each document is collected on the basis of purposive sampling, guided by the judgement of the researcher of which documents provide the best information (Kumar, 2014:315). The content of the documents vary in different policy areas, including migration, climate change and security. The purposive data collection is done on the basis of three conditions. *Firstly,* the documents have to originate from the European Parliament, the European Commission or the Council of the European Union. *Secondly,* each document has to originate from the time period 2010-2018. *Thirdly,* each document has to include the topic of CM. The third condition has been ensured through a digital pre-screening of each document. A digital search is performed to determine if the document contains key words such as *climate, environment* or *natural disaster* in relation with *migration, refugee, displacement* or *human mobility*. The digital search of these terms enables the researcher to determine if the document includes the topic of CM. If all of the above criteria are fulfilled, the document is selected for analysis.

All the documents are collected from official EU online document registers. The search is conducted through key words, including the terms *climate* or *environment* and *refugee, migration or displacement*. Documents containing these terms are selected for the pre-screening, to determine if the document includes the topic of CM. The search is furthermore conducted per year, in the period 2010-2018. All the documents which are found to include the topic of CM are collected for analysis, with only a few exceptions. A small number of documents have not been collected for analysis on the basis that the discussion surrounding CM in these documents was too limited.

A total of *201 documents* have been collected for analysis. Approximately the same amount of documents were collected from the Commission and the Parliament, while a lower amount of documents were collected from the Council of the EU. The reason for this was that the search resulted in fewer documents including the topic of CM in the Council if the EU. Below a more detailed data collection of each legislative institution is presented.

2.2.1 Official Documents of the European Commission

A total of 79 official documents published by the European Commission have been collected. A full list of the selected documents from the Commission is provided in Appendix I. The following bar chart illustrates the quantity of documents which have been collected from the Commission each year between 2010 and 2018:



Figure 2.1 Official documents collected from the Commission per year (own graphic).

As can be seen from the above bar chart, there is a significant decrease in documents including the topic of CM published by the Commission in 2012. This is followed by an increase of published documents in the years 2015-2018.

All of the collected documents have been retrieved from EUR-Lex, the Register of Commission Documents, the European Commission Press Release Website, or the websites of DG Climate Action, DG Migration and Home Affairs. In addition to this, some documents have been found through academic research articles. The following types of document serves as a source of data:

- *Communications*, directed towards the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, or other EU institutions.
- *Proposals* for regulations.
- *Reports,* directed towards the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, or other EU institutions.
- *Staff Working Documents,* providing overviews of research data and impact assessments in a certain policy area.

- *Green Papers*, aimed to stimulate debates and processes of consultations.
- *Statements and Press Releases* clarifying certain standpoints of the European Commission.
- *Memos* of a particular event or topic.
- *Fact Sheets* of specific areas in which the European Commission is active.
- *Speeches* by the President or other members of the European Commission.

2.2.2 Official Documents of the European Parliament

A total of 88 official documents published by the European Parliament have been collected. A full list of the selected documents from the Parliament is provided in Appendix II. The following bar chart illustrates the quantity of documents which have been collected from the Parliament each year between 2010 and 2018:



Figure 2.2 Official documents collected from the Parliament per year (own graphic).

All of these documents have been retrieved either from EUR-Lex or the Parliament's Public Register of Documents. Some documents have also been found through academic research articles. Both legislative and non-legislative acts are included in analysis. The following types of document serves as a source of data:

- *Resolutions* and *Texts Adopted*.
- *Amendments* to proposed resolutions.
- *Reports* from the Parliamentary Committees, including motions for a resolution.
- *Opinions* from the Parliamentary Committees, including motions for a resolution.
- *Recommendations* directed towards the Council of the European Union.
- *Questions* directed towards the European Commission from Members of Parliament.
- *Studies* and *briefings* from the Parliament Directorates-General and the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS).
- *Notice* to Members of Parliament.
- *Explanation of votes* by Members of Parliament.
- *Corrigendums* to positions of the Parliament.

2.2.3 Official Documents of the Council of the European Union

A total of 34 official documents published by the Council of the EU have been collected. A full list of the selected documents from the Council is provided in Appendix III. The following bar chart illustrates the quantity of documents which have been collected from the Council each year between 2010 and 2018:



Figure 2.3 Official documents collected from the Council of the EU per year (own graphic).

All of these documents have been retrieved from EUR-Lex or the Document Register of the Council of the European Union. Some documents have also been found through academic research articles. Both legislative and non-legislative acts are included in the data collection. The following types of document serves as a source of data:

- *Regulations* and *Decisions.*
- *Council conclusions* and *Outcome of Proceedings,* adopted during meetings of the Council of the European Union.
- *Notes,* directed towards EU delegations, Permanent Representatives Committee and representatives of Member States.

2.2.4 Reflection on the Data Collection

Before proceeding with this research it is relevant to further reflect upon and discuss possible limitations of the applied data collection. The discussion surrounding CM in the EU is relatively limited. Often CM is just briefly mentioned in relation to other issues of climate change or broader migration, and not further elaborated on. There is furthermore a lack of policies and practices of the phenomena in the EU. To overcome this limitation, the quantity of documents collected for data collection has been extensive. The limited discussion of CM in official EU documents has thus been compensated with the quantity of documents including the topic. By including a larger amount of documents in analysis, a more comprehensive image of the discursive construction of CM can be attained.

Another limitation regards the search for documents including the topic of CM. A key word search in the official databases for each institution has been conducted in order to find documents suitable for analysis. The key word search has been extensive, and a variety of terms synonymous with 'climate' and 'migration' have been used in the search. This however does not fully guarantee that all relevant documents including the topic of CM have been found. It is possible that certain documents relevant for this research have not been attained through this method. A potential accidental exclusion of certain documents discussing the topic of CM could ultimately affect the findings. This has been reflected upon during the data collection, and therefore the search for documents have been conducted in several official databases of the analysed institutions. Research articles have also been used to find relevant documents. In addition to this, a wide range of different types of documents have been purposefully included in the analysis, in order to attain a variety of sources. Finally, the large quantity of documents collected for analysis aims to minimise potential effects of the accidental exclusion of certain documents discussing CM.

2.3 Discourse Analysis

The study of discourse emerged in the mid-1960s in the field of humanities and social science (van Dijk, 2008:xix). In recent decades discourse studies has found its way into a broad range of disciplines, such as sociology, anthropology, psychology, linguistics, history and cultural studies, with a large variety of methods and objects of study (Wodak, 2008:4). However, there is a common core of discourse studies which can be formulated as a systematic analysis of various structures and strategies in text and talk (van Dijk, 2008:xxvi). The aim is to explore 'systems of social meaning' through analysis of the discursive construction of various versions of social reality (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:35). Discourse analysis is thus concerned with the way knowledge is produced through the use of language (Ibid.,200).

A number of common features can be found in the many developments of discourses studies. Firstly, discourse studies focus on naturally occurring language by real language users, as opposed to studies of invented linguistic examples. Furthermore, the study of discourse is focused on larger units rather than isolated words or sentences. Larger units refer to texts, conversations or other communicative events. The analysis goes beyond grammar, and can extend to action and interaction, including non-verbal interaction such as visuals. The analysis can include a vast variety of grammar and language use, including argumentative structures, rhetoric, coherence, topics, signs and speech acts (Wodak, 2008:3-4). This research draws upon a specific direction of discourse studies, namely Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which is further elaborated upon below. Firstly however, the concepts of *discourse* and *text* are defined.

2.3.1 Discourse and Text

In discourse studies *text* and *discourse* are two distinguished concepts (Wodak, 2008:6). The term *text* takes on a broad meaning. Texts are generally considered to be longer pieces of writing, and can incorporate every type of communicative utterance relating to the notion of

discourse. Concrete examples of texts include news articles, policy documents, letters, transcribed interviews and speeches, webpages, radio and TV programmes as well as visual images (Fairclough, 2003:3-4). A text only makes sense in connection with knowledge of the world. Thus, certain ways of structuring reality and texts is crucial to understanding a text (Wodak, 2008:9). Texts reflect and reinforce knowledge, values or attitudes of social reality. In the longer term they can also shape peoples identities or even provide changes in the material world, thus constituting one of many influencing factors on social change (Fairclough, 2003:3-4).

The term *discourse* is defined on a more abstract level than text. Discourse can be understood as linguistic action, which can be written, visual, oral, verbal or non-verbal, undertaken by social actors in a specific setting determined by social rules and norms. Building on this, discourse can be understood as *text in context,* and is thus focused on the connection between language and thought, and the creation and maintenance of systems of knowledge. Text is here a realisation of discourse, where discourse is manifested through patterns and structures of knowledge emerging from text (Wodak, 2008:5-6).

Drawing on a Foucauldian definition of discourse, discourses constitute knowledge and relations of power. This is enabled by our acceptance of the reality which is presented to us. With this, discourse creates truth and meaning in society. Discourses contain exclusions as well as inclusions, meaning they enable what can be said, and limit what cannot be said. Foucault suggests that each society has a regime of truth, which is a set of discourses that society accepts and renders true. This constitutes the very mechanism of determining what is considered true and false in a society. The task of the discourse analyst is according to Foucault, to discover the patterns and distributions of power which influences the way society selects, classifies and transmits knowledge (Pitsoe and Letseka, 2012). The concept of discourse is interconnected with the concept of power in the Foucauldian tradition, therefore a thorough definition of *power* is presented in the theoretical framework.

2.3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

To study the discourses surrounding CM in EU legislative institutions, the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is used. CDA is not a uniform theoretical formulation (Wodak, 2011:34), but can instead be understood as a heterogeneous framework, incorporating a wide range of various epistemological traditions and methodologies. Epistemological traditions within CDA are generally located in what can be identified as 'Western Marxism', referring to for example Foucauldian poststructuralism, Gramsci, Habermas, and the Frankfurt School (Forchtner, 2011). In addition to this, CDA draws upon a wide range of methodological tools to analyse discourse, both quantitative and qualitative. For example methods of textual analysis developed within linguistics, pragmatics, anthropology, conversation analysis and stylistics, can all be re-contextualised and used in CDA (Fairclough, 2003:6; Fairclough, 2010:6). This pluralism within CDA allows for a purposeful selection of theories and methodologies suitable for a particular research.

The common element which unites different variations of CDA is the explicit purpose to understand, expose and resist social inequalities. The analysis focuses on how dominance and unequal relations of power are produced and sustained through text (van Dijk, 2008:85). The analysis takes on an explicitly critical approach. To further understand this it is relevant to look into the concept of *critique*. Critique refers to the direct and explicit purpose of CDA to criticise and ultimately change society to the better. CDA goes beyond solely understanding or explaining a phenomena (Wodak and Meyer 2009:6), and instead brings a normative element into the analysis. The critique is grounded in values of what makes a 'good society' and the production of 'social wrongs'. According to CDA unequal relations of power and inequalities which leads to exclusion of social groups are categorised as social wrongs.

The primary focus of CDA is thus to unveil hidden power structures, discrimination and inequalities. What constitutes a 'good society' is of course a highly normative notion and very difficult to define. People have different ideas of justice, freedom, or basic human needs and other highly normative concepts. Norman Fairclough (2010) makes a distinction between *negative critique* and *positive critique* within CDA. Negative critique engage in how society produce and perpetuate social wrongs, while positive critique focus on how to correct and mitigate social wrongs (Fairclough, 2010:7-8).

CDA is a framework focused on critical analysis of the discursive reproduction of social inequality and abuse of power (van Dijk, 2009). This is the ultimate aim in all variations of CDA. This places the notion of power at the very centre of analysis, and calls for a detailed definition and theoretical analysis of the concept in relation to language and discourse. This is far from an unproblematic task, as the concept of power is both abstract and complex. The concept of power in this research borrows a Foucauldian theorisation, which will be further elaborated on in the theoretical framework under ontological and epistemological presumptions.

2.3.2.1 Normative Positionality

As have been discussed above, the element of critique in CDA brings a normative element into the analysis. The normative positionality of this research should therefore be clarified. This research draws upon Fairclough's notion of negative critique. With this, analysis is focused on how social wrongs are produced and perpetuated through discourse in EU institutions. Social wrongs in this context refers to the production and reinforcement in discourse of unequal relations of power, resulting in exclusion of social groups. A normative position is taken, that these social wrongs should be changed and resisted in order to attain a better society. Unveiling social wrongs in discourse and unequal power relations, is considered to contribute to a transformation towards a better society.

2.3.3 Analytical tools

Discourse analysis does not have a defined analytical toolbox to be mechanically applied. A good discourse analysis is instead highly dependent on the interpretation of the researcher and a firm theoretical foundation on which to build the analysis (Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2008:100). The analysis can make use of a wide variety of methods, which should be selected depending on the object of research (Fairclough, 2010:7).

The analysis of this study focus on *argumentative structures* of discourses surrounding CM. To analyse argumentative structures in discourse the study of *topoi* is applied. Topoi connects argument and conclusion in the argumentative structure. Analysis of argumentative structures is commonly used discursive method of the so called *Discourse-Historical Approach* (DHA), which is one of the major branches within CDA (Žagar, 2010). In DHA, analysis of argumentation is used to question and assess normative claims of 'truth' and 'rightness' (Wodak and Reigsigl, 2001). By specifically looking to the argumentative structure of discourses, one can get an increased understanding of the claims and conclusions surrounding CM which emerge in EU institutions. The method provides an overview of the reasoning which is used to justify certain measures. Below, it is further described how the analytical tool of topoi is applied in analysis.

2.3.3.1 Topoi

The term *topoi* refers to an argumentative scheme, which allows one to construe an argument for a given conclusion (Žagar, 2010). Topoi are content-related warrants or 'conclusion rules', which connect an argument with a conclusion. As such, they justify the transition from argument to conclusion (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001:75). They are the parts of argumentative structure which belong to the required premises. Topoi are not always explicitly expressed within an argumentation, but can still be identified in conditional and causal paragraphs. Examples of such paragraphs could be 'if x then y', or 'y because of x'. Such reasoning signifies the connection between argument and conclusion, i.e. the topos (Wodak and Reisigl, 2009:102).

In order to identify topoi in discourses surrounding CM, the argumentation of the discourses are reconstructed in a certain scheme. How such a reconstruction could be performed in analysis of argumentative structures has been presented by Žagar (2010). Žagar's method is focused on identifying arguments and conclusions in the discourses, to then determine topoi. This study applies the method developed by Žagar, while also identifying *claims* on which arguments are built. The reconstruction topoi is thus done by identifying *claims, arguments* and *conclusions* within the discourse, to then analyse how arguments connect to conclusions in order to identify *topos*. Claims are in this context referring to statements and assertions held as truths. From certain claims arguments are constructed, from which certain conclusions are drawn. By lifting claims, arguments and conclusions from the analysed texts, one can determine topoi, or how arguments and conclusions are connected. The scheme below serves

as a structure to reconstruct the argumentation and topos of CM discourses. This process is illustrated in the following figure:



Figure 2.1 – Illustrating the reconstruction of topos (own graphic).

2.3.3.2 Interdiscursivity

Interdiscursive analysis is commonly used in CDA (Fairclough, 2010:7). The concept of interdiscursivity refers to the way different discourses are linked to each other in various ways (Wodak & Meyer, 2009:90). Discourses can be described as topic-related elements of a text, and they are articulated together in interdiscursive relations (Fairclough, 2003:38). This is based on the notion that texts can draw upon and articulate multiple discourses (Fairclough, 2010:7), which allows for analysis of how pre-existing discourses confirmed, opposed or re-elaborated. This also enables interpretations of how social problems are framed, constructed and managed (Wodak & Forchtner, 2018:268). Discourses can be conceived as mainly topic-related. For example, a discourse on climate change can refer to topics of other discourses, surrounding economy, health, or migration. Discourses are furthermore open and hybrid; they can create subtopics at several points (Wodak, 2009:90). The concept of interdiscursivity allows the analyst to explore how several discourses are interrelated. Scholars have pointed out how CM discourses are embedded in both discourses surrounding climate change and broader migration (Trombetta, 2014). With interdiscursive analysis the analyst can further identify how discourses surrounding climate change, migration and CM relate and link to each other. As this study furthermore analyses discourses emerging in three different EU institutions, interdiscursivity allows consideration of how CM discourses are interlinked between these institutions. In turn, this can contribute to an increased understanding of the formulation of CM discourses.

2.3.4 Reflexivity

As discourse analysis is dependent on the interpretation of the analyst, it is relevant to further discuss how to perform a good interpretative work. Interpretation is in its essence a process which aims to capture the meaning of a text. Meaning-making depends not only on what is explicitly stated, but also what is assumed, and 'unsaid'. Part of the analysis is therefore to identify underlying assumptions. Interpretation is furthermore a matter of judging or evaluating what is being claimed. Are claims serious and sincere? Are they in accord with the social or institutional context in which they are produced? In addition to this there is also an explanatory

dimension of interpretation, as the interpreter aims to understand why certain things are said and expressed in certain ways. From this, social causes can be identified. Interpretation requires a great deal of conscious thought about the meaning of a text, and why it has been formulated in a certain manner (Fairclough, 2003:9-11). The process therefore needs to be reflexive, as the choices of the analyst need to be well thought through and conscious.

Reflexivity of the researcher manifests itself in the researcher being self-conscious of the choices throughout the analysis. The analyst's choices are made visible as part of the discourse analysis. This increases the transparency of the analysis, and the understanding of the interpretation and reasoning of the analyst (Bucholtz, 2001). In order to attain this transparency, the discourse analysis of this research is presented with direct quotes from the analysed documents, and thorough discussion of these quotes and the meaning they convey. Every choice throughout the analysis is made with conscious thought of the dimensions of the interpretative process.

3 Theoretical Framework

This chapter presents the theoretical framework on which the analysis is built. The chapter is structured as follows: firstly ontological and epistemological presumptions of this study are described. Following this, a deeper theorisation of the concept of 'power' is presented. Subsequent section presents Securitisation Theory as developed within the Copenhagen School. The chapter is concluded with a discussion of how Securitisation Theory is compatible with the ontological and epistemological presumptions of this study.

3.1 Ontological and Epistemological Presumptions

The ontological and epistemological foundation of this research stems from social constructionism and poststructuralism. These concepts are both broad and the connection between them is commonly contested, it is therefore relevant to clarify that in this research poststructuralism is seen as sub-part of the broader tradition of social constructionism (Phillips & Winther-Jørgensen, 1999:12). Below, the general philosophical assumptions of social constructionism are outlined.

Social constructionism takes a critical position towards objective knowledge. Reality is solely available to us through filters of our personal knowledge and worldviews, and can thus only be experienced subjectively (Phillips & Winther-Jørgensen, 1999:12). Social constructionism acknowledges that knowledge, worldviews and identities change over time, and are therefore culturally and historically determined. In this context, discourse emerge as constructing and representing the social world in various ways (Fairclough, 2010:4). Knowledge is produced in social interaction, in which common truths are established. The construction of knowledge and 'truth' has real social consequences, as this limits or enables social actions. Thus, instead of assuming a reality in an external world, social constructionists focus on social realities which are created through individual or collective action (Phillips & Winther-Jørgensen, 1999:13).

Poststructuralism draws on the idea within social constructionism of how claims about reality are dependent on certain forms of knowledge. In other words, any knowledge or experience of reality is not possible outside of interpretation. This places language in the centre, as language is our access to reality and a constitutive force of the social world (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010:63). In this context discourses emerge as a complex set of relations of communication through social interaction. These relations constitute the social world, by producing meaning (Fairclough, 2010:3). Within the framework of CDA, texts carries an ability to bring about social changes. Text can change our knowledge, values or attitudes of social reality. This again illustrates how language is seen as constitutive of social reality (Fairclough, 2003:3-4).

Social constructionism and poststructuralism form the very foundational ontological and epistemological assumptions of this research. It is however relevant to go deeper into a specific concept central for this critical discourse analysis, namely *power*.

3.1.1 Power

Power is a concept with high abstraction level, and it is positioned in the very centre of this analysis. This research draws on the definition and theorisation of power as developed by Michel Foucault. Foucault does not view power as something which is possessed by for example a state, individual or a class. He seeks to move from the traditional analytical focus of power as a commodity or instrument, which can be acquired and used for strategic purposes. Instead, Foucault illustrates the concept of power as a network, with threads extending all over society. With this, Foucault emphasises that power is more complex than a top-down mechanism where authority exerts constraints and limitations on the masses (Sarup, 1993:73-74). Power should thus not be analysed from a central point of sovereignty.

Instead, relations of power pervades all aspects of social life, culture and politics. It is produced from one moment to another at all times, in every relation from one point to another. *'Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere'* (Foucault, 1978:93). It emerges from the interplay of innumerable relations in society. The central point of this argument is moving from a focus on top-down binary oppositions. Relationships of power instead take shape in local oppositions, within families, limited groups and institutions. These local oppositions are forming the basis of cleavage in the social body on a larger scale. Foucault argues that relations of power are the immediate effect of divisions, disequilibrium and inequality (Foucault, 1978:94).

Power is furthermore seen as a productive force, producing discourse, knowledge and also pleasures (Foucault, 1980:119). Power is thus not only a negative, repressive force, but it can be a creator of social possibilities as well as restrictions. The social world is created through relations of power, as objects are differentiated and put in categories in relation to each other. For example, the concept of 'criminal' creates certain subjects, which are differentiated from other subjects. From this certain institutions are created, such as prisons, and certain social practices such as resocialisation. Power is thus spread across social practices, and both enables and restricts action (Phillips & Winther-Jørgensen, 1999:20).

Foucault here sets up a strong connection between power and knowledge. Power is always interconnected with knowledge, as one requires the other. Power itself creates knowledge and the accumulation of information, while at the same time knowledge induces effects of power (Foucault, 1980:52). To return to the example of the concept of 'criminal', modern prisons are built on the knowledge of academic disciplines like psychiatry and criminology, which illustrates the intrinsic dependence between power and knowledge (Phillips & Winther-Jørgensen, 1999:20). It is from the power-knowledge connection that Foucault builds the notion of 'normalising power'. This is central to the shift of focus from power as solely repressive. Here, Foucault turns attention to the establishment of what is considered 'normal', which is an exercise of power. Normalisation aims to expand and proliferate power in society.

This is established through disciplines, and the standardization of for example national standards for educational programs or medical practices (Foucault, 1975:184). Reaching the standards and norms of society encourages subjects to perform a defined set of practices, and thus becomes a new way of shaping behaviour, which is counter to freedom (Taylor, 2009).

The relationship between power and knowledge also bears connection to the concept of 'truth'. According to Foucault ritualised procedures of the production of truth are rooted in society, which is also interwoven with the concept of power. Power cannot be exercised without the production of truth, and power produces discourses of truth. Foucault argues that the very function of society is dependent on the production of truth. We are all judged, classified, destined in our mode of living as a consequence of discourses of truth, which bears the effects of power relations (Foucault, 1980:93-94). This enables societies to state what is true and false, ultimately creating so called 'regimes of truth', consisting of discourses which accepts and reinforce what is considered true (Ibid., 131). Foucault stresses the fact that what is objectively true is impossible to reach, as one can never speak from a position outside of discourse. Focus should therefore not be on what is objectively true or false, but rather on how discourses are constructed to give an impression of true images of reality (Phillips & Winther-Jørgensen, 1999:21).

Using Foucault's view of the concept of power brings certain elements to the analysis. For one, the focus of this study is not placed on exercise of power of the EU as a supranational authority, but rather on the exploration of relations of power through certain discourses within the EU. Categorisations and differentiations in discourse are seen as producing relations of power, and therefore holds a focus point of the analysis. How these discourses enable or restrict actions, as well produce certain social practices within the EU, is important in analysing the production of power relations. Finally, the contestation and establishment of discursive 'truths' enables analysis of the normalisation of power in the EU surrounding CM. Foucault's notion of power thus provides a useful theoretical foundation for the exploration of discourse in the EU.

3.2 Securitisation Theory

Research on security started to broaden its scope following the Cold War, when security issues began to encompass more than solely military threats. A number of issues traditionally classified as 'low politics' were gradually incorporated in the security agenda (Boas, 2015:17). This shift in security politics and research led Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde in the 1990s to develop a form of Securitisation Theory which we today refer to as the Copenhagen School (Buzan, et al., 1998). The concept of securitisation has since been developed and transformed by various scholars into other schools of theory, such as the Paris School, the Risk School and Critical Security Studies.

The Copenhagen School of securitisation is the most known of the Schools, and revolves around traditional notions of security such as survival, urgency and war. The focus of the Copenhagen School is basically centred on how new issues enter the security domain through speech acts, rhetorically presenting these issues as threats. The Paris School provides an alternative approach to security studies, by placing focus on the emergence of securitisation

through technocratic practices and routine (Boas 2015:18). The Risk School draws upon Ulrich Becks conceptualisation of 'Risk Society', and argue that practices of security increasingly revolves around the notion of risk, through a focus on potentiality, risk-management, preparedness and prevention (Ibid., 38). Like the Risk School, Critical Security Studies draws upon the concept of 'Risk Society', and do not intend to empirically assess how the securitisation process unfolds. Instead the purpose is to develop a normative interpretation of what security should mean and entail. Critical Security Studies endorses security measures in form of cooperation, human security and emancipation (Ibid., 31-32). All these Schools provide a set of approaches to study processes of securitisation. Rather than rivalling approaches with different agendas, these schools can be seen as a critical dialogue surrounding the concept of securitisation (Bigo & McCluskey, 2018).

This study draws upon the Securitisation Theory as developed within the Copenhagen School. The analytical tools of the Copenhagen School will therefore be used in analysis. However, some critique developed towards the Copenhagen School is discussed and taken into consideration, in order to align the theory with the ontological and epistemological assumptions of this study. The ontological and epistemological premises of this study builds on Foucauldian poststructuralism, therefore a more fluid, poststructuralist reading of the Copenhagen School is applied, building on theorisations by Judith Butler. This is further elaborated below, but before going deeper into what this means for this research, the framework and analytical tools of the Copenhagen School are presented.

3.2.1 The Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School theorises that a securitising speech act evokes exceptional political measures, driven by the logic of emergency, survival and rivalry (Boas, 2015:26). The very process of securitisation consists of three fundamental elements: a securitising *speech act*, a *securitiser* and an *audience* (Stritzel, 2014:30). The securitising speech act is a rhetorical depiction of an issue to be an existential threat to so called *referent object*, and a need for this referent object to be defended and secured. The rhetorical utterance itself is referred to as the *speech act* (Buzan et al., 1998:26). A speech act thus occurs when an issue is linguistically dramatized, prioritized and labelled as an issue of security. This generally includes an existential threat, a point of no return, and a possible solution (Ibid., 33). The speech act is furthermore seen as performative in the social world, it holds the potential to establish meaning which reworks or produces context (Ibid., 46). Through a speech act a certain perception of reality is produced, which allows for certain actions to be taken (Boas, 2015:21). This can be read as the incorporation of a poststructuralist approach in the theory, with language as a performative force in the social world (Stritzel, 2014:24). The following quote by Balzacq illustrates this performativity of language: *these utterances [speech acts] realize specific action; they "do" things: they are "performatives"* (Balzacq, 2011:1).

The securitising speech act is performed by the *securitiser*. This actor needs to be in a position of authority, as a successful securitisation is dependent on the position of power held by the actor enunciating the speech act (Buzan et al., 1998:31). Buzan et al. do not clearly define the

level of authority needed to be held by the securitiser, however some examples could be political leaders, or elites which have a relatively high position within an organisation or institution. The Copenhagen School thus assumes that the securitisation process takes place at high level politics, and can be identified in important debates, diplomatic agreements and high level reports (Boas, 2015:21). Buzan et al. argues that the analysis of securitisation should be conducted in documents that are *central*, referring to documents in which a security discourse is likely to materialise (Buzan et al., 1998:177). It should also be pointed out that no actor exclusively holds the ability of securitising an issue, and no one is excluded from articulating alternative interpretations of the speech act (Ibid., 31-32).

The last important element in securitisation is the *audience*. The audience refers to those which the securitising act attempts to convince of the existential threat of the referent object, and the exceptional procedures deemed necessary to handle this threat (Buzan et al, 1998:41). The process of securitisation is not complete until the audience accepts the securitising speech act as a reality. This brings the securitisation process to an intersubjective negotiation of an existential threat between the securitising actor and the audience. Here, Buzan et al. differentiates between securitisation and a *securitising move.* A securitising move is when a discourse presents an existential threat to a referent object, and a full securitisation process solely occurs when the audience accepts the existential threat (Ibid., 25). The level of authority of the securitiser is here important, as this increases the chances of the audience accepting the speech act (Boas, 2015:22).

The Copenhagen School presents a comprehensive theory, which revolves around a conceptualisation of security which suggests extraordinary emergency measures to deal with a threat (Boas, 2015:20). Security is seen in accordance with a realist approach mainly focused on issues of survival, war, zero-sum thinking and a 'friend-enemy' dichotomy. It is argued within the Copenhagen School that when an issue is securitised, it is considered in terms of security (Ibid., 23). This allows for a state of exception to emerge, and evokes confrontation, competition and defence. Actions outside of the normal bounds of politics is enabled. Buzan et al. argues that by stating 'security', the securitiser claims the right to use whatever means necessary to address the threat (Buzan et al., 1998:21; 24). In other words, by using a certain rhetoric, emergency measures are legitimised. The Copenhagen School is based on a negative understanding of security, and assumes that securitisation of an issue leads to a more tense, and potentially dangerous political climate with harsh and exclusive policies. The securitisation process endorses confrontational situations, on the basis of fear and self-protection. Based on this, securitisation should not necessarily be thought of as something positive, but as a process which potentially could have negative effects in society (Buzan et al., 1998:4).

3.2.1.1 Critique of the Copenhagen School

Critique which has emerged against the Copenhagen School regards a level of ambiguity of the actors and mechanisms involved in the securitisation process. This criticism is directed towards the level of the authority of the securitiser, the audience, and also the emergency measures which follow a speech act. As discussed above, Buzan et al. (1998) do not clearly define what

is meant with a 'level of authority', which needs to be held by the securitiser for the acceptance of the audience. This leaves a level of uncertainty in the identification of the securitiser. How can one determine who is an elite or a regular member? While held as an important requirement for a complete securitisation, it is not always easy to identify who is, and who is not an actor with authority. Neither is it clear who exactly the audience refers to, or when an audience has accepted a speech act (Boas, 2015:22). The emergency measures and actions outside of the normal rules of politics also remain insufficiently defined. Which political actions can be considered extraordinary emergency measures? This is a perception which can vary between actors (Ibid., 25). These criticisms unveil some inherent tensions and a lack information regarding exactly what securitisation really is, and how one should understand the dynamics of the process (Ibid., 29). This ambiguity leaves a lot to the interpretation of the analyst.

The speech act, securitising actor and audience triad in securitisation theory, and the relationship between them, has further met criticism from various scholars. This criticism is mainly directed towards the application of a strict, one-way 'speaker-audience model' (Strizel, 2007), which does not consider the potentially more dynamic and interactive mechanisms involved in the securitisation process. The audience could ignore or contest speech acts, and with this have an active role influencing the nature and outcome of the process (Boas, 2015:22). Stritzel (2014) points towards a tension between the notion of the very utterance of a speech act, and the intersubjective negotiation of the existential threat between the securitising actor and the audience. He notes how Buzan et al. in *Security: A New Framework of Analysis?* (1998) both see the utterance of the speech act itself as performative in the social world, while at the same time seeing securitisation process as solely complete when a shared understanding of the threat is created between the securitising actor and the audience. Thus, it becomes unclear whether securitisation is a rhetorical utterance, or an intersubjective constructive process between actors. Stritzel criticises the notion that the performativity of certain utterances can be equated with the process of securitisation involving actors, audiences and contexts. Here, Stritzel argues, the Copenhagen School remains selectively poststructuralist, involving both objectivist and relativist approaches (Stritzel, 2014:31).

3.2.1.2 Poststructuralism and the Copenhagen School

As Stritzel (2014) points out, it appears as if the Copenhagen School is selectively poststructuralist in its theorisation. As this research builds on a poststructuralist foundation, it is relevant to further discuss how this approach is compatible with the Copenhagen School. By taking the Copenhagen School in a more poststructuralist direction, the tensions between the objectivist and relativist approaches of the Copenhagen School can be mitigated.

Ole Weaver has in some of his works taken on a Derridarian direction of Securitisation Theory, pointing towards the importance of studying how a text produces its own meaning, rather than relating the text to a certain context (Stritzel, 2014:24). With this approach focus is put on the performativity of security utterances, and the study of the production of meaning through discourse, rather than the constructive process between the securitising actor and the audience. It is the performativity of the speech act which makes it interesting. In Buzan et al. (1998:46)

own words: *A speech act is interesting exactly because it holds the insurrecting potential to break the ordinary, to establish meaning that is not already within the context – it reworks or produces a context by the performative success of the act.*

In regards of the performative power of language, Judith Butler is referred to, but not extensively elaborated on in *Security: A New Framework of Analysis?* (Buzan, et al., 1998:46-47). Butler reflects on the performativity of language in many of her works, which is well summarised in *Performativity's Social Magic* from 1996. The core of Butlers view on performativity lies in the possibility of change and transgression, as an example Butler refers to the constantly unstable practices of constituting gender identity. Two central elements of Butler's understanding of the performativity in language can be outlined: the *reiterability* and the *productive power of language.* The concept of reiterability has two central dimensions. Firstly speech acts have the ability to be cited, reiterated and resignified, in other words a generative mechanism. Secondly, without reiterability speech acts are constantly unstable and open ended, and they are therefore continually in need of iteration and reiteration. Therefore, in order for a speech act to be performative, it is crucial that it is reiterated. Butler furthermore emphasises how language is always articulated within and as social norms. Language is never solely language. With this, the analysis is placed in a Foucauldian tradition and the poststructuralist approach of the constitutive power of discourse. This differs in some degree from the quite actor centred approach of the Copenhagen School. As the Copenhagen School sees the speech act as performative in itself, Butler denies the sovereign power of a single speech act uttered by for example a state-representative (Stritzel, 2014:26-27). The performative power instead emerge from reiteration. The reiteration of speech acts is considered as central in the analysis, in order to further align the theory with the poststructuralist foundation this research builds on. In other words, a securitising speech act needs to be reiterated, and not isolated utterances, in order to be considered to be performative.

The theoretical skeleton of the Copenhagen School focused on the securitising speech act is used in the analysis of this particular study. The advantage of this is the use of speech act as an analytical tool. As an example, the Paris School which builds on a Foucauldian theorisation of 'governmentality' focus is on everyday practices and routines of security (Boas, 2015:31). As CM is a relatively recent discussion emerging in the EU, it is of interest to focus on discursive utterances rather than practice. However, this analysis is less centred on actors and the creation of a shared understanding of an existential threat between the securitising actor and the audience. More focus is instead directed towards the performative power of speech acts, and the reiteration of speech acts in the analysed discourses. By basing the analysis on the theorisation of Butler, one can move towards a poststructuralist tradition of securitisation (Stritzel, 2014:30). The constitutive power of discourse is held as central, aligned with a poststructuralist tradition. This way the analytical tools of the Copenhagen School are used in the analysis, while combining them with a poststructuralist theoretical foundation.

Focus in analysis is on the reiteration of speech acts and their performativity. The following figure illustrates the securitisation process:



Figure 3.1 – Illustrating the securitisation process (own graphic).

4 Background

This chapter intends to contextualise CM in previous research, with the aim to provide the reader with a deeper understanding of the issue and the discourses formulated around it. Scholars have pointed towards the way discursive framings of CM are deeply embedded within discourses and practices surrounding climate change and broader migration (Baldwin et al, 2014; Trombetta, 2014). Considering this, it is relevant to further explore how climate change and broader migration have been discursively constructed in the EU. This way, a deeper understanding is attained of how the two knit together in the formulation of CM discourses.

The chapter is structured as follows: the first section provides the reader with an overview of previous research of securitisation of *climate change*, and its inclusion in a security context in the EU and other international political arenas. The second section concerns research on securitisation of *broader migration* specifically in the EU, as well as migration policies and border control in the EU. Section one and two provides the reader with a context for the formulation of CM discourses, as these are embedded in framings of climate change and migration. The final section connects back to CM, and presents a comprehensive look into previous research of various discursive framings of CM, including securitisation. Some concluding remarks emphasise the most important insights of this chapter, insights which are used as a foundation for the coming analysis.

4.1 Securitisation of Climate Change

The securitisation of climate change is a frequently studied subject by scholars, and today a well-established research field (see for example Oels, 2012; Bo, 2016; Boas and Warner, 2017; Thomas, 2017; Dupont, 2019). The increasing connection between climate change and security can be traced back to the 1980s. During this time new global environmental issues started to emerge, specifically a depleting ozone layer and global warming (Montreal Protocol, 1989). With these new global challenges began a development in the form of a security framing of environmental issues in the international debate. The Brandt Report released 1980 by the Independent Commission, suggested that environmental degradation threatens the very survival of human communities. Increasing concerns for climate change led to the creation of the UN organ the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988, as well as the signing of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Rio 1992. Despite all this, the issue of climate change remained quite peripheral in international politics up until the early 2000s (Trombetta, 2008; Oels, 2012). It was in the new millennia climate change really emerged as the biggest environmental challenge of our time, and entered the public debate as security issue. Climate change has since frequently been rhetorically connected to violent conflict, and posed as presenting new challenges to human security and safety (Boas, 2015:5-6; IPCC, 2014b; IPCC, 2014c).

The securitisation of climate change is also visible in EU institutions. In the EU, climate change has over time become firmly embedded in 'high politics', which has resulted in far-reaching climate targets and centralisation of climate policies. Climate change as a security domain has been on the agenda of the European Council since the mid-2000s. From being an issue handled by the environmental Directorate-General of the Commission and by the Council of Environmental Ministers, to gradually become an issue engaging the Commission, the Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Council (Dupont, 2019). Climate change is commonly discussed in terms of security, and is at times brought up in debates regarding threats to be countered in EU's Common Foreign and Security and Defence Policies (Vogler, 2013).

It appears clear that in the latest decade's climate change has been framed as a crisis of global proportions, and has therefore accordingly been included in a security discourse. Whether climate change has been securitised or not in the tradition of the Copenhagen School, has however been debated among scholars. For a successful securitisation to occur according to the Copenhagen School, a securitising speech act needs to result in extraordinary emergency measures to handle the rhetorically constructed threat (Oels, 2012; Vogler, 2013; Boas and Warner, 2017; Peters, 2018). Research has however shown that no extraordinary emergency measures have occurred in the case of climate change (Oels, 2012; Boas and Warner, 2017).

Instead a different framing of climate change as a security issue has been identified by scholars. The issue of climate change is framed as so big and encompassing, that it creates an image of it being more or less impossible to stop. Climate change is frequently formulated as an existential problem, or even in an apocalyptic manner (Trombetta, 2008; Boas and Warner, 2017). Instead of this resulting in extraordinary emergency measures, it appears as if technocratic solutions and risk management is the norm, such as mitigation of carbon dioxide emissions. The threat of climate change is framed to be so great, that it counterintuitively results in smaller and less drastic political measures (Methmann and Rothe, 2012; Oels, 2012; Boas and Warner, 2017; Trombetta, 2008).

Boas and Warner (2017) argue that this particular security framing of climate change is due to the nature of the issue. Firstly, it is not possible to pinpoint one tangible source of climate change, as its cause is more of systemic character. There is also an absence of a 'saviour', meaning that no single actor can stop climate change, instead action is needed from numerous actors on multiple level in society. This makes it difficult to present emergency action to mitigate the threat of climate change, which does not provide a good setting for a complete securitisation in the theoretical tradition of the Copenhagen School. In politics of security, attention is more easily given to visible weather events or disasters, rather than the much slower processes of increasing temperatures and sea levels (Boas and Warner, 2017). As a result, climate change risk being discarded for more urgent and direct threats (Trombetta, 2008). This is an interesting insight to bring into the analysis of CM discourses. Is CM framed in a similar apocalyptic manner as climate change? What is the nature of proposed measures as a result? These are questions that are taken into consideration in the analysis of CM discourses.

4.2 Securitisation of Migration in the EU

This section looks to securitisation of broader migration in the EU. Migration has been increasingly presented as a danger to public order and safety, labour market stability, cultural identity, and simply the good life of Western European societies (Huysmans, 2000; 2006; Guild, 2003; Pellerin, 2005). Liberal migration regimes are framed as bringing terrorism, drugs, and crimes – while restrictive migration regimes minimises threats and increases national security (Lazaridis and Wadia, 2015). Discourses in EU institutions picture migration as a destabilizing and dangerous challenge to European societal stability. Migrants are frequently rhetorically connected to societal instability, and with this a category of people is reified as a danger and excluded from cultural values and social assistance. The inclusion of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers in the EU is thereby rendered more difficult (Huysmans, 2000; 2006).

The year 2015 marked the beginning of what infamously became known as the 'refugee crisis'. European states saw an increase of displaced people seeking refuge, primarily from Syria, but also from Libya, Iraq, Eritrea, Somalia and Afghanistan (European Parliament, 2017). This was a crisis in terms of the inability of EU institutions to handle this influx of people, and has resulted in a new level of complexity in EU migration governance and securitisation (Grigonis, 2016). The EU responded to the event as a high security threat and prompted tighter border controls, patrolling and surveillance. Emergency actions have been manifested through the swift adoption of security strategies, such as a number of EU Member States temporarily suspending Schengen, and others by constructing metal fences upon refugee arrivals (Fakhoury, 2016).

Another response to the 'crisis' was the creation of 'European Agenda on Migration', containing a set of measures to manage migration more effectively, mainly by securing external borders, reducing incentives for irregular migration and develop a stronger common asylum policy (European Parliament, 2018b). The prioritisation appeared to be security of internal space, rather than the claims of migrants and asylum seekers (Grigonis, 2016; Ceccorulli, 2018). Along with this development, public discourses of migrants as a threat to societal security has thrived. In 2015 the Eurobarometer poll revealed that migration was the top concern for EU citizens, and other surveys showed how EU citizens tend to link refugee arrivals with terrorism. The Syrian refugee influx sparked an acute security reaction from the EU, and fuelled tensions between the interests of EU Member States and migrants (Fakhoury, 2016).

The study of securitisation of migration in the EU shows that the discursive construction of CM takes place in a context where broader migration is considered a security issue and governed as such (Trombetta, 2014). The securitisation of migrants in the EU, further spurred by the 'refugee crisis' in 2015, is therefore another important insight on which to build the analysis of CM discourses.

4.2.1 EU Migration Policy and Border Control

Since the Cold War, states have been increasingly preoccupied with border control and security. Particularly Western states have strengthened their border control and created new border security practices by building fences, deploying airborne and seaborne patrols, and installing various surveillance technologies (Walters, 2006; Bosworth, 2008; White, 2011). What we see today is an on-going militarisation of national borders. Simultaneously, an ever more globalised world emerges, with constantly increasing cross border flows of capital, trade, communication and culture (White, 2011:14-15). It appears as if the world is ever more borderless, except for the international migrant.

This has however not always been the case. After World War II, industrialized countries relied heavily on migrant labour for their quickly growing economies. Far into the 1970s international migrants could enter Europe with relative ease (Huysmans, 2000; White, 2011:16). Countries like France, the Netherlands and Germany all had a permissive or even promotional migration policy motivated by a need for extra labour. During this period, migration policy was not a political priority in European states. The free movement of third country migrants was a marginal issue next to the development of an internal market in the EU. However, changes of economic conditions and the labour market entering the 1980s spurred more restrictive migration policies throughout the European community. Migration became increasingly politicised and also an Europeanization of migration policy began to take place, through policy coordination on an interstate level within the EU (Huysmans, 2000).

The development started with the creation of intergovernmental fora such as Trevi, the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration and the Schengen Group, which in turn led to transnational policy networks working towards cooperative regulations of migration within the Union. One of the most significant actions taken by the EU was Council Regulation 1612/68, which makes a distinction between the right of free movement of Member States citizens and the free movement of third country nationals. This arguably laid the foundation for 'Fortress Europe' and the development towards a more militarised border control of EU external borders through de-legitimisation of third country nationals (Huysmans, 2000; Huysmans, 2006:65-67). In the 1980s the EU created the Schengen Information System (SIS), a large-scale information system for supporting external border control of the Schengen States. Gradually migration and asylum policy became integrated in the very constitutional structure of the EU, and is today regulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), with a focus on managing regular migration to the Member States and combating irregular migration. With the so called Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) from 2011, focus is outwards by outlining a general framework for EU's relations with third countries in regards of migration (European Parliament, 2018c). The increasing integration of Europe, less controlled internal borders, and a new category of 'third country nationals', has contributed to a stronger control of EU *external* borders (Huysmans, 2006:63).

The EU has further institutionalised its border control practices with the establishment of the *Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States*, also known as Frontex. Frontex is responsible for coordinating extensive policing of Europe's external borders (White, 2011:15). The agency supports national police

with technical competences and education, and cooperates with other EU organisations concerned with border control and cross border crimes (European Union, 2017). Frontex employs around 1500 border guards to be deployed for rapid interventions, and makes use of vessels, aircrafts, vehicles and other technical equipment's in their operations. They also assist Member States in screening, identification and fingerprinting of migrants, as well as assists in forced returns (Frontex, 2018).

Migration has gradually developed to become an intergovernmental matter in the EU, and managing and regulating migration is today part of the very constitution of the EU. Another development is the increasing militarisation and policing of EU external borders, and the deployment of non-traditional measures to ensure security. Migration and security is today deeply connected in EU practices, which is embedded in the process of articulating migration as a threat endangering society.

4.3 Securitisation of Climate Migration

The framing of CM as a security issue is an emerging field in academia since the beginning of the 2000s (see White, 2011; Boas, 2015; Trombetta, 2014; Baldwin et al, 2014; Methmann and Oels, 2015). These scholars point towards instances where environmental degradation and associated migration have been increasingly framed as a danger to global order. Below sections delve deeper into this securitising development of CM. It is further discussed how securitisation of CM has been strategically used in political contexts to achieve climate change mitigation targets. Finally, criticism of securitising tendencies of CM and the responding discourses which have emerged from this are discussed. This with the aim to create a holistic image of the development of CM as an issue of security.

4.3.1 The Development of Climate Migration as a Security Issue

Environmental degradation and massive migration flows have been rhetorically linked since the 1970s (Trombetta, 2014), a connection which grew stronger in the 1980s, and was back then generally characterised by asylum crises and natural disasters (Gemenne, 2011b). In 1985 the term 'environmental refugee' was first coined by Essam El-Hinnawi of the United Nations Environment Programme (Docherty and Giannini, 2009). In the years to follow a number of dramatic forecasts of millions of people forced to move because of a degrading environment emerged (Myers, 1986; Jacobson, 1988; Mathews; 1989).

The alarmist discourse of millions of environmental migrants continued throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s (Myers, 1993; 1997; 2002), often expressed as 'streams', 'tides', or 'waves' of migrants (Piquet, 2013). Eventually the concept of *climate migration* became more commonly used, simultaneously with the development of securitisation of climate change (Boas, 2015:5). In 2007 the European think tank Christian Aid published a prediction of millions of people fleeing from forecasted severe consequences of climate change in the coming future (Piquet, 2013). The US the defence think tank CNA published a report called

'National Security and the Threat of Climate Change' in which large refugee movements were forecasted as a result of political instability in developing countries (Trombetta, 2014).

In the first decade of the 2000s the debate on CM also intensified within the EU (Trombetta, 2014). In 2008, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission published a paper on '*Climate Change and International Security'*, in which CM was a sub-topic and here said to potentially lead to political instability and conflicts. Climate change was deemed a 'threat multiplier', and that 'millions of environmental refugees' could be expected by 2020. Although the report acknowledged a humanitarian dimension of environmental refugees, it also emphasised that environmental refugee inflows into Europe include a dimension of security risks, which directly affects European interests (High Representative and European Commission, 2008). In 2008 a report by Tina Acketoft was published for the European Parliament, in which an alarmist image of millions of environmental refugees was painted, suggesting that the number of environmental refugees already exceeds the number of people displaced by war. The report mobilised threat defence logic and the securitisation is evident. It appears as if the debate on CM is subjected to the European machinery of managing, controlling and restricting migration in the EU (Trombetta, 2014).

4.3.2 Securitisation of Climate Migration as a Political Strategy

Securitisation of CM has been a recurrent theme in promoting action in climate negotiations, with both states and NGOs as securitising actors. CM has become a shorthand to emphasise the security implications of climate change, and used to underpin the effects of climate change on already existing instabilities (Baldwin et al, 2014).

This case in point can be illustrated through a concrete example, namely two debates held by the United Nations (UN) Security Council in 2007 and in 2011. These debates were focused on issues of global warming, and around 60 states participated in each debate. In both of these debates, CM was a key issue used to exemplify security related impacts of climate change (Boas, 2015:68). A study conducted by Boas (2015) showed that alarmist statements were frequently uttered surrounding CM, and the phenomena was portrayed as a driver of conflicts and tensions. Concern for movements of a large amount of people was expressed and explicitly framed as a security threat. According to Boas, these utterances were strategically used by developed countries, with the political aim to convince developing countries to adopt mitigation targets under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Boas, 2015:107).

What was discovered by securitising actors during these debates, was that the strategic securitisation directed towards developing countries was largely ineffective. Particularly India, appeared to perceive the dangers of CM as a vague, western construct, used to force a western agenda on developing countries. The situation resulted in a political environment centred on competition, blame and suspicion (Ibid., 139). Realising the counterproductive effect of securitisation of CM, securitising actors changed narrative. Instead the argument of economic prosperity was used to bolster action on climate change, which proved to provide greater

opportunities for advancing the dialogue and negotiations with India. In this instance, there was not a clear connection between security and climate change in policy making in India, it instead proved more effective to engage with India's economic interests (Ibid., 163-164). This provides important insights in the complex process of securitisation, and the importance of adjusting the narrative to the audience.

4.3.3 A Critical Response to Securitisation of Climate Migration

In addition to securitisation at times having undesirable strategic results on the political arena, concerns have also been raised by several scholars of how the securitisation of CM might result in militarisation of developmental aid, increased border control and distortion of climate policy (Hartmann, 2010; White, 2011; Boas, 2015). The securitising rhetoric surrounding CM has thus given way to softer tones and calls for de-securitisation of the phenomena.

Particularly the idea of CM as a legitimate and effective adaptation measure to climate change has emerged strongly in academia in recent years (Black, et al., 2011; Bettini, et al., 2016). Some argue that migration is a valid coping mechanism for increased stress and degradation that may result from climate change. Several models have been developed aimed at policy-making of migration as an adaptive response to climate change. Black et al (2011) have formulated a heuristic device which illustrates the relationship between various drivers of migration and the sensitivity of these drivers to anticipated climate change impacts. Another example is the approach developed by Kniveton et al (2008) which aims to simulate behavioural responses by individuals and households to climate impacts. Research has also been done with the aim to facilitate migration of people in the event of climate change impact, to increase the adaptive ability of people (Jha, et al., 2018). This illustrates another direction of CM discourses gaining prominence in the public debate in recent years, and represent a counter response to securitisation. This discourse has been manifested in form of a greater attention to the humanitarian aspect of migrants, and the call for developmental aid towards countries sensitive to climate change impacts (Trombetta, 2014).

4.4 Concluding Remarks

The exploration of discourses surrounding climate change, migration and CM provides insights which are brought into the analysis. Climate change has gradually become an issue engaging the highest decisive instances of the EU, and is commonly discussed in terms of security. Broader migration is in the EU frequently framed in terms of security, which is also reflected in practices of border control and surveillance. The security-migration nexus has further been strengthened by the events of the 'refugee crisis' following 2015. Climate change and broader migration are thus both incorporated in a security context in the EU, where practices and discourses revolves around the formulation of these two phenomenon as security threats. It is in this context which discourses surrounding CM emerges. This insight provides a contextual comprehension of the discursive formulation of CM. Attention is paid to the interaction and interdiscursivity of climate change and migration discourses and the discursive formulations of CM.

5 Analysis

In this chapter the findings of the critical discourse analysis are presented. As the discourses surrounding CM are analysed over time, the findings are presented chronologically. This is done in order to illustrate how they change and develop over this time period. The discourses are furthermore presented as they emerge within each legislative institution, meaning that the findings from documents published by the Commission, the Parliament and the Council of the EU are presented in separate sections. The findings have been divided into different *discursive themes*. These themes consists of reiterated discursive utterances which revolves around a certain argumentation. The most reiterated discursive themes have been selected, in order to capture discursive patterns which emerge from the analysed documents. Each discursive theme is analysed on their topos and argumentative structure. This structure gives a general overview of the various discursive framings of CM, and how these framings transform and develop over time. It furthermore gives a more detailed analysis of the argumentative structure emerging within each discourse.

5.1 European Commission

In total three discursive themes have been identified in analysed documents from the Commission throughout the time frame of 2010-2018. Below the discursive themes are presented in two different time periods, namely 2010-2015 and 2015-2018. The reason for this is a change of the formulation of CM starting 2015. In order to illustrate this change of rhetoric, the discourses are evaluated separately before and after 2015.

In 2010-2015 two discursive themes are developing in parallel, with two differing discursive constructions of CM. Discursive Theme 1, called 'Complexity', takes a nuanced approach to the complexity of CM and emphasises the need for further research on the subject. This discourse fades out from analysed documents following 2015. Discursive Theme 2, called 'Direct Link', establishes a more direct, causal link between climate change and migration.

In 2015-2018 there is an increasing amount of documents containing the subject of CM. The discussion around CM thus appear to be expanding in this time period. One discursive theme can be identified in these years. This discursive construction of CM is increasingly alarmist with occurring securitising speech acts. Below these developments are presented in more detail.

5.1.1 Climate Migration Discourses 2010-2015

5.1.1.1 Discursive Theme 1: Complexity

Discursive theme 1 is centred on the complexity of the relationship between environmental factors and migration, and the need for further research on the subject of CM. This discursive theme emerge mainly from documents aimed at assessing impacts of proposed legislations,

such as for example Staff Working Documents. Thus, this discourse seems to emerge from more research oriented publications. The argumentative structure of this discursive theme is outlined below.

Internal Environmental Migration

There is a reiterated claim of how environmentally induced migration is likely to occur mainly in an intra-state context, and not cross-border. This is exemplified in the following quotes:

> *Available studies indicate that environmentally-induced migration takes place in most cases in an intra-state context and thus it is far from certain that the European Union and North America would be the first to be faced with great waves of environmentally-induced migrations (E-5550/2010:1).*
>
> *Recent evidence suggests that no significant increases of external immigration to Europe solely due to climate or other environmental changes can be expected (SWD/132/2013:43).*

It is in the above quotes explicitly claimed that external migration to Europe due to environmental factors is unlikely to occur. A certainty is expressed in these claims, as this is suggested through *recent evidence* and *studies*.

Complexity of Environmental Migration

Other reoccurring claims are centred on the complexity of the relationship between environmental factors and migration. Environmental factors are expressed as being embedded in other socio-economic factors, making it difficult to make a distinct connection between environmental factors and migration. The following quotes exemplifies such claims:

> *The extent of climate-induced displacement is hard to estimate with certainty. It is difficult to attribute migration to climate factors only, as broader environmental pushes often add to already existing political or economic push factors (E-9120/2011:1).*
>
> *[…] it is difficult to establish a direct link between climate change and migration. Individual decisions to migrate are usually the result of a complex set of considerations (E-007742/2011:1).*
>
> *Decisions to migrate are usually the result of multiple considerations that reflect a complex combination of environmental, economic, social, security and political factors. Economic and social factors are in most cases considered both by social scientists and migrants to be the most important drivers of migration (SWD/138/ 2013:7).*

These claims emphasise that environmentally induced migration is *complex*, and that environmental factors are embedded in a range of other migratory factors. In fact, socio-economic factors are claimed to be the most important drivers of migration. These claims communicates uncertainty. There is an uncertainty surrounding the interlinkages between environmental factors and migration, thus it is not known in what extent climate change will result in migration.

Difficult to establish Interlinkage

Building on these claims arguments emerge that it is *difficult* to establish an interlinkage between environmental factors and migration, and that it is hard to estimate any environmentally induced migration.

The conclusion drawn from this, is that there is a need for more knowledge, research and attention towards the interlinkages between environmental factors and migration. This conclusion is examplified in the following quotes:

> *The interlinkages between climate change, environmental degradation and migration require enhanced consideration, notably within a development context (COM/292/2013:5).*
>
> *More focused attention should be paid to the debate on the connection between forced displacement and development, in particular the links between migration, climate change and environmental degradation (SEC/1353/2011:17).*
>
> *Finally, more research should be conducted about the reasons behind migration linked to climate change, which are multiple, as well as its consequences and scale (E-5520/2010:1).*

Conclusion

In summary, the argumentative structure of this discourse is built around two reiterated claims. One claim of external environmental migration being unlikely to occur, and one claim of the complexity between the interlinkages of environmental factors and migration. It is thereafter argued that it is difficult to extablish a link between environmetal factors and migration, to finally arrive at the conclusion that more research is needed on this topic. The topos which connects the argument with the conclusion in this argumentative structure is thus: not enough is known about the links between environmental factors and migration, therefore more research on the subject is needed. This reasoning is presented in the table below:

Claim	Argument	Conclusion	Topos
The link is complex External environmental migration unlikely to occur	It is difficult to establish a link	More research is needed	It is difficult to establish a link between environmental factors and migration, therefore more knowledge is needed

Table 5.1 – Argumentative structure of Discursive Theme 1 EU Commission.

5.1.1.2 Discursive Theme 2: Direct Link

The second discursive theme in the time period 2010-2015 is a competing discourse to the more nuanced rhetoric outlined in discursive theme 1. This discursive theme mainly emerge from communications, memos, transcribed speeches, statements, and other documents which do not have a purpose of assessing the impacts of a proposed legislative act. In contrast to discursive theme 1, this theme poses a clear and causal link between environmental degradation, climate change and migration, and suggests the need for strengthening climate adaptation and resilience. This is further elaborated on below.

Climate Change as a 'Threat Multiplier'

The following argumentative structure is firstly built on certain claims. These claims are centred on how climate change and environmental degradation act as a 'threat multiplier', meaning that climate change and environmental factors exacerbate certain tensions and instabilities. It is thereafter argued that this leads to migration or influences migration patterns. This is exemplified through the following quotes:

> *Climate change may act as a 'threat-multiplier', exacerbating trends, tensions and instabilities which would already have an influence on migration patterns (E-007742/2011:1).*
>
> *Natural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and security consequences, including greater migration (COM/845/2011:27).*
>
> *The increasing challenge of climate change is a multiplier of existing threats that add a new dimension of man made natural hazards and security risks (COM/845/2011:2).*
>
> *[…] global warming undermines development opportunities and exacerbates poverty, notably in most vulnerable countries, and ultimately becomes a major security issue as a "risk multiplier" for food scarcity, migration and regional instability (SPEECH/86/2013:3).*

These quotes make claims of a certain link between environmental degradation and migration, by claiming that environmental changes exacerbates certain factors, which then influences migration patterns. They communicate certainty, as opposed to the expressed uncertainty in the competing discursive theme 1.

These claims can furthermore be characterised as securitising speech acts. Climate change is described as leading to certain *threats*, with threats referring to instabilities, conflicts, and environmentally induced migration. These claims thus pose environmentally induced migration as a *threat*. This whole situation is furthermore described as a *major security issue*, or as having *security consequences*. This can be interpreted as an ongoing securitising process of climate change, in which environmentally induced migration becomes implicated and formulated as a security threat. By rhetorically establishing a link between environmental degradation and migration, to then categorise this link as a security issue, a securitising speech act is performed.

Strengthening Climate Adaptation

The conclusion drawn from the above argumentation is the need policy responses to environmentally induced migration to be placed in a developmental context. This draws on a humanitarian response to environmentally induced migration, and links it to climate adaption and resilence, and risk management. This is examplified in the quotes below:

> *Furthermore, broader links between migrants in countries experiencing natural disasters and policies in the areas of climate change adaptation, resilience and disaster risk reduction require further exploration (ANNEX 3/2014:5).*
>
> *Recognises the importance of further exploring and addressing the links between climate change, environmental degradation and migration, including the importance of climate change adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in reducing displacement, and the role of migration as a strategy to strengthening adaptation and DRR (SWD/133/2014:13).*

This relates to a discourse of climate migration as an adaptation strategy to climate change, and the importance of managing and reducing risks following natural disasters. The focus is on assisting eople affected by adverse climate change, and following the above argumentation it is implied that through this the need for people to migrate is avoided.

Conclusion

To conclude the argumentative structure of discursive theme 2: Direct Link, climate change is claimed to be a 'threat-mutiplier', which is then argued to result in increased migration. It is thereafter concluded that there is a need for the development of policy responses in a humanitarian context, with a focus on building resilience and adaptation towards impacts of climate change and enviromental degradation. This is illustrated in the table below:

Claim	Argument	Conclusion	Topos
Climate change is a threat multiplier	This leads to increased migration	Need for climate adaptation, resilience and risk management	As climate change can lead to migration, by helping people affected by climate change migration can be avoided

Table 5.2 – Argumentative structure of Discursive Theme 2 EU Commission.

5.1.2 Climate Migration Discourses 2015-2018

5.1.2.1 Discursive Theme 3: Increasing Alarmism

The year 2015 marks the year in which a change of discourses surrounding CM can be identified. The call for further research and knowledge about the interlinkages between environmental factors and migration is in this time period less reiterated. Instead, the rhetoric becomes increasingly alarmist, and CM is rhetorically connected with the 'refugee crisis'. This is further elaborated on in the sections below.

Climate Change as a 'Threat Multiplier'

A number of different claims and arguments emerge in CM discourses following 2015. Firstly, there is a continuous reiteration of climate change as a 'threat multiplier', as could be identified also during the years 2010-2015 in discursive theme 2. Following 2015 this discourse becomes more prominent and reiterated in various documents produced by the Commission. The following quotes exemplifies how climate change is claimed to be a threat multiplier:

> *Climate change is best viewed as a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability (ANNEX IV/2015:3).*

> *Environmental degradation caused by climate change can indeed be a trigger for migration. Climate change is the ultimate threat multiplier, as it aggravates fragile situations and contributes to social upheaval and even violent conflict. Europe is surrounded by regions that are vulnerable to the climate change effect (E-014569/2015a:1).*
>
> *With a growing population that is dangerously pushing planetary boundaries, the tension between agricultural production, scarcity of arable land and water, and climate change will increasingly be a source of conflict and a powerful driver of migration (ANNEX/2018:15).*

The statements above contains claims of how climate change exacerbates and aggravates tensions, instabilities and fragile situations. This is then argued to be a powerful driver of migration, as well as a source of conflict. Conflict and migration are frequently equated and used in connection to each other to illustrate coming consequences of climate change, as can be exemplified in the following quote:

> *For many years the Sahel region at large, including the Lake Chad Basin, and the Horn of Africa have faced growing challenges of demographic pressure, environmental stress, extreme poverty, internal tensions, institutional weaknesses, weak social and economic infrastructures, and insufficient resilience to food crises, which have in some places led to open conflict, displacement, criminality, radicalisation and violent extremism, as well as forced and irregular migration, trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of migrants (C/7293/2015:2).*

We can above see claims of how the Sahel region has experienced environmental stress. It is then argued that this has been one of the contributing factors to conflict, radicalisation, violent extremism, as well as irregular migration. Environmental factors are thus posed as one of the reasons for these events. All the above quotes have securitising and alarmist elements. Climate change and other environmental factors are described as exacerbating existing threats, such as conflicts, instability, violence, criminality, radicalisation, violent extremism, and migration. Migration induced by environmental factors is thus posed as a threat, caused or partly caused by climate change. With this, environmental migration is included in a securitisation process which also implicates climate change and migration.

Large-scale Environmental Migration

To further assure the certainty of the causation between environmental factors and migration, environmental migration is described as already occurring, or to occur in a near future. A reality is described where millions of people are forced to migrate partly due to environmental factors, and that this is a phenomena which is accelerating:

> *Millions of people are on the move, sometimes forced because of conflicts, natural disasters, environmental degradation and climate change or simply to seek better economic opportunities (ANNEX/2018:13).*
>
> *My friends, there is no greater risk to humanity today than global warming. It is not a hypothetical theory about what might happen in some years from now. No, it is a reality which is already affecting all of us, in different ways, around the world. We are facing more and more severe natural disasters, pollution-related diseases, forces new flows of migration sometimes causing new conflicts to erupt (SPEECH/5400/2015:1).*
>
> *Migration as a result of environmental causes is increasing at an accelerating pace. Current estimates indicate that 135 million people could be at risk of being permanently displaced by*

desertification and land degradation over the coming decades to 2050, with 60 million of these vulnerable people located in Africa (ANNEX 6/2016:8).

The lack of livelihood options and insecurity feed off each other and drive large migration flows to cities and across borders (ANNEX 6/2016:12).

The above statements show claims of millions of people already migrating due to environmental factors. There are claims of many millions of people being at risk of displacement. These claims have an alarmist connotation, through the use of expressions such as *accelerating pace* and *no greater risk*. In addition to these claims, certain arguments can be identified in the above quotes. It is argued that a lack of livelihood options and insecurity as a result of environmental factors drive migration flows. An image of current reality is constructed, of millions of people being displaced and forced to migrate across borders as a result of environmental degradation and climate change.

Environmental Migration towards Europe

Developing from this is an expressed concern of environmentally induced migration directed towards the Europe. Claims are made that environmental factors and climate change are to affect migration specifically to the EU or to Europe. This can be seen in the following quotes:

Migration to the EU is thought to be heavily influenced by environmental and climate changes (FACT SHEET/1555/2017:2).

The international migrant population in Europe is expected to increase in the future, due to economic and demographic factors, political unrest, conflicts and climate change (C/2468/2017:66).

There are unprecedented numbers of forced displaced persons and migrants both moving within the region and leaving it, with growing numbers travelling to Europe […] Significant numbers of refugees leave their country to escape from violent conflict, political persecution or environmental catastrophes (ANNEX 2/2017:5).

Environmentally induced migration to Europe is also used as an argument. Below we can see claims of climate change having certain impacts on for example water access and stability. This is then argued to lead to migration towards Europe:

Climate change is increasingly causing severe water shortages in the region […] This social and economic stress, in turn, constitutes a key cause of instability and becomes a cause of migration, both internally, leading numerous farm families to move to cities and, externally, driving part of the population to migrate in particular towards Europe (SWD/332/2016:4).

Let's be clear: migration will be one of the main challenges the European Union has to face together in the longer term. This issue is not going away. Globalisation, economic trends, climate change, war and instability all mean that people will keep trying to come to Europe, in search of refuge, of a better life, or to join their families (SPEECH/1289/2016:1).

The use of terms such as *challenge* and *unprecedented* has alarmist connotations. It implies a concern, in this context specifically a concern for the EU, as it is argued that environmental migration will increase towards the Union. This also reinforces the idea of EU external borders and community, by the construction of a coming challenge facing Europe as a whole. The below quote states how environmental changes have already affected Europe, leading to *unprecedented flows* of refugees:

> *Conflict, war, instability, environmental changes and disasters have increasingly affected Europe's proximity. This has led to unprecedented flows of refugees, compounded by intensified migration from various poverty-stricken or crisis-affected regions. In addition to this, the EU has been confronted with a growing number of terrorist attacks. In response, the EU has adopted several initiatives to deal with these pressing political priorities (ANNEX/2018:11).*

Again, this statement has alarmist connotations in its use of *unprecedented* and *flows*. From the claim of how environmental changes has affected the proximity of Europe, it is argued that this has led to migration towards Europe. Connecting with this argumentation is a claim of increased terrorist attacks happening in the EU. This can be identified as a securitising speech act, as a rhetorical connection is created between environmental refugees and terrorist attacks. One is not explicitly said to cause the other, but it is implied that these attacks are the result of migration.

Environmental Migration and the 'Refugee Crisis'

A discursive connection between environmental migration and the 'refugee crisis' can be identified in the quote below. Claims are made of how water scarcity induces people to migrate. Water scarcity is frequently stated as being exacerbated by climate change. This is thereafter followed by a statement of how EU is experiencing 'the largest refugee crisis in recent history':

> *As outlined in a recent World Bank study, water scarcity and the consequent increase in food prices can induce people to leave their countries and can contribute to igniting civil conflicts […] The EU is of course well aware of this, affected as it currently by the largest refugee crisis in recent history (SWD/332/2016:17).*

The above statement implies that water scarcity, exacerbated by climate change, could be a concern as the EU is already negatively affected by migration towards Europe. The statement sets up a rhetorical connection between environmentally induced migration and the 'refugee crisis', thereby discursively constructing a relationship between the two.

Strengthening Climate Adaptation

The conclusions which are uttered in connection with the above argumentative structure, tend to be humanitarian and placed in a developmental policy context, a tendency which could also be seen in discursive theme 2: 'Direct Link' during 2010-2015. It is stated that migration and forced displacement caused by environmental changes should be integrated in climate change adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction measures. This is more clearly illustrated in the following quotes:

> *More work is required to better understand the inter-linkages between climate change and displacement […] In this context, the EU recalled the importance of integrating human mobility within climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction, preparedness and early warning mechanisms (E-006802/2017:1).*

> *Develop tailored migration schemes of various duration, including planned temporary and permanent relocation, to facilitate migration as an adaptation strategy to slow-onset environmental degradation related to the adverse effects of climate change, such as desertification and sea level rise (COM/167/2018:7).*

> *Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, issued in June 2016, acknowledges that "climate change and environmental degradation exacerbate potential conflict,*

in light of their impact on desertification, land degradation, and water and food scarcity", and highlights the need to seek to enhance environmental resilience (ANNEX 3/2017:5).

The above statements emphasise the importance of resilience towards environmental degradation. Focus is on building capacity in third countries to handle environmental degradation and the adverse impacts of climate changes, in order to avoid forced displacement and migration. Measures proposed are preventive and humanitarian, focused on risk management, adaptation and resilience towards adverse environmental impacts.

Conclusion

Discursive theme 3: 'Increasing Alarmism' emerges as the most reiterated discourse over the years 2015-2018. The rhetoric is frequently alarmist, with securitising elements. Claims during this time period are centred on how climate change exacerbates certain tensions and instabilities in third countries. It is then argued that this leads to migration, specifically towards Europe. This in turn is rhetorically connected to the 'refugee crisis'. The conclusion reached though this argumentation is focused on measures to improve climate adaptation, resilience and risk management in third countries in order to avoid forced displacement and migration. This argumentation is illustrated in the following table:

Claims	Arguments	Conclusions	Topos
Climate change is a threat multiplier	This will lead to migration towards Europe	Need to strengthen climate adaption, resilience and risk management in third countries	In order to avoid environmental migration to Europe, preventive action needs to be taken in third countries

Table 5.3 – Argumentative structure of Discursive Theme 3 EU Commission.

5.1.3 Conclusion European Commission

Above three different discursive themes over two time periods have been outlined. Looking to the discursive development of CM in the Commission as a whole, various patterns can be identified. Firstly, the nuanced discursive theme focused on complexity seems to fade out following 2015 and is less reiterated. Instead the more alarmist discursive theme is increasingly reiterated, and further developed in its argumentative structure. Thus, what is revealed in the analysis of the Commission documents is a discursive development of alarmism surrounding CM following 2015. Despite the increasing alarmism and occurring securitising speech acts, responses to CM remain humanitarian and focused on adaptation and risk management throughout the whole analysed time period. To fully illustrate the discursive development of CM in the Commission, the following figure is presented:



Figure 5.1 CM formulation in the EU Commission over time (own graphic).

5.2 European Parliament

In total two discursive themes have been identified in analysed documents from the Parliament throughout the time frame of 2010-2018. Below these discursive themes are presented in two different time periods, namely 2010-2015 and 2015-2018. The reason for this is a change of the discursive construction of CM starting 2015. In order to illustrate this change of rhetoric, the discourses are evaluated separately before and after 2015.

In 2010-2015 one discursive theme can be identified. This theme is called 'Direct Link', as it establishes a direct, causal link between climate change and migration.

In 2015-2018 there is an increasing amount of documents containing the subject of CM. The discussion around CM thus appear to be expanding in this time period. One discursive theme can be identified in these years. This discursive construction of CM is increasingly alarmist with occurring securitising speech acts.

5.2.1 Climate Migration Discourses 2010-2015

5.2.1.1 Discursive Theme 4: Direct Link

The discursive theme of this time period is focused on the establishment of a direct link between environmental factors and migration, and large-scale migration as a result of this direct link. This is further elaborated on in the sections below.

Link between Environmental factors and Migration

The claim of a clear and direct link between environmental factors and migration emerge in documents produced by the Parliament. Migration is also described as growing as a result of environmental factors. This is exemplified in the following quotes:

> *[…] whereas climate change and environmental degradation are becoming an increasingly common cause of migration (RESOLUTION/0121/2011:3).*

> *[…] whereas environmental problems – caused and exacerbated by climate change – are currently responsible for the growth of forced migration […] and whereas there is therefore an increasing link between asylum-seekers and areas of environmental decline (RESOLUTION/0145/2012:3).*

A certainty is expressed in these claims. There is no discussion around the complexity of the relation between environmental factors and migration. Instead, this interrelation is stated as a fact, and environmental factors are described as a *common cause* of migration. In addition to this, environmental migration is posed as an increasing and growing phenomena.

Large-scale Environmental Migration

Building on claims of a direct link between environmental factors and migration, certain arguments are formulated. It is argued that due to this interrelation, a large amount of people are likely to migrate as a result. The statements below shows how this is expressed:

> *Environmental degradation, including the consequences of climate change, is likely to force millions of people worldwide to leave their homes over the coming years (E-9120/2010:1).*

> *Calls on the Commission to assess the impact of 'climate migration', a phenomenon that some estimate will cause 200 million people to leave their homes by 2050 as conditions in their lands gradually worsen (REPORT/0205/2011:13).*

These statements argue that millions of people are likely to leave their home, resulting in large-scale environmental migration. It is furthermore argued that this migration is likely to be directed towards Europe, which can be seen in the following quote:

> *Emphasises that climate change is likely to induce large-scale environmental migration from regions which are already at the origin of migration flows to Europe (Africa, the Middle East, south and south-east Asia) (RESOLUTION/0154/2010:11).*

The above quotes are all characterised by alarmist elements. The use of terms such as *large-scale*, and the estimations of hundreds of millions environmental migrants gives an alarming image of a large amount of people migrating. In the last quote, it is implied that this migration will be directed specifically towards the EU. This rhetoric is reinforcing EU external borders, and constructs an outside issue directed towards European states.

Humanitarian Aid

Based on the above claims and arguments a number of conclusions are drawn. The importance of reducing the number of people fleeing from adverse environmental impacts is emphasised. This through a humanitarian approach, with a focus on assisting countries and people affected by adverse environmental impacts. These conclusions can be seen in the following quotes:

Calls on the Commission to assess the impact of 'climate migration' […] emphasises that the European Union must contribute through its development policy to providing assistance and reducing the number of refugees, by investing in technologies, human resources and financial aid; (REPORT/0205/2011:13).

[…] helping partner countries in coping with the challenge of displacement and migration induced by the effects of climate change, and rebuilding climate refugees' livelihoods. (TEXTS ADOPTED PART II, 2013:74).

Stresses that environmental migration should be taken into account in the long-term planning of development assistance policy, so that timely prevention and prompt humanitarian response measures can be taken in the countries of origin (RESOLUTION/0154/2010:11).

The emphasis on *helping*, *rebuilding livelihoods*, *providing assistance*, all reinforce the humanitarian approach formulated in these statements. This humanitarian aid is directed towards both people and third countries. The explicit aim of these responses is to reduce the number of environmental refugees.

Legal Recognition of 'Climate Refugees'

Another conclusion which is reiterated within this discursive theme is the need for a legal recognition of 'climate refugees', and with this provide international protection to people affected by climate change. It is argued that people forced to leave their homes need help and protection. This serves as a basis on which it is concluded that a legal recognition of 'climate refugees' is needed. To exemplify this the following quotes are presented:

Calls on the Commission and the Council to promote an official, judicial legitimisation of the term 'climate refugee' (intended to describe people forced to flee their homes and seek refuge abroad as a consequence of climate change), which is not recognised yet in international law or in any legally binding international agreement (RESOLUTION/169/2012:8).

[…] whereas people forced from their homes by large-scale disasters brought on by climate change need to be assisted and protected; whereas, however, existing law on refugees does not recognise the right of climate refugees to international protection (RESOLUTION/0121/2011:4).

This call for legal recognition is aligned with the humanitarian context in which responses to CM so far have been formulated, as it aims to provide international legal protection to the people affected.

Conclusion

Discursive theme 3: 'Direct Link' which emerge during the period of 2010-2015, is focused on claims of a direct link between environmental factors and migration. From this it is argued that environmental factors will result in large-scale migration flows, directed towards Europe. Building on this, two conclusions are reached. It is firstly concluded that people affected by adverse environmental impacts in third countries are in need of humanitarian aid, with the explicit aim to reduce the number of migrants. The second conclusion revolves around the need for a legal recognition of 'climate refugees'. The topos that emerges from this argumentative structure is thus: as large-scale migration is expected as a result of environmental changes, humanitarian aid is needed in order to reduce the number of people forced migrate. The

following table illustrates the argumentative structure which emerges from this discursive theme:

Claims	Arguments	Conclusions	Topos
Environmental factors drive migration	This will result in large-scale migration, also towards Europe	Aid and assistance is needed towards people and third countries affected by environmental impacts Legal Recognition of 'climate refugees'	In order to avoid migration, people affected by adverse environmental impacts need assistance and legal recognition

Table 5.4 – Argumentative structure of Discursive Theme 4 EU Parliament.

5.2.2 Climate Migration Discourses 2015-2018

5.2.2.1 Discursive Theme 5: Increasing Alarmism

During 2015-2018 the discourse surrounding environmental migration becomes increasingly alarmist with occurring securitising utterances. Environmental migration is also described as increasingly directed towards Europe, and is rhetorically connected to the 'refugee crisis'. This development is further explored in the sections below.

Link between Environmental factors and Migration

The argumentative structure of this discursive theme builds on claims which establish a direct and certain link between environmental factors and migration. To exemplify this, the following quotes are presented:

> *Points to the links between GHG emissions, climate change and abnormal weather conditions, and the incidence and gravity of natural disasters, land degradation, food crises, increasingly difficult access to drinking water, large-scale migratory flows and conflicts (REPORT/2112/2015:35).*

> *[…] whereas climate change can increase competition for resources, such as food, water and grazing lands, can exacerbate economic hardship and political instability, and could become the biggest driver of population displacements, both inside and across national borders, within the not too distant future (MOTION FOR RESOLUTION/1043/2016:3).*

> *[…] whereas there is a direct link between climate change and its impact on environmental degradation, food and water security, access to natural resources , human health, and migration (REPORT/0403/2017:15).*

A direct and causal link between environmental factors and migration is established in the above quotes. No uncertainty regarding the complex relationship between environmental factors and migration is expressed, the rhetoric is instead assertive of the direct link between the two. Environmental factors are described as potentially becoming the *biggest driver* of migration. The use of terms such as *large-scale*, and equating migration with conflicts, reveals alarmist connotations of these statements.

Large-scale Environmental Migration

Building on the claims of a certain and direct link between environmental factors and migration, it is argued that up to a billion people will be displaced as a result of environmental factors. It is furthermore argued that the number of environmental migrant will keep rising. This reasoning is exemplified in the following quotes:

> *[…] whereas a billion people could be displaced as a result of climate change by 2050, with more than 40% of the global population living in areas of severe water stress; whereas climate change is already a major cause of migration (OPINION/2342/2016:3).*

> *[…] whereas, according to the UN International Organisation for Migration, 200 million people could be displaced due to climate change by 2050; whereas, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Africa and its population is particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change exposure; (REPORT/0403/2017:15).*

> *[…] unless serious efforts are made, the number of migrants, as well as internally displaced persons, driven by environmental changes could, in the worst scenario, reach up to 200 million by 2050 (REPORT/0221/2018:6).*

Up to a billion people being displaced as a result of environmental factors is a reiterated claim in analysed documents. The discursive reiteration of this large amount of people migration due to environmental factors carries alarmist connotations. It is then argued that this will occur *unless serious efforts are made*, and that this is an issue which needs to be avoided. This reinforces an alarmist context of an unwanted scenario.

Securitising Speech Acts

In addition to increasingly alarmist statements, securitising speech acts can be identified in documents produced by the Parliament. Migration appears to be included in a securitising process of climate change, where migration is posed as one of the threats caused by climate change. In the following quote below, it is argued that a *serious worldwide migration crisis* is predicted as a result of climate change:

> *[…] whereas the evidence pointing to human responsibility for climate change is beyond any doubt and we are already seeing devastating environmental impacts and high socioeconomic costs […] whereas a serious worldwide migration crisis is predicted as a result (DRAFT REPORT/2006/2017:4).*

This can be characterised as a securitising speech act. The use of the term *crisis* implies security consequences. Climate change is posed as the cause of this migration crisis. This can be interpreted as the inclusion of migration in a securitising process of climate change, thus including environmental migration in a security rhetoric. This reasoning is frequently reiterated, and can be illustrated in the following quotes:

> *[…] whereas climate change is a major threat to global security, peace and stability that amplifies threats to traditional security, inter alia by diminishing access to fresh water and foodstuffs for populations in fragile and developing countries and thus leading to economic and social tensions, forcing people to migrate, or creating political tensions and security risks; (RESOLUTION/0435/2016:3).*

> *Notes that environmental degradation and climate change pose significant risks to establishing and maintaining peace and justice; recognises the need for a higher profile of the part that climate*

> *change and environmental degradation are playing in driving global migration, as well as poverty and hunger; calls for the EU and the Member States to maintain climate change as a strategic priority in diplomatic dialogues at global level (RESOLUTION/0315/2017:12).*

In the above quotes a clear securitisation of climate change becomes visible. Climate change is claimed to be a *major threat* to global security, peace and stability. Climate change is with this discursively formulated as a security threat and risk. Forced migration is described as a consequence of this situation. With this, migration is implicated in an ongoing securitisation process of climate change, where environmental migration is formulated as an adverse consequence.

Environmental Migration towards Europe

Environmental migration is in this time period increasingly framed as being directed towards Europe. This is often accompanied by alarmist phrasings, an example can be presented in the following quote:

> *Similarly, Europe has a responsibility to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of climate change outside Europe: famine, drought and hurricanes, and an unfair development model, are generating a wave of climate refugees who are arriving in the EU, and particularly in its cities, in search of a decent life (DRAFT REPORT/2006/2017:8).*

The above quote claims that a *wave of climate refugees* is already affecting the EU. This constructs an image of reality as European states being affected by large-scale environmental migration. This can be characterised as an alarmist phrasing. Environmental migration towards Europe is also described as threatening security and stability in the EU, exemplified in the following quote:

> *EU climate diplomacy should focus its efforts on the climate change-migration-nexus which is increasingly threatening security and stability in- and outside the EU (REPORT/0221/2018:21).*

The above quote can be characterised as a securitising speech act, in this case a direct securitisation of CM, as CM is directly constructed as a threat to security and stability. EU is constructed as the referent object, which this threat is affecting. This rhetoric further reinforces the construction of an EU community and EU external borders.

Environmental Migration and the 'Refugee Crisis'

CM is frequently rhetorically connected with the 'refugee crisis' in various ways. Climate change is claimed to be partly the cause of the 'refugee crisis', which is exemplified in the quote below:

> *Considers that the magnitude of the migration and refugee crisis, caused by conflicts and climate change […]additional funding will also be needed to back up reinforced action at EU level for internal security in the EU and for the fight against terrorism (RESOLUTION/0309/2016:12).*

Climate change is described as part of the cause of the 'refugee crisis'. It is from this claim argued that additional funding is needed for the fight against terrorism and EU internal security. With this, the 'refugee crisis' is described as having consequences for the security within the EU. This utterance can be characterised as a securitising speech act, where climate change is included in a securitising process of the 'refugee crisis'. CM is here connected with discourses

surrounding the refugee crisis. In addition to this, it is reiterated that impacts of climate change in Africa and the Middle East could *escalate* the 'refugee crisis':

> *[…] draws particular attention to the fact that climate-related developments in parts of Africa and the Middle East could contribute to political instability, economic hardship and an escalation of the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean (RESOLUTION/0383/2016:2).*
>
> *[…] recalls in particular that climate-related developments in parts of Africa and the Middle East could contribute to political instability, economic hardship and an escalation of the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean (RESOLUTION/0380/2017:11).*

CM is in the above statements directly linked to 'refugee crisis', claiming that climate-related developments contribute to an *escalation* of the situation. The 'refugee crisis' is in addition to this framed as a *precursor* to coming adverse impacts of climate change. The situation is used as an alarming warning for the future impacts of climate change. A migration *wave* is described as in the future being far greater than the current migration 'crisis':

> *The current wave of migration arising from armed conflicts and violent eruptions can only be a precursor to further streams of people who will head to Europe as a result of climate change. […] According to certain predictions, subsequent waves will be far greater than the one currently causing alarm (E-014569/2015b:1).*

Alarmist connotations surrounds the above statement, connecting climate change and the 'refugee crisis'. It is implied that the future climate impacts will result in even worse scenarios than the 'refugee crisis'.

Humanitarian Aid

Conclusions drawn from the above outlined claims and arguments are focused on humanitarian measures to help and assist people affected by adverse environmental impacts. The following quotes illustrate this:

> *[…] to cooperate with third countries on a global scale in order to address the challenge of environmental migration; therefore calls in particular on the EU to put sufficient means at the disposal of countries affected by climate change in order to help them adapt to its consequences and mitigate its effects (OPINION/2342/2016:9).*
>
> *[…] stresses that climate change is one of the main causes of increasing internal displacement and forced migration; calls on the international community to develop measures to combat it and protect those affected (RESOLUTION/0515/2018:21).*

It is concluded in the above quotes that the EU should provide means to third countries and people affected by climate change, with the aim to mitigate migration as consequence of climate change. Focus is on aid and protection of affected people.

Legal Recognition of 'Climate Refugees'

In addition to the above call for humanitarian assistance, there is a strong reiteration of the need for a legal recognition of the term 'climate refugee'. This is shown in the following statements:

> *Calls on the Commission and the Council to promote 'climate refugee' as an official, legally recognised term (RESOLUTION/434/2015:19).*

calls on the European Union and the Member States to take their responsibilities seriously when it comes to the challenge of climate change and to implement the Paris Agreement; calls on them to get involved in the debate on the terms 'climate refugees' and 'environmentally displaced persons', so as, where appropriate, to grant a legal status and international protection to persons fleeing for environmental reasons (OPINION/2342/2016:9).

Requests that the Commission and the EEAS participate actively in the debate on the term 'climate refugee', including its possible definition in international law or in any legally binding international agreement (RESOLUTION/316/2016:7).

The Parliament seeks to spur a debate on the legal recognition, trying to engage the Commission, the Council and EU Member States. This with the aim to provide international protection of those affected by the adverse impacts of climate change, aligned with the humanitarian approach which emerges throughout this whole time period.

Conclusion

In the time period 2015-2018, the discursive theme surrounding CM develops in numerous ways. Firstly, the rhetoric becomes increasingly alarmist with securitising speech acts of the relationship between migration and environmental factors. Claims are made of how there is a direct link between environmental factors and migration. From this it is argued that environmental flows will result in large-scale migration flows, and that this migration will be directed towards Europe. Climate change is furthermore described as partly the cause of the 'refugee crisis', and future climate related impacts are posed as potentially escalating the 'refugee crisis'. It is concluded that the EU needs to provide aid and assistance to people and countries affected by adverse environmental impacts, with the aim to avoid migration as a consequence. This outlined argumentative structure is illustrated in the following table:

Claims	Arguments	Conclusions	Topos
Environmental factors cause migration	This will result in large-scale migration, also towards the EU Climate change could escalate the 'refugee crisis'	EU needs to assist third countries and people affect by adverse environmental impacts	In order to avoid large-scale migration to Europe, humanitarian aid needs to be provided to people and countries affected by environmental changes

Table 5.5 – Argumentative structure of Discursive Theme 5 EU Parliament.

5.2.3 Conclusion European Parliament

Above two different discursive themes over two time periods have been outlined. Looking to the discursive development of CM in the Parliament as a whole, a pattern can be identified. What is revealed in the analysis of Parliament documents is a discursive development of increasing alarmism and securitising speech acts of CM following 2015. CM is rhetorically connected to the 'refugee crisis'. In addition to this, there is an expansion of the number of documents including the topic of CM 2015-2018. Despite the increasing alarmism and occurring securitising speech acts, responses to CM remain humanitarian and focused on adaptation and risk management throughout the whole analysed time period. To fully illustrate the discursive development of CM in the Parliament, the following figure is presented:



Figure 5.2 CM formulation in the EU Parliament over time (own graphic).

5.3 Council of the European Union

In total two discursive themes have been identified in analysed documents from the Council of the EU throughout the time frame of 2010-2018. Below these discursive themes are presented in two different time periods, namely 2010-2016 and 2016-2018. The reason for this is a change of the formulation of CM starting 2016. In order to illustrate this change of rhetoric, the discourses are evaluated separately before and after 2016.

In 2010-2016 one discursive theme can be identified. This theme is called 'Direct Link', as it establishes a direct, causal link between climate change and migration.

In 2016-2018 there is an increasing amount of documents containing the subject of CM. The discussion around CM thus appear to be expanding in this time period. One discursive theme can be identified in these years. This formulation of CM is increasingly alarmist with occurring securitising speech acts.

5.3.1 Climate Migration Discourses 2010-2016

5.3.1.1 Discursive Theme 6: Direct Link

The discursive theme which emerge in the years 2010-2016 is firstly characterised by the rhetorical establishment of a certain and direct link between environmental factors and migration. This is further elaborated on below.

<u>Link between Environmental factors and Migration</u>

The direct link between environmental factors and migration is expressed through various claims, which is exemplified in these quotes:

> *Migration is a multi-faceted phenomenon with numerous inter-linkages with other areas of intervention - such as employment, health, education, social protection, climate change (NOTE/16901/2014:4).*

> *ACKNOWLEDGE that climate and environmental degradation are already exerting an increasing influence on migration and mobility (ITEM NOTE/12415/2013:6).*

In the above quotes interlinkages between climate change and migration are established. The second quote claim that environmental factors are already increasingly influencing migration. This is not only asserting a link between environmental factors and migration, but also discursively constructing a reality where CM is already increasingly occurring.

Climate change is furthermore claimed to be a 'threat multiplier', which exacerbates tensions and results in certain security implications. The following quote exemplifies the claim of climate change as a 'threat multiplier':

> *Climate change is a global environmental and development challenge. Next to the most immediate effects, it also has important security implications since it acts as a "threat multiplier", exacerbating tensions over land, water, food and energy prices, and creating migratory pressures and desertification. It is a threat to global growth, prosperity and stability (COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS/2011:1).*

From the claim of climate change as multiplying existing threats, it is argued that this results in migration. It is furthermore argued that climate change has security implications, as it multiplies existing threats. This in turn, is said to be a threat to global growth, prosperity and stability. This can be identified as a securitising speech act. Climate change is discursively constructed as a security threat, in which migration is constructed as one of the threats produced by the impacts of climate change. Migration is here included in a securitising process of climate change.

Humanitarian Assistance

The conclusions which are formulated from the above claims and arguments are focused on humanitarian assistance and developmental aid. Conclusions are drawn of a need for humanitarian assistance directed towards people affected by adverse environmental impacts. The below quotes illustrates how CM is placed in a developmental context, with a humanitarian focus:

> *[…] address the needs arising from the displacement of people, such as refugees, displaced persons and returnees, following natural or man-made disasters (DECISION/755/2013:23).*

> *[…] considers that the linkages between climate change, environmental degradation and migration should be further explored and addressed as appropriate, in particular in the context of development cooperation, Foreign policy and humanitarian assistance (ITEM NOTE/12415/2013:6).*

It is concluded above that CM needs to be addressed in a context of development cooperation, foreign policy and humanitarian assistance. The inclusion of foreign policy in this conclusion further indicates that CM is seen as an issue which needs to be addressed in third countries, where people are affected by environmental impacts. The focus on humanitarian aid directed towards third countries is also exemplified in the following quotes:

> *[…] helping partner countries in coping with the challenge of displacement and migration induced by the effects of climate change, and rebuilding climate refugees' livelihoods (REGULATION/233/2014:18).*

> *A useful instrument is the development of policies that elaborate on the connections between climate change, environmental decay and migration, integrating the long term refugees' situation in the development planning and consolidating the impact of migration on development in destination, as well as origin countries (NOTE/17808/2013:238).*

The conclusions which emerge in this discursive theme is thus focused on the need for humanitarian aid directed towards people and countries affected by adverse environmental impacts. Responses to CM are thus placed in a development context.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that in the time period 2010-2016, a certain link is established between environmental factors and migration. This is expressed through claims of an interlinkage between the two, and claims of how environmental migration is already increasingly occurring. The formulation of climate change as a 'threat multiplier' and migration as a consequence of this can also be identified in this time period. From these claims it is argued that climate change will result in migration. The conclusions which are building on these claims and arguments are

centred on the need for humanitarian assistance directed towards those affected by adverse environmental impacts. The argumentative structure of Discursive Theme 1 is illustrated in the following table:

Claims	Arguments	Conclusions	Topos
Link between environmental factors and migration Climate change is a threat multiplier	This will result in migration	Need for humanitarian assistance directed towards countries and people affected	In order to avoid environmentally induced migration, people affected need humanitarian assistance

Table 5.6 – Argumentative structure of Discursive Theme 6 Council of the EU.

5.3.2 Climate Migration Discourses 2016-2018

5.3.2.1 Discursive Theme 7: Increasing Alarmism

In the time period 2016-2018 the discussion of CM in official documents by the Council of the EU increases. In addition to this, the discourse takes an alarmist turn, and is increasingly connected with the 'refugee crisis'. Below, the argumentative structure emerging from this discursive theme is outlined.

<u>Link between Environmental factors and Migration</u>

The argumentative structure of this discursive theme builds on claims which establish a certain and direct link between environmental factors and migration. This certain link is expressed in various ways. Climate change is for example claimed to be a 'root cause' of migration. The relationship between climate change and migration is also stated as 'widely evident', reinforcing the notion of certainty. These discursive claims are exemplified in the following quotes:

> *Climate change is one of the underlying root causes of displacement, irregular migration resulting from state fragility, insecurity and resource scarcity (NOTE/5853/2016:6).*
>
> *The EU and its Member States are committed to coordinated action to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, such as […] environmental degradation, including climate change (C/210/01/2017:15).*
>
> *It is now widely recognised that climate changes, increased frequency and severity of droughts and storms, changes in rainfall patterns and losses of agricultural productivity are likely to increase migration in the coming decades (PROPOSAL/13296/ADD 2/2016:46).*

These claims are strong and express certainty. Environmental factors are posed as likely to increase migration in a near future. Building these claims is an increasing alarmist rhetoric which is further exemplified below.

Securitising Speech Acts

The alarmist discursive utterances which increases in this time period takes various forms. Firstly, arguments are formed where climate change are posed as resulting in instability, migration, violence and terrorism. This can be exemplified in the following quotes:

> *This challenge is exacerbated by climate change and has important downstream societal impacts including instability and external migration (PROPOSAL/13296/ADD 2/2016:12).*
>
> *Changes in water availability and variability can also induce migration and ignite civil conflict according to the World Bank. Where economic growth is impacted by rainfall, episodes of droughts and floods have generated waves of migration and statistical spikes in violence within countries (PROPOSAL/13296/ADD 2/2016:43).*
>
> *The world has become characterised by rising fragility, brought about by several crises in the EU's neighbourhood and beyond. Regional conflicts, terrorism, economic inequalities and growing migratory pressures, are all part of this new reality compounded by population growth, climate change and environmental degradation (PROPOSAL/10148/2018:1).*

Violence, conflicts, instability and terrorism, are all part of a securitising discourse. The rhetoric implies that environmental factors can result in certain security threats. In addition to this, 'waves of migration' are argued to be a consequence of environmental factors. The use of the term 'waves' creates an image of an uncontrollable quantity of people. The migration resulting from environmental factors is framed as large-scale, which is illustrated in the following quote:

> *Environmental degradation, climate change, extreme weather, and natural or man-made disasters can offset development gains and economic progress, especially for the poor. This can increase vulnerabilities and needs, jeopardise peace and stability and cause large-scale migration (C/210/01/2017:9).*

It can be observed how terms such as 'large-scale' or 'waves' are used to describe migration resulting from environmental factors. This is also related to terms of conflict, terrorism, instability and violence, which are all part of a securitising rhetoric. Climate change is posed as the source of all these threats. Thus, what can be identified in these quotes is a securitisation process of climate change. Migration is discursively used as one of the dangerous and adverse consequences of climate change. This is an example of the embeddedness and interconnection of CM and a securitisation process of climate change.

Environmental Migration towards Europe

The development of increasingly alarmist and securitising statements surrounding CM correlates with a discursive formulation of CM being directed towards Europe. This is frequently reiterated in relation to alarmist utterances of environmental changes resulting in conflicts and instability. The discursive construction of environmental migration being directed towards Europe can be exemplified in the following quotes:

> *Climate change is increasingly causing severe water shortages in the region […] This social and economic stress, in turn, constitutes a key cause of instability and becomes a cause of migration, both internally, leading numerous farm families to move to cities and, externally, driving part of the population to migrate in particular towards Europe (PROPOSAL/13296/ADD 2/2016:4).*

> *Regional conflicts, terrorism, economic inequalities and growing migratory pressures, are all part of this new reality, compounded by population growth, climate change and environmental degradation. Distant crises have not only far-reaching regional consequences, but often impact on the lives of EU citizens (PROPOSAL/10184/2018:2).*

In the first quote we can see claims of climate change having adverse impacts in the Sahel region. It is then argued that this drives migration *particularly* towards Europe. In the second quote migration is rhetorically equated with conflict, instability and terrorism as a severe consequence of climate change. Again, we can identify a securitising process of climate change in which migration is implicated.

Environmental Migration and the 'Refugee Crisis'

Above it has been illustrated how CM is posed as being directed towards Europe. In connection with such argumentation, CM is also rhetorically connected with the 'refugee crisis'. The 'refugee crisis' is claimed to partly be a consequence of adverse impacts of climate change, mainly water and food scarcity. The following quotes exemplifies such reasoning:

> *Europe is affected by the large-scale instability close to its borders and by the refugee crisis driven partially by the shortage of water in the region. As outlined in a recent World Bank study, water scarcity and the consequent increase in food prices can induce people to leave their countries and can contribute to igniting civil conflicts. […] The EU is of course well aware of this, affected as it currently by the largest refugee crisis in recent history (PROPOSAL/13296/ADD 2/2016:19).*

> *The Committee has also warned that the ongoing water and food crisis in the Mediterranean region, together with war and lack of respect for fundamental human rights, is one of the main causes of the waves of immigration that Europe is currently facing (COVER NOTE/5928/2017:7).*

> *Water scarcity and lack of affordable and sustainable food production are some of the main causes of the wave of migration that Europe is currently facing. If these are not eradicated at source, the consequences will be impossible to deal with in either the short or long term (COVER NOTE/5928/2017:5).*

> *In light of the global refugee and migration crisis also affecting Europe, this is a major source of concern for the Council. Climate change, natural and man-made disasters, as well as a lack of development possibilities or human security pose additional challenges in this respect (OUTCOME OF PROCEEDINGS/8832/2016:2).*

In the above quotes, water and food scarcity are claimed to be exacerbated by climate change, creating a discursive link between climate change and the 'refugee crisis'. It is argued that environmental impacts of climate change are one of the main causes of at the time ongoing 'refugee crisis'. The 'refugee crisis' is described in alarmist terms, claimed to be a concern for the Council, and if the water scarcity is not dealt with in the region, the consequences of the 'refugee crisis' will be 'impossible to deal with'. This rhetoric has clear alarmist connotations, where climate change and environmental factors are included in a rhetorically expressed concern regarding the 'refugee crisis'.

Humanitarian Assistance

The conclusions drawn from the above claims and arguments are throughout this whole time period placed in a developmental policy context and focused on humanitarian aid. Reiterated

discursive utterances emphasise the need for assistance and aid directed towards the people affected by adverse environmental factors. This is exemplified through the following quotes:

> *By further analysing climate vulnerability links with fragility and security risk, and conducting risk assessment for disasters and crises, the EU will be able to better identify areas where combined risks are particularly high and where there are critical opportunities for conflict prevention and resilience. Practical support for mitigation and adaptation policies through the implementation of comprehensive low emission economic development strategies should be a key part of the wider EU response to the migration challenge (NOTE/5853/2016:6).*
>
> *EU will continue to provide support to the millions of vulnerable people affected by conflicts, widespread insecurity, recurrent natural disasters and poverty in the region, and to strengthen their resilience. It is essential to mainstream the nexus between climate change and security in policy dialogue, conflict prevention, development and disaster risk strategies, as well as to fully ensure the linkages to humanitarian action in a region significantly affected by climate change (OUTCOME OF PROCEEDINGS/10026/2018:5).*
>
> *In particular, special attention is being given to ensuring close coordination and consistency with actions carried out under other EU policies, such as on climate change adaptation, and instruments acting in the field of disaster prevention and disaster risk reduction, such as cohesion, rural development, research, health, as well as migration and security policies. Likewise, the proposal seeks to establish stronger synergies with humanitarian aid policy, particularly in the response to emergencies outside the Union (PROPOSAL/14884/2018:3).*

As is illustrated in the above quotes, there are a repeated calls for humanitarian aid directed towards people in third countries affected by adverse environmental impacts. In addition to this, there are calls for strengthened climate change adaptation, resilience and risk management in third countries, especially in relation to natural disasters. Strategies to lower emissions are concluded as a key response to migration. The conclusions which are reached are thus focused on humanitarian aid and strengthening climate resilience and adaptation in countries affected by adverse environmental impacts.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that the discursive theme which emerges in 2016-2018 takes an increasingly alarmist turn in these years. Claims of a direct link between environmental factors and migration creates a foundation for the following argumentation. A number of arguments develop during this period. It is for example argued that CM will be increasingly directed towards Europe, and that environmental factors partly caused the 'refugee crisis'. Another tendency which can be identified during this time period is increasing securitising speech acts surrounding CM. The conclusions which are reached through this argumentation remain in a developmental and humanitarian context. The need for strengthening climate resilience and adaptation in third countries is emphasised, along with the need for increased support and assistance towards affected people. The argumentative structure of the discursive theme is illustrated in the following table:

Claims	Arguments	Conclusions	Topos
Direct link between environmental factors and migration	Environmental migration likely to be directed towards Europe	Need for humanitarian aid towards people affected	As environmental factors are likely to increase migration to Europe, there is a need for humanitarian aid and building of climate resilience in third countries
	Environmental factors partly cause of the 'refugee crisis'	Need to build climate adaptation and resilience in third countries	

Table 5.7 – Argumentative structure of Discursive Theme 7 Council of the EU.

5.3.3 Conclusion Council of the EU

Above two different discursive themes over two time periods have been outlined. Looking to the discursive development of CM in the Council of the EU as a whole, a pattern can be identified. What is revealed in the analysis of Council documents is a discursive development of increasing alarmism and securitising speech acts of CM following 2016. CM is described as having partly caused the 'refugee crisis', and also risk escalating the 'refugee crisis' in the future. In addition to this, there is an expansion of the number of documents including the topic of CM 2016-2018. Despite the increasing alarmism and occurring securitising speech acts, responses to CM remain humanitarian and focused on climate adaptation and risk management throughout the whole analysed time period. To fully illustrate the discursive development of CM in the Council, the following figure is presented:



Figure 5.2 CM formulation in the Council of the EU over time (own graphic).

6 Discussion

In this chapter the findings of the analysis are discussed on the basis of the theoretical framework. The discussion is divided into four parts, in which the findings are discussed from different aspects. Firstly, the findings emerging from documents produced by the Commission, Parliament and the Council of the EU are compared to each other. It is discussed how the findings from these three institutions differ and converge, and how they evolve over time. Secondly, securitisation of CM in EU legislative institutions is discussed. Thirdly, it is further discussed how the findings relate to the unfolding events of the 'refugee crisis'. Lastly, a critical assessment of the findings is conducted, on the basis of the Foucauldian theorisation of 'power'.

6.1 Comparing Discourses in EU Legislative Institutions

In the analysis, the development of the discursive constructions of CM has been outlined separately for each legislative institution of the EU. In this section the findings of the CM discourses in each analysed institution are compared and further discussed. Focus is thus on how the findings differ and converge between the analysed institutions.

Common Developments

The first common development which can be identified in all analysed institutions, is the expansion of the number of documents including the topic of CM following 2015, or in the case of the Council of the EU, following 2016. This development can be illustrated in the following diagram:



Figure 6.1 The number of documents including the topic of climate migration in EU legislative institutions per year (own graphic).

The above diagram shows the common development of the quantity of documents including the topic of CM in the legislative institutions of the EU over time. It also shows how this increase of documents occurs a year later in the Council, in comparison to the Commission and the Parliament. The reason for this delay in the discursive development is difficult to determine. Possibly, the nature of the communication between the three legislative institutions influences this.

The above diagram also illustrates how the Council of the EU differ in the sense that significantly fewer documents including the topic of CM were found in the analysed time period. While 79 documents were found in databases of the Commission, 88 documents were found in the databases of the Parliament, solely 34 documents including the topic of CM were found in databases of the Council. It thus appears as if the discussion surrounding CM is less present in documents published by the Council, in comparison to the other two analysed institutions. The reason for this is also difficult to fully determine. One possibility is that the Council of the EU is responsible for developing the EU's foreign and security policy, and therefore has a focus in this particular area (European Union, 2018d). The analysis has shown that responses to CM seems to be mainly humanitarian and placed in a development context, rather than in a security context. As a consequence, CM could be a topic which the Council of the EU does not engage in, in the same extent as the Commission and the Parliament. This could be a potential reason for the limited discussion of CM in documents published by the Council.

The second common development in all analysed institutions is the formulation of CM before 2015, and in the case of the Council of the EU, before 2016. Similar CM discourses can during this time be identified in all three legislative institutions. The discursive construction of CM in this time period is focused on establishing a direct and certain link between environmental factors and migration. One can see the commonality of the discourses in the analysed institutions at this time, by looking at the topos of each of them. The same topos emerges from discursive themes before 2015 and 2016 in the case of the Council. These discursive themes are 2, 4 and 6, and are in the analysis all called ‘Direct Link’. The topos emerging from these discursive themes is: *in order to avoid environmental migration, climate adaptation and humanitarian aid are needed in third countries*. The fact that the same topos emerge in all legislative institutions during this time period, illustrates the similarities of the discursive constructions of CM.

The third common development identified in all analysed institutions is the increasingly alarmist tone of CM discourses following 2015, or 2016 in the case of the Council of the EU. In correlation with the expansion of the number of documents including the topic of CM, are an increasing number of utterances which frames CM in an alarmist and securitising manner. In all legislative institutions securitising speech acts are reiterated, the number of alarmist statements increase, and the framing of CM as being directed towards Europe is developed. In order to illustrate this common development, one can look to the formulated topos during this time period in all the analysed institutions. The same topos emerges from discursive themes 3, 5 and 7, which are all in the analysis signified by their name ‘Increasing Alarmism’. The topos emerging from these discursive themes is: *as environmental factors are likely to increase*

migration to Europe, there is a need for humanitarian aid and strengthening of climate resilience in third countries. The fact that the same topos emerges in all legislative institutions during this time period, illustrates the similarities between the discursive constructions of CM in the analysed institutions.

Differing Developments

In addition to the similarities of CM discourses in the time period of 2010-2015 (2010-2016 in the case of the Council of the EU), there is also a significant difference emerging from documents produced by the European Commission. This difference is identified in discursive theme 1 'Complexity', which emerge in the years 2010-2015 in the Commission as an additional competing discourse surrounding CM. Discursive theme 1 'Complexity' in documents produced by the Commission is thus differing in comparison to the broader discursive development emerging from the analysis. This differing discursive theme is more nuanced in its rhetoric, focused on the complexity of CM and the need for additional research on the subject. The topos of this discourse is: *it is difficult to establish a link between environmental factors and migration, therefore more knowledge on the subject is needed*. This topos illustrates how this discourse differs from the other discourses emerging in the same time period. This discourse of the complexity of CM fades out from Commission documents in 2015, and cannot be identified in documents produced by the Parliament or the Council of the EU. The reason for this more nuanced CM discourse emerging from the Commission is difficult to fully determine. The findings suggests that this 'Complexity' discourse emerge mainly from documents aimed at assessing impacts of proposed legislation, such as for example Staff Working Documents. The Commission has the role of proposing legislation, and is publishing essential research material for the legislative process (Overy, 2016), and this discourse seems to emerge from such research material. This is an indication which points towards the possibility that the research material published by the Commission has spurred a more nuanced rhetoric in official Commission documents, as a competing discourse to more alarmist discursive tendencies. Contrasting to this, the other discursive themes emerging from the Commission in this time period seems to mainly emerge from documents which do not serve as research material or impact assessment for legislative proposals, but rather from documents such as communications, memos, transcribed speeches and statements.

Concluding Remarks

Looking at the discourses emerging within the legislative institutions of the EU, a similar broader discursive development over time is revealed. This indicates an interrelation between the discourses formulated within the institutions. Considering that many of the documents analysed are communications between these three institutions, the similarity of the emerging discourses could be expected. Reports, communications, recommendations, questions and proposals are often directed to either of the other two legislative institutions. As these three bodies form the legislative machinery of the EU, communication between them is extensive. This could be an underlying cause which results in similar discursive constructions of CM within all three legislative institutions in the EU.

6.2 Securitisation of Climate Migration

The analysis reveals occurring securitising speech acts in all legislative institutions of the EU. These utterances mainly appear repeatedly in analysed documents in the period 2015-2018, or in the case of the Council of the EU, the period 2016-2018. Although securitising speech acts can also be identified in earlier years, they are not reiterated but rather isolated occurrences.

Securitising Speech Acts

The securitising speech acts identified in analysis are complex in their formulation, and do not fully fit the structure of a speech act as formulated by the Copenhagen School. In the theorisation of the Copenhagen School, CM would be directly described as security threat to a referent object. However, as securitising speech acts emerge in analysed documents, they formulate CM as a security issue in a different manner. A majority of the identified speech acts pose climate change as a 'threat multiplier', where one of the threats being multiplied is migration. This reasoning is formulated in terms of security, where this constructed situation is described as having security implications and risks for the EU area. The threat in this formulation is migration, and this threat is worsened and amplified by climate change. With this formulation, CM becomes included in this rhetorically constructed threat. These speech acts reveal a securitising process of both climate change and migration, as they are both described as having consequences for security. With this, CM is implicated in the securitisation of both climate change and broader migration.

In addition to this, there are instances where securitisation of broader migration or the 'refugee crisis' occur in identified speech acts. In these speech acts, climate change is described as partly the cause of the 'refugee crisis', and that future climate impacts could escalate or amplify the 'refugee crisis'. There are also instances where climate change is described as increasing migration towards Europe in the future. This scenario is then argued to carry potential security implications for the EU. In this formulation both climate change and migration are included in a security rhetoric, and with this CM is implicated in a security framing.

One speech act can be identified as a direct securitisation of CM, where CM is explicitly framed as a security threat. In a report produced by the European Parliament from 2018, the 'climate change – migration nexus' is described as threatening security both in and outside of the EU. This securitising speech act can be recalled from the following quote presented in the analysis:

> *EU climate diplomacy should focus its efforts on the climate change-migration-nexus which is increasingly threatening security and stability in- and outside the EU (REPORT/0221/2018:21).*

This is a clear securitising speech act of CM. Generally however, there is an indirect securitisation of CM. CM appears to be indirectly implicated in securitising processes of climate change, migration or the 'refugee crisis'.

The Referent Object

In the securitising speech acts identified in the analysis, the EU is formulated as the referent object. The term 'EU' is at times interchanged with 'Europe', 'EU Member States', or 'EU citizens', it is however clear that it is the area of the Union which the formulated threats are

directed towards. It is repeatedly stated that it is the EU which is affected by the constructed security implications and risks produced by the interrelation of climate change and migration. The constructed threat is directed towards the EU, and it is thus implied that the EU is in need of protection from these threats. This formulation reinforces a discursive construction of an enclosed EU community. The EU is constructed as an entity, exposed to an outside threat.

Proposed Measures

The formulation of the EU as an entity subjected to an outside threat is a common formulation in securitisation of migration. In securitising process of migration, this rhetoric generally result in argumentation for increased border control of EU external borders (Huysmans, 2000). However, in the securitising speech acts of CM, no such measures are proposed. As CM is framed as a security issue, it could in accordance with the Copenhagen School be expected that responses to the constructed threat of CM are situated in a security context. Instead, the conclusions reached in the argumentative structure surrounding CM are focused on building resilience against adverse environmental impacts in third countries. Climate adaptation and risk management are held as important measures to reduce the amount of people migrating as a result of environmental changes. Humanitarian measures, such as aid and assistance towards people and countries affected, are also held as important to mitigate migration and displacement. Legal recognition of 'climate refugees' is furthermore held as an important response particularly within the Parliament. It seems like the responses which are proposed in relation to securitising speech acts surrounding CM are placed in a humanitarian and development policy context.

The criteria for a complete securitisation in accordance of the Copenhagen School is dependent on the suggestion of extraordinary emergency measures as a response to a constructed threat. However, as have been shown above, no emergency measures are suggested in discourses surrounding CM. Instead the responses are placed in a humanitarian context, and focused on climate adaptation and resilience. This tendency shows a similarity with measures proposed in securitising processes of climate change. In the securitisation of climate change proposed measures are generally technocratic and focused on risk management and mitigation (Boas and Warner, 2017).

Interdiscursivity

The similarity of proposed measures to CM and climate change could be an indication of the interaction of CM discourses and climate change discourses. It has been pointed out previously by scholars that CM discourses are embedded in discourses surrounding climate change (Trombetta, 2008). The concept of *interdiscursivity* can bring further clarity to how multiple discourses are linked to each other in various ways. The concept presents the notion that texts can draw upon and articulate multiple discourses. As a result of this, several discourses can influence and link to each other in various ways (Wodak & Meyer, 2009:90). The analysis shows how documents produced by the legislative institutions of the EU draws upon multiple discourses of CM, climate change and migration, which are then interlinked to each other. The interdiscursivity of the analysed documents link CM discourses and discourses surrounding climate change, resulting in responses to CM focused on mitigation and adaptation of climate

change. CM discourses can also be seen as linked with discourses surrounding migration. Particularly the formulation of the EU as the referent object is commonly formulated in securitising processes of migration (Huysmans, 2006). This could indicate an interdiscursive relationship between CM and discourses surrounding migration.

Reiteration of Speech Acts

The analysis reveals that securitising speech acts of CM occur repeatedly following 2015, or 2016 in the case of the Council. As discussed in the theoretical framework, reiteration is seen as a central condition of performativity of language (Stritzel, 2014:26). Reiteration stabilises the speech act, and establish new meanings within a context. The reiteration of speech act following 2015 contributes to a new framing of CM in EU legislative institutions. As securitising speech acts are occurring but not reiterated in the period before 2015, they are not viewed as performative. Following 2015 and 2016, securitising speech acts are reiterated in discourses surrounding CM and are therefore also seen as performative. This means that a new meaning and understanding of CM as a security issue is established in this time period.

Concluding Remarks

Although securitising speech acts of CM are reiterated, the securitisation process of CM cannot be considered successful in accordance with the Copenhagen School. The main reason for this is that there are no emergency measures proposed as a response to the constructed threat of CM. The proposed responses instead shows the interlinkage of CM discourses and discourses surrounding climate change. The formulation of the EU as referent object could furthermore indicate an interlinkage of CM discourses and discourses surrounding migration. It can be concluded that the reiteration of securitising speech acts surrounding CM shows the development of a new meaning of CM, as an issue of security.

6.3 The Influence of the ‘Refugee Crisis’

The analysis has revealed a change of rhetoric surrounding CM starting 2015 in the Commission and the Parliament, and in 2016 in the Council of the EU. Going into this research, the potential influence of the ‘refugee crisis’ on CM discourses was taken into account. The events of the ‘refugee crisis’ have in various ways affected EU migration policy and discourse, which includes both a discursive security framing of migration and the implementation of emergency measures as a response to the ‘crisis’ (Grigonis, 2016; Fakhoury, 2016; Vermeulen, 2018). Below it is further discussed how this could have potentially influenced the rhetoric surrounding CM in EU legislative institutions.

Correlation with the ‘Refugee Crisis’

The number of asylum seekers in Europe reached its peak in 2015 and 2016, to then begin to decrease in 2017 and 2018 (Eurostat, 2019). The year 2015 is commonly known as marking the beginning of the ‘refugee crisis’, and the unfolding events becomes rhetorically categorised as a ‘crisis’. The analysis shows that the change of CM discourses, and the increasing discussion surrounding CM in EU legislative institutions, *correlates* with the events of the

'refugee crisis'. In 2015, a larger quantity of documents were published including the topic of CM by the Commission and the Parliament, and the same development is seen starting 2016 in documents published by the Council of the EU. The rhetoric surrounding CM becomes increasingly alarmist, with occurring securitising speech acts. The correlation of the change of rhetoric and the unfolding events of the 'refugee crisis', indicates that the 'refugee crisis' could have influenced the discursive construction of CM in EU legislative institutions. The external events of the 'refugee crisis' has brought a new complexity to the securitisation of migration within the EU, and a number of emergency measures were implemented as a response to these events (Grigonis, 2016; Fakhoury, 2016; Vermeulen, 2018). The findings of the analysis indicates that this can have affected also CM discourses towards a more alarmist formulation.

Rhetorical Connection

Another indication of the influence of the 'refugee crisis' on CM discourses is the explicit rhetorical connection made between the 'refugee crisis' and CM. Environmental factors are described as a partial cause of the 'refugee crisis', and climate change is posed as potentially escalating the 'refugee crisis' in the future. With this, a connection is rhetorically constructed between CM and the 'refugee crisis', further indicating the discursive interrelation between the two.

Interdiscursivity

Returning to the concept of interdiscursivity, one can once again in this context see how analysed documents draw upon multiple discourses. The analysed texts indicate an interrelation between discourses surrounding the 'refugee crisis', broader migration and CM. Environmental factors and climate change are included in securitising and alarmist rhetoric surrounding the 'refugee crisis' and migration. These two phenomenon are explicitly described as interrelated. Environmental factors are frequently posed as increasing migration, or escalating the 'refugee crisis'. With this, CM is used to confirm and reinforce a securitising process and alarmist rhetoric of the 'refugee crisis' and migration.

Concluding Remarks

To summarise, the analysis can establish a correlation between the events of the 'refugee crisis' and the increasingly alarmist and securitising rhetoric surrounding CM in EU legislative institutions. Furthermore, the analysis can establish an interdiscursive connection between discourses surrounding the 'refugee crisis' and CM discourses, which could indicate that CM discourses have been influenced towards more alarmist tendencies following 2015 and 2016. While CM becomes increasingly described in an alarmist and securitising manner, responses to CM remain focused on solutions to climate change. This reveals the complexity of the formulation of CM, which is influenced by discourses surrounding climate change, broader migration and the 'refugee crisis'.

6.4 Critical Assessment of Climate Migration Discourses

This section discuss the findings on the basis of Foucault's theorisation of *power,* and the conceptualisation of *negative critique*, as developed within CDA. The aim is to critically assess the findings of the analysed CM discourses in EU legislative institutions. In accordance with Foucault's theorisation, power relations emerge in discourse through categorisations and differentiations, rather than through a top-down authoritative exercise of power (Foucault, 1978:93). Below, the categorisations and differentiations which emerge in discourses surrounding CM are further discussed.

The North-South Divide

Firstly, it is relevant to recall discursive theme 1, called 'Complexity' in the analysis. This discursive theme emerge from documents produced by the Commission in the time period 2010-2015. It is developing as a competing discourse to discursive theme 2 called 'Direct Link', in the same time period. Discursive theme 1 is focused on the inherent complexity of CM, and the difficulty to establish an interlinkage between environmental factors and migration. One aspect of this discourse is reiterated claims of the unlikelihood of CM being external and directed towards Europe. This can be recalled from the following quotes:

> *[…]it is far from certain that the European Union and North America would be the first to be faced with great waves of environmentally-induced migrations (E-5550/2010:1).*

> *[…] no significant increases of external immigration to Europe solely due to climate or other environmental changes can be expected (SWD/132/2013:43).*

The above statements are almost reassuring in their formulation. The EU is constructed as an entity which probably will not be affected by this issue of concern, or at least not the first to be affected. North America and the EU are categorised together, implying that this is an issue which would be directed towards developed countries. This rhetorically constructs a categorisation of a North-South divide.

The rhetorical North-South divide can be identified not only in discursive theme 1 'Complexity', but also in all of the emerging discourses surrounding CM in all of the analysed institutions over the entire time period. The EU area is continually put in relation to developing countries. The North-South divide becomes more reiterated in analysed institutions following 2015 and 2016, when a more alarmist rhetoric is emerging.

The Global South

Formulated around this divide is the notion that climate related issues occurs almost exclusively in the *Global South*. With the Global South, mainly the regions of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia are referred to. A chaotic situation of conflict, instability and insecurity is described to emerge in the Global South as a result of environmental factors. The following quotes from the analysis exemplifies this:

> *For many years the Sahel region at large, including the Lake Chad Basin, and the Horn of Africa have faced growing challenges of demographic pressure, environmental stress, extreme poverty, internal tensions, institutional weaknesses, weak social and economic infrastructures, and insufficient resilience to food crises, which have in some places led to open conflict, displacement,*

criminality, radicalisation and violent extremism, as well as forced and irregular migration, trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of migrants (C/7293/2015:2).

Migration as a result of environmental causes is increasing at an accelerating pace. Current estimates indicate that 135 million people could be at risk of being permanently displaced by desertification and land degradation over the coming decades to 2050, with 60 million of these vulnerable people located in Africa (ANNEX 6/2016:8).

Emphasises that climate change is likely to induce large-scale environmental migration from regions which are already at the origin of migration flows to Europe (Africa, the Middle East, south and south-east Asia) (RESOLUTION/0154/2010:11).

The instable situation in the Global South due to environmental impacts is described as being the cause of migration. This consequential migration is repeatedly described as being directed towards the EU. What is emerging in CM discourses is thus an image of the Global South as a fragile and instable region, which causes migration towards Europe. This migration towards Europe is framed as a security issue specifically for the EU. The divide of the EU and the Global South creates a sense of 'otherness', where the Global South is posed as the instable 'other' (Boas, 2015:77). The EU is in turn portrayed as being threatened by the consequences of the instable Global South.

The Production of 'truth'

Central to the production of power relations is the notion of 'truth', and how discourses are constructed to give an impression of 'true' images of reality. The production of 'truth' is revealed in the analysis through claims surrounding CM. Claims surrounding CM continually assert a direct and certain link between environmental factors and migration, and can be identified throughout the whole analysed period within each analysed institution. These claims are stated with certainty and as facts. The direct link between environmental factors and migration is continually described as 'widely recognised' or 'evident'. Framing CM in such a way, contributes to the construction of what is considered 'true'. Discursive theme 1 'Complexity' emerging from the Commission can be taken as a contrasting example of this assertion of a direct link between environmental factors and migration. In discursive theme 1 CM is described with uncertainty and complexity. The link between environmental factors and migration is questioned in this discourse, as opposed to stating this link as a fact. Through this rhetoric, no discursive 'truth' is constructed in discursive theme 1. In the other discursive framings of CM emerging in the analysis however, the normalisation of a 'true' direct link between environmental factors and migration is asserted.

From the discursively constructed 'truth' of a direct link between environmental factors and migration it is argued that CM is expected to be large-scale and directed towards Europe. The establishment of a 'true' and direct link between environmental factors and migration contributes to normalise alarmist statements and arguments of large-scale CM towards Europe. Had the rhetoric been more nuanced and focused on the uncertain interrelation between environmental factors and migration, it would have been difficult to legitimise a more alarmist rhetoric surrounding CM. The discursive construction of a direct and certain link between environmental factors and migration can therefore be seen as the establishment of a certain 'truth', which normalises the increasingly alarmist rhetoric in EU legislative institutions.

Alarmist statements of large-scale migration towards Europe further normalises the categorisation of CM being an issue emerging from the Global South with security consequences for the EU.

Unequal Relation of Power

In Foucault's notion of power, the discursive divide between the EU and the Global South can be identified as the production of an unequal relation of power between the two. Through the construction of a divide, where the Global South is ascribed certain characteristics and the EU others, an unequal power relation is discursively produced and repeatedly reinforced in CM discourses. Through this framing, CM becomes an intrinsic problem of the Global South, while simultaneously a security risk for the EU. The analysis has shown that responses to CM are focused on third countries where CM is described as originating. The need for humanitarian aid as well as the strengthening of climate adaptation and resilience in third countries affected by environmental impacts, further reinforces the notion of CM as an issue of the Global South, which have to be dealt with by the EU in order to avoid security implications.

The Foucauldian theorisation of power brings an additional dimension to the analysis. An unequal relation of power can be identified in discourses surrounding CM in all three analysed institutions over time. This relation of power emerge through the categorisation of CM as an issue emerging from the Global South which has security implication for the EU. This reinforces a binary confrontational dichotomy and a sense of 'otherness' of regions outside of the EU. Creating binary oppositions in language is a way of escaping the inherent instability of meaning, and create an impression of international politics as stable and indisputable (Peoples, Vaughan-Williams, 2010:67). These terminological oppositions rely on each other's existence, without the second term, the first cannot function (Ibid., 64). This is a way of producing and reinforcing European identity, as identity is constituted by difference (Ibid., 68). This further enables binary categorisations and differentiations of people, such as EU-citizen/migrant.

Concluding Remarks

This unequal power relation between the EU and region in the Global South is further normalised by the discursive establishment of certain 'truths'. The certainty and direct causal link which is described between environmental factors and migration legitimises an increasingly alarmist rhetoric surrounding CM. In accordance with the aim of CDA, this production of an unequal power relation between the EU and the Global South is seen as a 'social wrong'. Here, a normative element is brought into the analysis. This is aligned with the overall purpose of CDA, to criticise and ultimately change society to the better (Wodak and Meyer 2009:6). The normative notion of categorising discursively produced power relations as 'social wrongs' constitutes a critique directed towards the formulation of CM and the division between the EU and the Global South. This division is a discursive exercise of power as it produces as sense of 'otherness' of regions outside of the EU, and as a consequence people migrating from these areas. By unveiling this tendency, and categorising it as a 'social wrong', knowledge is produced which can contribute to right these wrongs and mitigate them. A normative standpoint is thus taken that the discursive formulation of CM sustains and

perpetuates an unequal relation of power between the EU and the Global South. With this, the aim is to foster more egalitarian discourses (Fairclough, 2010, p.78).

7 Conclusion

The analysis of the discursive construction of CM has resulted in five key findings. Before concluding this research, these key findings are briefly summarised:

Firstly, a similar discursive development of the framing of CM over time can be identified in all EU legislative institutions, indicating a communicative interconnectedness between the three. This discursive development takes the form of an increasingly alarmist formulation of CM following 2015 in the Commission and the Parliament, and in 2016 in the Council of the EU.

Secondly, the discursive development of the framing of CM following 2015, and 2016 in the case of the Council of the EU, increasingly includes securitising speech acts of CM. CM is framed as an issue which has security impacts for the EU. However, a successful securitisation process in accordance with the Copenhagen School does not occur, as no emergency measures are proposed as a response to CM. Instead, responses to CM are consistently placed in the realms of development and humanitarian interventions.

Thirdly, the discursive development towards a more alarmist formulation of CM correlates with the events of the 'refugee crisis' starting in 2015. CM is in the time period following 2015, and 2016 in the case of the Council of the EU, repeatedly and explicitly connected with the events of the 'refugee crisis'.

Fourthly, CM discourses are in analysed documents interdiscursively connected with discourses surrounding climate change, broader migration and the 'refugee crisis'. This influences the discursive construction of CM in EU legislative institutions.

The *fifth* and final finding relates to how the discursive construction of CM in EU legislative institutions produces and reinforces an unequal relation of power. This power relation is produced through the categorisation of CM as an issue emerging from the Global South which has security impacts for the EU. This creates a binary dichotomy and a sense of 'otherness', ultimately leading to categorisation and differentiation of people. In the context of CDA this is normatively regarded as a 'social wrong'.

The findings of this research give an encompassing and holistic image of the discursive constructions of CM in the EU, over time and in their institutional context. They show how the formulation of CM discourses has changed in the most recent decade, the discursive interplay between the legislative institutions of the EU, and the external influence of the events of the 'refugee crisis' on CM discourses. This unveils previously opaque patterns of discursive constructions of CM, shedding light on tendencies which have been unknown. The critical assessment brings these findings beyond descriptive observations, and uncover relations of power manifested in CM discourses.

The development towards an increasingly alarmist and securitising formulation of CM in recent years is an important insight. As have been discussed in the introduction of this research, alarmist and dramatic framings of CM in high instances of international politics, risk affecting political responses to the phenomena. Scholars have warned of the risk for militarisation of climate policy, borders and developmental aid. Although research has shown the complexity and uncertainty between environmental factors and migration, and even potentially the necessity of migration as a response to adverse environmental impact, an alarmist and securitising discursive direction of CM is developing within the EU in the latest years. This could affect current responses to CM formulated by the EU, which are situated in a context of developmental and humanitarian aid. As CM is increasingly framed as an issue of security, the responses to CM risk being changed accordingly.

By bringing light to these discursive tendencies in the EU, more egalitarian discourses surrounding CM can be fostered. It is the very uncovering of discursive patterns and hidden power structures which can contribute to an alternative framing of CM, moving from the development of increasing alarmist formulations of the phenomena. Ultimately, appropriate responses to CM can be developed, outside of this alarmist and dramatic narrative which lacks evidence in empirical research.

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Appendix I

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Appendix III

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