Designing out terrorism in New York City

How counterterrorism measures influence people's perceptions
of safety and space in New York City

Name: Daphne Hobelman
Student number: 951215341050
Thesis supervisor: Bram J. Jansen
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1

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Executive summary

This thesis research looks into the influence of counterterrorism measures on people's perceptions of space and safety. Since the 9/11 attacks, all kinds of counterterrorism measures have been implemented in urban spaces. As European cities are implementing counterterrorism measures as well, it is interesting and useful to look at experiences of people in New York City with the counterterrorism measures implemented there, as they have been around for a while. As such, it is possible to ask people about their experiences with these measures and how these experiences and their perceptions have changed over time. To understand their influence on people's daily lives, this research looks at counterterrorism measures in three different locations in New York City: the World Trade Centre, Times Square and the Staten Island Ferry. This research will use theories of securitisation and Lefebvre's spatial triad to understand these influences better.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with New Yorkers who have been living in the city for their whole lives, and mini-interviews were conducted in the three different research locations with passers-by, whether tourists or locals. In these interviews, material structures, texts and documents were analysed as well. Next to interviews, (participant) observation was used to understand the processes in urban spaces better, and to see how people interact with the counterterrorism measures.

The most important finding of this research is that counterterrorism measures do impact space and people's perceptions of safety, and this influence can be both positive or negative. While it was expected that people felt more afraid and nervous due to the counterterrorism measures installed in the research locations, most respondents claimed to feel safer. Their explanations included their perception of counterterrorism measures being able to stop attacks, and to prevent them as they are deterrents for possible terrorists. However, not all research participants felt safer. Some respondents expressed concerns regarding obtrusive counterterrorism measures, such as bollards and heavily-armed police officers, and they preferred less obtrusive measures. Urban planners and security experts should understand the relationships between counterterrorism measures and space and safety better before implementing them. It is their task to find a midway between overt and covert counterterrorism measures, while keeping aesthetics and the openness of urban space in mind.

Table of contents

1. Introduction

Terrorism is not something simply of 'our' time, it has been around for centuries and is as old as human civilization itself (Law 2009). However, the weapons, methods and goals of terrorists change constantly. The 9/11 attacks in the United States of America (hereafter the United States) came as a paradigm shifting surprise, and the 9/11 attacks became an era-defining moment (*ibid*). This thesis explores the way counterterrorism measures influence the lives of people in New York City and, in this, especially how counterterrorism measures influence their perceptions of safety and urban space. It does so by studying the influence of counterterrorism measures in New York City.

There is considerable evidence that the indirect targets of terrorists typically overestimate the risk of a terrorist attack occurring (Wellman 2013). Terrorism produces an anxiety that causes these indirect targets to make unreasonable sacrifices in their own lives, and it often motivates them to act in ways that reduces the value of their contributions to the lives of others. People fearing terrorism will act differently than people who do not fear the threat of terrorism (*ibid*). A poll conducted after the Pulse nightclub massacre in Orlando, Florida in June 2016, found that half of the Americans who answered the poll are strongly in favour of more surveillance and security checks in public spaces to prevent terrorist attacks (Jester 2016). According to New York City's 2017 annual participatory budgeting cycle, nearly 12,000 New Yorkers believe that the city needs more surveillance cameras (Doig 2017). The recent attacks in Europe have (also) given people the feeling that they are vulnerable to terrorist attacks (van Weezel 2017). According to Amsterdam's former deputy mayor Eric van der Burg, people feel safer when there are concrete blocks in the vicinity. The municipality of Amsterdam is now looking at ways to increase defences against terrorism (*ibid*). Furthermore, terrorists evolve with time: they will innovate and use technological advances (Monaco 2017). Terrorists already use the Internet to communicate, recruit, raise money and disseminate propaganda (Schorn 2006). Terrorists have shown a motivation to overcome the post-9/11 security obstacles (Monaco 2017). As skilled ISIS fighters are returning from the battlefield to Europe, some of which have already carried out terrorist attacks such as the 2015 Paris attacks, Europe may become more focused on counterterrorism measures (*ibid*). We can already see counterterrorism measures popping up in European cities. For example, Amsterdam started placing concrete blocks in November 2017 to protect its citizens against terrorist attacks involving trucks, such as in the 2017 Barcelona attack (van Weezel 2017).

After the 9/11 attacks, the George W. Bush administration vowed that something similar would never happen again (Monaco 2017). First the George W. Bush administration, and later the Obama administration, developed a strategy for fighting terrorists which became known as "the global war on terror". Washington D.C. sought to disrupt terrorist plots whenever and wherever they emerged, and to deny terrorists safe havens. The global war on terror uses, if possible, local partners to carry out the fight. However, when necessary, it will act alone in for example carrying out drone strikes or special operation raids (*ibid)*. Furthermore, the 9/11 attacks influenced the United States' territory. For example, the U.S. counterterrorism community has increased its intelligence capabilities (Monaco 2017). The U.S government created new agencies and constituted a new paradigm for intelligence sharing among multiple agencies, and they set up fusion centres and joint task forces. Furthermore, the U.S. borders were hardened, cockpit doors reinforced, and watch lists created. Due to all these efforts, the threat of an outside entity attacking the United States has been lowered, although it still exists.

At the same time, there has been an increase in homegrown and lone-wolf terrorism (Jester 2016; Cosker 2017; Monaco 2017). This type of terrorism is not new, but these threats have taken on a new urgency as terrorist organisations use social media to inspire mostly young men to commit violence (Monaco 2017). The House Committee on Homeland Security also claims that there is a growing and persistent threat from homegrown terrorists (Cosker 2017). Whenever this research uses 'counterterrorism measures', it refers to visible counterterrorism measures, and not the invisible counterterrorism measures such as intelligence gathering or overseas operations – unless stated otherwise.

Attacks			Fatalities		
Rank	City	Number of Attacks	Rank	City	Number of Fatalities
1	New York City, NY	430	1	New York City, NY	2,812
2	San Juan, PR	115	2	Arlington, VA	192
3	Los Angeles, CA	103	3	Oklahoma City, OK	170
4	San Francisco, CA	97	4	Shanksville, PA	44
5	Miami, FL	85	5	San Francisco, CA	22
6	Washington, DC	81	6	San Juan, PR	18
7	Chicago, IL	56	7	Washington, DC	17
8	Seattle, WA	36	8	Littleton, CO	15
9	Berkeley, CA	33	9	Fort Hood, TX	13
10	Denver, CO	22	9	Los Angeles, CA	13
			10	Miami, FL	10
			10	New Orleans, LA	10

Table 1.1: Cities in the United States experiencing the most terrorist attacks and fatalities between 1970-2011 (LaFree et al. 2012)

Terrorism in cities is nothing new. In 1883, for example, London's underground was the target of Irish extremists who hoped to shift public opinion and political thinking about their nation (Burke 2018). In 1920, Wall Street in New York City was bombed. Even then, there were concerns about technological advances and how cities should be protected from terrorism (*ibid*). Nowadays, we have had the destruction of the Twin Towers in 2001 in which 2,753 people in New York City died (9/11 Memorial n.d.). In 2017, a truck drove into people in New York City, a van ran over pedestrians in La Rambla in Barcelona, and these are just two examples of terrorist attacks in cities in 2017[1]. It is the attack on ordinary citizens, in places where they work, relax, or travel that stay most visibly in the public consciousness (Burke 2018). Terrorist attacks in the United States are primarily associated with large urban areas (LaFree et al. 2012). The states of California and New York experience the most attacks. New York City experienced the most terrorist attacks between the period 1970-2011, and accounts for nearly 17 percent of all U.S. attacks in this period. The number of fatalities in table 1.1 are highly influenced by single events (*ibid*), such as the 9/11 attacks which killed 2,753 people in New York City (9/11 Memorial n.d.) or the Oklahoma City bombing which killed 68 people (LaFree et al. 2012).

Cities are especially vulnerable to terrorist attacks, as most of the world's population, assets and economic activity are concentrated in cities (Manelici 2017). Since the 9/11 attacks, public and private officials in most Western cities have used a discourse of counterterror security to tighten security and fortify our streets, sidewalks and spaces (Németh & Hollander

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[1] For an interactive map of terrorist attacks over the world, see esri (n.d.):
https://storymaps.esri.com/stories/terrorist-attacks/?year=2017

2010). No other city in the United States has done more to defend itself against terrorism as New York City (Schorn 2006). The New York Police Department (NYPD) is made up of 37,000 officers, which is a larger police force than the army of 84 countries. It places a large emphasis on combating terrorism, with 1,000 officers devoted to fight terrorism on a full-time basis (*ibid*). New York City even stations officers overseas as local intelligence agents (Schorn 2006; Nussbaum 2007). Since cities are targeted by terrorists, security measures transform urban spaces: bollards, jersey barriers, restricted areas, CCTV cameras and security guards have transformed many public and private spaces in cities (Silberberg 2014). Security measures can have both positive and negative effects on the people on which they are imposed. It can be a positive effect, when community participation in planning and designing public areas results in safe and vibrant spaces. However, the effect can be negative when security measures imposed on people detract people from public spaces, discouraging gathering, eliminating services or even making public space more dangerous. Unnecessary security can erode peoples' right to access city spaces, exploit fear and insecurity and promote feelings of vulnerability and anxiety. This becomes a vicious cycle as a sense of vulnerability leads to increasing security measures (*ibid*). In January 2018, Mayor Bill de Blasio announced that New York City will install more than 1,500 new barrier posts on sidewalks and plazas to protect pedestrians from vehicles (Reuters 2018). Bollards are placed to replace the concrete blocks that the NYPD had deposited around the busier areas in the city, as bollards are more attractive. New York City will spend $50 million on installing the new bollards in busy, high-profile areas and on other efforts to protect urban spaces (*ibid*). The implementation of counterterrorism measures into urban spaces is a new land use which will be a permanent feature in cities (Németh & Hollander 2010). Due to this new type of land use in cities, people's perceptions of safety and space changes. What this research found is that there is primarily a difference between the way urban planners envision space, and the way users perceive space. There is also a discrepancy between feelings of safety: whilst counterterrorism measures, and security measures in general, are installed to create a safe(r) space, not all respondents perceived space with counterterrorism measures as safe. There is ambiguity due to the material interventions: there is not simply *one* way in which people perceive the counterterrorism measures. This ambiguity is the central focus of this thesis, as it will explore how different people perceive the counterterrorism measures and its impacts on them and urban space.

1.1 Research questions

This thesis research seeks to understand how counterterrorism measures affect people's perceptions of space and safety in New York City. New York City has many counterterrorism measures, such as the NYPD's counterterrorism bureau and an extensive covert intelligence network (Kaplan 2006), and the city experiences terrorist attacks. Because of this, urban space has changed due to the implementation of all kinds of security measures (Németh & Hollander 2010). Thus, it is interesting to see how the counterterrorism measures in New York City, and security measures in general, alter space and people's experiences in and of space. Furthermore, this research looks at people's perceptions of safety due to the counterterrorism measures. Being safe is defined here as being free from hurt or harm. Feeling safe means that you do not anticipate either harm or hurt, whether this is emotionally or physically (Preisler 2013). People's perception of safety might cause people to change their behaviour (Curiel & Bishop 2016). As such, the following research question has been formulated: **How do**

counterterrorism measures affect people's perceptions of space and safety in different locations in New York City, the United States of America? This research question is relevant, as falsely based perceptions of (in)security affect the efficiency of security systems, since governments are encouraged to spend resources in places where people are more concerned, whereas action might not be necessarily needed in those places or have the greatest impact there (Curiel & Bishop 2016). Fieldwork was carried out in three urban spaces: the World Trade Centre, Times Square, and the Staten Island Ferry. I will briefly explain why these places have been chosen in part 1.2. To answer the research question, three sub-questions were formulated:

1. *How have counterterrorism measures impacted different spaces and people's behaviour in New York City?*

   This question will seek to explain what people in New York City see as the difference in space before and after 9/11; what kind of changes have people seen? The question will thus take the history of the particular public space in which the counterterrorism measures are installed, into account. It will try to explain the normalisation of counterterrorism measures and differences in people's views on this. This question will thus explain how people experience the changes in the research locations related to counterterrorism measures in New York City.

2. *To what extend do the counterterrorism measures in the different research locations influence people's perceptions of safety?*

   This question will explain the influence of counterterrorism measures in the research locations on people's perceptions of safety. Do the counterterrorism measures make people feel more or less safe? According to Dalgaard-Nielsen et al. (2016), visible counterterrorism measures around potential targets of terrorist attacks are becoming more common in the urban landscape. There is a theoretical debate on whether these security measures make people more afraid of terrorist attacks or makes them feel safer (*ibid*). This question will contribute to this debate, as it looks into the way counterterrorism measures have impacted the research locations, and how this makes them feel. In order to ensure that I do not steer people into a 'terrorism mode' too much, I will first ask respondents what they perceive as the vulnerabilities of a particular urban space.

3. *How do people legitimise the counterterrorism measures in the different research locations?*

   This question will primarily look at the securitising moves of certain actors, but will also focus on speech acts, visualisations, and audience acceptance. It will help in explaining whether securitising moves have succeeded or not. Furthermore, it will look at the way in which people may use counterterrorism measures, and whether their response is positive or not.

Both New Yorkers and tourists were part of the research population, as the research locations were tourist attractions, and many people I approached were tourists. Important to note is the immediate and close link between ordinary security measures and counterterrorism measures. Security measures can be counterterrorism measures, but do not need to be installed to counter terrorism. The line of demarcation, if it even actually exists, between security measures and counterterrorism measures is thin. A camera can be simply a camera to find criminals, but it can also be used to find suspicious people or left luggage. Bollards are installed to stop any

vehicle, whether it is driven by a terrorist or a person with a heart attack. However, these bollards can be installed to stop an attack, as happened after the 2017 West Side truck attack (Otterman 2017). There is also an inconsistency between the way security professionals and ordinary people see a security measure. The Department of Homeland Security, for example, started the 'see something, say something' campaign in 2002 to combat terrorism. However, ordinary people understood the campaign to encompass more than terrorism: also drug abuse, sexual violence, petty crimes et cetera. While this thesis seeks to explore the way counterterrorism measures influence people's perceptions of space and security, one must know that in practice, one persons' idea of counterterrorism measures can be another persons' idea of ordinary security measures.

1.2 Research locations

For this research, New York City was chosen as the broader research context. It is a populous, high-profile global city that offers 'payoffs' for terrorists in terms of lives, resources and media attention (Németh & Hollander 2010). Furthermore, as noted in the introduction, it is a city which has implemented many counterterrorism measures, and it has seen different terrorist attacks. As such, it is interesting to ask my research questions in a city such as New York City, even though they may be asked in any other major city with counterterrorism measures as well. New Yorkers have been living with these measures for a longer period of time and may therefore be able to provide better insights than someone living in Amsterdam where these visible counterterrorism measures are relatively new – the city council inquired into visible counterterrorism measures in 2017 (Het Parool 2017). In order to find respondents, and to understand how counterterrorism measures influence their perceptions of safety and space, I have chosen three different urban spaces: the World Trade Centre, the Staten Island Ferry, and Times Square. Throughout this thesis, other urban spaces will be used as examples as well, since my respondents talked about them and they were important spaces to them. As such, I will explore some private spaces as well, such as the 9/11 Museum or the Empire State Building. These buildings are privately owned, but open to the public. The Staten Island Ferry is somewhere between public and private space, as the space is not fully open to anyone. For example, you cannot enter the upper parts of the ferry in which the captain works, as this is protected by gates. As such, this thesis uses 'urban space' to denote any space in the city that anyone can enter, in the sense that they are not fully private such as a home or office building.

1.2.1 The World Trade Centre

The World Trade Centre has been chosen as the 9/11 attacks were carried out on that site, and One World Trade Centre is a symbol of American resilience and Western capitalism (Jester 2016). Even though it is one of the safest – if not the safest – buildings in the world, One World Trade Centre remains a target for terrorists. With a cost of $3,9 billion, much of it attributable to security measures (*ibid*), the new World Trade Centre has many of the counterterrorism measures in place, making it an interesting site for my research. Whenever this thesis refers to the World Trade Centre as a research location, it refers to the places that anyone can visit, thus the places with no restrictions such as the 9/11 Memorial, Liberty Park and the areas surrounding the different buildings, and not the inside of the buildings unless stated otherwise.

1.2.2 The Staten Island Ferry

The Staten Island Ferry has been chosen, as it is part of New York City's public transport system and is one of the ways to get to Manhattan. The Staten Island Ferry provides 22 million people a year (70,000 people a day) with ferry services between St. George on Staten Island and Whitehall Street in lower Manhattan (Staten Island Ferry 2018). Manelici (2017) has done research into the housing prices after the 7/7 bombings in London and found that this terrorist attack and the failed terrorist attacks two weeks later, caused an unexpected shock to the perceived risk of terror on major transportation hubs. Transportation hubs are especially appealing for terrorist attacks, as many people use public transport during rush hour, they are difficult to protect, and have high cost to repair in case of damage (*ibid*). There are multiple security measures in the ferry (terminals), such as security cameras and bomb-sniffing dogs. This research site is interesting, as it is a soft target and an attack can have an enormous impact on the community. Whenever this thesis refers to the Staten Island Ferry, it refers to both the terminals and the areas adjacent to them (the restaurants and outside plaza), and the ferries themselves.

1.2.3 Times square

Times Square has been chosen as it is one of the most popular places in New York City. Times Square is a hub in New York City, in which more than 5,800 people live and 172,000 office workers travel through Times Square on a daily basis (Times Square NYC 2018). There are multiple shopping and dining opportunities (*ibid*). Furthermore, Times Square has been the target of terrorists before (NBC New York 2017) and there are many counterterrorism measures in place, making it an interesting urban space to unravel how people are influenced by the counterterrorism measures. Whenever Times Square is mentioned as a location, it refers to the 'bowtie' area of Times Square, and the open spaces rather than the inside of the buildings.

Figure 1.1: Bowtie area of Times Square (Stellenbosch Heritage Foundation 2015)

1.3 Theoretical framework

This thesis will use both theories of securitisation and Lefebvre's spatial triad. This part will explain the two theories briefly, as I have chosen to use a writing style in which the theories will be integrated in the different chapters, as I believe this will improve the readability. Therefore, chapter three will elaborate on securitisation, whilst chapter four explains Lefebvre's spatial triad in more detail.

Theories on securitisation specify how and under which conditions the security-ness of an issue is fixed (Balzacq et al. 2016), it is the discursive construction of a particular issue as a

threat (McDonald 2008). There is, however, no grand theory of securitisation; there are various theories of securitisation (Balzacq et al. 2016). Securitisation theory seeks to explain the politics through which 1) the security character of public problems is established, 2) the social commitments are fixed which are the result from collective acceptance of a phenomenon being a threat, and 3) the possibility of a particular policy is created. Securitisation is often defined as taking place when a securitising actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of 'normal' politics (*ibid*). According to critics of securitisation theories, securitisation theorists do not take the audience into account as much as should be (McDonald 2008). Theories of securitisation are useful, as the counterterrorism measures are the effect of government policies (Nussbaum 2007; Monaco 2017). This research will look at whether people in New York City see these counterterrorism measures as legitimate, and thus whether politicians or the media have succeeded in their securitising acts. It will consider the research locations as being securitised and looking at it through a securitisation lens will help us better understand why people legitimise the security measures, and why not. Furthermore, it will help in understanding why and how these research locations have become securitised urban spaces. I will also provide a discussion about the normalisations of securitisation: what if an issue is securitised for an extended period of time, that the extraordinary measures which were implemented to combat this threat become normalised? In this, I will try to understand how we can use securitisation theories after an existential threat becomes normalised – people live with the fear of terrorism for a longer period of time now, even though the 9/11 attacks may have increased the fear of terrorism.

To understand the different locations I have chosen to conduct fieldwork in, it is helpful to use Lefebvre's (1991) spatial triad, or the three moments of social space. Lefebvre (1991) explains that every society produces a space which is its own. He conceptualises space as a triad of concepts: 1) spatial practice, 2) representations of space, and 3) representational space. *Representations of space* (conceived space) are bound to the relations of production and the 'order' which those relations impose, and thus to knowledge, signs, codes, and

Figure 1.2: Lefebvre's spatial triad

'frontal' relations (Lefebvre 1991). This is the dominant space in any society, it is the space of those who conceptualise space (e.g. urban planners and scientists) (*ibid*). *Spatial practice* (perceived space) embraces production and reproduction, and the particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation. It ensures continuity and a degree of cohesion. This cohesion, in terms of social space and the relationship of each member of a society to that space, implies a guaranteed level of competence and a specific level of performance (*ibid*). Perceived space is the outcome of one's own choices and practices in space; how someone uses space (Briercliffe 2015). *Representational space* (lived space) embodies complex symbolisms, linked to the underground side of social life and to art (Lefebvre 1991). Lived space is the space of inhabitants and users (Biercliffe 2015). It is the space which is passively experienced, which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate. It is a combination of the many symbols and signs by which people understand their world (*ibid*). Lefebvre's spatial triad is useful to understand how the research locations are socially produced

and how counterterrorism measures play a role in this production of space. Space is, as Lefebvre writes, not empty: it consists of relations, people and material structures[2]. People ascribe meaning to space and the objects in space, and as such, to understand how something (in this case counterterrorism measures) has influenced space, one must understand the interrelations Lefebvre explains in his spatial triad. Interesting to see is whether there is a tension between conceived space and lived space. Lived space is the space where other voices and practices than those of the formal city authorities can be heard and recognised, and as such are full of reactions and social process. For my research, this may mean that some users of space do not agree with the way professionals have embedded certain counterterrorism measures in the research locations or see other and alternative uses for these. Interesting to see is whether there is a tension between conceived space and lived space. Lived space is the space where other voices and practices than those of the formal city authorities can be heard and recognised, and as such are full of reactions and social process. For my research, this may mean that some users of space do not agree with the way professionals have embedded certain counterterrorism measures in the research locations.

By combining these two theories, this thesis can provide important insights in the processes that shape people's perceptions of safety and space. Counterterrorism measures are the result of securitisation processes, in which space has become securitised. By using securitisation, this research will show the way people's acceptance of these counterterrorism measures influences the way they perceive space and safety. These material interventions impact space, and the production of space. These interventions are ambiguous: different people ascribe different meanings to them. There is an interrelation between the two theories, as counterterrorism measures are created after he (successful) securitisation of space. Planners and professionals implemented counterterrorism measures (conceived space), and these have impacted urban space in different ways (perceived and lived space). It would be useful for planners and other officials to understand how a material intervention changes space, and how this affects the users of that space. This can be done to analyse space such as Lefebvre explains through his spatial triad.

1.4 Societal relevance of this research

As noted above, terrorism in cities is nothing new. However, the response of many European cities to counterterrorism measures is new: more and more visible counterterrorism measures are implemented, and as such, impact urban space. Since European cities are increasingly implementing counterterrorism measures, New York City can be used as a counterterrorism model. New York City has done far more to protect itself against terrorism than any other American city, and therefore, the city can provide a model for other cities that seek to protect its inhabitants (Kaplan 2006). Even though New York City is not the only city that has experienced many terrorist attacks, I have chosen New York City as research location. I could have looked at for example London, Moscow or Jerusalem, but I chose not to due to the openness of New York City, and its comparable norms and values to European cities. New York City is a symbol of freedom, and free movement of people, it is the city 'where dreams come true'. As such, it is interesting to see how this holds in spaces where counterterrorism

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[2] Material structures are seen in this thesis as any object or material in space, e.g. office buildings, benches and trees, but it excludes humans.

measures are installed. Furthermore, it was quite easy to access New York City, and I speak English, making it unnecessary to have a translator. Even though these arguments also hold for London, New York City was more interesting to me as 9/11 happened there, and I have been interested in the attack's influence on peoples' lives for a long time.

Van Weezel (2017) makes the remark that visible counterterrorism measures can increase peoples' feeling of insecurity, and wonders where we draw the line in counterterrorism measures. Since New York City already has many counterterrorism measures installed it is interesting to see how people respond to these measures. Europe may, as Monaco (2017) has explained, experience more terrorist attacks and European countries may follow the United States in its counterterrorism measures. While there has been research done into feelings of safety related to counterterrorism measures (e.g. Dalgaard-Nielsen et al. 2016), I was unable to find similar research in New York City. This was somewhat surprising to me, as New York City has many of these measures, and the 9/11 attacks took most casualties in New York City. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the city implemented all kinds of counterterrorism measures (Khalil 2009), and as such, New Yorkers have lived with these measures for a longer period of time. This research therefore has societal relevance, as it will explore how people living in New York City experience the counterterrorism measures, and how these influence their daily lives. By exploring how people who already life with many counterterrorism measures experience them and how these measures influence their (daily) lives, it may be possible to understand how counterterrorism measures will change and influence the (daily) lives of people living in European cities if they were to be implemented in a similar way as in New York City. In order to decline the impact of counterterrorism measures in European cities, knowing how New Yorkers experience them will thus help. European cities may thus learn from New York City and its counterterrorism measures. As terrorism is an issue of contemporary city life, this thesis has some use for planners and other professionals that install material structures in space. They may learn from the outcomes of this thesis, primarily the (possible) differences between conceptions of space and perceptions of space. Planners should use a framework through which to understand how their interventions in space impact people's (daily) lives, and this thesis provides such a framework by linking Lefebvre's spatial triad to the securitisation of space.

1.5 Outline of the thesis

This thesis will continue as follows: first, the used methodology during fieldwork will be explained. I will explain the methods that were used to gather data, who my research participants were and how I gained access to them. The third chapter will explore the securitisation of space in New York City as a result of the securitisation of terrorism after the 9/11 attacks. It will use theories of securitisation to understand audience acceptance, the reasons why people legitimate the counterterrorism measures (or not). It will also provide a discussion on the normalisation of counterterrorism measures. Chapter four will start with a discussion on obtrusive and unobtrusive measures, as the obtrusiveness of a measure can decide how it impacts space. Then it will turn to Lefebvre's spatial triad to discuss how counterterrorism measures impact the production of space in New York City. The following chapter will discuss people's feelings of safety related to counterterrorism measures. Both positive and negative feelings of safety will be discussed, followed by a short discussion on the paradox of counterterrorism measures. This thesis will end with a conclusion and discussion in chapter six,

in which the research findings will be presented. It will also explore some shortcomings of this research and possibilities for future research.

2. Methodology

To provide answers to the questions posed above, I have conducted ethnographic research. I have lived in New York City (Staten Island) for three months, to gain first-hand insights into the local context. I have explored the influence that counterterrorism measures have on different urban spaces in New York City from the point of view of New Yorkers and tourists, however focus was placed on New Yorkers. Tourists were an interesting source of information, as most of them do not see the extend of counterterrorism measures in their daily lives as New Yorkers do. For a city that has many tourists, understanding how tourists experience counterterrorism measures is important for future changes in urban space. I have furthermore taken my own experience into account, by for example writing down my own feelings into my fieldnotes and thinking about the way I would answer my research and interview questions. The remainder of this chapter will first explore the data collection methods I have used during this research. Then, I will explore the research participants to this research. Thirdly, I will briefly explore how I gained access to the field and research participants. Finally, I will explore the validity of this research.

2.1 Data collection methods

Here, I will explain what kinds of data collection methods I have used during this research. First of all, this research is primarily based around different kinds of interviews. The most prevalent were semi-structured interviews, for which a topic list was developed. I have conducted seventeen interviews with New Yorkers, from a variety of ages (youngest 23, oldest 73). The interviews were with people who either live or work near or on my research locations, or who visit them often. Interviews will be used to explore people's experiences with counterterrorism measures, and what their opinions on these measures are. By conducting multiple interviews, a comparison and exploration can be made between the different accounts, and this can provide more knowledge on the overall beliefs on counterterrorism measures. So, for example, there were three interviews with people who regularly travel to Manhattan with the Staten Island Ferry to understand what their experiences with and opinions of the counterterrorism measures are. However, I have experienced that it was very hard to find people who were willing to be interviewed. So, in November, I made a post on Facebook asking whether someone in my network knows people who live in New York City, and whether they would like to link me to them. This has proven useful, as I found twelve people through this post. As it is important to have an idea of what you want to ask, I made a short topic list, and this list was increased as the interviews progressed. This was done in order to make sure that a whole range of topics was covered in all the interviews, and to make sure the interview covered my research subject. In this way, I could also compare the data from the different interviews as the topics inquired into were all the same.

Even though I have conducted seventeen interviews which were agreed on in advance, I also conducted some smaller interviews with people on-site, with people I met minutes before the interview. I prefer to call these 'mini-interviews', as they started more as conversations, but turned out to be very useful as people were willing to answer questions. For these mini-interviews, I made a short topic list on the last page of my notebook, so I could consult that list while interviewing them. One of these mini-interviews for example, was with an elderly lady who takes the Staten Island Ferry at least eight times a week (to and from Manhattan), and she was more than willing to provide answers to my questions. During these mini-interviews, the

questions that were asked were very dependent on the people I talked with, and what they explained to me. They could get 'deep', talking about the feelings and experiences of people, but they could also be 'shallower', meaning that they touched upon different topics while not going in-depth that much. For example, the lady in the ferry and I talked a lot about how 9/11 impacted her own life and her own idea of safety, whilst another person I talked to explained more about how Times Square has changed, and another respondent explained how 9/11 was of influence in his professional life as a construction worker. Thus, through all these kinds of interviews and conversations with people on the street, I was able to explore how counterterrorism measures influence people's perceptions of safety and public space.

Secondly, this research has used participant observation, in which I participated in the daily life of my research population and setting. The experiences and observations of research settings are recorded in this method (Jupp 2006). Participant observations provide information of the field – the setting within which participant observation is undertaken (*ibid*). I have participated in multiple activities, such as taking the Staten Island Ferry every day when going to Manhattan, going out at Times Square, and visiting the 9/11 Memorial and Museum. Fieldnotes have been made during my time in the field, and these have been expanded when I returned home in the evening. I have also observed the research sites, in which I did not participate in the field. This has been done in order to gain an understanding of the security (and counterterrorism) measures in place in the different research locations, and to see how people respond and interact with them. This observation enabled me to see certain things I would otherwise probably not have noticed that much, as I simply took the time to really sit down and take in the location. For example, I noticed how people thank police officers, something I could in turn bring into my interviews or conversations with people, in order to understand how people look at the police officers more clearly. Observation has also been used to map the different counterterrorism measures.

Thirdly, material structures have been analysed, such as the buildings at the World Trade Centre and security measures such as bollards and concrete blocks. This has been done during the interviews, to find out what certain material structures mean to people and how they describe them, and to better understand how these influence people's perceptions of space.

Finally, texts and documents have been analysed. These texts are for example government texts, media texts (such as NYPD's Instagram account), and reports. These documents will be used to analyse during interviews, in order to see whether people in New York City legitimise the claims made by different actors in these texts. It is also used to see how people respond to the images, videos et cetera which are provided by these sources, and how they 'communicate' security with the people who are living in, or visiting, New York City.

2.2 Research participants

In this part, the research participants will be elaborated. As noted above, both New Yorkers and tourists were research participants in this research. While in the research proposal I chose to look at New Yorkers only, I soon found out that this was impossible in reality. The research locations were crowded with tourists, making it hard to find only New Yorkers. It could have been done, for example by asking people whether they live in New York City or not, and then deciding to talk to them or not. However, I chose to include tourists into my research as I believe(d) them to be useful for understanding how counterterrorism measures impact on space and feelings of safety – as the following empirical chapters will show. Adding tourists to the

research population created another dimension of this research, and another use of this research for others: it shows how tourists look at the impact of counterterrorism measures. Understanding tourists' perceptions is important, as many people visit New York City, and their answers might help planners and other officials in making choices regarding the implementation of counterterrorism measures. I saw a change in the way I looked at the counterterrorism measures: at first, I felt that it was a lot, that there were counterterrorism measures everywhere I looked. But then, as I got used to them being there, it was nothing special anymore, and I was no longer watching out for them. It is this difference between locals and visitors that I find particularly interesting for this research. While it would have been interesting to analyse how policy makers, security guards, police officers and other 'officials' view the counterterrorism measures and their impacts on space and feelings of safety, they were no part of the research participation. This, for the simple reason to let sleeping dogs lie: this research's subject is quite sensitive, and I can imagine officials being unwilling to explain much about the city's counterterrorism measures. Furthermore, I was travelling on a tourist visa, as it was unclear what other type of visa I could apply to – I never heard from the United States Consulate after inquiring into types of visa.

Although tourists were included in this research, I did not have in-depth interviews with tourists. This for the simple reason that tourists wanted to do other things rather than being interviewed in-depth. However, to counter the threat of not gaining in-depth knowledge of tourists' ideas of safety and space, I made a topic list for shorter interviews. As such, I was able to interview many tourists for about thirty minutes. Tourists were very willing and interested in talking with me, and especially the American tourists were very keen to help. Even though they do not regularly visit New York City, they were able to explain how for example the 9/11 attacks created a shockwave throughout the United States and how it has changed the country as a whole, but also the different cities they live in. As New Yorkers had more available time, my focus for in-depth interviews was on them. Since this research is partly interested in counterterrorism measures and the evolvement through time in the different research locations, the best possible research participants were the people who have experienced them best: New Yorkers who work and live in or around the research locations.

The three different research locations provided different categories of people. At the World Trade Centre, research participants were for example employees, shopkeepers, people living near the World Trade Centre, and volunteers at the 9/11 Memorial Museum. At Times Square, research participants were for example people working in shops and restaurants, commuters who move through Times Square multiple times a week, and people who relax in Times Square. Also, the people who live at or near Times Square belong to the research population. At the Staten Island Ferry, commuters from Staten Island to Manhattan – and the other way around – were the research participants, but also the shopkeepers and workers in and around the ferry. As noted above, tourists in the three different research locations were also considered research participants. In this way, I talked to a broad range of people who regularly visit the locations, or who occasionally visit them. Finally, I have talked to a broad range of ethnically different people in an effort to have a representation of all people who move through these research locations.

2.3 Access

The issue of access in this thesis was twofold, as I needed physical access to the city and research participants. First of all, gaining physical access to the research locations was a smooth process, however gaining access to my research participants was harder than expected. To get into the United States, an ESTA-application was done two months prior to leaving the Netherlands. This was approved within 48 hours of application, and at the U.S. border, there were little difficulties in gaining access - after some questions, I was allowed into the United States. The research locations in New York City were all open to the public (Times Square, Staten Island Ferry, and the World Trade Centre), and I went there either by subway or foot.

However, physical access is not enough to conduct a research: you also need access to research participants. What became clear during the first weeks, was that New Yorkers were willing to talk for about thirty minutes, but not so willing to be interviewed. I tried to overcome this issue by using my own personal network and social media to find interviewees. First of all, I asked a colleague whether I could interview some of her family members who live in New York City. Secondly, I used Facebook and posted a message in multiple Facebook groups, asking whether there were any people willing to be interviewed – these groups were all local New York City groups. I was able to get twelve interviews out of these Facebook posts, a number I would not have gotten if I had stayed on the streets to ask people. Since I primarily observed my research locations in the first week, I got to know where to go when I wanted to talk to people. For Times Square, this was primarily near the food trucks and seating areas, for the World Trade Centre this was Liberty Park, and for the Staten Island Ferry it was inside the ferry or while waiting in the terminal. Both locals and tourists were willing to have conversations, and I have had some conversations which lasted for at least an hour. Also, on multiple occasions, the respondent and I went to a café to drink something while talking – which I believe improved the information I got, as we came to like each other, and some of these people turned out to become important respondents (and friends) as we met on multiple occasions which enabled me to gain deeper insights into their ideas of space and safety.

As I rented a room through AirBnB, I was able to get to know three locals very well, and they became main respondents. Through them, I was able to see whether they agreed with what other people had said to me, and they provided a lot of information on my research subject and how New York City has changed after the 9/11 attacks. As they are all locals, and have lived in New York City all their life, they know about the different attacks that the city has had and the response from law enforcement and the public alike. By building mutual trust, their information was helpful in understanding the processes better and gaining a better insight into the research subjects. We have had many casual conversations, in which my research became a subject and then we would discuss about counterterrorism and New York City. I have also been to different locations in Manhattan, and New York City in general, with them, and on-site, we were able to discuss some things regarding my research. One example is a day one of my housemates and I went to the World Trade Centre: he is a pilot, so he explained the altitude on which airplanes are allowed to fly, while there was a ban on flying over Manhattan after the 9/11 attacks. This kind of information would not have been gathered had I not build a bond of mutual trust with him, and the same goes for my other main respondents.

3. Counterterrorism measures and people's responses

This chapter will show how theories of securitisation can make use of cities, in this case New York City, to explore securitisation processes. I will show how the securitisation of space has impacted New York City through the creation of different counterterrorism measures. The first sub-question "how have counterterrorism measures impacted different spaces and people's behaviour in New York City?" will be partially answered in section 3.2, as this part focuses on the rise of counterterrorism measures in New York City but not on people's behaviour. However, the chapter as a whole primarily focuses on answering the third sub-question "how do people legitimise the counterterrorism measures in the different research locations?" The securitisation of space after the 9/11 attacks will be (briefly) explored, and the reasons why people legitimise the resulting counterterrorism measures (or not) in New York City will be explored. As explained by McDonald (2008), the securitisation framework is problematically narrow in three ways:

1) The form of act constructing security is defined narrowly, with the focus on the speech acts of dominant actors;
2) The context of the act is defined narrowly, with the focus on the moment of intervention only;
3) The nature of the act of securitisation is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats to security (*ibid*).

Therefore, this chapter will try to address the first two theoretical gaps explained by McDonald (2008), by not only focusing on the securitising moves of certain dominant actors, but also focusing on (social) media and audience acceptance, thus contributing to theories of securitisation. A securitising actor identifies an issue (here 'terrorism') as an existential threat and in doing so frames this issue as a 'higher' type of politics, for which emergency measures can be pursued (Malcolm 2016). This chapter will seek to explain how counterterrorism measures in New York City as a 'higher' type of politics are perceived by local New Yorkers and tourists alike. First of all, theories of securitisation will be explored. Secondly, the rise of counterterrorism measures in New York City will be explained. Then, the reasons why people in New York City accept these measures will be explored. Finally, I will explore whether terrorism is still exceptional or not, and whether counterterrorism measures should be seen as extraordinary measures or not.

3.1 Securitisation

In theories of securitisation, the edifice rests on the separation between politics and security (Mavelli 2013). Politics is democratic debate and decision which takes place within the boundaries of the rule of law. Security takes place beyond the boundaries of established procedures. Security is about survival, and when survival is at stake, extraordinary measures may be required to deal with this threat. Security is thus the move which takes politics beyond the established rules and frames an issue as a special kind of politics, or as above politics (*ibid*).

Theories on securitisation specify how and under which conditions the security-ness of an issue is fixed (Balzacq et al. 2016), it is the discursive construction of a particular issue as a threat (McDonald 2008). There is, however, no grand theory of securitisation; there are various theories of securitisation (Balzacq et al. 2016). Securitisation theory seeks to explain the politics through which 1) the security character of public problems is established, 2) the social

commitments are fixed which are the result from collective acceptance of a phenomenon being a threat, and 3) the possibility of a particular policy is created. Securitisation is often defined as taking place when a securitising actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of 'normal' politics (*ibid*). McDonald (2008), for example, defines securitisation as "the positioning through speech acts (usually by a political leader) of a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn (with the consent of the relevant constituency) enables emergency measures and the suspension of 'normal politics' in dealing with that issue" (p. 567). Other approaches do not use this separation of existential versus normal in their definition (*ibid*). Balzacq, for example, argues that securitisation is:

> "an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilised by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor's reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customised policy must be immediately undertaken to block it" (Balzacq in Balzacq et al. 2016, 495).

The underlying thought of securitisation is that an issue is given sufficient saliency to gain the approval of the audience, which in turn enables those who are authorised to handle the issue to use whatever means he or she deems most appropriate (Balzacq et al. 2016). The core elements of the theory, according to Balzacq et al. (2016) are the following:

- The securitising actor: the agent who presents an issue as a threat through a securitising move;
- The referent subject: the entity that is threatening;
- The referent object: the entity that is threatened;
- The audience: whose agreement is necessary to confer an intersubjective status to a threat;
- The context in which the securitising move takes place;
- The adoption of distinctive policies: either 'exceptional' or not.

However, as explained by McDonald (2008), there are some points of criticism. As the audience is underdeveloped, it is unclear how the resonance of the securitising moves with the audience or the acceptance of the audience of a securitising move can be assessed in practice (McDonald 2008). This research will seek to contribute to this aspect of the theory. I will look at how people in New York City, thus the audience, perceive the securitising moves and how (and if) they legitimise them. The audience in securitisation processes also have power: they can either accept the securitising move or reject it (Balzacq et al. 2016). Thus, when doing research at securitisation moves, one has to ask whether the audience accepts an issue as a threat. By focusing on the audience as well, I will seek to answer the question whether the three research locations are securitised or not; thus whether space has been securitised. Furthermore, the context of a securitising move plays an important role. The way in which security is understood at the local level is crucial for uncovering the concrete practices of security. Differences in the way securitising moves are presented and/or received also depend on the wider social environment in which they take place (*ibid*). As 9/11 has played an important role in New York City's securitisation, and implementation of counterterrorism measures (such as the creation of the NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau (Schorn 2006)), context appears to play an important role as well. I will try to understand if – and how – different contexts are important

for the perception of security in the different sites in New York City. Does the context in these different sites promote, foster or limit specific outcomes of securitisation moves, e.g. security measures such as more cameras, (uniformed) guards, police presence? And are these outcomes different between the sites, or are they similar? Coming back to McDonald's (2008) criticism of the focus on speech acts, I will look at the role of the (social) media in securitising moves as well. McDonald (2008) makes the argument that multiple authors have suggested that images or visual representations can be central to the construction of security in general or even securitisation specifically. Television images of 9/11 may have been central to the development of dominant perceptions on threat and security in the United States (*ibid*). Hansen, for example, explains visual securitisation in relation to the 'Danish 2008 Cartoon Crisis' (Hansen 2007). Images travel across linguistic borders due to global (news) media, and they are often thought to evoke an immediate, physical response which can be mobilised by political actors (Hansen 2007). Hansen argues that the meaning producing links between images, text and speech in foreign policy discourse should be at the centre of a research agenda on visual securitisation. Images may function as communicative acts, and impact different audiences. Visuals are then articulated with a security discourse and linked to spoken and written text (*ibid*). The media is in this research thus important as the media can use a certain frame to depict an act. Variation in the presentation of information about an actor who has acted violently affects whether the audience perceives that act as terrorism (Huff & Kertzer 2018). The media has the ability to shape the public's perception of violent incidents, and subsequently whether these are classified as terrorism (*ibid*).

3.2 The rise of counterterrorism measures in New York City

This part will partially answer the first sub-question "how have counterterrorism measures impacted different spaces in New York City?" This part will explain what people in New York City see as the most important differences in counterterrorism measures before and after the 9/11 attacks, whilst chapter five will continue answering this question by explaining how it has become normalised in New York City, and what people's views on this process of normalisation is. First of all, I will shortly explain how space got securitised after 9/11. To do this, I will first explain how terrorism became securitised as this is a precondition for the securitisation of space through counterterrorism measures. Then, I will explain how the three research locations (Times Square, World Trade Centre and the Staten Island Ferry) have changed post-9/11, thus how they have been securitised.

3.2.1 The securitisation of terrorism after the 9/11 attacks

According to McDonald (2008: 567) "securitisation can be defined as the positioning through speech acts (usually by a political leader) of a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn (with the consent of the relevant constituency) enables emergency measures and the suspension of 'normal politics' in dealing with that issue." As multiple theorists have already explained (e.g. Williams 2003; Hansen 2011), speech acts are not the only way that an issue can become securitised. Today, political communication is increasingly bound with images and televisual communication is an essential element of communicative action, making modern media an essential element in security relations (Williams 2003). The focus on speech and linguistic rhetoric of the Copenhagen School is a challenge in today's world in which communication is increasingly conveyed through electronic media. However, speech acts are inextricable from the image-dominated context in which they take place and through which

meaning is communicated (*ibid*). Therefore, this section will look at both visual and linguistic securitisation of terrorism before turning to the securitisation of space in part 3.2.2.

An external threat which is linked to events of great importance can lead to historical openings for the rearticulation of security (Mabee 2007). International and transnational terrorism was articulated as a key issue to the security (policy) of the United States after the 9/11 attacks. The securitisation of terrorism is not only represented by articulating terrorism to be a security issue, it is also solidified in the organisation of security policy-making within the United States. Prior to 9/11, threats to the United States were seen as external, but the 9/11 attacks showed the risk inherent in increasing transnationalism, which allowed for the institutionalisation of border protection through policing measures, next to the moves towards pre-emptive use of military force (*ibid*). And as the following parts of this chapter show, also the securitisation of space in cities such as New York City.

As explained above, securitisation does not only come from speech acts. Visuals can also be used to securitise an issue (Williams 2003; Hansen 2011). The 9/11 attacks themselves were horrific and were directly broadcasted on television where they were also being repeated (Mabee 2007). This embedded them into the public consciousness. The 9/11 attacks became crucial in a securitisation process concerning terrorism, and they strengthened the idea that there is a new environment of threat, which would need unprecedented kinds of action (*ibid*). The visuals of the attacks contributed to the speech acts in the securitisation of terrorism, which will become clear from this and next parts of this chapter. Front pages of newspapers on September 12, 2001 showed images of the attacks. Furthermore, President Bush's different speeches on the 9/11 attacks were about evil, the targeting of the United States and America's way of life, and he also talked about the visuals of the attacks. His speeches can be seen as an example of the securitisation of terrorism after the 9/11 attacks, and this will be discussed directly below the quotations. After the 9/11 attacks, the images of destruction at the World Trade Centre and Pentagon were an iconic part of the mediascape, and Bush and his administration regularly referred to these images (Kellner 2004). Two excerpts from President Bush's speeches in the direct aftermath of the 9/11 attacks which show the securitisation of terrorism:

Figure 3.1: Front pages on September 12, 2001 (Lee n.d.)

"Good evening. Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. […] The *pictures* of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet, unyielding anger. […] America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism" (Bush 2001a; my emphasis).

"Tonight we are a country *awakened to danger and called to defend freedom*. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, *justice will be done*. […] On September the

11th, enemies of freedom committed an *act of war* against our country. Americans have known wars – but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war – but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks – but never before on thousands of civilians. All this was brought upon us in a single day – and night fell on a *different world,* a world where *freedom itself is under attack*. […] There are *thousands of these terrorists* in more than 60 countries. […] They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction. […] Our *enemy* is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them. […] We will direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war – to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network. […] Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take *defensive measures against terrorism* to protect Americans. […] *This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom*. […] The civilized world is rallying to America's side. They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next" (Bush 2001b; my emphasis).

According to Williams (2003), a particular speech act becomes a specific security act – a securitisation – in its casting of the issue as one of an existential threat, which in turn calls for extraordinary measures that go beyond the routines and norms of everyday life. According to Mavelli (2013), President George W. Bush's speeches after the 9/11 attacks framed terrorism as an attempt to destroy the way of life in the United States and its freedom, a speech act which constructed terrorism as an existential threat which endangered the survival of the United States. President George W. Bush's speeches can clearly be seen as securitising terrorism: at the time, he was the highest political leader of the United States who used speeches to claim that terrorism is a threat to survival – a threat to freedom itself (Bush 2001b). In the second quotation, we can see that President George W. Bush casts terrorism as an existential threat to the United States, with defensive measures that have to be taken in order to protect the United States against terrorists (*ibid*). This can be seen as involving extraordinary measures, as "every resource at our command" (Bush 2001b) will be used to fight the terrorists. President George W. Bush also refers to the visuals of the attacks: pictures that many New Yorkers and tourists that I have spoken to explained as being 'stuck' in their heads. They claimed that whenever you say "9/11", you see the airplanes flying into the buildings, the people falling to their deaths, the collapse of the towers, or the site that became known as Ground Zero.

The images of the planes hitting the World Trade Centre and the final collapse of the towers were broadcasted repeatedly (Kellner 2004). The message was that the United States was vulnerable to terrorist attacks, that terrorists could create great harm, and that anyone could be subject to a deadly terrorist attack. The people who watched the images of the attacks and its aftermath would not forget them soon, they would remain in spectators' memories. There was a media spectacle of the highest order: for several days, television stations suspended broadcasting of advertising and entertainment, and focused solely on the 9/11 attacks (*ibid*). Kellner (2004) shows that the media established a binary dualism between Islamic terrorism and civilisation, and largely circulated war fever and retaliatory feelings and discourses which

called for and supported military intervention. The media would bring in experts on national security, for example Jeane Kirkpatrick who argued that the United States was at war with Islam and that they should defend the West. According to Kellner (2004: 49), "broadcast television allowed dangerous and extremist zealots to vent and circulate the most aggressive, fanatic, and sometimes lunatic views, creating a consensus around the need for immediate military action and all-out war." Television networks used logos such as "War on America" and "America's New War" that assumed that the United States was at war and that the only appropriate response was military response (Kellner 2004). The television networks' three-day non-stop broadcasting of these kinds of ideas, drove the country into hysteria and made it certain that there would be a military response and war. Radio broadcasts were also talking propaganda, oozing hatred and hysteria. In the years following the 9/11 attacks, television networks would hire military consultants to explain complex events, making them more propaganda channels for the military than independent analysts. Instead of reasoned debate and bringing critics of military intervention into the picture, television networks helped generate and sustain a widespread public desire for military intervention. The networks detailed the harm done to the victims of the 9/11 attacks, kept filming Ground Zero to document the destruction and drama of discovering bodies, and constructed reports on the evil of bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorists who had perpetrated the attacks (*ibid*).

Finally, Nicholas J. Rasmussen, the former director of the National Counterterrorism Centre in the United States, has explained in a hearing (2015) that the United States continues to be under the threat of terrorism. Both international terrorist groups and lone wolves, whether inspired by terrorist organisations or not, are a threat to security (*ibid*). This view is shared with numerous media outlets[3], who write about the terrorist threat to the United States. The research respondents also share this view; everyone who I have talked to regarding the threat the United States faces from terrorists, stated that they believe that the United States is amongst one of the top (intended) targets of terrorists. So even today, terrorism is still securitised and seen as an existential threat to the United States (here New York City), and it is seen as necessary to have counterterrorism measures – however, whether these are still exceptional will be explored in section 3.4 below. The counterterrorism measures are so embedded in New York City's urban landscape, that they manage people's behaviour. This will be explored in part 4.2.1, where counterterrorism measures' governmentality is discussed.

3.2.2 The securitisation of space

After 9/11, it became clear that the United States was no longer safe from international terrorism, and that counterterrorism measures had to be created and installed (Monaco 2017; fieldnotes). To curb the threat terrorists pose, the United States has implemented all kinds of security measures after the 9/11 attacks (Brill 2016). Today, all security agencies in the United States share the same watch lists and threat databases, something they did not do prior to 9/11 (Brill 2016; Monaco 2017). Airport security has increased, with for example more security screeners, reinforced cockpit doors and Federal Air Marshals on some airplanes. The ports in the United States are also more secured now: every American port screens cargo for both drugs and explosives, using billions of dollars' worth of technology (*ibid*). Furthermore, in the wake

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[3] See for example https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/06/world/middleeast/isis-global-terrorism.html
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-10-30/real-terrorist-threat-america

of the 9/11 attacks, intelligence gathering changed. For example, the Bush Administration worked with Congress to create the USA PATRIOT Act, which updated electronic surveillance rules to allow warrants to intercept individuals even if they regularly changed phones, and to grant access to Internet communications (Chertoff 2011). Another change in intelligence gathering after the 9/11 attacks was the implementation of regulations designed to collect routine traveller and financial information. The United States implemented US VISIT, which collects fingerprints from all foreign travellers entering the United States (*ibid*).

There has also been an increase in international cooperation in policing, through for example Interpol (Nussbaum 2007). Many police forces have also changed their priorities and focus, including counterterrorism as a duty. The New York Police Department (NYPD) changed drastically after the 9/11 attacks. Until the mid-1990s, the NYPD focused primarily on reducing crime. After the 9/11 attacks, counterterrorism became one of the key priorities of the NYPD (*ibid*). In 2002, then Police Commissioner Ray Kelly created the Counterterrorism Bureau as a direct response to the 9/11 attacks (Jackson 2011). Almost immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the NYPD began deploying the Critical Response Vehicle (CRV) and Hercules teams. A CRV deployment consists of dozens of patrol cars with flashing lights who drive through predetermined routes in the city. The Hercules teams consist of an intelligence officer, a canine unit, a highway patrol unit and a small squad of heavily-armed police officers who travel through the city (*ibid*). Furthermore, the NYPD is able to detect unusual levels of radiation, routinely deploying NYPD helicopters and two specialised vessels in the New York Harbour (Jackson 2011; CBS News 2011). Next to the helicopters and boats with radiation detectors, police officers throughout the city carry a portable radiation detector in their gun belts (CBS News 2011). The NYPD also has access to many cameras (3,000 in 2011), with artificial intelligence looking at the camera feed, watching whether something suspicious is happening (*ibid*). The Police Department spends around 200 million dollars annually on counterterrorism, and there are now around 1,000 police officers working full-time in counterterrorism while there were just a handful of police officers working on counterterrorism before the 9/11 attacks (Nussbaum 2007). The NYPD is part of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), in which also the FBI is active. The NYPD's Counterterrorism Bureau deploys heavily armed, paramilitary-style units at perceived targets throughout the city. The NYPD's intelligence Division also changed, with a new focus on using police officers who are native speakers in security sensitive foreign languages, and by expanding overseas by stationing NYPD officers in other countries (*ibid*).

These counterterrorism measures also impact urban space: space got securitised. Certain areas in the city are saturated with visible counterterrorism measures, while other urban spaces have none visible counterterrorism measures. Space becomes differentialised: one side of the road is protected by security measures whilst the other side is unprotected. This struck me for the first time when I was walking towards the World Trade Centre from Battery Park. Along the sidewalk, there were no barriers before entering Liberty Street, showing the demarcation between urban space which is deemed 'safe' from terrorism and urban space which is 'unsafe' from terrorism. Urban space which is deemed safe does not need protective measures, whilst unsafe spaces need protective measures to become safe(r). One of my respondents, who is a retired journalist, used to go to many media events throughout the city. He told me that he used to watch the July 4th fireworks from the observation deck of the South Tower and he would be able to enter the United Nations building with his press card. However, this changed after the

9/11 attacks: security was tightened afterwards. After the 9/11 attacks, he had to register himself and attain an identification card, whenever there was a press event at the World Trade Centre. He can also no longer go to the cafeteria inside the United Nations building, where he used to be able to go to. After the 9/11 attacks, he still had his press card, but they could only enter certain rooms where press was allowed, all the other rooms have key cards. He explained that he had taken his niece inside the United Nations with his press card (before the 9/11 attacks), but he said that this would no longer be possible with the current security level[4].

During this research, it became clear that the World Trade Centre was the research location in which most visible security measures were installed (see table 4.1 below for the visible security measures I noted in the three locations), followed by Times Square, and finally by the Staten Island Ferry. The people I have talked to all explained why they think this is a logical way of securing the city. They explained that the World Trade Centre has to be protected most, simply because it would be a disaster if it were attacked again, and because it is the symbol of the resilience of New York City and a symbol of American capitalism. One interviewee explained why he believed that the World Trade Centre is amongst the top targets of terrorists: "So like, if they really want to attack again, they would target the World Trade Centre or something big. So that way, like, thousands will die[5]". Many others as well believed that the World Trade Centre is an attractive target, because if an attack were to 'succeed', there would possibly be thousands of lives lost, and it would be a statement against the United States as they secured the buildings and site quite heavily. Here, I will continue to explain which measures the respondents identified as most important for the three different research locations, and which had most impact on public space in their point of view.

At the new World Trade Centre, the security measures that can be found today, were installed during reconstruction (DAWN 2011; The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 2012). During the reconstruction of the World Trade Centre, security was enhanced by for example improved building codes, a vehicular security centre (The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 2012), and closed-circuit surveillance cameras (DAWN 2011). As explained by a construction worker I met on Times Square, and who was both involved in the clean-up and rebuilding of the World Trade Centre, the World Trade Centre was rebuild with the new security measures directly installed. One of the security measures that stood out, were the patrolling soldiers. They primarily patrol the Westfield Mall directly below the World Trade Centre, but they occasionally patrol at the Memorial itself. Primarily tourists explained how the 9/11 Museum first gave the impression of entering an airport, the following is from my own experience of going to the 9/11 Museum. Immediately after I bought tickets for the 9/11 Museum, I was met by two security guards with a bomb-sniffing dog. They told me to go inside the building, where a row of metal detectors and x-ray machines were waiting to scan me and my belongings. I had to put my bag, personal items and coat into a tray which was scanned. Then, I had to walk through the metal detectors. But: keep your hands out of your pockets. I was waiting with my hands inside my pocket, something I am used to doing, and the security guard was telling me very loudly (almost yelling) to take my hands out of my pocket and to keep them next to my body. The 9/11 Museum was not the only location in the city that has this level of security, the Empire State Building for example has the same airport-like security

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[4] Interview, November 5, 2018
[5] Interview, October 21, 2018

system in place. A final security measure that was mentioned regularly, were the security guards with bomb-sniffing dogs. There are multiple security guards every day, and occasionally, they have a bomb-sniffing dog with them.

At Times Square, the following visible security measures were mentioned the most: bollards, concrete blocks, police officers (both heavily armed and normally armed), military personnel, cameras, and bomb-sniffing dogs. Times Square's transformation, however, was not implemented at the same time, but over a longer period of time. In the 1990s, Times Square already had public safety officers, back then they were wearing police uniforms, without a gun (The New York Times 1992). They were supposed to aid tourists, to banish illegal peddlers and confidence games, and to alert the police when trouble struck Times Square (*ibid*). Today, public safety officers receive anti-terrorist training, and they can patrol with bomb-sniffing dogs (Times Square NYC 2019). They also dress differently than police officers nowadays, so there is more distinction between regular police officers and public safety officers. After an increase in traffic accidents in the Times Square area in the summer of 2009, the Department of Transportation (DOT) closed off Broadway to vehicles and created temporary pedestrian zones (Warerkar 2017). The city made this decision permanent, with a $55 million project which created pedestrian zones throughout Times Square (*ibid*). Over 200 bollards were designed and manufactured by Calpipe to protect pedestrians from vehicles (Calpipe Security Bollards 2017). Although vehicle-pedestrian accidents might have been an important reason to close down parts of Times Square from vehicles, many respondents did not think this was the only reason. They believed that possible vehicular attacks also played a role in the DOT's decision to create pedestrian zones. One tourist from Florida explained that in her city there are also bollards, but these are to prevent older people from driving into stores, simply because they are "too old to drive[6]". However, she linked the bollards in New York City directly to vehicular attacks, simply because it is New York City, and particularly Times Square

Figure 3.2: Heavily-armed police officers and bollards in Times Square

where we were talking. A Long Island resident explained to me why he thinks that bollards are not necessarily only installed for accidents. For him, after the 9/11 attacks the city understood that they had to put up their defences to protect us from terrorist attacks. So, in the end, 9/11 has created a safer New York City, and this is one of the good things that came from the attacks. He claimed that the bollards were not only installed to protect pedestrians from someone who lost control or who has had a heart attack behind the wheel, but more importantly, it will protect pedestrians from intentional attacks where a vehicle is used as a weapon. And these attacks are

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[6] Conversation, October 15, 2018

now on the rise, with terrorists using cars or trucks to drive into people[7]. The bollards were first installed in Times Square in 2016, but in January 2018, the city announced that it will place 1,500 more bollards around the city to protect pedestrians from vehicular attacks (Reuters 2018). Thus, the respondents were right that vehicle accidents were not the only reason for installing bollards, as Mayor de Blasio explained that New York City reacts to events throughout the world, but also to attacks in the city itself (Reuters 2018). Another visible measure at Times Square are heavily armed police officers from the Counterterrorism Bureau. During the time I was in New York City, I saw them regularly, although not every day – whether it was busy at Times Square or not. In 2015, Police commissioner Bill Bratton announced a new 350-officer strong group of police officers, called the Strategic Response Group, which will be armed with machine guns, to deal with events like the 2015 Paris attacks (Laughland 2015). At the beginning of 2018, the force had 700 highly-trained and heavily armed police officers assigned to potential trouble spots throughout the city (Burkett 2018).

At the Staten Island Ferry, there were three security measures that were mentioned the most as having changed after the 9/11 attacks: bomb-sniffing dogs, heavily-armed police officers, and the prohibition of cars on the ferry. On the website of the Staten Island Ferry, and in their broadcasting system and on the ferries, passengers are told that they are subject to random screening by NYPD and security guards (The Staten Island Ferry n.d.). When you enter the terminal in St. George, the first thing you may notice are the police officers standing in front of the entrance to the ferry, followed by security guards with two bomb-sniffing dogs. They let the dogs check all larger bags and suitcases of anyone who enters the terminal. The bomb-sniffing dogs have been a familiar sight to commuters travelling with the ferry since 2004, when they were first introduced (Platt 2008). These dogs are not trained to sniff drugs, but they can sniff out any of a number of chemical scents used in explosives (*ibid*). Likewise, as in Times

Figure 3.3: Warning signs at the entrance to the St. George terminal

Square, the Staten Island Ferry can also be guarded by heavily armed police officers from the Strategic Response Group, and by officers from the Department of Homeland Security. I have seen them mostly in Whitehall terminal, and only a handful of times in the St. George terminal. Prior to 9/11, cars were allowed on the ferry, but were banned due to security reasons following the 9/11 attacks (Wrobleski 2015). The DOT maintained that allowing vehicles on the ferry would be too time-consuming as all vehicles would have to be screened, and it would be too dangerous (*ibid*). One of my main respondents explained how he would take his wife to Manhattan each week, and they would go with their car onto the ferry. He explained that he understood it was necessary, but it was a shame, as he always liked the trips with the ferry better than going over the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge. Something that I noticed immediately next to

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[7] Conversation, October 18, 2018

this, were the warning signs hanging around both terminals[8]. There are multiple signs that explain things about security: one is about the maritime security (MARSEC) level in the ferry, another is about 'see something, say something' in relation to terrorism, and a final sign is about general security. In both the terminal and ferry, security and DOT personnel are very focused on personal belongings. There are multiple signs stating that you should keep your personal belongings with you at all times, and the public announcement system also pays attention to this. One experience I had regarding this was on October 8, 2018. A tourist left his bag inside the ferry while he went outside to take a photograph of the Statue of Liberty which it passes. One crewmember saw the bag without its owner, so he asked people nearby if they knew whose bag it was. No one knew who the bag belonged to, so the crewmember walked to the railing (outside) and yelled "whose bag is this?" The tourist then told him that it was his bag, and then the crewmember explained that under no circumstances you are allowed to leave your bag unattended, due to security issues.

Security measures at the different research locations

World Trade Centre	Times Square	Staten Island Ferry
NYPD officers (heavily and regularly armed)	NYPD officers (heavily or regularly armed)	NYPD officers (sometimes heavily and mostly regularly armed)
Security guards	Security guards	Security guards
Bomb-sniffing dogs	Bomb-sniffing dogs	Bomb-sniffing dogs
No garbage cans	Police horses	Park Department Police
Military personnel	Military personnel	United States Coast Guard
Cameras	Cameras	Cameras inside and outside
Vehicle security centre	Vehicle checks	AEDs
Concrete blocks	Concrete blocks	Concrete blocks
NYPD helicopter patrolling above	NYPD helicopter patrolling above	NYPD helicopter patrolling above
Port Authority Police Department	Planters	USCG or NYPD boats patrolling next to the ferry
Bollards	Bollards	Bollards
See something, say something	See something, say something	See something, say something
Police station	Police station	Police station
Identification cards	Identification cards	No cars allowed on the ferry
Traffic police	Traffic police	Security signs
(Bag) searches	(Bag) searches	
Metal detectors	Metal detectors	
Reinforced buildings	Specialised street furniture (crash-tested)	
Pedestrian zones	Pedestrian zones	

Table 3.1: Identified security measures by author (and respondents) at the three research locations (fieldnotes).

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[8] Conversation, October 4, 2018

3.3 Acceptance of the counterterrorism measures in New York City

During this research, it became clear that everyone I have talked to agreed with the securitisation of space and said that counterterrorism measures are necessary and should be implemented. This part is divided into three smaller parts, in order to better explain why people in New York City legitimise the counterterrorism measures. First of all, the role of context will be explained. Then the role of the (social) media, and finally the role of politicians in audience acceptance will be elaborated.

3.3.1 Context

Context is one of the core-concepts of theories of securitisation (Balzacq et al. 2016). However, as explained before (McDonald 2008), context is underspecified in the securitisation framework. Therefore, I have attempted to put context into this research, by looking into the way New York City and its history may have influenced people's acceptance of counterterrorism measures. Context can have an impact on securitisation processes, and the context can be a facilitating condition (Balzacq et al. 2016) This research found that context in New York City definitely played a role in accepting the securitisation of terrorism and the related counterterrorism measures. This part will explain how context can be seen as an important factor for accepting the securitisation of space in New York City. First of all, it will explain how terrorist attacks can be seen as a facilitating condition to accepting the securitisation of space. Secondly, it will look at the possibility of finding multiple smaller contexts within one large context. And finally, it will look at the city's characteristics as a part of context.

The attacks of 9/11 can be seen as a facilitating condition, as it still plays a large role in accepting counterterrorism measures today: New Yorkers, and politicians alike (Monaco 2017), were determined that something like that attack would never happen again. The impact of the attack on the city as a whole has been enormous, it has become one of the defining moments of the city, and a cultural event (more on this in part 4.2.3). Many people lost someone they loved or knew, or they know someone who has lost a loved one; the skyline of the city has changed drastically with the two towers gone and the new towers now in place; the city has experienced an increase in security measures, and so on. One of my most vivid memories to my fieldwork is a conversation with a 48-year-old construction worker I got to know very well. While we were having dinner at a restaurant near Times Square, he looked back at the clean-up of the World Trade Centre after the 9/11 attacks. As he works in construction, he felt it was his duty to help in the process, so whenever he and his friends were done working elsewhere in the city, they would go to Ground Zero to help with the clean-up. Their job was primarily cutting through steel beams. However, when they cut through one particular beam, an arm became visible. This was the only thing they found that resembled anything human, as people were vaporised because of the immense power of the collapse. What he remembered very well next to this, was one of his friends wondering why there were no doorknobs. "The only thing we saw was mingled steel, but we could not find any doorknobs. This struck us as weird". This is primarily why he explained to be in favour of so many counterterrorism measures at the World Trade Centre. Not only because of the attacks causing deaths and injuries, but also because of the mental problems some of his friends got from working at Ground Zero. They saw things what he believed no one should ever have to see, but they saw it because terrorists flew an airplane into a building. He said it was horrific, and it should never happen again. So even after

seventeen years, he explained that the attacks on 9/11 were amongst the top reasons why he felt that counterterrorism measures were necessary[9].

Although the 9/11 attacks can be seen as an important event in New York City's history, the 9/11 attack was not the first and only terrorist attack in the city: for example, the World Trade Centre had been the target of terrorists before when a bomb exploded in the garage beneath the World Trade Centre on February 26, 1993 (NBC New York 2017). Also, after the 9/11 attacks, there have been multiple attacks, such as the West Side truck attack in 2017 (*ibid*). After these attacks, additional security measures were taken, such as the placement of hundreds of concrete barriers at 57 intersections along the Hudson River Park Bikeway (Otterman 2017). The most important reason for accepting the counterterrorism measures in New York City, has been explained by all interviewees, and many people I have simply talked to, as the fact that there have been multiple attacks in the city before, and that there will be more attacks in the future. The fact that New York City already has experienced terrorist attacks, and has been the target for attacks before, creates the feeling that security measures to prevent against terrorists had, and still have, to be installed. Below are two excerpts from conversations with locals:

> "I don't really feel safe here, especially now [4.45 p.m., many people at the ferry]. This would be a perfect target. There aren't really any defence mechanisms in the ferry and look at the amount of people here.[10]"

> "Everybody now knows that we are a target, and that it can actually happen here.[11]"

As the second quotation shows and as expected, not everybody feels safe in New York City, and in this case, it was related to the woman's perception of security measures in the ferry. She did not believe that there were enough measures in place to prevent a terrorist attack from happening. The ferry had the least visible security measures of the three research sites, and people felt that it was not good enough to prevent a terrorist attack. For example, many people believed that it would be too easy to carry a bomb into the ferry, as the bomb-sniffing dogs do not check every passenger who enters the terminal. This would then be a reason for them to believe that there should be more counterterrorism measures in the ferry, or at least more visible police officers. Thus, context here plays a crucial role: New York City is believed to be a target, simply because it is New York City. People believe that the city is a major target for terrorists, all stating that the city should do everything in its power to protect the people from attacks. However, this view of New York City as being a target is not only shared by local New Yorkers, but also by tourists who visit New York City. As explained above, the 9/11 attacks have created such an impact on people's mindset, not only in New York City but throughout the United States, and arguably the world. Both tourists from elsewhere in the United States and New Yorkers have explained that pre-9/11, they thought they were safe, simply because they had a whole ocean between them and other places in the world, one example:

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[9] Conversation, October 18, 2018
[10] Conversation, November 8, 2018
[11] Conversation, November 14, 2018

> Q: "Can you still remember how security was during that time [before the 9/11 attacks]?"
>
> A: "Uhm. Yeah, slack. There was really a mentality like 'it won't happen to us, we're so far away from it' [Middle East][12]."

However, all respondents explained how 9/11 changed this view of their country being a safe place, a place without international terrorism, and that the other attacks confirmed this view. The attacks created a fear for terrorism, which in turn led to the increased security measures (securitisation of space) in New York City. However, this fear of a terrorist attack occurring is not shared in the same way throughout the United States. Multiple American tourists explained how they are more afraid during their holiday in New York City, than in the American cities they live in. For example, a woman who was visiting New York City with her daughter explained how she felt much safer in Oklahoma, where they live, than in New York City – even though Oklahoma has had a major terrorist attack as well: the Oklahoma City Bombing which killed 168 people (FBI n.d.). This being said, she did not believe in heavy security such as in New York City to counter terrorist attacks, as she believed the likelihood of another major terrorist attack in Oklahoma City to be very small. However, in New York City, she believed that the chance of a terrorist attack happening is real, and that it is necessary to install counterterrorism measures. In this sense, she legitimised the counterterrorism measures primarily from her beliefs of New York City as being a target for terrorists, and her belief that the city will be attacked again. When inquiring as to how she got this opinion, she explained that the media and politicians played a role as they give information on the terrorist threat to the United States[13].

As noted above, McDonald (2008) claims that context in theories of securitisation is defined narrowly, with the focus on the moment of intervention only. Furthermore, he claims that the framework of securitisation is narrow in another sense: "the *nature* of the act is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats to security" (McDonald 2008, 564; original emphasis). He goes on to explain that this focus ignores the central importance of the way in which security is understood in particular contexts (McDonald 2008). This can mean that within a certain context, in this case New York City, there are even smaller contexts where security is understood in different ways, in which space is differentialised (see figure 3.4 below). So in this case, New York City would be the context (within the overall context of the United States), and the smaller contexts would be the five boroughs – and within those smaller contexts, you could distinguish even smaller contexts such as Times Square in Manhattan or Silverlake Park in Staten Island. For example, people argue that it is important to have security at Times Square, as more things can happen there – whether it is an accident or intentional. However, in Silverlake Park, people would not want to have security measures in the same category of the ones at Times Square, simply because it is not a target, "and terrorists don't know Staten Island[14]". People have explained how they believe that the counterterrorism measures are good and needed in Manhattan, but not in the other boroughs, or at least not as much. For example, they would say that it is important to secure the St. George Terminal on Staten Island or the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge connecting Brooklyn to Staten Island, but it would be senseless to

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[12] Interview, November 14, 2018
[13] Conversation, September 18, 2018
[14] Conversation, October 8, 2018

secure other parts of the borough, unless there are certain events going on, such as the TCS New York City Marathon which starts at Staten Island. This would mean that Staten Island is not as secured against terrorism as Manhattan, but this makes sense to New Yorkers and tourists alike. Manhattan, on the other hand, has to be heavily secured according to most people I have spoken to. The following is from one of the interviews I conducted:

> "Like Midtown, is obviously, there are tons of people and tons of giant office buildings. And, that's where you want to go, and that's where they have these, uh, security measures anyway. So, it's just, it seems logical[15]".

However, not all of Manhattan has to be secured on the same level, and as explained above it is not secured in the same way. Times Square is perceived as a place which is a target for terrorists, same goes for the World Trade Centre (amongst others). In this way, respondents explained that they believe that these highly visited and trafficked places need to be placed at a higher level of security – both counterterrorism measures and other measures, such as traffic control, have to be implemented there.

Figure 3.4: Example of a multiplicity of contexts. New York City is a context within the United States of America, but in New York City, Manhattan is one of the five boroughs and can be seen as another (smaller) context. In Manhattan, there are different areas, with a different amount of security, of which five are mentioned in this figure.

The above is related to a third factor of the context: the city's characteristics. New York City is a busy city, with many people in it. One 30-year-old Staten Island resident explained this aspect as being very relevant to the city's terrorism threat: "This is where an attack is going to be." "If you want to attack someone, you're going to want the maximum death toll. If you have the maximum death toll when there's maximum number of people, and in America maximum number of people are in New York City[16]." Thus, according to him, and many others I have

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[15] Interview November 18, 2018
[16] Interview, October 21, 2018

spoken to, New York City is an attractive target for terrorists. Also, because they see New York City as the "symbol of American capitalism" as a 51-year-old female I interviewed explained:

> "Uh, but I think, you know, we're a huge city and a huge symbol of American capitalism and I think it's only a matter of time before we have another, uh, big attack. I think people, you know, try their best to anticipate and keep the city safe, but ultimately, like, bad people are bad people and if they want to attack you, they are going to[17]."

3.3.2 Visualisations and hashtags: the role of the (social) media

Securitisation is not only done through speech acts, but it can also be done visually: visual securitisation (Hansen 2011). Different mediums (speech, print and electronic) are not neutral in their communicative impact (Williams 2003). The medium that transmits the communication fundamentally influences the conditions of the production and reception of communicative acts. Images are in need of further empirical and theoretical attention. Because of new technologies, it is possible to have real-time (global) television coverage, and the Internet and cell phones with camera and video-recording capacity have changed the relationship between producers and consumers, and between elites and audiences. The real-time images of the 9/11 attacks, appear to have had a decisive impact on the adoption and abandonment of foreign policies (*ibid*). First of all, the role of the media will be discussed; for example newspapers, radio stations, and television stations. Then, the role of social media platforms will be discussed. And finally, movies and documentaries will be explored in the process of legitimising the securitisation of terrorism and the acceptance of counterterrorism measures.

As explained above, the context of the 9/11 attacks played an important role for New Yorkers in accepting the security measures: the attack was in their city, and their family, friends and acquaintances were killed. However, this is not necessarily the same for people from other places in the United States – and even from other places in the world. They did not see, hear and smell the attacks and their aftermath as close as New Yorkers did. However, they were able to see the attacks live from their televisions, or read it in the newspapers of the following days. This is where visuals of the 9/11 attacks come in: especially the people who were not immediately in the vicinity of the World Trade Centre during the 9/11 attacks, or who had no direct view on them, remember that they were watching television when the breaking news broadcast was aired, and they could see the World Trade Centre on their television. This is a moment in their lives which they all explained as 'you know where you were, and what you were doing when you saw the Twin Towers collapse'. Many explained how these images and videos of (primarily) the World Trade Centre, and the people falling to their deaths and the eventual destruction of the two iconic towers, largely influenced their opinion on terrorism and the threat terrorists pose to the United States. As noted before, Americans thought they were relatively safe from international terrorism before the 9/11 attacks, but this view changed drastically afterwards. The television (and radio) broadcasts, which many people saw or listened to, thus played a very important role in the possibility of securitising terrorism which in turn led to the securitisation of space. And even today, seventeen years after the attacks, the image of the burning Twin Towers is in everybody's minds when you talk about terrorism, especially in New York City. You do not have to be born before September 11, 2001 to know

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[17] Interview, November 18, 2018

what happened at the World Trade Centre that day, and how it has changed the world – everybody knows what has happened that day and what it meant for the world of today. The role of the media in visual securitisation does not stop at the 9/11 attacks, but it continues today with other attacks which are happening throughout the world. One example in which media is perceived to be of importance to securitisation is the following: pictures and videos after terrorist attacks are shown online and on television. These images can be quite shocking and gory, with blood, dead and injured people, and material destruction. This has more impact on people than simply stating that an attack has happened. People give meaning through images and videos and in this case, she explained that this is exactly why terrorism is so bad: because of the death and destruction it brings.

The media also plays a role in legitimising security measures, which makes people accept the securitisation of space. For example, after the 2017 Times Square car incident, news outlets[18] reported how the bollards stopped the car, in this way preventing more injuries and possibly deaths. A 45-year-old New Yorker I met at Times Square told me about the existence of these articles, and that it certainly influences him on how he thinks about the necessity of counterterrorism measures, and security measures in general. After the 2016 Nice truck attack and the 2016 Berlin truck attack, he was thinking to himself "where were the bollards?", primarily because New York City has so many bollards and they have proven to be "an essential part of the city[19]". The same can be seen from the following quotation on One World Trade Centre: "I heard on the news that the Freedom Tower is a target for terrorists", so that is why he believes that the heavily-armed police officers, bollards, cameras, and all the other counterterrorism measures are needed and good at the World Trade Centre[20].

The media furthermore helps in making people more security-aware: there are campaigns through the media in which reporters talk to security experts who then explain how New York City (and the United States in general) cannot be kept safe without the help of ordinary people[21]. Certain shows would invite an expert on terrorism, something I watched myself after suspicious powder-filled letters were send to democrats and CNN in October 2018. These experts explain what they are doing to keep us safe, and they explain the 'see something, say something' campaign: if you really want to be safe, you have to be aware of your surroundings, and if you do not trust something or someone, go to a police officer or MTA personnel. "So it means, like, anything that's suspicious or a package that is unattended in the subway, then feel free to go ahead and alert a train conductor or anybody that's working or

Figure 3.5: 'See something, say something' printed on the stairs at 42 St. Times Square subway station.

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[18] See for example USA Today: https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/05/18/what-stopped-car-times-square-closer-look-bollards/101851466/ or CNN https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/18/us/new-york-times-square-car-pedestrians/index.html

[19] Conversation, October 22, 2018

[20] Conversation, October 28, 2018

[21] Interview, November 16, 2018

police officer and they will come and investigate it[22]". This campaign is also done throughout public transportation, with the words 'see something, say something' on stairs, advertisement boards, countdown clocks, and through broadcasting systems in the subways, buses or stations. During my fieldwork in New York City, I have experienced two instances of left bags, and these are examples of the impact of 'see something, say something'. The first time, two duffel bags were left in the St. George ferry terminal, and a passenger walked up to the security guards to tell them about the bags. These security guards then circled the bags, and a bomb-sniffing dog was brought up to the bags to sniff them. As they reacted to the bags, police was called and the package was removed – a police officer picked it up and took it inside the police office at the terminal. The second time was inside the Staten Island Ferry, on my way to Manhattan. A tourist left his bag inside the ferry, while watching the Statue of Liberty. A DOT employee saw this and asked us who the bag belonged to. As we did not know, he went outside and asked the passengers there, upon which he found the tourist to which the bag belonged.

Social media also plays a role in accepting counterterrorism measures, and the securitisation of terrorism and space. Social media is in this sense primarily a way of 'showing' you are against terrorism, and as a way to converse with others in how unwanted terrorism is. As a result of these conversations, people can become more willing to have space securitised. As explained by a 49-year-old male who lives in Staten Island, he had a discussion with his European friends after the 2015 Paris attacks. He has lived in Paris during his student years, and he had expected Europe's main cities to have the same levels of counterterrorism measures as New York City, as he sees European capitals as terrorist targets. As there were less counterterrorism measures installed in France, as the Bastille Day truck attack also showed, he felt confident in New York City's ability to defend people from terrorist attacks, and he defended the counterterrorism measures of the city by saying that European cities should implement them as well and look at New York City as a counterterrorism model[23]. Furthermore, after the Charlie Hebdo attack, everyone was suddenly Charlie: #JeSuisCharlie. This hashtag became an "outlet for sympathy, unity and outrage" (Kleeman 2015). It stood for the refusal to be silenced regardless of the threat of violence, whether you are a journalist or not (*ibid*). Another example I regularly heard when talking about the role of social media was the social media aftermath of the 2015 Paris attacks. In the 24 hours after the attacks, more than 70 million people shared their support and prayers for Paris through Instagram (Laurent 2015). Again, hashtags were used to show support, examples are #PrayForParis, #JeSuisParis and #PeaceForParis (*ibid*). Facebook made it possible to filter your profile picture with the French flag as another way to show your support to Parisians (Feeney 2015). Even the respondents older than 70 years old explained that they have Facebook, and that they see these kinds of hashtags and images on their feed – even when they only befriend their grandchildren as a 72-year-old male New Yorker I met on Times Square told me. Primarily the younger respondents (20-50 years old) explained that they use social media as a way to express themselves about certain subjects, such as terrorist attacks. They explained that the threshold to say something online is lower, so it is easier to engage in discussions below news items, for example. Many also felt that they had to say something about the attacks, primarily because so many of their friends or followers also said something about it – whether it is a Facebook post, or a picture of

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[22] Interview, October 17, 2018
[23] Conversation, October 19, 2018

the French flag. They would also talk with their friends and family about the attacks in real life, but their online profiles were also an important outlet to them. As one person put it "you don't want to be the only one of your friends who doesn't have a French flag filter[24]". As people would post how horrible the attacks are, people would discuss with others (both online and in real life) how important it is to step up to terrorism and to take measures against it – again: "where were the bollards?" Thus, social media also played a role as a platform for online discussions on the necessity of securitising space and the need to do something against terrorists. This can be seen as a securitisation of terrorism by ordinary people, as they have conversations with other ordinary people on how terrorism is a threat to our way of life, and how it must be stopped. And in this, they accept the counterterrorism measures which are either already implemented, or being implemented.

A final way in which visuals play a role in legitimising security measures are movies and documentaries which show certain events to an audience. One example I have heard is the movie 'World Trade Center', directed by Oliver Stone (IMDb n.d.). Movies and documentaries bring you 'into the lives' of the characters, and this creates a 'bond' between the audience and the character. If you have ever watched a movie you believe is really well made and acted, you might be drawn into the movie, as if you are there. That is what many explained as what happened when they watched 'World Trade Center'. You can feel the emotions of Nicolas Cage's character John McLoughlin – an NYPD officer who got stuck in the World Trade Centre as it fell down (IMDb n.d.). Written or told stories are one way to understand the horrors seen and felt by the people in the towers, but a movie brings it 'better'. The movie brings you into the events of the 9/11 attacks, and show a portrayal of how it must have been for a group of people inside the towers during and after the attacks. Through the movie, respondents who had watched it, felt quite connected to the events of that day, and they lived through them in another way. It brought many emotions of that day back, some respondents said they had to cry during watching. Other movies and documentaries also made people feel positive towards the securitisation of terrorism and the resulting counterterrorism measures. Netflix airs a series of documentaries which shows planned attacks which failed, and how security agencies over the world stopped them before they could be undertaken (Terrorism Close Calls, Netflix Original). A 26-year-old New Yorker who watched the documentaries explained that some of the planned attacks came really close, but that security agencies stopped them. That is why he felt positive about the counterterrorism measures, although he was somewhat uncomfortable with intelligence gathering – unless there are sound reasons to collect intelligence on certain people. Furthermore, he felt it was apparently needed to keep securing the city against terrorists, as plots are still being stopped "as we speak[25]".

The media thus play an important role in the securitisation of terrorism, and this role can be explained through looking at visuals from the 9/11 attacks, but also from other attacks, such as the attacks in Europe. People explained how the media 'confirmed' what they were already thinking: that counterterrorism measures are necessary to stop attacks, or to lessen their impact at the least. People read and/or listen to the media that resonates their own ideas and worldviews. And their friends and family probably also feel that way, so in that sense, when the media says something, people may feel that it's true and talk about it to their family as well.

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[24] Conversation, October 20, 2018
[25] Conversation, November 29, 2018

So, in that sense, the media plays a role, because they can decide what news gets broadcasted; what the people hear about. And they can reach a large audience. They can frame certain incidents as terrorism and others as 'another shooting' and in this way influence public opinion on the extent of the 'problem'.

3.3.3 Politicians

Interestingly, most of the people I have spoken to stated that to them, politicians do not play a large role in their acceptance of counterterrorism measures. However, they explained that there are people who are very easily influenced by politicians. I have only spoken to a handful of people who actually told me that they believe what politician say. One of them was a security guard on his way home from Manhattan, who I met in the Staten Island Ferry. He said to be a fanatic Trump supporter, and he said that President Trump's immigration plans were very good, as he believed that immigrants are dangerous for the national security of the United States. He believed that Muslims were terrorists, and that they should be banned from entering the country, or at least screened very strictly. When asked why he thought this, he said that terrorists throughout Europe are ISIS members, the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by Muslims, and other attacks in New York City and throughout the United States were also perpetrated by Muslims, such as the Orlando nightclub shooting on June 12, 2016[26]. While this respondent had a very outspoken opinion on who terrorists are (Muslims) and what the problem is (immigration), most respondents were not so outspoken. Although many respondents said they felt that politicians had no influence on them, they did tell me that directly after the 9/11 attacks (for the older respondents), the framing in both the media and by politicians did shape their idea of terrorism and understanding of it being a problem to the United States which needs to be solved. But they downplayed the influence politicians had on them, as they said that the attacks hit home, and that everyone knows someone who either died or was present at the World Trade Centre, or that you know someone who lost someone.

In an interview, a 25-year-old male who works near the Empire State Building told me what he thought of the role of politicians in impacting people's opinions.

> Q: "[… P]oliticians have an impact on how people think about issues?"
> A: "Uhm, yes definitely. Especially I think in the direct aftermath of 9/11 and then getting into the Iraq war. The politicians were in the driver seat there, I mean. But now we still have these wars going on we pretend aren't happening. People in the United, Americans are not thinking about like, those actual wars. I think 9/11 was a long time ago, uhm, so politicians demagogue like ISIS. I mean look at Trump, he certainly did. Uhm, it's not quite the same like it used to be. Ten years ago, I think the politicians had much more power, like, scaring people or whatever. But there hasn't really been anything since[27]."

A 70-year-old male, for example, believed that politicians use people's fear to gain popularity. They use the media to say something is a problem, for example Islamist terrorism, and the media shows their speeches and opinions, and, in this way, people's fears are heightened because both politicians and the media give attention to Islamist terrorism. While, in his

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[26] Conversation, September 19, 2018
[27] Interview, November 29, 2018

opinion, terrorists in the United States are primarily white males with legally bought guns who shoot people, such as the Pittsburgh attack, which was one week before we talked[28]. During an interview, a 73-year-old male who is a retired journalist, explained that politicians use a culture of fear to get votes. He explained that, especially during election times such as the midterms in November, politicians use the frailty that came into being after the 9/11 attack. The idea that Americans are no longer protected from terrorists is used to gain followers and popularity. And he believes that there are many people who decide to vote for someone who says things such as "Muslims are dangerous, they are all terrorists" because they are afraid, easy to manipulate and no longer do research[29]. One of my main respondents came with an example of how easily people are influenced by certain politicians. During the 2016 presidential elections, the Jimmy Kimmel Live[30] show asked Hillary Clinton supporters what they thought of certain quotes which they said were Clinton's, but they were actually Donald Trump's quotes. Many people suddenly agreed with the quotes, because they thought they were Clinton's. Thus, this example shows, according to one of my main respondents, that Americans are easily manipulated and believe what a politician says. So, when a politician says that terrorism is a problem, they believe it is a problem. Even when there are other problems. My respondent was someone who said he thinks twice about what someone else says, and he tries to find out if something is true or not. For terrorism, he was not entirely sure whether it was a really big issue. He started searching websites and articles on the Internet, and this caused him to believe that there are bigger problems in the United States, such as the drug problems in New York City or the natural disasters throughout the country. He claimed to be one of the people who do not believe everything the media or politicians say[31].

Many respondents furthermore explained that politicians and governmental agencies provide information on the current terrorist threat and claim that terrorists are coming to the United States to attack them, but they do not give that much attention to them anymore. They said that they know that the United States is a target, and they know they can be attacked, but they do not need politicians or anyone else telling them that anymore. It is so embedded within the mindset of New Yorkers that the city will be attacked again, that they no longer need politicians to tell them that. However, local politics do play a role in their acceptance of securitising space on a more daily level. One example is the TCS New York City Marathon of 2017, for which security was ramped up after the 2017 West Side truck attack just days before the marathon. Mayor Bill de Blasio and New York Governor Andrew Cuomo both explained that additional measures would be taken to make sure the marathon is safe (ABC7 2017). Many respondents did explain that they do listen to these kinds of announcements, as it affects their daily lives in a direct way: roads are closed off, subway and bus services are changed, there are more bag checks, and so on and so forth. They also explained that they give more value to a city or state authority who says something regarding public safety than to a national body, such as the President. This, because they believe that the local level government knows more about the situation in New York, and they know more about life in the city and how people will respond to certain security measures. So, when there is an announcement being made such as

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[28] Conversation, November 5, 2018
[29] Interview, November 5, 2018
[30] See: Jimmy Kimmel Live. 2016. "Clinton Supporters Agree With Donald Trump Quotes." August 4, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IzC-l7tovFk
[31] Conversation, November 7, 2018

the increased security measures during the marathon, they usually agree with the Mayor or whoever makes the announcement, as it is local level government. Thus, to a certain extent, politics still plays a role, but it is primarily local politicians who are listened to. People explained that it is nowadays common sense that security measures are needed to prevent a terrorist attack from happening. Only after certain events do they listen to what the political body in New York (City) has to say about it, and whether there are new changes implemented or not – such as the 1,500 bollards being installed after two deadly vehicle attacks in Manhattan (Katersky & Shapiro 2018).

3.4 The 'new normal': normalisation of counterterrorism measures

In the final part of this chapter, I will discuss whether the counterterrorism measures in New York City should be seen as exceptional or not. What if an extraordinary threat (such as terrorism after the 9/11 attacks) becomes 'normal'? What does it mean for theories of securitisation when people do not see terrorism as extraordinary, but rather something of contemporary life? And if the threat becomes normal, what happens to the way extraordinary measures are looked at? Many New Yorkers I have spoken to, said that the counterterrorism measures implemented after the 9/11 attacks were nothing normal. At the time, the installed counterterrorism measures were exceptional. For example, soldiers began patrolling heavily-trafficked stations, and checkpoints at tunnels going into Manhattan were established. This was not done prior to the 9/11 attacks. Therefore, at the time of their installation, these measures were never seen before, and never imagined as necessary, and therefore exceptional.

They were deemed necessary, and still are seen that way, to protect the way of life in New York City and to protect the city's freedom. When I went to Manhattan by car to see the Christmas markets and have lunch at Chelsea Market, I saw this myself. I was sitting in the passenger seat, so I had the opportunity to observe the tunnel entrances very well. There were state troopers outside, and the familiar sight of police cars with their emergency lights on. As I explained that in the Netherlands, we do not have police stationed in front of tunnels, my housemate chuckled and said, "this is New York[32]".

One interviewee who was around 16 years old at the time of the 9/11 attacks, explained that there was not much law enforcement around public spaces before 9/11. But then the attacks happened, and everything changed. Law enforcement was present in a very visual way, with soldiers on and around Ground Zero, and a lot of police vehicles. "Especially in open areas, where people congregate like Rockefeller Centre, […] big train station areas, bus stations, uh, tourist areas like empire State Building or World Trade or whatever. Initially there was a large presence of law enforcement. Over time it became a little less, but it never retracted to the way it was before. Even now, especially when you go over to Penn Station, which is just over here, there is uniformed army reserve, or army personnel, just hanging around[33]".

Everyone I have spoken to, whether this was during an interview or on the streets of New York City, explained that they see the counterterrorism measures as something 'normal' in today's world. They explained how 9/11 changed the city and its security apparatus. The following is an excerpt from a conversation with a woman (approximately 40 years old) on the Staten Island Ferry:

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[32] Conversation, November 25, 2018
[33] Interview, October 2, 2018

Is there always police on the ferry? Uhum [yes]. Ever since 9/11. And security dogs in the front. They're always on the ferry, on every trip. And they get off at Manhattan and make sure that on every ferry there are a couple of policemen. *And they're armed?* Uhum, of course. Gotta protect us, right? When something happens, they're here. *So, this is normal here?* Uhum, ever since 9/11. All kinds of security[34].

According to securitisation theories, "[…] by labelling it as *security* an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means" (Buzan et al. 1998 in Williams 2003: 514). However, as the above fragment shows, New Yorkers do no longer see the counterterrorism measures as extraordinary measures. They see them as part of daily-life, as part of today's world. When the counterterrorism measures were first installed, they already knew they would not be temporary, it would at least take as long as there are terrorists out there who want to target the United States. When the Bush Administration started the War on Terror, they understood that these measures were "here to stay" – they would be incorporated into the city and would never go away. It is now part of the city, just like the traffic lights and buildings (see chapter 5). Thus, even though 'terrorism' is still securitised, as people view it as an existential threat today as they did after the 9/11 attacks, the 'extraordinary' measures are now becoming 'ordinary'. The NYPD concrete blocks or concrete barriers which are placed after an attack, such as the 2017 West Side truck attack (Otterman 2017) are at many locations replaced by bollards or planters. The 'makeshift' security measures implemented directly after an attack are being replaced by something more permanent, the new security measures are embedded in public space – for example the bollards and reinforced seating at Times Square. Would this still make them emergency measures? When asked this question, many respondents answered with a simple 'no'. First of all, these measures are now so embedded in the public spaces of New York City, that New Yorkers do not even pay attention to them anymore. The counterterrorism measures are located throughout the city, although they are primarily placed in Manhattan. There are bollards and planters around Union Square for example, and soldiers patrol Penn station and Grand Central station on a daily basis. During an interview with a 40-year-old director of sales at an international company in lower Manhattan, I was told the following regarding the normalisation of security measures in New York City:

> "[…] well you look at it, but the local people, we don't even see it [counterterrorism measures]. We live with it. It's so normal to see them, so we don't see them because of that[35]."

However, people do not think the counterterrorism measures are 'normal', as this would imply that it is normal to be possibly killed by terrorists. They explained in this sense that it is normal in the sense of being there every day: every day there are heavily-armed police officers, bollards, bag checks and so on and so forth. However, were there no threat of terrorism, these measures would not be necessary and not installed. New Yorkers see the counterterrorism measures thus as 'normal' as far as them being there every day and being a necessary part of the city. Another interviewee, who is a 29-year-old architect who works at Times Square, explained the following:

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[34] Conversation, October 9, 2018
[35] Interview, November 14, 2018

> *Q: "So it's been 17 years since 9/11. Do you think the counterterrorism measures are normal?"*
> A: "Yes. They've become part of everyday life in Times Square now. Yeah. So, for local New Yorkers it's not too much of a big deal. If you haven't been out to Manhattan and Times Square a lot, then you'd be really surprised to see so much security. Also, in train stations, I forgot to mention that, not just in Times Square but big stations also like Union Square, there is police officers, they set up tables outside those turnstiles. So, they did tell us that you may be randomly selected so that they can check your backpack for any suspicious items[36]."

In theories of securitisation, a particular speech act becomes a security act – thus a securitisation – in its casting of the issue as one of an existential threat, which in turn calls for extraordinary measures that go beyond the routines and norms of everyday life (Williams 2003). But in New York City the counterterrorism measures are now part of daily life, and people have changed their behaviour and routines to meet them. For example, people arrive earlier at a Yankees game because of all the security measures installed at the stadium. Another example is the World Trade Centre, where no garbage cans are placed, due to security risks according to a short conversation with a security guard of the Memorial. You have to bring a bag with you to dispose of your garbage elsewhere, or search for sanitation personnel who walk around with garbage cans. These measures could be argued to be no longer exceptional in this sense, as people have had time to adapt their behaviour to them. When regular travellers on the ferry enter the terminal, many already walk by the bomb-sniffing dogs, to have their bags being checked by them, without being asked to do that.

New Yorkers did not talk about counterterrorism measures as being 'extraordinary', they explained to not notice them anymore. Furthermore, respondents explained that these counterterrorism measures simply 'pop up' without warning. Tourists were the only respondents who believed the counterterrorism measures to be extraordinary, although their views differed greatly. Many American tourists, and tourists from big cities such as Paris, said that the counterterrorism measures are normal in a city as big as New York City, especially taking its history into account. They were not surprised at all to see these measures, and they thought it completely normal in today's urban landscape. Most tourists who perceived the counterterrorism measures as extraordinary explained to come from small cities or rural areas, in which no counterterrorism measures are installed. Mabee (2007) explains that securitisation theorists discuss how persistent threats become institutionalised, and it would be possible to argue that happened to the threat of terrorism as well. As explained, terrorism is still seen as a persistent threat, and the United States has built up a whole apparatus to deal with this threat, one of these is the Department of Homeland Security which was created in 2002 as a response to the 9/11 attacks (Mabee 2007; Department of Homeland Security 2018). The idea of terrorism as being an existential threat has been institutionalised in the minds of New Yorkers (and Americans) as well, and also on the streets with all the counterterrorism measures throughout the city. The threat of terrorism is still justified through the discourse of security, as has been shown by all the previous quotes. People (tourists and New Yorkers alike) explain that counterterrorism measures are necessary, as New York City is still a target, and terrorists still try to attack the city with some terrorists being successful. So, in order to keep the people in the

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[36] Interview, October 17, 2018

city safe, it is necessary to have all these counterterrorism measures. People in the streets explained that they feel like New York City will survive anything and that they cannot and will not be afraid.

Thus, even though terrorism is still seen as an existential threat to the people in New York City, and the United States in general, the resulting counterterrorism measures in New York City are no longer seen as extraordinary. On the contrary, they are spoken of as being normal, and part of daily city life. It is simply a part of New York City, there to stay. A 37-year-old woman in Manhattan explained this discussion: "It is just a necessary part of the city[37]". Counterterrorism measures have become institutionalised and normalised in the minds of Americans and institutions that try to keep the county safe.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have analysed the way people legitimise the securitisation of space, and briefly how securitisation has impacted space and people's behaviour. According to McDonald (2008) securitisation theorists lack through their underdevelopment of the audience in the theory. This research has looked at the audience, at the ordinary people living in and visiting New York City, and how the audience perceives the counterterrorism measures and how they legitimise them. Furthermore, it has explored the influence of context, another point of criticism made my McDonald (2008) as he claims theories of securitisation to define context too narrowly, with the moment on intervention only. However, as this chapter has shown, context plays a significant role in the legitimisation of counterterrorism measures for people in New York City.

After the 9/11 attacks, (international) terrorism was articulated as a key issue to the security of the United States, the attacks strengthened the idea that there was a new threat environment which needed unprecedented kinds of action (Mabee 2007). Suddenly, the threat of international terrorism was a threat to cities inside the United States, rather than places outside the United States. However, this articulation was not only done through speech acts, such as many securitisation theorists explain. It was also done through visuals, such as the front pages in figure 4.3 show. Furthermore, President George W. Bush talked about the visuals as well, and he called the attacks an attempt to destroy the United States' way of life and freedom (Bush 2001b). Respondents explained to agree with these statements and the idea that terrorism is an existential threat to the United States, and therefore they agreed with the securitisation of space which manifested itself in the creation of counterterrorism measures. All respondents claimed the United States to be one of the top targets for terrorists, although many did not see terrorism as an existential threat anymore. They felt this way immediately after the 9/11 attacks but explained that after living through multiple terrorist attacks in the city, they know life goes on. Furthermore, there has not been an attack with as many casualties in New York City as the 9/11 attacks.

While terrorism may no longer be seen as an existential threat by many respondents, all respondents legitimated the counterterrorism measures as it is 'better safe than sorry'. The securitisation of space has been accepted by the audience, as many believed an attack to be possible. Certain urban spaces are protected by counterterrorism measures, such as the World Trade Centre and Times Square in which many measures are installed, whilst other urban spaces have no visible counterterrorism measures. This is where context plays an important role: some

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[37] Conversation, November 26, 2018

spaces are perceived as possible terrorist targets, while others are not. However, one of the weaknesses of theories of securitisation is its theorists ignoring the importance context plays (McDonald 2008). This chapter has shown that the 9/11 attacks can be seen as a facilitating condition for the acceptance of the securitisation of space in New York City: many people saw the attacks live, either in person or through the television, and they explained the counterterrorism measures to be necessary to prevent other attacks. After the 9/11 attacks, the city has experienced multiple terrorist attacks and as such, respondents legitimated the securitisation of space, and the installation of counterterrorism measures after newer attacks. Furthermore, context is an important aspect, as not all spaces in New York City are securitised in the same way. There are spaces with a high visibility of counterterrorism measures, such as Times Square in Manhattan, but also spaces with no visible counterterrorism measures, such as Silverlake Park in Staten Island. As such, space gets differentialised into possible 'dangerous' and 'safe' locations, the former being secured spaces and the latter unsecured (or less secured) spaces. Perceived terrorist targets are securitised by many visible counterterrorism measures, whilst spaces that are not categorised as terrorist target are secured less.

Finally, this chapter has provided a discussion on the normalisation of the securitisation of space. Whilst the counterterrorism measures were seen as extraordinary immediately after the 9/11 attacks, people now perceive them as normal. The city has experienced many terrorist attacks, and other cities throughout the world as well, and respondents believed counterterrorism measures to be necessary to counter the threat terrorists pose. However, counterterrorism measures are no longer seen as extraordinary, but rather as a normal aspect of urban space in New York City. Temporary barriers are being replaced with beautified barriers, such as bollards and planters. The counterterrorism measures are part of daily life, and people have altered their routines and behaviour due to the securitisation of space.

4. The impact of counterterrorism measures on urban space in New York City

Q: *"So, since you're an architect how do you like the looks of the counterterrorism measures installed in Times Square?"*
A: "I don't like it very much. It still looks like a warzone a little bit; aside from the café seating and the picknick area. Like, the concrete blocks, that is a big red flag right there – it is not that friendly. You'd get the feeling of there coming an attack. As designers, and industrial designers, if they would actually turn them into a flower pot and sort of conceal that kind of feeling, that would help make the place a bit more relaxed. […] Well, you still need to maintain the concrete there to block out cars. But in the flower pots, there is probably also concrete, and it looks way better. Or they could spray-paint the blocks with different colours on them and have like "Welcome to New York" or like, put advertisements on it[38]."

This chapter will answer the first sub-question "how have counterterrorism measures impacted different spaces and people's behaviour in New York City?" It will do so by looking at the impact of counterterrorism measures on urban spaces in New York City. This part will explain how New Yorkers and tourists talked about the counterterrorism measures, and how they impact space in their opinion, whilst chapter four has explored the emergence of counterterrorism measures after the 9/11 attacks. It will be about people's experiences regarding counterterrorism measures in urban spaces. Because of this change in urban space, and the changes European cities such as Amsterdam are making in urban spaces, it is interesting to examine the effects of counterterrorism on urban space and the way people experience it.

The ubiquity of security measures in urban space is, as argued by Németh & Hollander (2010), a new type of land use which alters the urban landscape. Since the 9/11 attacks, both public and private officials in most Western cities have used a discourse of counterterror security as their rationale for tightening security and fortifying streets, sidewalks and spaces – and in this way threaten the very publicness that makes cities vital and attractive (Németh & Hollander 2010). Some claim that these measures limit civil liberties as they control behaviour, limit movement and downgrade the quality of life in cities (*ibid*). The instalment of security measures in urban spaces has implications for the experience of the everyday urban landscape (Coaffee et al. 2009). Since the counterterrorism measures in New York City have been installed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, and following attacks, New Yorkers have been well-known with these measures for a while – see chapter four. According to Mueller & Stewart (2018), the impact of terrorism on actual behaviour is in general fairly minor, as opposed to opinions as registered in polls. However, how does this relate to the counterterrorism measures, which are a direct result of terrorism? As will be shown in this chapter, counterterrorism measures do influence people's behaviour, although in a somewhat subtle way. First of all, this chapter will shortly explore the designing out of terrorism in urban space in New York City. Then it turns to the use of Lefebvre's spatial triad to explore the impact of counterterrorism measures on the production of space in New York City.

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[38] Interview, October 17, 2018

4.1 The designing out of terrorism in urban space

Until recently, the security techniques that have traditionally been used in urban spaces were largely based on policing or military-style approaches that seek to secure access to risky locations through robust physical interventions (GCDN 2018). Security cordons, barriers, and enhanced surveillance is used to make spaces safer through the manipulation of the built environment. In this way, the attractiveness and physical access to possible targets is reduced. In practice, this has meant the mass use of bollards, security barriers, and high-visibility policing. In recent years, there has been a need to use specialised street furniture, due to the frequency, complexity and death-toll of vehicular attacks. Specialised street furniture can help decrease the risk of this type of attack in ways that balance the effectiveness of intervention measures with their acceptability of those spaces (*ibid*). These benches are covert security measures: they are integrated in the physical environment in such a way that the untrained eye may not see them as being a security measure (Németh & Hollander 2010). These unobtrusive measures are experienced in a different way than the obtrusive measures such as the heavily-armed police officers, and the many concrete blocks that block off walkways and bicycle paths. The predominant view that is emerging is that security measures in cities should now be as unobtrusive as possible (GCDN 2018). This part has been divided into two smaller parts to explore the impact these measures have on urban space: the first part will explore the obtrusive counterterrorism measures, and the second part will explore the unobtrusive counterterrorism measures, and how both measures have impacted space. This division has been chosen as many respondents already divided the different counterterrorism measures in this way and tend to prefer the unobtrusive measures. The counterterrorism measures below are by no means claimed to be all counterterrorism measures present in New York City, but they are the most present and cited counterterrorism measures for this research.

4.1.1. Obtrusive counterterrorism measures

Many counterterrorism measures in New York City were seen as obtrusive; as unwelcoming and very prominent in a negative way. Respondents linked the bollards, heavily-armed police officers and bomb-sniffing dogs immediately to (counter)terrorism, and these were believed to be the 'real' counterterrorism measures. Many respondents did not like them, however did appreciate them. They were seen as improving safety (more on that in chapter six), while decreasing the aesthetics of the urban spaces in which they are installed.

Multiple respondents at the World Trade Centre, for example, felt intimidated by the obtrusive security measures. What I noticed immediately during my first visit to the World Trade Centre, was the multitude of bollards, which are placed on every sidewalk. Many people who I met at the World Trade Centre said that the whole location resembles a 'warzone', simply because of all the bollards, National Guard soldiers and police presence. However, not everyone minded the bollards: one respondent told me that he does not mind the bollards being there, as it is necessary, but "they don't have to be ugly[39]". Others said that the bollards are simply more concrete in a city known as the 'concrete jungle'. In Times Square there are also many bollards, and people were wondering why these were even installed, as they are seen to decrease urban space and aesthetics. People do believe that pedestrians have to be protected from vehicles, but in a different way, for example through more granite benches or planters, or even by painting

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[39] Conversation, November 13, 2018

49

the bollards in bright colours such as applied to the concrete blocks at the World Trade Centre, in order to keep the space more open (see figure 5.1 below). Around the World Trade Centre buildings, the roads are blocked off by moveable barriers, and the vehicle security centre is perceived as a military-style way of policing, as many respondents felt this type of security necessary in a warzone such as Afghanistan rather than in a liberal city like New York City (see figure 4.2 below). Next to the vehicle security centre, the other entrance points for vehicles have a security booth and movable barriers. Due to the vehicle checks, there are few 'normal' cars on the surface of the World Trade Centre, most are parked in the garage underneath the World Trade Centre. As a result, most of the cars in the 'secure zone' (NYPD 2013) are (un)marked NYPD cars, or vehicles of other law enforcement agencies, thus, increasing the

*Figure 4.1: Painted concrete blocks with flowers at the World Trade Centre*

Figure 4.2: Vehicle security centre at the World Trade Centre

visibility of security measures. Many people believed the bollards inside the 'secure zone' to be useless, even though they could stop a potential attack, as all cars are already checked, and it is an unpleasant sight which only 'militarises' the World Trade Centre. Many respondents furthermore explained that the enhanced and permanent security measures at the World Trade Centre keeps the 9/11 attacks as a close reminder to what could go wrong. It creates a threat environment, in which people keep wondering when the next attacker will strike. The bollards are also grey, which does not seem to improve the World Trade Centre, while people do appreciate the colourful concrete blocks at the Church St. side. These blocks integrate into the environment, as the place where Two World Trade Centre will come is also painted with many different colours. Interestingly, the painted concrete blocks with flowers at the World Trade Centre were not seen as obtrusive, as they integrate into the environment, and because they are colourful. Other concrete blocks, on the other hand, which have "NYPD" sprayed on them, or which are simply plain concrete blocks, were seen as obtrusive, as they remind people to a threat immediately. One older woman (60-70 years old), for example, explained that in her opinion, the bollards and concrete blocks look visually 'threatening'. Most concrete blocks are placed in such a way that it becomes clear that they are installed to prevent a vehicle from entering a walkway or bicycle path, while the colourful ones at the World Trade Centre are placed in a playful way, which was still seen as a barrier, but a less unwelcoming one.

At the Staten Island Ferry terminals, bollards are present at the entrance to the Whitehall Terminal. It is a row of bollards in front of the entrance, and also another 'ring' of bollards protecting the Peter Minuit Plaza in front of the terminal. People seemed to mind these bollards less, as they somehow blended in with the environment more: they had the same shape and material as the overhead 'roof', and they were placed around the terminal instead, rather than

on the plaza itself. The plaza, however, is protected as well, intentionally or unintentionally, by a curb surrounding different flowers and plants, and there are multiple constructions that make it difficult for vehicles to enter the plaza, such as the different subway entrances and the New Amsterdam Pavilion. The NYPD and USCG also employ security escorts: NYPD/USCG boats that accompany the ferry on its trip between Staten Island and Manhattan (Sedon 2012).

Figure 4.3: An NYPD boat ready to escort the ferry to Manhattan

The presence of the NYPD is appreciated by all respondents, although the way in which they are present is less appreciated. Police officers in itself were not deemed obtrusive, but also not unobtrusive, they were placed somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. The heavily-armed police officers and National Guard soldiers (whether heavily-armed or carrying a pistol) were seen as (extremely) obtrusive. They carry "big guns" to shoot the "bad guys", and are in full armour: helmet, bullet proof vests, and look more threatening than normal police officers. One interviewee (29-year-old male) felt that the bollards and heavily-armed police officers were deteriorating urban space in Times Square. However, if they would put away the guns and gear, he would not mind them that bad. He would still notice them, but their presence would be less forceful, and you would be less forced to look at them, which the armour and gear makes you do according to him. It would also be more pleasant for tourists, as many tourists explained that the primary impact of the heavily-armed police officers on them is the idea that a certain urban space is not safe, and that they are being continuously watched, which makes them wonder if they look suspicious or not. Next to this, the NYPD deploys helicopters. Regularly, I have seen NYPD helicopters fly over the ferry and stay above it for a few minutes. I have also witnessed an NYPD helicopter coming up close to the windows at One World Trade Centre, and NYPD helicopters circling above Times Square. NYPD helicopters also circle above events in the city, such as the TCS New York City Marathon and the Greenwich Halloween Parade. During the Greenwich Halloween Parade, people were less appreciative of the noise the helicopter made, as they were afraid that they could not hear the music of the parade. In the end this was not the case, and they were able to enjoy the parade and explained that it was good practice to have helicopters scanning the perimeter.

NYPD cameras were also categorised as obtrusive measures. Even though the city was inspired by London's 'Ring of Steel' to install over 8,000 cameras after the 9/11 attacks (Garcia 2016). These cameras are used to record all kinds of incidents in the city (*ibid*). Cameras are heavily present in the busy areas of New York City, and in Times Square, they are placed on every junction. The cameras are not hidden, and they are very present, as they have big, white boxes in the middle of the cameras with the NYPD logo on it. There were respondents who said this was fine for them, as they know that they were being watched, whilst others did not like the cameras, as they were too present or seen to violate their privacy.

51

In all three research locations, bomb-sniffing dogs were present, although the frequency differed. At the Staten Island Ferry, these dogs are part of everyday commuter life, and they are in the terminals 24 hours a day. They are seen as friendly dogs, and when it is not busy in the terminals, you are sometimes allowed to pet them, and the handlers play with the dogs. One interviewee (42-year-old female) explained her experience with the dogs at the Staten Island Ferry:

> "Sometimes it makes the impression, like, I'm certainly sure that the dogs are trained but sometimes it makes the impression that, uhm, they certainly search everyone with the heavier luggage, uhm, but I guess because I also ask the guards sometimes if I can pet the dog, it makes me feel that they are a little laid-back about the duties. Uhm, which is, when there are no people coming through, you can certainly do that. But at the same time, if it is a search dog, it has to be a search dog[40]."

Most people did not mind the dogs at all, and in Times Square as well, people would pet the dogs, and the handlers would have a small conversation with those people. Another thing that 'helps' in people's positive attitude towards the bomb-sniffing dogs, is that they are usually Labradors, who are seen as friendly dogs, although I have seen German Shepherds in Times Square. One respondent had a theory regarding this aspect of the counterterrorism measures: by having Labradors instead of German Shepherds, people will feel more comfortable, as Labradors are perceived to be friendlier than German Shepherds. They are also quieter, whilst German Shepherds might bark a lot. For him, this was the reason why people like the dogs, instead of simply accepting them. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses floppy-eared dogs in airports, as they believe these dogs to have a more friendly and calming effect on passengers, particularly children (Cook 2019), and this could be the reason like my respondent said. Two Asian tourists who were walking around Times Square saw one of the bomb-sniffing dogs and they said "Haaaaay" to the dog and asked the handler if they could pet him, and they stayed with the dog for about five minutes before moving on.

To end this part, it is interesting to shortly look at the security in and around private buildings that are accessible to the public. As noted in chapter four, before entering the 9/11 Museum you have to go through a security check which resembles airport security. This is also implemented in multiple other publicly accessible buildings, such as the Empire State Building, Rockefeller Centre, the Statue of Liberty, and the National Museum of the American Indian. My own experience with security checks in public buildings has been different every time, however, there was always some kind of security check. It was striking that even the New York Public Library located in Bryant Park had a bag check, although it was nothing more than a quick look inside my backpack. Many museums had bag checks, which were usually done quickly, I have not gone through a very thorough inspection when entering a museum in which no scanning was done. In this sense, it felt a bit like a show that was put on to give people a safer feeling, although some people claimed to feel the opposite after these 'checks', more on this in chapter six. At the Trump Tower near Central Park, National Guard soldiers and heavily-armed police officers keep watch and visitors are subject to security screening. When I went to the Rockefeller Centre the day after the lighting of the Christmas tree, it was crowded with

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[40] Interview, November 16, 2018

tourists and locals alike who were watching the lights, or simply passing through. There were multiple groups of heavily-armed police officers with bomb-sniffing dogs, and the road was closed down – some of the streets near the tree are closed down regularly until the tree is taken down again (Plitt 2018). What became clear was that there was tight security around the block of Rockefeller Centre, with police cars and fences blocking the roads for cars and police officers standing at these erected roadblocks. Something that has already been briefly touched upon, is the security during

Figure 4.4: Sanitation trucks as a barrier near the finish of the TCS New York City Marathon

events, for example the TCS New York City Marathon and the Greenwich Village Parade. During the Greenwich Village Halloween Parade, I saw snipers on top of the buildings, helicopters hovering above, and people actually called the parade the "Police Parade" before it started, as there was a whole 'convoy' of police vehicles that went ahead of the actual parade: bomb squad vehicles, counterterrorism bureau police officers, K-9 units, police cars, mounted police, and police on scooters[41]. At all events, sanitation trucks filled with sand blocked off roads to make sure vehicles could not enter the roads behind it. Many locals who live near these roads did not appreciate this, as they are unable to travel by car to their house and have to walk a distance of up to a few blocks in some instances.

4.1.2. Unobtrusive counterterrorism measures

In some areas in New York City, security measures are becoming less obtrusive; many security measures are integrated in the physical environment in such a way that the untrained eye may not see them as security measures (Németh & Hollander 2010). Aesthetics were claimed to help people in feeling more relaxed in a space they deemed a possible target for terrorists. Unobtrusive security measures were said to increase the liveability of the urban space in which they were placed, while feelings of safety were still high, as explained by many respondents in Times Square. The pedestrian zones, for example, were seen as an enormous improvement of that space. First of all, it is a safer place, something all respondents claimed. The conversion of Broadway into a pedestrian zone has reduced traffic-related injuries by 33% (Auckland Design Manual n.d.). One respondent, who was sitting on one of the granite benches, explained that he sees the transformation as a positive thing, as he can sit down and watch the cars. He is a New Yorker who enjoys Times Square's vibrancy, and believes that, especially due to the vehicle attacks and incidents around the world, the closing-off of Broadway is a good thing. The chance of a vehicular attack in Times Square has declined, and there are less accidents. Secondly, respondents said that the closing of some parts of Broadway to vehicles is a positive thing, as it brings back pedestrian space. Before the transformation of Times Square, which started in 2009, the pedestrian zones were car lanes. Today, however, these pedestrian zones are the vibrant centre of Times Square, and people are able to relax and enjoy the scenery of Times Square. The project added 13,000 m² pedestrian space, which improved the comfort and amenity of the 400,000 pedestrians who pass through Times Square everyday (Auckland

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[41] Halloween Parade, October 31, 2018

Design Manual n.d.). Due to the increase in space, multiple café seating areas with food trucks can be found in Times Square, next to the street vendors selling hotdogs and bagels. Respondents explained that shopping in Times Square is better now than before the transformation, and the whole area has better accessibility – by foot, for cars it has decreased. All respondents in Times Square were positive about the pedestrian zone, and most said it is a great urban space to sit back and relax. A 25-year-old New Yorker explained "you can sit and chill, watch everyone around you and just have a good time with friends[42]". The police officers also do not bother you, according to him, and the pedestrian zones have created zones for entertainers to make some money from the many tourists going through Times Square. This security measure has in a sense created more opportunities for locals and tourists alike, as you can enjoy Times Square in a relatively safe way, and many people appreciated this. Within the pedestrian zones, and in multiple other locations in New York City, reinforced street furniture can also be seen as an unobtrusive counterterrorism measure. Street furniture, such as the granite benches, have multiple uses for the users of space (see 5.2) and are visually preferred over bollards or concrete blocks. One American tourist explained that camouflaging counterterrorism measures in this way is good to keep people calm, as there are no bollards everywhere you look, and the space looks nicer, as the granite melts in with the overall environment of Times Square[43].

Figure 4.5: Planters on Broadway & 50th Street

Planters, which are basically another form of a bollard or concrete block, were seen as beautiful and colourful, and as creating both a safer and prettier environment in the city. Respondents appreciated planters especially, as they brought plants and flowers into the city, where few trees are found in the streets of primarily Manhattan. One couple of approximately 60 years old I met in Times Square, suggested that the city should partner up with architects to make the concrete barriers nicer to look at, in order to reduce the feeling of walking around a warzone or heavily defended location. They explained that they do not like the sight of the concrete blocks and bollards, and they prefer the planters – which were on the opposite part of the street – more. They believe that people will link planters less to terrorism, or these planters being there to defend them from terrorist attacks. During a conversation at Times Square, a 29-year-old female told me that she believes the counterterrorism measures especially important in busy areas, and that they should be altered to the needs of the people in that area. We were sitting at a table on Broadway and 7th Avenue, which was blocked off from traffic by planters. This, according to her, is an important way of protecting pedestrians from vehicles *and* making sure people can enjoy a location in the best possible way. If the planters were changed to bollards, it would be less enjoyable in this small space, as it is too much steel and concrete in an area that is simply for enjoying the food you bought, or working on your laptop, and all the other uses a table can provide. For her, "it is necessary to have [counterterrorism measures], but

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[42] Conversation, October 18, 2018
[43] Conversation, November 8, 2018

it's not necessary to have them ugly[44]", an opinion many respondents shared. As one interviewee explained, the closing of streets to cars is an aesthetically pleasing security measure. For him, this meant that he could have a picknick with his friends, or simply sit down, in an area that is secured from vehicles, but not closed off in a military style with bollards, but with other types of measures such as planters or specialised street furniture[45].

Warning notices and advertisements against terrorism (e.g. the 'see something, say something' campaign) were placed somewhere between obtrusive and unobtrusive counterterrorism measures. In the end, I have chosen to place them under unobtrusive measures, as most people did not necessarily see them as obtrusive, and others did not notice them at all. In the Staten Island Ferry (terminals), the warning signs were primarily present, in the other locations it was primarily the 'see something, say something' ad campaign. One female respondent (35 years old) did, however, saw the warning signs in the ferry as obtrusive. She explained that these signs are a "red flag" to her, as they are red and have the word 'terrorism' in it; it is a direct link to terrorism and the accompanying threat terrorists pose. This creates an "uneasy" feeling in her and gives her the idea that she has to be constantly on guard while in the ferry (terminals). For her, the warning signs should be altered to get a more neutral appearance, so as to not link to danger immediately by using a red background, which she linked to blood, and the word 'terrorism'. She preferred the 'see something, say something' campaign over the warning signs on terrorism, as she believed that campaign to be more neutral[46]. This is also a reason why the 'see something, say something' campaign is seen by respondents as less obtrusive, even unobtrusive, in relation to terrorism. Although the Department of Homeland Security created the see something, say something campaign as a way to raise public awareness of the indicators of terrorism and terrorism-related crime (DHS n.d.), many respondents thought that this campaign encompasses all types of suspicious or unwanted activities, therefore indicating that it is good to have the campaign, and saying it is not obtrusive. Others said that the warning signs were good, because they create awareness in people: the more people who are watching around, the better. A 40-year-old Staten Island resident I met in the ferry explained that she rather has these warning signs than heavily-armed police officers in the ferry. She believes that this awareness creation is better than anything else, as New Yorkers and tourists alike are the "eyes and ears" of the NYPD, without people looking around, security would be impossible. She did not mind this measure at all, as in her opinion, the signs are embedded into

| Planters | Reinforced street furniture | Pedestrian zones | Security guards | Warning signs | Normal police officers | Bomb-sniffing dogs | Security cameras | Bollards & Concrete (road)blocks | Heavily-armed police officers | Soldiers |

Unobtrusive counterterrorism measures

Obtrusive counterterrorism measures

Figure 4.6: A continuum of counterterrorism measures, according to respondents

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[44] Conversation, November 13, 2018
[45] Interview, October 17, 2018
[46] Conversation, November 11, 2018

the environment of the ferry, as there are multiple (warning) signs hanging around, and she feels that this makes sense in a terminal for mass-transit[47].

4.2 Urban space in New York City and Lefebvre's spatial triad

In *The production of space*, Henry Lefebvre explains a theory of physical, mental and social space (Lefebvre 1991). According to Lefebvre, urban space is not a neutral container but rather a social construct (Leary-Owhin 2015). He explains that every society produces a space which is its own (Lefebvre 1991). He conceptualises space as a triad of concepts: 1) representations of space, 2) spatial practice and 3) representational space (*ibid*), and this is the epistemological foundation of his theory (Watkins 2005). He suggests that space is fundamental to our lived experience of the world, and that every experience is comprised of all three interrelated aspects (*ibid*):

1. Representations of space, or conceived space, is the dominant space in any society, and constructed by professionals and technocrats (Watkins 2005; Merrifield 2006). It is conceptualised space constructed out of symbols, codifications and abstract representations (Watkins 2005), and rather conceived than directly lived (McCann 1999). These representations of space are not neutral, but they impose certain meanings onto urban space, imply how it should be used and not be used and by whom (Leary-Owhin 2015).

2. Spatial practices, or perceived space, embraces "production and reproduction, and the particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation" (Lefebvre 1991: 33). Perceived space is the outcome of one's own choices and practices in space; how someone uses space (Briercliffe 2015), it is a physical space that is produced by a society's spatial practice (Lefebvre 1991).

3. Representational space, or lived space, is the space of lived experience (Watkins 2005). It is the space of inhabitants and users, and this space is directly lived, through its associated images and symbols (*ibid*). It is the space which is passively experienced, which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate (Briercliffe 2015). It is a combination of the many symbols and signs by which people understand their world (*ibid*).

Lefebvre's theory is relevant, as it helps to understand how the research locations are produced and how counterterrorism measures play a role in this production of space. Also, as the following quotation shows: "It is important that our built environment continues to reflect that we are an open and inclusive society, and that in interpreting these new requirements our buildings do not convey that we are driven by security measures" (Reed in Quito 2016). Politicians, planners etc. create certain requirements for urban spaces with the intention to keep people safe from harm (e.g. bollards to defend from car accidents). By understanding people's lived space, on the other hand, it will be possible to understand what meanings and symbols people ascribe to a certain space. Spatial practice will help explain how people may unknowingly change their behaviour due to the changing representations of space, as counterterrorism measures are installed, and how they use space, and what routines come into existence.

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[47] Conversation, November 6, 2018

According to McCann (1999), the attention Lefebvre gives to the everyday practices of life makes his work applicable to discussions of urban spaces. Lefebvre links representation and imagination with the physical spaces of cities. The spatial practices of everyday life can be understood as central to the production and maintenance of physical spaces by the conceptual framework he provides (*ibid*). For this research, Lefebvre's spatial triad has been applied to the three research locations to improve our understanding on the way in which counterterrorism measures influence space and people's perceptions of space. Therefore, this part will seek to explain how Lefebvre's spatial triad can be used to better understand relations between people, space and counterterrorism measures. How do people in New York City give meaning to counterterrorism measures in space? How does it govern them? The research locations are not simply passive containers or locations of people's activities, and to show this, I will focus here on the way in which counterterrorism measures influence the production of space in the different research locations.

4.2.1 Representations of space

According to Briercliffe (2015), conceived space gets at the heart of the history of ideology within a space. It can be argued that after the 9/11 attacks, the worldviews of many Americans changed, as explained by many respondents as a collectively shared feeling that ordinary Americans were no longer safe from international terrorist attacks, whilst previously these attacks occurred outside of the United States. A change in public space after the 9/11 attacks can be seen as well: all kinds of security measures were implemented after the 9/11 attacks, and the following attacks New York City has witnessed. The counterterrorism measures are the product of the securitisation of space in New York City. These counterterrorism measures are installed after they have been commissioned by city officials, such as mayor Bill de Blasio who announced a plan to install 1,500 security bollards (Reuters 2018). Conceived space is the space of the planners of space, they "are representations of power that designates how a certain society should look like and how it should function properly" (Sun 2017: 2). It is a 'space without people' (Gronlund 1993), we could perceive of it as the blueprint of (urban) space, it is the way in which space is designed. By installing counterterrorism measures, the representation of space implies that terrorists cannot 'use' this space. For example, by deciding that there is a need to install bollards, possible terrorists cannot drive their vehicle into crowds anymore in that particular space, such as Times Square. Continuing on chapter four (especially 4.3), the idea that terrorism is a persistent problem nowadays has created a shift from temporary counterterrorism measures to more permanent counterterrorism measures – thus the normalisation of counterterrorism. Concrete blocks are replaced with bollards or other barriers, such as planters and specialised street furniture (GCDN 2018). This can be seen as a change in the ideology after the 9/11 attacks, in which counterterrorism measures were something temporary at first, but more permanent today, as New York City's response to heightened threat levels was to enhance security in other urban spaces (GCDN 2018).

For the World Trade Centre, the vision during rebuilding was "to remember, renew, and rebuild the future" (The Port Authority of NY & NJ 2012: 1). However, due to the relatively new view that the 9/11 attacks created, the idea that (international) terrorism is becoming an urban problem, the site is heavily secured. Next to the visible measures explored in chapter four, One World Trade Centre has security features that are invisible, such as structural redundancy, enhanced fireproofing and extra-wide pressurized stairs (The Port Authority of NY

& NJ 2012). When you walk around the World Trade Centre, all physical objects embedded in that space are part of the conceived space: The Memorial was designed and constructed, the buildings were designed and constructed, or still under construction, the embedded security measures were designed and constructed, and so on and so forth. The idea that terrorism is a threat to Americans was also taken into account during reconstruction of the World Trade Centre, by designing out terrorism. This can be seen as part of the ideology of the decision-makers, thus part of conceived space, as this idea has been influential in the design of the new World Trade Centre, and this is expressed by the bollards, security guards, security cameras, vehicular security centre et cetera. Terrorism is seen as a problem in New York City, thus it needs to be countered by measures, which has an impact on space, and the way space is conceived. The World Trade Centre's vision can be seen in the site: for remembrance there is the Memorial with the names of all victims who died during the 1993 and 9/11 attacks, in the Memorial the 'Survivor Tree' stands tall, in Liberty Park the Sphere. As for the renewal and rebuilding, the new buildings' exteriors are made of glass, which little buildings in lower Manhattan have. Some respondents disliked the buildings for this, as they explained that they are an odd sight at the skyline being all made of glass, while others loved them.

In Times Square, the cleaning of unwanted behaviour in the 1990s resulted in Times Square becoming a vibrant, relatively safe, highly-visited tourist location in Manhattan. By installing 'designated activity zones', which are parts of the pedestrian spaces in which performers can perform their acts, tourists and New Yorkers alike are not allowed to be approached by performers outside these zones (CBS New York 2016). The designated activity zones were a response to complaints from pedestrians about the behaviour of some performers and aggressive panhandling (*ibid*). This is a planned way to control people's behaviour, as performers are not allowed to get outside these zones, and if they do, they can face arrest or summons (Walker 2017). On the other hand, the Times Square Alliance has placed signs that say that performers expect to be tipped when you take a photo with them, in order to let tourists know that they are expected to pay the performers. Both the performers and tourists' behaviour are thus controlled in a way that tries to make Times Square less aggressive, and apparently, the designated activity zones have resulted in fewer arrests (Walker 2017). One interviewee had some concerns that this designation of space might be making life harder for the performers, causing "inequality of life for people", as they are watched by police and the designated activity zones can make their work harder[48]. On the other hand, many respondents explained that they were glad that the performers were being watched and only allowed in certain areas. One tourist asked me to take a photo of her and her boyfriend in front of the One Times Square building. While taking the photo, an Elmo and Minnie Mouse stepped behind them, and the tourists asked them to leave, as they did not want them on the photo. However, Elmo and Minnie did not move, so I took the photograph, after which the performers demanded a tip. The tourists declined, saying that they did not want them in the photo in the first place, and after some comments back and forth the performers left the tourists alone[49]. Furthermore, as already touched upon above, the counterterrorism measures in Times Square are a representation of power which see terrorism as a threat, and thus design out terrorism. As Times Square is believed to be a terrorist target by officials and ordinary people alike, and Times Square has

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[48] Interview, November 29, 2018
[49] Own experience, October 10, 2018

had multiple (attempted) attacks, Times Square has seen all types of counterterrorism measures being implemented. The first time I went to Times Square was September 10, 2018. As it was still peak season with many tourists in New York City, Times Square was flooded with tourists, locals, performers, but also many police officers. As I exited the subway on 42nd Street & 7th Avenue, I saw the many people, but my eyes also fell on a group of six heavily-armed police officers with a bomb-sniffing dog at the other side of the street, next to the Chase bank. These police officers are the result of the idea that Times Square is a terrorist target, and that people should be protected from terrorists by heavily-armed police officers among other measures. Another thing that immediately stood out, were the many bollards that started at 42nd Street, continuing up to 49nd Street, and along the 7th Avenue/Broadway walkways. This gave me the impression, and multiple respondents have also said

Figure 4.7: 42nd Street & 7th Avenue, the Start of Times Square

the following, that Times Square is seen as 'dangerous' or a 'terrorist target' while the streets immediately next to it is seen as completely 'safe', as there are no bollards, heavily-armed police officers or planters installed on the walkways there. Figure 4.7 shows 42nd Street & 7th Avenue, and one can see the absence of bollards in the walkways, while Times Square's security measures start immediately at the right side of the picture with bollards, concrete blocks, and police officers. Multiple respondents took the counterterrorism measures in Times Square as increasing security, while others felt nervous due to the counterterrorism measures – more on this in chapter six. Due to the visibility of the counterterrorism measures, many respondents believed that Times Square was somewhat dangerous, as it could be the location of a terrorist attack.

The space in the Staten Island Ferry (terminals) was impacted less by the counterterrorism measures according to my respondents. The only 'real' impact they saw, were the bomb-sniffing dogs and the occasional presence of heavily-armed police officers. Usually, there were multiple security guards, and one or two uniformed police officers. Occasionally, there were heavily-armed police officers and officers from DHS at the Whitehall Terminal. In the ferry itself, there were usually two police officers present. Furthermore, upon entering both ferry terminals, one is confronted by warning signs noticing people of the potential terrorist threat and that you must say something when you see something (see figure 4.3). These warning signs are said to impact the ferry terminals and ferries in, primarily, two ways: 1) it creates a safer environment as more people are looking around as they are being reminded to do so; and 2) respondents became more nervous, as the signs immediately referred to terrorism, creating feelings of uneasiness and nervousness through people's understanding that city officials see the ferry as a potential terrorist target. Otherwise, it is just an ordinary terminal in which people can wait for public transportation. The terminal is large, has large windows which look out over the water, it is bright and there are many seats, although not enough during rush hour. There is

free WIFI, which many tourists appreciated as they could use their time waiting to plan on what to do after seeing the Statue of Liberty from a distance. There are also multiple shops and restaurants in both terminals, where commuters can get something to eat and/or drink, and they can relax there while waiting for the ferry. Both terminals are also connected with other public transportation (bus, subway, Staten Island Railway). In both terminals, there is a police station, and their officers patrol the ferry and terminals. When a homeless person gets inside the terminal, he or she is not allowed to 'stay behind' when the ferry departs: they have to leave the terminal. They are allowed (or tolerated) outside the terminal, I have seen many homeless people sleep on the benches at the bus stops. Everyone has to leave the terminal, although many times, this is not enforced: on multiple occasions, I have seen people stay inside the terminal even though the ferry was boarding and departing. What is enforced, however, is that everyone has to leave the ferry upon reaching its destination. Multiple DOT employees sweep the ferry to make sure no one stays behind, and everybody disembarks the ferry.

4.2.2 Spatial practices

The perceived space is the outcome of one's own choices, thus how someone uses space (Briercliffe 2015). During the three months of fieldwork, it became clear that the counterterrorism measures influence people's behaviour in different spaces, and how people use space. The counterterrorism measures are installed in urban spaces to address security threats, and to protect people in New York City, and the city's infrastructure (NYC 2018).

While people understood that many measures were implemented for counterterrorism purposes, as shown in part 4.1, other measures were less linked to counterterrorism or security, such as the planters. People perceive the counterterrorism measures not only as being there for counterterrorism. For instance, the granite benches in Times Square are, first of all, benches to people: they do not necessarily perceive them as counterterrorism measures, even though they are specialised street furniture to stop a vehicle from driving into the pedestrian zones (GCDN 2018). People sit on these benches, have lunch, talk about the weather, enjoy the scenery of Times Square, wait for their wives and girlfriends who are shopping, stand on them to take pictures, and so on and so forth. They ascribe different meanings to these measures, more than merely 'security'. Thus, first of all, the benches were installed due to security concerns and to stop a vehicle from driving into

Figure 4.8: People standing on a granite bench in Times Square

pedestrians, whether intentional or not. Secondly, the benches are just that: benches. On multiple occasions I have seen homeless people use the benches as beds, and they slept on the benches before moving elsewhere. People furthermore use the benches by standing on them to have a better view of Times Square and pose to take pictures. One useful example of the difference between representations of space and spatial practices is a conversation I had with two American tourists. They had no idea that the granite benches and walls were installed as

security measures apart from simply being a bench. We were watching traffic and multiple pedestrians 'jumping' in front of cars to be on the other side of the road earlier, when we got into a conversation about the bollards. She was amazed that the long sides of the pedestrian area were not protected by bollards, but that there was a small 'wall'. When she heard that the granite benches were also to prevent a vehicle incident, she became somewhat nervous and exclaimed "Oh my God! I keep my fingers crossed." Her husband told me that his wife was "way too afraid" for a terrorist attack happening, while he thought the odds to be small. He, too, thought that the granite benches and walls were for tourists to sit or stand on to enjoy the scene and make pictures of Times Square, rather than to prevent a car from driving into pedestrians[50].

Before the implementation of the pedestrian zones, many New Yorkers I talked to or interviewed explained that they did not like Times Square. It was too crowded and busy, and it would take a while to get from one side to another. Nowadays, many still do not like Times Square as much as I do, but they no longer avoid Times Square because of its crowdedness. Due to the pedestrian zones, the sidewalks are widened, there is a 'pedestrian flow zone', and for them, this created a better space to simply walk through. Of course, there are still people who stand still in the pedestrian flow zones, but the average walking speed is higher now than before. Furthermore, the different food kiosks provide a working space outside, as there are tables and chairs. At some days, I saw people with their laptops who had bought food and coffee at the kiosks, and during conversations they told me that they sometimes have a lunch break there to get out of their building. At a sunny day, I met a Dutch-American male, who has been living in New York City for over twenty years, who told me that he particularly likes the 'Wafels & Dinges' kiosk at Times Square, since they sell Belgian waffles, and this brings him 'home'. He takes his American wife and daughter regularly to Times Square to eat a waffle, and he chooses Times Square rather than other places where 'Wafels & Dinges' have settled, as he likes Times Square due to the "atmosphere and buzz of the streets[51]". To continue on part 5.2.1, the performers in Times Square are not allowed to perform outside the designated activity zones. Their spatial practices have thus been changed since these zones were implemented, as they could move freely before (CBS New York 2016). According to many regular visitors, the harassment of the performers has lessened, but many respondents said that it still happens. From my own experience, the CD sellers, and performers, were somewhat intrusive, but would stop harassing a person as soon as that person walked away. Thus, for people who do not like performers and want to be left alone, the implementation of designated activity zones has changed their spatial practice, as they know where to go if they do not want to be disturbed, and they choose their walking direction keeping this in mind. They sit in the 'general civic zones' and walk in the pedestrian flow zones.

In all the urban spaces I visited in which bollards or concrete blocks were installed, I saw people sit, lean or stand on them. At the World Trade Centre, people use the concrete blocks by standing on them to take a picture of One World Trade Centre in the same way people take a picture with the Leaning Tower of Pisa: they pretend to 'hold' the tower. Others simply sit on the concrete blocks and some have a conversation, use their phone, or eat and/or drink something. Others, like me, used the concrete blocks as working stations, sitting with laptops or notebooks on their laps, doing (school)work. At the World Trade Centre, I spoke with a

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[50] Conversation, November 8, 2018
[51] Conversation, November 14, 2018

school teacher who was grading papers on one of the concrete blocks in front of the place where Two World Trade Centre is supposed to be build. However, the intended purpose of concrete blocks and other perimeter security measures is to protect people and buildings from threats (FEMA 2007). Furthermore, people take pictures of the concrete blocks at the World Trade Centre. Respondents, primarily tourists, explained that the quotes on the concrete blocks, such as 'make love', were worth photographing, and the graffiti makes it colourful – making it worth to take a photo. Many respondents also explained that due to the graffiti, the concrete blocks look less intimidating. At Times Square, many men used the concrete blocks and bollards in front of the shops to lean against or sit on while their wives and girlfriends were shopping. Security guards also leaned on the concrete blocks or bollards, and people who were selling tickets for sightseeing also leaned on them. So basically, people were using the counterterrorism measures as improvised chairs, even when there are actual chairs and tables right in front of many shops. Interestingly, homeless people used the bollards as well: they placed cardboards against the bollards and laid down next to them in order to be shielded from the wind. They did this on 42nd Street, below construction work, so their heads were covered as well, creating a makeshift bedroom in this way using bollards.

At the World Trade Centre, people's spatial practices have somewhat changed. People working in or visiting the buildings have to be screened and receive an identification card which they must use in the buildings (Craighead 2009). All vehicles entering the World Trade Centre have to be screened in the vehicular security centre (The Port Authority of NY & NJ 2012). After the 1993 bombing, the World Trade Centre became more closed, although security was still quite 'loose' compared to today's security (Craighead 2009). Some of the implemented security measures after the 1993 bombing were the installation of 250 steel-reinforced planters surrounding the World Trade Centre, closed-circuit television coverage of the plaza and World Trade Centre perimeter, all visitors had to pass through an optical turnstile or register at the visitor's desk, people had to wear identification cards, and the underground parking facility was equipped with bullet-resistant guard booths, anti-ram barriers and bomb-sniffing dogs (*ibid*). Thus the World Trade Centre has had a heightened security level since the 1993 bombings. However, the new World Trade Centre has seen more and different kinds of security measures, with 24 hours a day, seven days a week security strict access controls (Craighead 2009). The old World Trade Centre had the appearance of being an open space, whereas the new World Trade Centre has a more closed feeling to it, according to my respondents. There are barriers everywhere: vehicle security centres, bollards, cameras, security booths, police officers, and concrete blocks which creates a closed-off space, at least for vehicles. The space also looks more closed due to these measures, and multiple New Yorkers and tourists I spoke to explained that they would not want to go into the World Trade Centre, no matter how high they would have to go. They were afraid of an attack and would not want to be found in the buildings if an attack were to happen. During one ferry ride to Manhattan, I met an older woman who is a volunteer at the New York Public Library ever since she retired. She told me that she would never go into the World Trade Centre again, and would even be hesitant to enter the site, because of all the counterterrorism measures and her fears of another attack. Someone else fears airplanes ever since the 9/11 attacks, as she saw the airplanes fly into the World Trade Centre from the Express bus she takes every day between Staten Island and Manhattan. Furthermore, at the World Trade Centre, there are no garbage cans due to the fear of a terrorist attack (Ocbazghi 2016). Representations of space have a direct link to people's spatial practice here:

due to the conceived threat a garbage can poses, people have to change their behaviour at the World Trade Centre by bringing something to put their garbage in, such as a plastic bag, they have to take it with them, or they have to search for the people who walk around with garbage cans. Another option would be to take nothing with you that can become garbage, for example not eat lunch at the World Trade Centre. At first, I was not aware of this as I was eating my lunch on September 12, 2018. After a while searching for a garbage can, I decided to ask a 9/11 memorial volunteer about the whereabouts of garbage cans. He explained that there are no fixed garbage cans due to security reasons, as people can conceal bombs in garbage cans, and that I had to look for a sanitation employee who carried a portable garbage can. It took a few minutes before I found this person, after which I decided to take a small bag with me every time I would go to the World Trade Centre again in order to take it elsewhere to throw it away. During multiple conversations with people during lunch time, I asked how they felt about this. Most of the respondents understood it, as the Boston Marathon bombers used garbage cans to conceal their bombs, so they saw the need for having no garbage cans. However, other respondents claimed it would be easy to conceal a bomb in a closed bag which is thrown away in the garbage can the sanitation workers carry around. They explained that their behaviour towards eating had changed since the new World Trade Centre opened, as they have to take their garbage with them, or find a sanitation employee which can take some time. Most respondents who work at the World Trade Centre or who regularly visit the site, said that they usually bring a bag or stuff all garbage in their coffee cups in order to throw it away elsewhere. None of them said they would leave their garbage at the World Trade Centre as this would pollute the site. The World Trade Centre was the only research location in which there are no fixed garbage cans, and respondents claimed that the reason for this is the fear of another devastating attack on the World Trade Centre, as they say it is a symbol of resilience and American capitalism. At Times Square and the Staten Island Ferry, there are multiple garbage cans, which people also use to make money: multiple people open the garbage cans to look for bottles, as there is a five-cent deposit on them.

In the Staten Island Ferry and the terminals, respondents explained that they do not see a difference in their behaviour due to the counterterrorism measures. They explained that the measures do not really impact them as much as in other locations, such as the airport or Times Square. This, because there are not many measures installed (see table 4.1 for the visible counterterrorism measures I saw during fieldwork). People read, have conversations, sleep, eat, drink, and so on. Some respondents explained that this created some concerns regarding the Staten Island Ferry. They felt that the ferry was not secured as much as it should be, and they thought that they would not use the ferry, at least not for a while, if it were to be attacked by terrorists. This would change their spatial practice, as they would either take the Express bus to Manhattan or drive to Manhattan.

Figure 4.9: Two tourists checked by the bomb-sniffing dogs, Whitehall Terminal

They would have to pay more, as the ferry is free, and they would have to change their travel schemes as travelling by car takes more time, especially during rush hours. Many tourists explained that they saw the Staten Island Ferry as a good alternative to going to the Statue of Liberty, as it is free to use, and it passes the Statue of Liberty making it easy to make multiple

photos with and of the Statue of Liberty. There is a café in the ferry and there are multiple restaurants and shops in both terminals which provide a place to sit and eat something before embarking to Manhattan again. One thing has changed after the implementation of bomb-sniffing dogs in the ferry, and this has changed people's spatial practices there. People carrying larger luggage and backpacks were subject to security screening, and they had to walk past the bomb-sniffing dogs in order for the dogs to sniff their luggage. Many people, primarily people who regularly travel by ferry to and from Manhattan, immediately walk to the dogs to let their bags be sniffed, even when they are not asked to.

This is a form of governmentality, as people are aware of the bomb-sniffing dogs and their purpose, that they already walk up to them to let them check the luggage. Governmentality refers to both the process of governing and a mentality of government, how governing happens (Sokhi-Bulley 2014). It can be understood as the way governments seek to produce the citizen which is best suited to fulfil the policies of that government, and the organised practices through which subjects are governed (Mayhew 2009). The counterterrorism measures are a way of governmentality in which subject's behaviour is sought to be altered. This can clearly be seen in the ferry through the bomb-sniffing dogs and the influence they have on people's behaviour: many regular ferry travellers walk up to the bomb-sniffing dogs, even when they are not asked to by the handlers and put their luggage in front of the dogs to let them sniff it. To understand their reasoning, and spatial practice, better, I asked multiple people why they walked to the dogs even when they were not asked to, and they explained that it was to make the handlers' job a little bit easier. Also, some experienced the presence of the bomb-sniffing dogs as somewhat intimidating, wanting to make sure the handlers and police officers did not see them as suspicious, thus walking up to the dogs themselves. Others have come to know both the handlers and bomb-sniffing dogs and have short conversations with the handlers while letting the dogs sniff their bags. Another example of governmentality of counterterrorism measures is the 'see something, say something' campaign. It is a campaign created by the Department of Homeland Security, and it tries to alter peoples' behaviour in such a way that they will respond to suspicious activities by alerting police officers, MTA personnel, DOT personnel, security guards and so on and so forth. It is advertised among others on television, in the subway, in the ferry, on the streets, and people are continuously confronted with the 'see something, say something' campaign. During a conversation with one of the people I lived with, I was told that this campaign has been going on for a while and that it has influenced her by making sure she has more awareness of her surroundings. It became the 'national motto' after the 9/11 attacks and was started September 12, 2001 (O'Haver 2016). One interviewee said that it lowered the threshold to say something, as you do not want to be the person who saw something suspicious but did not report it. The 9/11 attacks changed people's mentality in wanting to make sure something like this does not happen again, and the 'see something, say something' campaign provided a way to make sure something does not happen again. Due to the many posters, signs and commercials dedicated to the campaign, it is something many Americans know, and they will do something in the case of suspicious activity. One interviewee told me that she has called due to a suspicious package, stating "I think, you know, collectively nobody wants to be the person that walked by something suspicious and had a weird feeling about it but didn't do anything about it, and it turned out to be bad. So I think collectively people are pretty good

about that[52]". The MTA spends $2 million to $3 million a year on "if you see something, say something" slogan-adorned placards for trains, subway cars and buses, and radio and television ads (O'Haver 2016). Although most respondents said it is good that people are becoming more aware of their surroundings and possible threats, it could also have an adverse effect and actually scare people. The counterterrorism measures are thus used to teach other behaviour to people, for example to walk past the dogs and watch your surroundings. The measures are used to create security aware behaviour.

Another aspect I would like to bring forward that influence people's spatial practices, are safety drills in public and private buildings since the 9/11 attacks. According to multiple respondents, these drills no longer exist of fire safety, but also train people on what to do in the case of a hostage situation, bombing or shooting. One teacher, who teaches French in a female-only private school in Manhattan, explained that she had a training in September 2018 with NYPD officers on how to behave in an 'active shooter' situation. This frightened her, as she never thought of something like that happening in her school. Her school has a security guard and people have to show their identification cards upon entering the building. In the case of a shooting, she and her colleagues know how to act, how to keep as many people safe as possible and to lower the impact of such an attack. One interviewee who works near the Empire State Building also has drills like this, but the drills in his office building started focusing more on possible hostage takings and bombs. The NYPD and FDNY send people to explain what to do in those situations, and how to make sure as many people as possible survive and exit the building safely.

In the research locations, and in other urban spaces throughout New York City, respondents included the different counterterrorism measures when they were talking about space. Primarily, this means that respondents saw the counterterrorism measures as an important part of open urban spaces, such as city parks and other spaces such as Times Square or Wall Street. For example, when I was talking to a tourist who often visits New York City, I was told that, over the years, Times Square not only transformed in terms of billboards, but also gained more security presence with the installation of bollards and police patrols[53]. This also goes for the World Trade Centre: many respondents explained that there were few security measures before the 9/11 attacks, but nowadays there are many counterterrorism measures in place. These counterterrorism measures have changed people's behaviour in multiple ways. For example, a Yankee-game is now heavily secured, causing large lines before the entries to the stadium. People have to take more time to go to a game, as this security check takes longer than simply entering the stadium without a security check. One interviewee explained that he thinks that people build in extra time unconsciously, as it is now so all-encompassing that there are security checks at big events such as a baseball game. People know that there will be a line before the entry points, whether this is a stadium or concert hall, and to be in time, people have to leave their houses earlier than before the security checks were imposed. In other instances, the counterterrorism measures have had little impact on people's spatial practices, for example when you enter the ferry with no luggage or only a small bag: you do not have to be checked by bomb-sniffing dogs in that case, so you can simply sit down and wait for the ferry. The way in which people use that space has not particularly changed, while this is the case for Times

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[52] Interview, November 18, 2018
[53] Conversation, October 15, 2018

Square. Due to the closing-down of roads to vehicles, pedestrian zones were created in which pedestrians can now use more space, whilst vehicles cannot use that space any more. Whilst Mueller & Stewart (2018) may be right that terrorism does not necessarily influence people's behaviour, the counterterrorism measures do influence people's behaviour, as their spatial practices show. If there were no counterterrorism measures installed in the urban spaces this research has examined, people would not have to let their bags be sniffed by bomb-sniffing dogs, they would not take pictures of and/or with heavily-armed police officers, and so on and so forth. For a few respondents, terrorism influenced their behaviour, as they said they never travel by air anymore due to the 9/11 attacks, or will not go into One World Trade Centre or the World Trade Centre.

4.2.3 Representational space
Lived space is the space directly lived through symbols and images, a combination of the many symbols and signs by which people understand their world (Briercliffe 2015). Through images and videos, for example on YouTube or in movies, many tourists became known with the NYPD, while they were still outside of New York City. Many explained that the NYPD was already known to them, and that they were somehow 'fans' of the police force. Wherever NYPD officers were present together with tourists, there was someone who wanted to take a picture with or of the police officers. In Times Square this happened often, especially the heavily-armed police officers were an 'attraction'. While in representations of space, these police officers are meant to provide security, in people's minds, or representational space, they were attractions and heroes. Whenever the ferry is escorted, the escort boat is an attraction in itself: people, especially tourists, watch the NYPD/USCG boat(s) and take pictures. It becomes a whole show in itself for the passengers, with the boats racing from one side of the ferry to the other. During my fieldwork, I have seen these escorts on multiple occasions, and every single time, tourists were cheering and watching the spectacle. Whilst taking a photo is a spatial practice, this observation is also important to understand lived space. Police officers became heroes after the 9/11 attacks, according to multiple respondents. Furthermore, multiple television shows and movies use the NYPD either as protagonist or supporting role of the storyline, creating a world-wide awareness of the NYPD. Primarily the heavily-armed police officers were a focus of attention amongst the colourful and shining billboards: people would stop to take a photo of them, talk about them, thank them for their service, or watch them. When I asked someone why he was taking pictures of the heavily-armed police officers, this was a 16-year-old American tourist, he explained that he wanted to show it to his friends as he thought the police officers to be cool. During the Village Halloween Parade, many people filmed the progression of police officers before the actual parade started. In my direct surroundings, I saw multiple people, both tourists and locals, film the 'police parade'. When asked why they filmed them, they provided answers such as "It's cool to see so many officers", "It's for Facebook", and "I'll send it to my family[54]". The same answers were given in Times Square when I asked people why they were filming police officers or making photos of them. The police officers were usually fine with tourists taking photos, and it seemed that the ordinary police officer was approached more often than the heavily-armed police officers, probably because there is a larger threshold to take a photo with the heavily-armed police officers – this was a reason for one person to take a photo

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[54] Multiple conversations, October 31, 2018

with an ordinary police officer rather than with heavily-armed police officers. On multiple occasions, I have witnessed people say something in the line of "thank you for your service" to the police officers, primarily the heavily-armed officers, and to soldiers patrolling urban space such as Penn Station. On October 26, I had to pick two people up from Penn Station, and due to their train being 40 minutes late, I was able to observe the National Guard soldiers more closely. In thirty minutes, I heard "Thank you for your service", "Thank you" and derivatives of these six times. At Times Square, someone who just thanked a police officer sat down next to me. Due to this, I was able to ask him why he said this to a heavily-armed police officer, and he explained that people need to be protected in the United States as well, and that police officers are the first layer of defense in the case of something happening, so they should be thanked and respected more. Some American tourists I talked to said that the police officers were 'heroes in blue' and renowned primarily due to their response to the 9/11 attacks and other terrorist-related events. Whenever there is an NYPD (or FDNY) car or truck, especially with emergency lights on, many people start filming or take pictures of the vehicle(s). The NYPD has many fans, which shows itself in tourists making pictures of and with the police officers and cars, and the many gift stores that sell NYPD products. People videotape police cars driving by with their emergency lights and sirens on, which in turn gets send to friends, family, or is simply kept for their own entertainment. Especially the heavily-armed police officers gathered much attention from tourists, and they became a symbol of Times Square, as much as the bollards at the World Trade Centre, as they are regularly there and became part of this space. Furthermore, police officers and security guards are asked for directions and other information. People asked where certain sites are, such as museums, or where the subway stations are. As such, these measures intended for security are not simply only security measures, but people ascribe different meanings to them.

The World Trade Centre is one location in New York City where the concrete blocks are painted in a bright, colourful way. The Department of Transportation partnered with multiple artists to paint concrete blocks and barriers throughout the city[55] (DOT n.d.). At the World Trade Centre, one of the artists explained to CBS News that the murals were metaphors of wildflowers growing through the rubble to him (CBS News 2018). Another concrete block has "make love" on it, which people referred to "make love, not war", which was then referred to the war on terror and the need to use as little violent as possible as this was seen to increase terrorist's hate towards the United States. The colours are the opposite of that which the concrete blocks and jersey barriers seek to stop: terrorist attacks (obviously, they also seek to stop accidents). Whenever people talked about terrorism, they would use the words 'violence', 'blood' and 'bad' often. However, the colourful paintings were seen as cheerful, positive and beautiful. While the art can mean something different for every person, what became clear is that people favour painted concrete over blank concrete, or concrete graffitied with "NYPD". The respondents that gave an opinion on this matter, were all agreeing that colours take the threat away. They know that the barriers are placed to protect them from possible threats, but by making the concrete colourful, the space looked less dangerous, they lost some of their distressing appearance. Even though they referred to the space as potentially dangerous, less people appeared to be anxious due to the colours 'creating happiness' through their brightness.

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[55] See the New York City Department of Transportation's photo archive of its barrier beautification project via https://www.flickr.com/photos/nycstreets/collections/72157625142046887/

People pose in front of the murals, not only the painted concrete blocks, it is a tourist attraction in itself. Two King's College Manhattan students said that the painted concrete blocks at the World Trade Centre are "cool[56]". They explained that there are multiple painted jersey barriers throughout the city, and that this makes the city more colourful, as the jersey barriers are originally grey. They felt very positive about this and said that the city should do this with every barrier in the city. In their opinion, New York City should rid itself from the grey, ugly barriers and instead create nicer looking barriers. This is a point also made in part 5.1, as many respondents explained that they would prefer to see beautified security measures, for example in the form of planters, specialised street furniture, or in this case painted jersey barriers and concrete blocks. People valued the painting of barriers greatly, not only because they take the threat somewhat away, but also because it beautifies the space in which they are located. All respondents saw the painted barriers as an open-air work of art. The barriers are perceived as necessary, but respondents did not favour them 'ugly'. People thought it important to open up the possibility of having people, not necessarily artists alone, paint the barriers and make it something 'of the people'.

Whilst the counterterrorism measures in New York City have been designed in such a way that terrorism is designed out, the space of lived experience in the research locations do not necessarily reflect this. Whilst conceived space might hold that Times Square, the World Trade Centre and the Staten Island Ferry, are safe, people's experiences in these locations do not always concur with this. The representations of space, such as the NYPD's report on the World Trade Centre which claims the protected spaces to be a 'safe zone', as there are no unauthorised cars that could carry explosives (NYPD 2013). However, multiple respondents, as will be more elaborated in chapter six, felt that the counterterrorism measures were doing the opposite of their purpose: they felt more afraid, at least nervous, due to the presence of counterterrorism measures. The meaning these people ascribed to the different counterterrorism measures, especially the bollards and heavily-armed police officers, was negative: it was directly linked to the threat of terrorism, death and injuries. Rather than the dominant voices of city officials who claim that these urban spaces are safe, these respondents felt nervous, they did not feel safe. Also, the possibility of an incident in these spaces which are conceived as safe, such as the 2017 Times Square car crash, creates a disruption between what is conceived and perceived. This fear or nervousness, and incidents alike, challenge the abstraction of these locations being protected by counterterrorism measures, which are New York City's symbol of resilience. The counterterrorism measures, especially at the World Trade Centre, also remind people of why they are here: the 9/11 attacks and other attacks in the city. These are traumatic memories for many people who were in the city, watched the towers fall, or lost someone they knew. The measures are a constant reminder that the city has been attacked before, and that it is possible that it will be attacked again. The counterterrorism measures can, in this sense, be seen as symbols of insecurity: one never knows if (and when) New York City will be attacked by terrorists, and the measures create feelings of uneasiness. All respondents claimed to be nervous in varying degrees, some are feeling relatively safe while others fear busy areas such as Times Square, or they will not go into what they perceive as high target buildings such as One World Trade Centre or the Empire State Building. On the other hand, the counterterrorism measures are New York City's local War on Terror. The counterterrorism measures were also

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[56] Conversation, November 27, 2018

said to be deterrents for potential terrorists, as they show that "we're tough, we're strong, just go away[57]". They are seen as symbols of American strength and New York City's resilience against terrorism.

As locations in itself, the World Trade Centre and Times Square have a large relevance for Americans and New Yorkers alike. The World trade Centre due to the two terrorist attacks, but primarily due to the 9/11 attacks which changed the country, and Times Square as it is seen as the symbol of the American spirit. Both are listed highly in the top-touristic things to do in New York City, and they are visited by many people from over the world. Lived space is also about (cultural) memories of the past (Leary-Owhin 2015). Mayor de Blasio symbolically stood in Times Square to announce the installation of 1,500 bollards in early 2018 (GCDN 2018), months after bollards stopped a car from driving into more pedestrians. Furthermore, for people in New York City who visit the World Trade Centre, the 9/11 attacks are an important memory, or event for younger people, of the past. The site is connected to the attacks, primarily through the 9/11 memorial with the names of all who perished in the 1993 and 9/11 attacks. Due to these memories, and the very lived experience when you walk around the World Trade Centre and wonder how it would have looked like today had the attacks not occurred, the new World Trade Centre is said to be have an important meaning: that of resilience and hope. One World Trade Centre was originally referred to as the 'Freedom Tower', but the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey decided to call it 'One World Trade Centre' in 2009 (CNN 2018). As soon as you see the New York City skyline for the first time, you will see One World Trade Centre towering above all the other buildings. It has filled the void in the skyline after the destruction of the Twin Towers, although not everyone likes the architecture of the building, all respondents agreed that it was important for New York City to have new high-rising buildings on the location of the World Trade Centre. This to show that New York City, and the United States in general, is not scared by terrorists and will continue city life – although it changed after the 9/11 attacks with all counterterrorism measures in place. As claimed by multiple New Yorkers, the tower is the symbol of New York's spirit and resilience, and of America's economic power and freedom. The World Trade Centre itself, and especially the 9/11 memorial and museum, is a place of remembrance and the future at the same time. However, this symbolic status has also made the World Trade Centre a terrorist target according to respondents. Times Square's iconic status of the Crossroads of the World, and its frequent appearance in movies and shows, is seen by respondents as the reasons why terrorists would want to attack it. The Staten Island Ferry had a less iconic status, but it is still frequented by many tourists, and many daily commuting New Yorkers, that respondents thought of it as a likely terrorist target – although they explained the subway to be a more likely target. The memories of past attacks made people more on-guard whenever they are in crowded spaces. They give meaning to certain events due to the ever-present thought of the possibility of a terrorist attack happening. Multiple people, and this has also been shown by police officers and DOT personnel on multiple occasions, explained that they do not trust unattended luggage, even though it may mean nothing. A (seemingly) unattended bag brings back images of what can happen when nothing is done about it, it creates fear in that particular moment, or nervousness at the least. People will call 911, or go to someone who can help, people will act in order to make sure 'another 9/11' does not happen. This is a direct link between perceived and lived space, as memories ensure that people act.

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[57] Interview, October 17, 2018

4.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have sought to analyse the extent to which counterterrorism measures impact the research locations, and how they impact people's behaviour. This chapter first explored the (un)obtrusiveness of some of the counterterrorism measures in New York City, and then the use of Lefebvre's spatial triad in understanding the way that counterterrorism measures influence the production of space.

The respondents in this research all explained to see the need of counterterrorism measures, as the city has had multiple (attempted) attacks in the past, and they view it as a target for terrorist attacks to come. However, they did not all appreciate the *way* in which the counterterrorism measures are implemented. The obtrusive measures, such as the heavily-armed police officers, soldiers and bollards, were said to be too much. Many respondents said that these obtrusive measures should be replaced by less obtrusive measures, such as planters or specialised street furniture, so as to lessen the threat level associated to the previous measures, as the latter are seen as more aesthetically pleasing and inclusive. Whilst the World Trade Centre is said to be like a military zone with all the vehicle checkpoints, bollards, National Guard soldiers, and heavily-armed police officers, Times Square has a more camouflaged physical security landscape, with granite benches, planters and a pedestrian zone next to all the overt counterterrorism measures. Overall, respondents did not mind the security measures, even the obtrusive measures were mostly accepted as necessary. Although most respondents agreed that especially obtrusive measures such as bollards and heavily-armed police officers reduce the enjoyability of urban spaces, they did not prevent them from going there. The respondents also did not see a restriction in the use of urban space, as they could have encounters with other people, and could use the space freely. Overall, people perceive the counterterrorism measures as a necessary part of New York City. However, the respondents explain that they feel a need for more camouflaging of the counterterrorism measures, in order to have fewer negative feelings in urban spaces. As said by Coaffee et al. (2009), security features are increasingly being camouflaged, also in New York City. This camouflaging has implications on people's feelings of safety, as many respondents claimed that they feel less intimidated and scared in areas that are less militarised or fortified, while these areas could still be terrorist targets. The counterterrorism measures are a constant reminder to the possible terrorist threat, and this is especially true for obtrusive counterterrorism measures.

The three different aspects of Lefebvre's spatial triad have been explored in part 4.2, and even though the extent of this thesis does not allow to explore every single way in which we can see the production of space in the three research locations, I have tried to show how Lefebvre's spatial triad can be used to understand the interrelatedness of the processes that contribute to the production of space. First of all, the *representations of space* decide how a certain space looks: it is the way in which the counterterrorism measures are installed, where they are installed, how many are installed, how they look, and so on and so forth. However, people's daily experiences with these counterterrorism measures called for them to be beautified, and this is what the city is now doing: artists are invited to partner up with the city to use jersey barriers and concrete blocks as canvases for their art, Times Square has been transformed into a safer space for pedestrians, specialised street furniture is installed, and more concrete blocks are replaced by bollards or planters. People use the counterterrorism measures as well, their *spatial practices* are influenced by them: were there no heavily-armed police officers, then tourists would not stop to take a picture of/with them, people would not sit on

concrete blocks or lean against bollards, people would be able to drive through Times Square as they used to in 2007, and so on and so forth. *Lived space* is also influenced by the counterterrorism measures, as people explained to feel more nervous and less safe in spaces with many counterterrorism measures. People give meaning to space, and terrorist attacks and the resulting counterterrorism measures are one of many influences on people's meaning of space.

This chapter has shown an important finding of this research: the ambiguity of counterterrorism measures. As the analysis has shown, different people understand the counterterrorism measures and their link to space differently: it is not simply an understanding of counterterrorism measures creating more safety. On the contrary, this chapter has set out to show that there is a difference in perceptions of what counterterrorism do to urban space, that there is no clear-cut relation between counterterrorism and people's perceptions of space. This is an important outcome for urban planners, as they are the ones who design and implement counterterrorism measures. They could use the findings explained in this chapter by considering what measures to install in certain urban spaces. They could decide to implement both unobtrusive and obtrusive security measures, to show the city's ability of protecting people while guaranteeing an aesthetically pleasant space. Planners should thus look at the interrelation between the three aspects of Lefebvre's spatial triad, and understand how these are working together to produce space. What planners conceive to be the use of counterterrorism in space, does not necessarily reflect what users of space perceive. What this chapter has also shown, is the possible discrepancy between conceived and lived space, as counterterrorism measures start to get a life on their own, for example police officers becoming seen as heroes.

5. Counterterrorism measures' influence on people's feelings of safety

While walking to my friends' AirBnB in Staten Island after the Village Halloween Parade on October 31, I had my first negative experience with security measures in New York City. We found ourselves in a street which was somewhat sketchy: there were NYPD floodlights and patrolling cars. However, I did not necessarily feel unsafe, I was simply more aware of my surroundings. We were navigating to the AirBnB by phone as neither of us really knew where to go. As such, we were stopped by two police officers in their car who asked us "Where are you from and what are you doing here? Are you tourists?" They explained this particular neighbourhood as unsafe for us as tourists and that we had to go out as soon as possible. They drove next to us to make sure we safely exited the street and got ourselves on 'safer' streets, we even learned that a tourist was shot in that street a year before (Ostapiuk 2017). Reflecting back, I believe that I would not have felt as unsafe and vulnerable as I did after the encounter with the NYPD, when they would not have stopped us. In fact, the counterterrorism measures in the busier areas such as Times Square did make me feel safe, as I believe the counterterrorism measures to be helpful in case of an attack. There is a certain paradox in this story: I used to feel safe in New York City *due to* the security measures, but the same security measures, in this case NYPD officers, made me feel unsafe in that particular street in Staten Island. This chapter will continue on this paradox, as I encountered a whole range of responses regarding people's feelings of safety due to the counterterrorism measures.

This chapter will answer sub-question 2: "to what extend do the counterterrorism measures in the different research locations influence people's perceptions of safety?" After the 9/11 attacks, the United States saw an increasing presence and power of armed forces protecting airports, bridges, tunnels, trains, and American landmarks (Bornstein 2005), and as Dalgaard-Nielsen et al. (2016) explain, protective security measures are becoming a common feature of the urban landscapes of the world's major cities. Some analysts and commentators argue for the need of security measures due to the continued threat from terrorist, while others are highly sceptical. According to the critics, visible security measures create undue anxiety by constantly reminding the public of a (presumed) serious threat from terrorism (*ibid*) and are in this way counterproductive (Minton 2018). The main purpose of security measures is, according to the critics, the control of citizens through a manipulation of threat perceptions, by creating and exploiting fear to legitimize government control, counterterrorism measures, and spending (Dalgaard-Nielsen et al. 2016). Minton (2018) claims that visible security measures lead to an increase in fear and distrust between people. Counterterrorism measures are said to remind people about threats, and rather than providing reassurance, they magnify people's sense of danger (Hoffman & Shelby 2017). However, the argument that visible security measures create anxiety by making people think about threats, is most frequently assumed rather than tested (Dalgaard-Nielsen et al. 2016).

One of the things this research has set out to do was to understand whether, and how, counterterrorism measures in New York City influence people's feelings of safety. Before conducting fieldwork, I expected that most people would feel less safe due to the counterterrorism measures, as they are a constant reminder of the threat of terrorism. However, this research found the opposite: most people did feel safer, while a small minority explained to feel less safe. There was a big difference between locals and tourists: most New Yorkers said

to feel safe, while different tourists explained to feel less safe due to the counterterrorism measures. This might be due to New Yorkers' continuous interaction with the counterterrorism measures for many years, while many of the tourists came from places that did not have counterterrorism measures. However, this goes beyond the extend of this research and its focus.

This chapter will show that there is a paradox: there was a broad range of feelings of safety related to counterterrorism measures. While counterterrorism measures can invoke feelings of safety in some people, it can evoke feeling unsafe in others. Thus, how is the fear of terrorism influenced by visible counterterrorism measures, especially with the magnitude of measures in a city like New York City? This chapter will first of all explore what respondents indicated to be the vulnerabilities of the three research locations and New York City in general. Then, it will explore feelings of safety due to the counterterrorism measures. Thirdly, it turns to counterterrorism measures' increase of anxiety. The chapter will close with a short discussion on the paradox of counterterrorism measures in New York City.

5.1 Vulnerabilities in the research locations

Vulnerability to terrorism is defined as a combination of the attractiveness of a facility, or public space, as a target and the level of deterrence and/or defence provided by the existing countermeasures (Renfroe & Smith 2016). It is relevant, as it is useful to understand what people see as vulnerabilities of a certain urban space such as the three research locations, as their idea of vulnerabilities may influence their perceptions of safety. It is also asked to understand what people, next to terrorism, see as a threat or vulnerability in the research locations. In this way, I ensured that this research is not leading random people I met on the streets to answering my questions with only terrorism in mind. At first, I would ask people whether they would agree to answer some questions related to feelings of safety in the specific location we met. Therefore, I also learned that people perceive petty crime as a 'threat' in busy areas such as Times Square. During an interview with someone who works at Times Square, I was told that the main vulnerability for him is the bowtie area of Times Square, in particular the area around the red steps. There are many tourists in this area, and people are distracted by all the lights and things happening around them, therefore making them an easy target for pick pocketers. Furthermore, he (as many other respondents) said that Times Square is vulnerable to terrorist attacks: "terrorists always target an area where there are a lot of people"[58]. As noted previously, people furthermore felt vulnerable when they were harassed by performers and CD sellers. Some felt that police officers should be stricter towards these people, but all were glad the performers did not follow them after they exited the designated activity zone.

The Staten Island Ferry was seen by multiple respondents as an easy target for terrorists, it was also the research location that was perceived as the least secured, while being an attractive target as many people use the ferry to commute between Manhattan and Staten Island. Respondents therefore also saw the security of the Staten Island Ferry as its biggest vulnerability, as many respondents claimed that there were too few security measures. Furthermore, the 'real' protective measure in the ferry terminals are the bomb-sniffing dogs, security guards and police officers. On the ferry itself, there are usually two police officers, armed with a handgun and taser gun. This is seen as one major vulnerability of the ferry: respondents worried that the police officers would be unable to stop a heavily-armed attacker.

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[58] Interview, October 17, 2018

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One 40-year-old male who migrated to New York City after obtaining his university degree in India explained that there would be a situation similar to that of the 2008 Mumbai attacks[59], in which police officers carrying inadequate equipment were unable to fight the terrorists who carried automatic weapons (Rabasa et al. 2009). The ferry is a soft target, with little protection apart from the bomb-sniffing dogs at the terminal entrances and the police officers in and around both terminals and in the ferries. However, before entering the terminal with the bomb-sniffing dogs, there are large areas in which many people congregate, either to relax in one of the restaurants, or outside the Whitehall Terminal in the Peter Minuit Plaza. This gives terrorists the opportunity to attack these people, rather than the people behind the lines of defence, even when this defence is little compared to the World Trade Centre or Times Square. Furthermore, bomb-sniffing dogs face difficulty detecting bombs in crowds, they cannot just smell any explosive from across a crowded room (Horowitz 2013). A terrorist with explosives only needs to stay some distance from the dogs (*ibid*), and this was a major concern for travellers on the Staten Island Ferry. The dogs only sniff commuters with larger bags, and commuters with no or small bags can walk past them, which is seen as a vulnerability of the Staten Island Ferry. Respondents explained that this vulnerability affects them in primarily one way: they expressed to be more alert than in other areas, especially due to terrorist attacks on public transportation elsewhere and the perceived easiness of carrying out such an attack. However, many commuters do not seem to be so alert: they are on their phones, listen to music, sleep, talk to others and so on and so forth. After learning that many people said to be 'on guard' in the ferry, and public transportation in general, I started to talk to commuters who did not seem to be alert. However, after talking to them, I learned that they do have a higher level of awareness of their surroundings than it seems. They explained that they listen to what is happening around them, and regularly look around – especially during rush hours. Furthermore, multiple respondents were concerned that the human counterterrorism measures (security guards, police, soldiers) would be influenced by their own prejudices about who a terrorist is. Some daily ferry commuters said that the security guards stop commuters who look Middle Eastern even when they do not carry large bags, while white commuters are not stopped in the same way. However, they said that white people can also be terrorists, and by only focusing on Middle Eastern people, they may miss terrorists who do not portray the image of terrorists that the guards suspect. Whether this really happens is not something this research has set out to discover, although I have thought it multiple times as well. I carried a large backpack, and I have seen multiple commuters with smaller bags than mine being stopped while I could continue. As such, I can understand why people would see this as racial profiling. However, whether there is real racial profiling going on, I do not know, but it is a perceived vulnerability of the ferry and as such mentioned here.

At the World Trade Centre, people explained that the main vulnerability is its status as a national symbol of hope and resilience, and its economic value to the city. Respondents were not so worried about another mass casualty attack such as the 9/11 attacks, as they think the city has done enough to counter such an attack. However, they did believe a smaller-scale terrorist attack to be possible at the World Trade Centre, especially as this would have a high impact on people since the site is perceived as heavily secured and culturally relevant. The vulnerability in this sense, is thus the attraction of the World Trade Centre for terrorists as a

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[59] Conversation, October 24, 2018

possible location to attack. The most mentioned vulnerability is the accessibility of the World Trade Centre, as anyone can enter the site by foot. This makes it possible for terrorists to go to the World Trade Centre with some kind of weapon and attack people, even though the last attack was the 9/11 attack.

Overall, respondents saw the vulnerabilities primarily as a result of the crowdedness in the city. There are so many people that it is difficult to determine who enters the city and with what intention. When I landed on JFK International Airport, I was shortly interviewed by a Customs and Border Protection Officer, but when I went on a short trip to Washington D.C. by bus, I did not encounter any security measures at all. As such, respondents thought this a major flaw in the city's defences, as anyone can get into the city and if one wants to hide one's purpose of coming to New York City, he or she can easily do so. Respondents saw New York City's public transportation network as a soft target, as it is impossible to check every traveller for explosives and weapons. Respondents explained that they would look out for themselves, especially in the more crowded subways and stations, and walk away if they do not trust a situation or person. Tourists were furthermore concerned with 'crazy people': people who shout to no one in particular, or who seem very aggressive. The very first time I entered the New York City subway line 1 at Whitehall Street, I experienced such a person myself. This was very uncomfortable, but multiple people told the man to stop and get off the subway, as the conductor did not want to move forward as long as this man was in the carriage. A New Yorker saw that I was uncomfortable, or so I assume, and he told me not to worry, that it happens all the time that a 'crazy' person gets on the subway and that I would soon be used to it – as in fact, I became used to it after seeing it many times. Finally, different respondents explained a coordinated attack could be possible, such as during the 2015 Paris attacks, and that one of the probable locations to attack would be the World Trade Centre – but also other famous New York City locations such as Times Square, Wall Street and the Brooklyn Bridge. As the sites are open for pedestrians, and people carrying bags, respondents said that the ability to move around freely in the city is a vulnerability. This vulnerability is thus not limited to the World Trade Centre or my other two research locations. Multiple respondents gave the example of the failed bombing in a pathway between Times Square subway station and the Port Authority bus terminal (Maslin Nir & Rashbaum 2017). While he did not succeed in killing people, respondents claimed the city would stay vulnerable as long as people can enter locations freely. However, none of the respondents said they wanted this freedom of movement to change, as they expressed concerns that New York City and the people inside would then become controlled by the government.

5.2 Feeling safer due to the counterterrorism measures

Being safe is defined here as being free from hurt or harm. Feeling safe means that you do not anticipate either harm or hurt, whether this is emotionally or physically (Preisler 2013). As explained by Hoffman & Shelby (2017), people see risk management strategies (e.g. counterterrorism measures) as effective when they are reassured about their security and accept recommendations embedded in the communications they receive (e.g. the media). Reassurance reflects the knowledge that there are ways to manage people's exposure to risk (*ibid*). Respondents gave multiple explanations for feeling safer due to the counterterrorism measures. The most mentioned (by 29 respondents) was that counterterrorism measures stop attacks. Respondents also explained that they still feel anxious, but that this feeling lessens in areas with counterterrorism measures: the counterterrorism measures are said to reassure people. Another

much explained reason is that counterterrorism measures are a deterrence for terrorists. In this part, I will explain why people said to feel safer, or less anxious, in areas with counterterrorism measures, and I will explore why the critics of counterterrorism measures are 'wrong' in the sense that not everyone feels less safe due to counterterrorism measures. Many people I spoke to explained that they will not avoid areas such as Times Square due to the threat of terrorism. People travel through these potentially dangerous locations, and neither New Yorkers nor tourists seem to avoid these locations – although there are some exceptions that will be discussed in part 5.3.

5.2.1 Feeling safer by believing counterterrorism measures can stop attacks

First of all, many respondents said to feel safer due to the counterterrorism measures' ability to stop attacks, even though respondents acknowledged the counterterrorism measures not to be flawless. The counterterrorism measures are primarily centred around possible terrorist targets, such as the research locations, and the respondents explained that these make these spaces safer. The critics of visible counterterrorism measures, as noted above, claim that counterterrorism measures impact negatively on feelings of safety and security. Therefore, if we must believe the critics of visible security measures in cities, the people visiting or working at the World Trade Centre for example, should experience a negative impact on their feelings of safety and security. Bollards are located on every sidewalk, there are many police officers, there are security guards with bomb-sniffing dogs, there are soldiers, and so on and so forth. However, when asked whether people could explain their feeling of safety at the World Trade Centre, most explained that they felt (relatively) safe.

Respondents claimed that the city will be attacked again in the future, but that the counterterrorism measures could, and would, stop an attack, like the 2017 Times Square vehicle incident was eventually stopped by bollards. The attack could create injuries and casualties, but these are perceived as less than if the counterterrorism measures were not installed. One respondent, who works at Times Square, explained that the bollards which stopped the vehicle in the 2017 Times Square vehicle incident made sure that many lives were saved. He believed that there would be many more casualties in the case of there being no bollards at Times Square. Therefore, respondents believed that attacks such as those in Berlin and Nice in 2016 are not possible in the research locations as these are all protected by bollards. A vehicle could run over people, such as happened in 2017, but the bollards and concrete blocks will stop the vehicle at an earlier stage than in the case of there being no barriers.

A 55-year-old female tourist from Omaha (Nebraska) told me that she has been afraid for a terrorist attack since the 9/11 attacks. She saw the attacks live on television as she was preparing to go to work, and this made it hard for her to go to the World Trade Centre today. However, as she was walking around the memorial and in Liberty Park, she said to feel safe. She explained that fear for a terrorist attack is still on her mind, but it has lessened due to all the counterterrorism measures, it is more suppressed due to the visible security measures[60]. Many other respondents in different locations also explained that the visible counterterrorism measures make them feel safer when walking around areas that they perceive as possible terrorist targets, such as Times Square, Penn Station, Grand Central Station, and Union Square Park. Respondents believe that the heavily-armed police officers and soldiers can stop an active

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[60] Conversation, September 18, 2018

shooter attack easily due to their training and equipment. The respondents felt confident that these heavily-armed units could stop an attack such as the 2008 Mumbai attack, and this made them feel safer. Respondents said that an attack could happen while they are moving around the city, but that the counterterrorism measures are preventing terrorists from inflicting harm on many people. If these counterterrorism measures were not in place during an attack, many people would get hurt, and in this sense, it is damage control. People felt safer as they believed counterterrorism measures to reduce the impact of a terrorist attack. At Union Square Park, I met two students of King's College in Manhattan, who explained that they moved to New York City from a smaller town two years ago. When their mother visited them this summer, she was anxious due to the counterterrorism measures, while the students thought it to be normal, as it is New York City. They had a long discussion with their mother who was all but happy about them studying in New York City, as she perceived the city as a dangerous place after seeing the heavily-armed police officers and bomb-sniffing dogs. The students themselves, however, felt more confident in busy areas due to the presence of counterterrorism measures. They are not very afraid of a terrorist attack happening to them, but they are aware that it is a possibility. As such, they are glad that the city has taken protective measures to protect people from attacks.

5.2.2 Respondents believe counterterrorism measures prevent attacks

A second reason why people said to feel safe, is the display of force. Terrorists and their organisations may be sensitive to measures that affect the successful outcome of their operation, but they may also be sensitive to measures that could both threaten the life of the operatives and provide security forces with information which could compromise the group (Morral & Jackson 2009). According to the NYPD (n.d.), the Critical Response Command saturate strategic locations (possible targets) with uniformed presence to disrupt and deter terrorist planning and surveillance operations. This display of force is said to improve people's feelings of safety as respondents were certain that the display of many police officers can prevent an attack. Some respondents explained that different plots had been prevented due to the counterterrorism measures, as they deterred the terrorists. One such plot was to attack the Brooklyn Bridge (Weiser & Baker 2011). The 2017 West Side Truck attacker wanted to attack the Brooklyn Bridge at first, but the NYPD believes that he did not attack the Brooklyn Bridge due to the counterterrorism measures he saw while he was scouting the area. He sent a message to an Al Qaeda operative, saying "the weather is too hot" (*ibid*). The very visibility of certain counterterrorism measures, such as heavily-armed police officers and bollards, is the reason why many people explained to feel confident that terrorists will be deterred to attack the city. And in this way, counterterrorism measures are seen to prevent attacks. Because of this, some respondents claimed the very visibility of heavily-armed soldiers and police officers should be exploited more. A 40-year-old woman said that the heavily-armed police officers and soldiers should be located in more areas throughout the city. She felt that there could be more places with these counterterrorism measures installed, as she said to believe terrorists to be deterred by heavily-armed police officers[61]. Many respondents believed the counterterrorism measures to keep Times Square, and other busy urban spaces, safer. During an interview with a 29-year-old New Yorker, I was told the following:

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[61] Interview, November 16, 2018

> "It's also a deterrent. […] if a terrorist walks by Times Square, the police officers, the soldiers, the bollards are all there and showing off saying like "we're here, we're tough, we're strong, just go away". It brings up the security spirit of New York City. At the same time, some people might actually be intimidated by it."[62]

Respondents believed that the counterterrorism measures in locations perceived as possible targets will deter terrorists from attacking that location. However, this can also mean that terrorists attack other locations – this will be discussed in part 5.3.

One of my housemates, a 30-year-old Staten Islander, told me that he believes the counterterrorism measures primarily to be a deterrent for "smaller terrorists":

> "[…] smaller people, who just, like, get influenced and become terrorists, it deters them to some extent. It stops them when they see these measures. […] They would think like "okay my chances of executing a successful attack is less because of all these measures". So these measures will help against smaller terrorists. But if it were coming from a higher authority like Al Qaeda or something like that, it would not stop them."[63]

According to him, the counterterrorism measures are useful in so far that they deter the less resourceful terrorists and reassure people. He can be placed somewhere between being a proponent or critic of counterterrorism measures, but overall, he did feel some comfort due to the counterterrorism measures. However, due to his training in the U.S. Army, he saw some flaws in the defences of the city, and this made him somewhat sceptical towards the counterterrorism measures. Another respondent who is a United States Army veteran, explained that soldiers have a higher impact on people's feelings of security, and this impact can be both positive or negative. It is positive, as people can feel safer due to the combat training of soldiers, but it can be negative when people get the feeling that they are walking around an occupied area. For him, the impact that soldiers had was positive: he understood the reason for National Guard soldiers to be in urban space to fight terrorists and to deter them. Next to this, he felt a connection with the National Guard soldiers, as he served in the Army, and he liked to talk to them shortly[64]. Two New Yorkers (24 and 25 year old males) explained that they feel safer due to the National Guard soldiers at the World Trade Centre. They see them as unthreatening, and most of them carry handguns, making them look less threatening to them. However, also these New Yorkers said that they, as well as the heavily-armed police officers, can have different impacts on people. They were, however, used to the soldiers, as they patrolled urban space for as long as they can remember. They explained to me that they pay little attention to the soldiers, as it is just another day for them[65].

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[62] Interview, October 17, 2018
[63] Interview, October 21, 2018
[64] Conversation, October 9, 2018
[65] Conversation, October 28, 2018

5.2.3 Counterterrorism measures reduce respondents' anxiety

The third explanation respondents gave is that they feel reassured by the counterterrorism measures, simply because they are in place. One interviewee, who works in Times Square, explained that people can enjoy themselves in a safe way due to the café seating that has been installed throughout Manhattan. Times Square has this, as already noted, but other areas in the city have these areas as well. One example is the area around the Flatiron Building. The area is protected by planters and stone blocks, and behind those barriers, there are many seats where people can enjoy their day. For Times Square, but this was the same for all locations with this kind of protection, he explained: "With, like, the café seating people get to enjoy themselves and relax a little bit more and feel more secured in Times Square"[66]. Some respondents who regularly come to Times Square said that the barriers are making them feel safer, especially as there is more pedestrian space and the pedestrians are protected from vehicles. Multiple respondents simply said that the counterterrorism measures provide a feeling of safety, because they show the city's willingness and ability to protect people. A 33-year-old New Yorker I met while waiting for the ferry at the Whitehall terminal, said that to him, it feels good that there are so many visible counterterrorism measures. We know we are being watched, and that there are police officers and security guards who are screening the terminals and ferries for our own safety[67].

Figure 5.1: Café seating and planters. Picture taken in front of the Flatiron Building

A 40-year-old director of sales in Manhattan told me how he feels about the counterterrorism measures: "[it] feels good. It feels nice and good, gives you a safe feeling"[68]. When continuing the conversations and interviews on why they said the counterterrorism measures make them feel safer, many explained the previous mentioned reasoning: it keeps us safer from a terrorist attack, terrorists are stopped before doing much damage, the impact of an attack becomes less, and so on and so forth.

Another reason why respondents said that the counterterrorism measures increase their feelings of safety, is the 'personal touch' of the counterterrorism measures. Many respondents said the security guards to be nice and kind. Many tourists ask the security guards with the bomb-sniffing dogs in the ferry for directions, and all explained that the security guards seem eager to help and are nice to them. When I came back to New York City after a short trip to Washington D.C., I was asked to stop by a security guard at the Whitehall terminal. He asked me if I was okay with the bomb-sniffing dog checking my bag. After the dog sniffed my backpack, he turned his attention to the sandwich with chicken I just bought, and the security guard laughed and made some jokes, after which he wished me a pleasant day. Others explained that they have come to know the security guards, as they commute daily between Staten Island and Manhattan and let the bomb-sniffing dogs sniff their bags. At the World Trade Centre and Times Square, tourists said that the police officers and security guards are helpful whenever they are asked something. Finally, respondents said the interaction between police officers,

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[66] Interview, October 17, 2018
[67] Conversation, November 11, 2018
[68] Interview, November 14, 2018

security guards and the public is positive and friendly, rather than them commanding the public. This relaxed behaviour of security personnel is appreciated, as people feel safer due to this and it takes the fear of the big guns away for some.

While some New Yorkers I have talked to expressed fear of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack, the respondents who were most afraid of an attack were the tourists – whether international or from the United States. According to Hoffman & Shelby (2017), people's focus on their anxiety for a terrorist attack makes them embrace measures that help them secure their sense of security from terrorism. Many people who were afraid of an attack indeed explained that their anxiety was lessened when they saw the bollards and heavily-armed police officers. At Times Square, I had multiple longer (>30 minutes) conversations with tourists, and many explained to feel more at ease after seeing the counterterrorism measures. These respondents explained that they saw New York City as a possibly dangerous location in relation to terrorism before coming here, but that they feel reassured to see the counterterrorism measures. For these people, the counterterrorism measures produced reassurance rather than alarm. They did express feeling anxious while walking around the city, especially the tourist attractions, but the presence of heavily-armed police officers and bollards made them feel safer. In their eyes, terrorists use vehicles, weapons and explosives most, and these measures can prevent and stop the first two types of attacks.

5.3 Counterterrorism measures: causing anxiety

According to Aly & Green (2010), the fear of terrorism is a very real and rational fear that arises out of the actual, lived experiences of how terrorism has impacted the everyday lives of people. They argue that a conceptualisation of the fear of terrorism should take into account feelings of anxiety, worry, distress and concern about the social and global impacts of terrorism and the domestic counterterrorism efforts. The responses have real consequences for the everyday lives of people (*ibid*), as explained in chapter five. Unnecessary security measures can erode people's right to access city spaces, exploit fear and insecurity, and promote feelings of vulnerability and anxiety (Silberberg 2014). In this part, people's heightened feelings of anxiety, rather than feeling safe, will be explored. Dalgaard-Nielsen et al. (2016) claim that empirical evidence which shows that visible security measures provoke anxiety is limited and mixed. Even though an unexpected minority felt anxious due to the counterterrorism measures, their responses are helpful in understanding the broad spectrum of feelings that counterterrorism measures impose on people. The majority of the respondents who felt more anxious due to the counterterrorism measures, explained that was due to its direct link to terrorism. Secondly, respondents felt intimidated by the obtrusive counterterrorism measures, and were afraid for an unwanted increase in government control in urban space. And finally, respondents explained that the deterrence aspect of counterterrorism measures would not work, as terrorists would simply find other locations to attack. This part is divided into the three explanations for feeling less safe due to counterterrorism measures.

5.3.1 Counterterrorism measures are directly linked to terrorism

The fear of physical harm from a terrorist attack is directly linked to the perceived threat of terrorism and the presence of certain stimuli that produce a fear response in the individual's direct environment (Aly & Green 2010). For the respondents who explained to feel less safe, many said that the counterterrorism measures were a direct link to terrorism and the threat of

terrorism. This made them feel less safe in any urban space with these measures. These respondents made a distinction between 'safe' and 'unsafe' zones related to terrorism, they securitised space. 'Safe' were the locations with no or few visible counterterrorism measures, and urban space not perceived as busy. 'Unsafe' were the locations with many counterterrorism measures, and locations that many people visited. Thus, in their perception, the counterterrorism measures did not create a safe space, rather, it made them think of all the things that could go wrong. People expressed questions such as: what if I walk around Times Square and a bomb goes off? What if I walk around and someone tries to hit me with his car? For them, terrorism is a real problem and the counterterrorism measures exacerbated their fear. However, I did talk to these respondents in places they saw as 'unsafe', for example Times Square. New Yorkers expressed the need to be in these possibly dangerous spaces, for example because they work there, or have an appointment. Tourists, on the other hand, explained to go to the World Trade Centre, Times Square or into the Empire State Building because they are iconic places of New York City, and any tourist should see them. Furthermore, many of the respondents who explained the above, did say that it is important to go into potentially dangerous locations, as terrorists will otherwise win. And they "can't let them win[69]", and therefore respondents went to the locations they feel anxious about.

In line with this, respondents explained to be more 'on guard' in urban spaces that have visible counterterrorism measures in them. As respondents believed locations with counterterrorism measures to be more dangerous, or more susceptible to a terrorist attack, they explained to watch their surroundings more, and to look for clues that something is 'going wrong'. One woman I met in Liberty Park at the World Trade Centre told me that she keeps an eye on what is happening around her, even though she has lived in the city all her life[70]. Multiple respondents explained this as well, and they explained that this changed with the 9/11 attacks. Before the attacks, and other attacks around the world involving bombs such as the 7/7 London bombings, people would not stop or flinch at a left bag. But today, whole areas are locked down in the case a 'suspicious package' is found[71]. As such, respondents explained the atmosphere in urban spaces to be more anxious. One of my main respondents I regularly met at Times Square explained that he is more on guard in busier areas. While the 9/11 attacks are the reason why the city is so secured today, he, like many others, believes another terrorist attack to be imminent. He believes that it is not something that ordinary people like us can influence much. However, we can be more on guard, and say something when we see something. In his case, and multiple respondents explained this, the counterterrorism measures made them more aware of their surroundings. This is both a direct link to the 'see something, say something' campaign you can see throughout the city, and people's mental distinction of urban space. Most respondents explained them being on guard as being nervous: they were not afraid, but also did not feel safe. A 70-year-old New Yorker told me to watch myself as I spent so much time in Times Square. He was nervous in urban spaces which had obtrusive counterterrorism measures in them, but as he loved to walk around the city, he would not avoid such spaces. He explained that his nervousness was primarily caused by the counterterrorism measures, as he said becoming a victim of a terrorist attack to be very unlikely. However, the counterterrorism measures are so visible and placed in many locations throughout the city, that he cannot escape

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[69] Conversation, September 17, 2018
[70] Conversation, September 18, 2018
[71] Interview, October 2, 2018

81

the thought of becoming a victim in a terrorist attack. As such his own ideas of New York City being a safe city do not correspond with what he sees, with daily city reality[72].

Two female New Yorkers I have talked to, explained they do not go to the World Trade Centre anymore, since they fear an attack on One World Trade Centre. For them, the counterterrorism measures were a demonstration that their fears were justified: why else would the World Trade Centre need so much counterterrorism measures? They said to avoid potential terrorist targets, unless there is absolute need for them to go there. Another respondent who lives in Queens explained to avoid Times Square as much as possible. He explained that he both feared an attack at Times Square more than in any other place in the city, and he does not like the crowdedness of Times Square. He explained to get very anxious due to the counterterrorism measures in Times Square, as there are heavily-armed police officers, and these scare him, making him unwilling to go into Times Square if he does not need to be there. These two ladies were the very extreme cases I encountered, no one else had the same feelings of fear as them. One of the ladies saw the planes hit the World Trade Centre, and this has had such an impact on her, that she believes this to be the reason for her fear of terrorism. However, I have also met other people who saw the 9/11 attacks, some of whom lost family and friends, but none expressed the same fear as her.

5.3.2 Feeling intimidated by counterterrorism measures

Though National Guard soldiers were seen by some as a good way to fight terrorism, and these people felt safer, other respondents felt less safe due to the soldiers – especially when they carried rifles. Multiple respondents said to feel as if they are walking around occupied area, and the heavily-armed police officers also had this effect. As noted earlier, these spaces were seen as more dangerous, and rather than providing a safe feeling, these measures made people feel intimidated. One interviewee told me that he, as his family comes from Asia and he is not white, is nervous about the presence of National Guard soldiers and heavily-armed police officers as he is afraid that they will see him as a terrorist. "What if they think that I am carrying something?" He explained that this made him more self-conscious, so whenever there are heavily-armed police officers or National Guard soldiers, he feels the need to behave in a way that he perceives as non-threatening. He was stopped once by an undercover police officer at Penn Station, who asked him whether he was carrying a knife. He did carry a knife which he uses for work, and the police officers let him go. After this, he has been feeling nervous around and intimidated by this presence of heavily-armed police officers and National Guard soldiers[73]. Another interviewee explained this feeling of intimidation when he drives to Manhattan from Brooklyn, and he goes through the Hugh L. Carey tunnel. There are police officers at both sides of the tunnel, and especially during slow traffic, he felt watched by these police officers and he, too, gets nervous as they might see something on him. He said to drive "calmer", in order to be less noticeable[74].

Furthermore, people said to feel somewhat intimidated by bag searches. The NYPD conducts random bag searches in subway stations, whenever you decline a bag search, you are not allowed to enter the station (Preston 2005). As there are multiple officers around the table

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[72] Conversation, November 5, 2018
[73] Interview, October 2, 2018
[74] Interview, November 14, 2018

on which the bag is checked, some respondents said to feel uneasy or intimidated. They were watched closely while one of the officers swiped their bags for explosive residue and checked the bag. Some people did not like this, as they felt it was a violation of their privacy, but most said to understand why the NYPD would do these tests on explosives and weapons. Some respondents claimed that these bag searches are based on ethnic profiling: they said that it appears that bag searches are focusing on people "looking like terrorists"[75]. They explained that people who are perceived to come from certain places are more subjective to these searches, while others are never searched.

Finally, people expressed concern over increased government control through counterterrorism measures. One respondent explained that the NYPD got into problems after infiltrating mosques to search for terrorists, while there was no evidence that the people in the mosques were terrorists. The NYPD settled a 2012 lawsuit in 2018, which claimed the NYPD to have infiltrated at least 20 mosques, 14 restaurants, 11 shops, two schools and two Muslim student groups in New Jersey (Pilkington 2018). Some respondents were afraid that terrorism would be used as a way to control the population, by restricting civil liberties through amongst others closed-circuit television, and bag searches. People were primarily concerned with the 'randomness' of stop-and-search procedures. Respondents who felt this way claimed that the NYPD and security guards around the city are profiling people on their ethnic backgrounds, and pick people to search by their appearance, and as such do not see bag searches as random. Whenever I explained that I had never been searched, they claimed that my appearance is not threatening: according to them I am a young, white female that does not look threatening. When I was searched halfway through my fieldwork and I would tell people that I had actually been searched, many were still sceptical and claimed that the security guards must have been bored or had the instructions to check everyone entering the terminal. In fact, when I actually got searched, one of the bomb-sniffing dogs was walking around all people waiting for the ferry to embark to Staten Island. The respondents would agree with intruding people's rights when there are reasonable grounds, for example when the authorities are warned that someone is radicalising. Finally, a 25-year-old man I interviewed explained to be intimidated by the heavily-armed police officers, and he is "seriously worried about the police shooting people". According to him, police officers should not be armed heavily, and he was uncomfortable with the militarisation of the NYPD. He feared that the NYPD officers could not handle the weapons, or would shoot at terrorists, but miss their target due to them being untrained[76].

5.3.3 Believing counterterrorism measures are not working

Whereas respondents feeling safer due to the counterterrorism measures said that their very visibility is a deterrent, respondents who felt more anxious were more sceptical: they claimed that terrorists would simply attack another location. They expressed concern that there would always be another attack as long as not all parts of the city are secured. Instead of attacking a highly visibly secured urban space such as Times Square, terrorists might divert to less secured urban space, such as Central Park or a highly trafficked road. They felt the counterterrorism measures useless as they only incite fear and anxiety, but do not prevent a terrorist attack. Respondents explained that they believe terrorists do look at target locations before executing

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[75] Interview, November 29, 2018
[76] Interview, November 29, 2018

an attack, and in this way choose another location to attack. Rather than believing counterterrorism measures will prevent an attack, they see the 2017 West Side truck attack as an example of their claim. The perpetrator wanted to attack the Brooklyn Bridge first but diverted to the West Side highway due to all the visible counterterrorism measures at the Brooklyn Bridge (Weiser & Baker 2011). As such, many critics of counterterrorism measures among my respondents claimed counterterrorism to be nothing more than a show. As such, they did not feel safer but more anxious. As they claimed the counterterrorism measures to be very little use, even though they have proved themselves during the 2017 vehicle incident in Times Square, they fear terrorists will choose other targets which are not protected.

Secondly, some respondents wondered what counterterrorism measures actually can do in case of a well thought-through attack. Some critics of visible counterterrorism measures dispute the effectiveness and efficiency of protective measures, pointing out that they are expensive while being effective only in some threat manifestations (Dalgaard-Nielsen et al. 2016). Furthermore, respondents explained that terrorists will use technological advances for their own causes, something also explained by Monaco (2017). According to them, all it takes for a terrorist is one successful attack, whilst counterterrorism agencies have to be ahead of terrorist each and every time to ensure public safety. Respondents explained that it is good to have bollards and concrete blocks, but these are of little use when explosives are used. Same goes for the presence of police officers: what can they do to stop a terrorist determined to commit suicide by using an explosive belt? As an example, two main respondents told me how easy it is in their perception to attack the city in a coordinated manner. A group of terrorists could make a plan to attack the city in multiple vital places, such as touristic areas like Times Square. They would only have to attack these places at the same time, to make the city a bad place. Police would not know where to respond, and in the case of multiple heavily-armed terrorists, they would have to wait on heavily-armed police officers to help the regular officers. As seen during the 2008 Mumbai attack, normally-armed police officers stand no chance against coordinated attacks, and if it were to happen in New York City, many people would die[77]. During a conversation with a 37-year-old female New Yorker in Times Square I was told about this woman's anxiety of attacks in which drones are used. She said that she "wouldn't be too surprised if someone would come here and use drones to attack Times Square, or basically any other busy area. […] Especially with all the barricades, it will be hard to use a van or truck, so people have to find other ways to kill people. And they will find other ways, you know[78]?"

5.4 Counterterrorism: the paradox

The above two parts analysed some reasons why people felt either safer or less safe due to the counterterrorism measures. However, people's responses were not black and white, and differed from case-to-case, and between locations. As my own experience in the introduction to this chapter shows, security is a paradox. Before encountering the NYPD in Jersey St. in Staten Island, I did not feel anxious or uncomfortable at all. However, after I talked to them, I perceived the space as much more dangerous, and due to the security measures (NYPD), I became anxious. This paradox may have come into existence due to the ambiguity of counterterrorism measures. As shown in the previous chapters as well, securitisation is a

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[77] Multiple conversations with two main respondents, both males (30 and 49 years old)
[78] Conversation, November 28, 2018

dynamic process: new security measures are installed when a new threat shows itself. This can be seen from the action-reaction way of implementing counterterrorism measures: only after the West Side truck attack, concrete blocks were placed along bicycle paths. As different people have explained, counterterrorism measures can provide reassurance and feelings of safety in some instances, such as when walking around Times Square, but it can also increase anxiousness when counterterrorism is perceived as too much. According to Coaffee et al. (2009), counter-terrorism measures have an aesthetic paradox. While security experts may try to transmit feelings of safety through the built environment, these feelings may not be shared by the general public. Security can draw attention to the fact that one's safety is threatened, and in this case arouse feelings of anxiety (*ibid*). As such, feelings of safety are not clear-cut, adding another dimension to the ambiguity of counterterrorism measures.

One example of a counterterrorism paradox is the TCS New York City Marathon where sanitation trucks are filled with sand to stop vehicles trying to run over people, heavily-armed police officers are walking around, NYPD helicopters are flying above and the NYPD searches bags with devices that detect explosives and bomb-sniffing dogs. Although many people I spoke with explained to be in favour of the counterterrorism measures, others were less happy about them and felt anxious. Due to the explosive detections device which was put in every bag, people were wondering whether the marathon was threatened, and they worried about an attack such as the Boston Marathon Bombings in 2013. My own experience was not that bad: I was carrying a normally-sized backpack, and a police officer from the counterterrorism bureau wanted me to open it, so I did. He put an explosive detection device into my backpack and around my body, followed by a metal detector. Since I had my phone in my pocket, the metal detector went off. The officer asked me jokingly "RPG [79] or phone?" to which I answered it was indeed my phone, and I was allowed to go into Central Park to watch the runners go over the finish line. Although I did feel comfortable due to the device, I was somewhat reassured that people inside Central Park did not have any explosives. However, I can understand why people felt more anxious after an encounter like this, as they may be reminded to the Boston Marathon Bombings, making them anxious due to the very same counterterrorism measures that are installed in other urban spaces – bomb-sniffing dogs are nothing of a rare sight.

5.5 Conclusion

Here, I have looked at the way in which counterterrorism measures influence people's perceptions of safety. People saw different vulnerabilities in the research locations, and not all were related to terrorism. In Times Square, tourists' distraction by all that is happening around them is seen as a vulnerability, as they are an easy target for pick pocketers and they will not see suspicious behaviour as fast as someone who is watching the surroundings. At the World Trade Centre, people did think about terrorism as a primary vulnerability. The World Trade Centre is seen as a target for terrorists, and its symbolic status is its main vulnerability. The Staten Island Ferry is seen as a soft target, and again, respondents saw terrorism as its primary vulnerability. Whereas respondents felt the World Trade Centre to have sufficient counterterrorism measures, the Staten Island Ferry is not secured as much, and in this lies its main vulnerability according to my respondents.

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[79] Rocket-propelled grenade: a weapon held on the shoulder that fires rockets with an explosive warhead.

While many people saw terrorism as a vulnerability to urban space in New York City, the responses to counterterrorism measures were not all negative. For many respondents, seeing counterterrorism measures ensured feeling safer than in locations with no counterterrorism measures. Counterterrorism measures are believed to stop attacks whenever they happen, for example through bollards which prevent cars from entering the pedestrian zones at Times Square. Furthermore, respondents said that counterterrorism measures will deter terrorists from attacking the city, thereby preventing attacks by a display of force. Overall, most people felt safer due to the visible counterterrorism measures. However, there was a minority of respondents who became more anxious due to the counterterrorism measures, primarily tourists coming from places that are 'calm and quiet'. They explained to fear terrorism more, as the counterterrorism measures are a constant reminder to the threat of a terrorist attack. The counterterrorism measures made them feel unable to deal with this threat, as they had to rely on the counterterrorism measures for keeping them safe. Also, these sceptical respondents said that the deterrence aspect will cause terrorists to shift targets and seeking the path of least resistance. Therefore, they believed it to be useless, as they will simply attack other urban spaces which are not protected as much as Times Square or the World Trade Centre.

A possible explanation for people feeling safer in New York City due to the counterterrorism measures may be that the city has been attacked multiple times in the past years. Their lived experiences show a fear or anxiety towards terrorism, which makes it so that they *do* feel safer due to the visibility of counterterrorism measures. By taking the city's history into account, the current fear of terrorism over the world, and the claim that many New Yorkers know someone who was a victim of the 9/11 attacks, it makes sense that they feel safer due to the display of force, and less visible measures, such as planters. The 9/11 attacks had a high death toll, and so many more people escaped the towers, that many respondents claimed that everyone in the city knows someone who was in one of the towers of the World Trade Centre. However, when these counterterrorism measures are perceived to be too much, and too invading, such as during the TCS New York City Marathon, its effects can be negative rather than positive, showing the paradox in counterterrorism measures.

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6. Conclusion and discussion

In this final part, I will answer the research question by analysing how counterterrorism measures affect people's perceptions of space and safety in the different research locations. This is relevant, as many cities in Europe are implementing counterterrorism measures as well, and urban planners and policy makers may learn from people in New York City and their daily experiences with counterterrorism measures – although other cities around the world can use the outcomes of this research as well. Not only locals' experiences are important to take into account, but also those of tourists, as tourists visit cities such as New York City, Paris and Amsterdam. Therefore, officials should take their perceptions into account when deciding how to implement material interventions in space. These material interventions can alter people's perceptions towards the threat of terrorism, and as such, it is important to understand contemporary urban space in relation to terrorism.

As noted in the previous chapters, counterterrorism measures are full of ambiguity. There is no simple way to interpret them and see how they 'fit' in space. The experiences of people in New York City have been altered due to the securitisation of terrorism and space after the 9/11 attacks. These experiences have been analysed by using Lefebvre's spatial triad and theories of securitisation. Officials (and scholars) could use both theories to analyse processes of securitisation and their impacts on people's daily lives, when the implemented measures are installed in (urban) space. This chapter will first provide a conclusion, and then a discussion on this research in which the validity and recommendations for future research will be given.

6.1 Conclusion

After the 9/11 attacks, the United States implemented many counterterrorism measures, and these changed urban space as well as this thesis has shown. Counterterrorism measures were implemented, and as such changed space *physically*: bollards are now a common side on the streets, heavily-armed police are seen around many touristic sites, and airport-like security can be found in high-target buildings such as the World Trade Centre. Counterterrorism measures have also changed space *mentally*: respondents made a divide between 'safe' and 'unsafe' space. Even though this meant different things to different people, many explained a 'safe' space to be a space where little to no counterterrorism measures are present. They believe that in such a space where there is no security, the threat or possibility of a terrorist attack is small compared to a space in which there is a lot of security.

Whereas terrorism in cities is nothing new, the effects it has on people today can be argued to be larger than in earlier times. For example, after the attacks in Sri Lanka on April 21, 2019, the NYPD posted an Instagram post, stating that they would protect churches in New York City as a response to the terrorist attacks half a world away (see figure 6.1). Terrorist attacks far away now have a large influence on people, especially with the immediate sharing through (social) media. More and more governments are combatting terrorism in cities by placing bollards, concrete blocks, and other barriers, they station heavily-armed police officers or soldiers in urban space, they let bomb-sniffing dogs check people's luggage and so on. And these counterterrorism measures are becoming more permanent (Németh & Hollander 2010), which can be seen in the


Figure 6.1: Instagram post by the NYPD (nypdct 2019)

three research locations where bollards protect pedestrians and specialised street furniture is installed in Times Square. Concrete blocks are being replaced by bollards (Reuters 2018), which is another manifestation of the permanency counterterrorism measures. As such, it is important to understand how this new land use creates a new dimension to city life: how does it affect people in cities? This thesis has argued that the securitisation of terrorism after the 9/11 attacks led to the securitisation of space in New York City. Different urban spaces are protected by visible counterterrorism measures, although this protection is limited to 'strategic' locations, or possible terrorist targets. Theories of securitisation have been helpful in understanding the securitisation of space better, and throughout this research, I have looked at the way in which this impacts people. What I found were research participants explaining that in the direct aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the media had an important role in securitisation of both terrorism and space. For several days after the 9/11 attacks, television stations suspended all broadcasting of advertising and entertainment, and focused solely on the 9/11 attacks (Kellner 2004). Next to the 9/11 attacks, the media reports on other attacks as well and shows images and videos of the attacks and its aftermath. As such, respondents believed something had to be done to prevent other attacks, and this was an important step in their acceptance of the securitisation of space. Furthermore, social media was used as a discussion platform and an outlet to express opinions regarding terrorism. As such, the Copenhagen School's focus on speech acts of primarily political leaders should be complemented with visuals shown and stories told in the media, as explained by for example Williams (2003) and Hansen (2011). Another important aspect of theories of securitisation that this research has contributed to, is context. While context is underspecified in theories of securitisation (McDonald 2008), I have tried to understand how context might improve theories of securitisation. This research has found many respondents who referred to contextual aspects in their acceptance of the securitisation of both terrorism and space. One of the most important contextual aspects is the fact that most people in the 9/11 attacks died in the World Trade Centre in New York City. Respondents believed that New York City is amongst the top targets of terrorists, and as such needs counterterrorism measures. These contextual factors were reasons to accept the securitisation of terrorism and space, and as such should be taken into account whenever one is looking into processes of securitisation. Not only speech acts are important, but also visuals and contextual factors, and as such, these need to be conceptualised more in analyses of securitisation.

Based on this research, I found that counterterrorism measures *do* something to people and space, the securitisation of space has three main impacts:
1. A change in the aesthetics of urban space;
2. The creation of a mental construct in which space is differentialised;
3. New ways in which people use space.

The *first* impact is a change in the aesthetics of urban spaces, as counterterrorism measures are physical interventions. The World Trade Centre, for example, is highly securitised with many fixed counterterrorism measures such as bollards and a vehicular security centre. At the World Trade Centre, the security measures were installed during rebuilding (The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 2012). However, at Times Square and the Staten Island Ferry, as many other spaces in the city, the security measures were installed while these spaces already existed. In Times Square, the pedestrian zones, which can be perceived as both a counterterrorism and security measure, were created in 2009 (Warerkar 2017). My respondents

saw the creation of pedestrian zones in the city as a positive development, as this brought space back to pedestrians and it was claimed to make the city safer and more pleasant for pedestrians. *Secondly*, the securitisation of space created a differentialisation in urban space. Spaces in which counterterrorism measures were visibly present, were seen as possible terrorist targets and therefore perceived to need counterterrorism measures in order to become safe. However, spaces which had no or little counterterrorism measures, were perceived as safer, they are not a terrorist target, and thus not in need of counterterrorism measures. As a result, some urban spaces, such as Times Square and the World Trade Centre, become securitised whilst other urban spaces do not have counterterrorism measures. *Thirdly*, the creation of counterterrorism measures also created new ways in which people use space. This can be clearly seen from Times Square, where the pedestrian zones used to be roads for cars. Nowadays, however, they are vibrant spaces that are used by pedestrians, they are spaces of relaxation where one can sit down and enjoy the scenery or recover from a long walk.

To understand the influence of counterterrorism measures on urban space, I have used Lefebvre's spatial triad to understand the production of space in the three research locations. The three aspects of the spatial triad (conceived space – the space of planners and experts, lived space – the space of users and inhabitants, and perceived space – how someone uses space) create a new space. By using both Lefebvre's spatial triad and theories of securitisation, this thesis is able to show some interesting aspects of space. Counterterrorism measures were created as a reaction to the securitisation of 'terrorism', and the believed need to defend Americans (but also people in cities in other countries), and thus are created in Lefebvre's conceived space. These material interventions have done something to space, and as noted before, they change space and people's practices in space. The physical space is changed: bollards are installed, concrete blocks are installed, pedestrian zones created and so on. *Perceived space* is also impacted, as people use space in which counterterrorism measures are installed differently than spaces with no/little counterterrorism measures. People can use the bollards and concrete blocks as seats, and they even use them to decide whether a certain space is 'safe' or not. Counterterrorism measures also have an impact on *lived space*: people's daily experiences caused people to want more beautified security measures; many respondents preferred planters or bollards over concrete blocks, and other concrete blocks and jersey barriers are painted by artists. Another clear example of an impact on people's lived space is that tourists and locals thank heavily-armed police officers and soldiers for their service, and taking a picture of/with them.

What stood out, is the difference between perceived and conceived space: people did not necessarily see the counterterrorism measures in the way that urban planners and professionals envision them. Vehicular barriers are installed to prevent vehicles from entering pedestrian zones and walkways (Reuters 2018). As they are installed as a security measure, and with the paradigm of security, urban planners and professionals seek to protect pedestrians. However, my research respondents and many other people I observed used the barriers as seats, they became part of social interactions as groups of people sit on these barriers or lean against them when having conversations. During fieldwork, I saw a discrepancy between conceived and perceived space. The 'see something, say something' campaign is a case in point: in conceived space, this measure was created to counter terrorism, while in perceived space, respondents explained to see this campaign as creating awareness for any negative behaviour, not only terrorism. The pedestrian zones were also not seen by all respondents as a

counterterrorism measure, some respondents were 'shocked' after learning that the benches were able to withstand a vehicular attack or accident. In conceived space, terrorism is designed out by using counterterrorism measures, and this has impacted people's spatial practices. According to Mueller & Stewart (2018), the impact of terrorism on actual behaviour is fairly minor. However, they do not take counterterrorism measures, which are a direct consequence of terrorism, into account. An important finding of this research is the actual impact of counterterrorism measures on people's behaviour. Especially with the discourse of counterterror that public and private officials in most Western cities use to fortify urban spaces (Németh & Hollander 2010), the impact of counterterrorism measures on peoples' behaviour may be relevant for policy makers in cities elsewhere. Counterterrorism measures are a form of governmentality, as counterterrorism measures can be seen as a way to alter people's behaviour by (government) officials. Counterterrorism measures influence people's behaviour in ways that they may become more security-aware. The 'see something, say something' campaign was created to make people more aware of their surroundings, and have them report on suspicious behaviour or packages (DHS n.d.). This is a way to change behaviour in order to have people act in certain circumstances. Furthermore, the bomb-sniffing dogs are said to have influenced people's behaviour, as many respondents explained to walk to the dogs to have them sniff their luggage even though the security guards had not asked them to. Other ways in which people use counterterrorism measures are amongst others seats, elevations to take photos, shelters, attractions and information points – even though their intended use is to protect people and buildings from threats (FEMA 2007). Lived space has also been explored in this thesis. Many respondents, especially tourists, can be said to be fans of the NYPD: they buy NYPD souvenirs, take pictures of and with them, and talk about them as being heroes. Another discrepancy I found was between conceived space and lived space. Whilst the dominant voices in conceived space claim the city to be safe because of the counterterrorism measures, people's lived space was not always in line with this, rather, some people became anxious and more afraid because of the counterterrorism measures.

The view that is emerging is that security measures should be as unobtrusive as possible (GCDN 2018). The respondents to this research agreed with this view for different reasons. Some people became more afraid or nervous due to the obtrusive counterterrorism measures such as bollards and heavily-armed police officers, while others claimed that less obtrusive counterterrorism measures such as planters would beautify urban space. While most respondents claimed to feel safer due to the presence of counterterrorism measures, some respondents felt more anxious, especially when in an urban space with multiple obtrusive counterterrorism measures. The obtrusive counterterrorism measures were said to be a direct link to terrorism, and both the respondents who felt safer and less safe said that these should be replaced by unobtrusive measures. However, many respondents said to actually feel safer by heavily-armed police officers and bollards as they believed that these could stop an attack and were a deterrent for would-be terrorists. However, others felt intimidated by these measures and as a result, were highly aware of their own behaviour. Some respondents were concerned with the government increasing its control of the population through counterterrorism measures. As noted above, counterterrorism measures can be used to govern people and learn them certain behaviour. Next to this, people were concerned about the possibility of security agents to profile people as possible terrorists based on their ethnic backgrounds. People's feelings of safety can fluctuate highly, as I have experienced myself. In one situation, one can

feel safer because of the counterterrorism measures, while in other situations, one can feel more nervous due to their presence.

To summarise shortly, the main finding of this research is that counterterrorism measures are ambiguous in their relation to people. Counterterrorism measures do influence people's perceptions of space and safety, although this is not as simple as it appears. Space gets impacted as physical barriers are created and installed, but this also affects people's ideas of space: space gets defined as 'safe' or 'unsafe'. Feelings of safety are also influenced by counterterrorism measures, as they can both reassure people or make them anxious. Most respondents explained to feel safer as they believed the counterterrorism measures to be able to stop attacks and prevent attacks as they are a deterrent. The respondents who felt more anxious due to the counterterrorism measures explained to feel intimidated and were not certain about their ability to stop and prevent attacks.

6.2 Discussion

In this part, I will first of all explore the validity of this research. Then, I will provide some recommendations for future research.

6.2.1 Validity of this research

Qualitative researchers need to demonstrate that their studies are credible (Creswell & Miller 2000). Validity is defined by Creswell & Miller (2000: 124) as "how accurately the account represents participants' realities of the social phenomena and is credible to them." In order to ensure validity, this research has used triangulation to look for convergence among multiple and different sources of information. Throughout fieldwork, I combined different methods to get data as described in 2.1. The data gathered through interviews, (participant) observations, and texts are all closely related, and I did not find any big discrepancies in data, although there were some outliers in feelings of safety due to counterterrorism measures. As the data gathered through different research methods were closely related and not very different, this research has high validity on triangulation. The different data sources provided corroborating evidence

Throughout fieldwork, I have sought to stay reflexive on my own role and feelings as researcher, but also as person. I am aware that I look at the subject from a particular lens, and I have tried to incorporate this into my findings. Whatever my feelings of safety and my ideas of space may be, this may be completely different for someone else with an entirely different background than mine. While interviewing and talking to people, I tried to stay as neutral as possible, and I maintained an open attitude. Furthermore, I did not actively try to steer a conversation into a particular direction. During interviews, I also tried to let the interviewee set course, although I did have a topic list. One benefit of semi-structured interviews is that the interview is not predetermined, making it possible to explore other ideas and feelings of interviewees, to talk about what they deem important. In order to keep treatment of my research participants the same while interviewing, I had made an introduction to the interviews and these were the same for all interviewees.

Another aspect of validity that I would like to highlight here is 'prolonged engagement in the field' (Creswell & Miller 2000). I stayed in New York City for three months, and after some time I met people who regularly visit the research locations. Furthermore, my housemates and I created a bond of mutual trust and friendship, and they provided me with valuable information I would not have gathered had we not trusted each other as well as we did. The people I regularly met also proved to be gatekeepers, as they introduced me to other people and

explained where to find respondents. Being in the field enables researchers to solidify evidence as they can check out the data and their hunches and compare interview data with observational data (Creswell & Miller 2000). During fieldwork, I did this as well. Whenever I sensed something to be important, I would follow that hunch and ask respondents, especially my main respondents, whether my hunch was correct. While three months might be relatively short, I am confident that it provided better views of living with counterterrorism measures and how this affects people's daily reality.

The above points all relate to the research's internal validity, but I would like to inquire into its external validity as well. First of all, the interviews were not conducted in the same settings, and usually, they were outside, and as most interviews were conducted in Manhattan, this meant a noisy environment. As such, my respondents and I would sometimes get distracted by other people or things. One example is an interview I conducted in Union Square Park. We were sitting whilst a rat was moving around, and as such we got distracted and decided to move elsewhere. Secondly, this research is highly location specific, as they were all centred around and in Manhattan. Two of my research locations (Times Square and the World Trade Centre) were saturated with counterterrorism measures, and this may have impacted people's answers as well. However, this is what this research has set out to do: to find out how counterterrorism measures influence people's feelings of safety. However, it would have been useful to compare the research locations with high visibility of counterterrorism measures to a location in New York City with no or little visible counterterrorism measures, for example an urban space in Brooklyn or the Bronx. Even though this has not been done, I am confident that the data I collected is valid. It is possible to generalise the data for people in New York City in locations with visible counterterrorism measures. I have talked to many people from different (ethnic) backgrounds, and I used a standardised interview guide to ensure that every respondent were asked the same questions, while they could still talk about things important to them. Whenever I went out into the field, I tried to find respondents as ethnically and age-diverse as possible. However, I would not count how many people with a certain background I talked to, as I learned that it was hard to find people to have (mini-)interviews with. A possible solution could be a follow-up study in which the participants are chosen on New York City's demography – however, this was not possible in the scope of this research. While this might be a point for improvement, I am still certain that other researchers will find similar data for people in New York City. And as such, I believe that the external validity is high and the data can be generalised.

Both theories of securitisation and Lefebvre's spatial triad were very useful in understanding the way counterterrorism impact space and people's behaviour. As noted before, the securitisation of space can be seen as part of conceived space, whereas its 'real' implications on people can be understood by investigating lived space and perceived space. As such, both theories make this analysis richer. The securitisation framework helps in the analysis of *how* and *why* counterterrorism measures came into existence and are now so widespread. The spatial triad complements the knowledge by providing an analytical framework for understanding the processes underlying the production of space, and thus how the implementation of counterterrorism measures have influenced the different aspects of space, and in this, urban space as a whole. Even though using both theories has been frustrating at some instances, in the end, it made the preceding analysis richer. It was somewhat frustrating, as Lefebvre's spatial triad was quite abstract to me, and as such, I had to search for was to use it in my research.

However, due to the availability of multiple articles and books that apply the spatial triad, I was able to use the theory in such a way that it helped in analysing the processes that are happening in urban space in New York City due to the implementation of counterterrorism measures. As such, for following research, I would recommend using these two theories together as I have done for this research, especially when one wants to understand how certain material interventions influence space and perceptions.

Throughout fieldwork, I was able to see connections between the subjects and people's responses to my questions. As I have noted before, an interesting point during fieldwork was around a week after starting when I was no longer very 'intimidated' by the counterterrorism measures. I noted that I was no longer looking at the counterterrorism measures as much as before, and I also felt no longer overwhelmed by all the counterterrorism measures – something I was at the beginning, even though I had done a literature study before fieldwork. When I came back to the Netherlands, the first thing I saw when I entered Schiphol Plaza, were the heavily-armed Marechaussee officers, even though they had been guarding Schiphol for a while like that. What I have also noticed, is the NYPD's outlook on the world: after the attacks during eastern in Sri Lanka, they stationed more police around churches. This is something that the Dutch police did after the Brussels attacks in 2016 as well, but I had never really paid attention to that as much as I do now. Furthermore, when I am walking around busy areas in Dutch cities like Amsterdam or The Hague, I see multiple counterterrorism measures as well. This makes me wonder what fellow Dutch people, and tourists, think of this. As such, I would be very interested in doing a similar research in the Netherlands as well, although the counterterrorism measures are 'younger' than in New York City.

6.2.2 Recommendations

This research found that people are affected by counterterrorism measures in multiple, different ways. As such, it would be useful for urban planners and officials to take these findings into account when creating and installing (new) counterterrorism measures. Urban planners might want to team up with architects to create aesthetically pleasing counterterrorism measures, in order to ensure the openness of cities, rather than having urban space resemble a militarised zone. Urban space will not only become more pleasant and safe, it may also improve people's *feelings* of safety. Most respondents who felt anxious due to the counterterrorism measures, explained that this was because 1) they are a direct link to terrorism, and 2) they were seen as intimidating. Whenever temporary counterterrorism measures such as concrete blocks are replaced by permanent ones, urban planners and security experts should keep this in mind when deciding what kind of measures to implement. While heavily-armed police officers might be useful in protecting urban spaces, they are seen as obtrusive by many people. Taking this into account, they might be used next to planters, rather than bollards, to have an urban space which remains open but also safe. Experts should thus look at the interplay between obtrusive and unobtrusive measures, and find a way to have security without security being to invasive.

To finalise this thesis, I would like to provide some recommendations for future research into the influence of counterterrorism measures on people's perceptions of safety and space. Researchers should first of all use both theories of securitisation and Lefebvre's spatial triad in conjunction, as they provide a good framework for understanding how material interventions created to deal with an 'existential' threat influence people's daily lives and space. Theories of securitisation will first provide an understanding of the processes leading up to a change in

space, and the spatial triad will provide a framework for understanding how space is continuously changing due to these securitisation processes. Next to this, this research was done in a relatively short period of time (three months), and as such, it was not able to follow every lead. Follow-up research might look into the governmentality of counterterrorism measures more closely, to understand it better. Furthermore, research should look at space which is not securitised as well. This research has chosen locations which have counterterrorism measures in place, while it might be interesting to see how people experience urban space which is not as securitised. During fieldwork I heard respondents wonder why urban spaces such as Central Park and Union Square Park are not as securitised as my research locations. How does the absence of counterterrorism measures in urban spaces seen as possible terrorist targets by ordinary people relate to people's perception of space and safety? This could be a lead to follow for future research, as multiple respondents wondered about this as well. Furthermore, this research focused on areas in Manhattan, or closely tight to Manhattan, and as such, the research findings might be different than in other areas in New York City, as Manhattan was seen as a terrorist target while other boroughs were not seen as such. How do people in other boroughs with no or few counterterrorism measures respond to the same questions? While talking to some people I met in Staten Island, I learned that not everyone continuously interacts with these measures, and as different tourists explained, the less you interact with counterterrorism measures, the more anxious you become. How does this relate to New Yorkers who rarely visit Manhattan or securitised spaces? Finally, for future research into processes of securitisation, I would recommend taking context and audience acceptance into account. People are not merely listening to dominant actors, but their opinions are also shaped by contextual factors, media outlets, and their social network. Because of new technologies, it is now possible to have real-time global coverage, and the Internet and cell phones with camera and video-recording capacity have changed the relationship between dominant actors and audiences (Williams 2003). This said, audiences can choose where they get their information from and which actor to listen to. Thus, theories of securitisation should understand audience acceptance as broader than agreeing with the speech acts of dominant actors. Rather, they should unravel the interrelationship between speech acts, visuals, and context more.

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