CONTROLLING THE COLONY

Military Practices and the Monopoly of Violence in the Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies: a comparison

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Abstract

Because the ruling elite in a colonial state is culturally and ethically distinct from the native population colonial states inherently lack legitimacy, presenting the question how the colony is controlled. In order to establish a monopoly of violence the colonial state needs to build a colonial army, but also needs to create legitimacy for itself if it wishes to sustain this monopoly of violence through other means than coercion. This thesis aims to analyse how Belgium and the Netherlands established a monopoly of violence in their equatorial colonies in the Congo and the Indonesian archipelago by using the theoretical framework provided by North, Wallis, and Weingast in their 2009 book 'Violence and Social Orders', and by making use of the concepts of hard and soft power coined by Nye (2004, 2008). In order to do so question have been formulated regarding the composition, leadership structures, and deployment of the colonial armies of the Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies, set against the contextual factors that influenced colonial policies and practices. Answering these question gives an insight in how colonial elites functioned within the colonial society and what role colonial armies played in creating legitimacy for, and loyalty towards, the colonial state. With the introduction of the colonial elite the framework of North, Wallis, and Weingast is expanded as the native elite does not cease to exist as a new elite is established. Rather, the native elites are co-opted by the colonial elite, providing the colonial elite with legitimacy, while the colonial elite ensures the continuation or establishment of the privileged position of the native elites. As salary and regard provide pull factors for native recruits the colonial army transforms from an instrument of suppression into an organisation that creates loyalty towards the colonial elite, while at the same time giving the colonial elite the possibility to enforce the continued co-optation of native elites.

The painting on the cover page is the "Painting of a Wounded KNIL soldier" by Isaac Israels, property of the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Colonialism

The golden age of colonialism has been over for several decades. Yet, a lot of research is still published about it, and this will probably continue to be the case into the foreseeable future. Because the effects that colonialism brought onto the societies of the colonised are still visible in the present this research on colonialism is important to understand the societies of former colonies. Former colonies can be found all around the world and range from very poor to very rich, and from failed states to stable democracies. Understanding the way colonialism has shaped the world in the past can help in coming to a better understanding of the present.

At the end of the nineteenth century, all major European powers met in Berlin in order to divide the continent on which many had already been laying claims for several years. As Africa was being divided sovereignty was awarded to these powers over parts of this vast continent, including areas where Europeans never ventured before. At this point in time Léopold II, King of Belgians, had already been working to establish a claim in the heart of Africa along the river Congo. With the help of the Welsh explorer Sir Henry Morton Stanley, the first European to travel along this river a few years earlier, Léopold had set up a small number of posts along the Congo under the banner of his Association Internationale du Congo (AIC) (Van Reybrouck, 2010). Under the pretence of humanitarianism and geographical exploration Léopold had been working towards establishing a form of soft power over the Congo. Nye (2008, p. 94) defines soft power as 'the ability to affect others to obtain outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment'. In the case of Léopold and the Congo this meant that the AIC, and thus chairperson and founder Léopold, gained international recognition for its humanitarian efforts in the Congo basin. This recognition as a great humanitarian played a vital role for Léopold in acquiring the Congo (Hochschild, 2012).

While the Belgian King had been spending time and resources on establishing a foothold in Africa, Belgium's neighbour to the North had finally succeeded in consolidating effective control over the Indonesian archipelago. Dutch presence in modern-day Indonesia dates back to the late 16th century when Dutch trading fleets started arriving at Java. It took until the beginning of the 19th century for the Dutch state to take control over the possessions held up to that point by the Dutch East Indies Company (Frankema & Buelens, 2013). From this moment forth an ever-expanding portion of the archipelago came under Dutch administration as the Dutch took control over the islands. At the time the AIC was rewarded sovereignty over the Congo the spread of Dutch influence over the archipelago was still under way.

Although thousands of kilometres apart, the Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies share many similarities which makes it possible to compare the two countries. Both territories were controlled initially by companies whose main business was with extracting wealth. The Congo and the Indonesian archipelago were both taken over by the governments of the countries where these companies were founded. These governments inherited a colony with serious problems. In the Netherlands Indies the Dutch government had to deal with a large debt, for which it loaned its colony the amount of 40 million guilders (van der Doel, 1996). The Belgian government, which had made clear from the beginning that it did not want to get involved in the Congo, inherited a country where ruthless extraction had led to humanitarian atrocities and where state infrastructure was virtually non-existent (Frankema & Buelens, 2013; Van Reybrouck, 2010). Still, both the Netherlands and Belgium eventually succeeded in establishing effective rule over their large equatorial colony. The small Western-European nations then proceeded to efficiently exploit their colonies through varying systems, arguably helping Belgium and The Netherlands to become two of the best developed countries in the world.

1.2 The Monopoly of Violence

The landmasses of the Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies are substantially larger than those of Belgium and The Netherlands[1]. Furthermore, the colonies lacked the infrastructure to be easily accessible for a colonising power. This meant that gaining control over territory and sometimes unwilling subjects

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[1] Landmass Indonesia : Netherlands 46 : 1, Landmass Congo : Belgium 75 : 1

proved to be a challenge for colonising Europeans. At the Berlin conference it was agreed that a territory needed to be controlled effectively in order for other nations to recognize the claim to it (Isaacman & Vansina, 1976; Van Reybrouck, 2010, p. 67). While international recognition is important for a colonial project for multiple reasons, effective control over the colonial territory brings one very important benefit: the power to exploit the resources of the territory and exclude others from exploiting it. For both Léopold and the Dutch this seemed to be a difficult problem to solve. After all, how does a small state from Europe effectively control an enormous territory halfway across the world?

A key concept in this effort of the metropole to gain effective control over the colony is the monopoly of violence.Using the army to establish and maintain the monopoly of violence has been a global norm throughout history. However, the road towards a monopoly on violence is not linear or equal across cases. Establishing a monopoly of violence in a colonial context is substantially different than in a state like the Netherlands, which is rooted in history and formed more or less organically. The colonial state by definition suffers from a lack of legitimacy as foreign rule is superimposed upon the native population. However, treating the native population as homogenous does not do justice to the complex social realities surrounding the establishing of a monopoly of violence. Subduing native polities by use of force is costly and therefore never the first choice for a colonial administration. Instead, a colonial administration will seek to co-opt ruling elites in the colony, thereby integrating a polity peacefully into the colony. Similar to cooperation, co-optation is defined by the fact that one party sets the common goal and is therefore dominant in the relationship. This is different from cooperation, where both parties work together towards a jointly agreed goal. The likelihood of one elite being co-opted by another elite is dependent on several factors. One important factor is the capacity of violence of one elite as perceived by the other elite. If the distribution of violence capacity is unequal, co-optation will become more likely as failing to co-opt could lead to violent suppression of the weaker elite. It is possible to analyse the dynamics at play between colonial and native elites in the colony with the theory put forward by North, Wallis, and Weingast in their 2009 book 'Violence and Social Orders'.

Evidence of the co-opting of native elites in order to establish indirect rule and a monopoly of violence can be found in both colonies. However, there are important differences between elite co-optation in the Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies. Differing degrees of societal organisation, population density, and resource wealth influence whether native elites are willing to be co-opted by the colonial administration. The Aceh sultanate in Northern Sumatra, for instance, refused to cooperate with the Dutch coloniser and were eventually conquered by military force. In contrast, native elites of small polities in the Belgian Congo would often choose to by co-opted by the coloniser as doing so allowed them to retain their position, albeit under colonial rule. The differing success of elite co-optation in these examples influence the military practices in both colonies. After all, if peaceful co-optation of native elites is successful and a monopoly of violence can be established without the use of violence, the army will be deployed differently than in a colony where elites have to be coerced into submission through violence.

Establishing a monopoly of violence is not a straightforward endeavour. Colonial realities differing across cases ask for a tailor-made approach. Central to understanding the way colonial administrations establish a monopoly of violence are the concepts of soft and hard power (Nye, 2004, 2008). How these concepts will be used to properly analyse and compare Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies will be discussed in the next chapter, where I will elaborate on the theoretical framework for this thesis. In this theoretical framework I aim to link the monopoly of violence as conceptualised by North et al. with power as defined by Nye. The theory of North, Wallis, and Weingast and Nye provide a framework that allows for a side-by-side comparison of differences and similarities of military practices in both colonies. By doing so, I hope to be able to uncover differences in the approach towards establishing a monopoly of violence in the Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies and simultaneously analyse why these differences exist.

To do so I will take a look at these armies from multiple angles. I will look at the recruitment tactics used by the colonial state, asking who was recruited, from which ethnic group, and why. I will also investigate the use of foreign mercenaries in these colonial armies, where and how these mercenaries were recruited, and the leadership structures of both colonial armies. This raises questions about the possibilities for

indigenous people to hold leadership positions in the military, but also about the leadership structure within the colonial state. For instance, what does the top leadership of the colonial army look like, and from where is it commanded: the metropole or the colonial capital? I will also be looking at the deployment of these colonial armies. To what purpose are these armies deployed: fighting insurgencies, policing, or defence from extraterritorial aggression? The last point I will be looking into has to do with the way these colonial armies are controlled: how did the colonial states make sure that an army made up of colonial subjects would do as asked and serve the colonial power? Why are native soldiers loyal towards a colonial administration lacking legitimacy?

1.3 Research Questions

In this thesis I aim to answer the research questions presented below. These questions have been formulated along four main points of comparison: recruitment and composition, leadership structures, deployment and the creation of loyalty. These four subjects allow for an analysis on the military practices themselves, as well as the results these military practices had on the establishment of a monopoly of violence within the colony.

Main research question:
"How was the monopoly of violence in the Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies established and maintained?"

Sub questions to the main question per subject:
- Recruitment and Composition
    o What tactics were used to recruit soldiers?
    o From what indigenous groups did the colonial armies recruit?
    o Was one ethnic group deemed more favourable, and why?
    o What role did ethnicity play in recruitment?
    o Were mercenaries used in the colonial army? To what extent and purpose?
- Leadership structures
    o What was the leadership structure in the colonial army?
    o What positions could be held by Europeans and what positions by indigenous peoples?
    o Who controlled the colonial army?
- Deployment
    o What were the colonial army's duties?
    o To what purpose were the armies deployed?
- Creation of loyalty
    o How did the colonial state create an army loyal to the metropole?
    o What tactics are used to integrate indigenous people into the army?
    o How was obedience created?
    o What role does legitimacy play in the creation of loyalty?
    o What were push and pull factors that made indigenous people join the army?

1.4 Methods, Limitations, and Clarification of Terms

In order to answer the research questions information was gathered from contemporary sources like journal articles and book publications, and archive material. I visited the archives of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels and the Dutch National Archives in The Hague. In the archives both books published in the colonial period and archived documents were consulted. During this consulting of sources in the archives it became evident that there was a significant disparity between the amount of information as well as the richness of the information between the Belgian Congo and Netherlands Indies with regard to military practices and army organisation. A search of contemporary literature provided no satisfying explanation for this observation. However, the explanation as to why the Belgian archives contained more and richer information are important to hypothesise about as this can have impact on the answering of the research questions. By doing so, I have come up with two possible explanations.

The first explanation for the difference in quality and quantity of information on military practices in Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies is the way the colonial armies in both colonies were founded. As was already mentioned in the introduction the Dutch first established a presence in the Indonesian archipelago in the 16th century through trading fleets and trading posts. In order to protect its trading interests the Dutch East India Company made use of a private army (Breman, 2010). The Company realised that it would be convenient to fill the ranks of this private army with the local population. After all, shipping in soldiers from Europe was a costly undertaking, was risky because of disease, and was therefore bad for business (Teitler, 2002). After the Dutch government had taken over administration of the settlements in the archipelago from the Dutch East India Company and slowly started to take control over the islands, a rudimentary tradition of army composition was already in place. As the Dutch East India Company had for decades successfully protected its interests by enlisting a mix of European and local soldiers there was no direct need to change. In other words: although total troop strength will have increased as the controlled territory grew, a lack of profound change in the way the army was set up limits the amount of source material that survived the passing of time.

This is different for the source material of initial army composition in Belgian Congo. An important note here is that the Dutch colonial project was centuries underway when Léopold received sovereignty over the Congo. Belgium seceded from the Netherlands in 1830, and 60 years had passed since the start of the Java war in 1825. The standards of record keeping have progressed in this time, as evidenced by the much richer information from the Netherlands Indies at the end of the 19th century. The effect of these six decades since the start of the Dutch colonial expansion will be elaborated upon in the second explanation. When the colonial army for Belgian Congo was established there had been no significant colonial military presence in the territory. This called for a new standard, to which end the Force Publique was founded in 1888 (Bulletin Officiel, 1888). Founded by Royal decree, the Force Publique needed soldiers to fill its ranks, as there had been no form of standing army to do so immediately. This led to a trail of decrees, Colonial Council reports and recommendations about recruitment, distribution, and privileges for the Force Publique (Bulletin Officiel, various issues).

The second explanation was briefly mentioned in the former paragraph: because of the different starting points in time of the colonial projects in the Congo and the archipelago, the standards for record keeping were different. When comparing Dutch yearbooks from the 1850's to those 30 years later, it becomes clearly visible that progress was made in the detail and specificity of the information. Information about the Congo Free State still is relatively limited in its first years as the penetration of the state into the vast unexplored territory is not complete, and the state performed a more limited role than later on the colonial timeline (Van Reybrouck, 2010, p. 92). However, because technology in 1885 was significantly more advanced than in 1816, the expansion of the colonial state in the Congo could take place faster than in the Netherlands Indies. Take the typewriter as an example: important for disseminating information, it became available for office use in the late 1880's (Cortada, 1993, p. 16). Naturally, the scale of the colonial state also directly influences the amount of information recorded. All in all, the later starting point of the colonial expansion in the Congo has led to a higher average quality and quantity of sources for the Belgian Congo than for the Netherlands Indies, which is also influenced by the more rapid expansion of the bureaucracy of the colonial state as technology advanced through time.

In order to be able to systematically compare the military practices in the Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies the timeline of the colonial period has been divided into two parts. This is done in order to compare the situation in two colonies where the timelines are not synchronised. In order to be able to say anything sensible about the development of military practices in both colonies it is important to find a point in time which occurs in both timelines and has an impact on military practices. In order to do this the point in time has been chosen in which it is reasonable to argue that the army has succeeded in establishing a monopoly of violence in the colony. In other words, in the coming chapters a distinction will be made between the early and late colonial period based on whether there is a monopoly of violence in the territory. For the Belgian Congo, this point was identified as the transfer of sovereignty from Léopold II to the Belgian government in 1908. This point is chosen as the territory was under the nominal control of the Force Publique at this point, with no substantial challenges to its power. For the Netherlands Indies the moment

chosen is when the KNIL finally pacified the Aceh region in 1910 and thereby gained control over the entire archipelago and was underway with the political integration of Java and the rest of the archipelago (Lindblad, 2002, p. 111).

Before elaborating on the theoretical framework and answering the research questions, it is important to briefly clarify the terms used in this thesis to prevent ambiguity. "Belgian Congo" is used when referring to the territory that is currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as this was the name for the territory for most of the colonial period. Also, the territory was commonly referred to as the Belgian Congo before it was officially called that, a result of the confusing situation of Belgium and the Congo sharing a head of state (Stengers & Vansina, 1985, p. 316) The Congo Free State will be used to refer to events or practices that occurred between 1885 and 1908. All in all, the Belgian colonial project lasted between 1885, when the AIC and Léopold II acquired sovereignty over the territory, until 1960 when the Republic of the Congo became independent. As people employed by Léopold to establish control over the Congo in the early years were largely Belgians, I will refer to 'Belgians' settling the colony, even though people from multiple nationalities participated.

"The Netherland Indies" is referred to as the name for the territories effectively controlled by the Dutch in what is now the Republic of Indonesia at a given point in time. This means that what is called the Netherlands Indies refers to a larger territory in 1910 than it did in 1830. Although the Dutch maintained a formal presence on the archipelago for a very long time, in this thesis the start of the colonial project is defined as the moment the Dutch get back control over their Eastern belongings from the British in 1816. For the first time in 1816, the Dutch government in The Hague has formal responsibility over the foreign possessions after the disintegration of the Dutch East India Company. Buelens and Frankema (2015, p. 43) indicate that the building of the Post road across Java during the French occupation of the metropole is the first step to control over the archipelago. 1816 marked the first time the post road could be administered by the Dutch, who took their colonial project from this point until the Japanese occupation in 1942, after which the Dutch never regained control over the archipelago.

It is important to note that the colonial realities in the Netherlands Indies and Belgian Congo are sometimes simplified and understated in this thesis. Although I am very much aware that both colonies were heterogeneous with respect to ethnic composition, culture, traditions and impact of the colonial rule. In order to compare military practices in both colonies some parts of the colonial reality are simplified in order to contain the size of this thesis. An example of this is the simplified division of the timeline into two parts. Where possible the nuances of the colonial reality are specified. In both the Congo and the Indonesian archipelago, the names of regions and cities have changed after the colonial period. In this thesis I will make use of the names used during the colonial period, for purposes of historical accuracy. For example, the cities currently known as Kinshasa and Jakarta will be referred to as Léopoldville and Batavia. The Belgian colonial army will be referred to as the Force Publique, the name it had since its inception. I will refer to the Dutch colonial army it by its Dutch acronym KNIL, short for the Royal Netherlands Indies army.

1.5 Roadmap
In the rest of this thesis military practices in the Belgian and Dutch colonies of the Congo and the Indonesian archipelago will be systematically compared. This will be done by looking at a few pre-determined aspects of military practices in early colonial states and how these practices have developed through time. The first, and most important, point of comparison is recruitment and army composition. After analysing who makes up the colonial army, why, and how this has changed over time, the colonial armies of Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies are compared by looking at the leadership structures in the army. The next point of comparison is made by looking at the deployment of the colonial armies. After all, the actions of an army significantly shape its role in the colony. The last point this thesis will be elaborating upon is probably the most abstract point of comparison, which revolves around one of the most pressing questions in colonial states: why are the colonial subjects, incorporated in the army, loyal to the colonial power rather than to their peers? As answering the research questions on this subject provide pivotal answers to the main research question I will answer these questions, along with a reflection on the theory, in the conclusion.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Conceptualising the Monopoly of Violence and Power

In order to elaborate on the theories used to analyse the military practices in colonial Congo and Indonesia I will combine the concept monopoly of violence as brought forward by North, Wallis and Weingast in their book 'Violence and Social Orders' with the conceptualisation of power of Joseph Nye, who divides power into hard power, soft power and economic power (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009; Nye, 2008). The concept of the monopoly of violence is of central importance to this thesis as it envelops the *raison d'etre* of every (colonial) army in the world, including those of Belgium and The Netherlands. Jessop (2009) quotes Max Weber's definition of the modern state as the 'human community that successfully claims legitimate monopoly of coercion in a given territorial area', a definition presenting problems to early colonial states which may lay a claim to a certain territorial area but certainly did not have the capacities to successfully claim the monopoly of coercion. One example of this from the Congo are the raids carried out by Afro-Arab slave traders in the Eastern Congo, ended by the Arabic Expeditions of the Force Publique in 1892, almost a decade after the Congo Free State had seen the light of day as a sovereign entity (Buelens, 2007; Van Reybrouck, 2010, p. 95).

This example illustrates that being a sovereign entity does not automatically mean that the monopoly of violence over the territory has been established. However, establishing the monopoly of violence does play a crucial role in creating a stable colonial state in which trade and productivity can flourish, important goals for both the Dutch and the Belgians. In its essence the monopoly of violence is just that: the use of violence reserved to a single actor, usually the state. One important work that deals with the monopoly of violence is the book 'Violence and Social Orders' by Douglass North, Joseph Wallis and Barry Weingast (2009). The authors recognise that all societies face the issue of violence and indicate that no society deals with violence by eliminating it. Rather, violence can be curbed or managed. North et al. conceptualise that as the number of people within a group increases the personal relationships between the members of this group are no longer sufficient in dealing with violence. After all, in a small group it is possible to maintain a personal relationship with every member of the group, something which becomes impossible when the group expands in size. Therefore, the creation of some sort of social institution to control violence is needed as the number of people in a group increases.

North et al. recognise *institutions* and *organisations* as the ways for handling the problem of violence within a society. North (1990, pp. 3-4) defines institutions as 'the rules of the game'. Examples of institutions are rules, laws, and unwritten rules of behaviour. The means with which the law is to be enforced are also examples of institutions. Institutions shape the way individuals behave, as well as the individual's expectations of the behaviour of others. The other way North et al. identify for dealing with violence in society are organisations. The authors recognise two types of organisations: *adherent* and *contractual* organisations. Adherent organisations one the one hand are 'characterized by self-enforcing, incentive-compatible agreements among its members' (North et al., 2009, p. 16). Contractual organisations, on the other hand, make use of outside enforcement of contracts next to incentive-compatible consensus among its members.

North et al. identify three types of societies in their book. The two most important ones are the limited access order society and the open access order society. In a limited access order personal relationships are paramount: they form the basis for interaction and organisation. In an open access order this focus on the personal shifts to the impersonal: everyone has the possibility to form organisations supported by the society and personal relationship are of decreasing importance. Although modern day Belgium and The Netherlands are open access orders, this was not the case during the colonial era. In an open access order violence can be limited through institutions alone: rules are formulated that change the payoff of violent behaviour. An individual will obey the rules if this individual believes others will do the same, impersonal enforcement of rules is needed. After all, if the rules differ from person to person the individual cannot trust that the other will refrain from using violence. Even though this example of containing violence is applicable to some societies in the present, open access orders did not exist during the beginning of the colonial era. At the beginning of their colonial projects, Belgium and The Netherlands were limited access

orders or *natural states,* as were their respective colonies. It is important to note here that Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies were not alone in being natural states, as colonial states by definition are limited access orders.

Natural sates try to solve the problem of violence by creating a dominant coalition, or an elite, which possess privileges and control the economic rents created by resources and activities (North et al., 2009). Because fighting among themselves will reduce these economic rents, elites have a strong incentive towards cooperation rather than fighting. Subsequently, elites have an incentive to limit access to the coalition in order to maintain their rents and secure the stability of the coalition. In order to mobilise economic rents elites have the privilege to form contractual organisations, which depend on the support by other elites for their continued existence. This makes the coalition an adherent organisation as it allows elites to discipline other elites and thus becomes self-enforcing. The dominant coalition in Belgian Congo and The Netherlands Indies is easily identified: this coalition is made up of the officials comprising the colonial state. Due to the nature of colonial states the distinction between elites and non-elites could also be made on the basis of ethnicity, with Europeans comprising the elite and the indigenous population making up the non-elites. However, the realities of the colonial state do not fit perfectly within the confines of the natural state as defined by North et al.

Although the colonial elite replaces the native elite in most respects, this does not mean that the native elite ceases to exist. Instead, the native elite is often co-opted by the colonial elite, leaving traditional societal structures intact to some extent, in exchange for enforcement of the monopoly of violence. This significantly changes the position of the native elites, however, as they cease to be an adherent organisation and become a contractual organisation under the colonial elite instead. This three-layer model of colonial elites, native elites and native non-elites adds a new dimension to the theory of North et al. and allows for a better understanding of the way the monopoly of violence is established and maintained within a colony. Although native elites can still form contractual organisations, they are less dependent on the support of other native elites, but rather on the continued support of the colonial elite. The co-optation of native elites therefore provides some insight into the question of how small European metropoles were able to effectively control their large colonies.

In this thesis the road towards the monopoly of violence, or the control of the colony, will be analysed through the concepts of hard and soft power as coined by Joseph S. Nye of Harvard University. Nye (2009, p. 160) defines power as the ability to influence the behaviour of others to achieve desired outcomes. Nye conceptualises that there are three ways to achieve this influencing of behaviour: coercion, payment, and attraction. He groups these into two categories, hard power and soft power. Hard power envelops the use of coercion and payments to achieve desirable outcomes. After all, both the use of coercion and the making of payments involve direct pressure and can be compared to a stick and a carrot. Soft power pertains to attraction serving to achieve the desired behavioural outcomes. All three forms of power in one form or another may be used by one actor on another actor at any given time in. Nye (2009) refers to a well-tuned combination of coercive power, economic power, and power of attraction in world politics as smart power. The same thing can be observed in the policies and practices regarding colonial armies: a combination of the three forms of power should result in a more desirable outcome than the application of just one form of power. This conceptualisation of power in three forms comes close to coercion, capital, and commitment as described by Tilly (2004). Although the work of Nye is more recent than the work of Tilly I have chosen to work with Nye in this thesis as his framework is more operationalised. Where Tilly remains fairly theoretical in his conceptualisation of power, Nye's soft and hard power lend themselves to more direct application to colonial reality.

2.2 Violence and Power in Action
The use of Nye's conceptualisation of power in analysis is not limited to the establishment and maintenance of the monopoly of power in the colonies, it can also be used to analyse how Belgium and the Netherlands became the sovereign power over their colonies. In the introduction the role of soft power in the acquisition of the Congo by Léopold II was briefly mentioned. There are very few examples in world history of territories of the size of the Congo basin being appointed to either a person or a company. The Berlin Conference resulted in the AIC, and by extension Léopold II, being appointed as the sovereign over a

territory hardly any European had ever been. This was the result of years of public diplomacy by Léopold and his AIC. By involving geographers and humanitarian causes into his pursuit of the Congo, Léopold convinced the major European powers that all of them were to gain something from Léopold's involvement in the Congo. This power of attraction, as well as smart diplomacy which will be elaborated upon in a chapter on the context, therefore resulted in a king from a small and young European nation becoming the sovereign over what later proved to be an economic goldmine, both literally and figuratively. Through soft power Léopold had achieved sovereignty over the colony, but hard power would still be needed to establish control over the colony.

The path towards control over the colony was very different in the Netherlands Indies. The Dutch maintained a presence on the Indonesian archipelago for a long time before they started expanding their influence into what could be called a colony rather than a collection of trading points scattered across multiple islands. An event marking the beginning of colonial control by the Dutch in the Indonesian archipelago is the construction of a highway across the most important island, Java, in 1808 (Frankema & Buelens, 2013, p. 43). This highway, supposed to help in defending Java, could not prevent a takeover by the British, with the Dutch regaining sovereignty in 1816 after Napoleon was defeated. At this point the Dutch started to consolidate their grip over the archipelago's most prosperous island by setting up a tax system on the local population and conquering Java during the bloody Java war (1825-1830) (Buelens, 2007). With taxation being a display of economic power and conquest a display of coercive power, the Dutch took their first step to control the colony through hard power. It would take decades and hard power, sometimes combined with soft power, for the Dutch to consolidate their grip over the entire archipelago. This slow process involved numerous military campaigns provides a significant explanation to military practices in the Netherlands Indies, which will be elaborated on at a later point.

These are two examples of how soft power and hard power were used by the Belgians and Dutch in the acquisition of their respective colonies and the expansion of territorial control. Similarly, elements of hard and soft power can be identified throughout colonial policies and practices. While the deployment of the military in the field will always be qualified as coercive hard power, the power of an army is much more dynamic and multi-faceted than just coercive hard power. For instance, the Dutch colonial army enforced an economic blockade on the rebellious Aceh province during the Aceh war, which started in 1873 (Teitler, 2002). Likewise, the prospect of European-made clothing, a rifle, and basic education provided soft power attraction for young Congolese men looking to make a living in Belgian Congo (Van Reybrouck, 2010, p. 92). These are two examples of colonial armies as the instrument or cause of economic power and soft power.

As hard and soft power played an important role in creating both colonies as shown in these examples, it is important to acknowledge the influence of societal structure of the native polities in the territory. Differing in scale and societal complexity, every native polity requires a different combination of hard and soft power in order to be integrated into the colony. Generalising, it can be argued that native polities in the Netherlands Indies were more complex and of a larger scale than native polities in the Congo, something which will be further discussed in the next chapter (Frankema & Buelens, 2013; Stengers & Vansina, 1985; Vansina, 1990). Especially on Java and Sumatra population density was greater than in the Congo, making it impossible to manage violence in society through personal relationships. Also, economic rents in these societies were larger as resources and activities from which to extract rent were more common. However, it should be noted that there are notable exceptions to this generalisation both in the Indonesian archipelago and in the Congo. It can be argued that elites with access to large economic rents and a large capacity for violence will be less incentivised to be co-opted by a colonial elite. After all, this would mean sharing economic rents and losing much of their privileges to the colonial elite. This is one factor that could explain the fierce resistance encountered by the Dutch in the Indonesian archipelago, and the relatively easy expansion of Belgian colonial control in the Congo.

3. Context

3.1 Preamble and Early European Contact

Before elaborating on the military practices in colonial Congo and Indonesia it is important to look at the time leading up to the colonial period. This is important because this pre-colonial era and the international political climate have significantly shaped the realities of colonial endeavours. Prolonged exposure to the later colonisers shaped the way the indigenous population view Europeans, and the international political context shapes colonial policies and institutions. The impact this prolonged exposure to Europeans had on the colonisation process is difficult to measure. However, it is safe to assume that the fact that the people on Java had been trading with Europeans for a long time before they ultimately took control over the archipelago's most populous island played a role in the way the Dutch established and maintained the monopoly of violence in their colony. Several centuries of intensive spice trade in the Indonesian archipelago contrasts sharply with the Congo river basin, an area that remained unexplored until the end of the 19th century.

For most people living in the Congo river basin, the first contact with Europeans dates to around the same time as the colonisation of the Congo started. Within 10 years of the first European crossing through central Africa Léopold had received sovereignty over the area. Because rapids made upstream navigation impossible close to the point where the Congo river met the Atlantic, the first European to traverse the river was Sir Henry Morton Stanley in 1877 (Van Reybrouck, 2010). For villages farther away from the river it would be some more time still before they encountered the first white Europeans, as the Equatorial rainforest proved to be difficult to penetrate and tropical diseases hindered European advances. Within the territory that was to become the Congo Free State there was, however, one part which had already seen decades of trade and contact with Europeans. Due South of the mouth of the river Congo the Portuguese had established a trading post in 1483 next to the Kongo kingdom, a rudimentary state boasting a centralised government, rotating markets and a standardised currency (Vansina, 1990, p. 200). The Portuguese did not settle the land here to create a colonial state. They were rather more interested in trade with the Kongo kingdom, the effects of which impacted peoples further inland, even though they had never seen a single Portuguese trader.

The Portuguese presence on the coast affected the inland population because the demand for slaves caused slave traders to venture ever farther inland in search of slaves. On the bank of the river where later Léopoldville would be founded, a thriving slave market was created. In Map 1 the locations of the African states most affected by the coastal demand for slaves are shown, with Congo, Loango, and Kongo states being in contact with the traders (Vansina, 1990). From Map 1 it becomes clear that a vast part of the territory did not come into direct contact with the traders. However, the Atlantic slave trade was not the only slave trade affecting the territory as Afro-Arab slave traders from Zanzibar impacted the Easternmost part of the Congo. With the arrival of Dutch, British, and French slavers, demand for slaves on the Atlantic coast increased even further. The larger demand for slaves on the coast resulted in an ever greater area affected by this Atlantic slave trade, as slavers preferred to acquire slaves further inland instead of taking more slaves from the same territory (Vansina, 1990, p. 207). This resulted in close to a million slaves exported from the area close to the Congo estuary between 1660 and 1793, weakening native polities in the territory as this amounted to a significant share of the population (Ekholm, 1972; Hilton, 1983; Vansina, 1990).

The disruptive effects of the slave trade also threatened the position of native elites as it weakened existing social and economic structures. As inhabitants of polities were taken away by slave raids elite coalitions crumbled as economic rents diminished and elites failed to protect non-elites from violence. The Atlantic slave trade thus helped disrupt the societal structures of the native polities throughout the Congo, which helped Léopold establish control over the territory some time later (Isaacman & Vansina, 1976; Klein, 1999). After 1793 the demand for slaves decreased, due to the Napoleonic wars in Europe and the British formal abolition of slavery. Although this demand from the coast affected a large part of the hinterland, most of the territory that later became Belgian Congo was inhabited by people who had never seen a European. All in all, contact with Europeans in the Congo had been very limited, being confined to trade

only on the Western coast. Reasons for this can be found in the inaccessibility of the hinterland, with rapids barring passage up the river, limited infrastructure, and diseases like malaria posing a threat further away from the sea.

Map 1: States near Congo estuary

Source: Library of Congress, 1997

Contact with Europeans in the Indonesian archipelago also began with the arrival of Portuguese traders. These traders, along with their Spanish colleagues, came to the archipelago not only for trade but also with the bible in their hand, intent on converting the population to Christianity. The Dutch, who started to arrive in the archipelago in the late 16th century, did not come to convert; they were looking for trading opportunities only (Frankema & Buelens, 2013, p. 42). These Dutch traders did not establish a foothold on every island in the archipelago. The most important islands were the Moluccas and Java, where the Dutch established the later capital of the colony, Batavia. In Batavia the control of the Dutch did not extend further than the rural areas surrounding Batavia (Breman, 2010). Rather than slaves, which the Dutch acquired in Africa, the archipelago yielded profitable spices and cash crops like coffee. This did not mean, however, that the Dutch trading practices did not have a destructive effect similar to the slave trade. It is estimated that the population of the Moluccas decreased by 33% percent over the first hundred years that the Dutch traded with the islands, showing that the Dutch were not shy to use violence to enforce their monopoly on the spice trade in the Moluccas (Gonggrijp, 1949, p. 35).

One important difference with the trading that took place around the Congo estuary is that the Dutch not only came to take valuable commodities away, but also took the effort to grow crops. On Java the Dutch introduced systems of forced cultivation in the areas surrounding Batavia, along with similar systems in other places around the archipelago that came to be known as the Cultivation System (Frankema & Buelens, 2013). Although these systems of forced cultivation had a significant impact on the people working the plantations, this did not mean that the Dutch had complete control over Java. Large parts of the island

were still ruled by native elites, a situation that ended after the Java war in 1830 when the Dutch gained control over the entire island. The sometimes brutally enforced trading interests of the Dutch throughout the archipelago lasted until 1799. At this point a large part of the indigenous population across multiple islands had become acquainted with the Dutch, as well as with Portuguese, Spanish and British traders visiting the vast archipelago. Although these Europeans did not penetrate into the heartland of every island, Europeans did establish trading posts on the coasts and came into prolonged contact with locals through trade and forced labour. This differs from the African situation in the pre-colonial era, where Europeans focussed more on trading commodities like slaves and ivory at the coast and transporting them than actually growing something and forcing the local population to work for them (Vansina, 1990).

What can be observed here is that the European traders in Africa and the Dutch in the Indonesian archipelago went about achieving their goals differently. For multiple reasons, procuring slaves and ivory in Africa depended on Africans delivering these commodities to the traders, which worked because they were interested in what the traders could offer them. This can be seen as a form of soft power exerted by the traders over the native elites, although this was partly born out of necessity as the geography and diseases prevented the traders from collecting commodities themselves. The situation was different in the East, as the Dutch enforced their monopoly on the spice trade from the Moluccas with coercion and utilized forced labour to acquire coffee and other agricultural products. This hard power approach to what would later become a colony yielded effects for the long term which can be observed throughout the military practices in the Netherlands Indies.

3.2 International Political Context

The international political context is important to understand colonial policies and practices in the Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies because these two small European metropoles secured their colonies in a world dominated by their larger European neighbours. At the moment when the Dutch started to establish their monopoly of violence over an ever-increasing portion of the archipelago it was still united with what would some time later become Belgium. In 1830 the rich South of the Netherlands seceded and became Belgium, essentially slicing the Netherlands in half and thereby reducing its capacities. At this point in time the European colonial superpowers were France, Spain and Great Britain. Germany, which would later play an important role in the way Léopold II would acquire the Congo, was still in the process of unification. The end of the 18th century saw violent political turmoil in Europe, and this heavily impacted the Dutch. 1795 saw the end of the Dutch Republic and the start of French control over the Dutch metropole. In 1811, as part of a political game of chess with the French, the British took control over the Dutch possessions on Java.

In 1816, when the Dutch colonial project set off, the metropole had recently regained independence after the Napoleonic wars had shaken Europe. With control over the what are now the Netherlands and Belgium secured, the Dutch received back control over their possessions on Java. The two decades in which the Dutch Republic had been conquered and occupied have left their marks on colonial policies and practices. The Netherlands, now a monarchy, was intent on not losing their potentially very profitable possessions in the archipelago again. One clear example of how the British takeover of Java impacted Dutch diplomatic relations with its neighbour across the North Sea can be found in accounts of the Dutch role in the Boer wars in South Africa. The metropole refused to cross imperial Britain by supporting the Boers, so as to not endanger its colonial project in the Indonesian archipelago (Bossenbroek, 2012). The Dutch took their possessions in the archipelago by conquest, and at significant loss of life. Additionally, the British Empire showed the Dutch that it should take its more powerful neighbours into account if it wished to hold on to its colony.

The international political context for Belgium significantly differed from the Dutch. For a start, when the Dutch commenced with their colonial project in 1816, Belgium was still part of the Netherlands. After secession in 1830 the newly formed kingdom did not have a colony and it would take 55 years and the effort of an ambitious king to get one, as has been mentioned before (Hochschild, 2012). However, for a small country to participate in what has been coined 'The Scramble for Africa' took smart diplomacy in an environment dominated by unified Germany, Britain and France. France was persuaded to recognise Léopold's claim after being granted first rights to the territory might the king's colonial project fail. Britain

was persuaded by the promise to secure free trade in the territory, and supported Léopold to prevent the Congo falling in French hands. Portugal followed suit and recognised Léopold's claim to prevent the territory becoming French, so close to Angola. Germany believed the Congo to provide a decent neutral buffer between French, British and German colonial interests, and also recognised Léopold's claim (Van Reybrouck, 2010, pp. 66-68). This shows the circumstances in which Léopold was able to establish sovereignty over the territory. The bigger powers in Europe distrusted each other and Léopold made use of public diplomacy and soft power to get his claim recognised (Stengers, 1989, pp. 58-59; 1997).

3.3 Resistance to Colonial Control

Getting his claim over the territory recognised by other European powers was an important step for Léopold in establishing the monopoly of violence over the Congo. Now that the Congo Free State was a sovereign territory the challenge remained to gain effective control over the land within its borders. Although the way the Dutch got sovereignty over the archipelago was different, they also faced the problem that they did not yet effectively control the entire territory. Both the Congo and the archipelago were inhabited by a variety of ethnic groups with their own distinct culture and societal structure. As current sources identify around 200 distinct ethnicities in the Congo and an estimated 1,000 in Indonesia as a result of its island geography, it is impossible to describe the resistance to colonial control of every ethnic group in the colony (CIA, 2018; Suryadinata, Nurvidya Arifin, & Ananta, 2003). However, it is possible to create a general image of native polities in both colonies based on the literature. Although population estimates for both colonies are imprecise, and in the case of the Indonesian archipelago are only based on Java, they can serve as a rough estimate for population density at the start of the colonial project. The population for the entire Congo before the creation of the Congo Free State, in 1880, is estimated at 15 million (Frankema & Buelens, 2013). For Java, the population after the Java war in 1830 is estimated at 7.1 million (Bleeker, 1863). This amounts to a population density of 6.4 and 51.1 people per square kilometre respectively, as can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1: Population estimates and densities for the Congo, Java and Indonesia n.d. = no data.

Year:	**Congo** Population (millions)	2,345,000 km^2 Density (no./km^2)	**Java** Population (millions)	139,000 km^2 Density (no./km^2)	**Indonesia** Population (millions)	1,919,000 km^2 Density (no./km^2)
1830	n.d.	n.d.	7.1	51.1	n.d.	n.d.
1845	n.d.	n.d.	9.5	68.3	n.d.	n.d.
1850	n.d.	n.d.	9.6	69.1	n.d.	n.d.
1855	n.d.	n.d.	10.9	78.4	n.d.	n.d.
1860	n.d.	n.d.	12.7	91.4	n.d.	n.d.
1865	n.d.	n.d.	14.2	102.2	n.d.	n.d.
1870	n.d.	n.d.	16.5	118.7	n.d.	n.d.
1875	n.d.	n.d.	18.3	131.7	n.d.	n.d.
1880	15.0	6.4	19.8	142.4	n.d.	n.d.
1890	14.0	6.0	23.9	171.9	40.5	21.1
1920	10.0	4.3	34.8	250.4	54.9	28.6
1950	13.5	5.8	49.6	356.8	82.6	43

Source: Bleeker, 1863; Boomgaard & Van Zanden, 1990; Frankema & Buelens, 2013; Maddison, 2010; Suryadinata et al., 2003; Vansina, 2010.

The fact that Java, the centre of the Dutch colonial project, was more densely populated than Congo is important in understanding the amount of resistance to colonial control because a denser population influences the degree of organisation in native polities, as the problem of violence in society can no longer be managed through personal relationships (North et al., 2009). A larger population also allows for a better organised and larger military, as well as higher rents for the elite. As the native elites are unwilling to give up their rents to the colonial elite, they are more likely to fight against being co-opted by the colonial elite. From the population densities in both colonies it can be assumed that native polities in the Indonesian archipelago were better organised than those in the Congo. The amount of resistance faced in certain regions of the territory can have influence on the position the people from that region have in colonial society and therefore in the colonial army. For instance, does the army recruit people from a region or ethnic group that is in open rebellion to the colonial power? In order to be able to answer questions about

who composes the colonial army, and why, we need to look at the resistance put up by the local population to control by the colonial powers.

The diplomacy undertaken by Léopold II in getting his claim in Africa recognised by other European states has already been discussed, however within the borders of the Congo another diplomatic initiative was beginning to unfold. With the help of Sir Henry Morton Stanley, treaties were made with chiefs of African polities all throughout the Congo. Additionally, all land that appeared 'unoccupied' was now property of the state (Peemans, 1975, p. 169). As native elites signed over their land and positions to the agents of the Free State, they were unwittingly agreeing to their co-optation by the new colonial elite. The realisation of what signing those treaties meant came later for most polities in the Congo, when government officials accompanied by the Force Publique came to their villages to collect taxes and labour. Isaacman and Vansina (1976, p. 176) write that "more than a dozen of nominally 'subjugated' groups revolted in the lower and central Congo" between 1885 and 1905. Although these uprisings were numerous, they had been quelled by 1906. Not all polities greeted the growing colonial presence with hostility, however. For instance, the coming of the Belgians provided opportunities for polities to free themselves from the rule of Afro-Arab slave traders or the domination by another African polity. Additionally, an alliance with the Belgians could further the interests of a native elite, as competing elites were defeated and the Belgians were looking for a chief to rule the territory for them (Isaacman & Vansina, 1976). This strategic co-operation with the colonial rulers, observed throughout the Congo, is an example of how colonial subjects '*colonise the coloniser*', using the foreign power to achieve their own goals.

Rebellions and insurgencies are the most visible form of resistance to colonial control. Violence on a large scale against agents of the colonial power are tangible forms of resistance that are sure to invoke a reaction, costing the colonial state resources and manpower and reducing the economic rents that can be created in the territory. Next to this hard resistance there is also evidence of soft resistance. This pertains mostly to subjects of colonial rule trying to get away from the influence of the state or refusing to be used by it. Isaacman and Vansina (1976) mention forced labourers refusing to work, and entire villages disappearing into the rainforest to get away from army levies and rubber collection. Van Reybrouck (2010) corroborates these findings. Even though there was noteworthy resistance in the Congo to colonial rule, control was imposed over the territory. This would have been impossible without the cooperation of Africans, both Congolese levies and mercenaries from other parts of Africa. In the end, then, cooperating Africans on the side of the colonial power defeated divided African polities opposing colonial rule. Early steps to the monopoly of violence were thus taken both through hard power and soft power in the Congo. Hard power was displayed in quelling insurgencies, and soft power was displayed in the attraction of African polities looking for opportunities in the advance of the colonial power, both by entering into an alliance with the Belgians and by joining the Force Publique.

Similar resistance to colonial control can be observed in the Netherlands Indies. After the Java war of 1825-1830 armed insurgencies on Java were rare (Frankema & Buelens, 2013). However, this was not the case on other islands in the archipelago. Especially in the North of Sumatra, Aceh, the Dutch were met with fierce resistance to efforts to establish colonial control and a monopoly of violence. Between 1873 and 1910 the Dutch colonial army fought a protracted war of attrition against a guerrilla enemy in Aceh, at a high price. All over the archipelago the Dutch fought similar wars, which they labelled 'pacification missions' but were in practice territorial conquests. In these wars the Dutch were met with varying degrees of resistance. While the Java war had claimed many casualties on the Dutch side, victory saw the Javanese defeated and under Dutch control until 1942. Aceh was a different story as territorial advances were lost after some time due to the people of Aceh starting a guerrilla war in the Sumatra rainforest. The expensive subjugation of Aceh and the heavy casualties on the Dutch side prompted interesting changes in the organisation of the Dutch colonial military. Most importantly, Dutch experiences in Aceh led to a different appreciation of indigenous soldiers. This example of how military practices like recruitment were shaped by colonial experiences will be elaborated upon in Chapter 4.

Concluding, both the Dutch and the Belgians were met with resistance in trying to establish control over their colonies. Although resistance differed from region to region, with some elites resisting for decades

and other elites using the advance of the colonial power to better their own position, both Belgium and the Netherlands had to wage war in order to establish control over their colonies. Because of the difficulty of co-opting elites of wealthier and better organised polities in the Netherlands Indies this meant that the Dutch had to wage more protracted war, with some regions only conquered after decades of struggle. Also, there is a significant difference between the reasons these colonial wars were fought in the Congo and in the archipelago. While Léopold had already been granted sovereignty over the territory and waged war to establish actual and effective control, the Dutch waged war not only to establish control but also to enlarge their colony. This meant that there was a strong incentive to keep 'pacifying' more islands in the archipelago, as a larger colony means more resources to extract revenue from and prevented other European countries to establish a foothold in the archipelago. Effective control of an island could lead to international recognition of the Dutch claim, but only in that order. In other words: the Dutch had sovereignty because of conquest, while the Belgians had conquest because of sovereignty. My hypothesis is that the necessity of conquest to extend the territory of the colony for the Dutch meant that more emphasis was placed on the quality of the soldiers, meaning more Europeans as they were viewed as superior soldiers. The Belgians placed more emphasis on being able to effectively control a territory and therefore created a large army which minimized the risk of Europeans getting killed, instead of relying on sheer numbers of the rank and file. This was also influenced by the fact that the prevalence of tropical diseases created a hostile environment to Europeans in the Congo.

3.4 Economic Context
The general idea that the colony existed for the motherland was present in the colonial endeavours of the Belgians and the Dutch (Elson, 1997; Nelson, 1994). In the Congo the Belgians were drawn in by the prospects of ivory, while the Dutch came to the archipelago looking for spices and other agricultural products. For the Dutch the export of agricultural products remained important during the entire colonial period. This was different in the Congo where ivory, the most important export good in the first few years of the Congo Free State, was soon replaced by natural rubber as the rubber tire was invented in 1888 (Van Reybrouck, 2010, p. 101). The magnitude of this discovery for the economic situation in the Congo becomes evident when looking at Graph 1. The growing importance of rubber as an export commodity was important for military practices in the Congo for two reasons. First, the costs of building a colonial state were high, especially when trying to maintain a colonial army which constituted around 50% of total ordinary expenses in the first 15 years of the Congo Free State before its share reduced to around the same share as the KNIL as is shown in Graph 2 and Graph 3 (Bulletin Officiel, various issues; Verslag der Handelingen, various issues). Because of this, the export of rubber became instrumental in financing the colonial project (Stengers & Vansina, 1985). Second, in order to export rubber, it had to be gathered first: a slow process due to the fact that rubber plantations did not exist but vines had to be found in the forest by forced labourers. Villages were made to pay a tax of rubber to the colonial administration, which was to be collected and enforced by the Force Publique (Peemans, 1975). This way, the Force Publique became a vital instrument for the administration to pay for its colonial projects, of which the Force Publique was one.

As time went by natural rubber decreased in importance. However, large quantities of copper were discovered in Katanga in the South of the Congo. While the revenues from copper sales were a lifeline for the indebted colony, mining is a labour-intensive industry which meant that the Force Publique was again tasked with acquiring forced labour, this time for the mines. Because Katanga was thinly populated, labourers came from British Rhodesia and different parts of the Congo, up to 800 kilometres away (Cornet, 1944; Van Reybrouck, 2010, p. 137). Merlier (1962, pp. 133-135) even estimates that around 21 percent of all adult males in the Congo worked in the Katanga mines in 1939. This shows the importance of the army in coercing labour, which makes the army an important instrument in the colonial economy. After all, labour is an important asset in any economy. The Dutch colonial administration solved similar problems of labour shortages in its colony by importing labourers from South East Asia, most notably from China. Rapid population growth in the archipelago also helped solve labour shortages. Although the Belgians also imported labour from outside the colony, the discovery of copper on the Rhodesian side of the Southern border stopped this labour flow as the Rhodesian administration needed labour for their own mines (Juif & Frankema, 2016). Although it needs to be noted that coercing labourers to work in the mines gradually

became less predominant, for instance because of population growth, it is clear that the Force Publique played a vital role in acquiring labour for the early colonial economy. As the labour migration and population growth in the Netherlands Indies proved more sustainable than in Belgian Congo it might be possible that the acquisition of labour was a less important job for the Dutch colonial army. However, there is little evidence in the sources consulted for this thesis to support this claim. This does not mean that the army was not used in coercing the local population to work for the Dutch colonial administration. However, sources of direct involvement of the Dutch colonial army in coercing labour are less prominent and evident than in Belgian Congo.

Graph 1: Export value by product category in Belgian Congo 1887-1910


Source: Bulletin Officiel, various issues

Although the KNIL did not play as prominent a role in the coercion of labour as the Force Publique did in the Congo, this does not mean that the KNIL was not involved in civic duties. The KNIL provided the colony with medical services and a topographical service aimed at mapping the archipelago. Also, the Genie division of the KNIL was deployed throughout the colony to build roads and bridges (NA, 2.21.028). These civic duties of the KNIL are significant because they are important for the colonial administration in expanding the reach of the colonial state. The exact reasons behind the KNIL providing important services apart from traditional military duties remain unclear. Also, evidence of what infrastructure projects were undertaken, where, and when are unclear in the available literature. However, the fact that the KNIL had access to a large contingent of Europeans certainly played a role in its capacity to provide this kind of assistance to the colonial administration as medical professionals and topographers of European standards will probably have been hard to find in the archipelago. Additionally, as the KNIL was tactically deployed throughout the archipelago to be deployed quickly when needed, the KNIL provided a vast labour pool during peacetime. Although labour was not too scarce on Java, it was in the more remote parts of the archipelago. By using the labour reserves of the KNIL during peacetime the colonial administration could improve the infrastructure of the colony without moving additional labour to these regions, which was important for the efficient development of the economy and the Cultivation System. Furthermore, the fact that the military worked on improving infrastructure and provided medical services would have aided the legitimacy of the colonial elite.

Graph 2: Force Publique expenditures as percentage of total expenditures

Source: Bulletin Officiel, various issues; IRCB, 1952

Graph 3: KNIL expenditures as percentage of total expenditures

Source: Verslag der Handelingen, various issues

4. Recruitment and Composition

4.1 Introduction to Recruitment and Composition

The first point on which the military practices in the Netherlands Indies and Belgian Congo will be compared is recruitment. Generalizing, both the Dutch and Belgian colonial armies are filled with soldiers from diverse ethnicities. Both armies used locally recruited soldiers who received training in the colonial army. Also, both colonial armies made use of foreign soldiers recruited either in another colony or sourced from neighbouring colonies controlled by other European powers, as well as foreign Europeans. So, on the surface it seems both colonial armies share important similarities. However, when looking deeper into recruitment it also becomes evident that there were important differences, which are rooted into the way the colonial project developed in the Congo and the archipelago. In order to systematically compare the recruitment practices in these two colonial armies I will make use of a chronological analysis. As recruitment practices change over time, which is significant in itself, I will look at recruitment tactics in the early and late colonial period. For each point in time all aspects of the recruitment as specified in the research questions will be elaborated upon.

One aspect of colonial recruitment tactics that can be observed around the colonial world, including in the Congo and the Indonesian archipelago, are martial races. Martial races are supposed to be ethnically distinct people who are somehow more suitable to become soldiers. The identification of these martial races happened in multiple colonial societies. Rand (2006), for instance, describes the identification of martial races within the large and multi-ethnic India under British imperial rule. Rand quotes former Quarter-Master General MacMunn who indicates that a distinction between martial races in the Orient was needed as "the mass of the people have neither martial aptitude nor physical courage" (p. 8). The identification and utilization of these martial races also played a role in both the Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies. In the Netherlands Indies the Amboynese and Menadonese were identified as martial races, complemented by a few Alfurian and Timorese soldiers (Teitler, 2002). Together these soldiers were often referred to as *Amboinezen,* or Amboynese in English. In documenting the troop strengths in the colony, the Dutch distinguished between Europeans, African mercenaries, Amboynese and other indigenous peoples (for example: Koloniaal Verslag, 1880). This shows that the Dutch differentiate between different indigenous soldiers based on ethnicity. In the Congo the people of Haut-Uélé, Aruwimi and Maniema are mentioned as being known to produce fine soldiers (IRCB, 1952). However, the Belgians never distinguish between different ethnicities while reporting troop strength like the Dutch did.

4.2 Early Colonial Period: European Recruits

In order to understand the recruitment practices of the Dutch colonial army during the early colonial state it is important to recognize that the Dutch East India company already had a private army in the archipelago before the start of the colonial project. The long-standing presence of the Dutch, and previously the Portuguese, in Northern Celebes and the Moluccas resulted in the people of these regions converting to Christianity and becoming more familiar with Dutch military culture. Dutch knowledge of these Menadonese and Amboynese soldiers therefore resulted in them serving in the Dutch East India Company private army, and subsequently in the Dutch colonial army (Teitler, 2002). As the Dutch colonial capital of Batavia was located on Java, which was also the first major island with a large population that fell under Dutch control, the largest contingent of indigenous soldiers in the Dutch colonial army were the Javanese. Although more numerous than the Amboynese, as can be seen from Graph 8 on page 28, the Dutch had little appreciation for the martial skills of the Javanese in the early colonial state, although this changed towards the end.

Aside from indigenous soldiers the KNIL also had a large contingent of European soldiers. However, finding sufficient European recruits turned out to be difficult for the Dutch colonial administration. As the circumstances in the colonial army were not always very good and because soldiers had to serve a minimum of 6 years finding enough Dutch volunteers to staff the army turned out to be a problem. Because of this recruits from Flanders, Scandinavia and Germany were also accepted to make sure that the European contingent was sufficiently large (Teitler, 2002). Being able to find enough European recruits was important because the colonial army relied on these Europeans for its fighting power. However, it soon became a problem that the scarce European soldiers were also overrepresented among the wounded and

killed after a battle (ibid, p. 365). This posed a problem to the way the Dutch colonial army functioned, as the trouble of recruiting Europeans directly impacted its fighting power. Solving this problem became increasingly important for the KNIL, but it stayed a defining feature of European recruitment in the early colonial state.

Europeans also played an important role in the Belgian colonial army, the Force Publique. Although there had been a rudimentary army during the first few years of the colony, the Force Publique came into existence by royal decree in 1888 (Bulletin Officiel, 1888). Soldiers from the Belgian army played a vital role in the early days of the colony as they filled a variety of positions within the new colonial administration. Soldiers from the metropolitan army could become commissioners of districts, for instance, in addition to the more logical role of officer in the newly formed colonial army (IRCB, 1952). Between 1877 and 1908 the metropolitan army supplied the Congo with 648 officers and 1,612 NCO's (ibid, p. 45). Scandinavians, Italians, English, Swiss, Germans and Austrians all filled positions within the Force Publique during the first years after its foundation, as they were recruited on a voluntary basis throughout Europe (ibid, p. 47). Over the years the number of these non-Belgian Europeans within the Force Publique increased from 122 in 1891 to 517 in 1911. The role of Europeans within the Force Publique differed significantly from the Dutch colonial army. As Europeans did not become regular soldiers the death toll among them was low, as becomes evident in the recordings of the '*Campagnes Mahdistes*'. In this campaign only 12 Europeans died as a result of battle between December 1893 and June 1898 (ibid, p. 524). It does need mentioning, however, that Europeans in the Congo regularly fell victim to tropical diseases, which played a much smaller role in the Indonesian archipelago. This also impacted the establishment of a European administration, as there were just 1,500 European civil servants in 1906 (Makulo, 1983). This contextual factor severely limited the possibilities of maintaining a large European contingent.

4.3 Early Colonial Period: Indigenous Recruits
It is evident that the roles of Europeans in the Dutch and Belgian colonial armies show important differences. While the KNIL relied heavily on the scarce European recruits to maintain its fighting power during the early colonial state, the Force Publique maintained a much smaller number of European soldiers as officers. This difference in the way the Europeans in the colonial army were utilized has implications for both the role and the recruitment of indigenous soldiers. Naturally, the Force Publique relied on indigenous soldiers for its fighting power as the contingent Europeans was too small and too precious to win battles. For the KNIL, the indigenous contingent, especially the Javanese soldiers, played a much less prominent role during battles than the indigenous soldiers in the Force Publique. The deployment of the colonial army, to which the utilisation of the various ethnicities that together constitute the colonial army is an important factor, is further discussed in chapter 6.

Regarding the recruitment of indigenous soldiers there are significant differences between the Congo and the Indonesian archipelago. In the Congo the colonial administration made use of a levee system from the beginning of the colony. In a royal decree on July 30, 1891 it was determined that the recruitment of the army would take place by means of voluntary engagements and annual levees, which were to complete the contingent of recruits where the voluntary engagements turned out to be insufficient. The total contingent to be recruited was to be determined by king Léopold, while the districts where levees were to be lifted was to be determined by the Governor General of the colony (IRCB, 1952, p. 507). The number of recruits to be leveed from each district was designed in such a way not to take out too many able-bodied men from any district, so as not to hinder the labour supply in that district. Between 1892 and 1914 an average of 2,997 men per year were leveed throughout the territory, specified in Table 5 in the Annex on page 43. Over the entire history of the Force Publique levees remained an important way of recruiting indigenous soldiers as voluntary engagements or reengagements always proved to be insufficient to replenish soldiers leaving the army as their term of service had expired or as they died in service. Initially, new recruits in the Force Publique served a term of 5 years and 2 more years in the reserve. This was quickly changed to 7 years of active service, which was years later reduced to 5 years. One important reason why the term of service for indigenous recruits was this long was the civilising effect that incorporation into the army had on the 'uncivilised' Congolese. Later on, when the 'civilisation' that the

Belgians introduced to the colony had influenced the indigenous population more, 5 years was deemed enough time to sufficiently civilise new recruits (FP 2427, 1930).

As was already mentioned, levying recruits from throughout the Belgian Congo was necessary insufficient natives voluntarily enlisted in the army. In 1888 only 111 natives enlisted, which rose to 187 in 1889 and 702 in 1891 (IRCB, 1952). In order to compensate for the lack of native volunteers the colonial administration resorted to hiring what were called 'Coast Volunteers', which were essentially African mercenaries. Between 1888 and 1901 a total of 11,595 African volunteers signed up for, or reengaged with, the Force Publique. The largest groups of Africans consisted of Haoussas, from modern-day Nigeria, of which 4,728 signed up between 1888 and 1901 while 767 had already signed up before 1888 (ibid, p. 510). Other mentioned nationalities are Liberians, Ghanaians, Ethiopians, Egyptians, Beninese, Somalis, Zanzibaris and Sierra-Leoneans. The exact numbers of Coast Volunteers per nationality are represented in Table 2. The Zanzibarites are especially noteworthy here, as it were Zanzibari mercenaries that aided Henry Morton Stanley in exploring the Congo and preparing it for colonisation. Zanzibarites thus were important during the very beginnings of the colony and remained relatively numerous among the African recruits in the newly formed Force Publique during the following decades. There was also a brief presence of 350 Zulu soldiers from South Africa, which were considered a fierce martial race. However, the Zulu soldiers proved unwilling to accept training with guns with 17 recruits disappearing after the first shooting exercise. The entire contingent of Zulus was soon repatriated 'at great cost to the colony' (IRCB, 1952, p. 13).

Table 2: Engagements and Reengagements of Coast Volunteers per nationality per year. Between 1883 and 1887 a number of 767 Haoussas joined the Force Publique. This is omitted for legibility purposes.

Country of Origin:	1888	1889	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899	1900	1901	Total:
Liberia	143	168		39	59	99	89	12	5	38	20	11	17	8	708
Ghana						192	295	36	5	12	21	20	6	4	591
Ethiopia					412										412
Somalia						215									215
Egypt			217	1					1	1	1	1	1		223
Benin		185			1				5	3		2	1	1	198
Zanzibar	783		243			593		32	109		2	8	2	3	1,775
Nigeria	305	15	1,253	548	316	463	774	340	238	76	211	111	37	41	4,728
Sierra-Leone		204		9	138	793	715	92	176	98	237	128	85	70	2,745
Total:	1,231	572	1,713	597	926	2,355	1,873	512	539	228	492	281	149	127	11,595

Source: IRCB, 1952, p. 510.

Although these Coast Volunteers solved the problem of insufficient indigenous volunteers in the Congo on the short term, the higher cost of salary and transportation costs provided a stimulant for the colonial administration to replace the Coast Volunteers with native recruits. Important to remember here is that the territory of the colony in this early period was sparsely populated, suffered from a population decline, and infrastructure was non-existent apart from the Congo river (Huybrechts, 2010; Stengers & Vansina, 1985). This made navigating the colony to collect levees very hard, especially as diseases proved a lethal threat to Europeans and not all polities in the territory had been pacified. In order to ensure a steady flow of indigenous recruits the colonial administration for a short time adopted a bonus system. A few years later Félicien Cattier, professor of Law involved in the colony, elaborated on the bonus system: "Each recruit was worth to the recruiter a premium of ninety francs per healthy and vigorous man whose size exceeded 1 m 55, sixty five francs between 1 m 35 and 1 m 55, one hundred and thirty francs per married man ..." (Cattier, 1906; IRCB, 1952, p. 49). The amount of money that could be earned by providing recruits for the Force Publique under the bonus system was substantial, opening the door to abuses of all kinds.

In his study of the situation in the Congo Free State, published in 1906, Félicien Cattier also elaborates on the effect of the Force Publique on the natives. He mentions that the Force Publique attracts natives, as the soldiers are held in high esteem and carrying weapons is associated with power and domination by the

natives (Cattier, 1906). Cattier goes on to explain that this attraction changed the levees substantially. Where the soldiers collecting new recruits formerly had to resort to buying domestic slaves from native elites to incorporate into the army, now there are enough volunteers in many villages to complete the levees. This way of recruiting soldiers for the Force Publique shows two things. First, the fact that recruiters relied on the cooperation of local chiefs to provide recruits through domestic slaves shows how these local elites have been co-opted by the colonial elite as they assist in filling the army that enables the colonial elite to stay in power. Second, this shows the effect of soft power exerted by the Force Publique over the native non-elites, where the benefits of joining the army outweigh the downside of leaving their native village and family. After all, getting a weapon, a uniform, money, a steady supply of food and an education are significant benefits a small-scale farmer in early colonial Congo. Arguably, enlistment in the Force Publique could also mean a rise on the social ladder for a non-elite aspiring to become a local chief. Soft power thus played a vital role in the early colonial state as it allowed the Force Publique to gather strength as well as increase its legitimacy as native people voluntarily join. At the same time this does justice to the name of the Force Publique, as it actually becomes a public force.

In the Netherlands Indies recruitment was not organised through regional levees as in Belgian Congo. There are a number of possible reasons for this difference, although there is no direct source indicating a rational choice between levees or voluntary enlistment. One important factor that enabled the Dutch colonial administration to work with voluntary enlistment is the relative abundance of possible recruits. The estimated population density of Java in 1890 was 172 people per square kilometre, much more than the estimated 6 people per square kilometre in the larger Congo territory (Boomgaard & Van Zanden, 1990; Frankema & Buelens, 2013; Vansina, 2010). Access to this populous and densely populated island with a good infrastructure and long exposure to Europeans all influenced the relative ease with which the Dutch had access to volunteers for the KNIL. As Java was the first major island under colonial control, the majority of the indigenous soldiers in the KNIL were of Javanese ethnicity, as can be seen in Graph 8 (Teitler, 2002). This did not mean, however, that the Dutch colonial administration did not make use of recruits from other colonies, like the Coast Volunteers in the Congo. Between 1830 and 1871 the Dutch bought slaves at their outpost Elmina on the African Gold Coast. These slaves were set free and served in the KNIL to replenish the losses from the Java war which ended in 1830. Known as '*Belanda Hitam*', or Black Dutchmen, these Ghanaian soldiers were held in high regard by the Dutch, equalling them to Europeans (Verhoog, 1989). In total around 3000 Africans served the KNIL between 1830 and 1881 when the last Africans were discharged.

As was already discussed, it proved difficult to find enough voluntary native recruits in Belgian Congo, leading to a levee system for the recruitment of indigenous soldiers. Eventually, the attraction of the Force Publique on the native population became sufficiently large, changing the situation in which levee collectors bought domestic slaves into a situation where natives voluntarily enlisted as part of their district's levee. In the Netherlands Indies, attraction of the colonial army saw a slightly different development. Teitler (2002) distinguishes between positive and negative motives for voluntary engagement in the KNIL. Although both are the effect of soft power exerted by the army over the indigenous population, the reasons for a Javanese man to join the army generally differed from the reasons of an Amboynese recruit in the early colonial state. While enlisting in the army was considered an honour for Amboynese men, Javanese recruits rather joined to escape poverty and forced labour on Java. The strong attraction of the KNIL on Amboynese men eventually became a problem as the unwavering demand for Amboynese soldiers created a shortage of labour on their native islands. However, as the population of the archipelago grew, so did the number of Amboynese soldiers in the KNIL, as can be seen by looking at Table 3 and Graph 4.

Table 3 : Number of Amboynese soldiers in the KNIL between 1867 and 1920. Amboynese soldiers are not mentioned seperately before 1867 and after 1920.

Year:	Amboynese Soldiers:	Year:	Amboynese Soldiers:
1867	872	1897	2,448
1872	763	1902	3,727
1877	970	1907	4,696
1882	970	1912	4,789
1887	2,182	1917	5,569
1892	2,360	1920	8,818

Source: Verslag der Handelingen, various issues.

Graph 4: Amboynese and other Native soldiers in the KNIL over time

*Source: Verslag der Handelingen, various issues.*

On Java this depopulation as a result of the power of attraction of the KNIL did not play a role, as there were plenty able-bodied men on the archipelago's most populous island, which also saw rapid population growth. However plenty Javanese recruits were, they were not held in high regards as far as their martial skills went. The shortage of good, Amboynese, recruits resulted in the transfer of a brigade from the Metropolitan army when the need was dire, instead of recruiting more Javanese soldiers. During the Aceh war, the need for fresh soldiers became dire as the Dutch ran into heavy resistance when trying to pacify this Northern part of Sumatra. The difficulty of subduing Aceh, as well as the looming threat of the expanding Japanese empire to the North eventually led to efforts by the Dutch to improve upon the quality of the numerically dominant Javanese soldiers (Teitler, 2002). Up until the Aceh war the Europeans, Amboynese and Javanese soldiers in the army operated in separate units. By mixing these units the Dutch hoped to increase the effectiveness of its indigenous soldiers, as well as reduce the number of European casualties in battle. In other words, the position of indigenous soldiers in the KNIL took a step towards the situation in the Force Publique, which relied on the fighting power of native troops.

This change in attitude towards indigenous soldiers in the KNIL as described by Teitler also becomes visible when looking at the data. Represented in Graph 4 and Graph 5, the data shows a clear uptick in total troop numbers at the beginning of the Aceh war, with the number of European soldiers increasing faster than the number of indigenous soldiers, until the point where the number of European soldiers equal the number of indigenous soldiers in 1883. After this point the number of European troops does not drop significantly, but there is a sharp increase in the number of indigenous soldiers visible. After this point in time the ratio between European and indigenous troops never again approximated the even distribution of 1883. Concluding, the events of the Aceh war significantly shaped the composition of the Dutch colonial army.

The realities of a guerrilla war and the difficulty of recruiting enough European soldiers created an increased need for sufficient numbers of better trained indigenous soldiers. This is an example of how the actual experiences of warfare in the colony change the colonial blueprints for the colonial army. It was never the plan of the Dutch colonial administration to shift the emphasis of the army from European to native soldiers, but the realities of the Aceh war and the problems with recruiting Europeans forced it to.

One last point pertaining to the composition of the colonial armies in Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies worth addressing is the total size of the colonial army. Even through consulting a variety of sources it was not possible to find a reliable figure for the total size of the colonial armies at any point in time. However, compiling several sources has led to the creation of Graph 6, Graph 7, and Graph 8 that together should provide a sufficient image of the development of total troop numbers over time. Additional sources provide at least some information of total troop strength, as well as answers as to why the size of the army was determined at a certain number. At the end of the early colonial state in the Congo the Force Publique numbered 16,000 men (Conseil Colonial, 1908-1909). Mr. Vauthier, a member of the Conseil Colonial, indicates in the report of the Conseil Colonial for 1908-09 that this seems to be large number, but that it should not be thought that this is only because of the role of the Force Publique in the collecting of rubber taxes from the natives. He mentions that the 'Noires' easily bow to the obligations of military service, and that a large army is needed for an increasingly effective occupation of the territory and for protection of merchants. The short explanation for the large number of troops by Mr. Vauthier provides the clear double purpose that the Force Publique had in Belgian Congo: establish and maintain the monopoly of violence in general, and protect trade and merchants in particular.

Graph 5: Ratio European and Native troops in the KNIL.

*Source: Verslag der Handelingen, various issues.*

*Graph 6: Total number of troops over time in the KNIL.*

Source: Verslag der Handelingen, various issues.

Graph 7: Total troop strength in the Belgian Congo. Note: no data during WWII because of occupation of the Metropole. No data available for 1951. Scattered data before 1922, not incorporated in graph.

Source: Conseil Colonial, various issues.

All figures of total troop strength available for the Netherlands Indies indicate an army much larger than the Force Publique. Troop strength never fell below 25,000 between 1858 and 1927, and peaked at almost 40,000 in 1919, less than a decade after the Aceh war ended. Although the KNIL is significantly larger than the Force Publique it does lack the same double purpose, as the KNIL was never tasked with the direct collection of taxes like the Force Publique was. The reasons why the KNIL was larger than the Force Publique should therefore not be sought in the way the army was deployed, but rather in the geographic and demographic differences between the two colonies. While the Congo has a larger landmass than the Indonesian archipelago, the fact that the archipelago consists of islands dispersed over large distances required more troops to effectively control the entire territory. After all, though Bali is visible from Java, ships rather than porters are needed to transfer soldiers and equipment. The second reason is the fact that the Indonesian archipelago was more populous than the Congo basin. As was indicated before, Java on its own was home to more people than the entire Congo. As a result of this the Force Publique was much larger than the KNIL compared to population size. In 1908 the Force Publique controlled the entire Congo with one soldier for every 750 inhabitants, while the KNIL controlled the entire archipelago in 1910 with one soldier per 1410 inhabitants (Population sizes are estimates, based on Table 1). To put this into perspective, the French maintained an army of one soldier for every 720 inhabitants over the entirety of their African possessions in 1933, on an estimated 41 million inhabitants (FP 799, 941).

4.4 Late Colonial Period: European Recruits

As was mentioned before, the role of European soldiers in the Netherlands Indies changed in the period the Dutch expanded their territory in the Indonesian archipelago. This new role of the European recruit stayed the same during the rest of the colonial period. Europeans were still seen as superior, but circumstances had forced the Dutch administration to adept and expand the contingent of indigenous soldiers. Another important development during the early colonial period also affected the situation of Europeans in the late colonial period. At the turn of the nineteenth century the Dutch colonial administration adopted what was called the Ethical Policy (Frankema & Buelens, 2013). Designed to facilitate the process of economic development for the colony, the Ethical Policy also had the goal of compensating the native population for the exploitation by the colonial administration over the past century. For the KNIL, this had several effects. First, pay differences between Javanese, Amboynese and European troops were abolished in theory, although Europeans still earned more than their native colleagues in practice. Second, the position of Non-Commissioned Officer was opened to highly qualified native soldiers at the beginning of the 1920's. As there were still too few European recruits to fill the positions, this resulted in European

troops led by native officers (Teitler, 2002). This important and interesting development, which starkly contrasts with the situation in the Belgian Congo, will be discussed further in Chapter 5.

The situation for European recruits changed little in the Belgian Congo. As the Force Publique only employed Europeans as officers, problems with finding enough suitable European recruits did not arise as they did in the Netherlands Indies. After all, an officer is much less likely to die in combat than a normal soldier. Other barriers for Europeans to join the colonial army in the Congo, like tropical diseases, became an ever-smaller problem as technology and healthcare advanced during the late colonial period. By continuing to levee recruits from throughout the territory the Force Publique remained a strong fighting force, and even fought in both World Wars. Especially the First World War, in which the Force Publique advanced well into German Tanganyika, cemented the image of the Force Publique as a way for natives to climb the social ladder, as former soldiers were held in high regard among the indigenous population and the colonial administration (IRCB, 1952; Strachan, 2004; Van Reybrouck, 2010). This high regard further enhanced the power of attraction that the Force Publique exerted over both the European and the native population. A new recruit would not only have some money saved after his years of service, but also a good social standing in the colony. The success in the World Wars also sparked a debate in the Congo about the treatment of the natives both in the army and in the general population. Soldiers who had been in Nigeria had seen that not only Europeans served as officers there, unlike in the Force Publique. Although the Congo became an independent country 15 years after the end of the Second World War, natives did not rise to the position of officer in the Force Publique until the last few, transitional, years of the colony (Van Reybrouck, 2010). Chapter 5 will elaborate on the leadership structures of the colonial army.

4.5 Late Colonial Period: Indigenous Recruits
In the Netherlands Indies the changed role of the native population within the KNIL led to an increasing amount of Javanese recruited in the army. The measures as part of the Ethical Policy, abolishing differences in pay and treatment between Amboynese and Javanese soldiers, did have an effect on the Amboynese as they were no longer regarded as superior to Javanese recruits. Although this initially had a detrimental effect on the number of Amboynese that joined the army, this was compensated by the far greater number of the more populous Javanese joining the KNIL (Teitler, 2002). Teitler also discusses the debate in the colonial administration about changing the method of voluntary recruitment for native soldiers into a method of conscription. Although this would have been possible, this never came into being. One reason for this is the fact that there were no longer grave manpower problems in the KNIL now the Javanese soldiers could cover for the problems caused by insufficient Amboynese recruits. Enough Javanese volunteered for the KNIL to fill the army without having to resort to conscription.

Regarding the composition of the KNIL more changes flowed out of the Ethical Policy, whether direct or indirect. It was proposed to change the mixed company, which was created during the Aceh war, into a system where merit rather than ethnicity determined a native soldier's standing in the army. This meant that the Amboynese, apart from not being paid more than Javanese soldiers, could now also be equalled in rank by a Javanese soldier. This merit-based composition of the army did not influence the European contingent, as Europeans were still regarded as the superior soldiers. This proposal was rejected, however, as it was deemed ineffective of solving the real problem: too few European recruits to provide fighting power. Another change in the recruitment of native soldiers for the KNIL described by Teitler in her 2002 article which did get implemented is the admission of recruits from all islands in the archipelago. Until this point, after the end of the First World War, the native contingent of the army had been just Javanese and Amboynese. The admission of recruits from other islands was believed to accomplish two things. First, it would guarantee that the KNIL would always get enough native volunteers. Second, this would show that the colonial administration placed its trust in all ethnicities on the archipelago (Teitler, 2002, p. 373). This change in recruitment policy in the KNIL likely also affected the removal of the distinction between Javanese and Amboynese soldiers in the reported troop strengths from 1920 onwards (Verslag der Handelingen, e.g. 1921, 1922).

4.6 Conclusions on Recruitment and Composition
All throughout the colonial period the key theoretical concept on the subject of recruitment and composition is soft power. Soft power enables the colonial army to stay at fighting strength as new recruits fill its ranks.

While modern armies of a nation state are composed of soldiers with one nationality and (supposedly) one common identity, this was not the case for colonial armies. Even if the KNIL only recruited among people of Javanese ethnicity the fact that the army also contained Europeans meant that the colonial army was always going to be a multi-ethnic endeavour. Soft power thus has to perform its attraction not only on the territory of the colony, but also in the metropole. As European soldiers play a pivotal role in both the Force Publique and the KNIL, the power of attraction of the colonial army in Europe is very important.

This power of attraction of the KNIL in the Netherlands is something which caused the army problems throughout the colonial period. Because it proved hard to find sufficient Dutch recruits, the recruiters in Harderwijk resorted to recruiting Europeans of other nationalities as well. Although this gave the KNIL a little more breathing space, its dependency on European troops for its fighting power coupled to its inability to attract enough of these valued European recruits caused the composition of the KNIL to change. By rearranging its composition in order to be less dependent on Europeans the KNIL adapted to be less dependent of its insufficient attraction on European recruits, and instead focussed on increasing its soft power in the archipelago. By increasing the standing of the plentiful Javanese recruits and maintaining its good relationship with the Amboynese recruits the KNIL eventually succeeded in bringing the entire archipelago under the nominal control of the Dutch government.

In the Congo the rudimentary colonial state and army possessed too little soft power to attract enough recruits during the early years of the Congo Free State. This led to the recruitment of Coast Volunteers from elsewhere in Africa, as well as the introduction of the levee system. In principle, the levee system had a dual purpose of filling the army and making sure that the burden of the loss of able-bodied men was distributed evenly across the territory. As there were little volunteers, recruiters had to resort to buying domestic slaves from village chiefs. As time went by and the colonial administration expanded its control over the territory this changed. This can be seen as a shift in recruitment from the use of payments to the use of attraction. The opportunities that resulted from service in the Force Publique were significant for 'uncivilised' natives, who were foreign to Western culture and technology. Soon, no more domestic slaves needed to be bought from chiefs, as the levees were completed with volunteers. This increase in soft power thus resulted in a situation where natives wanted to serve in an army which was designed to subjugate them. As evidence suggests that native recruits perceive enlistment as a path towards prosperity and possible social mobility, the Force Publique became much more than a tool of subjugation. However, this does not mean that payment and coercion cease to play a role in the recruitment of native soldiers, as local chiefs retain their status as gatekeepers to the pool of possible recruits for which they receive payment and political protection.

This shows the great paradox of colonial armies in general. Both the KNIL and the Force Publique are staffed by the same people they should subjugate. This is evidence of the successful co-optation of local elites. These local elites provide an environment in which the army can recruit native soldiers as doing so grants benefits to all parties involved. The colonial elite, inherently lacking legitimacy, can staff its army and disperses the rents it creates among these recruits thereby gaining some form of legitimacy. The native elites, co-opted by the colonial elites, can maintain their power under the protection of the colonial army and therefore have an interest in maintaining the status-quo. The native non-elites have access to a fraction of the rents created by the colonial elites through salary and the possibility for social mobility through promotion. This creates a form of legitimacy for the monopoly of violence in Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies, as this monopoly is established and maintained by the native population rather than just by the colonising Europeans. This is truer for the Force Publique than for the KNIL, however, because number of ethnicities of native soldiers in the KNIL was limited in the multi-ethnic Indonesian archipelago. The levee system in the Congo resulted in a multi-ethnic Force Publique, controlled by the European coloniser and led by an exclusively European officer corps.

5. Leadership

5.1 Introduction to Leadership

Understanding more about the leadership structures in the colonial armies is crucial to comprehend why the army was composed the way it was, and who controlled the fighting power of the army in the colony. In this chapter the leadership structures within the army will be analysed and the way the army is managed by the administration will be discussed. At the end of this chapter the answers to the research questions will be analysed by making use of the theory of North et al. and Nye.

5.2 Leadership Structures in the Early Colonial Period

Regarding leadership a similar situation can be observed in the KNIL and the Force Publique in the early colonial period. In both colonial armies the top positions are held by Europeans. Still, there are differences between the two colonial armies regarding who could fill the position of a low-ranking officer. In the Force Publique it is very clear who could become an officer. The position of Commissioner of the Force Publique and all the positions of officers are only to be filled by Europeans, and this is controlled by a royal decree signed in 1888 (Bulletin Officiel, 1900, pp. 207-213). The position of sergeant major, sergeant, and corporal, all petty officers, could be filled by the natives. In all the literature consulted for this thesis not one case was found in which an exception was made to this rule. During its entire existence the division of roles within the Force Publique was clear: Europeans were the leaders, and the natives filled the ranks and acted as petty officers under the command of a European.

The situation in the early colonial period was much less rigid in the Netherlands Indies, at least for a time. Archival data from 1828 indicates that 6 native officers served in the KNIL, all of them in the infantry (NA, 2.21.007.58). Further data indicates that native officers were employed by the KNIL until 1866, as shown in Table 4. After 1866 there is no more mention of native officers until the available data ends in 1929. It needs to be noted that the method for record keeping of the composition of the army in the Netherlands Indies changes often, making it possible that native officers are sometimes not mentioned separately. When mentioned, however, the number of native officers in the KNIL does indicate that native officers were quite rare. As the Dutch held the Amboynese native recruits in higher regard than Javanese recruits, it can be assumed that the native officers in the KNIL were of Amboynese ethnicity. However, there is no evidence to support this claim in the sources that provided these numbers of native officers. The African recruits discussed earlier were classified as Europeans during the earliest years of their involvement in the KNIL (NA, 2.21.007.58). However, there is no evidence of Africans ever serving as officers in the KNIL.

Table 4: European and Native officers in the KNIL 1828-1870

Year:	European Officers:	Native Officers:	Year:	European Officers:	Native Officers:
1828	393	6	1863	1,228	11
1836	526	10	1864	1,237	9
1857	1,043	0	1865	1,246	9
1858	987	8	1866	1,246	9
1859	1,026	6	1867	1,314	0
1860	1,019	5	1868	1,306	0
1861	1,101	12	1869	1,297	0
1862	1,263	12	1870	1,342	0

Source: Verslag der Handelingen, various issues; Staatkundig en Staathuishoudkundig Jaarboekje, 1828; Nationaal Archief, 2.21.028 – 364

The leadership structures within both colonial armies are dominated by European officers. Logically, the same can be said for the structures that govern the army itself. Both the Force Publique and the KNIL are governed in part from the colonial capital and in part from the metropole. The commander-in-chief of both colonial armies is the colony-based Governor General. The Governor General is a political appointee and can be seen as the Prime Minister of the Colony on all executive matters. This means that deployment of the army in both the Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies happened at the discretion of the Governor General. However, certain other aspects of military organisation in both colonies did not originate from the colony, but rather from Brussels and The Hague.

Different aspects of the KNIL were the responsibility of different ministries of the Dutch government. As was mentioned, the command of the KNIL was the responsibility of the Governor General, and so was the recruitment of native soldiers. The Dutch Ministry of Colonies, which bore the political responsibility for the work of the Governor General, was also responsible for creating the financial framework for the defence of the colony. The recruitment of soldiers in the Netherlands, which took place in the Dutch city of Harderwijk, fell under the responsibility of the Ministry of War. Adjacent, but not directly influencing the KNIL, was the marine. The geographical reality of governing an archipelago meant that marine defence was an important aspect of the defence of the colony. The Dutch marine was the responsibility of the Ministry of Marine. However, the section of the Marine deployed in the colony was placed under the command of the Governor General, and therefore fell under the responsibility of the Ministry of Colonies (NA, 2.10.01; Verslag der Handelingen, various issues). Although a part of the defence of the colony, the marine does not constitute as part of the KNIL and is therefore completely disregarded in this thesis. The dispersed responsibilities for different aspects of the KNIL are interesting because they could be of influence on the recruitment problems the KNIL faced throughout its history.

As the Congo Free State originated as something of a private venture of king Léopold II, the command structures of the Force Publique are much less dispersed than in the Netherlands Indies. Although the deployment of the Force Publique in the Congo had always been the responsibility of the Governor General, the commander and the captains of the Force Publique were appointed by the king (Bulletin Officiel, 1888, p. 251). The reign of Léopold lasted the entirety of the early colonial period in the Congo, and his influence on the Force Publique was large. For instance, Léopold determined the size of the contingent to be recruited through levee system. How and where these recruits were to be leveed was the responsibility of the Governor General. This more centralised command of the Force Publique in both organisation and utilisation led to a fast foundation of the armed forces. What started in 1888 as a small army mostly filled with mercenaries quickly grew to a serious fighting force with modern equipment and 16,000 men at arms in 1908 (IRCB, 1952; Van Reybrouck, 2010).

5.3 Leadership structures in the Late Colonial Period
The most profound change in the leadership structures within the colonial armies of Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies could be observed in the Dutch colony. As was mentioned earlier, the Ethical Policy that shaped the way the colony was governed also impacted the leadership structures of the KNIL. As the Ethical Policy was aimed at elevating the position of the native population of the archipelago, this soon led to the opening of the position of officer to native soldiers (Teitler, 2002). Although this change in policy did not mean that the KNIL now preferred native officers and European officers still far outnumbered native officers, this was a ground-breaking development in an army which had long separated its ranks based on ethnicity. These developments played out just after the First World War, which had a negligible effect both the colony and the metropole. The First World War did, however, affect Belgium and its colony, as the metropole was defeated, and the colony fought the Germans in Africa. There were even some Congolese soldiers which fought in Belgium, and which were brought to Berlin as prisoners of war (Van Reybrouck, 2010). Even as these Congolese defended a country they did not know existed 50 years earlier, the Force Publique strictly kept to its policy of only allowing Europeans to serve as officers. Tensions over this stark divide between Europeans and natives in the Force Publique sometimes caused mutinies and small-scale revolts in the army but it took until the transitional period to Congolese independence at the end of the 1950's before the first native was promoted to officer in the Force Publique.

The transition from the Congo Free State to Belgian Congo also saw some changes into the way the army was governed. The king sovereign Léopold was no longer involved in the Congo, as the Belgian government took over sovereignty and inherited an indebted colony which had been attracting attention because of widespread abuse (Van Reybrouck, 2010). Where Léopold used to have strong influence over policy in the colony his role now had to filled by new institutions. One of these institutions was the Conseil Colonial, a body based in Brussels which advised the colonial administration in Léopoldville on a number of issues. Concerning the army, the Conseil Colonial determined the number of recruits to be leveed in the colony. How these levees were distributed over the territory was the responsibility of the Governor General. The structures of control for the KNIL, although more complex and bureaucratic than in Belgian Congo, did not see a change between the early and late colonial periods. This meant that there was the same split of responsibilities over several ministries for the entire colonial period.

5.4 Conclusion on Leadership Structures

All in all, the conclusion is that the leadership structures in the colonial armies of the Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies are very similar. Within the army itself positions of leadership, the officer's positions, were only open to Europeans for most of the history of these colonial armies. In the Force Publique native officers only appeared at the very end of the colonial project, as the Congo was being prepared for independence (Van Reybrouck, 2010). In the KNIL, evidence of native officers appears much earlier in the data. However, the data also indicates that native officers ceased to exist as time progressed. It was during the Ethical Policy reforms that the positions of leadership within the colonial army were reopened to native officers. The literature suggests, however, that native officers in the KNIL were appointed not because the administration saw them as equals, but rather because of the chronic lack of officer candidates from Europe (Teitler, 2002). Even though the KNIL had a similar contrast between European officers and native rank and file throughout its history, this divide was less rigid than in the Force Publique. In the decree creating the Force Publique king Léopold II already cemented the inability of natives to rise through the ranks of the colonial army.

Regarding the command of the two colonial armies little change can be observed throughout the colonial timeline. In the Belgian Congo the change in sovereignty from Léopold to the Belgian state caused a small shift in responsibilities as the *Roi-Souverain* lost his influence on policy, which was covered by creating the Conseil Colonial under the auspices of the Belgian Government in Brussels. Overall, the command of the Force Publique stayed pretty linear, with a limited amount of state institutions and officials involved in the organisation of the army. This was considerably different in the case of the Netherlands Indies, where different aspects of the colonial army fell under the responsibilities of different ministries. The fact that the responsibility for the recruitment of European soldiers fell under a different ministry than the responsibility for the KNIL could be a factor influencing the chronic problem of the KNIL of acquiring enough European recruits to keep up its fighting strength. As a consequence, the fact that the standing of native soldiers improved throughout history can be attributed to the bureaucratic organisation of the recruitment of the KNIL.

6. Deployment

6.1 Introduction to Deployment

It is logical that both armies have been deployed in wars, either small scale or large scale, as this is the traditional use of an army. However, looking at the colonial armies from a perspective of hard power and soft power in a world of colonial elites, native elites and native non-elites encompasses more than just the use of violence by the army. For instance, the objective of the Force Publique of making native recruits familiar with European 'civilisation' like monogamy and Christianity serves as a source of creating legitimacy for the rule of the colonial elite by adding elements of its distinct culture into the native culture (Van Reybrouck, 2010). In this chapter the ways the army is deployed will be elaborated upon, in order to create a clearer image to what ends the Force Publique and the KNIL have been utilised by the colonial elite in the Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies. One point of comparison that transcends the development of deployment of the colonial armies through time are the civic duties that the respective armies fulfilled. As was discussed in Chapter 3, the KNIL performed a diverse array of important civic duties for the colonial administration in the Netherlands Indies, as opposed to the Force Publique whose effect on the civic society was much more focussed on the collection of taxes, maintaining order, and indoctrination of colonial values through incorporation in the army.

6.2 Deployment in the Early Colonial State

Simply put, the objective of the Force Publique and the KNIL was to establish and maintain the monopoly of violence in the colony. In reality, establishing and maintaining the monopoly of violence is not the only goal of the colonial armies. The capacity for violence intrinsic to an army was not only deployed in order to get control over the territory and defeat challenges to colonial rule. The Force Publique in particular was deployed by the colonial administration to collect taxes and protect trade caravans, thereby employing its capacity for violence in order to develop the colonial economy. Even though this economic aspect of the deployment was pivotal to the functioning of the colonial state, it was an aspect of its work in a state which had not yet achieved a monopoly of violence. At the beginning of the Belgian colonial project in the Congo the vast territory of the colony was largely unexplored and contained several polities where native elites were hostile to the colonial elites moving in on their territory. Trade in the territory of the Congo Free State was one of the most important reasons for the creation of the Free State, which made the protection of trade caravans in an unpacified territory of the utmost importance.

In the Belgian Congo during the early colonial state there were many challenges to the colonial rule over the territory. For instance, the native elites in the colony that refused to be co-opted by the colonial elite had to be defeated and pacified, as was mentioned earlier. Different than in the Indonesian archipelago the Congo was thinly populated and most native elites lacked the organisation and technology, and therefore the capacity for violence, to successfully wage war against the coloniser (Buelens, 2007, p. 44; Van Reybrouck, 2010; Vansina, 1990). Although some native polities took around a decade to be defeated, the coloniser in the Congo did not have the same difficulties subduing these polities as the Dutch had in the archipelago (Isaacman & Vansina, 1976). However, there was one internal enemy in the Congo that was more difficult to subdue as they were better organised and possessed better weapons than the natives: the Afro-Arabic slave traders in Eastern Congo, an external elite that entered the Congo from the East (IRCB, 1952; Van Reybrouck, 2010). As abolishing the slave trade was an important reason why Leopold was given the Congo at the Berlin Conference, the colonial administration focussed resources on defeating the Afro-Arabic slave traders.

Purely looking at the deployment of the military, the Arab slave traders were defeated by a succession of small military campaigns against their strongholds dispersed over the Eastern Congo. In practice, however, the peaceful co-optation of Afro-Arab elites played an important role in the colonial tactics. The Arab influence over the Eastern Congo was not organised as one distinct polity. Rather, several connected polities of varying size and influence scattered this part of the Congo, trading in slaves and ivory. The most powerful Afro-Arabic slave trader was named Hamed-ben-Mohamed, also known as Tippo-Tip. Tippo-Tip had helped Stanley on his first passage through the Congo and was by far the most powerful player in the Eastern Congo, with many men and rifles under his command. Instead of defeating Tippo-Tip, the colonial

administration co-opted him by naming him chief of a station at Stanley Falls in 1887, where he was to enforce the authority of the state, fly the flag of the Free State, and from where he was allowed to trade under the supervision of the state. This deal was made for two reasons: the administration hoped that Tippo-Tipp would cease raiding villages for slaves, and it bought the administration time to build up the Force Publique to be able to deal with the slavers through military force (IRCB, 1952). This approach had a very limited effect. In 1891 the Force Publique had 120 Europeans and 3,500 natives at its disposal, which rose to 10,000 in 1894, and took up arms against the Afro-Arab slave traders. After about 10 years of low-intensity fighting the Arab slavers were expelled from the territory or defeated, and the administration took an important step towards the monopoly of violence (Buelens, 2007).

The resistance of the native elites of the Congo to colonial rule was already briefly mentioned in chapter 3. However, it is important to mention these elites here again. Native elites controlled polities of differing size and societal cohesion in pre-colonial Congo. The banks of the river were most densely populated, and these were the first people in inland Congo to come into contact with Europeans (Vansina, 1990). Lacking infrastructure, the rest of the territory was more difficult to access than the river, and it took some years for the colonial administration to reach every part of the vast territory. In order to do this, the Force Publique undertook numerous small campaigns to remote parts of the territory to establish posts and possibly defeat challenges to the colonial rule. Several of these expeditions are detailed by the IRCB, but almost all were short campaigns against small polities lacking the firepower or the military organisation to challenge the Force Publique, unlike the better organised Afro-Arabs. The long expeditions to remote places did create problems for the Force Publique, however. Several times the native contingent, an ever growing part of the army that had been filled with well-paid mercenaries before, turned against its officers in revolt (IRCB, 1952; Van Reybrouck, 2010). Now the Force Publique had to fight this insurgence of European trained soldiers wielding European weapons. The most prominent example of this occurred during the relief mission of the Force Publique for Emin Pasha in British Sudan, when a large portion of the army revolted and a second expedition was set up to quell the revolt and continue the campaign (IRCB, 1952; Van Reybrouck, 2010). Different from expeditions against native elites refusing to be co-opted, these mutinies represent the struggle of creating loyalty for a foreign elite lacking legitimacy.

Apart from dealing with the Afro-Arab slave traders, and native polities and mutinies the Force Publique also played an instrumental role in the protection of trade interests in the colony. As establishing a colony is expensive, the colonial administration depended on trade to finance the colony. The Force Publique was deployed in the interest of trade in three ways. First, the military was used to protect trade caravans hunting for ivory, the primary commodity in the beginning of the early colonial state. As the territory was not yet completely pacified, the Force Publique was utilised to protect trade from possible raids. Second, the Force Publique was deployed in order to prevent others from taking resources from the colony, most notably the Afro-Arabs in the Eastern Congo who exported large amounts of ivory to Zanzibar. The third way the Force Publique was deployed to economic ends was the collection of taxes from the natives, most notably natural rubber. As natural rubber increased in value more needed to be extracted, a job the colonial administration left to the native population as a form of taxation. The Force Publique was charged with collecting the rubber and enforcing the taxation if no rubber was delivered. This opened the door to what became known as "Red Rubber" as many Congolese were killed by the Force Publique for failing to deliver enough rubber (Gordon, 2017; Van Reybrouck, 2010). Although some of these atrocities happened in territories which were run by concession companies, the Force Publique played an important role in the collection of rubber taxes to create rents for the colonial elite (Casement, 1904).

As was indicated in Chapter 3 the sources on the role of the KNIL in the economy of the Netherlands Indies are limited. Although it is highly likely that the military played a role in the coercion of natives unwilling to produce cash crops for the colonial administration, this never received the widespread attention of the collection of rubber in the Congo. This does not mean, however, that there were no negative consequences to the forced cultivation of cash crops instead of food crops as many natives died in famines as a result of the Cultivation System (Elson, 1985, p. 56). Limited in its deployment on behalf of the economy in a direct sense, the KNIL was primarily a fighting force with additional civic duties. Still, infrastructure projects undertaken by the KNIL are likely to have impacted the developing economy of the archipelago. In

establishing the monopoly of violence over the entire colony the KNIL faced a different reality than the Force Publique. Without Afro-Arab slave traders and without large-scale mutinies, the primary adversary of the KNIL in the archipelago were the native elites and the native polities they controlled.

Different than in the Congo, the Dutch faced native polities with a high degree of organisation and a high capacity for waging war as modern weapons were more available on the archipelago, which had been trading with Europeans for centuries. Combined with the fact that these polities were relatively populous, the KNIL faced considerable difficulty in subduing the colony. As rents created by more populous polities are larger, the native elites have more to lose when co-opted by colonial elites. The most important war waged by the KNIL against a native polity is the aforementioned Aceh war. In comparing the Aceh war to the war against the Afro-Arabs in the Belgian Congo it becomes clear why it took much longer to defeat Aceh. While the Afro-Arabs were defeated by deploying several expeditions to fight the dispersed pockets of slave traders, fighting in Aceh was a prolonged war of attrition against several local power holders who operated from their seats of power. One important similarity is the alliance that both colonial administrations made with warlords, Tippo-Tip in the Congo and Teuku Uma in Aceh (Kitzen, 2012). As with Tippo-Tip, the Dutch hoped that Uma could help them in subduing the region. This initially succeeded, but the plan collapsed when Uma betrayed the Dutch and was ultimately defeated.

In Aceh the KNIL fought a war of attrition against an enemy that was prepared to fight a guerrilla war, to which the KNIL slowly adapted. Enlisting the help of local power holders helped the KNIL with this, as they possessed knowledge vital for subduing Aceh. The co-optation of native elites like Teuku Uma also played a role in the conquest of other parts of the Archipelago. Many of these islands were inhabited by several polities ruled by elites quarrelling amongst themselves. By forging an alliance with one power-holder the Dutch gained a pretext for establishing a military foothold on an island to come to the aid of their ally, while at a provocation taking control over the entire island and adding it to the colony. The most prominent example of this is the pacification of Bali, where Dutch military aid meant that less powerful elites had to submit to Dutch colonial rule. When a trade ship sank before the Balinese coast and the crew was murdered, the KNIL had its pretext to pacify the rest of the island and end the autonomy of Bali (Schulte Nordholt, 2010). This pattern of politics and pretexts as tools towards pacification of islands was a regular tactic of the Dutch colonial government extending its reach over the archipelago. This need of a pretext in order to pacify a region or a polity was different in the Congo, the promise of bringing civilisation and the fact that Léopold was already the sovereign over the entire territory were enough reason to pacify the colony by use of force.

6.3 Deployment in the Late Colonial State
After the monopoly of violence has been established in the colony the main objective of the deployment of the Force Publique and the KNIL is to maintain this monopoly of violence, as well as to ensure the continued defence of the outer borders of the territory against foreign threats. In both colonies the maintaining of the monopoly of violence meant quelling uprisings of any form. In the Congo the problem of mutinying soldiers proved persistent, and there are multiple examples of religious uprisings over the course of the colonial period (Buelens & Frankema, 2015; Van Reybrouck, 2010, p. 157). These religious uprising may seem harmless, but they proved a challenge to what can be described as the Holy Trinity of the Congo: the state, business and Christianity. Because of this, these religious uprisings were met with violence and the leaders were imprisoned. In other words: any challenge to the authority of the state, business, or state religion was met by deploying the Force Publique to restore order. In the Netherlands Indies the policy was similar. A challenge to the authority of the Dutch colonial government was met with the deployment of the KNIL. This method of order through coercion remained in place throughout the colonial period.

Acquiring (forced) labour for the colonial state or concessionary companies remained a responsibility of the Force Publique for some time in the late colonial period. Although the atrocities of the Force Publique in collecting rubber taxes were a direct factor in the transfer of sovereignty from Léopold to the Belgium state, there is no evidence that these practices stopped immediately. For example, a law was passed in 1917 ordering 60 days of forced cultivation of government determined crops, under threat of penal sanctions (Young, 1994, p. 253). However, this deployment of the Force Publique became less important as the colonial state expanded and time went by. Another way the Force Publique was deployed during the

late colonial period was in both world wars, as was briefly mentioned earlier. The Force Publique fought successfully against the German colonial state in modern-day Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. The successes of the Force Publique during World War I in Africa added to the soft power of the army, as its prestige increased. During World War II the Force Publique undertook a long journey to defeat the Italians in Abyssinia, and elements of the Force Publique were deployed as far as Palestine and British India (Van Reybrouck, 2010). The KNIL did not see a similar deployment during the world wars. As the Netherlands remained neutral during World War I, the KNIL was not deployed to fight for the metropole. During World War II the KNIL did have to fight as the Japanese Empire invaded the archipelago. However, the KNIL was quickly defeated and the colony was never completely regained by the Netherlands after the war.

6.4 Conclusions on Deployment

Concluding, the deployment of the Force Publique and the KNIL show some important differences. The most important reason for these differences in deployment are the differing circumstances in the Congo and the Indonesian archipelago. In establishing the monopoly of violence over the entire territory the resistance of native elites in the Congo was smaller and less organised than in the Netherlands Indies. This meant that the Force Publique did not have to fight prolonged wars of attrition but could defeat unwilling native elites through a succession of military expeditions. Furthermore, the fact that the colonial administration was internationally recognised as the sovereign ruler of the territory meant that no pretext was needed for war to prevent scrutiny from other states. This pretext was needed in the Netherlands Indies, where the colonial administration was looking to expand its territory by combining politics and conquest to pacify islands and co-opt native elites.

Another important difference is the deployment of the Force Publique to maintain trade monopolies and levee taxes from the population. The lack of state structure across large parts of the territory prevented the coloniser to make use of existing forms of taxation overseen by co-opted native elites in the early colonial state, a system of indirect rule which was widely used in the Netherlands Indies throughout the colonial period. Although both armies are naturally vehicles of the hard power of the state, there are cases when soft power comes to the fore. In the cases of Tippo-Tip and Teuku Uma warlords align themselves with the colonial state as both have more to win with an alliance than war on the short term. Although the alliance did not last in either case, it can be concluded that co-optation by the coloniser sometimes seemed more fruitful than fighting, even if there is no immediate possibility of defeat for these powerful warlords. Strategic alliances with local elites are a common occurrence in colonial warfare, and the Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies prove no exception (Kitzen, 2012).

7. Conclusion

7.1 Military Practices

In the previous chapters the recruitment, composition, leadership, and deployment of the KNIL and the Force Publique have been discussed. Overall, there are important similarities in military practices between the two colonial armies. Both armies rely on a considerable contingent of native soldiers. The importance of this contingent is greater in the Force Publique, but this converges over time as native soldiers in the KNIL became more important as the experiences of colonial warfare shaped the army. The way native soldiers were recruited in both colonies differs. In the Congo a levee system was used in order to raise the required number of soldiers and spread the pressure of recruitment evenly over the territory. In the Netherlands Indies, only natives of Javanese and Amboynese ethnicity served in the colonial army. Enlistment for natives in both colonies was generally voluntary. However, in the early days of the Force Publique insufficient volunteers caused recruiters to resort to buying slaves and freeing them in return for their service in the army. Additionally, the lack of native recruits was supplemented by Coast Volunteers from elsewhere in Africa. As the native population became more aware of the benefits of serving in the Force Publique, voluntary enlistment increased and soon replaced expensive mercenaries. As the Indonesian archipelago was more populous, and because less natives served the in the KNIL than in the Force Publique, the native contingent of the KNIL was filled voluntarily. However, reasons for voluntary enlistment differed between Javanese and Amboynese recruits, with the former trying to escape poverty and the latter increasing his social standing.

Leadership structures in both armies also show important similarities. Leadership positions in the army were almost exclusively reserved for Europeans. This divide was sharpest in the Force Publique, where the division between the European and native contingents was cemented into the decree founding the army. In the KNIL the divide was more ambivalent. There is evidence that native soldiers could fill officer positions, but these native officers gradually disappear and only reappear in sources during the Ethical Policy reforms in the 20th century. High command of the army in the Belgian Congo has been straightforward from the conception of the Force Publique. The Governor-General of the colony commands the army and answers to the sovereign ruler of the colony. First, this was king Léopold II, and later the Belgian government in Brussels. The chain of command is more complicated in the Netherlands Indies. Different ministries are responsible for different parts of the KNIL. For instance, the recruitment of European soldiers is the responsibility of a different ministry than the recruitment of the native soldiers and the command of the KNIL itself. This complicated chain of command could have influenced the difficulties faced by the KNIL to recruit sufficient Europeans to serve in the army.

Deployment of the colonial armies in the Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies show important differences. In both colonies, native elites resisted to colonial control. However, the resistance of these elites in the Congo was smaller and more dispersed than in the Netherlands Indies, where the KNIL fought protracted wars of attrition against populous and well-organised polities. Colonial wars in the Netherlands Indies were fought in order to enlarge the territory of the colony, while in the Congo military expeditions were organised in order to pacify polities already under the sovereignty of Léopold II. The fact that the KNIL encountered heavier resistance in trying to establish colonial control could present a reason why it depended so much on the European contingent, as opposed to the native fighting force in the Congo. One last difference between the Force Publique and the KNIL is the deployment of the former in the economic sphere. Used to collect taxes in the form of rubber, the coercive capacities of the Force Publique played a pivotal role in the emerging colonial economy of the Belgian Congo. As the expenditures on the Force Publique totalled to around 50 percent of total expenditures of the colonial state in the first few years, the Force Publique helped finance its own existence through the collection of taxes. As there was little existing economic activity to extract revenue from, the Force Publique provided a service crucial to the success of the colonial project in the Congo.

Overall, the Force Publique and the KNIL are relatively similar colonial armies in several important aspects. The differences discussed in this thesis are the result of the local colonial realities encountered by the Belgians and the Dutch. For instance, the levee system for recruits in the Congo was a result of the fact

that the territory was sparsely populated, and the number of volunteers proved insufficient to fill the army. As this was not the case in the Netherlands Indies, no levee system was developed there. Maybe the most important similarity in both colonial armies, and a feature of more colonial armies throughout history, is the reliance on native recruits. The use of native recruits to pacify the colony created the interesting situation in which the coloniser pacified native elites with natives non-elites. As the difficulty of the KNIL to find European recruits proved, pacifying the entire colony using European recruits would have been nearly impossible, it is the participation of these native recruits in the army that allowed the coloniser to co-opt the native elites and thereby gain effective control over the colony. The native elites also profited from this situation, as continued loyalty to the colonial elite granted both a flow of rents and ensured elites could stay in their privileged position. Furthermore, the introduction of the colonial state also provided political opportunities to lesser elites, who could form an alliance with the colonial elite in order to overthrow the dominant coalition. The question still remains how the colonial elite, despite its inherent lack of legitimacy, ensured the continuing support of the native recruits in order to establish and maintain its monopoly of violence over the colonial territory.

7.2 Controlling the Colonial Army

As both the Force Publique and the KNIL relied on the fighting power of native recruits to a differing extent, the question arises how the loyalty was created to make sure that natives fight with the colonial elite instead of with the native elite. As has been mentioned before, the Force Publique had problems with mutinies over its history, but these mutinies did not appear as a result of a struggle for power between native and colonial elites. Analysing the reasons why native recruits fight on the side of the coloniser is important because it explains why small European states were able to control large territories far away from their metropoles. Although it cannot be proven that the subjugation of the natives was impossible without native recruits, it is reasonable to believe that it would have been difficult when looking at the historical military realities in both colonies.

In the Belgian Congo native recruits were sent to training camps for around one year, of which there were several across the territory (IRCB, 1952). In these training camps the recruits were schooled in military discipline and fighting by European officers. This resulted in native soldiers being familiarised with colonial culture, trained to a European standard, and integrated into the army and thereby the state. This integration into the state meant that a portion of the rents created by the colonial elite was awarded to the native recruits as salary. Although there is less mention of the training and integration in the sources regarding the KNIL, it is reasonable to assume a similar system was used. However, as the Dutch regarded native recruits as inferior and did not rely on them as much as in the Congo, it is possible that the training for native recruits in the Netherlands Indies was less rigorous. At the end of their training native recruits would be used to following the commands of their European officers and were ready to be deployed as soldiers of the colonial army. Although military training can certainly create loyalty to the colonial state where there was none before, this system works better when recruits have volunteered to serve in the army. For this, the pull factors of serving in the army are important. Increased social status, an escape from poverty, escape from hunger, and the increase in material welfare all serve as pull factors in both colonies that could have created loyalty from the recruits to the army. In other words, the army as a contractual organisation created by the colonial elite proved to be more capable than organisations of native elites in creating rents for the benefit of native non-elites.

Serving in the colonial army brought with it benefits, which pulled recruits towards service. The alternative to serving in the army provides push factors. This point flows directly from the fact that the rents to which the native non-elites had access increased upon the arrival of the colonial elite. Famine, tribal warfare and poverty could be escaped by joining the army. Even if conditions in the colonial army for native recruits were not ideal, a worse alternative option can serve to integrate natives into the army. A last factor influencing the loyalty of natives in the army could be the negative consequences of defecting. Although there is mention of recruits disappearing from the training camps in the Congo, not much is mentioned about the punishment for defection in either colony (IRCB, 1952). However, if the punishment for defection is more severe than the possible negative consequences of serving the army, defection will be deterred. After all, involuntary loyalty also served the purpose of a colonial army.

7.3 Soft Power, Hard Power, and Elites

Throughout the military practices in the Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies the concepts of hard power and soft power and the position of elites all play a role. For example, the 'pacification' of Aceh by the KNIL is an example of hard coercive power, while soft power played a role in the collaboration with local power holders like Teuku Uma which served the interests of both parties. The advance of the colonial state thus did not only present a threat to the position of native elites, but also provided opportunities for new alliances which saw some native elites increase their political and economic power. These examples shows the interplay between hard and soft power in military reality. A similar combination of hard and soft power is visible in the pacification of a territory by an army, while at the same time using soft power to attract native recruits from that same territory. The situation in which the coloniser controls a territory by using the people it pacifies to wield the weapons is made possible by bundling of hard and soft power.

The specific bundle of hard and soft power is dependent on an array of contextual factors. Previous exposure to Europeans, the amount of resistance to colonial control by native elites, the complexity of native polities, and the benefits of joining the colonial army all play a role in this. The army has control over the natives, who join the army, which controls the natives. In order to do this effectively, the natives in the army should not function as a 'slave army' but should have some form of loyalty towards the army. In order for either army to function it needed enough recruits. Although it was more important in the Congo, the native contingent of the KNIL was always sizeable and increased in importance over time. This means that too much hard power to control the natives can work against recruitment. Hard power and soft power for colonial armies in maintaining and establishing the monopoly of violence therefore existed in a delicate balance. Although it is likely that Nye never thought of the Belgian Congo or the Netherlands Indies when he coined the term, the concept of smart power is applicable when looking at the military practices in these colonies (Nye, 2009).

Although North, Wallis, and Weingast have tried to build a theoretical framework that would explain how societies manage violence they have not considered the intricate realities of a colonial state, as colonial state are not mentioned once in their book. The evidence of this thesis suggests that their theoretical framework needs to be expanded in order to be able to explain the management of violence in a colonial state. As the colonial state is established the situation of the natural state in which native elites form a coalition to rule native non-elites is shaken up. However, the entry of a new elite lacking legitimacy as it is culturally and ethnically distinct from the native population does not supplant the native elite, but rather co-opts it in an effort to gain the legitimacy needed to control the territory effectively. Schematically presented in Figure 1, the societal structure of a colonial state adds a layer of colonial elites to the framework of North, Wallis, and Weingast.

Figure 1: Elites and Non-Elites in the Pre-Colonial and Colonial Situation

The introduction of a colonial elite created a situation where the colonial elite was superior to the native elites and took from it or suppressed its capacity for violence in order to create a monopoly of violence that lies with the colonial elite. One of the ways this was done is by recruiting the native non-elites to fill the ranks of the colonial army, which was used to forcefully co-opt reluctant native elites. Although native elites still existed within the colonial state, they no longer owed their position to the continued support from other native elites, but rather to the consent of the colonial elite. Because of this, the native elites ceased to be an adherent organisation, but were rather a contractual organisation controlled by the colonial elites. Different than contractual organisations of native non-elites controlled by native elites this contractual organisation is not only used to mobilise and create economic rents, but also yields legitimacy for the colonial elite, thereby allowing the colonial elite to effectively control the colony. Through this addition of a second layer of elites in the theoretical framework of North, Wallis, and Weingast it becomes possible to explain how colonial elites effectively controlled a colony.

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FP (2564) 721, 722	2.10.01, 27/08.1 - 27/08.7
FP (800) 162	
FP (814) 1174	
FP (815) 1176	
FP (2670) 114, 115	
FP (2427) 50	

Appendix

Table 5: annual levees 1892-1914

LEVÉES DE MILICIENS ORDONNÉES ANNUELLEMENT POUR LA FORCE PUBLIQUE DE 1892 À 1914.

Territoires Districts et Zones	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899	1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	Totaux (*)
Banana	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	3	6	—	—	—	—	—
Boma-Mayumbe	300	370	350	270	400	400	125	75	50	200	25	50	—	25	30	30	17	28	43	—	—	—	—	—
Matadi	120	120	100	100	100	100	75	75	100	75	75	100	—	50	65	50	25	31	46	100	100	73	80	7.428
Cataractes	180	100	100	100	100	100	75	50	100	50	75	100	—	50	130	75	40	63	155	—	—	—	—	—
Stanley-Pool	120	120	120	200	200	200	75	25	40	50	50	50	—	50										
Kwango					100	100	150	150	50	75	75	150	—	90	120	170	85	134	230	205	205	144	100	2.363
Lac Léopold II	180	200	200	300	600	600	450	290	250	300	300	250	—	250	325	275	140	212	338	325	379	211	100	6.445
Équateur	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	75	40	63	97	93	138	86	100	692
Maringa (Lopori-Lulonga)	300	300	300	300	300	300	550	250	250	300	300	250	—	250	325	300	150	157	265	275	321	163	300	7.256
Bangala	180	300	600	350	500	500	150	150	150	200	300	250	—	210	275	100	80	126	199	198	223	124	125	5.512
Mongala	180	250	280	200	300	300	300	150	150	150	200	200	—	250	325	220	100	142	233	225	225	127	150	4.785
Ubangi	300	1.050	500	600	800	800	150	75	—	—	300	500	—	430	560	270	125	157	237	215	257	139	200	8.407
Aruwimi													—			500	250	252	286	302	352	200		
Lualaba Kasai											100	50	—			95	55	86	138	152	290	153	300	{11.970}
Rubi-Uele	200	300	600	700	1.200	1.200	600	600	460	800	100	50	—	275	400	115	65	102	156	165	190	111		
Makua (Bomokandi)											100	50	—			115	65	102	161	172	197	130	225	
Uele-Bomu (Uele-Bili)											100	50	—			75	55	87	114	122	147	93		
Makrakra (Gurba-Dungu)													—			50	20	31	46	—				
Enclave de Lado	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	130	65	94	148	145	170	98	100	147
Haut-Ituri	120	250	700	880	1.400	1.400	300	225	—	—	—	400	—	370	445	125	65	110	155	152	177	100	125	{10.472}
Stanley-Falls													—			150	75	94	129	125	150	87	100	
Ponthierville													—			60	50	79	105	100	125	85	100	
Maniema																								
Ruzizi-Kivu {Uvira / Rutshuru}	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	20 / 10	31 / 16	56 / 32	40 / 25	74	65	50	428
Katanga	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	230	50	50	75	405
TOTAUX	2.180	3.360	3.850	4.000	6.000	6.000	3.000	2.000	1.550	2.200	2.500	2.500	—	2.300	3.000	2.980	1.600	2.290	3.375	3.375	3.770	2.250	2.350	66.340

P.O. Province Orientale
(*) Moins l'année 1904

Moyenne des levées annuelles : 2.997 hommes.