Killing nature to save it?

An analysis of two sport hunting policy arrangements in Uganda

Amos Ochieng

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Amos Ochieng
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ACRONYMS

ADMADE:	Administrative Management Design Areas Programme
AU:	African Union
AUTO:	Association of Uganda Tour Operators
AWF:	African Wildlife Foundation
CAMFIRE:	Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
CBC:	Community-Based Conservation
CBNRM:	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CCP:	Community Conservation Policy
CHAs:	Controlled Hunting Areas
CITES:	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
CMS:	Church Missionary Society
CPI:	Community Protected Areas Institutions
CWA:	Community Wildlife Area
CWAs:	Community Wildlife Associations
DI:	Discursive Institutionalism
DRC:	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU:	European Union
FFI:	Fauna and Flora International
GC:	Governance Capacity
GD:	Game Department
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
GPS:	Global Positioning System
GRs:	Game Reserves
GTL:	Game Trails Uganda Limited
GTZ:	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HI:	Historical Institutionalists
I(NGOs):	International non-governmental organizations
ICDPs:	Integrated Conservation and Development Projects
IGC:	Indicative Governance Capacity
IR:	International Relations

IUCN:	International Union for Conservation of Nature
IUCN:	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
KKTGMA:	Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area
KRS:	Kanyanyeru Resettlement Scheme
KTCWA:	Kaiso-Tonya Community Wildlife Area
KTCWA:	Kaiso-Tonya Community Wildlife Association
KWR:	Kabwoya Wildlife Reserve
LG:	Local Government
LMGR:	Lake Mburo Game Reserve
LMNP:	Lake Mburo National Park
MBC:	Market-Based Conservation
MBIs:	Market-Based-Instruments
MET:	Ministry of Environment and Tourism
MTTI:	Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry
MTWH:	Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Heritage
NEMA:	National Environment Management Authority
NI:	Neo-Intuitionalism
NP:	National Park
NU:	Nature Uganda
NWA:	Nshaara Wildlife Association
OAG:	Office of the Attorney General
OI:	Old Institutionalism
PAA:	Policy Arrangement Approach
PACO:	IUCN's Central and West African protected
PAs:	Protected Areas
PGC:	Performative Governance Capacity
PGRs:	Private Game Reserves
RI:	Rational Institutionalists
RSPB:	Royal Society for the Protection of Birds
SCI:	Safari Club International
SI:	Sociological Institutionalists
TRS:	Tourism Revenue Sharing
UBOS:	Uganda Bureau of Statistics

USAGA:	Uganda Safari Guides Association
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development
USD:	United States Dollar
UTA:	Uganda Tourism Association
UTA:	Uganda Tourism Association
UWA:	Uganda Wildlife Authority
UWP:	Uganda Wildlife Policy
WCS:	Wildlife Conservation Society
WD:	Wildlife Direct
WMAs:	Wildlife Management Areas
WURs:	Wildlife User Rights
WWF:	World Wildlife Fund for Nature

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Sport hunting, conservation and development: a brief history

Hunting has been a part of human history for millennia. Hunter-gatherers greatly depended on hunting for subsistence and fur, and it also played an important role in their rituals and for show of prowess. They mainly used rudimentary methods (e.g. slings, snares, spears, nets, dogs and often bows and arrows) to kill wild animals (Steinhart, 1989). This hunting had minimal impact on wildlife populations, as the world population was still low (Milner-Gulland et al., 2003; Willcox & Nambu, 2007). However, by the 1500s, when European settlers arrived into North America, hunting increased. Similarly, hunting increased in Africa by the 1800s when early explorers arrived and found a continent abundant with wildlife. Wealthy Europeans followed in their wake for hunting expeditions, particularly in Kenya (Adams, 2004; Adams & Hulme 2001; Lindsey et al., 2007). Related, following the arrival of Arab traders in the 1700s, especially in the coastal areas (Stearman, 2000), Africa entered a new era of socio-economic development accompanied by technology changes in the hunting industry (Milner-Gulland et al., 2003). Hunting was no longer something people did mainly for subsistence, people now also hunted for commercial and leisure purposes (Stearman, 2000). The hunters started to use new weapons, such as guns, which enabled them to kill more animals (Milner-Gulland et al., 2003). As Steinhart (1989:247) pointed out, 'hunting during the colonial era was a major element in the struggle for survival, for development and for power among the various forces vying for control of […] resources of land, water and animals – wild and domesticated'.

In order to sustain the European hunters' expeditions in Africa, the colonial administrators decided to collaborate with the African kings and chiefs to reduce hunting by the local Africans. This was done through widespread demarcation of large areas of land in the name of wildlife protection (Adams, 2004; Dunlap, 1988; Lindsey et al., 2007). Furthermore, in order to secure the boundaries of the demarcated areas, rural Africans were forcefully removed from these areas, often to 'waterless sites' (Beinart & Coates, 1995; Jones, 2006), without any form of compensation. Several of these demarcated areas across Africa were named national parks in the early 1950s (e.g. Queen Elizabeth National Park, Murchison Falls National Park and Kidepo Valley National Park) purposely for the preservation of pristine environments with restricted access for the local people (cf. Jones, 2006).

So, many of the state-led conservation areas and application of the concept of conservation in Africa owe their origin to the practice of hunting (Jones, 2006). In fact, most of the state

protected areas (including those in Uganda, see also section 1.5) that (were and) are still used for sport hunting were originally demarcated as either game reserves (GRs) or controlled hunting areas (CHAs). There is little in the conservation literature about hunting in Uganda, and this dissertation represents one of the first attempts to incorporate the issue of sport hunting in Uganda into international academic debates on hunting, development and conservation. Moreover, Uganda is the only Eastern African country apart from Tanzania that reintroduced sport hunting following its band in 1979. In this thesis, sport hunting (also known as safari hunting, trophy hunting and game hunting), is described as an activity where a tourist pays to hunt an animal with desired physical attributes (e.g. large horns, tusks, body size or skull length), usually in the company of a professional hunting guide (Cooney et al., 2017; Lindsey et al., 2007). The motivations for the hunt range from adventure, pleasure and attaining trophies to using tracking skills, being in remote bush areas and understanding the target species. Sport hunting became popular in most African countries during the colonial and post-independent periods (Ayorekire et al., 2011).

The post-independent hunting mainly targeted big game such as *Rhinoceros* and buffalo *Syncerus caffer* for their horns, and elephant *Loxodonta africana* and hippopotamus *Hippopotamus amphibious* for their tusks. This was primarily driven by economic motives. This hunting by the Europeans, reinforced by the colonial status of wildlife protection, and coupled with hunting by the local people, eventually had negative ecological impacts on wildlife populations across the African continent. For example, *Rhinoceros* became extinct in Uganda (Ayorekire et al., 2011), as did the plains zebra quagga *Equus quagga* and the antelope blue buck *Hippotragus leucophaeus* in South Africa *(*Adams, 2004; Lindsey at a., 2007) and the bird species Nubian bustard *Neotis nuba* in Sahelian Africa (Loveridge et al., 2006). Overwhelmed by the declining wildlife numbers, some post-independent countries (e.g. Kenya, Botswana and later Uganda) banned sport hunting in order to avert the possible further extinction of species in Africa (cf. Adams, 2004). Subsequently sport hunting changed under the influence of shifting conservation discourses.

1.2. From ‘fences and fines’ to participatory approaches

Sport hunting in state protected areas historically has been inspired by conservation related movements and organisations that had emerged from within Europe, such as the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) in 1891 (an initiative from two groups of women to fight

against trade in certain bird species thought to be nearing extinction). Similarly, the Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa was signed in 1900 by European countries with their colonies in sub-Saharan Africa to protect species that were also facing extinction (see Jones, 2006). The RSPB and the Convention greatly supported the idea of preserving wildlife for its intrinsic value. They were backed by movements such as 'the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English "enclosure" movement' (see Büscher & Whande, 2007; Igoe, 2004), and influenced by the early German concerns about forest conservation (see Büscher & Whande, 2007:25-26; Matose, 2001).

The newly created national parks in Uganda (see also section 1.5), like elsewhere in Africa, were managed through the protectionist model, with a 'fences and fines' approach also known as the 'fortress conservation' model under state authority (Jones, 2006). Subsequently, the displaced local people were referred to as 'encroachers' or 'poachers' (Büscher & Dietz, 2005), thought to be 'wasteful' resource users, and were liable to harsh punishments. Sometimes they or were even shot at and killed by the protected areas' rangers, armed with guns by the states to guard the demarcated pristine areas (Dunlap, 1988; Jones, 2006). Consequently, many rural Africans, especially those who lived next to the new protected areas, became vulnerable to animal attacks and crop damage. This fuelled local animosity towards wildlife and the protected areas in general (Jones, 2006).

Around the late 1970s conservationists started to recognise that the protectionist model of 'fences and fines' was facing challenges as it perpetuated exclusion of rural Africans from participating in decision-making concerning protected areas (Büscher & Whande, 2007). Protectors or managers of conservation areas had better treat neighbouring communities as 'partners' in conservation (Adams & Hulme, 2001; Hulme & Murphree, 1999) as opposed to viewing them as 'resource wasters' and or 'conservation enemies' (Jones, 2006).

The key driver of changes in the debates around the protectionist model was the need to promote a more inclusionary and participatory approach (Büscher & Whande, 2007). Thus, motivated by a strong desire to rectify the mistakes of the 'fortress conservation approach' (Adams & Hulme, 2001; Büscher & Whande, 2007; Hulme & Murphree, 2001; Jones, 2006), the post-independent African governments were faced with the need to adopt an alternative approach that would ensure participation and participatory development (Jones, 2006). The

alternative approach would not only achieve local ownership and local management of natural resources, but also recognise the centrality of the formerly 'excluded local people' in the conservation debates (Büscher & Dietz, 2005) and derive benefits that were expected to be shared with the local people (Hulme & Murphree, 2001). Subsequently, the 'sustainable development' agenda of the 1980s and 1990s was touted as one of the ways through which economic, environmental and social sustainability could be achieved together.

Hence, the idea that a 'conservation-development nexus' was a possibility in Africa (Büscher & Dietz, 2005) was institutionalised in the African wildlife conservation arena with the implementation of 'community-based conservation' policies (CBCs) (Adams, 2004; Büscher & Dietz, 2005; Hulme & Murphree, 2001). These policies were meant to 'allow people living near protected lands to participate in land-use policy and management decisions; give people proprietorship or ownership over wildlife resources; and give local people economic benefit from wildlife conservation' (Hackle (1999: 727; see also Büscher & Dietz, 2005). Many African countries with donor support immediately adopted and operationalised CBCs in their conservation and development agenda thereby changing natural resource policies from the traditional 'state-led' or 'fences and fines' (Adams, 2004; Gibson & Marks, 1995; Hulme & Murphree, 2001) to a more participatory approach (Mariki, 2013) where both state actors and non-state actors are involved in environmental matters (Arts, 2006). Despite the CBCs' wide application in Africa, various critics (e.g., Adams & Hulme, 2001; Brosius, 1998; Büscher & Dietz, 2005; Büscher & Whande, 2007; Duffy, 2000; Dressler, 2014; Dressler et al., 2010; Jones, 2006) view it as mere extension of colonial legacies driven by western agenda (Büscher & Whande, 2007). This is because in part CBC implementation has been overtaken by the large influx of the private sector (with profit motives), thereby hampering the potential of CBC to effectively attain the conservation-development nexus (cf. MacDonald, 2010). Nevertheless, for nearly four decades now, several forms of CBCs, including sport hunting, have been developed and implemented in Southern and Eastern Africa. These are assumed to have attained some level of 'successes' towards overcoming the conservation-development challenges.

1.3. From 'old' to 'new' sport hunting

Against this backdrop, I make a distinction between the 'old' sport hunting and the 'new' sport hunting. The 'old'[1] sport hunting that was associated with 'fortress conservation', changed into a 'new' sport hunting approach, coupled to a changed discourse on conservation (Hutton et al., 2005). The 'new' sport hunting is promoted within the context of market-based (McAfee, 1999) and community-based approaches (Hulme & Murphree, 2001). Although market-based approaches are anchored in the idea of attributing monetary values to all wildlife to raise their conservation status, and community-based approaches in the idea of involving the formerly excluded communities in conservation activities, both approaches aim at deriving benefits from wildlife, and sharing these benefits with the protected areas neighbouring communities to win their support for conservation activities while at the same time stimulating the economic development of the poor communities (Hulme & Murphree, 2001).

The 'new'[2] sport hunting was first experimented with in the 1970s and early 1980s in Southern Africa and later West Africa, then Central Africa and more recently Eastern Africa, to promote the conservation-development nexus. However, in Uganda it was particularly implemented to reduce human-wildlife conflicts. More generally, the new sport hunting is promoted as one of the ways of promoting participation and participatory development through the active involvement of both state and non-state actors in conservation, and the sharing of conservation and benefits. Thus, sport hunting implementation in most parts of Africa is allegedly driven by a strong desire to conserve wildlife while deriving (economic) benefits from it (Nelson et al., 2013). It was widely implemented as part of integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs), community-based conservation (CBC) and community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) that highlighted the centrality of the local communities in conservation (Dressler et al., 2010). Namibia, for instance, integrated sport hunting in the management and governance of communal conservancies, in Zimbabwe it was part of the communal areas management programme for indigenous resources (CAMFIRE), South Africa allowed sport hunting in private game reserves (PGRs) and Tanzania did so in wildlife management areas (WMAs) (see Gibson, 1995; Lewis & Alpert, 1997; Lindsey et al., 2006; 2007; Van der Duim,

[1] The notion 'old' sport hunting in this thesis refers to hunting that was conducted during the pre-historic times, colonial and the immediate post-independent period under 'fortress conservation' approach.
[2] The notion 'new' sport hunting in this thesis refers to sport hunting introduced coupled to a changed discourse on conservation and now widely practiced under community-based and market-based conservation approaches to simultaneously achieve conservation and development

2010, Van der Duim et al. 2011). Governments state that the continued practice of sport hunting in Africa is supporting conservation and development, but different scholars hold different perspectives regarding this practice in Africa. This study hopes to contribute to these debates.

1.4. Debates on sport hunting

Sport hunting has been and still is subject to a number of closely related debates. First, scholars have widely debated the extent to which sport hunting implementation purportedly can contribute to addressing the conservation and development challenges (Adams; 2004; Barrett et al., 2011; Berkes, 2004; Di Minin et al., 2016; Gibson & Marks, 1995; Hulme & Murphree, 2001; Lewis & Alpert, 1997; Lindsey et al., 2006; 2007ab; Muposhi et al., 2016; Van der Duim, 2010, Van der Duim et al. 2011). These debates are especially heated when they are about areas where wildlife conservation (or sport hunting) is in competition with human demand for arable land, settlement and commercialisation (Adams, 2004; Czech, 2000; Emerton, 1999; Kareiva et al., 2011; Pooley et al., 2015; Rands et al., 2010). The proponents of sport hunting argue that it is an important tourism segment for most Southern and Eastern African countries (Lewis & Alpert, 1997; Van der Duim et al., 2015) which attracts thousands of tourists, mainly from the United States and Europe (Lindsey et al., 2007), and potentially encourages local participation and sharing of benefits (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001; Di Minin et al., 2016; Lewis & Alpert, 1997; Lindsey et al., 2006; 2007; 2013; Mariki, 2013; Muposhi et al., 2016). Although earlier studies estimated that sport hunting generated a total of about US$ 201 million of revenue annually continent-wide (see Booth, 2010; Lindsey et al., 2006; 2007), in a study commissioned by Safari Club International (SCI) (although contested, see Murray, 2017), it is estimated that sport hunting contributes about US$ 426 million to the GDP of Botswana, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe put together (Southwick, 2015). Generally, sport hunting is promoted on the grounds that it creates incentives for local inhabitants and especially former poachers, who, for instance, could work as community wildlife scouts (Lindsey et al., 2007). However, others, such as Weaver et al. (2016) and IUCN/PACO (2009) claim that benefits from sport hunting are insufficient, especially when compared to traditional tourism (e.g. photographic tourism or ecotourism) which aims for the same benefits but without destroying the very resource on which it depends (Koens et al., 2009; Ormsby & Mannle, 2006; Snyman, 2017).

Second, but closely related, is the debate on market-based conservation approaches (Roth & Dressler 2012; Sullivan 2012). This is guided by neoliberal ideologies of a free market economy (Artuso & De Castro, 1996; Pirard, 2012; Roth & Dressler 2012; Sullivan, 2012). Market-based conservation is known for using economic instruments, referred to as market-based-instruments (MBIs), to help raise money to advance conservation agendas (Anyango-Van Zwieten et al., 2015; McAfee, 1999; Perrings, 1995; Pirard, 2012) while stimulating development (Fletcher, 2010). One of the promoters of this approach, McAfee (1999), introduced the concept of 'green developmentalism', which focuses on achieving development through environmentally sensitive approaches. According to McAfee (1999), when local nature is valued according to international market prices, it becomes more competitive and has higher chances of survival. Sport hunting is seen as one of those ways through which wildlife is valued at market prices. Although the MBIs and sport hunting may be different in focus, they all attribute monetary value to nature (Pirard, 2012). In the domain of sport hunting particularly, different governments attach different price tags to different wildlife species that tourists are expected to pay to gain permission to hunt. The sport hunting proponents argue that this revenue is used to protect the remaining animals from illegal hunters or poachers. Although MBIs (including sport hunting) have gained prominence in biodiversity conservation in Africa in the past decades (Anyango-Van Zwieten et al., 2015; Lindsey et al., 2007; McAfee, 1999; Pirard, 2012), other scholars are critical about its wide application. As argued by Pirard (2012:59), 'MBIs cannot be said to be cost-efficient […] or capable of revealing information to reach a social optimum and better environmental management'. Breitling (2016) further argues that although 'selling nature to save it' (McAfee, 1999) may provide short-term solutions to biodiversity loss, it does not address the underlying causes of biodiversity loss, such as deforestation and degradation. Critical scholars (e.g. Büscher et al., 2012; Fletcher, 2010) state that MBIs only work to weaken state control of biodiversity conservation as private individuals and organisations promote their neoliberal agenda – by paying to hunt wildlife, for example in Africa.

Third, a relatively new line of argumentation has emerged in the sport hunting debate: the promotion of a 'sustainable hunting model' (Paulson, 2012; 2014). According to Paulson (2012), this model is a 'paradox of conservation', as the proponents tend to see themselves as conservationists on the one hand and as hunters on the other. This argument that individuals can be both hunters and conservationists is common in the current global conservation

advocacy, where more attention is paid to the intrinsic value of nature, rather than the social or economic benefits that most pro-sport hunting advocates present (Paulson, 2012). Many of the hunting proponents are also known to be philanthropists. They mobilise resources through campaigns to protect nature and make donations to conservation organisations around the world (Paulson, 2012; 2014). It is estimated that about 1.4 million km² of land in Africa is currently used for sport hunting (IUCN/PACO, 2009; Lindsey et al., 2007) and supported by its revenues. Moreover, some scholars (e.g. Hofer, 2002) have also argued that revenue generated from sport hunting is often used to directly finance conservation activities of the African government conservation agencies (Hofer, 2002). Others (e.g., Lindsey et al., 2007; Muposhi et al., 2016) furthermore argue that the local communities who usually receive sport hunting benefits are more likely to report poachers in their communities, and/or work as wildlife scouts themselves, thereby increasing the chances of wildlife survival in Africa. However, these arguments fall short of concrete evidence of how sport hunting or sport hunters have a direct impact on African conservation practices. The variety of financial data collected regarding sport hunting are typically not systematically collected, across different temporal and spatial scales (Naidoo et al., 2016). Moreover, the idea to devolve the governance of sport hunting areas (or general conservation) upon private entrepreneurs and organisations, and to include foreign sport hunters or organisations, is risky, as these can be inclined to serve their individual interests, not necessarily those of conservation, government agencies or the local communities (IUCN/PACO, 2009).

Fourth, the implementation of sport hunting to achieve conservation and development objectives in Africa is opposed by animal rights advocates as well as animal welfare advocates. Rooted in different ideologies, the animal rights proponents are of the opinion that animals should not be used or killed for whatever purpose, while the animal welfare advocates are more concerned with the living conditions of animals. Both ideas are promoted by academics and practitioners (NGOs, citizens etc.). Animal rights advocates are broadly guided by animal and environmental ethics, arguing that people should be concerned about the intrinsic value of an individual animal as opposed to their instrumental value. As such, Regan (1983), the proclaimed father of animal rights, campaigned against the disregarding of the rights of individual animals in conservation efforts concerning species or ecosystems (Perry & Perry, 2008). Other scholars, (e.g. Bekoff, 2013; Wallach et al., 2018) urge individuals and organisations involved with wildlife to have compassion. At the continental level, the Africa

Union recently adopted an animal welfare strategy that recognises animals (including wild animals, farm animals and animals used in research) as sentient beings (AU, 2017) following, among others, EU countries. Moreover, there have been (and still are) campaigns against linking sport hunting and conservation in Africa (see Batavia et al., 2018; Carpenter & Konisky, 2017; Lindsey et al., 2016). The intensity of these campaigns is exemplified by the international attention following one incident in July 2015 of the killing of a radio-collared Lion, named Cecil, by Dr. Walter Palmer, a trophy hunter in Zimbabwe (Batavia et al., 2018; Carpenter & Konisky, 2017; Lindsey et al., 2016). Related, Namibia's minister of environment and tourism issued a public memo as of 3 July 2018 banning the posting or sharing of photographs of hunters posing with dead animals on pubic platforms, as the government considers such actions as unethical (MET, 2018).

1.5. Sport hunting in Uganda

The management and utilisation of wildlife in Uganda, like in many parts of Africa, was for a long time rooted in customary rules and practices, with the kings and chiefs acting as custodians of wildlife (NEMA & MTTI, 2008). With the arrival of colonial administrators in the late 1800s, the wildlife management landscape changed to a protectionist model, institutionalised in the 1926 game ordinance, which prohibited unsanctioned forms of wildlife use. The game ordinance granted absolute wildlife management authority to the central administration on behalf of the people of Uganda. Consequently, the government created several game reserves and controlled hunting areas across the country, some of which later became national parks in the 1950s (e.g. Queen Elizabeth National Park, Murchison Falls National Park and Kidepo Valley National Park). However, the government continued to issue sport hunting permits for financial reasons, especially for big game such as rhinoceros, elephants and buffalos. For example, Uganda earned around £ 486,267 from the sale of game licenses and ivory in 1969 (NEMA & MTTI, 2008; Ochieng, 2011) – an equivalent of US$ 638, 598 today. The continued (illegal) hunting decimated wildlife populations throughout the country, which prompted the 1979 ban on all forms of hunting in Uganda (Ayorekire et al., 2011).

Following the increased human population in Uganda, from 4.9 million people in 1948 to the recent 2018 population estimate of 44.3 million people (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018), human-wildlife conflicts have been on the rise, as Uganda's protected areas are encroached for arable land, settlement, grazing and extractive industries. Human-wildlife conflicts are

considered to be 'conflicts which occur whenever an action by humans or wildlife has an adverse impact upon the other' (Conover, 2002:8). Although different scholars have defined human-wildlife conflicts in various ways (see e.g., Conover, 2002; Duffy, 2000; Nyhus, 20016; Treves & Karanth, 2003; Woodroffe et al., 2005), these definitions invariably include the aspect of interaction (usually negative) between humans and wildlife. There are many forms of human-wildlife conflicts, for instance when animals are regarded as pests (Kagoro-Rugunda, 2004) or nuisance (see chapter 4), when people poach wildlife (Duffy, 2000), or when large predators and herbivores injure or kill people and livestock (see Nyhus, 2016). In the case of Uganda, in order to reduce human-wildlife conflicts the government has experimented with and implemented several (alternative) CBC related approaches, including the 20% Tourism Revenue Sharing scheme[3] (TRS) (see Ahebwa et al., 2008; 2012a; Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001; Tumusiime & Sjaastad, 2014). Although revenue sharing schemes were presented as a panacea for conservation challenges (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001), literature indicates that results were mixed (see Ahebwa et al., 2012a; Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001; Schroeder, 2008; Spiteri & Nepalz, 2006; Tumusiime & Sjaastad, 2014; Tumusiime & Vedeld, 2012).

In addition to TRS, sport hunting was reintroduced in 2001 to address human-wildlife conflicts. It was first (re)introduced on private land around Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) and later in and around other protected areas (see below and also Chapter 3). The reintroduction had the following objectives: (1) to positively change residents' attitudes towards wildlife, and (2) reduce human-wildlife conflicts (especially poaching by local communities), by (3) providing incentives for local inhabitants, and (4) to provide lessons in developing guidelines and procedures for further implementation of sport hunting (UWA, 2001). Sport hunting has since been practiced and its benefits have allegedly been shared with the local communities around Lake Mburo National Park (Ayorekire et al., 2011; Ochieng, 2011; Ochieng et al., 2015; 2017; Lamprey & Mugisha, 2009; Muhimbura & Namara, 2009). It was extended to Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKGMA) in 2006. Generally, sport hunting now covers 13 different areas in Uganda mainly classified as community-owned wildlife areas, such as Karenga community wildlife area, Amudat community wildlife area etc. Sport hunting is

[3] Tourism Revenue Sharing scheme (TRS) was initiated by the Uganda Wildlife Authority in 1996 with the aim of sharing 20% of the total park entry fees paid by a single tourist to enter a protected area in Uganda with the neighbouring local communities to the protected areas.

also organised on private-owned land around Lake Mburo National park and the Kafu River basin; and government-owned wildlife reserves, such as Kabwoya wildlife reserve, Pian-Upe wildlife reserve etc. Sport hunting in all these areas is guided by the same objectives as around LMNP.

1.6. Defining the research problem

Uganda's – and other African countries' – current hunting policy is being implemented within the context of the market-based conservation approach (Artuso & De Castro, 1996; McAfee, 1999) and the community-based conservation approach (Berkes, 2004; Hulme & Murphree, 2001). The government, through the Uganda Wildlife Authority and in collaboration with civil society organisations, private hunting companies and the local communities around different protected areas, signed various agreements to implement it. The involvement of these actors implies adopting new management strategies that are collaborative in nature.

Guided by institutional theory, in particular discursive institutionalism, regime theory and governance literature, I conceptualise the Ugandan sport hunting policy in this thesis as an arrangement built on (inter)national institutions and discursive processes, but implemented at local levels, with both local and wider implications for development and wildlife conservation. I will deploy the policy arrangement approach (Arts et al., 2006; Arts & Tatenhove, 2004; Van der Zouwen, 2006) and the governance capacity approach (Arts & Goverde, 2006; Arts, 2001; Dang et al., 2015), together with the concepts of congruence (Arts & Goverde, 2006; Boonstra, 2006) and effectiveness (Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2011; Levy & Young, 1994; Mitchell, 2003) as a conceptual framework to analyse the Ugandan sport hunting policy implementation. I will use this same framework to analyse the impacts of this sport hunting policy, as well as the stakeholders' perceptions of it, and its impacts at both national and local levels. This conceptual framework will be explicated in Chapter 2.

Our knowledge of how these sport hunting policy arrangements in Africa, and in particular Uganda, have developed and evolved is limited, as is our knowledge of how national and local processes shape this evolution. Following the policy arrangement approach, the aim of this thesis is therefore to understand the relations between and among the policy arrangement dimensions (discourses, actors, rules and resources) of the sport hunting arrangement in Uganda, and how these relations influence policy stability or change as well as the policy's

effectiveness. This study addresses this puzzle by analysing how Uganda's sport hunting policy was developed and implemented, and how it evolved over the years. This, in turn, requires an analysis of the processes that influence actors' relations at the national and the local level, and how these national and local discourses and processes shaped the policy evolution.

With this analysis I will also contribute to the four debates introduced in section 1.4, especially by showing, analysing and discussing the ecological, social and economic impacts of sport hunting, including the extent to which poaching is reduced and the perceptions of local communities towards wildlife have changed, and how the income is used to provide social services and support social development projects around Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKTGMA).

1.7. Research objective and questions

To address the issues and knowledge gaps identified above, this thesis is aimed at analysing the sport hunting policy arrangements around Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKGMA). The main objective of this research is therefore:

> *To analyse the development and implementation of the sport hunting policy arrangements in Uganda and their implications for conservation and development.*

In order to operationalise the objective of this thesis, the following research questions were formulated:

1. How was the sport hunting policy reintroduced and implemented in Uganda?
2. How did the sport hunting policy arrangements around Lake Mburo National Park and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area evolve over time and what have been the driving forces for this change?
3. What are the impacts of the sport hunting policy around Lake Mburo National Park and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area in terms of enhancing development, reducing poaching and changing residents' attitudes towards wildlife?

1.8. Study sites and methods

1.8.1. Study sites

This research was conducted based on a comparative case-study approach (Yin, 2003; Stake, 2008; Miles et al., 2014). A comparative case-study approach is particularly suited to analysing

commonalities and differences across study sites (Miles et al., 2014; Sheridan et al., 2014). It is used in this study to integrate diverse sources of information to build a deep understanding of the two sport hunting policy arrangements. The two case studies compared in this thesis are situated in Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management (KKTGMA) (see Figure 1.1).



Figure 1.1: Location of the two case studies

These case studies were chosen based on the fact that the government first introduced the 'new' sport hunting policy around LMNP in 2001 and later extended it to KKTGMA in 2006. Both areas have for a long time experienced human-wildlife conflicts. Nonetheless, the two areas are different: the LMNP is a national park but hunting is conducted on private-owned land around the national park and KKTGMA comprises both a formal game reserve and community-owned land. The areas are therefore well suited to compare the sport hunting arrangements and their impacts. I briefly describe the two sites below.

Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP)

Lake Mburo National Park lies in the southern savannah rangeland in Uganda: a wildlife migratory route from northern Tanzania to southern Sudan. The park is at about 1,210 meters above sea level, with local relief of 30-400 meters, and experiences a semi-arid savannah climate – with the minimum annual rainfall ranging from 400 mm in the south-east to 700 mm in the west. The mean maximum temperature is approximately 27.5^{o}C and the mean minimum is 15^{o}C. Relative humidity is rather high, averaging between 61-84 per cent (noon and midnight respectively) (Kamugisha et al., 1997). The Bahima (nomadic pastoralists and subsistence farmers) and a few other tribes, such as the Bakiga and Baganda (Emerton, 1999) used to inhabit most of this area. By the early 1900s, the area was infested with rinderpest, killing large numbers of cattle and forcing some nomads to migrate (Kamugisha et al., 1997).

The (temporary) absence of pastoralists meant an increase in wildlife numbers, which eventually attracted local hunters (who were later referred to as poachers) from the neighbouring communities (from central and south-western Uganda). The large influx of (illegal) hunters forced the government to introduce restrictions on hunting. First, the government declared the 650 km^2 area a strictly controlled hunting area (CHA) in 1958, and two years later a game reserve (Lake Mburo Game Reserve – LMGR), managed by the Game Department (GD), before eventually declaring it a national park in 1982. This declaration resulted in the mass eviction of (illegal) occupants (especially pastoralists and some local hunters who had temporarily settled in the park area) without compensation (Emerton, 1999). However, in 1987, the government instituted the Kanyanyeru Resettlement Scheme (KRS), that allocated over 8,000 ha of park land to 700 families (Ochieng, 2011), thus reducing the park area by about 60% (Emerton, 1999; Kagoro-Rugunda, 2004; Kamugisha, et al., 1997). Today, LMNP measures only 260 km^2. In the meantime, wildlife continued to roam outside the park boundaries – on the land now owned by individual local residents – which perpetuated human-wildlife conflicts. Sport hunting was (re)introduced as a solution.

Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Areas (KKTGMA)

Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Areas (KKTGMA) lies in the great Albertine Rift: the western branch of the East African Rift that runs through western Uganda and through parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. This area was declared a controlled hunting area (CHA) in 1963, covering a total area of 194 km^2

(Plumptre et al., 2009). In the 1990s, the government decided to split it into Kabwoya Wildlife Reserve (KWR, a government controlled reserve situated on the western side) and Kaiso-Tonya Community Wildlife Area (KTCWA, a community-owned wildlife area situated on the eastern side (see Figure 1.1). It is currently co-managed by the Uganda Wildlife Authority and the local communities (UWP, 1999; 2004). As was the case around LMNP, an increasing number of people moved into KKTGMA, especially following invasions by nomadic pastoralists, settlers and (illegal) hunters. The Hoima district local government development plan 2015/2016–2019/2020 indicates that the district population was at 573,903 people by 2014, with an annual growth rate of 4.2 per cent and over 90 per cent living in rural areas (Hoima district development plan, 2015). Sport hunting was introduced in KKTGMA in 2006 following a signed concession agreement between the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), a private sport hunting company (Lake Albert Safaris Limited), the local government, and the local communities.

1.8.2. Research methods

In this section, I briefly describe the methodological approaches used in this thesis. More details on the approaches used are presented in the methods sections of the empirical chapters (3-5). Fieldwork was done at both the national and the local level. Specifically, data collection for Chapter 3 was done at the national level, with examples from around LMNP used for the analysis. Fieldwork for Chapters 4 and 5 was done at both the national and local level. For LMNP, fieldwork covered four sub-counties (Kanyaryeru, Nyakashashara, Sanga and Sanga Town Board (Kiruhura district), and for KKTGMA three sub-counties (Kabwoya, Buseruka, Kyangwali (Hoima district). The empirical chapters (3-5) focus on the development and implementation of sport hunting in the context of Uganda and show the social, ecological (in terms of reducing poaching) and economic impacts of hunting. These chapters furthermore describe how the different stakeholders in Uganda perceive these impacts, and also how these perceptions influence the continued policy implementation at the local level.

Three methods of data collection were used in this thesis: literature and document review, qualitative in-depth interviews and non-participant observation. To analyse these various data, I used methods for validation (Kumar, 2012) and triangulation (Jennings, 2001). The use of a triangulation approach enabled an understanding of the different aspects of the empirical reality (Jennings, 2001) about sport hunting in its context-specific settings (Hoepfl, 1997), thus

respecting and staying close to the empirical domain of what was being researched. Different studies have affirmed the importance of combining different methods to collect and validate data on complex topics (see Ayana, 2014; Bose, 2012; Ochieng, 2017; Somorin, 2014). Below, I discuss the methods of data collection and analysis used.

In-depth qualitative interviews

Given the nature of the debates on sport hunting, it was inevitable to execute in-depth interviews to gain an understanding of the different perspectives. An in-depth qualitative interview approach was chosen because it allows the use of open-ended questions, it is discovery-oriented, and allows the interviewer to deeply explore the respondent's feelings and perspectives on a subject (Guion et al., 2001). The interviews resulted in rich background information about sport hunting in Uganda.

Interview participants were selected through judgemental (Kumar, 2012) and snowball sampling (Jennings, 2001) and were asked predesigned semi-structured interview questions (Piboonrungroj & Sorèze, 2009). During interviews, I asked questions and let the interviewees talk and express their opinions about sport hunting's implementation, expected benefits and challenges, its rules, impacts of the policy, and changes in the arrangements over time and the reasons for these changes. Table 1.1 shows the categories of respondents interviewed for each empirical chapter. A total of 99 interviewees were contacted and interviewed: 65 of these were interviewed once, while 34 were interviewed more than once. In total, 121 interviews[4] were conducted between 2013-2017. The majority of interviews were audio-recorded and later transcribed. Interviews were conducted in respondents' homes and offices or restaurants, lasting 20-90 minutes. Three of the respondents agreed to be interviewed but declined to be recorded. Also, a total of 45 informal conversations took place with various officials; these were not recorded, only notes were taken. Data from the different sources, namely literature and document review, qualitative in-depth interviews and non-participant observation, were systematically analysed. Specifically, I coded and categorised respondents' responses based on

[4] The total number of interviews mentioned here does not mean that 121 interviewees were contacted and interviewed. Since the interviews for the different chapters were collected at different times, it meant that some respondents were interviewed more than once. For example, the representatives of the two sport hunting companies were each interviewed for Chapters 4 and 5, and one of the representatives of Game trails (U) was interviewed for chapters 3-5.

the language used, to reveal similarities and discrepancies in views. These views were then interpreted and compared according to the theoretical concepts described in Chapter 2.

Key informants for the national level interview included representatives of organisations such as the Uganda Wildlife Authority (headquarters), the Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Heritage (MTWH), Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) office, the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), Nature Uganda (NU), World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF), Fauna and Flora International (FFI), and representatives of tourism associations such as Uganda Tourism Association (UTA) and Uganda Safari Guides Association (USAGA).

At the local level, the main interviewees were the district local government and sub-county officials, local residents who own and use land around LMNP and KKTGMA where hunting takes place. Others included people who are locally involved in conservation activities and development practitioners, representatives of the organisations mentioned in the above, community wildlife associations (CWAs) representatives and the private sector such as the sport hunting companies.

Table 1.1: Category of research respondents

Empirical chapter	**Category of research respondents and number of interviews**							
	Government: UWA Headquarters, Lake Mburo, Kabwoya	Conservation NGOs	Sport hunting companies	District/sub-county leaders	Tourism associations	Village leaders/ local communities	Expert	**Total**
Chapter 3	6	4	1		4			15
Chapter 4	19	6	3	4	1	26		59
Chapter 5	6	1	2	4	2	31	1	47
Total	**31**	**11**	**6**	**8**	**7**	**57**	**1**	**121**

Literature and document review

An extensive review of relevant peer-reviewed and grey literature and analysis of relevant documents was done to understand how and why sport hunting policy has been reintroduced and implemented. The documents reviewed included the professional hunting agreements, the internal (UWA, 2002) and the external (Muhimbura & Namara, 2009) sport hunting evaluation

reports, Uganda Wildlife Act 2000 and the Community Conservation Policy 2004. Other documents were for instance the Uganda Vision 2020 and 2040, The Uganda Wildlife Authority general management plan 2017-2018, Lake Mburo conservation area general management plan, Uganda Wildlife Policy 2004 etc., minutes of meetings, animal census data, records of hunted animals, revenue generated and number of arrested poachers. This helped in gaining an understanding of details of the sport hunting policy arrangement, including the formal policy goals. Subsequently, I was able to develop criteria and indicators for assessing the impacts of sport hunting policy arrangements around LMNP and KKTGMA (see Table 5.1, Chapter 5). To research the impacts of the national level sport hunting policy arrangements around LMNP and KKTGMA, I used the available quantitative data on animal census statistics, poaching seizure statistics, hunted animals, and generated revenue and distribution over the years. However, data on the number of wildlife species in the two areas, number of hunted animals over the years, number of arrested poachers or number of poached animals, amount of sport hunting revenue generated and distributed over the years were difficult to access. For this reason, I was unable to access data on the number of arrested poachers in KKTGMA. This was largely due to incapacity to collect and store credible data (see OAG, 2011). Moreover, no feedback mechanisms which translate local experiences in national polices are in place. As noted by Boonman-Berson et al. (2014), authentic data needs to be readily available, universally valid and/or accessible and unquestionable (see also Porter, 1995; Hinchliffe, 2007).

Non-participant observation

Non-participant observation during fieldwork is increasingly applied in qualitative research (Myers, 1997). Its validity stems from the fact that it allows the researcher to collect data while actively observing field occurrences (Myers, 1997). This method is well enhanced by photography. Through field visits and observation, I was able to visit, take photographs and assess the state of the projects financed with the sport hunting revenues. Critical scholars argue that (non-) participant observation can be associated with 'observer bias' and 'selective observation and interpretations' (Jennings, 2001). In this study, this issue was addressed by also using other data-collection methods, namely qualitative in-depth interviews, and literature and document reviews.

1.9. Outline of the thesis

This thesis is comprised of six chapters. The three empirical chapters each address one of the three research questions highlighted in section 1.7 of this chapter. Two of the empirical chapters have been published as a book chapter and article in a peer-reviewed journal, and one of these has been submitted to a peer-reviewed journal.

Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical and conceptual framework underpinning this research. It reflects on the different theories and concepts used to analyse the development and implementation of sport hunting policy arrangements in Uganda.

Chapter 3 answers research question 1 by analysing the development and implementation of sport hunting at the national level using examples from around Lake Mburo National Park. It highlights the different actors' involved, legal framework and the views of the national actors about sport hunting in Uganda.

Chapter 4 studies the evolution of the sport hunting policy arrangements and the factors that explain this evolution around Lake Mburo National Park and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area, and thereby addresses research question 2.

Chapter 5 answers research question 3 by focusing on the impacts of the sport hunting policy arrangements around Lake Mburo National Park and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area, how these impacts are perceived by the different actors, and how these impacts influence the continued sport hunting implementation in Uganda.

Finally, Chapter 6 presents the conclusions of this PhD-research and discusses the major findings on the development and implementation of sport hunting in Uganda. This chapter ends with suggestions for future research and several policy recommendations.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

In order to address the three research questions highlighted in Chapter 1, this Chapter 2 and this thesis overall is embedded in the governance literature, institutional theory, especially discursive institutionalism (DI), and regime theory. In the next section of this chapter, I will introduce these three bodies of literature as a theoretical foundation. Based on this, I will then introduce the Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA) and its dimensions, and the concept of governance capacity (GC, with a focus on the concepts of congruence and effectiveness) as a conceptual framework. Finally, I will discuss how this conceptual framework was operationalised in the context of Uganda's sport hunting policy arrangements.

2.2. Theoretical framework

2.2.1. Governance

Governance has become a 'growth industry' (Dang et al., 2015; Jordan et al., 2005; Van Kersbergen & van Waarden, 2004; Visseren-Hamakers, 2015). It has become popular across various disciplines and sectors, such as political science (policy study), international relations, public administration, development studies, natural resource management, water, forestry, conservation and tourism (see Agrawal, 2003; Arts, 2014; Arts, 2003; Arts & Goverde, 2006; Arnouts et al., 2012; Berkes, 2004; Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; Hufty, 2007; Lamers et al., 2014; Nelson et al., 2013; Nthiga, 2014; Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Somorin, 2014; Stocker, 1998; Tenbensel, 2005; Van Kersbergen & van Waarden, 2004; Visseren-Hamakers, 2015). According to Van Kersbergen & van Waarden, the concept of governance can function as a 'bridge between these disciplines' (Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004). Common among these disciplines is the focus on the increasing involvement of non-state actors in managing society, the ongoing complexity and changing nature of society, and the emergence of new tools and techniques employed to govern society (Somorin, 2014; Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004) and to address societal challenges, including environmental issues. The increasing involvement of non-state actors in managing and addressing societal challenges has been referred to by others (e.g. Rosenau, 1992; Rhodes, 1996; 1997; Stoker, 1998) as 'a shift from government to governance'. Moreover, these scholars think the government is gradually losing its sovereign role in governing society (Baccaro & Mele, 2009; Bell & Hindmoor, 2009).

However, among these disciplines there is a general lack of consensus on the definition and interpretation of governance (Arts, 2014; Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004; Visseren-

Hamakers, 2015; 2018). Despite this lack of consensus, Stoker (1998:17) states that governance can be defined as 'creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action', which is expected to lead to the achievement of certain policy goals. Thus, governance is considered as an 'object' or a 'social fact' (Hufty, 2007), that is considered to guide the interactions and relations between societal agents, social processes and nodal points (i.e. observation areas, in space or virtual terms) in a governance process (Hufty, 2007). In order to ensure effective governance processes and to achieve environmental goals, there is increasing demand for flexibility among governments by adopting new management styles (Arts & Goverde, 2006) that facilitate multi-stakeholder participation (Visseren-Hamakers, 2015), previously deemed to be lacking in the state-controlled systems (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009; Lockwood, 2010). From the foregoing, according to some authors a governance process is characterised by: an increased role for non-state agents in policy-making, increased decentralised decision-making authority, and an emergence of new tools and techniques to steer and guide society (Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Rhodes, 1997; Somorin, 2014; Stoker, 1998).

Generally, governance looks at the role of different actors in making and implementing rules in a discursive process, and how these rules become institutionalised to guide, enable and/or constrain the behaviour of actors in a governance arrangement. Certainly, the concept of governance is broader than the concepts of institutions or regimes (see the next section). According to Schneider & Bauer (2007:10), 'governance decomposes and deconstructs the institutional fabric and self-organization of modern societies into constellations of actors and rule regimes'. Similarly, Mayntz (2004) observes that governance is a hallmark of an institutional approach dealing with regulatory structures combining public and private, hierarchical and network forms of action coordination. Thus, the concept of governance encompasses the other concepts that guide this study, namely institutionalism and regimes (see below). Moreover, regimes or institutions can also be viewed as governance instruments to govern society and to address societal challenges whether at (inter)national levels or at local level (cf. Visseren-Hamakers, 2018).

2.1.2. Institutionalism, regimes and environmental governance

Institutional theory or *old institutionalism (OI)* is an approach that studies politics by focusing on the formal institutions of government (Rhodes, 2011). However, new or neo-institutionalist theory, which emerged as a critique to OI, is equally used in political science studies to offer

explanations for the existence of political institutions (i.e. the system of politics and government) and how they affect society (Schmidt, 2010). Thus, both OI and neo-institutionalist theory (NI) highlight 'the role of rule structures in determining individual behaviour and the outcome of social processes' (Somorin, 2014:19; see also Arts & Buizer, 2009). Nevertheless, NI is more concerned with societal actors acting and interacting within larger institutional frameworks (cf. Somorin, 2014; Van Wijk et al., 2011). Neo-institutionalism also includes a focus on rules in use instead of rules on paper (as is the case in OI), and a focus on informal rules (including private and community rules) (cf. Samuels, 1990; Rutherford, 2001). Neo-institutionalist scholars are divided into three groups: rational institutionalists (RI), historical institutionalists (HI), and sociological institutionalists (SI) (Schmidt, 2008; 2010), which explain political institutions differently. RI posit that rational agents use institutions to pursue logically calculated political preferences. HI posit that the development of political institutions follows a logical path, which is regularised and routinized by the practices of political agents. SI posit that social agents, who make 'logically appropriate choices', act within the confines of socially constituted and culturally framed rules and norms (Schmidt, 2010). SI thus defines institutions as 'organized patterns of socially constructed norms and roles, and socially prescribed behaviours of occupants of those roles, which are created and re-created over time' (Goodine, 1998:19; see also Van Wijk et al., 2011).

Because these three traditional perspectives view institutions as 'given, static and constraining' in nature (Schmidt, 2010), an alternative, fourth perspective of neo-institutionalism, emerged, namely discursive institutionalism (DI) (Arts & Buizer, 2009; Schmidt, 2008; 2010). As such, DI emerged to provide an alternative approach to conceptualise (political) institutions as opposed to the older three institutional traditions (Schmidt, 2008; 2010). DI's notion is that ideas and discourses are central elements in conceptualising, analysing and explaining institutional change. DI scholars study how new ideas and discourses become institutionalised into rules that enable, guide and constrain actors' behaviour in society. Therefore, DI is preoccupied with understanding the role of ideas and discourses in explaining politics, policy-making and institutional change (Ochieng, 2017; Schmidt, 2008), with institutional change referring to a scenario where an 'institution may lose parts of its constituency and become contested' (Van Wijk et al., 2011:6). This change is viewed as emerging from within the institutional structures itself, and not externally as assumed by the older three traditions

(Schmidt, 2002; 2010). Thus, DI aims to '…know about institutions and what makes them continue to change in regards to interests and norms' over time (Schmidt, 2008:313).

The concept of institutions, on the other hand, is used to study rules at all levels of governance, so from local to (inter-)national levels (Ochieng, 2017; Schmidt, 2008). Although there is no commonly agreed definition, institutions are synonymous to rules of the game (Ostrom et al., 1994; Schmidt, 2008). However, rules have been given varying interpretations based on the old and new institutionalist perspectives of institutions, namely: the rules of the game in a society (Glaeser et al., 2004; Ostrom, 1990), rules in use (Ostrom et al., 1994; Cleaver, 2000), formal and informal rules, regulations and conventions that enable, guide and constrain human behaviour (North, 1990), sites where production, authority and obligation are contested and negotiated (Berry, 1989), and an interplay of knowledge and power (Mehta et al., 1999). As discussed under the rules section of the PAA dimensions (see section 2.3), institutions serve mainly to enable, guide and constrain (e.g. by incentives that structure, shape and frame) action of societal agents (Schmidt, 2008).

Closely related to institutionalism is regime theory (Haggard & Simmons, 1987), which can be considered as a specialised part of institutional theory. The literatures on regimes and institutions recognise the commonality between the two concepts (see Giddens, 1984; Scott, 2001) as both – in a nutshell – denote sets of (in)formal rules and norms (Arts & Buizer, 2009; Visseren-Hamakers, 2018; Wiering & Arts, 2006). New-institutionalist or neo-institutionalist scholars (e.g. Arts & Buizer, 2009; Schmidt, 2008; 2010) conceptualise institutions or regimes as societal instruments that shape, guide and constrain human action and agency (Arts, 2006; Ochieng, 2017; Scott, 2001). Although regimes and institutions are thought to be synonymous, the two concepts are usually used at different levels of governance (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018), with the concept of regimes usually referring to institutions at the international level.

Regimes thus have been defined as 'implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures...' (Krasner, 1982:185) at the international level. Regimes theory originates from International Relations (IR) studies (see Puchala & Hopkins, 1982). The main preoccupation of regime theorists is to 'conceptualise and explain the formation, persistence and transformation of international institutions' (Ochieng, 2017:7), what ideas and discourses form institutions through which agents communicate, deliberate and persuade one another in

order to reach desired institutional outcomes. The literature on regimes has evolved from studying regime design and development to effectiveness, and institutional interaction, often with a focus on global environmental challenges (Visseren-Hamakers, 2013). With the emergence of new institutional approaches such as DI, the difference between institutionalism (including regimes) and governance is getting smaller – with a growing roles of non-state actors in addressing environmental issues (see Visseren-Hamakers, 2013).

2.3. Conceptual framework: Discursive institutionalism and the Policy Arrangement Approach

Against the backdrop of these three (related) bodies of knowledge I now will present the conceptual framework used to analyse Uganda's sport hunting policy.

As highlighted in the previous section, DI emerged to provide an alternative approach to conceptualise institutions, aiming to understand how (new) discourses become institutionalised into rules that guide, enable and constrain actors' behaviour in society. To comprehensively conceptualise and analyse institutions and institutional change, and to be able to better explain the causes of the institutional changes that DI hints at, I adopt the Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA) (Arts et al., 2006). The PAA offers further opportunities to conceptualise and analyse how multiple actors relate to each other within an institutional environment.

The PAA has been widely applied in the social sciences, and especially within the European Union (EU). The book '*Political Modernization and the Environment*' by Van Tatenhove et al. (2000b; also see Leroy & Van Tatenhove, 2000) marked the beginning of the wide application of the PAA as an analytical tool in policy studies (Arts et al., 2006; Van der Zouwen, 2006). It is now increasingly used within Southern and Eastern Africa (see e.g. Ahebwa et al., 2012ab; Ayorekire et al., 2011; Lamers et al., 2014; Majale-Liyala, 2013; Nthiga, 2014; Nthiga et al., 2015; Ochieng, 2011; Ochieng, 2017; Ochieng et al., 2013; 2015; Van der Duim et al., 2011), and also Asia (see Dang et al., 2015) and South America (see Ochieng et al., 2013; 2015). A policy arrangement is defined as '…the temporary stabilization of the content and organization of a policy domain' (Arts et al., 2006: 96), and incorporates four dimensions, namely discourses, actors, rules and resources. The temporary stabilisation is assumed because the arrangement is under constant pressure to change to accommodate (new) actors, rules, discourses and resources, or to (re)strategize to achieve policy goals (Arts & Buizer, 2009; Arts

& Tatenhove, 2004; Van Gussom et al., 2011; Van der Zouwen, 2006). Van der Zouwen (2006) points out that some of the new discourses, actors, rules and resources that find their way into an already existing policy arrangement may cause change within it. She further notes that these changes may result into 'patterns', where rules become stable or certain actions become routines, in other words, become institutionalised. It is important to note that the PAA dimensions (as discussed below) are intrinsically interwoven, with a change in any one dimension inducing changes in the others (Ahebwa, 2012a; Lamers et al., 2014; Liefferink, 2006).

2.3.1. Discourses

In this thesis, discourses are defined as 'narratives, sets of ideas, beliefs, concepts and story lines used to give meaning to a phenomenon in a real setting, produced and reproduced through sets of practices' (Hajer, 1995: 60). Discourses are the substantive aspects of a policy domain (Wiering & Arts, 2006), and shape the way one views the world and the realities within it (Potter, 2003), and also influence the way these realities are debated and/or contested by stakeholders (Hajer, 1995; Hajer, 2003; Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Wiering & Arts, 2006). Policy arrangements – as assumed – 'contain' at least two discourses that differ and/or may compete (Arts & Buizer, 2009). The 'difference and competition causes actors to group together in coalitions to enhance certain discourses and constrain others' (Arts & Buizer, 2009:343). Moreover, discourses do not necessarily remain stable over time; they are fluid. They change relative to the context, participants, rules, resources et cetera (Hajer, 1995). It is only when a discourse maintains its 'sameness' (coherence) that we can state that its '(routine) practices' have the capacity to produce and reproduce themselves within a specific context (Hajer, 1995). Thus, when new discourses become institutionalised into rules (another dimension of the PAA, see section 2.3.3 for explanation on rules) (Schmidt, 2008), such 'discourses may undermine or reinforce existing institutions, thereby causing institutional change or stagnation' (Ochieng (2017:9). However, discourses may not be 'easily' distinguishable. As such, discourse(s) are ('better') distinguished by analysts, since they may not be obvious to participants in any policy domain (Hajer, 2005; Hajer, 2006; Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). Overall, the analysis of discourses in this thesis helps to understand the changing ideas about sport hunting, and how these (may) influence its future development and implementation.

2.3.2. Actors

Actors refer to individuals and organisations that are involved in a particular policy domain (Arts & Leroy 2006; Buizer, 2008; Leroy & Arts, 2006; Van der Zouwen, 2006; Wiering & Arts, 2006). Policy actors make policy decisions, resolve trade-offs, and provide a vision and direction (Van Gossum et al., 2011; Lebel et al., 2006; Boyle et al., 2001). The relations and interactions between actors in a policy arrangement provide key factors for the success of the arrangement (Van Gossum et al., 2011). These relations may be based on trust, information exchange et cetera (Van Gossum et al., 2011). Policy actors can be analysed based on 'actor constellations', 'interaction patterns' and 'coalitions and oppositions' (Buizer, 2008; Wiering & Arts, 2006). Actor coalitions are usually informed by particular beliefs or narratives, and aimed at achieving particular shared objective(s), 'by allocating resources in a specific way, agreeing upon certain rules of the game or by employing specific storylines or other discursive notions in such a way as to further their objectives' (Buizer, 2008:25). However, whether or not actors will support or oppose each other will largely depend on the set objectives (or actors' interpretation of these objectives), rules in place and/or individual, and/or institutional preferences (Buizer, 2008). As such, it is important to analyse discourse coalitions to better understand how these coalitions affect the implementation of policy arrangements.

2.3.3. Rules of the game

Rules as used in the PAA refer to institutional and regime theory elaborated in the previous section. Rules define or shape (or influence) how issues are framed, agendas are set and communicated, how policies are formulated and decisions are made. Rules may be formal or informal in nature. Formal rules refer to legislation, agreements, and procedures (Giddens, 1984; Wiering & Arts, 2006) shaping the domain of the policy arrangement. Legislation refers to 'formalisation and transposition of policy discourses into binding laws' (Wiering & Arts, 2006: 329). Procedures refer to organisational aspects of rules (Wiering & Arts, 2006; also see Giddens, 1984), and also guide the allocation of resources and division of authority and competencies (Arts & Buizer 2009). Procedural rules are usually enforced by state authorities and may involve prosecution and legal sanctions. Informal rules refer to norms and political culture (Arts & Buizer, 2009; Wiering & Arts, 2006), and are usually enforced by social exclusion or other related forms, such as stigmatisation, blacklisting and boycotts (Van Wijk et al., 2011). The acceptance of rules by actors helps in measuring coherence between formal and informal rules (Van Gossum et al., 2011). Although rules have been given varying

interpretations (see section 2.3), following North (1990) I consider rules of the game/institutions as formal and informal regulations, legislation, agreements and conventions that enable, guide, shape and/or constraint human interactions (Glaeser et al., 2004; Mehta et al, 1999; North, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994) to facilitate collective action and outcomes (Mehta et al, 1999; North, 1990).

2.3.4. Resources

Resources are assets that are owned or can be mobilised by policy actors, and include authority, knowledge, finances, land, technology and legitimacy (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2004; Buizer, 2008; Van Tatenhove et al., 2010; Wiering & Arts, 2006). Resource distribution is crucial in policy formation as it determines who has the (political) power to exert influence (Schmidt, 2010; Wiering & Arts, 2006), and the ability of actors to form (discourse) coalitions. These coalitions usually mobilise resources or assets through interactions or relations in order to achieve certain outcomes in social systems (Arts & Buizer, 2009; Kuindersma et al., 2012), either through deliberations or (sometimes) through manipulation. Hence, resources are 'intrinsically linked to the concept of power' (Arts & van Tatenhove, 2004: 343). The actor coalition that is capable of mobilising (more) assets is more likely to achieve or influence outcomes (Schmidt, 2010). These outcomes can eventually result in unequal power relations between the reigning coalition and the opposition (Wiering & Arts, 2006). Power itself is a social construct and resonates around issues of access to, control over, exercise of, and use of (natural) resources (Raik et al., 2008).

2.4. The concept of governance capacity

To enhance the application of PAA and its dimensions, this thesis also adopts the concept of governance capacity (Arts & Goverde, 2006; Dang et al., 2015) to analyse and explain the capacity of a policy arrangement to achieve its goals. Governance capacity can be defined as the 'ability of societal actors to work together in order to solve collective problems' (Dang et al., 2015:1155).

Dang et al. (2015) propose a framework for analysing governance capacity. The approach has so far been successfully applied in studying Vietnam's forestry reforms (see Dang et al., 2015), by paying close attention to both the indicative and performative capacity of a governance arrangement (Arts & Goverde, 2006), and also in water management in the Netherlands (Koop

et al., 2017; Koop & van Leeuwen, 2017). Whereas indicative governance capacity (IGC) is defined as 'the extent to which new forms of governance have the potential to solve societal or administrative problems that are legitimately recognized by the stakeholders', performative governance capacity (PGC) is defined as 'the performance of the (new) modes of governance in those practices that are meant to solve these societal or administrative problems' (Arts & Goverde, 2006:75-76).

Indicative governance capacity

In order to analyse indicative governance capacity, the conceptual framework deploys the PAA and its dimensions together with the concept of congruence (Arts & Goverde, 2006; Boonstra, 2006). Congruence refers to the extent to which different policies or policy dimensions, organisations and individuals aim for the same objectives (Lundin, 2007). Thus, congruence is part of the thinking of the PAA. In this thesis, the concept of congruence is used to explain the (in)consistencies in the policy dimensions, and how this causes changes in a policy arrangement over time.

Congruence is comprised of strategic, structural-internal and structural-external congruence (Arts & Goverde, 2006; Boonstra, 2006). First, *strategic congruence* refers to the extent to which policy actors share policy discourses and common interests when deploying their strategic actions (Arts & Goverde, 2006). Second, *structural-internal congruence* is the extent to which the four dimensions of a policy arrangement 'match' to achieve the 'agreed upon' goals (Arts & Goverde, 2006). This might include backing up certain policy goals with adequate resources and/or appropriate rules. Third, *structural-external congruence* is the extent to which an arrangement potentially works along with other arrangements to achieve its own and wider societal goals (Arts & Goverde, 2006). Sufficient congruence in the three types thus means: '1) coherence in the policy views of the actors, 2) coherence in the four dimensions of the policy arrangement, and 3) coherence in the policy arrangement and its wider institutional context' (Arts & Goverder, 2006: 80). As proposed by Arts & Goverde (2006: 80), 'a certain level of congruence – strategic and structurally, internally as well as externally – is needed for a policy arrangement to perform. A failure to realise this certain level of congruence will imply a possible governance failure'.

Performative governance capacity

In order to analyse performative governance capacity, the conceptual framework includes the concept of effectiveness (Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2011; Mitchell, 2003). The concept of effectiveness has been defined, discussed and operationalised in various literatures, including literature on regimes (Mitchell, 2003), and in particular international environmental regimes (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018; see also section 2.2, this chapter); institutions (Giddens, 1984); and policy evaluation (Arts & Leroy, 2006; Visseren-Hamakers, 2018).

Policy evaluation literature is inspired by several traditions, namely, rational-instrumental ex-post and ex-ante evaluation (Arts & Leroy, 2006) and interpretative policy analysis (Arts, 2012; Arts & Babili, 2013; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Wagenaar, 2011; Yanow, 1999). The former asks the evaluator to identify particular variables (goals) of the policy. The policy evaluator then uses these variables to analyse the impacts of a particular policy arrangement. Hence, the evaluator concludes whether or not the goal is achieved as an intended consequence of the concerned policy intervention or not (Arts & Goverde, 2006). However, because evaluation of policy success differs among actors (Arts & Goverde, 2006), it is advisable that certain criteria for evaluation are developed in relation to the stakeholders' different perceptions (or storylines) of the problems (Arts & Goverde, 2006). The latter tradition (interpretative policy analysis and evaluation) fills this gap. Interpretative policy analysis scholars (e.g., Fischer & Forester, 1993; Myers, 1997; Yanow, 1999), consider policies as 'systems of meaning that constitute multi-interpretable realities of problems, solutions and evaluations' (Arts & Babili, 2013:112). Thus, policies are re-negotiated and reshaped ''on the ground', and evaluation is a performative act (Arts & Babili, 2013: 120). Therefore, policy 'successes or failures' are neither considered as 'given' nor 'discovered', but actively performed by the evaluator(s) based on their theoretical lens (Arts & Babili, 2013; Mosse, 2005, Van Assche et al., 2011). Thus, the two traditions (i.e. rational-instrumental and interpretative policy analysis), as used in this thesis, are expected to overcome the shortcomings and the assumptions associated with rational-instrumental approaches (Arts & Goverde, 2006).

2.5. A framework for analysing the development and implementation of sport hunting policy arrangements and their impacts

In chapter 1 I showed how sport hunting and conservation governance have evolved over the years: from customary norms to formal legislations that institutionalised 'fortress

conservation', to community-based conservation (CBC), and now market-based conservation (MBC). The new sport hunting analysed in the empirical Chapters 3-5 is implemented applying both CBC and MBC approaches. The text below provides a summary of how I conceptualised Uganda's national sport hunting policy, transposed and implemented as local level sport hunting policy arrangements around LMNP and KKTGMA, using the PAA and the concept of governance capacity. I operationalised the concept of governance capacity by using the concepts of congruence (to analyse indicative governance capacity) and effectiveness (to analyse performative governance capacity).

With this, the thesis is firmly positioned in the regime, institutional and governance literatures, and DI more specifically. Together, these theories and concepts enabled the analysis and evaluation of the development and implementation of the sport hunting policy arrangements, explaining their evolution over the years and evaluating their impacts. The analysis was based on the argument that a low indicative and/or performative governance capacity might cause changes in an arrangement, in terms of deployment of (new) actors, rules of the game, resources and/or discourses. Such an evolution of a policy arrangement could over time lead to the realisation of the policy goals (see Figure 2.1).



Figure 2.1: A framework for analysing the development and implementation of sport hunting policy arrangements and their impacts

Following Figure 2.1, I situate the development and implementation of the national sport hunting policy in the left box. This is where Chapter 3 (which is the first empirical chapter) is situated. In this chapter I broadly analyse the introduced hunting policy at the national level and draw examples from around LMNP. The analysis is only loosely inspired by the Policy Arrangement Approach and its dimensions. Contrary to Chapter 4, where I will, following the PAA, conceptualise and analyse the national sport hunting policy as a multi-actor arrangement implemented at the local level (and encompassing the interwoven policy discourses, rules, actors and resources).

Chapter 4 then focuses on the left and the middle boxes including arrow 1 that joins the left and middle boxes in the framework, by analysing the development and implementation of two local sport hunting policy arrangements, that is, the translation of the national policy to the local context around LMNP and KKTGMA. It concentrates on the indicative governance capacity of these two policy arrangements including how the national policy has shaped the

local policy arrangements. Thus, in Chapter 4, I analyse and explain the potential of the policy to achieve its goals by using the Policy Arrangement Approach together with the concept of congruence to provide a better understanding of the causes of the temporary stability and/or change experienced in the arrangements over the years. Here I will focus on the internal congruence as well as on how it affects and/or is affected by the institutional context. This is represented by arrow 4, which joins the middle box to the feedback loop arrow 3. External congruence (represented by arrow 5, which joins the middle box to the wider institutional context) will only briefly be dealt with in the three empirical chapters and the concluding chapter, and is therefore not explicitly included in the research questions. This study is not the first to analyse only the internal dynamics of a policy arrangement dimensions, Arts & Buizer (2009) also analysed only the internal dynamics of global forest policy arrangement. The other external aspects were considered as part of political modernization (Arts & Buizer, 2009).

Chapter 5 is situated in the right box and includes a discussion of arrow 2 (joining the middle and right boxes) so as to understand how, and the extent to which, congruence influences performance. The focus in this chapter is on the analysis of the performative governance capacity of the sport hunting policy arrangements and to understand how congruence (or the lack of it) influences the performance of the arrangements. I specifically analyse the social and economic impacts of the policy at the local level, but also analyse impacts in terms of the number of hunted animals and number of arrested poachers, since the policy was introduced to address local challenges, applying both rational-instrumental and interpretative approaches to policy evaluation. The aim is to determine the impacts of the policy in terms of reducing human-wildlife conflicts (especially by addressing poaching and retaliatory killing) by distributing benefits to the local communities with a view to improve local attitudes towards wildlife. Also, the arrows 3 and 4 with the institutional context and arrow 5 with wider institutional context are partially discussed in chapter 5 by reflecting on the different policies (e.g. sport hunting, oil exploration or even agriculture etc.), which contrarily have different aims and objectives. For example, the translocation of animals from around LMNP to Katonga wildlife reserve which was not really done for conservation purposes but for the benefit of sport hunting – as sport hunting is also practiced in the area. I also pay attention to how the stakeholders' perceptions of the sport hunting policy arrangements influence their interactions, and how these interactions shape the continued sport hunting policy implementation. The main aim is to evaluate the three objectives of the national sport hunting policy to understand how –

through the feedback loop (represented by arrow 3) – the policy impacts influence the policy re(design).

Finally, in Chapter 6, I focus on the framework as a whole, including all the arrows, to understand how congruence influences the performance of the arrangements and how the direct institutional context is of influence, since the policy impacts are expected to have an effect on the policy (re)design and its continued implementation. The analysis also loosely includes the wider institutional context. This is expected to provide an understanding of how policy outcomes lead to a shift or stability in any of the policy arrangement dimensions (on the national as well as on the local level), and whether or not this can lead to a new state in the arrangement all together, by attracting new actors. In case new actors do enter the arena, they can potentially bring new discourses with them that could lead to the adjustment of certain rules in order to institutionalise their interests and preferences as well as to enable them to mobilise resources to achieve certain policy outcomes in society.

CHAPTER 3: HUNTING FOR CONSERVATION? THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF SPORT HUNTING IN UGANDA EXAMINED

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Abstract

Uganda reintroduced sport hunting in 2001. The policy was piloted around Lake Mburo National Park and later replicated around other protected areas. This chapter analyses the development, implementation and impact of sport hunting policy in Uganda. We do so through literature review, document analysis, and by analysing the different actors' perspectives on the policy. Our analysis indicates that the sport hunting policy has undergone a dynamic development over time and is highly contested. The policy is implemented with rather varying rules across Uganda, on both public and privately-owned land. The government is of the opinion that the policy contributes to sustainable development, while other actors, such as NGOs, question the policy's impacts and ethics. The extent to which the policy is meant to contribute to conservation goals, and its impacts on conservation on-the ground, remain unclear.

Keywords: Sport hunting, Conservation, Development, Lake Mburo National Park, Uganda

3.1. Sport hunting: a contested practice

Sport hunting involves chasing and killing animals for pleasure (Loveridge et al., 2006). The practice started in the nineteenth century when colonial governments, traditional kings and chiefs in Africa designated areas abundant with wildlife to hunt for pleasure, show of prowess and attain trophies (Ayorekire et al., 2011). Currently, sport hunting in Africa mainly involves tourists paying to hunt, with some of the proceeds flowing to communities (Lindsey et al., 2006; 2007). Proponents consider sport hunting as a market-based conservation and development approach, and argue that it is one of the ways through which wildlife can be used to provide economic incentives to rural communities and subsequently bridge the conservation-development divide. McAfee (1999: 134), for example, points out that 'nature, if offered an opportunity, can earn its own right to survive in the world market economy'. She therefore argues for commercialization of nature and the granting of concessions to rent-seekers to manage nature on behalf of, or sometimes with, governments. The income could then provide incentives for conservation and development, potentially empowering formerly excluded residents. This would require that individuals invest in sport hunting and selling game products (Fischer et al., 2013), and that hunting would be controlled, e.g. through a limited number of off-take per year (Baker, 1997; Hurt & Ravn, 2000). Critics, however, argue that this market-based approach advances neoliberal ideologies, i.e. linking nature to capital, thereby disenfranchising local residents and national governments, and weakens social relations and environmental outcomes (Büscher et al., 2012; Fletcher, 2010). They also argue that sport hunting hampers animal regeneration as it interferes with animal grazing patterns and mating seasons. Others raise ethical concerns. Loveridge et al. (2006), for example, are critical of killing wild animals just for hunters' entertainment. It is argued that the form of stress, distress and death caused by hunting, can cause damage to and extinction of wildlife (Gamborg et al., 2012; Fischer et al., 2013), and violates the moral principle of the sanctity of life. In their study on the morality of hunting in Europe and eastern Africa, Fischer et al. (2013) reveal that hunting is only generally accepted if it is done for subsistence. Otherwise, commercial hunting is seen as an act of taking away life, which should be prohibited. These critics thus question whether sport hunting indeed enhances effective conservation and development, and critique the idea of killing wildlife for conservation and development purposes. In the early twentieth century, the colonial administrators in Uganda, together with reigning kings and chiefs, declared areas abundant in wildlife so-called 'Controlled Hunting Areas' (CHAs) (Ochieng, 2011). With this, the creation of CHAs marked the beginning of hunting as a sport in the country. CHAs were

created to minimize impact by local inhabitants on wildlife populations, and to provide grounds for colonial governments, traditional kings and chiefs to, among others, hunt for pleasure and attain trophies for rituals (Ayorekire et al., 2011). In Uganda, CHAs were gazetted in the 1920s, as legitimized by the 1926 Game Ordinance that cemented the central government's control over CHAs (Lamprey & Mugisha, 2009).

The Game Ordinance thereby provided for the creation of many CHAs across the country, including the Ankole controlled hunting area (today's Lake Mburo National Park – LMNP), Semeliki controlled hunting area (today's Semeliki Wildlife Reserve), and Karamoja hunting areas (areas around Kidepo Valley NP). It is this type of hunting that dates back to the colonial era that we refer to as the 'old' sport hunting. This 'old' sport hunting was conducted only in government- controlled reserves, and it mainly targeted big game, such as rhinos and elephants, that were thought to fetch large sums of money for the government. The local communities neither participated in the design of its guiding principles nor directly shared in the accrued benefits (Ochieng, 2011). As such, the 'old' sport hunting model fuelled persistent human-wildlife conflicts and resistance in Uganda. Local residents continually encroached on hunting grounds, and illegally hunted small game, like deer and duikers, for subsistence use. They also burned and cleared forested areas for cultivation, and poisoned and killed wildlife, especially on land privately owned by the communities, since the animals caused damage to crops, competed for pasture and water, and spread diseases (Ayorekire et al., 2011). This 'old' hunting in Uganda, combined with the illegal hunting and the national political unrest throughout the 1970s, greatly affected wildlife populations, with some species, such as the white rhinoceros and lion, becoming extinct in some ecosystems (Kamugisha et al., 1997). This led to a ministerial decree that banned all forms of hunting in Uganda in 1979 to allow for wildlife regeneration (Ayorekire et al., 2011). Since then, the increase in the human population has resulted in increasing demand for land for settlement and agriculture. This implies that today, wildlife faces greater risk of extinction than ever before. Moreover, wildlife does not recognize the boundaries of the remaining 'islands' of conservation areas and spends most of the time grazing and roaming on privately-owned community land (Ayorekire et al., 2011). According to estimates by the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), over 65 % of wildlife lives and/or feeds outside protected areas (UWA official, Research Interview 2013). This exposes them to the risk of illegal hunting, and intensifies human-wildlife conflicts. In order to address these issues, the government extended conservation efforts outside protected areas (PAs), which led to the

enactment of the Wildlife User Rights (WURs) by UWA in 2000 (Ayorekire et al., 2011). One of the key elements of these WURs is the reintroduction of sport hunting, here referred to as the 'new' sport hunting. The introduction of the 'new' sport hunting started as a pilot project in 2001 around LMNP (UWA, 2005). It was meant to address the conservation and development challenges in the area. The government, through UWA, reintroduced sport hunting, with the financial, technical, and supervisory support from NGOs (Former UWA official, Research Interview 2013). UWA also worked in cooperation with local governments (LGs), the Community Wildlife Associations (CWAs), and Community Protected Areas Institutions (CPIs). This chapter examines the development and implementation of the 'new' sport hunting. To achieve this, the chapter answers the following research questions: (1) How was sport hunting reintroduced and how has it been implemented; and (2) What are the impacts of the policy? The first question will be answered by analysing the development of the policy, the policy framework, the actors involved, and the revenue-sharing arrangements. For the second question we will review existing evaluations of the policy, and present the views of the different stakeholders on the policy's impacts. The analysis draws on views expressed in policy documents, and views of policy makers and stakeholders on its implementation and impacts. The chapter is based on interviews that were conducted with sport hunting policy stakeholders at the national level in Uganda between June-October 2013. A total of 15 in-depth interviews plus over 15 informal conversations were held with different actors, including officials from government agencies, including UWA and the Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Heritage; NGOs, such as World Wildlife Fund (WWF), African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Fauna and Flora International (FFI) and Nature Uganda (NU); and sport hunting companies and tourism associations, including Uganda Tourism Association (UTA), Association of Uganda Tour Operators (AUTO) and Uganda Safari Guides Association (USAGA). These interviews were supplemented by an extensive review of secondary data, such as policy documents, evaluation reports, newspaper articles, and (un)published (academic) articles and reports. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 answers the two research questions by presenting the development and implementation of the 'new' sport hunting. The last section discusses our results and makes some final conclusions.

3.2. The development and implementation of the 'new' sport hunting

In this section, we discuss and explain the development and implementation of the 'new' sport hunting at the national level, with illustrative examples from LMNP. Table 3.1 shows that the 'new' sport hunting has developed through different phases. It was first introduced in Rurambiira parish in 2001 as a pilot, with some policy makers, such as UWA, CPI and the local government being positive about the results. The pilot was then replicated to more parishes around LMNP, such as Nyakahita and Rwakanombe parishes between 2003 and 2005 (UWA, 2005), when the company Game Trails Uganda Limited (GTL) was granted a hunting concession and quota for the three parishes. In 2008, UWA commissioned an independent external evaluation. The policy evaluation outcomes were positive in terms of social impacts: the communities received direct revenue and benefitted from infrastructural development such as roads, dams, schools and health centres (see Muhimbura & Namara, 2009). This motivated UWA to replicate it to other protected areas between 2008 and 2012. Currently, five hunting companies are licensed across Uganda (see Table 3.5), with different hunting concessions and hunting quotas (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). Also, different types of actors are involved in the various regions, causing different typologies of the local arrangements.

Table 3.1: Phases in the development and implementation of sport hunting in Uganda

		Period			
		2001	**2002**	**2003-2007**	**2008-2012**
Levels	National	Policy documents developed	1st evaluation	Implementation and coordination of the different policy documents	External evaluation around LMNP (2008), decision to replicate sport hunting across Uganda, drafting of national sport hunting policy
	Local	Pilot sport hunting in Rurambiira parish (LMNP)	Continued implementation in Rurambiira	Implementation in new parishes, including Nyahahita and Rwakanombe; new hunting agreements; changes in revenue percentages; and new actors emerging, e.g. landowners	Implementation in new areas around Uganda; different revenue sharing agreements; new hunting quotas, hunting agreements, more actors, resources, and hunting companies licensed and hunting fees revised

3.2.1. The sport hunting typologies in the different locations

The 'new' sport hunting is being implemented in different locations under diverse circumstances (see Table 3.2). While around some protected areas (e.g. Kafu river basin ranches, Nakaseke, Masindi, Kiboga districts) it is practiced purely on privately-owned land, in other cases it is practiced on both private land and government- owned reserves (e.g. around LMNP). In other areas, it is practiced only in government reserves (e.g. Kabwoya Wildlife Reserve) and community-owned wildlife areas (e.g. Kaiso-Tonya Community Wildlife Area). Overall, the 'new' sport hunting is managed by both governmental and non-governmental actors, who jointly formulate its guiding principles, stipulated in the sport hunting agreements. These principles include, for example, rules regarding which animals to hunt, e.g. only mature males, penalties for (accidentally) injuring an animal unintended for hunting, and monitoring of hunting.

3.2.2. The policy framework

The implementation of the 'new' sport hunting was guided by the Uganda Wildlife Policy (MTTI 1999: 12), that states '…government will encourage a range of participatory approaches such as empowering the people to participate in the conservation and management of the country's natural resources…'.

Table 3.2: Typologies and examples of sport hunting areas in Uganda

Typology	Examples
Community-owned wildlife areas	1. Karenga CWA – adjacent to Kidepo Valley National Park
	2. Amudat CWA – an extensive arid area in eastern Karamoja, and a buffer zone between the Pia, Karimojong and the Pokot communities
	3. Iriri CWA – Bokora Corridor wildlife reserve (WR)
	4. Rwengara CWA – on the southern shores of Lake Albert and part of the wildlife corridor between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Toro Semliki WR
Privately-owned lands	1. Ranches in Kafu River basin – i.e. the southern 'cattle corridor' of the central rangelands of Luwero, Nakasongola, Nakaseke, Kiboga and

	Masindi Districts, and the private ranches around LMNP
	2. Ranches in Aswa-Lolim – found in the open rangelands north of Murchison Falls NP, e.g. degazetted Aswa-Lolim Game Reserve and Kilak CHA, in Gulu and Amuru Districts
	3. Ssesse Islands – the Ssesse Islands comprise a cluster of some 35 islands in Lake Victoria, most of which are part of forest reserves
	4. Ngenge plains in Kapchorwa – This lies south of Karamoja, formerly Sebei CHA
Government-owned wildlife reserves	1. Pian-Upe wildlife reserve in Karamoja
	2. Bokora-Matheniko wildlife reserve in Karamoja
	3. Ajai wildife reserve in Arua
	4. Ngenge plains in Kapchorwa
	5. Ssesse Islands (wildlife reserves)
	6. Rwengara CWA

Also, the Community Conservation Policy (UWA, 2004: 6) echoes UWA's mission statement in this regard: '…to conserve and sustainably manage wildlife and protected areas in Uganda in partnership with the neighbouring communities and stakeholders for the benefit of the people of Uganda and the global community'. These documents recognize that a vast number of wild animals is found outside protected areas and must be protected. Section 29 of the Uganda Wildlife Act 2000 (Cap. 200) provides for six Wildlife User Right (WUR) classes for the general public to benefit from wildlife. These include: sport hunting, farming, ranching, trade, research and education, and resource access. The WUR classification was meant to combat illegal hunting, as changing land uses and degradation of wildlife habitats had raised a lot of concern, especially about ensuring the survival of wildlife outside PAs. At this time, the attitude of communities towards wildlife was not conducive for conservation, leading to drastic decline of wildlife (UWA undated). Local residents saw wildlife as useless and destructive (UWA undated), and according to UWA this attitude encouraged illegal hunting. Hence, the WUR classification was envisaged as an incentive to promote wildlife conservation and combat the negative perceptions of communities, who regarded wildlife as government property and of benefit only to foreign tourists (UWA undated).

Table 3.3: The 2012 provisional quota allocation for the LMNP area

NO	Scientific name	Common name	Quota	Animal Fees (US $)	Remarks
1	Aepyceros melampus	Impala	80	350	
2	Damaliscus lunatus	Topi	10	700	
3	Equus burchelli boehmi	Zebra	100	500	
4	Hippopotamus amphibius	Hippos	5	600	Only 'problem animals'
5	Kobus ellipsiprymus defassa	Waterbuck	20	800	
6	Ourebia ourebi	Oribi	5	300	
7	Panthera pardus	Leopard	4	5,000	Only 'problem animals'
8	Papio anubis	Baboon	20	20	Vermin[5]
9	Phacochoerus aethiopicus	Warthog	20	350	
10	Potamochoerus porcus	Bushpig	30	150	Vermin
11	Redunca redunca	Bohor Reedbuck	10	400	
12	Sylivicapra grimma	Duiker	10	200	
13	Syncerus caffer	Buffalo	30	1,500	
14	Tragelaphus oryx	Eland	10	1,500	
15	Tragelaphus scriptus	Bushbuck	25	600	
16	Tragelaphus spekii	Sitatunga	2	2,000	
17	Crocuta crocuta	Hayena	2	300	Only 'problem animals'

Source: UWA, 2012a

Table 3.4: The 2012 provisional quota allocation for Kabwoya wildlife reserve and Kaiso-Tonya community wildlife area

No	Scientific name	Common name	Quota	Animal Fees (US $)	Remarks
1	Kobus kob	Uganda Kob	25	450	
2	Ourebia ourebia	Oribi	15	300	
3	Papioa nubis	Baboon	15	20	Vermin
4	Phacochoerus aethiopicus	Warthog	10	350	
5	Potamochoerus porcus	Bushpig	15	150	Vermin
6	Sylivicaprag rimmia	Duiker	15	200	
7	Syncerus caffer	Buffalo	2	1,500	
8	Tragelaphus scriptus	Bushbuck	15	600	

Source: UWA, 2012a

The policy was guided by the overall objective of promoting sustainable extractive wildlife utilization, by facilitating the involvement of landowners and users in managing wildlife outside PAs, through the provision of incentives from wildlife. Further, several national policies, including the Uganda Land Act Cap 227 1998, the National Environment Act 1995,

[5]Pests or nuisance animals, especially those that are viewed to threaten human society by spreading diseases or destroying crops and livestock.

the National Forestry and Tree Planting Act 2003, the National Environment Management Policy 1994, the Environmental

Table 3.5: Sport hunting companies in Uganda

Number	Sport hunting company	Operational areas
1	Game Trails (U) Ltd	Ranches outside Lake Mburo National Park (Kiruhura District), Katonga wildlife reserve
2	Lake Albert Safaris Ltd	Kalangala District, Kabwoya and East Madi Wildlife Reserves, and Kaiso-Tonya Community Wildlife Area
3	Karamoja Safaris Ltd	Bokora-Matheniko Wildlife Reserve, Karenga and Iriri Community Wildlife Area
4	Uganda wildlife Safaris Ltd	Ajai Wildlife Reserve and Luwero, Nakaseke, Nakasongola, and Amuru Districts
5	Karamojong Overlander Safaris Ltd	Pian-Upe Wildlife Reserve and Amudati Community Wildlife Area

Source: UWA, 2012b

Impact Assessment Regulations 1998, the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan 2000, and the National Development Plan 2015, vest all rights of ownership of wildlife with the government of Uganda. They grant limited provisions for individuals to own wildlife, upon lawful acquisition, and share benefits that may accrue from it for social development. Furthermore, the Uganda Wildlife Statute 1995; 1999 and 2004 and Uganda Wildlife Act 1996 stipulate which wildlife can be hunted, and include rules that guide the allocation of hunting quota and hunting blocks, i.e. 'any area of land…demarcated as a block managed by an association for professional … hunting' (UWA, 2001:1). At the local level, the new sport hunting is guided by the Local Government Act 1997, the CPI Policy 2000, the CWAs constitutions, and the community norms, which vary from community to community. The local government authorities and CWAs are meant to work hand in hand with UWA to monitor the utilization of annual hunting quotas in the different areas. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show different annual hunting quotas and fees around LMNP and KWR. These quotas are allocated based on the number of species in a PA. The animal fee means the amount to be paid per animal killed.

3.2.3. Actors involved in the 'new' sport hunting

Several different types of actors are involved in the 'new' sport hunting arrangement, either as policy developer, implementer or beneficiary, while others are only consulted. These different manners in which various actors are involved results in very diverse understandings of the policy, and different presentations of the rationale behind it. The key actor controlling and

implementing the policy is UWA, which introduced the 'new' sport hunting, meant as a tool to bridge the conservation- development divide in and around PAs. This was guided by the market-based discourse of 'selling nature to save it' (McAfee, 1999). UWA advanced sport hunting as an instrument that could minimise illegal hunting outside PAs, provide an incentive for local communities to control their off-take of wildlife, and promote rational use and conservation of wildlife. In the process, UWA involved civil society, the private sector, local communities and donors. Currently, USAID, WWF and GTZ are in the process of informing communities about the potential benefits of sport hunting, through financing workshops and familiarisation tours to southern and other eastern African countries, to learn from their experiences (UWA official, Interview 2013). These organisations are also working on sensitizing the local communities on the values of wildlife, aimed at making communities appreciate wildlife as 'assets' that can lead to development, and not as a 'burden' to them, since they currently receive direct benefits, and are being 'freed of' 'problem animals[6]' (e.g. baboons). '… NGOs like WCS, AWF and USAID are supporting communities by building the associations' capacity to manage resources around them' (UWA official, Research Interview 2013). Communities are also undergoing training in business management, bookkeeping, and monitoring and supervision of sport hunting projects (see Ochieng, 2011). UWA and the local communities, especially the beneficiaries from the parishes around LMNP, claim that development can be realized through the 'new' sport hunting, by referring to schools, health centres, roads, and animal watering points that have been constructed for the communities (Ayorekire et al., 2011). The Ministry of Tourism Wildlife and Heritage also asserts that animal populations have increased and local communities' attitudes towards wildlife have improved (MTWH official, Interview 2013). According to UWA, this is because certain conditions were met before sport hunting was introduced, including sufficient numbers of animals to hunt, support by communities and the local government, capable private partners, and signed agreements between the parties involved (UWA official, Interview 2013). The sport hunting companies are also of the opinion that sport hunting could be used for conservation and development, with one interviewee stating that '…if sport hunting worked well among the southern African countries, then it should work for Uganda' (GTL official, Interview 2013). Since the initiation and rolling out of sport hunting across Uganda in 2008, UWA has licensed

[6] Any protected animals that cause or may cause material damage to any land, crop, domestic animal, building, equipment or other property (UWA, 2004).

five professional companies. The company Game Trails Uganda Limited (GTL) was first licenced for hunting around LMNP in 2001 by UWA, based on the provisions of the Uganda Wildlife Act 2000. The licence has been renewed on an annual basis. All companies are working closely with different types of stakeholders to implement sport hunting in the different areas in Uganda (see Table 3.5). The number and relevance of the different stakeholders across Uganda have changed over time. In the beginning, mainly UWA, CWAs, LG, CPI and GTL were involved (see Ochieng, 2011). Currently, landowners, CWAs and UWA are the most relevant stakeholders around LMNP, with CPI and LG losing their relevance (see Table 3.6 for a full overview of actors' responsibilities and activities).

Table 3.6: Actors involved in sport hunting

Actor	Responsibilities and activities
UWA	Grant use-rights and licenses to professional hunting companies
	Monitor the hunting activities and advise companies
	Determine the animal and area booking fees in consultation with the hunting company and the CWA
	Conduct wildlife management training for CWA members together with the hunting company
	Control illegal hunting in the project area
	Build capacity among stakeholders to monitor and evaluate project operations
Local government (Local Councils and Sub-County Administration)	Facilitate registration and legalization of CWAs
	Provide guidance and support to the project to ensure sustainable utilization of wildlife
	Assist in policing and monitoring illegal activities in the project area
Community Wildlife Associations (CWAs)	Ensure protection of wildlife within the hunting blocks against illegal hunting through participating in policing and monitoring of project activities
	Report instances of poaching, ensure land use practices are consistent with promotion of wildlife conservation
	Secure protection of sport hunters and employees of professional hunting companies while within their hunting block

	Work together with local authorities, keep proper books and accounts and granting UWA access thereto
	Provide information to the hunting company and UWA on the status and distribution of wildlife within the hunting blocks
Community Protected Area Institutions (CPIs)	Ensure project activities are integrated into local government development plans
	Facilitate dialogue and conflict resolution
	Represent local community interests and concerns with regard to wildlife conservation
	Mobilize local people to support project implementation
Sport hunting companies	Carry out professional hunting in the project area
	Record hunting activities on daily basis and submit the data to UWA for quarterly analysis
	Provide quarterly operational reports, enforce wildlife laws among clients and ensure personnel abides by the law
	Ensure that animals wounded by clients are humanely handled and accounted for
	Maintain appropriate camping facilities for clients in the hunting blocks, where necessary
Conservation NGOs and Tourism Associations	Advocate for the rights of the communities and the animals
	Fund local conservation and development projects
	Monitor sport hunting impacts on the communities
	Provide technical guidance
	Advise UWA, CWAs and local communities on the implementation of conservation and development projects
	Organise discussion fora
	Campaign against sport hunting activities in Uganda

Table 3.7 shows the animal fees over time. The fact that these have been adjusted since 2001 is an indication of the changes during the policy's implementation and the value that hunters attach to different species. For example, species like buffalos, leopards, elands and sitatunga attracted a higher market value in the last 4 years. This is explained by the fact that they are threatened, although hunting is allowed on condition that it is a 'problem animal' (UWA official, Interview 2013). Charging high rates is thus meant to prevent a high off-take. Species like baboons, bushpig, oribi, and warthogs maintained or declined in market value. Interviews

with UWA officials and document review revealed that the animal fee for baboons was reduced to USD 20 from USD 90, because other countries in the region allow hunting of baboons without charge. Moreover, baboons are considered vermin that need to be controlled. New species have also been included on the animal fee list since 2012. This could be explained by the increased number of hunting blocks, hunting companies and diverse hunters' interests. In this case, UWA has adjusted the fees to match the market demand.

Table 3.7: Animal fees

Animal		Animal Fees in US$				
		2001	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**
1	Baboon	90	90	90	90	20
2	Buffalo	600	650	900	900	1,500
3	Bushbuck	250	300	500	500	600
4	Bushpig	150	150	150	150	150
5	Duiker	130	150	200	200	200
6	Eland	600	650	800	800	1,000
7	Hippo	500	500	600	600	600
8	Impala	250	300	350	350	350
9	Leopard	-	-	3,500	5,000	5,000
10	Oribi	150	150	300	300	300
11	Reedbuck	250	300	400	400	400
12	Topi	350	400	650	650	650
13	Warthog	250	300	350	350	350
14	Waterbuck	500	550	600	600	1,000
15	Zebra	500	500	550	550	550
16	Sitatunga	-	-	-	1,500	2,000
17	Crocodile	-	-	-	-	1,000
18	Dik-Dik	-	-	-	-	200
29	Hartebeest	-	-	-	-	1,000
20	Hyena	-	-	-	-	100
21	Jackal	-	-	-	-	200
22	Klipspringer	-	-	-	-	700
23	Red Hartebeest	-	-	-	-	1,000
24	Uganda Kob	-	-	-	-	450

Source: UWA, 2012a

Table 3.8: Revenue sharing percentages around LMNP

Stakeholders	Percentage (%) share			
	2001	2003	2008	2012
CWAs	65	65	45	40
UWA	25	15	15	10
Landowner	0	10	30	50
CPI	5	5	5	0
Local Government (Sub-county)	5	5	5	0

Source: UWA, 2012a

Among the different species around LMNP, buffalo was the most hunted animal between 2001 and 2007, with a total of 85 animals hunted out of 85 animals that were on the quota. This was followed by waterbuck with 65 out 83 animals hunted, and bushbuck with 66 out of 72 animals hunted. This implies that buffalo was the only animal with 100 % quota utilization between 2001 and 2007 (Muhimbura & Namara, 2009). This is because hunters prefer savannah buffalo to Cape buffalo (UWA official, Research Interview 2013). Table 3.8 shows that over the years the revenue sharing arrangement around LMNP has been revised three times. With this, sport hunting revenue distribution among stakeholders has been dynamic, with landowners earning more and CWAs around LMNP earning less over time. Previously, landowners were also excluded from direct benefit-sharing schemes, on the assumption that they would benefit through their CWAs. Due to this arrangement, landowners have advocated for transfer of all animals into the park and fencing of the park, and have continuously encouraged illegal hunting on private land. However, landowners have now been included in the revenue arrangement, since benefits that accrue through the CWAs are spent in communal projects (Ayorekire et al., 2011) and enjoyed by everyone, and yet, when animals damage crops in individual farms, the landowner solely bears the burden. To 'compensate' landowners around LMNP, it was agreed that a landowner, on whose farm an animal is killed, receives a direct share of 50% of the particular animal fee, and also indirectly benefits from the 40 % that goes to the CWAs. UWA retains the 10% for administrative costs. 'In addition to what the landowner receives, the landowner is also entitled to benefit from the general community fund. The community fund is used for the community projects like roads, bridges, water points etc.' (UWA official, Research Interview 2013). The current arrangement is thus meant to make landowners better appreciate

the value of animals on their land. As a result, landowners now play a central role in the arrangement. Sport hunting around LMNP generated a total of USD 323,086 from the animal fees and other fees between 2001 and 2007, which was shared among stakeholders as follows: CWAs USD 199,170; UWA USD 68,110; landowners USD 26,566; CPI USD 14,120; and sub-counties USD 14,120 (Muhimbura & Namara, 2009). However, local governments and CPIs around LMNP, which no longer receive revenue from animal fees, receive a daily community development fee of USD 20 and USD 20, respectively, which is paid by sport hunters and observers[7] (UWA, 2012). This money is payable around all PAs where hunting is taking place. The money is shared by LG and CPIs as 35 % and 65 % respectively (UWA, 2012), and is supposed to be invested in community infrastructure, implying that the community development fee flows back to community institutions. Furthermore, the hunter and observer each pay a daily conservation fee of USD 200 to the CWA revenue pool. This money is meant solely for CWAs activities (see Table 3.9).

Table 3.9: Fees payable for community development and conservation around LMNP

	Type of fee paid by different actors	Rate (USD)
1	Community development fee-hunter (per day)	20
2	Community development fee-observer (per day)	20
3	Conservation fee-hunter (per day)	200
4	Conservation fee-observer (per day)	200
5	Animal fees	(See Table 7)
6	Hunting Permit (per year)	600
7	Trophy handling (per animal)	300
8	Daily fees (charged per hunter)	Various
9	Anti-Poaching fees	20% of animal fees

Source: UWA, 2012a

3.2.4. Impact of the 'new' sport hunting

In piloting the 'new' sport hunting, UWA developed the following objectives: to reduce human-wildlife conflicts, to provide incentives for local inhabitants to manage and protect wildlife, to positively change residents' attitudes towards conservation, and to provide lessons in developing guidelines and procedures for its further implementation (Lamprey et al., 2003). These policy objectives are mainly oriented towards local communities, and only indirectly

[7] An observer is a person(s) who travel(s) with a sport hunter to observe the hunting.

target conservation goals. Since 2001, UWA has commissioned two evaluations to assess the impact of the 'new' sport hunting, which were both overseen by UWA, MTWH and CWAs executives. First, UWA conducted an internal evaluation in 2002, after the first pilot, to establish community response to the project, and how the revenue was being used. UWA again commissioned an external evaluation in 2008 (see Muhimbura & Namara, 2009) to assess ecological and social impacts of the project, establish community attitudes towards wildlife, and assess impacts of the project and recommend remedies. The evaluators mainly interviewed officials from UWA, MTWH, GTL, CPI and local government, association executives and project beneficiaries around LMNP. It therefore largely ignored the views of 'other' community members, especially those that were considered non-landowners or immigrants.

In the evaluations, the 'new' sport hunting around LMNP is reported to have registered some positive impacts in terms of community development. Both evaluations (UWA undated; UWA, 2011; Muhimbura & Namara, 2009), indicate that communities received direct revenue and benefitted from infrastructural development such as roads, dams, schools, and health centers. UWA also claims that the number of wild animals outside PAs has increased over the years (UWA undated). Our interviews show an extremely varied evaluation of the 'new' sport hunting among the different actors involved. According to UWA, MTWH, CPI and local government officials, this policy has been vital in changing community attitudes towards wildlife (Former MTWH official, Research Interview 2013). Also the built schools provide formal education to their children, making them appreciate the value of wildlife (Ochieng, 2011). However, these 'success stories' are not shared by all actors. Nationally, and in other regions, stakeholders critique the policy and its impacts, and different actors have joined and formed, often opposing, coalitions. Some NGOs, such as NU, and trade associations, such as UTA, AUTO and USAGA, and regional bodies like Wildlife-Direct argue that Uganda does not have enough wildlife to sustain the practice (USAGA official, Research Interview 2013). These organisations do not support sport hunting for conservation and development, they believe in the protectionist model of conservation, in which nature is preserved for its intrinsic value. NU, Wildlife Direct (WD) and USAGA also argue that '… sport hunting will lead to a drastic decline in wildlife populations… there is no sufficient data on wildlife populations across Uganda to support it' (USAGA official, Research Interview 2013). Others, such as IFAW, critique the gruesome nature of killing wildlife under the pretext of sport hunting. They also accuse UWA of manipulating figures to portray that wildlife populations have increased

(NU official, Research Interview 2013). 'Someone was giving a fake figure that we have many leopards in Uganda… we don't see them during non-hunting game drives, you spend 3, 4, 5 days without seeing any leopard, and now you start hunting them…they are not enough' (UTA official, Research Interview 2013). These practices seem to contradict the CCP which advocates for 'applying scientific criteria to wildlife utilisation" especially where there are 'rare, high risk and endangered species' (UWA, 2004:11). Also, some communities around LMNP criticize UWA for assuming that increasing animal populations outside PAs is a result of sport hunting (NU official, Interview 2013). To them, more animals could be moving out of the park in search for pasture due to competition with cattle from 'illegal grazers', and maybe prey animals are fleeing from predators. Others, like FFI, are also pessimistic about sport hunting, and are especially concerned that the implementers seem to be diverting from its original objective of bridging the conservation-development gap. '[S]port hunting could be a good tool to achieve conservation objectives,… if very well managed… Things are changing on the ground, people are no longer interested and they want to get rid of wild animals… I am not sure that sport hunting has a future…' (FFI official, Interview 2013).

However, UTA and some representatives of local communities are of the opinion that sport hunting can lead to development. '… sport hunting can lead to sustainable development when it is proven that wildlife populations are beyond sustainable levels … and if game ranching[8] is first introduced' (UTA official, Interview 2013). They think that once communities are in full charge of the animals, they will be able to determine how much a hunter can pay them, and monitor off-take, unlike in the present arrangement, where UWA sets the quotas and price, and monitors hunting. Further, NGOs, like WWF and AWF, also believe that sport hunting could lead to community development only if it is well managed. They argue that UWA sets the quotas and prices for the different animal species, without directly involving the local communities, who are supposed to monitor and ensure constant flow of direct benefits from the program. This raises questions in terms of transparency and accountability. The communities do not know how many animals are actually hunted in a season, as some information, which is regarded as 'classified information', is kept at management levels, leaving the communities to wait for whatever revenue is shared with them. The current sport hunting arrangements also encounter other operational challenges. For example, Ochieng (2011) reports accusations and

[8]Granting local communities permission to own and rear wildlife on their land.

counter accusations among community members, association executives, and between UWA and community members. For instance, association executives and community members accuse GTL of frequently hunting on government ranches and land of influential individuals, and leaving animals to destroy crops, especially of less influential local residents. This is noted to be common in cases where a hunting agreement is meant for both private and government land, e.g. around LMNP. Further, the communities also claim that the distribution of project revenue is inequitable, and only benefited the sport hunting companies and UWA (Muhimbura & Namara, 2009). This potentially creates disparities in the amount of revenue that flows to CWAs and landowners. To date, it is not clear to what extent the policy has achieved its goals. Whereas policy makers like UWA and MTWH see it as leading to positive changes, communities and non-governmental actors largely remain sceptical. Our research thus shows that the impact of this policy is contested. Moreover, there also seem to be differences between the policy on paper and policy on ground. UWA, together with MTWH, allocates and approves annual quotas, and in some cases allocates additional hunting quota to the hunting companies, which are not usually formally approved. There has also been a delay in the review process of the hunting license for GTL around LMNP, and the company has continued to hunt, by having its clients cleared on a day-by-day basis for over a year (as of October 2013). This makes monitoring the company's activities highly problematic, especially in the absence of a legally binding contract. Finally, the policy guiding the 'new' sport hunting is still considered a draft regulation (a so-called 'Draft zero'[9]). Furthermore, the five hunting companies in Uganda are operating under different agreements, making a generalization of the impact of the policy at the national level difficult to determine.

3.3. Discussion and conclusion

Uganda reintroduced sport hunting as a national policy for conservation and development. The sport hunting policy in Uganda changed over time. The policy was first introduced as a pilot project around LMNP in 2001, and has been replicated to new areas. The policy framework has changed over time to meet the interests of various stakeholders in the arrangement. Thereby, the policy is now guided by rather varying rules across Uganda, including new agreements signed regarding benefit sharing, and varying hunting quotas developed for

[9] Proposal has been developed by a civil servant, awaiting to be discussed and approved by the responsible minister

different areas. This has created different forms of sport hunting across the country, with variable interpretations of the objectives and impact of the policy. The implementation of the policy has attracted a myriad of stakeholders, who perform various roles in the implementation. Nonetheless, on many occasions, landowners have claimed a more central position in steering the 'new' sport hunting. This is, among others, reflected by the inclusion of landowners among beneficiaries of sport hunting. However, UWA still maintains a central position by setting hunting quotas, fees, carrying out animal census, registering and issuing hunting licences and guidelines, and monitoring the operations of hunting companies and CWAs. UWA is also mandated by the Uganda Wildlife Act 2000 to conserve and manage all wildlife for the benefit of the communities. The impact of the 'new' sport hunting policy is highly contested. Whereas the government is convinced that sport hunting is an appropriate instrument for sustainable development, other stakeholders, including UTA, USAGA, AUTO, NU and Wildlife Direct, challenge the manner in which sport hunting is being practiced. However, they do not have enough influence to change current sport hunting practices. The contribution of sport hunting to conservation especially remains highly contested. Moreover, the more fundamental ethical questions of applying hunting for conservation have to date hardly been discussed in Uganda.

CHAPTER 4: THE BATTLE OVER THE BENEFITS: ANALYSING TWO SPORT HUNTING POLICY ARRANGEMENTS IN UGANDA

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Abstract

In 2001 sport hunting was reintroduced in Uganda around Lake Mburo National Park, and in 2008 at Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area, to derive economic benefits for communities and thus reduce human–wildlife conflict and change communities' attitudes towards wildlife. We used the policy arrangement approach to analyse and compare the development of the two sport hunting policy arrangements. Through interviews and document review we learned that the arrangement at Lake Mburo changed considerably over time, whereas that at Kabwoya remained relatively stable. The two policy arrangements started with small constellations of actors but turned out to be complex arenas, mainly involving disagreement regarding the benefits. Land ownership proved to be a crucial factor in explaining the differences between the arrangements. Our results also show that benefits do not change communities' attitudes towards conservation, thus questioning incentive-based policies for conservation. We argue for a careful analysis of the complex social, cultural and political contexts in which conservation and development policies are implemented, to better understand their outcomes.

Keywords: Human–wildlife conflict, incentive-based approach, market-based conservation, policy arrangement approach, sport hunting, Uganda

4.1. Introduction

Conservation organizations in Africa have struggled to develop new, more participatory forms of wildlife conservation and management, recognizing that residents living adjacent to conservation areas suffer from crop loss and pasture depletion, competition for saltlicks and water between wildlife and cattle, and exposure to diseases carried by wildlife (Ochieng, 2011). This necessitates developing new policies to ensure that conservation links with and contributes to human welfare and development.

In terms of human development, advocates have implemented sport hunting as a market- and community-based approach (Hulme & Murphree, 2001). Sport hunting involves hunters (often tourists) paying to chase and kill an animal for pleasure (Loveridge et al., 2006). It is practised in diverse forms in c. 23 African countries (Lewis & Alpert, 1997; Van der Duim et al., 2015), with >18,500 clients (Lindsey et al., 2007) generating revenue of c. USD 200 million annually (Booth, 2010).

The debate on sport hunting hinges on fundamental concerns (Hutton & Leader-Williams, 2003; Yasuda, 2012). Proponents (e.g. Hutton & Leader-Williams, 2003; Nelson et al., 2013) argue that people will actively support and practise conservation if they derive tangible benefits from wildlife. Critics argue that sport hunting causes stress and distress among animals, and can lead to extinction of species (Fischer et al., 2013). Büscher et al. (2012) and Fletcher (2010) contend that the neoliberal tendencies associated with sport hunting disenfranchise local residents and national governments, and hamper their participation and ability to derive benefits from conservation. Consequently, it is argued that the contributions of sport hunting benefits in southern and eastern Africa are inadequate to improve human welfare (Booth, 2010).

In Uganda, sport hunting started in the 1900s to meet the demands of the colonial administrators, and African kings and chiefs (Ayorekire et al., 2011) and rural communities also practised small-scale hunting for consumption. The practice was legalized in 1926 through the Game Ordinance (Ochieng et al., 2015). This regime of hunting lasted until 1979, when a ministerial ban was issued because of decreasing wildlife populations (Ayorekire et al., 2011). In 2001 the Uganda Wildlife Authority (the government authority responsible for managing wildlife in Uganda, hereafter the government) reintroduced sport hunting around Lake Mburo

National Park (hereafter Lake Mburo; Figure 4.1), and in 2008 at the Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (hereafter Kabwoya; Figure 4.2), with the formal goals of reducing poaching by local communities, providing incentives for local inhabitants to manage and protect wildlife, improving residents' attitudes towards wildlife, and providing lessons in developing guidelines and procedures for further implementation of sport hunting (UWA, 2001). The main species hunted include the zebra *Equus burchelli boehmi*, impala *Aepyceros melampus*, buffalo *Syncerus caffer* and bushbuck *Tragelaphus scriptus*, and to a lesser extent



Figure 4.1: Location of Lake Mburo National Park in Uganda



Figure 4.2: Location of Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area in Uganda

the hippopotamus *Hippopotamus amphibius*, leopard *Panthera pardus* and hyaena *Crocuta crocuta* (Ochieng et al., 2015). There is little in the conservation literature about hunting in Uganda, and this chapter represents one of the first attempts to incorporate the issue of sport hunting in Uganda into international academic debates on hunting, development and conservation.

Our aim was to analyse the development of hunting policy in Uganda by focusing on two sites where sport hunting has been reintroduced. We employed the policy arrangement approach and the concept of congruence to answer the following research questions: (1) how did the sport hunting policy arrangements at Lake Mburo and Kabwoya evolve over time? and (2) what have been the driving force(s) for change?

4.2. Theoretical framework

We used the policy arrangement approach and the concept of congruence as a conceptual lens. Arts et al. (2006: 96) defined a policy arrangement as 'the temporary stabilization of the content

and organization of a policy domain.' Policy arrangements stabilize only provisionally, as they are under constant pressure to accommodate new actors, rules, discourses and resources, or to (re)strategize to achieve goals (Van Gossum et al., 2011).

The policy arrangement approach was chosen because: it has already been used successfully to study tourism and conservation policies in Africa (e.g. Ahebwa et al., 2012b; Lamers et al., 2014), and in many other policy fields, including forest and nature policy (Van der Zouwen, 2006); it considers the organization of policies in terms of various actors and their resources, as well as the content in terms of rules and discourses; it can be used to understand the changes in the arrangement over time; and it builds on multi-actor network models (Rhodes, 1997), paying specific attention to the institutional contexts in which policy actors operate (Van Gossum et al., 2011).

The policy arrangement approach includes the following four dimensions: discourses, actors, rules and resources. Discourses are defined as narratives, sets of ideas, beliefs, concepts and stories used to give meaning to a phenomenon in a real setting, produced and reproduced through sets of practices (Hajer, 1995: 60). Actors are individuals and organizations involved in a particular policy domain (Arts et al., 2006). Actors with relatively similar opinions tendentiously converge into coalitions to oppose or support particular discourses or rules (Van der Zouwen, 2006; Arts & Buizer, 2009). Formal and informal rules consist of 'legislation', 'procedures' and 'political culture' (Wiering & Arts, 2006) that 'guide and constrain the behaviour of actors' (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2004: 342). Resources are assets such as authority, knowledge, finances, land and legitimacy, mobilized by policy actors (Wiering & Arts, 2006), and are 'intrinsically linked to the concept of power' (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2004: 343). Although power remains a contested concept (Kuindersma et al., 2012), we consider it to be a relational concept: the ability of actors to mobilize resources to achieve or influence outcomes within a policy domain (Giddens, 1984) through deliberation or even coercion. We used these four dimensions of the policy arrangement approach to analyse the change over time of the content and organization of the two sport hunting policy arrangements.

We also adopted the concept of congruence (Arts & Goverde, 2006) to explain the changes in the arrangements over time. Although congruence can include both internal and external aspects, we focused on the internal congruence of the two arrangements, which we regard as

the extent to which the policy dimensions (discourses, rules, actors and resources) are internally consistent. A key underlying assumption is that 'a certain level of congruence…is needed for any policy arrangement to perform. A failure to realize this certain level of congruence will imply a governance failure' (Arts & Goverde, 2006: 80).

4.3. Methods

We focus on two cases (Yin, 2003): Lake Mburo and Kabwoya. Data sources include documents, observation notes and interviews. Interviews were conducted in two phases: October 2010−January 2011 and February−August 2014. For Lake Mburo, fieldwork covered four sub-counties (Kanyaryeru, Nyakashashara, Sanga and Sanga Town Board (Kiruhura district)), and for Kabwoya three sub-counties (Kabwoya, Buseruka, Kyangwali (Hoima district)). Most interviewees were selected using snowball sampling. NGO representatives and government officials were purposively selected (Kumar, 2012) because of their relative importance. Fifty-nine in-depth interviews were conducted: four (R1, R,2, R3, R46) with national and local governmental conservation organizations, six (R39−R44) with conservation NGOs, three (R47, R48, R52) with sport hunting companies, four (R16−R18, R55) with district local leaders, one (R45) with a tourism association, nine (R19−R27) with village leaders, 15 (R4−R15, R49, R58, R59) with the Uganda Wildlife Authority (Lake Mburo, Kabwoya), and 19 (R28−R38, R50 to R57) with local communities.

Interviews were conducted in respondents' homes, offices and restaurants, lasted 20–90 minutes and were recorded. Three respondents agreed to be interviewed but declined to be recorded. Circa 20 informal conversations took place with various officials. Five respondents were interviewed twice. All recordings were transcribed. Interview transcripts, observation notes and documents were analysed thematically, implying 'a form of pattern recognition within the data, where emerging themes become the categories for analysis' (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006: 4). Quotes from interviews are presented as evidence of respondents' perceptions of the policy arrangements, and are coded to anonymize respondents. The trustworthiness (cf. Decrop, 2004) of this research approach was established by the intense engagement of AO with the two cases, credibility was enhanced by systematic and transparent data analysis with tangible products (transcripts, codebook, coded transcripts), and joint analysis of the various data sources (interviews, documents and observation notes) provided validation by triangulation.

4.4. Evolution of the sport hunting policy arrangements

4.4.1 Lake Mburo National Park

The Lake Mburo sport hunting policy arrangement has been a dynamic arrangement, including four main periods, characterized by struggles over benefits.

2001–2003

In this period the sport hunting policy was developed and implemented. Actors were sensitized and rules were set, including about the distribution of benefits, based on the expectation that the policy would reduce human–wildlife conflict.

Sport hunting around Lake Mburo started with a small group of actors. The national government involved the local government at both district and sub-county levels (hereafter local government, responsible for enforcing government programmes, including wildlife management) and Community Protected Area institutions (hereafter institutions). These institutions were formed by the government in 1997 to harmonize community–protected area interactions in Uganda, including coordination of the disbursement of the 20% of tourism national park revenue fees funding community-based development projects (Ahebwa et al., 2012a). At Lake Mburo the government implements two tourism models: traditional tourism, implemented within the Park, with the community receiving 20% of the tourist entry fees, and sport hunting outside the Park to raise funds to reduce poaching. The company Game Trails Uganda Limited was licensed by the government to organize sport hunting.

The government's policy mission was '...to conserve and sustainably manage wildlife...in partnership with neighbouring communities and other stakeholders for the benefit of Ugandans and the global community' (UWP, 2004: 2). Therefore, it was necessary for the government to find ways of incentivizing the communities to convince them to support sport hunting, and to reduce human−wildlife conflict. The communities include three groups of residents: rich and influential individuals who own large parcels of land, residents who own smaller parcels of land, and squatters who don't own land.

To bring the communities on board, the government sponsored a familiarization trip to southern Africa and Tanzania to show institution members, the local government and some village

opinion leaders how sport hunting was implemented there, and to learn how to run Community Wildlife Associations (R31). These are community-based organizations that manage sport hunting benefits and implement community development projects. After the familiarization trip, meetings were held to sensitize the communities in Rurambiira parish (the lowest administrative unit in Uganda), where pilot hunting was to be implemented. Some respondents (R3, R4, R35) revealed that the meetings had mixed results; residents approved of sport hunting and agreed to form the Rurambiira Wildlife Association, but also hoped that the policy implementation would ultimately reduce the presence of wildlife on their land (R6).

The meetings and discussions were followed by the formulation of rules, based on the Wildlife Use Rights Policy of 2000. The policy stipulates the categories under which individuals and organizations can own, use and benefit from wildlife. They include sport hunting, farming, ranching, trade, research and education, and general extraction (WUR, 2000).

Under sport hunting, individuals are licensed to hunt designated wildlife in or outside protected areas. Other legal documents that support the policy include the Uganda Wildlife Policy 1999, of which section 3.4.1 aims to create a facilitating environment for community and private sector participation in sustainable wildlife utilization, and the Uganda Wildlife Act (Cap 200 of 2000), section 29(1a) of which affirms wildlife use rights. These documents recognize that wildlife belongs to the government of Uganda, for its people. The rules for implementing sport hunting included revenue-sharing rules and other operational rules (e.g. quota allocation, hunting fees, and monitoring), including the 2001 professional hunting agreement signed by the government, the hunting company and the association.

According to the hunting agreement the benefit-sharing rules specified the following beneficiaries: the association would receive 65% of the fee, the government 25%, institutions 5% and the sub-county 5% (see Table 4.1). These were the same actors the government consulted to convince the Rurambiira residents to support sport hunting. In 2002 the government conducted an internal evaluation among the beneficiaries, and the results revealed that the policy provided substantial benefits to the communities (R3).

Table 4. 1: The revenue-sharing percentages of various actors benefiting from sport hunting around Lake Mburo National Park (Figure 4.1) and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (Figure 4.2).

Actor	% revenue sharing			
	2001	2003	2008	2012
Lake Mburo National Park				
Associations	65	65	45	40
Government	25	15	15	10
Landowner	0	10	30	50
Institution	5	5	5	0
Local Government (sub-county)	5	5	5	0
Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area				
Government			50	
Association			20	
District local government			15	
Kabwoya parish(sub-county)			7.5	
Buseruka parish(sub-county)			7.5	

Source: UWA, 2012

It was on this basis that the government opted to continue trialling sport hunting in Rurambiira parish. The communities soon became involved in the debates about sport hunting and demanded some rules to be changed, to include residents who owned land as direct beneficiaries (Table 4.1), reflecting incongruence between rules and resources. Although the residents owned the land where hunting was conducted, the 2001 revenue-sharing rules did not recognize them as beneficiaries.

2003-2008

In this second period landowners started to challenge the policy arrangement, based on which the 2001 revenue-sharing rules were revised in 2003. However, contrasting discourses and discontentment with the benefit-sharing rules remained, leading to the first battles over the benefits.

The battles over the benefits resulted from (and were clearly reflected in) competing discourses. Whereas the government, institutions and hunting company perceived sport hunting as a means to derive benefits from wildlife for local residents, to change their attitudes towards wildlife and reduce human−wildlife conflict, for the residents sport hunting was a means to derive financial benefits but they also remained interested in reducing wildlife numbers, as wildlife competed with cattle for pasture, water and salt-licks, and destroyed crops.

The residents criticized sport hunting for perpetuating wildlife on their land. One interviewee (R32) stated, '...we have seen an increase in invasions of wildlife on private land...sport hunting declared poaching illegal.' In response to this claim, a park official (R6) argued that the residents wrongly perceived that hunting would reduce wildlife on private land. He reaffirmed the policy's formal goals: '...sport hunting was to reduce illegal hunting by the communities, while delivering benefits and to change their negative attitudes towards wildlife on private land.'

However, most landowners argued that 'they accommodate wildlife on their land and suffer wildlife damages' (R32). Consequently, the coalition of landowners and the association began to challenge openly the revenue-sharing rules and the government's hegemonic discourse, and advocated to be recognized as landowners. As they controlled the land, a key resource for policy implementation, they were able to overturn the 2001 revenue-sharing agreement in 2003, to 65% for the association, 15% for the government, 10% for landowners, 5% for institutions and 5% for the sub-county (Table 4.1). Although the association's situation did not change, landowners gained 10% and together they became powerful actors in the arrangement, influencing debates and gaining more resources. Subsequently other new actors joined (residents of Nyakahiita and Rwakanombe parishes), who envied the benefits received by Rurambiira residents (R23, R33, R36). The government permitted the same company to hunt in these parishes. Two new associations were founded, in Nyakahiita and Rwakanombe parishes, bringing the number of associations to three, all working with the same principles.

2008-2012

The third period was characterized by intense battles over the benefits, continued conflict between the government and the communities, further changes in the revenue-sharing rules and some incongruence between rules and resources.

In 2008 the government commissioned Enviro Consultancy League to evaluate the impacts of sport hunting in the three parishes. The outcomes were allegedly positive in terms of community development projects financed through hunting revenue. The consultant recommended the policy be extended to other areas, including Kabwoya (Muhimbura & Namara, 2009). The post-evaluation period was characterized by negotiations leading to

changes in the 2003 revenue-sharing rules in 2008. The associations lost a significant percentage of revenue to landowners, while the percentages allocated to other actors remained as before (Table 4.1). However, landowners remained dissatisfied with the rules for benefit sharing because they received only 30% of the total revenue. They demanded to be granted at least 90% of the revenue to sustain meaningful livelihoods (R35).

Meanwhile it was claimed that some community members who resided in the capital, Kampala (hereafter the Kampala group), tried to hijack the sport hunting benefits in 2010. The elite Kampala group comprised larger landowners. They held several meetings in Kampala and invited some village residents to attend. Their intention was to 'improve community involvement in sport hunting, deliver more benefits to landowners, and to convince the government to fence the Park to settle human−wildlife conflicts' (R31, R45). The group founded a new association, the Lake Mburo Landowners Wildlife Association, which granted them absolute power over the benefits (R31). However, some landowners, the old associations and some village opinion leaders opposed the group for not being initiated by the residents, not being accountable, and their views not necessarily representing the wider community. With the support of the Conservation Area Manager of Lake Mburo, the opposition to the group organized a joint meeting with the residents of the three parishes (R31), where it was agreed to merge the old associations (R36). Consequently, a new association, the Nshaara Wildlife Association, was founded, covering four sub-counties (Figure 4.1), and taking over the management of the sport hunting benefits (R31). As a result the opposition managed to end the capturing of hunting benefits by the elite and abandon the Kampala association. However, although the communities gained more benefits they still demanded that the government fence the Park to mitigate human−wildlife conflict.

2012- present

The fourth period marked the settlement of the battles over the benefits in favour of landowners, and the emergence of winners and losers. Institutions and the sub-counties were excluded from the arrangement.

Following the continued implementation of sport hunting, the battles over the benefits intensified in 2012. The coalition of landowners and the association succeeded in influencing debates, and the revenue-sharing rule was amended so that landowners received 50%, the

association 40%, and the government 10% (Table 4.1). At this point the government (the chief architect of the policy) and the association lost ground to the landowners. Landowners became winners, while the institutions and the sub-counties were no longer part of the benefit-sharing scheme. 'The current revenue-sharing rule gives landowners and the associations more power and opportunity to influence policy debates. However, smaller landholders complain that it only favours large landowners' (R21). Large landowners own large herds of livestock and receive 50% of the revenue, whereas small landowners are disadvantaged. One interviewee summarized the situation thus: 'The problem is that some of us own smaller plots of land...the animals may have spent the night in my land...by morning they have crossed over to another person's land. When the sport hunters come, they find the animals in the other person's land (because his land is large), he is the only one that is paid and not me, yet I have also suffered losses' (R32). In conclusion, although the current rules favour the communities in terms of giving them control over more benefits, their attitudes towards wildlife have not changed as a result. The association and landowners are still unsatisfied with the benefits, claiming they continue to suffer from damage caused by wildlife. Only the larger landowners, most of whom reside in Kampala, support hunting, because the size of their land favours hunting, and thus they receive more revenue.

4.4.2. Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area

Contrary to the situation at Lake Mburo, the sport hunting policy arrangement at Kabwoya has been relatively constant over time. Government agencies have remained in control of major resources. Although the communities show signs of discontentment, they do not own land where hunting is conducted, and therefore they are unable to change the arrangement.

Following an evaluation of the situation around Lake Mburo in 2008 (Muhimbura & Namara, 2009), the government decided to extend sport hunting to Kabwoya. The policy goals were the same as in Lake Mburo: to reduce human−wildlife conflict and illegal hunting by providing benefits to the communities. Previously Kabwoya had experienced uncontrolled (subsistence) hunting, and encroachment of protected areas by the (pastoral) communities (R49). To derive income from wildlife, the government granted the company Lake Albert Safaris a hunting licence in 2008, and subsequent benefits were to be shared (R49). The licence was based on a 4% quota of the available population per species (R49, R52). However, official national rules

in Uganda grant a 2% hunting quota of the population per species, reflecting inconsistencies between rules on paper and in practice.

To encourage participation by local actors in the Kabwoya arrangement, the government and the hunting company incorporated the Hoima District Local Government, Kabwoya and Buseruka sub-counties and the local communities (R52). Although the residents of Kabwoya supported sport hunting, the residents of Buseruka opposed it initially, arguing that the government wanted to grab land and would eventually restrict subsistence hunting (R49, R50). Following sensitization and persuasion by the government, the residents of Buseruka supported the policy (R51, R52). The revenue-sharing rules were drafted, with the following beneficiaries: government (50%), district (15%), association (20%), and Buseruka and Kabwoya sub-counties (7.5% each; Table 4.1). The government justified its 50% share by arguing that it introduced sport hunting, that sport hunting was conducted within a government-owned game reserve, and that it needed to raise money to finance conservation and reduce poaching. One respondent (R51) noted, 'the government is the most important partner...their rangers ensure that encroachers are kept away from the reserves.'

To manage the 20% community benefits the Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Community Wildlife Association was founded in 2009. Association membership included residents of Kabwoya, Buseruka and Kyangwali sub-counties (R51). Kyangwali sub-county joined the arrangement later, and to date benefits only from the association's 20% revenue. The association is a registered community-based organization to manage hunting benefits, and is supervised by the district (R55, R56).

Because of the involvement of various actors who do not own land but who receive wildlife benefits, some residents have shown a positive attitude towards conservation (R49). Interviews with some association members indicated that they supported the idea that unrestricted use of environmental resources can lead to their decline. They believed that the government should grant residents only limited access to wildlife resources to safeguard resource sustainably (R56). One interviewee (R51) summarized the situation thus: 'We want to preserve the environment, for the good of the people, if you allow people to move freely here, it's a matter of months, it will go away.' Consequently, the association executives encourage former poachers to register as reformers (without prosecution, so they can receive meat from sport hunting as an additional benefit to the 20% revenue (R57). One respondent (R56) noted,

'...some meat is taken to the association leaders to be distributed among the members.' This is supposed to discourage poaching and other illegal activities. Some residents admitted they inform government rangers when wild animals stray into their communities, and rangers then drive them back into the reserves (R56, R57). Under the 2013 association constitution, any member found poaching is arrested and prosecuted (R56). Consequently, poaching has been reduced at Kabwoya. One respondent (R55) noted, '...the communities used to kill the animals because they didn't know their importance, but the association involved the community which made them feel important...poaching stopped.'

Although this reflects a high level of congruence between actors, discourses and rules, some community members claimed that sometimes the government and hunting company hoarded the meat in their camps and did not share it with the communities (R50). Revealing another 'battle over the benefits', one respondent (R54) suggested they '...bring the meat to the community and it is the executive to share it... the community will love the animals,'.

Whereas some community members agreed that sport hunting had partially achieved its goals of delivering benefits and reducing poaching, other members of the association criticized the arrangement. They accused the government of not inviting them to most meetings, especially when determining hunting rules, fees and quotas, and monitoring hunting (R51, R56). One interviewee (R51) lamented, '...we are never informed, yet we are part and parcel.' Similarly, association members expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the hunting companies never revealed how many animals were hunted, or how much the association should expect at the end of the hunting season. 'They never tell us...they just give us the money by cheque' (R51). Although the policy arrangement has proven relatively stable, with some notable positive changes in communities' attitudes towards wildlife, the Kabwoya arrangement is still characterized by mistrust and a lack of accountability and transparency. Mistrust in the arrangement reinforces passive community involvement, which undermines the principal aim of involving local residents. The current revenue-sharing rules reinforce the government's control over conservation, with the communities receiving benefits as determined by the government and its allies.

In conclusion, because the government dominated the Kabwoya arrangement it has remained the same over time. Although the communities showed willingness to support conservation and

are deriving more benefits, they do not own land, and lack adequate financial resources and experience to negotiate or cause a change in the revenue-sharing scheme, as at Lake Mburo.

4.5. Discussion

We used the policy arrangement approach (Arts et al., 2006) and the concept of congruence (Arts & Goverde, 2006) to analyse the development of sport hunting policy in Uganda, with a focus on Lake Mburo and Kabwoya. The Lake Mburo policy arrangement evolved in four clear phases, illustrating incongruences among the dimensions of the policy arrangement approach. Land ownership emerged as a crucial factor for changes in benefit-sharing rules. However, although landowners received hunting benefits, their inclusion has not necessarily increased their support for conservation. Compared to Lake Mburo the Kabwoya arrangement was more stable over time, as the government remained the main landowner, could set and maintain the rules, and received 50% of the revenue. More generally, both arrangements started with small constellations of actors but developed as complex and messy arenas where debates were not focused on the formal aims of the policy arrangement (reducing poaching and changing community attitudes towards wildlife) but on battles over the benefits.

Discourses have influenced the arrangements in various ways. We found that the arrangements were characterized by two conflicting local discourses. The government's official discourse of changing communities' attitudes towards wildlife through benefits was challenged by a competing community discourse that considered wildlife to be a nuisance. Although the Lake Mburo communities received more money over time, they continually advocated fencing of the park to reduce human−wildlife conflict.

Human−wildlife conflict prevails in two ways: one where animals are regarded as pests (e.g. through the destruction of crops; Ochieng, 2011), and another where people poach wildlife (Duffy, 2000). The government implements the sport hunting policy to reduce poaching, whereas the communities interpret the formal goal of reducing human−wildlife conflict as reducing wildlife on private land and thus reducing its impact on livestock and farms. Consequently, the discursive incongruence remains unresolved and the communities still perceive benefits to be more important than wildlife. Solving human−wildlife conflict will not therefore automatically lead to communities protecting wildlife on private land. A related lesson learnt here is that human−wildlife conflict reflects conflict over land use, and therefore

wildlife protection remains a daunting challenge for governments amidst changing land-use practices as the human population increases (Emerton, 1999).

Although the government's discourse links to the broader international discourse of promoting conservation through market-based approaches (McAfee, 1999; Fletcher, 2010), in Uganda this discourse remains implicit. The government expects to achieve its conservation goals after the communities have appreciated hunting benefits, stopped poaching and begun to protect wildlife on their farms. Whether this will be achieved remains uncertain. Another discourse, on concerns about the ethics of sport hunting and animal welfare and rights (Loveridge et al., 2006; Fischer et al., 2013), which is gaining increasing attention globally, has not influenced debates in Uganda.

Our analysis of the reintroduction of sport hunting in Uganda has four general findings. Firstly, we have shed light on the role of government in market-based conservation approaches. Across Africa sport hunting is practised and controlled by public, private and communal actors (Lindsey et al., 2007). Although this signals a declining role of state actors, the uncontrolled influence of non-state actors could result in unsustainable practices. To prevent this, governments should guide the implementation of such market-based approaches (Büscher et al., 2012); for example, by mobilizing resources and setting legal frameworks.

Secondly, we have raised questions about the durability and feasibility of implementing two different tourism models to raise funds for conservation, namely traditional tourism, based on tourists' love for and admiration of wildlife, and sport hunting. In Lake Mburo, traditional tourism is implemented within the National Park, and sport hunting is organized outside the Park, whereas in Kabwoya both traditional tourism and sport hunting exist in the same landscape. Although this coexistence may appear to be viable in the short term, the combination seems impossible in the longer term, as traditional tourists may start avoiding areas where conservation-based tourism is combined with sport hunting when they realize that the same animal they admired within a protected area may be shot to make a profit once it crosses the protected area boundary.

Thirdly, market-based solutions are widely implemented across Africa to deliver conservation benefits (Booth, 2010; Nelson et al., 2013). However, implementation of sport hunting in

Uganda led to mixed reactions from the communities. This finding shows that market-based solutions do not always bring about community involvement in conservation (Ahebwa et al., 2012a; 2018; Van der Duim et al., 2015).

Fourthly, we have contributed to the literature on the role of tourism revenue-sharing in conservation and development (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001; Ahebwa et al., 2012a). The ongoing debate about big vs small landowners around Lake Mburo demonstrates the prevailing resource inequality among communities. The government's policy is to buy landowners' acceptance of wildlife on private land; however, the big landowners are more influential in the arrangement, and therefore most are able to supplement their income from livestock with hunting revenue, whereas the ability of small landowners to do so is limited. Similar results were recorded in the Maasai Mara, where elites with more land and livestock have greater opportunities to receive tourism revenues (Thompson et al., 2009), whereas smaller landowners do not usually receive substantial direct compensation for wildlife damages. Although tourism revenue-sharing is often considered to be a panacea for conservation challenges in Africa (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001), we found that most communities in both arrangements in Uganda considered livestock to be more important than wildlife. Around Lake Mburo the communities consistently called for the government to fence the park, even after they had received revenue from hunting. Our results also indicate that if benefits cease, animosity towards wildlife may be renewed. Regarding a similar case in Kenya, Anyango-Van Zwieten et al. (2015) argued that sustainability of the benefits is a necessary pre-condition to guarantee the success of incentive-based conservation approaches and avoid renewed animosity towards wildlife. Although market-based arrangements are widely supported and implemented, the basic assumption on which they are based may not hold. We therefore argue for a careful analysis of the complex and messy social, cultural and political contexts in which tourism revenue-sharing is implemented.

CHAPTER 5: HUNTING OR POACHING? THE SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF HUNTING IN UGANDA

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Abstract
In 2001 Uganda reintroduced sport hunting around Lake Mburo National Park, and in 2006 in the Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area, with the aim to reduce human-wildlife conflicts by providing incentives for the local inhabitants, thus positively changing residents' attitudes towards wildlife. We conducted interviews and reviewed documents to analyse and evaluate the impacts of this reintroduction of sport hunting. The income generated from sport hunting was used to provide social services and implement social development projects. Although this did initially help to improve local residents' attitudes towards wildlife, residents continue to perceive wildlife as a nuisance. Poaching only stopped temporarily. Hence, this study shows that the common underlying assumption of sport hunting policies and other market- and community-based approaches to conservation – that when local residents receive benefits, they will appreciate wildlife – is debatable.

Keywords Effectiveness, livelihoods, poaching, sport hunting, Uganda

5.1. Introduction

In order to ensure that conservation links with and contributes to human welfare and development, several African countries, including Uganda, have adopted a variety of market- and community-based approaches to improve the people's livelihoods and address human-wildlife conflicts – especially uncontrolled (subsistence) hunting. Sport hunting is seen as one of these approaches. It is an activity where a tourist pays to hunt and kill an animal with desired physical attributes, such as large horns, tusks or a certain body size (see Lindsey et al., 2007; Booth, 2017). Although sport hunting has many forms (Lindsey et al., 2016), we particularly refer to trophy hunting (found in Uganda): hunting particular animals to keep the animal or certain body parts (e.g. entire heads or hides, but this may also include scrotum, tail, hooves or teeth) as souvenirs or mementos (trophies).

Sport hunting – especially in Africa – has attracted mixed reactions. Several countries in Southern Africa continue to practice it, including Zimbabwe, South Africa and Tanzania (Booth, 2017). Uganda has reintroduced it in 2001. Kenya (although still maintaining hunting for birds) and Botswana (although now considering to reintroduce it again), banned sport hunting while at the same time promoting photography tourism as a source of income for local communities (Muposhi et al., 2016).

Currently, sport hunting advocates (e.g. Yasuda, 2011; Booth, 2017) argue that local communities around protected areas are able and willing to sustainably manage and use wildlife (while at the same time abandoning poaching), especially when they share in the income and meat from legally hunted animals (Muposhi et al., 2016). They say that hunting operators can promote anti-poaching campaigns by integrating (former) poachers in conservation programmes as village scouts (Lindsey et al., 2007). Recent studies (e.g. Di Minin et al. (2016) and Muposhi et al. (2016)) show that for example Zimbabwe's trophy hunting industry generates approximately US$ 16M/year. The authors highlight the potential of sport hunting for African governments to involve and motivate local residents when political and governance structures are adequate.

However, there are fundamental social, ecological and ethical problems associated with sport hunting. Southwick (2015) and Weaver et al. (2016) for example argue that the rate of return from the hunting industry remains minimal in comparison to other conventional land-use

activities such as agriculture (Lindsey et al., 2016) or traditional, non-consumptive, tourism. In ecological terms, Loveridge et al. (2006) and El Bizri et al. (2015) further contend that commercialization of nature threatens species survival, just as poaching (Lindsey et al., 2007). Also, the killing of wild animals in the name of conservation remains unacceptable to organizations and individuals promoting animal welfare and rights (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018). Bekoff (2013), for example, proposes a paradigm shift from a dominant and exploitative conservation to a compassionate one. Especially following the incident in July 2015, when a trophy hunter killed a radio-collared lion named Cecil in Zimbabwe, the anti-hunting movement intensified its campaigns against killing of animals (Lindsey et al, 2016), or linking sport hunting to conservation. These campaigns – so far – only had a limited impact in terms of policy changes (Carpenter & Konisky, 2017). Related, the Africa Union recently adopted an animal welfare strategy recognizing animals as sentient beings, including wild animals, farm animals and animals used in research (AU, 2017).

This chapter contributes to these discussions by analysing and evaluating the impacts of sport hunting in Uganda, around Lake Mburo National Park (hereafter Lake Mburo), where sport hunting was first piloted in 2001, and the Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (hereafter Kabwoya), to which it was extended in 2006. The government reintroduced sport hunting in order to try to address poaching, which was affecting the survival of species in the two areas: lions became extinct in Lake Mburo and rhinoceros in the whole country, and other species (currently listed for sport hunting; see Tables 2 and 5) equally declined (UWA, 2015).

For the reintroduction of sport hunting around Lake Mburo, the Uganda Wildlife Authority (responsible for managing wildlife in Uganda, hereafter the government), involved the local governments (both the district and sub-county, hereafter local government) responsible for enforcing government programmes, including wildlife management. The government also engaged the Community Protected Areas Institutions (hereafter institutions), formed by the government in 1997 to harmonize community-protected area interactions in Uganda, the Associations (registered community-based organization to manage hunting benefits) and the landowners (individuals who own land around Lake Mburo where hunting is conducted).

In Kabwoya, the government and Lake Albert Safaris (hereafter the hunting company) collaborated with the Hoima District Local Government, Kabwoya, Buseruka and Kyangwali

sub-counties and the local communities represented by Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Community Wildlife Association (hereafter Association).

In this chapter, we analyse three formal goals for reintroducing sport hunting in Uganda, to (1) reduce human-wildlife conflicts by (2) positively changing residents' attitudes towards wildlife through (3) the providing of incentives for the local inhabitants (UWA, 2002). We employ the concept of effectiveness to evaluate if and to what extent these goals have been achieved and thus answer the following research question: what are the impacts of the sport hunting policy around Lake Mburo and Kabwoya in terms of changing residents' attitudes towards wildlife, reducing poaching, and improving livelihoods?

5.2. Conceptual framework

In this chapter, we adopt the concept of effectiveness (Levy & Young, 1994; Mitchell, 2003) to evaluate and analyse the impacts of the sport hunting policy in Uganda. Levy and Young (1994: 20) define effectiveness as 'the extent to which a regime ameliorates the problem(s) that prompted its creation'. Thus, we analyse the effectiveness in terms of the three sport hunting policy goals (UWA, 2002).

The concept of effectiveness has been defined, discussed and operationalized in literature on regimes (Mitchell, 2003), and in particular international environmental regimes (Arts, 2000; Visseren-Hamakers, 2018); institutions (Giddens, 1984); and policy evaluation (Crabbé & Leroy, 2008; Visseren-Hamakers, 2018). The literature on regimes and institutions recognises the commonality between the two (Giddens, 1984; Scott, 2001), as both – in a nutshell – denote sets of rules (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018). New-institutionalist or neo-institutionalist scholars conceptualise institutions or regimes as societal instruments that shape, guide and constrain human action and agency (Ochieng, 2017), thus also incorporating informal rules and norms. Hence, institutions refer to the norms and values that define goals, impose constraints on social behaviour and empower social actions (Scott, 2001). Institutions are known to function at all levels of governance, from the (inter)national to the local level, and govern (inter)national and local issues. Regimes refer to 'implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures' (Krasner, 1982:185) at the international level, governing international issues (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018).

Policy evaluation literature is inspired by several traditions, namely rational-instrumental ex-post and ex-ante evaluation (Arts & Leroy, 2006) and interpretative policy analysis (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). Whereas the evaluator in the former determines policy (in)effectiveness based on particular policy goals (Arts & Leroy, 2006), the evaluator in the latter considers policy (in)effectiveness as a matter of multiple interpretations – based on the evaluator's theoretical lens (Mosse, 2005). Our interest here is particularly on the effectiveness of institutions (e.g. the sport hunting regulations) implemented at national and local levels in Uganda, thereby positioning the chapter within the literature on institutional effectiveness (Mitchell, 2003) – the 'problem-solving capacity' of regimes or institutions (Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2011; Ochieng, 2017) – while including both rational and interpretative perspectives, as discussed below.

Therefore, we study the effectiveness of the sport hunting policy from the perspective of whether or not the policy reaches its intended goals. Although effectiveness can be analysed as a two-dimensional concept (i.e. the *first order* and *second order* effects), in this chapter, we focus only on the *first order* effects (as our analysis is limited to the policy goals achievement at local level), which is the 'contributions of the set rules or policy in solving problems that led to their creation' (Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2011:3). Thus, we regard *first order* effects as the direct impacts of sport hunting in Uganda.

We define *direct impacts* of sport hunting as the social and ecological effects resulting directly from its implementation. Epistemologically, we consider both the objectivist and subjectivist approaches (Moon & Blackman, 2014) towards the evaluation of these impacts. Thus, we analyse hunting effects based on the existing official (formal) hunting data, and through the perceptions of stakeholders, collected through interviews. We assume that some stakeholders may think that, for example, the benefits of the arrangement are insignificant, and others may think the benefits are actually significant, while they are both reflecting on the same amount of revenue generated by the policy over time. This is because different stakeholders usually have different interests, opinions and expectations concerning any policy implementation (Visseren-Hamakers, 2018). Since the hunting policy lacks clear criteria or indicators for assessing its effectiveness, we adopt the three formal policy goals and categorise the direct impacts into four aspects: the number of hunted animals through sport hunting, through poaching, impacts on

livelihoods, and changed community attitudes (Table 5.1). We briefly highlight these aspects below:

Table 5.1: Indicators for assessing the impacts of sport hunting policy in Uganda

Policy goal	Aspects	Indicators	Data	Research methods
Reduction of human-wildlife conflicts (poaching)	• Hunted animals through sport hunting • Illegal hunting	• Number of animals hunted per year through sport hunting • Poaching rates per year • Number of individuals/ communities protecting wildlife • Adherence to set quota • Actors' perceptions regarding sport hunting	• Hunting evaluation report(s) • Government records • Association records • Animal census data • Sport hunting documents • Poaching statistics • Interview data on perceptions	• Interviews • Document review • Informal conversations
Provide incentives for local inhabitants to manage and protect wildlife and improve livelihoods	Financial incentives	• The accumulated and distributed income • Adherence to the revenue sharing rules • The projects financed by hunting income • Number of directly benefitted landowners • Actors' perceptions regarding incentives	• Official revenue records • Record of financed projects • Interview data on perceptions	• Interviews • Document review • Observation notes • Informal conversations
Positively change residents' attitudes towards wildlife	Changed community attitudes	• Number of residents protecting wildlife • Number of residents allowing wild animals to freely graze on their farms • Number of residents reporting poachers • Number of residents forming associations to protect and benefit from wildlife • Number of residents working with other individuals/ organisations to support and benefit from sport hunting • Residents' attitudes towards sport hunting benefits	• Minutes of meetings • Hunting agreements and other hunting policy documents • Association records • Interview data on perceptions	• Interviews • Document review • Studying minutes of meetings • Informal conservations

Hunted animals: we analyse the (data on) numbers of animals hunted through sport hunting between 2001-2016 around Lake Mburo and 2006-2016 in Kabwoya. Further, we analyse the

hunting agreements signed by the actors, including rule implementation and rule adherence in the two areas.

Poaching: this study does not draw causal relationships between sport hunting and conservation, because (1) the available data on wildlife numbers in our case studies are unreliable, and (2) the objectives of reintroducing sport hunting in Uganda are not explicitly aimed at conservation but rather at reducing human-wildlife conflicts (i.e. poaching by the local communities). Therefore, we operationalise conservation impacts in terms of reducing poaching and analyse the rate of poaching based on the available seizure data to determine whether there is a de- or increase in poaching in the two areas. We also analyse the views of the stakeholders on poaching, and the extent to which they are protecting wildlife in the two areas.

Livelihoods: we mainly analyse the financial (livelihoods) assets (see Scoones, 2009): hunting income and the social projects supported through sport hunting in the two areas. First, we examine how, and how much of, the income was shared among the beneficiaries, and analyse actors' adherence to the revenue-sharing rules. We then show how the individual(s) and the communities utilised hunting income. Finally, we incorporate the residents' thoughts about these projects and whether or not these improved their livelihoods over the years.

Changed community attitudes: here, we analyse whether or not local communities' attitudes towards wildlife have changed.

5.3. Materials and methods

This chapter focuses on a comparative analysis of two case studies (Yin 2003): Lake Mburo and Kabwoya. Data sources include document review and qualitative in-depth interviews. Fieldwork was conducted in four phases: February – August 2014, January – May 2015, October – November 2016 and June – September 2017. For Lake Mburo, fieldwork covered four sub-counties: Kanyaryeru, Nyakashashara, Sanga and Sanga Town Board (Kiruhura district), and for Kabwoya three sub-counties: Kabwoya, Buseruka, Kyangwali (Hoima district). Most interviewees were selected using snowball sampling. NGO representatives and government officials were purposively selected (Kumar, 2012) because of their relative importance to the topic. In total 47 respondents were contacted and interviewed: 22 (R1-R22)

around Lake Mburo, 18 (R28-R45) in Kabwoya and 7 (R23-27, R46-R47) relevant to both areas. More specifically the first author interviewed representatives from one conservation organisation (R26), two sport hunting companies (R1, R44), and two tourism associations (R24, R27), four district local leaders (R32, R39-R40, R42), six government representatives (Lake Mburo, Kabwoya) (R23, R25, R31, R41, R45, R46), one wildlife expert (R47), and 31 village leaders/local communities/landowners (R2-R22, R28-R30, R33-R38, R43). Six respondents were interviewed twice. Interviews were conducted in respondents' homes and offices and in restaurants; they lasted 20-90 minutes and were recorded. All recordings were transcribed. Ten informal conversations took place with various officials. Interview transcripts and documents were analysed thematically, implying 'a form of pattern recognition within the data, where emerging themes become the categories for analysis' (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006: 4).

The official data used in this study include the number of hunted animals through sport hunting and income generated between 2001-2016 (Lake Mburo) and 2006-2016 (Kabwoya), poaching rates, and the livelihoods projects financed using hunting income. However, these data may not be free from errors and are not readily available to the public. We, for example, received three sets of data on hunted animals and hunting income around Lake Mburo. One set was from the hunting company, another from the government and yet another from the hunting evaluation report (Muhimbura & Namara, 2009). Because the figures varied between the different sources in some years, we used the averages of the three sources. To corroborate this data, we present quotes (coded to anonymise respondents) from interviews (based on respondents' memories) as evidence of respondents' perceptions of the policy impacts.

The trustworthiness (cf. Decrop, 2004) of this research approach was established through the intense engagement of the first author with the two cases. Credibility was enhanced by systematic and transparent data analysis with tangible products (transcripts, codebook, coded transcripts); and joint analysis of the various data sources (interviews and documents) provided validation by triangulation. Finally, the second and third author acted as 'auditors' reviewing analytical procedures and 'adherence to sound research practices' (Decrop, 2004: 161).

5.4. Results

5.4.1. Lake Mburo National Park

The Lake Mburo sport hunting and its benefits, including direct income, social services and funded social development projects, only had a limited impact on local residents' attitudes towards wildlife and incidences of poaching. Wildlife is still viewed as a nuisance by local communities even when benefit-sharing rules were adjusted in their favour.

Hunted animals

The Lake Mburo sport hunting policy allows 2 per cent of adult male animals to be killed (R1) – based on census results per species (R25, R46), but the data on wildlife numbers is unreliable. Based on three data sets on the numbers of hunted animals, we estimate that 1,819 animals were hunted between 2001-2016. The most hunted species include: impala and zebra while the least hunted sitatunga and hyena (Table 5.2). This hunting is mainly regulated by the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) through its rangers, who escort sport hunters and record details of the hunted animals including the Global Positioning System (GPS) locations of where an animal is killed (R1, R2, R46). The recording is then used to identify the landowner who later receives direct revenue based on the specified revenue-sharing rules (R2). Furthermore, the government's strategic plan (2013) and monitoring and research plan (2003) provide for regular monitoring (although this has not always happened) of the operations of Game Trails Uganda Limited (hereafter the hunting company) to avoid affecting the species populations, abundance and distribution that can be caused by killing more than the specified annual quota per animal species (R1, R46). Similarly, the 2015 professional hunting agreement (signed by all actors) stipulates that the hunting company can only hunt on private land outside LMNP. This involves killing of healthy mature male animals for their treasured trophies. Any form of non-compliance by the company or its clients is supposed to be penalised, which could even mean revoking the company's hunting license (UWA, 2015). So far, the company's hunting license has not been revoked in sixteen years. This hunting, however, if left unmonitored, may threaten the very species it is now supposed to protect, as more sport hunters look for healthy male animals that could be leaders of herds.

Table 5.2: Estimated number of hunted animals through sport hunting per species around Lake Mburo between 2001-2016

Species	Number of animals hunted per species around Lake Mburo between 2001-2016																
	2001	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**	**Total of hunted animals**
Baboon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	3	3	5	2	2	0	**15**
Buffalo	10	12	13	10	16	16	18	10	11	18	15	13	12	17	14	25	**230**
Bushbuck	9	8	15	8	9	11	13	7	5	13	8	12	7	9	13	15	**162**
Warthog	1	0	2	0	9	12	16	6	7	15	14	19	18	15	16	15	**165**
Duiker	1	4	1	3	3	2	7	0	2	5	5	5	1	4	4	6	**53**
Eland	7	5	5	3	4	4	4	3	4	4	3	6	7	6	6	11	**82**
Hippo	3	2	2	1	4	4	2	2	2	4	5	3	2	1	1	1	**39**
Impala	20	15	20	21	26	30	46	49	15	38	34	34	25	28	36	43	**450**
Oribi	0	0	0	0	6	4	6	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**20**
Reed Buck	0	0	0	0	7	6	8	3	0	0	8	2	2	4	4	4	**48**
Topi	0	0	0	0	7	9	6	2	2	9	6	5	6	9	11	13	**85**
Water Buck	2	11	9	5	14	15	13	16	2	9	13	15	12	11	13	17	**177**
Zebra	0	0	0	0	19	31	34	26	9	14	16	28	19	18	16	42	**272**
Leopard	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	**6**
Bush pig	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	1	0	2	1	0	**12**
Hyena	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	**1**
Sitatunga	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	**2**
Total	**53**	**58**	**67**	**52**	**124**	**144**	**177**	**129**	**61**	**129**	**133**	**146**	**117**	**126**	**139**	**194**	**1,819**

Source: Muhimbura and Namara, 2009; UWA, 2017; GTL, 2016

Financial benefits

One of the goals of the sport hunting policy was to provide incentives for local residents to protect wildlife. A government official (R46) confirmed '*it was to demonstrate the economic value of wildlife to the community*'. Since its implementation, almost US$ 1 M was generated from sport hunting (Table 5.3). The income was shared according to the hunting agreement's benefit-sharing rules (Table 5.4), with the communities receiving more revenue following a continued dispute over the benefits. Consequently, residents' attitudes towards wildlife initially improved (UWA, 2002; Muhimbura & Namara, 2009) and the numbers of arrested poachers were low in the early years of sport hunting (see Figure 5.1). However, the majority of the respondents remained discontented and agitated, claiming that more revenue should be returned as household income. As landowner (R4) complained: '*we are receiving peanuts*', and tourism association representative (R24) observed, '*the money only benefits a few individuals*'. Dissatisfaction with the revenue sharing fuelled disputes over the benefits between the big landowners and the small or non-landowners, who claimed that the big landowners benefitted disproportionately and maintained that, as a rule, they only benefitted through public goods financed by the association. Moreover, this conflict about the benefits also manifested in an attempted but failed 'elite seizure' of the hunting benefits by larger landowners who are originally from the region but are currently mainly living in the capital city Kampala.

Although the government also receives a share of the hunting income, which it is supposed to reinvest in monitoring and conservation, there is no paper evidence of how much of income from sport hunting or traditional tourism is being used for conservation. Only one government representative stated that this income was partly used for monitoring illegal activities around LMNP: '*We use it to carry out patrols and monitoring*' (R46).

Table 5.3: Estimated hunting revenue per period in US$ around Lake Mburo between 2001-2016

Animal Species	Estimated revenue per period in US$ around Lake Mburo																Total estimated revenue between 2001-2016 in USD$	% of total revenue
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016		
Baboon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	270	60	100	40	40	0	510	0.05
Buffalo	9,000	10,800	11,700	9,000	14,400	10,400	11,700	6,500	7,150	11,700	9,750	19,500	18,000	25,500	21,000	37,500	233,600	23.51
Bushbuck	2,250	2,000	3,750	2,000	4,500	3,300	7,150	3,500	1,750	3,900	2,400	7,200	4,200	5,400	7,800	9,000	70,100	7.06
Warthog	300	0	600	0	2,700	3,600	4,800	1,800	2,100	4,500	4,200	6,650	6,300	5,250	5,600	5,250	53,650	5.40
Duiker	130	520	130	390	390	300	1,050	0	400	1,000	1,000	1,000	200	800	800	1,200	9,310	0.94
Eland	4,550	4,000	4,000	2,400	3,200	3,200	3,200	2,400	4,000	4,000	4,500	9,000	10,500	9,000	9,000	16,500	93,450	9.41
Hippo	1800	1,200	1,200	500	2,400	2,400	1,200	1,200	1,200	2,400	3,000	1,800	1,200	600	600	600	23,300	2.34
Impala	5,000	3,750	5,000	5,250	6,500	7,500	11,500	14,700	4,500	13,300	11,900	11,900	8,750	9,800	12,600	15,750	147,700	14.86
Oribi	0	0	0	0	540	600	900	450	150	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,640	0.27
Reed Buck	0	0	0	0	2,100	1,800	2,400	900	0	0	3,200	800	800	1,600	1,600	1,600	16,800	1.69
Topi	0	0	0	0	2,800	3,600	2,400	1,300	1,300	5,850	3,900	3,500	4,500	6,300	7,700	9,100	52,250	5.26
Water Buck	1100	6050	4950	2750	7700	8,250	7,150	9600	1,200	7200	10,400	12,000	9,600	8,800	10,400	13,600	120,750	12.15
Zebra	0	0	0	0	9500	15,500	17,000	13000	4,500	7000	8,000	14,000	9500	9,000	8,000	21,000	136,000	13.69
Leopard	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,000	0	5,000	0	5,000	0	5000	0	5,000	0	27,000	2.72
Bush pig	0	150	0	150	0	0	300	300	0	0	300	150	0	600	300	0	2,250	0.23
Hyena	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	300	0	300	0.03
Sitatunga	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,000	4,000	0.40
Total	**24,130**	**28,470**	**31,330**	**22,440**	**56,730**	**60,450**	**77,750**	**55,650**	**33,250**	**60,850**	**67,820**	**87,560**	**78,650**	**82,690**	**90,740**	**135,100**	**993,616**	**100**

Source: Muhimbura and Namara, 2009; UWA, 2017; GTL, 2016.

Table 5.4: Distributed income in US$ around Lake Mburo between 2001-2016

Actor	Period																Grand Total US$
	2001	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**	
Associations	15,685	18,506	20,365	14,586	36,875	39,293	50,538	25,043	14,963	27,383	30,519	35,024	31,460	33,076	36,296	54,040	**483,650**
Government	6,033	7,118	4,700	3,366	8,510	9,068	11,663	8,348	4,988	9,128	10,173	8,756	7,865	8,269	9,074	13,510	**130,566**
Landowner	-	-	3,133	2,244	5,673	6,045	7,775	16,695	9,975	18,255	20,346	43,780	39,325	41,345	45,370	67,550	**327,511**
Institution	1,207	1,424	1,567	1,122	2,837	3,023	3,888	2,783	1,663	3,043	3,391	-	-	-	-	-	**25,944**
Local government (sub-county)	1,208	1,424	1,567	1,122	2,837	3,023	3,888	2,783	1,663	3,043	3,391	-	-	-	-	-	**25,945**
Total	**24,131**	**28,471**	**31,331**	**22,440**	**56,731**	**60,451**	**77,751**	**55,651**	**33,251**	**60,851**	**67,820**	**87,560**	**78,650**	**82,690**	**90,740**	**135,100**	**993,616**

Source: UWA, 2017

Projects financed using sport hunting income between 2001-2015

The residents received different benefits from sport hunting to support their livelihoods, including income (Table 5.4), meat, and employment (R5). Out of about 2,591 landowners around Lake Mburo, only 461 landowners allegedly received direct income (R2) to cater for their household needs (R4, R6). One landowner (R2) mentioned, '*I paid school fees for my children, fenced my banana plantation, [...] and employ 5 scouts on my land to monitor encroachment*'. The scouts are paid an incentive of US$ 8 only if they report and the poacher/encroacher is arrested by the government or the company rangers. This amount is based on an informal agreement between the scout(s) and the landowner(s). Similarly, some 13 workers were employed by the company at its camp – most of them former poachers – earning between US$ 33 and US$ 167 per month (R1).

Generally, the association used its income (about US$ 53,000) to finance different community projects between 2010-2015 e.g. schools dormitory blocks and classroom blocks, health centres, roads, churches and mosques (Table 5.5) – which improved local healthcare and literacy levels (R2, R4, R46). A very tangible improvement the sport hunting income was used for, is the infrastructural transformation in Rurambiira parish (a parish is the lowest administrative unit in Uganda) in Nyakashashara sub-county, a formerly remote village, as well as in other sub-counties (Table 5.5). The majority of the local resident landowners in Rurambiira parish have been able to construct semi-permanent houses within the Kashenshero trading centre and now run small-scale retail businesses. Furthermore, a murram road was opened to link Rurambiira trading centre to Kagetti trading centre on the main Masaka-Mbarara highway, which helped to ease traveling and boosted trade between the villages and nearby towns of Mbarara and Lyantonde.

Table 5.5: Projects financed using hunting income around Lake Mburo between 2001-2015

Sub-county	Project and period		Amount (US$)
	2001-2007[1]	2010-2015[2]	
Nyakashashara	• Kashenshero Primary School – dormitory block, latrines, staff kitchen, water tank, fencing, mattresses, beds, boarding contribution • Two water dams • Nyanga Primary School contribution, teachers' salaries, teachers' lunch • Administrative costs – meetings, stationery, communication, office	• Construction of Rurambiira Church of Uganda (Anglican church)	11,765
		• Construction of Rurambiira Church house (Priest's residence)	2,941
		• Construction of two classroom blocks at Birunduma Primary school	4,706
		• Construction of classroom blocks at Nyakahiita Primary School	3,235

	rent, writing Constitution, compound maintenance, transport • Cattle vaccination against anthrax	• Opening of a (new) 3km Karunyiga-Rwitsura feeder road	4,706
Kanyaryeru	• Health centre with staff house, kitchen, water tank and 2 latrines • Karengo Primary School classroom block • Girls' dormitory at Sanga Senior School • Cattle vaccination against anthrax • Water dam in Akayanja • Graded Sanga to Kibuza road (approximately 21km) • Ntura Primary School – two classroom blocks • Kigarama Primary School – two classroom blocks • Rwemikunyu primary school • Facilitated annual community education meetings • Administrative expenses – opening of bank account, office opening and rent, meetings and allowances, welfare, intelligence information, coordination allowances	• Construction of Rwamuranda boarding Primary School	2,544
		• Contribution to renovate Kibega Primary School	1,309
		• Construction of Toilets at Akayanja Primary School	1,529
		• Staff office	2,294
		• Classroom block	3,824
Sanga I and II		• Construction of two classroom blocks at Rwemikunyu Primary School	2,647
		• Contribution to Rwabarata Health Centre	1,471
		• Contribution to Kakagate Primary School	735
		• Contribution to Sanga Church of Uganda (Anglican church)	882
		• Contribution to Sanga parents Primary School	1,471
		• Contribution to Sanga Muslim Primary School	735
		• Contribution for acaricide distribution	1,471
		• Contribution to the construction of four classroom blocks at Kikatsi Primary School	4,285
		• Contribution to the renovation Bisheshe Primary School	706
Total expenditure			**53,256**

Source: Muhimbura and Namara, 2009; NWA, 2015

Although the majority of stakeholders are of the opinion that sport hunting improved the livelihoods of the residents, a few are disappointed by the quality of the facilities. The hunting company representative (R1) lamented: '*now the maternity ward is cracked*'. This is explained by the unprofessional manner in which the facilities are constructed – without proper supervision by the (local) governments – resulting in low-quality facilities. Hence, the majority of interviewed residents are of the opinion that all the income should be distributed among themselves to meet their household needs (R13, R14, R16).

Illegal hunting

Government officials (R23, R25) confirmed that the government introduced sport hunting to reduce poaching. However, the policy's effectiveness in reducing poaching has varied significantly over time. The number of illegal hunters in and around Lake Mburo was low between 2001-2004 (Figure 5.1), because of a shared patrol by the government, hunting company and the association (UWA, 2015). The residents also reported poachers, especially after receiving awards (R1, R2). A resident (R9) confirmed, '*I blow the whistle on every poacher taking away the animals*'.

Figure 5.1: Estimated poaching trends in and around Lake Mburo between 2002-2016



Source: UWA, 2015; 2017

However, as Figure 5.1 illustrates, in subsequent years poaching picked up with fluctuations in poaching seizure data consistent across the years with two peaks in 2006/2007 and 2014/2015. These figures are high because some poachers were arrested several times a year (R1, R2). For example, about 388 poachers were arrested in 2014/2015. Overall, substantially higher numbers

were recorded in the years after 2006/2007, more than for instance in 2002-2004. This possibly indicates that residents either practiced retaliatory killing or perpetuated poaching for either subsistence or small-scale commercial purposes, even while they were receiving sport hunting benefits (R6, R7). They were driven by the local demand for low-priced alternative sources of animal protein (Kisame et al., 2017). For example, during fieldwork the meat of an entire impala was sold for between US$ 111-US$ 195, and zebra for US$ 69-139 (R1, R10). Most of the landowners claimed that the government was the main beneficiary from (hunting) tourism, although they were the ones who were expected to protect the animals on their land (R4, R5). As such, the high poaching seizure numbers between 2006-2007 and 2013-2016 are probably still too low, and more animals were being killed off the record. So these data may not be very reliable, especially since we received two sets of seizure data and averaged these (see UWA, 2015; 2017).

Although the government and the company have tried to recruit and employ scouts, and arrested some poachers, they have not been very successful. Many poachers do not have permanent addresses, making it hard to write anti-poaching agreements and to warn them (R2). Whilst poaching (and particularly retaliatory killing) is perpetuated, especially to eliminate animals on private land (R10), the government lacks a strong and independent legal framework to deal with culprits. Perpetrators are often released by the police after paying a bribe of about US$ 46 (R2, R36), after which they usually return to poaching.

Community attitudes towards wildlife

The sport hunting policy only partially changed community attitudes towards wildlife. Our results show that although the residents' 'ultimate' aim is to benefit from wildlife, their mostly negative attitudes towards wildlife have not significantly changed after sixteen years of sport hunting around Lake Mburo.

Internal (UWA, 2002) and external (Muhimbura & Namara, 2009) evaluations also revealed that although sport hunting generated benefits, it only partially improved residents' attitudes towards wildlife (R19, R23, R46). The majority of landowners are critical of the current hunting benefits: it does not compensate for wildlife damages (R4, R24), and not everyone benefits directly (R10). Only the big landowners benefit directly, at the expense of the small or non-landowners.

Moreover, landowners are changing the Lake Mburo landscape by diversifying land uses to include cultivation and rearing exotic livestock, such as cows and goats. A government representative (R46) confirmed that '*change in land use is a challenge*', as it can destroy wildlife habitat, and the exotic livestock is incompatible with wildlife and could result in a greater number of human-wildlife conflicts. This can have a negative impact on policy effectiveness, as the benefits are thought to be lower than the possible extra income from land-use change.

Although the association uses hunting income to finance so-called 'social goods' (Table 5.4), the majority of respondents are of the opinion that these 'goods' should be provided by the central government (R13, R14, R16). One community member (R4) noted, '*they are making the government ignore its responsibilities*', as private actors provide public goods/services; a role traditionally by the government. Thus, a majority of the landowners are therefore of the opinion that the 2012 benefit sharing-rules should be adjusted so that at least 90 per cent of the sport hunting revenue is allocated to individual landowners (R2). Furthermore, the landowners demand for the annual hunting quota to be increased to generate more income (R7). This shows that the conflict over the benefits remains unsettled. Other local residents, living within 5km radius from Lake Mburo, allegedly connive with poachers to kill game and sell the meat to local restaurants (R2, R6, R7). One local resident (R10) confirmed, '*there is a local restaurant in Lyantonde town where I eat […] I realised I was not eating beef but zebra meat*'. Although allocating more benefits to individual landowners may improve household incomes, it could perpetuate local inequality as bigger landowners would continue to receive a bigger share than the small and non-landowners.

5.4.2. Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area

In comparison to Lake Mburo, sport hunting benefits in Kabwoya created a stronger, albeit temporary, community interest in conservation. The communities, however, continued poaching for subsistence and small scale-commercial purposes.

Hunted animals

Following an application by the hunting company in 2002 for a concession to use Kabwoya for (sport hunting) tourism (R46), the government decided to increase the number of game in the area

by translocating animals from other protected areas (R45). The government, local governments and the company signed a 20-year lease agreement in 2005, where the company was to construct a tourist lodge and eventually provide residents (especially former poachers) with employment opportunities. In 2006 the government introduced hunting in a formal government protected area covering 87 square kilometres and in 2008 expanded it to Kaiso-Tonya Community Wildlife Area, which covers 107 square kilometres, as opposed to hunting on private land outside Lake Mburo National Park. The rules regarding hunting here are the same as in Lake Mburo except that 4 per cent adult male animals are killed based on census results per species even when the rule on paper stipulate 2 per cent. One government official (R23) mentioned, '*Kabwoya had many Uganda kobs and warthogs of which if the company was to remove 4 per cent, the conditions would still be sufficient for sport hunting*'. The other hunted species are the same as in Lake Mburo. A total of 452 animals were hunted between 2008-2016 (Table 5.6).

Table 5.6: Number of hunted animals through sport hunting in Kabwoya between 2008-2016

Species	Period									Total hunted animals
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
Baboon	5	7	4	0	13	3	6	2	5	**45**
Buffalo	1	2	3	3	2	0	1	3	3	**18**
Bushbuck	10	11	11	9	11		9	11	14	**86**
Bushpig	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	**0**
Bush Duiker	3	12	7	3	6	6	5	4	10	**56**
Oribi	6	10	6	2	5	6	5	3	6	**49**
Warthog	2	10	10	6	7	3	7	6	10	**61**
Waterbuck						9			2	**11**
Ugamda kob	18	17	10	12	17	9	10	10	16	**119**
Vervet Monkey							0			**0**
Hippopotamus						0			0	**0**
Black and White Colobus Monkey						3		2		**5**
Leopard						0			0	**0**
Hartebeest								1	1	**2**
Total	**45**	**69**	**51**	**35**	**61**	**39**	**43**	**42**	**67**	**452**

Source: UWA, 2017

Financial benefits

Apart from generating income for the government, the association and the local governments also receive direct benefits. Association representative (R28) confirmed, '*there was no other source of income for the community*'.

Table 5.7: Distributed income in Kabwoya between 2006-2016 in US$

Year	Beneficiary and the amount of revenue (in US$) received in Kabwoya between 2006-2016					Total Revenue
	Government	District local government	Association	Local governments		
				Buseruka sub-county	Kabwoya sub-county	
2006	2,265					2,265
2007	10,650					10,650
2008	26,150					26,150
2009	42,875					42,875
2010	22,276	4,201	4,256	1,596	1,596	33,925
2011	25,168	4,632	3,720	1,395	1,395	36,310
2012	29,410	5,419	4,532	1,700	1,700	42,761
2013	31,348	5,569	4,856	1,821	1,821	45,415
2014	23,447	3,849	3,294	1,235	1,235	33,060
2015	33,337	5,292	4,658	1,747	1,747	46,781
2016	35,034	5,881	5,980	2,243	2,243	51,381
Total	**281,960**	**34,843**	**31,296**	**11,737**	**11,737**	**371,573**

Source: UWA, 2017

Thus, a total of US$ 371,573 hunting income was generated between 2006-2016 and shared according to the hunting agreement's benefit-sharing rules (Table 5.7).

However, the government fully retained the hunting income in the first four years (i.e. 2006-2009) because there was no functional revenue-sharing agreement (R25) and hunting was only conducted in the formal government protected area (R45). The communities started receiving income in 2010 following the expansion of hunting to the community-owned land (R37, R41). Since then, the government monitors hunting and the distribution of benefits by the company to the other stakeholders. Association representative (R34) confirmed, '*the government ensures that the money is shared*'. Similarly, the 2013 revenue-sharing agreement in Kabwoya stipulates that the

government has to offer technical advice to the association about providing 'social goods' with the aim of helping to improve the residents' attitudes towards wildlife.

Projects financed using sport hunting income between 2008-2016

The income received by the association was used to finance livelihoods projects in Kabwoya, Buseruka and Kyangwali sub-counties (Table 5.8). This followed consultative meetings of the association and the wider community to generate a list of needs for funding (R35). The lists usually vary but include mostly public goods, such as schools and clinics (R25, R29, R31). One association representative (R37) explained, '*we supported the construction of teachers' quarters in Tonya and Kabaale public schools*'. Similarly, the association supported organised groups to start up pig farming, goat keeping, beekeeping and tree-planting projects (R32, R35).

These projects are intended to improve household income and to eventually reduce (or stop) poaching. It is not clear how the district and the sub-counties used their income. The government claims it used its income to carry out patrols and monitor encroachments in Kabwoya (R41), including sensitising residents to conservation (R46). However, there was no paper evidence for the income from sport hunting being used by the government for conservation. Some interviewees (R41, R36, R46) did state that this income was partly used for monitoring illegal activities, conducting animal censuses, sensitisation and hiring community wildlife scouts.

Although the benefits have been shared with the stakeholders, the association criticises the limited amount of income they received (R29, R34, R37). One association representative (R29) complained, '*we don't get enough revenue*'. Some residents also allege that the projects financed with hunting income do not translate into improved household income (R34). Also, the actual amount spent by the association in providing the 'social goods' largely remained unclear (except for where respondents were able to estimate the activities/projects costs (Table 5.8)), reflecting inconsistency in record keeping, a lack of transparency and accountability. Some residents even stopped working as wildlife scouts and resorted to poaching (R29). One association representative (R28) confirmed, '*one guy was given a job as a community scout but left*'. Moreover, some individuals who previously hunted for commercial purposes (R38) feel deprived of their source of income.

Table 5.8: Projects financed using hunting revenue in Kabwoya between 2010-2016

Project funded	Beneficiary	Cost in US$
A motor cycle for the association chairperson (Transferable in case one leaves office)	Association	964.90
Eighteen bags of cement for the construction of staff quarters	Kabale Public School	158.80
Eighteen bags of cement for the construction of staff quarters	Tonya Primary School	158.80
Mattresses, curtains, blankets and bed sheets	Kabwoya Health Center	
Construction of toilets (first phase)	Association	956
School materials (text books, pens, pencils, and literature books)	Kyehoro primary school, Hoima district	
Sensitisation meetings, Radio programme and formation of resource use groups	All three sub-counties	634
Facilitation of meetings to ensure that Rwembogo becomes a protected buffer zone along Howha river in the CWA	Government	330.90
Acquiring one acre of land and construction of association offices in Howha trading centre	Association	964.90
Construction of Association offices	Association	5100
Designing association logo, T-shirts and sign post	All three sub-counties	271.50
Acquiring office furniture (two tables, six chairs and four benches)	All three sub-counties	99.70
Distributing thirty piglets	Nyakabingo, Igwanjura, Buhogo women's groups (ten piglets each)	275.60
Distributing thirty high breed goats	Buhuka parish and women's groups	1240.40
Distributing ten beehives	Nkondo parish community group	413.60
Donating seventy iron sheets and ten poles for renovation	Humuro and Kimbugu community primary school	443.90
Acquiring one digital camera	Association	1282
Fencing Association land	Association	403.60
Office stationary (visitors' book, pens), typing and photocopying 2015 & 2016	Association	74
Allowances and transport for 11 Association executive members twice a year	Association	485

Source**:** UWA, 2017

Illegal hunting

Similar to the Lake Mburo case, the Kawoya residents had a long history of human-wildlife conflicts. A community member (R35) confirmed and elaborated, '*poaching was almost being done in the open, there was no conservation*'. This led to the local extinction of some species, such as the hartebeest in the 1980s, while buffalo and waterbuck were reduced to very low numbers (Plumptre et al., 2009). Following the implementation of sport hunting, some respondents (R37,

R41, R44) noted that poaching reduced, as some residents reported illegal activities. Association representative (R28) puts it: '*people have known that they are part of wildlife […] they report poaching*'. Similarly, the government conducts regular patrols to curb illegal activities (R45). Those found guilty are jailed for three months or fined US$ 42 (R28). As government representative (R41) explained, '*We extended patrols, rangers stay in the bush for about four days*'. Equally, the association organises regular sensitisations to convince known poachers to surrender and register as 'reformers' (R34), who are later recruited as community wildlife scouts (R25, R35, R45, R46). A community leader (R36) elaborated, '*when poachers are sensitised […] they are more likely to appreciate wildlife and to convince others to abandon poaching*'.

Although we were unable to access poaching seizure data in Kabwoya, as there are said to be no records of it, the communities appear to have diverse expectations of the reserve, including poaching, pastoralism and charcoal production (R29). Association representative (R28) confirmed, '*poachers get more money than they would working as community wildlife scouts*'. Poachers usually earn about US$ 139 from selling Uganda kob meat (R29) and thus usually opt to pay the US$ 42 fine and then return to the village to poach (R28). Conversely, some respondents (R29, R35) blame the persistent poaching on the unfair distribution of meat. One community leader (R36) noted, '*they were used to wild meat […] sport hunting has some restrictions*'. Association representative (R30) complained, '*sometimes the meat is given to the staff and clients of the company or the government soldiers*'. Similarly, when the company decides to share the meat, it only delivers to the nearby villages to keep transportation costs low (R29). This means that faraway villages never receive the meat, thereby provoking poaching.

Community attitudes towards wildlife

The implementation of sport hunting in Kabwoya has received mixed reactions from the stakeholders. While the residents' mainly negative attitudes towards wildlife generally changed over the years, the residents are still more concerned about livelihood security than conservation. Obviously, those who are given meat are happy, compared to those who have never received any. A local leader (R40) noted, '*we have benefited […] meat and some money to support our projects*'. However, another leader (R39) from the same area is not content with the arrangement: '*we are given like one Uganda kob, which is not enough […] they should give like five animals*'. Another

community member (R33) lamented, '*we never receive benefits, including meat*' – reflecting how benefits remain insufficient to guarantee the communities' continued support for conservation. Consequently, the communities only temporarily stopped and resumed poaching for subsistence and small-scale commercial purposes. Moreover, this local policy arrangement is not only characterised by passive community involvement, but also marred by mistrust and a lack of accountability (R28, R40). There were corruption allegations especially in regard to the sharing of meat (R38, R43) and a lack of transparency in terms of data availability – as we were even unable to get poaching seizure data for this site. The person responsible claimed not to have these records. Although, a majority of the residents were very interested in conservation in the beginning, they are gradually becoming unhappy about the inadequate benefits. Moreover, a tourism association representative (R24) views sport hunting as a '*deceptive activity*' that '*leads to reductions in species populations*'.

5.5. Discussion and conclusion

In this chapter, we evaluated and analysed the impacts of sport hunting for three formal policy goals around Lake Mburo and Kabwoya in Uganda, namely to (1) reduce human-wildlife conflicts by (2) positively changing residents' attitudes towards wildlife through (3) the providing of incentives for the local inhabitants (UWA, 2001).

Our results show that around Lake Mburo sport hunting is practiced on private land and on the one hand it does help to enhance local livelihoods. On the other hand, the politics of landownership perpetuates disputes over how the benefits are distributed. Sport hunting seems to temporarily and partly help to address human-wildlife conflicts, especially as local residents are hired as wildlife scouts. However, there are no official records on how many scouts were hired and paid over the years. Only the associations and a few (of the big) landowners around Lake Mburo who receive direct income talked about hiring some scouts. The association and landowners have used a large bulk of the income from sport hunting for conservation-unfriendly development, such as diversified land use with arable farming and stock breeding, accompanied by the construction of new roads and (semi-)permanent houses, thus destructing habitat. In Kabwoya, sport hunting was reintroduced in a formal government protected area and mainly practiced to generate income for the government to reduce human-wildlife conflicts.

Although sport hunting in Kabwoya was later extended to a community-owned wildlife area, most residents only had strong interests in conservation at the start, and remained largely unhappy about the hunting benefits, especially the sharing of meat. The communities accused the government and hunting company of holding back meat and not delivering it to the distant villages. Related, the majority of respondents around Lake Mburo believe that the current hunting benefits do not compensate for losses caused by wildlife. These respondents maintain that using hunting income to finance 'social goods' leads to what has been referred to as 'hollowing out the state' (Rhodes, 1996), as private actors are taking over what are usually considered public responsibilities. As such, the local communities feel that the benefits are insufficient to have a meaningful impact on their livelihoods. Moreover, the official government price tags for hunting animals in the two areas have remained low. While hunters in Tanzania pay US$ 1,900 for buffalo and US$ 1,700 for eland (see Booth, 2017), in Uganda hunters pay US$ 1,500 for buffalo and US$ 1,000 for eland (UWA, 2012).

As a result of these mixed outcomes of the sport hunting policy, communities' attitudes towards wildlife did not fundamentally change. Whereas the Kabwoya residents initially showed a changed attitude after receiving benefits, the Lake Mburo residents still view wildlife as a nuisance. Overall, the majority of the respondents in the two areas are still more concerned about livelihood security than conservation.

The third goal of the sport hunting policy is reducing human-wildlife conflicts, especially poaching. Although this goal is related to broader debates about the extent to which market-and-community-based approaches such as sport hunting contribute to conservation goals, our analysis shows that poaching has not been significantly reduced in the two cases. Poaching was only temporarily low around Lake Mburo after which it increased, on top of the legal hunting. This is demonstrated by the sharp increases in poaching seizure trends between 2006-2007 and 2013-2016 (Figure 5.1). As residents continued to think of wildlife as a nuisance, more animals were probably killed off-the-record. Moreover, there was no paper evidence that legal hunting actually contributes to paying for conservation. Thus, due to the unreliable data on both legal hunting and poaching, the sustainability of sport hunting in the two areas and its impact in terms of conservation remains unknown. Although we were unable to access poaching statistics for KKTGMA, interview

data revealed that poaching is still practiced especially for subsistence and small-scale commercial purposes.

Three main lessons can be learned from our analysis. Firstly, policy effectiveness is threatened by the lack of coordination among government agencies. Although the government implements hunting through the Uganda Wildlife Authority with a view to reduce poaching, the same government distributed exotic livestock (cattle and goats) to residents to promote the 'wealth creation' agenda through the National Agricultural Advisory Services. This new policy not only threatens the sustainability of wildlife but also encourages further land-use changes. Consequently, the government translocated 11 zebras and 68 impalas from around Lake Mburo to the Katonga wildlife reserve in western Uganda (UWA, 2017), casting doubts about the future of wildlife on private land around Lake Mburo. Whereas historically, wildlife co-existed with the indigenous long-horned Ankole cattle, the exotic breeds require vegetation to be cleared. Similarly, in Kabwoya, the government declared the entire Lake Albert region an oil reservoir. Although an intensive exploration is underway, it potentially breaches the government's objective 'to protect and conserve Kabwoya […] with varied ecosystems providing habitat to flora and fauna' (UWA, 2013:10). These two examples illustrate that: 1) the impact of Uganda's sport hunting policy is undermined by a lack of policy coherence and 2) there are serious conservation-development trade-offs in the two areas. The different policies in Lake Mburo and Kabwoya have contradicting goals and requirements, although they are all expected to contribute to transforming Uganda from a predominantly peasant/low income economy to a competitive, upper-middle income economy with an average per capita income of US$ 9,500 by 2040 (Republic of Uganda, undated).

Secondly, figures on benefits, hunted animals, poaching, and even census data are in essence political, and not as neutral as one might think. We were not able to get all the data on the different (financial) benefits generated, animals hunted through sport hunting and poaching, as this data is typically not systematically collected and recorded. Moreover, the census data attained through monitoring the number of animals per species are also flawed as it is irregularly conducted and poorly recorded. Similar inconsistencies regarding sport hunting data sets were observed in Tanzania (Booth, 2017). Baker (1997) also highlights inaccuracies in sport hunting data as well as animal censuses used for setting annual hunting quotas in southern and eastern Africa. Elsewhere,

acquiring data on illegal hunting, for example in Brazil, is also a challenge (El Bizri et al., 2015). Moreover, non-state actors usually have no insight in the actual (income) figures, except for what is shared with them. Although conservation organisations have demanded (income) audits, these data have not been released, nor publicly discussed. This reflects a lack of accountability and transparency, which are key elements of good governance (Rhodes, 1996). It is therefore possible that some data we received from different sources were provided to paint an image of a well-managed and supervised process – a challenge regularly associated with private-sector involvement in biodiversity conservation (MacDonald, 2010). It also shows that the sport hunting policy is not based on accurate, reliable data, casting doubts as to its sustainability.

Thirdly, based on our analysis, we conclude that whereas sport hunting generated benefits and helped to improve local livelihoods and attitudes towards wildlife in the first years of its implementation, the benefits remain insufficient to make meaningful livelihood improvements and sustain more positive attitudes towards wildlife in the two areas. As such, the underlying assumption of the sport hunting policy – that when local residents receive benefits, they will appreciate wildlife and thus human-wildlife conflicts will be reduced – is debateable. This is illustrated by the fact that the communities around Lake Mburo still perceive wildlife as a nuisance even when they receive benefits. In Kabwoya, discontentment over the way meat and other benefits are shared generally led residents to resume poaching. This conclusion supports similar findings in earlier studies on market- and community-based conservation (see Nthiga et al., 2015), and has big consequences for conservation policy in a more general sense.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

6.1. Introduction

Sport hunting, defined as an activity where a tourist pays to hunt an animal with desired physical attributes (e.g. large horns, tusks, or a certain body size or skull length) (Booth, 2017; Cooney et al., 2017) has been subject to heated debates around the world, and especially in sub-Saharan Africa. In Kenya it was banned in 1977 and more recently (2014) in Botswana as well. In Uganda, however, it was reintroduced in 2001, first as a pilot project around Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) and later in Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKTGMA) in 2006 and in other areas.

Uganda reintroduced sport hunting to achieve the following objectives: 1) to positively change residents' attitudes towards wildlife, and 2) reduce human-wildlife conflicts (especially poaching by local communities), by 3) providing incentives for local inhabitants, and 4) to develop guidelines and procedures for further implementation of sport hunting (UWA, 2001). These objectives were expected to contribute to achieving the wider goals of conservation and development in the country. This thesis analyses this reintroduction of Uganda's national sport hunting policy.

This thesis is positioned in the broader debates on conservation and development trade-offs in Africa. The analysed sport hunting policy arrangements are implemented based on both market-base conservation and community-based conservation approaches. Market-based conservation approaches are guided by the idea that attaching monetary value to nature will raise nature's worth and improve its chances of survival (see Fletcher, 2010; McAfee, 1999). Community-based conservation approaches are based on the idea that conservation and development can be simultaneously achieved (see Baker, 1997; Hulme & Murphree, 2001; Lewis & Alpert, 1997).

For this research, I drew on the theory of institutionalism, particularly discursive institutionalism (DI), regime theory and the governance literature to conceptualise Uganda's sport hunting policy as a policy arrangement built on (inter)national institutions and discursive processes, but implemented at the local level. I then used the Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA) (Arts et al., 2006) and the concepts of governance capacity (see Arts et al., 2006; Dang et al., 2015), together with the concepts of congruence (Arts & Goverde, 2006) and institutional effectiveness

(Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2011; Levy & Young, 1994; Mitchell, 2003) for my conceptual framework to analyse the development and implementation of the sport hunting policy arrangements and their impacts around LMNP and KKTGMA (see Figure 2.1). Policy arrangements comprise policy discourses, actors, rules and resources. It is argued that policy goals can only be achieved when these dimensions are, to a certain extent, consistent with each other, or at least experience a certain level of congruence. This thesis thus aims at understanding the indicative governance capacity of the sport hunting policy arrangements in the two areas – that is the potential of these (new) modes of governance to contribute to the solution of societal or administrative problems, as seen differently by the different stakeholders (Arts et al., 2006:75; see also Dang et al., 2015).

The performative governance capacity – 'the performance of the (new) modes of governance in those practices that are meant to solve these societal or administrative problems' (Arts & Goverde, 2006:76) – was analysed using the concept of effectiveness (Levy & Young, 1994; Mitchell, 2003). To understand the effectiveness of the two sport hunting policy arrangements around LMNP and KKTGMA, I analysed the sport hunting policy impacts in terms of improving local livelihoods, reducing human-wildlife conflicts (especially poaching by local residents) and changing local communities' attitudes towards wildlife.

Also informed by the framework developed in chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1) this research therefore had the following main objective:

> *To analyse the development and implementation of the sport hunting policy arrangements in Uganda and their implications for conservation and development.*

In order to operationalise the objective of this thesis, the following research questions were formulated:

1. How was the sport hunting policy reintroduced and implemented in Uganda?
2. How did the sport hunting policy arrangements around Lake Mburo National Park and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area evolve over time, and what have been the driving forces for this change?
3. What are the impacts of the sport hunting policy arrangements around Lake Mburo National Park and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area in terms of

enhancing development, reducing poaching and changing residents' attitudes towards wildlife?

In order to the answer the three research questions, this thesis is based on a comparative case study approach (Miles et al., 2014; Yin, 2003). Sport hunting arrangements in Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKTGMA) were analysed. The use of various data sources (i.e. literature and document review, qualitative in-depth interviews and non-participant observation) provided for validation (Kumar, 2012) and triangulation (Jennings, 2001).

This final chapter of the thesis comprises four sections. Section 6.2 draws on the empirical chapters to answer the research questions. Section 6.3 discusses these findings to make a contribution to the debates around sport hunting implementation, and reflects on the methods used in this study. Finally, section 6.4 provides some policy recommendations and areas for future research.

6.2. Conclusions

I will first present the main conclusions of the thesis here, before zooming into my three research questions.

The Ugandan government developed and implemented its sport hunting policy first as a pilot around Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) in 2001 and later extended it to Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKTGMA) and 11 other areas. The national level sport hunting policy aims have remained the same, with adjustments only having been made in animal fees (the amount of money to be paid by each sport hunter to kill a certain animal) and the annual population quotas per species. Most of the changes happened at the local level. First, although the rule on paper states that it is allowed to hunt 2 per cent of the available population in both LMNP and KKTGMA, in the latter, the actual percentage is 4 per cent. This implies that rules on paper are different from rules in practice. Second, the sport hunting policy arrangement around LMNP changed through four major periods as the communities actively participated in the debate and they owned the land where sport hunting takes place. Moreover, the government and the local communities had different interpretations of what sport hunting is all about. The LMNP

arrangement has been dominated by politics of landownership, conflicts over the benefits and changes in the local discourses (as elaborated below). In the KKTGMA, the arrangement remained relatively stable as the community was less active in the debates and the government is dominant and owns most of the land where hunting takes place, thereby exhibiting a high congruence among the policy arrangement dimensions.

Generally, landownership is an important variable in explaining the nature of the two policy arrangements. Obviously, the sport hunting policy arrangements generated revenue, which was shared with the beneficiaries following agreed revenue-sharing rules. In LMNP, the association and the landowners received more revenue because they own the land where hunting is practiced. In KKTGMA, the government took the lion's share of the hunting revenue because sport hunting is mainly practiced on government land. Although the money received by the associations was used to provide social services and support social development projects at the community level, the community members interviewed do not think that their household-level livelihoods have improved. The majority of the local residents around LMNP are small landowners on whose land sport hunting rarely takes place, meaning they rarely earn from the landowner's share of the revenue. Most of the benefits flow to the larger landowners.

In the government's official sport hunting policy, reducing human-wildlife conflicts, especially poaching by the local communities, was implicitly expected to contribute to conservation goals. However, this has not happened in either of the studied areas. Moreover, there are significant questions to be asked about the sustainability of the sport hunting itself (as discussed below). The local people in the two areas only temporarily stopped, but soon resumed poaching for subsistence and small-scale commercial purposes. Furthermore, the local communities' attitudes towards wildlife in the two areas only temporarily improved in the earlier years of the sport hunting policy arrangements' implementation despite the fact that they continued to receive benefits. Initially there were high expectations, especially around LMNP, about sport hunting 'providing opportunities to reduce' wildlife on private land, and also providing a new revenue source alongside the traditional tourism (e.g. visiting to protected areas to observe wildlife, photographic tourism) revenue-sharing scheme. However, the communities, especially around LMNP, still think of wildlife as a nuisance.

Also, the LMNP arrangement experienced disputes over the benefits, including an attempted but failed 'elite seizure' of sport hunting benefits by larger landowners who are originally from the region but are currently mainly living in the capital city Kampala. Overall, the communities think that the two arrangements are characterised by insufficient benefits, which have not translated into household-level development. Moreover, the practice of sport hunting in KKTGMA is marred by corruption allegations, as the communities accuse the government and hunting company of not sharing meat and not delivering it to the faraway villages.

Although sport hunting in Uganda can be described as a 'double-edged sword' with the potential to control poaching, provide benefits and improve local attitudes towards wildlife, it may also destroy the very wildlife it is supposed to protect, as more healthier animals are hunted for their treasured trophies. Moreover, my research shows that changes in local attitudes and behaviour were only temporary. The continued disputes over the benefits indicate that the local communities are more interested in the hunting benefits than in sport hunting as a conservation approach. As such, a large bulk of the income from sport hunting is often used for conservation-unfriendly development, such as the construction of roads and (semi-permanent) houses, as well as clearing habitat for cultivation and livestock rearing by individual landowners around LMNP. So there are tremendous trade-offs between development and conservation. This is worsened by the continued local community demand for raised hunting quota to generate more revenue while other individuals connive with poachers to illegally profit from wildlife by selling the meat to local restaurants in nearby towns.

This thesis reveals a lack of complete and reliable data on the populations of wildlife in the two areas, including data on the number of hunted animals, number of arrested poachers and revenue generated. It cannot be guaranteed that continued implementation of sport hunting will not hurt Uganda's wildlife population in the long run. Questions can therefore be asked about the sustainability of sport hunting in Uganda.

In the next paragraphs I will elaborate on these findings by answering the three main research questions.

6.2.1. Uganda's sport hunting policy

The first research question dealt with how sport hunting has been reintroduced and implemented in Uganda. This question is answered in Chapter 3 based on a review of the policy documents, and on interviews with policymakers and other stakeholders on the sport hunting implementation at the national level and around the first pilot area, Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP).

Sport hunting was reintroduced in Uganda as a form of 'new' sport hunting following a global change in conservation discourses, namely from a 'fences and fines approach' to 'community-based approaches' . Whereas the implementers of the 'old' sport hunting did not consider the views of the local residents during the design and implementation of the policy nor did they contribute direct benefits to the local communities, the designers of the 'new' sport hunting in Uganda implement it as an approach aimed at achieving both conservation and development goals through increased local participation in conservation activities (see also Table 6.1).. They also aim to generate and share hunting benefits with the local people in areas where sport hunting is implemented as well as in neighbouring areas. In Uganda, the new sport hunting was adopted to achieve four specific objectives, namely, 1) to positively change residents' attitudes towards wildlife, and 2) reduce human-wildlife conflicts (especially poaching by local communities), by 3) providing incentives for local inhabitants, and 4) to develop guidelines and procedures for further implementation of sport hunting (UWA, 2001).

Table 6.1: Broad characteristics of the 'old' and 'new' sport hunting

'Old' sport hunting	'New' sport hunting
• Introduced during the colonial era • Solely controlled by the government • Practiced mainly in government-controlled reserves • Faced resistance from the communities as it prohibited traditional hunting by communities • Persistent wildlife poisoning, poaching and encroachment of protected areas by the local communities • Mostly targeted larger species • Led to decline and/or extinction of some species • Banned by some countries (e.g. Kenya and Botswana)	• Notion of new sport hunting in Uganda is part of a changed discourse on conservation and development since the 1980s • Collaborative management arrangement involving the government, private sector, civil society, local communities and individuals • Practiced on private land, community-owned land and in government reserves • Meant to enable controlled hunting (e.g. focused on hunting old male animals) • Reintroduced in Uganda while other countries, e.g. Zimbabwe, changed its organisation to better involve local communities. Botswana now reconsidering reintroducing it after the 2014 ban (see Mbaiwa, 2018)

The 'new sport hunting' was first reintroduced in Uganda as a pilot project in 2001 in Rurambbiira parish, due to its proximity to the Lake Mburo National park boundaries. Therefore, its residents experienced more crop damage and animal attacks as well as poaching by people from neighbouring communities (UWA, 2002; Muhimbura & Namara, 2009). Before the reintroduction of sport hunting the communities thought of wildlife as a nuisance, but this changed after they started receiving hunting benefits in the first period with the anticipation of more revenues to come, but this change in view was only temporary. Following an internal evaluation in 2002 (UWA, 2002), in which the new sport hunting was reported to have positive outcomes in terms of delivering benefits and changing local people's attitudes towards wildlife, the government decided to extend the sport hunting policy to two other parishes (i.e. Nyakahiita and Rwakanombe). This marked a change in the actor, resource and discourse dimensions of the policy arrangement around LMNP. Although the rules dimension of the arrangement remained the same, the new parishes started to receive direct benefits from the continued sport hunting implementation. However, in 2003 the landowners (individuals who own land where wild animals graze and hunting is conducted) started to challenge the revenue-sharing rules on the basis that they own the land where sport hunting is practiced and therefore deserved to be included among the direct beneficiaries.

Accordingly, these rules were adjusted in 2003 and the landowners started to receive direct benefits. As there was little inclusion of all the relevant stakeholders (especially landowners) during the initiation of the LMNP sport hunting policy arrangement, it was bound to be dynamic from the onset. Furthermore, in 2006 sport hunting was extended to Kabwoya Wildlife Reserve (KWR, a government-controlled reserve situated on the western side of the lake) and in 2008 to the Kaiso-Tonya Community Wildlife Area [KTCWA] (community-owned wildlife area situated on the eastern side).

6.2.2. Sport hunting around Lake Mburo National Park and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area

The second research question dealt with how the sport hunting policy arrangements around Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKTGMA) evolved over time and what the driving forces for change were.

While the national sport hunting policy objectives remained the same, the LMNP sport hunting policy arrangement has been a dynamic arrangement over four main periods, characterised by disputes over the benefits, politics of landownership and changed local discourses, thereby reflecting a highly incongruent policy arrangement in terms of the actors and rules dimensions of the policy arrangement. However, in the first period (2001-2003) the policy arrangement dimensions were relatively congruent. Communities were excited about the new opportunity to receive benefits from the hunted animals especially alongside the already existing traditional tourism revenue sharing scheme (TRS) initiated by the Uganda Wildlife Authority in 1996 (Ahebwa et al., 2008). Also, the communities expected that sport hunting would reduce the numbers of wildlife on private land, so they would have fewer problems with crop damage and animal attacks. Thus, benefits were shared among the different stakeholders as specified in the revenue-sharing rules and the communities continued to simply hope that the numbers of wildlife would go down because of the sport hunting. However, in the second period (2003-2008) the arrangement began to experience some incongruence between the rules and actors dimensions, largely fuelled by the politics of landownership. The landowners argued that since they owned the land where wildlife grazes and hunting is practiced, they deserved preferential treatment. Therefore, certain rules, including the revenue-sharing rules, were adjusted in 2003 to include

landowners among the direct beneficiaries. Similarly, sport hunting was introduced in two other parishes (i.e. Nyakahiita and Rwakanombe) during this period, and they equally received benefits. Although the rules were changed to include landowners in the arrangement, these rules continued to be a source of discontentment.

Similarly, the third period (2008-2012) revealed a total mismatch between the national and local level discourses in terms of what sport hunting is all about. The government, hunting company and community protected areas institutions (CPI – hereafter institutions) continued to perceive sport hunting as a means to derive benefits from wildlife to help change the local residents' attitudes towards wildlife and to eventually reduce human-wildlife conflicts (especially poaching by the local people). The local people, on the other hand, had a different interpretation of the policy and not only viewed sport hunting as a means to derive financial benefits, but also as a way of decreasing wildlife numbers in order to reduce crop damage and animal attacks. This mismatch in policy interpretation, interestingly, reflects different discourses on human-wildlife conflicts and the role of sport hunting in addressing these conflicts, with one discourse coalition interpreting human-wildlife conflicts as having to reduce poaching, and the other as having to reduce crop damage and attacks by animals. This confusion among stakeholders on this aim of the sport hunting policy has played an important role in the arrangement throughout its development. More so, it perpetuated increasing disputes over the benefits, with land being a critical factor in the debates about sport hunting implementation at the local level. As such, the communities resumed to think of wildlife as a nuisance especially as they were still faced with animal attacks and crop damage. In their view the purpose of sport hunting was merely to receive benefits and lower wildlife numbers. More changes were made in the revenue-sharing rules at the local level and eventually some actors were removed from the arrangement in favour of the association (community based organisations that manage sport hunting benefits and implement community development projects) and the landowners.

Furthermore, in period four (2012 to date), the continued conflicts over the benefits resulted in a total reorganisation of the benefit-sharing rules, including which actors directly receive benefits. This period also witnessed the failed attempt of 'elite seizure' of the benefits by larger landowners who are originally from the region but are currently mainly living in the capital city Kampala.

Although this group claimed they wanted to improve community involvement in sport hunting and convince the government to fence the park in order to reduce human-wildlife conflicts, the local landowners opposed them because they thought that the group wanted to deprive them of sport hunting revenues. Eventually, new actor coalitions arose based on landownership size: 'the big landowners' versus 'the small landowners'. Related, between 2008-2012 the LMNP landowners argued that they should be given at least 90 per cent of the sport hunting revenue. After negotiations, landowners started receiving 50 per cent of the sport hunting revenue in 2012 following changed benefit-sharing rules to help enhance development at the household level. As sport hunting is mostly conducted on large pieces of land usually owned by the 'big landowners', it is, however, likely that they will continue to receive benefits at the expense of the 'small landowners' on whose land sport hunting is rarely practised.

In comparison (see Table 6.2), the KKTGMA sport hunting policy arrangement remained stable over the years due to its relative congruency. Following the extension of sport hunting to Kabwoya Wildlife Reserve (KWR, a formal government protected reserve) in 2006, the government and the hunting company (Lake Albert Safaris Limited) incorporated other actors in the arrangement, such as the Hoima District Local Government, Kabwoya and Buseruka sub-counties and the local communities through their association. Generally, the government and the association executive share similar views regarding wildlife protection and agree that unrestricted use of environmental resources can lead to their decline. In comparison to the case in LMNP, landownership did not really play a key role in determining the distribution of benefits in KKTGMA. Because the government allegedly introduced sport hunting here to raise money to enable financing conservation activities in the area (although there is very little proof that hunting income is actually used for conservation), the benefit-sharing rules were stipulated to favour the government, getting 50 per cent of the sport hunting revenue. Nevertheless, a minimal change happened in the rules and actors' dimensions of the policy arrangement in 2008. First, sport hunting was extended to Kaiso-Tonya Community Wildlife Area (KTCWA, community-owned land) and second, a new actor, Kyangwali sub-county, was included among the sub-counties to receive sport hunting benefits. Further, there was a little incongruence in the rules, resources and actors' dimensions of the arrangement, as the rules never specified what percentage of direct revenue the new actor would receive as is the case with Kabwoya and Buseruka sub-counties (see Chapter 4). Currently,

Kyangwali sub-county only indirectly benefits from the association's 20 per cent share of the revenue, mainly through the provision of social services regarding education and health, and funding of social development projects (see Chapter 5 and section 6.2.3 below). But overall, this arrangement experienced few conflicts over the benefits, except regarding the sharing of meat – with claims that UWA and the hunting company sometimes hold back the meat and/or do not distribute it to villages located further away from the areas where hunting takes place. In conclusion, in KKTGAM the arrangement exhibited congruence in the policy arrangement dimensions, *first* due to the fact that the government and the local leaders share relatively similar views regarding wildlife protection, and *second*, the politics of landownership were largely absent here. This is because sport hunting was first introduced and is mainly practiced on government-owned land, (although it was later expanded and is also practiced in community owned-land in KTCWA) and thus the government wields more power in terms of decision-making.

Table 6.2: Comparison between the LMNP and KKTGMA sport hunting policy arrangements

LMNP	KKTGMA
• Hunting on privately owned land • Evolved in 4 periods • Changes in all the PAA dimensions • Mismatch in discourses between the government and hunting company on the one and hand and local people on the other • Disputes over the benefits (including 'elite seizure' of the benefits) • Changing community discourses on wildlife • Community more active in the debate over time • Strong influence of the politics of landownership	• Hunting in government-controlled reserve and on community-owned land • Relatively stable arrangement throughout the years • Only actor dimension visibly changed • Relative match in policy interpretation between all actors • Few disputes over the benefits (except dismay regarding the sharing of meat) • Community less active in the debate • Politics of landownership largely stable as the government is dominant and owns the land where hunting mostly takes place

6.2.3. Impacts of the sport hunting policy arrangements

The third research question dealt with the impacts of the sport hunting policy arrangements around Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKTGMA). This question is answered in Chapter 5.

The impacts of the sport hunting policy arrangements were analysed in terms of enhancing local development, reducing poaching and changing residents' attitudes towards wildlife. My study shows that sport hunting only helped to reduce poaching in the earlier years of its reintroduction. Based on the analysed seizure data, the number of arrested poachers around LMNP for example was only low between 2001-2004. This was because of a successful combined patrol by the government, the sport hunting company and the associations (UWA, 2015). Also during this time, the local communities were still content with the benefits with a few individuals stating that they employed community wildlife scouts. These scouts were supposed to help monitor and report illegal activities e.g. poaching, charcoal burning, wire snares and encroachment et cetera on private land as well as generally in the community. Overall human-wildlife conflicts (especially poaching by local communities) have not significantly decreased in either of the areas studied. Poaching is still regularly practiced, as is retaliatory killing, in LMNP in the hope that it will help to reduce wildlife numbers on private land and thus reduce incidences of animal attacks and crop damage and in KKTGMA for subsistence use and small-scale commercial purposes.

Further, this study shows that an estimated 1,819 animals were legally hunted between 2001-2016 in the LMNP arrangement, while an estimated 452 animals were legally hunted between 2008-2016 in the KKTGMA arrangement. This research further shows that the LMNP policy arrangement generated an estimated US$ 994,000 from hunting between 2001-2016 and the KKTGMA policy arrangement generated an estimated US$ 372,000 between 2006-2016. The income was used to incentivise the local people in the two arrangements. Although the revenue was shared among the policy actors, the LMNP arrangement, as also elaborated in Chapter 4, experiences continuous disputes over the benefits amplified by the politics of landownership. In both cases, the associations used their share of the revenue to complement the central government by providing different social services and social development projects based on the needs of the different local communities. The social development projects included the construction of classroom blocks in the village schools, health care facilities, upgrading of roads and boreholes most of which were originally provided or supposed to be provided by the government, and most of which were originally constructed by the church missionary society (CMS). Local residents do, however, challenge the way the revenue is used, arguing that these shared community development benefits should be translated into direct income at household levels. They think that the central

government is ignoring its mandate of providing public goods to their communities because the government now knows that the associations are playing this role.

Furthermore, the 'new' sport hunting was expected to change community attitudes towards wildlife, especially after they were incentivised. This study reveals that the local community attitudes towards wildlife only temporarily improved in the earlier years of sport hunting implementation (see also Muhimbura & Namara, 2009; UWA, 2002), also as shown by the low numbers of poachers between 2001-2004. This was because: 1) they received and were happy about the promised benefits, and 2) they thought that sport hunting would considerably reduce wildlife on private land in the long run. Obviously, the government introduced the 'new' sport hunting and interpreted it differently, namely as an approach to incentivise and motivate the local people to protect wild animals on private land against poachers, leading to greater numbers of wildlife numbers in the long run. However, it is premature, if not impossible, to conclude whether or not sport hunting has led to an increase in wildlife numbers in the two areas studied, as the auditor general's report in 2011 also highlighted the incapacity of UWA to conduct regular censuses of wildlife numbers in Uganda (OAG, 2011; also see section 6.3). The local communities continued to hope that the policy would lower wildlife numbers, especially when they were disappointed in the way the revenues were shared – implying no change in attitudes. Moreover, the local residents do not think the current revenues match the costs of the neighbouring LMNP, thereby reinforcing the disputes over the benefits. This disgruntlement has led the local communities to not only increasingly change land uses to include cultivation and livestock rearing, but also to kill wildlife in retaliation and sometimes return to poaching for subsistence and small-scale commercial purposes. This obviously hinders the effectiveness of the policy. These changes in land use threaten wildlife habitats and therefore contribute to the broader trends in biodiversity loss across Africa, including Uganda. In comparison, in KKTGMA the communities were less negative about wildlife to begin with, as they also poached for subsistence and small-scale commercial purposes. As such, the majority remains more concerned about their livelihoods than conservation. Chapters 4 and 5 show how the communities resumed poaching for subsistence and small-scale commercial purposes.

In conclusion, the continued implementation of sport hunting in Uganda has not led to a sustained change in local residents' attitudes towards wildlife, even though this was one of the main goals of the government policy of reintroducing sport hunting. The continued conflicts over the benefits indicate that the local communities have remained more interested in the benefits from sport hunting, than considering it as an approach to conservation. Also, the socio-cultural context in which these arrangements have been implemented had a great impact on how local communities perceive these benefits. For example, the local communities in KKTGMA eat wild meat and so they place great value on the sharing of meat from the killed animals, while the LMNP communities are more interested in improving their household level livelihoods. As such, for the LMNP residents, sport hunting competes with alternative agricultural land uses, which are expected to bring higher returns to individual households. The different contexts influence the continued implementation of the policy in the two areas, for instance bringing about changes in the number of policy actors and in the rules to institutionalise dominant discourses and to enable the mobilisation of resources.

Table 6.3: Comparison of impacts of the sport hunting policy arrangements

LMNP	KKTGMA
• Human-wildlife conflicts, especially poaching, only diminished in the earlier years of sport hunting reintroduction. Thus, the local residents' attitudes towards wildlife have not fundamentally changed • Mainly retaliatory killing and to a small extent poaching for small-scale commercial purposes • Sport hunting benefits insufficient to compete with benefits from other land uses • The continued disputes over the benefits indicate that the local communities have remained more interested in the benefits from sport hunting than they are in conservation • A large bulk of the sport hunting income is shared between the association and the larger landowners • Sport hunting income is often used for conservation-unfriendly development such as funding social development projects, construction and farming	• Human-wildlife conflicts, especially poaching, only temporarily diminished in the earlier years, but poaching was resumed following discontentment with the sharing of meat • Mainly poaching for subsistence and small-scale commercial purposes • Sport hunting benefits, especially meat from the killed animals, remain insufficient to meet the demand of the communities • The continued dispute over the sharing of meat indicates that the communities have remained more interested in the benefits from sport hunting than they are in conservation • Government takes a lion's share of the income • The government claims that a large bulk of the income from sport hunting is used for conservation-friendly activities such as monitoring illegal activities and conducting animal censuses, although no records exist of how much of this income was used for this purpose

6.3. Discussion

In chapter 1, I highlighted a number of debates on sport hunting in developing countries, and I introduced my thesis topic, Uganda's sport hunting, against the backdrop of these debates. In this section of Chapter 6, I return to these debates. This thesis contributes to these debates in the following ways.

First, there is a general consensus that biodiversity loss is one of the main environmental challenges of our time (Breitling, 2016). In order to try to preserve the remaining biodiversity, market-based approaches, including sport hunting, are often promoted and used across Africa (Roth & Dressler, 2012; Sullivan, 2012). Market-based conservation approaches are often applied for two reasons: (1) its suggested potential to provide incentives to conserve biodiversity, and (2) its suggested potential to complement traditional regulatory conservation approaches (Bräuer et al., 2006).

In terms of incentivising the local people, Muposhi et al. (2016:11) confirmed that, in their case in Zimbabwe, sport hunting 'creates incentives for conservation for especially rural communities sharing space with wildlife'. According to Di Minin et al. (2016) incentives from sport hunting are expected to change local attitudes in sub-Saharan Africa and enable them to protect wildlife especially when there are adequate political and governance structures. However, in the case studies analysed in this thesis, the local communities are more interested in the hunting benefits than in sport hunting as a conservation approach. These benefits are furthermore considered to be inadequate to result in a permanent change in local residents' attitudes towards wildlife, which was the main goal of the government. Moreover, further research is still needed to fully understand the role of benefit sharing in changing and sustaining local attitudes and behaviour. As such, the settlement of the disputes over the benefits is yet unforeseeable. Similarly, studies by Ahebwa et al. (2012a) and Anyango-Van Zwieten et al. (2015) caution that the durability of conservation benefits is a necessary precondition to guarantee the success of incentive-based conservation approaches and to avoid renewed animosity towards wildlife. Additionally, Breitling (2016) cautions that although market-based approaches may provide short-term solutions to biodiversity loss, they fall short of capacity to address the underlying causes, or indirect drivers, of biodiversity loss, such as poverty, inadequate institutions and governance, population growth and more distantly, values or views on a 'good quality of life' (see Diaz et al., 2015). Thus, current sport hunting practices do not address either the direct or the indirect drivers of biodiversity loss. As Chan et al. (2007) argue, sport hunting benefits are not a magic bullet to address conservation and development challenges.

Equally, several scholars (e.g. Challender & Cooney, 2016; Damm, 2008; Di Minin et al., 2016; Muposhi et al., 2016) argue that market-based conservation approaches (e.g. sport hunting) can complement traditional regulatory approaches especially when governments collaborate with the local communities to protect wildlife. Lindsey et al. (2007) studied the hunting industry in southern and eastern African countries and showed that local communities and sport hunting operators can work as wildlife scouts to prevent poaching. However, although sport hunting seems to complement traditional tourism approaches in Zimbabwe (Muposhi et al., 2016), its contribution in Uganda is debatable. My study only partly confirms that sport hunting complements traditional

conservation approaches. The UWA was able to collaborate with the local communities at the start of the policy implementation to protect wildlife on private land and the number of arrested poachers was low in the earlier years of sport hunting, also because the communities expected benefits. However, it was only a short period of time before it became clear that there was a general mismatch in the interpretation of the sport hunting policy aims between the government and the local communities. This has continued to affect how the local residents view the policy and its effectiveness generally. Moreover, although the government received US$ 130,566 from the LMNP arrangement between 2001-2016 and US$ 281,960 from the KKTGMA arrangement between 2006-2016, supposedly to be used to fund conservation activities, there is a lack of clear records of how much of the sport hunting income is actually directly reinvested into conservation activities. Consequently, it is difficult to assess the extent to which sport hunting actually complements traditional regulatory conservation approaches in Uganda.

Further, there is a discussion on the relative contribution of sport hunting versus photographic tourism in Africa (cf. Baldus & Cauldwel, 2004; see also Damm, 2008; Rodrigues & Force, 2004). As a matter of fact, some (e.g. Rodrigues & Force, 2004) argue that the latter brings many more incentives to conservation than sport hunting while others e.g. Booth (2017) argue that sport hunting brings more revenue. However, very few studies (e.g. Booth, 2017; Mbaiwa, 2018) have examined the relative importance of either sport hunting or photographic tourism. Nevertheless, a study by Naidoo et al. (2016) revealed that both practices complemented one another in protecting wildlife in over 77 conservancies in Namibia. These authors warn that 'a singular focus on either hunting or tourism would reduce the value of wildlife as a competitive land-use option and have grave repercussions for the viability of community-based conservation efforts in Namibia, and possibly other parts of Africa' (Naidoo et al., 2016: 628). Around LMNP, the association (which is located in Kiruhura district) received around US$ 54,000 as sport hunting income in 2016 compared to around US$ 62,000 from the traditional revenue-sharing income from (photographic, ecotourism, wildlife viewing et cetera) tourism that was disbursed by the UWA to Kiruhura district in 2016 (www.newvision.co.ug; UWA, 2016). However, photographic tourism is only practiced within the formal protected LMNP boundaries and not on private land. This means that sport hunting is currently the only major source of income for the communities that can be an incentive to continue protecting wildlife on private land outside LMNP – although it leads to killing of

wildlife. The KKTGMA arrangement is so far the only approach of which the income is allegedly used to finance UWA's conservation activities, such as monitoring, and conducting animal censuses, although no formal proof was found for this. Photographic tourism is still underdeveloped in this area especially following several years without UWA's presence amidst widespread poaching by the local communities, which reduced wildlife numbers in the area. Thus, following a collaborative agreement between UWA and Lake Albert Safaris Limited in 2002 the area was 'restocked' with wildlife for sport hunting.

Similarly, the debate on market-based approaches includes the view that private actors can indeed complement the government in not only conserving biodiversity but also in contributing to improving the livelihoods and wellbeing of the local residents. Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE (see Metcalfe, 1994), Tanzania's Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) (see Gillingham & Lee, 1999), and Namibia's integrated management and governance of communal conservancies (see Baker, 1997) indeed exemplify how non-state actors complement the traditional government in conservation and provision of public goods/services. However, the continued involvement of non-state actors especially in conservation has been argued by some (e.g. Milward & Provan, 2000; Rhodes, 1996; 1997) to lead to what has been referred in literature as 'hollowing out the state' (Milward & Provan, 2000; Rhodes, 1996) as private actors (including associations) take over the role of providing public goods/services. As of 2012, local landowners around LMNP started to challenge the use of the sport hunting income by the association to provide public goods, arguing that it potentially allows the government to ignore its responsibilities. On the other hand, ignoring the contributions of non-state actors may potentially hamper rural development in Africa as most governments are usually budget-constrained and non-state actors can fill this gap.

Also related to the discussion on market-based conservation is the emerging idea of a convivial conservation approach in a quest to overcome the use of market-based conservation approaches associated with capitalist ideologies (Büscher, 2014). Convivial conservation approaches are already being discussed and experimented with in some parts of Africa, particularly South Africa. It is considered as a new way of thinking about nature conservation as opposed to market-based conservation (Büscher, 2014). Its promoters argue that we are living in the era of the 'Anthropocene' and recognise that humans are responsible for the environmental challenges we

face today (Crutzen, 2002; see also Moore, 2017; 2018). The gist of convivial conservation is to encourage the idea of 'living with nature' (Büscher, 2014) as opposed to 'selling nature to save it' (McAfee, 1999) or, in the case of sport hunting, 'killing nature to save it'. The idea is evolving, with the potential to offer possible alternative ways of looking at nature as part of human existence without necessarily viewing nature based on its instrumental values, as has been the case with market-based approaches. However, despite its emergence and prominence in other countries, this idea is not yet considered in Uganda. The debate in Uganda is still very much about the ecological and developmental impacts of sport hunting, as also demonstrated by disputes over the benefits. Nevertheless, this thesis provides opportunities to integrate these debates in Uganda's discursive processes regarding the practice of sport hunting, as well as to rethink the future of sport hunting for either conservation or development. Although a convivial approach may be related to the currently widely applied rewilding concept, in the hope that it will lead to reclaiming and expanding protected areas (Büscher, 2014; see also Lorimer, 2015) in Europe and also across Africa, in Uganda the idea to reintroduce wildlife in KKTGMA and also the translocation of zebras and impalas from LMNP to Katonga wildlife reserve (UWA, 2017) was instead done for the benefit of sport hunting. In this case, rewilding the two areas actually perpetuates the use of market-based conservation approaches, and does not necessarily lead to achieving the objectives of convivial conservation.

Second, and related, sport hunting implementation in Africa and other developing countries is widely debated not only in regard to its purported contribution to addressing conservation and development challenges (see Barrett et al., 2011; Di Minin et al., 2016; Muposhi et al., 2016), but also specifically about the participation and empowerment of local communities in governance processes (cf. Lindsey et al., 2007; Muchapondwa & Stage, 2013; 2015; Noe & Kangalawe, 2015). Gillingham & Lee (1999) note that local empowerment is a crucial determinant of the nature of relationships between rural communities and state institutions for effective wildlife management. Moreover, Namara & Infield (1998) argue that effective collaborative management includes representation of the communities in decision-making. In the cases of sport hunting analysed in this thesis, collaborative agreements are signed by the governments (i.e. national and local), the private sector (private sport hunting companies) and the local communities through their associations. These collaborative agreements also reflect a governance setting usually

characterised by the involvement of non-state actors (cf. Pahl-Wostl, 2009). Indeed, this thesis confirms that non-state actors are actively participating in the management and decision-making. The local communities in the two sites not only participate in the monitoring of sport hunting practices alongside the government rangers, but also communicate suggestions concerning community benefits as well as their development needs through their representatives. However, this participation has not translated into empowerment of all the communities in the two sites. Only the LMNP residents exercised some power as they were able to sway the sport hunting debate in their favour and also influenced and caused changes in the rules dimension. The changed benefits-sharing rule around LMNP did not only institutionalise the landowners among the direct beneficiaries but also now favours the local residents more than the government. This is witnessed by the fact that a large part of the hunting benefits goes to the communities.

Certainly, as demonstrated in the two policy arrangements, the extent to which sport hunting helps to achieve the broader goals of community-based conservation (CBC) by providing incentives for local people and thereby changing their attitudes towards wildlife conservation varies. Despite the apparent relationship between sport hunting and CBC, there are tremendous trade-offs between development and conservation as a large part of the income from (sport hunting) tourism is often used for relatively conservation-unfriendly development. These trade-offs show that the use of sport hunting to achieve both conservation and rural development is challenging. A study by Berkes (2004) revealed that community development objectives are usually not consistent with conservation objectives. However, although a study by Gillingham & Lee (1999) around the Selous Game Reserve in Tanzania revealed that local people who received wildlife-related benefits had a more positive attitude towards conservation, my study largely shows otherwise. The local communities' attitudes towards wildlife particularly around LMNP only partially improved but the people I interviewed still see wildlife as a nuisance and are not content with the way the sport hunting benefits are shared.

Related to the CBC discussion above, MacDonald (2010) argues that the arrival of private actors (who are mostly profit-motivated) in CBC arrangements can bring about over-exploitation of wildlife through off-the-record hunting at the expense of the local people. The case studies analysed in this thesis reveal that the arrival of new actors (e.g. landowners), who have continued

to advocate for further changes in the rules dimension and to include more animals on the annual hunting quota, can lead to more animals being killed. Obviously, this will potentially have a negative impact on the populations of the targeted species. Unfortunately, the data on the hunted species as well as number of arrested poachers are inconsistent and unreliable.

Third, some scholars (e.g. Di Minin et al., 2016; Paulson, 2012; 2014) have presented arguments that sport hunters and organisations such as Safari Club International (SCI) and the International Council for Game and Wildlife Conservation (CIC) can play advocacy roles for a 'sustainable hunting model' (cf. Murray, 2017; Southwick, 2015). According to Paulson (2012) the 'sustainable hunting model' is promoted through the established limits on the number of animals hunted per species, the sale of trophies from the hunted animals to provide incentives for conservation, as well as allowing local people to continue traditional hunting in a regulated manner. However, whether or not the sport hunters in Uganda actually advocate for a 'sustainable hunting model' (Paulson, 2012; 2014) and/or mobilise extra funds to protect the animals remains unclear. As such, it is difficult to argue for a 'sustainable' hunting approach in Uganda because the arrangements analysed in this thesis are characterised by inconsistency, inaccuracy, inadequacy, unreliability and inaccessibility of sport hunting data. Moreover, as sport hunters primarily kill male animals, critical scholars (e.g. Batavia et al., 2018; Ripple et al., 2016) argue that it could lead to disrupting the species' social structures – as in some cases leaders of groups are killed. The killing of strong and healthy male animals as desired by sport hunters equally reduces the possibility of sustaining strong and healthier genes in the population (Ripple et al., 2016). My study also varies from the sustainable hunting discourse. While this discourse allows traditional hunting by the local people, in my two cases it is prohibited. In fact, sport hunting is implemented to reduce human-wildlife conflicts and especially hunting by the local people, referred to as 'poaching'.

Fourth, Chapters 1, 3-5 also discussed the ethical debate about sport hunting, and more broadly the killing of animals in the name of conservation, or 'killing nature to save it', inspired by animal rights and welfare arguments. Specifically, animal rights advocates are concerned about the rights of animals as sentient beings (Bekoff, 2013; Duncan, 2006) while welfare advocates are concerned about the general wellbeing of animals (Batavia et al., 2018; Batavia & Nelson, 2017ab; Bekoof, 2013). However, these ongoing debates on the welfare and rights of (hunted) animals do not form

part of the discourses in the two areas studied, nor in national level debates in Uganda. For example, none of the interviewees in this study mentioned the issue of animal welfare or rights. So interestingly, while animal welfare and rights discourses are evolving at the global scale and in different regions and countries around the world, these have not yet influenced the sport hunting debate in Uganda, especially in the two arrangements studied. However, following the Africa Union's recent adoption of an animal welfare strategy – recognising animals as sentient beings, and including wild animals, farm animals and animals used in research (AU, 2017) – it is expected that African countries, including Uganda, will institutionalise this agenda in their national policies. This will open up discursive spaces that will potentially influence future sport hunting policy decision-making.

Fifth, based on the theoretical framework of discursive institutionalism (DI), Chapter 2 also presented a conceptual framework for analysing the development and implementation of sport hunting policy arrangements and their impacts (Figure 2.1). I come back to this figure on the basis of its application throughout this thesis. While the use of the framework (see Figure 2.1) generally enabled me to analyse the development and implementation of the national sport hunting policy in Chapter 3, it was clear that DI could not explain the evolution of the arrangements and the impacts following the policy implementation around LMNP and KKTGMA. For this reason, I adopted the concept of congruence in Chapter 4 to explain the evolution of the two arrangements over time and the factors responsible. As such, the concept of congruence proved useful in explaining the internal dynamics of the PAA dimensions and how (in)consistency between and among these dimensions influences the policy impacts at the local level. Chapter 5 describes the analysis of the impacts of the policy implementation in the two areas, using the concept of effectiveness. The concept of effectiveness equally proved useful to understand the policy impacts in the two areas and how the stakeholders perceive these impacts, as well as how the impacts influence the (re)-design of the policy.

Using this framework, I was able to show that the performative governance capacity of the two policy arrangements has the capacity to influence whether or not the initial policy objectives remain the same or get changed to accommodate local preferences and interests, which could have been overlooked at the start of the policy. As such, a lack of policy effectiveness in one area can

cause changes in the entire policy arrangement by attracting new actors, who might make new rules to institutionalise new discourses and to mobilise resources to achieve certain policy objectives.

Further, my application of the framework also demonstrates that policy arrangements are affected by the extent to which the different policies or policy dimensions aim for the same goals. In order to analyse how the institutional context influences policy implementation, I deployed the PAA together with the concept of congruence, and found that the dynamics between the policy dimensions influence the policy's capacity to achieve its intended goals in society.

The analysis in this thesis largely focuses on the strategic and structural-internal congruence (see Chapter 2); structural external congruence was only partially looked into, as it is not explicitly included in the three research questions answered in this thesis. Also, it is because the national sport hunting policy is aimed at addressing local challenges. Although this might be seen as a weakness of this thesis, this study follows a previous study by Arts & Buizer (2009) that also only analysed the internal dynamics of the global forest policy arrangement. So, this will not be the first study to limit its analysis to only the internal dynamics of policy arrangements.

A sixth and final discussion is on the methods and data used in this thesis. Throughout this research, data availability and access were a major challenge. Moreover, there was a lack of transparency in the data especially the data on the number of animals per species (censuses), numbers of hunted animals, revenue generated from the hunted animals as well as the statistics of poaching in the two areas. Similarly, the tourism associations (who mainly promote photographic tourism) and the civil society organisations also question the hunting rules and reliability of the animal censuses as well as the transparency of the sport hunting statistics. They continue to demand transparency regarding these data. However, issues of data availability, accuracy, transparency and difficulties in accessing data on sport hunting are not unique to this study. Booth (2017) brought several inconsistencies in sport hunting data sets from Tanzania to light. Similarly, Baker (1997) highlighted inaccuracy in sport hunting data as well as animal censuses, which are often used for setting annual hunting quota. Such inconsistences are largely a result of incompetence of the personnel responsible for carrying out surveys (OAG, 2011) and poor data storage. Sometimes no

data is accessible at all, as was the case with poaching data in KKTGMA, or sometimes the responsible persons are not willing to share these data. For this study, I largely tried to overcome these challenges through triangulation of the data collection methods (Jennings, 2001). I used three methods of data collection: literature and document review, qualitative in-depth interviews and non-participant observation. The use of these various data sources allowed validation (Kumar, 2012). Moreover, the auditor general's report revealed that although the Monitoring and Research Policy (1999) requires that the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) consistently conducts surveys on the number of animals, hunted animals, revenue sharing, poaching and other related human-wildlife conflicts, the UWA did not carry out over 47.6 per cent of the surveys that it should have conducted between 2008-2011 in all of Uganda's protected areas (OAG, 2011). The report attributed this failure to conduct surveys on a regular basis to lack of adequate personnel and insufficient funding of the research unit of the UWA (OAG, 2011). The same report concluded that this scenario contributes to lack of data, which should be guiding sport hunting implementation in Uganda. As such, continuing to implement sport hunting without credible data on the number of animals, hunted animals, revenue generated and number of arrested poachers brings to question the sustainability of sport hunting in Uganda.

6.4. Future directions

The findings presented in this study generated some potential areas for future studies and insights for future policies.

6.4.1. Recommendation for further studies

This study has analysed the development and implementation of sport hunting around LMNP and KKTGMA. However, since 2006 the number protected areas where Uganda's sport hunting is implemented has reached 13 different areas (see Chapter 3). As such, it is important to conduct a broader study to analyse the impacts of the sport hunting policy in all of the 13 areas, the unique challenges regarding its continued implementation in Uganda and the lessons that can be learned. Such a study would help in not only informing any generalisation of the impacts, but also show local perceptions of sport hunting.

Similarly, a broader study of sport hunting impacts versus the impacts of photographic wildlife tourism in Uganda needs to be conducted, to help make policy recommendations for future focus on either the first and/or second market-based solution for conservation.

Related, this thesis has presented different viewpoints in favour of and against the practice of sport hunting (see Challender & Cooney, 2016; Lindsey et al., 2016; Muposhi et al., 2016), including those who argue against sport hunting based on ethical concerns. Nevertheless, the animal welfare and rights aspects are underrepresented in the Ugandan debates on sport hunting, and actors representing these views should be included in these debates. Thus, there is no real ethical reflection on the 'killing of nature to save it' in areas where it is most relevant. As such, a study that entails a focus on the local to global views regarding the ethical practices of sport hunting would be useful.

Foreign tourists are the only ones to hunt for sport in Uganda, paying a lot of money to hunt. However, the extent to which sport hunting in Uganda actually provides funding for conservation (monitoring, conducting animal censuses et cetera) remains scanty. Similarly, the extent to which the claimed 'sustainable hunting' advocates including organisations such as Safari Club International (SCI) and the International Council for Game and Wildlife Conservation (CIC) directly mobilise funds to conserve the animal species that they hunt has not yet been investigated in Uganda. As such a longitudinal study focusing on understanding the sport hunting tourists in Uganda, and other parts of Africa, including organisations that advocate for a 'sustainable hunting' model and their contribution to wildlife conservation, would be vital for wildlife managers and generally for the future of the hunted species.

As in this study, benefit sharing has often been applied as a panacea for conservation challenges in Africa although it has had mixed outcomes (see Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001). Further research is still needed to fully understand the role of benefit sharing in changing and sustaining local attitudes and behaviour. This could be done by conducting a comparative study of local communities' attitudes and behaviour in areas where tourism benefits are shared and in areas where benefits are not shared or an alternative approach is being applied to help comprehensively understand the role of benefits in changing and sustaining local attitudes and behaviour towards

conservation. This will further help to make decisions concerning the continued implementation of tourism benefit-sharing schemes in Africa and particularly in Uganda.

Sport hunters are obviously not the only ones to hunt wildlife, local hunters (often referred to as 'poachers') in Uganda do so too, although illegally. A study that investigates the motives for hunting by the local people and whether or not their hunting can be incorporated in the sport hunting or the 'sustainable hunting' value chain and to minimise impacts on the hunted species would be valuable for Uganda and Africa at large. This would possibly provide valuable recommendations to formally include the local hunters in hunting policies without criminalising them, as is the case now.

Finally, this study explicitly used the concept of congruence to analyse and explain the evolution of the sport hunting policy arrangements. However, it did not explicitly analyse the external congruence aspects of these arrangements. External congruence is the extent to which an arrangement potentially works along with other arrangements to achieve its own and wider societal goals. The implication of not including this aspect in my analysis is that I am unable to establish the extent to which sport hunting is embedded in the broader international and national (institutional) context. For example, how the government's plan to reduce poverty, through its policy for modernisation of agriculture, and the national environmental, forestry, wildlife, land, and tourism policies affect continued implementation of sport hunting – and vice versa – remains unclear. As such, there is need for a study that fully addresses the external congruence aspects of the sport hunting policy arrangements in Uganda to better understand how they are affected by or affect the wider policy environment in Uganda and beyond.

6.4.2. Policy recommendations

Sport hunting features prominently in the wildlife management approaches of many African countries, including Uganda. This thesis shows that the local communities studied think the shared community development benefits from sport hunting are insufficient to improve individual household-level income, nor to sustainably improve local communities' attitudes towards wildlife, also as wildlife benefits are valued against other land-use benefits.

The fourth policy goal of reintroducing sport hunting is to provide lessons for developing guidelines and procedures for further implementation of sport hunting. As I have shown, the national hunting policy aims have remained unchanged. Change only occurred in terms of the animal fees, the number of animals on the annual hunting quota and hunting now covers 13 different areas. The previous internal (UWA, 2002) and external (Muhimbura & Namara, 2009) reports that were commissioned by the UWA have only been partially used to guide the extension of national sport hunting policy to KKTGMA and the other areas. Although Muhimbura & Namara (2009) recommended transparency and accountability in further implementation of sport hunting, this has not really been implemented. This could be attributed to a lack of clear feedback mechanisms to translate local experiences into national polices. Therefore, regular monitoring and a nationwide sport hunting evaluation based on reliable and accurate data on sport hunting is urgently needed to establish the policy impacts and lessons learned in other areas. Also, there is need for clear mechanisms of translating local experiences into national policies guiding sport hunting. The UWA should recruit, train, equip and facilitate staff to be able to competently carry out animal census exercises including collecting data on hunted animals, revenue sharing, poaching and other related human-wildlife conflicts. Also, the UWA should give third parties easier access to their data, and should regularly organise science-policy dialogues with the wider public to generate and exchange information not only on data, but also on how to address conservation-development trade-offs.

In order to encourage public interest and participation in sport hunting debates, I would recommend that UWA collects and evaluates data regularly, and makes these data available to the public in a transparent manner in order to encourage members of the public to express their views on how best to conserve wildlife in a manner that does not threaten the current wildlife population. Moreover, holding local seminars and/or workshops will enable the local communities to understand the aims of sport hunting including how they can improve their livelihoods without necessarily depending on sport hunting income. If such a discursive space is opened, it will enable serious discussions that take into account lessons learned (successes and failures) following the reintroduction of sport hunting in Uganda. This will also help ensure local participation and cooperation in the policy process.

Similarly, based on this thesis, I also recommend that research (see also previous section) should be conducted to fully understand the role of benefit sharing in influencing the local communities' attitudes and behaviour towards wildlife. This will inform future policy decisions aimed at applying benefit-sharing mechanisms in the hope to sustainably improve local attitudes and behaviour towards wildlife in any particular protected area.

Furthermore, it is unclear what the ecological impacts of sport hunting are in Uganda and particularly around LMNP and KKTGMA. As such, I recommend that UWA halts any further expansion of sport hunting and does not increase the number of animals per species on the hunting quota. It should first conduct regular and consistent census of the hunted animal species over the years vis-à-vis the available population per hunted species in Uganda. This will inform any future decision on whether to change, reconsider or completely ban it, or continue the practice but with a possibility of banning it when the ecological impacts prove disastrous to the hunted species population and their habitats.

Finally, this thesis contributed to the important and current topic of sport hunting for conservation and development in Africa and globally. Following reflections on the perspectives of the market-based conservation approach of 'selling nature to save it' and the existing trade-offs between conservation and development in southern and eastern African countries, it can be concluded that sport hunting, paradoxically, implies 'killing nature in the hope to save it' – with potentially long-term negative effects on the wildlife population. Based on this analysis and considering that the UWA implements sport hunting in 13 different areas across Uganda, the UWA should halt any further expansion of sport hunting in Uganda, and first and foremost conduct a national evaluation of the policy to better understand not only its ecological impacts but also the broader policy impacts on livelihoods. For now, the UWA should practice sport hunting reluctantly pending the results of the nationwide evaluation, regular and reliable longitudinal animal census, reliable data on poaching and revenue generated including how and how much of this revenue is actually reinvested into conservation activities. The evaluation should also take into account the ethical considerations regarding the practice of sport hunting for both conservation and development. Last but not least, I recommend for UWA to investigate and implement forms of ecotourism as a way of raising conservation funds that can be practiced instead of sport hunting.

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SUMMARY - KILLING NATURE TO SAVE IT? AN ANALYSIS OF TWO SPORT HUNTING POLICY ARRANGEMENTS IN UGANDA

Sport hunting (also known as safari hunting, trophy hunting and game hunting) is described as an activity where a tourist pays to hunt an animal with desired physical attributes usually in the company of a professional hunting guide. The colonial administrators exported it to Africa in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, protecting wildlife so they and African kings and chiefs could then hunt it for leisure. Around the late 1970s, the reason for practicing sport hunting changed from 'hunting for leisure' to 'hunting to achieve conservation and development'. This followed a changed conservation discourse from a 'fines and fences' approach to a 'participation and participatory development' approach. Since then, sport hunting has been implemented through both community-based conservation (CBC) and market-based conservation (MBC) approaches. Despite the mixed reactions in both academic and policy debates on sport hunting, Uganda reintroduced it first as a pilot around Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) in 2001 and later extended it to Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKTGMA) and 11 other areas. Uganda reintroduced sport hunting to achieve the following objectives: 1) to positively change residents' attitudes towards wildlife, and 2) reduce human-wildlife conflicts (especially poaching by local communities), by 3) providing incentives for local inhabitants, and 4) to develop guidelines and procedures for further implementation of sport hunting.

This thesis analyses the development and implementation of the sport hunting policy arrangements in Uganda and their implications for conservation and development. Specifically, it analyses the evolution of the sport hunting policy arrangements around LMNP and KKTGMA and the factors responsible for this evolution, and the impacts of the sport hunting policy arrangements around LMNP and KKTGMA in terms of enhancing development, reducing poaching and changing residents' attitudes towards wildlife. By doing so, this thesis contributes to the broader debates on the implementation of sport hunting in Africa in aid of conservation and development. Particularly, this thesis contributes to four main debates: 1) the debate on the implementation of sport hunting as a means to address conservation and development challenges; 2) the debate on market-based conservation approaches; 3) the debate on the promotion of a 'sustainable hunting model'; and 4) the debate on animal rights and welfare. Despite the continued practice of sport hunting by over

23 African countries in support of conservation and development, I argue that sport hunting paradoxically implies 'killing nature in the hope to save it' – potentially having long-term negative effects on nature.

Chapter 1 introduces the research presented in this thesis. It starts off with a historical overview of the practice of sport hunting globally and in Africa in particular as an approach that can be used to aid both conservation and development. I began my PhD project by familiarising myself with the different researches and debates regarding the practice especially in developing countries. This way, I was able to identify the existing research gaps and define the research objective of this PhD thesis. In order to operationalise this objective, the following research questions were formulated:

1. How was the sport hunting policy reintroduced and implemented in Uganda?
2. How did the sport hunting policy arrangements around Lake Mburo National Park and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area evolve over time and what have been the driving forces for this change?
3. What are the impacts of the sport hunting policy around Lake Mburo National Park and Kabwoya and Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area in terms of enhancing development, reducing poaching and changing residents' attitudes towards wildlife?

As the final part of the introduction, I describe the study's general research design including the methodology used to gather data presented in this thesis.

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical and conceptual framework used in this thesis. For this research, I drew on the theory of institutionalism, particularly discursive institutionalism (DI), regime theory and the governance literature to conceptualise Uganda's sport hunting policy as a policy arrangement built on (inter)national institutions and discursive processes, but implemented at the local level. I used the Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA) (Arts et al., 2006) and the concepts of governance capacity (see Arts et al., 2006; Dang et al., 2015), together with the concepts of congruence (Arts & Goverde, 2006) and institutional effectiveness (Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2011; Levy & Young, 1994; Mitchell, 2003) for my conceptual framework to analyse the development

and implementation of the sport hunting policy arrangements and their impacts around LMNP and KKTGMA.

Chapter 3 presents an analysis of the development and the implementation of the sport hunting policy at the national level in Uganda and draws on examples from around LMNP. The analysis is based on a review of the policy documents, and on interviews with policymakers and other stakeholders on the sport hunting implementation at the national level and around LMNP. The 'new' sport hunting Uganda was reintroduced following a global change in conservation discourses from a 'fences and fines' approach to a 'participation and participatory development' approach. Sport hunting was first reintroduced in Uganda as a pilot project in 2001 in Rurambbiira parish (a parish is the lowest administrative unit in Uganda), due to its proximity to Lake Mburo National Park. The residents of this parish had experienced more crop damage and animal attacks than people living in other areas, and welcomed poaching by neighbouring communities. Over time, the development and implementation of the national sport hunting policy in Uganda has attracted a myriad of stakeholders who perform different roles and have different responsibilities.

Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the evolution of the sport hunting policy arrangements around LMNP and KKTGMA over time and explains the driving forces for change. For this analysis, I deployed the policy arrangement approach (PAA) and its four dimensions: discourses, actors, rules and resources. The concept of congruence was used to explain the causes of the evolution. The LMNP arrangement has been a dynamic arrangement over four main periods, characterised by conflicts over the benefits, politics of landownership and changed local discourses, thereby reflecting a highly incongruent policy arrangement. Conversely, the KKTGMA arrangement remained highly congruent over the years with minimal or few conflicts over the benefits, other than dissatisfaction about the sharing of meat. This is because the national government and the local leaders held relatively similar views regarding wildlife protection and the politics of landownership were largely absent here.

In **Chapter 5** I analyse the impacts of the sport hunting policy arrangements around LMNP and KKTGMA. For this analysis, I used the conceptual framework of institutional effectiveness (Levy & Young, 1994; Mitchell, 2003) as elaborated in chapter 2. Since Uganda's sport hunting policy

lacks clear criteria or indicators for assessing its effectiveness, I adopted the three formal policy goals and categorised the direct impacts into four aspects: the number of hunted animals through sport hunting, through poaching, impacts on livelihoods, and changed community attitudes. The impacts were analysed in terms of enhancing local development, reducing poaching and changing residents' attitudes towards wildlife. An estimate of 1,819 animals were legally hunted between 2001-2016 in the LMNP arrangement while an estimate of 452 animals were legally hunted between 2008-2016 in the KKTGMA arrangement. The income generated from these hunted animals was used to incentivise the local people in the two areas. The association and local landowners were the largest beneficiaries from the practice of sport hunting around LMNP, while the government took a lion's share of the income in the KKTGMA arrangement. Overall, the associations used their income to provide different social services (regarding e.g. education and health) and to fund social development projects. Nevertheless, sport hunting only helped to reduce poaching in the earlier years of its implementation in the two areas. In terms of changing community attitudes towards wildlife, my research showed that changes in local attitudes and behaviour were only temporary. Poaching was resumed for subsistence and small-scale commercial purposes, or as a way of retaliation. Moreover, in the LMNP arrangement, the communities continue to view wildlife as a nuisance. As such, conservation goals have not been achieved in the two areas because poaching is still practiced on top of legal hunting. This may potentially exacerbate negative effects on wildlife population.

Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and a discussion on how this thesis contributes to the different debates on sport hunting highlighted in Chapter 1. The results from the empirical Chapters 3-5 are used to answer the three research questions highlighted in Chapter 1, guided by the theoretical and conceptual framework described in Chapter 2. The first conclusion is that the policy aims have remained the same, with adjustments only having been made in animal fees (the amount of money to be paid by each sport hunter to kill a certain animal) and the annual population quotas per species. Overall, most of the changes have happened at the local level as elaborated in Chapter 4. The second conclusion is that the politics of landownership played a crucial role in the LMNP case, as it fuelled the conflicts over the benefits and changes in local discourses. In KKTGMA the politics of landownership did not really play a role, since hunting was first introduced in a government protected area, although it was later also introduced to community-owned land. The

third conclusion is that the idea to use sport hunting to reduce local poaching in aid of conservation goals did not work. The local communities in the two areas only temporarily stopped, but then resumed poaching for various reasons. Local residents around LMNP never stopped thinking of wildlife as a nuisance, and in KKTGMA, the residents resumed poaching because they were discontented with the way meat was shared. Thus, the continued implementation of sport hunting in Uganda did not result in a permanent change in local residents' attitudes towards wildlife, which was the main goal of the government.

In this concluding chapter, I also reflect on the theoretical framework underpinning this study, namely discursive institutionalism (DI), by showing how it enhanced the use of the Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA) and the concept of governance capacity together with the concepts of congruence and effectiveness. In reflection on the methods used in this study, I focus on issues of data transparency and availability, as these posed a problem for this research. In the discussion, I highlight several areas for further research. One of my recommendations is for the government to assess the nationwide impacts of the policy by precisely establishing the population trends of all the hunted animal species, the number of hunted animals and number of arrested poachers. In addition, I recommend that the sport hunting impacts be compared to the impacts of photographic wildlife tourism in Uganda. There is also need for a study focusing on the local to global views in the ethical debate on sport hunting. Further research is still needed to fully understand the role of benefit sharing in changing and sustaining local attitudes and behaviour. A study that investigates local residents' motives for hunting and whether or not their hunting has any relation with hunting by sport hunters or the 'sustainable hunting advocates' would be valuable for Uganda and Africa at large. I propose for a study to be conducted into the external congruence aspects of the sport hunting policy arrangements in Uganda to better understand both the indicative and performative governance capacity of these and other arrangements, as well as how these are affected by or affect the wider policy environment in Uganda and beyond.

In conclusion, I make some policy recommendations based on the findings in this PhD thesis. First, a nationwide sport hunting evaluation is urgently needed to establish the policy impacts and lessons learned in other areas in Uganda. This should also provide clear mechanisms of translating local experiences into national policies guiding sport hunting. Another recommendation is for the

UWA to conduct improved and regular research, monitoring and evaluation of the policy implementation in Uganda to fully understand the impacts and the role of benefit sharing in terms of influencing local communities' attitudes and behaviour towards wildlife. UWA should also organise regular public science-policy discussions, which should be informed by credible data, in order to encourage members of the public to express their views on how to manage wildlife. For now, UWA should halt any further expansion of sport hunting in Uganda, and first and foremost conduct a national evaluation of the policy to better understand not only its ecological impacts but also the wider policy impacts on livelihoods. The evaluation should also take into account ethical considerations regarding the practice of sport hunting for either conservation or development. Pending the nationwide evaluation report, UWA should practice sport hunting reluctantly. Last but not least, I recommend for UWA to investigate and implement forms of ecotourism as a way of raising conservation funds that can be practiced instead of sport hunting.

Samenvatting - De natuur doden om hem te redden? Een analyse van twee beleidsarrangementen voor plezierjacht in Oeganda

Ondanks de gemengde reacties over plezierjacht in zowel wetenschap als beleid, heeft Oeganda in 2001 plezierjacht opnieuw geïntroduceerd rondom Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) en dit later uitgebreid naar Kabwoya en Kaiso-Tonya Game Management Area (KKTGMA) en 11 andere gebieden. Oeganda wil hiermee de volgende doelstellingen bereiken: 1) het positief veranderen van de houding van bewoners ten opzichte van dieren in het wild; 2) het verminderen van conflicten tussen mensen en dieren in het wild (door het tegengaan van lokale stroperij); 3) het bieden van voordelen voor de lokale bevolking; en 4) het ontwikkelen van richtlijnen en procedures voor de verdere implementatie van plezierjacht.

Gebaseerd op de theorie van institutionalisme, in het bijzonder discursief institutionalisme (DI), regime theorie en de beleidsarrangementen benadering, analyseert dit proefschrift de ontwikkeling en implementatie van de herinvoering van plezierjacht in LMNP en KKTGMA en de impact daarvan. Uit mijn onderzoek blijkt dat waar de herintroductie rondom LMNP vier grote periodes van verandering doormaakte, het KKTGMA-arrangement relatief stabiel bleef met minimale veranderingen.

Net als in andere landen in Afrika, kent Oeganda's plezier jacht gemengde resultaten. Aan de ene kant helpt het om het levensonderhoud van mensen in beide gebieden te verbeteren. Aan de andere kant bleken de gemeenschappen rond LMNP alleen tijdelijk geïnteresseerd in natuurbescherming. Ze bleven wilde dieren vooral als last zien en stroperij werd slechts tijdelijk tegengegaan. Als zodanig is in beide gebieden de houding van de lokale gemeenschappen ten opzichte van dieren in het wild alleen in de eerste jaren van de tenuitvoerlegging van het beleid voor plezierjacht veranderd.

Een probleem bij het uitvoeren van dit onderzoek was het gebrek aan betrouwbare gegevens over plezierjacht. Daarom beveel ik de Oegandese regering aan de plezierjacht en de effecten daarvan veel beter te monitoren. Daarnaast adviseer ik om de effecten van plezierjacht te vergelijken met de effecten van fotografisch wildlife-toerisme in Oeganda.

Ondanks dat meer dan 23 Afrikaanse landen plezierjacht toestaan ter ondersteuning van natuurbehoud en ontwikkeling, concludeer ik dat plezierjacht paradoxaal is. Het betekent 'doden van natuur in de hoop het te redden', met voor de natuur negatieve gevolgen op de lange termijn.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Peer reviewed

Ochieng, A., Visseren-Hamakers, I. J. & Van der Duim, R. (2017) The battle over the benefits: Analysing two sport hunting policy arrangements in Uganda. *Oryx*, 1-10 doi: 10.1017/S0030605316000909

Ochieng, A., Visseren-Hamakers, I. J. & Van der Duim, R. (forthcoming) Hunting or poaching? The social and ecological impacts of sport hunting in Uganda. *Conservation and Society*

Book chapters

Ahebwa, W. M. Sandbrook, C. & **Ochieng, A.** (2018) Parks, people, and partnerships: Experiments in the governance of nature-based tourism in Uganda. In: Cavanagh, C. J., Sandbrook, C. & Tumusiime, D. M. (eds.) *Conservation and development in Uganda*, pp 148-170, London: Earthscan,

Ochieng, A., Ahebwa, W. M. & Visseren-Hamakers, I. J. (2015). Hunting for Conservation? The Re-introduction of Sport Hunting in Uganda Examined. In Van der Duim, R., Lamers, M. and Van Wijk J. (eds*.) Institutional Arrangements for Conservation, Development and Tourism in Eastern and Southern Africa*, pp139-155, Dordrecht: Springer. DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9529-6_8

Ayorekire, J., Ahebwa, M. W. & **Ochieng, A.** (2011) Managing Conservation and Development on Private Land: An Assessment of Sport hunting around Lake Mburo National Park, Uganda, In Van der Duim, R., Meyer, D., Saarinen, J. and Zellmer, K. (eds.) *New alliances for tourism, conservation and development in Eastern and Southern Africa*, pp185-207, Delft: Eburon

Blog Articles (on the thesis)

Ochieng, Amos (2016) Wildlife or Domestic Animals? 10 June, 2016. School of Global Studies. https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/global/2016/06/10/wildlife-or-domestic-animals/

Ochieng, A. & Niak Sian Koh (forthcoming) How can we integrate the STEPS Centre's pathways to sustainability discussions in the debates about conservation financing? *Forthcoming,* https://steps-centre.org/

LIST OF COMPLETED TRAINING AND SUPERVISORY PLAN ACTIVITIES

Amos Ochieng

Wageningen School of Social Sciences (WASS)

Completed Training and Supervision Plan

Name of the learning activity	Department/Institute	Year	ECTS*
A) Project related competences			
Writing of Research Proposal	GEO, WUR	2013	6
FNP 31306: Communities, Conservation and Development	FNP, WUR	2013	6
RDS 32806: Advance Social Theories	RDS, WUR	2012	6
Research Methodology: From topic to proposal	WASS	2013	4
Visiting scholar at George Mason University	George Mason University, Virginia, USA	2015	1
B) General research related competences			
WASS introductory course	WASS	2012	1
Interpretative Research Methods and Methodologies	WASS	2013	4
STEPS Centre Summer School	IDS, Sussex University, UK	2018	3
'The re-introduction of sport hunting in Uganda: A discourse analysis'	ATLAS Africa conferences, Kigali, Rwanda	2013	1
'Managing Sport Hunting implementation around Lake Mburo National Park, Uganda: A policy arrangement perspective'	Critical Perspectives on the Financialisation of Nature: Theory, Politics and Practice, Sussex, UK	2015	1
"Restocking wildlife ecosystems for conservation and development? A case of sport hunting in Kabwoya Wildlife Reserve, Uganda'	ATLAS Africa conferences, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania	2015	1
'Substituting illegal hunting by sport hunting? Analyzing the impacts of sport hunting in Uganda'	ATLAS Africa Conferences, Eldoret, Kenya	2017	1
'The battle over the benefits: An analysis of two sport hunting policy arrangements in Uganda'	Seminar Presentation, Department of Environmental Science and Policy, GMU	2015	0.5
C) Career related competences/personal development			
The Essentials of Scientific Writing and Presenting	WGS	2014	1.2
Data Management	WGS	2013	0.4
Workshop Interviewing Professionals,	WASS	2012	0.5
Guest lecturer, in developing countries	George Mason University, Virginia, USA	2015	0.5
Landscape Conversation	GEO, WUR	2013	0.5
Wageningen Geography Lectures	GEO, WUR	2014	0.5
Tourism, Wellbeing and Ecosystem Services: TObeWELL and the Instagram Effect: Cultural Tourism in the Digital Age	Higher Institute on Territorial Systems for Innovation, Turin, Italy	2014	1
Total			**40.1**

*One credit according to ECTS is on average equivalent to 28 hours of study load

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