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Securitization of Aid and Hybrid Peace in Humanitarian Space

A Case-Study of the Green Zone in Baghdad of Iraq Post-2003

Iraq's Long Road to Peace: The Triumphal Arch of Baghdad in Iraq (Source: De Spiegel, 2013).

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Preface

'Walls that protect you, can also hem you in' (The Atlantic, 2004). This quote underscores the message that I will put central in this bachelor thesis. The securitization of aid, in detail the bunkered architecture of compounds and the ambiguous way of life of expats inside these so-called 'bunkers', impedes the establishment of hybrid peace in humanitarian space. In other words, cooperation of both local and international actors is key for the establishment of peace. As the photo below illustrates, to rebuild a nation, working side to side with different people is the only pathway for success for the re-construction of a nation-state, such as in Iraq.

Furthermore, I would not have been able to write this thesis without the help of my supervisor Dr. Bram Jansen. Therefore, I would like to thank him for all of his, ideas, suggestions and feedback which he provided me and enabled me further to write and finalize my thesis.

Figure 1: Murals in Front of the Ministry of Public Works, Karkh District of Baghdad in Iraq. The Arabic transcript reads: 'Let's all build this nation together'. *(Source: Jadaliyya, 2014).*

Abstract

The notion of the securitization of aid and hybrid peace in humanitarian space is applied to the Green Zone of Baghdad in Iraq Post-2003. After the 1980's, an era of the emergence of 'new wars', fragile states and terrorism increased the securitization paradigm of the aid-industry. Security measures such as razor wire, concrete blast walls and armed guards are used to protect and strengthen the resilience of expats in an ever more dangerous humanitarian space. This form of 'bunkerization' results in the establishment of fortified-aid-compounds and eventually in the so-called expat bunker and the expat bubble. In other words, the world that humanitarian aid workers 'inhabit' is contrary to that of the people they tend to serve. The self-sufficiency of these compounds, due to the establishment of leisure facilities, in combination with the suspicion of expats towards the outside world, fabricated in resilience training, results that to the situation that the 'air' is kept inside the bubble. However, both the expat bubble and the expat bunker influence the design of humanitarian aid and peace building practices and the performances and success of it. Often, the outcome is inefficient, contrary or unsustainable. The notion of hybrid peace, a mix of top-down and bottom-up policy and social movement practices, could be used as a tool to change and lead this outcome to a more positive one. However, the notion of hybrid peace and the securitization of aid are to some extend at odds. The bottlenecks, weak points and pitfalls of the securitization of aid will be discussed and elaborated upon in this thesis. In short, the negative impact of the securitization of aid within the aid-industry has to be opened up and questioned in order to gain understanding why hybrid peace is difficult to implement in some context. The case-study of the Green Zone in Baghdad in Iraq of Post-2003 is used to show how securitization of aid and hybrid peace in humanitarian space and their underlying motives and practices are insuperable interlinked.

Key Words:

Aid-Industry; Bunkerization; Expat Bubble; Expat Bunker; Fortified-Aid-Compound; Hybrid Peace; Humanitarian Space; Securitization; Post-Conflict; The Green Zone;

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1. Introduction

1.1 Context

The Post-Cold-War era characterized a trend of the securitization of the aid-industry (Duffield, 2010; Autesserre, 2014; Smirl, 2015). The concept of 'securitization' is derived from the theory of the Copenhagen School and argues that political problems are framed in terms of restrictive means in order to guarantee the security of it (Buzan *et all.*, 1998; Pram Gad and Lund Petersen, 2011). The appearance of security on the agenda non-governmental organizations of the aid-industry was caused among others by the emergence of 'new wars', fragile states and terrorism (Brown and Gravingholt, 2016). The slogan of *no development without security and no security without development* triggered the importance of securitization in the ideology within the aid-industry (Duffield, 2010). From 1980 onwards, aid and development measures were more often provided in zones that were characterized by violence in order to diminish the negative 'spill-over effects' (Duffield, 2007; Autesserre, 2014). In detail, the 9/11 period increased the need of the aid-industry to intervene in fragile states and to carry out peacebuilding practices to create, strengthen and solidify peace and diminish the possibility to make it become a breeding place of terrorism (Burke, 2004; Autesserre, 2014; Brown and Gravingholt, 2016).

The invasion of Iraq led by the United States of America in March 2003, is the perfect example of the performance of the securitization ideology within the aid-industry. In detail, the Bush Administration viewed the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein as a threat for both the national and international security (Hughes, 2007). Bush legitimized the invasion on the grounds that he accused Saddam Hussein of the possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and having connections with the terrorist organizations of Al-Qaeda, who was responsible for the 9/11 attack in 2001 at the Twin Towers in New York City. (Al Jazeera, 2003).

First, the result of the securitization of the aid-industry is the 'bunkerization' of the architecture of aid-compounds. The notion of 'bunkerization' refers to strategy of using restrictive security measures, such as razor wire, high concrete walls and armed guards, in order to secure the aid-workers from external threats. Due to the increase of aid-actors working in insecure zones and the firmness of aid-actors to stay *no matter what,* these restrictive security measures are often widely implemented by the aid-industry (Autesserre, 2014; Smirl, 2015). As a result, the overt bunkerization leads to the establishment of 'fortified-aid-compounds' (Duffield, 2011). These 'bunkers' are located in demarcated areas, such as the 'Green Zone' in central Baghdad in Iraq.

Second, the result of the securitization of the aid-industry is the notion of 'peaceland' and the expat bubble. These concepts are metaphors that refer to the world that aid-workers 'inhabit' characterized by its own culture and system of meaning due to disclosure (Autesserre, 2014). There is an increase in field security trainings, which are used to simulate risky situations in both real life and in online modules which fabricate skills of resilience in risk management. Consequently, many humanitarian aid workers will perceive the world they are exposed to with vigilance in order to protect the self from harm (Duffield, 2011; 2012).

1.2 Problem Formulation

On the one hand, strict security measures such as bunkerization and field-security trainings are viewed as indispensable for the continuity of providing aid and development in violent zones. On the other hand, these security measures increase a physical and social segregation between expats and the people they tend to serve. Furthermore, this stimulates feelings of suspiciousness and misperception among local communities towards the aid-industry and can even fuel more violence.

The friction of the need for securitization of the aid-industry triggers an unintended outcome. Overt fortification does not stabilize security and peace in a conflict zone, it rather stimulates a disconnection with local actors which is reinforced by the expat bubble. This bubble creates a working style that is standardized, top-down and lacks local knowledge. Consequently, it creates a social segregation between expats and the people they tend to serve. A disconnection can lead further to a counterproductive, ineffective and inefficient peace building practices and can in return increase the violence in humanitarian spaces against humanitarian aid-workers (Autesserre, 2014a, p.13).

The failure of peace building practices and the increased violence against the aid-industry influences a local turn in development in humanitarian space and the occurrence of hybrid peace. This notion is a mix of top-down and bottom-up policy and social movement practices in a specific area (Mac Ginty, 2010). Hybrid peace could offer an alternative implementation of policy in the aid-industry to improve the effectiveness of peacebuilding practices. In detail, the importance of cooperation, negotiation and interaction with several local and international actors in a specific context is placed central. Furthermore, this could offer new insights on how to contextualize a conflict and to design and to implement sustainable peace building practices.

The purpose of this thesis is to discover how processes and practices of the securitization of the aid-industry are carried out by the American Coalition and if they impede the notion of hybrid peace. In detail, the geographical context of Iraq is used because it provides a possibility to apply several theoretical notions onto a place where both local and international actors were located in the same city but have experienced the Iraq War and the foreign occupation in different ways. Therefore, the central research question of this thesis will be: ***How does the securitization of aid influence the process of hybrid peace and how is this reflected in the Green Zone in Baghdad of Iraq post-2003?***

In order to give an answer to this central research question, this thesis is divided into three chapters. Every chapter has its owns sub-question which is as follows:

1. ***How does the securitization of aid relate to the establishment of expat bubbles and bunkers?***
2. ***How can we speak of hybrid peace in times of securitization?***
3. ***In what ways does the Green Zone in Baghdad of Iraq Post-2003 signify the process of the securitization of aid and impedes the establishment of hybrid peace?***

1.3 Methodology

In this thesis I will argue that the securitization of aid, the establishment of expat bubbles and bunkers, negatively influences the occurrence of hybrid peace. The Green Zone which was designed to house aid-workers who would contribute to the design of a democratic, stable and prosperous Iraq, has resulted in the contrary. The physical and psychological characteristics of the Baghdad Bubble has led to the situation wherein the American Coalition, has made several mistakes which hindered the establishment of hybrid peace.

Firstly, I will focus on the securitization of aid. This chapter will be divided into three sections which will start with the notion of humanitarian space and violence. This allows me to gather insight, in line with the next paragraph, of the occurrence of securitization and bunkerization of the aid-industry. Finally, the metaphor of peaceland will be introduced in order to describe the notion of the expat bubble, including the psychological and physical characteristics that come with it. In short, this chapter will try to find an answer to the following sub-question: ***How does the securitization of aid relate to the establishment of expat bubbles and bunkers?***

Secondly, I will elaborate upon the notion of hybrid peace in humanitarian space. This chapter will be divided into three sections which will start with the local turn in development. This allows me to gather insight, in line with the next paragraph, of the politics of knowledge about the notion of hybrid peace. Finally, the tension between hybrid peace and liberal peace will be given and explained in order to contextualize its defects in the implementation. In short, this chapter, in line with the securitization paradigm of the previous chapter, will try to find an answer to the sub-question: ***How can we speak of hybrid peace in times of securitization?***

Thirdly, I will research how the securitization of aid and the hybrid peace in humanitarian space is performed out during the U.S led occupation of Iraq. This chapter will be divided into three sections which will start with an explanation of the *Operation Iraqi Freedom* and in detail an overview of the Green Zone: pre-invasion and post-invasion. Furthermore, in line with the first chapter, I will describe the securitization of aid inside the Green Zone and question if we can speak of an Baghdad Bubble. Besides, in line with chapter two, I will discuss if hybrid peace in Iraq is impeded due to the significance of the Baghdad Bubble inside the Green Zone. The mistakes that have been made as a result of this bubble will be elaborated upon and put into context to explain the obstacles for the implementation of hybrid peace in the setting of post-conflict Iraq. In short, this chapter will try to find an answer to the next sub-question: ***In what ways does the Green Zone in Baghdad of Iraq Post-2003 signify the process of the securitization of aid and impedes the establishment of hybrid peace?***

The structure of this thesis is as follows. First, the chapter '*Introduction'* has given an overview of the context, theoretical framework, problem formulation and finally the methodology of this thesis. Second, the chapter '*The Securitization of Aid'* will introduce concepts of securitization and bunkerization of the aid-industry and peaceland as the unintended outcome of it. Third, the chapter '*Hybrid Peace in Humanitarian Space'* will provide an overview of the local turn in development, politics of knowledge and the tension between liberal peace and hybrid peace. Four, the chapter '*The Green Zone of Baghdad of Iraq Post-2003'* will provide an overview of establishment of the Green Zone before and after the U.S led invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, the notion of securitization of aid and hybrid peace in humanitarian space will be applied upon this case-study. In detail, it will discuss the features of the Baghdad Bubble and the events that impeded the notion of hybrid peace. Five, the chapter '*Conclusion'* will summarize the most important arguments of this thesis. Six, and also lastly, the chapter '*Discussion'* will elaborate upon some points of discussion that are linked to the research and personal reflection.

The social and theoretical relevance of this thesis is that it contributes to an understanding of the effectiveness of peacebuilding practices and humanitarian aid that are carried out by the aid-industry. By applying the theoretical notions of the securitization of aid and hybrid peace in humanitarian space upon The Green Zone in Baghdad of Iraq Post-2003, some lessons can be learned. In detail, it will provide insights on how to close the gap between expats and the local community they tend to serve. Furthermore, this may contribute to the effectiveness of peacebuilding practices and establishment of peace in the future. Besides, the methodology of this thesis is based upon a literature study. In detail, information will be used from books and (peer-reviewed) articles from scientifically journals. Furthermore, news articles and pictures taken by journalists from example: Al Jazeera, The Guardian and The New York Times will be used to report crucial events that occurred before, during and after the Iraq War. Finally, the book '*Imperial Life in The Emerald City; Inside Baghdad's Green Zone*' written by the Sunday Times award-winning author Rajiv Chandrasekaran, will be elaborated upon. Specifically, some vignettes of the book will be used to introduce an event, setting or a conversation.

2. The Securitization of Aid

The news on 17 December 1996 was headlined with the statement that six staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were murdered while they were asleep in Chechnya (The New York Times, 1996). However, this was not the last event of violence against aid-workers. For example, the Jordanian embassy was targeted by a car-bomb on 7 August in 2003 that killed eleven people and injured 65 others (The New York Times, 2003b). Furthermore, the Green Zone in Baghdad was several times the target of suicide bomb attacks. On 19 August in 2003, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Iraq, named Sergio Vierra de Mello was killed with 22 other staff-members and more than 160 people were injured (The New York Times, 2003a). Besides on 27 October in 2003, twelve people were killed nearby the ICRC headquarter (The Guardian, 2003a). In short, offices and headquarters of international actors inside demarked 'safe zones' were more often the target of attacks.

These violent attacks raise questions: *Where do these violent attacks against humanitarian aid-workers come from? How does the aid-industry take measures towards this?* In this chapter, the notion of the humanitarian space and the occurrence of violence will be explained. Besides, the concepts of securitization and bunkerization will be elaborated and linked upon the notion of humanitarian space. Last, the notions of peaceland and the expat bubble will be introduced as the unintended outcome of securitization. The sub-question will be central in this chapter is: *'How does the securitization of aid relate to the establishment of expat bubbles and bunkers?*

2.1 Humanitarian Space and Violence

The aid-industry performs and delivers humanitarian aid and development as much as they can in areas asking for assistance. These areas are often referred to as the humanitarian space that is according to (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010): '*an environment where humanitarians can work without hindrance and follow the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity'* (p. 1117). In detail, the elements which influence the shape of humanitarian space are as follows. First, the physical environment, such as a refugee camp. Second, the space for manoevre, for example the capacity and opportunity to design and implement ideas (p. 1118).

Before the Cold War ended, was aid often politicized (Duffield, 2010b). Democratic nation-states in the Global North often sought alliance with nation-states in the Global South in order

to secure that they would not take over the ideology of communism. Consequently, both aid and development became subjects of politics in international relations. In detail, the Truman Doctrine established the strategy of liberal interventionism which enabled the United States to deliver development tools and means of aid for other nation-states in order to establish a democracy (Merrill, 2006). When the Cold-War ended, the assumption within the aid-industry was that it could finally focus on delivering aid to realize peace and stability, without focusing on political motives. However, although communism was no longer perceived as the main security threat, (humanitarian) aid remained politicized (Henry and Higate 2010; Faust, 2010).

From 1990 onwards, the so-called 'development-security nexus' was introduced in the policy of the aid-industry (Duffield, 2010b). This nexus consisted of the statement that 'development cannot without security' and vice versa and eventually it became the aid-industry's new truism. The occurrence of 'new wars', population movements, state collapse, refugees and terrorism are just a few examples of the new perceived threats that fueled the development-security nexus (Duffield, 2012a). According to Terry (2011), the international community including the aid-industry, needs to recognize and accept that there is a 'fundamental paradox at the heart of humanitarian action'. In detail, she states that international aid organizations need to decide whether aid should be used as a tool to influence security or that it should be perceived solely as the expression of our shared humanity.

Hilhorst and Jansen (2010) argue that humanitarian space where the aid-industry operates can be viewed and analyzed as an arena. In this arena, national and international aid-actors interact, negotiate and collaborate over the intention and the outcome of aid. This assumption is based upon two characteristics. First, concepts of language, power and discourse together influence the construction of humanitarian principles, operational and professional standards (p.1121). Second, the performance of humanitarian action is based on both moral and political motives. Governments of nation states often use humanitarian action, in the field of humanitarian space, as a tool to carry out their own political agenda (p.1122).

Consequently, the fact that the humanitarian space is not free from national political interests has an effect on the neutrality and thus the acceptance and effectiveness of aid. The trend of violence against the aid-industry can be seen as consequence of this change. There is a wide range of literature available in academia that underscores this statement (for example: Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2006; Duffield, 2010: 2011: 2012; Autesserre, 2014).

However, the described causes of the violent attacks against humanitarian actors varies. Fast (2010) has discovered two trends within the literature. On the one hand, the epidemiological approach uses empirical evidence to under-score the proximate causes. The focus point is the collection of the data of who, where and in what type of incident actors have been injured and assassinated. On the other hand, there is the trend of describing deep causes which are: the loss of neutrality; merged mandates; NGO association with military intervention; privatization of assistance and the proliferation of NGO towards humanitarian assistance. Though, most of the conclusions from the deep causes are not derived from empirical evidence.

Furthermore, Denskus (2007) argues that peacebuilding practices does not result in peace but leads to the occurrence of concepts and methods that legitimize humanitarian intervention. As a result, the focus of aid shifts away from the center, which is offering aid and development to local communities in need, towards a '*do no harm'* position (World Vision International, 2017). In short, according to Van Brabant (2010) and Brown and Gravingholt (2016), violent attacks towards expats who work for non-governmental organizations (ngo's) have introduced a shift in the paradigm of the aid-industry. In detail, this paradigm-shift is the change from delivering dominantly aid and development measures towards the domination of security management in the policy of ngo's of the aid-industry.

Although the empirical data of violence in academia is widely available, some marginal notes need to be addressed. Fast (2010) argues that there is a lack of consistency of data sources, that there is no clear definition of what a 'security incident' and 'aid worker' is and finally the so-called 'denominator issue' needs seriously to be taken into account. The denominator issue is used as a tool to determine whether violent attacks have increased in comparison with the amount of aid workers that are located in humanitarian spaces. Furthermore, Duffield (2012a) argues that the decline of international security is caused by the fact that host governments are today unable or unwilling to provide protection for the aid-industry and that state harassment, political impunity and a humanitarian denial also contributes to the increase of violence.

2.2 Securitization and Bunkerization

The politicization of aid and violence against the aid-industry has caused the establishment of the securitization paradigm. The theory of securitization is established by a few scholars of the Copenhagen School during the 1990's. It is based on the idea that security can be used as a tool

to influence and perform out power in the field of international relations (Buzan *et all*., 1998). After the violent attacks of 2003 in Baghdad against international actors, the United Nations Security Council formulated and accepted the Resolution 1502 (UNSC, 2003). Briefly, this resolution will judge violent attacks against actors of national and international humanitarian organization as a war crime. Also, according to (Duffield, 2012a) a global trend of security protocols and code-of-conducts emerged in the policy of the aid-industry. In detail, it enables expats to be prepared whenever a violent attack occurs. But, Brown and Gravingholt (2016) argue that the increase of these security measures does have little to zero influence due to the fact that we live in a less orderly, structured and predictable world than we perceive it to be.

Furthermore, Zanotti (2006) agrees with Brown and Gravingholt (2016) and argues further that security measures are used as a speech act to deal with this unpredictability. He argues that the Post-Cold War period characterized the emergence of governmentalization and institutional disciplinarily. These concepts are linked to the work of Michael Foucault who studied bio-politics (Peters, 2007). The theory of bio-politics describes the mechanisms that influences human life and the relation between power and knowledge. Also, Zanotti (2006) describes governmentalization as a process where organizations and states use means of governing, such as monitoring, assessing and steering, to gain knowledge and control over others. Second, institutional discipline refers to the situation wherein several international organizations use disciplinary tools, such as orderly administrations to make state processes manageable and predictable and where features of governmentalization can be carried out by.

As a result, Balzacq (2005) argues that a new social order can be established and is divided in two parts: the internal and the external. First, the internal is responsible for the establishment of the rule of the act. This means that a form of speech used to legitimize an act. Second, the external is influenced by contextual and social features that create a boundary and segregation of who is included and excluded from this rule of act. Furthermore, Balzacq (2005) argues that the strategy of securitization is a non-static rule-governed practice. This statement is confirmed by Henry and Higate (2010) who both argue that the fluidness of the securitization is caused by social-processual and social-relational dimensions.

The perception of securitization carried out in the humanitarian space has changed over time. According to Duffield (2010a), during the 1970's, threats and risks were seen as unscheduled events which occurred outside the ordinary life and could be controlled due to securitization.

In other words, the securitization paradigm uses measures such as separation with the help of checkpoints and controlled areas to secure the 'ordinary way of life' and to resolve the problem by placing a barrier between the victims and society. During the 1990's, the perception of risks shifted towards a so-called 'complex system'. This system was an approach which was build-up of political, economic, social and environmental factors that all together shape and influence the multi-causality of risks. Besides, Duffield (2013) argues that urgency of preparedness and the rise of securitization of the aid-industry has been caused by the fact that humankind is still not capable to predict unforeseen threats and therefore tries to secure itself as much as possible to decrease danger and surprise threats.

The construction of securitization is divided into three dimensions according to Henry and Higate (2010). The securitization often starts with a spatial approach. Cartographic principles are used to mark out country in spaces of levels of security. The authors introduce three spaces that are formulated in conflict areas. First, the spaces that host the headquarters of UN and other international organizations. Second, the 'sector sites' where local ngo's are deployed. Third, 'team sites' where military departments and observers are based. Consequently, security measures as road blocks, security checks and concrete blast walls create physical boundaries between these spaces, for instance to observe and control the inflow and outflow of people.

Furthermore, according to Duffield (2010b) are resilience-oriented approaches integrated in security policies of international aid-organizations. He makes clear that the so-called '*stay and deliver programs*' of field security training and online modules are widely used. Both practices create resilience, preparedness and vigilance of aid-workers which in turn can be used for their own security. Aid-workers are trained to detect insecurities and learn how to manage a certain situation, and more importantly wherein they control both personal and organizational security. According to Duffield (2010a), these programs vary from intensity (hours, weeks to months) and realism (from simple classroom courses to real life role-play exercises). Overall, in both programs the aid-worker is trained to be risk-averse and view the external world which they are exposed to with suspiciousness. Besides, Higate and Henry (2010) argue that these security practices are an '*embodied performance with performative capacity*' (p.37). In other words, the wide range of security scripts and code-of-conducts create a performance where security is constantly visible in the everyday practices which is carried out by aid-workers.

Finally, the securitization of compounds consists of a defensive form of architecture, better known as bunkerization (Duffield, 2012b). Bunkerization leads to the occurrence of fortified-aid-compounds or 'bunkers' which are used as a form of defense to secure humanitarian aid-workers from external violent threats and risks. Hughes (2007) argues that securitization is also carried out through socialization. This process is influenced by social capital of several actors. This concept is made up of the relationships, networks and the membership of groups (Scoones, 2009). In return, the socialization of actors influences the *'frames of legitimacy of actions, events and actors'* (Hughes, 2007, p. 86). The difference in social capital between individuals in society influences the perception and acceptance of the securitization practices.

2.3 Peaceland and the Expat Bubble

Autesserre (2014a) has introduced the concept of 'peaceland' to describe the world that aid-workers inhabit and consist of the shared practices, habits and narratives (p.2). Peaceland is an alternative of the term 'Aidland'. The chapter *Postcards from Aidland'* in the book *Adventures in Aidland* is a portray of the story of humanitarian aid from its origin, the construction and impact of it globally (Apthorpe, 2010). Aidland is similar to Peaceland in the fact that both 'worlds' are a satire of how the humanitarian space in controlled by the expats. They are a so-called 'place-that-is-not-a-place' and are both immaterial and material, infinite and immediate (Apthorpe, 2010, p. 201). However, they differ on the fact that Aidland focuses on the aid-industry while peaceland is based on humanitarian intervention in conflict zones. Furthermore, peaceland has its own so-called 'system of meaning' (Autesserre, 2014, p.5) that is divided into the construction of knowledge and the modes of operation (Autesserre, 2014, p.12).

Autesserre (2014a) argues that ineffective peacebuilding is caused by the notion of peaceland. In other words, the everyday life of aid-workers and their habits, practices and narratives is counter-productive. According to her, a peace building project is effective as: '*a large majority of the people are involved in it - including both implementers (international interveners and local peacebuilders) and intended beneficiaries (including local elite and ordinary citizens) – and view it as having promoted peace in the area of intervention*' (p.8). Besides, Autesserre (2014b) calls for the international recognition of peaceland in order to understand the struggle for development and appearance of violence against the aid-industry. The common culture is caused by the standardization process of peacebuilding projects in humanitarian space. Often, development and peace projects consist of a standard pattern.

First, the conflict is mapped, from physical areas to motives of actors. Second, the intervention is financialized in terms of policy, practices and participants which link to the intervention. Third, international development and peacebuilding organizations are called upon to carry out the intervention (Autesserre, 2014a, p.4). Often minimum local knowledge and involvement is used in these stages. The process of the intervenors is based upon their own views, beliefs and experience of how the intervention should be designed and what is best for the country and its habitants in question. Although the working style of these intervenors is based on hard work in risky zones with many deprivations. Autesserre (2014a) argues that still many interveners are left surprised when the situation is worsened (p.4).

The politicization and securitization of aid in the humanitarian space encounter the notions of Peaceland and/or the expat bubble. In other words, expats live inside a 'bubble' that influences the physical and psychological distance between the aid-workers and the local community they tend to serve. The common culture of expats and working style enables peacebuilders and aid-workers to ignore the micro-level tensions that will consequently jeopardize the macro-level settlements (Autesserre, 2014b). This inhabited 'land' or 'bubble' is perfectly put into words by Ross Coggins (1976) in his poem '*The Development Set'*. Although the poem has been written a couple of years ago, it is still relevant upon today. In detail, due to the description of the problems within the humanitarian space.

Excuse me, friends, I must catch my jet *I'm off to join the Development Set;* *My bags are packed, and I've had all my shots* *I have traveler's checks and pills for the trots!*	*We discuss malnutrition over steaks* *And plan hunger talks during coffee breaks.* *Whether Asian floods or African drought,* *We face each issue with open mouth.*
The Development Set is bright and noble *Our thoughts are deep and our vision global;* *Although we move with the better classes* *Our thoughts are always with the masses.*	*We bring in consultants whose circumlocution* *Raises difficulties for every solution –* *Thus guaranteeing continued good eating* *By showing the need for another meeting*
In Sheraton Hotels in scattered nations *We damn multi-national corporations;* *injustice seems easy to protest* *In such seething hotbeds of social rest.*	*Development Set Homes are extremely chic,* *Full of carvings, curios and draped with batik.* *Eye-level photographs subtly assure* *That your host is at home with the great and poor.*

Although there is no strict definition of what the expat bubble entails, there are some scholars such as Smirl (2008), Duffield (2012b) and Autesserre (2014b), who study concepts and trends that influence the establishment of it due to extensive field-research and in-depth interviews.

First, Smirl (2008) argues that although aid-workers 'fabricate their own spheres of dialog and interaction', the notion of mobility, securitization and links to the site of origin do affect the establishment of expat bubble (p.239). First, mobility is an important characteristic because it determines the ability of an expat to depart whenever and wherever (p.240). Most of the time, the international aid-worker has the ability to leave when the job has been finished and will 'hop' to another place, while most of the local people will stay in the same place. Second, the securitization of the aid-compound draws another boundary between the expats and the local community. Smirl (2008) argues that the 'self-exposed exclusion' of a fortified-aid-compound is often viewed by the local community as exorbitant (p.242) Specifically, the use of extensive security measures such as concrete blast walls and the mobile security in terms of the famous white Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV), constantly performs a security narrative to the world it is exposed to. Third, the links to the site of origin indicates that the expats are often more bonding and connecting with the place of origin than the host country (p.242).

Furthermore, Duffield (2012b) argues that the self-sufficiency of the fortified-aid-compound influences the establishment of the expat bubble. Compounds have often their own water-reservoirs, electricity generators, medical post, offices, housing and leisure facilities such as a swimming pool and/or a sports gym. This self-reliance reduces the necessity to leave the site to a minimum and thus provides the opportunity for expats to remain in their 'bubble'. Also, he argues that the fortified-aid-compound symbolizes *a place for refuge and consumption* (p.467) and *demarcates an inner zone of normality and civilization* (p.468). In other words, expats rather socialize with their colleagues than local actors. This is furthermore influenced by the fact of the severe time constraints and the blurred line between work and private life.

Autesserre (2014a) argues that the practices, habits and narratives of expats influence for a part the expat bubble. First, the practices are linked with patterned process over time and space that are based on knowledge, preferences and policies (p.31). Second, a habit is an automatically carried out practice. The bubble fabricates 'ready-made' practices and thus diminish the ability for expats to re-question the quality of it (p.33). Third, narratives are a discourse influenced by time and experience that influence how we will view the world we are opposed to (p.34). Also, these three concepts influence the establishment of the expat community that will make up the bubble. In detail, Autesserre (2014b) states that the community is featured on four grounds.

First, a shared official goal or official task. However, the motive varies from a career switch to simply earn more money (p.163). Second, a common experience of life in a conflict zone. The condition and construction of the work style is often more under-stood by expats rather than the relatives in their home country (p.164). Third, the professional and social interaction. Attending meetings and social events influences 'a sense of belonging' (p.169). Fourth, are the internal tensions, that are the socio-economic and security differences between expats and the local community influence this boundary.

The expat bubble that occurs due to the bunkerization of aid-workers is according to Duffield (2012a) part of another unintended outcome. He perfectly put this problem into words: '*the fortified aid-compound is more than an unfortunate but necessary defensive measure. It is a therapeutic infrastructure allowing for the care of the self and a necessary refuge from a threatening world that aid workers no longer understand or feel safe in. As such, it signals a deepening malaise within the liberal project*' (p.487)

Besides, Smirl (2008, p.244) agrees with Duffield (2012a) and argues further that the expat bubble within the fortified-aid compound reinforces the 'exceptionalism' of it. In other words, the defensive form of security measures and architecture creates an exclusion, disempowering and incomprehension between humanitarian aid-workers and the local people they tend to serve. This segregation is partly caused and maintained due to the transiency of the arrival and departure of expats and due to the privileged practices and leisure activities, such as swimming pools (p. 243).

Autesserre (2014a) also argues that the social segregation is negative trend. She states that it is caused due to the fact that expats live in a different 'world' than the local community. Due to cultural, economic and social differences and the strict security protocols the boundary of both groups is held intact (p.175). Henry (2015) adds to this statement that the humanitarian workers keep holding onto their acquired forms securitization to justify their existence within the aid-industry. Furthermore, derived from many interviews and fieldwork, the author argues that many expats within the aid-industry 'play hard' and compensate for it by throwing parties and enjoying other leisure activities inside the fortified-aid-compound (p.381).

2.4 Conclusion

What can be concluded is that the securitization of humanitarian space is linked with a paradox. On the one hand, the security measures are seen as indispensable in order to be resilient against the increasing violence against humanitarian aid-workers and the continuation of development. While on the other hand, the securitization of aid and bunkerization of compounds creates an expat bubble and expat bunker. In detail, both bubbles stimulate feelings of incomprehension and antagonism by the local community that can in return impede the outcome of development.

The trend of the securitization of aid in humanitarian space is visible in the architecture of aid-compounds, the emergence of field-security trainings and in online risk management modules. Consequently, concepts of bunkerization and fortified-aid-compounds are indispensable linked with the aid-industry. The notion of peaceland offers an insight of how the expat bubble in humanitarian space is constructed. It provides some characteristics that influence practices, habits and narratives of expats in fortified-aid-compounds. The fact that these compounds are often self-sufficient reduces the mobility and need of expats to leave the compound. As a result, they will often socialize with colleagues and remain in their bubble. Due to the fact that other expats live the same type of life, share the same goal and meet in social events only stimulates the coherence between expats and reduces integration with the local community.

However, the expat bubble is not a fixed concept. The boundaries which make up the bubble is constructed differently in humanitarian spaces around the world due to external differences. Overall, the characteristics of practices, habits and narratives are important for the construction of the bubble and the self-sufficiency of the fortified-aid compound diminishes the mobility of expats and thus the bubble is held intact. The transiency and privileged membership of expats gives another stimulus for the establishment and maintenance of the expat bubble.

Duffield (2013) argues that the *paradox of presence*, that is the setting of expats withdrawing themselves into fortified-aid-compounds while spreading the message to locals to strengthen their own resilience, underscores the need for hybrid peace in humanitarian space. The next chapter will provide an overview of what the notion of hybrid peace entails. Furthermore, the local turn in development and the politics of knowledge will be elaborated upon. Besides, this will help in order to get a picture of the obstacles which hybrid peace will come across.

3. Hybrid Peace in Humanitarian Space

> **Box 1:**
> **Fragment of 'A Nation at War: Tumult; Cheers, Tears and Looting in Capital's Street'**
>
> *It was real, at last. When the city awoke to find that the American capture on Monday of the government quarter in west Baghdad had been followed overnight by a deep American thrust into the city's eastern half, the fear ingrained in most Iraqis evaporated.*
>
> *Iraqis on foot, on motor scooters, in cars and minivans and trucks, alone and in groups, children and adults and elderly, headed for any point on the map where American troops had taken up positions -- at expressway junctions, outside the United Nations headquarters, at two hotels on the Tigris River Where Western journalists had been sequestered by Mr. Hussein's government -- and erupted with enthusiasm.*
>
> *Shouts to the American soldiers of "Thank you, mister, thank you," in English, of "Welcome, my friend, welcome," of "Good, good, good," and "Yes, mister," mingled with cries of "Good, George Bush!" and "Down Saddam!" (The New York Times, 2003c).*

The fragment of the article which was published in 2003, situates the public opinion of Iraqi's who welcomed the American Coalition that liberated them from Saddam Hussein's one-man's rule of the Baath Party. Hope for a stable, democratic and peaceful Iraq were both favored by the American Coalition and the Iraqi people (The New York Times, 2003c). However, as the Operation Iraqi Freedom persisted, the American Coalition started to base itself in the Green Zone while accomplishing little success, resulting in a setting where the Iraqi opinion changed (BBC News, 2003a; The New Yorker, 2004; Diamond, 2005). In other words, the liberal peace paradigm of the American Coalition was top-down and insufficient due to the ignorance of the existing local Iraqi governance capacity. Therefore, I argue that we have to acknowledge that the securitization of aid, elaborated upon in the previous chapter, impedes the occurrence and viability of hybrid peace in humanitarian space. This chapter will give an overview of hybrid peace in academia in conflict and peace studies. In detail, the occurrence of the local turn in development will be outlined. Also, the politics of knowledge and the characteristics of the notion of hybrid peace will be discussed upon. Besides, the theory concerning the notion of hybrid peace will be linked to liberal peace. In other words: are there tensions visible between both concepts that can be linked to features of hybrid peace? The sub-question which will be central in this chapter is: '***How can we speak of hybrid peace in times of securitization?***'

3.1 The Local Turn in Development

Development and peace-building practices in humanitarian space are often seen as top-down, exclusive and in-efficient. As discussed in the previous chapter, the securitization of aid results in the fabrication of expat bunkers and bubbles. Following up, the next section will provide information about trends of a local turn in development and the notion of hybrid peace.

The local turn in development is an outcome of the liberal peace paradigm of the aid-industry. To put it differently, it can be viewed as an alternative to this discourse by offering a new way of thinking. The scholars Dempsey and Munslow (2009) argue that the U.S led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has deteriorated the credibility of interventionism and of peacebuilding practices in humanitarian spaces. Besides, both scholars argue that the Iraq invasion influenced the shield of neutrality of the humanitarian and non-governmental organizations around the world and reduced the budgets available for these agencies. Furthermore, they emphasize the need for expats to have an understanding of local livelihoods and way of life of the people they serve.

Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) argue that it is important to take a closer look at the local turn in development because it unravels explanations of the changing conditions of peace-building practices. They argue that top-down peacebuilding practices are unsustainable because they are not always able to map the core of the problem and often neglect the importance of local development. Both refute the criticisms of local peacebuilding practices that argue that local initiatives are corrupt, dysfunctional and that there is no real 'local'. Instead Ginty and Richmond (2013) argue that the local turn in development should be taken seriously because it has '*widespread global implications and dynamics'* (p.765). Furthermore, they argue that hybrid peace should be introduced in the field of conflict studies as an alternative for today's top-down peacebuilding practices. They argue that hybrid peace is the outcome of the so-called *'unintended outcomes of external blue prints'* (p.769). In other words, peacebuilding practices nowadays focus too much on realizing goals which are designed in policies but which neglect structural causes of conflict and local knowledge of everyday life. Also, they argue that 'local' means: *locally based agencies within a conflict and post-conflict environment which aim at identifying and creating the necessary processes for peace, perhaps with or without the international help, and framed in a way in which legitimacy in local and international terms converges* (p.769). They add up onto this that hybrid peace must be seen as both a theoretical perspective and as a practice, which both includes social and historical struggles (p.770).

3.2 Hybrid Peace and Politics of Knowledge

Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) argue that a so-called 'decolonization of knowledge' in the field of peacebuilding and conflict studies is needed for the establishment of the local turn in development (p.765). Specifically, the authors argue that the local turn in development should not be viewed as an abandoning of top-down peacebuilding practices. Rather as a combination of cooperation and acceptance of how local knowledge influences power relations (p.780). In other words, hybrid peace as a form of local knowledge, is viewed by both authors as an opportunity to establish peace in humanitarian spaces that are exposed to conflict.

Furthermore, Autesserre (2014a) argues that: *researchers who examine grassroots dynamics usually focus on how intended beneficiaries react of interventions. They demonstrate that local authorities and populations regularly contest, adapt and transform international programs, and thus that the results of foreign efforts are a hybrid between the intentions of the expats and the interests of the local stakeholders* (p.25). In short, Autesserre argues that the politics of knowledge of hybrid peace is inseparable with local preferences, policy and perspectives. In line with this statement, Denskins (2007) underscores the importance of giving attention and listen to local actors for the design of and carrying out of peace building practices.

Belloni (2012) argues that the existence of hybrid peace is the confirmation of an existing gap and antagonism between the international and local actors in a specific context. He explains that the term 'hybrid' in hybrid peace should be viewed as '*a sort of state of affairs where actors, institutions and norms on both liberal and illiberal grounds are established next to one other'* (p.22). Also, he argues that humanitarian aid-workers should keep in mind the statement of '*not everything Western is liberal and not everything local is illiberal'* (p.23). Therefore, Belloni argues that although liberal forms of policy and intervention dominate the field of international relations they can be contrary when they are carried out. In short, the foundation of peacebuilding practices is often designed on liberal grounds but the performance of it can be carried out on illiberal grounds and thus perceived by the local community as unsuitable to local norms, values and beliefs. Finally, the scholar argues that hybrid peace is a very important concept in conflict studies for two reasons. First, it can provide a stage for local actors which represents the entire society of the given context (p.25) Thus, not only the elite will be given a voice but also neglected groups of people such as woman. Second, decision-making that is designed and carried out by these local actors is often viewed among the local community as more legitimate than those carried out by the international actors (p.25)

Furthermore, Belloni (2012) discusses in his article four types of hybrid peace governance that can be discovered and should be taken seriously in order to understand the foundation of the notion of hybrid peace. First, 'the game theory' argues that hybrid peace is the outcome of the social interaction between local and international actors who all have their own form of agenda, motives and practices (p.27). Overall, it provides a tool to understand the changing nature of the different actors in a given setting and thus the implementation of hybrid peace. Second, 'the path-dependence theory' argues that a context in humanitarian space should be placed central in order to understand the outcome of it (p.28). In short, it underscores the importance of particular events and their timing that influence the grand agenda. Third, 'the international incentives theory' argues that the motives and incentives of local and international actors (p.30). Overall, it emphasizes the importance of the socio-economic and political setting of a given area where humanitarian intervention takes place. Finally, 'the critical theory' under-scores that the liberal peace paradigm is based on social segregation and that it will produce unsustainable practices (p.31). To put it differentially, it argues that (Western) actors often do not address or to some extend ignore basic human needs: in detail security and socio-economic prosperity and that local actors eventually will join the counter-movement.

3.3 Liberal Peace and Hybrid Peace

In short, the aid-industry is dominantly based on the liberal peace paradigm. But, the process of the securitization of aid has resulted in insufficient, unsustainable and contrary. Therefore, hybrid peace could influence the outcome of this. There are several scholars who favorite the use of hybrid peace in peace building practices (Denskins, 2007; Dempsey and Munslow, 2009; Belloni, 2012; Mac and Richmond, 2013). However, Richmond (2015) critically discusses the tension between hybrid peace and liberal peace, that is dominant in the aid-industry, and the positive and negative effects of it. He argues that the term 'hybridity' in the notion of hybrid peace is linked with several dilemmas compared to the liberal peace paradigm. He divides these dilemmas into five categories. First, the tension with (neo)liberalism (p.55). Overall, hybrid peace is at odds with the phenomenon of elite domination in terms of socio-economic control of a market and the protection of it, including status and prosperity. In short, (neo)liberalism is less focused on a so-called 'social contract' and thus social groups within a society can be excluded from processes and practices in everyday life. Second, the tension with international community and sovereignty (p.56). Overall, hybrid peace is at odds with the phenomenon of humanitarian intervention by the international community and the sovereignty of the nation-state. In other words, there is a tension between the protection of the norms of the international

community and the respect for the local context. Third, the tension with the autonomy and international prescription (p.57). Overall, hybrid peace is at odds with the phenomenon of responsibility and legitimacy of peacebuilding practices. In other words, there is ambiguity if local or international actors should design and look after the policy, law and development of a given nation-state. Fourth, the tension between the individual and the community (p.57). In short, hybrid peace is at odds with the phenomenon of political individualism and acceptance of social groups within a society. In other words, the individual has to balance between its own norms and preferences while at the same time he or she has to balance the aims of the social group that can perhaps protect the individual norms. Five, the tension between rights and needs (p.58). Overall, hybrid peace is at odds with the phenomenon of the internationally formulated rights and the individual form of needs. In other words, rights can only be sustainable if several basic needs of individuals are met, however the imbalance is held in tact due to neo-liberalism which places the responsibility at the local level.

3.4 Conclusion

What can be concluded is that the securitization of aid has contributed to the notion of hybrid peace. In detail, the securitization paradigm of the aid-industry has created a top-down peace blueprint of peace building practices. The local turn in development has influenced to some extent the foundation of hybrid peace. In short, individuals that make up a group in the society of a nation-state have taken measures to speak out their objectives, needs and rights in the form of local social movements. This chapter has elaborated upon several scholars which underscore or introduce the notion of hybrid peace in conflict studies. They argue that hybrid peace could be used as a tool to understand and/or explain the changing conditions of the peacebuilding practices. Besides, cooperation with both local and international actors is seen as the most sustainable way to establish a stable, free and democratic nation-state. Different people among the society are given a voice which will thus strengthen the credibility and representation of a certain policy within a nation-state. The next chapter will give insight of how the securitization of aid is constructed in the Green Zone. First, an overview of the U.S led-invasion of Iraq and the Green Zone will be given. The notions of peaceland and bunkerization will be applied onto it in order if we can speak of a *Bagdad Bubble*. If so, then we cannot leave it unnoticed. Due to the fact that it can create obstacles for the implementation of hybrid peace and thus the effectiveness of the mission in the first place. The paragraph of the obstacles for the notion of hybrid peace will focus on mistakes that have been made during the Iraq War, such as the de-Ba'athification, the electricity or power policy and the insurgency of Sadr-City in Baghdad.

4. The Green Zone of Baghdad In Iraq Post-2003

The news on 5 April 2004 was headlined with the uprising of Shia Iraqi's against the American occupation, after just three weeks of the invasion. Seven soldiers of the American army were in total assassinated during a battle in Sadr City, one of the biggest Shia slums in Northern Baghdad (The New York Times, 2004). The battle was fought between the American army and the Mahdi Army, a Shiite rebellion group led by the cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr. However, this was just the start of violent turns of events between the American Coalition and the Shia Mahdi Army in Sadr City (The New Yorker, 2004; UNHCR, 2004; The New York Times, 2004).

The violent events and attacks on the American Coalition raise questions such as: *Why was the Mahdi Army established? Can it be linked to dissatisfaction of the U.S led invasion of Iraq and the occupation of the Green Zone? And has the Baghdad Bubble impeded in some ways the establishment of hybrid peace*? This chapter will give an overview the securitization of aid and hybrid peace in humanitarian space. In detail, it will start with the Iraq War of 2003 and the most important events that followed during occupation. The context of the Green Zone pre-invasion and post-invasion will be elaborated upon. Besides, the concepts of the securitization of aid will be used to describe the features of the Baghdad Bubble. Also, an overview of three events will be linked to the impediment of hybrid peace. The sub-question which will be central in this chapter is: ***In what ways does the Green Zone in Baghdad of Iraq Post-2003 signify the process of the securitization of aid and impedes the establishment of hybrid peace?***

4.1.1 The Green Zone: Pre-Invasion

Iraq is located between the Euphrates and the Tigris and it has six neighboring countries, which are: Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia. Jordan and Syria. Baghdad, Iraq's capital, is divided into nine districts. Inside the Karkh district, a 10-square-kilomtre demarcated area is located (Diamond, 2005) Also known as the '*Green Zone'* (Gregory, 2010). Green is a type of symbol for the safeness of the place while the rest of Baghdad is referred to as the 'Red Zone': a risky no-go area for expats according to policy reports of Global Security (2018).

Figure 2: Map of the Green Zone in Baghdad
(Source: Google Maps, 2018a)

Iraq was ruled since 16 July 1979 by Saddam Hussein, who was also the leader of the Baath Party. This party aimed for socialism, secularism and Arab unity (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001). Pre-invasion was the Green Zone used as the political, administrative and judicial location of the Baath Party. The Green Zone was also the setting for several buildings related to the regime, such as: The Ministry of Defense and the Republican Palace (Chalmers, 2006).

The passage below is a fragment from the War Ultimatum Speech by George's W. Bush given on 17 March 2003. I have used it in this chapter to describes the setting of tensions between the United States and Iraq. Furthermore, it gives in some sense a sense of feeling how a speech act within humanitarian space is carried out to legitimize humanitarian intervention. However, it illustrates a sense of naivety of the American Coalition, which is visible throughout the war.

> **Box 2: Speech of War Ultimatum Iraq 2003 by President George W. Bush.**
>
> *Many Iraqis can hear me tonight in a translated radio broadcast, and I have a message for them. If we must begin a military campaign, it will be directed against the lawless men who rule your country and not against you. As our coalition takes away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you need. We will tear down the apparatus of terror and we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free. In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near (The Guardian, 2003c).*

The 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers in New York City, established the *War on Terrorism* by the Bush Administration and marked the start of a trend of the securitization of the aid-industry (Bush Administration, 2002). In short, the regime of Saddam Hussein was accused of WMD possession and links with Al-Qaida (Al Jazeera, 2003). As a result, Iraq was seen as a threat for the security of the Middle-East and other nations world-wide. The Bush Administration (2002) argued that the removal of Hussein and the establishment of democracy in Iraq would be the only solution to dissolve terrorism in the Middle-East.

On 18 March 2003 gave George W. Bush an ultimatum for Saddam Hussein and his two sons, Uday and Qusay, to leave Iraq within 48 hours. If no action was undertaken by them, then they would have to face a coalition of American and British military troops who would dismantle Iraq (The Guardian, 2003b).

However, Saddam and his sons did not answer towards the ultimatum and thus the invasion of Iraq was launched on 20 March 2003. The *Operation Iraqi Freedom* accomplished their first aim on 9 April 2003, when Baghdad became under the rule of the coalition. A month later, on the 1st of May in 2003, stated George W. Bush that the '*mission is accomplished*' (The New York Times, 2003c). However, although Iraq was liberated from Hussein, the *Operation Iraqi Freedom* was also the beginning of an era characterized by insurgencies, sectarian violence and Islamist struggle (Hastings-Dunn, D. 2003; Allawi, 2007; Cleveland and Bunton, 2016).

4.1.2 The Green Zone: Post-Invasion

Post-invasion became the Green Zone the political, administrative and judicial location of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (OHRA). In its beginning, OHRA was set up by the Pentagon of and led by Jay Garner (Dobbins, *et all*. 2009) The main purpose was to set up and control administration practices in Iraq and eventually establish a new democratic Iraqi Government (Dobbins, *et all.* 2009). The staff members of OHRA arrived on 21 April in 2003 Baghdad and the former Presidential Palace became OHHRA's new headquarter. That same year, the OHRA was re-named due to a lack of improvements as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which was led by Paul Bremer (Chandrasekaran, 2007, p.43). However, The Green Zone is a controversial place. I have used the next vignette to give an overview of the establishment of the buildings and atmosphere within it, established by Saddam Hussein.

Box 3: Fragment of 'Imperial Life in the Emerald City' by R. Chandrasekaran (2007).

It was Saddam who first decided to turn Baghdad's prime riverfront real estate into a gated city within a city, with posh villas, bungalows, government buildings, shops and even a hospital. He didn't want his aides and bodyguards, who were given homes near his place, to mingle with the masses. And he didn't want outsiders peering in. The homes were bigger, the trees greener, the streets wider than in the rest of Baghdad […] No one other than members of Saddam's inner circle or his trusted cadre of guards and housekeepers had any idea what was inside […] It was the ideal place for the Americans to pitch their tents (p.13)

Baghdad and other cities in Iraq where during the *Operation Iraqi Freedom* exposed to the '*shock and awe*' bombing campaign (BBC News, 2003b). A lot of buildings were destroyed; however, the Green Zone was spared. The American Coalition decided to install the OHRA and later the CPA department inside the former political heart of the Baath Party of Saddam Hussein. In short, the history and memories of that place by Iraqi's were in stark contrast with that of the American Coalition and in detail of the CPA (The Atlantic, 2004).

4.2 The Baghdad Bubble

The vignette below is derived from the prologue of the book written by Chandrasekaran (2007). As an American (war) journalist and bureau chief for the Washington Post in Baghdad, he has gathered a lot of information and insights from within the Green Zone. I have used the fragment because it gives an idea of what life in the Green Zone has looked like during the occupation of Iraq by the American coalition.

Box 4: Fragment of 'Imperial Life in the Emerald City' by R. Chandrasekaran (2007).

In the back garden of the Republican Palace, deep in the heart of the Green Zone, young men with rippling muscles and tattooed forearms plunged into a resort-size swimming pool. Others, clad in baggy trunks and wraparound sunglasses, lay sprawled on chaise lounges in the shadows of towering palms, munching Doritos and sipping iced tea. Off to the side, men in khakis and woman in sundresses relaxed under a wooden gazebo. Some read pulp novels, some noshed from the all-you-can-eat buffet. A boom box thumped with hip-hop music. Now and then, a dozen lanky Iraqi men in identical blue shirts and trousers walked by on their way to sweep the deck, prune the shrubbery or water the plants. They moved in single file behind a burly, mustachioed American foreman. From a distance, they looked like a chain gang (p.1)

The Green Zone became after the U.S led-invasion of Iraq in 2003 highly securitized for the ordinary habitants of Baghdad. Security checks, high concrete walls with razor wire and armed guards transformed the former political center of the Baath Party into a humanitarian space that symbolizes the concept of bunkerization by Duffield (2007; 2010; 2012). To enter the Green Zone, strict forms of securitization measures were used. First of all, the entire Green Zone was separated of the rest of Baghdad by high concrete walls (figure 3)[1]. The Green Zone was during the American occupation only accessible for humanitarian aid-workers and contractors of CPA. However, ordinary Iraqi's could be granted access if they succeed the several body and identification checks at the front gates and could prove they were employed by the departments of OHRA or CPA (Chandrasekaran, 2007, p.23). Leaving the Green Zone was indispensable connected with escorted cars, in detail with armed guards and/or soldiers and with M16 riffles on top of the vehicles (Chandrasekaran, 2007. P. 18). The several car-bombs and violent attacks on the Green Zone, as described in the introduction of chapter 2, had caused another increase of the security measures carried out by staff members of OHRA and/or CPA.

Footnote 1: Several Iraqi artists started to paint art in the shape of colorful paintings on these walls in 2010, to shift the focus of people away from memories of the Iraq War in order to remind them on the shared culture of Iraq (figure 4)

| **Figure 3:** Concrete Blast Walls at Green Zone | **Figure 4:** Art Work of Woman with a Hijab |
| *(Source: The New York Times, 2010b).* | *(Source: The New York Times, 2010c).* |

Inside the Green Zone, the self-sufficiency of practices and services increased over the years. Firstly, a military laundry service was established by the American company Kellogg, Brown and Root (Chandrasekaran, 2007, p. 54). This choice resulted that local Iraqi laundry services were not appointed to carry out the job and thus an opportunity to create more job opportunities and economic activity in Baghdad had been surpassed. Secondly, the catering for the members of staff by OHRA or CPA was identically to on regular American diet, including pork meet. Chandrasekaran (2007) describes in his book the following setting: *'You could dine at the cafeteria in the Republican Palace for six months and never eat hummus, flatbread or lamb kebab […] Instead, the cafeteria was about meeting the American needs for high-calorie, high-fat comfort food* (p.7). Furthermore, there was even an Burger King established at the highly securitized military base of the American Coalition next to Baghdad International Airport (The Denver Post, 2011). Thirdly, there was an Bazaar established in the Green Zone housing multiple convenience stores, which made it unnecessary for humanitarian aid workers and/or contractors of the CPA inside to leave when they had to buy products (Chandrasekaran, 2007, p.17). Furthermore, the establishment of '*ordinary way of life'* inside the Green Zone was held intact by the set-up of leisure activities, such as a gym with luxurious exercise machines. There were movie screenings and *goodbye parties* of expats at the former discotheque in the palace of Uday Hussein (Chandrasekaran, 2007, p. 17). Besides, the 107.7 Radio FM of '*Freedom Radio'* was established which broadcasted updates from within the Green Zone, the Iraq War and of course American country-music (Chandrasekaran, 2007, p.14; Gilmour, I. 2016).

As Duffield (2012b) has argued before, the self-sufficiency of fortified-aid-compounds such as the Green Zone, influences the establishment of the expat bubble. This is underscored by the Feinstein International Center (FIC), that is a research department of TUFTS University in Boston and investigates and published annual reports of the humanitarian intervention in Iraq.

In their annual reports they underscore the negative outcomes of the overt bunkerization of the Green Zone which creates the so-called *Baghdad Bubble,* an alternative for the expat bubble or peaceland by Autesserre (2014). The 2007-report of FIC argues that bunkerization does not decrease the security threat, the success of the program and/or access to other humanitarian spaces in need (Hansen, G. 2015, p.9). Rather, bunkerization creates both a psychological and physical segregation between Iraqi's and the American Coalition. The American journalist Anthony Shadid has written several articles about ordinary life in the Middle-East. In one of his articles he interviewed an Iraqi man who perfectly expresses the bubble of the Green Zone: *'We're one Iraq; you can say that the Green Zone is another Iraq, [...] A badge is a passport, and if you don't have a passport, you can't enter that country."* (The New York Times, 2010a). This quote thus underscores that the securitization of aid and bunkerization as an outcome of it, creates an expat bubble and an expat bunker that impedes social interaction and strengthen social differentiation of people. It creates in some sense another world or 'country' which will have its owns rules and standards. If you cannot measure upon them, you are denied access. The creation of different sectors inside a city, such as in Baghdad, impedes the possibility to interact and negotiate with each other because people will alienate from others by withdrawing into their own established bubble. On top of that, legitimization of practices and the design of peace building practices can be underscored by people inside the bubble. In other words, due to the fact that humanitarian aid-workers are kept inside the bubble and fabricate their top-down policy, they will view outcomes differently than how the local community will perceive them. The next vignette, about helicopters flying over Baghdad, will underscore this statement

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Box 5: Fragment of 'Imperial Life in the Emerald City' by R. Chandrasekaran (2007).

A Coalition Provisional Authority Press Briefing

Date: February 25, 2004

Setting: Conference Room Three, Baghdad Convention Center.

Briefers: CPA spokesman Daniel Senor and Brigadier General Mark Kimmit.

Question (in Arabic from an Iraqi Journalist): *General Kimmit, the sound of American helicopters, which fly so low to the ground, is terrifying young children, especially at night. Why do you insist on flying so low and scaring the Iraqi people?*

Answer (by General Kimmit): *What we would tell the children of Iraq is that the noise they hear is the sound of freedom. Those helicopters are in the air to provide safety, provide security. Certainly, our helicopters pilots do not fly at an altitude intentionally to distract the children of Iraq. They're there for their safety. They're there for their protection [...] We would recommend you to tell that helicopter noise you hear above you ensures that they don't have to worry about the future (p.141).*

4.3 Impediment for Hybrid Peace

'The delivery of food and medicines and more specifically a prosperous and free Iraq', which George W. Bush promised in his War Ultimatum Speech (see Box 2), has to some extend not been granted. The CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council set up national elections in Iraq on 25 January 2005, in order to establish of a new Iraqi government (Al Jazeera, 2010). The elections resulted in the appointment of Nouri Al-Maliki, an Iraqi Shia politician who became the new prime-minister of Iraq from 2006 until 2014 (Fearon, D. 2007; Dobbins, *et all.,* 2009) However, not all Iraqi people were satisfied with the appointment of the new prime minister and started to revolt against Al-Malaki. Furthermore, they also did not agree on the presence of foreign actors of the American Coalition (World Public Opinion, 2006. In short, a '*prosperous and free Iraq'* was not acknowledged by all of the Iraqi's, especially those who lived in Baghdad.

In this paragraph I will elaborate upon three events during the Iraq War which had negatively influenced the establishment of hybrid peace. My aim is to explain the basic notions which are very important for the introduction of hybrid peace in a given context. The case-study of the Green Zone of Iraq in Post-2003 offers as a context where lessons can be learned from.

First, the Baghdad Bubble has enabled expats to implement the strategy of de-Ba'athification and the disbanding the Iraqi army but hindered them to realize the negative outcomes of it. The de-Ba'athification was a policy of the CPA to remove all the members of the Baath Party from positions for the new Iraqi government (Pfiffner, 2010). Also, the disbanding of the Army was part of this strategy, that include the dismissal of all the soldiers of the former army of Saddam Hussein. The author argues that these two decisions made by the CPA caused a stirring in the socio-economic structure of Iraqi livelihoods as many (85.000 till 100.000) lost their job and could not feed their family anymore (p.79). Furthermore, it fueled antagonism among the Iraqi people against the American Coalition which resulted in several insurgencies.

Overall, the implementation of hybrid peace can only be possible if interaction of international and local actors is made possible (Mac Ginty, 2010). Because, the basis of this notion is a mix of top-down and bottom-up policy approaches and practices by local and international actors Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). By implementation both the strategy of de-Ba'athification and disbanding the army, exclusion of people within the Iraqi society is established.

Resulting in the situation that not every individual can be represented in the Iraqi government and thus needs of some actors in society are left unheard. This could eventually result in the further neglecting of policy practices designed by expats and other contractors of CPA.

Second, the Baghdad Bubble had limited expats to see and to acknowledge the need for the establishment of human basic rights such as water, sanitation and power (Al Jazeera, 2004). For example, the electricity policy during the Iraq War has not been sufficient. Often, the only place where electricity was reliable in Iraq was in the local mosque (BBC News, 2003). Local people would therefore gather themselves mosques and facilitated a place of exchange of perceptions of the situation of everyday life and in detail of the American occupation (Al Jazeera, 2004). For example, three years after the US occupation 79% percent of the Iraqi's argue that it has a negative impact on the situation in Iraq (World Public Opinion, 2006, p.5). Furthermore, 77% of the Iraqi population has a strong confidence in the establishment of a new government and wants to get rid of the armed militia groups (World Public Opinion, 2006, p. 12). To put it differently, by ignoring the need for the improvement of Iraqi livelihoods, the perceptions of the Iraqi's about the presence of the American Coalition has turned over from positive to negative (World Public Opinion, 2006).

In short, understanding of the importance of the local context is crucial for the implementation of hybrid peace (Richmond, 2015). Because the acceptance from the local community by recognizing and implementing their needs, are more likely to succeed. Because the American Coalition neglected or did not prioritize the standards of living of the Iraqi people, they lost an opportunity to interact and work together with local Iraqi people who could help them to build a stable democratic Iraq. Overall, the Iraqi people were satisfied with the removal of Saddam Hussein and aimed for a peaceful new Iraq (see Box 1). However, the opportunity to work together and to stand on the same side has to some extend been neglected by the American Coalition and the CPA. The next fragment underscores the sentiment among Iraqi's about it.

Box 6: Fragment of 'New Role for Mosques in Iraq' by BBC News (2003).

"Freedom is not just about being able to express your views without fear," says Ahmad Madali, a thoughtful young man who approaches me in the Kadhimiya mosque. "Freedom is about action, about using our own resources for the benefit of our people. And we are concerned that the Americans have not just come to rid us of the terror of Saddam Hussein, but for their own interests as well."

Third, the Baghdad Bubble established securitization of peacebuilding practices by shutting down insurgencies with military means but this also decreased the possibility for a dialogue. Inside the Green Zone was a close connection of cooperation between the aid-industry and the military force (read: the American Coalition). However, this close relationship puts some question marks among Iraqi's. Their perception of the American Coalition and the CPA cannot be disconnected from a sense of suspiciousness, due to the fact that the aid-industry is working together with a military force. I argue that the overt securitization has created to some extend suspiciousness and eventually hostility among local citizens in the northern part of Baghdad, known as Sadr-City, against the foreign actors that occupied Iraq. Therefore, the interaction with local actors of Sadr-City and the American Coalition is impeded and thus also the basics for hybrid peace. As a consequence, mosques facilitated a place where the influence, messages and power of extremist Islamist clerics and politicians could be spread among Iraqi's (The Guardian, 2016). The cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr took advantage of this setting and increased his popularity among citizens in Sadr-City, a neighborhood, often called as the biggest slum in Northern Baghdad, housing a third of its total number of citizens (Davis, M, 2004; SBS, 2004; The Guardian, 2016). However, his newspaper '*Al Hawza*' was banned on 28 March 2004 by the American Coalition and that quickly escalated the tension between the citizens of Sadr-City and the foreign occupation inside the Green Zone (Bayless, L. 2012). Furthermore, inside Sadr-City is the basis of the Mahdi Army, who now controls daily life in Sadr-City and is responsible for the establishment of military trainings for children (SBS, 2004)

Figure 5: Map of Sadr City in Baghdad
(Source: Google Maps, 2018b).

Figure 6: Moqtada Al-Sadr
(Source: The Guardian, 2016).

4.4 Conclusion

What can be concluded is that the securitization of the Green Zone has established a fortified-bunker that impeded the implementation of hybrid peace. Furthermore, on the one hand, the Operation Iraqi Freedom was seen by international actors and Iraqi's themselves as the end of the ruling of Saddam Hussein and the beginning of a new era. On the other hand, the U.S led-invasion and occupation of Iraq has resulted in the establishment of the Baghdad Bubble which was just as exclusive and privileged as before the invasion.

The architectural and geographical location of the Green Zone has been favored by Saddam Hussein and the American Coalition. Its central location inside Baghdad and the overt security measures has made it into a self-sufficient fortified aid-compound during the Iraq War. Both the OHRA and CPA has set up facilities, practices and services to make their expats feel at home in the Green Zone. On the one hand, a day-off and moment of leisure can be seen crucial for the continuous delivery of work. On the other hand, luxurious facilities such as the gym and the swimming pool and the self-sufficiency of a bazaar, catering and laundry service and throwing parties in the Republican Palace, can only give an extra stimulant for maintaining the bubble of the Green zone. In other words, we can argue that there is indeed to some extent an Baghdad Bubble visible inside the Green Zone. In other words, the securitized architecture, the establishment of self-sufficiency services and leisure practices helped to keep the 'air' in the *Baghdad Bubble* in order to make sure that the expats of the CPA felt safe and at home.

The impediment of hybrid peace in Iraq has been influenced by the securitization of aid by the Baghdad Bubble inside the Green Zone. By elaborating upon mistakes that occurred during the Iraq War, lessons can be learned for the future. Furthermore, the have been three events set out in this chapter. First, the Baghdad Bubble has enabled expats to implement the strategy of de-Ba'athification and the disbanding the Iraqi army but hindered them to realize the negative outcomes of it due to ignorance. Also, the Baghdad Bubble has lacked expats to acknowledge the need for the establishment of and human basic rights such as water, sanitation and power. And in return, it unintendedly fueled antagonism among Iraqi's because they did not feel heard or taken seriously by the American Coalition. Finally, the Baghdad Bubble implemented top-down peacebuilding practices by shutting down insurgencies with military means. However, this also decreased a possibility for a dialogue between both sides. In short, what can be concluded is that hybrid peace is impeded by the securitization of aid of the CPA due to the ignorance of basic human rights, the use of military means and closing off a dialogue.

5. Conclusion

'We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking when we created them' *~ Einstein*

The theoretical framework of the securitization of aid and hybrid peace in humanitarian space has been applied upon a case-study of the Green Zone in Baghdad of Iraq Post-2003. This thesis explored how the securitization of aid negatively influences the prospect of hybrid peace in a post-conflict setting, such as Iraq. Overall, the following conclusions can be drawn. The American humanitarian intervention, which was used to liberate the Iraqi people from a dictator and in more detail to establish a peaceful, democratic and stable Iraq has brought the contrary. The paradigm of the securitization of the aid-industry has created an expat bubble and an expat bunker. In other words, the defensive architecture of the Green Zone and use of securitization measures has created a 'way of life' inside the compound that physical and psychological draws a boundary between the expats and the local community of Iraq. This analysis is worrying due to the fact that this segregation negatively influences the outcome of particular peacebuilding practices and has brought dissatisfaction among expats and the Iraqi people. Furthermore, the close cooperation of expats of the aid-industry and soldiers and/or policy makers of a military force is at odds, which brings a friction in the neutrality of delivering humanitarian aid and establishment of peace building practices. I have tried to map the securitization of aid inside the Green Zone by using fragments of books, photos and news articles of crucial events that occurred during the Iraq War. The formulation of this setting is crucial to understand the process of the establishment of the notion of hybrid peace, as a grassroots practice against the dominant liberal peace policy paradigm. In other words, I tried to discover the tension field between securitization of aid and hybrid peace by illustrating the bottlenecks between these two concepts. In detail, I discovered practices which occurred inside the Green Zone that could perhaps explain the occurrence of the insurgency of Sadr-City in the Northern part of Baghdad. In short, the Green Zone closed itself off from the reality of everyday life inside Baghdad. The understanding of local developments, such as sectarian segregation and violence and politics of knowledge, for example the importance of electricity, has to some extend been totally ignored by the CPA and/or threated with the wrong (read: violent) measures. To conclude, this thesis tried to illustrate that we need to acknowledge the paradigm of the securitization of the aid-industry and put question marks to it. Linking back to the above quote, hybrid peace could be used as a tool to establish successful peacebuilding practices. However, this can only be realized if the securitization paradigm is acknowledged by the actors of the aid-industry and when it is changed to a more inclusive one, inspired upon the notions of hybrid peace.

6. Discussion

It should be emphasized that this analysis of the Green Zone in Baghdad in Iraq of Post-2003, by means of the notion of the securitization of aid and hybrid peace in humanitarian space, is restricted by limited time. Some events of the run up to the *Operation Iraqi Freedom* and during the foreign occupation, that came to the fore by the notion of the securitization in humanitarian space, are only shortly touched upon. In this thesis the main theories were applied to the case-study of the Green Zone. As it shows some interesting insights of the construction of the expat bunker and bubble of the CPA. It could be valuable to go deeper into the structure of the CPA. With more extensive time this thesis could integrate with more literature, including interesting statements by a variety of scholars and updates of events in articles, interviews and reports.

Furthermore, the choice for the setting of the Green Zone and the Iraq War in particular can be viewed as obvious for the description of theory in a post-conflict setting. To put it differently, the Iraq War is viewed as the ultimate example of how a humanitarian intervention should not go (Human Rights Watch, 2004). But the theory however, enabled to analyze the impediment of hybrid peace in Iraq from the perspective of the securitization of the aid-industry, has offered new findings which can be useful for other scholars and the aid-industry, for example the re-construction program of Syria. However, it asks for a better understanding how that conflict has occurred and what each actor, both local and international, has in it.

Also, the situation taking place at the Green Zone of Baghdad in Iraq of Post-2003, is an issue which has developed over the years. Anno 2018, the American Coalition has already left the country for two years and The Green Zone has been opened up for limited public entrance since 2015 (The Guardian, 2015). It could be the argued that the request of local Iraqi's to reduce the privileged work setting of the Iraqi Parliament, is a form of the growing success of grassroots movements within hybrid peace.

Finally, reflecting upon my thesis, it has enabled me to look more critically at the aid-industry. Liberating a country from a dictator and promote the establishment of a stable, prosperous and democratic nation-state sounds legitimate. However, it also asks for sufficient expertise. To put it differently, it means that being critical about the practices, policy and prospects of a given actor in combination with openness for suggestions, criticism and opinions from others (both local and international) are key for increasing the change of success of the mission.

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