

Unpacking the Controversy on the Green Growth Strategy in the Republic of Korea:

Case Study of the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project



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Abstract

Inclusive Green Growth (IGG) has become one of the alternative solutions for countries to grow their economic sector without neglecting environmental and social dimensions. It is no different in the Republic of Korea (ROK) in which President Lee Myung-bak, though it drew many controversies, has decided to adopt the concept into Four Major Rivers Restoration Project (FMRRP). This thesis investigates the controversies in the FMRRP from the governance lens which focusses on the process of stakeholders' inclusion and exclusion, also on the different frames by various stakeholders on defining the nature and drivers of the project. For this purpose 22 interviews to the relevant stakeholders and observations to the public seminar also to the field of construction project have been conducted in different cities of ROK. In analyzing the case, this thesis made use of the concept of governance to understand the stakeholders' inclusiveness in the design, during the decision-making process, and to the benefits resulting from the project, also the concept of framing to present different ways of stakeholders in framing the project. In the timeline history of ROK's society, the issue of inclusiveness has constantly been debated between the government, business actors called *Chaebols*, and civil society, where different frames have also been shaped by the interactions. The FMRRP, as a project of ROK's green growth strategy, has also escalated the debate of the inclusiveness issue in the operation of the project and continues the deeply rooted history amongst these stakeholders. While the dispute remains unsolved, it is clear that the project has included and excluded several actors throughout the process, in which different frames also have taken their shape through the interaction between the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society.

Keywords: Inclusive Green Growth, Four Major Rivers Restoration Project, Governance, Framing, Inclusiveness as a Process, Stakeholders' Inclusion, Stakeholders' Exclusion, Frame Analysis, Interaction, Government, *Chaebols*, Civil Society.

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Abbreviations

CEO	: Chief Executive Officer
E&C	: Engineering and Construction
FMRRP	: Four Major Rivers Restoration Project
FOEI	: Friends of the Earth International
IGG	: Inclusive Green Growth
IGGS	: Inclusive Green Growth Strategy
GCF	: Green Climate Fund
GGGI	: Global Green Growth Institute
GGGW	: Global Green Growth Week
GNP	: Gross National Product
GTCK	: Green Technology Center Korea
KEI	: Korea Environment Institute
KFEM	: Korea Federation for Environmental Movements
KICT	: Korea Institute of Construction Technology
KRIHS	: Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements
MAFRA	: Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
MB	: President Lee Myung-bak
MCTS	: Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism
ME	: Ministry of Environment
MLTM	: Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs
MOPAS	: Ministry of Public Administration and Security
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organization
NIER	: National Institute of Environmental Research
OECD	: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCGG	: Presidential Committee on Green Growth
PKGW	: Pan Korea Grand Waterway
POMAC	: Professors' Organization for Movement Against the Grand Korea Canal
ROK	: Republic of Korea

CHAPTER 1

Introduction



Gangjeong-Goryeong Weir, Daegu

Image © 2016 personal

1.1. Research Background

Inclusive Green Growth Strategy (IGGS) has been portrayed as one of the approaches for economic growth that is not only environmentally sustainable, but also socially inclusive (World Bank, 2012). Whereas ‘the growth’ and ‘the green’ aspects deliver the demand of rapid economic growth without neglecting environmental preservation, the inclusiveness aspect acts as the pathway to embrace different stakeholders in the society and to highlight the importance of multi-level stakeholders participation in the whole process of shaping green policies (OECD, 2012; World Bank, 2012). Hence, whereas focus on the green growth is seen as serving economic and environmental interests, the inclusiveness element in IGGS is supposed to deal with the social aspect presenting solution to the issue of participation in policy-making and access to benefits resulting from this policy (Huberty, et al., 2011; OECD, 2012, World Bank, 2012). In this sense, the operation of “*green growth is not inherently inclusive*” (World Bank, 2012: 30). Interestingly, although many countries are keen to transform their economic model based on ‘the growth’ and ‘the green’, a transformation that sufficiently incorporates the inclusiveness aspect is still need to be addressed.

The Republic of Korea (ROK) which is widely known as one of the fastest growing economies in the world with their global brands such as “*Samsung*”, “*LG*”, and “*Hyundai*”, interestingly, it is also the ‘home’ of the green growth concept¹ and had an early commitment to adopt green growth strategy into their policies and government structures (KEI, 2013: 174). The first step in adapting a green growth strategy in ROK was done under the lead of President Lee Myung-bak (President of ROK in 2008-2013) which was symbolized by the declaration of “*Low-Carbon Green-Growth*” as the new vision of ROK in 2008 (Owen, 2010). In the not-so-open society where applying the democracy value still become one of the main agendas of civil society in approaching the government system (Chaibong, 2008; H. Choi, 2015), an incorporation of inclusiveness aspect might become an exceptional challenge while the green growth strategy in some way could be adapted in the economic system only by the support of the government and private sectors. Despite challenges, the ROK attempts to put the inclusive green growth concept into practice. It can be found in the establishment of a mega project called “*Four Major Rivers Restoration Project*” (FMRRP), which was announced as one of the biggest projects of ROK’s National Green Growth Strategy to restore four rivers across the country by mainly constructing weirs and dredging the rivers bed (Lah et al., 2009; MLTM, 2012a). It was brought to the public as a green growth project that integrated the aspect of inclusiveness into its design since it was meant to challenge the climate change and escalate job creation. A report of UNEP (2009) mentioned the FMRRP as an exemplary case for a green growth project that is inclusive (KEI, 2013; Office of National River Restoration, 2011b).

However, the implementation of FMRRP has become a controversy at the domestic level of ROK. Various groups from civil society such as academicians, environmentalists, and NGOs have strongly contested the FMRRP by pointing out the environmental damages caused by the project and by suspecting partnership between the government and private sectors conglomerate namely *Chaebols* in the project (FOEI, 2010; I. Heo, 2015; KFEM, 2016; Lah et al., 2009). Regarding environmental issues, opposition describes how algae blooms have suddenly appeared in the rivers after the construction of FMRRP, which is believed to harm the water quality and ecosystems in and

¹ Green growth concept marked its beginning in the Fifth Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development (MECD) in 2005, in Seoul, the ROK, when numerous governments, private sectors, and other stakeholders agreed to follow the path of ‘green growth’ and move beyond the discourse of sustainable development (Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, 2017).

around the rivers (J. S. Kim, 2013; Park, 2012). Environmental NGOs and other environmentalists have been vocally confronting the FMRRP about to this environmental damage and asking the government to take responsibility in solving these environmental problems. Other than that, the contestation also comes from academicians that suspect partnership between the government and *Chaebols* in the project. The suspicion is driven by the huge money invested in the project (19.4 billion USD) and the historically tight-but dwells with corruption scandals- relationship between the government and *Chaebols* (Powers, 2010; Watson, 2014). These two ideas are intertwined and contest the FMRRP as an inclusive green growth project. Whereas at the international level the FMRRP has been mentioned as an exemplary case of an inclusive green growth project, at the domestic level the FMRRP has received strong opposition.

From 2009 onwards, these groups have continued to oppose the FMRRP and demand reinvestigation of the project in light of the environmental assessment in the rivers and any illegalities that might have happened during the realization of the project (FOEI, 2010; I. Heo, 2015; KFEM, 2016; Lah et al., 2009). These contestations have been developing ever since the beginning of the project in 2009 and continue even though the FMRRP was already finished in 2012. They tried to convey their ideas through the publication of multiple scientific journals, articles, and statements in public media, as well as through organizing demonstrations, workshops, and public discussions. Recently, the problem came back into the spotlight because the newly elected president of ROK in 2017, Moon Jae-in, has ordered reinvestigation for the project to audit any illegalities in the policy making as well as to assess environmental and social impacts of the restoration project (Kim, 2017; Yoon, 2017).

1.2. Justification

Several earlier studies have suggested the discussion of FMRRP either in black and white based on environmental assessment and social problems occurred after the project, in which they refer to ‘taking a side’ as in to supporting or to contesting the project (Heo, 2015; Jones & Yoo, 2011; Lah et al, 2011; Mathews, 2012). Others see the FMRRP as a strategy of President Lee Myung-bak to protect his legacy and have suggested to connecting this concern to the policy making of the project (Mathews, 2012; Yun, 2014). Also, some have preferred to link the issue of *Chaebols’* power in the ROK’s governance system by emphasizing the FMRRP as a project that favors the *Chaebols* and thus forms another example of the strong government-*Chaebols* nexus (Murillo & Sung, 2013; Powers, 2010; Watson, 2014). However, none of these studies has pictured the case from a governance perspective that emphasizes the stakeholders’ inclusion and interactions during the policy making of FMRRP. Suggesting the view from a governance perspective that is merged with the issue of framing, thus, proposes a novel perspective from which to discuss the contestation of the FMRRP. It looks into the governance system of the case whilst talking the values attached to the project into consideration.

1.3. Research aim

The aim of this research study is multifaceted. The first and foremost objective is contributing to the political debate of IGG in the ROK with a new point of view and as such filling the knowledge

gap, by unpacking the controversy of FMRRP from the governance perspective. This is particularly interesting when considering the lack of discussion about how the governance system of FMRRP that is focusing on the discourse of stakeholders' interaction also stakeholders' inclusion and exclusion in the policy making does impact the political debate of IGG in the controversy of FMRRP. The second aim is gaining a better insight into the governing practices of the ROK, by analyzing interactions between the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society. This is achieved by analysis of actions and frames used by them in the governance system of FMRRP. Although the analysis of ROK's governing practice has been explained in multiple journals, it seems that there has as of yet been no attempt to connect the governing practice of the ROK with the interaction of these stakeholders in the governance system of FMRRP.

1.4. Research questions

Based on the elaboration above, the main questions of this research are:

1) To what extent and how are *Chaebols* and civil society included and excluded in the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project?

The sub-questions are formulated as follow:

1. How to characterize the design and decision-making process of the case of FMRRP? Who was included and excluded?
2. How to characterize the interactions between the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society in the design and decision-making process of FMRRP?
3. How to explain the inclusion and exclusion process of *Chaebols* and civil society in the design and decision-making process of the case of FMRRP?

2) How do different stakeholders frame the nature and drivers of the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project?

The sub-questions are formulated as follow:

1. How to explain the different frames of stakeholders in framing the nature and drivers of FMRRP?
2. What do different stakeholders consider as the aim of the FMRRP?
3. What do different stakeholders consider as the value(s) that used in the FMRRP?

1.5. Thesis Outline

The following chapters present the main parts of this thesis. **Chapter 2** presents the theoretical framework and methodologies used in the research. **Chapter 3** describes the main theme and the international debate on the theme. **Chapter 4** and **Chapter 5** provide societal background and provide context on a particular president's rule in the period of time studied. **Chapter 6** and **Chapter**


7 present results of the researches and analyses of the case based on the research questions and constructed analytical frameworks. **Chapter 8** gives a conclusion and further discussion within the theme. The following paragraphs server to provide some more information on the aims and methods of each of these chapters

Chapter 2 provides an elaboration of central concepts used in this thesis, which is the concept of inclusiveness as a process and frame analysis. Using these concepts, a construction of an analytical framework is presented as the tool to analyze the case in this study. This chapter also gives an explanation of various methods that are used to understand the problem described in real life including the methods of data collection and analysis. In **Chapter 3**, elaboration of the debate of IGG in international level is presented. **Chapter 4** covers the historical storyline from different presidents of ROK that focus on the stakeholders' interactions within the governance system of ROK and the relation with stakeholders' inclusiveness. **Chapter 5** characterizes ROK's administration under Lee Myung-bak that is related to the implementation of National Green Growth Strategy. It also explains the interaction between government, *Chaebols*, and civil society in the National Green Growth Strategy, mainly related to the inclusiveness aspect of the policy.

Chapter 6 presents an explanation of FMRRP as the 'biggest' project of National Green Growth Strategy as well as an identification of the interaction between government, *Chaebols*, and civil society especially the inclusion and exclusion of these stakeholders in the design, decision-making process, and access to benefits emerging from the project. This chapter also provides identification of the frames that are used by different stakeholders of the FMRRP. **Chapter 7** presents an analysis of the stakeholders' inclusiveness issue and the different frames constructed from the ideas of government, *Chaebols*, and civil society. These analyses are used to answer the first and second research questions. **Chapter 8** gives a conclusion of the description and analysis presented in other chapters. Additionally, some final remarks are presented by looking at the relation between FMRRP in the debate of IGGS. This is followed by a discussion on the interactions between stakeholders in the FMRRP which is connected to the deeply rooted history of their interactions in the economic and political system.

CHAPTER 2

Theoretical Framework and Methodology



*The ARC River Culture Pavilion,
Museum of the FMRRP, Daegu*

Image © 2016 personal

2.1. Theoretical Framework

This sub-chapter presents a literature review of several theoretical concepts and provides a framework that is used to answer the two main research questions. These theoretical concepts are 'Governance' and 'Framing'. Within the particular framework, the concepts are combined and adapted to analyze the controversy on the green growth strategy in the ROK. This sub-chapter starts with an elaboration of each concept and then provides an analytical framework that combined these concepts at the end of the section. The analysis within the analytical framework considers three types of stakeholders in the ROK as the central focus of the discussion. These stakeholders are the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society. In addition to that, the analysis also recognizes that there are various actors under each type of stakeholder who have different interests and roles in the case.

2.1.1. Governance

Governance is a contested and multifaceted concept that has been interpreted, applied, adapted, and utilized over the years by numerous scholars within different fields. The meaning of governance shifts from one field to another according to the context, range of discussion, and policy area (Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009; Walters, 2004). It is flexible and *"as varied as the issues and levels of analysis to which the concept is applied"* (Krahmann, 2003). For instance, in the natural science field, governance might be defined as *"a crucial steering activity"* within particular sectors (Kooiman, et al., 2008), whereas in social science it can be defined as *"the process of steering society and the economy through collective action and in accordance with some common objectives"* (Torfing et al., 2012: 14). In this sense, although governance in both fields reflect the concept of *"steering"*; as it portrays a continuous process to create conditions for ordered rule and collective action from various actors at different levels (multi-level participation) with common goals, the application to the field could be varied depending on the context and level of analysis (Stoker, 1998; Torfing et al., 2012). Thus, there is no shared definition of the concept of governance; it requires recognition of how it might be framed and the possible implications of the choice of the frame (Ison & Wallis, 2017).

In social science, especially in the public policy field, governance has been defined either as a normative approach or as an analytical approach (Kooiman et al., 2008; Torfing et al., 2012)(Torfing et al., 2012; Kooiman, 2008). As a normative approach, governance is seen as a new *"steering"* system in society where the role of government or state has decreased, and the flow of power has been moved to other actors at different levels (Kooiman, 2008). Discussion about governance in this approach, then, focuses on how to create a better system to *"steer"* society, such as 'good governance' and 'inclusive governance'. Good governance suggests a better regulation and management of society such as enhancing the principles of legitimacy and the voice of participants, accountability, fairness, the direction of policy, and performance (Graham et al., 2003; Schout et al., 2010; Warren, 1999). Inclusive governance focuses on the issue of stakeholders' inclusion and exclusion in the governance system which emphasizes equal participation, treatment, and rights of the stakeholders (Dias and Sudarshan, 2007; Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009). It believes that *"[a]ll stakeholders have something to contribute to the process of governance² and that mutual*

² The original text is 'the process of risk governance'

communication and exchange of ideas, assessments, and evaluations improve the final decisions (Renn and Schweizer, 2009: 175). It highlights the practice of stakeholders' inclusion and exclusion in the governance system, which not only relates to administrative and managerial issues but also engages wider issues such as the nature of political and societal characteristics (Ison and Wallis, 2017; Ruggiero, 2006; United Nations, 2016). It means that the inclusiveness should not only happen on paper but also in real practice during the process.

As an analytical approach, governance is seen as the “*steering*” system based on the interaction between self-governing actors at different levels, in which there is a movement of power from traditional government institutions into the networks and partnership of trans-national bodies, private actors, and representatives of civil society (Ruggiero, 2006; Kooiman, 2008). Discussion about governance in this approach can be found in the concept of ‘network’ governance (Assens & Lemeur, 2016; Westerlund, 2009) and ‘global’ governance (Bradford, 2005; Krahnemann, 2003). Within this perspective, the “*state does not become irrelevant, but rather assumes a new role*” to coordinate different forms of governance (Ruggiero, 2006; Walters, 2004: 31). It believes that the rise of different forms of governance is the result of an intention from independent actors to have a better administration system that could facilitate coordination and management amongst actors (Schout et al., 2010).

Another form of governance in the analytical approach is ‘interactive’ governance, in which defined by Torfing et al., (2012) as,

“[t]he complex process through which a plurality of social and political actors with diverging interests interact in order to formulate, promote, and achieve common objectives by means of mobilizing, exchanging, and deploying a range of ideas, rules, and resources.” (Torfing et al., 2012: 14).

It is based on the idea that various actors are trying to create a mechanism or structure in society, and these efforts are interacting with each other and there is a process of exchange of ideas as well as direct and indirect feedback, within formal and informal institutions (Torfing et al., 2012). Kooiman (2008) also stated that since “*[s]ocieties are governed by a combination of governing efforts, these governing mixes are ‘answers’ to ever growing societal diversity, dynamics and complexity*” (Kooiman, 2008). Within this interaction, values and frameworks held by different actors in society are also having influences in defining the shared objective (Kooiman, 2008; Torfing et al., 2012). Aside from that, interactions are not only happening between the stakeholders who are administratively included in a particular system, but also with the ones who are excluded (Renn & Schweizer, 2009). The interplay of the actors who are administratively included and excluded in the governance system as well as the practice of these actors in contributing to the system either from ‘the inside’ or ‘the outside’, therefore, can generate a sufficient representation of various perspectives, knowledge claims, and values to the governance system in society (Engelen et al., 2008: 3; Rauschmayer et al., 2009; as cited in Renn and Schweizer, 2009: 175). This pluralism of representation counts as one of the main components in finding a better way of governing.

2.1.2. Framing

Framing has been defined as *“The process by which issues, decisions, or events acquire different meanings from different perspectives”* (Dewulf, 2013). The notion of the frame has spread widely due to its flexibility to understand a variety of issues, decisions, or events in different disciplines. To analyze frames, Goffman (1974) presented the concept of frame analysis to challenge the perception of "real" that is often simply perceived as a contrast term and precise definition (Goffman, 1974: 56). He argued that people use a particular frame to portray an evolving situation around them and give a label of "real" which could be different from each others' and biased. This phenomenon might be taken for granted by actors in the society to acquire particular interests by shaping what they define as real and promoting "the real" to the other actors (Goffman, 1974: 21-35). Agreeing on that, Entman (1993) stated that,

“Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.” (Entman, 1993:52).

In this sense, Goffman (1974) and Entman (1993) believed that there is no such thing as a single "reality" since people have different interpretations connected to their own interest towards one single condition; as a result, there are different frames of one single condition (Entman, 1993; Goffman, 1986).

Framing represents a process of constructing a reality, in which it is closely related to a very own personal setting of an individual that consists of values, norms, objectives, interests, convictions, and knowledge (Van Bommel and Aarts, 2011: 3). Under this setting, a different perspective of 'reality' is produced due to various ways of framing. However, Aarts and Van Woerkum (2006) see that the embedded personal setting is not the only factor influencing the construction of a frame. They claimed that a frame is produced by a linkage between the personal setting of an individual and the ongoing context; to which it is connected with the actual interaction during a certain moment (Aarts and Van Woerkum, 2006 as cited in Van Bommel & Aarts, 2011). Agreeing on that, Bommel and Aarts (2011) stated that:

[f]raming is shaped by cognitive processes (referring to the way our minds work), social processes (referring to interaction with others who are 'actually' present), and by the continuous interaction between both (p.3).

Framing, then, does not occur based on only one factor, rather it is a continuous process that takes into account the personal setting of the individual, social (and political) processes within society, and also the actual interaction in a particular case.

In addition to that, Van Bommel and Aarts (2011) also refused the idea that people already have the frames that are readily available beforehand as the basis of interaction. People only bring their personal setting, which can produce different frames depending on the context of the actual interaction at the exact moment (Van Bommel and Aarts, 2011: 3). By confronting different situations and interactions, the frames that have been made can be adapted by changing details as necessary (Minsky, 1975, as cited in Dewulf et al., 2009: 158). In this light, framing can be seen as 'a social practice in context' (Eshuis, 2006, as cited in Van Bommel and Aarts, 2011). Therefore, by

looking into the embedded personal setting and the actual interaction during a social process, a way of people framing in a particular condition can be analyzed; it also works the other way around. One of the ways to analyze these aspects is by looking into their communication approach. The way people are communicating in a particular situation, such as how they give the definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, treatment, and recommendation, could indicate a frame that they use in a particular situation (Entman, 1993: 52).

In the public policy field, framing can play a pivotal role in the decision-making process, since by guiding the set of terms in the debate into a particular direction, a certain goal can be achieved in the final decision (Dewulf, 2013). It can be used to support particular views or even to counter them by making a different way of framing (Renn and Schweizer, 2009; Dewulf, 2013). By presenting the perception of “*real*” which was combined with the context and values in society, a common understanding or instead a disagreement could be developed and influence the decision-making process (Renn and Schweizer, 2009: 175). Different ways of framing from these stakeholders, either as the included or excluded stakeholders might contribute to a certain extent to the whole process of decision making (Van Hulst and Yanow, 2016). This is because the process of framing is not solely occurring during the decision-making process; the personal values of stakeholders, as well as normative values and issues in the nature of society and political system, are also having a significant influence in framing the problem (Van Bommel and Aarts, 2011). Thus, to explain the different frames in a particular case, other than looking into the context of the case, it is important to see the pluralism of frames that are available in the society by the included and excluded stakeholders, as well as the values held in the society and political system. The pluralism of frames, thus, could give a picture of the interaction of stakeholders in the governance system (Grotenbreg & van Buuren, 2017).

2.1.3. The Analytical Framework

To unpack the controversy on the Inclusive Green Growth in the ROK, especially in the case of the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project (FMRRP), the research proposes an analytical framework that has been adapted from the concepts of ‘governance’, and ‘framing’. This framework is divided into two parts which are ‘inclusive governance as a process: input, throughput, and output’ and ‘inclusive governance as a frame’. Inclusive governance as a process is used to understand the stakeholders’ inclusiveness in the design (input), decision-making process (throughput), and benefits resulting from the policy (output). Inclusive governance as a frame is used to understand framing of different stakeholders on the nature and drivers of FMRRP.

Inclusive Governance as a Process: Input, Throughput, and Output

The issue of stakeholders’ inclusiveness has been presented as one of the main components in inclusive governance. It is associated with the practice of stakeholders’ inclusion and exclusion as the means of participation in the decision-making. Some studies have discussed and affiliated the concept of stakeholders’ participation in the decision-making process with several issues, such as the fundamental issue as to including stakeholders based on the notion of right for self-governed actors (Lister, 1998; United Nations, 2013); democratic issues regarding pursuing a better democratic

practice through political participation (Bullock, 2014; Gaventa, 2002); also the issue of benefits of efficiency in decision making which can be achieved from the stakeholders' participation that is inclusive (Beierle & Konisky, 2001; Hong, 2015). Other studies are also attaching the concept of participation with knowledge, values, and principles that are embedded in particular stakeholders as well as in the nature of society and political system, which could influence the meaning of stakeholders' participation in the decision-making process (McAuliffe & Chenoweth, 2008; Renn & Schweizer, 2009).

Accordingly, the discussion of the inclusiveness issue in policy making has been mainly focusing on the attachment or influence of other issues or concepts to the initial discussion, while the discussion on the inclusiveness issue along the whole process of policy making remains limited. Over the years, studies that explain the whole process of policy making have been connected with the theory of 'Political System Model' by David Easton (Miller, 1971; Osman, 2002; Rissmiller, 2000). The theory illustrates how environment provides the demands and supports as the means of the inputs to the political system in which the decision-making process is taking place. These inputs are, then, converted through the decision-making process into outputs or policies (Osman, 2002: 39). This theory has been used for a couple of decades since it provides a dynamic understanding of how the policy is being made through the input, decision-making process, and the output (Rissmiller, 2000). Contestation of this theory came from Miller (1971) who argued the fundamental difficulties in Easton's theory such as the failure to develop the value theory and to cover the political inquiry (Miller, 1971: 235). This theory, nonetheless, became the root of several concepts exploring the policy making process where inputs, decision-making processes, and outputs have been used as the main argument.

The concept of 'inclusiveness as a process' by Hospes et al., (2016) has a similar design with Easton's theory where input inclusiveness, throughput inclusiveness, and output inclusiveness are used as tools to analyze the policy making. However, while the theory of the political system model actively mentions if inputs profoundly contributed to outputs, the theory of inclusiveness as a process considers the contribution of input and throughput inclusiveness to output inclusiveness, yet, it might not always be the case (Hospes et al., 2016: 2). This theory also has been acknowledged as an adaptation of the series of input legitimacy, throughput legitimacy, and output legitimacy by Scharpf (1999) and Torfing et al., (2012). While the theory of legitimacy translates input, output, and throughput into participation, performance, and process (Schmidt, 2013), the theory of inclusiveness as a process illustrates the inclusion of the poor and marginalized into three stages: design (*input inclusiveness*); decision-making process (*throughput inclusiveness*); and access of the poor and marginalized to the benefits of the policy (*output inclusiveness*) (Hospes et al., 2016). These three concepts are portrayed in one straight line where input inclusiveness and throughput inclusiveness are considered to contribute to output inclusiveness, based on the idea of putting input and throughput inclusiveness as the main elements of 'inclusive governance' and placing the output inclusiveness as the central element of 'inclusive growth' (Hospes et al., 2016).

Within this line, inclusiveness and exclusiveness of stakeholders in inclusive governance are considered to contribute to the recognition of stakeholders in accessing the benefits resulting from the policy which is connected to the inclusive growth. Thus, the assumption is that there is a continuous relation from inclusive governance to inclusive growth (Aiyar, 2009; OECD, 2015). The OECD (2015) highlights that the decision-making process of policies in the inclusive governance

system could stimulate the conversion of growth into inclusive growth. In policy-making to achieve inclusive growth, OECD (2015) characterizes four main steps of policy making that emphasize the inclusive governance in order to progress to the inclusive growth. These steps are: giving people a voice in policy since inclusive growth requires a diverse voices in shaping the policy, designing policies that cover all parts of government to work together, operating a delivery mechanism across the policy-making cycle using services that promote Inclusive Growth in which the vision is delivered broadly through a diverse public sectors, and bolstering accountability for joined-up outcomes (OECD, 2015). By aligning these steps as building blocks for policy making under the umbrella of inclusive governance, it is believed that it could accelerate the growth into Inclusive Growth.

This research is adopting the concept of ‘inclusiveness as a process’ by Hospes et al., (2016) to understand inclusive governance as the means of analyzing the stakeholders’ inclusiveness in the design and decision-making process of FMRRP, as well as its connection to the inclusive growth as the means of analyzing the stakeholders inclusiveness in the benefits resulting from the FMRRP. While the original concept is focusing only on the inclusion of poor and marginalized, this research proposes to adjust and open up the concept by broadening the focus towards the inclusion of all stakeholders instead of only the poor and marginalized. Neither to put aside the poor and marginalized nor to make the focus unclear, the concept is broadened by the logic that each stakeholder in the FMRRP has interests that need to be addressed, wherein the inclusion and exclusion process of each stakeholder in the design and decision-making process (input and throughput inclusiveness) and in the benefits resulting from the FMRRP (output inclusiveness) might explore the behavior and perspective of each stakeholder and explain the interactions amongst them. Moreover, an understanding of each stakeholder’s inclusiveness process can help to better explain the inclusive governance of FMRRP and its link to inclusive growth.

Hence, in this research, *input inclusiveness* is defined as inclusiveness of stakeholders (the government, *Chaebols*, civil society) in the design of FMRRP. *Throughput inclusiveness* is defined as inclusiveness of stakeholders (the government, *Chaebols*, civil society) in the decision-making process of FMRRP. *Output inclusiveness* is defined as inclusiveness of stakeholders (the government, *Chaebols*, civil society) in the benefits resulting from the FMRRP. Since the main stakeholders of FMRRP are the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society, the discussion about stakeholders’ inclusiveness is focusing on these three stakeholders. The government is also seen as a stakeholder along with *Chaebols* and civil society considering that they also have interests in the FMRRP and cannot be perceived as a neutral actor. Other than that, it is important to note that the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society are not a single entity in which there are many actors labeled the same as the government or *Chaebols* or civil society, yet, they have entirely different approaches, standpoints, and interests in the FMRRP. Therefore, identification of each actor under the name of the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society is needed to better understand the story behind the case.

Inclusive Governance as a Frame

Framing plays an important function in inclusive governance, especially to understand the perspectives, standpoints, and interactions of stakeholders in the society. Framing of the problem puts the meaning by and for the relevant actors on the appropriate situations which they are

involved whether as the included stakeholders or excluded stakeholders (Hulst, van Hulst, & Yanow, 2016). It can act two ways as in to generate a shared understanding between stakeholders which can also produce potential solutions and consequences, or either as in to create a counter frame as the opposition against the former one (Renn and Schweizer, 2009: 175). Coherently, Grotenbreg and Van Buuren (2017) argued that framing can be an instrument of power by the government to persuasively mobilize self-governing actors, in which they deliver a certain meaning to the problem without directly forcing their interest (Grotenbreg & van Buuren, 2017: 3; Partzsch, 2009). In regards to this view, Renn and Schweizer (2009) stated that the process of government “*steering*” is not that simple by saying that “*Individuals do not need to accept the conditions of society once for all. Rather, they have the power to shape the social structure surrounding them*” (Renn and Schweizer, 2009: 179). They emphasize that there is an interlinkage between power and knowledge to the public, which could reframe the decision context and create a counter frame over public authority by producing a legitimation of collective decisions from self-governing actors (Ibid). Hence, the framing of the problem in regards to inclusive governance acts as the catalyst for both the included and excluded stakeholders in the decision-making process, in which it could determine the final decision and in some cases affect the nature of society and political system.

In this research, analysis of frames is applied to understand the perspectives, stand points, and interactions between stakeholders in the governance system of FMRRP. It is to analyze the frames of different stakeholders on the nature and drivers of FMRRP and how the inclusive governance can be used as a frame by the stakeholders. Indeed, various frames can be used to explain the nature and drivers of the FMRRP, yet, this analytical framework chooses to focus on the frames that are used most often in portraying the FMRRP based on the official publication of FMRRP, academical journals, newspapers, and indeed, from the result of the interviews. The identification of frame is used to map out the available frames in the FMRRP also to define whether the available frames are simply different from each other or there is a counter-framing to the other frame(s). Apart from that, the analysis of the available frames is focusing on the concept of “*real*” by different stakeholders in framing the nature and drivers of FMRRP, interactions of actors in persuading their opinions, characterization of power from each frame, and also how the available frames are interacting from one to the others which could impact the practice of inclusive governance in the FMRRP. Hence, the analyses of the frames of different stakeholders on the nature and drivers of FMRRP can show the interactions between the actors of the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society including their perspectives, stand points, and responses to the other frames in the governance system of FMRRP.

2.2. Methodology

This sub-chapter presents the methodology used in this research, which includes the research design, research limitation, and research methods.

2.2.1. Research Design

The empirical data for this research was collected in the Republic of Korea (ROK) from July 2016 until January 2017. Five months of data collection took place not only in Seoul-the capital city, but also in several cities of ROK such as Jeju, Daegu, Anseong, and Yeosu. This research is identified as a

qualitative field research since it fits well with the exploratory research that emphasizes on generating a holistic view of the researched case (De Vaus, 2001). The research is conducted in different settings. For example, the internship period in the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) in Seoul, when becoming a general participant in the Global Green Growth Week (GGGW2016)³ in Jeju, field visits to the *Han* and *Nakdong* rivers, construction projects, and museum of FMRRP in Yeosu and Daegu, as well as during the interviews. Three methods were applied in these settings: participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and literature reviews. The data collection of this research was held in different settings:

The first setting took place from July until December 2016 (20 weeks) during the internship period in the GGGI. Participant observation was used as the method to identify the key stakeholders of ROK's green growth and FMRRP as well as to observe the interaction among them. From the observation, the identified key stakeholders were approached to be the interviewees for the research. Besides, since the internship period lasted for 20 weeks, observation on the ROK's governance system which focused on the interactions between the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society was also performed within this time. Information for ROK's governance system was gained through participant observation, the literature reviews, and informal interviews with the staff of GGGI.

The second setting was conducted during the GGGW2016 in Jeju, using the lens of a general participant. This lens was used since I was forced to not join the committee during the week of GGGW2016 even though my assignment as an intern in GGGI was to help the arrangement of the event; the responsibility was limited only to the assignment during the preparation of the event. Hence, the lens of a general participant was used in this setting while doing the participant observation. From the observation, information about ROK's green growth was gained from the presentation by ROK's Green Growth Committee⁴, also by identifying the key stakeholders of ROK's Green Growth. During the event, observation on the interactions between the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society was also conducted. Other than that,

The third setting was during the visit to the *Han* and *Nakdong* rivers and construction projects in Yeosu and Daegu, as well as to the museum of FMRRP in Daegu. Participant observation and semi-structured interviews were conducted during this period to observe the implementation of FMRRP in the field also to understand the views of local people alongside the rivers. The semi-structured interviews were held with one farmer and one head of farmers in Yeosu to study their roles in the FMRRP.

The last setting was applied by doing the interviews in Seoul, Anseong, and Yeosu. The interviewees were selected based on three criteria. First, the observation during the internship period and the GGGW2016, secondly, the informal interviews to the GGGI's staff, and thirdly, the literature reviews to the journals made by scholars living in the ROK. Subsequently, snowball sampling which is defined as a technique to identify new actors using the names that provided by an initial actor to expand the web of contact (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004), was used to select the next interviewees. Based on the comprehensive approach of case study research, all data from the

³ An international conference for the green growth organized by the GGGI

⁴ The name used to be the Presidential Committee on Green Growth during President Lee Myung-bak's administration but, changed to ROK's Green Growth Committee in the administration of President Park Geun-hye

interviewees which includes their positions, interpretation of governance principles, perspectives, and also scientific insights were used to analyze their frames to the case. Since the issue is quite sensitive in the ROK and could lead to a personal problem for the interviewees (e.g. regarding their jobs), there are not many people who want to speak freely about this issue, especially the people who were involved in the project. Accordingly, the interviewees' candidates have been contacted during the internship period by means to approach them using status of a GGGI's intern and to make it possible to have an interview. Other than that, literature data in the mass media, journals, also the national policy were also collected during the internship period to help with the interview.

After the data collection in different settings, analysis of the data collected was executed using a desk study. A thematic content analysis is performed by reviewing and categorizing the data that has been collected. This was done by reading transcriptions and highlighting key issues, coding the data, classifying and comparing the data, translating and defining the meaning of the data, relating themes to established knowledge, and developing the story line (Vaismoradi., 2006). Subsequently, the result of this analysis was divided into several chapters in this thesis to answer the sub and the main questions.

2.2.2. Research Limitations

Some issues might be considered as limitations in this research, such as confidentiality, language barrier, time for collecting the data, and image that attached from the internship period. Firstly, confidentiality is applied as one of the limitations since the case of FMRRP has already drawn some controversies, in which an opinion or data could attract a debate or even could harm the reputation and position of the actor involved. In coping with this issue, the status of a GGGI's intern and an agreement to put participants' identities as anonymous could be used. Moreover, an assurance to use this research for the academic purpose is also mentioned to convince the interviewee. However, the access to the *Chaebols* during the research was also cannot be entered even using the status of GGGI's intern. The regulation of *Chaebols'* company to restrict their employees talking about any projects of their companies to outsiders becomes the limitation of this research. Regarding this, secondary data from the opinion of people in academics, researchers, and NGOs, who have written publications about *Chaebols* is used to fill in the gap of *Chaebols* in this research. Secondly, a language barrier is considered as a limitation since the research setting is located in ROK. Since not all participants can speak English, an interpreter is employed to help during the interviews with the non-English speakers. Thirdly, time constrain of the field research is also seen as a limitation since it is combined with the period of internship. It is further added by the time restriction of the visa approved in the ROK. With regards to this, the field research partly started during the internship period with the permission of internship's supervisor in the GGGI. After the internship's period, half of the work for the field research already completed and only need the other half to be executed. The last limitation is an image that attached from the internship period since it is perceived as one of the GGGI's employee. This image can be a double-edged sword. Thus, a smart approach to either use an identity as an intern of GGGI or to strongly use an identity as a Wageningen UR's student is enforced while doing the approach with the interviewees' candidate.

2.2.3. Research Methods

Literature Review

The literature review method is used to build the theoretical framework of this research and to understand the controversy of Inclusive Green Growth Strategy that is focusing in the case of FMRRP, especially between the interactions of the government, Chaebols, and civil society. The literature has been collected before, during, and after the field research. Before the field research, data is retrieved from scholarly databases (Google Scholar and Scribd), official websites of organizations newspapers' website, and the library of Wageningen UR. During the field research, as there are several offline publications for the case, the literature is mostly collected from the library of GGGI, the public library of Seoul, and directly from the interviewees. After the field research and the research became more understandable, literature data is obtained through the several web sites that are related to the case (mostly ROK's web sites), also using the scholarly databases. The literature consists of academic journals, books, newspapers' articles, and also the official reports made by the governments, international organizations, and NGOs.

Semi-structured Interviews

During the field research, semi-structured interviewees have been implemented to gain information from different stakeholders regarding their views to the FMRRP. The interviewees have mainly been selected by using the purposive sampling to the stakeholders, which “[i]nvolves identifying who the major stakeholders are who are involved in designing, giving, receiving, or administering the program or service being evaluated, and who might otherwise be affected by it.” (Palys, 2008: 697). In this sense, since the research focuses on the interactions of the three stakeholders (the government, Chaebols, and civil society), the interviewees were chosen from this categorization of actors. To do this, the identification of stakeholders is needed and has been conducted during the internship period in the GGGI by using different sources in the organization. Apart from this, the list of participants that was received during the GGGW2016 also an observation of stakeholders invited to the event also helped the identification of key stakeholders as well as interactions between these people. Additionally, snowball sampling also applied in the research to asking further appropriate interviewees as to find the ‘right’ person to be contacted.

In total, there are 38 people who have been invited to join the interview. However, only 22 people agreed to be interviewed, while 11 people did not respond and five people rejected the proposal. From the people who refused the interview, two of them at first accepted the invitation but then suddenly rejected it. The invitations that have been sent via email and phone outlined the identity of the researcher, aim of this research, also topic that going to be discussed. The lists of questions were prepared based on the topic and were further tailored to the interviewee's backgrounds and their position in the case. During the interview, since written transcripts are needed, participants have been asked for permission to be recorded and whether to mention their names in the research report. However, whereas the permission to record the interviews were given from all participants, some participants rejected to be mentioned in the list of interviewees. Thus, by means to be equal, the list of interviewees only consist some forms of information from the participants (see **Appendix 1.**). Furthermore, the permission to be quoted in the research has been asked during the interview, in which apart from one interviewee, the rests agreed to be quoted. The

interviews were held face to face, except for one interviewee who does not live in ROK for which the interview was done through *Skype*. For the interviews that took place in the ROK, they were organized in different places such as offices, cafes, also during the rivers' observation. Regarding the language during the interview, a total of 18 interviews have been performed in English and four in Korean. While not all of the 18 interviewees could speak English well, the four interviewees who preferred to speak in Korean used the assistance from the interpreter to carry out the discussion.

CHAPTER 3

Debate of Inclusive Green Growth



This chapter presents an international debate on the Inclusive Green Growth (IGG) which emphasizes the concept of green growth as one of the solutions to address both economic and environmental interests, as well as the concept of inclusiveness that is portrayed as the means to embrace different stakeholders in the implementation of the green growth concept. Thus, this chapter formulates the discussion by first, exploring the debate over green growth including the idea of the economic and the environmental values within the concept, and afterward, elaborating on the inclusiveness concept to connect the green growth with the IGG.

3.1. The Green Growth Debate

Marked by the Fifth Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development (MECD) in 2005 that was held in Seoul, the ROK, the green growth concept rapidly evolves through the discussion to pursue a harmonization of economic growth and environmental sustainability by enhancing the synergies between economy and environment (Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, 2017) (Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, 2017). Different definitions of green growth have been provided by several international organizations, such as from the OECD and the World Bank to interpret the concept of green growth based on their focus and interests. According to the OECD, green growth means:

“[f]ostering economic growth and development while ensuring that natural assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which our well-being relies” (OECD, 2012: 8).

In the World Bank’s definition, green growth is defined as:

“[g]rowth that is efficient, clean, and resilient—efficient in its use of natural resources, clean in that it minimizes pollution and environmental impacts, and resilient in that it accounts for natural hazards and the role of environmental management and natural capital in preventing physical disasters” (World Bank, 2012: 30).

Aside from explaining a harmonious connection between economic and environmental interests by giving an emphasis on the economic growth that is environmentally sustainable, both definitions also highlight the role of effective policies in achieving the objective (OECD, 2012: 23-25; World Bank, 2012: 2). A proper policy to support the green growth is needed since the complexity of the real-world setting might halt the implementation of this concept in the ground, such as problems on governance failures, market failures, and the knotty interests between stakeholders (World Bank, 2012: 2). Furthermore, the green growth policy should be adapted to the context within a particular country to have a suitable approach in achieving the goal. Thus, it has been mentioned by OECD that there is no single model of green growth concept (OECD, 2012: 23-25).

In the recent years, the concept of green growth has received new attention following a remarkable goal offered by the concept to simultaneously address economic and environmental issues (Huberty et al, 2011a). It is stimulated by the challenge to combine two values that are usually confronting each other since the activities in the economic sector might give a bad impact to the environmental sector (OECD, 2012: 8). It refuses the idea of “grow now, clean up later” that prioritizes economic interest more than environmental interest by proposing the feasibility to perform the task of growing the economy while also conserving nature or in other words the opportunity to have a cleaner growth (World Bank, 2012: 3). The emphasis is on the combination of

economic and environmental values applied in actions that are based on green growth as the means to pursue its ambitious vision. The economic value is portrayed to stand for the economic notion that relates to the efforts to grow the economy, while the environmental value is pictured to stand for the environmental issues relating efforts to combat climate problems (Ibid). However, implementation to combine these values in the real-world setting, especially to a specific country, might give a different result from the expected outcome. Discussion of green growth that is saying a growth which is “green” ought to be achieved simply by combining the economic and environmental values in a particular policy, *“has been more religion than reality”* (Huberty., et al., 2011b).

Some critiques have been directed to the concept of green growth by stating that it may be a utopian concept and *“may give much false hope and excuses to do nothing really fundamental that should bring about U-turn of global GHG emissions”* (Hoffmann, 2016: 2). Completely *“delinked”* environmental problems by the employment of green growth in the economic growth is also *“based on a myth”* (Wanner, 2013: 35). This perception relies on the portrayal of the green growth concept that is only focusing on the policy and structural changes to reform the industry, yet, there are not many efforts on altering the behavior of societies and their socioeconomic drivers (Hoffman., 2016: 2). It is rather seen as the new economic opportunity since modifying the methods of doing the industry-and allowing business as usual- is much easier than confronting the dominant capitalist industrializing model (Adams, 2009; Unmüßig et al., 2012; Wanner, 2013). Wanner (2015) also stated that there is an essential connection between green growth and the concept of neoliberal capitalism, in which green growth is seen as a *“double movement”* that one is to *“challenge capitalist hegemony”* and another is *“the commodification of society-nature relations”* (Wanner, 2013: 25). Based on this, he called green growth another *“passive revolution”*,

[t]he emergent green economy/green growth discourse can be seen as another ‘passive revolution’ where neoliberal capitalism adjust to crises arising from contradictions within itself” (Wanner, 2015: 23).

Agreeing on that, Brand (2012) also stated that green growth is only about changing technology and *“making sense”* the green industry, in which there is a “Northern” agenda beyond the creation of green growth (Brand, 2012., as cited in Brown et al., 2014). Narratives of green growth by the OECD and the World Bank are portrayed to be an advocacy in the agenda to expanding economic liberalization, where the green growth is seen as the new economic opportunity (Brown et al., 2014: 246).

“[m]uch of the green growth agenda is driven by the desire of Northern economies to secure raw materials and find new sources of growth for the ‘over-accumulated capital that seeks new investment opportunities’ in the continuing fallout from the global financial crisis” (Brand., 2012: 28, as cited in Brown et al., 2014).

Other than that, critiques are also directed toward the concept of green growth which emphasizes the benefits that are offered towards the creation of green jobs and escalation of the green energy system in the green industries. Huberty et al., (2011b) stated that the economic growth that is sustainable cannot be achieved only by job creation in the green energy sector. The societies already have a *“fully built-out energy system and relatively modest growth in energy demand”* (Huberty et al., 2011b: 10). It needs an environment of society that can provide jobs in the green industry, yet, creating the green energy-friendly society is another set of agenda that still need to be achieved. Aside from that, assuming that society is ready to employ the “green” workers,

transitioning the “brown” jobs to the “green” ones also might lead to a reduction of the current employment and also decreasing opportunity for people who do not have the appropriate skill (Posthuma & Muçouçah, 2016). Thus, there is a rough assumption of the link between the “green” jobs creation and the growth in the green growth concept since it might be too risky to simply mention if the sustained growth that is “green” could be achieved by the escalation of “green” jobs (Huberty et al., 2011a: 10).

3.2. The Inclusiveness Element

The green growth concept in the IGG only covers the ‘green’ and the ‘growth’ values, whereas the inclusiveness element that assures the social inclusion in the implementation might not always be addressed. This logic is based on the argument that “[g]reen growth is not inherently inclusive.. [w]e cannot presume that green growth is inherently inclusive” (World Bank, 2012: 30). Thus, by attaching the inclusiveness element, the IGG offers the idea to construct a better implementation of green growth that is not only beneficial for the economy and environmental interests, but also favorable for all stakeholders especially the poor and most vulnerable regarding the inclusion and exclusion issue in the policy making process and in the access to the benefits. It highlights the importance of stakeholders’ inclusion in the creation of a green growth strategy and in the benefits resulting from the implementation. An implementation of IGG is also believed as one of the ways to an inclusive and sustained growth which could bring developing countries to the level of prosperity and achieve the urgent development needs of the world’s poor also the need for a better-managed environment. Therefore, an emphasis on the inclusiveness element in the IGG, can be a tool to pave the way for an inclusive and sustainable green growth that covers the ‘green’ and the ‘growth’ values, whilst also socially inclusive (World Bank, 2012).

The inclusiveness element in the IGG encompasses two different issues as the means of stakeholders’ involvement, which are the issue of stakeholders’ participation in the creation of a green growth strategy and the issue of benefits resulted from the green growth strategy for the poor and most vulnerable (World Bank, 2012: 155). The first issue which focuses on the stakeholders’ involvement in creating a green growth strategy emphasizes the idea to sustain the policy by building consensus. The inclusion of stakeholders in the policy-making process, where there is room for diverse groups of stakeholders to build connections and exchange viewpoints, can raise awareness of these stakeholders to the issue discussed which then build a sustained political commitment to the IGG (World Bank, 2012: 155). Other than that, the participation of multiple levels stakeholders such as from cities, regions, and communities as the means of integration of local and sectoral levels to the national policy framework can support the adaptation of IGG within the country (OECD, 2012: 24). However, this issue of participation in the IGG is portrayed to be “*much stronger on hopeful sentiments about involvement than political analysis of power*” (Adams, 2009: 95). Many concepts have employed the word “participation” with the expectation of having a multi-level participation in the implementation of the concepts; yet, a bottom-up approach is portrayed to be incapable of escaping from the stronger and wider power in the society (White, 1996). It is too naive thinking that a non-hierarchical system can work within the organization and government when the participation itself is “*a highly political process*” (Adams, 2009).

The second issue which stresses the idea of assuring the inclusion of stakeholders especially the poor and most vulnerable in the access to benefits resulting from policy, gives a view that IGG offers

the hopes of growth that is socially inclusive. It emphasizes the poverty issue and inclusive growth by aiming to increase the level of prosperity from the world's poor as well as supporting equality for the relevant stakeholders (World Bank, 2012: 30). However this view is argued by Dercon (2014) stating that,

“There may be some windows opportunity whereby poverty reduction now can be combined with greener growth, but a priori assuming that these are plentiful and effective would be wrong. It would risk making the poor pay for greening growth.” (Dercon, 2014).

He opposes the portrayal of an equal implementation of the IGG by all countries-poor and rich- in their national strategy for the sake of world poverty reduction since the poor countries will lose more than the rich countries. The poor countries should sacrifice a quantity of their production on growth in doing the transition to the inclusive green growth, whereas the rich countries only have to give up lesser than the poor countries do (Brown et al., 2014). In this sense, an equal transition to the IGG is burdening poor countries more than the rich countries, which makes the meaning of the growth that is green and inclusive questionable. Regarding to this, Warner (2015) also stated that the issue of poverty, global economic inequality, and global ecological unsustainability are the issues that are not well-addressed in the IGG, since the concept rather *“further intensifies the privatization and marketization of the fictitious commodity of ‘nature’ and perpetuates the myth of limitless growth”* (Warner, 2015: 36). He argued that the IGG concept is a concept to sustain the current capitalist economy, in which there is a hidden agenda to maintain benefits for “the rich” (Ibid). In this vein, the critique of the IGG is mainly directed towards poverty issues which underpins the relation between the rich and the poor countries, as well as questioning the system on how to achieve inclusive growth without burdening the poor.

CHAPTER 4

Republic of Korea's Society: Government, *Chaebols*, and Civil Society



Cheonggyecheon Stream, Seoul


Image © 2016 personal

This chapter provides an introductory background of ROK’s society that focuses on the interaction between the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society, especially in the political development of ROK and also inclusiveness issue within each term of presidency. The development of government-*Chaebols* nexus throughout history is also highlighted in this chapter.

4.1. The Top-Down Approach of ROK’s Governance

The society of ROK presents an arena of interaction for three main stakeholders of ROK, which are the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society. Over the years, the interaction shows a typical top-down approach (see **Figure 1.**) where the government, which was driven by President who is having the power, has created numerous policies and decisions with a clear-cut system of command and control (Lew and Gregg, 2000; Watson, 2014). As shown in **Figure 1.**, the clear and bold line between the government (that lead by the President) and *Chaebols*, shows a continuous support of the government to *Chaebols* in the ROK’s governance system. The President has favored *Chaebols* with the creation of multiple policies to support their economic activities, while the policies that portray their supports to the civil society stay low (Fioramonti and Fiori, 2010; Watson, 2014). Interaction between the government (led by the President) and civil society is pictured by the discontinuous line that represents unstable relations amongst them. Only some cases in the ROK, in which the President had pledged and showed their efforts to support the civil society (Strnad, 2010). In addition to that, although during the time when the President has favored the civil society, the government still gave their supports to the *Chaebols* (Fioramonti and Fiori, 2010; U. Heo et al., 2008). Additionally, each type of stakeholders, indeed, is not a single entity since various actors from different fields might be categorized into one type of stakeholder. Thus, instead of only recognizing the interaction based on three types of stakeholders, an identification of particular actors is needed to better understand the interaction and the frame on the government-*Chaebols* nexus.

Figure 1. A typical top-down approach of ROK’s governance



The Government, throughout the history, has constantly been changing its power and there have been twelve presidents in nineteen presidency terms of ROK (see **Table 1.**). Policies produced by each government might be different from one to the others, depends on the president who holds power. These different policies are ones of the main drivers that develop the frame of the government-*Chaebols* nexus in the ROK’s society. **Chaebol**, as translated from Korean as ‘a group of individuals related by blood, who have accumulated massive wealth’, is known as a term in the ROK to define a business group that consists of different companies and controlled by a person or family (Kim, 2012). Murillo and Sung emphasize that *Chaebols*-plural- have a certain power in the ROK’s governance as the accumulation of *Chaebols’* shares “account for a great percentage of the national economy” (Murillo and Sung, 2013: 2). The growth of *Chaebols* is influenced by the government-*Chaebols* nexus since the government has been supporting *Chaebols* ever since the industrial revolution of Korea⁵ (Heo, et al., 2008). **Civil society**, as the “third sector” of ROK’s society along with government and *Chaebols*, has been playing the role to serve different values and interest from

⁵ It is called as the ‘Miracle on the Han River’ which started during the Park Chung-hee’s era.

individuals and groups since the democratic regime in 1961 (Fioramonti & Fiori, 2010: 89-92). It is also recorded that several groups of civil society were the important actors of multiple historical events involving government and *Chaebols*, such as three military coup *d'état* and two president's impeachments in the ROK⁶. Thus, in the discussion of government-*Chaebols* nexus, civil society functioned as the third actor in the nexus who has influence to a certain extent (Chaibong, 2008; Chekan, 2011; Choe, 2017; Lew and Gregg, 2000; McCurry, 2017).

Table 1. List of ROK's presidents and the key events within each term of presidency

No.	Name of President	Years (Term of presidency)	Key Events
1.	Rhee Syng-man (이승만)	1948-1960 (1 st -3 rd)	The birth of <i>Chaebols</i>
2.	Yun Bo-seon (윤보선)	1960-1962 (4 th)	
3.	Park Chung-hee (박정희)	1963-1979 (5 th -9 th)	The beginning of government- <i>Chaebols</i> nexus
4.	Choi Kyu-hah (최규하)	1979-1980 (10 th)	
5.	Chun Doo-hwan (전두환)	1980-1988 (11 th -12 th)	The rise of <i>Chaebols</i>
6.	Roh Tae-woo (노태우)	1988-1993 (13 th)	The rise of civil society and crisis in the government- <i>Chaebols</i> nexus
7.	Kim Young-sam (김영삼)	1993-1998 (14 th)	Chaebols to join the political system and decreasing proximity of government- <i>Chaebols</i> nexus
8.	Kim Dae-jung (김대중)	1998-2003 (15 th)	
9.	Roh Moo-hyun (노무현)	2003-2008 (16 th)	
10.	Lee Myung-bak (이명박)	2008-2013 (17 th)	The return of the government- <i>Chaebols</i> nexus and the era of Green Growth Strategy
11.	Park Geun-hye (박근혜)	2013-2017 (18 th)	Crisis in the government- <i>Chaebols</i> nexus
12.	Moon Jae-in (문재인)	2017-present (19 th)	

Source : Lew and Gregg, 2000; Strnad, 2000; Heo et al., 2008; Richardson, 2007; Kim, 2012; M. Lee, 2013

4.2. The Interaction of Stakeholders in ROK's Governance Milestones

Interactions between three main stakeholders in ROK's governance are continuously adapting throughout different governments, upon the nature of politic and the issues prioritized in each government (S. Kim, 2000; Murillo and Sung, 2013; Richardson, 2007). Since there are several presidents who served the ROK (see **Table 1.**), each government might present different styles in governing or "*technically steering*" the system toward a particular goal (Mayntz, 1993: 11). In this sense, the system could either be favorable or inconvenient for other stakeholders -*Chaebols* and civil society- in stressing their interests. These stakeholders, thus, might perform different approaches in pushing their interest in the governance system and produce a different model of interaction. In addition to that, since governance system provides a continuous process of interaction

⁶ May 16 coup in 1961, *Coup d'état* of December Twelfth in 1979, *Coup d'état* of May Seventeenth in 1980, impeachment of Roh Moo-Hyun in 2004, and impeachment of Park Geun-hye in 2017 (Oh, 1999; Lee, 2005; Choe & Rich, 2017; McCurry, 2017)

among different stakeholders, the interplay of stakeholders which already happened in the previous terms of the presidency could also affect the construction of current interaction (Royall, 1993). Thus, interactions within the governance system of ROK may differ from one to the other terms of presidency, in which there is a process of adaptation to the nature of politic and issue prioritized within each period, also influence from the previous interplay. This, then leads to a particular situation that becomes a serial of the interaction between the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society.

The birth of Chaebols

Rhee Syng-man as the first president of ROK has created the *Chaebols'* system to support the development of ROK's companies that were damaged during the Korean War. He arranged a proper policy to support the establishment of *Chaebols*. However, since he led an authoritarian regime by pushing his interests to the government system and the society, the *Chaebols'* arrangement was loaded with collusion by President Rhee Syng-man and his party (Rhyu, 2005: 205). He was accused of an extensive vote-buying, corruption, and fraud as well as suppressed the voices of civil society (Croissant, 2002; J. Lee, 2012). In the end, after three terms of presidency, he resigned from his post following demonstration from a large group of labors and students which called as April 19 Revolution (Lew and Gregg, 2000; Lee, 2012). The next president, which is **Yun Bo-seon** had no remarkable contribution to the ROK since he only lasted for eight months following a military coup d'état (May 16 coup) led by **Park Chung-hee** in May 1961 (Choi, 2012; Croissant, 2002; Lew and Gregg, 2000).

The beginning of government-Chaebols nexus

In **Park Chung-hee's** lead (the third president), the government and *Chaebols* nexus was created in which a mutual relationship between these stakeholders started to develop; the nexus has been grown ever since (Lew and Gregg, 2000). His era is known as the root of 'the miraculous economic development' or 'the miracle on the Han River' of RoK with the employment of *Chaebols* in the national economic strategy and also the starting point of ROK industrial revolution (Chaibong, 2008; Heo, et al., 2008; Minns, 2001; Yang et al., 2006). Park Chung-hee, with his dictatorial military based, believed in a close relation with *Chaebols* to improve the economic and infrastructure sectors, yet stressed the government system into his favor and sacrificed some degree of civil society's democracy to maintain the national security (L. Choi, 2012). He refused the international concept of democracy and rather managed his undemocratic style of decision-making, by saying that the idea of democracy from the international regime is not efficient for ROK (Ibid: 14). Under his regime, the economic and infrastructure sectors of RoK drew a significant improvement by alteration of economic policies and strategies (Minns, 2001; Power, 2010). His plans to give an immense support to the *Chaebols* is believed to be the primary cause of this improvement (Lew and Gregg, 2000). *Chaebols* were supported by government and received many benefits such as exclusive projects, tax reduction treatment, export subsidies, and loans without a monetary deposit (Croissant, 2002; Lew and Gregg, 2000; Murillo and Sung, 2013).

Contrasting with his approachment to *Chaebols*, he oppressed civil society democratic movement that reacted to his dictatorial action in order to maintain his power (L. Choi, 2012). As a result, since the impartiality of his action towards *Chaebols* and civil society remains questionable, President Park received pro and contra from civil society. He gained supports from some groups in civil society as he proved his ability in growing economy, but also got a backlash from the working class and other democratic movement groups who argued to be exploited during the industrial revolution and could not have a freedom of speech (Insitute for International Economics, 2003: 15; Minns, 2001: 1032). Being in power for 16 years (five terms of the presidency), Park was assassinated by the president's security chief inside the Blue House⁷, which also marked the end of his regime (Choi, 2012; Croissant, 2002; Lew and Gregg, 2000). **Choi Kyu-hah**, who was the prime minister during the President Park's last term of presidency became the acting president and also officially elected as the fourth president of ROK (Lew and Hahn, 2017; Nam, 2017). However, his power was overthrown after nine months serving by **Chun Doo-hwan** with the second military coup *d'état of ROK (Coup d'état of December Twelfth)* (Choi, 2012; Lew and Gregg, 2000).

The rise of Chaebols

After the military coup *d'état*, **Chun Doo-hwan** approached *Chaebols* and civil society in different manners. He reacted brutally to the resistance of civil society that led by students by leading another military coup called by *Coup d'état of May Seventeenth* as the following of the previous coup, applied the martial law to all over the country, dissolved the National Assembly, banned all political activities, closed universities, and took some political figure into arrest. Chun took repressive measures in controlling the protest, in which at least 200 demonstrators were killed (Adesnik and Kim, 2008; Croissant, 2002; Fowler, 1999). To the *Chaebols*, he provided a better term of policy⁸ to assist their economic activities (Kim, 2012). As a result, the share of *Chaebols* (top 5) in GNP was rapidly increasing even until half of the total GNP in 1985 (see **Table 2.**). *Chaebols* grew to become multinational business groups which are expanding much faster than the national economy that leads to their raising share in the national economy and increasing market power (Kim, 2012: 12; Trautvetter, 2010). This domination drives to difficulties of government in controlling the *Chaebols*.

Albeit the attempt produced by the government to control the *Chaebols* in the 1980s, the government started to lose its power over *Chaebols* (Minns, 2001: 1034; Murillo & Sung, 2013: 5). This condition led to the criticism over *Chaebols* by civil society. They highlighted the gigantic size of *Chaebols* and the oversized power that owned and controlled only by a few persons (Kim, 2012). However, this criticism did not lead to a big demonstration against *Chaebols* as democracy was portrayed as the biggest issue at that time. The voice of civil society went to the issue of democratic transition which marked by the Grand March for Democracy in Seoul. This movement pointed out the end of military rule and the start of civilian democracy (Adesnik and Kim, 2008; Croissant, 2002; Fowler, 1999; Lee, 2000).

⁷ Blue house is the president official resident and executive office of ROK's president, equivalent of the white house in the United States

⁸ Investment readjustment of Heavy Industries: restructuration by bail-out financing and interest rate subsidies (Jang, 2001)

Table 2. Chaebols percentage in GNP, 1975-1985

(Unit: %)

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Top 5	11.6	12.8	14.5	19.8	22.9	24.6	35.0	41.3	42.2	46.7	52.4	65.6
Top 10	15.1	17.1	19.8	26.0	30.1	32.8	48.1	55.7	57.6	62.4	67.4	79.9
Top 20	-	26.1	-	-	-	-	61.0	-	-	76.9	81.8	93.0
Top 30	-	31.0	-	-	-	-	67.8	-	-	85.3	89.1	100.0
Top 40	-	34.0	-	-	-	-	72.3	-	-	90.3	94.1	104.7

Source: Kim, Seok Ki, 1987, as cited in Kim, 2012: 28

The rise of civil society and crisis in the government-Chaebols nexus

As the demand for democracy increased, civil society called for an open governance system in the new government that ruled by **Roh Tae-woo**. His era might be considered as a turning point in the political history of ROK towards a civilian democracy even though he was ‘the man’ of Chun⁹. The transition into the civilian democracy symbolized by the first direct presidential election in ROK, in which Roh Tae-woo defeated two candidates from the liberal party (Heo et al., 2008; Strnad, 2000). Many policies in his term emphasized ‘equity’ such as on the social welfare system, human rights improvement, a better reflection of public opinion in policy making, and freedom of speech. It is also recorded that during his administration, the number of labor unions increased by 19.8% in 1989 (Strnad, 2010: 13).

Other than that, he also started an ‘equity economic’ that designed to spread out economic power and influence of *Chaebols* (Strnad, 2010: 222). This policy is considered as the beginning of the crisis in the government-*Chaebols* nexus since for the first time in history the government tried to pressure the domination of *Chaebols*. However, despite the increasing number of civil society groups also number of policies to value ‘democracy’ and ‘equity’, he faced the problem in economic growth. Roh’s administration which considered to leaving behind the economic issue and focusing on the political issue, has resulted to the fallen of economic growth to 4.7% (Heo et al., 2008; Strand, 2010: 224). This condition has worsened the government-*Chaebols* nexus during his era. He even left his position with a strong remark from Chung Ju-yung (the chairman of Hyundai-*Chaebol*) who mentioned that Roh’s regime created an economic crisis in ROK (Institute for International Economics, 2003: 89).

⁹ He came from military background and closely affiliated with Chun Doo-hwan (Heo et al., 2008)

Chaebols to join the political system and decreasing proximity of government-Chaebols nexus

In 1992, *Chaebols'* showed more than a symbolic challenge to join the political system when one of the *Chaebols*, Chung Ju-yung, entered the presidential election (see **Figure 2.**) (Strnad, 2010). Although at the end **Kim Young-sam** who came from civil society succeed in defeating Chung Ju-yung (the chairman of Hyundai-*Chaebol*) and Kim Dae-jung from liberal party, the participation of Chung Ju-yung who is a *Chaebol* symbolized the enhancing power of *Chaebols* in the ROK (Institute for International Economics, 2003: 89; Strnad, 2010: 223). As *Chaebols* having more power than before with their increasing power from economic to political system, in the 1990s, *Chaebols* 'became truly out of control' from the government (Minns, 2001: 1034; Murillo and Sung, 2013: 7; Trautvetter, 2010). This led Kim Young-sam to plead "putting things right" and anti-corruption campaign in the political and economic issues.

Figure 2. Election Picture of Chung Ju-yung (the chairman of Hyundai-*Chaebol*)



Source: blog.naver.com/iran80s

To achieve his goal, he established "Blueprint for Financial Liberalization and Internationalization" as the second phase of Roh's policy in controlling domestic economy which overpowered by *Chaebols* (Institute for International Economics, 2003: 90). Indeed, *Chaebols* chairmen were united to against this policy but did not receive a positive result from the government. President Kim insisted to cautiously implement the policy since it has a possibility to gain political support by restoring public credibility (Ibid). This policy, in the implementation, dragged many politicians and senior officials, even the former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, in the corruption case with *Chaebols*. Both ex-presidents were investigated and at the end were jailed on charges of corruption, also charges on treason based on the previous military Coup - *Coup d'état of December Twelfth and May Seventeenth* (Institute for International Economics, 2003; Strnad, 2000; Trautvetter, 2010; Watanabe, 1995; Wudunn, 1996).

In the mid of Kim Young-sam's revolution on the politic and economic structure, the ROK faced with the Asian Crisis 1997. The ROK economic structure with *Chaebols* stimulated higher risk to the crisis as the average debt-equity ratio of top largest *Chaebols* was almost 400% compared to U.S. business groups with only 70% (Heo et al., 2008: 16). This condition made the counter movement to *Chaebols* system goes wider¹⁰; they demanded transparency, accountability, and a fight against corruption in public and private sectors (Fioramonti and Fiori, 2010; Trautvetter, 2010). Weakening of *Chaebols* system followed by financial difficulties –almost collapsed- of some *Chaebols* (Hanbo Group¹¹, Daewoo Group, and KIA Motors¹²) because of the crisis, and also poor management of government to cope the crisis were assumed to be the main reason behind the movement (Kim and Koo, 2006.; Minns, 2001: 1037–1038; Powers, 2010; Murillo and Sung, 2013: 5).

¹⁰ It is also followed by the fallen of the authoritarian system of RoK in which many people withdrew their support to the government; and also the rise of democratic value in the country (Chaibong, 2008:137).

¹¹ It went bankrupt in 1997.

¹² It went bankrupt and merged with Hyundai Groups in 2007.

Kim Dae-jung as the newly elected president in 1998, took the following action pressured by IMF¹³ to restructure *Chaebols* and the poorly managed financial institutions (Heo et al., 2008: 17; Fioramonti and Fiori, 2010; Trautvetter, 2010). In order to manage the *Chaebols* system, the government made structural reforms: changed almost 50% of business regulations and strengthened the Korean Free Trade Commission (K. Kim & Koo, 2006; Trautvetter, 2010). Indeed, this action supported by a wide range of groups in civil society who determined to have a transparent, accountable, and corruption free governance (Fioramonti and Fiori, 2010; Trautvetter, 2010). At this point, *Chaebols* were announced to not receive special benefits any longer from the government except for the consideration in restructuring *Chaebols* system. Nonetheless, the conception of the government-*Chaebols* nexus tends to remain the same in the civil society influenced by the past corruption scandals (Powers, 2010; 144).

In 2003, **Roh Moo-hyun** elected as the new president in 2003 with huge support from civil society, especially youth, mediated by the online network (Kim, 2008; Richardson, 2007). Roh Moo Hyun who approached civil society's voice by supporting a wide variety of civic groups, gained a lot of support in the earlier state of his years (D. Kim, 2016; Richardson, 2007). Younger people used the online network to raise the popularity of Roh Moo-hyun by generating a movement called *Rohsamo* that translated as the society of people who love Roh Moo-hyun (Kim; 2008). *Rohsamo* acted as a bottom-up approach to support Roh Moo-hyun by generating political discussion, organized meetings at their own expense, and raising funds (Kim, 2008; Walker and Kang, 2004: 843, as cited in N. Kim, 2009). However, although he gained a lot of support in the beginning, he faced pros and contras that followed after his policy decision in the economic and political system. In the economic system, his decision to increase taxes, encourage credit card usage, raise labor cost, and increase foreign investment resulted in the decrease of annual economic growth rate (Heo et al., 2008: 21). Other than that, he also pushed a reformation of *Chaebols'* structure in the attempt to improve transparency and corporate governance (Chekan, 2011). Several corruption issues involving *Chaebols*, politicians, and government officials were unveiled during this reformation (You, 2015). As a result, other than having a poor economic condition, he also made *Chaebols* to move their business to foreign countries and worsened the government-*Chaebols* nexus (Chekan, 2011).

The return of the government-Chaebols nexus and the era of Green Growth Strategy

The next president of ROK, **Lee Myung-bak (MB)** elected in 2008 and considered as the "ROK's first CEO President" since he was the CEO of Hyundai (*Chaebol*) before his political career. Indeed, his era became the return of the government-*Chaebols* nexus as he was in favor for the growth of business and a pro-business government (E. M. Kim and Kim, 2012). He nonetheless was not so popular in ROK's society caused by his questionable business and personal ethics that applied in the national policy choice and output (Interviewee #4; Interviewee #5; Interviewee #6). His era is also known as the era of green growth as he introduced "*the green growth strategy*" to become his fundamental component and a new vision in growing economic and business in ROK using an emphasis on environmental value. He was the first president who brings in environmental value into the national strategy (KEI, 2013). Eventually, he established the "National Strategy for Green Growth" as the implementation of the green growth strategy in the ROK for 2008-2012 and also implemented

¹³ ROK received \$58.4 billion loans from IMF to handle the Asian crisis 1997 (Kim and Koo, 2006; Trautvetter, 2010).

it into the government bodies (Presidential Committee on Green Growth) (KEI, 2013; Owen, 2010; OECD, 2016). In his direction, ROK experienced an era of green growth strategy and established several green growth projects in which *Chaebols* acted as one of the main stakeholders (I. Heo, 2015, p. 359). The clear government-*Chaebols* nexus in his term generated argumentations among groups in civil society. Some supported the nexus for the sake of economic growth, whereas the others opposed the nexus (Interviewee #2; Interviewee #22).

Crisis in the government-*Chaebols* nexus

Park Geun-hye, replaced MB after her win in the 2012 election and became the first female president in ROK's history (M. Lee, 2013). As the daughter of Park Chung-hee-the third president of ROK who was assassinated, Park Geun-hye succeed in convincing the public to vote her by saying that, *"The wound inflicted that day... changed me completely. Since then I have decided to dedicate the rest of my life tending to your wounds."* (Rauhala, 2012). However, the popularity of Park Geun-hye decreased after her policy to replace all history text-book in high school with the uniform government-published which portrayed as her favor to her late-father to set the "correct history"; also the policy to reform labor policy which believed as business-friendly policy dedicated for *Chaebols* (S.-H. Choe, 2017; Ramstad, 2015). Both decisions received a lot of criticism and drew a large group of people gathered in Seoul calling for her removal. The protest turned into violence and even had injured victims after the police fired water contained liquid tear gas to the mass (S.-H. Choe, 2017; Denney, 2015). A couple of months after the protest, her popularity dropped even further following the controversy of power abused by Choi Soon-sil¹⁴. She gave Choi Soon-sil the access to the government's confidential documents and to influence policy decision that includes millions of dollars donation to Choi Soon-sil's foundation. This money is connected to a corruption scandal with *Chaebols* which led to another protest from civil society to impeach Park Geun-hye (Fensom, 2016; Griffiths, 2017; Kelly, 2016). The protest that gathered approximately 1.7 million people, happened every weekend for months, which at the end succeed in removing President Park from her position (Ahrens, 2016; S.-H. Choe, 2017). Park Geun-hye arrested and jailed over her corruption and abuse of power controversies, while the Court investigated the government-business mixed with *Chaebols* starting with Samsung-*Chaebol* (S. H. Choe & Rich, 2017; McCurry, 2017a). Subsequently, the government-*Chaebols* nexus faced another difficulty after her era.

Moon Jae-in, the current president of ROK, ended the era of the conservative party after two previous presidents from this party (Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye) ruined public opinions with their controversies. Coming from the liberal party, he started his years by stating a pledge *"to punish the puppet group of conservatives associated with Park"* (McCurry, 2017b). He made a vow to reform *Chaebols* system that dominated ROK economy which receives good responses from the big 4 *Chaebols* (Samsung, Hyundai Motor, SK, and LG) (K. Choi, 2017). These policies, indeed, bring in a lot of supports from civil society, especially NGOs and academicians who have been demanding for "correction" upon the issues. Moon Jae-in is expected to serve ROK as a president for the next five years.

¹⁴ Church leader and spiritual mentor for Park Geun-hye

CHAPTER 5

Lee Myung-Bak: The Bulldozer of the Green Growth Era



*The ARC River Culture Pavilion,
Museum of the FMRRP, Daegu*

Image © 2016 personal

This chapter describes the setting of President Lee Myung-bak (MB) as the first president of ROK who introduced and adopted the green growth strategy in ROK's policies and government's structure. He recognized as the man behind the steering wheel in the establishment of ROK's National Green Growth Strategy and the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project (FMRRP). The first part of the chapter explains a brief history of President MB who was known by the nickname of "The Bulldozer", whereas the second part provides a narrative on the development of green growth strategy in the ROK which includes an elaboration of stakeholders' interaction in the development process.

5.1. Lee Myung-bak: "The Bulldozer"

President MB who came from the poor backgrounds and interestingly has succeeded in gaining the position of CEO of Hyundai Engineering & Construction (E&C) in his early age, became the first president who came from the row of "first business executive" (Chen, 2007). He gained the name of Bulldozer during his years in the business sector due to his strong leadership and aggressive approach in conducting a project and getting things done (Lah, 2011). His 'bulldozer' governing style was shown in the time when became the Mayor of Seoul, when he launched a project to restore the *Cheonggyecheon* (underground waterways) by tearing down a busy-fly over into a public park and a new stream bed (see **Figure 3.**). The safety problem, paradigm shift of urban management, and revitalization of the downtown area were mentioned to be the main reason of the restoration (I. Lee, 2006). Despite receiving a strong pessimistic response from some groups in civil society due to the huge number of money invested and the time limitation of his period in the office, he pushed the project and performed a top-down communication during the project's making (C. S. Choe, 2013). In the end, he succeeded in finishing this project within his term which then led him to the fame; *Cheonggyecheon* stream is now one of the most popular places in the ROK. This project was even believed as one of the main drivers of his popularity and his win in the presidential election

Figure 3. *Cheonggyecheon* Project before (left) and after (right)



Source: (Ryu & Kwon, 2016)

(C.S. Choe, 2013; RESTORE, 2013).

Having success in the *Cheonggyecheon* project encouraged him to propose a cross-country canal project in the presidential election that he was entered. The project that called the Pan Korea Grand Waterway (PKGW) was expected to connect the rivers from the northern to the southern area of the ROK (Lah et al., 2009; Sudworth, 2008). Using the canal project, he argued that he could solve the problem of unemployment in the country and improve the transportation system (Powell, 2007). The PKGW (see **Figure 4.**), which has the length of 540 km across the country and connects two largest rivers the *Han* River in Seoul and the *Nakdong* River in Busan, received a huge backlash from many groups in civil society even from the government's officials. A movement called the Professors' Organization for Movement Against the Grand Korea Canal (POMAC) that has a total of 2,544 professors from country's universities was also established to halt the implementation of PKGW. They argued and provided scientific data to oppose the project by saying if the project can be a great economic and ecological loss for the country (Lah, et al., 2011).

Figure 4. The Plan of Pan Korea Grand Waterway (PKGW)



Eventually, due to the big movement opposing the PKGW, President MB stated that he would not process the development of PKGW if the public would keep opposing the project (Lah et al., 2011). However, ahead of any official announcement from the government to revoke the PKGW, a new rivers' construction project that has a similar plan with PKGW was established by President MB. The project that called the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project (FMRRP), later on, was associated with the green growth strategy by becoming one of the biggest projects in the ROK's National Green Growth Strategy (Lah et al., 2011; Yun, 2014). The resistance of people against PKGW which once turned down by the previous statement of President MB was back on track, and even bigger and stronger after the plan to implement the FMRRP was announced to the public (Yun, 2014). They said that it was basically the same project only without the canal plan; the plan to dredging the rivers and building the weirs which were on the plan of PKGW can still be found in the plan of FMRRP (Lah et al., 2011; Yun, 2014). Regarding this, President MB and the Minister of the Office of National River Restoration rejected the claim by saying that the people who associated the PKGW and FMRRP were either not fully aware of the content or only act as the objection unconditionally (Office of National River Restoration, 2011a). In the end, President MB pushed the scheme of FMRRP and completed the project in 2012. He, once again, showed his "Bulldozer" governing style in the construction of FMRRP.

5.2. The Development of Green Growth Era and the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project

The green growth era of the ROK started under the rule of President MB. It is marked by the proclamation of "Low-Carbon, Green Growth" in 2008 as the new vision of the country that transforms the economic system based on the green growth values (GGGI, 2016). Subsequently,

Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG) as the foundation for the implementation of green growth policy was established in 2009 which followed by the publication of National Green Growth Strategy in the same year (KEI, 2013). Other than that, as there is a need to maintain a close relationship with the private sectors for the initiation and implementation of economic and environmental values in the green growth strategy, President MB's administration also provided a platform for a two-ways discussion for the government and private actors. This platform is called 'Green Growth Private Sector Consultative Bodies' that was maintained under the PCGG and have five consultation bodies covering five areas of industry, science and technology, finance, IT, and lifestyle. These bodies also involved various actors from consumer sectors, some organization from civil society, and local governments to get a broader view and active participation from different actors (KEI: 23). However, over the time, there were no significant outputs from these consultative bodies other than its initial objective to stir multi-stakeholder participation (Sang, 2013).

Several organizations were also initiated to facilitate the green growth strategy in the following years, such as the establishment of Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) in 2010 as a think tank to assisting the economic transformation for both country and industry and Green Technology Center Korea (GTCK) in 2012 as a research center for green technology (KEI, 2013; GGGI, 2016). These two organizations included in the sub-strategy of green growth called the 'Green Triangle' that was formulated by President MB's administration to support the development of ROK's green growth strategy at the global level. This strategy includes: 1)a promotion of the GGGI as a global organization, that already implemented in 2012 by the transformation of the GGGI into an international organization in the Rio+20; 2)an emphasis on technology sector by the founding of the GTCK as a global center for green growth technology; and 3)a plan to strengthen the financial resource by attracting the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to have the Headquarters in the ROK which also already implemented in 2012 (KEI, 2013: 178-186). The GGGI, GTCK, and GCF, then, known as the 'Green Triangle' of the ROK that became the national asset of ROK in developing their green growth strategy.

Along with the 'Green Triangle', the ROK noted the FMRRP as one of the projects that develop their green growth strategy, especially in the effort to adapt to the climate change and create jobs opportunity. To some extent, this project is associated with the picture of President MB as "the Bulldozer" since it has a big scope on the construction project, huge money invested, and a quick decision-making process (Yun, 2014, Choi, 2013). The project was initiated in 2008, started the master planning and construction in 2009, and finished in 2012; it took only four years from the starting point until the finishing line (Lah et al., 2009). The initiation of FMRRP was published to the public right after the proclamation of "Low-Carbon, Green Growth" in 2008, which also simultaneously with the arrangement of PCGG that was officially established in 2009. The formulation of FMRRP, thus, was not taken under the authority of PCGG that has the central authority of ROK's green growth strategy. The attachment of FMRRP to PCGG came later in the discussion of FMRRP's master plan. Authority of FMRRP instead was taken into the responsibility of Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs (MLTM), which was also the biggest investor for the project's cost (Ishiwatari et al., 2016; MLTM, 2012a). Hence, although the FMRRP is known as one of the biggest projects that based on and created to support the development of ROK's green growth strategy, the initiation and management of FMRRP not held by the PCGG as the authorized body of the green growth policy and projects, but was under the power of MLTM.

CHAPTER 6

Four Major Rivers Restoration Project




This chapter elaborates on FMRRP and covers a description of the case and analysis of the inclusivity issues. The first part presents the description of the case including the controversy beyond the project, while the second part explains the analysis on the inclusivity issues regarding the inclusion of stakeholders' and the value used in the project.

6.1. Introduction of Four Major Rivers Restoration Project

6.1.1. The Mega Project of ROK

Four Major Rivers Restoration Project (FMRRP) is a mega project which aims to restore four big rivers in the ROK: Han River, Nakdong River, Geum River, and Yeongsan River, with an aim to provide water security, flood control, and ecosystem vitality, by means of addressing the challenge of climate change (see Figure 5.). In detail, the restoration has the total length of 1,944km and includes various construction projects such as, 1)dredging of the rivers for the flood management, 2)construction of 16 weirs along the four rivers (see Figure 5.), 3)construction of facilities to improve water quality, and 4)construction of facilities to improve ecological area and spaces including creation of bike paths and museum of the four rivers (Ministry of Land Transport and Maritime Affairs-MLTM, 2012a). The total cost for this project was 22 trillion KRW or approximately 19.4 billion USD (Ishiwatari et al., 2016; Lah, et al., 2009). Due to a large scope of project and money invested, the FMRRP is known as one of the extremely large-scale investment projects in the ROK. Also, one of the fastest projects since it only spent four years for the FMRRP to be initiated, planned, and implemented (2008-2012).

Figure 5. The four rivers and locations of the weirs



The FMRRP presents an inter-governmental project which involves four Ministries (Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, and Sports, also Ministry of Public Administration and Security) in the arrangement of the project (MLTM, 2012a). These ministries encompass multi-purpose of FMRRP that is, “providing solutions to address water scarcity and protecting disasters, nurturing green growth industry, overcoming economic crisis and activating local economy, creating spaces of culture and life, and comprehensive regional development” (Ibid: 36). However, even though the FMRRP is mentioned to have multiple objectives, the first two aims that are addressing the flood prevention issue and advancement of the green growth issue have been presented to the public as the foremost goals.

6.1.2. The Green Growth Value of FMRRP

As explained in the previous chapter, green growth strategy became the new growth engine of ROK in the President MB's era after the declaration of ROK's new national vision 'Low Carbon Green Growth'. The green growth value that considers the environmental preservation while also escalating the economic growth was announced to be the catalyst for the creation of FMRRP (MLTM, 2012). The identity of FMRRP, since then has been linked to the topic of green growth with special attention on the 'green' and the 'growth' values. It is published as a project that initiated to address climate change without decreasing the economic growth by escalating 'green' jobs creation.

In the development, this project is usually known as the centerpiece of Korean Green New Deal¹⁵ and National Green Growth Policy of ROK considering the emphasis green growth value that offered by the project for the economic and environmental interests. In the case of Korean Green New Deal, FMRRP is attached to the project since it is believed as a 'green' project that can create many job opportunities and grow the economy (MLTM, 2012: 28). In the case of National Green Growth Policy, FMRRP is associated with the attempts to address climate change by increasing the water industry technology through the construction of dams and weirs in the rivers that can also offer a new growth industry (KEI, 2013: 208). Thus, within both policies, the identity of FMRRP as a green growth project that emphasizes the 'green' and the 'growth' values has been highlighted to accomplish the objectives in the economic and environmental sectors.

The identity of green growth that glued to FMRRP has properly promoted abroad by President MB and the Office of National River Restoration. International organizations such as UNEP and OECD showed positive responses to the attempt of ROK in applying the green growth strategy in the national policy, including the action of ROK in creating the FMRRP as the means of its policy (Schäfer, 2015: 92). The FMRRP even labeled by OECD as a remarkable program that represents the real product of green growth value as it was expected to create 960,000 'green' jobs (OECD, 2011: 15). They also acknowledged the project as the attempt of ROK in adapting to climate change by improving water quality and construction of environmentally-friendly dams (Jones & Yoo, 2011: 18). The creation of FMRRP, indeed, succeeds in gaining the name abroad as the implementation of actions in the ROK's green growth strategy (OECD, 2014).

6.1.3. Controversy in the FMRRP

Despite the good image of FMRRP abroad, this project raised a controversy in a domestic level. The problem focused on two issues, which are the issue of stakeholders' inclusiveness in the project and the issue of green growth image that attached to the project. The first issue happened following the problem of stakeholders' inclusion and exclusion in the case, in which some groups of people from the civil society claimed that only selected actors were included in the project. This claim based on the assumption that the included actors are the ones who in favor of the economic value and agreeing to the project, while the actors who in favor of environmental value and criticized FMRRP were excluded from the project.

"Actually there was a clear exclusion of scholars who resist against the project, and also environmental group. There is no way for them to be engaged in the process." (Interviewee #5).


¹⁵ A project in the ROK to revive local economies through new job creation and production inducement (MLTM, 2012: 28).

This issue also emphasized the exclusion of people who are directly affected by the project in the decision-making process of the FMRRP, such as local people living alongside the rivers, farmers, and fishers. They had relocated and received compensation during the construction of FMRRP in a top-down manner and one-way of communication.

“[t]here were no mutual conversation-between the government and farmers- not even a call, just a paper sent to each household that the government is starting this and this, so we want you to get out of here with the timeline of one or two months...They did compensate for installing or reinstalling the house, like farming house, and two years of compensation. Two years...which is the lowest area when it comes to compensation.” (Interviewee #16).

The exclusion of these actors led to several confrontations in different places of ROK that was driven by the local actors as well as the environmental NGOs. They confronted both the government and *Chaebols* through multiple ways, such as demonstration on the site, seminars against the FMRRP, even until the legal action to the court (S. W. Choi, 2016; Yun, 2014). As shown in **Figure 6** Error! Reference source not found., farmers who had relocated because of FMRRP, tried to confront the government through the publication of their story. They disclosed their stories during the confrontation including their struggle to move to the provided farmland by the government, also when they had to pay a court fine since they lost to the *Chaebols* who reported them as a business nuisance.

Figure 6. Books made by Farmers in Dumulgyeong (near Ipo Weir)



Source: Image © 2016 personal

The second issue highlights the debate of the public on the green growth image that has been promoted by the government as the identity of FMRRP. A contestation developed following the environmental problems such as algae blooms (see **Figure 7.**) which suddenly appears in different spots in the rivers and influences the water quality also lead to the first algae warning in ROK (J. S. Kim, 2013; Park, 2012). Another problem is the issue on the massive fish kill due to the construction of weirs and the dredging of river bank which is harming the daily activities of the fishers (S. W. Choi, 2016).

“[t]he fishers, before the project they were able to catch very big, fresh fishes, but not they cannot even catch small fishes. So they are in a state of giving up fishing.” (Interviewee #6)

These environmental problems, then, stimulated the contestation of FMRRP as a green growth project.

Figure 7. Algae blooms in Nakdong River



Source: (Park, 2012)

Numerous publications discussing the green growth identity of FMRRP have been published and created various perspectives (I. Heo, 2015; Lah et al., 2009; Watson, 2014; Yun, 2014). Interestingly, whereas there is an active contestation over the green growth identity of FMRRP in a domestic level, the international organization such as UNEP and OECD have approved the FMRRP as a notable project of ROK's green growth than can give a significant impact on the attempt to changes economic system and respond adequately to the challenge of climate change (Jones & Yoo, 2011; KEI, 2013; UNEP, 2009).

6.2. Stakeholders' Inclusion in the FMRRP: Input, Throughput, and Output

Identification of stakeholders' inclusiveness in the design (input), during the decision-making process (throughput), and to the benefits resulting from the FMRRP (output), is presented in the following section. During the identification, it is necessary to not recognize the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society as a single entity; rather they consist of various actors who come from different fields (e.g. the government's officials, *Chaebols* from the construction field, professors, environmental NGOs).


6.2.1. Input Inclusiveness

This research has defined input inclusiveness as the inclusion of the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society in the design of FMRRP, and particularly questions which stakeholders were included and excluded in the design of FMRRP.

The design of FMRRP has included several actors from the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society. Based on the official publication of FMRRP (MLTM, 2012), the inclusion of these actors started by President MB's announcement to carry out the project, where he also simultaneously appointed the Ministries of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs (MLTM) as the central authority and 'the engine' of the project (see **Figure 8.**). Master Planning of FMRRP subsequently began by the lead of the MLTM to conduct a six-month preliminary research of the project. Also, a public institute called Korea Institute of Construction Technology (KICT) was engaged to manage the research. The preliminary research started in December 2008 and was organized by inviting various actors from different fields to join the research, such as from the government: Ministry of Environment, public research institutes (KRIHS, NIER), state-owned company (K-Water); from the private companies (*Chaebols*): Hyundai E&C, Dongbu Engineering, Dohwa Engineering, Saman Engineering, Isan Engineering, Yooshin, and from the civil society: private institute (Future Research Institute) (MLTM, 2012: 27-29). According to the researchers from KICT who were involved in the preliminary research, President MB and the MLTM also actively participated in this research, but their deep participations are not explicitly mentioned in the official publication of FMRRP (Interviewee #19 and #20).

Other than the preliminary research, during the master planning of FMRRP, the MLTM also initiated the Office of National River Restoration in February 2009, as a pan-government organization to coordinate the implementation of the master plan (see **Figure 9.**). Under the MLTM, four ministries (ME, MAFRA, MCTS, and MOPAS) were included to form the central body of the organization. An

Figure 8. Actors included in the design of FMRRP



Advisory Committee consists of a huge number of 1,000 experts, such as academics, policy advisors, and community organizations was also embedded in the organization to present their ideas for the master planning of FMRRP. The Office of National River Restoration also made a plot to ask opinions from the association for government support in the Prime Minister's office and also local government associations of the four rivers. Moreover, MLTM also arranged a joint briefing session inviting all actors included in the research and the Office to present the master plan of FMRRP and also to draw ideas from Presidential Committees on Green Growth, Regional Development, and Agriculture Policy on the master plan. Later on, the master plan was finalized and announced in June 2009 (MLTM, 2012: 29-30).

As described from the aforementioned, after the initiation of FMRRP by President MB, several steps of stakeholders' inclusion can be identified in the design of FMRRP.

- First, the inclusion of the MLTM as the appointed authority of the FMRRP.

- Second, the inclusion of Prime Minister’s office along with the announcement for proposal ‘Green New Deal’ that connected the FMRRP with the green growth.
- Third, the inclusion of different types of stakeholders (the government, *Chaebols*, civil society) in the preliminary research of FMRRP that managed by KICT. The included actors are KICT, KRIHS, NIER, and K-Water (from the government); Hyundai E&C, Dongbu Engineering, Dohwa Engineering, Saman Engineering, Isan Engineering, and Yooshin (from *Chaebols*), and Future Resources Institute (from the civil society).
- Fourth, the inclusion of Presidential Committees on Green Growth, Regional Development, and Agriculture Policy to share their opinions as an input for preliminary research.
- Fifth, the inclusion of other Ministries and an Advisory Committee that mobilized 1,000 experts from different fields by the establishment of the Office of National Restoration.
- Sixth, the inclusion of local governments by the establishment of Local Government Association and the Association for Government Support at the Prime Minister’s Office.

Accordingly, while the involvement of actors from the government sector is possibly influenced by the connection of FMRRP with their functions in the government system, *Chaebols* and groups from civil society were carefully selected by MLTM and Office of National Rivers Restoration to participate in the design of the project. This circumstance is pictured in the third step of the stakeholders’ involvement in which only six *Chaebols* from the construction companies and only one private research institute that were invited to join the research. Other than that, in the fifth step of the involvement, MLTM and Office of National Rivers Restoration have selected 1,000 experts from different fields, such as from the academic sector, research institute, and civic groups to be parts of an Advisory Committee in the Office of National Restoration. The involvement was operated by asking the experts to support the FMRRP by making an assessment report about the project and provided them with the government funding for their research (Interviewee #5, #13, and #18). Furthermore, even though the third and fifth steps have involved many actors from *Chaebols* and civil society, information regarding the selection process of these actors as well as criteria that were used to select them is not provided by the government in the official publication of FMRRP by the MLTM (2012) and the Office of National Restoration (2011). Instead, the official publications only mention which various experts and stakeholders have been involved, not how these actors were selected.


6.2.2. Throughput Inclusiveness

This research has defined throughput inclusiveness as the inclusion of the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society in the decision-making of FMRRP, which emphasizes the involvement of these stakeholders during the decision-making process.

The decision-making process of FMRRP falls under the institutional setting of the Office of National Rivers Restoration Project (see **Figure 9**). Under the MLTM, four ministries (Ministry of Environment; Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism; also Ministry of Public Administration and Security) are part of an inter-governmental arrangement and act as the central body of the organization (Ishiwatari et al., 2016). Participation of variety of actors is also emphasized in this setting by the creation of an Advisory Committee that consists of 1,000 experts, academics, policy advisors, and community organizations from the civil

society. The organization is also designed to have a regular meeting with Association for Government Support and Local Government Associations of The Four Rivers as well as a periodic joint consultation with Presidential Committee on Green Growth, Regional Development, and Agriculture Policy, to move the sequence of ideas in horizontal and vertical ways (Ishiwatari et al., 2016; MLTM, 2012a).

Figure 9. Institutional Setting of the Office of National River Restoration



However, this multi-level and multi-actors participation scheme did not correspond with the actual decision-making of FMRRP that was dominated by President MB and the MLTM. Even though other actors from various backgrounds were listed as participants in the decision-making process, room for their participation was pretty limited (Interviewee #19). A former researcher of KICT who was included in this setting, stated that in the time when they should do the research, President MB and MLTM provided them with details and certain aims of the project, in which they had only to complete the mission that were given to them (Interviewee #20). This is also what usually happened to the other researchers who worked for the government’s research institute. They only worked on the tasks and limitations that have been given to them by the government (Interviewee #11).

In the case of FMRRP, it is interesting to note that although FMRRP is presented as an inclusive green growth project it was mostly dominated by President MB, the role of Presidential Committee on Green Growth was not crucial. The former chair of ROK’s Presidential Committee on Green Growth during President MB’s era even stated that the FMRRP was not under the responsibility of his committee,

“[f]our rivers restoration project actually was launched even before formally launching Korea’s green growth strategy and the presidential committee...[s]o my committee-Presidential Committee on Green Growth- did not have any formal deliberation about that policy. We didn’t discuss that. We only received the report and discussed the progress, but it was not part of our committee, this decision.” (Interviewee #13).

He also emphasized that the President MB had complete control over the FMRRP with the support of his officials from the Blue House-the President's office. For the FMRRP, he even believed that President MB had decided to omit the public consultation with the ecologist specialists (Interviewee #13).

Another interesting issue in the throughput inclusiveness is the role of *Chaebols* as the private actors who had an ability to influence the decision-making process of FMRRP. The former researcher of KICT who worked together with engineers from the included *Chaebols* in the FMRRP stated that these engineers were the focal point who connected the research's office with their companies. They had the ability to influence the construction design of FMRRP, in which it could be beneficial for the companies. They worked back and forth from their companies to the research's office to circulate the project and to seek the companies' agreement on the project's design before finalizing and presenting it to the government (Interviewee #20). Thus, to some extent, the *Chaebols* were also able to put their interests in the construction design of FMRRP and to influence the decision-making process of FMRRP. Contrasting to this, civil society had no ability to influence the decision-making process. Various actors of civil society in the Advisory Committee of the Office of National Rivers Restoration had very little power in the decision-making process since they agreed to join the committee to secure the government's funding of their research (Interviewee #5, #6, and #18).

6.2.3. Output Inclusiveness

This research has defined output inclusiveness as the inclusion of the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society in the benefits resulting from the FMRRP in terms of income and access to the resource. The benefits can be perceived as direct and indirect benefits since the actors can be either receiving benefits directly from the implementation of FMRRP or indirectly as the means they received benefits from the other relevant process to the implementation of FMRRP, such as securing government funding or the position of their jobs.

Exploring output inclusiveness in the FMRRP has revealed several arguments are demonstrating that different actors have been included and excluded in gaining benefits from the project. These arguments to a certain point indicate that the FMRRP did not provide access for all actors to receive the benefits; only some actors had received the benefits from the project. These arguments mentioned that the FMRRP had only included several actors, such as President MB, *Chaebols* who were included in the project, and experts from civil society who supported the FMRRP (Interviewee #4, #5, #6, #7, #11, #18, and #22).

President MB and *Chaebols*-particularly Hyundai E&C- were the ones who received the direct benefits of FMRRP by the connection of President MB's past business history as the CEO of Hyundai E&C with the involvement of his former company in the project (Interviewee #5, #7, and #11). Hyundai E&C was included in the FMRRP from the beginning which is in the preliminary research to make the master plan, until during the implementation of FMRRP where they won the public construction bidding to be one of the companies that execute the project's construction (MLTM, 2012). Other than that, the implementation of FMRRP is a form of achievement for President MB to leaving a big legacy as a president of ROK (Interviewee #4 and #11). Had been rejected by various groups in the ROK's society to make a mega project namely the PKGW, the accomplishment of

FMRRP as the “new” mega project help him to leave a big legacy as a president of ROK (Interviewee #11 and #22).

Several experts from civil society who supported the FMRRP have received the indirect benefits from the FMRRP since they gained government funding for their research (Interviewee #6, #11, and #18). Due to the scientific requirement to conduct the project, the government had invited numerous experts to work and provide them with a scientific report saying that the FMRRP is possible and is not harming the environment (Interviewee #11). However, many experts that reportedly joined the FMRRP mostly have their majors in the sociology and construction engineering, not from the environmental field (Interviewee #6). So the reports did not strongly use an environmental perspective (Interviewee #22). Also, even though many experts have known that the FMRRP could bring environmental damages to the river, they still agreed to support the FMRRP for the sake of gaining research fund (Interviewee #18).

Apart from that, the FMRRP had also excluded several actors in receiving benefits from the project, such as environmental NGOs, newspaper companies, local people alongside the rivers, fishers, farmers, and experts from civil society who criticized the project (Interviewee #4, #6, #15, #16, #17, and #21). Environmental NGOs and newspaper companies that criticized the project have been excluded in receiving the indirect benefits from the FMRRP since the government either reduced or completely removed the government funding for them (Interviewee #6, #15, and #21). In fact, the government did not directly mention the reason was about their criticism to FMRRP and instead mentioned the other reasons, but it was almost like a common understanding (Interviewee #15 and #21).

Local people alongside the rivers, fishers, and farmers have also been excluded from receiving the direct benefits of FMRRP. Due to the project’s construction, they lost their original jobs by the relocation and the massive fish killed in the rivers (Interviewee #4). The farmland provided by the government was not as good as their original land and reduced their production (Interviewee #16). The jobs created in the FMRRP were also not sustainable since it was only a short term job and there was hardly any chance for them to participate (Interviewee #4 and #17). Other than that, when they tried to involve and participated in the parks created by the project for tourism reasons, they had to compete with different levels of government (local and national) and also *Chaebols* who also tried to manage and made money from the area (Interviewee #17). Hence, there was hardly any new jobs opportunity while they lost their old jobs due to the project.

Experts from civil society who criticized the project have also excluded from the indirect benefits of FMRRP. KFEM, as the environmental NGO that has been joining the protest of FMRRP since 2009 and became one of the leaders in this opposition movement had several experiences when the experts who wanted to help them received threats from the government (Interviewee #6).

“Government actually called and threatened the specialist who was offering help to us(KFEM) and said if you keep on offering help to them, we will not fund your research anymore and even called to check whether they are teaching well” (Interviewee #6).

Through the above identification, the FMRRP had excluded those actors who did not favor the FMRRP, from the benefits resulting from the project. In terms of income and access to resource, actors that portrayed to be included in benefits are President MB, *Chaebols*, and experts from civil society who supported the FMRRP, while actors that excluded are environmental NGOs, newspaper

companies, local people alongside the rivers, farmers, fishers, and experts from civil who criticized the project.

6.3. Framing the Nature and Drivers of FMRRP

Identification of frames that has been used by different stakeholders to explain the nature and drivers of FMRRP is presented in the following section. It focuses on the framing of FMRRP's nature and drivers that was officially published to the public and how this frame evoked a counter-frame that is addressed towards President MB.

6.3.1. The Official Frame: FMRRP stimulates inclusive green growth

The identity of FMRRP as an inclusive green growth project and several objectives mentioned in the environmental, economic, and social dimensions are framed as the nature and drivers of FMRRP by President MB, MLTM, and the Office of National Rivers Restoration in the official publications of FMRRP. A mega project to restore the four main rivers by creating various dams, multiple construction projects, dredging the rivers bed, and improving water system management is framed as an inclusive green growth project since it is meant to prevent floods and droughts as the climate change's challenges, create numerous jobs during and after the project's implementation, also stimulate an inclusive governance system (MLTM, 2012a, 2012b). Accordingly, the objectives to address climate change challenges, to escalate jobs creation and inclusive growth, and also to build an inclusive governance system are the main drivers of the FMRRP (MLTM, 2012a: 34; Office of National Rivers Restoration, 2011a). Additionally, the fundamental base of FMRRP's identity as an inclusive green growth project is published to be placed under the ROK's National Green Growth and Korean Green New Deal, where the FMRRP stands as the centerpiece project of these policies (KEI, 2013). When developing and discussing the practices of environmental, economic, and social inclusion issues for the project, President MB, MLTM, and the Office of National Rivers Restoration argued that the project has been involving actors from the three different spheres. Also, they mentioned that the FMRRP had promoted an inter-agency process of the government, private sectors-*Chaebols*, and civil society in the creation and management of the project (MLTM, 2012a).

Accordingly, it is written in the official publications of FMRRP that this project has received an acknowledgement from UNEP as an exemplary project for green growth (KEI, 2013). ROK's government was mentioned by UNEP (2009) to successfully performed such a vertical governing arrangement between public and private sectors, also civil society, albeit a horizontal network that persisted in the governance system of FMRRP,

“ROK¹⁶ authorities appear to be adequately considering the need to balance swift and effective implementation with concerns for transparency and public information and participation in the policy-formulation process.” (UNEP, 2009: 29).

This compliment has been used by President MB, MLTM, and the Office of National Rivers Restoration ever since to strengthen their presentation of FMRRP as a green growth project that has

¹⁶ The original text is “Korean”

an inclusive governance system. President MB, MLTM, and the Office of National Rivers Restoration suggested that inclusive governance system has been underpinned by the creation and the management of FMRRP also promoted the FMRRP as an exemplary case of a green growth project that has effectively performed a multi-level stakeholders participation (KEI, 2013: 173). Other than UNEP, they also actively engaged international actors such as OECD and World Bank, in promoting their efforts of escalating green growth strategy through an inclusive governance system in the case of FMRRP (Ishiwatari et al., 2016; KEI, 2013).

The frame of FMRRP as an inclusive green growth project has been actively presented by President MB, the MLTM, and the Office of National Rivers Restoration through several actions. The Office of National Rivers Restoration and MLTM had published several books that are underpinning the story of FMRRP as an inclusive green growth project using various scientific data and narratives beyond the creation of FMRRP (MLTM, 2012a, 2012b; Office of National River Restoration, 2011a, 2011b). They also organized an 'International Conference on River Restoration for Green Growth' to specifically raise the awareness of FMRRP as an inclusive green growth project by inviting about 800 domestic and overseas experts to join the forum and the field trips to the rivers (T. Kim, 2011; Office of National River Restoration, 2011b). Other than that, several presentation sessions in other international conferences were also used by MLTM and Office of National Rivers Restoration to frame the FMRRP as an inclusive green growth project (Cha et al., 2011; Jung, 2012). This publicity was also performed by President MB through numerous speeches and interviews in various news media (newspaper, radio, television) (M. B. Lee, 2016).

6.3.2. Counter-frame: FMRRP is a political instrument of President MB to leaving a legacy

In the counter-frame to the official frame of FMRRP, personal interests of President MB in leaving a legacy using a mega construction project that suggests his tight relationship with *Chaebols* is framed as the nature and drivers of FMRRP. Variety groups in civil society and also former government's officials were the ones who have used this counter-frame. This counter-frame is rooted on three issues which have been interacting and intertwining that eventually evokes the portrayal of FMRRP as a political instrument of President MB to leaving a legacy. These three issues are the environmental damage that believed as caused by poor management and inadequate composition of governance system in the FMRRP, the notable involvement of Hyundai E&C in the project in relation to the history of President MB as a CEO of Hyundai E&C, and the perception of FMRRP as a substitute project decorated by green growth values to replace President MB's old controversial project namely PKGW (Interviewee #4, #5, #6, #7, #11, #12, #13, #14, #15, #20, #21, and #22).

The first issue is portraying the dissatisfaction of variety groups in civil society and former government's officials to the FMRRP due to the environmental damages in the rivers that were appearing after the project's construction. They argued that this phenomenon happened because of a lack of good environmental management and an inadequate composition of experts in the governance system, in spite of the label of FMRRP as an inclusive green growth project. The former chair of ROK's Presidential Committee on Green Growth during President MB's era even stated that,

“[i]t-the FMRRP- was badly managed. The Lee Myung-Bak government and the people who pushed that were not ecologically conscious. They were not environmentalist. They did not know about the ecosystem consequences of river restoration project. So I believe that this four rivers project has in fact damaged the Korea’s existing natural ecosystem.” (Interviewee #13).

In the same vein, the former advisor of Ministry of Environment and several NGOs and academicians believed that President MB has specifically excluded professionals of environmental sector and only included engineers and development oriented professionals in the formulation and management of the FMRRP (Interviewee #5, #6, and #22). They believed that the lack of environmental assessment and professionals in the composition of FMRRP’s governance system were the main drivers of the negative impacts on the environment in the rivers. In addition to that, they believed that President MB and his officials have carefully selected stakeholders to pursue and to seek support for the design of FMRRP (Interviewee #5, #6, #13, and #22).

The second issue is related to the connection of the notable involvement of Hyundai E&C in FMRRP with the history of President MB as a CEO of Hyundai E&C. Hyundai E&C was heavily involved in the formulation of FMRRP’s design and during the implementation in the construction field, whereas the other *Chaebols* were only included either in the formulation or in the implementation in the construction field (MLTM, 2012a: 89-90). In any case, the opinion of various groups in the society to the FMRRP has been influenced by the portrayal of the strong government-*Chaebols* nexus, in which both the government, in this case particularly President MB and *Chaebols* gained mutual benefits through the FMRRP. One of the professors of ROK also stated that,

“[C]haebols were heavily involved in this project, so basically it goes back to Lee Myung-Bak essentially Lee Myung-Bak’s role within Hyundai Corporation...Because it seems to be the Lee Myung Bak’s cooperation and particularly Hyundai Corporation getting a lot of contracts-in the FMRRP” (Interviewee #7).

To some extent, this idea is also correlated with the deeply rooted history of the relationship between the government and *Chaebols*, which practically dwelled with the corruption scandals that involved many actors at different levels of government with the *Chaebols* (Croissant, 2002; Fendos, 2016). Any project that shows a strong government-*Chaebol* nexus, since then, has been portrayed with a negative perception by the public (Powers, 2010). FMRRP as a construction project that suggests a strong partnership between the government and *Chaebols*, where the huge money also invested in the project, has been perceived as ‘the next’ mutually beneficial project for the government and *Chaebols* (Interviewee #5, #7, and #12).

The third issue touches upon ‘the old’ mega project proposed by President MB during his presidential election to make a canal crossing the country, which was heavily protested by the public. The FMRRP was seen as “the new” mega project of President MB that replaces “the old” one, since they are similar in project design except for the canal plan (Interviewee #5, #6, #11, #13, #14, #15, #21, and #22). According to a journalist who said to have gained information from staff in the Ministry of Environment, President MB took the lead in the decision-making process of FMRRP from the very beginning of the FMRRP (Interviewee #11). He pushed the officials in the Ministry of Environment to change the report of PKGW, that is known as a project by President MB during his presidential election, into FMRRP by removing the canal plan and adding a ‘green’ value in the project,

“[h]is transition team had a meeting with Ministry of Environment...[t]hey-the Ministry of Environment- did not want to do it-the PKGW, but there is no option because President said, ‘I want to do this’...[s]o they just pushed the ministry to change the report and come up with a new report on how it’ll be possible-the FMRRP.” (Interviewee #11).

This argument was also supported by the former advisor of Ministry of Environment that stating if President MB was the one behind the steering wheel in the decision to implementing the FMRRP by modifying the plan for PKGW,

“[m]any people opposed against this project-the PKGW, this is disaster, we don’t need any canal in Korea. It is not economical, it can destruct our nature seriously and it is kind of budget consuming and many people resist against to it...[s]o he decided that he will not do this project but he changed the name of the project and he said that four larger rivers project-the FMRRP- is important for the climate change...[s]o the original design, construction design was almost same except this canal” (Interviewee #22).

The interplay of these three issues generates a counter-frame to the official frame of FMRRP as an inclusive green growth project. It is developed as a counter-frame which has been saying that the FMRRP is a political instrument of President MB to leaving a legacy in the ROK; it is not about an inclusive green growth project. This frame particularly stressed the top-down approach of President MB and one-way of communication for the initiation and management of FMRRP, which connects to the idea of inclusive green growth project, actors selected in the governance system, the relation of Hyundai E&C with President MB, and the linked to the PKGW. Through multiple journals, demonstrations, and seminars about the FMRRP, particularly various groups of civil society-not the case of former government’s officials- have countered the official frame of FMRRP and have been demanding for reinvestigation of FMRRP from 2009 (FOEI, 2010). In the end, the counter-frame has also been used by the new president of ROK (2017-present), Moon Jae-In, as he started to reinvestigate the environmental problems and a possibility of fraud in the FMRRP (K. Choi, 2017; R. Kim, 2017).

CHAPTER 7

Analysis: Inclusive Governance of FMRRP



Dumulgyeong, Yeosu
(the courses of two rivers' water and bike path)
Image © 2016 personal

This chapter provides an analysis of the research that includes a discussion on the stakeholders' inclusiveness issue at different stages and frames used by different stakeholders to define the nature and drivers of FMRRP. The first part presents the first issue under the name of 'inclusive governance as a process', while the second part addresses the second issue under the name of 'inclusive governance as a frame'.

7.1. Inclusive Governance as a Process

In the theory section, inclusive governance as a process has been described as an theoretical concept to analyze stakeholders' inclusiveness at different stages of FMRRP, which are input, throughput, and output inclusiveness.

Input Inclusiveness

In the design of FMRRP, the inclusion of actors has been done in a very short time and a selective manner. It is because the selection of actors to be included in the design can be critical to pursuing and seeking support to the available design and to the implementation in the field project. Several groups in civil society believed that only selected people who are in favor of the FMRRP are drawn in the process. Accordingly, President MB and MLTM were portrayed to be the ones behind the steering wheels who arranged the selection of these actors. As a result, some perceptions are appearing in the public to interpret the motive beyond the selection. The views have been focused on, first, the government-*Chaebols* nexus that connects to the deeply rooted history of the relation between government and *Chaebols* in the economic and political issue as well as the past business history of President MB, and second, the values that promoted in the project.

The first view that relates to the government-*Chaebols* nexus and the special history of President MB as the CEO of Hyundai E&C is underpinned by the involvement of Hyundai E&C during the making of the master plan as well as during the implementation of the project in the field. Several academicians stated that the heavy involvement of Hyundai C&E in the FMRRP is the result of their tight connection with President MB. This opinion is further strengthened and linked to the record of President MB who are in favor in making a big construction project involving *Chaebols*, such as the restoration of *Cheonggyecheon* stream and the proposal to make the PKGW. In a sense, President MB has been portrayed to support the economic activities of *Chaebols* by providing several mega construction project when he was in power. Thus, there is a strong opinion from various groups in civil society that the FMRRP is another mega construction project that he arranged for the *Chaebols*, which explains the inclusion of *Chaebols* in the design of FMRRP.

The second view that associates to the values used in the project is connected to the backgrounds of the selected actors. Academicians and NGOs believe that the selection of actors from civil society in the FMRRP was biased since even though the FMRRP is promoted as a green growth project, it consists more people from the economic and construction fields than environmental sector. The former advisor of Ministry of Environment also stated that President MB has included engineers and construction oriented professionals only, whereas the environmental organizations and professionals have been excluded in the design of FMRRP (Interviewee #22). In this sense, selection of actors from civil society to be included in the design of FMRRP has been conducted in a certain direction to pursuing and seeking support for official and unofficial goals.

Throughput Inclusiveness

In the decision-making process of FMRRP, several roles have been performed during the process in which a top-down approach has also been applied. This condition is pictured in the characteristic of ways to involve different actors in the decision-making of FMRRP. These actors have been appointed to specific roles and tasks during the making of the master plan, but not all of them were provided with the capacity to influence the decision-making process. Rather, they had to comply with the given plot and rules by President MB and MLTM in the decision-making process of FMRRP. The characterization of the roles and capacity of these actors are divided into two types, which are:

- *Main Players*

The main players are the central actors who have the authority and power in managing and deciding the plot and the timeline of the FMRRP. Actors who are included in this categorization are President MB, MLTM, and the Office of National Rivers Restoration (on behalf of MLTM). They have the power and ability to push the researchers to finish the research within a certain time frame and limitations, which to some extent neglected the researchers' opinion. Although President MB and the MLTM were not explicitly written in the institutional setting of FMRRP, in practice, they were heavily involved in all decision-making process of FMRRP (Interviewee #13, #19, and #10). Other than that, instead of Presidential Committee on Green Growth who is in charge of all green growth projects in the ROK, the institutional setting of the Office of National Rivers Restoration shows that they have more power than the Presidential Committee on Green Growth in the case of FMRRP albeit the identity of FMRRP as an inclusive green growth project. Thus, the main players of FMRRP are identified as President MB, MLTM, and Office of National Rivers Restoration.

- *Supporters*

The supporters are the actors who are participated in the decision-making process, but only to support the process and act as the appointed roles. They have limited capacity in influencing the decision-making process and simply comply to the plot also rules given by the main players. Their roles in supporting the project can be seen through their efforts in providing opinions, doing research based on a particular direction, and managing the relation between involving stakeholders. Actors who are identified to be included in this category are, from the government: Prime Minister's Office, presidential committees (Green Growth, Regional Development, Agriculture Policy), Ministries (ME, MAFRA, MCTS, MOPAS), the public research institutes (KICT, KRIHS, NIER), state-owned company (K-Water), and Local Government Associations of The Four Rivers; from the *Chaebols*: Hyundai E&C, Dongbu Engineering, Dohwa Engineering, Saman Engineering, Isan Engineering, Yooshin; from the civil society: private research institute (Future Research Institute) and advisory committee for the Office of National Restoration.

As an illustration, the role of supporters from the government's actors in the decision-making process of FMRRP is attached to the role of Presidential Committee on Green Growth, Regional Development, and Agriculture Policy in the Office of National Rivers Restoration. They only acted as a supporter by attending the joint sessions, listening to the presentation of the Office of National Rivers Restoration, and receiving reports about the projects; but not to decide the next plans of FMRRP. Other than that, the supporting role was also pictured by the role of public research institutes. They were given the role in managing the overall research, but in practice they only worked based on the 'command' from the government, and hence, not to take part in the decision-

making process. The same goes for the role of K-water as a state-owned company in the FMRRP. Although management of the rivers is one of their original functions, in the decision-making process, they acted only as a supporter who provided study about the river management and had no capacity in influencing the decision-making process.

Aside from the government's actors, the role of supporters also shown through the ways to involve *Chaebols* and civil society. A bit different from the government's actors, the *Chaebols* were categorized to be the supporters who had a capacity to a certain extent to involve in the decision-making process. Their capacity was shown following their responsibility in the making of the construction plan's design, such as the design of the weirs. Although the design was made together with other actors in the Office, they were able to put the interests of their companies and in a sense were involved in the decision-making process of the construction's design. Thus, although they are categorized as supporters, they also have the ability to a certain extent to influence the decision-making process of the construction design in the master plan. Contrasting to that, the role of civil society as the supporters in the decision-making process was limited since their involvement only to provide reports as the scientific basis for the FMRRP. Their limited capability is considerably constrained by the government funding that they gained by joining the FMRRP. They were unable to be critical and independent as to secure the funding from the government.

Links between Input, Throughput, and Output Inclusiveness

In the benefits resulting from the FMRRP, several actors have been provided with access to receive direct or indirect benefits while the others have not. The process of inclusion and exclusion of these actors was not connected to the label attached to them (e.g. the government, *Chaebols*, or civil society), but to the process in the input and throughput inclusiveness. This is considering that the issue of inclusive governance that represented by input and throughput inclusiveness is connected to the issue of inclusive growth that refers to output inclusiveness. By looking into particular actors that categorized to be included and excluded in the output inclusiveness while also observing the identification of stakeholders' inclusion in input and throughput inclusiveness, some patterns can be constructed to define the connection between the three types of inclusiveness. These patterns are:

- 1) *Actors who were included in input inclusiveness were also included in output inclusiveness.* This pattern is based on the observation from the stakeholders' inclusion and exclusion in the output inclusiveness, which also had the same pattern in input inclusiveness. An assumption is that since they were included in the design of FMRRP, they have the possibility to access the benefits resulted from the project. However, the ones who were excluded in the design were troubled in accessing the benefits. For instance, Hyundai E&C as one of the *Chaebols* that listed and involved in the design of FMRRP has also received direct benefits resulting from the FMRRP as they received the construction agreement in the project.
- 2) *Actors who were included in throughput inclusiveness were also included in output inclusiveness.* This pattern is based on the observation from the stakeholders' inclusion and exclusion in the output inclusiveness, which also had the same pattern in throughput inclusiveness. An assumption is that since they had the ability to participate in the decision-making process of FMRRP, they have the possibility to access the benefits resulted from the project. However, the ones who were excluded in the decision-making process were troubled

in accessing the benefits. For instance, experts in the Advisory Committee who were involved in the decision-making process, despite of their roles as supporters, have also received indirect benefits as they secured the government funding for their research.

- 3) *Not all actors who were included in input and throughput inclusiveness were also included in output inclusiveness.* This pattern is based on the observation of stakeholders' inclusion and exclusion between the three types of inclusivity, in which not all actors that were included in input and throughput inclusiveness were also included in output inclusiveness. An assumption is that some actors who were included in input and throughput inclusiveness only acted based on their functions and based on the command from the people at a higher position. Thus, instead of pursuing benefits for their own interests, they performed to support the demand from other actors. For instance, Ministry of Environment was included both in design and decision-making process of the FMRRP. However, they have not received benefits from the FMRRP in the sense that instead of gaining benefits, they agreed to be included in the design and decision-making process in order to secure their jobs.

From the established patterns, in regards to inclusive governance, the practice of stakeholders' selection in input and throughput inclusiveness indeed, influenced the selection of actors in output inclusiveness. Thus, the inclusion and exclusion pattern within one type of inclusiveness had an impact on the inclusion pattern in the other inclusiveness. However, in addition to that, the measurement of stakeholders' inclusion and exclusion between the three types of inclusiveness can be different from one to the other type of stakeholders, since each actor is having different interests and roles within the project.

7.2. Inclusive Governance as a Frame

The interactions amongst stakeholders in the FMRRP, both the included and excluded stakeholders, are characterized by the construction of the official frame and the counter-frame. By framing the FMRRP as an inclusive green growth project which operates to pursue several objectives in the environmental, economic, and social dimensions, also has a multi-level participants governance system, President MB, the MLTM, and the Office of National Rivers Restoration created and used the identity of inclusive green growth and its objectives as the nature and drivers of the FMRRP. This frame is defined as the official frame since it has been used in all of the official publications and speeches of FMRRP. In reaction to this frame, various groups in civil society and former government's officials developed a counter-frame by rejecting the frame of FMRRP as an inclusive green growth project and instead suggesting an idea that FMRRP is an instrument of President MB to leaving a legacy. This counter-frame was supported by an argument that President MB has performed a top-down approach and one-way communication in the arrangement and management of FMRRP for pursuing his personal interest. Hence, in defining the "real" nature and drivers of FMRRP, different stakeholders in the FMRRP have developed an official frame and a counter-frame that have totally different ideas from one to the others.

The development of the contrasting frame of the nature and drivers of FMRRP by different stakeholders visualizes the interactions amongst stakeholders in defining their perceptions of the "real" nature and drivers of FMRRP. President MB, MLTM, and the Office of National Rivers

Restoration used the institutional setting of the Office of National Rivers Restoration that is promoted to have a multi-actors and multi-levels participation, also has 1,000 experts from different spheres in the Advisory Committee to strengthen their frame-official frame- of the “*real*” nature and drivers of FMRRP. Other than that, they also used the assessment of UNEP and other international organizations of the FMRRP to make their frame become more powerful. In the opposition, various groups in civil society and former government’s officials used some relevant issues that connected to President MB such as the poor management and inadequate composition of FMRRP’s governance system, the relation of Hyundai E&C with President MB, and the link of FMRRP to the PKGW, to support their counter-frame.

Accordingly, whereas the official frame focused on defining the identity of FMRRP as an inclusive green growth project by promoting the institutional setting of the Office of National Rivers Restoration, the counter-frame used several issues related to President MB in countering the official frame. In the beginning, the official frame was seen to be stronger than the counter-frame since the FMRRP was finished in time and received acknowledgements from different international organizations as an exemplary case of green growth. Also, the promising multi-actors and multi-levels participation in the institutional setting of the Office of National Rivers and the inclusion of 1,000 experts from different fields in the Advisory Committee have become the major power of this frame. However, in the development, the counter-frame has become more powerful from the official frame since several environmental issues have appeared in the rivers and many of former government’s officials who worked for President MB have stated that the FMRRP is not an inclusive green growth project and President MB has used his power to control the creation and management of this project. It becomes more a political tool that used by President MB, rather than a project that stimulates an inclusive green growth.

Therefore, the official frame and counter-frame in the FMRRP have shown that framing can be used as a tool to “*steering*” the society. President MB, MLTM, and the Office of National Rivers Restoration have succeeded in persuading the international organizations using their frame to believe that FMRRP is a project that stimulates inclusive green growth. Whereas, a variety of groups in civil society and former government’s officials have gained the trust from many actors in the ROK’s society using their counter-frame, even succeed in convincing the new president of ROK, Moon Jae-in, to reinvestigate the environmental damage and illegalities in the creation and management of FMRRP. However, the “*steering*” systems from both frames have no two-ways communication between the actors from one to the other frames, which generates a non-mutual understanding. The actors from each frame were only busy to stating their frame, yet, have no intention of trying to understand the other frame or to develop a joint-constructive interpretation of the nature and drivers of FMRRP.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion and Discussion



Bicycle Path of Ipo Weirs, Yeosu

Image © 2016 personal

8.1. Conclusion

Based on the findings that were elaborated with theories and concepts during the research, this subchapter provides the conclusion that can be given as the answers to the main research questions.

First question: To what extent and how are *Chaebols* and civil society included and excluded in the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project?

Chaebols and civil society were included in the FMRRP only to a certain extent. In the design of FMRRP, only six *Chaebols* (Hyundai E&C, Dongbu Engineering, Dohwa Engineering, Saman Engineering, Isan Engineering, and Yooshin) were engaged as the private sectors' representatives. For the civil society, only one civil society organization (Future Resources Institute) was included during the design of the master plan and there were 1,000 experts from civil society were included in the Advisory Committee of the Office of National Rivers Restoration. While including and selecting *Chaebols* can be linked to the history of government-*Chaebols* nexus as well as the connection with President MB's history as the CEO of Hyundai E&C, including civil society can be very selective and crucial for gaining support in the operation of FMRRP. Various groups in civil society and the former government's officials even believed that President MB and his officials have been carefully selected experts who are engineers and constructions professionals from civil society to support the construction progress of FMRRP, while the inclusion of environmental experts remained low.

In the decision-making process of FMRRP, *Chaebols* and civil society were identified to have less power than President MB and MLTM. The decision-making process was taken under the command of President MB, while MLTM and the Office of National Rivers Restoration acted on behalf of President MB. Apart from that, the *Chaebols* to some extent also had the capability to influence the decision-making process of FMRRP since they were able to give their voices in the design of the project's construction. It is different with civil society since they cannot influence the process at any cost; they only acted by the appointed roles and within some limitations. Accordingly, President MB, MLTM, and the Office of National Rivers Restoration are categorized as the "*Main Players*" in the decision-making process since they were able to influence the arrangement of FMRRP, while *Chaebols* and civil society are grouped as the "*Supporters*". *Chaebols* are also categorized as "*supporters*" considering their limitation to only influence the decision-making process in the design of the construction's project. An interesting note in the decision-making process of FMRRP is that Presidential Committee on Green Growth had no power in the decision-making process although the FMRRP is a promoted as a green growth project for which they also categorized as "*Supporters*".

In the benefits resulting from the FMRRP, President MB and *Chaebols* received direct benefits of the FMRRP, while only some groups in civil society gained indirect benefits. This statement constructed by an assumption that these actors were able to earn the benefits since they were involved in the design and decision-making process of FMRRP. This pattern is identified through the continuous participation of President MB, *Chaebols*, and experts who supported the FMRRP in the design and decision-making process of FMRRP which in the end they also received the benefits from the project. Meanwhile, experts who criticized the FMRRP and had no access to participate in the design and decision-making process of FMRRP did not receive any benefits from the FMRRP.

Second question: How do different stakeholders frame the nature and drivers of the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project?

Different stakeholders have framed the nature and drivers of FMRRP into the official frame and counter-frame. The official frame which was suggested by President MB, MLTM, and the Office of National Rivers Restoration has framed the nature and drivers of FMRRP as an inclusive green growth project that has several objectives in the environmental, economic, and social dimensions as the main drivers of the project. To build the frame of FMRRP that stimulates inclusive green growth, they emphasize the multi-level participants system in the institutional setting of Office of National Rivers Restoration which was also promoted to include various actors from different fields. The counter-frame was evoked to reject the frame that used by President MB, MLTM, and the Office of National Rivers Restoration by framing the nature and drivers of FMRRP as an instrument of President MB to leaving a legacy. Several issues such as environmental damages, the link of Hyundai E&C and President MB, also the similar design of FMRRP with PKGW, were used by various groups in society and former government's officials to counter the official frame. Whereas the official frames was more powerful in the beginning due to the official publications, reports, and speeches by President MB, MLTM, and the Office of National Rivers Restoration; the counter-frame become more powerful after President MB left the power and his former officials started to counter the official-frame that in the end made the new president of ROK, Moon Jae-in, has ordered to re-investigate the FMRRP. Additionally, since there were no two-ways communications between the actors who have a different frame, there is no mutual understanding about the nature and drivers of the FMRRP.

8.2. Discussion

This subchapter presents an issue to discuss which is drafted based on the research's findings and research's objectives of this study. It relates to the root of the controversy that happened between the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society in the case of FMRRP. The discussion of this issue is enforced as the means to draw a possible idea on whether this controversy relates to the implementation of IGG or to the past interaction history of these stakeholders. It is questioned whether the controversy that happened was purely caused by the political debate in the IGG or instead, it is still going to happen even in the different setting of the case that employs the government-*Chaebols* nexus, also the civil society as the third actor.

The Controversy in the FMRRP: The Issue of Inclusive Green Growth Strategy or a Sequel of ROK's Deeply Rooted Political Debate?

The tension between the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society in the FMRRP happened for quite a long time during President MB's administration. Even before the implementation of FMRRP, the public of ROK's society already tensed up due to the plan of making a great canal across the country named PKGW by President MB. The FMRRP, which came after the strong contestation from the public that made the PGKW about to halt, received a massive rejection. The portrayal of the high risk of environmental impacts as well as a deep government-*Chaebols* nexus in the project became the drivers of the contestation. They questioned if this project is qualified to be mentioned as a green growth project since the construction projects in the FMRRP cause a lot of ecological losses which is

contradicted with the value of green growth, or it is only used as a tool by President MB to increase *Chaebols'* production considering the huge money given to the project, or a tool to leave a legacy. Despite the noise, nonetheless, President MB still carried out the project using a top-down approach and one-way communication which generates a couple of rallies from different groups of civil society that happen until the present day.

A closer look into the FMRRP reveals a similar pattern of the controversy in this case with other cases in ROK's history that engages the government-*Chaebols* nexus. Many projects involving this nexus have drawn commotion in the society calling for transparency of partnership between the government and *Chaebols* on the policy production and implementation of the projects. The reputation of this nexus which dwelled with several corruption scandals that keep happening even under a different figure of presidents, acts as a trust reducer upon the nexus. The trust further reduced as the corruption culture of *Chaebols* as the emphasis of loyalty has become the common sense and an "open secret" in the public of ROK (Fendos, 2016). Indeed, there are only a few people from the government who were accused of the corruption scandal or were portrayed to have supported the *Chaebols*; yet, it became the common understanding if illegal money was always included for individual benefit in this relationship. The characteristic of ROK that always uses a top-down approach and mostly one-way of communication in creating and implementing policy also strengthen the doubt of public to the project that includes the government and *Chaebols*. Hence, the pattern to put skepticism towards any project involving the government-*Chaebols* nexus already planted over couple decades in the ROK.

An assumption is then the FMRRP has become the next sequel of ROK's deep rooted history on the nexus between government and *Chaebols*. The values of IGG that have been stressed throughout the controversy might be not the main drivers of the contestation, yet, the values stimulate a new sequel of the unique interaction between the government, *Chaebols*, and civil society in ROK's society.

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Annex 1 : List of Interviewees

Interviewee	Occupation	Date of Interview
#1	Former Director General of GGGI	21st September 2016
#2	Staff of a 'Green' Company	6th September 2016
#3	A water expert of GGGI	12th October 2016
#4	The Energy and Climate Policy Institute	14th October 2016
#5	Professor in Seoul National University also one of the leaders of POMAC	18th October 2016
#6	Korea Federation for Environmental Movements (NGO)	25th October 2016
#7	Professor in Ajou University	27th October 2016
#8	Former high official at blue house (president's office)	9th November 2016
#9	Former staff of Samsung	11th November 2016
#10	Former researcher at one of the government's research institute	17th November 2016
#11	Journalist of Korea Times	24th November 2016
#12	Former journalist of Yonhap News, ROK	27th December 2016
#13	Former Chair of ROK's Presidential Committee on Green Growth and currently a member of the Leadership Council of UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network	10th January 2017
#14	Green Korea United (NGO)	10th January 2017
#15	Green Peace (NGO)	10th January 2017
#16	Head of Farmers Association in Yeosu	18th January 2017
#17	Farmer in Yeosu	18th January 2017
#18	Professor in Hankyong University, hydraulic expert	20th January 2017
#19	Researcher of KICT	21th January 2017
#20	Former Researcher of KICT	21th January 2017
#21	Journalist of the Hankyoreh	21th January 2017
#22	Former advisor of Ministry of Environment, ROK and former chief research fellow of Presidential Committee on Sustainable Development	26th January 2017