Agree to Disagree
Strategic Framing in the Conference on Disarmament
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General Information

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Abstract
Set up in 1978, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) was created by the United Nations General Assembly to negotiate legally binding treaties in support of disarmament. Throughout the years, the Member States of the CD have come together in Geneva to discuss and negotiate the key issues of disarmament, such as nuclear weapons. However, since the conclusion of negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, the CD has not been able to conclude negotiations on any other issue. In 2016, this deadlock in the CD has marked twenty years. While the first part of the 2016 session introduced four Programmes of Work for consideration and heard numerous state representatives speak about breaking the deadlock-situation, the much needed consensus remains elusive. This thesis has analysed the different strategic frames used by state representatives in discussions on breaking the deadlock of the Conference. By analysing the arguments, strategies, and language choices made by state representatives to support their state positions, this thesis provides three general strategies for negotiations: the steering strategy, the passive strategy and the blocking strategy. Each of these strategies was supported by five or six frames. These frames lead to different positions on what the problem is, what the solution is, and how the Conference should continue in its current situation. While used strategically by state representatives, none of the frames could lead to a dominant strategy that would find the agreement needed to allow the Conference to resume its negotiating mandate. The only agreement in the Conference thus remains the agreement that there is disagreement.

Key words: Conference on Disarmament - strategic framing – state representatives – deadlock – strategies - frames
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Secondly, I would like to thank the LAW and PAP chair groups in Wageningen for making it possible to write my thesis on the topic that captured my passion. In particular I would like thank three people. Firstly, my thanks goes to Dr. Otto Hospes who guided me through the first phase of shaping my thesis with a passion possibly even greater than my own. Secondly, Dr. Art Dewulf, who so kindly shared his knowledge about framing and framing analysis, as well as reading my thesis as a second supervisor. And thirdly, but most certainly not lastly, my supervisor Dr. Sylvia Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, who guided me when I needed guidance, read with me when I got lost in the words, and thought with me when I needed a second opinion. I can safely say that this thesis would not be the research it has become without her unwavering support.

Finally, I would like to thank my family, who supported me throughout the journey of my studies. Their wisdom and love lightened the way to and during this thesis.

Dorien de Keyzer
Arnhem, December 2016
**List of abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCW</td>
<td>Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects as amended on 21 December 2001 (also known in short as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Conference on Disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNWC</td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMCT</td>
<td>Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMT</td>
<td>Fissile Material Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSAs</td>
<td>Negative Security Assurances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEWG</td>
<td>Open-Ended Working Group on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCW</td>
<td>Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons</td>
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<td>PoW</td>
<td>Programme of Work</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>RoP</td>
<td>Rule of Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SoA</td>
<td>Schedule of Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs</td>
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  \item Mr. Jones (interview)
  \item Mr. Miller (Unsolicited oral account)
  \item Mr. Smith (interview)
  \item Mr. Taylor (interview)
  \item Mr. Williams (unsolicited oral account)
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{1}All names were chosen, and randomly distributed, from lists of the most common English surnames. To guarantee complete anonymity, all interviewees are presented as male.
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I Introduction

The only agreement in the CD seems the agreement that there is disagreement

Problem statement
Throughout the years, many states have come together to discuss and negotiate on issues of disarmament in international committees such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD). These issues include: biological weapons, landmines, outer space, fissile material and nuclear weapons. However, since the conclusion of negotiations around the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, the CD has not been able to conclude negotiations on any other issue, as is requested by its mandate (Conference on Disarmament 2003). The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) therefore calls upon the CD to “further intensify consultations and to explore possibilities for overcoming its ongoing deadlock of almost two decades by adopting and implementing a balanced and comprehensive programme of work at the earliest possible date during its 2016 session” (General Assembly 2015a).

During the discussions regarding the breaking of this deadlock, states do not blankly discuss the issues and problems on the table. Like everyone, states ‘frame’ the world and its issues in order to make sense of what is going on (Van Herzele and Aarts 2013). Furthermore, they have to take into account international treaties, national laws and regulations, national interests, international relations, and many other interests that frame (Van Herzele and Aarts 2013) their perspective on the issues under negotiation.

Aside from the many background interests that play a role, the actors involved, the environment in which an issue is discussed, and the language used to discuss an issue, all frame and influence the development an issue makes towards a solution. To use the article from Fletcher (2009) as an example, an issue such as the United States climate policy is influenced by many external factors. First, the actors that are allowed to negotiate on the issue, come with different interests and different desires for a solution. Secondly, it will make a difference whether an issue is discussed on a US ministry or at a place such as a company office. Thirdly, the language used to discuss the issue plays a role (e.g. is climate policy an issue of technology, environment or security?). This means that the language used, frames how actors or solutions are in- or excluded.

It is on this use of framing that this research will focus, for in its turn, framing can affect the other impacts as well. As the article from Fletcher (2009) shows, framing an issue as a security issue brings different actors (and thus desired solutions) to the table, than when something is framed as an issue of technology or environment (Fletcher 2009). Similarly does it bring different discourses and narratives supporting that frame.

As mentioned above, framing can be used as a strategy to influence negotiations. This research will focus on this strategic use of framing by state representatives in the CD while they discuss the continuing deadlock of the Conference.
Justification
Why should strategic framing be researched? On the one hand, much research in international politics has been done on the types of framing, the effect of different frames on the outcomes of negotiations, and the importance of national interest (Putnam 1988; Dewulf et al. 2009; Fletcher 2009; Baylis et al. 2011; D’Angelo 2011; Lieshout et al. 2012; Van Herzele and Aarts 2013; Hospes and Kentin 2014). The combination of the three issues, however, is not much researched. While the effects and consequences of framing have been studied, there is little research on the use of framing as a deliberate strategy. That is the focus for this research.

In the author’s view, a better understanding of the strategic use of framing, will help us to comprehend the diversity of ways in which a concept of framing can be used as a tool instead of as a concept. As mentioned before, much research has been done on framing and on the effects of framing (Chong and Druckman 2007). Studies have been conducted on how we frame the world and why, and these studies add to our understanding of how we see the world in perspective. Yet the uses of theories of frames and framing in scientific literature are varied, which allows the term framing to be used in many different ways (D’Angelo 2011; Matthes 2012).

This research takes a new approach to framing by shifting it away from a practice into a tool for strategy, such as has been done for social movements (Benford and Snow 2000; Xenos and Foot 2004; Entman 2007). It uses the idea that everyone frames to research the way that people are able to change the frames that other people hold of a certain issue.

Research Questions
The purpose of this study is to do research on strategic framing in the CD. While a lot of research on strategic framing has already been done in media settings (Entman 2007; Aalberg et al. 2011; D’Angelo 2011; Hanggli and Kriesi 2012; Matthes 2012), research in other settings has had less attention. This research attempts to shed some light on the use of strategic framing in another setting: the setting of international politics, with a focus on disarmament issues.

This objective will be reached with several research questions. The main research question limits the topic of strategic framing by focusing on state representatives in the CD, and by furthermore focussing on the deadlock in the CD. The research question thus becomes:

How do state representatives in the Conference on Disarmament use framing as a strategy in discussions on breaking the deadlock of the Conference?

This central research question will be answered by several sub-questions:

- In which conditions will state representatives use strategic framing?
- What kind of frames are used?
- How are the frames used?
- In which interactions is strategic framing most influential for the results?
- In which situations is it possible for new frames to be established?
Operationalization of the Research Question

A focus on strategic framing by state representatives during the discussions on breaking the deadlock of the Conference highlights several concepts that need to be described before this issue can be researched.

The first concept is the ‘state representative’. This research will look at strategic framing by state representatives only. This means that the people researched will only be those actors involved in the negotiation process who represent a member state within the CD. This includes Ambassadors, first, second and third secretaries, attachés, high level officials (such as ministers), and other diplomats sent to the CD to represent a state. It does not include representatives from observer states, NGOs, private actors, or other interested stakeholders.

The second concept is the issue which is being discussed. This research focuses on the deadlock in the CD. All statements that link to the deadlock will be included in this research. Other issues, like the nuclear test done by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or international women’s day will be excluded from this research.

The third and final concept to be discussed here is the arena of the Conference on Disarmament. This research focuses on all the interventions made by states during the formal meetings of the CD during its first 2016 session.

Thesis Outline

This thesis will continue with outlining the theoretical framework of the research. This theoretical framework will provide an in depth analysis into framing and interactional issue framing. The framework will introduce the theory of strategic framing and identify the context-setting in which actors that use framing, reframers (Abolafia 2004), work. The theoretical framework will end with a section on methodology and methods, which will focus on the way the research was conducted.

The third chapter will set the scene of this research. It will introduce the CD as part of the larger international disarmament machinery, and introduce the issues and rules that structure the CD. The chapter will continue with an introduction into the deadlock of the CD.

The subsequent chapters discuss the results of the framing analysis done for this research. It will start with a chapter introducing the three strategies found in this research, and three overlapping frames within these strategies. The following three chapters will each introduce one of the three strategies, and outline the frames that make up this strategy.

The thesis will follow up with a discussion on the research findings and a following conclusion. The thesis will conclude with an afterword which muses about the question: Will the CD be able to break the deadlock?
II Theoretical Framework

What is framing? How can state representatives use framing strategically? And why would they use it? This chapter seeks to answer these questions by creating a theoretical framework around framing and strategic framing. This is done in four different steps, where each different step encompasses a set of choices made by the researcher to narrow down the field of research for this thesis. First, the different ideas on frames and framing will be voiced, leading to the several ways in which frames can be researched. Second, the theoretical framework will narrow its scope to a more specific type of framing which will then lead to the third section. In this section, a theory of strategic framing will be formed on the basis of several authors. The section will continue by looking at the steps which have to be taken for strategic framing. Finally, this chapter will pay attention to the context of strategic framing.

Theories on Frames

In order to look at the process of framing, it is important to first make a distinction between framing and frames. Where frames are the result of the process of framing (Matthes 2012), framing refers to the process of giving meaning, defining and developing a conceptualization of a particular issue, thus changing the way in which the issue is thought about (Putnam and Holmer 1990; Chong and Druckman 2007). There are many different theories both on framing and frames, and not all make a very clear distinction between the two. This section will focus on these different theories of frames and framing, before addressing the uses of frames.

There are several authors who have attempted to create a theory on what frames are and how they are to be used. This leads to a variety of uses for frames and framing. Some say that a frame can be explained as a set of ideas or a storyline which gives meaning to an action or event (D’Angelo 2011), while others use framing in a context of social or political requirements. All these different ideas lead to frames and framing becoming used for so many purposes that some argue that they have lost some of their significance (D’Angelo 2011; Matthes 2012). Amongst many other theories found in literature, the author can distinguish four parts which can be combined into a new theory of frames with new uses for this theory.

The first part of a theory of frames is the use of framing for structuring our social world. One of the authors discussing this part of the theory of frames is Matthes (2012). He uses frames as a theory for making sense in a social world, mentioning that frames are socially shared principles that organize and structure the social world. He continues by saying that frames are culturally determined and construct the way that we select and interpret information and attitudes around us (Matthes 2012). In his view, frames can thus be used as a structure for the construction of our social world.

Another part of the theory around frames uses frames not as a construction, but as a metaphor. This theory is provided by Susan Sell and Aseem Prakash (2004). They mention that frames are metaphors, representations and ways to see actions and behaviour, which will lead to evaluate and determine our own cause of action. This theory of the function of frames, connects well with the use of frames in political processes, for frames help to determine and select information that will prevail
in the frame. “It is important to examine whose agenda prevails. After all, politics is about who gets what and how” (Sell and Prakash 2004, p. 145).

Another theory, used by Amy Lynn Fletcher, who cites Reber and Berger, focuses on the ability of frames to link certain dimensions and derive meaning from this specific form of linking the aspects. This means that a theory of frames both focuses on structures, as well as on selection. “[Reber and Berger] identify the main goal of frame analysis as ‘understanding how certain idea elements are linked together into packages of meaning, potentially encoded into sound bite-like signifiers that stand for those packages of meaning, and deployed in situated discursive activity’” (Reber and Berger in Fletcher 2009).

A theory of frames encompasses a final aspect, which is the link between frames and the process of framing. This connection is Highlighted by Wedeking (2010) who mentions that frames highlight certain words and meanings, binding them together to create a leading image, excluding the other words and meanings which could be important. The process of framing, is the action of selecting these frames. Framing thereby selects what is important and which frame is leading over the other potential frames. This results into that frame shaping the thoughts and behaviour of others. (Wedeking 2010).

As figure 1 also shows, framing and frames are connected with one another. And just as frames are made up of different parts, creating a more complete theory, so is framing. De Vreese (2012) has therefore tried to connect some of the different existing views on the understandings of framing in order to create one theory. “Entman (1993, p. 52) suggests that to frame is to “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context.” This part of the definition is sufficiently broad to be almost nonexclusive and is in line with Gamson and Modigliani
(1989), who suggest that a frame is a “central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (p. 143)” (de Vreese, 2012 p. 366).

While there are many different views on framing and frames, many authors agree that framing works on an assumptive basis, meaning that it works underneath structures of language or behaviour (Rein and Schon 1996). The process of selecting frames leads to the inclusion of certain views, types of information or actions, while it excludes others. Yet these frames are not fixed. They are able to change over time, in interactions with different actors (Lieshout et al. 2012) or through new forms of knowledge. They thus construct and reconstruct our reality. When people frame they thus select certain aspects corresponding with their perception on reality, they communicate these frames through specific words or arguments, they evaluate them and reshape them when in contact with other frames. The frames themselves thus create a common language of words and arguments corresponding with the perceptions of the frame, which will help people to gain a sense of meaning and understanding of reality (Wedeking 2010). The more dominant the frame, the more people are inclined to use that frame and to be led by the frame and its implications of problems, solutions, right, wrong, etc. In such a way, framing can thus be described as: “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman 1993, p. 52).

In a similar way as to how frames work, frames can be identified by their use of language and arguments. Certain keywords, images, sources of information, arguments and, most importantly, problem definitions will continually return in a conversation around a certain issue (de Vreese 2012). These ‘frame devices’ (de Vreese, 2012) can then be analysed through documents of conversation transcripts which will lead to an understanding of the different frames that interact with one another. The analysis of frames can be used to observe frames in the context of texts and conversations, from whoever constructed the frame and whoever receives the frame (D’Angelo 2011).

The result of analysing frames by looking at texts and conversations is that it becomes possible to see what is included, what is excluded, and where the focus was placed. By critically looking at the use of certain words, certain sentences or the absence of either, a researcher can see frames come into place, excluding other frames and their viewpoints. “Policy actors draw disparate elements together in a pattern, selecting some things as relevant or important and discarding, backgrounding or ignoring others, occluding other ways of seeing (and acting), and thereby silencing them in policy discourse and ensuing action (at least, from the perspective of that particular frame). [...] In these ways, framing lays the conceptual groundwork for possible future courses of action, and actors intersubjectively, interactively construct the socio-political world in and on which they act” (van Hulst and Yanow 2014, p. 8). This thus assists the reframer to make sense of the situation in a way for them to make it possible to act in that situation as well. For the researcher, this process becomes visible by the specific use of frames, which will lead to an image of frame uses in those particular situations.
**Interactional Issue Framing**

The model from the previous section already mentioned the importance of the focus on issues while actors frame. Frames focusing on specific issues, issue frames, are a type of frame which through time structures expectations, ways of thinking, language and ultimately the discussion around a certain issue (Wedeking 2010). These issue frames can furthermore be formed in two settings. The cognitive setting, in which frames are formed using representations stored in memory (cognition), and the interactive setting, in which frames are formed in ongoing interactions with others (Dewulf et al. 2009). As this research focuses on the creation of frames during interactions (negotiations), this theoretical framework will focus on interactive framing instead of cognitive framing.

This interactive setting can be any kind of communication setting, for example, a negotiation setting. The reason for this is that frames in the interactional view, are built up piece-by-piece during interactions, and are also changed and influenced by the course of the interaction process. “The participants co-develop the conversation, and they try to negotiate the relevant framing on the spot. An interactional approach to framing contributes to our understanding of how negotiators and disputants co-construct meanings while they are interacting” (Dewulf et al. 2009, p. 160). The creation of frames in interactions is thus not only influenced by the actors that first introduce the frame, but it is also influenced by the other actors in the interaction. They change, shape, discard or accept the offered frame in their interaction, which is very significant for the importance that the frame will acquire.

Similarly to frames in general, are interactive frames used to make sense of the diversity of ideas and relevant policy issues concerning a specific interaction (van Hulst and Yanow 2014). In this sense, interactive frames can focus both on the framing of the communication and negotiation process itself, as well as on the framing of knowledge and ideas about the issue itself. Connecting this type of focus, issue framing, combined with the interactive framing discussed above, leads to ‘interactional issue framing’ (Dewulf et al. 2009), as shown in figure 2. This interactional issue framing looks at how parties interactively construct the meaning of issues in interactive situations. Just as other forms of framing, can interactional issue frames be found by looking at the problem definitions, language, and arguments used by the different reframers in order to define to others in the interaction process how the issue should be understood. The language of these frames will have to take into account that there are different frames in the interaction at one point in time. They are both influenced by these other frames, and they challenge the other frames and languages used (Dewulf et al. 2009). A researcher can uncover the different frames and their mutual interaction by both paying attention to the specific issue definitions of the reframer as well as to the way the frame is received and interpreted by the others in the interaction.
Interactional framing about a specific issue thus perceives that people frame specific issues through interaction. “Frames are understood here as perspective-based co-constructions of meaning (rather than individual-biased representations), and therefore the criterion for frame change lies in the interaction (rather than in the cognitions)” (Dewulf and Bouwen 2012, p. 170). While this interaction takes place in a setting with a limited number of actors which participate in the interaction, this does not mean that the individual actors are only influenced by one another. External relations, activities and environment all play a role. The preferred frame used by the actor is thus influenced by these. And while the external factors are not actively involved in the process in which frames are created (the interaction setting) they still have some secondary effect on the actors behaviour during the interaction processes, allowing for new options and frames to appear. The interactive issue framing setting itself thus becomes fluctuating. The interaction between actors involved in the interaction, therefore also reveals the underlying interests and influences for the other actors. Reframers “learn how explicit statements, nonverbal cues, and the exchange of offers signal the other bargainer’s interests, priorities, and needs” (Putnam and Holmer 1990, p. 145). This in turn can help to formulate frames in such a way that they are acceptable for all.

In practice there are several strategies in which people can frame issues in interactions. One way of balancing the issue to a preferred frame setting is to summarize the conversation of the other(s), underlining certain elements or words that are consistent and important to the preferred frame (Dewulf and Bouwen 2012). In this way, the reframer shows agreement with the others while at the same time disagreeing (partially) by implementing a different frame. Similar to this strategy is the answer of ‘yes, but...’, which also shows agreement and disagreement at the same time (Dewulf and Bouwen 2012). This strategy is often used in conversation, both consciously, but more often unconsciously as a way of managing conflict. “These discursive devices do not take the meaning of the preceding assertion as entirely given or fixed, but reformulate it to manage differences by endorsing certain aspects and challenging others” (Dewulf and Bouwen 2012, p. 172).

Changing the direction of the conversation from the original frame to a more preferred frame as brought in by the reframer, can be done using one of five main strategies (Dewulf and Bouwen 2012, p. 179). 1) Frame incorporation: incorporating (part of) the original frame into the preferred frame. 2) Frame accommodation: restructuring the preferred frame in such a way as to be accepted by the original frame. 3) Frame disconnection: presenting (part of) the original frame as irrelevant or
unimportant to the issue. 4) Frame polarization: using polarization of the differences between the frames to reaffirm the preferred frame. 5) Frame reconnection: using both frames to create an altogether new frame. (Dewulf and Bouwen 2012) The reframer can use these strategies to actively change the dominant frame during one or more interactions.

The Theories of Strategic Framing
As the previous section concluded, the changing of frames can be done as a strategy to change the direction of the conversation (Schultz, Kleinnijenhuis, Oegema, Utz, & van Atteveldt, 2011). The theory of strategic framing can be further explained by Riker’s theory of rhetoric and heresthetic as interpreted by Wedeking (2010). He describes rhetoric as the persuasion of individuals in favour of a certain viewpoint (or frame), and heresthetics as the framing of the alternatives in such a way as is supportive of the favoured frame. The idea behind heresthetics is to redefine the situation in such a way that it offers a new frame, while trying to split the dominant frame enough for the new frame to challenge it. Ideally this strategy leads to a reinterpretation of the issue, compelling others to join this new position. This is not due to a change of interest or belief, but because the strategy creates the feeling that they have to join because they feel ‘forced by the circumstances of the situation’ (Wedeking 2010).

Strategic interactional issue framing can thus be seen as a set of actions to strategically change (or maintain) the direction of the negotiation into a more desired direction about the issue that is being discussed (Abolafia 2004). The general goal is to shape the interpretation and perception of the issue by selecting specific information, and emphasizing this information by excluding other types of information (Matthes 2012). In order to reach this goal the reframer has to be aware that continuously repeated, and unchallenged frames are more likely to have an impact (Matthes 2012). It is thus important for the reframer to have a strong frame that is continuously placed under attention by diminishing and excluding the other frames that are present. One strategy for strengthening the preferred frame is to use a language that combines facts, or strong emotions, in order to either diminish other frames, or to connect the frame to the memory of others by linking it to emotion (Matthes 2012).

This process in which strategic framing is to take place consists of four general steps which repeat themselves throughout the negotiation and interaction process. These steps are: frame competition, frame selection and modification, frame dynamics, and frame consistency (Matthes 2012). This means that (1) in political issues, there is always a competition of frames since the issues are contested and open to different interpretations, leading to a struggle for the dominant frame position. The actors involved in the process are free to (2) select their preferred frames and/or modify and combine the different frames in existence. These changes of frames remain dynamic (3) as they evolve over time, being influenced by external factors such as a changing political environment. This leads to changing reactions to the frames as well as leading to counter frames being created. In the end (4) frames are interconnected with each other and with the interaction in which they take place, keeping them in certain consistent patterns and expectations (Matthes 2012). These four steps are repeated throughout the different negotiation and interaction processes.

Taking these general steps into account, the reframer has to be careful and conscious of the environment in which the framing takes place. The information selected for the frame has to be
appropriate and has to suit the norms and values which are dominant in the negotiation network and institution in order for the frame to be accepted. Similarly does the reframer have to take into account the different power dimensions of both themselves and of the other negotiators present. This power can change or remain constant over time. One way this power balance can change is if the frame changes. After all, the dominant frame sets the direction (Sell and Prakash 2004), meaning that the one implementing the dominant frame gains the power of direction setting as long as their frame remains dominant. It thus takes ‘framing skills’ (Sell and Prakash 2004) to strategically introduce a new frame into interactions.

This strategic introduction of a new frame can be done in three steps as explained by Hanggli and Kriesi (2012). The first step is to search for a frame that is perceived to be strong enough in its nature, repeatedly present in negotiations, and able to challenge the other frames. This may be one frame, but can also be a set of frames between which can be switched if this proves strategically more advantageous (Hanggli and Kriesi 2012). The second step is to consider the other frames present in the interaction. Not every frame needs to challenge the preferred frame and some frames may even consist of attributes which can improve the preferred frame. The reframer can thus decide to incorporate, accommodate, disconnect, polarize or reconnect (Dewulf and Bouwen 2012) the other frames with the preferred frame. “We expect political actors to prefer their own substantive frames and to refer to their opponents’ frames only to the extent that their opponents’ framing is successful or that they anticipate it to be successful“ (Hanggli and Kriesi 2012, p. 262). The third and final step is to decide how much attention is paid to the context (relationships and interaction) and how much attention is paid to the content (the issue at stake) (Hanggli and Kriesi 2012).

The creation and implementation of these strategic frames will eventually lead to a strategy of persuasion of the actors involved in favour of the preferred frame. This process has to be planned carefully in order to assure the interest of the other actors in favour of the frame since these actors are the ones that have to accept the frame in order for it to be successful. These actors will thus become the target for strategic persuasion during the interaction. For this situation, Adler (1992) has described three conditions in international negotiations which must be met by the reframer in order to be successful. First, the new frame must allow for the possibility to be interpreted as advancing a shared interest in avoiding a particular outcome, for example a nuclear war. Second, the new frame must also allow for the possibility for the other actors to advance their more personal interests, such as their national, political or economic interests. Finally, the frame must be clear in its implications and its interdependence. It must be aware of the limits of current systems, power balances, political and economical conditions and technologies in order to give value to the proposed changes and outcomes of the frame (Adler 1992).
If other actors join the preferred frame, the reframer is able to determine the problem definition, and thus the solutions that are seen as befitting the problem definition. If the strategy of the reframer, as shown in figure 3, is successful and this frame becomes dominant, the reframer is thus effectively able to shape the outcomes of the negotiation process.

The Context of Strategic Framing

As the previous section mentioned, strategic framing can enable a reframer to determine the direction of the negotiation in the hope of dominating the problem definition and solutions of the problem. Yet strategic framing has to take into account the context in which strategic framing takes place. The context shapes the possibilities and opportunities for strategic framing, as well as that it provides a structure in itself which may be negotiable for the reframers. This means that adapting to, or changing the context can indirectly change the possibilities for strategic interactive issue framing, as well as that using the context can become a strategy in itself to prevent others from framing an issue in a certain way. This section will discuss nine settings that strategic reframers in the Conference on Disarmament need to take into account. It will consider the possibilities and pitfalls for strategic framing, thereby highlighting new opportunities and possibilities for uses of strategic framing, which will become visible in the research itself.

Firstly, strategic framing is set by the international setting in which the different actors operate. This means that it has to take into account “procedural and distributive fairness norms [which] warrant that essential national concerns are taken into account and that negotiators aim for equitable outcomes” (Eising 2002, p. 87). Strategic framing will thus have to account for the variety in opinions, concerns and interests coming from the different actors involved. If these are not taken into account, the chance for support will decline.

Secondly, reframers that use strategic frames have to take into account the set of boundaries placed on them by the national level policy-makers. All reframers represent a state, meaning that they will be limited by the direction setting on which the state has decided. This will then have to be incorporated into an international-level strategy. One of the authors that has presented an approach
on how to balance the national and international interests is Putnam (1988). He created the Two-Level approach.

The two-level approach is an approach designed to gain understanding of the process of representing a nation on an international level (Putnam 1988; Wolf 1999). State representatives constantly need to balance the domestic and the international in order to come to the best possible outcomes. This leads to a limited set of opportunities and a broader set of dilemmas, all influencing the possibilities of state representatives to frame an issue strategically. The two-level approach highlights several features that characterize the link between the domestic and the international:

“* the important distinction between voluntary and involuntary defection from international agreements;
* the contrast between issues on which domestic interests are homogeneous, simply pitting hawks against doves, and issues on which domestic interests are more heterogeneous, so that domestic cleavage may actually foster international cooperation;
* the possibility of synergistic issue linkage, in which strategic moves at one game-table facilitate unexpected coalitions at the second table;
* the paradoxical fact that institutional arrangements which strengthen decision-makers at home may weaken their international bargaining position, and vice versa;
* the importance of targeting international threats, offers, and side-payments with an eye towards their domestic incidence at home and abroad;
* the strategic uses of uncertainty about domestic politics, and the special utility of “kinky win-sets”;
* the potential reverberation of international pressures within the domestic arena;
* the divergences of interest between a national leader and those on whose behalf he is negotiating, and in particular, the international implications of his fixed investments in domestic politics” (Putnam 1988, p. 460).

Thirdly, strategic framers need to take into account the importance of existing coalitions and relationships between actors within the negotiation setting (Eising 2002). This negotiation setting is an environment of actors and relationships which has established itself over a longer period of time. A strategic framer will have to take into account that these established settings do not change overnight. A greater chance of success would then come if the framer accounts for these while forming a strategic frame.

Fourthly, the institution in which the negotiation takes place needs to be taken into account (Eising 2002). The actors involved will be guided by their existing interests and relationships, but they will also be guided and restrained by the set of rules and practices which are established by the institution. The institution facilitates the negotiation process, but sets several behavioural norms in place in order to be able to facilitate the interaction. These norms can be about language, appearance, access and they can guide the way a conversation can take its course. If the strategic frame does not establish itself within these rules and procedures, the frame will stand out and probably not be accepted as legitimate or acceptable.

A fifth context-setting is the position which is held by the framer itself. A framer is part of the negotiations, meaning that (s)he, just as the other actors, is subjected to opinions, concerns and interests. The other actors in the negotiation will be aware of this and will thus have certain expectation on how the framer will or should behave (Eising 2002). During the negotiations both
the reframer and the other actors will become aware of the position and preferences of the other, which will lead to specific reactions from themselves, questioning and reconsidering their positions and strategies during the process of negotiation.

Sixthly, strategic framing needs to take into account the existing frames, which need to be addressed when strategically framing that issue. Important in this situation is to challenge the legitimacy and ability of the old frame in dealing with the present situation (Abolafia 2004). “This kind of casting doubt includes attacks on the efficacy and practicality of past practices and the frames that interpret them. The reframer attempts to convince others that continued commitment to the outdated frames is irresponsible. There is an implication in these questioning moves that those who do not see this are holding back the progress of the organization” (Abolafia 2004, p. 356).

Seventhly, strategic framing is subjected to information (Eising 2002). Issues discussed in negotiations are often complex, multidimensional and multilateral. This means that there is plenty of information on the issue, the actors, the policy preferences, the assumptions, etc. On top of that can new information arise, or might there be wanted information which is missing. A strategic frame has to take into account this information in order to decide which information will be included and excluded, yet the more complex an issue is, the more difficult this process becomes.

Eighthly is the scale-context. While reframers in an international setting bridge between the national and the international level, they have to be aware of the international setting in which the interaction takes place. They will have to address the issue as befitting the international scale, thus connecting to international issues that concern a multitude of the actors present. This means that a reframer will have to scale frame the issue in such a way that it can be addressed, discussed and resolved on the scale in which the negotiation takes place (Hospes and Kentin 2014). A reframer will have to take into account which language is appropriate, which power balances need to be respected, and which reactions may come to this particular type of frame. On the other hand, can the framing of scale be used to interrupt the negotiations by adding a different scale, thus challenging the appropriateness of the negotiation at the present scale. “As a tool and outcome of power struggles, scale frames reflect and are subject to controversy. The social construction of a scale frame is often a reaction to another frame and/ or may trigger the construction of new frames […] actors try to outmanoeuvre political opponents and their views by rescaling a problem and the scale at which the problem needs to be solved ” (Hospes and Kentin 2014, p. 206).

The final context-setting discussed here, is time (Abolafia 2004). Negotiations are time constrained, but they are also shaped by a history of previous interactions between all the actors or between individuals. Yet there is more to the issue of time, for it might also be possible that ‘the time is not right’ to discuss an issue (Goodin 1998). This effectively stops negotiations or strategic framing on a certain topic or issue. Yet on the other hand, a strategic reframer can also use this. When other actors claim that the time is not right to discuss a certain issue, this can give the reframer more time to create the desired frame, and it can give the reframer the opportunity to direct the conversation to a more favourable topic. It can furthermore assist both the reframer and the other actors in taking the time to wait until the context has changed into a more favourable environment for the desired discussion-direction. This is particularly true for delicate issues which concern citizens directly (e.g. gun control in the USA) (Goodin 1998).
A reframer might also choose to use that the time is not right, or that they need more time, as a strategy itself. It can disrupt the negotiation just long enough to provide strategic opportunities, but it can also provide time for the reframer to play a particular strategic card (Goodin 1998). One example is to table the issue just long enough that the reframer is able to present a proposal first, thereby setting the terms of the debate (Goodin 1998), or contradictory, making sure that you have the last say about an issue, to assure that others remember your viewpoint.

In sum, there are many different choices which can be made when looking into a theory of frames. This research has made specific choices, as shown in figure 4, which will lead to a certain way of reasoning. The theory described above starts with looking at frames in general, acknowledging that there are many different definitions of frames. This then leads to different ways of looking at the process of framing. One of these ways of looking at the process of framing is to focus on interactional issue framing, which looks at the way that issues are framed in interactions. One form on how issues are framed in interactions is the form of strategic framing in which actors decide to implement a number of strategies, arguments and language choices in order to promote a certain way of looking at the problem definition and the solutions adjoined to this. This is the form of framing which is central in this research. If done correctly, strategic framing can enable the reframer to dominate the conversation, yet the choice of strategic framing needs to take into account the context in which strategic framing takes place. Using or contesting these context-settings by different reframers leads to the introduction of a new frame or the contestation of another frame. This subsequently changes the possibilities and thus changes the context, opening the interaction for new frames and interactions.

Figure 4: Framing as a continuing circular process
Methodology and Methods
The Central Research Question of this research is: How do state representatives in the Conference on Disarmament use framing as a strategy in discussions on breaking the deadlock of the conference?

This means that this research is mainly interested in the process of framing, starting from the point of strategic interactional issue framing to the point where a new frame has become established (see figure 4, strategic interactional framing until changing frames).

In order to answer this question, access to the research field had to be taken into account. The researcher was able to do an internship with the Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. This delegation is responsible for the representation of the kingdom of the Netherlands in the CD. Having an internship with this delegation, gave the researcher the opportunity to gain access to the CD and the representatives of its member states.

The research looks at strategic framing by state representatives during the formal meetings of the first part of the annual session of the CD (January until April). This means that the CD is the arena in which discussions take place on breaking the deadlock of the CD. As there are several meetings throughout this first part of the annual session, each meeting can be seen as a round of interactions. This allows the researcher to compare the interactions of the state representatives in one meeting, with the interactions of other meetings. As each intervention is recorded, these interventions by state representatives will be the basis of this comparison.

The research questions are answered using qualitative research, document analysis and literature research. Using the literature study as the basis for an understanding of processes within international politics and strategic framing, is useful to lay the groundwork for answering all sub-research questions. The theoretical framework placed boundaries to the different theories and concepts, and provided the necessary information to fulfil the qualitative part of the research.

A large proportion of information came from document analysis of the interventions from state representatives\(^2\). These documents provided the basis for selecting the used frames on the basis of a coded analysis of the language and word use within the documents.

The documents were coded by hand, using the programme Atlas-Ti. Each quote (paragraph or sentence) was awarded a set of different codes, based on language, argumentation, etc. A process of coding and re-coding led to a final set of codes, which could subsequently be divided into several designed code families. The quotes were awarded codes within the following code families, if applicable:

- the type of argumentation used;
- the goal of the coded section (e.g. topical negotiation, getting the CD back to work);
- location codes, related to specific events inside or outside the CD;
- possible actors which were being mentioned (e.g. their own state or other states);

\(^2\) Interventions were, when published, taken from the official CD website. Non-published interventions were transcribed from the English CD audio records, thus possibly deviating a little from original (non-English) interventions.
- phrasing;
- mentioned reason for the deadlock;
- whether the code related to events on a national, regional or international scale;
- active or passive mentions of time;
- their attitude towards other states (e.g. cooperation or confrontation);
- topic;
- the type of quote (e.g. call for action or state position);
- specific words in the quote (consensus, flexibility, political will).

These codes were subsequently analysed based on co-occurrence, frequent use by states, frequent use during specific meetings and frequent occurrence of multiple codes together, which led to the generation of the frames, which in turn could be related to three strategies of approaching the deadlock.

In order to complete the frames and place them in context, resources were used based on the CD-documents of the first 2016 session, the Geneva Press releases, the CD-documents of previous sessions, and the interviews and unsolicited oral accounts with people present during the CD sessions (mostly state representatives).

![Figure 5: Build-up of the use of sources for this research](image_url)
Limitations of the analysis

Important for this thesis to be well structured is to keep the limitation of the central question in mind.

The first limitation is one of the arena that was researched. The central research question focuses on framing in a CD setting, between state representatives, about the deadlock of the CD. The research limits itself to the formal CD meetings of the first part of the annual session of 2016, in which all state representatives can be present, speaking to the other states about the deadlock of the CD. It will thus, for example, not focus on the informal or consultative meetings. As only the formal meetings are used in the official reporting from the CD, a focus on these formal meetings gives an overview of the recorded work of the CD. The meetings are open to the public and all member states can participate, thus not excluding any state representatives, while simultaneously allowing the researcher to research all statements on an equal basis (as each statement is recorded and can thus be transcribed in detail).

Secondly, strategic framing is only researched if it is both interactive and issue focused. The framing that was researched only focused on the framing of issues included in the discussions on how the CD should start its work again. All other topics were excluded from the research. Similarly, the strategic framing must have occurred in formal discussions between state representatives. This means that the research focused on framing during the interaction between the research subjects, instead of focusing on framing to/from other actors (such as framing to the national government or framing from the national government).

By keeping the concepts well-defined and the research area small, this research allowed for an in-depth research on this topic, thereby allowing for a thorough examination of what actions do and do not belong within the concept of strategic framing.
III Setting the Scene

“In spite of the best efforts of the international community, adequate results have not been produced with the existing machinery. There is, therefore, an urgent need that existing disarmament machinery be revitalized and forums appropriately constituted for disarmament deliberations and negotiations with a better representative character. For maximum effectiveness, two kinds of bodies are required in the field of disarmament - deliberative and negotiating. All Member States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership.”

(General Assembly 1978)

The International Disarmament Machinery

Since the establishment of the United Nations (UN), disarmament has been an important issue on the agenda of the member states. The first UNGA resolution already mentions disarmament issues in the form of atomic energy (General Assembly 2016).

Over the years, disarmament has been addressed in many forms and through many forums, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Arms Trade Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the CD. Collectively some of these disarmament initiatives are called the Disarmament Machinery. However, which disarmament initiatives are considered as part of this Disarmament Machinery varies. Nations Encyclopedia mentions the UNGA, the Disarmament Commission, the CD, and the Department for Disarmament Affairs to be part of the Disarmament Machinery (Nations Encyclopedia 2016). The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), however, mentions other members of the Disarmament Machinery. They mention the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, the CD, the Conference on Disarmament and Negative Security Assurances, and the Conference on Disarmament and a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Use in Nuclear Weapons (UNODA 2016a).

What both descriptions have in common, is the inclusion of the CD as part of this Disarmament Machinery. Set up in 1978 as a negotiating body with a relatively small membership, the CD was created to be the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum (General Assembly 1978).

The CD

Based in Geneva and established during the First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, the CD was the successor to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, that in its turn succeeded several other Committees on Disarmament (James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies 2015). While the CD has a close working relationship with the United Nations, it is not a UN body as such (UNODA 2016b). According to Mr. Smith, CD representatives prefer to underscore the CD’s independence, stating that the CD decides on its own rules. The CD indeed decides on its own rules and procedures and sets its own agenda. Yet the CD does not operate completely independent of the UN. It’s working relationship can be seen in its interconnectedness with the UN on several areas. The CD secretary is appointed by the UN Secretary-General and the CD has a close relationship with the United Nations General Assembly. The connection can also be seen in its activities as the CD “reports to the General Assembly annually or more frequently, as appropriate. The budget of the CD is
Some notable accomplishments of negotiations in the past include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, in 1992, and The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in 1996 (UNODA 2016b). The CD convenes throughout the year. Its annual session is divided into three parts of ten weeks (the end of January until the beginning of April), seven weeks (May and June), and seven weeks (August to September). The time in between of these parts is, if necessary, used to continue negotiations on priority issues (UNODA 2016b). The annual session is presided over by member states in a rotating presidency of six presidents in a year, following one another in English alphabetical order (UNODA 2016b). Every president holds this position for four weeks.

The issues on the CD agenda include almost all multilateral arms control and disarmament issues, with a major component of the issues relating to nuclear weapons. As mentioned before, the goal of the CD is to conclude negotiations on the issues on their agenda. The agenda of the 2016 session consists of the following issues:

1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
2. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
3. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
4. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
7. Transparency in armaments.
8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations. (Conference on Disarmament 2016a)

Of these issues, nuclear disarmament (issue 1 and 2), fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (issue 1 and 2), preventing an arms race in outer space (issue 3), and negative security assurances (issue 4) are often mentioned to be the four core issues of the CD (UNIDIR 2012). These four issues have been on the agenda for a number of years. An important step on this issue of fissile material was set in 1995 with the introduction of the Shannon Mandate.

**The Shannon Mandate for negotiations on fissile material**

When representatives talk about negotiations on fissile material, they mostly mention an outcome in the form of a Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty (an FMCT, or an FMT). An important negotiation element is the inclusion or exclusion of stockpiles in this treaty. When ambassador Shannon of Canada, consulted states in order to create a mandate on this issue, in 1995, consensus was found on the so called, Shannon Mandate (see box 1). However, with the wish of some states to guarantee the inclusion of stockpiles in negotiations on fissile material, the Shannon Mandate does not necessarily command consensus anymore.
The Players of the Game
Contrary to the First Committee of the UNGA, the CD does not have a membership consisting of all UN member states. To improve its work, the CD has a relatively small membership. Originally comprising of forty members (The United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) 2009), the Conference has since been expanded twice, both in 1996 and in 1999 (UNODA 2016b). The current membership is up to sixty-five member states, including the P-5 (the five nuclear-weapon states of the UN Security Council: United States of America (USA), Russian Federation (RF), United Kingdom (UK), France, and China), and other states of key military significance (Conference on Disarmament 2016b).

Box 1: Extract from the Shannon Mandate

“At the beginning of this year’s session, the Conference decided to continue consultations on a mandate.

I have since held numerous consultations, and am pleased to report that delegations have agreed that the mandate for such a committee should be based on resolution 48/75L of the United Nations General Assembly, and reads as follows:

1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee on a "ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

2. The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

3. The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1995 session.

During the course of my consultations, many delegations expressed concerns about a variety of issues relating to fissile material, including the appropriate scope of the Convention. Some delegations expressed the view that this mandate would permit consideration in the Committee only of the future production of fissile material. Other delegations were of the view that the mandate would permit consideration not only of future but also of past production. Still others were of the view that consideration should not only relate to production of fissile material (past or future) but also to other issues, such as the management of such material.

It has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the Ad Hoc Committee any of the above noted issues.” (Conference on Disarmament 1995)
The member states are divided into four regional groups:

- The Western and Others Group (WEOG), consisting of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States of America;
- The Group of 21 (G21), consisting of Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, DPR Korea, Democratic Rep. of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe;
- The Eastern European Group (EEG), consisting of Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Romania, Russian Federation, and Ukraine;
- And the Group of One, of which China is its only member (Reaching Critical Will 2016).

Aside from the CD member states, non-member states are allowed to request participation in the work of the conference. In 2016, this meant that an additional 40 states were granted participation in the conference as observers (Conference on Disarmament 2016c).
The Rules of the Procedure

The Conference works according to specific Rules of Procedure (RoP), which were originally named in the 1978 document creating the CD. These rules included that the CD:

- Conducts its work by consensus;
- Has a rotating presidency on a monthly basis;
- Adopts its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations made to it by the UNGA; and
- Submits a yearly report to the UNGA; (General Assembly 1978)

As further instructed, the CD adopted the rest of their RoP within the CD. These Rules have been written in document CD/8/Rev.9, which was last revised in 2003. The complete set of Rules covers: who is allowed to participate in the Conference, how the representation and accreditation of states is regulated, when the CD is to convene, how the rotating presidency is arranged and what tasks the president should carry out, what the tasks and assistance of the secretariat of the Conference consists of, that the Conference conducts its work and adopts its decisions by consensus, the allowed languages, that records and documents of the sessions will be made publicly available, that the Conference is allowed to invite specialized organs of the United Nations system when appropriate, how communication with NGOs should be conducted, what the procedure and content of the report is, which is to be send to the UNGA, and rules regarding amendments to the RoP (Conference on Disarmament 2003).

Further rules specify the organization of the work of the conference, and the agenda and programme of work. These Rules cover:

- how the CD shall conduct its work in plenary meetings, as well as via additional arrangements agreed on by the Conference, such as informal meetings or subsidiary bodies;
- if the CD is unable to decide on the content of an issue under negotiation, it will further examine that issue;
- that a Programme of Work (PoW) shall be established on the basis of the adopted agenda; and
- that a PoW shall be drawn up by the president, but that states are allowed to raise relevant subjects and are allowed to request the inclusion of urgent agenda items; (Conference on Disarmament 2003)

Programmes of Work

In order to fulfil its mandate, CD member states need to negotiate. In order to negotiate, states need to agree on which issues to negotiate. This agreement happens with a Programme of Work (PoW), detailing which issues should be discussed, how and when. Such a PoW in its turn, needs to be agreed on by consensus. If representatives cannot agree on the content of the negotiations, for example as a result of unchanging state positions⁴, consensus cannot be found, preventing a PoW from being accepted and agreed to. In such cases, CD representatives can search for agreement on other PoWs, or try to find different ways for the CD to continue working (for example, by accepting a Schedule of Activities for discussions instead of negotiations).

⁴ Interview with Mr. Williams.
In the first part of the CD session, four proposals of PoWs have been submitted to representatives in the Conference for their consideration. These proposals are:

- The United States proposal, submitted on 4 February 2016;
- The Nigerian (presidency) proposal, submitted on 16 February 2016;
- The United Kingdom proposal, submitted on 19 February 2016; and

**The United States of America’s PoW**
The PoW submitted by the USA is an adaptation of the PoW from 2009, amended on the issue of fissile material in the hope that it will regain the consensus it had in 2009. It was thus submitted to the Conference in form of the amendment to the 2009 PoW, reading: "To establish a Working Group under agenda item 1 entitled “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament” which shall negotiate an internationally and effectively verifiable treaty dealing with fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." (Kalbush 2016).

**The Nigerian PoW**
The PoW submitted by Nigeria in the role of President of the Conference was submitted on the 16th of February with the goal of establishing working groups on the four core issues. It takes the following decisions:

1. To establish a working group under the agenda item 1 entitled “cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament” and agenda item 2 entitled “prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”, to carry out discussions with a view to identifying, elaborating and recommending effective measures on nuclear disarmament.
2. To establish a working group under the agenda item 1 entitled “cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament” and agenda item 2 entitled “prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters” to carry out discussions with a view to identifying, elaborating and recommending effective measures on fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosives.
3. To establish a working group under the agenda item 3 entitled “prevention of an arms race in outer space” to carry out discussions with a view to identifying, elaborating and recommending effective measures on prevention of an arms race in outer space.
4. To establish a working group under the agenda item 4 entitled “effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” to carry-out discussions with a view to identifying, elaborating and recommending effective measures to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(The President of the Conference on Disarmament 2016)
The proposal is seen to place equal attention on all four core issues, but it is also seen to recommend discussions on each of the four core issues, instead of negotiations.

**The United Kingdom’s PoW**
The UK submitted a PoW proposing to establish one inclusive working group. It thus reads:

“1. To establish a working group and associated programme of work for the duration of the 2016 session to identify, elaborate and recommend effective measures on nuclear disarmament, including legal provisions and other arrangements that contribute to and are required for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons; the legal provisions could be established through various approaches, including a stand-alone instrument or a framework agreement.”

(Conference on Disarmament 2016d)

**The Russian Federation’s PoW**
The PoW submitted by the Russian Federation proposes:

“1. To establish a Working Group under the agenda item 6 “Comprehensive programme of disarmament” and associated schedule of work for the duration of the 2016 session to conduct negotiations with a view to elaborating basic elements of an international convention for the suppression of acts of chemical terrorism.” (Russian Federation 2016a)

**The Deadlock**
2016 marks the twentieth anniversary of the negotiation of the CTBT, the last treaty that was negotiated in the Conference. It also marks the seventieth anniversary of the first resolution adopted by the UNGA, directed at eliminating atomic weapons and other weapons adaptable to mass destruction. Yet nuclear weapons still pose a challenge in today’s world, and the CTBT has still not entered into force. Within this setting, the CD has not been able to conclude negotiations on any issue since 1996.

In 2009, the CD was able to adopt a PoW, thus breaking the long deadlock of the CD. This PoW consisted of compromises made, especially surrounding the issues of space and fissile material (Conference on Disarmament 2009). However, the PoW was never executed as the agreement collapsed soon after (UNIDIR 2012). Since then, no PoW has been adopted in the CD as no consensus could be found on the issues in the PoW, resulting in a continuing deadlock. A large group of state representatives in the CD identifies some, or all, of the core issues to be the reason for the absent consensus. The “CD stalemate is a result of substantive not procedural factors”, says Mr. Jones.

**The Open-Ended Working Group**
While the CD was created in 1978 to be the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, is has not been the only arena in which multilateral disarmament has been negotiated since that time. Due to the CD deadlock, treaties, such as the Anti-personnel Landmine Treaty (entered into force in

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4 Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany, Japan, the joint G21 statement, Malaysia, Norway, Pakistan, RF, Slovakia, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
1999), the Convention on Cluster Munitions (entered into force in 2010) and the Arms Trade Treaty (entered into force in 2014), were all negotiated outside of the CD. Starting another process outside the CD, the UNGA decided in December of 2015 to establish an Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations (General Assembly 2015b). The group was scheduled to start its work in February of 2016, halfway through the first part of the annual CD session. Addressing the issue of nuclear disarmament, an issue which, previously, has always been a CD issue, the OEWG placed further pressure on the CD.

Mr. Williams mentions that the OEWG has been created mainly due to the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament in the CD. It was originally introduced in the First committee of the UNGA by the representative of Mexico, on behalf of 22 states (General Assembly 2015c). Half of those states are represented in the CD. The revised version would eventually be accepted with 135 votes in favour, 12 against and 33 abstentions. Of these votes, 37 CD member states voted in favour, 8 against and 20 abstained. While the UNGA First Committee thus accepted the resolution with a clear majority, the votes by CD members were divided more. This also led to different reactions to the OEWG in the CD.

Being mentioned 41 times, and being linked often to processes outside the CD, the OEWG shows to have its impact on the processes of the CD. Some representatives welcome the OEWG progress as a means to get the CD back to work as well, while others seek to find ways around the OEWG to allow the CD to resume its negotiating mandate.

**Problem Frames**

“the ultimate burden rests on the members of this Conference to bridge the gaps and find an urgent solution to the chronic impasse. Without such concrete action, this Conference risks becoming completely marginalized. I encourage the Conference to live up to its responsibility as the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament”.

(Secretary-General to the Conference on Disarmament)

As of 2016, there has been no unanimous agreement on what the solution of the deadlock should be. While most interventions address the deadlock in the CD, and almost all representatives express the need for the CD to resume its work, it is not always clear what the representatives believe to be the problem of the deadlock, nor how it should be solved. In his opening statement as President of the Conference, the Norwegian ambassador stated that the deadlock could be attributed to many causes, ranging from the international security environment to the rules of procedure in the conference, and that efforts were still being made in the Conference to find a way around the impasse (United Nations Information Service in Geneva 2016a).

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5 Intervention of the Canadian minister of foreign affairs as delivered on 2 March 2016.
6 Interview with Mr. Smith.
7 Austria, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, South Africa, and Venezuela.
8 China, France, Hungary, Israel, Poland, RF, UK and USA.
9 OEWG has a co-occurrence of 0.66 with the location-outside the CD.
10 Message of the Secretary-General as delivered on 26 January 2016.
11 Representatives of five states (Cuba, Egypt, Peru, Romania and Ukraine) have not explicitly addressed the deadlock situation, representatives of three states (Egypt, Peru and Ukraine) have not explicitly addressed the need for the CD to resume its work.
In their interventions regarding the deadlock, most representatives remain positive\textsuperscript{12}. In 23 occasions, this was expressed in the form of the wish that the CD resume its work. The ambassador of the United States, for example, used such positive language in 10 quotes, while negative language was only used in 2 quotes.

Another example from such a positive statement, here about the relevance of the CD, comes from the Venezuelan minister of foreign affairs, who spoke during the High Level Meeting of 2 March. She said: “The CD is the ideal multilateral and irreplaceable forum, because if it’s universal nature. It has made transcendental achievements throughout its history, such as the convention on biological weapons, the convention on chemical weapons, as well as a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty”.

Asking Mr. Smith, why state representatives remain positive during the two decades of deadlock, he answered that hope is the last thing to leave. If you wish to make progress you need to remain hopeful in order to continue. Twenty years is indeed a long time, but the CD is not the only forum that moves slowly, with long periods of disagreement. Mr. Anderson similarly mentioned to remain optimistic. Joking that sometimes the CD looks a lot like a soap-series (take away the formal wording and it becomes one big show), he mentioned that staying positive is all they can do at the moment.

Mr. Jones is less optimistic. He mentioned that he did not witness much positivity in the interventions about the CD, even from those who, according to him, benefit from its stalemate. He stresses that the majority of states usually highlight concerns about the stalemate in their statement and that people started to acknowledge that the CD is facing a serious debacle that might eventually lead to the demise of the CD.

While the analysis showed that there was more positive than negative phrasing, Jones’ statement about the criticism towards the CD is also true. For while many representatives express the need for the CD to resume its work, they also acknowledge the problem of the deadlock (52% of the times that representatives spoke about the need to get the CD back to work, they similarly spoke about the problems the CD is facing).

In order to address the deadlock, some representatives (in 25 quotes from 5 different states) use confrontational, blaming language to other states, while others (96 quotes) speak about common responsibility, or call for action (75 quotes).

And while some representatives do not refer to specific issues or procedures in their interventions, there are several issues and procedures that are mentioned quite frequently in context of the deadlock. Around these issues several strategies arise, concerning the framing of the deadlock, as well as possible solutions for the deadlock. The next part of this thesis will address these different strategies.

\textsuperscript{12} 282 quotes were coded with positive language, 62 with negative language and 50 with blaming language.
IV The three strategies for negotiations

Framing in the CD can be used strategically in many different ways. The problem of the deadlock can be framed, as well as a solution for the deadlock. This solution can be framed as agreement on a certain topic, proposal, or Rule of Procedure (see table 2). These solutions are often derived from an accompanying vision on the problem causing the deadlock. The lack of political will can, for example, be seen as the problem, while creating political will can be its solution. The problems, and their subsequent solutions, can be organized as supporting three strategies. A steering strategy, a passive strategy, and a blocking strategy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solution</th>
<th>Times mentioned in different interventions</th>
<th>Date (and number of states)</th>
<th>Representatives from (if mentioned in more than one intervention)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreement on an FMCT</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26 January (13)</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Secretary-General of the UN, Spain, UK, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement on a PoW</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26 January (10), 2 February (4), 9 February (2), 16 February (2), 1 March (1), 2 March (2), 15 March (2)</td>
<td>Canada, Finland, India (2), Ireland, Japan (2), Malaysia, Netherlands, Pakistan, President Nigeria (4), Republic of Korea, RF (3), Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, UN High Representative for Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking at the RoP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26 January (2), 2 February (2), 2 March (1)</td>
<td>China, Germany, Malaysia, UK, Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating political will/ showing flexibility</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26 January (4), 2 February (2), 9 February (1), 19 February (1), 23 February (1), 1 March (1), 2 March (4)</td>
<td>Austria, Canada (2), Colombia, Germany, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Norway, President Nigeria, RF, Spain (2), US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finding consensus</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26 January (3), 2 February (2), 1 March (2), 8 March (1)</td>
<td>Belarus, China (2), India, Norway, President Nigeria, RF, Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement on a Schedule of Activities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26 January (1)</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Main solution-issues mentioned by representatives

The Steering strategy

Characteristic of the steering strategy is that representatives using the strategy try to direct the discussions in the CD into a desired outcome. This outcome is framed as the solution for the deadlock. If other representatives do not share the same view, the opposing view is framed as preventing a breakthrough in the Conference. Cooperative language and a flexible stance are
characteristic for representatives using this strategy. However, the desire to steer the CD into a specific direction also adds to the deadlock by blocking other (less desired) outcomes that could break the deadlock.

In this strategy, representatives implement specific arguments and language choices in order to promote the view that their chosen direction is the best way to break the current deadlock of the CD. This chosen direction then immediately becomes the desired solution to break the deadlock. The other views are subsequently contested as halting the progress in the CD or even contributing to the problem.

By countering or contesting proposals of other representatives, a desired pathway is set to compete with the other proposals, while the strategy simultaneously uses cooperative language to accommodate other representatives in the CD, thereby persuading them to join the desired direction.

The Passive strategy
Characteristic of the passive strategy is that representatives use the strategy in order to maintain a passive cooperation in the discussion on breaking the deadlock in the CD. While these representatives do not block proposals, they neither show an active participation in trying to find consensus on a proposal. Inclusive language and seeking balance are characteristic for representatives using this strategy. However, this passive stance does not help to move the CD forward, often even prolonging progress.

In this strategy, representatives implement subtle arguments and language choices. Striving for consensus or asking for more time are ways to subtly hint at possible agreement or disagreement with proposals. By remaining more in the background of the discussions, representatives using the passive strategy do not dominate the conversation, but they influence it by using the context of the conference to their advantage (such as a limited time, the necessity of consensus, or consistency in the working format of the CD). Representatives that wish to steer or block the discussions will need to accommodate the representatives in this frame, which limits their options of opening the interaction for new strategies, frames, or proposals.

Mr. Anderson illustrates this by saying that the CD sometimes feels more like a psychological session than like a negotiating forum. The reason for this feeling is that states are mainly exchanging their views without offering any progress.

The Blocking strategy
Characteristic of the blocking strategy is that representatives using this strategy mainly try to prevent certain outcomes from taking place. While the steering strategy tries to steer the discussions itself, the blocking strategy uses language, such as interests and security, to limit possibilities of certain outcomes, thereby setting the conditions of acceptable outcomes. Proposals from others are seen as harming either state interests or the CD itself, and are therefore framed as non-solutions for a
breakthrough in the prolonged deadlock of the CD. At the same time, the blocking strategy of certain states can be used to silently maintain the status quo in the CD, thus blocking progress in general.

Proposals from other representatives are selected and carefully challenged and countered with proposals designed to compete with the original proposal. Aside from language such as security and interests, language choices that conform to the CD mandate are used very often (such as consensus, negotiating, and trust).

As consensus is needed for the CD to resume its negotiating mandate, representatives using the blocking strategy are able to dominate the conversation by forcing other representatives to accommodate their interests if they wish to seek a way forward for the CD.

Three overlapping frames
Each of the three strategies consists of different frames, that together distinguish one strategy from another. However, there are several frames that can be found in all three strategies. These frames are the consensus frame, the status frame and the political will frame. While the themes from each frame are the same in each of the three strategies, the use of each frame differs to suite the specific strategy. This chapter will continue by introducing the themes within each of these overlapping frames. The following chapters will discuss each of the different strategies with their supporting frames.

The consensus frame
The consensus frame brings a focus to one specific Rule of Procedure within the CD. This is the rule of consensus. Together with the other Rules of Procedure, the rule of consensus is often seen as part of the problem of the CD deadlock.

No agreement in the CD can be made without consensus. The Rule was established to strengthen the decisions made by the CD, as those decisions would naturally have the support of all members within the CD. Within the last two decades, however, a lack of consensus has also prevented the CD from resuming its negotiation mandate. While rewriting the Rule of Consensus might seem like a solution, this is made a lot more difficult, as for a change in the Rule of Consensus, consensus itself is needed.

Looking at the interventions, states refer to consensus in different contexts, leading to different argumentations. States such as Malaysia, Russian Federation, Ethiopia and Pakistan, for example mention the importance of the consensus rule for the working process in the CD.

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13 States/presidencies (and date of intervention) that identify the RoP as part of the deadlock-problem: Algeria (15-3), Austria (19-2), Belarus (2-2), Brazil (23-2), Canada (26-1), China (8-3 and 2-2), Colombia (2-3), Cuba (23-2), France (26-1), India (16-2), Italy (29-3), Japan (26-1), Kazakhstan (2-3), G21 (8-3), Malaysia (2-2), Mexico (16-2), Netherlands (26-1), NZ (2-3), Norway (1-3), Pakistan (26-1 and 2-2), Poland (26-1), President-Nigeria (9-2), President-Norway (23-2), President-Pakistan (29-3), RF (1-3), Slovakia (29-2), South Africa (16-2), Spain (26-1), Switzerland (16-2), UK (26-1), Venezuela (2-3).
14 Unsolicited oral account with Mr. Williams.
15 Interventions of 2 February, 2 February, 16 February, and 19 February 2016.
Largely accepted by all representatives, is that a lack of consensus on a PoW is the reason for the deadlock, and that agreement on a PoW is the desired path for breaking the deadlock and resuming negotiations. Almost all representatives link a PoW with the goal of getting the CD back to work, resulting in 93 uses of the link\textsuperscript{16}. The only representatives not to have specifically linked the two in their intervention are the representatives from Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Egypt, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Peru, Slovakia, South Africa, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Furthermore, in 28/30 times that the link between a PoW and the issue of the deadlock was made, this was also connected to the goal of getting the CD back to work.

The view that a lack of consensus on a PoW is the reason for the deadlock is used by representatives from 27 states, as well as by two presidents and the G21 statement\textsuperscript{17}. Most of the quotes stating that the PoW is the reason for the deadlock (32 out of the 45 quotes) remain positive in their phrasing, hoping that consensus on a PoW can be a solution for the CD deadlock. The reasoning remains the same when negative language is used, phrasing the lack of agreement on a PoW is the reason for the deadlock in the CD.

The common factor within the consensus frame is the importance placed on the Rule of Consensus as part of the CD and its deadlock. While consensus can be the problem, or the solution of the deadlock, the consensus frame frames consensus as a key factor that needs to be taken into account when breaking the deadlock. In general, two main directions can be taken with the consensus frame.

1. **Consensus as a means for the CD to resume its negotiating mandate.** This direction mentions that finding consensus, for example on a PoW, will lead to a break in the deadlock. This consensus must therefore be sought actively. This frame is used by representatives from 30 states (and presidencies) in the Conference\textsuperscript{18};

2. **Consensus outcomes as a goal in itself.** This direction values outcomes that are consensus-based as an important objective of the CD itself. This frame is used by representatives from 11 states (and presidencies) in the Conference\textsuperscript{19}. Mentioning this frame in 12 different quotes, the representative from Pakistan are most active in using this direction;

**The Status frame**

The status frame focuses on the status of the CD as a forum within the international community. Comparing the CD with other fora is possible, according to Jones, as the CD does not operate in a vacuum. This means that the developments inside the CD cannot be separated from the

\textsuperscript{16} 0.28 co-occurrence level between the code of PoW-General and Goal-Getting the CD back to work.

\textsuperscript{17} Argentina (26-1), Austria (19-2), Belarus (2-2), Belgium (23-2), Brazil (23-2), Bulgaria (23-2) Canada (26-1/15-3), China (16-2), Colombia (2-3), DPRK (22-3), Ecuador (23-2), Finland (23-2), France (26-1), India (16-2), Iraq (16-2), Italy (15-3/29-3), Japan (23-2/2-3), G21 (8-3), Malaysia (2-2), Poland (22-3), President-Norway (17-3), President-Pakistan (29-3), Republic of Korea (26-1/8-3), Romania (26-1), RF (2-2/16-2/15-3/22-3), Sweden (8-3), Switzerland (15-3), Syria (8-3), UK (26-1), USA (26-1/17-3), Zimbabwe (19-2).


\textsuperscript{19} Algeria (15-3), China (2-2), DPRK (22-3), G21 (8-3), Iran (17-3), Pakistan (26-1/2-2/16-2/19-2), Poland (22-3), President-Pakistan (22-3), RF (2-2), Spain (26-1), UK (23-2).
developments in other areas of the international arena. This view of the CD as part of a larger international arena is shared by the representatives from Malaysia, Pakistan, Turkey and the USA. Yet, the CD does not only have a reputation to maintain as the single multilateral negotiating forum, but it also has to show its contribution in content.

Representatives using the status frame, use the status of the CD to frame their interests as part of the interests of the CD as a working forum. This frame consists of two general themes: a context theme (the CD as the single multilateral negotiating forum) and a content theme (the CD as the producer of specific output). Contrary to the consensus frame directions, these two themes are not in competition, but co-exist with one another. These themes, as part of the general frame, lie behind the argumentation fuelling the specific frames in each strategy.

The CD as the Single Multilateral Negotiating Forum
Building upon the past successes of the CD, or the CD’s unique function as a multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, many state representatives frame the need that the CD resumes its work, by maintaining its function as the single multilateral negotiating forum. Representatives from states, such as the DPRK, Italy, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, and Zimbabwe, all use a factual argumentation to frame the importance of maintaining the CD’s function in the international disarmament machinery. The deputy minister of foreign affairs of Kazakhstan mentions, for example: “The Republic of Kazakhstan considers the Conference on Disarmament as an exclusive and irreplaceable multilateral negotiating platform in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.”

Within this theme, the uniqueness of the CD is continuously reaffirmed, as can be seen in the statement from the deputy minister of Kazakhstan. Jones similarly follows this frame, reaffirming the CD’s uniqueness by stating that it is very different from other fora that deal with ‘high politics’ impacting international and national security.

Similarly, several states use positive phrasing to connect the CD’s credibility as the single multilateral negotiating forum to the need that the CD resume its work. The main argument is that a working CD is a credible CD that maintains its role in the international disarmament machinery. During the High Level Segment of the CD (when high level government officials address the CD), as well as during the opening interventions of the CD year, states such as Australia, France, Morocco, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, and the USA, all mention the possibility for the CD to move forwards in its work, resuming its negotiating role.

The theme can also be used in a more negative approach. Referring to the inactivity of the CD as the cause for loss of integrity and credibility of the forum, thus rendering the CD obsolete, this frame hopes that stronger words will form a wake-up call that lead the CD into action. The German ambassador says, for example: “And while we basically must preserve the integrity of this forum, in

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20 Interventions as delivered on 2 February, 26 January, 2 February, and 26 January 2016.
21 26 January: DPRK, Italy, Pakistan, Romania; 16 February: Mexico; 19 February: Zimbabwe; 2 March: Italy, Kazakhstan, Rep. of Korea, Spain.
22 Intervention as delivered on 2 March 2016.
23 Opening interventions (26 January and 2 February): Australia, France, Morocco, Netherlands, USA; High Level Segment (29 February, 1 and 2 March): Netherlands, Rep. of Korea, Slovakia.
24 Intervention as delivered on 26 January 2016.
this specific case it would not appear inappropriate to look into options outside of the CD if the stalemate continues.” Other representatives that are similarly confrontational are Australia, Mexico, the Netherlands, and the RF.25

The format of CD output
The second theme, concerns the format of the output the CD produces. As the CD has not produced any treaties, this theme focuses on the PoW as CD output, looking to produce a specific PoW format.

Aside from an equal mention of negotiating mandates for each of the four core issues, the PoW should also address the parameters of the treaty that is to be negotiated. The PoW thus needs to address whether, for example, negotiations on fissile material will include stockpiles, or not.

“A PoW in the CD could lead to the start of negotiations on a legally binding instrument that has direct implications for the national security of member states. Thus a PoW in the CD is not be taken lightly or as a routine matter. Moreover, the CD’s PoW also lays down the broad parameters of the treaty that is to be negotiated. This factor also makes it different from other multilateral fora where the programmes of work are of a general nature, mostly providing a schedule/calendar of activities.”

(Mr. Taylor)

The inclusion of specific parameters has not always been present in PoWs for the CD. A copy of the agreed PoW of 1979, for example, simply states the following:

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"PROGRAMME OF WORK"

19–23 April: Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

24–27 April: Chemical weapons.

"In adopting its agenda and programme of work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its rules of procedure."

(Committee on Disarmament 1979, 1983)
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Box 3: Programme of Work 1979

The 1979 PoW seemed to be more of a timeline, than the more detailed PoWs which the CD has seen recently. Asking why this more detailed programme prevails, Smith states: “I think that everyone has become somewhat used to this way of thinking.” But he also links the need for a more detailed PoW to the CTBT-negotiations in the CD 20 years ago. During the end of the yearly CD session, there were two states who believed that the negotiations were not yet finished, meaning that negotiations on the CTBT should resume in the following year. However, the treaty text was sent to the UNGA and accepted with 180 states in favour, 5 abstentions and 3 against. These three states are similarly the states who voice specific requests regarding future FM(C)T negotiations, and uphold the value of

consensus very strongly. The breach in trust also leads to the wish to know what representatives can expect from negotiations. Specifically the larger states wish to know the details beforehand, in order to prepare themselves and rule out any (unpleasant) surprises.

Mr. Taylor supports this argumentation, stating: “Today it suits the major powers to insist on formulating a detailed PoW, because they want to be absolutely sure of the outcome of the various subsidiary bodies before they are established. They cannot risk entering into substantive work that could lead to unforeseen outcomes. But there is no logical reason for doing so. Substantive work can certainly start on the basis of a general PoW, however, I do not see any major power agreeing to it for the reason I’ve explained above.”

The Political will frame

The political will frame points the attention to the behaviour of states. This critical frame mentions that the lack of progress is (partly) due to the refusal of states and their representatives to make every effort to allow the CD to resume its mandate. Whether the focus is placed on the blocking of proposals by states, or on the criticism that some states are content with the current status quo, differs. The Norwegian president introduced this frame by saying: “Whatever the cause, the CD once worked in the days when member states wanted it to work. A question for members is whether it is feasible at this stage to make the conference work again.” The lack of political will is thus central to this frame.

Framing state actions to be the reason for the deadlock is done by a large group of representatives, coming from all the regional groups. Representatives of 32 states (and presidencies) use this frame in 47 different interventions, all recognizing that the blocking actions of some states, or the lack of political will of other states, are the reason for the deadlock.

A central theme to this frame is responsibility. State representatives need to take their responsibility and work together to allow the CD to resume its work. In 36 cases, the reason for the deadlock was mentioned to be states and their representatives not taking the responsibility to break the deadlock. Contrary to the consensus frame and the status frame, this frame is more negative in its

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26 Intervention as delivered on 23 February 2016.

28 Of the 63 quotes that link the CD problems to the responsibility argument, 59 also link with the goal of getting the CD back to work. Furthermore, 23 of these quotes also call state actions the reason for the deadlock.
29 Reason-State actions and the responsibility argument have a co-occurrence of 0.21 (36 quotes), spread indiscriminately over the different regional groups on the CD.
phrasing. The responsibility argument, for example, is used in a negative setting by representatives from Australia, Austria, Canada, Japan, and the RF\textsuperscript{30}.

A second central theme to this frame is confrontation. State representatives and their states are blamed for the lack of progress in the CD, failing to work towards results. This blaming is usually in general context, not blaming specific states in formal interventions. Representatives from Algeria, Austria, Canada, DPRK, Germany, Malaysia, Pakistan, Poland, and Sri Lanka\textsuperscript{31} all link the lack of progress in the CD to the actions of states, thereby trying to stir the CD back to work.

The interviews with Mr. Miller and Mr. Smith, however, do shed some light on specific actions of states that fall under this frame. Starting with the contentment of certain states with the status quo, Miller identifies the representatives of Mexico as representatives that often use the political will frame, calling for action, but possibly not having such a problem with the status quo at the same time. Smith also refers to this strategy, saying that as long as state representatives cannot be blamed specifically for the deadlock in the CD, they might have less problems with this deadlock.

Smith continues by analysing the blocking actions of certain states, saying that the Pakistani representatives used to be seen as blocking the CD with strict ideas regarding fissile material. This year, however, with the introduction of more creative PoWs, it becomes visible that there are more states that clearly do not accept any proposal that is being presented. While representatives from states such as Pakistan might gain more attention by more clearly blocking proposals, other representatives, from RF and USA for example, prefer to try to steer negotiations into a more favourable outcome, thereby still preventing the consensus on a PoW that might lead to a breakthrough in the deadlock. Smith thus concludes by saying that the four PoWs, as well as developments outside the CD (the OEWG), have led that representatives can no longer follow in Pakistan’s shadow of dissension.

Each of these three frames weaves into the three strategies and each of the strategies brings a different approach to these frames. While also introducing strategy-specific frames, these frames thus weave a structure to support their strategy.

\textsuperscript{30} Interventions as delivered on 26 January, 19 February, 2 March, 26 January, and 22 March 2016.

\textsuperscript{31} Interventions as delivered on 15 March, 19 February, 2 March, 2 and 9 February, 26 January, 2 February, 26 January and 22 March, 22 March, and 29 March.
The Steering strategy

As the name suggests, representatives that use the steering strategy try to steer the discussions in the CD to a specific direction. By framing a specific path or outcome as the solution of the deadlock, the steering strategy is a strategy to both break the deadlock of the CD, and work on the desired issues of the reframer. If other representatives, then, do not wish to follow the path chosen by the reframer, those representatives prevent a breakthrough for the Conference, according to the steering reframer. Words such as flexibility and cooperation are central to this strategy. However, as the representative frames towards a specific outcome in this strategy, (s)he effectively blocks other outcomes, which in turn also contributes to a prolonged deadlock.

Within the steering strategy, six frames can be found, divided into two sets of frames. The first set of frames consists of the three overlapping frames: the consensus frame, the status frame and the political will frame. The second set of frames consists of three frames found specifically within this strategy: the flexibility frame, the priority frame and the innovative frame.

This chapter will discuss each of these frames, starting with the three overlapping frames. Each of these frames will discuss the characteristics of the frame (as summarized in table 3), using examples from the interventions and the interviews to illustrate the frame.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name Frame</th>
<th>Problem definition</th>
<th>Solution</th>
<th>Non-solution</th>
<th>Key words</th>
<th>Prominent users of the frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consensus frame</td>
<td>The lack of consensus prevents a break in the deadlock</td>
<td>Create an outcome that can get all CD members to agree</td>
<td>Outcomes that force CD members to say no</td>
<td>Agreement, consensus, inclusive, compromise</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status frame</td>
<td>Outside initiatives, like the OEWG, threaten the status of the CD as the single multilateral negotiating forum</td>
<td>Returning focus and importance to the CD by resuming its mandate and breaking the deadlock, thus preventing the CD to become obsolete</td>
<td>Allowing fora, like the OEWG, to take over the issues and responsibilities of the CD</td>
<td>CD, single forum</td>
<td>Algeria, Australia, Japan, China, RF, UK, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political will frame</td>
<td>The lack of political will prevents the CD to start negotiating on any issue</td>
<td>Cooperation on issues that interest the reframer</td>
<td>A start on negotiations that are not in the interest of the reframer</td>
<td>Political will, cooperation, common goal, reasonable</td>
<td>Bulgaria, China, Italy, Netherlands, South Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Flexibility frame**
States remain unmoving in their positions, thus preventing an opening for consensus
States not moving from their fixed position, or one state showing flexibility while others do not
Flexibility, limited ambition
WEOG USA RF

**Priority frame**
The lack of progress on a high priority issue
Agreement to break the CD deadlock by resuming its negotiating mandate on the priority issue
Proposals to start negotiating on issues that do not include the priority issue
Priority, urgency, negotiations
G21 WEOG

**Innovative frame**
The lack of agreement on a traditional PoW
Agreement on an alternative to the traditional PoW
Resuming ‘fruitless’ discussions trying to find a consensus that does not exist
Alternative, new, progress, other possibilities
Pakistan Switzerland RF

| Table 3: Key features of the frames within the steering strategy |

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**The Steering Consensus frame**

Within the steering strategy, the consensus frame is used to steer discussions on a specific topic towards agreement, using the argument of needing and seeking consensus. While consensus can be seen as an important goal itself, the frame here tries to use the search for consensus as a persuasive argument to try to get other states to agree to a certain path. This frame can be explained best by taking the example of the introduction of the UK PoW.

The proposal was introduced by the UK ambassador with the words: “This, mister president, is a proposal aimed at getting every member state to say yes so that we can collectively resume our work. Not a proposal aimed at forcing one or a few states to say no.”

Framing their proposal as being created, keeping all interests in mind, thus making a consensus possible, the UK ambassador tries to steer the discussion in the CD towards agreement on his PoW. As, at this time, several other proposals were already introduced, the UK ambassador is seen to use the consensus seeking frame as an argument in favour of his proposal, while side-stepping the discussions on the other PoWs in the CD.

Furthermore, changing the format from four working groups on the four core issues, to one inclusive working group, the PoW submitted by the UK attempts to break away from the more ‘traditional’ PoW format, in the hope that this new format will reach a consensus.

The UK ambassador frames this proposal as being inclusive, aimed at getting the CD back to its work in a formal setting. In his intervention of 23 February 2016, the UK ambassador mentions the formal

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32 Intervention as delivered on 23 February 2016.
setting of this working group, building on previously held informal discussions. As these sessions were concluded by chair summaries, instead of with a formal report of recommendations, the output of these sessions could not be fed into the wider debate. Framing their PoW as the formal version of the previous informal discussions, and thus continuing on a path previously taken by the CD as a whole, the UK ambassador frames the outcome of the working groups as a negotiated report, containing recommendations, agreed to by consensus in the Conference. Thus allowing the CD to build upon that report and move forwards.

There are several states who share the UK frame of using this PoW as an inclusive proposal to find a consensus that can break the deadlock. Representatives from states such as Bulgaria, Colombia, Finland, Italy, Poland and Switzerland all mention the proposal as a way of overcoming the deadlock of the CD. The Bulgarian ambassador\(^{33}\) mentions, for example: “As all other CD members, we are very much concerned that we are not able to agree on a programme of work and that the conference fails to fulfill its negotiating mandate for already two decades. With this in mind, I would like to say that we see a significant merit in the UK proposal. It’s a well-balanced compromise that reflects efforts from previous years, to narrow down the differences on a programme of work.”

The Steering Status frame

Within the steering strategy, the status frame specifically focuses on the CD as the single multilateral negotiating forum of the disarmament machinery. With the upcoming OEWG, as yet another forum that attempts to negotiate CD issues outside the CD, the role of the CD is seen as being threatened. Representatives try to emphasize the CD status by framing the OEWG in relation to the CD, thereby also framing the way in which the CD should move forward within the context of this new development.

Several state representatives use this status frame to present the OEWG as a wake-up call for the CD, showing the necessity that the CD resume its mandate. The representatives from Algeria, Australia and Japan are amongst those who use the frame for this intention. The Japanese ambassador\(^{34}\), for example, mentions: “Regarding this year’s CD session, CD Member States should have the sense of urgency to move forward and end the nearly two decade stalemate. This year, the OEWG, established by the UN General Assembly Resolution 70/33, will hold several meetings in Geneva. This is a wake-up call from the international community that the CD should fulfill its mandate and not work ‘business as usual.’”

While these representatives are not specifically against the process of the OEWG, they do place importance and emphasis on the work of the CD, calling the OEWG a wake-up call for the CD to resume its work, instead of arguing for negotiations outside the CD.

However, the RF, UK and USA used other argumentation to steer the focus from the OEWG back to the CD. Each of these member states submitted a PoW in hopes that this would allow the CD to return to its negotiating mandate. Contrary to other years, this year three of the four PoWs came from P-5 member states. Both Smith and Jones connect this newfound commitment to the CD with

\(^{33}\) Intervention as delivered on 23 February 2016.

\(^{34}\) Intervention as delivered on 26 January 2016.
the creation of the OEWG. Jones calls the OEWG a “reflection of the disgruntlement on the continued stalemate of the CD and the lack of any substantive achievements in the field of nuclear disarmament”, stating that the P-5 reacted to this by submitting draft PoWs, thus steering the attention back to the CD and away from the possibility that the OEWG might take over certain issues. After all, if the CD will return to its negotiations with these PoWs, the deadlock is broken and the role of the CD can be maintained. Smith, furthermore, mentions that the UK PoW mandate is very similar to the OEWG mandate, with the exception of the UK PoW being executed within the CD.

So, each of these argumentations reaches a similar conclusion within this frame: the CD needs to resume its role as the single multilateral negotiating forum of the disarmament machinery, before more initiatives start to take over this role, rendering the CD obsolete.

The Steering Political will frame
Within the steering strategy, the political will frame is used by states to frame their interests in the light of cooperation and taking on responsibility. States, such as Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea and the RF\(^{35}\) all speak about the need to work together in order to move out of the deadlock in the CD. Yet state representatives do not only underline the importance of working together in order to break the deadlock, within the steering strategy, representatives show this willingness to cooperate particularly towards a specific topic or proposal.

In the interest of steering the CD towards the UK proposal, for example, the Dutch minister of foreign affairs says: “We must dedicate ourselves to the nuts and bolts of disarmament work if we are to reach our common political objective of Global Zero. I am encouraged by the initiative of the UK to present a proposal for a broad program of work for the CD and I hope others will support this initiative. I count on your best efforts in carrying out the important task that rests on your shoulders.”\(^{36}\)

A more general phrase within this frame is the mention of support for any ‘reasonable’ proposal that is brought before the conference. The ambassadors of Bulgaria, China and Italy\(^{37}\) all use this phrasing to show political will, while also steering the discussion to particular proposals, by mentioning that proposals should be ‘reasonable’. None of the ambassadors specify what is reasonable in their opinion, reserving this argument for when it is deemed necessary, thus still showing cooperation.

Finally, the South African counsellor uses this frame to encourage negotiations on nuclear disarmament, while also encouraging states to cooperate. Showing that South Africa is willing to join consensus on a less than ideal Nigerian PoW, the counsellor tries to use this demonstration of political will and cooperation to steer the Conference to acceptance of a PoW that would lead to progress on nuclear disarmament.

“We regret that the operative text of the draft Programme of Work does not include the word “negotiate”, but we nevertheless stand ready to join consensus in the hope that the work of the subsidiary bodies would lead to the commencement of negotiations on legally-binding effective

\(^{35}\) Interventions of 26 January, 26 January, 2 March, and 23 February 2016.
\(^{36}\) Intervention of 29 February 2016.
\(^{37}\) Interventions of 23 February, 2 February, and 15 and 29 March 2016.
measures, particularly on nuclear disarmament. We therefore call on all CD members to ensure that the reports of the Co-ordinators will contain concrete recommendations towards the adoption of legally-binding effective measures, including on nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, we hope that the envisaged discussions will not become yet another repetitive exercise in which CD members simply repeat their well-known positions, as this may add to the impression that some CD members are using such mechanisms to simply create an illusion of progress in the CD. It is our hope that 2016 will indeed be a year of business unusual in the CD, so that confidence in this body can be restored.”

(South African Counsellor38)

The Flexibility frame
The flexibility frame, links a little to the political will frame. As the South African intervention already shows a little, the unchanging positions of states in discussions are a problem. While the political will frame looks towards finding a solution via cooperation, the flexibility frame suggests that states themselves need to decide to move away from their state positions, more towards each other, to create the opening needed for agreement. This flexibility frame is mainly seen in discussions on fissile material, the USA PoW (also fissile material), and the RF PoW.

Used by many WEOG states in discussions surrounding the issue of fissile material, representatives that use this frame hope that showing and asking flexibility will lead to negotiations on fissile material. Within this setting, the discussions revolve mainly around whether to use the Shannon Mandate, the proposal that had once found consensus, as the start of fissile material negotiations, or not.

Contrary to previous years, representatives from several WEOG states show to be moving away a little from the Shannon Mandate, advocating flexibility. An example comes from the Australian ambassador, who says: “If a way can be found that does not prejudice any countries’ national positions, and yet moves us away from the polarisation that had emerged around the use of the phrase, “Shannon mandate”, we would be interested to explore such an option. We encourage all delegations to consider this as a historic opportunity for us to proceed from where we left off with [the PoW] in 2009.” Analysis of the interventions further showed that 6 out of the 8 uses of the term ‘flexibility’ in a quote, in connection with the goal of topical negotiation, were about an FMCT. All these quotes came from WEOG states.

Several WEOG representatives thus seem to present themselves as more flexible when it comes to negotiations surrounding an FMCT, in order to break the deadlock of the CD. In the example from the Australian ambassador, it is even mentioned as a ‘historic opportunity’. State representatives are thus willing to show some flexibility, if it means that fissile material can be discussed. They are, however, not prepared to give up the issue entirely for the sake of breaking the deadlock. While flexibility is needed, an FMCT is still mentioned to be ‘the next logical step’. Specifically in the opening statements of the CD session, the FMCT is mentioned as the next logical step by representatives from Australia, Japan, USA, Poland, France, and UK. The Italian ambassador similarly mentions an FMCT to be the next logical step in later sessions. Representatives from the

38 Intervention as delivered on 16 February 2016.
39 Intervention as delivered on 26 January 2016.
Netherlands, Canada and Poland, furthermore, mention an FMCT to be ‘ripe for negotiations’ in their opening statements.

Steering towards fissile material negotiations via a PoW that includes all four core issues, the USA similarly frames its PoW as being more flexible in its negotiating possibilities for fissile material. While the PoW is not circulated until the 4th of February, the US ambassador already hints at the proposal’s purpose and content in his opening statement on the 26th of January, stating: “The CD has to get back to work. This will require some flexibility on the part of all Member States, and the United States stands ready to do its part. Indeed, in preparation for the 2016 CD session the U.S. delegation has offered the Nigerian Presidency ideas for a program of work seeking to address the expressed concerns of some states. We hope that others will demonstrate a similar spirit of flexibility and that consensus will be achieved. My delegation will continue to work openly and constructively with our CD colleagues to develop ideas to break the current impasse.”

The main difference with the 2009 PoW, on which the US PoW is based, is the disappearance of the mention of the Shannon Mandate in its fissile material paragraph. The reason for this change was said to be the attempt to be flexible to accommodate states, such as Pakistan, that were known to block previous PoWs due to this reason. The Pakistani ambassador, however, mentions in her intervention of 2 February, that the exclusion of the word ‘Shannon Mandate’ does not equal a change for the negotiation direction that Pakistan wishes, thereby indirectly commenting on the lack of substantive flexibility shown by the USA.

The RF, however, takes a different approach with the flexibility frame.

The Russian Federation has always placed a strong emphasis on the issue of weapons in outer space. In this setting, they continue to promote the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. The minister plenipotentiary of the RF states in his 2 February intervention that a legally binding prohibition on the placement of weapons in outer space is needed and ready for negotiation. The minister plenipotentiary furthermore invites the United States to draft a document together on this issue, in the intervention of his right of reply during that session.

However, roughly a month later, on the 1st of March, Russia’s minister of foreign affairs introduces a fourth PoW to the Conference, which is also the third proposal from a P-5 Nuclear Weapon State. This PoW differs considerably in content from the other PoWs. While it also proposes to establish working groups on the four core agenda items. The idea for a convention for the suppression of acts of chemical terrorism is a new item, which has not been proposed before. The Russian minister sees this new Russian position and proposal as an opportunity for the CD. As they are prepared to limit their ambition on weapons in outer space, by presenting this new proposal, the minister frames the Russian Federation to be flexible in the search for a solution for the deadlock in the CD. Yet by steering the focus of the CD to this new PoW, the minister also side-steps previously introduced proposals looking for consensus.

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40 For example, the intervention by the Minister Plenipotentiary, as delivered on 2 February 2016.
The Priority frame

Another frame used to steer discussions in the CD to break the deadlock by negotiating a specific issue, is the priority frame. Within this frame, representatives claim an issue to be of high priority to their state, hoping that the CD will agree to resume its negotiating mandate in that direction.

A large group of states that combined their strengths to try and direct the CD to negotiations on nuclear weapons is the G21. There are two nuclear issues that stand out in the interventions from G21 representatives; these are the call for a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention (CNWC), and discussions around Negative Security Assurances (NSAs). While not exclusively, both issues are actively mentioned by representatives from G21 member states. The two issues are framed as priority issues that will help the CD to resume its negotiating work. The frame is used to place a high importance on these issues in the hope that it will steer the CD towards agreement to negotiate one
or both of these two issues, thereby breaking the CD deadlock\textsuperscript{41}. At the same time, the prioritization of specific issues prevents the view that other issues might find agreement.

Representatives lobbying for a CNWC mainly use the frame to frame the elimination of nuclear weapons as the highest priority for their state and for others. The representative of Sri Lanka, for example, mentions the following on March 29:

“On the substantive items on the Agenda, nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority for Sri Lanka. My delegation continues to be concerned at the existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use or threat of use, as it poses a grave danger to humanity. We join the collective voice for the elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals. Pending this achievement, we are of the view that there is an urgent need to reach an early agreement on a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We also wish to align ourselves with the Statement delivered by Kenya, on behalf of the G-21 in this regard.”

While most G21 state representatives, follow the frame that CNWC negotiations would benefit state priorities as well as break the deadlock (e.g. Argentina, Ecuador, and Cuba), one G21 representative is a little more careful in his phrasing. This is the ambassador of India, a state which is known to have nuclear weapons (Davenport and Reif 2016). The ambassador also mentions the need for negotiations on a Convention, but contrary to other G21 members, he does not state the need for such a Convention as a state priority, but rather uses UNGA resolutions as an argumentation in favour of starting negotiations\textsuperscript{42}.

While the other known G21 Nuclear Weapon State, Pakistan, does not address a Convention as such a priority, they did support the general G21 statement, delivered by Kenya, which mentioned this issue as a priority. This G21 statement of March 8 also addressed the priority for NSAs, mentioning national security implications as a reason for the priority to negotiate the issue in the CD as soon as possible.

“The Group reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of the complete elimination of such weapons, the Group reaffirms the urgent need for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as a matter of high priority. The Group expresses concern that despite the commitment of the nuclear weapon States (NWS) and long standing requests by NNWS to receive such legally binding assurances, no tangible progress has been achieved in this regard. It is a matter of more concern that NNWS implicitly or explicitly have been subject to nuclear threats by some nuclear weapon States contrary to their obligations under the UN Charter. The Group also calls for the commencement of negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any

\textsuperscript{41} 10/11 quotes about the Convention are also coded with the goal of topical negotiation, and all NSA quotes (8/8) are coded with topical negotiations. Furthermore, 7/9 quotes mentioning a topic to be the problem of the deadlock, center around the topic of Nuclear weapons.

\textsuperscript{42} Intervention as delivered on 26 January 2016.
circumstances in accordance with UNGA resolution A/RES/70/62.”
(Kenyan ambassador on behalf of the G2143)

As the examples above show, the prioritization of the elimination or non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is mainly used by representatives from G21 member states. While also mentioned by other representatives (e.g. from the WEOG states), these other representatives do not frame the issue of nuclear weapons disarmament as the main priority for topical negotiation that can restart negotiations in the CD. Several of these states believe that fissile material is much more urgent for negotiations, which will thus help to break the deadlock. Several WEOG state representatives (from Finland, Germany, Spain, Belgium and the Republic of Korea), together with Kazakhstan and Slovakia, frame this issue as the priority (for their state). “A balanced and comprehensive Programme of Work, with a negotiation mandate on a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devises would be our priority. We should continue searching for solutions that would fulfil this goal.”

(Finnish ambassador44)

The Innovative frame

The innovative frame is used to steer negotiations away from the more ‘traditional’ solutions for breaking the deadlock, such as agreement on a PoW. This frame argues that such a traditional approach might be too difficult to find, keeping the CD unnecessarily long from its negotiating mandate. CD representatives should thus search for other solutions.

Jones says that the adoption of a PoW is still a possibility, but a remote one. The irrelevance of a PoW for some, the lack of trust among CD members and the difference in priorities all cause obstacles for agreement on a PoW, making a PoW as a solution not very feasible. He believes that the lack of implementation of a PoW in the CD for the past twenty years has a direct impact on the willingness of some state representatives to actively push for one. He also mentions that for some states, it is better not to have a PoW, referring back to the difference in priorities and the irrelevance of a PoW for some.

The problem that Jones identifies is also seen by other representatives in the Conference, where the idea for a Schedule of Activities (SoA) is re-introduced by the Pakistani ambassador. She frames a SoA as an alternative, as it is likely that agreement on a PoW remains absent. This Schedule is a discussion mechanism and not a negotiating mechanism, thus not allowing the CD to resume its negotiating mandate. It can, however, assist representatives in their endeavour to find common ground for negotiations at a later stage.

While many states do not like the idea of stepping away from the negotiating mandate of the CD, the ambassador of Pakistan recognizes the opportunity that a SoA brings to the current deadlock situation. The ambassador frames this alternative as a useful exercise which can, in the absence of a PoW, help to form a better understanding of the different positions. She says45: “At the same time, a Schedule of Activities (SoA) providing for informal discussions on all agenda items would also be

43 Intervention as delivered on 8 March 2016.
44 Intervention as delivered on 26 February 2016.
45 Intervention as delivered on 2 February 2016.
highly useful to debate the substantive issues and better understand each others’ perspectives and concerns.”

Smith understands this position. Having seen most of the first part of the CD annual session unfold without agreement on a PoW, he notices the onsetting time pressure. He observes that the first ten weeks of the CD have not brought any progress. The second part will last seven weeks, just as the last part. But in this last part, the four ending weeks will be focused on drafting the report for the General Assembly. So, after the first part of the CD finishes, there is, effectively, only ten weeks left. If representatives continue their discussions on a PoW alone, no progress will be made on the substantive issues at all.

On the other hand, the Swiss ambassador believes that another Schedule of Activities is a less than favourable alternative, noticing that such a Schedule has brought little progress throughout the past years, when it was used. He states that another SoA will not lead to a sufficient outcome that can enable the CD to move forward. “Firstly, the CD should not just seek to repeat the formula of the past few years. If the discussions held in successive schedules of activities have not been uninteresting, such an approach is not sufficient as it does not enable the CD to move forward on substance. This is notably related to the informal nature of the schedule of activities, and the absence of an agreed outcome at the end of the process which would favor an iterative process from one year to the next.”

However, staying within this innovative frame, the Swiss ambassador has a counter-proposal. Seeing the lack of agreement, yet positive response for the UK PoW, and the newly introduced RF PoW, the ambassador introduces a double approach to the PoWs. In his intervention of 15 March the ambassador proposes to advance on the UK PoW, while continuing to study the proposal of the RF on the chemical weapons convention. He hopes “to adopt, in so far as possible, and as soon as possible, a work program focusing on of the key themes on the CD’s agenda and at the same time we should continue to study the proposal based on an instrument with respect to the repression of chemical weapons and chemical attacks. [...] On the programme of work to be adopted as soon as possible, we feel that the British proposal is the best one as we highlighted some weeks ago.” The UK representatives voiced their support for this proposal.

As this chapter showed, each of these six frames tries to steer the direction taken by the discussions in the CD and each frame sees a different solution and problem for the deadlock. The commonality in this steering strategy is that each actor uses this approach to the frames to steer the discussions into a specific direction. The passive- and blocking strategies, on the other hand, use a different approach in the discussions on breaking the deadlock.

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46 Intervention as delivered on 16 February 2016.
VI The Passive strategy

Representatives using the passive strategy maintain a certain sense of neutrality in the discussions on breaking the deadlock in the CD. Representatives that use this frame do not steer the discussions towards a specific path, nor do they block specific proposals. Seeking balance and mentioning (possible) support, representatives that use this frame appear to follow the majority without taking the initiative to work towards a solution. As the name suggest, representatives using this strategy remain passive in the discussions, showing little initiative in seeking a way out of the deadlock.

Strategies used within this frame are subtle and inclusive, asking for more time if a proposal is less to their liking, and striving for consensus if a proposal is more to their liking. Referring to common concerns and interests, representatives using this strategy prefer to remain in the background of the discussions on breaking the deadlock. However, taking a passive stance, slows down the process of the Conference, preventing immediate (dis)agreement that could allow the CD to move on, thereby contributing to the prolonged deadlock in the Conference.

Within the passive strategy, six frames can be found, divided into two sets of frames. The first set of frames consists of the three overlapping frames: the consensus frame, the status frame and the political will frame. The second set of frames consists of three frames found specifically within this strategy: the inclusion frame, the international security frame and the time frame.

This chapter will discuss each of these frames, starting with the three overlapping frames. Each of these frames will discuss the characteristics of the frame (as summarized in table 4), using examples from the interventions and the interviews to illustrate the frame.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name Frame</th>
<th>Problem definition</th>
<th>Solution</th>
<th>Non-solution</th>
<th>Key concepts</th>
<th>Prominent users of the frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consensus frame</td>
<td>The lack of consensus prevents the CD from breaking its deadlock and resuming its negotiating mandate.</td>
<td>All states joining a consensus, even if the outcome is not perfect.</td>
<td>Blocking a possible outcome for its (small) imperfections</td>
<td>Agreement, consensus, imperfect solution</td>
<td>South Africa, Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status frame</td>
<td>The CD needs to resume its negotiating mandate as soon as possible in order to maintain its position in the international disarmament machinery</td>
<td>No specific solution is mentioned; any initiative that can lead to the early resumption of the negotiating mandate</td>
<td>Any initiative that prevents the early resumption of the negotiating mandate</td>
<td>CD, single forum</td>
<td>India, Poland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Political will frame

| The lack of political will prevents the CD to break the deadlock and start negotiating on any issue | States showing political will. No specific solution is mentioned in this regard | States not showing political will | Political will, support, together | Romania |

### Inclusion frame

| A lack of consideration for all interests of state representatives causes proposals to be unsuccessful in breaking the deadlock of the CD | Inclusive proposals | Proposals that accommodate only part of the CD representatives | Comprehensive, balanced, inclusive, accommodating, complementing | Algeria, Malaysia |

### International security frame

| The deadlock in the CD prevents an adequate response to international security concerns | Cooperation and introducing proposals that address the international security concerns | Increased security tensions while no solutions are presented | Cooperation, peace, security | Netherlands, Pakistan |

### Time frame

| Issues need to be studied in capital, which takes time | Extending the choice between agreement or disagreement on a proposal | Immediate choice between agreement or disagreement on a proposal, thereby forcing non-acceptance of the reframer | Time, capital, waiting | India, RF, USA |

**Table 4: Key features of the frames within the passive strategy**

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**The Passive Consensus frame**

Within the passive strategy, the consensus frame is used to problematise the lack of consensus. The solution would be to join a consensus, even if the outcome is simultaneously mentioned as not being perfect. Consensus is simply seen as a means to get the CD back to its negotiating mandate.

The inability to find consensus on how the four core issues need to be discussed, for example, is mentioned as a reason for the CD’s inability to resume its function as the negotiating body of the disarmament machinery. The argumentation used by state representatives is that states cannot
agree on the way that these issues should be addressed, and subsequently negotiated in formal CD settings. This argumentation is, for example, used by: Switzerland, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Iran. Anderson supports this argumentation, saying that there is little agreement on any part of the issues. While agreement seemed to be found in 2009, there is no agreement anymore, not even on definitions. He uses the example of the issue of preventing an arms race in outer space, where there is not even agreement on a definition for outer space weapons.

While the lack of consensus, and the inability to agree on any part of the issues, is clearly problematised, the representatives do not mention a solution or best practice to address this problem. However, the CD has also seen four PoWs that have been introduced during the first part of the 2016 session. While these are presented as a way out, representatives using the passive strategy only passively support these initiatives, often supporting every initiative for the sake of consensus, without actively taking a stance in the discussions.

The consensus frame of support for the sake of consensus is used by representatives who state that consensus is needed to break the deadlock. State representatives speak of joining the consensus, even if the PoW is not perfect. The ambassador of Finland frames this very clearly: “For me we would like to also express our support to this proposal put forward by the UK today, but I would also like to stress that we were already prepared to support the proposal presented earlier by the US. And not surprisingly so, we would have been able to also work on the base of the Nigerian proposal. In summary, we are extremely willing to support any efforts put forward to this conference that would take us forward and would allow us to start negotiations.”

With regards to the Nigerian PoW, representatives from states such as Italy, South Africa, Switzerland and Zimbabwe all mention to join a consensus on the PoW. This does, however not mean that the representatives are very enthusiastic about its content, as can be shown via the intervention of the Swiss ambassador. He states that: “Should the work programme be unanimously supported, Switzerland would gladly join the consensus.”

However, the ambassador immediately continues by stating: “In absolute terms, we would prefer a more ambitious programme of work. Having long underlined its readiness to engage in negotiations on the four core issues on the agenda, Switzerland considers that a programme of work should either initiate negotiations, or enable us to make real progress in that direction. Even in the absence of negotiations, a programme of work could set more ambitious targets than mere discussions, namely request the identification, elaboration and recommendation of measures. It could also be more ambitious regarding the type of measures that should be the focus of our attention, namely norms of a legally binding nature.”

The consensus frame is finally used for the Russian PoW, where the Italian and Colombian representatives mention to join a possible consensus on the PoW if that would allow the CD to resume its work.

47 Brazil, Colombia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan and Spain.
48 Intervention as delivered on 23 February 2016.
49 Intervention as delivered on 16 February 2016.
The Passive Status frame

Characteristic of the status frame within the passive strategy is that the importance of the CD is mentioned together with the need to break the deadlock and resume the negotiating mandate as soon as possible, but no specific solution is mentioned50.

The ambassador of India mentions, for example51: “India attaches high importance to the Conference on Disarmament as the world’s single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, as mandated by the final document of SSOD-I and reaffirmed most recently in UNGA Resolution 70/67. The complex international situation underlines the urgency of redoubling efforts to reach multilaterally agreed responses to the varied challenges to international peace and security. For too long, this Conference has been held back from discharging its core mandate - of negotiating international legal instruments of global scope and universal acceptance. We hope that this impasse can be broken this year.”

While the statement clearly shows the importance placed on the CD and its role in the international disarmament machinery, the ambassador does not present any options that he deems to be in the right direction, nor does he mention what, in his opinion, would be a step in the wrong direction. While it is thus clear that the status of the CD is important, the ambassador remains passive in his actions on finding a way out of the deadlock, leaving this task to others.

A similar intervention comes from the Polish ambassador52, who mentions simultaneously that the time has come for action, while also mentioning that taking the right course of actions takes time. “The substantial outcome cannot be an overnight achievement. It needs a long negotiations and a strategic patience of all of us. We understand that this patience is running out with every day that this forum keeps on debating on procedures not on substance. It is therefore high time for the Conference on Disarmament to wake up. I can assure you that as one of six presidents of this year’s session Poland will make all the effort to revitalize this forum. We hope that together we will be able to break the stalemate and move on with substantive discussions on all the items on our agenda. Poland will spare no efforts to reach this goal. I call upon all of you to make a progress and achieve this historic breakthrough.”

As is already hinted at by the Polish ambassador, the status frame is also used when representatives look towards the output that the CD could and should bring. To maintain the reputation of the CD, substantive negotiations should start as soon as possible, but these negotiations also need to have a reasonable chance for success, otherwise the CD will remain without meaningful output nonetheless. Mr. Jones says, for example, that commencing negotiations on a fissile material treaty, based on a non-specific proposal, could command consensus for accepting the proposal, but no further than that, making it of little use to the CD as a forum.

The Passive Political will frame

As the two previous frames already showed, a passive approach is characteristic of the passive strategy. This is no different for the political will frame. Representatives that use this frame mention

50 22 quotes were coded as a position statement with goal-getting the CD back to work, and time-active.
51 Intervention as delivered on 26 January 2016.
52 Intervention as delivered on 26 January 2016.
the need for political will, while mentioning their own political will at the same time. They do not, however, present actions for cooperation, nor do they call upon other states to take their responsibility and show political will. Like the status frame, political will is important and should be shown, yet no specific action is presented for this.

The Romanian ambassador presents an example of a statement within this political will frame. In the statement, the ambassador presents Romania’s own political will, as well as showing support for ideas introduced by other representatives in the Conference, without introducing ideas himself.

“\textit{The Romanian Government is committed to being seriously engaged in the work of the CD. We are willing to contribute to the advancement of disarmament in all its aspects. My delegation supports the adoption of a Program of Work as soon as possible, leading to the resumption of the CD’s mandate as a negotiating body. We will spare no efforts to support any constructive ideas and proposals that may be put forward in order to reach consensus. This goal is still possible. For this to happen, the real and firm political will from all members is needed for a breakthrough.} “

(Romanian ambassador\textsuperscript{53})

The Inclusion frame

Representatives using the inclusion frame try to accommodate all opinions in the Conference, without presenting a way of doing so. Where the flexibility frame within the steering strategy uses the language of flexibility to find the consensus needed on inclusive proposals, the inclusion frame within the passive strategy only mentions preconditions that are seen as assuring the inclusion of all state interests, without favouring or introducing proposals that can do so. This is most clearly seen in the interventions directed towards the PoW proposals.

According to Smith, a detailed PoW, in combination with the need to accommodate the four core issues, will always lead to disagreement on at least one of the elements. Yet, discussing the issues apart from one another, is not desirable to most representatives either. This is the reason why representatives frame a successful PoW as needing to be “comprehensive and balanced”: a PoW needs to be balanced and/or comprehensive in order to be acceptable. This argumentation is used 32 times in interventions throughout the weeks\textsuperscript{54}. An example comes from the minister counsellor of Algeria, who states: “\textit{it’s important that we, the member states, be able to meet the aspirations of the International Community. These are aspirations which transcend our own security agendas and their respective interests. And we must ensure that the spirit of dialogue prevailed including the adoption of a comprehensive and balanced work program. Just like the spirit of cooperation which led to the adoption of the decision CD/1864 in 2009.}”

The language that is used (comprehensive and balanced) is, however, not specific to the Conference and carries over to UNGA resolutions, such as resolution 70/39 on fissile material, which: “\textit{Urges the Conference on Disarmament to agree on and implement a balanced and comprehensive programme of work}” (General Assembly 2015d).

\textsuperscript{53} Intervention as delivered on 26 January 2016.

\textsuperscript{54} Interventions by Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cuba, DPRK, Finland, G21, Germany, India, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, RF, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela.
Similarly, the Nigerian PoW is praised for its balance on the four core issues by representatives of, for example, Pakistan, Iran and the Russian Federation, the latter mentioning\(^{55}\): “we would like to note that with respect to the mandate of discussion, which provides so for discussions of the four key agenda items, this in many regards reminds us of those proposals that were put forward, included by the Russian Federation, over the past few years”.

Aside from its use in PoW discussions, the frame is also used in the context of the OEWG introduction. While the steering strategy, as well as the blocking strategy (which the next chapter will show), both frame the OEWG in the light of the single multilateral negotiating function of the CD, representatives that use the passive strategy rather frame the OEWG as another initiative that could complement the work of the CD.

Representatives do not place importance on the CD, but neither do they place importance on the OEWG. Rather, representatives frame the OEWG as complimentary to the work of the CD. Both fora are seen as presenting opportunities to move forward, with the inclusivity of the OEWG (it is open to all UN member states) simply presenting a new opportunity. Representatives from states, such as Brazil, Ireland, Italy and Malaysia, use this argumentation, with the Malaysian deputy permanent representative\(^{56}\) saying: “Too much is going on outside the CD for business in here to remain the same. The OEWG should not be seen as a rival to the CD. Its work compliments ours, it is an opportunity to move forward, its participation is for all member states of the UN, it is inclusive. All delegations should engage in that process, actively and constructively.”

Just as the PoWs need to be inclusive and accommodating of state interests with regard to the four core issues, the OEWG is celebrated for its inclusivity and seen simultaneously as inclusive in the disarmament machinery, complementing the CD rather than competing with it.

**The International security frame**

Linking to the argument that all state interests need to be accommodated equally, the international security frame is focused on the security implications that arise on an international level. Representatives using this frame advocate for cooperation and reason that the deadlock in the CD prevents an adequate response to increasing international security concerns of all CD member states.

Directing his attention to the international security implications surrounding nuclear weapons, the Dutch minister of foreign affairs mentions\(^{57}\), for example: “One thing is clear: progress on disarmament and on confidence-building are crucial to promoting international peace and security. In these troubled times, we should double our efforts to lower tensions. If we lose sight of the importance of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines, we run the risk of exacerbating international tensions by mirroring the behaviour of others. We should continue to work towards increased transparency on nuclear weapons, in order to create a climate of trust between states.”

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\(^{55}\) Intervention by the Minister Plenipotentiary, as delivered on 16 February 2016.

\(^{56}\) Intervention as delivered on 2 February 2016.

\(^{57}\) Intervention as delivered on 29 February 2016.
While this frame is more critical than the other frames in the passive strategy, this frame still does not frame a specific solution, nor does it block solutions.

While the ambassadors of Morocco and Iraq\(^58\) have used this frame as well, it is most frequently used by the ambassador of Pakistan. She often advocates for equal and undiminished security for all, such as on 2 February when she mentions: "What is needed is genuine political will to build consensus-based, cooperative and non-discriminatory approaches that lead to equal and undiminished security for all." While the ambassador is critical on the conditions that need to be found, she does not provide a proposal or solution that could reach these conditions, nor does she block proposals by saying that these conditions are not met.

**The Time frame**

Perhaps the most prominent frame within the passive strategy is the time frame. This frame is characterised by the use of needing time to postpone agreement or disagreement on a proposal. The most common argumentation is that a PoW is being studied in capital, which needs time\(^59\). The Nigerian PoW, the United Kingdom’s PoW and the Russian PoW, present clear examples for this frame.

The time frame is prominently used by India with regard to the Nigerian PoW. On 16 February 2016, the Indian ambassador reviews the proposal introduced by Nigeria stating: "I think your draft definitely moves in the right direction, and we thank you for your efforts in that regard. However, at the present juncture we believe that this draft requires further work. We have referred it to Capital and we are awaiting further instructions." Continuing his intervention with several amendments to the proposal, the ambassador does not give his clear support for the proposal, nor does he block the proposal. By referring to the awaited instructions from their capital, the Indian ambassador similarly does not frame his amendments as the immediate path forward, as these amendments could be reshaped by the instructions from Capital. Agreement or disagreement from India is therefore postponed. This awaiting position is further underlined as the ambassador ends his intervention by welcoming other future suggestions and placing the initiative back with the Nigerian president and his successor\(^60\).

“To conclude, we thank you for your proposal. I think it’s a proposal that takes us in the right direction. It has a number of positive elements. It can be improved with a view to making it more rounded and with adding clarity especially on its substantial portion. We are aware that having made these suggestions, there may be others who would also wish to make suggestions. Of course we are fully prepared to listen to them and once this document is more fully formed, it of course remains your prerogative, or the prerogative of your successor, the distinguished ambassador of Norway to take a decision, or to take a view on how fast this can be taken forward.”

(Indian ambassador\(^61\))

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\(^58\) Interventions as delivered on 26 January and 16 February 2016.

\(^59\) 14 quotes expressed that time is needed to study a proposal in capital.

\(^60\) The intervention was made during the second to last session under the Nigerian presidency.

\(^61\) Intervention as delivered on 16 February 2016.
Similarly, with regard to the UK PoW, representatives do not state their dislike of the proposal, but they rather state to need more time to look at the proposal in detail, thus postponing a possible consensus on the PoW. Mexico and the Russian Federation, are two states that use this frame, with the RF, for example, mentioning that they have send the proposal to Moscow to be reviewed, thus waiting for instructions from the domestic level. At the same time, Smith questions, how active the UK representatives themselves are in getting agreement on the proposal.

The same language is used with regard to the RF PoW. Again, state representatives mention the need for more time to study the proposal. However the frame language is expanded by mentioning the reason why it takes time to study the proposal in detail. This reason is introduced by the representatives of Sweden and Turkey on the 8th of March, who mention that the PoW raises many questions that need to be answered before agreement can be considered. These questions need to be answered by the RF, but considered in the capitals of CD member states. A second reason, of why time is needed to consider the proposal, is introduced by the deputy permanent representative to the CD of the USA, on the 8th of March, who wonders if the CD is the right venue for the negotiation of the proposed convention.

“While in our view the CD is not the appropriate place to address this particular issue, we are interested in working with Russia and others in the OPCW, UN 1540 committee, or other venues, and are studying the proposal in that context.”

(United States Deputy permanent representative to the CD)

This frame is followed by states, such as Algeria, Canada and Poland.

Both reasons share the wish for more time to study the proposal, while also giving time to the RF to defend its proposal and meet the concerns of state representatives. There is no mention of whether the content of the PoW corresponds with the state positions of the CD member states, yet neither is the proposal directly blocked.

Many state representatives seemed to be critical on the proposal (as the USA example shows as well), but this criticism is framed as the need for time, leading the Russian ambassador to counter with an optimistic, steering view for its PoW. During the meeting on the 29th of March, he noted that he was, in general, satisfied by the way that the proposal had been received. Recalling the interventions by other state representatives, the ambassador mentioned to have heard agreement on the importance of the topic of the PoW, as well as a lack of interventions mentioning the negative effect of the PoW on states’ national interest.

As this chapter showed, each of these six frames allows for a passive position in the direction that should be taken in the discussions on breaking the deadlock in the CD. The commonality in this strategy is that each actor uses the frames to frame its active participation, while remaining passive in solution-seeking. The blocking strategy, on the other hand, use a different approach in the discussions on breaking the deadlock.

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62 Belarus, Colombia, and the Republic of Korea
63 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
64 Intervention as delivered on 8 March 2016.
VII The Blocking strategy

Representatives that use the blocking strategy try to prevent a certain solution or outcome from happening. By framing a solution as going in the wrong direction for the CD, or as not fulfilling the CD’s mandate, representatives block a specific proposal in finding agreement. While the strategy can be seen directly as adding to the prolonged deadlock, representatives in this strategy also block as they believe that others are working on solutions that could do the CD more harm than good, therefore trying to prevent others to add to the prolonged deadlock.

Within the blocking strategy, five frames can be found, divided into two sets of frames. The first set of frames consists of the three overlapping frames: the consensus frame, the status frame and the political will frame. The second set of frames consists of two frames found specifically within this strategy: the security frame and the package deal frame.

This chapter will discuss each of these frames, starting with the three overlapping frames. Each of these frames will discuss the characteristics of the frame (as summarized in table 5), using examples from the interventions and the interviews to illustrate the frame.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name Frame</th>
<th>Problem definition</th>
<th>Solution</th>
<th>Non-solution</th>
<th>Key concepts</th>
<th>Prominent users of the frame</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consensus frame</td>
<td>The lack of consensus prevents the CD in the building trust and inclusive outcomes needed to break the deadlock</td>
<td>A detailed PoW that commands consensus and takes into account the security concerns of states</td>
<td>A general proposal that does not secure a specific direction for negotiations</td>
<td>consensus, trust, security, outcomes</td>
<td>Pakistan, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status frame</td>
<td>The CD is weakened by initiatives, inside and outside the CD, that disrespect the negotiating role of the CD</td>
<td>A negotiating mandate that allows work to resume inside the CD</td>
<td>Initiatives that deter from the CD’s negotiating mandate or take place outside the CD</td>
<td>CD, single forum, negotiating mandate</td>
<td>Brazil, China, Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political will frame</td>
<td>Not all states are evenly concerned about the status quo</td>
<td>Either a remainder of the status quo or a break in the deadlock, as long as the state is not seen as blocking progress</td>
<td>Other representatives identifying the reframer as blocking progress in the CD</td>
<td>Political will, status quo, effort, interests</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Blocking Consensus frame

Within the blocking strategy, the consensus frame is used to underline the importance of consensus as a goal in itself. While the other two strategies look at consensus as a means to allow the CD to resume its negotiating mandate, the blocking strategy highlights the importance of consensus for the CD as a forum. This is due to the characteristics and results of the consensus rule.

If a treaty is negotiated in a process of consensus, such as was the case with the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the universalisation of such a treaty is very high; to date 123 of the 191 UN member states have joined the CCW (The United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) 2016). Furthermore, if representatives agree to start negotiations on a treaty, and participate in such negotiations, it will be very difficult for those states to agree in the entire process, while finally mentioning that the treaty is not to their liking. In short, as long as consensus is found, there is trust that the conclusion of negotiations will also reach a successful and supported outcome.

Apart from the positive effects on the outcomes, the rule of consensus also assists in building trust, which is very valuable to states. Many states thus see the rule of consensus as a requirement for negotiation processes. This importance of consensus as a goal in itself can be traced back to the CTBT negotiations in the CD 20 years ago, which did not generate consensus throughout its entire process.

As mentioned before, the 1979 PoW seemed to be more of a timeline, than the detailed PoWs which the CD has seen recently. Asking why this more detailed programme prevails, Smith states: “I think

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65 Interview with Mr. Smith.
that everyone has become somewhat used to this way of thinking.” But he also links the need for a more detailed PoW to the CTBT-negotiations 20 years ago, where, as mentioned before, two states believed that the negotiations were not yet finished, while the treaty text was send to the UNGA and accepted with 180 states in favour, 5 abstentions and 3 against. This event has proven to be a breach in trust, which led to state representatives wishing to know in advance what to expect of negotiations in advance, lest there be another event like the CTBT negotiations. The three states that voted against are similarly the states who now voice specific requests regarding future FM(C)T negotiations, and uphold the value of consensus very strongly.

Smith continues by stating that the trust of deciding issues in the CD with consensus, has been taken away. The task of the CD is to find agreement with all the states of key military significance, leading to a treaty that all those states can sign and ratify. If one such treaty is then negotiated in the way the CTBT was, going around the rule of consensus, this leads to a breach in trust. Representatives, have thus increased their demands on the details of a PoW, making sure that this PoW already includes their interests, to prevent that consensus is eluded in their detriment (again). As already mentioned, this strategy is most clearly seen in the discussions surrounding fissile material.

In the interview, Mr. Williams mentioned that while consensus could be possible on three of the four core issues, certain states remained focused on the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which was not an option for other states. The Pakistani ambassador underlines this, by arguing that the direction taken by certain states (to exclude stockpiles from the negotiations) forces Pakistan to disagree.

“The vast majority of CD members support substantive work on Nuclear Disarmament, Negative Security Assurances (NSAs), and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Yet, certain powers are only prepared to advance a partial non-proliferation measure in the CD in the form of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). An FMCT that does not address the past production of fissile material, especially the regional and global asymmetries in fissile materials stockpiles, is not acceptable to my delegation due its negative implications for our security. It is also not acceptable to many others because of its limited scope and marginal contribution to nuclear disarmament."

(Pakistani ambassador)

During the first part of the CD session, Pakistan is thus seen to block proposals that do not clearly state the inclusion of stockpiles in their text. Jones states: “‘Stocks’ is such an important and substantive issue for many delegations because of the asymmetry in the fissile material holdings. Banning future production only means preserving this existing asymmetry which will directly impact the number of warheads/weapons a State might have/assemble.”

While the representatives from Pakistan have been leading in this argumentation, they are not the only ones. The inclusion of stocks has also been mentioned by representatives from Ireland, Ecuador, Cuba, Norway and Japan, although these statements are less strong in their language. The ambassador of Ireland, for example, mentions the inclusion of stocks as a means of reaching

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66 Intervention as delivered on 2 February 2016.
67 Intervention as delivered on 2 February 2016.
consensus. However, her statement leads to the argumentation that leaving out the mention of the Shannon Mandate should be enough, something that is opposed by the ambassador of Pakistan. The ambassador of Pakistan hereby addresses the standoff between two opposing argumentations within the issue of fissile material. On one hand, representatives try to steer towards FMCT negotiations (as was already mentioned in the steering strategy chapter), while other representatives have specific demands before consensus can be found, thus seeming to block the proposal, as their security concerns are not considered in proposals. In the interview, Mr. Taylor mentions that: “As things stand in the CD, the NPT NWS (P-5) are only willing to start negotiations on measures/treaties that apply on others and are cost-free for them. This is glaringly manifest in the push for FMCT. As long as this attitude prevails, the CD will find it increasingly difficult to make progress.” Smith adds to this, stating that states might even use this standoff as a strategy to prevent progress on the issue of fissile material, and thereby on the CD as a whole. He mentions that representatives know that as long as they refuse to include stocks, other states will block the consensus, making those other states responsible for the continued deadlock (instead of them). Similarly, is it mentioned that fissile material is a priority, but (apparently) only without stocks.

While representatives from states such as Pakistan, are thus seen as clearly blocking proposals, using the rule of consensus and clear descriptions in proposals to assure negotiations in good faith, the rule of consensus is also used to start negotiations based on the Shannon Mandate, which excludes the issue of stockpiles. This argumentation is most clearly used by the ambassador of China. He states that the consensus that used to exist around the Shannon Mandate should not be given up. Instead, states should work hard to find again this consensus that would allow the CD to resume work on its negotiating mandate. In his statement of February 2, he says: “To use the Shannon mandate as the basis to negotiate FMCT is the common understanding of all parties for long needs to be cherished. To give up easily such a consensus is an incentive on to opening up a Pandora’s box. Which will give rise to a series of negative consequences. That is why China will remain firm in using the Shannon mandate as the basis to negotiate an FMCT.” This position thus immediately blocks any negotiations on an FMCT as Pakistan’s position of not wishing to negotiate on the basis of this Shannon Mandate is well known.

### The Blocking Status frame

Within the blocking strategy, the status frame places specific importance on the CD’s negotiating mandate and its negotiating role in general. Representatives using this frame try to preserve that role and status of the CD. Wishing the CD to maintain this function, proposals are blocked if they are seen to weaken the status of the CD.

A first example of the use of this frame can be seen in relation to the UK PoW. While several state representatives acknowledge the UK proposal as a way to get the CD back to work, not everyone believes that the proposal ensures that the CD returns to its negotiating mandate. One representative, who explicitly mentions this is the Brazilian ambassador.

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68 Intervention as delivered on 2 February 2016.
69 Intervention as delivered on 23 February 2016.
“We have seen today, the introduction of this proposal by the UK, which we consider also very interesting in the sense that it also presents a contribution to move the CD back into work. So it is in that sense, welcome and we will certainly consider it positively.

There are of course, important elements that we should like to consider in this proposal and especially the fact that it lacks still a clear mandate on the negotiating aspect. And I think that is important; perhaps with the consultations that will ensue. I think that maybe there would be some ground for consideration of that aspect.”

The Brazilian ambassador states that he requires more consultations. Framing the proposal as needing adjustments via consultations, before it can generate consensus. This strategy is also used by Cuba and Mexico.

A second example is the OEWG. While several representatives encourage other states (mainly the P-5 member states) to participate in the OEWG process, mentioning its inclusivity as both an asset as well as an opportunity. The P-5 decided not to participate in the OEWG, having voted against the OEWG resolution. The Chinese ambassador, especially argues that the CD is the best forum for nuclear disarmament negotiations, instead of the OEWG:

“Finally, let me speak briefly on the subject of an Open Ended Working Group on nuclear disarmament. China always believes that CD is the most ideal venue to handle nuclear disarmament initials. On the matters such as nuclear disarmament, which is the core security concern of many states, it is of utmost importance to uphold the principle of consensus. Any attempt to abandon the CD and the principle of consensus to talk about nuclear disarmament without regard to the international security reality will not serve any use or purpose in moving forward in international nuclear disarmament process.” (Chinese ambassador)

While the Chinese ambassador directly mentions his preference for negotiations to be concluded in the CD, the other P-5 member states are not as verbal. France, UK and USA never mention the OEWG at all, and the Russian Minister Plenipotentiary only mentions the OEWG in comparison to the commitment of representatives in the CD, saying: “I very much hope that their participation here in the work of the conference on disarmament will prove to be as fruitful as their participation in the open-ended working group. I am convinced that with their active support we will be able to make a considerable and substantial progress forward towards striking a compromise here.”

A final, and perhaps the most clear, example can be found in an intervention of the Mexican ambassador with regards to the Nigerian PoW. The ambassador states that the Nigerian PoW can damage the CD, preventing it to resume its role as a negotiating body. On 16 February, the Mexican ambassador speaks:

“Despite the good intentions behind the proposal on a “draft decision for the establishment of a Programme of Work for the 2016 Session” presented by the current presidency, it has the potential to damage the CD not only for the 2016 Session but for many years down the road.

[...]

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70 Intervention as delivered on 2 February 2016.
71 Intervention as delivered on 23 February 2016.
The only way in which the CD will recover its relevance as a negotiating forum is by starting negotiations on disarmament not by keeping it busy.

As is well known by the Membership, my country believes that initiatives which do not contribute to the relevance of the CD as a negotiating forum, such as this one, are a distraction and constitute a simulation of work.

In conclusion, my delegation considers that adopting a decision on a Programme of work with a deliberative mandate will not only create a harmful precedent for the CD as a negotiating body but prevent other presidencies from making any progress.”

Using the negotiating mandate as a reference against the PoW, the Mexican ambassador effectively blocks consensus on the proposal as it stands now, thus leading the Conference to seek for amendments to the current draft, or another proposal entirely.

The Blocking Political will frame

The political will frame within the blocking strategy is a little more elusive than in the other frames. As was mentioned before, a large group of states identifies the lack of political will as a problem for the CD. However, no state mentions its own lack of political will. This frame is therefore, rather seen in what is not being said (and done), than in what is said, like the other frames show to do. The frame is therefore mainly supported by the observations made by the interviewees.

Most interviewees mention that there are several states who do not display a lot of political will. While none of the representatives will mention this about themselves in interventions, there appear to be several states who do not mind the current status quo as much. None of the interviewees would, however, mention specific states. Jones says, for example, “I am afraid that I cannot answer this question as I am keen in my answers not to explicitly tackle any States.”

Analysing the status quo, Smith says that this status quo might be quite safe for certain states, making sure that no negotiations will be started in directions against their interests. As long as representatives can prevent to be seen as blocking the CD themselves, they can keep up the diplomatic stance showing political will and seeking a breakthrough.

Williams is a bit more critical, stating that there is little interest in working on disarmament. It is known that the CD has not worked for 20 years, and few states make a real effort to change this. This is not only due to a lack of political will, but also a lack of taking the trouble.

Anderson, similarly, gives an example of the lack of political will in action. He mentions that if states really wanted, they could make every effort to find consensus, for example, by extreme measures, such as asking other fora/organizations for insights (thereby relinquishing part of the control of the process) in hopes that a breakthrough can be found. One such proposal is to establish a new Special Session on Disarmament, which has, until now, not found a consensus. So, while states all agree that the deadlock must be broken, none of the representatives seem to seek options outside of the traditional CD possibilities.
The Security frame

Representatives using the security frame within the blocking strategy, argue that a specific proposal is not acceptable due to its implications for the security of their state. A specific proposal should either encompass the specific issues that threaten the security of a state, or they should include assurances that specific content is negotiated. If this security concern is not taken into account, a proposal is blocked. Two prominent users of this frame are the ambassador of Pakistan and the Venezuelan minister of foreign affairs.

As was already mentioned earlier, Pakistan has clear concerns for the way in which fissile material is being discussed. While trust and consensus are used to frame their interests for proposals, the Pakistani ambassador also uses the security frame, when blocking the USA PoW and any other future proposal that excludes a specific mention of stocks in its text.

“To summarize, Mr. President, my delegation is not in a position to accept a Programme of Work that includes a negotiating mandate for FMCT negotiations either on the basis of the Shannon Mandate, or any other basis that does not explicitly cover the existing stocks of fissile materials in the treaty’s scope. The proposal recently put forward by one CD member for a draft Programme of Work which does not address the issue of asymmetries in fissile material holdings therefore affecting our vital national security interests, does not have our support. We cannot entertain any ambiguity on this account.”

(Paki

The ambassador also tries to counter those representatives that try to steer directions towards prioritizing an FMCT.

“Unfortunately, the situation in the CD today is such that there is no consensus on the commencement of negotiations on any issue on the CD’s agenda. In recent years some States have taken upon themselves to shift the goal post in terms of international security priorities. Their efforts to project FMCT as the “new” priority and the only “ripe” issue contradict ground realities. The fact is that for a vast majority of States, nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority on the international security agenda. Despite equivocation by some nuclear weapon states, the sheer number of General Assembly resolutions on this issue, over decades, speaks for itself.

(Pakistan

However, the representative who uses the security frame the most, is the Venezuelan minister of foreign affairs. In 9 of the 22 paragraphs in her intervention, she links nuclear weapons to the issue of security. She advocates strongly for a negotiation on the elimination of nuclear weapons and places the main responsibility with states possessing nuclear weapons, as can be seen in the following example: “Whilst nuclear weapon states continue to use huge resources into military nuclear research, those people who practice peace, such as our own, are still waiting for general comprehensive nuclear disarmament. It is the only absolute guarantee for peace and international security.”

Any proposal that does not include the security concern of Venezuela can thus expect to be blocked.

72 Intervention as delivered on 2 February 2016.
73 Intervention as delivered on 26 January 2016.
74 Intervention as delivered on 2 March 2016.
The Package deal frame

Within the blocking strategy, representatives using the package deal frame, frame one or more issues as conditions for negotiations. If those issues are not in the proposal, no agreement will be found. This means that a larger package deal will need to be formed in order to accommodate all those conditions. This package deal, however, makes the search for agreement a lot more difficult as some conditions conflict with one another, thus blocking immediate consensus for negotiations.

Anderson mentioned, for example, that while states agree that the goal of the CD is to resume its negotiations, there were some states, who should not be named, that were blocking this progress due to being unable to accept even the smallest thing like a focus on the four core issues. He mentioned that a large part of the problem revolved around the FMCT. Some states really did not like to start negotiations on such a treaty, while others were not prepared to give it up. His idea was that maybe it was time to name the states and get the problem states around the table until they would agree on a PoW together. But then again, other states may not like that again.

Smith agreed with the problem surrounding the package of issues. He used the example of the Russian Federation and the USA, where the Russian Federation will only negotiate on an FMCT if the arms race in outer space is also being negotiated. The United States representatives mention their argumentation the other way around, thus placing value on FMCT negotiations. The G21, finally, refuses to talk about either issue if nuclear disarmament, or at least NSAs are not part of the negotiations as well. As the opinions on each issue vary, the CD members effectively keep each other hostage to this situation.

As each issue is simultaneously of main importance to each state, representatives want insurances of the direction negotiations will take; the wish for stockpile inclusion is one example of this. The agreement to negotiate on the four issues is not enough. A detailed Programme of Work thus needs to be agreed upon by consensus in order to start these negotiations and break the deadlock.

Williams and Anderson recognized the interconnectedness of the four core issues. They both acknowledged that one issue cannot be discussed without discussion on the other issues. Looking at this from the other side, Anderson said that state representatives do not seem prepared to temporarily give up one issue, in favour of the other three issues, an example of which is the following quote:

“The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the launch of negotiations on the FMCT on the basis of document CD / 1299 and the mandate therein, remain the top priorities for France. To contribute to the implementation of these stages, France was fully involved in 2015 in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the FMCT; it welcomed the adoption of the report by consensus and submitted a draft treaty to its partners. We would wish the work opening in the CD today, to build on the momentum created by these important contributions. In keeping with the plan of action adopted by the NPT Review Conference in 2010, negotiation of an FMCT is the next logical step towards nuclear disarmament. We must make every effort to maintain this ambition: the technical discussions here in the CD, during the schedule of activities in 2015, confirmed the readiness for such a draft Treaty.”

(French ambassador)”

75 Intervention as delivered on 26 January 2016.
Williams mentions that, while the other three core issues are quite ripe for negotiations, many ‘western’ states are set on their wish to stay with the Shannon Mandate for an FMCT. If this preference is, then, not addressed, no solution can be found for the deadlock of the CD. Smith agrees with Williams, and also mentions the example of Pakistan, who prioritizes the inclusion of a disarmament section into negotiations surrounding a fissile material treaty. Smith states that this might be influenced by the disbalance in nuclear capacity between India and Pakistan. Mr. Taylor adds to this saying that for most states, a future production ban would mean nothing as they already have massive stockpiles far in excess of their needs, while for Pakistan, this asymmetry, specifically with India, is a matter of existential security concern. According to these views, the main difference lies in the scope that a possible treaty could have; to stop production or to diminish capacity. By stating that the fissile material issue can only be negotiated in their requested way (while the other issue(s) are also being discussed), both groups of states block any proposal, rather than seeking common ground.

As this chapter showed, each of these five frames tries to block a certain outcome in the CD and each frame shows a different solution and problem for the deadlock. The commonality in this strategy is that each actor uses this approach to the frames to block the discussions that lead to a specific direction.
VIII Discussion

While the effects and consequences of framing have been studied, there is little research on the use of framing as a deliberate strategy in international politics. However, a better understanding of the strategic use of framing, will help to understand the diversity of ways in which a concept of framing can be used as a tool instead of as a concept. This thesis has endeavoured to contribute to this research by studying how state representatives in the Conference on Disarmament use framing as a strategy in discussions on breaking the deadlock of the Conference. In order to answer this question, five sub-research questions were formulated:

- In which conditions will state representatives use strategic framing?
- What kind of frames are used?
- How are the frames used?
- In which interactions is strategic framing most influential for the results?
- In which situations is it possible for new frames to be established?

This chapter will now summarize and discuss the answers to these questions.

Conditions for strategic framing

The thesis started with building a theoretical framework on strategic framing in order to better understand the conditions in which state representatives will use strategic framing. Research done prior to this thesis describes several conditions for strategic framing. Dewulf an Bouwen, for example, mention that changing the direction of the conversation from the original frame to a more preferred frame can be done using five main strategies: frame incorporation, frame accommodation, frame disconnection, frame polarization, and frame reconnection (Dewulf and Bouwen 2012). The reframer can use these strategies to actively change the dominant frame during one or more interactions.

Furthermore, Adler (1992) describes three conditions in international negotiations which must be met by the reframer in order to be successful. First, the new frame must allow for the possibility to be interpreted as advancing a shared interest in avoiding a particular outcome. Second, the new frame must allow for the possibility for the other actors to advance their more personal interests, such as their national, political or economic interests. Finally, the frame must be clear in its implications and its interdependence. It must be aware of the limits of current systems, power balances, political and economical conditions and technologies in order to give value to the proposed changes and outcomes of the frame (Adler 1992).

Strategic framing can thus enable a reframer to determine the direction of the negotiation in the hope of dominating the problem definition and solutions of the problem, but different strategic frames can also contest one another.

How different kinds frames are used

In the CD many frames contest one another. The three strategies discussed in this thesis promote different views on approaching the discussions on breaking the deadlock, using different frames and
argumentations to frame the problem and its subsequent solution. At the same time, there are three frames that use overlapping themes within all three strategies, and compete with one another by using similar language for different purposes, problem descriptions, and solutions.

The steering strategy is used to steer discussions in a specific direction, towards a desired outcome. It uses the need for consensus to promote that desired outcome, the status of the CD to underline a timely outcome, and political will to promote cooperation on agreement for the desired outcome.

The passive strategy is used to subtly encourage or discourage discussion on specific topics or proposals while refraining from actively promoting or blocking proposals. Reframers use the consensus frame and the political will frame to show their willingness to break the deadlock, without actively seeking the agreement of all. Similarly, the status frame is used to underline the importance of the CD without presenting clear proposals.

The blocking strategy is used to prevent agreement on certain outcomes. The need for consensus and political will are used to underline the wishes of the reframer if others wish the reframer to show enough political will to join the consensus, and the status of the CD is used to assure that discussions remain within the CD forum.

The most influential frames
While the use of each of these strategic frames successfully prevents an undesired outcome from taking place, the use of each of these frames also prevents success in finding a solution for the deadlock. There are, however, several refraimers that showed to be more successful than others. While they were still unable to break the deadlock, they were able to control the terms on how the deadlock is to be broken. These refraimers were able to frame their viewpoint in such a way that it corresponded with generally accepted methods in the CD (such as agreement on a PoW, or the value of the consensus-rule), framing according to Wedeking’s strategy of framing by redefining the situation and splitting previously proposed frames enough for the new frame to challenge them (Wedeking 2010) and to establish themselves as positions that need to be taken into account in any future solution.

Contrary to Wedeking’s theory of strategic framing, the frames in the CD do not necessarily compel others to join the new position, but rather use the need for consensus to force other state representatives to accommodate those positions if they wish to find a break for the deadlock situation. Refraimers from two states will be accentuated here.

The Pakistani viewpoint
Working mostly with the blocking strategy, the Pakistani ambassador argued strongly for the inclusion of stockpiles in any proposal on fissile material, blocking any proposal that did not include wording on that issue. Knowing this position, the USA PoW tried to accommodate the Pakistani view by excluding the reference to the Shannon Mandate, a Mandate that had demanded consensus years before.

While the Chinese delegation used the blocking strategy to prevent the exclusion of the Shannon Mandate, this position was far less taken into account by others. Especially representatives from
several WEOG states, who traditionally favoured the Shannon Mandate, now agreed to be more flexible in this account in the hope to accommodate the Pakistani delegation. Using the flexibility frame within the steering strategy to try to accommodate the Pakistani position, while also securing negotiations on an FMCT, this newly framed position was a reaction to the long held security frame used by the Pakistani delegation.

While the Pakistani ambassador mentioned in her intervention that the exclusion of the Shannon Mandate alone was not enough, thus continuing to block proposals on this issue, the use of the blocking strategy by the Pakistani delegations successfully placed the Pakistani position in discussions as a position to be accommodated if other state representatives wish to negotiate the issue of fissile material.

**The Russian PoW**

Showing flexibility and political will, the Russian delegation framed the introduction of its new proposal as a step away from its normal position, in order to allow the CD to break its deadlock. By selecting a new issue, continuously placing the proposal under attention in interventions, (thus taking away the attention from other proposals on the table), and by addressing concerns and questions of other states via non-papers and explanatory notes (Russian Federation 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d), the Russian delegation used the strategy described by Matthes (2012) to shape the interpretation and perception of its PoW.

Being introduced as a new proposal, the Russian delegation took great efforts in establishing their proposal as a position that should be accommodated, framing it within the steering strategy as innovative, while framing the proposal in such a way as is supportive of the favoured passive strategy of state representatives using the time frame (Wedeking 2010):

“Before presenting these documents I would like to note that we are, in general, satisfied by the way the Russian initiative was received, even though it came as a surprise for many of you. Intensive contacts that took place in March in Geneva and in the capitals of the CD member states allowed us to take note of two important aspects. Firstly, all the partners admitted the extremely topical character of the issue of countering chemical terrorism. [...] Secondly, no one said that our initiative somehow affected their national interests and thus under no circumstances could serve as a basis for consensus. This is what, in our view, makes our initiative different from the traditional CD agenda items, each of which has its opponents. Taking this into account we consider intermediate results of discussions around our initiative as generally encouraging.”

(Russian ambassador)

While the other proposals for PoWs were still used in frames and positions, the proposal of the Swiss ambassador, who favoured the UK PoW, to combine the UK and the RF PoWs showed an example of how state representatives try to accommodate the Russian delegation. The attention placed on the proposal by the RF as well as its accompanying papers worked as a strategy to place the Russian position in discussions as a position to be accommodated if other state representatives wish to find agreement on a PoW.

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76 Intervention as delivered on 29 March 2016.
Establishing new frames
Within the three strategies, there are several frames which showed to be relatively new to the CD, or had grown in strength. Reacting to the current international environment, or resigning to accommodate long held positions in the CD, frames were introduced and strengthened to support state positions.

As the CD commemorates the twentieth ‘anniversary’ of its deadlock, many state representatives have referred to the problem of political will in the CD during that time. Referring to the status quo and seeking confrontation with other states, or asking for political will is all framed in the light of this longstanding deadlock. While not necessarily a new frame, the political will frame grew in strength as the twenty-year milestone showed to be an undeniable fact for all state representatives.

With the introduction of the OEWG in the same year as this deadlock-anniversary, the CD showed to be more active in its submission of PoWs, underscored mainly by the steering strategy. At the same time, the status frame, emphasizing the CD as the single multilateral negotiating forum, was introduced in all three strategies. Each of these strategies provided an opportunity for states to position themselves in the discussion on the relation between the OEWG and the functioning of the CD.

Finally a new frame that was introduced, was the frame of flexibility. As mentioned before, this frame grew in strength as a reaction to the set positions of some states, like Pakistan, and was introduced to break these firm positions as state representatives showed flexibility, thereby encouraging other representatives to do the same.

Future research
The three strategies and their frames both showed to compete with each other, while also overlapping in several cases. As the example from the Russian delegation showed, several state representatives also used different frames in different circumstances, using the frames to strategically support their position.

This research tried to gain an understanding of these different frames in the CD and how they are used strategically as tools by state representatives in the discussions on breaking the deadlock. The limited scope and time, however, are not sufficient to provide a general overview of the strategic frames in the Conference as a whole, nor can it determine the changing deadlock-frames over time. This will be an interesting angle for a larger research project.

The research did, however, give an insight into a form of framing that has previously been used primarily for research into, for example, social movements. Strategic framing, while known to be present in international political negotiations and discussions has gained less attention in research of these processes. Using the CD as a case study, this research has tried to uncover some of the dimensions of strategic framing in an international political environment. Future research could build on this research by, for example, looking at the differences in how strategic framing can be used in international political environments as compared to other environments. Or by comparing strategic framing in different international political arenas.
Finally, the research has focused on strategic framing in a formal setting by representatives from all member states during a short period of time. The way that state representatives frame in informal or bilateral meetings, to their capitals, or over time was not part of this research purpose. Future research could take an interest in such a viewpoint to contribute to a better understanding of strategic framing by state representatives.

This research has thus attempted to shed some light on the use of strategic framing in an international political environment. It has provided a basis for an increased understanding of strategic framing on which future research could build.
IX Conclusion

“I will leave you with one experience I encounter in the process of my consultation with one Ambassador. This is what he said: ‘I was posted here 20 years ago and I was negotiating disarmament when my daughter was born. My daughter is now 20 years old, I am still negotiating disarmament without a breakthrough. Now what will I tell my daughter?’

Your excellencies, dear colleagues, this is a question. What will the baby think that was born 20 years ago, think of us now? What does the world think of us? Excellencies, dear colleagues, the CD has been in labour for too long. It is time to move.”

(Nigerian Presidency)

For twenty years, the CD has remained in a deadlock, without being able to successfully negotiate new disarmament treaties. The first part of the 2016 session showed to be no different in its efforts on trying to break the continued deadlock. While four PoWs were submitted for consideration, no agreement on those PoWs could be found. There was no agreement on the content of the PoWs, no agreement on the priorities that should be placed on the issues that were to be discussed, and no agreement on what the problem or solution of the deadlock itself should be.

This thesis has tried to gain an understanding of the discussions surrounding the deadlock by looking at strategic framing. By analysing the arguments, strategies, and language choices made by state representatives to support their state positions, three strategies were formed: the steering strategy, the passive strategy and the blocking strategy.

While each of these strategies, and their frames, were used frequently by state representatives in the discussions on breaking the deadlock, none of the frames became dominant enough to command consensus on a solution for breaking the deadlock.

Several state representatives were able to use frames successfully to steer towards a desired direction (like the RF on its own PoW), while other representatives were more successful in blocking undesired directions (like Pakistan on fissile material and Mexico on the Nigerian PoW). And while this might be considered as a step in the desired direction for the states in question, the deadlock in the CD remains unaffected.

As the analysis showed, issues like fissile material, outcome formats like a detailed PoW on all four core issues, a lack of political will, and the CD Rules of Procedure are all mentioned as contributing to the deadlock. Yet there is no general agreement by all state representatives on the contribution to the deadlock of (one of) these issues either.

Strategic framing is subsequently used to emphasize one problem (and subsequent solution) over the other, while simultaneously accommodating the state position on that problem. This leads to steering and blocking on one hand, while the group that has less outspoken state positions maintain a passive stance, not contributing to seeking a solution either.

While the common theme in all the frames seems that it can at least be agreed that there is a problem which needs to be solved, the emphasis on political will and the lack thereof by certain states shows that not all representatives are of the opinion that everyone wishes to see a solution for

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77 Intervention as delivered on 19 February 2016.
the deadlock-problem. As this is again framed in different ways, it becomes an integral part (and problem) of the discussion on breaking the deadlock.

So, as the Conference is divided into different positions on what the problem is, what the solution is, and how the CD should continue, the only point that seems similar in all frames, is the fact that there is no agreement. State representatives in the CD will therefore need to continue their search for consensus, strategically framing their state positions in new ways that would accommodate other state positions, while remaining true to their interests.

Only then could a frame become dominant enough to break the deadlock and find agreement where disagreement has halted progress in the CD for so many years.
X Afterword: Will the CD be able to break the deadlock?

This research has highlighted the difficult situation in which the CD finds itself by looking at the frames that surround the discussion on breaking the deadlock of the CD. As state positions are analyzed by the way that frames are used strategically by the representatives of those states, it would seem that a break in the deadlock is far from being found.

There is no agreement on the content-issues, no agreement on larger PoWs, no agreement on the role of the working methods in the deadlock situation, and no agreement on the problem or solution of the deadlock itself. However, the CD works by rule of consensus, which means that agreement is needed on everything that is decided in the CD. This consensus rule could only be changed by, exactly, consensus.

While this does mean that the prospect of the CD seems gloomy, if there is no change, it does not mean that the CD will remain in its deadlock forever.

Changing state positions, newly formed alliances, an intervention from a new Special Session on Disarmament, or an innovating proposal could certainly change the current course of the CD. The CD is not the first Conference that is stalemated, nor will it likely be the last.

This year’s OEWG and the twenty-year ‘anniversary’ of the CD deadlock already lead to new initiatives in the Conference. The introduction of four PoWs in the CD (of which three from P-5 member states), is a change to previous years, and with the innovative approach from the UK and RF PoWs, and the introduction of flexibility in the USA PoW, a new direction has been taken in the CD. Only time will tell if these initiatives will lead to future efforts that will demand consensus.

So, while new efforts are being made today, and opportunities might be found tomorrow, the main question is if the CD will be able to find the consensus it needs to go back to the reason it was created: the negotiation of disarmament treaties. This will need the collaboration of all member states. After all, it needs all representatives to follow the consensus, and only one to deter it.
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