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How negotiations within the humanitarian arena shape the effectiveness of the
coordination of disaster response:

A literature review of the Indian Ocean earthquake of 2004 in Indonesia and the Haitian
earthquake of 2010 in Haiti

by

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NEGOTIATIONS OF THE COORDINATION OF DISASTER RESPONSE

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Abstract

The response to the Indian Ocean earthquake of 2004 and the response to the Haitian earthquake of 2010 were two of the largest humanitarian responses in history. Unfortunately, in both cases, academic literature and media show that the coordination of disaster response was ineffective because the international humanitarian response did not account for the local context and local needs. However, there is no clear and critical account in current literature that describes how the coordination of disaster response was shaped and how this process affected the overall effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response. This literature study reveals how the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response was shaped. It will do so by using the concept of the 'humanitarian arena.' Following the humanitarian arena, the space in which the coordination of disaster response is shaped is viewed as an arena where stakeholders negotiate their ability to coordinate disaster response. Based on a literature review, this thesis found that international organisations gained the overhand in the humanitarian arenas while local stakeholders had little power. Together with the lack of accountability mechanisms, a disregard for local capacities and a fragmented international humanitarian system it resulted in an ineffective and inefficient coordination of disaster response. This obstructed life-saving and other humanitarian efforts. Furthermore, the review shows that most literature addresses the coordination of disaster response from an organisation-centred perspective and does not address the power relations within the humanitarian arenas adequately. The thesis concludes with presenting areas that need further research and it discusses recommendations for future coordination of disaster response.

NEGOTIATIONS OF THE COORDINATION OF DISASTER RESPONSE

For Annemarie and Isabel

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List of Abbreviations

BAKORNAS	National Disaster Management Board
GAM	Free Aceh Movement
IASC	Inter-agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross Red Crescent Societies
INGO	International Non-governmental Organisation
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission In Haiti
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NRC	National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
OCHA	United Nations' Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PMI	Indonesian Red Cross Society
RC Movement	The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
SNGRD	National System for Disaster Management and Response
TNI	Indonesian National Army
UN	United Nations

1. Chapter One: Introduction

The disaster response following the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami of 2004¹ has been unique because of the amount of international funding that came along with it. Consequently, there were almost no financial constraints for the organisations within the international humanitarian system and an unprecedented high number of organisations responded to provide relief. The coordination of disaster response became a challenge and various problems were recorded during the process. The coordination of disaster response following the Haitian earthquake of 2010² was a challenging process as well due to the difficulty of coordinating the large response of the international humanitarian system. Similar to the Indian Ocean earthquake, international funding surpassed the amount that was needed to provide the disaster response that was deemed necessary. As the responses to the Indian Ocean earthquake and the Haitian earthquake were one of the few disaster responses in history that had met the funds they requested, the attitude of the academic world and the media towards the international humanitarian system was more critical than normal. In both cases the effectivity of the coordination of disaster response has been widely criticised by academics and the media. The international humanitarian system was especially criticised for its inefficient methods, ineffective practices and lack of involving local stakeholders, which made saving lives and the assisting of those in need difficult. However, in the literature it is unclear how the coordination of disaster response is shaped and how this process relates to the effectivity of the coordination of disaster response. It is important to understand the influences on the coordination of disaster response as the international humanitarian system still struggles to effectively coordinate disaster response of large-scale disasters. As the occurrence of disasters are reported to increase (McEntire in Oloruntoba, 2005, p. 506) and because vulnerable countries do not have the capacities to address their disaster resilience, the coordination of disaster response is a contemporary and highly significant issue; studying it can save lives and prevent malpractices in the future.

By using the concept of the humanitarian arena I will identify the social and political processes that help to explain how the coordination of disaster response is shaped and constantly contested. The main argument I will put forward is that there were asymmetrical power relations within humanitarian arenas: the international organisations negotiated their ability to coordinate disaster response effectively while local stakeholders had little influence on how the coordination of disaster response was shaped. Additionally, the conditions within the humanitarian arenas enabled already powerful stakeholders to negotiate relatively easily opposed to local stakeholders. An example of such a condition was the lack of a forceful accountability mechanism. This further increased the inequality between stakeholders within the humanitarian arenas. Furthermore, the most powerful stakeholders neglected the local capacities at hand and did not coordinate with each other because of the fragmented international humanitarian system in which these stakeholders took part. All these issues have had a negative effect on the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response.

While conducting the literature review, I also had a strong focus on the literature on the coordination of disaster response itself. When critically assessing the literature, I found that most literature had an organisation-centred perspective, mainly discussing issues related

¹ In the remainder of this research I will refer to ‘the Indian Ocean earthquake’ instead of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami of 2004.

² In the remainder of this research I will refer to ‘the Haitian earthquake’ instead of the Haitian earthquake of 2010.

to the international humanitarian system. Most literature was unable to identify stakeholders as independent and capable actors, while failing to address the different power relations within the humanitarian arena. This is the other argument I will make throughout the thesis.

In the rest of this chapter I will present the conceptual framework which I will use to analyse the relationship between the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response and how the coordination of disaster response is shaped first. Second, I will elaborate on the context of Indonesia and Haiti to give an understanding of the forces that were already at play before the disasters struck and to give a quick overview on the size of the coordination responses. Third, I will address the literature on the coordination of disaster response to give an understanding of the current arguments. I will also explain disaster response in detail to present a clear definition on what it entails and what not. Fourth, I will discuss the methodology of my research in which I will state how I performed data collection. Furthermore, I discuss the criteria I set for the literature and key literature. Fifth, I will address the limitations of this thesis to bring the results of the thesis into perspective. Sixth, I will describe the structure of the thesis to reveal the order in which I will present my arguments. Last, I will end with a summary of this chapter.

1.1. Conceptual Framework

Thus, I will identify the coordinative practices that took place during disaster response for both cases in this thesis. Additionally, I will review the effectiveness of these practises. To understand who implemented these coordinative practises and how those practises emerged I will use the concept of the humanitarian arena posited by Hilhorst and Jansen (2010, p. 1120-1123). According to them, the actors involved with humanitarian aid find themselves in an arena where they negotiate access, legitimacy and practise. I will refer to these actors as “stakeholders,” as they all have an interest in coordination of disaster response. This definition suits the concept of the humanitarian arena because its players have different interests that define their actions and themselves. Hilhorst and Jansen show that discourses shape humanitarian action and how it will be structured. They view humanitarian action as: “(...) the result of actors negotiating the outcomes of aid” (p. 1120). The humanitarian arena is not physical but rather a metaphorical space where stakeholders negotiate disaster response. Although coordination meetings between stakeholders may find place in a physical space, the humanitarian arena entails all stakeholders within the whole spectrum of humanitarian aid; also those excluded from meetings. The core idea behind the humanitarian arena is social negotiation which, as defined by Hilhorst and Jansen (2010): “(...) encompasses any kind of strategy, including coercive violence, written statements, formal interactions, schemes deployed in the shadows of the official process and the banalities of everyday gossiping” (p. 1120). In this thesis I will simply refer to this as ‘negotiation.’

Coordinative practises are thus shaped by the negotiation between stakeholders involved with humanitarian aid. This process is not straightforward; rather, it is a constant redefining struggle of the coordination of disaster response. Hilhorst and Jansen (2010) distinguish five key features of the humanitarian arena (p. 1120-1222).

First, they argue that stakeholders can behave differently from each other as their motivations and pressures may differ widely. Donors, the media, the needs of the stakeholder itself, interaction between stakeholders and movements of other stakeholders influence decision-making. Discourse analysis plays an important role in the research of these processes as a discourse may steer humanitarian aid or may be used by humanitarian organisations to legitimise its practices. A discourse can be understood as the interweaving of knowledge and power (Foucault as cited in Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010, p. 1120). Power relations are translated through behaviour, language and practice which in their turn shape a discourse. A discourse may become dominant which means it has become an accepted notion on how to behave, talk

and act in a certain context. Although there may be a dominant discourse in a society, multiple discourses may exist at the same time and new ones may emerge. Stakeholders are thus able to negotiate through the use of different discourses. It has to be noted that this understanding of what discourse entails is but one of many, as the concept of 'discourse' has many meanings and is used differently in various literature (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000, p. 1127-1128).

The second feature of the humanitarian arena is that humanitarian action itself, humanitarian principles and the stakeholders involved with humanitarian aid are not predetermined but are susceptible to change due to the interactions that exist between stakeholders.

Third, humanitarian principles are socially negotiated and have multiple meanings. These principles which serve as codes of conduct for providing disaster response have been documented but are still open to interpretation. Stakeholders negotiate between the humanitarian standards and other principles and standards such as the Sphere Standards and the HAP Standard which results in the actual practice of disaster response. The Sphere Standards and the HAP Standard will be explained in detail in Chapter three.

Fourth, humanitarian action is realised through different, interacting driving forces and is not solely based on the moral urge to aid people in need. Disaster response may also be provided because of political, organisational, self-promotional or other motivations.

Last, aid recipients strategically act to obtain aid. I find that aid recipients should not be treated as victims but as capable stakeholders instead because they negotiate what kind of aid they receive and how they receive it. Aid recipients are thus stakeholders within the humanitarian arena. In sum, the concept of the humanitarian arena will be used to explain the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response in Indonesia and Haiti. Consequently, the research question is as follows:

How was the effectiveness of coordination of disaster response shaped by negotiations within the humanitarian arenas that formed around the Indian Ocean earthquake of 2004 in Indonesia and the Haitian earthquake of 2010 in Haiti?

In the next part of this thesis I will explain the context of the two cases in more detail.

1.2. Context

In this segment I will give a short summary of Indonesia and Haiti that helps to understand the context in which stakeholders had to coordinate disaster response.

1.2.1. Indonesia.

On the 26th of December 2004 an earthquake took place with its epicentre near the west coast of the Indonesian island Sumatra. As a consequence of the earthquake multiple tsunamis occurred and hit the coasts of various countries such as Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and India. The exact number of casualties that the Indian Ocean earthquake caused in Indonesia remains unclear but estimations vary from a total of 130,000 to 220,000 deaths. Of all the countries that have been hit by the Indian Ocean earthquake, Indonesia suffered the most damage and suffered the most casualties. Before the Indian Ocean earthquake hit Indonesia there was already political unrest, corruption and low levels of nutrition. Political unrest was present because of the clash between several groups with different political convictions. There was the Indonesian military, who generally controlled coastal areas and there was a group of separatists called the 'Free Aceh Movement,' who mainly controlled the mountain areas (Zoraster, 2006, p. 14). Apart from political unrest, high levels of corruption

were reported in both the private sector and in the government according to the “Corruption Perceptions Index” (Zoraster, 2006, p. 14). Additionally, even before the Indian Ocean earthquake occurred access to food was insufficient, despite the overall food production levels. More than 35% of children under 5 were underweight and nutritional levels were far below the national average (Kelaher & Dollery, 2008, p. 122). In contrast to these unfavourable conditions, there were already various experienced international organisations in Indonesia who focused on disaster response and other forms of disaster management (Zoraster, 2006, p. 14). These organisations were present because disastrous events such as earthquakes occurred relatively frequently in Indonesia.

1.2.2. Haiti

On the 12th of January 2010 an earthquake occurred with its epicentre 25 km near the west of the Haitian capital Port-au-Prince. The earthquake destroyed many constructions in the city and killed a huge amount of people. Similar to the Indian Ocean earthquake there are different estimates on the number of casualties but they range from 100,000 to 316,000. According to the United Nations Human Development Index (Haiti, 2016), Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the world (ranking 163, with an index of 0.483); mainly because of poverty, corruption, poor infrastructure, lack of health care and lack of education. Additionally, Haiti has known a troubled political history. In the 20th century different governments seized control over Haiti which generally ruled for short-lived periods of time: from 1986 to 2011 Haiti saw 19 changes in head of state (Nolte, Martin & Boenigk, 2012, p. 713). As a consequence, the UN has been actively present in Haiti since the 1990s overseeing elections and different peacekeeping operations (Holguín-Veras, Jaller, & Wachtendorf, 2012, p. 1628).

I will only analyse the coordination of disaster response of the Haitian earthquake of January 2010. This is important to note as a cholera epidemic followed 9 months after the Haitian earthquake which changed the nature of the disaster management considerably. I do not want to take the cholera response and the earthquake response together, because these are two very different cases and funding was very different from each other; the funding declined rapidly after the response phase of the Haitian earthquake (Hidalgo & Theodaté, 2011, p. 28). As I am particularly interested in cases where funding meets the necessary amount that is asked for I have chosen to omit the cholera response.

1.3. Literature review

In this section of the research proposal I will present what has already been written on the coordination of disaster response in Indonesia and Haiti. First, I will explain disaster response in more detail to clearly define my focus throughout this thesis. Disaster response only entails a part of disaster management and it is important to understand what should and what should not be addressed when focussing on disaster response. Second, I will present different findings on the coordination of disaster response in order to lay out the main problems that have already been identified in academic literature.

1.3.1. Defining disaster response

Natural disasters can have a significant impact on the world as they reorganise societies and change the way people behave. They are especially destructive to poor countries as these are generally most vulnerable and do not have enough capacity to cope with the threats of floods, earthquakes and other dangerous natural phenomena. Dealing with a natural disaster is a complex task and needs different levels of approach according to its scale so multiple stakeholders are involved with planning for, responding to, and recovering from a disaster. Weber (as cited in H. Khan, Vasilescu, & A. Khan, 2008) defines disaster

management as something that “(...) aims to reduce, or avoid the potential losses from hazards, assure prompt and appropriate assistance to victims of disaster, and achieve rapid and effective recovery” (p. 48). Following H. Khan, Vasilescu and A. Khan (2008), disaster management consists of four phases: it entails the mitigation phase, the preparedness phase, the response phase and the recovery phase (p. 48). The mitigation phase strives to minimise the effects of disasters and addresses structural issues regarding disaster risk reduction, while the preparedness phase deals with the planning how to respond to a disaster. The actual handling of the disaster finds place during the response phase and finally, the recovery phase concerns the rebuilding of society after a disaster hit. This does not always mean that society is built back exactly like it was before, but that the recovery aims to stabilise society. These four phases do not necessarily follow up on each other in a set sequence but can occur separately and overlap. As previously stated I will focus on the disaster response phase because it is an area in which there are still many challenges to be overcome. Additionally, the inclusion of other phases of disaster management would make the scope of this thesis too large.

Coordination during disaster response is vital for the effective and efficient execution of humanitarian aid. Nolte, Martin and Boenigk (2012) define coordination as thinking strategically while having an overview of all the stakeholders (p. 709). To accomplish this, stakeholders need to communicate and exchange information with each other. However, according to different academics this was not practised as frequently and as thoroughly as it should have been during the Indian Ocean earthquake and during the Haitian earthquake. In the next section, I will summarise what authors have written on the coordination of the disaster response of both cases.

1.3.2. Coordination of disaster response in Indonesia and Haiti

Wahlstrom (2005) argues that the great number of stakeholders that are involved with providing aid presents the opportunity to reach a great amount of people and is able to strengthen disaster response (p.379). However, the international humanitarian system has to be effectively coordinated in order to respond efficiently and effectively. Oloruntoba and Gray (as cited in Oloruntoba, 2005) argue that: “A responsive, flexible and agile supply chain is needed at both the relief and reconstruction stages” (p. 516). Telford and Cosgrave (2007) are not convinced that the current international humanitarian system is able to provide relief effectively as they point to the limits of the humanitarian system (p.22). They state that there are not enough capacities to maintain highly-trained staff and to provide high quality relief during large-scale disasters. Oloruntoba (2005) adds to this by stating that individual volunteers can slow the process of disaster response when they are not coordinated effectively (p.514).

When looking at the Indian Ocean earthquake and the Haitian earthquake, both cases were uncommon compared to other large humanitarian disaster as there were enough funds to finance all the necessities for disaster response (Telford & Cosgrave, 2007, p. 2) (Grünwald, Binder & Georges, 2010, p. 35) However, humanitarian aid was heavily criticised by the media and academics during and after the disaster responses of Indonesia and Haiti. The main causes of problems with the coordination of disaster response that can be found in academic literature are: a lack of information exchange, weak leadership, little or no use of local knowledge and no accountability. Next, I will elaborate on these causes to understand how they affected the coordination of disaster response.

First, Altay and Labonte (2014) argue that data collection, information processing and information exchange are crucial abilities a stakeholder must possess. If executed properly, these abilities increase the effectiveness of decision-making in disaster response (p.55). They state that there was an unwillingness between stakeholders in Haiti to share information

because of complicated surveys or stakeholders who did not feel any need to do so (p. 63). Telford and Cosgrave (2007) depict a similar situation in Indonesia where information on needs assessments was rarely exchanged between the different stakeholders (p. 10).

Second, local knowledge was not effectively used in Indonesia and Haiti. Scheper et al. (as cited in Telford & Cosgrave 2007) point to the importance of relations between international organisations and local organisations. When these relations already exist before a disaster occurs it will increase the efficiency and effectivity of the coordination of disaster response (p.19). Telford and Cosgrave (2007) argue that the international humanitarian system was attempting to apply their own set of agendas instead of taking a supportive role for the affected communities in Indonesia (p. 22). They also state that early funding after the Indian Ocean earthquake was not needs based, but that the media was the main driving force of the allocation of funds. This was more focused on media and public interests than on the needs of the recipients (p. 4). In Haiti, local knowledge was not regarded as important by some stakeholders and it was assumed that local capacities were not present (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. 63-64) (Arroyo, 2014, p. 117-118).

Third, Arroyo (2014) argues that it was unclear who was accountable, and for what issues they were held accountable for after the Haitian earthquake (p. 117-118). A problem which arose from the lack of accountability of different stakeholders was poaching: the recruitment of local health officials by international organisations. The demand exceeded supply and this caused international organisations to recruit officials from smaller and local organisations which created a shortage in the health system of Haiti. The ministry of health foresaw this and tried to make up rules for salaries and recruitment but these were not implemented as many stakeholders were focused on their own policies (Arroyo, 2014, p. 124). Poaching also posed a problem in Indonesia as organisations struggled to find experienced health officials (Telford & Cosgrave, 2007, p. 13).

Lastly, Wahlstrom (2005) states that strong leadership and coordination is needed to facilitate disaster response, as disasters can put the affected governments and communities under strain (p. 379). In the case of Haiti this was difficult as prominent leaders had been killed and the president of Haiti was not able to unify Haiti after the disaster (Holguín-Veras, Jaller & Wachtendorf, 2012, p. 1628).

1.4. Methodology

In this section I will discuss the nature of my research, my search strategy and my approach on how I have addressed the literature. Additionally, I will present an account of the key literature to show the fundamentals of this thesis.

In this thesis I have performed a literature review. Data collection has been focused on different literature sources that helped to critically analyse the two cases of Indonesia and Haiti. To find these literature sources I have searched the databases Scopus, Web of Science and Google Scholar. For literature on the Indian Ocean earthquake in Indonesia I used the search terms: 'Indonesia' AND 'tsunami' AND 'response' AND 'aid.' When I added the term 'coordination' I found few useful literature, thus I decided to broaden the search terms. For literature on the Haitian earthquake I used the search terms: 'Haiti' AND 'Earthquake' AND 'Response' AND 'Aid' AND '2010.' I have also searched for various reports and evaluations of the response to the Indian Ocean earthquake and the Haitian earthquake. The search terms I used differed widely as I targeted specific organisations, such as the UN and IFRC, but I also searched for inter-agency evaluation reports, host-country organisations, host-country governments and groups within civil society³. I have also used websites of the organisations I studied to make sense of the hierarchy within that very organisation and their relations with

³ For a clear definition of civil society, turn to the introduction of Chapter two.

other stakeholders. For example, the composition of the IFRC and the UN is addressed with the help of these sources. Additionally, I have searched for various media sources that discussed the coordination of disaster response. As a result, I obtained different academic literature, reports, evaluations I have studied reports and evaluations of the disasters. These were either performed by the organisations involved or by an inter-agency evaluation team.

From the vast amount of literature, I have selected key literature sources that were the most useful for this thesis. I determined whether the literature was useful on the hand of its detail, inclusiveness and focus. Additionally, I wanted to include different perspectives of all sorts of stakeholders. Ideally, I would have evaluation reports of international organisations, public international organisations, host-country organisations, host-country governments, accounts of groups within civil society and critical accounts of academics to bring all perspectives together. This was not possible however as I was not able to find an evaluation report of the UN on Indonesia, evaluations of host-country organisations, host-country governments and accounts of groups within civil society. The evaluation reports and literature I did find proved to be useful as they gave detailed insight in the coordination process and its stakeholders. The key literature sources I used for the Indonesian case were: first, Zoraster's (2005) article on the barriers of disaster coordination in Banda Aceh in response to the Indian Ocean earthquake. Second, Telford and Cosgrave's (2007) article on the international humanitarian system. Third, the IFRC (2013) report. Fourth, the synthesis report of the Tsunami Evaluation Committee by Telford, Cosgrave, & Houghton (2006). The key literature sources I used for the Haitian case were: first, Arroyo's (2014) article on the accountability and responsibility issues that emerged after the Haitian earthquake. Second, Altay and Labonte's (2014) article on the challenges of humanitarian information management and exchange. Third, the IFRC (2010) report. Fourth, the UN (2010) report. Fifth, the Inter-agency real-time evaluation of disaster response by Hidalgo and Théodate (2011). These articles and reports are the backbone of this thesis.

Throughout this thesis I have used the key literature and used the concept of the humanitarian arena to understand the coordination of disaster response. I am especially interested in the social and political processes and the stakeholders that are present within the humanitarian arenas and I have used a sociological approach to understand these as sociology studies the interactions between stakeholders. As a result, discourse analysis has also been used as a tool to critically assess the literature.

1.5. Limitations

In this thesis I have chosen to focus on two countries that each have been affected by a natural disaster. My focus was only on Indonesia instead of on all the countries that have been affected by the Indian Ocean earthquake because it would make the scope of this thesis too large. Nevertheless, further study on other countries and other disasters would enhance the validity of the outcomes of this thesis and could give more insight in the coordination of disaster response in general. This reveals one of this thesis' limitations as it has a small sample size. In order to be significant more cases should be analysed to obtain a sample size that is statistically sound. Second, I used only one data collection method, because a combination of methods would also make the scope of this thesis too large. However, using more data collection techniques such as ethnographic research would enable data triangulation which in turn would enhance the validity of the research's results. Third, although there exists a report of the UN on the response to the Haitian earthquake I could not find a similar account of the UN for the Indonesian case. This led to an under-representation of the UN activities compared to the Haitian case. I have used other literature sources such as Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton's (2006) report to account for the under-representation of the UN as a consequence. Fourth, I have included two accounts of Telford and Cosgrave in my key

literature as they are both rich on data and address issues that are useful for this thesis. Including both accounts however, cause Telford and Cosgrave's arguments to have a strong role in my own arguments. I have tried to account for this by cross-checking arguments with other literature and being aware of this bias, avoiding a one-sided perspective. Fifth, I have heavily focused on failures and ineffective coordination of disaster response. This might depict a picture of a complete failure of the international humanitarian system, the national response and the local response while this was not the case. Rather, I focused on failures because I wanted to identify the ineffective practices to be able to recognise them in the future, improving the coordination of disaster response in coming disasters. This could increase the amount of lives that can be saved and increase the amount of people in need that can be helped. Finally I have adopted a Western bias throughout this thesis due to the literature that is mainly written from a Western perspective and because of my background as I am a Dutch student.

Although there are some issues with validity and bias, the results of this research can still be useful while keeping its limitations in mind. This thesis can have potential implications for the way in which the coordination of disaster response is understood and may reveal malpractices of the coordination of disaster response. Identifying these malpractices could help to avoid them in the future and save lives.

1.6. Structure

This thesis will consist of four other chapters. In Chapter two I will discuss the stakeholders during disaster response in Indonesia and Haiti in order to understand the players within the humanitarian arenas. In Chapter three I will focus on what influenced the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response in Indonesia and Haiti. In Chapter four I will address how stakeholders negotiated the coordination of disaster response within the humanitarian arenas. Finally, I will summarise all the findings from this thesis to make a final argument and I will use these findings to present recommendations within the field of disaster response in Chapter five. Additionally, I will present areas that need further research.

1.7. Conclusion

The international humanitarian system struggled to respond to large-scale disasters, although there were no financial issues. Academics presented multiple examples in which the coordination of disaster response was ineffective. However, the underlying social and political processes that shape the coordination of disaster response were not clearly presented. In this thesis I will aim to close this gap in the literature. I will use two different cases where the coordination of disaster response played a significant role in disaster management which are: the Indian Ocean earthquake of 2004 in Indonesia and the Haitian earthquake of 2010 in Haiti. I aim to explain how the coordination of disaster response is negotiated and how this process shapes the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response. To understand the coordinative practices that played a role during disaster response I will use the concept of the humanitarian arena that regards humanitarian action as the outcome of a contest for access, legitimacy and practice (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010, p. 1120-1123). The outcomes of this research can be used to understand the negotiation of the coordination of disaster response and can contribute to improving the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response in the future by addressing the coordination of an extremely large amount of organisations, the fragmented humanitarian system, accountability mechanisms (or the lack thereof) and improper needs assessments during the response phase of large-scale disasters. This understanding can improve the ability of stakeholders to save lives and to meet the needs of those affected by the disaster. Also, I will argue that the literature on the coordination of disaster response is too organisation-centred and does fail to assess all the stakeholders within

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the humanitarian arenas adequately. In the following chapter I will take the first steps towards understanding the humanitarian arenas in Indonesia and Haiti by providing an overview of the stakeholders within the humanitarian arenas.

2. Chapter Two: Stakeholders within the humanitarian arenas

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter I will describe all the stakeholders that were involved with the coordination of disaster response because I want to give a clear picture of all the players in the humanitarian arenas together with an account of their roles in the humanitarian arena. Identifying the stakeholders is key for understanding the negotiation process within the humanitarian arenas because stakeholders determine how they negotiate the coordination of disaster response.

Nolte, Martin and Boenigk (2012) argue that disaster networks generally exist out of four essential stakeholders: public international organisations, international non-profit organisations, the host-country government, host-country non-profit organisations and civil society (p.708). This categorisation of stakeholders involved with disasters helps to identify the players in the humanitarian arenas, although I will look at stakeholders in a broader perspective than Nolte, Martin and Boenigk. I want to include all stakeholders that were present both with a non-profit character and a commercial character. Consequently, I distinguish public international organisations, international organisations, host-country government, host-country organisations and civil society. Before turning to the individual cases of Indonesia and Haiti, the concept of civil society requires some further explanation as there are many different interpretations of what civil society entails in academic literature. I will use the following definition of civil society presented by Graham (2016):

(...) I define civil society as the social realm between the state, the market, and the family, which is occupied by voluntary associations—both “civil” and “uncivil,” ascriptive and nonascriptive—where citizens actively engage in communicative action and public debate to solve collective social problems, and where social norms, including generalized trust, cooperation, tolerance, and positive peace, are lauded as civic virtues. This definition should be understood to mean that “uncivil” groups are not likely to promote civic virtues, though there are many “uncivil” groups in the realm of civil society (p.7).

Thus, civil society entails the structured organisation of people as well as coincidental organisation and any form of social organisation in between. In the case of the humanitarian arena, civil society includes communities, religious groups and social movements who are involved with the coordination of disaster response. These are all the stakeholders and thus players within the humanitarian arena.

In the following part of this chapter I will describe the stakeholders within the humanitarian arenas that had an interest in the coordination of disaster response during the Indian Ocean earthquake or during the Haitian earthquake. As it is not possible to include all stakeholders that were involved, I aim to depict a clear reflection of the players within the humanitarian arenas by presenting a general overview. Additionally, I focus on some of the most prominent stakeholders to present detailed insight on how stakeholders acted and were organised which was mostly done through different coordination mechanisms. Consequently, the sub question for this chapter is as follows: ‘who were the stakeholders within the humanitarian arenas in Indonesia and Haiti?’ I will start by addressing stakeholders in Indonesia followed by stakeholders in Haiti. I will argue that although, there were several differences between the stakeholders in the Indonesian case and the Haitian case, both cases had many similarities that revealed different characteristics of the stakeholders within the humanitarian arenas. These stakeholders were complex and varied widely from each other.

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The vast amount of coordination mechanisms further complicated the conditions within the humanitarian arenas and, as a consequence, the processes of negotiation.

2.2. Indonesia

2.2.1. Public international organisations

In response to the Indian Ocean earthquake a multitude of countries became involved and donated financial and physical resources. In the next section, I will describe how the United Nations (UN) and international armed forces involved themselves with the coordination of disaster response as they were the most prominent public international organisations. The UN was one of the largest stakeholders who attempted to assemble and coordinate all organisations involved with disaster response, while the international armed forces covered a major part of the coordination and provision of disaster response in the beginning of the disaster response phase.

The United Nations' Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is the body within the UN responsible for the coordination of disaster response (UN, 2016a). It is part of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) which consists of different organisations from the UN and other areas (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2016). It has eight permanent members which are delegates of the UN operational agencies and it has a standing invitation to various organisations such as the World Bank, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. IASC's purpose is to realise inclusive coordination of disaster response with a relatively small group of stakeholders to remain effective. The UN had difficulties with the coordination of disaster response in Indonesia as the UN was mainly able to occupy itself with information-sharing instead of strategic planning (IFRC, 2013, p. 49). The UN therefore placed coordination centres in Jakarta and Banda Aceh that were aimed to improve information sharing and coordination between international organisations. Still the coordination of disaster response remained difficult.

The armed forces of 17 countries assisted in disaster response (IFRC, 2013, p. 48-49). They recognised the authority of the Indonesian army (TNI) and were able to function within its command structures to provide relief (Telford, Cosgrave, & Houghton, 2006, p. 60). Most international armed forces were asked to leave Aceh by the Indonesian Ministry of Defence in March 2015 and the remainder was asked to leave the next month.

2.2.2. International organisations

The scale of the disaster response to the Indian Ocean earthquake was unprecedented; at a point during the response there were 240 different international organisations (IFRC, 2013, p. 48-49). The international organisations differed widely in their experience, nationality, size, goals and policies. Furthermore, their actions were also shaped by the donors that backed them (Telford & Cosgrave, 2007, p. 4). The many differences that existed in the field indicates the complexity of the coordination of disaster response. Most of the international organisations did not feel the need to cooperate because of the large amount of funding they received which made them financially independent from other organisations (Telford, Cosgrave, & Houghton, 2006, p. 62). In the following part, I will describe the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. I have specifically chosen to focus on the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement because it is the largest humanitarian organisation in the world and consequently a powerful stakeholder within the humanitarian arena (IFRC, 2016c).

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the RC Movement) exists of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent

Societies (NRC) (IFRC, 2013, p. 9; 2016c). The ICRC, the IFRC and the NRC are independent organisations but they do cooperate with each other in certain situations. The IFRC is an international organisation which focuses on humanitarian development and assistance including the coordination of disaster response. The IFRC consists of 190 NRC, a secretariat and 60 delegations which are spread over the world (IFRC, 2016a). During disaster response the IFRC coordinates relief and cooperates with the NRC. In the case of the Indian Ocean Earthquake, the IFRC was able to respond at the same day the Indian Ocean earthquake occurred because it already had a small-scale delegation in Jakarta and it had a relationship with the Indonesian Red Cross Society, named Palang Merah Indonesia (PMI) (IFRC, 2013, p. 52). At the beginning of the disaster response phase, the IFRC was mainly involved with the mobilisation of international support and international resources. Additionally, the IFRC was tasked with the international coordination of disaster response, while leading the development of relief and recovery plans in all the regions of Indonesia except Aceh (IFRC, 2013, p. 57). When the NRC did not have the necessary capacities to provide relief the IFRC would assist in meeting the required needs. These responsibilities were given to the IFRC in an agreement between the IFRC and the ICRC which was officially stated seven days after the Indian Ocean earthquake found place (IFRC, 2013, p. 29).

The ICRC is another one of the three partners of the RC Movement: it aims to provide assistance to the victims of armed conflict or other violent situations (ICRC, 2016). Furthermore, the ICRC often works together with the NRC to realise effective assistance. The ICRC has been involved with Indonesia for decades because of the conflict between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) that started in 1976 (ICRC, 2013, p. 52)(BBC, 2016). The ICRC had one office in the city of Banda Aceh and one in Lhokseumawe and was experienced with the Indonesian population and the area. The involvement of the ICRC prior to the Indian Ocean Earthquake made it possible for the ICRC to respond on the same day the Indian Ocean earthquake struck. The ICRC cooperated with the PMI on various occasions, providing food rations and first-aid supplies. It also established a field hospital and executed other activities that were concerned with disaster response. After the afore mentioned agreement with the IFRC seven days after the Indian Ocean earthquake occurred, the ICRC was responsible for the coordination in Aceh as it had been already active there for some time. Their second task was to coordinate the restoration of family links that were affected by the Indian Ocean earthquake (ICRC, 2013, p.29).

The NRC is comprised of societies from 190 different countries. Each of them exists of staff members and volunteers who possess local knowledge and are trained to respond to different situations such as disasters (IFRC, 2016a). It depends on the scale of the disaster whether the host-country National Red Cross or Red Crescent Society deals with the disaster alone or whether multiple Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies from other countries involve themselves in disaster response. In the case of the Indonesian Ocean earthquake, international assistance was needed and approximately 90 different societies of the NRC provided relief, either financially, through donating goods, or by sending teams to the field (Telford, Cosgrave, & Houghton, 2006, p.56). The NRC had to contact the PMI or the IFRC in order to legitimately practise disaster response. On 31 January 2005, the IFRC, the ICRC and representatives from the PMI devised a coordination mechanism, the Movement Coordination Framework, to coordinate the disaster response of the RC Movement's partners who were already present in Indonesia and to make future disaster response more accessible (IFRC, 2013, p. 58-60).

2.2.3. Indonesian government

The National Disaster Management Board (BAKORNAS) and the Indonesian National Army (TNI) were the most prominent stakeholders of the Indonesian government

during the coordination of disaster response as they were tasked with the coordination of national disaster response and the coordination and provision of disaster response in the field, respectively. I will discuss them in this section to shed light on their roles in the coordination of disaster response.

The Indonesian government tasked BAKORNAS with the coordination of national disaster response. It had already obtained experience with several earlier disasters before it had to deal with the Indian Ocean earthquake but the scale of the Indian Ocean earthquake outstripped the capacities of BAKORNAS and the TNI eventually coordinated the greatest part of the national disaster response itself (IFRC, 2013, p. 48). During the first week after the Indian Ocean earthquake emerged, disaster response was mainly done by the TNI (Zoraster, 2006, p.14). Together with the paramilitary police, the TNI coordinated the majority of the search-and-rescue and recovery work in Banda Aceh in which they were assisted by Indonesian Muslim youth groups and armed forces originating from 17 different countries (Telford, Cosgrave, & Houghton, 2006, p. 44-45) (IFRC, 2013, p. 48). In general, most of the international armed forces had been completing tasks which were appointed by the TNI (The TEC Coordination Report in Telford, Cosgrave, & Houghton, 2006, p. 43).

2.2.4. Indonesian organisations and civil society

At a certain moment during disaster response, 430 Indonesian organisations were involved in providing relief (IFRC, 2013, p. 48-49). Similar to the international organisations their experience, size, goals and policies varied widely, which further stressed the coordination of disaster response. Additionally, a large number of Indonesian organisations and civil society were affected by the Indian Ocean earthquake as it killed an incredible amount of people that were members of an Indonesian organisation or group within civil society (World Health Organization Regional office for South-East Asia, 2015, p. 27-34). The disaster had also destroyed many Indonesian organisations and civil society buildings that reduced the ability to execute coordination of disaster response by those who were affected. In the following part I will highlight the PMI and private individuals because they played a major role in the coordination of disaster response and were strongly affected by the coordination of disaster response. Especially during the start of the disaster response phase those who were on site, that is, the PMI and private individuals, had coordinated and provided almost all the disaster response.

The PMI was the only organisation in the Indonesian province Aceh that had the authority to act independently during the conflict between the TNI and the GAM (IFRC, 2013, p.50). As a consequence, the PMI possessed local knowledge and experience and had established relationships with communities and other stakeholders within the civil society, including the military. The PMI also collaborated with the ICRC. When the Indian Ocean earthquake struck the PMI was able to provide and lead disaster response making use of the existing relationships with the military and the affected communities.

Most of the Indonesian survivors of the Indian Ocean earthquake claimed that they were rescued by private individuals (Fritz Institute cited in Telford, Cosgrave, & Houghton, 2006, p. 42-43). This depicts how dependent disaster response is on the disaster affected population and that, in the beginning moments of the disaster response, coordination efforts are mostly ad-hoc. Although disaster response in the form of food aid, the provision of drinkable water and the disposal of dead bodies was mainly done by Indonesian organisations, the early disaster response was mostly done by private individuals who spontaneously performed the coordination of disaster response regardless of their training in and experience in the coordination of disaster response.

2.3. Haiti

2.3.1. Public international organisations

In this section, I will describe the UN and international armed forces because of their large involvement with the coordination of disaster response. Their roles were similar to their role in the Indonesian case, as the UN tried to unite and coordinate all involved with disaster response, while the international armed forces were vital for the beginning of the disaster response phase. However, not all was the same as in Indonesia. I will give special attention to the cluster approach: a coordination mechanism which was led by a UN body and which covered a large part of the coordination of disaster response in Haiti. I will also discuss other coordination mechanisms to give an idea of the complexity of all the mechanisms that were at play during the disaster response phase.

The UN was one of many public international organisations that were involved in the coordination of disaster response to the Haitian earthquake. To effectively deal with the Haitian earthquake the UN used the same method that was used in the hurricane season of 2008, namely: the cluster approach (Rencoret, Stoddard, Haver, Taylor, & Harvey, 2010, p. 20). The cluster approach has been designed to improve humanitarian aid in general by assigning a group of organisations to one of the main sectors of humanitarian aid, such as food security, health or shelter (Humanitarian Response, 2016). Figure 1 shows how the cluster approach may be used to divide tasks. It has to be noted that figure 1 is just an example of several clusters with various organisations that are linked to each other, in some cases different clusters may be present and other organisations may be linked to them.




Figure 1. Example of the cluster approach (Humanitarian Response, 2016).

In the case of Haiti after the Haitian earthquake there was a total of twelve clusters; the efforts that related to each of these clusters were coordinated by OCHA (Rencoret, Stoddard, Haver, Taylor & Harvey, 2010, p. 20). A more detailed account of the cluster approach in response to the Haitian earthquake is presented in Appendix A.

Although Haiti and the Dominican Republic have had multiple conflicts with each other, their relationship had improved in the years before the Haitian earthquake which was reflected in the Dominican's disaster response (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010, p. 18). The Dominican Republic set up a coordination structure similar to the cluster approach that was present in Haiti to provide assistance (Rencoret, Stoddard, Haver, Taylor & Harvey, 2010, p. 20). Assistance of the Dominican Republic included: the provision of supplies and personnel, enabling its infrastructure for aid provision and opening borders for injured Haitians which were treated in Dominican hospitals (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010, p. 18). The cluster approach was not the only coordination mechanism present in Haiti however, as there were five other coordination mechanisms present (Grünewald, Binder, & Georges, 2010, p. 21).⁴

⁴ The first coordination mechanism I will address, the Group 11, consists of Jordan, Croatia, Ecuador, Georgia, El Salvador, Honduras, Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, and Sri Lanka and facilitates talks between donors and the Haitian government. Second, there is the Groupe d'Appui de la Coopération Internationale which

Military forces have also played a significant role in the coordination of disaster response of the Haitian earthquake. A part of the military forces were already in the field because of UN involvement. Namely, the UN has been actively present in Haiti since the 1990s when it was overseeing elections and executed different peacekeeping operations (Holguín-Veras, Jaller, & Wachtendorf, 2012, p. 1628).⁵ Although the MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission In Haiti) was already active in Haiti, its effectiveness to provide relief was hampered by the earthquake's destruction of their headquarters (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010, p. 5). Moreover, 102 UN staff were killed due to the Haitian earthquake including the head of MINUSTAH and his deputy which further complicated effective coordination of disaster response (UN, 2010, p. 16)(Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010, p. 5). In order for the MINUSTAH to assist effectively in recovery, reconstruction and stabilisation efforts after the Haitian earthquake of 2010, the UN Security Council (which governs the MINUSTAH) increased the amount of military personnel and police personnel that the MINUSTAH was allowed to have in service. The limit of 6,940 military personnel was increased to 8,940 and the amount of police personnel was changed from 2,211 to 3,711. On January 22, 2010, the United States and the MINUSTAH came to an agreement on their roles and responsibilities regarding the coordination of disaster response in relation to the Haitian government, which gave the MINUSTAH a "(...) continuing role in creating and maintaining a secure environment for recovery and in training a viable police force" (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010, p. 5). According to the UN, the military forces' medical team has provided assistance to 45,398 people that had been affected by the Haitian earthquake (UN, 2010, p. 17). Apart from UN military forces, more than 30,000 soldiers of different national armies have been deployed to Haiti in response to the Haitian earthquake (Grünwald & Renaudin, 2010, p. 47). Canada, the United States, France and various countries from Central America and the Southern Cone sent military support. Having deployed 20,000 military forces, the United States provided the largest number of military forces.

2.3.2. International organisations

Three weeks after the Haitian earthquake, 396 international health organisations were operating in Haiti (UN, 2010, p. 17). Eventually, OCHA identified 2,000 organisations which were active in Haiti, this depicts the size and complexity of the coordination of disaster response after the Haitian earthquake. The international organisations that had arrived in Haiti each acted differently from each other: some became part of a cluster of the cluster approach, some functioned in another coordination mechanism, some acted on their own terms or some practised disaster response by adopting a combination of these actions. In this section I will discuss the involvement in the coordination of disaster response of the RC Movement for the same reasons as for the Indonesian case because of the RC Movement's size and powerful position.

is comprised of various public international organisations (including MINUSTAH) and international organisations. They coordinate fundraising and the exchange of information, skills, knowledge and capacities. Third, the Comité Permanent Inter-organisation coordinates between international humanitarian organisations. Fourth, Comité de Liaison des ONG existed of international organisations who were situated in Haiti for a considerable time. They brought INGOs and Haitian NGOs together. Lastly, there was a National System for Disaster Management and Response that will be explained in detail in part 2.3.3 because it concerns the Haitian government and not public international organisations.

⁵ From 1993 to 1996, the UN realised its first peacekeeping operation in Haiti which was called the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UN, 2016b). In 2004, the mission was re-established in response to an armed conflict where rebel forces took over various Northern regions in Haiti. The mission was named Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti (MINUSTAH) in French which translates to: 'The United Nations Stabilization Mission In Haiti.' As of today, the MINUSTAH is still involved with different operations in Haiti while there is no given date on when the MINUSTAH plans to leave (Elliott & Sullivan, 2016).

The RC Movement was the largest international organisation that was present in Haiti. The IFRC deployed 21 specialised teams that operated in the field for a fixed period of time together with 3 other response teams to support the Haitian National Society in responding to the Haitian earthquake (IFRC, 2010, p.8). These teams assisted field hospitals, water treatment plants, logistic bases, portable operational centres, emergency telecommunication infrastructure and sanitation supplies. The RC Movement worked together with the Haitian government to provide safe drinking water and latrines (UN, 2010, p. 14). From the beginning of the disaster response phase of the Haitian earthquake until August 2010, the IFRC was also the Cluster Lead Agency of the Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items. The IFRC and ICRC coordinated several of their practices with each other, including medical assistance, restoring family links, tracing missing persons and the identification of mortal remains (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010, p. 10).

2.3.3. Haitian government

In this segment I will address the Haitian National Police force (HNP) and the bodies that were part of the Haitian disaster coordination mechanism as they were responsible for the coordination of national disaster response. They had the largest role in the coordination of disaster response of all the stakeholders of the Haitian government.

Despite the lack of a national army, the Haitian government was able to respond to the Haitian earthquake through the HNP. The HNP provided security and aimed to stabilise society (Rencoret, Stoddard, Haver, Taylor, & Harvey, 2010, p. 22). The HNP did not have the capacities to respond to the whole disaster and to complicate their ability to provide disaster response further, the Haitian earthquake had killed 77 staff members and 253 were badly injured (Rencoret, Stoddard, Haver, Taylor, & Harvey, 2010, p. 21). The MINUSTAH and the UN civilian police were already supporting the HNP before the Haitian earthquake as the HNP did not have the means to fulfil its role. This support given to HNP continued after the Haitian earthquake.

Apart from the afore mentioned coordination mechanisms, there was a national coordination mechanism: the National System for Disaster Management and Response (SNGRD), which covers risk management, disaster management and the coordination of disaster response performed by 26 governmental and non-governmental organisations (Fordyce, Abdul-Akeem & Grace, 2012, p. 9) (Grünewald, Binder & Georges, 2010, p. 21). Figure 2 shows how the SNGRD was composed.⁶

⁶ As Fordyce, Abdul-Akeem and Grace (2012) have laid out, the “SNGRD consists of the Haitian government’s Department of Civic Protections, regional support and various civic groups, both international and local. Driving the system was the Department of Civic Protections and the Permanent Secretariat for the Management of Risks and Disaster at the central, departmental and communal levels” (p.9). The Ministry of Interior was above the SNGRD, followed by the Permanent Secretariat of Risk Management and Disaster which coordinated SNGRD’s activities.

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


Figure 2. The Haitian National Risk and Disaster Management System prior to the 2010 earthquake (Fordyce, Abdul-Akeem & Grace, 2012, p. 10).

2.3.4. Haitian organisations and civil society

In this section I will elaborate on the general involvement in disaster response of Haitian organisations and civil society. Similar to the Indonesian case, those who were already present in the area after the Haitian earthquake, coordinated and performed almost all life-saving efforts and played a large role in the early stage of the disaster response phase

Haitian organisations and civil society situated in Port-au-Prince were affected by the Haitian earthquake and many of these stakeholders had to cope with loss of people, destruction of properties and other traumatic events. In the beginning of the Haitian earthquake most people responded by searching and looking after their loved ones, which affected the capability of the Haitian organisations and civil society to start practising the coordination of disaster response in an organised way (Grünewald, Binder, & Georges, 2010, p. 23). Most early practises of disaster response and the coordination of disaster response have most likely been performed by those who were nearest to the people affected by the disaster. The timing of the Haitian earthquake also influenced the way in which people have responded and who were mostly affected, as it occurred early in the afternoon which meant that most children and men were at work or at school and most women were at home (Grünewald, Binder, & Georges, 2010, p. 23). As a consequence, most casualties of the Haitian earthquake have proven to be women.

2.4. Conclusion

When answering the sub question: ‘who were the stakeholders in the humanitarian arenas in Indonesia and Haiti?’ several similarities and differences between Indonesia and Haiti emerge. I will start by addressing the similarities. First, the most prominent public international organisations were armed forces and the UN. The military forces were mainly involved at the beginning of the disaster response phase while the UN was involved during the whole phase. Second, both countries saw a large amount of international organisations who were involved with the coordination of disaster response. These organisations were generally extremely well-funded and varied widely from each other on multiple levels. The IFRC, ICRC and NRC had a large role in the coordination of disaster response and coordinated with each other. Third, national disaster coordination mechanisms were present in Indonesia and Haiti. Additionally, the national capacities such as the national military and police forces were vital for the providing of disaster response. Fourth, another resemblance was the vast amount of coordination mechanisms which indicates the complexity of the coordination of disaster response. These coordination mechanisms did not necessarily reflect the importance of the stakeholders that participated in it, but served as a tool for stakeholders to negotiate legitimacy to coordinate disaster response. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter four.⁷ Last, the majority of the coordination of disaster response was performed by national organisations and civil society in the beginning of the disaster response phase. Those affected by the disaster were involved with the coordination of disaster response in two ways as they both provided disaster response and received it.

Next, I want to discuss the differences between Indonesia and Haiti. First, the Indonesian government was in control of its own national army whereas the Haitian government was not. Instead of a national army, the international army MINUSTAH was

⁷ It seems that there were more coordination mechanisms present in Haiti than in Indonesia, although this was not the case as Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006) mention the existence of different coordination mechanisms (p. 150). Additionally, Zoraster (2006) describes a detailed account of the coordination of the health sector of Banda Aceh. I highlighted the coordination mechanisms in Haiti to show the complexity of the coordination of disaster response because of the many different mechanisms that were at play. I chose to use the Haitian case as the coordination mechanisms had been discussed in more detail making it a better example to clarify my argument.

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present during the Haitian earthquake. Years before the Haitian earthquake, the MINUSTAH was already involved in Haiti to undertake different peacekeeping operations. This also indicates the second difference: many international organisations were already involved in Haiti and were already in the area when the Haitian earthquake found place. In Indonesia there was less involvement from international organisations, especially in the Aceh province because of the ongoing conflict in that area. Third, there was a difference between the coordination mechanisms in Indonesia and Haiti. Though national coordination mechanisms were existent in both countries, the UN led coordination mechanism in Indonesia was different from the cluster approach because the cluster approach seemed to include and integrate more stakeholders. Last, little could be found on the Haitian NRC and Haitian organisations in the literature but I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter four.

To conclude, the most prominent stakeholders within the humanitarian arena in Indonesia were the UN, the international armed forces, the RC Movement, BAKORNAS, TNI, PMI and the Indonesian population. In Haiti these were the UN, the international armed forces, the RC Movement, the HNP and the Haitian population. These stakeholders reflected all the different stakeholders within the humanitarian arenas best, revealing their roles. The humanitarian arenas were very complex for there were different coordination mechanisms at play and stakeholders were organised in different ways. The structure of the RC Movement alone proves that one organisation within the humanitarian arena can be already very complicated while it is only a part of the humanitarian arena. The negotiation process that follows from the complicated organised stakeholders is therefore highly complex as well and should be addressed as such when trying to understand the process. However, to further develop the understanding of how the negotiations within the humanitarian arenas shape the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response I want to focus on what constitutes the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response before addressing the negotiation process in detail. I want to do this because the negotiation process is better understood when it can be put into context.

3. Chapter Three: Influences on the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response

3.1. Introduction

Chapter two has laid out the stakeholders in the humanitarian arenas in Indonesia and Haiti. It also presented some of the coordinative practices of the stakeholders involved with disaster response. In the following chapter I will focus on these practices together with other factors to reveal their effectiveness in relation to the coordination of disaster response. Understanding what influenced the effectiveness of the coordination will help to reveal how this effectiveness is linked to the negotiations within the humanitarian arenas. In order to gain a thorough understanding of the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response I will highlight individual situations that reflect the general developments that occurred in Indonesia and Haiti. Thus, the sub question addressed in this chapter is the following: ‘what influenced the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response in Indonesia and Haiti?’ First, I will address the early response in Indonesia and the coordination of disaster response that found place thereafter because the involvement of stakeholders was very different during the early response than in the remainder of the disaster response. I will analyse the Haitian case in the same way. Finally, I will present a conclusion in which the sub question will be answered. I will argue that there were multiple influences on the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response; first, there were structural political economic and social problems in Indonesia and Haiti that hampered the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response. Second, the destruction in Indonesia and Haiti was unprecedented and immobilised a great deal of the capacities the countries had to coordinate and practice disaster response. Third, the influx of international organisations that came to help in Indonesia and Haiti became very large, making it difficult to coordinate disaster response effectively. Fourth, needs assessments that were done by the different stakeholders did not reflect reality as local capacities were mostly neglected resulting in an inefficient and ineffective response. Last, a fragmented international humanitarian system prevented that a collective and effective response was realised.

3.2. Indonesia

3.2.1. Early disaster response

After the Indian Ocean earthquake there was an immediate need for clean water, food, shelter and medical assistance (Zoraster, 2006, p. 14). In this part I will discuss what practices stakeholders have performed as a reaction to those needs in the early stage of disaster response. I will clarify what influenced the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response and how stakeholders were involved.

Early disaster response in Indonesia was mainly provided by volunteers, PMI staff and the military; this was especially the case in Aceh because of the limited access to the area (Telford, Cosgrave & Houghton, 2006, p. 44). Some areas were also hard to reach because of their remoteness and the destruction of the Indian Ocean earthquake (Telford, Cosgrave & Houghton, 2006, p. 43). The IFRC (2013) state that they collaborated with the PMI during the disaster response phase and that they had realised several accomplishments (p. 50-51). First, 550,000 people affected by the Indian Ocean earthquake were registered. Second, health posts and mobile clinics were set up. Third, food aid, bottled water and other emergency supplies were distributed among people affected by the Indian Ocean earthquake. Last, bodies were retrieved and transported. Apart from the IFRC and the PMI, the military retrieved and transported bodies as well. Still, life-saving disaster response was almost exclusively done by local stakeholders; international, national nor even provincial response was generally unable

to rescue people in immediate need (Telford, Cosgrave & Houghton, 2006, p. 44). Médecins Sans Frontières realised this after their staff had arrived in Indonesia three days after the disaster struck: they stated that local stakeholders had already provided the necessary disaster response and had thus fulfilled the most immediate needs of the affected population (Indonesia Relief as cited in Telford, Cosgrave & Houghton, 2006, p. 44). Consequently, Médecins Sans Frontières decided to lower its effort.

3.2.2. Coordination of disaster response

In this segment I will address the coordination of disaster response after the first few days the Indian Ocean earthquake found place. I will show how the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response was influenced by discussing the different stakeholders, processes and conditions that were present. Additionally, I will provide an example of the Indonesian health sector for an in-depth view of the coordination of disaster response that helps to understand the influences on the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response by putting them into detailed context.

The Indonesian government initiated the National Disaster Management Board at the same day of the disaster. This was in contrast to the international humanitarian system which, according to Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006), was not directly activated after the disaster struck because organisations needed time to develop an overview of the damages (p. 43-44). Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton argue that damage assessment in Aceh was especially difficult and international involvement commenced two days after the actual disaster. In response to the inability to develop a thorough damage assessment of Aceh, the Vice-President of Indonesia flew to Aceh where he realised the extent of the damage and called for international humanitarian support. Because Aceh had been closed off from international organisations except for the ICRC, international disaster response was slow to respond; many organisations had no grounding in the area and it took days before it was clear that international organisations were allowed to enter Aceh.

Though most international organisations have not been able to directly save the lives of the people affected by the Indian Ocean earthquake, the international organisations were able to assist during the remainder of the disaster response phase and as stated in Chapter two, the amount of organisations that participated in disaster response was unprecedented. Nevertheless, the extensive amount of stakeholders and funds did not prevent the overcapacity of airports and warehouses in Indonesia (IFRC, 2013, p. 47-48). Some of the supplies that were delivered were unneeded or unasked for (IFRC, 2013, p. 26). An example of this was the case where food aid consisted of pork which was not appreciated by the Muslim recipients (Telford & Cosgrave, 2007, p. 10). The large amount of organisations involved with disaster response may even have contributed to the pressures on infrastructure and warehouse facilities. The IFRC (2013) argue that the involvement of such a large number of organisations increased the costs of coordination (p. 62). They also argue that the effectiveness of coordination was reduced because a large amount of international and Indonesian organisations did not participate in existing coordination mechanisms. These organisations did not participate due to the large amount of funds that they received. This did not mean that organisations were free to coordinate and provide disaster response however; organisations were influenced by its donor(s) and the media. Often, donors were interested in visible and sensational forms of disaster response instead in the most needed forms. This was because donors wanted to be able to show their contributions (Arroyo, 2014, p. 124). Telford and Cosgrave (2007) support this and point out that early funding was not needs-based (p.4). They state that in the early stages of funding, the media was the main driving force of the allocation of funds which was more focused on media and public interests than on the needs of the recipients. As international organisations felt the pressures of their donors who wanted

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to see certain types of projects and as these organisations did not want to be scrutinised by the media, the coordination of disaster response was not in line with the needs of those affected by the disaster. However, Telford and Cosgrave do not address how donors and the media pressurised international organisations in detail. The IFRC (2013) add that National Societies who came to Indonesia were in search for ways to participate in disaster response while under pressure by the large amount of funds and the media (p. 57). The IFRC also argue that organisations started to compete for projects (p.26). The staff of these organisations who were deployed to the field differed widely in their experience and were “under pressure to show quick results” (IFRC, 2013, p.49).

Following Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006) the coordination between the military and international organisations was weak due to hostility against each other. The interaction between the military and international organisations was mostly hostile because of distrust as the military was unsure how international organisations positioned themselves in the Aceh conflict. Conversely, international organisations accused the American military specifically for responding to the Indian Ocean earthquake because they were mainly motivated to change the American image towards the Muslim community (p. 60). Nevertheless, the military did collaborate successfully with civilian volunteers during various disaster response operations. According to the IFRC (2013) the IFRC held regular meetings with the ICRC, the government, public international organisations and international organisations after the Indian Ocean earthquake (p. 26). Furthermore, they argue that there was interaction with the local population and volunteers (p. 50). An example of this is the Irish Red Cross National Society that supported a local radio programme which provided information and served as a forum for on air discussions (p. 288).

In order to gain a better understanding of the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response after the Indian Ocean earthquake I will present an overview of the coordination of disaster response in the health sector of Indonesia. First, it has to be clear in what context organisations had to operate. Zoraster (2006) argues that the health care system of Indonesia was not able to respond effectively to the scale of the Indian Ocean earthquake as it had 16 physicians per 100,000 persons while in comparison, the US had, at the time, 548 physicians per 100,00 persons (p. 14). Moreover, the area that experienced the most losses, Banda Aceh, had 750 hospital beds available for its population of 3,000,000 which was not enough to account for the affected population. Zoraster also states that the health standards of Indonesia were relatively low prior to the Indian Ocean earthquake. Before the disaster found place the quality of healthcare depended on the amount of money a patient would pay. These numbers on the Indonesian health sector depict the extent of the challenges that had to be overcome by the organisations involved. Now, I will turn to the disaster coordination of the health sector itself.

The Ministry of Health of Indonesia led the health sector response with the assistance of the World Health Organization (Zoraster, 2006, p. 15). The goal was to provide effective and efficient medical assistance to those who needed it and to coordinate the provision of disaster response on multiple levels. Zoraster describes the structure of the health sector and depicts a setting in which there was little supervision and there was poor assessment on which stakeholder should have been included in the health sector. This occurred for several reasons. First, the Provincial Health office’ operational capacity had been affected by the Indian Ocean earthquake as their personnel had been killed, injured, had left for safety or had left to help family members. Empty places were filled with staff from the Ministry of Health, although some of them had a lack of local knowledge. Second, meetings to coordinate disaster response effectively and efficiently were held but the assessment of who was allowed to participate in these meetings was inadequate. The capacities of stakeholders participating in the meetings were unclear, important stakeholders were left out and activities regarding disaster response

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were adopted on a voluntary basis. Third, the WHO recognised that some segments of the health response had too many NGOs and others too little. Without a thorough assessment of the stakeholders involved with disaster response, important stakeholders have been overlooked which resulted in inefficient practices. An example of this was the repeated provision of oxygen tanks by helicopter (Zoraster, 2006, p. 15). Although the helicopter had space to carry multiple oxygen tanks and while there were various stakeholders who were in need of oxygen, the two-hour trips that supplied two oxygen tanks were only made for a single hospital. Fourth, the health sector was affected by the arrival of humanitarian organisations, as the humanitarian organisations offered translators a higher salary than most Achenese health officials would receive when they would practice health care (Zoraster, 2006, p. 15). Last, it was difficult to hold stakeholders accountable for their actions as there was no formal credentialing system in place (Zoraster, 2006, p. 16). Organisations were free to participate in providing and coordinating disaster response which resulted in a large number of stakeholders in the health sector whose degree of quality differed widely.

At a certain moment, the transition began from disaster response to disaster recovery which presented new issues. First, conflicts arose between organisations who provided health care. There were organisations who wanted to maintain local health standards, while others would focus on providing health care as much as possible, regardless of their influence on local health standards (Zoraster, 2006, p. 16). Second, the number of people in need for medical assistance in Aceh decreased resulting in overstaffed health officials and underused hospital beds which became a waste of resources (Zoraster, 2006, p. 16).

The example of the health sector shows a segment of the issues that emerged during the coordination of disaster response. Telford and Cosgrave (2007) criticise the international response system and state that problems with the coordination of disaster response are structural. They argue that it does not have the capacities to recruit and maintain the amount of experienced personnel needed for large scale disaster response (p.12). Only when a disaster has struck, funds become available and there appears a pressure on organisations to achieve quick results. Standby rosters and preparatory training have been developed in order to react quickly and effectively but often it is not enough to fulfil the needs that derive from the disaster in question. As seen in the health sector example international organisations try to overcome staff shortages by 'poaching': recruiting experienced personnel from local organisations and NGOs. It can have a two-sided effect: on the one hand it may weaken disaster response and recovery because a capable actor leaves their former place of operation but on the other hand the actor may strengthen the disaster management more than it could have been otherwise, which is a way to improve the quality of disaster response in general (Telford and Cosgrave, 2007, p. 13). In Indonesia poaching proved to decrease the quality of the health sector as some local health officials functioned as translators instead.

Another point of criticism that Telford, Cosgrave & Houghton (2006) address is the weakness of the coordination mechanisms within the international humanitarian system: they argue that there were several reasons for the weakness of existing coordination mechanisms (p. 62-63). First, they state that the UN had no direct authority over stakeholders during the disaster response as the amount of stakeholders was unprecedented and some stakeholders had received large funds that decreased their interests to participate in existing coordination mechanisms. Second, there was little funding available for coordination efforts and administrative systems were not adequate. Third, the continuity, skills and experience of some senior UN coordinators was not on a proper level which undermined the authority of the UN coordination mechanism. Fourth, coordinators did not act strong enough against stakeholders who provided inappropriate aid. Fifth, one person was both the UN Resident Coordinator (who is chosen by the UN and focuses on humanitarian activities by UN bodies) and the Humanitarian Coordinator (who is chosen by the IASC and focuses on the humanitarian

system). Because of the double responsibility, both functions did not get enough attention. Last, international organisations did not invest in personnel to coordinate with other stakeholders and share information with each other. Additionally, Indonesian organisations were under-represented in many coordination mechanisms and did not coordinate well with other Indonesian organisations.

3.3. Haiti

3.3.1 Early disaster response

In this section I will address the practices of stakeholders during early disaster response in Haiti. Similar to my approach for the Indonesian case, I will focus on what influenced the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response and how stakeholders were involved in order to be able to link effectiveness and the negotiations within the humanitarian arenas in Chapter five.

Immediately after the Haitian earthquake it became clear that food, clean water, sanitation, emergency supplies and medical assistance were among the most prominent needs (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010, p. 7) (IFRC, 2010, p. 8). Furthermore, search and rescue operations, emergency shelters, infrastructure and logistic operations were set up in order to cope with the destruction of the Haitian earthquake. During the first two weeks the aforementioned needs were the main concern of disaster response. Problems arose when the UN Disaster and Coordination team was not able to send its search and rescue teams to the affected areas because of security regulations (Rencoret, Stoddard, Haver, Taylor & Harvey, 2010, p. 22). Luckily, these regulations were adjusted on the 19th of January (a week after the Haitian earthquake) and search and rescue operations could be initiated by the UN. Despite the regulations that hampered the disaster response in the first week after the Haitian earthquake, Rencoret et al. (2010) argue that the HNP responded quickly to the Haitian earthquake together with MINUSTAH and other bodies of the UN (p. 22). Although the international media claimed there were various acts of looting and violence after the Haitian earthquake, the UN (as cited in Rencoret et al., 2010) claimed that this was an exaggeration of the real situation (p. 22). Still, the HNP and UN bodies recognised that there existed serious security threats that had to be accounted for.

3.3.2. Coordination of disaster response

The following part entails the coordination of disaster response after the early disaster response. Again, I will adopt the same focus as in the Indonesian case, explaining how the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response was influenced by discussing the different stakeholders, processes and conditions that were present. Additionally, I pay special attention to the concept of accountability as it is one of the fundamental issues that has influenced the effectivity of the coordination of disaster response.

In the first week following the Haitian earthquake the UN set up a well-functioning coordination centre which was accessible to all stakeholders involved with disaster response (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011, p. 31). However, in the second week the UN coordination centre became more restricted which increased the exclusion of local organisations and the local population. Moreover, most meetings and correspondence were held in English which further excluded Haitians as most natives mainly spoke French. Still, there was collaboration between international stakeholders and local stakeholders. The Haitian government for example, had been actively involved with needs and damage assessments together with international organisations (Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010, p. 4). Additionally, the UN (2010) argued that it cooperated with public international organisations, international organisations, national organisations and civil society during the disaster response phase (p. 17). Nevertheless, multiple reports point out that local organisations and civil society were

largely excluded from the coordination of disaster response. Rencoret et al. (2010) argue that coordination between international organisations, Haitian organisations, the Haitian government and civil society has been weak which resulted in weak national and local ownership (p. 19). Not all efforts were weak though as Rencoret et al, (2010) point to a multi-stakeholder collaboration in which the UN, international organisations and local radio broadcasters provided information on disaster response to the Haitian population through the use of the radio (p. 27).

Logistic issues emerged as the Port-au-Prince airport, ports, warehouses and trucking systems became over-used (Rencoret, Stoddard, Haver, Taylor & Harvey, 2010, p. 21). The extent of the damage to infrastructure and logistic structures further complicated logistics. Additionally, some delivered goods were unnecessary or were delivered in an impractical amount which made parts of it useless. These goods took up space while there was a struggle to find space for goods that were essential for disaster response. US armed forces assisted at the airport of Port-au-Prince and were known to have a positive effect on the coordination of disaster response, although they were criticised for prioritising security over aid (Rencoret, Stoddard, Haver, Taylor & Harvey, 2010, p. 22). Additionally, Canadian armed forces assisted at the Jacmel near Port-au-Prince and armed forces also provided escorts for aid distribution.

Three weeks after the Haitian earthquake, OCHA stated that 400 organisations were active in Haiti and in a later stage of the humanitarian operation they eventually acknowledged that 2,000 organisations were involved (IASC as cited in Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. 50). Some international organisations worked through the cluster system, which was initiated shortly after the Haitian earthquake occurred. Due to the experience that had been gained with the cluster system during previous disasters in Haiti, the clusters were able to respond quickly (Grünwald & Renaudin as cited in Rencoret, Stoddard, Haver, Taylor & Harvey, 2010, p. 20). The cluster system was criticised for the lack of strategic leadership, because organisations were left out of the decision-making process: the large number of meetings of clusters, sub-cluster and working groups and the lack of means to include all organisations especially caused smaller organisations to be excluded (Rencoret, Stoddard, Haver, Taylor & Harvey, 2010, p. 20). It is remarkable that there were not enough means to include all organisations while funds were unprecedented, although it may have been more of a logistic problem than a financial one. This may also be the reason for the time it took the Humanitarian Coordination Team to hold its first meeting, which was realised more than three weeks after the Haitian earthquake (Rencoret, Stoddard, Haver, Taylor & Harvey, 2010, p. 21). During the disaster response phase many clusters experienced problems with the conditions in Haiti that were already unfavourable before the earthquake. The shelter cluster for example, experienced problems when they could not distinguish between people that lost their homes and people that were already homeless before the earthquake (Binder, 2016). The question remained whether to aim for improving former living standards or to not surpass these standards, although ethically speaking denying people shelter when the means are present is debatable. Nevertheless, the challenge to shelter all Haitians was a great task.

According to Davis as cited in Arroyo (2014) responsibility is the obligation to act and accountability is the obligation to respond for an action (p. 115). Accountability has been a recurring point of criticism of the humanitarian system because the organisations involved could not be held accountable by the population it aided. In response, different accountability initiatives have been created of which the Sphere's Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response and the HAP Standard in Accountability and Quality Management were among the most prominent.⁸ Although these and many other

⁸ The Sphere Standards sets out minimal standards that people affected by crisis have: "the right to water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion; food security and nutrition; shelter, settlement and non-food items; and health

initiatives exist, the adoption of these initiatives remain voluntarily and they are not enforced in a consistent way. Arroyo (2014) states there were also struggles with accountability in Haiti (p. 117-118). First, the Haitian population found it often unclear what the role was of the organisations involved with disaster response. This complicated the identification of who could be held accountable. Second, organisations asked camp residents to vote and create a committee that represented the whole encampment. The problem that arose was that some of these committees did not function properly as they were accused of power abuse. Third, local capacities were largely excluded by international organisations. An example of an accountability issue in Haiti was when latrines were built by an international organisation and were not maintained. During the transition phase there were many organisations who acted similarly because funds declined. Since there were no stakeholders who could effectively hold organisations accountable and as these organisations did not feel responsible for the latrines anymore, they decided to leave.

3.4. Conclusion

So what practices influenced the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response in Indonesia and Haiti?

First, it has to be acknowledged that there were already structural problems in both countries before the disasters struck. A clear example of this is reflected in the health sector in Indonesia. As mentioned in Chapter one, Haiti was a country with multiple political, economic and social issues. Before the Haitian earthquake occurred, a large part of the Haitians were struggling to survive and were already dependent on international aid and remittances (Grünewald, Binder & Georges, 2010, p. 20). The capacities of both countries to deal with its disasters was limited.

Second, the destruction levels of both disasters obstructed the coordination of disaster response. The Indian Ocean earthquake and the Haitian earthquake both had a devastating effect on the areas they hit. Apart from the material damage, the loss of life had major impact on the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response as organisations who were responsible for disaster response had lost experienced staff. It has to be emphasised that organisations had to operate in an extreme context and that all stakeholders had to cope with physical and psychological trauma.

Third, Indonesia and Haiti both experienced a large influx of international organisations that aimed to assist in disaster response. The coordination of these organisations by themselves was already a great challenge apart from the actual response to the disaster. Additionally, the quality and experience among organisations varied widely.

Fourth, in Indonesia and in Haiti needs assessment was not always done properly as multiple international organisations were disconnected from the national and local context. Important stakeholders were excluded from the decision-making process which resulted in inappropriate disaster response and the delivery of unnecessary supplies or volumes of supplies that were too great. Pressures from donors and the media also had a significant impact on the coordination of disaster response and steered organisations away from the actual needs and towards projects that donors and media prefer. Though, how donors and the media pressurised stakeholders is unclear.

Last, the international humanitarian system was not functioning well. Although there were coordination mechanisms present in both cases some organisations did not involve itself

action” (Arroyo, 2014, p. 116). It also focuses on the quantity and quality standards of aid. The HAP consists out of 6 standards: “establishing and delivering on commitments; staff competency; sharing information; participation; handling complaints; and learning and continual improvement” (Arroyo, 2014, p. 116). Additionally, the HAP aims to make organisations accountable for the quality and effectiveness of their actions and to involve the affected population.

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in these coordination mechanisms and operated on their own. Because of a fragmented humanitarian system information exchange was difficult and disaster response was inefficient. When viewing the international humanitarian system in its entirety it is clear that most organisations did not use their resources adequately. Furthermore, because of the lack of any functioning and forceful accountability mechanism organisations were able to jump in and out of response operations.

4. Chapter Four: Negotiation of the coordination of disaster response

4.1. Introduction

Now that the players of the humanitarian arenas have been described and the influences on the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response have been addressed I will focus on how the negotiations within the humanitarian arenas have shaped the coordination of disaster response. As previously stated in Chapter one, the humanitarian arena is the place where humanitarian action is realised through negotiation by stakeholders. First, I will address how stakeholders have negotiated their access, legitimacy and practice by using the findings from Chapter two and Chapter three. I define access as the extent in which a stakeholder is able to involve itself with disaster response, legitimacy as the justification of a stakeholder to provide disaster response and practice as the ability of a stakeholder to define what kind of disaster response is given. Second, I will critically analyse to what extent the literature on the coordination of disaster response corresponds with the concept of the humanitarian arena together with an assessment of the literature in general. Thus, the sub question for this chapter is as follows: ‘how was the coordination of disaster response shaped by negotiations within the humanitarian arenas?’ I will argue that most international organisations and public international organisations in Indonesia and Haiti were able to negotiate their access, legitimacy and practice to coordinate disaster response effectively, while the Indonesian government, Haitian government, Indonesian organisations, Haitian organisations, Indonesian civil society and Haitian civil society had difficulty with negotiating access, legitimacy and practice to coordinate disaster response. Additionally, the conditions in which the stakeholders operated strengthened the position of the international organisations and the public international organisations within the humanitarian arena. The other argument I will put forward derives from the analysis of the literature. I will argue that most literature has an organisation-centred perspective while addressing the coordination of disaster response and fails to address all the power relations within the humanitarian arena.

4.2. The negotiation of access, legitimacy and practice

4.2.1. Access

As described in Chapter two, prior to the Indian Ocean earthquake, Aceh was closed off to most international organisations and the ICRC was one of the few organisations that was allowed to operate in the field. When it became clear other international organisations were allowed to enter, a wave of organisations who widely differed in quality arrived at the scene. Those who were already present in Indonesia before the Indian Ocean earthquake occurred had the advantage of possessing local knowledge to negotiate access to coordinate disaster response. The larger organisations that did not have grounding in Indonesia were nevertheless able to access the disaster affected area relatively easily without resistance of the government. In contrast, there was already a lot of involvement of international organisations in Haiti prior to the disaster. As a consequence, many organisations were already familiar with the local context which facilitated access to provide disaster response. But similar to Indonesia obtaining access for smaller organisations quickly became difficult as these stakeholders were left out. As seen in Chapter three, local organisations and the local population were denied access to the UN coordination centre which caused them to be excluded from coordination meetings. Furthermore, the language which was used in coordination meetings and in many communication efforts also determined whether organisations were aware of the current situation and practices of other organisations. Many times English was the main language instead of French or Haitian Creole, which put local organisations at a disadvantage. The Indonesian government and the Haitian government both

handed over power to the UN and international organisations and thus part of their access to provide disaster response. Governments were still present in coordination mechanisms but did not function at the centre of it: they had assumed an assisting role as is clearly seen in Appendix A where the Haitian government is situated on the side and only has one link with another actor in the whole coordination framework of the cluster approach, while other actors have multiple links to different actors.

4.2.2. Legitimacy

Also when addressing legitimacy, many similarities can be found between Indonesia and Haiti. Aid recipients derived their legitimacy to receive disaster response from 'being in need' while local organisations linked their own local knowledge and experience to legitimacy. Organisations also negotiated their legitimacy by their use of language: moral arguments were often used in the sense that organisations argued they had a moral duty to aid others in need which provided them with the legitimacy to provide disaster response. Some organisations also used coordination mechanisms such as the cluster approach as a way to negotiate legitimacy. However, the mere fact of being legitimised to provide disaster response through coordination mechanisms did not reflect the capacities, quality and nature of the organisations involved. Zoraster (2005) presents an example of health coordination meetings in Indonesia (p. 15). For several weeks, a member of a yoga group sat at the head table of these meetings, although the member had stated it was not involved with health care. The fact that it was possible for someone who was not experienced in the field of healthcare to sit in such a powerful position questions both the standards of access and legitimacy.

Well-funded organisations were able to negotiate their own legitimacy without the approval of other stakeholders. Just as in Indonesia, there was a lack of functioning accountability mechanisms that could enforce responsibilities of organisations. Arroyo (2014) argues that:

While in principle agencies have the best interests of affected populations as their goal, in practice they move between blurred lines of responsibility and accountability as a result of two factors: the deep fragmentation of the sector in which they operate; and power asymmetries and lack of control over the sector. It is within this context that agencies define the limits of what they are responsible for and, consequently, what they can be held accountable for. These factors have in turn prevented a common view and strategy across actors to improve their accountability to affected populations. (p. 123)

The lack of an effective and strong mechanism that could govern the organisations involved with disaster response gave organisations the ability to negotiate their own legitimacy to provide disaster response. There were no strong criteria for international organisations to participate because criteria such as the Sphere Standards and the HAP were taken on voluntarily. They may have directed organisations to take responsibility but these standards could not ensure and enforce accountability among organisations. If an organisation thought itself capable of providing disaster response it was legitimised to do so.

The government of Indonesia did not have the means to respond to the scale of the Indian Ocean earthquake and had to ask for international assistance. Although early disaster response was mostly done by local Indonesian stakeholders, a great deal of the disaster response was provided by international stakeholders. This meant that disaster response provided by international organisations was legitimised by the Indonesian government but that the government itself had to hand over a part of its control over the disaster response to

other stakeholders. This also proved to be the same for the Haitian government as they were not able to cope with the disaster.

4.2.3. Practice

Because of the already large international presence in Haiti before the earthquake, the Haitian government did not have a powerful position to begin with. As the disaster struck, the motto of many international organisation was to include local institutions and local organisations while Chapter three has showed that in reality the government, Haitian organisations and civil society were largely neglected. Similarly, the Indonesian government eventually had very little say in how disaster response was provided, just as Indonesian organisations and civil society. Local organisations and civil society were especially influential in the early stage of disaster response although many were limited in their choice in how to coordinate disaster response as the disasters in Indonesia and Haiti were unexpected. The influence of local organisations and civil society began to decrease as international organisations settled themselves in the area.

International public organisations were able to influence disaster response. While the UN used coordination mechanisms to direct disaster response, military forces were also able to influence disaster response as seen in Chapter three. When the Port-au-Prince airport was over-capacitated the US military became in charge of the logistics to stabilise the situation and they were able to determine what supplies would be allowed and what would not. This also gave them power over which organisations had access to supplies and which organisations had to wait for supplies. Given the military's mode of operation they gave priority to supplies concerning security instead of aid.

The UN and international organisations created coordination mechanisms that served to realise more effective and efficient disaster response. These mechanisms also served another purpose as the creators were able to implement their own set of policies and align the practices of other organisations with their own goals and practices. The coordination mechanisms were mainly in favour of the international organisations while many smaller and local organisations were under-represented. Due to the lack of a governing actor poaching and competition for projects among stakeholders found place. Poaching was a clear example of the negotiation process within the humanitarian arena: Different stakeholders in the humanitarian competed over staff and used different forms of negotiation to win staff over. In this case, the stakeholders who were able to use the largest financial assets generally won staff over.

As seen in Chapter three, donors and the media had a special role in the coordination of disaster response as they put pressures on stakeholders and indirectly influenced the coordination of disaster response. Donors generally preferred short-term projects that show clear results and the media steered disaster response towards visible and 'sensational' forms of practice. Although, there is a lack of an account on how donors and the media put pressures on stakeholders I still find it important to show how stakeholders were influenced, as it adds to the complexity of the negotiation within the humanitarian arena.

4.3. Literature on the coordination of disaster response

4.3.1. Little data on host-country government, host country-organisations and civil society

When I apply the concept of the humanitarian arena to the coordination of disaster response in Indonesia and Haiti certain issues in the literature are revealed. First, I notice that the amount of data on the various stakeholders is unevenly balanced. While there is much information on public international organisations and international organisations, there is little

information on the government, national organisations and civil society. Altay and Labonte (2014) show in their methodology section that they used multiple evaluations of disaster response to the Haitian earthquake (p. 58). These evaluations were mainly written on behalf of international public organisations and international organisations, while the government, national organisations and civil society were under-represented. Arroyo (2014) acknowledges that there is little data of Haitian organisations and smaller international organisations during the disaster response phase (p. 127). Additionally, Arroyo points to the limitation of having no evaluations that addressed successes and failures of the Haitian government, Haitian organisations and civil society. Zoraster (2006) describes the coordination of disaster response in the health sector and addresses the ministry of health and the local physicians thoroughly but I find that the patients could have been described in more detail. Zoraster mainly mentions patients as being subject to coordination instead of negotiating stakeholders (p. 15-16).

As mentioned in Chapter three, the cluster approach was not able to include national organisations and civil society effectively, thus most reports included in this thesis are authored or commissioned by public international organisations and international organisations and lack reports of national organisations and civil society. Although the importance of local capacities is often mentioned in these reports there is little data on the host-government, national organisations and civil society. This is especially true for the IFRC (2010), IFRC (2013) and the UN (2010). Nevertheless, Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006) have done multiple studies which included the Indonesian government, Indonesian organisations and the Indonesian population (p. 133). Furthermore, Hidalgo and Théodate (2011) have included 12 respondents of Haitian authorities, 67 respondents of Haitian organisations and 54 respondents of beneficiaries/affected populations during project visits in their semi-structured interviews. They often discuss how the Haitian population responded to developments regarding the coordination of disaster response (p. 18-19). Of all the authors, I find that Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton and Hidalgo and Théodate have presented the most complete view of the coordination of disaster response as they have paid the most attention to include as many different stakeholders as possible in their analyses. This made them able to address the coordination of disaster response from different perspectives and reveal interactions and practices better than most others. Still, I find that there should be a more inclusive account on host organisations and civil society which clearly presents the practices of these stakeholders together with their motivations and limits. Hidalgo and Théodate (2011) had planned a survey of the affected population's perceptions of the overall disaster response in Haiti that would give a considerable amount of data on civil society but the survey was cancelled (p. 20). I find that this is one of the most significant problems in current literature on the coordination of disaster response, which in turn also limits this thesis.

4.3.2. Organisation-centred perspective

Second, the lack of a thorough account of local disaster response of the Indian Ocean earthquake and the Haitian earthquake tends to drive focus on the data that is available. As a result, in the literature on the coordination of disaster response there is often attention paid to how aid recipients perceived international aid organisations, or how effective certain aid programs were for aid recipients. I argue that this point of view is not adequate for understanding the stakeholders within the humanitarian arenas as it only addresses aid recipients by bringing them in relation to other stakeholders, while aid recipients are not addressed as independent stakeholders. Attention should be given to how aid recipients have acted during disaster response with and without international organisations to develop a complete view of the stakeholders that were present within the humanitarian arenas.

An organisation-centred perspective is apparent in most literature. Coles, Zhuang and Yates (2012) recognised their organisation-centred perspective themselves; they studied

partnerships between organisations during disaster relief, identified public international organisations, international organisations, local organisations and civil society but stated that they performed their research from the perspective of “American relief organisations” (p. 72). Nolte, Martin and Boenigk (2012) also identify important stakeholders but based their analysis on a survey of 291 aid workers who functioned in a cluster of the cluster approach and responded to the Haitian earthquake (p. 708). This also influences the perspective of the authors and gives their analysis an organisation-centred character. Altay and Labonte (2014) recognise that the evaluations they used for their research were written from Western and international non-governmental organisation bias (p. 59). This was the case for most literature on the coordination of disaster response, including this thesis. One of Arroyo’s (2014) goals is: “(...) to illustrate the importance of not idealizing concepts of ‘community’ or ‘participation’ and to recognize capacities as well as limitations and diversity of local actors” (p.113). Arroyo presents an inclusive overview of the stakeholders within the humanitarian arena, but also writes from an organisation-oriented perspective, especially from the perspective of an international organisation. Consequently, Arroyo is not able to address the full capacities of Haitian organisations and civil society and is mostly discussing how the international organisations should have behaved differently in the humanitarian system. Zoraster (2006) is better in the analysis as the focus is more evenly divided over the different stakeholders and are regarded as independent and capable, although I find that civil society deserves more attention. The UN (2010), The IFRC (2010) and the IFRC (2013) are understandably organisation-centred as their main goal is to evaluate or present the coordination of disaster response of itself. All three reports could have a stronger focus on the other stakeholders though, as it would give a better idea on how stakeholders related to each other. Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006) criticise the way how the international humanitarian system is structured and how local capacities have been neglected. They also cite the TEC Needs Assessment Report: “Too often, situation reports and assessments served the interest or mandate of the assessing agency more than those of the potential beneficiaries” (p. 47). However, Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006) themselves mainly adopt an organisation-centred perspective instead of regarding stakeholders as capable. Hidalgo and Théodate (2011) succeed best in moving away from an organisation-centred perspective towards a more neutral perspective. They present multiple accounts of the Haitian government, Haitian organisation and civil society and treat them as capable stakeholders.

4.3.3. Little insight in the interactions between stakeholders

Third, Altay and Labonte (2014) state that many evaluations they found were selective and were mainly concerned with the organisation that issued the evaluation itself (p. 59). I agree with Altay and Labonte’s argument as most evaluations I encountered had a similar character, including the UN (2010), IFRC (2010) and IFRC (2013) in which interaction with other stakeholders was mentioned but rarely thoroughly addressed. An example of this is the IFRC (2013) who mentions the Irish Red Cross Society who ‘supported’ an Indonesian radio programme that provided information on developments of disaster response (p. 288). The IFRC does not address what kind of support was given exactly and does not assess how this interaction was perceived. The UN is more inclusive as it mentions how different stakeholders within the cluster approach participated in coordinative efforts, but the UN still does not critically assess how this interaction was perceived by all the stakeholders. I find that Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006) and Hidalgo and Théodate (2011) do focus much more on the interactions between all the stakeholders and assess them critically, revealing the strengths of the relations between the stakeholders that interacted with each other. Zoraster (2006), Arroyo (2014) and Altay and Labonte (2014) are also able to reveal these relationships although their accounts are less complete than those of Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton and Hidalgo and

Théodate as Zoraster, Arroyo and Altay and Labonte are much more specific, and do not aim to present an overview of every aspect of the coordination of disaster response. Still, a detailed overview of the coordination mechanisms that were present in Indonesia and Haiti would be useful to reveal the interactions between stakeholders while such an account is currently lacking in the literature.

4.3.4. Victimisation and disregard of capacities

Fourth, as seen in Chapter three, early response in Indonesia and Haiti has generally been provided by national organisations and civil society that were on site. The victimisation⁹ of disaster affected stakeholders was nevertheless very present as organisations imposed their policies on the aid recipients instead of taking a role where it assisted the existing institutions in the country involved. Victimising those affected by the disaster strips them of their capacities as capable stakeholders. Apart from organisations that disregarded local capacities, the victimisation of local capacities is also present in literature on the coordination of disaster response. The IFRC (2010) points to the issue of Haitians who stay in camps for too long while these people have better options to go to (p. 10). As a consequence, the IFRC argues that it must be clear who should receive aid and that aid motivates people to stay in camps while there are better options. Following this thought, the IFRC knows what the best options are for the Haitian population instead of the Haitian population itself which is a view I do not agree with. The Haitian population should be regarded as capable stakeholders who negotiate their access, legitimacy and practice actively, are able to assess their own needs and make sense of the context in which they live. Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006) support this view on the host-population and acknowledge that they are capable stakeholders moving to resources instead of waiting for assistance (p. 50).

Throughout different literature the local capacities seem to be highly regarded by academics, public international organisations and international organisations. The UN (2010) states that it gave civil society and Haitian organisations a prominent role in rebuilding its communities (p. 21). This does not seem to cohere with other literature, as multiple authors argue that local capacities were undermined (Arroyo, 2014, p. 118) (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. 51) (Grünwald & Renaudin, 2010, p. 34-37) (Telford & Cosgrave, 2007, p. 22) (Hidalgo & Théodate, 2011, p. 32-37). I feel that the IFRC and the UN often acknowledge the importance of local capacities but struggle to implement this in practice.

4.3.5. Transition between response phase and recovery phase

Fifth, the transition between the disaster response phase and the recovery phase is little discussed in literature and not always thoroughly addressed. As mentioned in Chapter one, the response phase and the recovery phase can exist together. However, there is also a transition from phase to phase. I find that stakeholders and the literature must take the transition phase into account in order for the coordination of disaster response to be effective from the beginning to the end. Understanding the transition phase strengthens the ability of the stakeholders to decrease or increase humanitarian action to the appropriate needs. A clear example of the transition phase can be found in Indonesia where shelter was needed. During the disaster response phase this entailed setting up temporary shelter and during the recovery phase it concerned the reconstruction of permanent housing. Throughout its report, the IFRC (2013) mentions transitional shelter multiple times and depicts this as a form of shelter that sits between ad-hoc temporary shelter and permanent housing (p. 42). The IFRC indicates that transition was slow but it does not address transition on other levels than shelter. In the IFRC

⁹ By victimisation I mean the way in which the disaster affected stakeholders were framed as helpless, incapable victims by other stakeholders.

report the transition between response and recovery is only mentioned a few times and is under-represented in comparison to the transition from recovery to development (p. 34, 236, 287). Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006) argue that : “The gap between relief and recovery that commonly appears in disaster response was avoided” (p. 18). Here, they refer to the gap of funding that often appears during the transition from disaster response to recovery (Telford, Cosgrave & Houghton, 2006, p. 71). Nevertheless, Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton state that the coordination of the transition to disaster response and recovery had been weak (p. 62) and elaborate on this. Additionally, they present recommendations for the future (p. 119, 123). Hidalgo and Théodate (2012) address transition much more often and recognise its importance, although they do point out that it should be given more attention by stakeholders (p. 22-23). I find that both Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton and Hidalgo and Théodate are able to present transition clearly and show what role stakeholders have had in the transition from disaster response to recovery. Other reports such as those of the IFRC (2010), IFRC (2013) and the UN (2010) lack this inclusiveness. In my opinion, authors such as Zoraster (2006) and Arroyo (2014) are aware of the transition from disaster response to recovery and address it accordingly. Zoraster mentions the transition period when pointing to over-staffing in field hospitals in Indonesia (p. 16) and Arroyo discusses the removal of latrines that had not been maintained (p. 111-112). Altay and Labonte (2014) do not pay as much attention to the transition period however, although I think humanitarian information management and exchange which they discuss can have a significant role during transition as it could facilitate coordination efforts between stakeholders.

4.3.6. Lack of detail of the coordination of disaster response

Sixth, I find that several reports of the different stakeholders adopted a fairly vague terminology when describing their own practices and their interaction with other stakeholders. For example, the IFRC (2013) mentions that regular meetings were held with governments, international organisations and UN bodies in Indonesia, but the IFRC does not clearly show how these meetings have impacted the coordination of disaster response and how the stakeholders of these meetings interacted with each other (p. 26). Further in the IFRC report accountability guidelines and measures are discussed but I do not find that the IFRC addresses the issue thoroughly (p. 37-38). Although the IFRC reflects on its actions by presenting that: “there was a lack of a clear accountability culture in the IFRC” (p.138), it does not give a detailed account of what constituted the accountability issue. As one of the main goals of the IFRC report is to draw lessons from the experiences that followed from the Indian Ocean earthquake I argue that the IFRC should be more detailed in describing the processes that were important for the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response (p. 8).

I find that the IFRC report that addressed the Haitian earthquake is more descriptive than its Indonesian counterpart. It has to be noted that the Haitian report is a one-year progress report in comparison to the Indonesian report which was completed nine years after the Indian Ocean earthquake. Nevertheless, the IFRC could have analysed the data that was available more critically. The IFRC (2010) argues that: “This is the first Federation-wide public report in the proposed series of reports that will allow us to monitor progress over time and to account for the funds raised for the relief and recovery work in Haiti” (p. 5) and that: “The intention is to report the combined achievements that are the most representative of National Societies’ efforts” (p. 5). If the IFRC wants to present an inclusive report of its coordination of disaster response while being accountable towards its donors I find that they should position themselves more critically and address the difficulties that arose better. I feel that Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006) and Hidalgo and Théodate (2012) succeed in their reports in assuming a critical attitude as they identify successes, gaps and limitations of the

coordination of disaster response. I find that Zoraster (2006), Arroyo (2014) and Altay and Labonte (2014) also accomplish this.

4.4. Conclusion

In the following section I will explain how the coordination of disaster response was shaped by negotiations within the humanitarian arenas. Second, I will summarise the findings of the analysis of the literature.

The humanitarian arenas show that the standards to gain access to disaster response were low and when the coordination of disaster response began to take form, local organisations and civil society found it more difficult to gain access to disaster response. Standards for being legitimate to provide disaster response were low as well, as there was no powerful mechanism or entity that was able to hold stakeholders accountable and that was able to determine whether stakeholders were legitimate or not. Ultimately, the practice of disaster response was mainly determined by local organisations and civil society in the beginning, but as time passed international organisations became more influential. However, organisations were not only providing disaster response based on needs but they were negotiating in a highly political environment to provide forms of disaster response that emerged from a combination of fulfilling the needs of aid recipients, realising a positive image towards the media, maintaining relationships with donors and being a viable organisation. In general, the negotiation of access, legitimacy and practice was effectively done by international organisations and public international organisations, while host-country governments, host-country organisations and civil society struggled to negotiate a powerful position in the humanitarian arena. Although local stakeholders had been providing and coordinating disaster response in the early phase, their ability to do so diminished after the international humanitarian response gained grounding in the area.

The concept of the humanitarian arena corresponds well with Zoraster (2006), Hidalgo and Théodate (2012), Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006) Altay and Labonte (2014) and Arroyo (2014). Especially Hidalgo and Théodate (2012), Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton (2006) present stakeholders clearly and pay attention to access, legitimacy and practice. The concept of the humanitarian arena is less applicable to the UN (2010), IFRC (2010) and the IFRC (2013) as they fail to address most stakeholders and lack detailed information on the processes regarding the coordination of disaster response. However, by using the concept of the humanitarian arena these limitations came forward which I found valuable for critically assessing the coordination of disaster response and its stakeholders

Using discourse analysis, I argue that the literature fails to address all the power relations that are present in the humanitarian arenas. Often, the authors discuss issues from the perspective of international organisations and public international organisations while omitting or under-exposing the government, national organisations and civil society. The language of the main discourse in literature on the coordination of disaster response and in the humanitarian field itself has to change in order to understand the context and to practice the coordination of disaster response effectively and efficiently. Additionally, the victimisation and disregard of local capacities is present in various literature sources. I criticise the manner in which many organisations have involved and positioned themselves and have treated civil society. When international humanitarian organisations look at governments and countries as a whole it would be wrong to regard them as incapable stakeholders. Although the importance of local knowledge is often stressed in the language of humanitarian organisations it is not reflected in practice. Consequently, the language of the current discourse in the international humanitarian system needs to be coherent with practice. Furthermore, there is little data on the host-country government, host-country organisations and civil society, there are few accounts of interaction between stakeholders, there is little attention given to the transition

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between the response and recovery phase and there is a lack of detail of the coordination of disaster response found in the literature. In order to have a full understanding of how the coordination of disaster response is shaped, these issues should be addressed.

5. Chapter Five: Conclusion

5.1. Introduction

In this final chapter I will summarise all the findings from the previous chapters and answer the main research question: ‘How was the effectivity of disaster response shaped by negotiations within the humanitarian arenas?’ Additionally, I will provide recommendations for future coordination of disaster response with the help of current literature. Ultimately, I will present areas in which further research could be done to address current gaps in the literature on the coordination of disaster response. I will argue that asymmetrical power relations within the humanitarian arenas resulted in that international organisations were most successful in the negotiation process while local stakeholders were not. As the context in which these international organisations operated was fragmented, as there was a lack of a strong accountability mechanism and a governing body, and because of inadequate needs assessments, the negotiations within the humanitarian arenas had a negative influence on the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response. Additionally, I will argue that most of the literature adopts an organisation-centred perspective and fails to address the power relations within the humanitarian arenas.

5.2. How negotiations have shaped the effectiveness of disaster response

To answer the main question I have to recapture the results of the analyses in the previous chapters first.

In Chapter two I have given an overview of the players in the humanitarian arenas to assess who negotiates and what their roles were in the humanitarian arenas, which improves the understanding of the humanitarian arenas. I have argued that the similarities between the two cases revealed some valuable characteristics of the coordination of disaster response, although the stakeholders in both humanitarian arenas were different from each other on some issues. Life-saving efforts were almost solely performed by the local stakeholders such as groups within civil society and host-country organisations that were on-site in Indonesia and Haiti. The national capacities of Indonesia and Haiti also had a large role in providing disaster response. Armed forces were generally involved at the start of the disaster response phase while the UN was involved throughout the whole disaster response phase. Additionally, there was an incredibly large amount of international organisations that became involved with the response to both disasters, which were of many different types and interests. This added to the complexity of the humanitarian arenas. Another similarity that was revealed was the great amount of coordination mechanisms in which different stakeholders operated. This made the humanitarian arenas even more complex.

In Chapter three I have looked at the influences on the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response. This helped to understand the relation between the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response and the negotiations within the humanitarian arenas. I argued that there were five major influences on the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response. First, the coordination of disaster response did not progress effectively because of the structural problems in Indonesia and Haiti. Second, the disasters themselves had destroyed much of the capacities in Indonesia and Haiti that were tasked with the coordination of disaster response, which caused further complications. Third, the large amount of international organisations that became involved with disaster response put even more pressures on the coordination of disaster response. Fourth, inadequate needs assessments due to the exclusion of local capacities decreased the effectivity of the coordination of disaster response. Last, the fragmentation of the international humanitarian system due to the lack of a strong accountability mechanism prevented the possibility of a unified coordination of disaster response.

In Chapter four I have explained how the negotiations within the humanitarian arenas have shaped the coordination of disaster response. I have argued that there were uneven power relations between the stakeholders within the humanitarian arenas which made it possible for most international organisations and public international organisations to negotiate access, legitimacy and practice of the coordination of disaster response successfully, while the host-country governments, host-country organisations and civil societies were considerably less powerful in the negotiation process. The conditions such as the lack of a strong coordination mechanism and the lack of a governing body further increased the unequal allocation of power. This allocation resulted in the coordination of disaster response which was mainly formed by the international humanitarian system.

When critically analysing the literature I found that there was too little information on local and host-country stakeholders, interactions, the transition between response phase and recovery phase. I also stated that some accounts such as the UN (2010) and the IFRC (2010, 2013) lacked in detail. Furthermore, I identified that there was often an organisation-centred perspective in the literature, there was a tendency to victimise those affected by the disaster and local capacities were undermined. Through discourse-analysis I came to the conclusion that current literature on the coordination of disaster response struggles with addressing all the power relations within the humanitarian arenas. Additionally, the literature is biased as it often has an organisation-centred perspective. I do not argue that all the literature is inadequate but rather find that there is a general trend visible that fails to address these power relations. Some literature sources may be relatively competent and others may be struggling to identify power relations within the humanitarian arena, but I find that all of the literature sources have difficulty with accounting for at least one of my points of criticism.

Now that I have summarised all the findings of this thesis I am able to answer the main research question: 'How was the effectiveness of coordination of disaster response shaped by negotiations within the humanitarian arenas that formed around the Indian Ocean earthquake of 2004 in Indonesia and the Haitian earthquake of 2010 in Haiti?' The humanitarian arenas in Indonesia and Haiti in which negotiations found place were both increasingly complex and the stakeholders that found themselves in these arenas were very different from each other, varying in size and quality. The conditions in which these stakeholders operated, being a lack of a strong accountability mechanism and the lack of a governing body, made it possible that unexperienced and incapable stakeholders were able to negotiate access to coordinate disaster response. Additionally, international and public international stakeholders performed inadequate needs assessment as they disregarded local capacities and local knowledge. Moreover, the international humanitarian system in which these stakeholders operated was highly fragmented which further diffused the coordination of disaster response. In combination with an unequal allocation of the power relations within the humanitarian arenas, the negotiations of the international organisations and public international organisations shaped the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response while the other stakeholders had little influence in the negotiation process. As the international organisations and public international organisations had powerful positions in the humanitarian arenas although they varied widely in quality, failed to account for local capacities and local knowledge, and were part of a fragmented system full of failing coordination mechanisms, the coordination of disaster response was not functioning effectively. This increased the difficulty to save lives, as well as to aid the people who were in need for help.

5.3. Recommendations for future disaster response

Valuable lessons can be drawn from the experiences of the Indian Ocean Earthquake and the Haitian earthquake and recommendations can be given for future coordination of

disaster response efforts. First, there is a need for an effective accountability mechanism which has power that extends from a local to a global level. As seen in Chapter three and four organisations are able to participate in the coordination of disaster response without any repercussions for their actions which in turn affects the overall effectivity of the coordination of disaster response. Telford and Cosgrave (2007) argue that: “The international relief system should establish an accreditation and certification system to distinguish agencies that work to a professional standard in a particular sector” (p. 23). Zoraster (2006) adds to this and recognises that the Indonesian health sector needed a credentialing system in order to realise accountability among organisations (p. 16). Without a functioning and powerful accountability mechanism the effectivity of the coordination of disaster response will be limited by processes such as poaching and competition among projects. Furthermore, stakeholders who want to participate must be assessed beforehand because access to coordinate disaster response must be based on quality. From the examples of Indonesia and Haiti it became apparent that the quality of various organisations was not adequate.

Second, for an effective coordination of disaster response a unified international humanitarian system must be formed. Hidalgo and Théodate (2011) state that there was a lack of an overall coordination system of disaster response and opt for a reform of the current coordination system (p. 36-37, 47). This is in the same line of thinking as that of Telford and Cosgrave (2007) who argue that: “All actors should strive to increase their disaster response capacities and to improve the linkages and coherence between themselves and other actors in the international disaster response system, including those from the affected countries themselves” (p. 23). I agree with Hidalgo and Théodate and Telford and Cosgrave as resources would be used more efficiently and needs and damage assessments could be more extensive.

It is important to note that these recommendations do not imply that there exists a single approach to perfectly coordinate disaster response but rather, the aim is to have an international humanitarian system that is able to adjust to the context in which it has to operate, is able to take a supportive role instead of imposing its policies on those it aids, and has an effective and efficient way of doing so. There is no single solution to a disaster as no disaster is exactly the same.

5.4. Need for further research

It is clear that there were gaps within the literature on the coordination of disaster response. There was especially little data on the host-country government, host-country organisations and civil society. To address these gaps I argue that different research should be done in the future. First, I find that ethnographic research would be valuable to address the different groups within civil society as it studies the social space of its participants to understand human groups (Madden, 2010, p. 16). A more inclusive account of civil society would help to gain a better understanding of the negotiation of the coordination of disaster response. Additionally, surveys among the host-country population should be conducted to gain insight in how people perceived and were related to the coordination of disaster response. Second, extensive studies on host-country governments and host-country organisations should be done that are able to reveal the capacities and interests of those stakeholders.

In my opinion, further study to the coordination of disaster response is crucial for improving the ability of stakeholders to save lives and aid those in need. As I have shown, current systems have to be changed and gaps have to be addressed to increase the effectiveness of the coordination of disaster response. I strongly hope we can realise this in the near future.

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Appendices

Appendix A: The cluster approach in response to the Haitian earthquake of 2010




Figure 3. Coordination Architecture in the Cluster Approach (Humanitarian Response, 2016).

Figure 3 presents all the main stakeholders involved with the cluster approach. These stakeholders will all be explained following the definition presented by OCHAs informational platform website for humanitarian response (Humanitarian Response, 2016). As mentioned in Chapter two, OCHA coordinates between clusters. Additionally, OCHA also works with the lead organisations of the global clusters. The Emergency Relief Coordinator oversees disasters where the UN provides humanitarian assistance while it also leads the IASC and appoints the Humanitarian Coordinator if they find this is necessary. The IASC mainly has a governing role as it devises policies and monitors the development of disaster response. The Humanitarian Coordinator determines if international disaster response is necessary and it is responsible for the organisation of disaster response. The Human Coordinator is held accountable by the Emergency Relief Coordinator and works together with the Humanitarian Country Team to decide which organisations will be assigned to which clusters. The Humanitarian Country Team consists of representatives of different international organisations and is tasked with overseeing and aligning humanitarian action. Next, the Global Cluster Lead Agency supports disaster response by providing resources such as experts and technical tools, while the Cluster Lead Agency leads and manages the cluster. The aim is to work together with host-country government and host-country organisations if this is possible. Finally, the Cluster Coordinators are responsible for information sharing and for reporting the cluster’s challenges with the Humanitarian Country Team.

NEGOTIATIONS OF THE COORDINATION OF DISASTER RESPONSE

In response to the Haitian earthquake, the Humanitarian Country Team realised twelve clusters and two sub-clusters: “Camp Coordination and Camp Management (led by IOM); Education (UNICEF/Save the Children); Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items (IFRC, then handed over to UN-Habitat in August 2010); Food Aid (WFP); Logistics (WFP); Nutrition (UNICEF); Protection (OHCHR, UNICEF for Child Protection and UNFPA for GBV); WASH (UNICEF); Agriculture (FAO) and Food Aid(WFP); Early Recovery (UNDP); Emergency Telecommunications(WFP); and Health (WHO)” (Hidalgo & Théodate, 2012, p.72). When possible, the Haitian government linked ministries to clusters in order for the cluster to be led by the ministry together with the Cluster Lead Agency.