# Fragmentation of global forest governance and its consequences

## The case of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests

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*"The work of an intellectual is not to mould the political will of others; it is, through the analyses that he does in his own field, to re-examine evidence and assumptions, to shake up habitual ways of working and thinking, to dissipate conventional familiarities, to re-evaluate rules and institutions and to participate in the formation of a political will (where he has his role as citizen to play)."*

Michel Foucault

# Executive summary

The web of organizations in global forest governance is complex and fragmented. Globally, a lot of different organizations are working towards Sustainable Forest Management. Fourteen of them came together in the Collaborative Partnership on Forests.

This research explores the possible lack of coordination of the fragmentation in global forest governance. The aim is to clarify the division of labour among the members of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests and to explore possible consequences for its principal function to enhance international cooperation and coordination in global forest governance.

The Collaborative Partnership on Forests' division of labour is assessed on its synergistic, cooperative and decentralized nature to be able to derive consequences. This is done by looking at the different mandates of all its 14 members to find out if they focus predominantly on the environmental, social or economic aspects of forests. The gaps and overlaps among the partnership's members are complemented by revealing the responsibility taken for four main governance tasks: knowledge building, norm building, capacity building and rule enforcement. Based on the synergistic, cooperative and decentralized elements of the fragmentation and responsibility taken for tasks and views, the research explores different possible consequences of the current division of labour for the partnership's function to enhance coordination and cooperation among its members.

Regarding its division of labour, the Collaborative Partnership on Forests seems to have a main focus on the environmental aspects of forests, especially on climate change. A gap exist on the rule enforcement of the norms built among its member organizations. Overlap exists on knowledge and capacity building, especially on building financial capacity. The Collaborative Partnership on Forests is mostly coordinated as a loose network of organizations with some decentralized elements. The latter are mostly shown in the creation and use of financial resources.

Although uncertainty exist on the causal relationship, observed consequences within the Collaborative Partnership on Forests are competition over resources and small group dynamics. The latter can be in- and out-group rivalry and the increasing importance of leadership. Concluding, decentralized elements in the division of labour lead more often to negative consequences.

It is recommended to go into more depth on the causal relationship of a fragmented division of labour and its consequences as most policy makers feel they can influence this more than its causes. More research can moreover be done on competition as this can be either a cause, consequence and something triggering other consequences. Finally, institutional interaction cannot be researched without taking the agency of representatives and power differences into account. In future research this should be included.

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# Acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| CBD | UN Convention on Biological Diversity |
| CIFOR | Center for International Forestry Research |
| CPF | Collaborative Partnership on Forests |
| DESA | Department of Economics and Social Affairs (UN) |
| ECOSOC | Economic and Social Council of the United Nations |
| FAO | United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization |
| FRA | Global Forest Resources Assessment |
| GEF | Global Environmental Facility |
| IAF | International Arrangements on Forests |
| ICRAF | World Agroforestry Center |
| ITFF | Inter-agency Task Force on Forests |
| ITTA | International Tropical Timber Agreement |
| ITTO | International Tropical Timber Organization |
| IUCN | International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources |
| IUFRO | International Union of Forest Research Organizations |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| MRV | Measurement, Review and Verification |
| NGO | Non-governmental organization |
| NLBI | Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests |
| PROFOR | Programme on Forests under the World Bank |
| REDD+ | Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, and foster conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. |
| SFM | Sustainable Forest Management |
| UNCCD | United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment Programme |
| UNFCCC | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change |
| UNFF | United Nations Forum on Forests |
| UNFF 11 | 11th session of the United Nations Forum on Forests |
| UNGA | United Nations General Assembly |

# 1. Introduction: UN´s forest labyrinth?

Did you ever have the problem of working together on an ambitious project and you lost sight of what your hard working team members were doing to reach your common goal? Or did you ever have the pleasure of working in a team in which tasks were clearly divided and communication among the team members went smoothly? Unfortunately the first situation is happens in large scale, especially in global governance, the United Nations (UN) labyrinth is complex (Malloch-Brown, 2015)[1]. Of course there are differences with the example of personal cooperation at work as more actors are involved and they are organized in different institutions, instruments, organizations and these may have goals difficult to reconcile. What would happen if we dreamt out loud, clearly divided tasks among organizations and their communication is excellent? In other words, what would happen if we would have a map of the labyrinth?

This research tries to see the opportunity in the complexity of global forest governance. As forests have effects and are affected at multiple levels and are by nature cross-sectoral, a number of institutions are involved. All these institutions can specialize in one or multiple components of forest governance which creates opportunity. Specialization generally increases the quality of the work. Initiatives to create a top-down forest regime had no success (Howlett et al., 2011) as forest governance on a global level is a blend of international agreements with different public and private actors involved. Although it is difficult to match forest related issues institutionally (Reischl, 2012), solutions should therefore be found in the existing system, trying to synchronize all institutions available.

This research focusses on one of the few partnerships including organisations and instruments with universal or nearly universal membership, the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF). Their division of labour is mapped out to be able to find what nature their interactions have. Both the positive and negative consequences of the fragmentation in their task division are explored.

To be able to derive these consequences, more detailed information is needed and the research is therefore split in three steps. First, the gaps and overlaps of governance tasks and mandates will be shown. Second, this division of labour will be assessed on either its cooperative, synergistic or conflictive elements (Biermann, Pattberg, van Asselt, & Zelli, 2009). Third, this will be followed by the observed consequences of the CPF's fragmentation for fulfilling its principal function to enhance international cooperation and coordination.

## 1.1 Problem statement

Before the Rio convention in 1992, forest aspects were mostly dealt with by forest specialists who made forests, and its international problem-solving largely sectoral. During that time the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the UN played an incredibly large role in international forest governance. More forest organizations and instruments were established before the Rio convention, examples are International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) of the International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO), the International Union of Forest Research Organizations (IUFRO), the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of wild fauna and flora (CITES), the

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[1] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/11699243/The-UN-is-an-under-funded-bureaucratic-labyrinth-and-a-force-for-good-in-the-world.html

International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) among other conservation focused Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). At the Rio Summit however, the need for an international high political forum for dealing with forest related problems was felt. Due to the complication and multiplicity of forest aspects only in 1995 at the third session of the commission on sustainable development, the Intergovernmental Programme on Forests and Intergovernmental Forum on Forests processes started. This was decided with full awareness of forest processes already existing in the UN framework. Three years later, in 1998, a UN task force recommended stronger cooperation between multilateral environmental institutions and to facilitate synergies and promote policy coherence (United Nations General Assembly, 1998). The United Nations were aware of the increasing fragmentation within their system. The first reaction they gave to this knowledge was to establish the Joint Liaison Group in 2001 between the three Rio conventions UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), UN Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). This group aims to exchange information, explore opportunities for synergistic activities and increase coordination (UNFCCC, CBD, & UNCCD, 2001, para. 42(d)) on a broader level, not only on forests.

A second reaction to the increasing fragmentation in the UN system was the establishment of the International Arrangement on Forests in 2001. The International Arrangement on Forests is an informal term for all actors involved in the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF). The International Arrangements on Forests consists of several different elements of which the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) is an important one. The International Arrangements on Forests and the CPF will be explained briefly below and more in detail in chapter 3.

Before these formations also other inter-institutional arrangements on the topic of forests existed for some years. UNDP for example launched its Programme on Forests (PROFOR) in 1997, which is now taken over by the World Bank. Moreover the Interagency Task Force on Forests, as a precursor of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) was supporting the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests and Intergovernmental Forum on Forests processes (Hoogeveen et al., 2014). As there was awareness about possible overlap, the purpose of these arrangements was to secure harmony and cooperation. This is still the case for the International Arrangement on Forests and its CPF. CPF's goal it is to enhance cooperation and coordination among all its 14 members[2] (CPF, 2013; ECOSOC, 2000). The relationship between the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) and other elemental institutions part of the International Arrangement on Forests and the forest governance complex is a major contentious issue and is currently addressed in a new resolution which was negotiated during the 11th session of the UNFF (ECOSOC, 2015). During this session negotiators agreed that fragmentation should be avoided (opening statements UNFF 11 by e.g. Turkey, Norway, Brazil, FAO researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 1, interview country delegate 5). In this research the focus will nog lie on how to avoid it but on embracing its existence (Howlett et al., 2011; IUFRO, 2011).

The CPF is credited as one of the most successful partnerships (Hoogeveen et al., 2014; Mankin, 2004, p. 3) and as an effective mechanism (Humphreys, 2006). Nevertheless, it has been criticized due to concerns over transparency (Hoogeveen et al., 2014; Mankin, 2004) and the existing rivalry among some of its members as well as other forest related agencies (Hoogeveen et al., 2014; Mankin, 2004). The rivalry has attracted some political attention which has led to less financial

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[2] The 14 members of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests: CIFOR, CBD, FAO, GEF, ITTO, IUCN, IUFRO, UNCCD, UNDP, UNEP, UNFF, UNFCCC, ICRAF and the World Bank.

resources for the UNFF secretariat as well as common CPF work. It has also led to decreased interests in the fulfilment of common objectives among its members (Hoogeveen et al., 2014). The extent to which this conflictive interaction is happening, its causes and its consequences are poorly documented in literature (Alter & Meunier, 2009, p. 13). This is partly due to the insecurities and uncertainties in creating causal relationships with fragmentation. Also the tendency of international relations scholars to focus on the origin instead of the implementation of international norms might have resulted in a focus on causes of regime complexity (Alter & Meunier, 2009). Policy makers are however more interested in the implementation and consequences as they have a general feeling being better able to influence these than the causes. This is why this research focusses on the consequences of fragmentation rather than the causes.

There is a lack of clarity on what the nature and its consequences of the institutional fragmentation of global forest governance exactly are. A research gap is the lack of information on consequences of regime fragmentation. This is problematic as most policy and decision makers feel they can change few causes of global forest governance´s fragmentation, consequences are easier addressed. When however, there is no research available to support these actions, policy makers stand with empty hands. Hence, this research tries to contribute to filling this gap. Therefore researching this in the threefold manner as described above: first finding the gaps and overlaps in the division of labour, second finding the synergistic, cooperative and decentralized/conflictive elements in their division of labour and their interaction and third exploring its consequences. Below I will briefly describe why it is important to research all three aspects to come to a full conclusion.

Mapping out the gaps and overlaps in CPF's division of labour goes a long way in enhancing the cooperation, an important aim of CPF's existence. By creating clarity on governance tasks institutions take upon them and the forest aspects they are focusing on, gaps and overlaps will be assessed. Researching the gaps and overlaps in mandates is moreover relevant to realizing the International Arrangements on Forests' global objectives on forests, as these can be linked to either the broad focus on different forest aspects and governance tasks. Global objective 2 is to enhance forest-based economic, social and environmental benefits, including improving the livelihoods of forest dependent people (ECOSOC, 2006).

Finding nature of the fragmentation in the interactions between the CPF members is an intermediate step. These interactions are influenced by the gaps and overlaps in their division of labour. From this nature consequences can be easier derived than directly from the division of CPF's tasks and mandates. This is elaborated upon in the conceptual framework in chapter two.

All these steps can give information on how to continue with an International Arrangement on Forests beyond 2015. This was discussed on at the 11th session of the UNFF which took place from four to 15 May 2015 at the UN headquarters in New York. As a preparation for the 11th session of the UNFF and as agreed upon in 2006, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the International Arrangements on Forests has been done. My research contributes to the conclusions made in this report (ECOSOC, 2006; Hoogeveen et al., 2014). I also hope to supply some clarity which could help setting priorities in the cooperation of the CPF.

## 1.2 Research questions
This research will be focussed on two specializations to assess the nature of the fragmentation. First of all the CPF members will be researched on their specialization in various regulatory subsets or

sectors (Oberthür & Pożarowska, 2013) related to forests, in other words the focus on a specific or multiple forest values represented in their strategy, mandate or actions. Another specialization institutions in global governance can focus on is the task or function they take up towards their common goal (Oberthür & Pożarowska, 2013; Reischl, 2012; Stokke & Oberthür, 2011; Visseren-Hamakers, Arts, & Glasbergen, 2011; Zürn & Faude, 2013). Afterwards the consequences of the nature of the fragmentation will be explored using the little research available (Alter & Meunier, 2009; Thomas Gehring & Oberthür, 2006; Reischl, 2012; Rosendal, 2001; Zelli & van Asselt, 2013) and the data obtained during i.e. the attendance of the 11th session of the UNFF.

These steps lead to answering the following research questions.

General research question:

*What is the nature of the fragmentation in the Collaborative Partnership on Forests and what consequences does this have for fulfilling its principal function to enhance international cooperation and coordination?*

Specific research questions:

1. What is the nature of the fragmentation in the CPF?
    a. What forest aspects are CPF's members focused on and which gaps and overlaps exist?
    b. What governance tasks are done by CPF's members and which gaps and overlaps exist?
2. What elements in the nature of the interactions between CPF members are synergistic, cooperative or conflictive, and why?
3. What are the consequences of such fragmentation for fulfilling CPF´s principal function to enhance international cooperation and coordination?

## 1.3 Methodology

To be able to answer the research questions above, different kinds of data and data sources were used. Via interviews with policy officers and employees of CPF members as well as from country delegates and other experts, data was gathered. I aimed to have a broad range of different respondents corresponding with the different specializations institutions can have according to the conceptual framework in this paper, see chapter two. Contact with respondents was made and several different interviews and (unsolicited) oral accounts were arranged beforehand, at the 11th session of the UNFF conference in New York and via snowballing among other techniques. I considered a conversation longer than 15 minutes to be an interview. Shorter conversations I gathered under unsolicited oral accounts. In the table below you can find an overview of all 19 interviews I conducted.

TABLE 1 OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEWEES

| Interviewee | Place | Time |
|---|---|---|
| NGO1 | Via Skype | April 2015 |
| CPF employee 1 | 11th session UNFF | May 2015 |
| CPF employee 2 | 11th session UNFF | May 2015 |
| CPF employee 3 | 11th session UNFF | May 2015 |
| CPF employee 4 | 11th session UNFF | May 2015 |
| CPF employee 5 | 11th session UNFF | May 2015 |
| CPF employee 6 | Via phone | May 2015 |
| CPF employee 7 | 11th session UNFF | May 2015 |
| CPF employee 8 | 11th session UNFF | May 2015 |
| Country delegate 1 | 11th session UNFF | May 2015 |

| Country delegate 2 | 11<sup>th</sup> session UNFF | May 2015 |
|---|---|---|
| Country delegate 3 | 11th session UNFF | May 2015 |
| Country delegate 4 | 11th session UNFF | May 2015 |
| Country delegate 5 | 11th session UNFF | May 2015 |
| Country delegate 6 | 11th session UNFF | May 2015 |
| Expert/other stakeholder 1 | 11th session UNFF | May 2015 |
| Expert/other stakeholder 2 | 11th session UNFF | May 2015 |
| Expert/other stakeholder 3 | Via Skype | June 2015 |
| Expert/other stakeholder 4 | 11th session UNFF | May 2015 |

The interviews were supplemented with documents produced by the different CPF members or consultants. Among these documents are statements, presentations and reports by CPF members as well as assessment reports, especially the International Arrangement on Forests independent assessment report.

Interviews and documents are complemented with participatory observation at the 11th session of the UNFF and during my internship at the UNFF secretariat in 2013. This 11th session took place from the fourth until 15th of May 2015 at the UN headquarters in New York. Reviewing the effectiveness of the International Arrangement on Forests and consideration of all future options was part of the professional agenda of this 11th session (UNFF Secretariat, n.d.). I participated as part of the Major Group of Children and Youth and as an informal member of the Dutch delegation. Through this two-fold participation I was able to have a broad view on the development of the 11<sup>th</sup> session of the UNFF. I could act rather independent as both groups let me free to go and stand where I wanted.

An overview of the methods used can be found below.
- Literature study
    - scientific literature covering discussions on the use of initiatives to enhance cooperation;
    - scientific literature on the broader global forest governance;
    - online resources, mainly retrieved from the CPF's members' websites containing their strategies, mandates or more general statements retrieved from the UNFF website explaining their division of labour and opinions;
    - reports on the CPF and the independent assessment of the International Arrangements on Forests;
- UNFF jurisprudence to analyse the overlap of both forest aspect focus and governance tasks including texts of conventions, resolutions and ministerial declarations;
- Participant observation during the 11<sup>th</sup> session of the UNFF negotiations and from August to October 2013 in the UNFF secretariat to see particular patterns in communication happening to be able to analyse the consequences of institutional fragmentation;
- Written reports and notes taken while attending the 11<sup>th</sup> session of the UNFF and its daily Major Group meetings as well as the European Coordination and while doing my internship at the UNFF secretariat;
- 19 interviews complemented with unsolicited oral accounts with UNFF and other organisations' representatives, country delegates and global forest governance experts (i.e. "naturally occurring" conversations on the negotiation developments and the progress of the International Arrangements on Forests in general). I had many conversations and discussions with representatives about the developments of the negotiations. To be able to refer to the respondents without revealing their identity, they are clustered in four groups: NGO, CPF employees, country delegates and experts. Moreover they are all referred to in male personal pronouns although some of them are women.

**Limitations methods**

This far I implied that the methods used range from literature to interviews to participatory observation. There are also some limitations to the methodology of this research, especially the fact that this is a highly political arena to research.

Doing research one should always wonder where your information is coming from. This also counts for the interviewees. It could be questioned how free they were to say whatever they were saying, maybe restricted by their country's or organization's mandate. This could also be said about the other information used in the research. How independent is an independent assessment?

Although the methodology is neutral and based on other research, especially the participant observation part of my research is impossible to conduct without being limited by the two sided role as researcher and participant (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, pp. 97–98). As a former intern at the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) Secretariat, a member of two different delegations to the 11th session of the UNFF and having a personality that generally cares about the environment I was deeply involved in the research. This involvement gave me a good deal of inside information however has possibly influenced my research. Especially my background as young European woman, restricted me in finding an equal representation of interviewees. I did not have the chance to speak to a lot of non-Western representatives. This could be due to two reasons: 1) because they were not often in the negotiation rooms and 2) because the easiest access was via snowball sampling and my starting ball was European. This lead to the fact that I spoke mostly to Western respondents as I had contacts in the EU delegation and the Major Group of Children and Youth who mostly existed of Western students.

Additionally, the fact that some CPF members were not present, or not present for a longer period of time at the 11th session of the UNFF made that I couldn't speak to all members. This might have influenced the results. I took this into account, especially the generally Western perspective and hope its influence on the outcome of this research was limited.

I recognize that this research issue area is politically sensitive. I do not have the aim to push certain solutions to possible problems or recommendations but to give a clarification of the current division of labour and interaction among CPF members. Due to the above limitations in my methodology, the outcomes of this research might however highlight certain aspects more than others.

## 1.4 Roadmap to the thesis

This thesis will be structured as follows. The following chapter gives an explanation of the most important concepts and theories used. The concepts of institutional fragmentation and specialization in both forest aspect focus and governance tasks and will be exposed in a figure.

In chapter 3, a more elaborated history and context of global forest governance will be elaborated upon and the different actors will be introduced. Specifically,  the chapter will give an overall background on the International Arrangement on Forests, the UNFF as an international organisation and the CPF as a partnership including all its members and other involved actors.

Subsequently, chapter 4 will address the first specific research question. This chapter will go into detail on the gaps and overlaps in both forest aspect focus and governance tasks creating an

overview of the division of labour among the CPF institutions. Chapter 4 ends with a section answering the second question. The interactions among CPF's members are explored on their synergistic, cooperative or decentralized nature.

Chapter 5 explains the third question by presenting a description of the consequences of the defined gaps and overlaps observed during the time spent by the researcher in both the UNFF Secretariat and at the 11th session of the UNFF. The extent to which the gaps and overlaps are supporting or disturbing the enhancement of the international cooperation and coordination will be explored.

Finally, chapter 6 will discuss the results in its theoretical context and chapter 7 will give the conclusions of this thesis answering the main research question. This chapter will be divided into four parts: the answers to the research questions, some further theoretical insights, some recommendations for further research including a few policy recommendations and a final reflection.

# 2. Conceptual framework: Fragmented theories and concepts

This chapter is about to explain what is actually meant by the concepts that were already touched upon in the introduction. These will be elaborated upon in the chapters to come.

First the most important concepts will be defined and an explanation will be given on their use in this research. This is vital for analysing the data to be able to explore the task division among the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) members and its possible problematic consequences. Clarity about the concepts is necessary, also to be able to not only empirically contribute to the evaluation of the International Arrangement on Forests and its CPF but also theoretically contribute to research on the consequences of institutional fragmentation. Therefore an explanation of all concepts is included in this chapter. First, the concept of Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) will be described as it is important to know what the aim of all involved organisations is. Following an explanation of global forest governance as an institutional complex is given to clarify in what context organizations strive towards Sustainable Forest Management (SFM). To be able to analyse the nature of the fragmentation we need to clarify what we understand under the concept of fragmentation and how we analyse this, which is described below. Finally an overview is given of the research already done on the consequences of fragmentation.

## 2.1 Sustainable Forest Management

It is very hard to find a definition of Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) on which the world has agreed upon (FAO, n.d.-c; GEF, n.d.). The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) mentions that generally SFM "can be viewed as the sustainable use and conservation of forests with the aim of maintaining and enhancing multiple forest values through human interventions. People are at the centre of SFM because it aims to contribute to society's diverse needs in perpetuity" (FAO, n.d.-c). In this research the broad concept will be used as agreed upon in the United Nations General Assembly and is also used by the Global Environment Facility (GEF):

> SFM is a "*dynamic and evolving concept, which aims to maintain and enhance the economic, social and environmental values of all types of forests, for the benefit of present and future generations*" (GEF, n.d.; UNGA, 2008).

## 2.2 Global forest governance as an institutional complex

Although in this research the focus is on 14 predefined institutions who interact in the broader global forest governance, we first need to define what is actually meant by the latter. This immediately shows the debate on the existence of a forest regime. Current literature ranges from reference to 'no regime' to the existence of a 'non-regime' to a 'forest regime' to a 'forest regime complex':

- The no regime literature refers to the idea that no agreement on a legal framework on forests could be decided upon (yet) (Rayner, Humphreys, Welch, Prabhu, & Verkooijen, 2011) and is mostly used by international law scholars (Humphreys, 2006). Another reason for not using the term regime when referring to forests is the fact that it mostly only focusses on states. Some scholars are of the opinion that, especially in forest issues, it should include non-state actors such as business, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private financial institutions. In a broader definition of forest regime (Krasner, 1982, p. 186) these actors are included. The view of the no-regime literature is that to avoid confusion, reference to a (possible) regime should be avoided.
- Opposing academics refer to the inclusive definition of Krasner for arguments against no-regime literature. They argue that the existence of hard legal instruments such as the Convention on

Biodiversity (CBD), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), etc. create a forest regime. They also refer to soft law instruments like the Forest Principles as agreed upon at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the Non-legally binding instrument on all types of forests (Forest Instrument) under the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) and the existence of private international law existing within the Forest Stewardship Council.

- In contrast with the (no-)regime view there is also the non-regime view (Dimitrov, Sprinz, Digiusto, & Kelle, 2007) which lies in between and refers to the common understanding among involved institutions that "hollow" institutions and non-decisions are made (Dimitrov, 2005, p. 15). A non-regime can therefore be defined as "transnational policy arenas characterised by the absence of multilateral agreements for policy coordination among states" (Dimitrov et al., 2007, p. 231).

- There is also reference to an international forest regime complex. This can be seen as a set of specialized regimes and other governance arrangements that are more or less loosely linked together, either reinforcing each other and at other times overlapping and conflicting (Victor & Keohane, 2010). In the following paragraph the concept of institutional complex will be explained on the basis of the definition of a regime complex.

There is also a group of authors who avoid using the discussion on regime terminology. They prefer to use the broader concept of global forest governance as this includes, without confusion, the role of private actors and institutions (Giessen, 2013). As the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) includes several organisations who are not strictly working on the topic of forests, this research will use the issue related and wider perspective on forests (Giessen, 2013), referring to global forest governance.

To be able to research the institutional complexity of global forest governance a definition of an institutional complex is needed. As most issue areas in global governance are affected by more than one institution, a broad range of definitions is available. In this research an institutional complex will be based on the definition of a regime complex and will be defined as "a set of two or more international institutions that are interdependent and as such interact to co-govern a particular issue area in international relations" (Oberthür & Pożarowska, 2013). Institutional complexes include both international regimes and organizations and is thus in this matter theoretically better. Additionally institutional complexes are not negotiated in most issue areas, in contrast with international regimes. In forests however, the connection between existing and emerging institutions is widely recognized and discussed. This is one of the reasons the Inter-agency Task Force on Forests, the UNFF, the Joint Liaison Group, and later the CPF were established and other initiatives were taken. Although the need for some of these institutions is contested (Dimitrov, 2005).

## 2.3 Institutional fragmentation and its analysis

Fragmentation is defined as a patchwork of international institutions whose, character, institutional forms, constituencies, spatial scope and subject matter differ (Zelli & van Asselt, 2013). According to some there are three ways of analysing fragmentation (Biermann et al., 2009):

1. The first is synergistic which includes a hierarchical governance coordinating in an authoritative manner. This is explained as a kind of coordination of fragmentation as if there is one umbrella organization which is closely linked with all relevant institutions and all core norms are integrated (Humrich, 2013).
2. The second is the kind of fragmentation in which organizations work cooperatively in loose networks.
3. The third is a more market like, decentralized, sometimes conflictive fragmentation in which there might be competition between institutions which in the end might be destructive. Humrich further argues that this fragmentation shows conflicting core norms, and important actors are supporting different institutions (Humrich, 2013).

The International Arrangements on Forests was established to promote cooperative coordination among the CPF members while the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF) could be defined as a synergizing institution. In this research focus is however not so much on assessing if the UNFF is a cooperative, synergistic or conflictive institution. This research focuses on analysing the form of interaction between the CPF members and their task division using cooperation, synergy or decentralization as an assessment mechanism.

It is also possible to distinguish different types of fragmentation which may help to understand the causes of fragmentation (Zürn & Faude, 2013). Zürn and Faude applied Luhmann´s distinction of forms of societal differentiation (Luhmann, 1977) to institutional fragmentation as they are of the opinion that the concept of fragmentation needs theoretical clarification. Basing themselves on the differentiation theory of Luhmann, Zürn and Faude make a distinction between segmentary, stratificatory and functional fragmentation (Zürn & Faude, 2013):

- Segmentary fragmentation is applying to institutions doing the same job in different geographical places.
- Stratificatory fragmentation is defined as the hierarchical relationship between institutions.
- Functional fragmentation is focussing on a non-hierarchical division of labour between institutions (Zürn & Faude, 2013).

Oberthür and Pozarowska come up with a similar threefold differentiation in levels of institutional fragmentation based on the "division of labour" between institutions (Oberthür & Pożarowska, 2013). Institutions can according to them specialize themselves in various regulatory subsets or sectors, in different governance functions and geographic regions. As functional differentiation is overlapping in both the frameworks of Oberthür and Pozarowska and Zürn and Faude, the focus of this research will be on this aspect. Also sectoral differentiation will be relevant as institutions can have a diverse focus on different aspects of forests: forest aspect focus.

**Forest aspect focus**

The globally agreed upon definition of Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) shows that to be able to manage forests, specific environmental, economic, social and cultural objectives need to be met. Forest management deals with administrative, economic, legal, social, technical and scientific aspects related to forests (FAO, n.d.-c). To quote Luhmann again, it is "by disjoining subsystems (...) that facts, events, and problems obtain a multiplicity of meanings in different perspectives" (Luhmann, 1977, p. 31). In other words, different subsystems which can be interpreted here as the different forest related institutions can give different meaning to forests as they have different perspectives. This research assumes that due to their own mandates and strategies the CPF institutions are not able to take every aspect equally into account themselves. Together they should be able to have an equal focus on all forest aspects. In reality the CPF might neglect certain forest aspects which causes gaps in the forest aspect focus. On the other hand some aspects might be given too much attention which overall causes an imbalance in forest aspect focus. Researchers and policy makers are becoming increasingly aware of the possible damaging consequences of focussing on a single aspect of forests due to i.a. the development of REDD under the UNFCCC (Levin, McDermott, & Cashore, 2008; Reischl, 2012).

**Governance task specialization**

Stokke created a link between governance and ecology (Stokke, 2011). When in nature there is a soil vacuum, different plants and other organisms will inhabit the soil. The organisms can compete, coexist or cooperate for a place on this empty land. The governance of one issue will also take a similar shape, institutions can compete, coexist or cooperate. Coexistence can lead to tension as their might not be full awareness of coexisting overlap among various institutions. This begs the question: what is their soil? What do they compete for? Stokke attempts to address these questions

by differentiating between governance tasks (Stokke, 2011). His view seems to be shared by other scholars as they refer to a division of labour between institutions (e.g. Oberthür & Pożarowska, 2013; Zürn & Faude, 2013). For all governance tasks, institutions can compete or, more optimistically cooperate.

Stokke distinguishes 4 governance tasks: knowledge building, norm building, capacity building, and enforcement (Stokke, 2011):

1. Most institutional arrangements make sure they include a scientific body, providing other involved institutions with valuable information, assessments, etc. An institution is more likely to be effective in the niche of knowledge building if the institution has high credibility, legitimacy and saliency in its output (Stokke, 2011). Several research institutions are involved in the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) and also other institutions provide themselves with information.
2. A second governance task institutions can fulfil is norm building. This is most logically a task for political bodies made up of member states. This also includes the applicability of certain norms in other regimes, the strength of the norms and if they cover states who´s participation is most important for solving the problem of deforestation. The CPF consists of several normative institutions all consisting of a certain representation of member states, whether or not universal.
3. Thirdly, it is important to recognize that building capacity among states that would otherwise not be able to comply with certain commitments is necessary. Who is taking responsibility for capacity building within the CPF? Stokke differentiates among three different ways of building capacity: models of implementation, funds and commitment of actors to do what they promised (Stokke, 2011).
4. The fourth governance task Stokke distinguishes is rule enforcement. The CPF could be assessed on the influence and usefulness of the current non-legally binding instrument on all types of forests and other rules. Moreover, the capacities for verification, review and sanctions could be evaluated (Stokke, 2011).

Additionally, the International Arrangement on Forests itself created nine principal functions (ECOSOC, 2000, 2006). Clear links can be made between some of these International Arrangements on Forests functions and the governance functions Stokke is talking about. Not all of them are able to link as some International Arrangements on Forests functions are especially on the collaboration and coordination. Stokke does not go into depth on these tasks, although they could be included in his capacity building.

## 2.4 Consequences of fragmentation
After assessing the task division of the CPF the its nature of the fragmentation, the research will focus on the consequences of this complexity for one of the principal functions to enhance cooperation and coordination among its members. Finding the necessary intermediate steps for deriving the consequences of fragmentation is an important aspect of this research. Not many scholars have been able to come up with consequences of fragmentation and it will be a challenge to do so. The previous steps of clarifying the division of labour and the nature of the interactions are used to discover links to consequences easier.

There are only few studies on the consequences of fragmentation and regime complexity (Alter & Meunier, 2009). Researching in what manner fragmentation enhances or undermines the effectiveness of international institutional arrangements is however relevant. Alter and Meunier mention several consequences of international regime complexity which could be similar to the outcomes of this research. Among others, one consequence is that complexity makes it difficult to locate what institution is responsible for what, which is undermining accountability (Alter & Meunier,

2009). In this research I assume this is indeed happening and this will be clarified in step 1 on the task division.

In the table below an overview is given of all possible consequences of international regime complexity. This table is based on the ideas of Alter and Meunier with some input from other literature. In this research I focus on the consequences for the enhancement of coordination and cooperation among the different CPF members on the institutional level.

As can be seen in the table below, fragmentation could introduce competition across actors, inefficiencies, and/or transaction costs which influence the realization of objectives like international cooperation and international governance (Alter & Meunier, 2009). International regime complexity could also facilitate non-compliance, regime shifting, or withdrawal from international organisations. On the more positive side, complexity can increase loyalty, as what states do in one arena affects perceptions of others in other arenas (Alter & Meunier, 2009). Regime complexity can also create such a complicated environment in which expertise is needed to be able to understand the discussions going on. This makes experts and informers more important and could exclude actors without the capacity to gain expertise. These could be small delegations from e.g. developing countries.

This research explores which of the below consequences can be observed in the International Arrangement on Forests and its CPF. It should be taken into account that not all of them can be discovered directly in the field of global forest governance.

**TABLE 2 CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIME COMPLEXITY** (Based on Alter & Meunier, 2009; Busch, 2007; T. Gehring & Faude, 2014; Helfer, 2004; Raustiala & Victor, 2004)

| |
|---|
| • Contribution to international law fragmentation and rule ambiguity. Countries will always create a clear set of rules for themselves. If there is vagueness about the different rules existing, countries can select their preferred interpretation. |
| • The process of this selection and because each international venue allows a different set of actors to be part of the political process, implementation politics will define which international agreements become salient, and the meaning of international agreement. |
| • The possibility of the use of cross institutional political strategies including: forum-shopping (Busch, 2007; T. Gehring & Faude, 2014; Raustiala & Victor, 2004) regime-shifting (T. Gehring & Faude, 2014; Helfer, 2004) and strategic inconsistence. |
| • An increasingly important role for informers - experts, lawyers, and NGOs - which help states manage rule and institutional confusion |
| • In increasing reliance of actors on heuristics |
| • Causal complexity makes it harder to identify clear cause and effect relations. |
| • Contribution to creating small group environments by multiplying the number of international venues, and thus occasions for states representatives to interact |
| • The more technical an issue, and the more expertise is valuable, the more likely small group environments will exist |
| • The more insular a small group, the greater the risk of the down sides of small group dynamics like in-group/out-group rivalry. It is also more difficult to fully monitor and respond to what goes on outside of embedded networks |
| • It creates competition among institutions and actors. Competition can have negative effects - turf battles and a failure to coordinate efforts. It can also have positive effects - increasing total resources, spreading risk, allowing experimentation. Competition also increases the options of aid recipients as it allows them to pick and choose which organization can service their needs best. |

| |
|---|
| • Increasing chances of unintentional impacts of one institution in parallel domains of other institutions. |
| • It is harder to locate which institution or actor is responsible for an issue which can undermine accountability. |
| • Increasing value of loyalty as what states do in one arena will affect perceptions of others (e.g., states, citizens, firms) in other arenas. |
| • Facilitation of exit via non-compliance, regime shifting, or withdrawal from international organisations. |

## 2.5 Overview of the conceptual framework

In the above sections I explained all the concepts that are going to be used in this research. The two different ways of assessing the task division among institutions, the use of the nature of fragmentation as an assessment mechanism and the possible consequences of fragmentation. With the following steps and the help of figure 2 I will explain the link between all of them.

1. The first step of this research will be to find out how tasks are divided among the 14 CPF members, answering the first specific research question. As explained, this will be assessed on both the scope of the field they are working on and the four governance tasks they can take responsibility for. I differentiate among three forest aspect focusses: economic, environmental and social. The four tasks are capacity, knowledge, norm building and rule enforcement.
2. If we have an idea where the gaps and overlaps exist we can map out where the fragmentation is decentralized, cooperative or synergistic. This will also answer the second research question.
3. From there we will go more deeply into the consequences of the assessed type of fragmentation for CPF's principal function to enhance international cooperation and coordination resulting in answering the last and third specific research question.



**FIGURE 1 OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

Before the research questions can be answered and this conceptual framework is implemented, it is important to know a little bit more about the development of global forest governance. The current discussions on the International Arrangement on Forests and the CPF will be explored in the subsequent chapter. Afterwards the first two steps are applied in chapter four. Chapter five will apply step three and answer the third research question.

# 3. Mapping the field: Introducing the actors

As previous touched upon in the introductory chapter, the International Arrangement on Forests includes a lot of different elements and actors: the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) as an international organisation, the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) as a partnership including all its members and other involved actors. To understand what is going on in forest land and recognize its complexity, this chapter will introduce the actors involved in the international arena of forest governance, their coming about and current discussions.

As the complexity itself is politically sensitive, this chapter will additionally specify the current debates on the existence and functioning of the International Arrangements on Forests elements. This will be done especially related to the Collaborative Partnership on Forests as their task division and interactions will be elaborated upon in the following chapters. The political sensitivity was illustrated by one of my respondents reacting on the explanation of my research:

> *"researching this is like opening Pandora´s box"* (CPF employee 4).

In this chapter I will explain how this "Pandora's box" looks like before clarifying it further in chapter four.

## 3.1 The International Arrangements on Forests and the UNFF

The International Arrangement on Forests is an informal term for all actors related to the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF). The International Arrangements on Forests consists of several different elements. First, the member states acting both individually and together as the forum. The second element is the UNFF Secretariat. Third is the voluntary Collaborative Partnership on Forests



**FIGURE 2 GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENT ON FORESTS** (Based on Cadman, 2011; Hoogeveen et al., 2014)

as well as other relevant international governmental organisations helping to implement the resolutions of the forum. The regional organizations and major groups taking part in the UNFF's sessions are International Arrangements on Forests elements too. In figure 2, the linkages between all different elements and the UNFF structure are graphically presented.

The most important aim of the International Arrangements on Forests is to promote conservation and sustainable management of all types of forests. This is done by implementing the non-legally binding instrument on all types of forests (Forest Instrument), fulfilling the four global objectives on forests as well as other UNFF resolutions (ECOSOC, 2000; Hoogeveen et al., 2014). The most important element the International Arrangements on Forests has contributed to international forest governance, is the establishment of the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF). The UNFF was formed as an intergovernmental body which later evolved as an umbrella organization focussing on the inclusion of all forest values that are represented by the concept of Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) (Hoogeveen et al., 2014). In the table below the most important actions during the UNFF process are visualized.

TABLE 3 IMPORTANT DATES IN THE UNFF PROCESS (UNFF Secretariat, n.d.-b)

| 1992 | UN Conference on Environment and Development adopts the "Forest Principles" and Agenda 21 |
|---|---|
| 1995/1997 | Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (1995) and Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (1997) are established to implement the Forest Principles from 1995 to 2000. |
| 2000 | UNFF is established as a functional commission of the UN Economic and Social Council. |
| 2001 | Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) is created to support UNFF and to foster increased cooperation on forests. |
| 2006 | UNFF agrees on four Global Objectives on Forests. |
| 2007 | UNFF adopts the UN Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests (Forest Instrument). |
| 2009 | UNFF adopts decision on financing for sustainable forest management which calls for creation of a Facilitative Process to assist countries in reversing a 20-year decline in forest financing. The Facilitative Process has an initial focus on Small Island Developing States and Low Forest Cover Countries. |
| 2011 | The International Year of Forests, "Forests for People" |

At the 11<sup>th</sup> session of the UNFF taking place in 2015 different actors recognized that the objectives and functions of the International Arrangements on Forests were not clear (e.g. EU statement, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 4). This was shown by four examples. First, a strategic plan to build synergy and work together with other fora was proposed (researcher's observations UNFF 11; ECOSOC, 2015). See figure 5 for this proposal. Secondly, a clarification of its role division among all actors was mentioned (e.g. Russian statement, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 4). Third, the functions of the UNFF Secretariat and the UNFF Bureau should be clarified and defined (Mexican statement, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 2). Fourth, the confusion existing around the differences between the International Arrangement on Forests, the CPF and the UNFF:

> *"International Arrangements on Forests is including or at least should include all forest mechanisms, institutions, conventions, instruments, etc. and therefore the CPF is (..) a natural part of this"* and the International Arrangements on Forests is *"actually almost the CPF"* (country delegate 1).

The processes of the International Arrangements on Forests should be seen in the light of the overall sustainable development agenda. 2015 was the year of sustainable development (e.g. UN DESA, 2015, CPF employee 6) and forests play a vital role in sustainable development as they are natural resources on which humanity depends (Lélé, 1991). Therefore, it was recognized at the beginning of the 11<sup>th</sup> session of the United Nations Forum on Forests that its outcome would be crucial for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals.

Although the importance of forests is recognized, the discussions about the International Arrangements on Forests are very low on the political agenda. Almost no ministers were sent to the 11<sup>th</sup> session of the UNFF (researchers' observations UNFF 11), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) almost all withdrew from discussions as the process was considered harmless (NGO 1) and international organizations were not sending representatives or only junior staff (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 4, country delegate 2). In general one could say there is no political pressure. As one respondent put it:

> The International Arrangements on Forests and its UNFF are *"not on the radar"* in high level discussions on sustainable development. Forests are however coming up in informal dialogues (CPF employee 6).

This might have to do with the circumstance that the International Arrangements on Forests and its Non-Legally Binding Instrument on all types of forests (Forest Instrument) are not legally binding. As one of the interviewees mentioned:

> *"it is really difficult to get money and other resources for things that are not legally binding"* (country delegate 2).

This could be the reason why nations, NGOs and organisations might change their focus to other conventions, organisations or instruments.

On the contrary actors advocate for a legally binding forest instrument to include all forests aspects. As a respondent mentions:

It *"is necessary to streamline all ideas about SFM"* and international forest policy should be able to work independent and should not be seen as *"a sum of other conventions". "A legally binding agreement on forests could balance all different ideas about forests"* (country delegate 5).

The CPF might have a role in advising member states on how this agreement would look like. The need for such a legally binding agreement is heavily debated and even the existence of the International Arrangements on Forests is questioned as it became irrelevant because of the emergence of forests in other fora. An argument heard against its existence from the non-state actors is that a strong UNFF with binding rules will mostly strengthen the industry and other fora will take care of the social and ecological issues.

The International Arrangements on Forests and its UNFF *"are irrelevant"* (CPF employee 6).

*"Other fora cover the need for social and ecological issues"* (NGO 1).

A reason for keeping the International Arrangement on Forests and its UNFF is that it acts as an umbrella organisation (Hoogeveen et al., 2014) and it can take up the role of moderator. As a respondent illustrates:

It should only be seen *"as a platform, a stewardship on forests instead of a leading organisation"* (country delegate 2).

The International Arrangements on Forests process tries to include and link so many aspects that they can be described as very massive and slow. Although there was also mentioning of the process going backwards due to the current circumstances (expert 1, researcher's observations UNFF 11). UNFCCC's programme on reducing emissions from deforestation (REDD+) is an example of a process developing rather quickly compared to the International Arrangements on Forests. A respondent illustrated this beautifully:

*"The International Arrangements on Forests process is like a steamboat going slowly forward". "REDD is like a rocket ship acting fast but not able to survive on its own on the long term"* (CPF employee 8).

The question therefore implied is if the International Arrangements on Forests process can catch up fast enough to work towards SFM on the long term including processes like REDD+. The fact that REDD+, climate change and the Sustainable Development Goals are high on the political agenda could be seen as an opportunity for the International Arrangements on Forests and the UNFF. The REDD-rocket ship might help to fasten the process although it might also complicate it.

Some general frustration around the lack of content and the feeling of urgency could be observed during the negotiations at the 11th session of the UNFF. These were mostly about the lack of content and feeling of emergency. Instead of the content, discussions were mostly about the form of the new

agreement as the International Arrangements on Forests was only established until 2015 and a successor needed to be decided upon. As two respondents put it:

> "*The only content in the negotiated text at the moment are the functions of the UNFF. The fact that it is 5 to 12 (23.55) is not in the text*" (expert 1).

> These negotiations are not useful to forests themselves, *"things need to get much worse for forests before it will get better"* (CPF employee 8).

An often discussed element during the 11ᵗʰ session of the UNFF was the means of implementation of SFM of which the Facilitative Process is an important part. The Facilitative Process was established in 2009 and provides assistance to developing countries to mobilize forest funds. The Facilitative Process has ten functions which are adopted in the resolutions of 2009 and 2011 (UNFF Secretariat, 2013; UNFF, 2011), see table 4. The Facilitative Process is housed by the UNFF Secretariat and carried out together with the CPF members, member states and some other international organizations (UNFF Secretariat, n.d.-a). The Facilitative Process is focussing mostly on the financial gaps, obstacles and opportunities of Small Island Developing States and Low Forest Cover Countries. Knowledge on these two types of countries' potential for forest financing was limited until the Facilitative Process' establishment (UNFF Secretariat, 2013).

**TABLE 4 TEN FUNCTIONS OF THE FACILITATIVE PROCESS** (UNFF Secretariat, 2013)

| |
|---|
| • To assist in mobilizing and supporting new and additional financial resources from all sources for sustainable forest management; |
| • To assist countries in mobilizing, accessing and enhancing the effective use of existing financial resources from all sources for sustainable forest management, taking into account national policies and strategies; |
| • To identify, facilitate and simplify access to all sources of finance for sustainable forest management; |
| • To identify obstacles to, gaps in and opportunities for financing sustainable forest management; |
| • To assist countries in developing national financing strategies for sustainable forest management within the framework of national forest programmes or their equivalent, as called for in the non-legally binding instrument on all types of forests; |
| • To facilitate the transfer of environmentally sound technologies and capacity-building to developing countries; |
| • To provide advice, upon request, and to share examples of good practice in improving the enabling environment for sustainable forest management, in particular in achieving the four global objectives on forests and implementation of the non-legally binding instrument on all types of forests, in order to attract public and private sector investment and philanthropic funding; |
| • To enhance coordination, cooperation and coherence among relevant funding sources and mechanisms to improve the implementation of the non-legally binding instrument on all types of forests and the achievement of the global objectives on forests at all levels and to improve the effective and efficient use of available financial resources for its implementation; |
| • Work to identify the barriers for access, in particular by developing countries and countries with economies in transition, to financing and suggest ways to simplify relevant procedures and build the capacities of countries to remove them and to examine the effects, impacts and synergies of cross-sectoral and cross-institutional activities on forest financing, and integrate |

| | |
|---|---|
| the lessons learned in their submissions to the second meeting of the ad hoc expert group on forest financing; | |
| • Encourage relevant institutions, such as international financial institutions, as appropriate, working in close concert with regional forest processes to further develop ways to mobilize resources from all sources and to mainstream the global objectives on forests in their programmes. | |

Another discussion related to the means of implementation of SFM is the possible establishment of an additional Global Forest Fund (researcher´s observations UNFF 11). Especially developing countries were advocating for this (researcher´s observations UNFF 11).

## 3.2 The CPF

The Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) is an informal group of 14 international organizations and secretariats[3] working on forest related issues. As the successor of the Inter-agency Task Force on Forests, the CPF is a high level informal mechanism. The Inter-agency Task Force on Forests got a lot of positive attention and in 2001 it was expanded into the CPF doubling its membership (expert 1). All 14 CPF members have their own mandates and are responsible to their own governing bodies. In annex 1, all CPF members' mandates are briefly described based on their strategic plans and convention texts. In the table below a brief overview of the mandates of the 14 CPF members as described in the annex can be found. As the CPF has no formal status in the UN system it depends upon the budget of all its governing bodies (Reischl, 2012).

TABLE 5 OVERVIEW OF THE 14 CPF MEMBERS´ MANDATES (BASED ON ANNEX 1)

| CPF member | Main mandate or objective |
|---|---|
| CIFOR | To advance human well-being, environmental conservation, and equity by conducting research to inform policies and practices that affect forests in developing countries. |
| CBD | To conserve biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. |
| FAO | To achieve food security for all, including the eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition, the elimination of poverty and the driving forward of economic and social progress for all and the sustainable management and utilization of natural resources, including land, water, air, climate and genetic resources for the benefit of present and future generations. |
| GEF | To provide new and additional funds to pay for the achievement of agreed global environmental benefits. |
| ITTO | To facilitate discussion, consultation and international cooperation on issues relating to the international trade and utilization of tropical timber and the sustainable management of its resource base. |
| IUCN | To influence, encourage and assist societies throughout the world to conserve the integrity and diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of natural resources is equitable and ecologically sustainable. |
| IUFRO | To advance research excellence and knowledge sharing, and to foster the development of science-based solutions to forest-related challenges for the benefit of forests and people worldwide. |

---

[3] The 14 members of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests: CIFOR, CBD, FAO, GEF, ITTO, IUCN, IUFRO, UNCCD, UNDP, UNEP, UNFF, UNFCCC, ICRAF and the World Bank.

| UNCCD | To provide a global framework to support the development and implementation of national and regional policies, programmes and measures to prevent, control and reverse desertification/land degradation and mitigate the effects of drought through scientific and technological excellence, raising public awareness, standard setting, advocacy and resource mobilization, thereby contributing to poverty reduction. |
|---|---|
| UNDP | To help countries achieve the simultaneous eradication of poverty and significant reduction of inequalities and exclusion. |
| UNEP | To provide leadership and encourage partnership in caring for the environment by inspiring, informing, and enabling nations and peoples to improve their quality of life without compromising that of future generations. |
| UNFF | To achieve the management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests and to strengthen long-term political commitment to this end. |
| UNFCCC | To achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. |
| ICRAF | To generate science-based knowledge about the diverse roles that trees play in agricultural landscapes, and to use its research to advance policies and practices, and their implementation that benefit the poor and the environment. |
| World Bank | To end extreme poverty by reducing the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day to 3 percent by 2030 and promoting shared prosperity by foster income growth of the bottom 40 percent of the population in every country. |

The objective of the CPF is two-fold: 1) to support the work of the UNFF, and 2) to enhance forest cooperation and coordination among its members (CPF, 2003, 2015b). The latter is executed by the following activities:

- Promoting policy learning on forests;
- Providing scientific expertise on forests;
- Sharing forest related information;
- Advocacy and outreach;
- Forest finance;
- Simplifying reporting;
- Integrating forests in the post-2015 development agenda (CPF, 2015a).

These tasks and objectives are complemented with work on consisting messaging and streamlining forest-related reporting (CPF, n.d.-b). The extent to which the CPF is working on this latter aspect is questioned. As one respondent mentioned it might have dropped in interest over time (CPF employee 5).

The CPF is always chaired by the FAO and has a changing vice-chair. The vice-chair can neither be the FAO or the UNFF Secretariat as the latter functions as the secretariat of the CPF. Currently, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is the vice-chair (Rojas-Briales, 2015). The CPF members are meeting three to four times a year, mostly taking place together with UNFF meetings or other major global meetings (researcher's observations UNFF 11, Reischl, 2012) like the Global Landscape Forum and COPs of the UNFCCC.

In table 6 an overview of CPF initiatives and achievements so far can be found.

TABLE 6 MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE CPF SO FAR (COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR)

| |
|---|
| • 30 initiatives (CPF chair at UNFF 11, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 1 and CPF, 2015a, p. 3) |
| • 3-4 meetings a year (CPF chair at UNFF 11, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 1) |
| • Collective actions have been grown on e.g. sustainable wildlife management and the international days of forests |
| • Integration in the Sustainable Development Goals (CPF, 2015a, p. 4) and the open working group 8 |
| • The CPF's joint response to the voluntary questionnaire on the review of the effectiveness of the International Arrangements on Forests (CPF, 2004) |
| • Global Forest Expert Panel lead by IUFRO (IUFRO, n.d.-a) |
| • Food security report written by the Global Forest Expert Panel lead by IUFRO (Vira, Wildburger, & Mansourian, 2015) |
| • Celebrating the international days of forests according to themes like forests and climate change in 2015 (CPF, n.d.-c) |
| • Sharing commonalities agriculture and forests (CPF chair at UNFF 11, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 1) |
| • Wangari Maathai award (CPF, 2015a, p. 10) |
| • Global landscape forum in 2013, 2014 and 2015 (CGIAR, n.d.-b; CPF, 2015a, p. 11) |
| • Global Forest Information Service and updates lead by IUFRO (IUFRO, n.d.-b) |
| • Sourcebook on funding SFM (CPF, n.d.-d) |
| • CPF Working Group on Advancing a Common Message on Sustainable Forest Management (CPF, n.d.-f) |
| **Dealt with together in the task force for streamlining forest-related reporting[4]:** |
| • The Forest Data Reporting Package 2015; |
| • Collaborative Forest Resources questionnaire; |
| • Forest Resources Assessment (FRA 2015) (FAO, n.d.-b, 2016); |
| • UNFF's reporting on the achievement of the Global Objectives on Forests (CPF side-event, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 2). |

Based on the different mandates and capacity of its members the CPF came up with a division of responsibility for different UNFF elements (CPF, 2002c). Focal agencies were designated a role to improve collaboration among members and with other partners.

Key tasks of focal agencies include:

- Facilitating the implementation of proposals for action[5] part of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests and the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests;
- Providing documentation for UNFF sessions, including drafting reports of the Secretary-General;
- Supporting country- and organization-led initiatives of UNFF;
- Channelling requests for information and assistance to the appropriate sources (CPF, n.d.-b).

Besides their key tasks, the focal agencies were asked to mobilize resources and expertise, avoid duplication and maximize efficiency and synergy to support the work of the UNFF. The focal agencies

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[4] Members of the Task Force for Streamlining Forest-related Reporting are Secretariat of CBD, UNFCCC, UNEP-World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC), UNFF, FAO, ITTO and UNCCD.

[5] The Proposals for Action consist of a list of more than 270 proposals for action towards SFM agreed upon during the time of UNFF´s predecessors the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests and the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IPF, 1995)

are supported by all or specifically designated CPF members. In table 7, an overview can be found of the CPF's focal agencies as agreed upon in 2002 (CPF, 2002a).

**TABLE 7 CPF'S FOCAL AGENCIES (CPF, N.D.-A, 2002A, 2002B)**

| UNFF elements | Focal agency | Supporting agencies |
|---|---|---|
| Formulation and implementation of national forest programmes | FAO | All CPF Members |
| Promoting public participation | UNFF (international) UNDP (national) | FAO, GEF, ICRAF, World Bank |
| Combating deforestation and forest degradation | UNEP | CIFOR, FAO, CBD, UNCCD, UNFCCC, World Bank |
| Traditional forest related knowledge | CBD | CIFOR, GEF, UNCCD |
| Forest-related scientific knowledge | CIFOR, IUFRO, ICRAF | CBD, GEF, UNCCD, UNFCCC |
| Forest health and productivity | FAO | CIFOR, ITTO, IUFRO, CBD, UNFCCC |
| Criteria and indicators of sustainable forest management | FAO, ITTO | CIFOR, IUFRO, CBD, UNEP |
| Economic, social and cultural aspects of forests<br> - Economic aspects of forests<br> - Social aspects of forests | <br>World Bank<br>CIFOR | <br>All CPF members<br>All CPF members |
| Forest conservation and protection of unique types of forests and fragile ecosystems | UNEP | FAO, CBD, GEF, UNCCD, World Bank, IUCN |
| Monitoring, assessment and reporting; and concepts, terminology and definitions | FAO | All CPF members |
| Rehabilitation and conservation strategies for countries with low forest cover | UNEP | FAO, CBD, GEF, UNCCD, IUCN |
| Rehabilitation and restoration of degraded lands, and the promotion of natural and planted forests | FAO | All CPF members |
| Maintaining forest cover to meet present and future needs | UNFF | All CPF members |
| Financial resources | GEF, World Bank | All CPF members |
| International trade and sustainable forest management | ITTO | FAO, World Bank |
| International cooperation in capacity-building, transfer of and access to environmentally-sound technologies for the support of sustainable forest management | FAO | ITTO, CBD, GEF, UNDP, UNEP, World Bank |
| Forest biological diversity | CBD | All CPF members |

**Relevance and existence of the CPF**

During the 11$^{th}$ session of the UNFF the future of the CPF was on the agenda as part of the future International Arrangement on Forests. The CPF's existence, its guidelines and the alignment with other globally agreed upon goals, the need for stabilized resources and the expansion of its membership were topics discussed and will be briefly described in the following paragraphs.

> *"Business as usual is not acceptable, also not related to the CPF"* (Jorge Illueca and Jürgen Blaser during their presentation of the Independent Assessment of the International Arrangements on Forests, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 1).

The existence of the CPF was questioned. On the one hand a group of people agreed that the partnership was not necessary as the different organizations could also cooperate in a more informal manner. As some interviewees mentioned:

> *"The CPF is not necessary, that it can happen organically"* (Michael Wingfield (president IUFRO), researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 3).

> *"The CPF is not such a strong and powerful body"* and there is no need strengthen it (NGO 1).

> *"It is an irrelevant coordination mechanism"* (CPF employee 6).

On the other hand the CPF could be seen as effective but with more potential to give its full support if there were clear guidelines. It could possibly benefit from more formal structures (opening presentation UNFF Secretariat at UNFF 11, researchers' observations UNFF 11 day 1). These could be by aligning the CPF's mission with the Sustainable Development Goals, the Global Objectives on Forests, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)'s Aichi targets. This way the CPF should think about common views on e.g. biological diversity among all its bodies. As respondents say:

> Forests should be *"integrated in a broader landscape"* (CPF employee 8).

> *"Forests are stuck in their four silos"* (Global Objectives on Forests) (Jürgen Blaser, Independent Assessment International Arrangements on Forests and his presentation at UNFF 11, researchers' observations UNFF 11 day 1).

A more formal way of creating this alignment is the introduction of a multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which is streamlined with the strategic plan of the UNFF (country delegate 2 and 5). There are already some bilateral MoUs among CPF members (see figure 9) but a multilateral MoU among all members does not exist.

> *"A multilateral MoU could channel the financial resources for donors"* (country delegate 5)

This is indeed an option as they can choose where their money goes within this working plan. States and all CPF members could add activities to the working plan.

**TABLE 8 MOU´S AMONG CPF MEMBERS (BASED ON CASWELL, 2015, PP. 28–29)**

| Title and parties MoU | Date of presentation |
|---|---|
| Agreement between FAO and IUFRO | Signed September 2012 |
| MoU between the Secretariat of ITTO and the Secretariat of CBD | Extension for the period 2015-2020 (signed 2014) |

| MoU between the Secretariats of the ITTO and the UNCCD | Signed December 2011 |
|---|---|
| MoU between the Secretariat of the UNFF and the Secretariat of the ITTO 2010-2015 | Signed October 2010 |
| MoU between the Secretariat of the UNFF and the Secretariat of the UNCCD | Press Release and Communique issued 25 May 2010 |
| MoU between the Secretariat of the UNFF and the Secretariat of the CBD 2009-2011 | Signed December 2009 |
| MoU between IUCN and the Secretariat of the GEF | Signed June 2014 |
| MoU between FAO and the Secretariat of the GEF on Direct Access to GEF Resources | Signed January 2005 |
| MoU between the COP of the UNFCCC and the Council of the GEF | As adopted by UNFCCC COP Decision 12.CP.2, 1996 |
| MoU between the COP of the CBD and the Council of the GEF | As adopted by CBD COP Decision III/8, 1996 |

Another discussion is if the UNFF should have a more stabilized resource base to support the CPF as budgetary implications should be decreased (opening presentation UNFF Secretariat at UNFF 11, researchers' observations UNFF 11 day 1). This can be both financially or in manpower (CPF side-event, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 2). The establishment of a strategic trust fund especially for the CPF (CPF employee 4) and the inclusion of financial resources from REDD+ and the Global Landscape Forum are discussed to stabilize the resources of the CPF (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 1).

A last albeit important point of discussion is if the CPF should be enlarged (side-events, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 2 and day 8), i.e. if members should be added to the 14 existing members. In the next paragraph several organizations are mentioned that put themselves, or were put forward by others, as potential additions to the CPF. Arguments against expanding the CPF are the lack of resources to be able to support a large number of members and the existing difficulty of managing the current members. Cooperation should only happen when there are benefits for both or more parties. As respondents say:

The CPF is already *"fighting over resources"* so members can only be added when they have the time and resources to deal with the issues equally (CPF employee 2).

*"The CPF is not for everyone, then it is going to be a mess"* (CPF employee 8).

It will be more difficult to agree upon and deal with issues if more groups and therefore opinions are included in the CPF (CPF employee 2).

*"The group of 7 members as under the Inter-agency Task Force on Forests was better"* (expert 1).

Arguments in favour of expanding the CPF membership are mostly coming from outside the CPF. Jorge Illueca (consultant of the independent assessment of the International Arrangements on Forests) mentions in a side-event at the 11th session of the UNFF that the partnership should be elaborated when CITES and other organisations interfered and expressed their interests in joining (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 8). Inside the CPF there are mainly discussions of including

regional organisations as well as major groups and other stakeholders (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 9). As Charles Barber (Open-ended Ad-Hoc Expert Group UNFF) said during the opening of the 11<sup>th</sup> session of the UNFF:

> *"get out of this little box and expand to other forums"* (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 1).

If the CPF is expanded it could be best that a core group is working on the management of the rest of the partnership and create clear commitments. Moreover the task division should be even more clear and the partnership should be flexible enough to jump on emerging issues.

> *"When the CPF is expanded a core group of around six committed members should closely work together to increase its effectiveness"* (country delegate 2).

> *"There are a lot of opportunities in elevating the CPF especially as this would also have advantages for others besides the UNFF". "Irrelevant parts of the CPF should be dropped however"* (CPF employee 5).

## 3.3 Other actors

There is an enormous group of other actors in the field of global forest governance. In this paragraph I will to go into more detail on the interests of a few of them. The following actors showed interest in joining the CPF during the 11<sup>th</sup> session of the UNFF or others mentioned them as possible additions. For a lot of interested parties a reason to join the CPF is that it is easier to get funding if projects are organized under CPF (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 8). Additionally to the ones described below more actors are more indirectly involved.

The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is especially contributing to the economic aspects of SFM. CITES would like to have a more formal cooperation and therefore mentioned in a statement during the 11<sup>th</sup> session of the UNFF that they would like to be stated as a partner in the ministerial declaration that was negotiated during the event (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 8).

The International Network for Bamboo and Rattan (INBAR) was more direct and stated they would like to join the CPF. Arguments for their possible involvement could be that they are already collaborating with a lot of CPF members and they could add innovation to the CPF. As said by the INBAR representative:

> We *"are involved with a lot of different governments, implementing a lot of projects and are working bilaterally with CPF members"* and we *"could contribute actually doing something to the CPF and "of course" an innovative market. We could bring new energy and ideas"* (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 8).

The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) showed interest in joining the CPF and mentioned the relevance of harmonized indicators and targets for SFM (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 8).

The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was mentioned by a respondent as a possible partner for joining the CPF. They could contribute to possible lacks in attention to some aspects in SFM (country delegate 3).

Moreover the Major Groups and Regional organizations are recognized within the International Arrangements on Forests. The Major Groups are identified in Agenda 21 and consists of Business and Industry, Children and Youth, Farmers, Indigenous People, Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), Local Authorities, Scientific and Technological Community, Women as well as Workers and Trade Unions (UNGA, 1992). They seem to have quite a good status within the UNFF (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 6). There is discussion among respondents and the Major Groups themselves to get more involved within the CPF and its meetings (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 2). This was discussed in the Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue in which the FAO advocated the need for a stronger connection of Major Groups and the CPF including more bilateral cooperation.

## 3.4 Concluding remarks

There are a multitude of different actors involved in global forest governance. The broad engagement of actors in the International Arrangement on Forests as well as the CPF is illustrating this. These multiple actors are creating a complex situation which is often debated among scholars, policy makers and others.

The objectives and functions of the International Arrangement on Forests are often unclear. Compared with other processes of forest governance, the International Arrangement on Forests doesn't seem to be high on the political agenda. The CPF appointed some focal agencies who are officially responsible for certain tasks. There is however some discussion on the necessity of the CPF's existence. This also includes their alignment with other globally agreed upon goals, the need for stabilized resources and the expansion of its membership. Nevertheless others outside the CPF are interested in joining the partnership.

In the subsequent chapter the complexity of the CPF will be unravelled regarding its mandates and task division. This chapter will also conclude on what elements of their interaction are synergistic, cooperative or decentralized and possibly conflictive.

# 4. The fragmentation of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests

This chapter will describe the results on the interactions within the fragmentation of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) answering the first specific research question. An overview on gaps and overlaps in both forest aspect focus and governance tasks is created. The different agencies part of the CPF will be assessed on their responsibility taken for both forest aspect focus and governance tasks. This will be visually presented in the concluding sections of this chapter. Afterwards research question two will be answered and a conclusion will be given on its synergistic, cooperative or decentralized elements in the CPF's fragmentation.

I would like to mention again that while attending the 11th session of the United Nations Forum on Forests and conducting the interviews, I discovered that researching the CPF and its task division is politically sensitive. Questioning if organizations are doing the right task is highly political (expert 3, country delegate 1). This should be taken into account when reading this chapter as its only aims are to clarify the current task division, the different mandates of the CPF member and the opinions existing surrounding the division of labour.

There is clear understanding among respondents that the CPF has institutional limitations and their task division is an important part of this (CPF employee 1, country delegate 1 and expert 1). This is illustrated by a respondent:

> There is a "*big fight*" going on about the task division among the CPF's members (country delegate 1).

CPF's successor, the Inter-agency Task Force on Forests, had only 7 members. Enlarging the partnership had some disadvantages for the clarity of the task division, see also the previous chapter. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was the logical leader as already working on forests for a long time, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was understandably involved because of their Programme on Forests (PROFOR) which is currently positioned under the World Bank, the Center for International Forest Research (CIFOR) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) were still young and ambitious and were involved as innovators (Blaser & Douglas, 2000). As a respondent mentioned:

> *"The task division in the ITTF* (Inter-agency Task Force on Forests ) *was clearer"* (expert 1).

In this chapter I will explore the division of labour among the 14 organizations of the CPF and see if I can come up with an equivalent description for the current division of labour. I will start with the forest aspect focus.

## 4.1 Forest aspect focus
In the definition of Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) reference is made to different forest aspects, as described in chapter 2.1: environmental; economic; social and cultural. In this section I explore the extent to which all forest aspects are given equal attendance within the CPF. Also the views of respondents on this discussion are given.

Although fragmentation is natural and logical as forests have different dimensions, delegates are of the opinion that fragmentation should be avoided (opening statements UNFF 11, day 1) and that different ideas about forests should be balanced (country delegate 5). It is however debated if the

CPF members together create a balanced view on forests. On the one hand it could be said that there is an equal representation of all forest aspects by definition as the CPF supports SFM. Especially in the emerging negotiations on the Sustainable Development Goals this group of people think the complete picture of forests is negotiated. As illustrated by some respondents:

> *"SFM is by definition giving the ´whole picture´ on forests and this should be cared for"* (country delegate 5).

> *"All forest aspects are equally represented in the discussion about the Sustainable Development Goals".* This *"is high at the political agenda"* (country delegate 5).

On the other hand one could say that there is a more or less unequal representation of forest aspects. On the social and cultural aspects, the rights of indigenous people are also missing attention (country delegate 2). It could also be that having a broad focus on all values of forests is something negotiators would prefer to avoid.

> It frightens negotiators as *"it will complicate things"* (country delegate 2).

The feeling is that there is too much focus on the different environmental aspects of forests at the cost of social aspects.

> The focus should be *"not only biodiversity and climate change"* (statement by Ecuador, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 4).

As the UNFF does not want to complicate, concern exists that with the discussion about Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+), the UNFCCC would make forests a climate change problem only. This is explained and illustrated by others too. Firstly, CIFOR who put a lot of its effort in the REDD+ agenda and also International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) is seen as a REDD expert (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 9). A second explanation for a strong focus on the environmental aspects like climate change might be the larger financial resources of the UNFCCC (country delegate 2). The difficulty of receiving money internally, within a country, for fora which are not legally binding like the UNFF possibly moves countries away from these fora (country delegate 2). Having a strong focus on climate change, may lead to a missing focus on biodiversity and its Aichi targets within the environmental forest aspect (country delegate 2).

Based on the different mandates as described in the previous chapter and in the annex, there is only few CPF members that mention the social and cultural aspects of forests as their main goal. Most of them mention the broad definition of SFM somewhere in their documents. In practice however, these organizations focus mainly on one specific aspect of forests.

Also within the environmental aspects there is not necessarily equal focus. As mentioned biodiversity and climate change are dominant but attention for desertification is lacking. The UNCCD is much weaker than the UNFCCC and CBD. As said by a UNCCD representative:

> It is "*not seen as an obvious partner on forests*". She also quotes Francois René de Chateau Briand: *"Forests precede civilization, deserts follow them"* to show the important link of forests and desertification (Ms. Krishna during side-event, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 8).

It could therefore be said that the broad definition of SFM is overruled by other conventions (country delegate 5).

There is different ways of solving the possible unequal focus on forest aspects. The first could be a legally binding forest convention, this could streamline and include all different aspects. As a respondent mentions:

> "the forest policy area should be able to work independent and not as a sum of other conventions" (country delegate 5).

An advantage of such a forest convention could be that the CPF has a stronger position. Collaboratively the CPF could create policy options on which the member states can decide.

Without the necessity of a forest convention, a second way of creating a more equal focus on all forest aspects is to create harmonized indicators and targets (side-event researcher's observations UNFF 11, day 8). Illustrating this, a representative of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) mentioned during UNFF 11 that there should be increased cooperation among the 3 Rio-conventions (UNCCD, UNFCCC and CBD) and the UNFF with its Facilitative Process (researcher's observation UNFF day 2). Common goals, themes and priorities should be set within the CPF to be able to focus on different forest aspects equally. When doing this it should be clear why the CPF members are focussing on certain aspects and not on others. As one respondent put it:

> "there is a need for more justification why certain themes are addressed. Forest themes should be linked to a plan and focus on what is in it for others" (CPF employee 5).

A third way could be to focus on SFM as part of cross sectorial approaches like the sustainable management of land, not only focussing on forests. According to UNCCD abandoned land (due to agricultural practices) should be restored and the multiple aspects of forests should be taken into account and fostered (researcher's observation UNFF 11 day 2). This could indeed be a way to focus on all forest aspects in a more equal manner. Another example of the link between land and forests is the mentioning of Climate Smart Agriculture, the landscape approach and the attempts to work together. Peter Holmgren gives an example of the institutional division of agriculture and forestry at a side-event during the 11<sup>th</sup> session of the UNFF:

> "At the climate summit where people were attending a fully packed forest event. An agricultural event was organized in the same room afterwards and all foresters left and a new ´agriculture´ crowd came in" (Peter Holmgren at UNFF 11 side-event, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 3).

A similar example was given by Reischl (Reischl, 2012, p. 36) illustrating the risk for duplication among many forest related institutions. There are however also arguments against a full integration of forest aspects. Some say that this works mostly on an implementation level but not on the political level. As one respondent put it:

> "It is not very helpful for forests" to look in a holistic view on an international political level. It "does make sense to look at landscapes on a project level. Integrating all different aspects" (NGO1).

Landscape is a very dominant discussion point. Another forest aspect that is going to rise in importance is water. As one interviewee mentioned:

> "cities are increasingly depending on forests for water (...). The topic of water is going to be big, nobody will think about carbon anymore" (CPF employee 8).

**A dominant focus on the environment**

As can be seen in annex 1, most mandates of CPF members focus on environmental aspects of forests. UNDP clearly stands out as a CPF member focussing on the social aspects of forests. Also UNCCD clearly mentions the deforestation consequences for livelihoods. Most other agencies mention the human aspect somewhere in their plan but it is missing from their core objective(s).

To summarize, including the discussions from the former section and the mandates described in the annex, the environmental aspect has a lot of attention among CPF's members. The discussions are not so much on the forest aspects like economic, social or cultural. Focus lies on the different elements to focus on within the environmental aspect, like climate change and biodiversity.

**FIGURE 4 OVERVIEW OF CPF´S TASK DIVISION ON FOREST ASPECT FOCUS**

This could be due to the larger financial resources of the UNFCCC and the coming closer of the Paris top. It could also be the result of the fear for complication and the need to focus on one issue.

Several respondents mention that there is a lack of the social and cultural aspects of forests, however others mention that with SFM there is a clear, overall functioning definition of all forest aspects. The possible unequal focus on forest aspects did not seem to be a big issue to respondents. This could because these elements are taken care of without much consultation within the CPF.

## 4.2 Governance tasks

As explained in the conceptual framework, Stokke distinguishes among 4 governance tasks: knowledge building, norm building, capacity building, and enforcement (Stokke, 2011). In this section I will explore what organizations are taking responsibility for what tasks within the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF).

## 4.2.1 Knowledge building

A number of organisations among the CPF are working on increasing knowledge on forests and forest related issues. They started several initiatives which are summarized below.

- Forest Policy Science Platform (IUFRO, ICRAF and CIFOR). This is a new commitment of three CPF organisations to "respond to needs and requirements of other processes and arrangements for which forests are relevant" (CIFOR, ICRAF, & IUFRO, 2015). It aims to interact with the development, monitoring and analysis of progress of the Sustainable Development Goals;
- Evidence-Based Forestry Initiative led by CIFOR, in partnership with ICRAF, IUFRO and others. This initiative facilitates use of "the best methods for informing decisions and actions in forestry" (CIFOR, IUFRO, ICRAF, CATIE, & CIRAD, n.d.). The initiative uses experiences of existing cooperation to increase the capacity of the forest community to make decisions based on the right knowledge (CIFOR, n.d.-b);
- ASB Partnership for the Tropical Forest Margins led by ICRAF. ASB is a partnership between international and national agricultural research institutes, non-governmental organizations, universities, community and farmers' groups. Together they are addressing climate change taking into account the livelihoods in the agriculture-forest landscape of the tropics (ICRAF, n.d.);
- Global Forest Expert Panels. This was launched in April 2007 by the CPF to make sure objective and independent scientific assessments are done to be able to support better informed decision-making. The initiative is led and coordinated by IUFRO;

Besides these initiatives, the FAO builds knowledge with their Global Forest Resource Assessments (FRA) (FAO, 2012). These assessments are published every five years and try to show consistently how the world's forests are changing. In these assessments they make use of country reports and remote sensing. These are highly valued by forest policy makers (country delegate 2). The FAO itself mentioned in their opening statement at the 11th session of the UNFF that they are:

> "the best institution working on UN statistics on forests" (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 1).

World Banks's PROFOR is another organisation creating knowledge. They create knowledge products about different topics, mostly related to climate change (PROFOR, n.d.). Their analyses are valued among foresters (expert 1).

There are different views on who should be responsible for building knowledge. According to the focal agencies assigned for this task these should be IUFRO, CIFOR and ICRAF should work on the forest-policy interface (CPF, 2003, country delegate 1). IUFRO is seen as a technical organisation which is dealing with the knowledge needed to define e.g. forest degradation (CPF employee 3) and seems to be an organisation that is always interested in joining CPF initiatives (country delegate 2).

CIFOR and ICRAF are both part of the CGIAR which aims to do agricultural research for development. CIFOR's research is mostly related to governance, livelihoods and the environment in its broadest sense. ICRAF addresses food security, poverty and the management of natural resources and is more focussed on the landscape process (country delegate 2). ICRAF is working with the interface of forests, trees and agriculture.

Within the knowledge building niche, specific topics can be found on which current research is lacking. Researchers and CPF members generally agree that scientific effort should be put in:

1. Finding out why forests are not politically interesting (researcher's observations UNFF 11's side events, CPF employee 8).

2. Finding a common vision on SFM is crucial and a common understanding of all underlying concepts.

The latter is important to decrease competition and create a better understanding of all CPF's members goals and ideas. This is influencing the perception of policy and decision makers that the scientific input reflects the best available knowledge.

It seems that there is enough information on the assessment of the extent of deforestation but as mentioned the political aspects are lacking. The research organisations within the CPF could enhance their credibility and legitimacy by focussing on the political aspects when involving and listening to decision makers. The Global Forest Expert Panels, led by IUFRO, were mostly working on these topics. By the recent creation of the Forest Policy Science Platform more focus is made towards these aspects which will be informed by existing initiatives. Connecting science and policy is also making sure science is relevant for its users. When explaining and clarifying available policy options, scientific organizations are increasing their saliency. The question is however to what extent this platform will be able to make this happen.

**TABLE 9 SUMMARIZING CPF´S KNOWLEDGE BUILDING INITIATIVES**

| Actor | Initiative |
|---|---|
| IUFRO, ICRAF and CIFOR | Forest Policy Science Platform |
| CIFOR, in partnership with ICRAF, IUFRO and others | Evidence-Based Forestry Initiative |
| ICRAF (coordinator) | ASB Partnership for the Tropical Forest Margins |
| IUFRO (coordinator) | Global Forest Expert Panels |
| FAO | Global Forest Resource Assessments (FRA) |
| World Bank | PROFOR |

### 4.2.2 Norm building

Within the forest regime there are multiple norms agreed upon. Among the CPF members there are five organisations that built norms which differ in legal form and cover a broad range of different aspects of forest policy.

- UNFF and its Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests (Forest Instrument);
- UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol;
- CBD and its Cartagena and Nagoya Protocol;
- ITTO and its International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA);
- UNCCD.

The **Forest Instrument** includes the four global objectives on forests (see table 10) and its scope is on Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) "as a dynamic and evolving concept, aims to maintain and enhance the economic, social and environmental values of all types of forests, for the benefit of present and future generations" (ECOSOC, 2007, para. 4). The Forest Instrument has therefore a broad coverage on aspects as well as in its participation as the instrument is adopted by the United Nations Generally Assembly. It lacks substantive strength due to the non-legally binding form of the agreement. It is also the question if the Forest Instrument is internationally applicable as it is vaguely formulated. This can lead to different interpretations of the text among the members who created it

and may justify nonadherence. Also it might not be coherent with other international norms that have contrasting aims, e.g. trade agreements.

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. | reverse the loss of forest cover worldwide through SFM, including protection, restoration, afforestation and reforestation, and increase efforts to prevent forest degradation; |
| 2. | enhance forest-based economic, social and environmental benefits, including by improving the livelihoods of forest-dependent people; |
| 3. | increase significantly the area of protected forests worldwide and other areas of sustainably managed forests, as well as the proportion of forest products derived from sustainably managed forests; |
| 4. | reverse the decline in official development assistance for SFM and mobilise significantly increased, new and additional financial resources from all sources for the implementation of SFM. |

The **Kyoto Protocol** under the UNFCCC is a legally binding agreement that commits its Parties to set internationally binding emission reduction targets[6]. Forests are likely to be greatly affected by climate change and mainly seen as sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases. It is important to notice that the term SFM is mentioned in its second article and parties to the protocol are therefore committed to the promotion of SFM, afforestation and reforestation (Wildburger, 2009, p. 150). The Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005 with 55 Parties to the UNFCCC which together accounted for at least 55% of the total emissions for 1990 of the developed parties. Currently the protocol consists of 192 parties (191 countries and the EU) (UNFCCC, n.d.). The Kyoto Protocol places a heavier burden on the developed nations as their larger contribution to climate change is recognized. Moreover, the Kyoto Protocol was not signed by China and not ratified by the United States of America and some other countries. Both China and the USA are great emitters of GHGs.
The Marrakesh Accords, part of the Kyoto Protocol, deliver definitions and guidelines relating to land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities (Wildburger, 2009).

The Kyoto protocol only focuses on forests as carbon sinks which influences the coverage of forest aspects. The Kyoto Protocol moreover loses strength due to its focus on developed nations. It therefore excludes emerging developing countries such as Brazil, India, China, South-Africa, etc. Plus the non-ratification by the USA, the Kyoto Protocol lacks sufficient representation of emitting parties. The Kyoto Protocol is with its clear targets rather applicable on a national level. It has some regulatory competition with organizations like the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organization and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Oberthür, 2006).

The CBD includes the legally binding **Cartagena Protocol** on Biosafety and the **Nagoya Protocol** on Access to Genetic Resources. The Nagoya Protocol offers a legal framework to implement the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources which is one of the three objectives of the CBD. Although forests are not specifically mentioned in the CBD text and its protocols, they are an important source for genetic resources. The Nagoya Protocol covers traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. With 68 parties it is a relatively small covered treaty. It

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[6] It should be noted that in December 2015, the world agreed upon a new climate treaty under the UNFCCC, widely known as the Paris Agreement. Unfortunately this felt outside the time of my data collection and is therefore not part of this research.

also only focusses on the sharing and access to genetic resources which is a rather small aspect of SFM.

The Cartagena Protocol is a convention with a larger participation and has 170 parties (CBD, n.d.-c). Due to the moving aspect of the Cartagena Protocol's living organisms it has little to do with SFM. In Decision IX/5 the CBD mentions the use of genetically modified trees.

The **CBD** itself is with its 196 parties a strong legally binding convention regarding forests (CBD, n.d.-a). The CBD has taken several decisions on forests. The CBD covers Forest Biological Diversity. This falls under one of the programmes of the CBD. During the second COP to the CBD, a decision on Forest Biological Diversity was made including decisions on cooperation with the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (which is the predecessor of the UNFF) (CBD, 1995). In 2002 the CBD adopted an Expanded Programme of Work on Forest Biodiversity (Decision VI/22) (CBD COP 6, 2002). This is an important decision for the implementation of the CBD regarding forests. A lot of environmental NGOs mainly concentrate on the CBD working on forest protection as they feel they can establish more compared to the International Arrangements on Forests and UNFF process (NGO 1) and more money is available (country delegate 2). As the CBD is universally agreed upon its participatory coverage is large, its legal strength is also great and although some aspects conflict with e.g. the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Laxman & Ansari, 2012; Rosendal, 2001), it is rather applicable on the national level.

The ITTO operates under an international treaty: the International Tropical Timber Agreement (**ITTA**). The latest ITTA was adopted in 2006 and entered into force in 2011, following the ITTA of 1994. The ITTA was agreed upon during the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). UNCTAD is the United Nations body authorized to deal with development issues and in particular international trade as an aspect of this development. The ITTA is a legal document (ITTO, 2006, para. 17(1)) and has 72 country members from which 34 are producing and 38 consuming (ITTO, n.d.). It might therefore miss some necessary participation from countries like Russia. Moreover conflicts might occur with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and CITES (Amilien, 1996) although article 34 states that "nothing in this agreement authorizes the use of measures to restrict or ban international trade in, and in particular as they concern imports of, and utilization of, timber and timber products" (ITTO, 2006).

The ITTO has with its ITTA a focus on the sustainable use, management, trade and conservation of tropical forests and its products. As described in the annex, the ITTO has a broad view on forests. At its establishment it recognized the multiple economic, environmental and social benefits of forests. The ITTO states that sustainably managed forests also contribute to sustainable development by increased variation and development of trade in forest products (ITTO, 2006). ITTO has developed the *ITTO criteria and indicators for the sustainable management of tropical forests*. In collaboration with the African Timber Organization (ATO) and IUCN it developed both the *ATO/ ITTO principles, criteria and indicators for the SFM of African natural tropical forests* and the *ITTO/IUCN guidelines for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in tropical timber production forests* (Wildburger, 2009, p. 150).

The **UNCCD** was adopted in 1994 and entered into force in 1996. Currently 196 country members have either ratified or accessed the convention. The UNCCD has no particular protocols under its convention. It is the only internationally legally binding framework currently working on desertification. There are especially links with forests in the National Action Programmes under the UNCCD. In these programmes, measures to conserve natural resources should be included of which

SFM is an important part (Wildburger, 2009, p. 152). As can be read in the annex, the UNCCD promotes prevention of land and forest degradation by sustainable land management and SFM as well as by restoration of already degraded land and forests. These links however only cover a small aspect of deforestation. The position of the UNCCD in the CPF could be improved as they are very weak at the moment. This is mostly due to a lack of finances, especially compared with the other two Rio Conventions, the UNFCCC and CBD. This could be because most forest money goes to the tropical countries. This financial aspect also has its influence on Low Forest Cover Countries on which the UNCCD is mostly focussed. As one respondent mentions:

The UNCCD is seen as *"very weak in the CPF"* (country delegate 2).

Five CPF members are working on the norm building niche. If the aim is to have one organisation creating norms on forests, it could be seen as competition. However this is not the scenario which most respondents and literature foresee. The different norms exist without much conflict next to each other. As there is no concrete action in the direction of a legally binding agreement or other norms specifically on forests, organizations could move away from the UNFF. It seems that the necessity of having such an umbrella that the UNFF envisions is not felt among CPF members. This could be noticed during its 11th session as e.g. UNDP, World Bank and UNEP were not often seen or they sent employees in junior positions (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 1). Other reasons for their withdrawal could be the limited effectiveness of the agreement and the idea that the UNFF is more of a coordinator than a norm setter. As respondents put it:

*"the effectiveness of the agreement is very limited"* (CPF employee 6).

*"The UNFF is the leader of the ´policy led interface´ and an umbrella organisation able to create an overview of different norms existing on forests, not as the most important norm setter"* (expert 1).

If one sees the complementary nature of already existing forest norms, one could say that broad coverage is led by the forest instrument and strength is given by specific legally binding international frameworks on climate change, biodiversity, timber trade and desertification. The strength among these different legal frameworks is however unevenly distributed. Climate change is such a hot topic that a lot of institutions mainly focus on the UNFCCC, other frameworks are lacking behind. In table 11, an overview can be found of all norms under the CPF.

TABLE 11 SUMMARIZING CPF´S NORMS

| Actor | Initiative | Focus |
|-------|-----------|-------|
| UNFF | Non Legally Binding Instrument on all types of forests | Sustainable Forest Management |
| UNFCCC | Kyoto Protocol | Forests as carbon sinks |
| CBD | Cartagena Protocol and Nagoya Protocol | Forests as large resources of biological diversity |
| ITTO | ITTA, ATO/ ITTO principles, criteria and indicators and the ITTO/IUCN guidelines | Forests as producers of forest products |
| UNCCD | Its National Action Programmes could refer to forests | Forests as part of land degradation |

### 4.2.3 Capacity building

There are different aspects within capacity building that are mentioned in this chapter. The most important one is the availability of financial resources. But also the transfer of knowledge and technology are a necessary part. This section tries to order the different responses and firstly shows some general remarks on capacity building, then it shows the relation and importance of other conventions and the emergence of REDD+, this will be followed by some views on who should be responsible for what aspect of financial capacity building and implementation.

> In principle Sustainable Forest Management should be able to pay for itself by being economically and ecologically viable and *"big money from elsewhere is not necessary".* There is "*no way forward until people realize they can make money out of SFM"* (CPF employee 8).

I quoted this respondent because of his interesting perspective on capacity building in which the transfer of knowledge and financial resources are seen as important aspects. However, the main debate in regards to capacity building is on competition over resources and the confusion about who is doing what related to financial resources (ITTO, 2013, p. 14, CPF employee 3, 8, 6 and expert 1, 3; CPF side-event, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 2). As illustrated by respondents:

> *"due to weakening of organisations more organisations were established and fragmentation increased as well as the money on the table and the competition over this money"* (expert 1).

> There is *"a fight about finances"* (expert 3).

> The problem is not that there is no money, "*everyone has money, everyone wants more"* (expert 3).

As SFM is such a broad concept it is very complicated to also create a financial mechanism which is able to finance all aspects. As a respondent put it:

> The financial mechanism is "*not designed for SFM"* (Peter DeMarsh in MSD, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 2).

The financial issues are very complex. This could be due to three reasons. First, the increasing number of organisations using the same bag of money which is decreasing (CPF employee 5). It should be noticed that the financial support for the CPF is voluntary and the contribution of UNFF is very small (CPF employee 5). Secondly, donor countries feel they cannot keep on paying which is also known as *"donor fatigue"* and thirdly leadership plays an important role (expert 1).

At the 11th session of the UNFF all actors agreed that the available financial resources should be used in a better way (opening statement FAO and EU and Peter DeMarsh in MSD, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 1 and 2). One way to do this is by creating a Global Forest Fund. This was mostly advocated at the 11th session of the UNFF by developing countries (e.g. opening statement Nigeria on behalf of African Group, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 2). Another way is by creating CPF broad projects as it is easier to receive funding for projects that involve more CPF members (researcher's observations UNFF 11, expert 4).

**The emergence of other conventions and funds**

UNFCCC's programme on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) and the other Rio conventions (CBD and UNCCD) often emerge in relation to the competition over resources. This is dominating the CPF projects as they are not only working on forests as carbon sinks. A comment of one interviewee:

> *"the money in the World Bank is all REDD-related money"* (expert 1).

This dominance of REDD+ could possibly explain why the World Bank is not so involved in projects directly related to UNFF and CPF. However there is also some positive remarks on the REDD money as it increased the bag of money for forests. Interviewees mentioned:

> The Clean Development Mechanism is *"the best thing to get"* and *"with REDD we achieved it and there is enough money!"* (expert 1).

> *"More money is available in UNFCCC and REDD+"* (CPF employee 6).

The emergence of REDD+ and other funds related to climate change like the Green Climate Fund, creates opportunities but could also be one of the reasons why organisations are moving away from the UNFF. To avoid this from happening, the UNFF could link itself to the conventions.

**Organizations working on financial capacity building**

Letting alone the confusion and competition over financial resources it is logical that the finances should be arranged by the World Bank and the GEF and no other CPF member as they are the agreed focal agencies, see chapter 3.2. Respondents therefore question if the Facilitative Process under the UNFF is rightly placed. As respondents mention:

> It should be questioned if the Facilitative Process is *"well placed in the (UNFF) secretariat"* (country delegate 1).

> *"an institution like UNFF should not work on capacity building as that is already taken care of by other organisations"* (CPF employee 3).

It could be an idea to have the Facilitative Process more integrated among the CPF members. This is already done by something like the CPF sourcebook for funding SFM. This is a tool of the Facilitative Process which is created by the CPF's members together (CPF, n.d.-d).

The World Bank and the GEF are two organisations working in a totally different way. The World Bank offers loans as it is a bank and afterwards the loan needs to be paid back. The World Bank is funding larger forest projects which are mostly unrelated to the UNFF (CPF employee 6). The GEF provides grants (Independent Evaluation Group World Bank and IFC and MIGA, 2013). This way the World Bank will mostly pay longer term investments like infrastructural projects and GEF is more flexible to spend their funds on other issues (CPF employee 8). To be able to apply for GEF funding, projects need to be country led as the GEF cannot fund anything that is led by scientific organisations or the like (CPF employee 8). CIFOR and UNEP are for example using this information to get involved in country led initiatives and receive funding via this channel (CPF employee 8).

TABLE 12 SUMMARIZING CPF´S FINANCIAL RESOURCES AND INITIATIVES

| Actor | Initiative |
|-------|------------|
| UNFF | Facilitative Process |
| World Bank | Loans |
| GEF | Grants |

**Implementation**

Showing models of implementation is another aspect of capacity building (Stokke, 2011). Also the task of implementation is seen as something actors compete for. As a respondent stated:

> Implementation of SFM is "*messy*". "*Everyone wants to take its part in implementation*" (country delegate 1).

The FAO itself mentioned in their opening statement at the 11th session of the UNFF that they would be the best institution working on the ground implementation of SFM (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 1). This was backed up by the EU and Swiss statement which pointed out that the UNFF (secretariat) is not an implementing agency. The Swiss gave as an example UNFF's role in the Facilitative Process in which it sounded that they prefer the Facilitative Process should not be under the UNFF as the FAO is implementing the Forest Instrument and National Forest Plans (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 2). As said by an interviewee:

> "*the FAO is the implementing agency in the CPF relating directly to the National Forest Plans*" (expert 1).

## 4.2.4 Rule enforcement

While capacity building backs SFM by removing obstacles to norm adherence, rule enforcement aims to discourage noncompliance by creating costs. This can be done via verification, review and sanctions (Stokke, 2011). As seen in the section on norm building, most norms as part of the CPF are globally agreed upon. The Forest Instrument is not legally binding and therefore lacks an enforcement mechanism. The Rio Conventions (CBD, UNCCD, UNFCCC) have better sections on measurement, review and verification (MRV) but are also often missing strong possible sanctions as important actors are not participating.

Although it seems from briefly reviewing what the CPF members are doing on MRV and creating costs for noncompliance that there are some gaps, the CPF members are working together on MRV. As one CPF member mentioned:

> "*The CPF members are working together on filling the gaps on MAR*" (statement Catalina Santamaria from CBD in a side-event, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 4).

The CPF seems aware of the gaps regarding MRV and attempts to at least try to fill those. The conventions seem to be the most important agencies in working on MRV. Especially UNFCCC as their REDD+ programme is focussing highly on MRV. As one respondent put it while emphasizing the importance of MRV for fulfilling their aim towards SFM:

*"The REDD readiness is almost the same as what we did before with the National Forest Plans with MRI added"* (expert 1).

### 4.2.5 The division of governance tasks among the CPF members

Different governance tasks are necessary to achieve Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) on a global level. A lot of CPF members want to build capacity in some way, especially concerning financial resources. Moreover, it seems that a lot of organizations want to do research although, everyone agrees that ICRAF, IUFRO and CIFOR are assigned this task. On norm building slight discrepancy exists between the three Rio conventions although most difficulties remain outside of the CPF with e.g. WTO. Although countries agreed upon the Forest Instrument, this remains a soft law instrument. Therefore a general lack of rule enforcement mechanisms occur within the CPF while the organizations are working together to fill the gaps on measurement, review and verification.



**FIGURE 5 OVERVIEW OF CPF´S TASK DIVISION ON GOVERNANCE TASKS**

## 4.3 Synergy, cooperation and conflict

This section answers the second research question assessing what elements of the interactions among members of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) are synergistic, cooperative or decentralized. As seen in previous sections CPF members are often working together, not the least shown by the existence of the CPF itself. As explained in the conceptual chapter, the interaction among institutions can be synergistic, cooperative or conflictive/decentralized. The latter being mostly decentralized which might be disruptive and may result in negative competition. In this subchapter the research results on the division of labour will be assessed on its synergistic, conflictive or cooperative elements. Additional data is used to illustrate the possible synergy, cooperation or decentralization. First a more general observation about the interactions of the CPF members is given before going into more detail on the synergistic, cooperative and decentralized elements in the division of labour.

The existence of the CPF itself is a good example of how collaboration can be formalized to a certain extent. If this would be in a more hierarchical and authoritative manner, this would be what Frank Biermann means with synergistic fragmentation (Humrich, 2013, p. 82). Formalized, synergistic elements among the CPF members are the Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) as described in chapter 3 although these extend only to two institutions at the time.

The collaboration of the CPF could be better streamlined and coordinated. This could be achieved by more frequent interactions, understanding better who is doing what tasks and activities and the sharing of resources (CPF employee 3, 2 and 8). The lack of this streamlining is illustrated by an example about disagreement on the publishing of a paper commissioned by the World Bank on the current status and options for the future of the CPF. According to several people this should have been presented during the 11th session of the UNFF, however according to my own observations it was not due to disagreement. As heard in the corridors reasons for this disagreement were weak scientific arguments, too critical, and not objective, etc.

As at the moment the CPF is mostly linked to the UNFF and not so much to other processes. These other emerging processes could be triggering conflicting fragmentation also on the national implementation level. One of the respondents mentions:

> "*the CPF is only linked to UNFF". "However since 2005 the mandate should not be linked only to UNFF as a lot of different processes emerged, like REDD*" (CPF employee 5).

Overall some CPF members and country representatives support more the organisations with conventions like the UNFCCC, others are still aiming for an umbrella organisation on forests like the UNFF.

**Forest aspect focus**

Although forests are fragmented in their nature, on the administrative and practical level fragmentation can be perceived as problematic because Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) is viewed different in all sectors. As a respondent mentioned:

> "*It is a matter of duplication, an administrative issue which involves thousands of people*" (country delegate 5).

Another conflictive matter is the dropped level of identification of some members as some disagreement exists between the different CPF members on what aspects should be focussed on. As a CPF employee said:

> "*There is friction between the core governance bodies*" (CPF employee 5).

When implementing formalized targets agreed upon in the CPF, issues arise when people are pushing their own agenda as they are not open and frank about their agenda and the effort everyone is able to put in the CPF (expert 1, CPF employee 2 and 8). Although it is said in section 4.1 that clear guidelines, priorities, better messaging and structure are needed, therefore it would be easier to deal with problems on a case to case, thematic basis of emerging issues (CPF employee 8, country delegate 2 and 5). Respondents think this would be better than setting priorities in the partnership. It has been too difficult to agree upon what these priorities should be (CPF employee 2, expert 1). This was illustrated by an example given by a CPF employee on the negotiations within the CPF about a position paper in February 2015:

> "*A lot of time and effort were put in when last minute some cooperating members add changes due to their own priorities and mandates*" (CPF employee 2).

It would also be helpful if countries would make a list of priorities for the CPF so that members can clarify what they are able to contribute and take responsibility for. This needs to be added next to the proposals for actions. According to an interviewee the existing list is too long and:

> "If priorities are set, CPF members can give what they can, want, and are able to add". "It was not clear from the beginning what everyone was going to contribute because the CPF was established on an ad hoc basis" (CPF employee 8).

A matter of conflict is the definition of SFM and the possible difficulties using such a broad definition. There seems to be a broad understanding however there is room for interpretation and some differences might occur at the implementation stage (CPF employee 3). A holistic view on forests is missing at the 11th session of the UNFF negotiations. Although the negotiations at the 11th session of the UNFF could have been about SFM, they were mostly about the Forest Instrument and its form. This could be observed in the negotiation rooms of the 11th session of the UNFF and a respondent mentioned that:

> "there is no interest in looking at the overall picture/cause" (expert 1).

This way some conflicts might occur on the forest aspect focus. Although it is centrally agreed upon to have a definition of SFM and CPF members are using this definition, the focus might be on the dominant climate change aspects of forests and not enough on the social and cultural aspects of forests. The rights of indigenous people might be considered insufficient in the CPF. They might be considered outside of the CPF in other international law but this is outside of the scope of this research.

**Governance tasks**

In this section I will briefly touch upon elements regarding the specific governance tasks that can be either synergistic, cooperative or decentralized/conflictive. As there is not so much data on the rule enforcement I took this together with norm building.

*Knowledge building*

Knowledge building is only coordinated in parts and therefore partly decentralized. Strong policy learning programmes are needed to give attention to fragmentation and stakeholders should be involved in these. This seems to be commonly agreed upon by the broad CPF organisation (CPF side-event, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 2). Although the new Forest Policy Science Platform was established, knowledge is not officially streamlined and more organized on an ad hoc basis.

All the knowledge building initiatives by IUFRO, CIFOR and ICRAF as described in paragraph 4.2.1 are organized bottom up in a loose network. IUFRO plays an important and informal role in pulling these initiatives. Other organisations working on knowledge building are organized less coordinated and more decentralized.

*Norm building*

The norms and their enforcement in global forest governance are not so much coordinated on a central level. CPF members give input to each other's meetings which is all on a voluntary and happens ad hoc. In most conventions the existence of other rules and regulations is acknowledged. Especially among the Rio conventions this is done, with the help of the Joint Liaison Group.

The Joint Liaison Group was established in 2001 between the secretariats of the three Rio conventions. These conventions mentioned to aim for common forest targets and indicators in line with the Aichi targets (researcher's observations UNFF 11, day 8). The aim of having formalized targets could be seen as synergistic. On the norm building niche, the only effort to create synergy formally is the forest instrument. Also the establishment of the UNFF should create synergy. The UNFF and its forest instrument however lack strength as they are based on soft law and coexist with other norms without any authoritative coordination. The Joint Liaison Group should be able to do so but is not only focussed on forests and includes only three CPF members.

Norm building is only coordinated in parts and therefore partly decentralized. Conflicts among CPF members don't often occur on norms as most are streamlined and recognize each other.

*Capacity building*

No hierarchical governance exists on the coordination of capacity building and especially the financial resources for forest projects. Capacity building is less coordinated and competition over financial resources is explicitly mentioned.

The GEF seems to be a good informal coordinator of projects. Jorge Illueca (independent assessment International Arrangements on Forests) mentioned that the GEF did great work on creating coherence and coordination in projects (researcher's observations UNFF 11, day 8). It seemed that the GEF has an important role in creating synergy among CPF members (researcher's observations UNFF 11). This is a role they took informally.

Especially capacity building is organized in a more ad hoc, decentralized manner. Over finances conflicts occur, not only over the resources itself but also who is or should organize them.

**Concluding remarks**

Although the CPF itself is an attempt to collaborate in a synergistic manner, the CPF is mostly coordinated as a loose network of organisations. This is especially the case on norm and knowledge building. On capacity building and the financial resources the collaboration within the CPF is mostly decentralized and conflictive.

In the figure below you can see an overview of the most dominant nature of the interactions among CPF members. It should be taken into account that this is a very simplified overview and there are elements that are in the division of labour having a different nature.

TABLE **13** OVERVIEW OF NATURE OF THE **CPF** INTERACTIONS

| | | Synergistic | Cooperative | Decentralized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Forest Aspect Focus** | | | |
| **Governance Tasks** | **Knowledge building** | | | |
| | **Norm building and rule enforcement** | | | |
| | **Capacity building** | | | |

In the following chapter I will explore what kind of consequences can be derived from this mostly cooperative and sometimes decentralized fragmented division of labour.

# 5. Consequences of the fragmentation of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests to enhance international cooperation and coordination

So far the gaps and overlaps on their synergistic, cooperative and decentralized elements were assessed. I found that although the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) itself is an attempt to collaborate in a synergistic manner, the CPF is mostly coordinated as a loose network of organisations. This is especially the case on norm and knowledge building. On capacity building and the financial resources the collaboration within the CPF is mostly decentralized and conflictive.

The next step in this research can be made answering the third and last specific research question. What are the effects of this fragmentation among the CPF's members? As described in the conceptual framework in chapter two, researching the consequences of both the fragmentation and the division of labour as it is now is challenging. First of all as there is little academic literature about it (Alter & Meunier, 2009; T. Gehring & Faude, 2014). Second of all it is a politically sensitive topic (interview expert 3 and researchers' observations UNFF 11 day 1).

As mentioned in chapter two this research only explores the consequences which can be observed in the International Arrangement on Forests and its CPF during the time of my data collection for fulfilling CPF´s principal function to enhance international cooperation and coordination. The extent to which the nature of the division of labour and the interactions are helping or disturbing the realization of this function are explored. It should be taken into account that not all possible consequences as described in this chapter were discovered in the field. Moreover, due to the time constrains of this research some possible consequences were left out although they might occur, like forum shopping (T. Gehring & Faude, 2014). An additional reason for this small selection of consequences is the difficulty of proving the causality between the nature of the fragmentation and its consequences. In the table below a selection is shown from the consequences of international regime complexity as stated in chapter 2.

TABLE 14 SELECTION OF CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIME COMPLEXITY OBSERVED IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENT ON FORESTS AND ITS CPF (BASED ON ALTER & MEUNIER, 2009)

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. | Contribution to creating small group environments by multiplying the number of international venues, and thus occasions for states representatives to interact |
| 2. | The more technical an issue, and the more expertise is valuable, the more likely small group environments will exist |
| 3. | The more insular a small group, the greater the risk of the down sides of small group dynamics like in-group/out-group rivalry. It is also more difficult to fully monitor and respond to what goes on outside of embedded networks |
| 4. | It creates competition among institutions and actors. Competition can have negative effects - turf battles and a failure to coordinate efforts. It can also have positive effects - increasing total resources, spreading risk, allowing experimentation. Competition also increases the options of aid recipients as it allows them to pick and choose which organization can service their needs best. |
| 5. | It is harder to locate which institution or actor is responsible for an issue which can undermine accountability. |

The fifth and last possible consequences is observed in the International Arrangement on Forests and its CPF. As this is closely linked to the clarification of the task division I would like to refer to the previous chapter for more information on this. As seen in the table above, there are two main consequences of regime complexity remaining that are also observed in the Collaborative Partnership on Forests. This chapter will be structured according to them. The first section will go into more detail on the fourth possible consequence, the competition among institutions and actors and illustrates this with examples from data collected. I will focus on the increase of competition due to the lack of synergy for the coordination among CPF members. The second will group the first three consequences in the table above on the small group dynamics and communication more generally. Other observed consequences related to communication will be added to this section. These are not necessarily backed up with existing literature but clearly observed during data collection. This section will be divided into in- and out-group rivalry according to the third consequence in the table above and the role of leadership.

## 5.1 Competition

As Alter and Meunier (Alter & Meunier, 2009) describe in their article on international regime complexity, one of the possible consequences of this complexity is increased competition among institutions and actors. They see competition as something neutral which can have both negative and positive effects. As negative effects they mention turf battles and failed coordination of efforts. Positive effects are an increase of total resources, risk spreading and the larger extent to which experimentation and innovation is possible. Competition is, according to Alter and Meunier, also good for the recipients of (financial) assistance as they are able to pick and choose which organization is best in serving their needs (Alter & Meunier, 2009). The competition over governance functions and resources is also described by others (Frey, 2008). Even when institutions are aware of their overlap, like in the CPF, overlap of their functions and scope are likely to produce competition. This is because existing institutions will lose some or all of their functions to other organizations (T. Gehring & Faude, 2014). Conceptually it is difficult to see competition only as a result of fragmentation. It could also be causing fragmentation (T. Gehring & Faude, 2014). In this research I will not go along with the debate on competition as a cause, consequence or both. I will only describe what I observed and could be labelled as competition.

As described in more detail in chapter 4.2.3 on capacity building, financial resources are an area in which competition among CPF organisations exists over limited resources (Hoogeveen et al., 2014, p. 60). Most actors see this as a negative consequence, calling it a "fight" (CPF employee 3) and mentioning that it should be avoided (researcher's observations UNFF 11). The question remains to what extent this more market like, decentralized organization of capacity building is negative. It can indeed, like Alter and Meunier mention have its positive effects as countries implementing SFM can choose what organisation suits them best and the total amount of money can increase. As one interviewee mentioned:

> "*Everyone has money, everyone wants more*" (expert 3).

For the existence of the International Arrangements on Forests, UNFF and other organisations it could have a devastating effect as they might indeed become less relevant when other organisations are taking over their job. This can be observed by the REDD+ agenda on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation under UNFCCC. Nonetheless can the creation of new institutions lead to "duplication of effort, donor fatigue, impact fragmentation, and turf wars" (Hoogeveen, Maini, Moomaw, Najam, & Verkooijen, 2008). Politically it is however difficult to abolish

less relevant organizations as historically most UN organisations have no intention to abolish themselves (CPF employee 6).

The described turf wars can be observed among the CPF members, there is little room for miscommunication. Although competition is not necessarily negative, this is not helpful in enhancing the coordination and cooperation among CPF members. As people spoken to in the corridors illustrated:

> There is currently *"no space for miscommunication within the CPF"* (researcher's observations UNFF 11, day 1).

> *"Whenever someone says something wrong others feel mistreated immediately"* (CPF employee 4).

> The internal CPF's communication is "*shocking*" and I have difficulties imagining a way out of this process (CPF employee 6).

In the next section more detail will be given on the communication and small group dynamics existing in the International Arrangements on Forests and CPF more particularly.

## 5.2 Communication and small group dynamics

Alter and Meunier describe a second group of regime complexity consequences: small group dynamics under which the first three consequences in table 14 fall. According to them the large number of international venues contributes to creating small group environments in which representatives of states and international organisations interact. This can immediately be observed at the 11th session of the UNFF where the group of international negotiators is generally very small, relatively informal and stays the same for longer period of time (researchers' observations UNFF 11 day 1 and 2, CPF employee 6 and expert 3). As one respondent mentions:

> *"They are very much internally focussed"* (CPF employee 6).

A clear division exist between people working already for 15 years in the field and others (expert 3 and country delegate 6). This is not necessarily a good or bad thing but might explain some of the group dynamics. A respondent comments:

> *"The same people are involved as in the discussions in 2007 over the forest instrument, it is almost a replica of these discussions before"* (CPF employee 6).

Also other actors involved in the discussions, like scientists, are there for a long time. They often worked for either a forest related institution and then for a country delegation before (researcher's observations UNFF 11, day 5). Alter and Meunier (Alter & Meunier, 2009) also mention that the more technical an issue is, experts on the particular issue are rare and the more likely small group environments exist. This can lead to a lot of power for some individuals leading to some problems envisioning the broader interests of the forests. The power of individuals is considerate. As interviewees respond:

> *"The core of the problem is that people are focussed on their own simple interest instead on the cause of forestry"* (country delegate 4).

There is a lot going on with "*personalities and ego's in this world*". In the past meetings were "*very informal and decisions could be made with a few people and phone* calls". Also the idea that the Inter-agency Task Force on Forests needed to expand in the CPF was an idea of a few "*ego's*" (expert 1).

Personal contact and communication is seen as very important and a lot is being done in the corridors (country delegate 2 and 5). Although communication is important in every aspect of life interviewees mention that only official communication might not bring the outcomes wanted. Personal contact can be used to give that extra positive push and can be seen as crucial (CPF employee 1, 3 and 7).

It is important to differentiate between interaction among CPF members and the actual persons representing them. Most country negotiators are different for negotiations in different CPF's organisations. To illustrate this, in an attempt to guess how many UNFF negotiators were also involved in CBD negotiations, a respondent mentioned "three". This is a similar number to UNFF negotiators involved in UNFCCC (country delegate 2). More coordination exists between the negotiators of Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and UNFCCC (country delegate 2). This has to do with how forests are situated in the different ministries on country level but might also complicate the coordination on international negotiations.

Finally I would like to mention it is very hard for small delegations like the major groups but also small countries that are not collaborating in regional organisations like the EU to be involved in all different groups, initiatives, organisations and events (multi-stakeholder dialogue, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 2). This especially counts for developing countries as these do not have the capacity to gain expertise. NGOs need to be very much specialized to be able to follow the discussions and therefore sometimes withdrawal from the negotiations. An example mentioned by one of the NGO representatives is that in the discussions about the Legally Binding Agreement only few NGOs were involved (interview NGO 1).

In the next paragraphs, the main observations on communication and consequences of small group dynamics are clustered into two groups: the rivalry between in- and out-groups and leadership.

**In- and out-group rivalry and the different types of negotiators**

When joining the forest negotiators at the 11th session of the United Nations Forum on Forests, a division among negotiators could be observed. In the corridors groups of negotiators were mentioned as either belonging to the "Forest club", the "dinosaurs" or the "New York mafia" (country delegate 2 and 6). Alter and Meunier mention this thinking as the one of the down sides of small groups as this could lead to in-group/out-group rivalry (Alter & Meunier, 2009). The first group, "dinosaurs", refers to all foresters already in these discussions for a long period as already briefly touched upon in the previous section. They are already involved for a very long time and able to understand the historical context of the discussions. However, this might exclude some that do not have this capacity. As one respondent mentioned:

Some of them are "*too happy to have and keep this club*" and the International Arrangements on Forests and UNFF (country delegate 2).

As most members of this group of "dinosaurs" have a forestry background they do not have the capacity and expertise on legal issues arising in the negotiations. This is illustrated by the following two comments from interviewees:

*"foresters are generally nice people but they do not have (…) expertise on legal stuff"* (country delegate 4)

*"foresters are romantic and in that sense different than hard negotiators"* (country delegate 3).

The long term involvement of most developed country representatives could also have the advantage that there is more "institutional memory". In developing countries this "institutional memory" is lower due to a quick flow of policy makers who are coming and going as the whole (forest) department changes when political power is changing (expert 1). Therefore these countries have less power in the negotiations.

The second group that can be differentiated, the "New York mafia", is referring to negotiators based at the permanent missions in New York (researchers' observations UNFF 11, country delegate 2 and expert 1). They mostly focus on legal agreements, technology transfer, etc. using the outcomes of e.g. UNFF to create stronger arguments for negotiations elsewhere in the UN system. An example given by an interviewee is the case of Cancun and the last UNFF negotiations (country delegate 2). During these UNFF negotiations there was a long discussion about one sentence as this was referring to the successful Cancun negotiations. This was however not accurate as Bolivia did not agree and therefore did not want to refer to these "successful" outcomes of Cancun in the UNFF negotiations. The New York mafia refers to negotiators of the permanent missions to the UN fighting in UNFF negotiations for other issues. The New York mafia also speaks their own (legal) language which excludes others. According to an interviewee:

They are *"being part of the UN carousel"* (country delegate 5).

Besides these main groups more differentiations among the UNFF negotiators can be made:

1. "The sightseers". These ones are often from developing countries and like to come to New York to go sightseeing and shopping. They are often unprepared and not often attending the meetings. Most of them were becoming more active closer to the High Level Segment (researcher's observations UNFF 11).
2. "The professionals". These are negotiators often hired to push forward a specific topic which is often related to other processes. An example is the lady pushing the Global Forest Fund. She was very successful but ignored other topics and was not able to creatively think towards a different solution (country delegate 2).
3. "The distracters". Some negotiators are pushing a topic so hard that it distracts from negotiating anything else and you get the feeling these negotiators are being used by others for tactical reasons.

When differentiating between all these various negotiators it should be taken into account that there are also fluctuations between countries which have very strict instructions from their capital. Others might have fewer restrictions and are therefore more flexible. There are also countries which have more financial resources and are therefore more powerful (country delegate 2), e.g. Germany as they fund a lot of the side-events at the 11th session of the UNFF and the MGI (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 5).

What can generally be observed is that there is not much at stake for people that are negotiating at UNFF as the negotiators are not foresters (researcher's observations UNFF 11, expert 1). The negotiators, Western or non-Western, are not affected by what is or what is not happening in forests because of their decisions.

This group thinking should not be seen only in a negative light because the diversity of negotiators and people involved can give creative and long term results that will resonate among a large group of stakeholders. As one respondent mentioned:

> *"Negotiating with a combination of both professional foresters and negotiators can result in good agreements like the new International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA)"* (expert 1).

Also the group of CPF members representatives present at the 11th session of the UNFF is quite small and a core group (GEF, CBD, IUFRO, ITTO) is talking quite a lot with each other including some friendly gestures and a lot of bilateral meetings (researchers' observations UNFF 11 day 1). This could be interpreted as a good sign enhancing the cooperation. As CPF employees themselves said:

> *"They have a good working relationship"* (CPF employee 8).

> The group is "*not structured, formal and cheerful" (*CPF employee 5).

The group requires more internal consensus however and the benefits for all members should be clarified. It would be good to have an individual taking the responsibility to clarify the latter. This leadership role is important to be played right as there is currently a lot of confusion (CPF employee 5).

The group of CPF representatives is not often interacting with country delegates (researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 1). Some do, but these are often belonging to a special core group of people that work or worked in different CPF members and as a country delegate. This is possible as it is not an exception if a person e.g. started their career at the UNFF secretariat, became the lead negotiator for their country and then end their career in the FAO (researcher's observations UNFF 11).

Different groups could be observed during the 11th session of the UNFF and were mentioned by respondents. This group thinking was most often not resulting in rivalry, except for the "New York mafia". Often it was also not referring to the interaction of the CPF members themselves. This group thinking could be however the result of fragmentation and might have some influence on the functioning of the CPF as an organisation enhancing cooperation among its members. It should especially be noted that the CPF members were mostly not so much involved in the negotiations and only watching from the side-line and organizing side-events.

**The role of leadership**

Although this is not directly mentioned by Alter and Meunier (Alter & Meunier, 2009), the role of leadership was often observed having an effect on the cooperation of the CPF coming close to power differences between CPF members. The cooperative nature of the interactions and fragmentation between of the CPF could have influenced that a clear leader pulling the partnership is lacking. As two respondents mention:

> *"There is a clear lack of leadership in international forestry over the last 5 years"* (expert 1).

*"A focussed guidance of the UNFF is missing"* (country delegate 5).

In corridors it was heard and also interviewees mentioned that leadership decreased during the last years (researcher's observations UNFF 11, expert 1). Jag Maini was mentioned as an example of a good leader in forestry heading the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests, Intergovernmental Forum on Forests and UNFF Secretariat (expert 1, UNFF Secretariat, 2002). On leadership of the CPF, some felt that roles were unequally distributed (CPF employee 1 and 7, expert 1). Not every CPF's member representative contributes the same time and resources to the CPF processes (Hoogeveen et al., 2014, p. 66). Quoting some respondents:

*"some people are pulling their weight"* (CPF employee 2).

Some organisations are only being part of it "*for the gallery*". This is shown by some organisations *"only sending public relations officers"* to the 11<sup>th</sup> session of the UNFF (expert 1).

As the chair of the CPF, the FAO could have a natural role as the leader of the CPF. It is however debated if the FAO might be too dominant in chairing the CPF. This as it has the biggest interest and some of CPF's members might therefore feel uncomfortable within the partnership and withdrawal from negotiations, e.g. the World Bank and UNFCCC (country delegate 2, CPF employee 1, researcher's observations UNFF 11 day 9). The doubts surrounding the leadership of the FAO are illustrated by other interviewees:

*"FAO's leadership is questioned due to a loss of authority, also within its own organisation"* (expert 1).

FAO's increasing power might have its *"influence on the functioning or non-functioning of the CPF"* (CPF employee 4).

Traditionally FAO's leadership was not questioned because they had a broad mandate and a big outreach especially in developing countries (expert 1, Hoogeveen et al., 2014, p. 58). This is one of the reasons why another group has a more positive opinion about the FAO. As a respondent put it:

FAO is a "*good and logical leader of the CPF*" as they serve the broadest functions of forests and other organisations might focus too much on one topic and mandate (country delegate 3).

A rotating chair to avoid having a too dominant role of one of the members and which could create more ownership among all members could be a solution (county delegate 2, expert 1). This option is however not seriously discussed within the CPF (expert 1).

## 5.3 Concluding remarks

The fact that so many organizations are involved in dealing with global forest governance and that the CPF consists of 14 organizations has its consequences. Especially the distribution of financial resources is disturbing the aim to work towards SFM. However on the function of the CPF to enhance coordination and cooperation among its members, the communication effects are significant too. Although the core group present at the 11<sup>th</sup> session of the UNFF seems to be interacting on a friendly basis, their communication is excluding some. Among the excluded are especially the country delegates who need to decide upon the future of the International Arrangements on Forests in the

UN system. As these negotiations and the work of the CPF has become so complicated, the system itself also excludes the ones without the capacity to invest time, money and people, like small delegations from developing countries or NGOs. NGOs sometimes withdraw from negotiations.

The role of leadership within the CPF is important and especially the power differences and differences in taking initiative for pulling the CPF are noteworthy.

In the next chapter I will discuss the results as described in this and the former chapter. Afterwards I draw some conclusions in chapter 7.

# 6. Discussion: Placing the results in their context

The fragmentation of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) is mostly of a cooperative and sometimes conflictive decentralized nature. This is due to the gaps and overlaps in tasks and forest aspect focus among the members of the CPF. There seems to be a lack of powerful organizations to enforce rules, while there are lots of organizations that want to build knowledge and capacity. A strong focus within the CPF exists on specific environmental aspects of forests, although their aim is to include the social and economic aspects as well. Moreover, it has been observed that competition exists mainly over financial resources, and that there are differences among CPF members in taking initiatives for cooperation. Some are driving the partnership, others are more passive partners. The labyrinth of different initiatives, organizations and instruments involved in the IAF and global forest governance also excludes some from participation. This is because the process requires expertise and knowledge in which some organizations cannot or will not invest time and resources. This may result in organizations withdrawing from the IAF process and shifting towards other instruments or institutions working on forests, such as the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

In this chapter I will describe and discuss what these findings mean in the context of research already done in the field of global forest governance and its complexity. I will go more in depth on the use of my research model, and explain its pitfalls and positive elements. This threefold assessment model moves from the division of labour, to the nature of the fragmentation, to deriving consequences. This approach will be compared with other research which is closely related, but having a slightly different perspective exploring whether this model contributes to the existing research.

More and more research and theories have been developed in the last decade on the interaction between institutions. These range from cause and effect relationships (T. Gehring & Oberthur, 2009), to the design of architectures to deal with fragmentation (Biermann et al., 2009), to the management of the interaction (Stokke & Oberthür, 2011; Stokke, 2011; Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2011) and the division of labour (Luhmann, 1977; Oberthür & Pożarowska, 2013). In this research I tried to combine a few of these theories in the context of the CPF and global forest governance. This contributes to the 'pluralism of theories' in political science (Arts, 2012). Combining theories in a new context can lead to inconsistency if approaches from different theoretical backgrounds do not match (Weber, 2012; Zahra, 2007). In this chapter I will explain how combining the different existing theories worked for me, and how that combination made this research innovative in several ways. First of all, it recognizes the importance of a division of views such as forest aspect focus, besides a single focus on the division of governance tasks as part of the division of labour. Secondly, it uses the differentiation of fragmentation as developed by Biermann to assess what parts are synergistic, cooperative or conflictive. This was necessary to derive the consequences of CPF´s division of labour to come to the last part of this research.

## 6.1 The division of forest aspect focus and governance tasks to find a complete division of labour

In my research I tried to recognize that by only assessing the division of labour on governance tasks, an equal division of the different aspects of forests would be forgotten. This could happen even though these aspects play an incredible role in the cooperation of organizations. An unequal division among aspects might give unequal ownership of a partnership. If there is too much attention to

certain aspects, other organisations might lose attention, become frustrated and end up withdrawing from such a partnership. Although, and this will be elaborated upon in the next paragraphs, a division of labour might develop naturally, it is important that views of minorities are taken into account. Creativity and diversity in a group generally lead to better participation and decision making (De Dreu & West, 2001). Moreover, one might lose sight of aspects that did not seem important at one point, but might emerge in the future. Not taking this into account allows the development of non-integral policies (Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2011, p. 102). On the other hand, minorities might benefit from a focus on emerging issues such as climate change, as that only requires them to concentrate on one forum to share their views. The latter is especially applicable to the lobbyists from the Major Groups. Among the CPF members, minority views are not always heard when leaving the development of the division of labour decentralized. It could therefore be said that the lack of attention for social and cultural aspects of forests might be due to the decentralized and conflictive nature of the fragmentation. This might be true for CPF discussions and initiatives, however, other (forest) organizations might give attention to these aspects outside the CPF and are therefore outside of the scope of this research.

The data collection regarding the division of forest aspect focus can be questioned. A reason for that is the mandates are derived from data collected in 2015. A year in which the negotiations and the adoption of both the Sustainable Development Goals and the new climate accord were very important. This could have created greater attention for the environmental aspects of forests at the cost of social aspects. This might have been different if this research would have been conducted in another year of CPF's existence.

Although this research aimed to give a full record of all governance tasks fulfilled by the CPF members, little data was collected on the governance task of rule enforcement. This can be explained in three ways. First of all, respondents rarely mentioned rule enforcement or measurement, review or verification (MRV) in interviews. It seemed that this was no issue among the IAF negotiators at UNFF 11. Most responses close to rule enforcement were about the possibility of a legally binding norm within the new IAF. More detail on review, verification and punishment within the possible new instrument was lacking as this was not high on the agenda for most respondents. MRV and possible sanctions by non-compliance outside of the UNFF was not discussed among CPF members.

A second explanation for the lack of data on rule enforcement is that most negotiators at UNFF 11 are used to soft law instruments such as the Forest Instrument. As the country delegates I spoke to were often only negotiators for the UNFF, rarely combining the UNFF with the CBD, they lacked severe knowledge about other instruments. Only a few negotiators follow both processes (Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2011, p. 102).

Thirdly, a reason for little data on rule enforcement is the broad and complex debate around this topic. Outside of the scope of the CPF, a lot of regional organizations have developed laws with possibly stronger enforcement mechanisms (Wildburger, 2009). Due to the many aspects and steps in this research unfortunately there was no time to dive into this aspect, which might have influenced the outcomes of this research.

I would like to make three more comments regarding the division of labour and the meta-governance among the CPF members. First, this research concentrates on the tasks of the CPF members, whilst

the complete partnership can also have tasks (Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2011). Visseren-Hamakers et al. differentiate among five functions of partnerships to manage interaction: agenda setting, policy development, implementation, meta-governance (coordination) and participation enhancement. Although some gaps and overlaps in the division of labour of the CPF exist, the CPF members might be very advanced in fulfilling these five roles. The second point I would like to make, before finishing the discussion on the division of labour, is on one of the functions: meta-governance. My research focusses mostly on the consequences of the task division for the functioning of the meta-governance, defined here as the coordination among different governance systems. Visseren-Hamakers et al. conclude in their article that among different partnerships in the environmental arena, a gap on meta-governance often occurs. Although the existence of the CPF is a good example of filling such a gap on meta-governance, this could explain why partnerships and their interaction management will not bring structural improvements to the interaction among its members (Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2011, p. 102). One of the reasons the authors mention is that actors seem to focus too much on their own mandates (idem). Taking different forest aspects into account is therefore valuable. Thirdly, I would like to mention that in this context it is important to see if partnership members are able to look beyond their own mandate, and whether they give attention to all aspects of forests as agreed upon at the establishment of a partnership such as the CPF and in the Global Objectives on Forests (ECOSOC, 2007).

## 6.2 The nature of fragmentation as assessment mechanism

It has been new that from the two divisions of labour as described in the former paragraph, the different natures of fragmentation as developed by Biermann (Biermann et al., 2009) are used as an assessment mechanism. This is to understand what aspects of the collaboration in a partnership are synergistic, cooperative or decentralized. The latter was done to see what was going on more specifically and to differentiate among different aspects of the cooperation. It would have been too difficult to go straight into the consequences without using this intermediate step as some aspects might have different consequences then others. By differentiating between synergistic, cooperative and decentralized elements, consequences could easier be linked to the lack of a clear division of labour. Before assessment of the interaction was done it was defined either as positive, neutral or negative (Thomas Gehring & Oberthür, 2006). Through providing more detail as is done by Biermann (Biermann et al., 2009), consequences can more easily be derived. Also there is less normative notion as the division of labour is not either positive or negative. It therefore also contributes to the discussion on whether fragmentation is a negative development. When using such a broad concept and not differentiating between different kinds of fragmentation, one cannot say what degree or aspect of fragmentation causes problems. Using the differentiation of Biermann as an assessment mechanism to derive consequences is a first step towards determining criteria to find what aspects of fragmentation are harmful and what aspects are not (Zürn & Faude, 2013). Building on this, referencing to a decentralized instead of a conflictive nature of fragmentation would be recommended in further research.

## 6.3 Elaboration on the consequences of fragmentation

While exploring the consequences of fragmentation, my research turned into real pioneer work. I dived into the material, even though there was little research available on the consequences of regime complexity, fragmentation or division of labour. I felt that especially on this aspect research could make a difference and potentially bridge the gap with the reality of policy making. This is also in line with the research of the Expert Panel on International Forest Regime on embracing the

complexity of forest governance (IUFRO, 2011). Policy makers feel they can better influence the consequences than the causes of complexity. However, research on the consequences is lacking. This is unfortunate and I tried my best to relate my findings to available research. I knew at the beginning of this research this would form a real challenge. This is also the reason why this is one of the weaker parts of my research. The causal relationship between the division of labour and the nature of the fragmentation was not necessarily clear and could be questioned. The research consists of two different and not necessarily related elements: the division of labour and its synergistic, cooperative or conflictive nature, and the possible consequences of regime complexity. The link between them remains a very interesting component to explore in further research. The role of competition in this research was unclear. It could have been a cause, consequence or something in between, developing from increased complexity and triggering other consequences (T. Gehring & Faude, 2014).

I found that the role of individuals representing CPF members played an important role, especially on the consequences of CPF's collaboration. It was challenging to see connections between officially agreed upon elements of collaboration such as the different initiatives, MoUs, Global Objectives on Forests on one hand and the individual acts of CPF representatives on the other. The research could have been improved when it had differentiated between the acts of CPF members on the organization level and the CPF representatives on a more practical level. Some literature recognizes that research as done until recently oversees this (Visseren-Hamakers & Verkooijen, 2013). The authors describe that the first part of my research remains a-political, assuming that the interactions can be improved by simply managing them (Visseren-Hamakers & Verkooijen, 2013, p. 135). Visseren-Hamakers and Verkooijen recognize the role of actors and their agency in the institutional interaction. While applying the practice based approach on interaction management they differentiate between front stage and backstage interaction. Front stage interaction refers to the formal interaction as described in the first part of my research on formal arrangements such as laws and MoUs. Backstage interaction happens during activities undertaken by the actors, in this case CPF representatives, on an everyday basis (Visseren-Hamakers & Verkooijen, 2013, p. 135). These differences are important to take into account as these are also the differences between theory and real world practice. If one differentiates between these two stages, the assessment of the nature of the fragmentation could have led to different results. If I would have applied their methodology, I could have concluded that the existing fragmentation would be synergistic front stage interaction. Its synergy stemming from the existence of different joint initiatives, such as the Joint Liaison Group and the Global Objectives on Forests. Backstage collaboration faces some difficulties with personal frustration. Some front stage difficulties like conflicting treaties could have been solved backstage as organizations need to work together and depend on each other.

Gehring and Faude (2014) have a very particular idea on this interdependence and cooperation between overlapping institutions. According to them they create patterns of co-governance even when their task division is not clear from the beginning. Gehring and Faude describe the division of labour as normal, sophisticated and as a "spontaneous" institution when no negotiation or written contract is signed (T. Gehring & Faude, 2014). They are optimistic, in contrast with the negative notion of most articles on competition and division of labour. To some extent the CPF and its division of labour are indeed spontaneous like Gehring and Faude describe. The division of labour happened more spontaneously as time went by. Although there were some negotiations about focal points, their objective and the establishment of the CPF were also mentioned in UNFF decisions (CPF, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c). According to Gehring and Faude as well as other scholars interacting institutions

enjoy different consequences like forum-shopping, regime-shifting and competition (Alter & Meunier, 2009; T. Gehring & Faude, 2014). These effects lead to processes of institutional adaptation which limit activities and initiatives in the areas of overlap, just as it would in a market mechanism (T. Gehring & Faude, 2014). This is what Biermann would call a decentralized form of fragmentation (Biermann et al., 2009; Humrich, 2013). Gehring and Faude assume that the power distribution is more or less balanced among all involved institutions, in order to be able to come towards their patterns of institutional co-governance (T. Gehring & Faude, 2014, p. 473). In the case of the CPF, however, it is the question whether this power balance exists among all members as mainly discussed in section 5.2. This could have its consequences on the focus on social forest aspects and rule enforcement. However, Gehring and Faude link the natural institutional adaptation to organizational ecology. They mention that organizations will generally shrink or disappear if they are not able to communicate why they are necessary or cannot define their niche (Aldrich, 1999, p. 226; T. Gehring & Faude, 2014, p. 475). This closes the circle again with my research as this links beautifully with Stokke (2011). He came up with the four governance tasks as a way of selecting niches (Stokke, 2011). Building on his ideas I defined gaps and overlaps among CPF members. If an institution does not define clearly why they exist, there are chances of becoming irrelevant. This is clearly happening in the International Arrangement on Forests. Some organizations take over, and these and other organizations, including CPF members, are changing their attention towards new or more powerful organizations such as the UNFCCC.

Although Gehring and Faude have a clear view on what happens when institutions are competing over tasks, they do not elaborate on necessary tasks or views which no one is willing to take up. These might be necessary for equality of disadvantaged and minority groups and focus on social, newly explored and or innovative aspects of forests. Moreover, they do not mention the lack of abolishing organizations in the UN system. They assume that organizations can just disappear, although historically this is not the tendency of organizations. Their tendency is to multiply. Though, of course organizations can still become irrelevant when they are not abolished.

To be able to change to a more efficient and equal division of labour, the establishment or abolishment of some organizations is not only depending on the above. Change will only happen, and happens from "disorder" to "order", when sufficiently powerful actors are supporting this change and are dissatisfied with the division of labour as it is now (Oberthür & Pożarowska, 2013, pp. 104–105). If the most powerful players in the CPF, such as the UNFCCC and FAO, want the change it is more likely to happen. This might catalyse the process of some organizations becoming irrelevant as the powerful organizations will become even more powerful, outweighing others.

# 7. Conclusion

This section provides the conclusions of this thesis, which are divided into four parts: answers to the research questions, some further theoretical insights, recommendations for further research and policy which could be of use for both policy as well as decision makers, and a reflection on my research.

## 7.1 Answers to the research questions

This research was set up in several steps and subquestions to be able to answer the main research question. Herewith I will give a short summarizing answer to the subquestions and thereby giving a full conclusion of the main research question as restated below.

> *What is the nature of the fragmentation in the Collaborative Partnership on Forests and what consequences does this have for fulfilling its principal function to enhance international cooperation and coordination?*

First I went into the division of labour, exploring the gaps and overlaps existing in both forest aspect focus and governanc tasks. Actors seem to focus too much on their own mandates. I found that the environmental aspects, such as climate change and biodiversity, receive most attention in 2015, due to the climate negotiations. Some environmental aspects, such as land degradation, are however lagging behind. This attention to the environment is mostly at the expense of social and cultural aspects of forests. The economic aspects seem to be taken care of by the ITTO and others outside of the CPF.

Concerning governance tasks necessary to achieve SFM on a global level, I found a lot of CPF members that want to build capacity in some way, especially concerning financial resources. Moreover, it seems that a lot of organizations want to do research. Although everyone seems to agree that ICRAF, IUFRO, CIFOR and to some extent FAO are assigned this task. On norm building slight discrepancy exists between the three Rio conventions, although most difficulties remain outside of the CPF, for example with WTO. Even though countries agreed upon the Forest Instrument, this remains a soft law instrument and a general lack of rule enforcement mechanisms exists within the CPF.

From the information I obtained while researching the division of labour and its gaps and overlaps, I drew conclusions on CPF elements that were synergistic, cooperative and decentralized. I conclude that the CPF is mostly coordinated as a loose network of organizations. It is not synergistic as there is not one top-down organization, although the FAO is chairing the CPF. The loosely cooperative organization of the CPF is especially the case for norm and knowledge building. On capacity building and financial resources the collaboration within the CPF is mostly decentralized and possibly conflictive.

To conclude on what consequences this has for fulfilling CPF's principal function to enhance international cooperation and coordination, I can say that especially the decentralized nature on financial capacity building has its negative consequences. Although the competition might have increased the total amount of financial resources, the distribution has disturbing consequences for the aim to work towards SFM. Moreover, competition does not help to improve the communication among members, while the core group of CPF representatives seem to interact a friendly manner. As the negotiations on the International Arrangement on Forests and the work of the CPF are very

complex, this excludes some groups from their work. In this regard one could think about small delegations from developing countries, NGOs and others that might even withdraw from negotiations as they feel they can achieve more in other fora. Additionally, the role of leadership and differences in power and initiative among CPF members lead to frustration and silent withdrawel from the partnership which is not helping the CPF in its coordinating function.

## 7.2 Theoretical insights

As referred to in chapter 3 and discussed in chapter 6, my research consisted of three elements: the division of labour, the nature of the fragmentation and its consequences. During this research I gained a few theoretical insights besides the conclusions I described above. This research unveiled four main theoretical insights.

First of all, I would like to mention that taking the agency of actors like the CPF representatives into account is vital to be able to derive conclusions. Researching only the institutional interaction did not seem sufficient to come to conclusions on CPF's collaboration.

A second insight I got from doing this research and using my conceptual and theoretical framework is that it is important to assess the differences in power between organizations. This has influence on the division of labour, especially on the division of forest aspect focus, or more generally, focus on different mandates. Besides the division of governance tasks it is important that this power should be clearly and to some extent equally divided to give minority views a chance to be represented.

Third, I discovered that what I assumed at the start of this research remains a challenge: finding the causality between the division of labour and possible consequences. However, differentiating between different kinds of fragmentation is an important step towards deriving consequences. Fragmentation on itself is too broad of a concept, and finding criteria on which aspects of fragmentation are harmful and which aspects are not is necessary to come to consequences and conclusions. Especially competition between organizations is difficult as it can be seen as either a cause, consequence or a catalyst for consequences.

Fourth, I discovered that the research is too large to conduct with sufficient depth in the time constrains of a MSc thesis. I would recommend other researchers to take more time or to focus only on one of the three parts of my research. The latter would create some problems as it is hard to derive consequences when the division of labour is not mapped out.

## 7.3 Recommendations

Now that I have shared the conclusions of my research, I would like to make a few recommendations. I start with some recommendations for policy makers and continue into more academic recommendations. Both are interlinked and this is one of the reasons I did not place them in separate sections. The policy recommendations will be more practical, the research recommendations will be more about using the theory.

- There are two different options for policy makers to deal with global forest governance. One could focus on the organizations taking over tasks like UNFCCC's REDD+, the other could stick with the organizations that were established to manage the broader global forest governance.
  - o The first recommendation draws on theory. If this is done, considerations should be taken into account that one could lose some aspects of forests.
  - o When the latter is chosen, one should make clear agreements on task division, especially on building financial capacity to avoid disturbing competition.

- In order to address the constraints of leading the CPF by one organization, a rotating chair instead of only a rotating co-chair might be a good idea to create ownership among all CPF members and address negative consequences of leadership.
- In order to make the CPF collaborate better, I would like to recommend the Expert Panel on International Forest Regime from the Global Forest Expert Panels to continue their work and keep focussing on the political and social aspects of forest governance besides the "technical" work.
- As this research was not able to reveal a clear link between the division of labour and its possible consequences, I would recommend to elaborate on the steps I made and go deeper into the consequences of regime fragmentation and the division of labour in further research. This is supported by a greater demand for knowledge on the effects of fragmentation from the policy side.
- Using the theoretical framework I used, I would recommend using the term decentralized instead of conflictive when assessing the fragmentation or division of labour to avoid jumping to conclusions.
- It would be interesting to go into more depth on the role of actors' individual agency in the institutional interaction. This might for example be accomplished by mapping out the development of actors' careers and linkages between actors in global forest governance and the IAF to find the advantages and disadvantages of small group dynamics.
- In further research it would be interesting to assess the differences in power between organizations to push their mandates in collaboration with others. The effects on the division of labour is something on which further research would be recommended.

## 7.4 Reflection

Finishing this chapter and thesis, I would like to stress that theoretically we can create all these organizations and partnerships that are exactly doing what they are assigned to do. However, in the end these organizations consist of humans with their own agency and their own ideas about "doing good". To quote one country delegate:

> *"It is not the topic of forests why it is so complicated. It is the institutional and people related problems that are the cause of complexity and the slow movement in forests"* (country delegate 4).

Where there are humans there is politics. On the one hand, this is one of the reasons why we can decide that it would be better to abolish or fuse some organizations. Though, this is only possible in an ideal world, one where a single authority could make these decisions. On the other hand, humans are capable of solving problems innovatively if they have the space to do so. Too much capacity, as described in this thesis as decentralized fragmentation, can however lead to increased negative consequences. Therefore in the ideal situation, a partnership is of a cooperative nature: Giving enough room for agencies to flow their creative ideas without too many negative consequences.

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# Annex 1: CPF members' mandates in alphabetical order

Below an overview will be given of all members of the CPF, especially on their mandates.

**Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)**

The Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) is a non-profit, scientific organization which is researching the challenges of forest and landscapes management on the globe (CIFOR, n.d.-a). CIFOR presents itself as the "centre without walls", referring to their focus on forest policy instead of technical issues in forestry research. They see this more as a task of national and private research projects (CIFOR, 2008). CIFOR recognizes "the broader ecosystem of organisations that are involved in forest research" (CIFOR, 2008) and therefore focuses a niche as they themselves say in their strategy (idem):

*CIFOR advances human well-being, environmental conservation, and equity by conducting research to inform policies and practices that affect forests in developing countries.*

CIFOR wants to focus on the relationships between forests, poverty and the environment as well as how livelihood and conservation outcomes get affected by management and governance. Moreover, climate change mitigation, adaptation and their relationship to forests are topics CIFOR likes to focus on (CIFOR, 2008). Lastly, they also want to become the leading force on impacts of globalised trade and investment on forests and forest communities.

CIFOR recognizes that although they see that forest research capacity in developing countries is insufficient, its organization is too small to contribute enough. It uses their relationships with partner countries, organizations and institutions to build capacity in a more informal manner, e.g. through 'learning-by-doing' projects. The most important partners CIFOR has are the ones with CGIAR, ICRAF and the government of Indonesia. The partnership with CGIAR has a historical background as CIFOR developed out of CGIAR and is currently mostly financial. CIFOR states themselves that this partnership comes with challenges related to the difference in organizational size with other CGIAR centres and NGO view of CGIAR as a "club of elite agricultural research centres" (CIFOR, 2008, p. 18).

CIFOR is also collaborating with ICRAF, another member of the CPF and both linked to CGIAR(CGIAR, n.d.-a), as they recognize the opportunity of working together as CIFOR researches forest systems and ICRAF trees in agricultural landscapes. They are trying to build synergies, created joint projects, facilities, meetings, etc. (CIFOR, 2008).

The government of Indonesia is also important to CIFOR as it is their host country since their establishment in 1993. Having a country involved in an independent research institute might cause some problems as research results might not be pleasant to the government (CIFOR, 2008).

**Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)**

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1992 (UN, 1992) and is one of the so called Rio conventions.

The DBD has three main objectives:

- the conservation of biological diversity,
- the sustainable use of its components and
- the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding (UN, 1992).

The CBD covers Forest Biological Diversity. This falls under one of the programmes of the CBD. During the second COP to the CBD, a decision on Forest Biological Diversity which includes cooperation with the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests, the predecessor of the UNFF (CBD, 1995).

The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing was adopted in 2010 in Japan and entered into force four years later. (CBD Secretariat, 2010; CBD, n.d.-b)

The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity is treaty on "the movements of living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from modern biotechnology from one country to another" (CBD Secretariat, 2000). In 2000 it got adopted as a complementary agreement to the CBD. It entered into force in 2003.

**Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO)**

The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) was established during the second world war. Although FAO´s main objective is to achieve food security for all, it has, like the CBD, three main goals:

- the eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition;
- the elimination of poverty and the driving forward of economic and social progress for all;
- the sustainable management and utilization of natural resources, including land, water, air, climate and genetic resources for the benefit of present and future generations (FAO, n.d.-a, 2010).

The latter goal became especially relevant in 1978, when the eighth World Forestry Congress was held. This had impact on FAO's work in this sector and its development towards attitudes towards forestry expert (FAO, n.d.-a). In 1999, the FAO Committee on Forestry (COFO), which is the highest FAO Forestry statutory body, approved the first FAO Strategic Plan for Forestry.

Summarizing their Strategy for Forests and Forestry (FAO, 2010), the member countries of the FAO agreed upon nine functions related to forests:

- Coming up with long-term perspectives and leadership in trends in forest resources, services, and the production, consumption and trade of forest products.
- Generating, circulating and applying information and knowledge.
- Leading the development of voluntary guidelines, supporting the development of national legal instruments, and promoting their implementation.
- Expressing policy and strategy options and advice to improve social, economic, and environmental aspects of forest development and conservation.
- Arrange technical support encouraging technology transfer, catalyse change and build institutional capacity for SFM.
- Mobilize political will and promote global recognition of required actions to achieve SFM.
- Bringing integrated interdisciplinary and innovative approaches to bear on work in the forest sector and in other key sectors that have an impact on forests.

- Working through strong partnerships and alliances where joint action is needed.
- Facilitating linkages between national, regional, and global levels (FAO, 2010).

The FAO is also coordinating the Global Forest Resource Assessments (FRA). These are executed every 5 to 10 years and are collecting data about the state of our forests globally (FAO, 2012).

**Global Environmental Facility (GEF Secretariat)**

The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) was established in the World Bank as a pilot program to give more attention to environmental problems. The GEF cooperates internationally with the purpose to provide new and additional funds to pay for the achievement of agreed global environmental benefits. The GEF focusses thereby on six focal areas:

- biological diversity;
- climate change;
- international waters;
- land degradation, primarily desertification and deforestation;
- ozone layer depletion;
- persistent organic pollutants (GEF, 2007, 2011).

The GEF has established a Sustainable Forest Management/REDD-plus strategy (GEF, 2007) in which it supports an integrated way of managing forests: the landscape approach, compatible with the forest landscape restoration approach. This combines the integration of people's livelihood objectives in the management of forest ecosystems such as the protection and sustainable use of biodiversity, climate change mitigation and adaptation and combating land degradation (GEF, 2007).

The GEF is not undertaking activities itself and as part of the CPF it only funds activities undertaken by its partners if these actions are taken up together with countries (CPF employee 8).

**International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO)**

The International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) is an intergovernmental organization focussed on the sustainable use, management, trade and conservation of tropical forests and its products. ITTO produces policy documents to promote SFM and assists its member countries with tropical forests to implement such policies to create an effective framework for international cooperation. Moreover, ITTO collects, analyses and spreads data on the production and trade of tropical timber. Via voluntary contributions from donors like the governments of Japan, Switzerland, the United States of America, Norway and the European Union it funds the development of community and industrial scale businesses (ITTO, 2013). In their strategic action plan they therefore formulate their mission as the following: "The ITTO facilitates discussion, consultation and international cooperation on issues relating to the international trade and utilization of tropical timber and the sustainable management of its resource base" (ITTO, 2013).

The ITTO has a broad view on forests. At its establishment it recognized the multiple economic, environmental and social benefits of forests. The ITTO states that sustainably managed forests also contribute to sustainable development by increased variation and development of trade in forest products (ITTO, 2006). The International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) of 2006, goes into more detailed objectives such as providing for technical cooperation and transfer of technologies; improving forest law enforcement and governance; recognizing the role of forest-dependent indigenous and local communities in achieving sustainable forest management (ITTO, 2006). The ITTA

is seen "quite modern" as it was created by a combination of professional negotiators and classical foresters (expert 1).

To be able to remain consistent with its core mandates, the ITTO created a list of priorities it wants to work on. Following you can find these very general priorities:

- Promote good governance and enabling policy frameworks for strengthening SFM and related trade and enhancing SFM financing and investment;
- Increase the contribution of tropical forests to national and local economies, including through international trade;
- Enhance the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in tropical timber producing forests;
- Reduce tropical deforestation and forest degradation and enhance the provision of environmental services;
- Improve the quality and availability of information on tropical forests, forest product markets and trade;
- Build and develop human resource capacity to implement SFM and increase trade in forest goods and services from sustainably managed forests (ITTO, 2013).

ITTO has a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or other formal arrangement with 6 other CPF members, namely CIFOR, CBD, FAO, IUCN, IUFRO and UNFF.

**International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)**

International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)'s mission is "to influence, encourage and assist societies throughout the world to conserve the integrity and diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of natural resources is equitable and ecologically sustainable" (IUCN, n.d.) IUCN aims to combine the work of communities involved in biodiversity conservation, nature-based solutions and sustainable development (IUCN World Conservation Congress, 2012). The idea of nature-based solutions originally occurred to identify conservation projects contributing to the objectives of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (IUCN World Conservation Congress, 2012, p. 24). It applies the sustainable management and conservation of natural resources to major global challenges like food security, disaster risk reduction and economical welfare. Doing this IUCN would like to link the biodiversity, sustainability and development groups and this way address the benefits nature has for the livelihood of people. As seen in their mission, IUCN has a mandate on nature and people, they therefore produce and propagate science based and applied knowledge on biodiversity and its conservation.  Moreover they build partnerships with governments and civil society organizations. They try to do this at the local, regional and global level. As they say in their programme for work 2013-2016 they will develop criteria, influence implementation and build capacity for conservation and sustainable development.

IUCN would like to impact mainly biodiversity, people and nature and development, the latter essentially including nature based solutions to global challenges like climate, food and development.

**International Union of Forest Research Organizations (IUFRO)**

International Union of Forest Research Organizations (IUFRO) is a global scientific network for forest research. It joins around 700 member organizations. This means about 15000 scientists in at least 110 countries are contributing to IUFRO's work (IUFRO, n.d.-c). IUFRO's mission is "to advance

research excellence and knowledge sharing, and to foster the development of science-based solutions to forest-related challenges for the benefit of forests and people worldwide" (IUFRO, 2015).

For the period between 2015 and 2019, IUFRO mentions five themes they would like to emphasize in their research. According to themselves these themes guide their collaboration especially on acknowledging the interconnections of forests with both the environmental and human systems (IUFRO, 2015, p. 12).

1. Forests for People
2. Forests and Climate Change
3. Forests and Forest-based Products for a Greener Future
4. Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services and Biological Invasions
5. Forest, Soil and Water Interactions (IUFRO, 2015)

Moreover they mention three institutional goals:

1. Research Excellence: Strive for quality, relevance and synergies
2. Network Cooperation: Increase communication, visibility and outreach
3. Policy Impact: Provide analysis, insights and options

**United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD Secretariat)**

The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)'s mission is "to provide a global framework to support the development and implementation of national and regional policies, programmes and measures to prevent, control and reverse desertification/land degradation and mitigate the effects of drought through scientific and technological excellence, raising public awareness, standard setting, advocacy and resource mobilization, thereby contributing to poverty reduction" (UNCCD, 2008, p. 11).

The UNCCD has different thematic priorities of which forests are one alongside biodiversity, climate change, food security, gender, water scarcity and drought (UNCCD, n.d.). They mention that deforestation and the following desertification affect the productivity of the land, human and livestock health, and the economy (UNCCD, n.d.).

The UNCCD promotes prevention of land and forest degradation by sustainable land management and SFM as well as by restoration of already degraded land and forests. All parties to the UNCCD are required to report on the status of land cover (UNCCD, n.d.).

They differentiate between strategic and operational objectives. The strategic objectives are more on the long term and will be mentioned below:

1. To improve the living conditions of affected populations
2. To improve the condition of affected ecosystems
3. To generate global benefits through effective implementation of the UNCCD
4. To mobilize resources to support implementation of the Convention through building effective partnerships between national and international actors (UNCCD, 2008, pp. 9–10)

The operational objectives are more focussed on what governance tasks the UNCCD envisions for itself and are short to medium term:

1. Advocacy, awareness raising and education
2. Policy framework
3. Science, technology and knowledge
4. Capacity-building
5. Financing and technology transfer (UNCCD, 2008, pp. 11–14)

In their 10 year plan they recognize that compared to the other Rio conventions they have "a weak scientific basis, insufficient advocacy and awareness among various constituencies, institutional weaknesses and difficulties in reaching consensus among Parties" (UNCCD, 2008, p. 8).

**United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has the following vision: "To help countries achieve the simultaneous eradication of poverty and significant reduction of inequalities and exclusion" (UNDP, 2014, p. 13).

UNDP has three areas they are working on at the moment:

1. How to adopt sustainable development pathways;
2. How to build and/or strengthen inclusive and effective democratic governance;
3. How to build resilience (UNDP, 2014, p. 20)

The first also includes the maintenance and protection of natural capital and risk management. In their strategic plan UNDP mentions ten ways of maintaining and protecting natural capital:

- Biodiversity
- Conservation
- Sustainable use of natural resources
- Restoration of degraded land
- Sustainable land management
- Energy and efficiency
- Oceans and marine systems
- Water resource management
- Chemicals and waste management
- Clean energy

Under the second, building and strengthening democratic governance, they also mention the well-being of people depends on their access to natural resources. UNDP will assist in mainstreaming and integrating "sustainable land, water and forest management, as well as measures related to conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity" in development policy and decision-making (UNDP, 2014, p. 31). This also counts for the restructuring of legal and regulatory frameworks. This to ensure that the poor, indigenous people and local communities keep access to land, water and forests and their benefits will be fairly and equitably shared (UNDP, 2014).

The Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review on the UNDP identified capacity building as their core function.

The Program on Forests (PROFOR) was initiated by UNDP in 1996. Since 2002, around the time that the CPF was established, it is accommodated at the World Bank.

**United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)**

United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)'s mission is "to provide leadership and encourage partnership in caring for the environment by inspiring, informing, and enabling nations and peoples to improve their quality of life without compromising that of future generations" (UNEP, n.d.).

The UNEP has the mandate to make sure that the United Nations systems respond to the current and future environmental challenges and opportunities being "a lead authority in articulating, facilitating and supporting" this response (UNEP, 2010, p. 3).

They identified six cross-cutting thematic priorities:

- Climate change;
- Disasters and conflicts;
- Ecosystem management;
- Environmental governance;
- Harmful substances and hazardous waste;
- Resource efficiency – sustainable consumption and production (UNEP, 2010).

The UNEP mandate includes according to their medium term strategy five overall, interrelated areas:

1. Keeping the world environmental situation under review;
2. Catalysing and promoting international cooperation and action;
3. Providing policy advice and early warning information, based upon sound science and assessments;
4. Facilitating the development, implementation and evolution of norms and standards and developing coherent interlinkages among international environmental conventions;
5. Strengthening technology support and capacity in line with country needs and priorities (UNEP, 2010, pp. 6–7).

The vision of UNEP for the medium-term future is to be: "The leading global environmental authority that sets the global environmental agenda, that promotes the coherent implementation of the environmental dimension of sustainable development within the United Nations system and that serves as an authoritative advocate for the global environment" (UNEP, 2010, p. 9)

The establishment of the United Nations Environmental Management Group in 1999 showed UNEP's interest and role in improving inter-agency policy coherence and collaboration.

**United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF)**

As described three of this thesis, the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) was established in 2000 following a series of other panels and fora to support forest policy globally. The UNFF's main objective is to promote "the management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests and to strengthen long-term political commitment to this end" (ECOSOC, 2000). More information can be found in chapter three.

**United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)**

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is one of the three convention agreed upon during the world summit on sustainable development in Rio, 1992. The objective of the UNFCCC "is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved

within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner" (UNFCCC, 1992, article 2).

In article 2 and 3 of the Kyoto protocol under the UNFCCC SFM, afforestation and reforestation are mentioned in the context of the "protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol" (UNFCCC, 1998, article 2). Moreover the effect of Land Use Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) on greenhouse sinks is mentioned (UNFCCC, 1998, article 3). Forests are also mentioned as important for adapting to the effects of climate change (UNFCCC, 1998, article 10).

After the adoption of the Kyoto protocol, REDD+ was developed. This stands for the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing countries and was decided upon during COP13 (decision 2) (REDD+ Web Platform, n.d.-a). During following COPs REDD was elaborated upon which led to the 7 decisions of the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ at COP19 (REDD+ Web Platform, n.d.-b). REDD+ standing for reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and foster conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. REDD+ has severely influenced global forest governance. Lots of different agencies are working on this topic. For example the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), which became operational in June 2008 after it was launched at the Bali conference of UNFCCC in 2007 by among other the World Bank. This is a global partnership fully focussed on the implementation of REDD+. The FCPF created methods for REDD+ readiness, helping countries to get ready for new financial systems included in REDD+ (FCPF, n.d.). Also the Forest Investment Program (FIP) developed to support the REDD+ agenda financially. Together with the GEF, FCPF and the UN-REDD programme it creates the financial mechanisms for REDD+ (Climate Investment Funds, n.d.).

As UNFCCC plays a rather important role in the interaction with other CPF members, the following table an overview is given of the possible interactions with other conventions.

TABLE 15 INTERACTIONS OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME WITH CPF MEMBERS (SELECTION OF TABLE 3.1 (OBERTHUR, 2006, P. 57))

| Interactions of the Climate Change Regime with CPF members | |
|---|---|
| Convention on Biological Diversity | May suffer from establishment of monocultural tree plantations induced by climate change regime |
| Convention to Combat Desertification | May benefit from forestry activities promoted under the climate change regime that help combat desertification |
| World Bank | Has greened its policies to some extent in response to the climate change regime |
| Global Environmental Facility | Has been asked to operate the financial mechanism of the climate change regime |

At this moment negotiations are going on for a new agreement under UNFCCC. The aim is to globally agree upon this agreement at the 21st Conference of the Parties in Paris.

**World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF)**

The International Centre for Research on Agroforestry (ICRAF) was founded in 1978 in Kenya. In 2002 it changed its name to World Agroforestry Centre but kept the acronym ICRAF. Their mission is "to generate science-based knowledge about the diverse roles that trees play in agricultural landscapes, and to use its research to advance policies and practices, and their implementation that benefit the poor and the environment"(World Agroforestry Centre, 2013). ICRAF allocates itself 6 roles in the research domain of forestry and agriculture: 1) Generation and validation of knowledge available without restriction; 2) Providing accurate information to decision makers to make better decisions on policies and investments; 3) Working with partners at multiple scales to translate the available information into actionable knowledge; 4) Applying the available knowledge to further impact and advance the science of scaling up; 5) Developing and mobilizing capacity at institutional and individual levels and identifying their capacity gaps, and; 6) Streamlining research and advocacy of and among actors and partners. ICRAF aims to spend 50% of their time on gaining knowledge and the rest of their time is divided among the other tasks, spending most time on translating information in actionable knowledge (World Agroforestry Centre, 2013).

ICRAF is focussing on generating knowledge, managing the complexity of landscapes and transforming agroforestry impacts into policies, innovation and partnerships (ICRAF, 2013). It is interesting to see that ICRAF specifically mentions the building and maintaining of strong partnerships in their operational goals. Especially the following two sub goals are interesting to mention in the context of this research:

- Ensure clearly defined roles and well documented agreements;
- Seek efficiencies and fairness in shared resources (World Agroforestry Centre, 2013, p. 20).


**World Bank**

The World Bank Group (World Bank) gives financial and technical assistance to developing countries. The World Bank includes five institutions that are managed by their member countries:

1. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) lends to middle-income and low-income countries.
2. The International Development Association (IDA) provides interest-free loans to the poorest countries.
3. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) focuses on the private sector.
4. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) offers political risk insurance to investors.
5. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) facilitates conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes (Bank, n.d.).

The World Bank mission includes two goals:

1. "End extreme poverty: reduce the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day to 3 percent by 2030.
2. Promote shared prosperity: foster income growth of the bottom 40 percent of the population in every country" (World Bank, 2014, p. 1).

The World Bank recognizes that in achieving these goals, the planet's future and its resources must be taken into account: "ensuring social inclusion, and limiting the economic burdens on future generations" (World Bank, 2014, p. 1).

On forests, the World Bank created a specific strategy which supports countries to preserve forests to be able to reduce poverty, integrate forests into their economies, and protect and strengthen the environmental aspects of forests (World Bank, 2015).

As mentioned under the description of UNDP, PROFOR falls currently under the World Bank.

It's activities extent around four themes according to themselves:

1. Improving the livelihoods of forest-dependent people
2. Enhancing forest governance
3. Financing sustainable forest management
4. Coordinating forest policy with other sectors (PROFOR, n.d.).