


London: expert interviews

Thomas Abeling, UNU-EHS and
Mark Pelling KCL


- 19 interviews, 59 approached
- 9 November – 2 December 2015
 - Local authority – 8
 - London-wide agency – 7
 - National agency – 3
 - Academic - 1

Current Orientation of Risk Management



Current Orientation of Risk Management


- Discrepancy between acknowledged need for transition to a more transformative regime, and lack of confidence in the prospects of such change.



“The sheer quantity of people and the density that comes with it will require a shift towards more fundamental changes in risk management. The infrastructure that needs to be added, and the changes in the climate and the impact that this will have on London also play into this.” (MI-YK-72)

Current Orientation of Risk Management

- Major changes in risk management are required at some point in the next 20 years. But no clear tipping point



“I am not sure that we would cope well with significant inequalities. I think to respond to this scenario (more social inequalities) would need a massive transfer in resources from the rich to the poor. This could be done through taxes, but also through a more equal access to employment opportunities.” (MI-HN-21)


Spaces for Change – pathways entrained decouple risk and justice

“I think we would see a complete change in government mindset here. Risk management would be that people have to look after themselves. There would be no calling of 911 anymore; we would have to help ourselves. So risk management would be about helping people to help themselves. That would be the norm. I think we are close to that tipping point already. It used to be that if we had a fire, for example, it would be about evacuating all people from the building, set up temporary shelter, treat them as guests, look after them, provide food, drink etc. Now we ask: ok there is fire on the 8th floor, so who really needs to get evacuated from the building. Probably the people on the 3rd floor are fine. We then expect that people seek accommodation themselves, and that they return as quickly as possible. The problem with that is that it matters how affluent you are. The less affluent the more you need help from the government. If you have money you can buy insurance, but if you are a migrant with no money and no social networks you have nowhere to go.” (MI-NE-91)

Who are the proven actors that could realign regime transition

- *The Mayor + Mayor’s Adaptation Policy (on paper, no funding yet)*
- *Science (policy relevant knowledge) + risk managers (apply knowledge) + political leaders (support practice)*

Prospects for transition



“It is already out there, people try to bring about transformation. But there is no clear idea of what transformation is. Rather each agency seems to have its own idea. There is no joined up approach between different agencies, and there is also a clash between government and business.” (MI-HK-42)

Barriers to regime transition

- Political influence and the effects of electoral cycles on planning and resource allocation,
- culture of short-termism
- shortcomings in cost-benefit calculations in adaptation policy

“The problem is that there is no price for adaptation. We value it, but can’t really put figures to it. We deliver against a non-stationary target. With climate change, we need to deliver a lot just to hold us where we are. The people who pay for adaptation and the people that benefit from adaptation are not linked, that makes it really difficult to make the case for significant payments that need to be made.” (MI-XN-91)

“What is also a problem is the fact that since we are London, many people think we are already good at things. There is a bit of arrogance here. In Canary Warf they had people from New York come over to look at how they do their security arrangements. That makes people feel we are already the top players, but there is so much where we are not strong. Why are we not trying to learn from others?” (MI-YK-72)

Conclusions

- Sampling challenges – indicative only
- Political orientation of interviewees and strategic responses
- Paris terror attacks, November 13th
- Local authority respondents perceive gap between desired future and ability to get there.
 - Centralisation of authority in Mayor’s Office
 - Erosion of LA planning powers
 - Desire for greater ‘longer-term planning’ approach.
 - Scope for individual LA leadership
 - Science as a critical friend brings vision - convening power?

Tokyo: Expert Interviews

Maiko Nishi

Masumi Yamamoto and Steve Krains, University of Tokyo
Mark Pelling, King's College London

Sample: 24

Academic/Science – 14


Private consultants/business – 4

Local and national government - 2

“Resilience” largely understood as “self-help” (*jijo*) and “mutual-help” (*kyojo*) to be prepared for unforeseeable large-scale disasters – while mandating stability & economic development

Risk Management Regime


- Several combinations suggested (e.g., A&B, A&B&C, A&D or B&D)
- particular concern about **the boundary between resistance & resilience.**



1
1

Transition / Emerging changes

- Largely moving or continuing towards **“resilience”**
- Factor establishing the current direction: **“administrative structure”** (serving as a critical city manager), **“a natural extreme event”** (evidence-based, awareness raising) **“economic change”** (influencing administrative capacity, producers/consumers behaviors)
- Present capacity: some concern of **compartmentalized structure** or **bureaucratic system** of government agencies; a question about **a (new) role of the public authority** (or continuous reliance on it) in the context of public-private relationships.




1
2

Drivers of change

- **Events:**


- **Natural extreme events** : guerrilla storms, extreme heats, great earthquakes, events abroad (volcanic eruptions in Europe, Hurricane Sandy in NY)
- Accident resulting from **dilapidated infrastructure** (Sasago Tunnel in 2012)
- **Political regime shift** (from LDP to DPJ in 2009)
- 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games



1
3

Thresholds – established dynamics of transition

- Largely perceived as **“slow” change**
 - **past 20 years** (e.g., gradual fiscal retrenchment, evolving discussion on new approaches, staged improvement learning from the events)
 - **past 10-15 years** (e.g., emerging climate change measures)
 - **past 5-6 years** (e.g., new risk management along supply chains, concepts of Level 1 and 2 disasters)
 - **last 2-3 years** (e.g., any change in the legal system)
- **“Medium” change**
 - Aftermath of the **Great East Japan earthquake**
 - **Any readjustment** in the existing administrative measures on a single-year basis



Conclusions

What worked:

- provoking new insights — face-to-face semi-structured interviews, underlying assumptions largely different from their norms (realizing unique approaches in Tokyo/Japan)
- international context — gained interests from the respondents

What not fully worked: concept translation, sample and access

Key findings to date:

- Culture of slow policy change
- Science elite as a gatekeeper on knowledge – a concern when hazards are changing or social vulnerabilities is recalibrated?
- Close, trusted relationships between policy and science – but also closed.