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# Endline report – Liberia, RHRAP MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component

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This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Liberia, RHRAP. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Keywords: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).



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The Liberia 5C evaluation team

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# List of abbreviations and acronyms

5 C	Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities
AFELL	Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia
Causal map	Map with cause-effect relationships. See also 'detailed causal map'.
Causal mechanisms	The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome
CAC	Citizen Action Committee
CAFOD	Catholic Agency For Overseas Development
CDI	Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR, the Netherlands
CFA	Co-Financing Agency
Detailed causal map	Also 'model of change'. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question).
CJS	Criminal Justice Sector
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
FIND	Foundation for International Dignity
General causal map	Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception.
ICCO-ROWA	ICCO Regional Office West Africa
IFES	International Federation for Electoral Systems
IREX	International Research & Exchanges Board
LCDGP	Liberian Community Development and Governance Programme
LEITI	Liberian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFS	Dutch co-financing system
MIS	Management Information System
NARDA	National African Research and Development Agency
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OD	Organisational Development
OSIWA	Open Society Initiative for West Africa
PMC	Programme Management Committee
PME	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
Process tracing	Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms
SIT	School for International Training (in the USA)
SPO	Southern Partner Organisation
ToC	Theory of Change
Wageningen UR	Wageningen University & Research centre

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# 1 Introduction & summary

## 1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

1. Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;
2. Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);
3. Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: RHRAP in Liberia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1. Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in appendix 4.

For those SPOs involved in process tracing a summary description of the causal maps for the identified organisational capacity changes in the two selected capabilities (capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew) is provided (evaluation questions 2 and 4). These causal maps describe the identified key organisational capacity changes that are possibly related to MFS II

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interventions in these two capabilities, and how these changes have come about. More detailed information can be found in appendix 5.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR); Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

## 1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

This report contains the organisational capacity component of the MFSII endline study in Liberia, concerning the Rural Human Rights Activist Programme (RHRAP). The endline discovered that RHRAP has been maintaining its capabilities largely at the same levels as during the baseline. Within the capability to act and commit, enhanced factors were improved staff training and attention to skills transfer, but these positive factors were somewhat offset by a fragile staff situation. Within the capability to adapt and self-renew, steps were made regarding the engagement with target groups and gathering information from the project environment. The capability to relate has slightly improved due to more engagement within the Liberian development environment in search for funds and new partnerships. However, engagement within current partnerships has not significantly changed the way in which organisational policies and strategies are developed. The capability to deliver on development objectives and the capability to achieve coherence have not changed, though within the latter capability a new strategic plan is currently being developed.

The evaluators considered it important to note down the SPO's perspective on what they experienced as the most important organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline. SPO staff members noted key changes in the organisation to be that programme implementation capacity was better through improved staff skills and knowledge and better field monitoring, that network and coalition participation had increased, and that fundraising capacity had improved. Important underlying factors that played a role in these development were that RHRAP management were motivated to work on staff capacity for future sustainability, a reduction in funds from ICCO, the director's completion of a Master-study in Conflict Transformation and Peace-building in the United States, and maintenance of ties with other (potential) network partners.

The two organisational capacity changes that were focused on through process tracing, were 'Improved capacity for Human Rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice Sector' (within the capability to act and commit) and 'Slightly improved capacity for fundraising' (within the capability to act and commit). The first organisational capacity change was improved due to a combination of a collaborative approach for human rights-based monitoring and improved knowledge on human rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice Sector. Key underlying factors that led to these improvements were the training of trainers on this topic in 2012 funded by ICCO (MFS II), a realisation that more dialogue is needed to achieve goals, but also previous experience with human rights monitoring and instruments through trainings and projects before the baseline. The improved knowledge on human rights-based monitoring can to a considerable extent be attributed to MFS II capacity development support by ICCO, though it was seen that RHRAP staff had previous experience and knowledge on this topic as well, which also played an important role. The second capacity change, on slightly improved fundraising capacity, involved improved capacity to write proposals, becoming more visible, and increased awareness surrounding issues of sound strategy and programme documents, building credible relationships with donors, and getting involved in more networking and partnerships. Important driving factors for these developments were reduced funding from ICCO and the institution of the LCDGP coalition in 2013. The slightly improved capacity for fundraising can only



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be partly attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions by ICCO: these were mostly reflected in improving the visibility of RHRAP, knowledge on proposal writing and awareness on building credible relationships with donors.

It should be noted that this endline assessment was carried out just before the Ebola virus epidemic and crisis hit Liberia as of July 2014. The effects of the epidemic have heavily impacted the staff and operations of all assessed organisations, and will likely continue to do so in the near future. As such the evaluation team acknowledges that the assessment described in this endline may not fully resemble the current situation in early 2015.



## 2 Context and General Information about the SPO – RHRAP

### 2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

Country	Liberia
Consortium	ICCO Alliance
Responsible Dutch NGO	Inter Church Cooperation Organisation (ICCO)
Project (if applicable)	Initiative for Human Rights Promotion/Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme
Southern partner organisation	Rural Human Rights Activists Programme (RHRAP)

The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation components:

Achievement of MDGs and themes	
Capacity development of Southern partner organisations	x
Efforts to strengthen civil society	

### 2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

The history of Liberia is a turbulent history. Settled by freed slaves from the United States around 1822, the newly formed state proclaimed independence in 1846. The Liberian state slowly expanded from the coast into the hinterlands and, though the state was founded on principles of freed slaves, the upholding of settler rights increasingly led to the suppression of indigenous peoples. In 1980 a coup d'état took place which ended the more than 100 year rule of the settler party (Pajibo, 2012; Richards et al., 2005). The military government, led by former sergeant Samuel K. Doe, suspended the constitution and instituted a repressive political system. In 1989 the invasion of Charles Taylor triggered the civil war in Liberia which lasted on and off between 1989 and 2003. The war, which was characterized by great terror and gruesome atrocities, counted many different fighting groups and changing alliances. Eventually the war ended with the departure of Charles Taylor, the institution of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003 and the election of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2006 (Pugel, 2009). After the war ended in 2003, with the intervention of a 15,000 man UN force, a peace-building process started and is still ongoing (Richards et al., 2005).

Since the end of the civil war, the Liberian government has formulated the 'Agenda for Transformation' (Aft) as a five-year development strategy from 2012 to 2017. It followed the three-year (2008-2011) Lift Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), which transitioned Liberia from post-conflict emergency reconstruction to economic recovery. The Aft was considered a first step toward achieving the goals set out in Liberia RISING 2030, Liberia's long-term vision of socio-economic transformation and development. The Aft articulates precise goals and objectives and corresponding interventions that should move Liberia closer toward structural economic transformation, prosperity and inclusive growth.

Perhaps one of the most critical achievements, of both the Liberian government and UNMIL, has been the maintenance of peace and security. Though Liberia continues to rely on the support the United Nations peacekeepers, it is hoped that the government will gradually assume full responsibility for maintenance of security for the coming years. This fragile peace has allowed Liberians to return to

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their farms, start businesses, return to their country from abroad, and witness an increase in flows of Foreign Direct Investment to Liberia. To revitalize the economy, the three-pronged economic strategy of the PRS focused on (i) rebuilding critical infrastructure; (ii) reviving traditional resource sectors; and (iii) establishing a competitive business environment.

The challenges Liberia is facing are daunting however. Starting from a state of post-conflict instability, extremely weak state institutions, and an economy left in shambles by nearly two decades of violence, further issues relate to minimal reconciliation efforts, high unemployment levels, low levels of education and limited access to healthcare. Within the field of governance and justice Liberia has much work to do. In the post-conflict period reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts have mostly been steered by international initiatives and forces such as the United Nations (Pajibo, 2012). The Truth and Reconciliation Committee, instituted to move on the path towards reconciliation rather than justice, has noted that those who committed war crimes in the civil war should be held accountable. This has not been the case, and the current political establishment has not acted on this view. The security and police sector are currently undergoing training and reform to take over the role of maintaining peace in the country. This is a difficult process, as for instance the police are often considered as predators rather than protectors. Access to justice is limited and trials often take long as only a limited number of cases are concluded each year (Human Rights Watch Liberia country chapters 2014).

Liberia is currently still receiving large amounts of international aid and budget support, and the transition to strengthen the main productive sector, agriculture, is still very much in a preliminary stage (Solà-Martin, 2012). According to the African Economic Outlook 2014, more than 70% of households in Liberia are engaged in rice production. However, since 1980 yields have not increased substantially and more than half of the country's rice is imported. Economic growth has thus far been heavily dependent on the natural resource sector, including goods such as ores, lumber, rubber and palm oil exports. In recent years the services sector has also been growing significantly, even though it is noted that the slow withdrawal of the UNMIL forces in 2015 will affect the demand for these services. It was reported that the informal economy, which reflects a large proportion of Liberian economic activity, has grown even though this has not translated into a decrease in poverty (African Economic Outlook 2014).

Major economic constraining factors include the lack of electricity and basic infrastructure. Until now infrastructure and basic services saw more than US\$500 million of direct investment, with key components of infrastructure (including airports, seaports, and roads) renovated or reconstructed. Plans are made to build a large hydropower dam to improve access to electricity. However, these investments alone will not be sufficient to diversify the Liberian economy, nor create jobs for the roughly 500,000 Liberians who will graduate from secondary and post secondary institutions in the next 5 to 10 years. The Liberian government has worked out a plan to establish a competitive business environment for firms in Liberia. It has reformed the Tax Code and the Investment Code, making them more competitive and beneficial to growth. It has streamlined business registration processes; established a one-stop-shop for customs clearing; and started implementing proactive industrial policies as a way of facilitating the growth of local micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMES). The Government also made it a priority to achieve a stable macroeconomic environment, which is necessary for growth. Further, it maintained a cash-based balanced budget; significantly increased government revenue; moved toward multi-year financial planning; and achieved US\$4.9 billion of cumulative debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. These and follow-up actions are creating the right incentives for further growth in employment, GDP, and public and private investment.

### **Ebola outbreak**

West Africa is currently experiencing the largest outbreak of Ebola ever recorded. In Liberia, the disease was reported in Lofa and Nimba counties in late March 2014. In July, the health ministry implemented measures to improve the country's response. On 27 July, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the Liberian president, announced that Liberia would close its borders, with the exception of a few crossing points such as the airport, where screening centres would be established. Public gatherings were banned, schools and universities were closed, and the worst affected areas in the country were placed under quarantine.

In August, President Sirleaf declared a national state of emergency, noting that it might require the "suspensions of certain rights and privileges". The National Elections Commission announced that it

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would be unable to conduct the scheduled October 2014 senatorial election and requested postponement, one week after the leaders of various opposition parties had publicly taken different sides on the issue. In late August, Liberia's Port Authority cancelled all "shore passes" for sailors from ships coming into the country's four seaports. As of 8 September, Ebola had been identified in 14 of Liberia's 15 counties.

Besides the enormous and tragic loss of human life, the Ebola epidemic is having devastating effects on West African economies in a variety of essential sectors by abruptly halting trade, agricultural productivity, and scaring investors away from the sub region for the foreseeable future. UN agencies such as the World Bank and international NGOs like Plan International, etc., have begun thinking post-Ebola, and have, therefore, embarked on conducting research and studies on the impact of Ebola on communities and the country, resilience of communities and the health care system, weaknesses in the health care system, etc.

As of January 2015 the Ebola epidemic seemed to be stabilising in Liberia. According to Medecins sans Frontieres the count is now around 8,157 cases and 3,496 deaths registered during the entire epidemic in Liberia (MSF Ebola crisis update 13-01-2015). This stabilisation means that the amount of new cases coming in has decreased significantly to around one case per week in Monrovia, but it is essential to not let the epidemic resurge. Not only Ebola patients have faced difficult times: the crisis has meant that general access to healthcare is even worse than before. As the Special Representative of the UN Secretariat in Liberia noted: rebuilding the country after the Ebola crisis will mean that the factors that caused the virus to spread so quickly need to be urgently addressed. This includes weak trust among the Liberian people, badly functioning basic services such as healthcare and education, lack of accountability and an over-centralized government (UN Special Representative Karen Landgren, 20-01-2015).

As it is with all sectors of Liberian society, this Ebola outbreak is testing the resilience of the SPOs to the highest limits. The SPOs are responding by readjusting their regular programmes by designing new strategies and realigning their resources to join the fight against the deadly Ebola virus disease. This is coming in the forms of Ebola awareness campaigns, psychosocial support for victims and survivors, provision of support to community care centres (CCCs), and procurement and distribution of sanitizing supplies to communities.

#### **RHRAP**

The operations of RHRAP have slowed down due to the outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease that started in February of this year in Liberia. The Ebola outbreak has led to wreck in the economy of Liberia. It has also caused a limited movement of people from one location to another and has led to people relating to strangers in a feared manner.

The limitation of movement has greatly hindered the work of RHRAP, which is a local non-governmental institution providing service to a large number of people in different localities. The organisation is struggling amidst the outbreak of this deadly disease and the lack of incentive to carry out their work effectively. However, they are optimistic that the situation will subside soon and they will focus on providing psychosocial support for orphans who were victims of this tragic situation. They are also considering working on economic impact mitigation for survivors and awareness on the effect of stigmatization.

## **2.3 Contracting details**

When did cooperation with this partner start: 2005

What is the MFS II contracting period: 2012 - 2015

Did cooperation with this partner end? NO

If yes, when did it finish? N/A

What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: N/A

If not, is there an expected end date for the collaboration? 2015

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## 2.4 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

### History

RHRAP is a human rights and peace organisation that was established in December 1997 by a group of activists who believed that the message of human rights should be spread into the rural areas so as to educate the rural inhabitants on issues of human rights, peace and social developments. It is a non-profit, non-governmental and non-political organisation. For the past years of existence, RHRAP education and advocacy work has focused on promoting the criminal justice system, accountability in the extractive sector, as well as peace building and conflict transformation in rural communities using various methodologies.

### Vision

RHRAP envisages Liberia as a place where there is rule of law, lasting peace, stability amongst its people.

### Mission

To build an environment where human rights and democratic principles will take firm roots and flourish at all levels within the Liberian society.

### Strategies

- 2005 - Peace Building project (ICCO funded)
- 2009 - RHRAP developed a strategic plan and focused on capacity building through the ICCO funding.
- 2011- focused on refugees at the Ivorian and Liberian borders (Refugees intervention programme).
- 2012 - ICCO partners in Liberia developed a joint strategic plan.

The organisation was supported by ICCO to work in maximum security prisons and detention centres in Lofa and Bong Counties, engaging the criminal justice system and working with communities on these topics. Since the baseline in 2012, RHRAP achieved a breakthrough with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Ministry of Justice, which spells out the working relationship between RHRAP and the Government of Liberia, as it relates to prison services and conditions. This has given RHRAP more access to all prisons and prison authorities in Gbarnga.

RHRAP plays a strategic role in the partnership with ICCO. Since 2013 RHRAP has been the contract holder for the whole LCDGP coalition, constituting of 20 partner organisations, and as cluster lead for the Democratisation cluster (one of the three LCDGP themes). This followed the start of the LCDGP in various phases since the bridging phase from bilateral to programmatic funding in 2012.

In the new strategic plan for 2015-2017 it is envisaged that RHRAP addresses a the following themes:

- Natural Resource Advocacy;
- Transparency and Accountability;
- Co-existence through participation;
- Environmental protection focusing on Large Volume Waste Management.

Human Rights Protection and Promotion:

- Promoting Criminal Justice System;
- Decentralization and Promoting Citizens Participation;
- Youth Programme;
- Women, Children: which will be headed by a newly created RHRAP Women & Children Protection Division.

Peace Building and Conflict Transformation:

- Conflict Mitigation;
- Promoting Peaceful Elections;
- Reconciliation and Reintegration;
- Community Organizing and Empowerment.

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## 3 Methodological approach and reflection

### 3.1 Overall methodological approach and reflection

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.
- **Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to

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focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## 3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012<sup>1</sup>.

Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See

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<sup>1</sup> The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.



below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

#### Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.

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### 3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?** and the fourth evaluation question: **“What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?”**

In terms of the attribution question (2), ‘process tracing’ is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

#### 3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:

- Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)
- India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)
- Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PtPPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)
- Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

#### 3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ‘ general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop

have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

#### Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

### 3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to be a very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores:** using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified

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organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs. In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire has been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors, rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

### Utilisation of the evaluation

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

**Design:** mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

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However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

## 4 Results

### 4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the RHRAP that have taken place since the baseline are described. The information is based on the information provided by the CFA.

Table 1

*Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since the baseline in 2012*

Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention	Objectives	Activities	Timing and duration	Budget
Training on the Criminal Justice System in Liberia	Improve knowledge about the Liberian Justice systems, procedures and prison monitoring	3-day training	14-16 September 2012	\$ 3,000 Dollars
Support to build RHRAP website	Build a website to improve RHRAP visibility	Financial support	2013	\$ 2,000 Dollars
Fundraising training with the LCDGP partners	Improve ideas and skills in proposal writing and fundraising	Short training	February 28th 2014	\$ 7000 Dollars (LCDGP general budget for Learning Agenda Support 2014)
Training with Programme and Financial staff members of the LCDGP	Understanding ICCO guidelines and policies	1-day Refresher session	March 2014	\$ 7000 Dollars (LCDGP general budget for Learning Agenda Support 2014)
Visit of SPO directors to Bamako in Mali	Strategy sessions for the LCDGP		September 2013	
Field visits from ICCO to Liberia	Visits for monitoring and discussion purposes	Discussions on funding, sustainability, business development and organisational strengthening	Throughout 2012 and 2013 - latest in March/April 2014	
Coordination meetings	Sharing of information among partners and groups (programmatic cross learning in the LCDGP	Interactions among members of the LCDGP and the Programme Management Committee (PMC)	Throughout 2013- 2014	\$ 1520 Dollars (2013)  \$ 7000 Dollars (LCDGP general budget for Learning Agenda Support 2014)


Source: CFA support to capacity sheet, SPO support to capacity sheet; LCDGP Financial Report to ICCO; LCDGP Budget Revised June 20 2014  
RHRAP

### 4.2 Changes in capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities. This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also Appendix 3.

#### 4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities

##### Summary capability to act and commit




In the past years since the baseline there has been some change in the leadership of RHRAP. A lot of operational leadership tasks have been fulfilled by the administrative officer and senior programme officer, due to partial absence of the director during his studies. Also, many inputs on the direction of the projects are from staff member inputs during critical decision-making meetings. Members of the RHRAP management team are able to communicate effectively and easily; the office is small and everyone is aware of the projects that are running and the proposals that are out. The current Executive Director still plays an indispensable role in the organization - it would be tough if he decided to leave the organization, as it seems like he is the person that networks and shares the vision of RHRAP. In the past two years there have been some positive developments in terms of staff capacity building- RHRAP staff members had access to a number of trainings to improve their programme related skills. However, when it comes to the capacity gaps that were identified during the baseline, related to skills in fundraising and M&E much can still be done.

Funding remains a challenge for RHRAP: a number of RHRAP staff has left due to this lack of funding while others continue at heavily decreased wages. This is still the main incentive for staff, even though they have been motivated through getting more responsibilities in their jobs and through improved internal communication.

Whilst the organisational structure reflects the objective of the organisation, reality is that some of these functions are not present due to lack of funding. In 2014 the LCDGP coalition funding procedures have been explored along the Resource Mobilization strategy, and a collective proposal has been written to OSIWA. These efforts have been increasing in 2014 and it is hoped that a focus on increasing board engagement, building staff fundraising capacities, improving visibility and matching entrepreneurial and civil society spirit will help the LCDGP increase its programmatic funding. RHRAP has been working on visibility through website and media engagement, staff proposal writing capacity and networking (see the process tracing outcome on fundraising). Through new strategic directions RHRAP hopes to open up new funding possibilities as well but the outcome is yet unsure.

Score: from 3.2 to 3.3 (very minor improvement)


## Summary of the capability to adapt and self-renew



Since the baseline situation a comprehensive M&E system and a designated M&E position has not been instituted, and a focus on the more long-term outcomes and impacts is still missing. However, some steps have been made to build the capacity of staff in M&E, and methods for gathering information from the field have been improved through open questionnaires with beneficiaries and evaluative round table discussions guided by force field analysis. An M&E template has been organised that provides a strategic matrix with indicators. Within the organisation the staff members feel free to contribute and share ideas. Through engagement with a wide range of organisations in society such as donors such as IREX and NED, and partners within the LCDGP they get inputs on their activities in strategies. Within the communities the CAC structure serves to connect RHRAP to local issues and provide feedback on the ongoing programmes.

Score: from 3.1 to 3.4 (slight improvement)

## Summary for capability to deliver on development objectives






Similar to the baseline, RHRAP has operational plans and work plans, but now also an M&E template and the interaction with the CACs seems to have increased RHRAPs connection and interaction with community beneficiaries and duty bearers in Bong County. Due to decreasing funds RHRAP is currently only active in Bong County, and many staff members operate on a semi-volunteer basis. This has some impacts on the delivery and quality of outputs. RHRAP increasingly includes the local government in the feedback loop by including them in the evaluation of project activities, which can provide feedback on the efficiency and quality of the work of RHRAP. RHRAP is also making efforts to ensure that project activities are more consistent with the strategic plan, but funding constraints affect the actual implementation of project activities. It is unclear how the organisation balances quality with efficiency, particularly with the funding constraints, which also affects staff leaving the organisation.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

### Summary of capability to relate




RHRAP works with ICCO funding since the baseline in 2012, and is included in both the ‘cluster arrangement’ and a coalition of 20 Liberian NGOs that are jointly implementing the ICCO-funded Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme (LCDGP). Within this coalition RHRAP works with FIND on monitoring prisons, courts, arrest proceedings, and situations at various detention sites in Gbarnga and Bong Mines Township. RHRAP also helps to document issues concerning domestic violence occurring in Gbarnga City, Bong County, for intervention by AFELL; and RHRAP is partnering with FIND for the development of a training manual.

Engagements with donors and networks are ongoing, though the names of the organisations have changed since the baseline. Regarding cooperation with stakeholders and beneficiaries a slightly emphasized component is the increased outreach to government agencies and cooperation with local duty-bearers. The director does play an instrumental role in this respect - his vision on the direction of RHRAP steers engagement with potential partners and beneficiary areas.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.6 (very minor change)

## Summary of capability to achieve coherence



Regarding the vision, mission and strategies, RHRAP has not changed much in the past years since the baseline. In the past year however, the organisation's focus has been changing due to changing contexts in the direction of natural resource sector advocacy. This signals that RHRAP is urgently searching for niches in which to maintain relevancy and adapt to the changing funding situation. This means that it is essential that RHRAP have a sharp vision and coherent strategic plan to guide its operations for the coming years. Operational documents have been updated.

Score: from 3.7 to 3.7 (no change)

### 4.2.2 General changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO

During the endline workshop at the SPO, a discussion was held around what staff perceived as the main changes in organisational capacity since the baseline and why these changes have taken place. The discussion was visualised in a general causal map as can be seen below. The narrative for the general causal map is also described below. It gives a more general picture of what were seen as important changes in the organisation since the baseline, and how these changes have come about. It tells the more general story about the organisational changes in the SPO. Please refer to the appendix 4 for further details and descriptions. Whilst the general causal map is mainly based on discussions during the endline workshop, additional information is added from additional sources. At the top the main organisational capacity changes are positioned (in yellow boxes). Some of their key consequences (in purple) are noted up top. Blue boxes represent factors and aspects that influence the organisational capacity changes above. These can be further traced back to interventions and activities. The contributing activities have been coloured brown. If a factor or outcome negatively impacted the organisation it has been highlighted in pink.


The key changes that occurred in RHRAP since the baseline:

- RHRAP was chosen to serve as the lead organisation for the ICCO Democratisation cluster (August 2013) and has taken over the responsibility to manage ICCO funds for all partners in Liberia (October 2013).
- RHRAP was chosen to work on a project with the International Federation for Electoral Systems (IFES) - June 2014.
- Staff numbers reduced from 9 to 5. In July 2013 RHRAP added a new finance officer to the team.
- The RHRAP website was launched in May 2013.
- The director of RHRAP received his graduate degree in May 2014 from the School for International Training (SIT) in Conflict Transformation and Peace-building.

- Better programme implementation and monitoring, even though activities in Lofa County could not be continued due to lack of funding.
- Better proposal writing and more fundraising activities.
- Management expressed that intentions to work on staff capacity had increased.
- RHRAP leadership among Civil Society Organisations increased.
- Management team had become more effective.

A number of more specific key organisational capacity changes were identified during the workshop: RHRAP has built its programme implementation capacity [1], the RHRAP network and coalition participation has increased [2] and fundraising capacities have improved [3].

The staff members felt that they had increased their **capacity to implement their programmes** throughout the past two years [1]. Three main factors were seen to influence this capacity: negatively, a precarious staff situation; improved staff skills and knowledge; and better field monitoring. The first two components are strongly related to staff competences. Improved programme implementation capacity was mainly reflected in the fact that work with the Prisons and the CACs in Bong County was seen to be relatively successful according to RHRAP staff and the CFA (RHRAP Learning and Sharing Meeting Minutes 08-04-2014; Annex B Support to Capacity sheet CFA perspective LD and AL) [4]. This gave the members of RHRAP the idea that the CAC structures in place would be able to keep up human rights activities should RHRAP withdraw. RHRAP did an IFES programme (which they implemented in June 2014) which made use of the Citizen Action Committees in their electoral activities. Not all of the planned work could be implemented due to lack of funding. For example the monitoring of the Criminal Justice System (ICCO funded) had to be limited to Bong, whilst Lofa County could not be included due to lack of funds [5] (Information from RHRAP website, accessed 23-05-2014). RHRAP is using the CAC structure in other proposals, for example to OSIWA regarding a project on equitable revenues of the extractive sector (RHRAP OSIWA proposal template).



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A sensitive dynamic that has negatively impacted the organisation as a whole related to the fact that RHRAP is currently in a precarious staff situation [6]. Since the baseline the number of staff at RHRAP has decreased from 9 to 5 people [9] due to decreasing amounts of funding [10]. Improved staff skills [13] was related to gains made for different staff members in terms of team and programme management skills [14], which were said to have improved in the past years since the baseline. One of the reasons included the efforts by the director and other senior staff to hold in-house trainings for junior members [15]. A second component of programme management skills of RHRAP staff members was that they improved knowledge and practical skills that helped them in interacting with the Citizen Action Committee structures that were set up in various project communities [17]. The final component was that RHRAP had become better at tracking what is happening in the field, conceptualized as field monitoring [25]. The main reason they felt that this was the case was due to a slightly changed monitoring process, with more of a focus on including communities in the process of monitoring [26].

A second major discussion that was ongoing in terms of organisational capacity changes, related to the perceived **increased network and coalition participation** of RHRAP [2]. This network and coalition participation has mainly come to expression in that RHRAP staff felt that their organisation has taken an increased leadership role among CSOs in Liberia on the issues of human rights monitoring and democratization, but also increasingly on the topics of natural resource and extractive industry advocacy [30]. In the course of the LCDGP coalition formation, RHRAP felt that their interaction with other partners in the LCDGP has increased. RHRAP plays a strategic role for the LCDGP as contract holder for the whole LCDGP coalition and as cluster lead for the Democratisation cluster (one of the three LCDGP themes) [32]. This followed the start of the LCDGP in various phases since the bridging phase in 2012 [24], and since the first partner that ICCO envisioned for this role did not live up to the responsibilities. Related to this, RHRAP management felt that RHRAP performance had exhibited trust and credibility in the past two years [33]. This was mostly due to the LCDGP key role, but the director also said that recently they had made an effort to update organisational documentation such as the financial policy, personnel policy, and start writing a new strategic plan [34]. RHRAP has also made contact with a number of newer partners and potential donors.

The third key organisational capacity change that took place in the organisation since the baseline, and according to RHAP staff present at the endline workshop, was an improved capacity to raise funds. Since this is also an area selected for process tracing so as to deal with the attribution question please find a detailed causal map in 1.3.2.

A reduction in donor funding since 2012, especially from main funder ICCO [10], has negatively impacted on the organisation, but meanwhile RHRAP management realised the need to improve staff capacity so as to ensure sustainability of the organisation, and maintaining good relationships with IREX, Global Fund for Children and FinChurchAid has also contributed to some of the positive changes in the organisation since the baseline in 2012.

### 4.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity development - evaluation question 2 and 4

Note: for each country about 50% of the SPOs have been chosen to be involved in process tracing, which is the main approach chosen to address evaluation question 2. For more information please also see chapter 3 and appendix 2 on the methodological approach. For each of these SPOs the focus has been on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, since these were the most commonly addressed capabilities when planning MFS II supported capacity development interventions for the SPO.

For each of the MFS II supported capacity development interventions -under these two capabilities- an outcome area has been identified, describing a particular change in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO. Process tracing has been carried out for each outcome area. The following outcome areas have been identified under the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. Also the MFS II capacity development interventions that could possibly be linked to these outcome areas are described in the table below. For RHRAP it was decided to focus on two outcomes

within the 'capability to act and commit' due to the focus of the organisation and the kind of support by the CFA: 'improved capacity to for human rights based monitoring in the Criminal Justice Sector'; and 'slightly improved capacity for fundraising'. Each of these key organisational capacity changes is further described below. For the detailed description of these changes and related factors, activities and actors please see appendix 5. This also includes detailed sources of evidence.

Table 2

*Information on selected capabilities, outcome areas and MFS II supported capacity development interventions since the baseline*

Capability	Outcome area	MFS II supported capacity development interventions (2)
Capability to act and commit	Improved capacity for Human Rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice Sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training in Liberian Justice systems, procedures and prison monitoring - 14-16 September 2012</li> </ul>
Capability to act and commit	Slightly improved capacity for Fundraising	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to build RHRAP website in 2013 with ICCO flexible funds</li> <li>• Proposal writing training with LCDGP members in February 2014</li> <li>• Training with Programme and Financial staff members of the LCDGP on ICCO guidelines and policies March 2014</li> <li>• Monitoring visits and discussions in 2012 and 2013</li> <li>• Visit of SPO directors to Bamako in September 2013</li> </ul>

#### 4.3.1 Improved capacity for Human Rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice Sector

RHRAP has a long experience in terms of monitoring human rights, in general, but also within the criminal justice system, and many activities have been undertaken in the past (well before the baseline) to strengthen the capacity of RHRAP staff members in this area (in the causal map, see the brown boxes at the bottom of the visual below). The capacity to monitor human rights in the criminal justice system has been built upon since the baseline in 2012 [1], mainly in relation to the ICCO funded project 'Monitoring and Promoting of the Criminal Justice System in Gbarnga, Bong County', initiated in 2012. Training in this topic was done in September 2012 for RHRAP staff for this programme [15]. Citizen Action Committees were established, which included zonal heads in Gbarnga, where groups of active citizens are involved in discussions with duty-bearers in the criminal justice sector. By having Citizen Action Committees, prominent citizens and leaders are involved in mediating and educating community members, engaging in dialogue with police and justice departments, and accurately communicating to RHRAP about what is going on in Gbarnga [2]. RHRAP has been able to successfully organise trainings for community leaders to advocate for issues relating to the criminal justice system, and other stakeholders such as police and court officials have been able to attend these meetings. Relations between these different stakeholders have improved according to RHRAP staff [3]. Furthermore, RHRAPs increased competencies in monitoring human rights in the criminal justice system, has led to improvements relations and activities within the Bong County prisons [4]. For example, inmates are more successfully accessed and have been given two cell phones to communicate with their family members. In addition to this, working relations with detention officers are more positive.


In the following section the main reasons for improved capacity of RHRAP staff rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice Sector (CJS) [1] are explained: improved collaborative approach for HR-based monitoring that guides the work of RHRAP [5], and specific knowledge on HR-based monitoring in the CJS [12]. Since the former mostly guides the work of RHRAP, and is embedded within the programmatic objectives, the evaluation team needed to weigh how much engagement in this collaborative approach has actually strengthened capacity for human rights based monitoring. In the next section some aspects of RHRAPs collaborative approach that have strengthened capacity is discussed, even though many dimensions can be traced to before the baseline.

RHRAP members stated that a key aspect of their improved capacity involved a **more collaborative approach than before** [5]. This also meant specifically involving government as well. With the ICCO

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project, RHRAP was working on human rights promotion. Before RHRAP had access to the prisons, they could do only low-profile monitoring, but with this project they gained access to prisons for more monitoring. Before this ICCO funded project, RHRAP worked with the Carter Centre on monitoring prisons, and staff members already had the basic skills to monitor prison conditions. With this ICCO funded project, the level of monitoring human rights in the prisons has been up-scaled. Thus it can be noted that experience gained in the course of the programme may have slightly influenced and improved RHRAP staff capacity. A second dimension which helped RHRAPs collaborative approach was through building better relations with prison correction officers, court officials and police officers [6]. These stakeholders were more approached using dialogue rather than only activism. This was partly at the beginning of the programme, but also due to previous experiences and trainings before the baseline. The trainings and experiences mentioned in the introduction of this section showed that RHRAP already had knowledge on international human rights and the associated instruments [9], and experience in human rights monitoring and promotion [10]. This knowledge and experience originated from trainings and projects from before the baseline.

The second major category that contributed to an increased capacity for human rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice System was the generation of additional **knowledge for HR-based monitoring** for RHRAP's work [11]. This can be divided into knowledge on how to train community members [12]; knowledge on the alignment of Liberian and human rights law [17]; and knowledge on how to accurately report on prison conditions [18]. One of the key themes within the improved knowledge capacity of the project relating to the Criminal Justice System in Bong County is the interaction with community members and the need to educate them on this system [12]. Key the senior programme officer and the administrative officer showed they had taught to community members in the past two years were: technical knowledge on the process from arrest to detention under Liberian law [13]; and knowledge on how to facilitate interrelations between, and understanding the roles of, the 3 major offices of the criminal justice system: correction officers, judiciary and police officers [14].





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Furthermore, RHRAP staff members have improved their competences to align Liberian and international human rights law [17]. At this training Liberia's constitutional provisions relating to the administration of justice as well as the major classes of human rights violations was discussed, and this sought to bring out the overlapping tools and provisions [16]. In addition to this, the many trainings and programmes in the past have also improved RHRAP's competencies in this area. These improved competencies have helped RHRAP to perform their activities in Bong County, and to work on issues that were both listed in the Liberian law book as well as in international human rights law, with the intention of bringing different stakeholders together with community members. The RHRAP staff added that they already had previous knowledge and experience that they could build upon regarding these aspects [9]/ [10].

Competences of RHRAP staff to report prison conditions more accurately have also improved [18]. This prison reporting was improved throughout the multiple visits that the RHRAP monitoring officers made to the Gbarnga Prison. In the narrative report to ICCO of 2012 it was written that ICCO visitors had made a short stop there and RHRAP was commended for its work with the inmates and the detention officers. This was caused, on the one hand, by various prison monitoring tools and information collection, such as comparing docket information with the list of admittances [19]. On the other hand, competences have improved by having more knowledge and skills to monitor work of the prisons more comprehensively, through checking conditions of prisoners, the way prisoners are admitted and by going through the detention statutes [20]. The monitoring of prisons has been something that RHRAP has some experience in: in 2001 RHRAP worked along with the Justice and Peace Commission in Bong, Cape Mount, Loaf, and Margi counties. So RHRAP did already have some informal connections before the baseline [23]. Weekly fact-finding and monitoring of courts and prisons have helped improving these types of knowledge.

#### 4.3.2 Slightly improved capacity for fundraising

The capacity to raise funds was a key issue the organisation was dealing with, and striving to improve at during the time of the endline process [1]. This slightly improved change in organisational capacity is reflected mainly in the fact that both the CFA as well as the SPO gave attention to this issue. It was further elaborated on during the process of process tracing.

Decreasing funding from the main funder ICCO [2] was discussed as a serious issue during the endline process, but hopes were still high that ICCO would continue with the LCDGP in the near future. The issue of funds has been an issue for some time, even before the baseline in 2012 when it became clear that ICCO had fewer funds. In the LCDGP coalition built by ICCO the idea was to apply the programmatic approach in 3 clusters. In the Democratization cluster a programme in which RHRAP was the lead was set up, and was urged to search for additional funds to fulfil the full programme. In 2012 the funding outlook seemed good; two programmes (ACT Alliance and ICCO) were taking place. However, this led to a withdrawal of two smaller donors, National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and Global Fund for Children (GFC), who said that RHRAP had surpassed over their funding threshold policy. These two funders only support small civil society organisations that do not have access to larger funding amounts. For RHRAP members this led to a double feeling - on a positive note they can show to other potential funders that they are able to handle large amounts of money, but on a negative note they could not access funds from NED and GFC in 2013. However, since the end of 2013 both ACT Alliance and AusAID have stopped funding RHRAP (AusAID due to decrease in Australian government spending).

The RHRAP staff members were sure that in the past two years their fundraising capacity had changed for the better, but larger programme funding was not yet realised. Funding diversity was not achieved yet [3]. A new idea currently under development is to get a proposal writer and grant seeker on board to seek opportunities for RHRAP. This person would help RHRAP to access funding through networking in return for a fee. This idea was still being developed at the time of the endline, but was discussed earlier in some RHRAP board meeting minutes in January 2014.

There are five key areas related to a slightly improved fundraising capacity. Improved capacity to write proposals [5] and more visibility for RHRAP [20] seemed to be the most substantiated and changed since the baseline in 2012. The other three revolved more around awareness and engagement with others: awareness of the importance of having a sound strategic plan and


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programme documents [28]; awareness of the need to build credible and trustworthy relationships with funders [33]; and engagement in more networking and partnerships [37]. These underlying changes are further explained below.

The first issue that RHRAP said they became better at was **proposal writing** [5]. This was due to having more members of staff involved in proposal writing; having improved knowledge on proposal writing techniques; actively using field data; and understanding the background of the funder better. All staff has been involved in proposal writing; whilst the director and the junior programme officer were quite active with this, others were involved in the brainstorm and review process [6]. Using a projector that they got from the NED some years ago they look at the document together to make changes. The members of RHRAP said that they had received knowledge on different proposal writing techniques [7], through a range of interventions that took place since the baseline. In 2014 the LCDGP a collective Resource Mobilization strategy was developed [10]. However, this seemed to be going slowly when the research team reviewed the documentation. The Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme (LCDGP) Strategic Plan development lasted for nearly two years to have a coherent plan. The clearest outcome of this process has been a collective proposal that was written to the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) to get extra funds for the LCDGP. This was presented to OSIWA in June 2014. Results from this bid are still pending. According to the director, the master degree education at the School for International Training in the US helped him with the writing of proposals, by using theories and tools for proposal writing [11]. He also mentioned that the RHRAP proposals are now SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic/relevant, and timely) [12].

RHRAP has increased its **visibility**, which can be seen in increased information sharing of their programme on their website [21] and attending as many meetings as possible; enhanced communication and showcasing towards donors and non-governmental organisations; as well as publishing activities toward broader society and the international community [20]. To further contribute to visibility, posters, brochures and billboards have been produced to promote RHRAP activities [24]. In the LCDGP narrative report to ICCO, the LCDGP partners had 10 plastic posters and 2500 small posters and stickers made depicting the objectives and activities of partners in the 'Democracy Cluster' of the LCDGP.

**Awareness on having a sound strategic plan and solid programme documents** was another aspect that RHRAP members realized [28]. It was said that in order to be able to get funding as an organisation you need to be able to hand in the necessary documents such as operational policies, employment contracts, rules and regulations, financial policies. This need to develop and amend the above mentioned issues related to the director's discovery of the importance of these aspects, in his discussions with ICCO and during his studies in the United States at the SIT [32]. He learned many of these things at the School for International Training in the United States, and was implementing these ideas in his fundraising activities.





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Staff members indicated that they were aware of the importance of having a **credible relationship with donors** [33]. The members of RHRAP said that building this relationship was important because they realised that it is essential to show results to funders. According to RHRAP staff financial audits that were done for ICCO and the ACT Alliance had helped to build up trust with the funders [34]. This responsibility has given the RHRAP members the feeling that this is a consequence of being a reliable partner of ICCO, and they said that this responsibility reinforced a more credible relationship with other donors. Another factor that contributed to improved awareness was an improved understanding the ICCO funding priorities and perspectives, which was necessary in order to develop and stimulate consolidated reporting guidelines for the LCDGP [36].

RHRAP staff noted that in the past two years the organisation has paid more attention to **networking and building new partnerships** [37]. There have been more networking activities, but clear and significant examples of concrete programmes and projects that came out of the new networks and partnerships are yet to fully materialize. RHRAP members stated that in the past couple of years RHRAPs standing among civil society has been positively improving, saying that other organisations in Liberian civil society often liaise with RHRAP. Due to networking activities of the director a project with AusAID was organised [38]. This project was unfortunately cut short in 2013. In the course of this LCDGP process RHRAP felt that their interaction with other partners in the LCDGP had increased. An example mentioned is that they are talking with the Association of Female Lawyers in Liberia (AFELL) and the Foundation for International Dignity (FIND) to explore collective fundraising efforts [39]. This has not developed beyond talks, but the director said that a working relationship with these organisations would definitely be in the advantage of RHRAP, as they are all three working with human rights issues.

On the whole, a reduction in funding, especially from ICCO [2], has forced RHRAP to engage in efforts to improve upon its fundraising capacity. Some of the major underlying activities that have helped in this process include a variety of trainings in fundraising. ICCO funded a number of trainings deemed valuable by the RHRAP staff through the PMC of the LCDGP [8]/ [32], and a visit to ICCO in Bamako which partly addressed sustainability strategies [9]. Furthermore, extra experience was gained by the director through his studies in the United States where he explored conflict transformation programme management and proposal formulation [11], and through the webinar via the Funds for NGO's website [19]. Staff members were able to attend a training provided by IREX in fundraising as part of a training trajectory in 2012-2013 [17].



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## 5 Discussion and conclusion

### 5.1 Methodological issues

Prior to conducting the fieldwork of the endline process, the Liberia 5C evaluation team requested and received some documents from RHRAP, including the Support to capacity sheet, training and capacity building reports, project proposal and budgets, audited financial reports, strategic plan, etc. These documents were uploaded to NVivo 10 software, coded and analyzed, and the initial 'causal map' and narrative description of capacity changes and 'outcome areas' were identified.

The Liberia 5C evaluation team conducted three one-day workshops with three subgroups of the staffs of RHRAP including management, finance, and project management. The data generated from the activities of the workshops, which involved individual staffs of RHRAP reflecting on and writing down on sticky notes all changes in the capacity of the organization since the baseline in June 2012, discussing and agreeing on the 'outcome areas' under which the changes were organized, identifying the related factors and capacity development interventions implemented by the SPO and the CFA, identifying the source(s) of funding support for the interventions implemented, attributing the changes in capacity of RHRAP to specific factors and capacity development interventions implemented by RHRAP and ICCO, as well as to the specific source(s) of funding.


The evaluation team also individually interviewed RHRAP's staff members that participated in the workshops, using questionnaires based on the 5C indicators of RHRAP, to gather additional data to complement and triangulate the data gathered from the workshops. The interviews were important in getting balanced information from participants that may have been lost during the workshop. During the workshop, the Executive Director in some instances spoke lengthily on issues that may have needed the input of other staffs. Making notes and then using the interviews to capture missing or additional information was important.

It is also important to note that in some cultural environments, staff will not speak about certain subjects, leaving the leader to speak entirely. In such case, it is important to note such questions and answers and follow up with interviews or advise staff about the importance of speaking and getting the information out. This was the case to a certain extent at RHRAP, especially as the evaluation team delved into the specific components of the process tracing outcomes.

The evaluation team also planned interviews with two of RHRAP's external partners – IFES and IREX – but the planned interview did not materialize due to the outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea.

On the whole, there was adequate information available for data analysis. The organisational capacity changes identified for 'process tracing' were determined through discussions with the CFA and SPO but for example the capacity for human rights based monitoring was specified to include 'the criminal justice sector' during the workshop.

## 5.2 Changes in organisational capacity



In the past chapters the capability changes were mapped through the 5C model. In the diagram on this page it can be seen that RHRAP capabilities have remained largely the same since the baseline in 2012. Some small changes have occurred in the capability to adapt and self-renew, and some very minor improvements in terms of capability to act and commit, and the capability to relate. Key improved indicators within the capability to adapt and self-renew concern the application of M&E, M&E competencies, critical reflection and systems for tracking the environment. Especially when it comes to engaging with the target groups of RHRAP and gathering information from the project environment some steps have been made. This has been worked on through other means of surveying respondents, using the CAC structure for evaluative round table discussions and using an indicator matrix to assess activities.

The way changes have been small can be exemplified by the indicators within the capability to act and commit. For RHRAP key indicators that exhibited positive changes were that staff training and skills had been worked on in the past two years. Trainings and skills transfer were noted as important by RHRAP staff members, but these positive changes were somewhat off-set by a fragile staff turnover situation. A similar balance could be seen within the capability to relate: though engagement within the environment and the search for new networks and partners is ongoing, engagement within current partnerships have not significantly changed the way in which organisational policies and strategies are developed. Since the indicators for engagement within the organisation and with the target groups were scored at 4 in the baseline, the endline evaluation team felt this score did not significantly improve.

There were a number of organisation capacity-related changes that had occurred since the baseline which were discussed extensively during the endline process. RHRAP staff members noted that programmes had been implemented better due to gains made in staff skills and knowledge and through better field monitoring. This is in line with the above mentioned changes in terms of monitoring and evaluation in the capability to adapt and self-renew and improved staff knowledge and skills in the capability to act and commit. Key efforts that influenced this were a couple of trainings done related to their area of focus, such as the training on Criminal Justice Systems in 2012, but also more general training such as the director's studies in the United States, M&E training for the senior programme officer, IREX trainings and training on inclusivity of local civil society actors in peace-building processes. Fundraising competencies have been improved on, but this will be discussed more in 5.3.

Parallel to this, important network participation efforts had been made: through interaction with partners of the LCDGP, exhibiting trust and reliability in fulfilling the contract with ICCO and through exploring other potential partners and relations, RHRAP has become more active in participating in



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networks. The key underlying factor that stimulated RHRAP to more actively participate in networks was the fact that ICCO funding has become less and that there is a need for RHRAP to be able to diversify funding and programmes, and for staff capacity to do this. The relations with for example IREX, AusAID and the FinChurchAid have been positive in the past and it is hoped that new opportunities will arise through those channels as well.

From what the evaluation team has seen, RHRAP has been a key partner of ICCO since 2005. RHRAP was chosen to be the contractual partner on behalf of the LCDGP in 2013 and the CFA has expressed confidence in the organisation. In the baseline it was written that most of the attention to organisational capacity development would be on the capability to act and commit. The support of ICCO and the activities within the LCDGP have played a role, especially regarding the Criminal Justice training to build staff skills for programme implementation, and through networking connections with other LCDGP members. Other influences of ICCO come back in the indicators on staff skills and fundraising capacity. The interventions that influenced these are discussed in 5.3.

### 5.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity development to MFS II

To address the question of attribution it was agreed that for all the countries in the 5C study, the focus would be on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, with a focus on MFS II supported organisational capacity development interventions that were possibly related to these capabilities. 'Process tracing' was used to get more detailed information about the changes in these capabilities that were possibly related to the specific MFS II capacity development interventions. The organisational capacity changes that were focused on were:

- 'Improved capacity for human rights-based monitoring within the CJS';
- 'Slightly improved capacity for fundraising'.

Both of these organisational change areas fall in the capability to act and commit. There are no organisational capacity changes identified in the capability to adapt and self-renew because no MFS II interventions to strengthen the capability to adapt and self-renew were planned at baseline. The organisational capacity change areas that were chosen are based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO and CFA. These organisational capacity changes are further discussed below.

#### Comments on intervention designs and SMART formulations

In the next section reflections will be made about the way in which interventions were designed. As a guideline SMART formulations are used to assess this. It is clear though that in some cases the expected objectives were not formulated in a SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). During the baseline the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions. So whilst the MFS II supported capacity development interventions have taken place, no decisive judgement can be made on whether these interventions were implemented as designed, since the design was not known during baseline, and has not been described as SMART objectives. Per intervention more specific objectives will be noted if they became clear from training reports.

#### The following issues are discussed for each of these MFS II funded activities:

1. **Design:** the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development intervention was well-designed. (Key criteria: relevance to the SPO; SMART objectives)
2. **Implementation:** the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development was implemented as designed (key criteria: design, according to plans during the baseline);
3. **Reaching objectives:** the extent to which the MFS II capacity development intervention reached all its objectives (key criteria: immediate and long-term objectives, as formulated during the baseline);
4. **Attribution:** the extent to which the observed results are attributable to the identified MFS II supported capacity development intervention (reference made to detailed causal map, based on 'process tracing').

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## "Improved capacity for human rights-based monitoring within the CJS"

### Training on the Liberian Criminal Justice Sector in September 2012

This was the only MFS II funded capacity development intervention by ICCO.

#### *Design*

In the baseline report it was written that RHRAP would undergo training with the immediate objective: "at least 10 staff members trained and acquired enhanced knowledge and understanding in prison monitoring, reporting, documentation and human rights education etc". The long-term objective was to have "well trained and equipped staff".

In other programme documentation and interviews done with CFA and SPO it became clear that this capacity development intervention was intended to be useful as a training on the criminal justice system as well as project orientation for staff members, which is relevant to the work of RHRAP and to staff members, since they needed to enhance their knowledge and skills on this topic. The rationale of the training was to build the capacities of staff of the organization on legal proceedings that would enable them be knowledgeable of the procedure regarding arrest, detention, and the revised penal Code of Liberia as it relates to the criminal justice system of the state. In the RHRAP proposal for 2012-2013 it was stated that "as a tradition, RHRAP will organize two (2) in-service trainings, three (3) days each for its staffs that are responsible for the implementation of this two years programme. The training will focus on Paralegal Training of Trainers (TOT), Prison Monitoring, Reporting and Documentation and General Human Rights Education which will help the staff to maximal desired results of the programme."

As such the immediate objectives were to some extent formulated according to SMART definitions (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Specifics have been made the number of staff, "at least 10 staff", and the topics to be discussed. The long-term effect was vaguer and quite broad: when is the goal reached that a staff member is exactly 'well-trained and equipped'? It should be noted however that the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for the SMART objectives specifically, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

#### *Implementation*

The training on the Liberian Criminal Justice Sector which was carried out in September 2012 was facilitated by two attorneys of law. It was planned for during the baseline and has been implemented as such. Only 1 (September 2012) and not 2 sessions have taken place. The training dealt with topics such as the Police Charge of Quarters (the major guidelines for police action), the Criminal Justice terminology, the rights of the defendant and the jurisdiction and limitations of the Magisterial Court. The training focused less on educational methods. The trainers discussed technicalities of the criminal justice system, how it works, and what different processes take place.

#### *Reaching objectives*

Whilst not having SMART objectives it was difficult to assess this issue, but a few things can be said about the more concrete results of the training.

The key outcomes described in the training report were that:

- Staff was exposed to new method of prison monitoring and documentation;
- Minds enrichment on the revised penal code was realized;
- Staff gained knowledge on the various terms and procedures of the courts;
- Staff exposed to the jurisdiction and limitation of each court in Liberia;
- Exposure to criminal procedures law was realized.

As such the immediate objectives were reached: at least 10 staff members attended, and the topics were addressed. Staff had learned from the training, demonstrated by a number of reports about the CACs, prison visitations, and RHRAPs community engagement where topics addressed in the training were being addressed. The training could have focused more on educational methods though. The training did indeed contribute to more well-trained and equipped staff according to a general definition.

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#### *Attribution of observed results to MFS II interventions*

Improved capacity for human rights-based monitoring within the Criminal Justice System in Liberia is due to an improved collaborative approach for human rights-based monitoring but more importantly to improved knowledge on human rights-based monitoring (see also section 4.3). Whilst the improved collaborative approach for human rights based monitoring cannot be attributed to the MFS II capacity development interventions by ICCO, the improved knowledge on human rights-based monitoring can be considerably attributed to MFS II capacity development support by ICCO.

ICCO supported a training specifically related to the RHRAP programme on the Liberian Criminal Justice sector which has been helpful to build the knowledge of RHRAP staff. This training improved the knowledge on HR-based monitoring. The improved knowledge can be greatly attributed to the MFS II funded training on the Liberian criminal justice system that took place in September 2012, since this training mainly affected RHRAP staff knowledge on how to train community members on the criminal justice system and on the knowledge to align Liberian and international law. The competencies to accurately report on prison conditions cannot be attributed to MFS II funded capacity development support by ICCO.

Key issues the senior programme officer and the administrative officer showed they had taught to community members in the past two years were: technical knowledge on the process from arrest to detention under Liberian law; and knowledge on how to facilitate interrelations between, and understanding the roles of, the 3 major offices of the criminal justice system: correction officers, judiciary and police officers.

The improved knowledge on human rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice System can also be attributed to other factors, including the fact that RHRAP staff members had extensive previous knowledge (through trainings and courses before the baseline) and experience from earlier projects, such as a project with the Justice and Peace Commission on prison monitoring in 2002.

#### **'Slightly improved capacity for fundraising'**

The MFS funded capacity development interventions by ICCO included:

- Website development in 2013;
- Proposal writing training with LCDGP members in February 2014;
- Training with members of the LCDGP on ICCO guidelines and policies in March 2014.

Each of these capacity development interventions is further discussed below.

### **Website development in 2013**

#### *Design*

The idea behind the website development was to enhance communication and increase visibility of RHRAP mostly towards funders, and to give RHRAP a platform to communicate on what they do. Already this was described as a requested intervention by RHRAP in the baseline, and therefore it was relevant to the organisation's needs. The immediate objectives in the baseline were "one website developed and functional". The long-term objective was defined as the CFA was: "enhanced communication and increase in visibility for RHRAP, mostly towards funders, and to give RHRAP a platform to communicate on what they do". According to RHRAP it was hoped that: "the development of the website where information of RHRAP Programme activities is placed will contribute to Resource Mobilization".

These objectives were relevant for RHRAP because both RHRAP and ICCO described the need for fundraising activities in the baseline report.

The objectives of this capacity development intervention were not particularly SMART as it was neither clearly defined in the documentation how the website should function (just that it could be made), nor was defined how the outcomes would be measurable. For example, in the baseline assumptions were stated that 'regarding the fact that website development and hosting is very broad in the way it is put, if RHRAP does not ensure that there are trained staff to manage the website, there would be some challenges regarding the operationalisation of the website'. This issue does not seem to have been addressed by either the CFA or SPO. Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART

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objectives specifically, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

#### *Implementation*

The evaluation team has seen that the website is currently functioning, and that it gives a good overview of the activities and projects that RHRAP has been undertaking. The website was developed in July 2013 and has been functioning since then, even though RHRAP stated to have had some technical problems with it regarding the uploading of documents and information. The issues have been resolved for now. Therefore the website has been implemented as planned, according to the immediate objectives.

#### *Reaching objectives*

On this intervention the CFA wrote that it helped to be visible, but was not sure about specific effects from the website. When aligned to the objectives, it can be said that the website was made and therefore achieved its objective. The more long-term goal is more difficult to assess. RHRAP staff expressed that the website has been useful to show the projects they are implementing and to draw attention of other partners and funders. It was said that RHRAP programme activities are gradually being exposed to both national and international communities. Thus from a RHRAP perspective the website intervention has helped them in their efforts to raise funds. Indeed, within the overall capacity to raise funds the website played a role in creating more visibility of the organisation, which fed into an increased capacity to raise funds. However, it could be considered as only one of the five contributing factors and due to the limited evidence of effects, and parallel attention to publishing RHRAP activities in newspapers, this visibility contributed only slightly to this, organisational change capacity.

### **Proposal writing training with LCDGP members in February 2014**

#### *Design*

In line with the LCDGP Resource Mobilization Plan, a project proposal development refresher and orientation workshop was organized by the Resource Mobilization subsector. This proposal writing training was part of the ongoing strategy to strengthen the capacity of the LCDGP partner organizations. It could not be assessed whether the training was well-designed based on the documentation of the organisations. In the baseline report the CFA wrote that the immediate objective related to fundraising was a "percentage increase in the fundraising venture with at least three proposals sent out for solicitation". The long-term objective was an increase in income. The interventions on fundraising was stated to be relevant to RHRAP, as in the baseline it was recorded that the organisation requested fundraising support in the form of fundraising training, website development and said it was also engaging in webinar training with 'Funds for NGOs'.

The immediate objective is relatively SMART, denominating a minimum number of proposals. However, the long-term objective is quite open and unrealistic to be based on a single proposal-writing training. Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

#### *Implementation*

The training brought together 19 programme officers. Areas of focus during the training included but were not limited to the following: general introduction of proposal writing including gathering of background information, concept development, the programme and expenses/budget. Other aspects of proposal writing highlighted also included the components of a proposal, i.e., the executive summary, statement of need, project description, organizational information and conclusion. The training was planned for during the baseline and has also been implemented as described in the Resource Mobilization Plan. The director of RHRAP was one of the facilitators of the session.

#### *Reaching objectives*

Improved proposal writing was seen as one of the contributing aspects to the slightly improved fundraising capacity of RHRAP. Key issue that was a part of this was that the members of RHRAP gained more knowledge on proposal writing techniques. This can be directly linked to the training in proposal writing. The immediate objective to send out at least three proposals has been reached:

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proposals were sent to OSIWA, NED, the US Democracy and Rights Fund. The long term goal has not been reached yet: decreasing income seems the trend at RHRAP in 2014. Considering the role of the director in this training as facilitator it might be said that this was not necessarily a key training for him. For the junior staff member the training was probably more valuable, but it should be noted that this officer also received additional training from IREX on fundraising as well.

### **Training with members of the LCDGP on ICCO guidelines and policies in March 2014**

#### *Design*

The reason for the session was the lack of adherence to contract terms and conditions. In the baseline this capacity intervention was not mentioned, and the need arose as the LCDGP was set up. The long-term objective stated in the baseline was general (related to staff capacity building in general) and said that staff members should be well trained and equipped. As such this training was quite relevant for the LCDGP partners. The working session was organised to enhance partnership development, and to make sure partners adhere to contracts. The evaluation team cannot say whether the training was designed according to SMART principles: it is likely that a session on ICCO policies and reporting may have helped to smooth procedures though it probably would not solve the general issues such as funding and programme alignment within the LCDGP which heavily concerned the partners. The training was only somewhat relevant for RHRAP: though both the CFA and the SPO stated that the relationship was good, the CFA noted that reporting could be better - timelier and more accurate. As such the long term objective was not formulated in a SMART way during the baseline. Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

#### *Implementation*

This was a one day working session/training for programme and finance officers of LCDGP partners. The idea was to increase awareness regarding ICCO's operational policies and procedures. In this session cluster members had the opportunity to share their experiences with each other as well as have their inputs into the decision making process of the D Cluster which is helping to bridge the communication gaps between and amongst cluster members including the Lead.

So whilst the MFS II supported capacity development interventions have taken place, no judgement can be made on whether this intervention was implemented as designed, since the design was not known during baseline, and has not been described as SMART objectives.

#### *Reaching objectives*

The LCDGP bridging report noted "significant increased understanding about the LCDGP between and amongst partners themselves, which have helped in addressing some of the growing concerns about the LCDGP as well as the Democratisation cluster (RHRAP is also within this cluster). This contributed to partner's abilities in writing and submitting reports to the Leads of the D Cluster in line with programme objectives making it much easier for consolidation of reports". The CFA wrote that reporting was gradually improving according to terms of contract, and an increase in the submission of reports was seen.

Though the session was initiated to build a better connection between LCDGP partners, it was linked to fundraising capacity by the RHRAP staff.

#### *Attribution of observed results to MFS II interventions*

In the baseline report RHRAP members expressed the need for more attention to funding and resources, and staff capacity. It was seen that some steps were made in these areas, with the support of ICCO, within the capability to act and commit. The RHRAP staff was sure that in the past two years their fundraising capacity had changed for the better, but larger programme funding was not yet realised. Funding diversity was not achieved yet. Fundraising capacity had been slightly improved due to five main capacity changes: improved capacities to write proposals and more visibility for RHRAP were the two that were the most substantiated and changed. The other three revolved more around awareness and engagement with others: awareness of the importance of having a sound strategic

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plan and programme documents; awareness of the need to build credible and trustworthy relationships with funders; and engagement in more networking and partnerships.

The visibility of RHRAP can be completely attributed to MFS II funded capacity development interventions by ICCO: on the one hand the website, which has been a priority for the organisation as well as the LCDGP. On the other hand, RHRAP and the LCDGP have been active in producing posters, factsheets and t-shirts. RHRAP has also actively sought publications of activities in Liberian newspapers. Furthermore, RHRAP visibility can be attributed to the presentation that the director did in the Netherlands at the World Justice Forum (this activity was not supported by MFS II).

The other key issue to which the slightly improved capacity for fundraising can be attributed is the improved capacity to write proposals. This can be partly attributed to MFS II funded capacity development interventions by ICCO, mainly through the improved knowledge on proposal writing skills, and the improved awareness of the need to build trustworthy relationships with donors. The improved knowledge on proposal writing skills can be partly attributed to the MFS II funded training on proposal writing in February 2014 which brought together 19 of the LCDGP programme officers. This helped to generate providing technical skills and knowledge on how to go about this. However, there were more changes to which improved capacity to write proposals can be attributed: being able to write SMART proposals, active use of field information, understanding the funder background, and active involvement of all staff in the process. An ICCO consultant that visited RHRAP in 2012 gave the director some advice on this. Other MFS II funded capacity development interventions helped with these changes such as the director's training in the USA, or the inspiration gained from the website 'Funds for NGOs'. These can be considered as non-MFS II factors. Also, other factors such as the need to develop SMART proposals, needing to understand funder backgrounds, actively using information from the target areas were developed through the directors training at SIT, earlier discussions and engagements with ICCO. The refresher session has meant that RHRAP is more aware about the funder background, and that ICCOs funding priorities and reporting standards were better understood. It was already noted by the CFA that RHRAP has been relatively trustworthy on ICCO protocols.

All in all, the slightly improved capacity for fundraising can be partly attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions by ICCO, in particular in relation to improving the visibility of RHRAP through the website and Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials (all MFS II funded) and in relation to improved knowledge on proposal writing, which can considerably be attributed to MFSII funded capacity development interventions by ICCO through the funding for website development, the proposal writing training. Awareness on building credible relations with donors can be partly attributed to the training on ICCO guidelines in March 2014, but also to the more general relationship that RHRAP has with ICCO as contract holder and cluster lead. The other two components that led to a slightly improved are only minimally attributable to ICCO interventions. Building more partnership and networking has both been within the LCDGP coalition and was stimulated by ICCO, but also to other alliances and funders in general. Awareness on having sound strategy and programme documents was mostly linked to the studies of the director in the US.

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### **Guidelines and formats for the 5C endline study**

5c\_endline\_questionnaire\_training\_participant\_perspective\_Liberia\_RHRAP\_Staff Training in Criminal Justice System\_Admin

5c\_endline\_questionnaire\_training\_participant\_perspective\_Liberia\_RHRAP\_Coaching P and F officer

5c\_endline\_overview\_trainings\_RHRAP\_staff\_Liberia

5c\_endline\_questionnaire\_training\_participant\_perspective\_Liberia\_RHRAP\_Coaching P and F officer\_Menyongai

5c\_endline\_draftreport\_country\_SPO\_26112014.docx

Annex A\_5c\_endline\_assessment sheet\_Dutch co-financing organisations\_Liberia\_RHRAP\_ICCO

Annex B\_5C\_endline\_support to capacity development sheet\_CFA perspective\_Liberia\_RHRAP\_ICCO

Annex C\_5C\_endline\_support to capacity development sheet\_SPO perspective\_Liberia\_RHRAP

Annex F\_5c\_endline self-assessment sheet\_management\_Liberia\_RHRAP

Annex G\_5c\_endline self-assessment sheet\_programme staff\_Liberia\_RHRAP

Annex I\_5c\_endline self-assessment sheet\_admin HRM staff\_Liberia\_RHRAP

Annex I\_5c\_endline self-assessment sheet\_admin HRM staff\_Liberia\_RHRAP

Annex M\_5c\_endline interview guide\_subgroup\_programme staff\_selected indicators\_Liberia\_RHRAP\_Sumo

Annex O\_5c\_endline interview guide\_subgroup\_admin and HRM staff\_selected indicators\_Liberia\_RHRAP\_Kotati

Annex Q\_5c\_endline observation sheet\_Liberia\_RHRAP Bram

Annex Q\_5c\_endline observation sheet\_Liberia\_RHRAP Sam

List of 5C indicator descriptions

Training overview table RHRAP

### **Partner Documents**

5C\_baseline\_report\_Liberia\_RHRAP\_19012013\_MR\_CK

72-03-04-011- RHRAP

ACT Audited scan Report

Arrest Powerpoint Presentation for RHRAP

AusAID-Peace-Building-Programme-In-Concessional-Communities

BRIEF SUMMARY OF RHRAP STAFF MEETING MINUTES

BRIEFING ON LCDGP STRATEGIC PLAN VALIDATION PROCESS

CAPACITY BUILDING TRAINING FOR RHRAP STAFF

Copy of RHRAP Financial Report to ICCO Dec 31-2013

Copy of RHRAP REVISED BUDGET TO ICCO & KIA 2012-2014

CSO Assessment\_Tool\_FINAL pdf

Email correspondence Sandee - RHRAP 06-05-2014

feedback on RHRAP's Project Update

Feedback to the PMC-June

FINAL- consolidated- Partners'capacity assessment report

FINAL TOR FOR PMC-Final

FINAL TOR FOR TPs- Final



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FIRST QUARTERLY BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETING MINUTES  
ICCO Financial Report Dec 31-2013  
Information on RHRAP website  
Input CDI for country baseline report\_06022013\_Liberia  
Institutional Support to LCDGP Partners  
IREX presentation\_Attributes of an Effective Local Organization v2  
LCDGP Bridging Narrative Report  
LCDGP Communication Plan  
LCDGP Financial Report to ICCO  
LCDGP GRANT AGREEMENT 2013-2015  
LCDGP GRANT AGREEMENT 2013-2015  
LCDGP Project Plan- Final  
LCDGP RESOURCE MOBILIZATION STRATEGY  
LETTERS FROM MINISTRY OF JUSTICE  
Overview of the Liberian Criminal Justice System  
PMC FINAL REPORT  
Proposal Template for Special Election Grants 2-17 FINAL RHRAP  
Proposal Writing Training  
REPORT TO ICCO 72-03-04-011  
Response to Lindora's Feedback  
RHRAP 4 Years Strategic Plan (2010-2014)  
RHRAP BUDGET TO OSIWA  
RHRAP EVALUATION FORM (Autosaved)  
RHRAP FINANCIAL POLICY  
RHRAP -ICCO Audit #72-03-04-011 copy  
RHRAP Learning and Sharing Meeting Minutes 08-04-2014  
RHRAP LETTER TO JUSTICE MINISTRY (2)  
RHRAP MONITORING AND EVALUATION TEMPLATE  
RHRAP Narrative Report to ICCO 2013  
RHRAP ORGNAIZATIONAL CHART  
RHRAP OSIWA proposal template  
RHRAP PERSONNEL POLICY  
RHRAP PROPOSAL FOR US DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS FUND  
RHRAP Proposal TO ICCO & KIA 2012-2013  
RHRAP Proposal to NED 2014-2015  
RHRAP Proposal to OSIWA  
RHRAP SCANNED CONTRACT COPY-ICCO & KIA 2012-2014-1  
RHRAP SP October 27-2014  
RHRAP Work Plan August 2012-July 2013  
RHRAP Work Plan September 2013- August 2014  
STANDARD MINIMUM RULES FOR THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS (2)

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# List of Respondents

**RHRAP staff:**

Lorma Baysah	Executive Director
Sandee Cole	Senior Administrator
Augustus Menyongai	Senior Programme Officer
Kotati King	Finance Officer
Sumo Harris	Junior Programme Officer

**CFA:**

Lindora Diawara	ICCO ROWA Programme Officer for Liberia
Allen Lincoln	PMC coordinator of the LCDGP

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# Appendix 1      Methodological approach & reflection

## Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

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During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.<sup>2</sup> Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

6. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
7. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
8. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
9. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
10. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

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<sup>2</sup> The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

### Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

16. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
17. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
18. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
19. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
20. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
21. Interview the CFA – CDI team
22. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
23. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
24. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
25. Interview externals – in-country team
26. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
27. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
28. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
29. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
30. Analyse the information in the general causal map – in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

#### *Step 1. Provide the **description of indicators** in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

### General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

*What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?*

*What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?*

**List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators** (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012?*  
*Please tick one of the following scores:*
  - -2 = Considerable deterioration
  - -1 = A slight deterioration
  - 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
  - +1 = Slight improvement
  - +2 = Considerable improvement
2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*
3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*

- o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: ..... .
- o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: ..... .
- o Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ..... .
- o **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ..... .
- o Don't know.

*Step 2. **Review** the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

*Step 3. **Send the formats** adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

*Step 4. **Collect, upload & code the documents** from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012; .
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;
- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;

- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will code these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

#### *Step 5. **Prepare and organise the field visit** to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews could be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

#### General causal map

During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

#### *Step 6. **Interview the CFA** – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

#### *Step 7. **Run the endline workshop** with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;

- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

**Purpose of the fieldwork:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

**Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors:** a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative. This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

**Self-assessments:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

#### **Step 8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team**

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

#### **Step 9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team**

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

#### **Step 10. Interview externals – in-country team & CDI team**

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.



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*Step 11. **Upload and auto-code all the formats** collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

*Step 12. Provide the **overview of information** per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

*Step 13. **Analyse the data and develop a draft description** of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

*Step 14. **Analyse the data and finalize the description** of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

*Step 15. **Analyse the information** in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

## **Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2**

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

## Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as “a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts” (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which ‘theories’ are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of ‘explaining outcome process tracing’, since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

### Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the

purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

## ETHIOPIA

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia*

Capability to:	AMREF	CARE	ECFA	FSCE	HOA- REC	HUND EE	NVEA	OSRA	TTCA
Act and commit	5	4	5	5	5	3	4	4	3
Deliver on development objectives	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1
Adapt and self-renew	4	2	3	4	2	5	3	3	3
Relate	3	1	2	2	3	2	1	3	1
Achieve coherence	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia*

Ethiopia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit – by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
AMREF	Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	AMREF NL	Yes
CARE	Dec 31, 2015	Partly	Yes	Yes	Yes – slightly	CARE Netherlands	No - not fully matching
ECFA	Jan 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Child Helpline International	Yes
FSCE	Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands	Yes
HOA-REC	Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014 Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes - slightly	ICCO	No - not fully matching
HUNDEE	Dec 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO & IICD	Yes
NVEA	Dec 2015 (both)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN)	Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE
OSRA	C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014 ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2 <sup>nd</sup> phase)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO & IICD	Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE
TTCA	June 2015	Partly	Yes	No	Yes	Edukans Foundation	No - not fully matching

## INDIA

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India<sup>3</sup>*

Capability to:	BVHA	COUNT	DRISTI	FFID	Jana Vikas	Samar thak Samiti	SMILE	SDS	VTRC
Act and commit	5	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	5
Deliver on development objectives	1	5	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
Adapt and self-renew	2	2	1	3	1	1	4	1	4
Relate	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	1	2

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

*SPOs selected for process tracing – India*

India – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit – by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
BVHA	2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Simavi	Yes; both capabilities
COUNT	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Woorden Daad	Yes; both capabilities
DRISTI	31-03-2012	Yes	Yes	No	no	Hivos	No - closed in 2012
FFID	30-09-2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes

<sup>3</sup> RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

India – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit – by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
Jana Vikas	2013	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus
NEDSF							No – delayed baseline
RGVN							No - delayed baseline
Samarthak Samiti (SDS)	2013 possibly longer	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Hivos	No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus
Shivi Development Society (SDS)	Dec 2013 intention 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No - not fully matching focus
Smile	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Wilde Ganzen	Yes; first capability only
VTRC	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Stichting Red een Kind	Yes; both capabilities

## INDONESIA

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia*

Capability to:	ASB	Daya kologi	ECPAT	GSS	Lem baga Kita	Pt. PPMA	Rifka Annisa	WIIP	Yad upa	Yayasan Kelola	YPI	YRBI
Act and commit	4	4	4	5	4	4	5	3	3	2	5	4
Deliver on development objectives	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
Adapt and self-renew	3	1	2	4	2	3	4	4	1	1	4	3
Relate	1	1	2	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	3	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, Pt.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

**Table 6**  
*SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia*

Indonesia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit – by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
ASB	February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Hivos	Yes
Dayakologi	2013; no extension	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Cordaid	No: contract ended early and not matching enough
ECPAT	August 2013; Extension Dec 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes, a bit	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	Yes
GSS	31 December 2012; no extension	Yes	Yes	Yes, a bit	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	No: contract ended early
Lembaga Kita	31 December 2012; no extension	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie	No - contract ended early
Pt.PPMA	May 2015	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	IUCN	Yes, capability to act and commit only
Rifka Annisa	Dec, 31 2015	No	Yes	No	Yes	Rutgers WPF	No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO
WIIP	Dec 2015	Yes	Not MFS II	Yes	Not MFS II	Red Cross	No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II

Indonesia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit – by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
Yayasan Kelola	Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015)	Yes	Not really	Yes	Not really	Hivos	No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos
YPI	Dec 31, 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Rutgers WPF	Yes
YRBI	Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes
Yadupa	Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now	Yes	Nothing committed	Yes	Nothing committed	IUCN	No, since nothing was committed by CFA

## LIBERIA

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.



Table 7

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia*

Capability to:	BSC	DEN-L	NAWOCOL	REFOUND	RHRAP
Act and commit	5	1	1	1	3
Deliver on development objectives	3	1	1	1	1
Adapt and self-renew	2	2	2	2	2
Relate	1	2	2	2	2
Achieve coherence	1	1	1	1	1

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia*

Liberia – SPOs	End of contract	Focus on capability to act and commit – by SPO	Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO	Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA	CFA	Selected for process tracing
BSC	Dec 31, 2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	SPARK	Yes
DEN-L	2014	No	No	Unknown	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
NAWOCOL	2014	Yes	No	No	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
REFOUND	At least until 2013 (2015?)	Yes	No	Yes	A little	ICCO	No – not matching enough
RHRAP	At least until 2013 (2014?)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ICCO	Yes

### Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

## Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

## Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- **A detailed causal map (or model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
- **A causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
- **Part or cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
- **Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

*Step 1. Identify the **planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

*Step 2. Identify the **implemented capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was found in the 'Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective' for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and

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then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for **coding** documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- **5C Indicators:** this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
- Information related to the **capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA** (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 **theory of change** on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between **the planned MFS II support** to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **CFA** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **SPO** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

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*Step 4. Construct the **detailed, initial causal map** (theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.


For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same time there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.

The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).



**Figure 1** An imaginary example of a model of change

*Step 5. Identify **types of evidence** needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, “What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that *X causes Y?*”. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern*, *sequence*, *trace*, and *account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

## Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

Source: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9

*Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)*

Part of the model of change	Key questions	Type of evidence needed	Source of information
Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change	Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related	Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions. Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y? Can we find this information by means of : Pattern evidence; Sequence evidence; Trace evidence; Account evidence?	Describe where you can find this information
Example: Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding	Example: What type of training workshops on M&E took place? Who was trained? When did the training take place? Who funded the training? Was the funding of training provided before the training took place? How much money was available for the training?	Example: Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training  Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training  Content evidence: what the training was about	Example: Training report SPO Progress reports Interviews with the CFA and SPO staff Financial reports SPO and CFA

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or

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discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

*Step 6. **Collect data** to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

*Step 7. **Assess the quality of data and analyse data**, and develop the **final detailed causal map (model of change)** – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

<i>Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included)</i>	Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no)	Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation	Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak	Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected
Description of causal relation				
e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice	e.g. Confirmed	e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training		

#### **Step 8. *Analyse and conclude* on findings– in-country team and CDI team**

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *“To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?”* and *“What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?”* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

## **Explaining factors – evaluation question 4**

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **“What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?”**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the ‘general causal map’ has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

## **Methodological reflection**

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to be a very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores:** using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes



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comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs. In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

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## Utilisation of the evaluation

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

**Design** – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and

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SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

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## Appendix 2      information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research programme on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value**' and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

**Capacity** is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

**Capabilities** are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

**Competencies** are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities**:

1. The capability to act and commit;
2. The capability to deliver on development objectives;
3. The capability to adapt and self-renew;
4. The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
5. The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

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## Appendix 3      Results - changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the baseline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

### 3.1      Capability to act and commit

#### 3.1.1      Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive'

This is about leadership within the organization (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organization.

*Description of the baseline situation:*

Since the baseline in 2012, there have been some changes in the leadership of RHRAP. A lot of operational leadership tasks have been fulfilled by the administrative officer and senior programme officer, due to partial absence of the director during his studies. Also, many inputs on the direction of the projects are from staffs' inputs during critical decision-making meetings. Members of the RHRAP management team are able to communicate effectively and easily; the office is small and everyone is aware of the projects that are running and the proposals that are out.

Whilst other staff have taken up responsibilities during the absence of the executive director, he plays an indispensable role in the organization regarding networking, designing new programmes, working on strategic directions (descriptions about changes in the organisational capacity; see later sections of this report). The CFA noted that though the leadership was absent for some time during the past 2 years he has shown key skills and networking capacities, and the CFA noted that his leadership is generally ok.

In relation to the future strategic guidance of the organization it would be tough if the current Executive Director decided to leave the organisation, as it seems like he is the person who networks and shares the vision of RHRAP. Due to his recently completed study in the US he has increased his general capacity, but also his personal career prospects - he mentioned that he was actively looking for other. It became clear during the endline evaluation that the junior programme officer was being sent to trainings and given room to develop - it might be hoped by RHRAP's management that he would be able to pick up leadership tasks if the current director leaves.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

#### 3.1.2      Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)'

This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions

*Description of the baseline situation:*

The current management team of RHRAP has responsibility for both strategic and operational leadership. It is highly probable that operational leadership has been prioritized at the expense of strategic leadership. There are plans that by December of 2014, the board of directors of RHRAP will be restructured. At this time the board of directors will be designed to have more people available and more qualified people.

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The board of directors is the influencer and motivator on how work is performed at RHRAP. Operations are based on the advice and direction of the board of directors. The current director of RHRAP stated that he was working on a new strategic plan for the coming 4 years, and revealed that more focus will lie on natural resources and extractive sector advocacy. Regarding these trends it is important that there is a strong board of directors to negotiate and discuss tricky issues with regard to a new strategic plan and contracting for project management and service delivery.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

### 3.1.3. Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'

This is about staff turnover.

*Description of the baseline situation:*

After the baseline in 2012, RHRAP received grants from different funding partners, both for project implementation and institutional support. The funding for institutional support has been used for staff costs and office maintenance. However, since one other programme with the ACT Alliance has ended and another programme with AusAID was cut short, the funding outlook has deteriorated somewhat. In 2012, the news of Dutch government funding cuts led to significantly less funding from ICCO for RHRAP to hire more people. The organization has lost two staff members since the baseline in 2012, and had size down operations in some areas.

RHRAP is highly dependent on grant funding and doesn't have the capacity to retain staffs using regular payment of salaries as a motivating factor. At present there are eight staff members at RHRAP; two were in the field and one was away to visit family at the time of the endline evaluation. It was noted, however, that these field staff and junior programme officer receive significantly less pay than was given before in that type of position.

RHRAP is trying to put in place an intervention strategy by which it can retain its staff. This strategy involves employment of qualified staff for programme areas, payment of project staffs according to qualifications, specialized training, and work experience.

Score: 2.5 to 2 (slight deterioration)

### 3.1.4. Organizational structure: 'Existence of clear organizational structure reflecting the objectives of the organization'

Observable indicator: Staffs have copy of org structure and understand this

*Description of the baseline situation:*

RHRAP has a five-member board of directors, which is the highest decision-making body of the organization. Currently, RHRAP has 8 staff members that are trained in various areas including human rights protection and promotion, peace building and conflict transformation, and project and financial management. Amongst the 8 staff RHRAP has 2 females and 6 males. There are 4 core staffs that run the day-to-day activities of the organization, and 4 field staff members composed of volunteers/contractors. A majority of the staff are field staff based on projects and on contractual basis; and RHRAP currently has four core staffs, but there used to be six.

The organizational chart of RHRAP shows that an executive director governs RHRAPs day-to-day activities. The board guides management in terms of policy and strategy. There is then a finance officer, administrator, and a senior project officer on the second tier. On the third tier are the office assistant and monitors, and a secretary. Though the chart is clear, due to funding issues, not all the positions represented are occupied.

The role of the junior programme officer described earlier is a bit ambivalent - though he seems to be placed on one of the lower tiers, he has been instrumental in many activities and has been sent to many trainings. This would suggest that his position might become more and more important.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

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### 3.1.5 Articulated strategies: 'Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E'

Observable indicator: strategies are well articulated. Situation analysis and monitoring and evaluation are used to inform strategies.

*Description of the endline situation:*

In terms of overall organization, there are governance and leadership challenges that somehow limit RHRAP's performance and sustainability. RHRAP's current executive director and many of the other executive directors and founders of other like-minded organizations have good networking skills for the organization, but when they leave, the organization does not work very well, partly because strategies and systems are not well articulated. It was said during the endline that current junior staff were being trained to take over in the future.

The absence of clearly articulated strategies leave a vacuum, which should be filled by systems put in place using the strategies. In the absence of the relevant strategies, gaps are seen when certain operational leaders are absent. This was evident when the current Executive Director of RHRAP travelled to the United States after the baseline to study for his Master's degree.

It was apparent during the endline workshop that the old strategic plan would not be able to guide RHRAP's future operations. However, the director did have clear intentions and ideas for the new strategic plan.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

### 3.1.6. Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans'

This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.

*Description of the endline situation:*

Since the baseline in 2012, RHRAP has been able to stick to its strategic plan, evidenced by the fact that the priorities captured in the strategic plan are the things that the organization has been doing before, and those are the same things envisaged by the organization when the strategic plan was developed. Work plans were based on the strategic plan as well.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

### 3.1.7 Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'

This is about whether staffs have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might need.

*Description of the endline situation:*

RHRAP has made an effort to increase its capacity by training its staffs in particular areas related to its mandate. Most of the training has been geared towards human rights monitoring. For example, from September 14-16-2012, staffs of the Rural Human Rights Activists Programme from Montserrado, Bong and Nimba Counties converged on the provisional capital of Bong County, Gbarnga City, to attend a three-day capacity building Training of Trainers (TOT) workshop.

The management of RHRAP also sought opportunities for staffs from all levels of the organization to receive training to enhance staffs' capacity. ICCO has provided fundraising training to the Executive Director, Finance Officer, Programme Officer, and the Administrator, at the PMC level of the LCDGP. Staff members of RHRAP have also been able to attend trainings given by IREX (topics such as community mobilisation, advocacy and reconciliation) and LIPA (monitoring and evaluation).

RHRAP is gradually shifting its focus to accountability in the extractive sector. Two of the core staff members had some training in these areas via the programme with AusAID addressing concessional community advocacy. The two individuals attended sessions at the National Endowment for Democracy studying easy reporting standards. There has been a major change in report writing and facilitation by the staffs since these trainings.

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It was noted that in the baseline gaps existed in M&E, IT and fundraising. These gaps still largely exist and more training is needed in that capacity. Most fundraising skills and ideas for instance greatly lie with the current director.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

### 3.1.8 Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'

This is about whether staffs at the SPO are offered appropriate training opportunities

#### *Description of the endline situation:*

RHRAP staff members have benefited from several training opportunities since the baseline, though staff members expressed the need for more opportunities. Some trainings that various staff members benefited from include:

- RHRAP's current Executive Director earned a Master's Degree in Peace Building and Conflict Transformation from the School for International Training (SIT), formally known as World Learning based in Brattleboro, Vermont, USA.
- RHRAP's core staff received trainings in Organizational Development, reporting and fundraising organized through the LCDGP in Liberia.
- The Executive Director did a webinar on Fundraising for Non-profit organizations.
- Trainings were received from IREX for various programme and field staff.

Opportunities for the training of RHRAP's staffs outside of Liberia are still a major challenge, as this involves funding. RHRAP has accessed training opportunities locally through the sponsorship of ICCO and IREX; and they are continuing in-service training and mentoring as the key driver for building the capacity of staffs. As the Executive Director has just returned from SIT with an MA in Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation, RHRAP is going to make sure that he provides in-service trainings on a regular basis to the staffs.

The management of RHRAP is actively seeking scholarships and access to local training opportunities. For example, they are engaging WANEP to see if it is possible for them to admit one or two staffs to their Peace Education training in Ghana in September 2014. They are also engaging the West African Civil Society Institute (WACSI) in Ghana to provide training in financial management, policy engagement and advocacy.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

### 3.1.9.1 Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'

This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.

#### *Description of the endline situation:*

After the baseline in 2012 funding for RHRAP has dropped. RHRAP sourced funding from ICCO, Global Fund for Children, ACT Alliance, and NED. Administrative costs were covered and some of the funds were used for paying staff salaries and fringe benefits.

After the baseline in 2012 the human resources were good - RHRAP started working in Nimba County sharing offices with SEARCH, a resident local NGO. By the end of 2012 and to the middle of 2013, things started slowing down due to drop in ICCO funding; and NED said that with the level of funding that RHRAP was now receiving from ICCO, RHRAP had exceeded the funding threshold of NED for national NGOs, and therefore, were no longer eligible to receive funding from NED, so they withdrew their funding from RHRAP. Also, the ACT Alliance programme drew to a close, and the AusAID programme was cut short. This drop in funding led to some staff leaving the organisation. Also, the director is looking for a better-paid job in another organisation after his training on peace building and conflict transformation.

Main incentives now come through the giving of responsibility to staff members and sending them to trainings and events. There has been more improvement when it comes to freedom at work and



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opportunities for staffs to receive training at the local level. One of the factors that have influenced the change is staff motivation during regular meetings. Staffs are constantly informed that they are vital to RHRAP and that they are not just ordinary people.

A negative outlook has been, however, that ICCO has notified RHRAP and the coalition of NGOs that are jointly implementing the LCDGP that they are pulling out of Liberia and Sierra Leone; and other funding partners have also either reduced or withdrawn funding to RHRAP.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

#### 3.1.9.2 Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'

**This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.**

*Description of the baseline situation:*

Since the baseline in 2012 the major source of funding for RHRAP has been the ICCO/MFS II funding mechanism for the LCDGP. Since then RHRAP has been successful in diversifying its funding sources by receiving funding from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), now the Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), for the project entitled "Promoting Accountability in Concessional Communities", which is a peace building project focused on concession-affected communities in Bomi, Gbarpolu, and Grand Cape Mount Counties in western Liberia. This project is empowering residents of mining communities at various levels, to peacefully engage stakeholders for their participation in the management of, and benefits from, natural resources extracted from their communities. This project was cut short. In 2014 a short project from IFES was done.

Currently, RHRAP has sent out an increasing number of project proposals with the aim of raising additional funds to fill the funding gap in its current project that is already partially funded by ICCO under the LCDGP. RHRAP has also held fundraising meetings separately with the German International Technical Cooperation (GIZ) and Trocaire for funding. Results are still pending from these meetings.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

#### 3.1.9.3 Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'

This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.

*Description of the baseline situation:*

RHRAP has been key in working through the LCDGP coalition; and they have developed a new strategic plan for the RHRAP, which will be launched in December 2014. RHRAP led the process of developing a joint programme for Liberia, the LCDGP, and did a lot of work in twelve working sessions with the LCDGP coalition, working on a consolidated budget of USD 4 million for ICCO and other donors to fund over a 3-year period (2013-2015). The LCDGP coalition envisaged ICCO contributing about US\$600,000 to the budget and other interested donors contributing USD 3.4 million. Recently, in 2014, the LCDGP partners have been developing a collective Resource Mobilization strategy which provides guidelines for getting more funds. This includes increasing board engagement, building staff capacity for fundraising, improving visibility, and matching the entrepreneurial and civil society development spirit.

RHRAP has become more vigorous in fundraising. The new website is expected to help with the visibility of the organisation. The Executive Director has been talking with many potential partners in the US, using RHRAP's history working with ICCO and other funding partners to attract new funding - showing other potential funding partners that RHRAP is capable of effectively managing relatively large programme budgets.

RHRAP is using its new strategic focus to seek funding. Proposals have been sent to other donors such as OSIWA but there has been little response thus far. At RHRAP's level they considers this as a great opportunity. This has influenced the movement of carrying a fundraising document that was sponsored

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by another donor. RHRAP is a member of a web-based network called “fundsforngos.org”, which regularly sends them information on funding opportunities in the form of Calls for Proposals. RHRAP has also engaged NED, IREX, and IFES through written communications and has also had meetings with them. Through those engagements RHRAP was able to send the proposals that these potential funding partners asked to present.

RHRAP has further engaged with other funding partners and through this engagement they got to know that RHRAP is a viable organization, and as a result of those relationships, those partners have reposed confidence in the capabilities and abilities of RHRAP to effectively plan and implement social development programmes and projects. It was noted that ICCO had some discussions with RHRAP on alternative means for funding, such as the development of ‘human rights products or services’, which might be developed to raise funds. These did not especially come up during the endline assessment.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

### 3.1.10 Summary capability to act and commit

In the past years since the baseline there has been some change in the leadership of RHRAP. A lot of operational leadership tasks have been fulfilled by the administrative officer and senior programme officer, due to partial absence of the director during his studies. Also, many inputs on the direction of the projects are from staff member inputs during critical decision-making meetings. Members of the RHRAP management team are able to communicate effectively and easily; the office is small and everyone is aware of the projects that are running and the proposals that are out. The current Executive Director still plays an indispensable role in the organization - it would be tough if he decided to leave the organization, as it seems like he is the person that networks and shares the vision of RHRAP. In the past two years there have been some positive developments in terms of staff capacity building- RHRAP staff members had access to a number of trainings to improve their programme related skills. However, when it comes to the capacity gaps that were identified during the baseline, related to skills in fundraising and M&E much can still be done.

Funding remains a challenge for RHRAP: a number of RHRAP staff have left due to this lack of funding while others continue at heavily decreased wages. This is still the main incentive for staff, even though they have been motivated through getting more responsibilities in their jobs and through improved internal communication.

Whilst the organisational structure reflects the objective of the organisation, reality is that some of these functions are not present due to lack of funding. In 2014 the LCDGP coalition funding procedures have been explored along the Resource Mobilization strategy, and a collective proposal has been written to OSIWA. These efforts have been increasing in 2014 and it is hoped that a focus on increasing board engagement, building staff fundraising capacities, improving visibility and matching entrepreneurial and civil society spirit will help the LCDGP increase its programmatic funding. RHRAP has been working on visibility through website and media engagement, staff proposal writing capacity and networking (see the process tracing outcome on fundraising). Through new strategic directions RHRAP hopes to open up new funding possibilities as well but the outcome is yet unsure.

Score: from 3.2 to 3.3 (very minor improvement)

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## 3.2 Capability to adapt and self renew

### 3.2.1 M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'

This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organizational).

#### *Description of the endline situation:*

To ensure the proper implementation of its projects RHRAP carries out regular monitoring of its project activities; this in order to keep track of progress towards achievement of the project objectives. RHRAP currently has an M&E template that is being used as a guiding document. As part of the M&E template RHRAP has a strategic matrix with activities and quantitative indicators. Monitoring entails field visitations in the projects' targeted communities. At the end of each activity, RHRAP provides open-ended programme evaluation questionnaires and Round Table Discussions to the project beneficiaries in the Citizen Action Committees (CACs). The director noted that for the round table discussions Force Field analysis is being used. Using the expected outputs of the project, and situation expected at the end of the project, questions are asked.

With these two methods, the monitoring of the project at every level, and then the evaluation with stakeholders and participants, the quality and efficiency of project deliverables at some reasonable levels are evaluated. However, it seems that a comprehensive system for M&E is not in place at the moment, and there is no specific staff member focused on M&E. The focus, however, still seems to be on activities and outputs and not outcomes and impact. There seems to be no difference with the baseline situation.

RHRAP has also adopted the "Force Field Analysis" method for listing, discussing, and assessing the various forces for and against the changes that their programmes and projects aim to make in the communities and sectors of Liberia society that they are targeting specifically. This helps them to look at the big picture by analysing all of the forces impacting on the changes and weighing up the pros and cons. Having identified these, they then develop strategies to reduce the impact of the opposing forces and strengthen the supporting forces.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

### 3.2.2 M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'

This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.

#### *Description of the endline situation:*

Individual competencies for performing M&E functions have been built on slightly. RHRAP's programme and project staffs acquired knowledge and skills on Monitoring & Evaluation from training that they received in Liberia from the Liberia Institute of Public Administration (LIPA) and through the support of ICCO and IREX. Also within the organisation knowledge is shared among senior and junior staff members. However, there is still no dedicated M&E person at the organisation.

RHRAP has prepared a plan to setup a Monitoring & Evaluation department in the organization. An M&E template guides the officers of RHRAP in their work. The CFA noted that RHRAP did reasonably decent monitoring and reporting but that they should become more comprehensive in terms of monitoring results and outcomes rather than just reporting on outputs and processes.

Score: from 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

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### 3.2.3 M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'

This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.

*Description of the baseline situation:*

RHRAP has developed a Monitoring & Evaluation template, and is working with FIND, a coalition partner of the LCDGP, in exchanging ideas and planning together, and also is in a peer review (working in different areas) agreement. The organization uses questionnaires and roundtable discussions to monitor performance every 6 months. The key participants of the roundtable discussions are the leaders of the beneficiary communities of their project, who in turn later share the information with community members.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

### 3.2.4 Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'

This is about whether staffs talk formally about what is happening in their programmes; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staffs are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.

*Description of the baseline situation:*

Staff stated that there had been a slight improvement in this area. Besides the administrator, junior staff members draw up agendas for regular staff meeting and also conduct these meeting. Staff members share information, learn from each other and complement the efforts of each other. There is a cordial working relationship amongst staffs.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

### 3.2.5 Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives'

This is about whether staffs feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the programme are welcomed and used.

*Description of the baseline situation:*

Staff is encouraged to share their ideas for strategic planning, programming, and project implementation. Staffs are involved in proposal writing, work plan preparation, writing and validating reports as well as in critical decision-making meetings

RHRAP organizes staff retreats at the end of their fiscal year, and during the staff retreats the management team and project staffs reflect on past activities and plan for the next fiscal year. All staffs actively participate in this reflection and consultation process.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

### 3.2.6 System for tracking environment: 'The organisation has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'

This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organization.

*Description of the baseline situation:*

RHRAP employs a two-tier system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment.

At the first tier, RHRAP networks with a diverse group of stakeholders including a) a coalition of 20 Liberian NGOs that are jointly implementing the predominantly ICCO-funded Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme (LCDGP), b) the ACT Alliance (Action of Churches Together

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Alliance), c) the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Liberia, and d) bilateral relationships with resident funding agencies and international development organizations and NGOs, including ICCO.

At the second tier tracking of trends and developments in the operating environment happens through conducting needs assessments and the setting up of Citizens Action Committees (CACs) in RHRAPs project communities. The CACs help RHRAP with interaction with community members, particularly at the grassroots level. The setting up of the CACs has made communication and engagement with their project communities easier and better. The CACs, which includes local government leaders, youth and women leaders, are major stakeholders in RHRAP's project communities. RHRAP collaborates with the CACs in monitoring implementation of its project. They also involve the CACs in round table discussions to evaluate their project.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

### 3.2.7 Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organization is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public'

This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they do with that input.

#### *Description of the endline situation:*

RHRAP conducts meetings with beneficiaries in their project communities and incorporates the feedback of the beneficiaries of their project into their implementation strategies to improve performance and results.

RHRAP has successfully secured access to the Liberia justice system by consummating a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Ministry of Justice to work with them to improve the criminal justice system of Liberia. Through its human rights programme RHRAP provides a means of communication for inmates and prison authorities.

For sustainability purposes RHRAP has also successfully facilitated the establishment of Citizens Action Committee (CACs), which are run by the leaders of the project communities to help in safeguarding the rights of the primary beneficiaries of their project.

Furthermore, RHRAP networks with the group of stakeholders as discussed in the previous indicator and hereby are able to get input from the stakeholders for RHRAPs activities and strategies

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

### 3.2.8 Summary of the capability to adapt and self-renew

Since the baseline situation a comprehensive M&E system and a designated M&E position has not been instituted, and a focus on the more long-term outcomes and impacts is still missing. However, some steps have been made to build the capacity of staff in M&E, and methods for gathering information from the field have been improved through open questionnaires with beneficiaries and evaluative round table discussions guided by force field analysis. An M&E template has been organised that provides a strategic matrix with indicators. Within the organisation the staff members feel free to contribute and share ideas. Through engagement with a wide range of organisations in society such as donors such as IREX and NED, and partners within the LCDGP they get inputs on their activities in strategies. Within the communities the CAC structure serves to connect RHRAP to local issues and provide feedback on the ongoing programmes.

Score: from 3.1 to 3.4 (slight improvement)

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### 3.3 Capability to deliver on development objectives

#### 3.3.1 Clear operational plans: 'Organisation has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand'

This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staffs use it in their day-to-day operations.

*Description of the endline situation:*

RHRAP has a clear operational plan for its projects, but this was being updated at the time of the baseline to readjust it to the changing funding situation. RHRAP has the flexibility of making adjustments to its operational plan or work plans in terms of the changing context, including reduction in funding and grant funding opportunities.

It is not clear concerning how effectively work plans are implemented in day-to-day activities due to the lack of fully funded projects. However, it is worth noting that when there are fully funded projects, RHRAP carries out day-to-day activities in line with clear operational plans.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

#### 3.3.2 Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'

This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.

*Description of the endline situation:*

RHRAP has a good track record for sound financial management, transparency and accountability. During the past projects RHRAP worked strictly within the approved budgets of the projects. Audits have been done for RHRAPs activities with ICCO in 2013 and with the ACT Alliance in 2013.

It seemed that an example of cost-effective resource use was the training on the Criminal Justice System in 2012: members of FIND were also present. For the rest, it is not clear at this point whether resources are used cost effectively due to the drastic reduction of funding from ICCO, but it does seem that additional funding is needed if RHRAP wants to be able to operate in Lofa County. Currently RHRAP is only able to work in Bong County on the LCDGP project.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

#### 3.3.3 Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'

This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.

*Description of the endline situation:*

The drastic reduction of funding from ICCO coupled with the withdrawal of funding by NED is a major challenge for RHRAP to effectively carry out its operational plan to deliver planned outputs.

Before the reduction of funding, the human rights project of RHRAP was effective in the area of geographic coverage and service delivery. The issue of staff turnover also has adverse effects on the delivery of the services offered by the organization.

Score: from 3.5 to 3 (slight deterioration)

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### 3.3.4 Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organisation has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'

This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs

#### *Description of the endline situation:*

RHRAP conducted needs assessment with beneficiaries and other stakeholders. The Project Management Committee (PMC) of the LCDGP, and eminent community residents (zonal heads, community leaders, respectable members of the communities, etc.) are also actively involved in the need assessment. They provide inputs to RHRAP for project development and implementation.

In an effort to complement the relevance and effectiveness of its human rights project, RHRAP successfully facilitated establishment of Citizens Action Committees (CACs) for the involvement of citizens of its project communities in the criminal justice system. The CACs are charged with the responsibility of organizing activities that help improve the criminal justice system in Bong County, and lobby with the courts for the release of people unlawfully imprisoned.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

### 3.3.5 Monitoring efficiency: 'The organisation monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio's)'

This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.

#### *Description of the endline situation:*

It was indicated that project beneficiaries and communities are now more involved with project implementation, and this has led to the assessment of outputs in relation to inputs.

The assessment of outputs is based on beneficiaries' accounts of the activities implemented, and not on cost-benefit analysis or objective comparison of achievement of milestones against planned targets.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

### 3.3.6 Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organisation aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'

This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available

#### *Description of the endline situation:*

RHRAP is yet to develop a method of balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work. However, the participatory project monitoring strategy that RHRAP has designed and is using cannot be used as a proxy indicator for assessment of the efficiency and quality of their work.

RHRAP works in line with its strategic plan and operational guidelines. RHRAP is now negotiating inclusion of 5% of project budgets as the 'negotiated indirect cost rate' (NICRA) to be used as unrestricted funds that the organization could invest to build the institutional capacity of RHRAP. If successfully negotiated and approved, NICRA funds could be used to retain the additional expertise that may be required, i.e., M&E and community-driven development (CDD) specialists to boost and ensure quality service delivery.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

### 3.3.7 Summary for capability to deliver on development objectives

Similar to the baseline, RHRAP has operational plans and work plans, but now also an M&E template and the interaction with the CACs seems to have increased RHRAP's connection and interaction with community beneficiaries and duty bearers in Bong County. Due to decreasing funds RHRAP is currently only active in Bong County, and many staff members operate on a semi-volunteer basis. This has some impacts on the delivery and quality of outputs. RHRAP increasingly includes the local

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government in the feedback loop by including them in the evaluation of project activities, which can provide feedback on the efficiency and quality of the work of RHRAP. RHRAP is also making efforts to ensure that project activities are more consistent with the strategic plan, but funding constraints affect the actual implementation of project activities. It is unclear how the organisation balances quality with efficiency, particularly with the funding constraints, which also affects staff leaving the organisation.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

## 3.4 Capability to relate

### 3.4.1 Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organisation maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organisation'

This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.

*Description of the endline situation:*

RHRAP works with ICCO funding since the baseline in 2012, and is included in both the 'cluster arrangement' and a coalition of 20 Liberian NGOs that are jointly implementing the ICCO-funded Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme (LCDGP). Together with LCDGP members for instance, a collective funding proposal was made to OSIWA as part of a collective Resource Mobilization Strategy. RHRAP has also forged bilateral collaborative relationships various other funding partners, and the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Liberia.

Besides its board of directors that RHRAP engages in formulation of policies and strategic planning, it is not clear how RHRAP engages both its funding and operational partners in formulating its policies and strategies.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

### 3.4.2 Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organization has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'

This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.

*Description of the endline situation:*

RHRAP is currently the Lead Agency for 10 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) working together in the Democratization Cluster of the Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme (LCDGP) in Liberia, supported by ICCO and KIA Netherlands, which is an added advantage for RHRAP in terms of networking and collaboration. RHRAP is working in collaboration with the Association of Female Liberian Lawyers (AFELL) and the Foundation for International Dignity (FIND) on the MFS II funding mechanism with ICCO as the co-financing agency. RHRAP and FIND collaborate in monitoring prisons, courts, arrest proceedings, and situations at various detention centres in Gbarnga and Bong Mines Township. RHRAP also helps to document issues concerning domestic violence occurring in Gbarnga City, Bong County, for intervention by AFELL; and RHRAP is partnering with FIND for the development of a training manual.

RHRAP is collaborating with the Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (LEITI), the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy (MLME) on information dissemination through meetings and roundtable forums relative to natural resource management (NRM) in Liberia. RHRAP is also in partnership with the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Liberia, which is aimed at putting in place mechanisms that would help buttress the government's efforts in improving the criminal Justice system, particularly in Gbarnga, Bong County, Liberia.

RHRAP is also a new and the only member of the International Alliance for Natural Resources Africa (IARNA) from West Africa. The IARNA is a coalition of CSOs from South, Central and East Africa with headquarters in Johannesburg, South Africa, that are working on issues including advocacy on natural



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resource management in Africa. The organization is also a member of the Africa Democracy Forum (ADF). Nationally, RHRAP is part of a Child Rights Coalition, the LCDGP, the Decentralization Platform, and internationally a part of the International Alliance for Natural Resources Africa.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

#### 3.4.3 Engagement with target groups: 'The organisation performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment'

This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.

*Description of the endline situation:*

RHRAP tries to maintain intensive presence in its project communities, as well as with funding partners and other civil society and government stakeholders.

There has been a high level of engagement between RHRAP and its target groups. Beneficiary communities through CAC structures fully participate in needs assessments and provide pertinent information to RHRAP for the organization to incorporate in its strategies and project activities.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

#### 3.4.4 Relationships within organisation: 'Organizational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'

How do staffs at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?

*Description of the endline situation:*

RHRAP has a hierarchical organization structure. Information flows from top to bottom, and relationships are shaped in that manner.

Notwithstanding the hierarchical organization structure, the management team and the project staffs seem to have good team relations and free communication between the two levels of staffing – management and project teams – but when it comes to strategizing and decision-making the Executive Director exercises pre-eminence.

RHRAP's staffs communicate mostly through meeting and emails.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

#### 3.4.5 Summary of capability to relate

RHRAP works with ICCO funding since the baseline in 2012, and is included in both the 'cluster arrangement' and a coalition of 20 Liberian NGOs that are jointly implementing the ICCO-funded Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme (LCDGP). Within this coalition RHRAP works with FIND on monitoring prisons, courts, arrest proceedings, and situations at various detention sites in Gbarnga and Bong Mines Township. RHRAP also helps to document issues concerning domestic violence occurring in Gbarnga City, Bong County, for intervention by AFELL; and RHRAP is partnering with FIND for the development of a training manual.

Engagements with donors and networks are ongoing, though the names of the organisations have changed since the baseline. Regarding cooperation with stakeholders and beneficiaries a slightly emphasized component is the increased outreach to government agencies and cooperation with local duty-bearers. The director does play an instrumental role in this respect - his vision on the direction of RHRAP steers engagement with potential partners and beneficiary areas.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.6 (very minor change)

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## 3.5 Capability to achieve coherence

### 3.5.1 Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organisation'

This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staffs discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.

*Description of the baseline situation:*

The vision, mission, and strategies of RHRAP have not changed; they are visibly displayed in all of the offices and at all workshops for all staffs, beneficiaries, and partners to know what RHRAP are all about.

In response to the changing context as it relates to the natural resource sector, RHRAP is expanding its human rights focus strategically, to include monitoring of natural resource management, focusing on advocacy, lobbying, and monitoring of the impacts of concessions, both positive and negative, on affected communities.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

### 3.5.2 Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'

This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.

*Description of the baseline situation:*

RHRAP has modified its strategic plan (at least, is currently doing so), financial policy, personnel policy, and employment contract templates. An M&E template is being used.

RHRAP's Annual Report has also been published as a means through which the visibility of RHRAP can be increased and enhanced.

Because of the findings of the baseline, there was a decision to modify the strategic plan, personnel and finance policies, including the terms and conditions of contracts for management and project staffs, respectively. For example, the management staffs get fixed term (annual) renewable employment contracts, whereas project staffs get definite term contracts based on the life spans of projects.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

### 3.5.3 Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organisation'

This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.

*Description of the baseline situation:*

RHRAP's strategic plan and intervention projects are line with its vision and mission.

Project proposals are designed and written based on the strategic plan, but this focus has been changing somewhat in the recent year. In response to the changing context as it relates to the natural resource sector, RHRAP is expanding its human rights focus strategically, to include monitoring of natural resource management, focusing on advocacy, lobbying, and monitoring of the impacts of concessions, both positive and negative, on affected communities.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

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#### 3.5.4 Mutually supportive efforts: 'The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts'

This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.

*Description of the endline situation:*

The drastic reduction of funding from ICCO combined with the withdrawal of funding from RHRAP by the NED is clearly currently driving RHRAP in more than one strategic direction. This has serious implications in terms of RHRAP's ability to remain focused on its vision, and to develop and maintain a portfolio of projects that provide opportunities for mutually supportive efforts.

The venturing of RHRAP to partnering with IFES to participate in the updating of voter's rolls for the mid-term elections, and its endeavours to enter the natural resource management sector are very clear signs that the organization is desperately searching for funding to remain alive and maintain its relevance.

Score: from 3.5 to 3 (slight deterioration)

#### 3.5.5 Summary of capability to achieve coherence

Regarding the vision, mission and strategies, RHRAP has not changed much in the past years since the baseline. In the past year however, the organisation's focus has been changing due to changing contexts in the direction of natural resource sector advocacy. This signals that RHRAP is urgently searching for niches in which to maintain relevancy and adapt to the changing funding situation. This means that it is essential that RHRAP have a sharp vision and coherent strategic plan to guide its operations for the coming years. Operational documents have been updated.

Score: from 3.7 to 3.7 (no change)

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## Appendix 4 Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map

Below you can find a description of the key changes in organisational capacity of RHRAP since the baseline as expressed by RHRAP staff during the endline workshop. First, a description is given of how this topic was introduced during the endline workshop by summarising key information on RHRAP from the baseline report. This information includes a brief description of the vision, mission and strategies of the organisation, staff situation, clients and partner organisations. This then led into a discussion on how the organisation has changed since the baseline. A number of issues that came up in this discussion were zoomed in on more specifically in the process tracing causal maps. See appendix 5 for details.

### Key changes at RHRAP

A brainstorm was held on staff's perception on the key changes that occurred in RHRAP since the baseline:

- RHRAP was chosen to serve as the lead organisation for the ICCO Democratisation cluster (August 2013) and has taken over the responsibility to manage ICCO funds for all partners in Liberia (October 2013).;
- RHRAP was chosen to work on a project with the International Federation for Electoral Systems (IFES) - June 2014;
- In July 2013 RHRAP added a new finance officer to the team;
- Staff numbers reduced from 9 to 5;
- The RHRAP website was launched in May 2013;
- The director of RHRAP received his graduate degree in May 2014 from the School for International Training (SIT) in Conflict Transformation and Peace-building;
- Better programme implementation and monitoring, even though activities in Lofa County could not be continued due to lack of funding;
- Better proposal writing and more fundraising activities;
- Management expressed that intentions to work on staff capacity had increased;
- RHRAP leadership among Civil Society Organisations increased;
- Management team had become more effective;
- Improvement in financial systems.

The brainstorm on key changes in the organisation led to one more structured session on identifying the key changes in organisational capacity of RHRAP since the baseline and reasons for these changes. Part of these discussions overlap with the discussions on changes that were explored more in detail (process tracing) for the purpose of answering the attribution question. Especially the issue around fundraising capacity has been more deeply looked at and therefore left out of this general causal map of changes that occurred in the organisational capacity of RHRAP. For more details please see 4.3.

### Key changes in RHRAPs organisational capacity - General causal map


In the causal maps the attempt is made to trace back key capacity outcomes to competencies and activities, and to factors and causes. At the top the main capacity competencies and outcomes are positioned. These main capacity themes (in yellow boxes) and some of their key consequences (in purple) are noted up top. Blue boxes represent factors and aspects that influence the outcomes above. These can be further traced back to interventions and activities. The contributing activities have been coloured brown. If a factor or outcome negatively impacted the organisation it has been highlighted in pink. The bottom of the causal map shows the most important underlying causes, opportunities and constraints that have influenced the organisation. Certain key influencing causes and external developments that have substantially impacted the organisation are listed in the round boxes at the bottom in light green.

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The narrative discusses the key capacity themes at the top first, with a short reference to the key influencing causes that impacted most of the factors in the middle. Consequently, per capacity theme the factors will be addressed from the top down, and from left to right.

A number of more specific key capacity outcomes were identified during the workshop: RHRAP has built its programme implementation capacity [1], the RHRAP network and coalition participation has increased [2] and fundraising capacities have improved [3]. In the following sections the general causal map results are brought forward. In this exploration of the general changes in the organisation issues related to fundraising capacity have been left out. This is more extensively discussed in the process tracing visual and narrative. This to decrease the amount of double information presented. Key influencing factors that have led RHRAP activities related to the self-identified need to build staff capacity and the decreasing funding from ICCO since before 2012 which has led RHRAP to engage more in fundraising activities and in networking with other potential partners. The members of RHRAP said that many of the activities have importantly contributed to the capacity to raise funds.

Please note that the numbers in the visual and the narrative below correspond to each other.



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### **Improved programme implementation capacity**

The staff members felt that they had increased their capacity to implement their programmes throughout the past two years [1]. Three main factors were seen to influence this capacity: negatively, a precarious staff situation; improved staff skills and knowledge; and better field monitoring. The first two components are strongly related to staff capacity. Improved programme implementation capacity was mainly reflected in the fact that work with the Prisons and the CACs in Bong County was seen to be relatively successful according to RHRAP staff and the CFA (RHRAP Learning and Sharing Meeting Minutes 08-04-2014; Annex B Support to Capacity sheet CFA perspective LD and AL) [4]. This gave the members of RHRAP the idea that the CAC structures in place would be able to keep up human rights activities should RHRAP withdraw. RHRAP did an IFES programme (which they implemented in June 2014) which made use of the Citizen Action Committees in their electoral activities. On a side note, not all of the planned work could be implemented due to lack of funding. For example the monitoring of the Criminal Justice System (ICCO funded) had to be limited to Bong, whilst Lofa County not be included due to lack of funds [5] (Information from RHRAP website, accessed 23-05-2014). RHRAP is using the CAC structure in other proposals, for example to OSIWA regarding a project on equitable revenues of the extractive sector (RHRAP OSIWA proposal template).

### **Precarious staff situation**

However, a sensitive dynamic that has negatively impacted the organisation as a whole, but which seemed sensitive, related to the fact that RHRAP is currently in a precarious staff situation [6]. Throughout the discussion it became clear that the new financial officer, just out of university, is mostly being employed on a volunteer basis. Similarly, RHRAP is barely able to offer the last junior officer compensation. This officer has been given increasingly important roles in the organisation and is often sent to trainings to give him incentives. Also the fact that a number of the field staff of RHRAP, who attended the Criminal Justice Systems training, have not been able to work shows the difficulty RHRAP now has to pay its employees [7]. In July 2013 the new junior financial officer was hired [8]. This was to replace the previous junior financial officer who went to a better paid job. Since the baseline the number of staff at RHRAP has decreased from 9 to 5 people [9] due to decreasing amounts of funding [10]. An element that also may impact the future staff situation at RHRAP is the stated intent of the director to seek other opportunities [11], having just finished his Master in conflict transformation and peace-building at SIT in the United States [12].

### **Improved staff skills**

Improved staff skills [13] related to gains made for different staff members in terms of team and programme management skills [14], were said to have improved in the past years since the baseline. One of the reasons included the efforts by the director and other senior staff to hold in-house trainings for junior members [15]. It was said that this ongoing way of internal trainings took quite practical expressions, by getting these young members to lead the agenda or take notes, but also giving them some information about advocacy or human rights for instance. Something that helped when it came to these in-house trainings was that the director did his master degree in the United States. He said that he often tried to make time to share the benefits of his education with the other staff. He also said that his education in conflict transformation and peace building gave him in practical experience he could use to manage RHRAP, both in terms of programme management and in terms of advocacy [12]. The administrative officer mentioned that more of these internal training efforts took place after the baseline workshops and the baseline report: the management of RHRAP felt that more efforts should be made to work on staff skills [16]. He said: "After the baseline we had series of meetings on this. We felt that we needed more staff skills and training. We worked on different ideas on what kind of trainings that might be needed and we should try to get when funds are there. For instance, someone wanted training in M&E in South Africa, and we still hope that we will be able to get funding for that soon." Unfortunately the M&E training in South Africa did not take place.

A second component of improved knowledge and skills of RHRAP staff members was that they improved knowledge and practical skills that helped them in interacting with the Citizen Action Committee structures that were set up in various project communities [17]. Specifically, knowledge and skills for working with the CACs, and general programme management skills were built for the junior programme officer. This officer has been attending a series of trainings with the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) in the past years since 2012. The most noteworthy outcome was that the junior staff member has become good at facilitation, worked on community organising,

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and advocacy issues [18]. The staff members of RHRAP explained that he and some of the other field officers (some of which no longer work at RHRAP) were part of a whole training trajectory at IREX [19]. The most recent training mentioned was the training the junior programme officer had by IREX in organising community sessions and community awareness raising. This training was in May 2014. Note: the training overview sheet filled in by RHRAP management earlier other trainings from IREX included: Proposal and Report Writing (October 2012), Advocacy and Reconciliation Training (February 2013), and Election Process and Constitutional Review (February 2014) (Training overview table RHRAP). IREX has been an important mentoring organisation for RHRAP since the last couple of years (2011/2012) [20]. The director said that these trainings are extra important as the junior programme officer still needs to build his skills as a recent graduate [16].

A training that the members of RHRAP mentioned that helped them in their engagement with the CACs was a training done recently in improving inclusion of local society actors in peace building [21]. The training was about sensitizing and providing skills for peace-building. The most recent attention for peace building was made extra relevant due to violent strikes in Bong County during the Unity Party convention. The staff members of RHRAP acknowledged that this training was too recent to have learning implemented in their programmes. However, they saw valuable lessons to be used when engaging with the CACs. The training was sponsored by the Lutheran Church of Liberia and was done on the 24th and 25th of June in 2014 as part of their Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Programme. This training came about because RHRAP had partnered with the organisation providing the training on a project in Nimba County with Fin Church Aid and Act Alliance funding [22].

The training that was done with ICCO funds on the Criminal Justice Highway in 2012 was not mentioned during this time at the workshop but has been added to the general causal map, since it came up in discussions within the process tracing examination of human rights monitoring competencies [23]. This training was part of the programme with ICCO as part of the bridging phase in 2012 [24].

### **Improved field monitoring**

The fourth component that was mentioned by the senior programme officer was that RHRAP had become better at tracking what is happening in the field, conceptualized by the research team as field monitoring [25]. The main reason they felt that this was the case was due to a slightly changed monitoring process, with more of a focus in including communities in the process of monitoring [26]. One of the ways in which community members can provide feedback is using open-ended questionnaires instead of closed question formats (RHRAP Evaluation Form). The RHRAP staff said this was working well because now community members are able to give more open feedback. After every activity these questionnaires were given to the residents to evaluate the programme. The senior programme officer added that now the RHRAP field officers pay more attention to during oral feedback sessions, since many community members cannot write [27]. In April 2014 a learning and sharing session was held in Gbarnga (RHRAP Learning and sharing Meeting Minutes 08-04-2014). A second aspect was the use of Force Field Analysis for facilitation of the field monitoring sessions. The director mentioned that this method was adapted from the Global Fund for Children and RHRAP has been using it since the end of 2012 to guide the meetings with community members [28]. The senior programme officer was able to attend a training in monitoring and evaluation at the Liberian Institute for Public Administration (LIPA) [29]. This training was financed through the RHRAP administrative budget. At this training issues that were discussed included: What do we monitor? What are the processes involved? If one is evaluating a process - when will you do that and how will you do that? This training led the programme officer and the RHRAP management to look at new ways to allow the beneficiaries themselves to formulate their perspectives. He said that now the data collection is no longer being done by the project officers, but by the beneficiaries doing self-assessments. However, how this new knowledge has been structurally adapted to RHRAPs programme cycle is unclear.

### **Network and coalition participation increased**

A second major discussion that was ongoing related to the changes in the organisation related to the perceived increased network and coalition participation of RHRAP [2]. This topic will be briefly discussed in this general causal map, but will also come back in the process tracing discussion on fundraising capacity. This network and coalition participation has mainly come to expression in that RHRAP staff felt that their organisation has taken an increased leadership role among CSOs in Liberia



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on the issues of human rights monitoring and democratization, but also increasingly on the topics of natural resource and extractive industry advocacy [30].

In the course of the LCDGP coalition formation RHRAP felt that their interaction with other partners in the LCDGP has increased. One example mentioned was that they were talking with the Association of Female Lawyers in Liberia (AFELL) and the Foundation for International Dignity (FIND) (both part of the LCDGP as well) to explore collective fundraising efforts [31]. RHRAP plays a strategic role for the LCDGP as contract holder for the whole LCDGP coalition and as cluster lead for the Democratisation cluster (one of the three LCDGP themes) [32]. This followed the start of the LCDGP in various phases since the bridging phase in 2012 [24], and since the first partner that ICCO envisioned for this role did not live up to the responsibilities.

Related to this, RHRAP management felt that RHRAP performance had exhibited trust and credibility in the past two years [33]. This was mostly due to the LCDGP key role, but the director also said that recently they had made an effort to update organisational documentation such as the financial policy, personnel policy, and start writing a new strategic plan [34].

Several other dynamics were taking place the last two years. RHRAP is active as secretary for the Child Coalition of Liberia [35], the junior programme officer plays an active role in that capacity and he was one of the people at RHRAP who showed initiative in this. In the context of this, he helped with the preparation of a joint proposal with the Child Coalition, with partners such as Defence of the Children International. The result of this proposal is still pending. IREX has been also increasingly approached to help RHRAP with new initiatives, and through personal contacts has encouraged RHRAP to write proposals for their tenders [36].

After some networking in the United States the director [12] came into contact with the International Alliance for Natural Resources Africa (IANRA) [37] and RHRAP became a member of that African network in December 2013. It is not yet certain what has come out of the membership of that network.

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## Appendix 5 Results - attribution of changes in organisational capacity - detailed causal maps

During the endline process, key organisational capacity changes have been identified in the following capabilities: capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew. These two capabilities have been chosen for the purpose of process tracing since these are the two capabilities that have most frequently been targeted by the CFAs. The organisational capacity changes that have been identified are based on a potential link with MFS II supported capacity development activities in these two capabilities, and on a variety of sources (secondary data as well as endline workshop data). The process tracing methodology has been adapted to the purpose of this evaluation and to investigate closely the underlying causes for these identified organisational capacity changes, and the extent to which these changes can be attributed to MFS II supported organisational capacity strengthening activities.

For RHRAP the following organisational capacity changes have been identified for the purpose of understanding the attribution:

- Capability to act and commit: 'Improved capacity for human rights-based monitoring within the CJS'; 'Slightly improved capacity for fundraising'

Below you will find a description of the detailed causal maps that have been developed for each of the above mentioned organisational capacity changes. In each of the causal maps, attribution to MFS II supported capacity development interventions and to other factors and actors is described. The causal maps are described both as a visual as well as a narrative. Numbers in the visual correspond to numbers in the narrative.

### **Capability to act and commit - outcome area 'Improved capacity for Human Rights-based monitoring in the Criminal Justice Sector'**


RHRAP has a long experience in terms of monitoring human rights, in general, but also within the criminal justice system, and many activities have been undertaken in the past to strengthen the capacity of RHRAP staff members in this area (in the causal map, see the brown boxes below: these have not been numbered due to the fact that this took place before the baseline):

- Peace-building and HR training - International Human Rights Internship programme 2002
- Monitoring and Reporting - Carter Center 2002
- Human Rights Monitoring: fact-finding and documentation - Carter Center 2002, Amnesty International 2008 (senior programme officer)
- Practice and approaches in monitoring the basic rights – Amnesty International 2008 (administrative officer)
- Reporting human rights violations and abuses - Amnesty International 2006 (administrative officer)
- Human Rights promotion in post-conflict societies - African Democracy Forum 1996 (director)
- International Human Rights standards - Amnesty International 1994 (director)

The capacity to monitor human rights in the criminal justice system has been built upon since the baseline in 2012 [1], mainly in relation to the ICCO funded project 'Monitoring and Promoting of the Criminal Justice System in Gbarnga, Bong County', initiated in 2012. As part of this programme Citizen Action Committees were established, which included zonal heads in Gbarnga, where groups of active citizens are involved in discussions with duty-bearers in the criminal justice sector. By having Citizen Action Committees, prominent citizens and leaders are involved in mediating and educating community members, engaging in dialogue with police and justice departments, and accurately communicating to RHRAP about what is going on in Gbarnga [2]. RHRAP has been able to successfully organise trainings for community leaders to advocate for issues relating to the criminal justice system,

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and other stakeholders such as police and court officials have been able to attend these meetings. Relations between these different stakeholders have improved according to RHRAP staff [3]. Furthermore, RHRAPs increased competencies in monitoring human rights in the criminal justice system, has led to improvements relations and activities within the Bong County prisons [4]. For example, inmates are more successfully accessed and have been given two cell phones to communicate with their family members. In addition to this, working relations with detention officers are more positive.



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Key aspects of RHRAPs work that came up related to the capacity doing their work in HR-based monitoring in the criminal justice:

1. RHRAP's improved collaborative approach;
2. Improved knowledge for human rights-based monitoring;
3. Better knowledge and skills to train community members on the criminal justice system contents and procedures, while other stakeholders were invited;
4. Improved knowledge on how to align Liberian law and international human rights law in order to protect and monitor human rights;
5. RHRAP has more knowledge to accurately report on the Gbarnga prison conditions.

In the following section this list is separated into two main components: improved collaborative approach for HR-based monitoring that guides the work of RHRAP, and specific knowledge on HR-based monitoring in the CJS. Since the former mostly guides the work of RHRAP, and is embedded within the programmatic objectives, the evaluation team needed to weigh how much engagement in this collaborative approach has actually strengthened capacity for human rights based monitoring. In the next section some aspects of RHRAPs collaborative approach that have strengthened capacity is discussed, even though many dimensions can be traced to before the baseline.

### **Improved collaborative approach**

RHRAP members stated that a key aspect of their improved capacity involved a more collaborative approach than before [5]. This also meant specifically involving government as well. With the ICCO project, RHRAP was working on human rights promotion. Before RHRAP had access to the prisons, they could do only low-profile monitoring. But with this project they gained access to prisons for more monitoring. The ministry of justice provided a letter so that RHRAP is able to officially enter the prisons. Before this ICCO funded project, RHRAP worked with the Carter Centre on monitoring prisons, and staff already had the basic skills to monitor prison conditions. With this ICCO funded project, the level of monitoring human rights in the prisons has been up-scaled. Thus it can be noted that experience gained in the course of the programme may have slightly influenced and improved RHRAP staff capacity.

A second dimension which helped RHRAPs collaborative approach was through building better relations with prison correction officers, court officials and police officers [6]. These stakeholders were more approached using dialogue rather than only activism. This was something RHRAP was striving more for in its work since recent years. To help with that the RHRAP director wrote various letters to different departments of the Justice Ministry: the office of the attorney general and the bureau of corrections and rehabilitation [7]. In the letter he wrote that:

"[...]RHRAP programme activities will concentrate on organizing workshops on fundamental human rights issues in line with our statutory laws governing the country that will help to enhance the capacity of community leaders, court and correction officers in improving the justice system. RHRAP programme also focuses on improving relationships between community residents and criminal justice system workers. It will also include prisons and courts visitations where some psychosocial counselling will be carried out to reduce some psychosocial problems facing inmates. RHRAP will also host continuous dialogues with the Ministry of Justice and relevant government agencies on core issues in improve detention centres."

Both of these departments asked RHRAP to contact another department initially, but it seemed that this communication paid off in the end. However, in these letters (dated 20th of September and 10th of October 2012), it is also shown that this collaboration with the Ministry of Justice did not exist before the project started in 2012. So this collaboration is something that has occurred later than the baseline.

For this component RHRAP had increasingly realised that for their human rights programmes dialogue was needed with various stakeholders to achieve their goals [8]. This was partly at the beginning of the programme, but also due to previous experiences and trainings before the baseline. The trainings and experiences mentioned in the introduction of this section showed that RHRAP already had knowledge on international human rights and the associated instruments [9], and experience in human rights monitoring and promotion [10].

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### **Improved knowledge for HR-based monitoring**

The second major category that contributed to an increased capacity for HR-based monitoring related to the generation of additional knowledge for RHRAP's work [11]. These can be divided into knowledge on how to train community members; knowledge on the alignment of Liberian and human rights law; and knowledge on how to accurately report on prison conditions.

#### **Knowledge on how to train community members on the Criminal Justice System**

One of the key focuses within the improved knowledge capacity of the project relating to the Criminal Justice System in Bong County is the interaction with community members and the need to educate them on the this system [12]. Key things the senior programme officer and the administrative officer showed they had taught to community members in the past two years were: technical knowledge on the process from arrest to detention under Liberian law [13]; and knowledge on how to facilitate interrelations between, and understanding the roles of, the 3 major offices of the criminal justice system: correction officers, judiciary and police officers [14].

This knowledge was discussed during the training in the Criminal Justice Highway held in Gbarnga Bong County in September 2012 [15]. During this training topics such as the procedures for arrest and detention were discussed, and procedures in the 'correction component' of the criminal justice system (sources: Training documentation provided: Arrest PowerPoint presentation, overview of the Liberian criminal justice system document; questionnaire training participant perspective Liberia RHRAP Staff Training in Criminal Justice System Administrator). It was said that at the beginning of the 'Monitoring and Promoting the Criminal Justice System in Bong County' programme there was a need to get RHRAP staff more knowledgeable about this subject [16]. The rationale of the training was to build the capacities of staff of the organization on legal proceedings (sources: Report to ICCO 72-03-04-011: reference 1; Email correspondence Sandee Cole - RHRAP: reference 1). Also RHRAP reported that due to the training staff knowledge and skills increased on the Liberian Criminal Justice System (source: Support to capacity sheet SPO: reference 1). This is closely related to the expectations from the baseline: "Expected immediate change – at least 10 staff members trained and acquired enhanced knowledge and understanding in prison monitoring, reporting, documentation and human rights education." (source: 5C baseline report Liberia RHRAP 19012013\_MR\_CK: reference 8). Apparently, "the facilitators in person of Attorney. James T. Fallah and Cecil B. Griffiths both from the Liberia Law Enforcement Agency (LINEA) facilitated the learning sessions with focus on introducing the Criminal Justice High Way. As a result of this training, RHRAP staff skills and knowledge have been enhanced to clearly understand how the Criminal Justice System works based on their performance" (RHRAP Narrative Report to ICCO Dec 2013: reference 1).

#### **Knowledge on the alignment of Liberian law and human rights law**

RHRAP staff members have improved their competence to align Liberian and international human rights law [17] due to the training on the Criminal Justice Highway organised by LINEA in September 2012. At this training Liberia's constitutional provisions relating to the administration of justice as well as the major classes of human rights violations was discussed, and this sought to bring out the overlapping tools and provisions [16]. In addition to this, the many trainings and programmes in the past have also improved RHRAP's competencies in this area. These improved competencies have helped RHRAP to perform their activities in Bong County, and to work on issues that were both listed in the Liberian law book as well as in international human rights law, with the intention of bringing different stakeholders together with community members.

The RHRAP staff added that they already had previous knowledge and experience that they could build upon regarding these aspects [9]/[10].

#### **Improved competences to report prison conditions more accurately**

Competences of RHRAP staff to report prison conditions more accurately have improved [18]. This prison reporting was improved throughout the multiple visits that the RHRAP monitoring officers made to the Gbarnga Prison. In the narrative report to ICCO of 2012 it was written that ICCO visitors had made a short stop there and RHRAP was commended for its work with the inmates and the detention officers. This was caused, on the one hand, by various prison monitoring tools and information collection, such as comparing docket information with the list of admittances [19]. On the other hand, competences have improved by having more knowledge and skills to monitor work of the prisons more comprehensively, through checking conditions of prisoners, the way prisoners are admitted and by going through the detention statutes [20]. These two aspects have been discussed during the training

in September 2012, mainly within the topics of 'Chain of Procedures', use of the 'Detention Book' and 'Crimes and Terms in Prison' (source: Report to ICCO 72-03-04-011: reference 1) [15]. The weekly fact-finding missions by RHRAP at the prison have also contributed to improving these competences [21]. Additionally, since this year, June 2014, interagency monitoring and fact-finding of prisons and courts is being planned by several organisations [22]. This initiative was led by the Rice and Rights Foundation because it was felt that monitoring could be much more effective and up to date this way. When this initiative was started up the most important thing was that every organisation visiting the prisons should look for the same things (a document that RHRAP uses is the Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners, of the United Nations Convention). The monitoring of prisons has been something that RHRAP has some experience in: in 2001 RHRAP worked along with the Justice and Peace Commission in Bong, Cape Mount, Lofa, and Margibi counties. So RHRAP did already have some informal connections before the baseline [23].

### **Capability to act and commit - outcome area 'Slightly improved capacity for fundraising'**

The capacity to raise funds was a key issue the organisation was dealing with, and striving to improve at the time of the endline process [1]. This slightly improved change in organisational capacity is reflected mainly in the fact that both the CFA as well as the SPO gave attention to this issue. It was further elaborated on during the process of process tracing.

Decreasing funding from the main funder ICCO [2] was discussed as a serious issue during the endline process, but hopes were still high that ICCO would continue with the LCDGP in the near future. The issue of funds has been an issue for some time, even before the baseline in 2012 when it became clear that ICCO had fewer funds. In the LCDGP coalition built by ICCO the idea was to apply the programmatic approach in 3 clusters. In the democratization cluster a programme in which RHRAP was the lead was set up, and was urged to search for additional funds to fulfil the full programme. In 2012 the funding outlook seemed good; two programmes (ACT Alliance and ICCO) were taking place. This led to a withdrawal of two smaller donors, National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and Global Fund for Development (GFFD), who said that RHRAP had surpassed over their funding threshold policy. These two funders only support small civil society organisations that do not have access to larger funding amounts. For RHRAP members this led to a double feeling - on a positive note they can show to other potential funders that they are able to handle large amounts of money, but on a negative note they could not access funds from NED and GFFD in 2013. However, since the end of 2013 both ACT Alliance and AusAID have stopped funding RHRAP (AusAID due to decrease in Australian government spending).

The RHRAP staff was sure that in the past two years their fundraising capacity had changed for the better, but larger programme funding was not yet realised. Funding diversity was not achieved yet. The main reasons and proof the director showed was the increased amount of proposals and fundraising activities [3] that RHRAP engaged in during the past months:

- Proposal presented to IREX in 2014 on advocacy in the mid-term elections
- Proposal to the US State Department June 2014 on Peace and Reconciliation with regard to violence.
- Proposal to NED on accountability in the oil sector, June 2014 (options to apply to NED have opened up due to the lowered amounts of funding).
- Mini-grant was received from International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in 2014 following a proposal to this organisation.
- In June 2013 RHRAP received a grant from AusAID to work in concessional communities (unfortunately this project was cut short as well due to a change in the Australian government).
- A collective LCDGP proposal was written to the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) in June 2014.
- AusAID and IREX have personally encouraged RHRAP to apply for future grants.


A new idea currently under development is to get a proposal writer and grant seeker on board to seek opportunities for RHRAP. This person would help RHRAP to access funding through networking in return for a fee. This idea was still being developed at the time of the endline, but was discussed earlier in some RHRAP board meeting minutes in January 2014 (source: First Quarter Board Meeting, January 2014).

Key components of the fundraising capacity improvements related to five components. Improved capacity to write proposals and more visibility for RHRAP seemed to be the most substantiated and

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changed. The other three revolved more around awareness and engagement with others: awareness of the importance of having a sound strategic plan and programme documents; awareness of the need to build credible and trustworthy relationships with funders; and engagement in more networking and partnerships. These underlying changes are further explained below.





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### Improvement in proposal writing

The first issue that RHRAP said they became better at was proposal writing [5]. This was due to having more members of staff involved in proposal writing; having improved knowledge on proposal writing techniques; actively using field data; and understanding the background of the funder better.

All staff has been involved in proposal writing; whilst the director and the junior programme officer were quite active with this, others were involved in the brainstorm and review process [6]. Using a projector that they got from the NED some years ago they look at the document together to make changes. They used this approach before the baseline but now more proposals are written than before then.

The members of RHRAP said that they had received knowledge on different proposal writing techniques [7], through a range of interventions that took place since the baseline. In February 2014 the members of the LCDGP gave a short workshop on proposal writing and fundraising. The director of RHRAP was present as a facilitator to this workshop and the junior programme officer attended [8]. This proposal writing training of one and a half day was part of the ongoing strategy to strengthen the capacity of the LCDGP partner organizations. The training brought together 19 programme officers. Areas of focus during the training included but were not limited to the following: General introduction of proposal writing including gathering of background information, concept development, the programme and expenses/budget. Furthermore, the components of a proposal were highlighted, i.e., the executive summary, statement of need, project description, organizational information and conclusion (source: LCDGP Bridging Narrative Report: reference 5). A resource document on proposal writing was shared with the research team. This document discusses the components of a proposal and the process of developing a proposal (source: Proposal Writing Training document).

The director said that due to the RHRAP management visit to Bamako from 15-21 September 2013 new ideas for writing proposals were discussed [9]. During this visit issues such as fundraising and project cycle management were discussed by ICCO members. This short capacity training during the visit was given due to perceived lacking skills in project cycle management: the whole cycle was reviewed. Key reasons to discuss this was that RHRAP (and other partners) were about to get a new contract with ICCO (Grant agreement for the LCDGP was signed by the RHRAP director in November 2013). The question was how a Civil Society coalition such as the LCDGP could be able to deliver and sustain the programme. During this visit programmatic officers of the partners of the LCDGP were able to visit and strategize on the LCDGP and discuss collective funding strategies. ICCO thought it wise that there is some practice in this.

In 2014 the LCDGP a collective Resource Mobilization strategy was developed [10] (source: LCDGP Resource Mobilization strategy). However, this seemed to be going slowly when the research team reviewed the documentation. "The Liberia Community Development and Governance Programme (LCDGP) Strategic Plan development lasted for nearly two years to have a coherent plan. This process implementation coordination role was delegated to the Project Management Committee (PMC) and one of the key aspects of this was to 'initiate visibility, communication, documentation and networking of the LCDGP as well as fundraising activities'" (source: LCDGP Bridging Narrative Report: reference 5). In the LCDGP bridging report it was stated that the subsector committees for communication and visibility, documentation and networking; and fundraising/resource mobilization completed their work plans and strategies for the bridging phase and received funds to rollout their activities (source: LCDGP Bridging Narrative Report: reference 2). During the workshop it became clear that the fundraising strategy and the communication strategy have been developed. The clearest outcome of this process has been a collective proposal was written to get extra funds for the LCDGP was written to Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA). This was presented to OSIWA in June 2014. The clearest thing that has come out has been the collective proposal to OSIWA, handed in by the end of June 2014. Results from this bid are still pending.

According to the director, the master's degree education at the School for International Training in the US helped him with the writing of proposals, by using theories and tools for proposal writing [11]. He also mentioned that the RHRAP proposals are now SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic/relevant, and timely) [12]. He said that funders and donor organisations now fully expect this of organisations that try to tender with them. He said he picked this up during discussions with consultants visiting from ICCO in 2012 (he could not remember exactly who it was) [13].

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RHRAP staff has more actively been using up to date field data for their proposals [14]. As mentioned in the general causal map, due to changes in the way the field is monitored, and communicated with, getting feedback is more open and flexible [15]. This information has been used more actively in developing proposals - making them more up to date and informed on local dynamics. A second component that is different is the use of Force Field Analysis for facilitation of the field tracking sessions. It was stated that this method was adapted from the Global Fund for Children and RHRAP has been using it since the end of 2012.

A final aspect of proposal writing that came up during the process tracing workshop was the need to understand the background of the funder, to communicate about the pending proposal, and to do precise budgeting, according to the director [16]. The RHRAP junior programme officer and other field officers built knowledge on understanding USAID proposal criteria: to understand how the budgeting system works and how to get future projects with IREX. In the process tracing workshop the director said that a fundraising training by IREX in September 2012 helped the junior programme officer to understand this better [17]. During this conference discussions were held on what the attributes are of an effective local organisation, have sound organisational control systems and adequate organisational management (source: IREX presentation - Attributes of an Effective Local Organisation). The director of RHRAP said he gained knowledge on the different requirements for international funding procedures [18] (for example the European Union) due to a webinar on the website 'Funds for NGO's' in 2012 [19].

### **Improved visibility of RHRAP**

RHRAP has increased its visibility, which can be seen in increased information sharing of their programme on their website and attending as many meetings as possible; enhanced communication and showcasing towards donors and non-governmental organisations; as well as publishing activities toward broader society and the international community [20] (source: CFA Support to Capacity Sheet: reference 1; SPO Support to Capacity: reference 1; Email correspondence with Sandee Cole: reference 1). Improved information sharing and communication was mainly related to having a website in place since 2013, showing RHRAP activities and programmes [21] (source: SPO Support to Capacity: reference 1; [www.rhrapliberia.org](http://www.rhrapliberia.org): accessed 23-05-2014). This website shows the vision, mission and projects that RHRAP is engaged in. It shows the programme that is being done with ICCO in Bong County and there is also a call for funds to expand this project in Lofa County (source: RHRAP website: accessed on 23-05-2014). The director did mention that during the time the research team was visiting RHRAP the website was not working properly. They were taking steps to improve this. RHRAP developed the website with fundraising in mind: that "the development of the website where information of RHRAP Programme activities is placed will contribute to Resource Mobilization" (source: SPO support to capacity sheet, reference 1). The director said he was actively involved in helping to design the website. It was not certain whether the website had directly led to project grants, but it was mentioned that other organisations are contacting RHRAP through their website in order to get more information about their programmes (source: email correspondence with Sandee Cole: reference 1). The website was developed with the use of LCDGP flexible funds, and RHRAP staff said it had cost about 2,000 USD [22]. Up to 3,000 dollars were made available to as part of the bridging phase towards the LCDGP coalition [23]. These funds were intended to substitute the ICCO Learning Trajectory which was supposed to be designed by the Liberian partners. However, throughout the past two years this trajectory had not materialized.

To further contribute to visibility, posters, brochures and billboards have been produced to promote RHRAP activities [24]. In the LCDGP narrative report to ICCO, the LCDGP partners had 10 plastic posters and 2500 small posters and stickers made depicting the objectives and activities of partners in the 'Democracy Cluster' of the LCDGP. These small posters carried the messages concerning the work of the D Cluster at all levels. The administrative officer showed the research team three newspapers which described the activities RHRAP had been engaging in (three newspapers reported on the sessions RHRAP did with inmates in Gbarnga prison on 13th June 2013, and on the visit ICCO paid to Liberia and to the Gbarnga Prison on the 17th of June 2013) [25]. This is part of the LCDGP resource mobilization strategy [10], and the LCDGP programme that started in 2013 [26]). RHRAP staff members later mentioned that t-shirts, factsheets and billboards were made to demonstrate their work. The director showed the research team such a factsheet for RHRAP (source: LCDGP Bridging Narrative Report: reference 4). Furthermore, a large poster decorated RHRAP office from the World Justice Forum that was held in The Hague in the Netherlands in July 2013. The RHRAP director was

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given the opportunity to go to the Netherlands after Amnesty International had seen some of their activities with zonal heads and CACs in Bong County and invited RHRAP to participate [27]. The director was able to present the work of RHRAP and therefore contributed to RHRAP visibility. This was partly described in the RHRAP Narrative Report to ICCO 2013 (reference 1) as well.

#### **Increased awareness on having sound strategic and programme documents in place**

Awareness on having a sound strategic plan and solid programme documents was another aspect that RHRAP members realized [28]. It was said that in order to be able to get funding as an organisation you need to be able to hand in the necessary documents such as operational policies, employment contracts, rules and regulations, financial policies (sources: RHRAP work plans for 2012-2013 and 2013-2014; organisational chart; monitoring and evaluation template; audit report; strategic plan 2010-2014). Thus, the financial and constitutional policies of the organization were amended. The director said that issues like employment contract, payroll for out-station staffs, rules and regulations of RHRAP, etc. have been amended and because of this RHRAP has sound organizational policies. As he stated: "we developed these structures and policies so that we can meet internationally acceptable standards" [29]. He said that it was realized that a sharp situational analysis for each proposal and strategic plan was needed [30]. This means staying in touch with what is going on in Liberia and in the international development sector. One of the things that are now going to be inserted in the coming strategic plan is a tactical focus on natural resource and extractive sector advocacy. The director said that part of this documentation is presenting the CVs of staff in the correct way, and consequently trying to stimulate staff capacity building in order to improve these CVs [31]. He said that concisely presenting these CVs was important because then you can also show to other donors and organisations what kind of skills the staff has. The evaluation team reviewed the documentation (organisational structure, financial and human resource policy) and found only minor changes in these.

This need to develop and amend the abovementioned issues related to the director's discovery of the importance of these aspects, in his discussions with ICCO and during his studies in the United States at the SIT [32]. He learned many of these things at the School for International Training in the United States, and was implementing these ideas in his fundraising activities. The director concluded by saying that "those documents, strategic plans, policies are necessary to sell an organisation. We feel that we are not donor-driven, we have a programme - we are RHRAP and this is what we are capable of doing". The CFA highlighted some of these developments at RHRAP as "increased consciousness/awareness on the need to become more strategic and proactive beyond implementing projects due to the field visits done by ICCO" (CFA Support to Capacity: reference 6). The evidence for this component of fundraising capacity is somewhat limited. However, a recent proposal to OSIWA (June 2014) by RHRAP as an individual organisation on the topic of 'Education and advocacy for the Implementation of Tangible Development Initiatives using Revenues from the Extractive Industry' showed good application of situational analysis and staff CV documentation (source: RHRAP OSIWA proposal).

#### **Awareness in building more credible and trustworthy relationships with donors**

Staff indicated that they were aware of the importance of having a credible relationship with donors [33]. The members of RHRAP said that building this relationship was important because they realised that it is essential to show results to funders. According to RHRAP staff financial audits that were done for ICCO and the ACT Alliance had helped to build up trust with the funders. The first audit report accounted for the ICCO project 'Initiative for Human Rights Promotion' in the period August 2012 to September 2013. The second audit report discussed the use of funds throughout the period March 2012 to February 2013 for the ACT Alliance to 'Assist Ivorian Refugees and Host Community Members in Liberia'. In both reports the accountants express the opinion that, according to International Accounting Standards, the statements of income and expenditure fairly reflect the operations within the projects [34]. It was stated in the workshop that such auditing reports were extra important due to the key contributions and activities of RHRAP as the contract holder and the lead for the LCDGP Democratization cluster [35]. This responsibility has given the RHRAP members the feeling that this is a consequence of being a reliable partner of ICCO, and they said that this responsibility reinforced a more credible relationship with other donors.

Another factor that contributed to improved awareness of being trustworthy and credible relationship with funders was an improved understanding the ICCO funding priorities and perspectives, which was

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necessary in order to develop and stimulate consolidated reporting guidelines for the LCDGP [36]. It seemed to the evaluators that the setting up of the LCDGP was a cumbersome process, and issues were not moving smoothly. To work on this in March 2014 a refresher training in financial and programme management was given to (new) staff members of the LCDGP. The senior and junior programme officer attended as participants [37]. There was a great deal of discussion on the way reports should be made. According to the CFA, in this workshop for finance and programme staff the topic of proposal writing was heavily discussed as well (linked to 'knowledge on proposal writing techniques [7]') (source: Annex B Support to capacity sheet CFA: reference 2). All members of the LCDGP should learn to use the same format, for the general reporting system. Key issues such as limiting the amount of pages, concise reporting, and clarity on expected indicators should be attempted. Prior to the LCDGP there were 20 separate organisations and now they were put in 3 clusters. RHRAP, as main contract holder of the LCDGP was responsible to consolidate these reports [35]. The director's visit to Bamako in September 2013 [9] helped him to get an idea of the perspective and needs of ICCO.

### **Slightly more networking and partnerships**

RHRAP staff noted that in the past two years the organisation has paid more attention to networking and building new partnerships [37]. There have been more activities and attempts made, but clear and significant examples of successful new networks and partnerships seemed limited. RHRAP members stated that in the past couple of years RHRAPs standing among civil society has been positively improving, saying that other organisations in Liberian civil society often liaise with RHRAP. Due to networking activities of the director a project with AusAID was organised [38]. The RHRAP director explained that RHRAP held a project launching which many actors and donors were able to attend. Via a contact and via discussions with AusAID RHRAP was asked to do a project with concessional communities in Gbarpolu County, using the CAC structure. This project was unfortunately cut short in 2013.

In the course of this LCDGP process RHRAP felt that their interaction with other partners in the LCDGP had increased. An example mentioned is that they are talking with the Association of Female Lawyers in Liberia (AFELL) and the Foundation for International Dignity (FIND) to explore collective fundraising efforts [39]. This has not developed beyond talks, but the director said that a working relationship with these organisations would definitely be in the advantage of RHRAP, as they are all three working with human rights issues.

After some networking in the United States the RHRAP director came into contact with the International Alliance for Natural Resources Africa (IANRA) and RHRAP became a member of that African network in December 2013. It is not yet sure what has come out of the membership of that network. RHRAP is an active member of the Child Coalition of Liberia, and is currently working on a proposal with them [40]. Finally, IREX has been also increasingly approached to help RHRAP with new initiatives, and through personal contacts has encouraged RHRAP to write proposals for their tenders [41].

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