Common Room end line report

MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component

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This report describes the findings of the end line assessment of the Indonesian organisation Common Room that is a partner of Hivos.

The evaluation was commissioned by NWO-WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research in the Netherlands and is part of the programmatic evaluation of the Co-Financing System - MFS II financed by the Dutch Government, whose overall aim is to strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. Apart from assessing impact on MDGs, the evaluation also assesses the contribution of the Dutch Co-Funding Agencies to strengthen the capacities of their Southern Partners, as well as the contribution of these partners towards building a vibrant civil society arena.

This report assesses Common Room’s contribution towards strengthening Civil Society in Indonesia and for this exercise it used the CIVICUS analytical framework. It is a follow-up of a baseline study conducted in 2012. Key questions that are being answered comprise changes in the five CIVICUS dimensions to which Common Room contributed; the nature of its contribution; the relevance of the contribution made and an identification of factors that explain Common Room’s role in civil society strengthening.

Keywords: Civil Society, CIVICUS, theory based evaluation, process-tracing
Acknowledgements

SurveyMETER and CDI are thanking the staff and the leaders of all Southern Partner Organisations that participated in collecting information for the evaluation of the contribution of these partner organisations to creating a vibrant civil society in Indonesia. They also thank the Co-Funding Agencies and the Dutch Consortia they are a member of for making background documents available. We hope that this evaluation can support you in better positioning yourself in the Civil Society Arena of Indonesia.
List of abbreviations and acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEF</td>
<td>Asia Europe Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bappeda</td>
<td>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Provincial or District Development Planning Agency)</td>
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<td>BCfNMA</td>
<td>Bandung Centre for New Media Arts</td>
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<td>BCCF</td>
<td>Bandung Creative City Forum</td>
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<td>BCI</td>
<td>Basic Capabilities Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Agency on Statistics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDI</td>
<td>Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Co-Financing Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFO</td>
<td>Co-Financing Organisation</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Civil society</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dana Bansos</td>
<td>Dana Bantuan Sosial (Social Aid Funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinas KUKM</td>
<td>Dinas Koperasi Usaha Kecil dan Menengah (Department of Cooperatives and Small Medium Enterprises)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIY</td>
<td>Design it Yourself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELSAM</td>
<td>Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forum PRB</td>
<td>Bandung's Disaster Risk Reduction Forum</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communications technology</td>
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<td>MFS</td>
<td>Dutch co-financing system</td>
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<td>MoC</td>
<td>Model of Change</td>
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<td>MoFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ormas</td>
<td>Organisasi masyarakat (Societal Organisations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pusdalisbang</td>
<td>Pusat Data dan Analisa Pembangunan (Centre for Development Data and Analysis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPJMD</td>
<td>Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah (Regional Mid-Term Development Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERF</td>
<td>Social Economic Rights Fulfilment</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPO</td>
<td>Southern Partner Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSI</td>
<td>Semi-structured Interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wageningen UR</td>
<td>Wageningen University &amp; Research Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>WALHI</td>
<td>Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Friends of the Earth Indonesia)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
1 Introduction

This report presents the civil society end line findings of Common Room in Indonesia which is a partner of Hivos in Indonesia under the Dutch Consortium People Unlimited. It is a follow-up to the baseline assessment that was carried out in 2012. According to the information provided during the baseline study, Common Room is working on the theme ‘governance’.

These findings are part of the overall evaluation of the joint MFS II evaluations to account for results of MFS II-funded or –co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework and seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values, perception of impact and contexts influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology.

Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO

In the 2012 – 2014 period the most important change that took place in the civil society arena of the SPO are related to ‘perception of impact’, specifically the impact of the emergence of a new sub-culture on the music scene in Bandung. Innovations supported by Common Room have generated greater public interest in, and acceptance of traditional Sundanese customs and the underground metal scene. This was achieved through the introduction of Karinding, a traditional Sundanese instrument, and supporting groups that were capable of offering a unique fusion of musical genres.

These findings were obtained through an analysis of documents, a workshop and follow-up interviews with the SPO, and interviews with external resources persons working in civil society organisations that receive support from the SPO; other civil society organisations with whom the SPO is collaborating; public or private sector agents and; external resource persons capable of overlooking the MDG or theme on which the SPO is concentrating.

Contribution analysis

Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs a selection was made of SPOs to be included in an in-depth process tracing trajectory and those to be included for a quick contribution assessment. Common Room was selected for a quick assessment.

The outcome that we looked at is: the Karinding community has become more organized and capable of championing the revival of an interest in a traditional Sundanese instrument and supporting the underground metal scene. Common Room’s innovation in combining Karinding – an instrument that lacked popularity, with the metal music genre has led to the development of a sub-culture amongst the youth of Bandung. The innovation has also brought the Karinding community and both affiliated communities, underground metal and Sundanese customary groups, into the public space. The pathway that most likely explains this outcome is a combination of Common Room’s intervention, and the popularity of the personnel of the Karinding Attack band, and the emergence of a trend or hype. The contribution of the SPO towards achieving this outcome is in facilitating the musical experimentation, assisting artists in music composition, and providing space for trainings and performances.
Relevance
Interviews with staff of Common Room, with external resource person, with the liaison officer of Hivos, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of Common Room’s interventions in terms of; its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (SC) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which Common Room is operating; the CS policies of Hivos.

With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcomes achieved are to some extent relevant because it shows how the provision of public space contributes to strengthened creative industry, which in turn leads to a healthy society characterized with strong cultural identity and freedom of expression.

With regards to the context in which Common Room is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because public space in Bandung has been dominated by market-driven and hegemonic urban culture.

With regards to the Civil Society policies of Hivos, Common Room’s interventions and outcomes are relevant because it is in line with Hivos’ strategy to empower civil society and encourage knowledge sharing collaboration between communities and/or individuals. However Hivos observed that Common Room’s organisational performance is hampering the organisation to effectively contribute to Hivos’ policies, which was a reason for ending the partnership in December 2013.

Explaining factors
The information related to factors that explain the above findings was collected at the same time as the data were gathered for the previous questions. The evaluation team looked at internal factors within Common Room, the external context in which it operates and the relations between Common Room and Hivos.

Internal factors within the SPO that explain the findings are the degrading quality of Common Room’s new facilities and Common Room’s absolute dependency on its director and an inability to recruit more competent personnel.

External factors that explain the findings are the emergence of similar initiatives (alternative public spaces) in Bandung, a supportive government, and the trend of contemporary urban sub-culture.

The following chapter briefly describes the political context, the civil society context and the relevant background with regards to the MDG/theme Common Room is working on. Chapter three provides background information on Common Room, the relation of its MFS II interventions with the CIVICUS framework and specific information on the contract with Hivos. An evaluation methodology has been developed for the evaluation of the Civil Society component which can be found in Appendix 2; however, deviations from this methodology, the choices made with regards to the selection of the outcomes for contribution analysis, as well as difficulties encountered during data collection are to be found in Chapter 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are being presented in Chapter 5, followed by a discussion on the general project design in relation to CS development; an assessment of what elements of the project design may possibly work in other contexts or be implemented by other organisations in Chapter 6. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.
2 Context

This paragraph briefly describes the context Common Room is working in.

2.1 Political context

2.1.1 Brief historical perspective

Indonesia’s rise to being the world’s third largest democratic nation has been lauded by many world leaders. The country is often considered to be a model Muslim democracy. As the fourth most populous nation with an estimated 250 million people\(^1\), Indonesia has sustained its democratic commitment since transitioning from an authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998. The decentralized administration now consists of 34 provinces and 508 districts and municipalities.

Prior to 1998, Indonesia was under strict authoritarian regime. Suharto, known for his so-called New Order (1966-1998) regime, ushered in radical transformations that would place social and political forces under direct state supervision. The defining characteristics of the Suharto era were a focus on economic growth and controlled consensus and political stability devoid of dissent. A series of tumultuous economic and political transitions in the nineties severely diminished the credibility of ageing President Suharto, who was forced to resign amidst mass street protests.

His departure in 1998 laid bare three decades of social inequalities, state-perpetuated abuses against human rights, and a lack of civilian liberties. The regime change opened the way for a period of Reformasi started under the presidency of B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) and continued by Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Restrictions on citizen participation, press freedom and association were removed. Democratic reforms and decentralization led to direct elections, portioned authority, devolution of authority to regional authorities, formation of new political parties and ended the military’s parliamentary influence. The distinct historical periods of the New Order Regime and Reformasi (1998-present) have shaped the emergence of civil society. Defining characteristics are summarized in the table below.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political system</td>
<td>Centralized, authoritarian characterized by unipolarity. Golkar as the dominant political party. In 1999, there were 27 provinces, 306 districts and around 60,000 villages.</td>
<td>Decentralized, democratic. Fragmentation of power and atomization of patronage relationships. Emergence of numerous political parties. Direct presidential elections since 1999. Decentralization altered the political and administrative landscape: 34 provinces, 410 districts, 98 municipalities, 6,944 sub-districts and 81,253.(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-citizen interaction</td>
<td>Benevolent leader, obedient population. Down to the village level, the state permeated society.</td>
<td>Modern political culture marked by diminishing hierarchy between the state and citizens, allowing for citizens to interact more freely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen representation and association</td>
<td>Strict control of speech, expression and association.</td>
<td>Burgeoning of CSOs, pressure groups and NGOs following the political euphoria after Suharto’s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) In 2010 the population was estimated to be around 237 million people (BPS 2010 Population Census). The current figure is an estimate from BKKBN and similar figures are cited in the CIA’s World Fact Book and the World Bank.

CSOs and their networks largely "hiding behind the screen", and operating under state surveillance. A period of growth occurred in 1995-98, as resistance was building. Indonesian CSOs began to establish new networks internationally. Up until the early 2000s the focus was on state-centrist issues. Later, issues that CSOs were tackling became more diverse, ranging from pluralism, poverty reduction to fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media</th>
<th>No free press, censorship and state-control. Suharto had firm grasp over how to use print &amp; broadcast media to promote political ideologies.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More vibrant media environment, flourishing of media businesses albeit in control of 12 main conglomerates that are mostly profit-driven and often have political ties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited public and CS use and access to internet until mid-90s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Twitter nation, widespread social media use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Growing realization of the importance of media/free press as the fourth pillar of democracy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artistic forms of expression</th>
<th>Art and literary censorship conducted by the state. Art forms were a means to reinforce political order.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greater freedom of the arts and cultural sectors. Organisations able to hold art events more freely. Freedom of expression a catchphrase amongst individuals and artistic groups, but challenged by more conservative members of society.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious expression and organisation</th>
<th>Regime repressed religious groups, especially radical forms.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergence of religious groups seeking to restore Islamic values and defend Muslim values.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With political reforms came greater freedom and space for civic engagement. In the Reformasi period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of civil society organisations, many of which were Islamic in character. In 2000, the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) recorded around 70,000 registered organisations, compared to just 10,000 in 1996. New groups sprung up with donors encouraging activists to establish NGOs they could fund. These organisations were eager to distance themselves from state and often took an anti-government stance. Proliferating CSOs and NGOs have taken advantage of decentralization and greater regional autonomy to engage in public affairs. Civil society and government relations have improved, although both sides remain sceptical of the others’ intentions.

2.1.2 Recent trends in the political context

Indonesia is considered to be a story of democratic success, but it still struggles to realize the benefits of sustained and equitable economic growth. In the political context, the main challenges lie in governing such geographically vast and decentralized country, applying principles of good governance and the enormous task of reforming the country’s bureaucracy.

Although, Indonesia’s ‘big bang’ decentralization initiated at the turn of the century narrowed the gap between local government and citizens, it has also localized political power struggles. While the devolution of authorities relieved tensions between the central government and the regions, it has also created opportunities for corrupt and rent-seeking practices, at the local level. As indicated by Transparency International’s corruption index scores, perceived corruption in Indonesia remains high.

Table 2

| Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer survey: Indonesia |

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In 2013, decentralization was taken a step further with the approval of the Village Law, intended to address weak governance arrangements and empower rural communities to participate politically. The new law could also lead to village elites distorting power relations and misusing government funding if not properly monitored.

Indonesia is still transitioning politically and many challenges lie ahead. According to the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index’s Executive Report, "Indonesia is witnessing a paradox in its democracy. On one hand, a successful opening-up of civil liberty has led to the avalanche of democratic demands across the nation, however on the other hand, democratic institutions’ are inadequately respond to those demands.” Nonetheless, the Indonesian Governance Index, which focuses on measuring provincial governance, does show a general improvement in the performance of the government (political office) bureaucracy, civil society and economic society based on principles of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness between 2008 and 2012. Civil society scores improved the most significantly, while scores for bureaucracy rose slightly.4

Table 3
Indonesia Governance Index: Average provincial scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>5.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>6.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Society</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>5.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi

In the past decade, Indonesians have generally enjoyed a freedom to participate in the political process through a direct-election mechanism. However, in September 2014 lawmakers voted in favour of a bill reviving indirect elections of regional heads. The controversial vote provoked public outcry which saw peaceful protests and the public voicing their discontent through social media. In early October, just before the end of his term, president Yudhoyono issued a regulation in lieu of the law, effectively repealing the law until further judicial review.

The recent 2014 elections which marked the end of Yudhoyono’s 10-year term, demonstrated that Indonesian voters are increasingly voting for popular figures irrespective of political party alliances. While practices of corruption, vote-buying and poor voter administration remained in the recent election, the public seems to have matured politically, indicated by the enormous interest in televised debates between the leading candidates. The appeal of the newly sworn in President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has come from his hands-on, man-of-the-people approach. As Jokowi begins his five-year term he will need to start addressing a myriad of challenges that include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and human rights concerns, particularly with respect to the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and religious intolerance. If left unaddressed, these challenges could seriously undermine Indonesia’s stability and democratic reforms.

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2.2 Civil Society context

This section describes the civil society context in Indonesia that is not SPO specific but in line with the information sources used by CIVICUS.\(^5\)

2.2.1 Socio-political context

Today, there are tens of thousands of civil organisations in the country,\(^6\) comprising of religious organisations, unions, mass-based membership organisations, ethnic groups, professional associations, politically affiliated organisations, NGOs, and other community organisations.\(^7\) CSOs in Indonesia work on wide range of themes. Thematic areas recently prominent include democratization and human rights; issue-based campaigns; protecting economic, social and cultural rights; promoting community access to basic services; environmental and natural resources management, and; climate change and disaster risk reduction. In 2012, the Ministry of Home Affairs documented more than 65,000 organisations, of which around 9,000 were officially registered with the Ministry.\(^8\) A year later, the figure increased to more than 130 thousand foundations, associations, NGOs, research institutions, and other organisations.\(^9\) It is worth noting that NGOs in Indonesia are also allowed to establish cooperatives or SMEs, of which there are 203,701 with a membership reaching 35.2 million people.\(^10\) Under recently reinstated Law No. 25/1992 concerning cooperatives, the cooperatives’ objectives are to improve the welfare of its members and participate in developing the economy.\(^11\) Given these regulations it is possible to expand the definition of civil society to include cooperatives.\(^12\)

The civil society stage has become more diverse; the stage is now “shared with more players, like political parties, religious organisations and universities, all able to speak out and publicize their views in a multitude of media outlets that have sprung up in recent years.”\(^13\) NGOs and civil society in Indonesia are now starting to deal with the dissolve of traditionally-compartmentalized roles and responsibilities as their activities begin to overlap with those of the government and private sector. As one recent report stated, “NGOs that were united against Suharto are now without a common enemy and something to unite them to a common vision.”\(^14\) While the government has come to recognize that “a strong civil society is an important contributor to both launching and sustaining a transition to democratic governance,”\(^15\) NGOs and CSO networks continue to be scrutinized and criticized for being vehicles of foreign intervention.

Despite the considerable number of organisations, those operating effectively are likely to be a small proportion.\(^16\) The accountability and transparency of CSOs and NGOs themselves has also come under greater scrutiny. “Donors have started to become impatient with some of their NGO counterparts, who have difficulties accepting that they now have to fulfill much greater demands.”\(^17\) In recent years

\(^{6}\) Under state law, there are two forms of organisation recognized legally: “ayyasan” or foundations, and “perkumpulan” or associations. The main difference between foundations and associations is that the latter is member-based and in the way they are governed internally and under law. A large majority of NGOs in Indonesia are private foundations.
\(^{7}\) NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations edited by Lisa Jordan, Peter van Tuijl
\(^{8}\) Source: http://www.koran-jakarta.com/?t112-1000-ormas-perbarui-pendaftaran. This figure is similar to 2010 data provided by Rustam Ibrahim in An ASEAN Community for All: Exploring the Scope for Civil Society Engagement, FES 2011.
\(^{10}\) Article entitled: Pemerintahan Jokowi Diminta Terus Beber Koperasi dan UMKM, 20 October 2014, Available at: http://www.depkop.go.id/
\(^{11}\) A cooperative is defined in Article 3 as: “an economic organisation of the people with a social content (character) having persons or legal cooperative societies as members, farming economic entity as a collective endeavor based upon mutual help” (FAO, A study of cooperative legislation in selected Asian and Pacific countries).
\(^{13}\) NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations, Edited by Lisa Jordan and Peter van Tuijl (2006)
\(^{14}\) STATT NGO Sector Review 2012
\(^{15}\) Evolution and Challenges of Civil Society Organisations in Promoting Democratization in Indonesia
\(^{16}\) Rustam Ibrahim comments on this in FES 2011
\(^{17}\) Ibid
foreign donor funding has depleted, which has led to more organisations turning to the private sector and government programmes.

Since 1985 the state has regulated member-based, citizen organisations under a Mass Organisations Law making it obligatory for social organisations to register with government. This law was largely ignored in the period of reform following 1998. However, in 2013 the law was replaced by a new controversial Mass/Societal Organisations (Ormas) Law No. 17, reinforcing control of foundations and associations. The Law could be used to prohibit or dissolve CSOs. Many NGOs and civil society networks deplored the Law for constricting democratic space and the freedom of civil society. The 2014 Freedom House Index’s ratings for civil liberties in Indonesia declined from Free to Partly Free as a result of the new law18.

Table 4
Indonesia’s Rank & Score: Freedom House Indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom status</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Partially Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political rights</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org

The 2013 CIVICUS report hinted that the legislation could be part of the state’s reaction to a perceived threat that environmental, land rights and indigenous activists pose to political and economic interests due to the “shadowy connections that can exist between transnational corporations and politicians” in the agriculture extractive and construction industries.

The annual Freedom of the Press Index produced by Freedom House illustrates that Indonesia’s media remains “partly free”. From 2011 to 2012 there was significant numerical improvement from 53 points to 49 with the reduction of restrictions and a greater ability of journalists to cover news more freely. From 2012 to 2014, the country’s rating remained steady at 49, with slight changes in global ranking (2012: 97th, 2013: 96th, 2014: 98th).19

Overall, the press system in Indonesia is vibrant, with a wide range of news sources and perspectives, further growing with the developments in digital media. “Indonesia’s online growth in recent years is recognised as nothing short of phenomenal” (Matt Abud 2012). While the Internet is seen as a new space for debate and participation, current laws still curtail openness, accessibility, inclusiveness and place limits on its use for expression. Only a limited number of organisations like ICT Watch are addressing freedom of expression and online rights. Nonetheless, citizens are using cyber space to set up online communities and organize campaigns. Some recent examples include the commuter movement ‘masukbusway.com’ aimed to capture and shame traffic violators in Jakarta.

Less progressive sources of rhetoric can be found amongst a number of hard-line religious groups and leaders, such as Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front or FPI), who have links with traditional religious schools (pesantren) and recruit members through these and online networks. Radical groups organize frequent protests to apply pressure on the government and are a threat to diversity and freedom.20

2.2.2 Socio-economic context

At a macro-level, Indonesia’s socio-economic situation has been improving. The country is a regional and global economic force, and has recently graduated to lower-middle income country (LMIC) status.

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Table 5
Indonesia’s Rank & Score: UN Human Development Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>HDI Rank (scale 1 – 187 for all years except 2010 out of 169)</th>
<th>HDI Value</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (years)</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling (years)</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita (2011 PPP$)</th>
<th>Gender Inequality Index (value &amp; rank)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>7,802</td>
<td>0.680(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8,201</td>
<td>0.505 (2008 data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>0.681</td>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8,601</td>
<td>0.494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>0.684</td>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8,970</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Human Development Report 2014 & Explanatory Note for Indonesia

In recent years, Indonesia has consistently been ranked in the medium development category of the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) measuring a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. In 2013, the HDI value was 0.684 with a rank of 108 out of 187 countries and territories. However, the value falls to 0.553, or 19.2 percent, when taking into account inequality. Indonesia’s HDI is above its peers in the medium development category but below the average of 0.703 in East Asia and the Pacific. The Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is steadily rising to US$ 8,970, a remarkable feat considering it was just 2,931 in 1980. Despite improvements, the 2014 report and its explanatory note show that growth is slowing and the country has yet to achieve equitable growth. For example, women only hold 18.6 percent of the seats in parliament, 10 percent fewer women reach secondary education compared to men, and women’s labour market participation is 51.3 percent compared to 84.4 percent for men.

The Basic Capabilities Index (BCI) produced by Social Watch offers a picture of the status of key human capabilities of accessing basic services. It utilizes three main indicators: under-five mortality rate, births attended by skilled personnel, and enrolment of children up to the 5th grade. Countries are categorized into five groups accordingly based on their BCI values: 1) Basic: 98 and over; 2) Medium: from 91 to 97; 3) Low: from 81 to 90; 4) Very Low: from 71 to 80, and; 5) Critical: values below 70. Results for Indonesia saw stable or improving scores for child and maternal health, but a regression for education. While no data beyond 2011 is available, other data sources confirm that Indonesia still has high maternal mortality rates but basic education through primary school enrolment is improving.

Table 6
Indonesia’s Rank & Score: Basic Capabilities Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Children reaching 5th grade</th>
<th>Survival up to 5</th>
<th>Births attended by skilled health personnel</th>
<th>BCI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>87 (low)</td>
<td>96 (medium)</td>
<td>73 (very low)</td>
<td>88 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>94 (medium)</td>
<td>96 (medium)</td>
<td>79 (very low)</td>
<td>90 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>86 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>74 (very low)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Social Watch

Indonesia does not fare too well on the Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index. In 2012 Indonesia achieved 67.86 percent of protecting social and economic rights. Although there was an improvement compared to 2011 values, performance worsened when compared to 2010. The country consistently preforms poorly in the areas of right to food and right to work, although it improved in fulfilling rights to education.

Table 7
Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index Values: Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SERF Index Value</th>
<th>Right to Food</th>
<th>Right to Health</th>
<th>Right to Education</th>
<th>Right to Housing</th>
<th>Right to Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>67.86</td>
<td>45.33</td>
<td>83.95</td>
<td>95.19</td>
<td>64.26</td>
<td>50.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>65.71</td>
<td>45.01</td>
<td>85.16</td>
<td>93.43</td>
<td>63.88</td>
<td>41.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>69.29</td>
<td>45.75</td>
<td>85.95</td>
<td>93.82</td>
<td>65.88</td>
<td>54.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Social Watch, Core Country SERF Indices 2010, 2011 and 2012 (Note that 2010 data was adjusted in 2013).

Trends in the country’s Economic Freedom Scores produced by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal are also rather bleak. From 2010 to 2014 the country has been categorized as ‘Mostly Unfree’, with only a small increase in its score from 55.5 to 58.5.23

These macro-level figures illustrate the complexity of the socio-economic context. While the economy has grown, 65 million people remain highly vulnerable to shocks. Disparities in income and geographic areas remain, made more complex by the number of people ‘floating’ between the poor and middle class’.24

2.2.3 Socio-cultural context

With respect to the socio-cultural context it is of interest to look at global indices that provide some insight into the level of trust between ordinary people and the extent to which tolerance exists. On a whole, Indonesia has been able to maintain peace as indicated in the improvements in scores recorded by the annual Global Peace Index. In 2010, the country scored 1.950 on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the best score. This has gradually improved to 1.853 in 2014, with a rank of 54 out of 162 countries.

Nonetheless, inequality, socio-economic conditions and rights claims (especially land rights) are still a source of localized incidences of conflict in Indonesia. Between 2010 and 2014 there has been a rising incidence of resource and identity-based conflicts as well as vigilantism.25

Amongst other components, the Social Progress Index published in 2014 examines whether there is opportunity for individuals to reach their full potential by scoring four different components: personal rights; personal freedom and choice; tolerance and inclusion; and access to advanced education. Indonesia scores low in this regard, at just 43.86 out of 100 and ranking 92nd out of 132 countries. Freedom of religion, tolerance for immigrants and religious intolerance are all considered to be weak (red), while the majority of the components are scored as neutral (yellow).

The Edelman Trust Barometer Survey, which collects annual data from 33,000 respondents in 27 countries has shown that on aggregate, Indonesians’ confidence in nongovernmental organisations, government, media and businesses increased by 10 percent in the 2014 trust index. Interestingly, businesses, with 82 percent, are the most trusted of the four sectors compared to 73 percent for NGOs, 53 percent for government and 73 percent of respondents putting their trust in the media.

23 http://www.heritage.org/index/
24 World Bank’s Indonesia Development Policy Review 2014
25 Data from the National Violence Monitoring System: www.snpk-indonesia.com/
According to survey results, Indonesians believe businesspeople are more inclined to tell the truth than their government counterparts and three times more likely to fix problems.26

The trends in levels of trust in NGOs over the past four years are noteworthy. In 2011, the trust level was at 61 percent, decreasing to 53 percent in 2012 and 51 percent in 2013. Reports claimed this was due to a lack of transparency and accountability. Edelman reported that the trust levels in 2013 were the lowest amongst eight Asia Pacific countries surveyed, ascribed to the growth of horizontal, peer-to-peer networks and a preference for social media.27 The most recent results released in 2014 show substantial jump to 73 percent in 2014 which is attributed to NGOs now being able to ‘walk the talk’ in accountability and transparency, as well as the emergence of ‘corporate NGOs’.28

2.3 Civil Society context issues with regards to the MDG

Several important changes took place during the 2011 and 2014 period. First, the global financial crisis and Indonesia’s rise to a middle-income country led to a decrease in international donor funding. Development actors, including CSOs and NGOs, have to compete harder for funding. Some have been more successful than others in diversifying funding by turning to the private sector or private foundations. At the expense of past idealism, local NGOs are now more disposed to receiving funding sources which in the past may have been criticized as supporting neoliberalism.

Regulatory changes also affected the civil society arena positively and negatively. Amongst the more controversial laws to spark reaction was Law No. 17/2013 on Societal Organisations. In an open letter sent before the bill was enacted, CIVICUS said the law would undermine freedom of association and “prevent CSOs from working on sensitive topics related to good governance and democratic reform in the public interest”.29 FORUM-ASIA deplored the repressive provisions in the law that “leave all groups vulnerable to attacks, undermining the hard-won democratic space that has been forged by civil society since the end of the New Order regime.”30

Other laws passed that provoked criticism were the State Intelligence Law (October 2011) and the Social Conflict Law (April 2012). NGOs and media see these laws as imposing further restrictions on freedom of speech, potentially leading to the criminalization of human rights defenders and signifying a tightening of state control. Discriminatory content was also an issue in discussions on the Religious Harmony Bill in 2013, for which drafting was initiated in despite not being part of the planned National Legislative Program. Late in 2013, the House of Representatives came under fire again for its weak stance against religious intolerance when it re-endorsed a law that limits state-recognized religions to six.

Land rights and natural resource protection have been a long-standing issue for Indonesia. While Indonesia has adopted and amended laws to improve the rights of smallholders and indigenous communities, many of these regulations have faltered in their implementation. Part of the issue lies in the overlap and lack of clarity of laws adopted that regulate different sectors and local legislation. Another issue is that there is a lack of oversight in the procedures such as granting permits and licensing. These problems, which are commonly found across development sectors, are compounded

28 Jakarta Globe (Indonesians Trust Businesses More Than Govt Survey Shows)
by a lack of information among local communities on what the laws regulate and their rights vis-à-vis them.
3 Description of Common Room and its contribution to civil society/policy changes

3.1 Background Common Room

Common Room began under the auspices of the Bandung Centre for New Media Arts (BCfNMA), an organisation founded in 2001 by artists RE Hartanto and Gustaff H. Iskandar; architect T. Ismail Reza, and graphic designer Reina Wulansari. At the time, BCfNMA was meant to serve as a vehicle for the development of multidisciplinary arts and education in Indonesia. In 2003, BCfNMA began collaborating with Tobucil, a small bookstore, in setting up a shared space for literacy activities and the promotion of creative potential. It was from this collaborative initiative that Common Room was born. Tobucil decided to continue to expand its activities independently, while BCfNMA was merged into Common Room, taking on a new organisational structure. In 2006, Common Room Networks Foundation registered as a non-profit organisation.

Common Room aimed to develop a civil society through arts, culture and the use of technology (ICT/media). It wants civil society participation to be inclusive, and it desires to provide the means for communities and individuals from different backgrounds to communicate their creative ideas to one another, thereby enhancing societal harmony. Common Room functions as an open platform for various activities related to art, culture and use of ICT/media. Common Room has facilitated numerous exhibitions, screenings, workshops, lectures, discussions, small music concerts, cultural festivals, etc. with the purpose of developing public knowledge and creativity. It has become a place that facilitates dialogue and multidisciplinary cooperation intended to connect individuals, communities and various organisations with diverse economic, social and political interests.

3.2 MFS II interventions related to Civil Society

Since its establishment, Common Room has endeavoured to be more than just a physical space; striving to be a melting pot of activities, ideas and creative discourse. In its early engagement with Hivos, the creation of a platform for expression and engagement through arts, culture and the use of technology in Bandung was regarded as a milestone achievement. The 2012-2013 period focused on sustaining spaces for citizen engagement and interaction, with a focus on a pluralistic society. Interventions were to focus on:

1. Expression and appreciation through a range of events such as film screenings, art grants, festivals, discussions, lectures, concerts, exhibitions, etc.
2. Training and education for individual artists in art, culture, and ICT.
3. Producing publications that included thematic books, web articles, anthology, and reports.
4. Working with the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy to support the development of cultural centres through policy development and campaigns for creative economy, social, economic and cultural rights. 31

Common Room intended to contribute to civil society by enhancing civic engagement, strengthening intermediary artists' organisations, and influencing policy. First, Common Room attempted to create a more pluralistic society, playing an intermediary role by encouraging interaction amongst artists and between artists and citizens through events with democratic, human rights or gender themes.

31 “Kerschet Common Room 1005103”, Hivos, 2012
Secondly, Common Room supported artist groups and collectives to engage with citizens and the public, whilst developing financial means to support the activities of creative communities. Thirdly the organisation aimed at getting involved in advocacy by assisting the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy in developing local cultural centres.

3.3 Basic information

Table 8
*Basic information Common Room*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Details</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of SPO</td>
<td>Common Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consortium</td>
<td>People Unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Hivos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start date of cooperation</td>
<td>MFS II: 31 May 2012 Earlier cooperation started in 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG/Theme</td>
<td>Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFS II Project Name</td>
<td>Open Platform for Expression and Citizen Engagement in Bandung and West Java, Indonesia (Project ID: 1005103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract period</td>
<td>May 31, 2012 - December 30, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlier contract (ID 189I01/Osiris No. 1001474) for period October 1, 2009 – September 30, 2011 € 47,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total budget FPU</td>
<td>€ 35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors if applicable</td>
<td>Dinas KUKM Bandung City, ASEF, Ministry for Tourism &amp; Creative Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimation of % of budget for Civil Society</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Project documents

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32 Costs that relate to civil society development or policy influence are those costs that possibly contribute to the development of the CIVICUS dimensions, excluding coordination and office costs; staff costs and financial reserves.
4 Data collection and analytical approach

4.1 Adjustments made in the methodology of the evaluation

The evaluation team tried to follow the operational guidelines to a great extent, but was unable to have a workshop with all of Common Room’s sub-groups. Common Room currently consists of just three personnel (a director and two staff). None of the board members were able to participate in the workshop. Nevertheless, the workshop participants were highly committed to the workshop. They were also very helpful in arranging the meetings with external resource persons.

The evaluation team was unable to obtain averages or scores for each subgroup as participants found the guiding questions difficult to discern, and their responses once the questions were explained tended to be biased. The in-country team has assigned the scores in Appendix 3 based on an analysis of the available evidence.

4.2 Difficulties encountered during data collection

During data collection, the team experienced the following difficulties:

- Workshop participants did not really understand, or were unfamiliar with the CS indicators or the CIVICUS framework. They found it difficult to relate Common Room’s situation with these indicators, although all of them participated in the baseline process. This lessened the effectiveness of the workshop.
- Common Room’s logical framework and reports were largely activity and output oriented. Thus it was difficult to obtain required information on higher-level outcome and impact level results. This also affected the quick process-tracing that was done for Common Room.
- The current Hivos Programme Officer for the Expression and Engagement Programme was unfamiliar with the details of the SPO portfolio because she began working on the programme in 2013.

4.3 Identification of two outcomes for process tracing

Given the limitations in the data and information available, only one outcome was selected for quick process tracing. The outcome, ‘Karinding community has become more organized and capable of championing the revival of an interest in Karinding and supporting the underground metal scene’, was selected to be measured for effectiveness.

The selection was made with the following considerations:

- Given the lack of data and challenges in collecting available information, it still seemed sensible to focus on finding evidence to confirm the outcome’s achievement.
- The outcome is in line with Common Room’s Theory of Change (ToC). The ToC developed in 2012 had two preconditions, namely the ‘provision of public space’, and ‘strengthening the creative industry’ that aligned with the outcome.
- This outcome is in line with the MFS-II end line evaluation orientation for Indonesia to focus on strengthening the relations with other organisations in civil society to undertake joint activities. The outcome is also in line with the interests of the CFA, Hivos, particularly with regards to expression and engagement.
5 Results

5.1 Results obtained in relation to intervention logic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme area</th>
<th>Contract deliverables (2012-2013)</th>
<th>Level of achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Expression &amp; Appreciation</td>
<td>The events go as planned with more audiences than the previous years (Baseline: 2010: 1,308; 2011: 3,556).</td>
<td>Regularly facilitated exhibitions, music concerts and cultural &amp; arts festivals. Not achieved, because audience decreased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The increase of events with democracy, women issues and human rights themes (baseline: 2010: 2%; 2011: 1%)</td>
<td>- 2012: 2,020 - 2013: 2,052 - 1st half 2014: 1,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The strategy to expand the involvement of women participants (baseline: 2010: 30%; 2011: 23%)</td>
<td>Regularly facilitated exhibitions, music concerts and cultural &amp; arts festivals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Education &amp; Training</td>
<td>No target identified in contract</td>
<td>Routine classroom trainings, which included classes in: psychology, dance, Karinding, computer, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Publication</td>
<td>The publishing of planned media: 3 journals and books and weekly updated website</td>
<td>Partially achieved: In addition publications on their website and social media, Common Room published two books: one book archiving the Nu-Substance programme from 2007 to 2012 and &quot;Reasoning&quot; (a collection of writings produced in collaboration with the Moedomo Learning Initiative / MLI) with diverse themes focusing on science and education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Policy advocacy</td>
<td>The assistance of local cultural bodies running in at least 3 cities which one out of it resides in outside Java Island.</td>
<td>Partially achieved: Common Room supported Ministry of Tourism &amp; Creative Economy in monitoring and evaluating activities of cultural centres in 9 provinces outside Java Island. Cooperation with West Java provincial Development Planning Agency (Bappeda, specifically Pusdalitbang) in developing an academic paper entitled, &quot;utilization of natural resources and local culture for the development of ecotourism destinations and creative economy&quot;. The collaboration resulted in the production of two policy recommendations documents that became reference material for the regional Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMD) in 2013. No evidence in Common Room reports. In ELSAM reports collaboration mentioned with regards to Common Room joining the Declaration of Internet Freedom together with 14 other organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The synergy with another Hivos partner(s) in this assistance of local cultural bodies.</td>
<td>Partially achieved: Common Room supported Ministry of Tourism &amp; Creative Economy in monitoring and evaluating activities of cultural centres in 9 provinces outside Java Island. Cooperation with West Java provincial Development Planning Agency (Bappeda, specifically Pusdalitbang) in developing an academic paper entitled, &quot;utilization of natural resources and local culture for the development of ecotourism destinations and creative economy&quot;. The collaboration resulted in the production of two policy recommendations documents that became reference material for the regional Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMD) in 2013. No evidence in Common Room reports. In ELSAM reports collaboration mentioned with regards to Common Room joining the Declaration of Internet Freedom together with 14 other organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Campaign</td>
<td>No target identified in contract</td>
<td>Insufficient information in reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Community development</td>
<td>No target identified in contract</td>
<td>Unclear which activities specifically focused on improving dialogue between civil society elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Research &amp; development</td>
<td>No target identified in contract</td>
<td>Research in the area of youth and creative economy. New media forms explored and 20 works developed presented to the public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Fundraising</td>
<td>No target identified in contract</td>
<td>Not achieved: Common Room expected to mobilize funds from local government and private sector for events, but this fell short of expectations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is difficult to conclude the extent to which planned results in the SPO’s intervention logic were achieved. This is due to several reasons. First, the logical framework is activity-oriented. There are no clear linkages between the activities and the intended orientation and deliverables of the 2012-2013 programme. Information provided in the reports by Common Room is inconsistent and does not report clearly against contract deliverables. The contract documents for the Hivos and Common Room engagement over the 2012-2013 period also include a specific focus on building the SPO’s internal organisational capacity. Yet very little seems to have been achieved in this area. Overall there is a lack of direction to the activities implemented, whilst the reported activities are difficult to match to a concise project plan.

5.2   Changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period

5.2.1   Civic engagement

Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

Since the baseline, Common Room has effectively used its space to bring together Bandung’s creative community through a number of events, classes, discussions, workshops and other activities. Between 2012 and mid-2014, some 383 activities were organised on a wide range of themes. These themes included contemporary arts, public policy, anti-violence, anti-corruption, science, history, religion, ICT and media, and others. The majority of the activities were held at the local level and have attracted a more diverse audience and participants with different backgrounds and interests. Participants included foreign artists, photographers, high-school students, academia, forums, government, media, and small businesses. However, female participation averaged at around 30 percent, with no significant increase since the baseline.

Unfortunately, there has been a decline in the number of participants since 2011. In 2011 Common Room attracted 3,556 participants, which fell to 2,052 in 2013. This decline can be attributed to a decline in funding as well as Common Room’s move to a new, less central location in 2012. While the number of individual artists utilizing Common Room’s facilities dropped, the SPO has managed to work with more diverse groups and organisations, although these are less closely related to artistic expression and engagement. It has become less clear which groups Common Room aims to target through its interventions, with the exception of an alternative music genre.

Despite challenges, Common Room has managed to maintain its support to marginal forms of art such as Karinding and the underground metal scene, which has given rise to an alternative, counter-culture amongst youth in Bandung. Common Room has provided space for Karinding groups to emerge, plan, organize and develop. These groups have experimented with the fusion of metal and customary music genres, gaining not just popularity, but acceptance and support from the government.

With regards to Common Room’s political engagement, the SPO’s director has close personal relations with the local government. As such, Common Room has been able to gain more political support, financial backing from the government, and has to an extent influenced policies and practices in the areas of creative industry and arts and culture.
5.2.2 Level of organisation

This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena.

Since the baseline, Common Room’s relations with other actors in the civil society arena have shifted. The SPO now has closer relations with education and youth-oriented CSOs and with fewer creative arts organisations. In addition, Common Room now engages in a local disaster risk reduction forum supported by International Organisation for Migration (IOM). According to Common Room’s management team this shift is due to Common Room’s relocation in 2012, and the lack of space for exhibitions.

Common Room remains close to Karinding groups and the underground metal scene, but has less intense relations with the Bandung Creative City Forum, Rumah Cemara and WALHI. Rather, regular informal and formal meetings now take place with the likes of the disaster risk reduction forum, Moedomo Learning Initiative, and the Indonesia Art Coalition. Karinding groups continue to experiment and practice music at Common Room’s location on a regular basis.

Karinding has become a less marginalized art form. Karinding Attack, a band formed in 2009, and continuously supported by Common Room, has championed the popularity of the traditional music instrument, the Karinding. Their unique mix of underground metal and customary practices has challenged public perceptions of both musical genres. With Common Room’s artistic and promotional support, and due to the popularity of Karinding Attack, a new contemporary sub-culture, which is modern yet seeks to connect to Sundanese cultural roots, has emerged. In turn, this has also reduced negative stigmas often associated with underground metal bands and garnered public interest and demand for this new form of musical expression.

As an organisation, Common Room is struggling with an unsteady financial resource base. Although Common Room has managed to gain financial support from the local government in 2011, 2012 and 2013, it has still depended heavily on Hivos funding. Annual expenditures have often exceeded annual incomes, and institutional costs were 50 percent in 2012 and 38 percent in 2013. Lower institutional expenses are most likely related to the slim staffing structure. At present, Common Room has just three staff.

5.2.3 Practice of Values

Practice of Values refers to the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. Important values that CIVICUS looks at such as transparency, democratic decision-making, taking into account diversity that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society’s practices are coherent with their ideals.

With regards to Common’s Rooms internal practices, there are no significant changes since the baseline in downward accountability. Common Room’s board receives reports on an annual basis and only holds meetings when necessary. The board has expanded to include a representative of a Karinding group, one of Common Room’s target groups. Although the executive claimed to have improved reporting practices and organisational policies, the size of Common Rooms staffing structure means that this does not have an extensive impact. Programmatic decisions and direction are determined solely by the current director, and Common Room is very much a ‘one-man show’.

Common Room admits that they face internal challenges that reflect on its performance as an organisation. The SPO relates this mainly to the difficulties to obtain human resources cable of designing and developing activities based on the organisation’s vision and mission.33

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33 Email communication with Gustaff H. Iskandar, 29 January 2015
Common Room has allocated funds for external organisation audits in 2011, 2012 and 2013. The evaluation team only received the financial audit for 2011. None of the audit reports are publically available.

5.2.4 Perception of Impact

Perception of Impact assesses the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perceptions of both civil society actors (internal) as well as actors outside civil society are taken into account. Specific sub-dimensions for this evaluation are the extent to which the SPO has contributed to engaging more people in social or political activities, strengthening CSOs and their networks, and has influenced public and private sector policies.

Civil society arena

Common Room’s impact upon the civil society arena shows both slightly positive and slightly negative trends.

Generally speaking Common Room’s most important positive impact has been its facilitation in the emergence of a new sub culture, which has become a new hype among urban youth in Bandung. This new culture merges a traditional instrument in the Sundanese customary community, the karinding, in the underground metal scene, another marginal subculture. Increasingly a trend is being observed among youth in Bandung to bring their karinding instruments with them, wearing traditional headbands as a means to show their identity and to socialise with individuals with the same interests. Underground metal groups, in the past labelled as antisocial and westernised, that now use the karinding observe how their position in society is improving. Apart from these, spells and mantras and burning incenses, often considered as a violation of Islamic rule, have become an integral part of karinding group performances. The popular karinding now also creates a market for those who make this instrument. Common Room has promoted this instrument since 2008.

Common Room’s move to a less central location in 2012 with fewer facilities for artists (individuals and groups) meant in practice a decline in the number of activities organised in the new locality as well as less participants. At the same time the utilization of its facilities have not much decreased, but the diversity of artists making use of these facilities has gone down, with mostly karinding performance groups rehearsing, whereas other non – artist groups like the disaster risk reduction forum of Bandung frequently use these facilities.

Public sector relations and policy-practice influence

Since the baseline assessment Common Room has intensified its engagement with the public sector and continued to lobby the government on other issues than in 2012.

With regards to public sector relations, Common Room has engaged in a number of lobby activities in the areas of arts promotion, creative economy and risk reduction through forums and coalitions. Common Room’s focus has been on developing policies and programmes related to creative economy. The SPO worked with the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy as well as the West Java Creative Economic Development Committee in this area.

It is unclear what tangible results these new forms of engagement have produced. What has been more successful has been the long-term campaign efforts by the Concerned Citizen Forum for Babakan Siliwangi, of which Common Room has been a part of, to convince the local government to revoke a building permit ranted to a private company that was planning to alter the function of a community forest area into a commercial area.

Common Room has also achieved some level of success in gaining government financial support and working alongside the government to develop policy inputs. In 2012, the SPO received funding support from the city government, and collaborated with the Provincial Development Planning Agency as well as the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy. Common Room produced recommendations on ecotourism and creative economy, and on the revitalization of cultural centres. The documents were said to have been used as reference materials by the government in formulating mid-term development
plans. But for Common Room itself the collaboration was not satisfying since it was a challenge to receive payments for the technical services it provided to the government and because their inputs were not taken up sufficiently. Common Room remains critical of the effectiveness of government programs.

Private sector relations and policy – practice influencing
With regards to the private sector, Common Room has not engaged companies and other actors in strengthening the development of a creative industry. Although the SPO did collaborate with small businesses and media, event organizers this was limited to specific events such as the Nu-Substance festival and through the utilization of Common Room’s facilities.

5.2.5 Civil Society Environment

The social, political and economic environment in which civil society operates affects its room for manoeuvre. The civil society context has been described in Chapter 3.

The civil society environment has not affected Common Room to a large extent. Rather Common Room’s forced relocation has had a larger impact on its ability to influence and manoeuvre due to the less strategic location. This also illustrates Common Room overreliance on its facilities to relate to other civil society actors and artistic groups. Although Common Room has now opened up to collaborate with other actors, the choice of new partnerships seems to be less strategic to the organisation’s vision and more driven by opportunistic motives for resource mobilization.

Common Room has put in place a more enabling environment for Karinding groups, who have become better acknowledged and now enjoy more government and public support. Young musicians and artists are now attracted to a sub-culture that promotes a customary-infused identity that is pluralistic in nature. Common Room is also likely to benefit from the personal relations that its director has with the current mayor of Bandung. But these favourable conditions may change if local elections usher in a new administration which is less open to creativity and artists’ groups.

5.3 To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partners?

Common Room was not selected for in-depth process-tracing. The evaluation team was able to identify one outcome achieved in the 2012-2014 period for quick process-tracing. This outcome is that the Karinding community has become more organized and capable of championing the revival of an interest in Karinding, a traditional Sundanese musical instrument, through a unique combination with the heavy metal music genre. Karinding Attack, a music group established in 2009, is recognized as an ‘ambassador’ of a progressive Sundanese cultural movement amongst the youth.

Common Room has helped the band Karinding Attack become popular. The band has become the champion of the unique blend of underground metal and Sundanese customary music. The underground metal community has grown to be more accepted and are enjoying a better position to exist in Bandung’s urban scene. They have also

Figure 1  Karinding is a traditional Sundanese wind instrument from West Java. It typically measures at 20 cm long and is commonly made from the bark of palm or bamboo trees. (Photo from: http://traditionalmusicinstrument.blogspot.com)
received more support from the government, with an increasing demand for performances and trainings on how to play Karinding. Karinding has attracted urban youth interest in exploring Sundanese customs. This in turn has meant that Sundanese customary identity has become more acknowledged and has been afforded a space in society. Karinding groups, like Karinding Attack, are more able to express their identity and practices freely through burning incense, using mantras and wearing traditional clothing. In the past this was perceived to be peculiar by mainstream urban society. This outcome has also been confirmed by prominent cultural figures of Bandung.

There are three pathways that could explain this outcome. The first attributes the outcome as a result of the popularity of Karinding Attack’s personnel among youth. The second attributes the outcome as a manifestation of a ‘hype’ (contemporary sub-culture), which has driven youth to seek new and unique forms of identity. The third pathway attributes the revival of Karinding to Common Room’s support to Karinding Attack.

**Information that confirms or rejects the pathways:**
1. **Pathway 1:** Karinding Attack’s personnel drive the popularity of Karinding
   Karinding Attack was formed when Common Room began innovating the combination of Karinding (an unpopular instrument at the time) with other musical instruments and genres. The personnel of Karinding Attack are popular figures amongst the youth and known for their contribution to the underground metal group Ujungberung Rebels. It is possible that the revival and popularity of Karinding is due to the fame of the Karinding Attack personnel.

   Information that **confirms** pathway 1:
   Man Jasad and Kimung, two of the Karinding Attack’s personnel, were already popular before Karinding Attack was formed. Man Jasad was a prominent figure among metal heads in Bandung as he was the vocalist of Jasad Band; while Kimung was a member of Burgerkill, a very famous band in the underground metal community in Indonesia.

   Information that **rejects** pathway 1:
   Man Jasad, does not deny that his popularity has been behind Karinding Attack’s overall popularity. However, in his opinion, without Common Room’s intervention they would never have existed, or gained the same level of popularity.

2. **Pathway 2:** A contemporary sub-culture hype drives Karinding’s popularity
   The urban youth are continuously seeking new forms of expression and unique identities, which often leads to new hypes. This could also become an explaining factor behind the rise of the Karinding trend.

   Information that **confirms** pathway 2:
   Bandung is popular as a barometer of lifestyle in Indonesia. Many new music groups and fashion trends have emerged from the city. Since the early 2000s, Bandung has boasted thriving underground music scene that includes punk, metal, hard-core and other alternative genres. Underground metal ‘activists’ reported that at the time of Karinding Attack’s formation (2008-2009), there was actually a downward trend in the metal underground scene. This drove many of its artists to seek out new forms of innovation.

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Before Karinding Attack was formed, there was already a growing hype around Sundanese customary identity. Common Room’s introduction of Karinding was actually a response to this hype. Outside the Karinding community, other forms of Sundanese cultural expression have also grown. Some examples of this include Rabu Nyunda, a city government initiative which stipulates that all students should wear Sundanese attributes and speak Sundanese on Wednesday; increased popularity of the Suku Baduy village, an isolated customary community, as a tourist destination and; trekking and hiking expeditions to Gunung Padang, famous for its remnants of an ancient mystical pyramid. The government and creative industries have sought to harness a ‘creative city’ development framework.

Information that rejects this pathway: none

3. Pathway 3: Common Room assisted Karinding Attack to become popular, in turn reviving an interest in Karinding

Information that confirms pathway 3:
Karinding Attack confirmed that Common Room helped them artistically and provided them a space for training and performing. Man Jasad, the lead singer of Karinding Attack, confirmed that without Common Room’s intervention, Karinding Attack would not be where they are today with regards to their existence and popularity. Common Room helped to develop Karinding classes and teaching material, which allowed

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more people to be exposed to and learn Karinding, resulting in the emergences of more Karinding bands/groups.

Information that rejects pathway 3: none

Conclusions:
Based on the available data and information, we conclude that Pathway 1 is a necessary explanation for the outcome, but it needs Pathway 3 to be sufficient; and vice versa. This means that they are part of a causal package that are together sufficient to explain the outcome. Pathway 2 is a sufficient but not necessary explanation for the outcome, as both Pathway 1 and 2 may also explain the outcome. Common Room played an important role in helping underground metal artists experiment with Karinding. In the art sphere, institutions like Common Room offered a meeting space for various groups to redefine artistic expression.36 Groups like Karinding Attack benefitted from the space offered by Common Room to practice and innovate, and also profited from the numerous festivals and events organized through the institute to gain a wider audience and fan base.

5.4 What is the relevance of these changes?

5.4.1 Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the selection of the outcome identified for analysis is relevant to the 2012 Theory of Change. Common Room sees itself as a platform and bridge to bring together communities and individuals from different backgrounds. Broadly speaking, the interventions of Common Room are around offering education and training, policy advocacy, developing spaces for expression and the production and distribution of knowledge. However, the evaluation team has found that the preconditions that Common Room sought to achieve in 2012, have not been fully realized. Common Room itself attributes the limitations in achieving intended results to its lack of organisational capacity. As such, the relevance of changes to the ToC is limited.

First, internally Common Room’s ability to network, mobilize human resources and sustain its interventions remains rather limited. Although they have made a name for themselves amongst the Karinding and underground metal scene, as well as gaining government recognition, Common Room organisationally remains rather weak. Second, the public space they offer is less accessible and less utilized by marginalized or non-mainstream artists compared to 2012.

Common Room intended to promote the use of ICT/media in their interventions. Other than developing some forms of explorative media and hosting workshops on ICT, the use of media and technology has not become a defining feature of Common Room’s work although it did seem to be part in parcel of its ambitions in 2012.

The changes that are relevant to the ToC relate to the forms of cultural identity that Common Room has successfully promoted. Sundanese traditions have been reintroduced into modern forms of musical expression and there seems to be a tolerance amongst the public for the mystical, mantra-like performances of Karinding bands. There is also more tolerance and acceptance of metal bands, who were often stigmatised in the past. As such, former ‘outcasts’ so to speak have been able to innovate through the support provided by Common Room and the preservation of cultural identity has indeed contributed to positive associations with this new sub-culture.

5.4.2 Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating

Bandung as a city is still known for its creative industry, but much of this creativity has been commercialized. In urban centres like Bandung, artists have found it a challenge to survive without compromising idealism and creative values. The creative economy discourse has been present in Bandung since the late 2000s and originated from initiatives of creative networks\textsuperscript{37}. The local government responded to pressures from alliances like Bandung Creative City Forum (BCCF) in formulating policies that promote creative industries. Although there is government support, arguably citizen-driven initiatives for dialogue and the exchange of knowledge and ideas are still as important to drive diversity and as elements of public spaces.

Common Room has continued to provide space for creative alternatives, especially in the music scene. Without the SPO’s support, groups like Karinding Attack may not have been as influential in the youth sub-culture as they are today. Common Room was amongst the first to facilitate the fusion of traditional instruments with the metal genre.

Common Room, like many other cultural and artistic spaces, has supported the emergence of alternative cultural movements. As such, they have contributed to a more diverse civil society through the dynamic sphere of art and culture. The underground music scene “provides young Indonesians with a set of alternative identities and lifestyles, providing a route to escape from, challenge, or at least negotiate the dominant frameworks of nationally, ethnicity and class”\textsuperscript{38}.

5.4.3 Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and the CFA

The support provided to Common Room falls under Hivos’ Expression and Engagement programme. This programme aims to generate social debate and cultural dialogue in order for a dynamic culture and new perspectives to emerge. Hivos considers space for socially engaged art and culture to be limited in developing countries and sees art and cultural expression as a means to generate critical reflection, pluralism and diversity.\textsuperscript{39} “For Hivos, culture, media and other forms of communication are important means to promote citizenship” and a means to challenge dominant ideas.\textsuperscript{40}

According to Hivos documents, Common Room was supported because its creative ideas were in line with Hivos’ focus. Common Room was viewed to be working on “empowering civil society through encouraging knowledge sharing and collaboration between communities and/or individuals”. The SPO was considered strategic for its support to communication and interaction, whilst maintaining principles of a democratic and pluralistic society.\textsuperscript{41}

According to the current Expression and Engagement programme officer of Hivos’ Regional Office for Southeast Asia who took over the management of the portfolio when Common Room support was coming to an end, the SPO did indeed provide a platform for alternative forms of artistic and cultural expression. However, Hivos found the interventions of the SPO to be less strategic. It was acknowledged that Common Room’s director had many good linkages with the local government in Bandung and that sufficient support could be drawn from the government. However, the organisation seemed to have lacked a strategic vision on how generate greater influence. Moreover, the issues the organisation faces internally, specifically the inability to generate new emerging leaders or staff, have led to Hivos’ decision

\textsuperscript{37} Zul Fahmi, Fikri. 2014. Creative Economy Policy in Developing Countries: The Case of Indonesia. Paper presented at the 54th ESRA Conference. Saint Petersburg Russia, August 2014, p. 11
\textsuperscript{40} “Hivos Vision Paper: Civil Society Building 2008”, Hivos, 2008, p. 11
\textsuperscript{41} “RO SEA at HO 1005103 Contract Intake Common Room, 2012-08-15 ”, Hivos
to discontinue support to Common Room especially given that Hivos funds were also intended to improve Common Room’s organisational performance.  

5.5 Explaining factors

5.5.1 Internal factors

In 2012, Hivos assessed the capacity of Common Room using the five capacities framework. The assessment scored the core capacities of Common Room, with most areas receiving respectable scores of 7 or 8 (9 being the maximum). The following table presents an overview of the scores:

Table 10  
Hivos assessment of Common Room against the 5C framework.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>5 Cs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The capability to act and commit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The organisation has a clear purpose and acts on decisions collectively. The leadership is accepted by staff, inspiring, action-oriented and reliable.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>ancements to mobilise sufficient financial resources, and (where relevant) non material resources from members/supporters.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>The organisation is internally transparent and accountable. (Relations between staff, direction and board; quality of decision-making process)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>ancements to act and commit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The capability to perform</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>The number, composition and expertise of staff is adequate in view of the organisation’s objectives and programmes. (Indicate when there is high staff turnover)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>The organisation has a coherent and realistic strategic plan. (Context and problem analysis; Theory of Change; quality of formulation of objectives, intended results and indicators; explanation of strategic choices)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>The quality of financial and administrative management is adequate. (Budget, funding plan, financial management, financial report)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>The organisation has an appropriate monitoring and evaluation process (documentation &amp; data collection, involvement of stakeholders, quality of analysis and learning) and uses it for accountability and learning purposes.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The capability to relate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>The organisation maintains relevant institutional relationships with external stakeholders and is seen as credible and legitimate. (Indicate main strategic relationships and collaboration with other actors)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>The organisation is accountable to and communicates effectively with its primary constituents/beneficiaries. (Describe downward or horizontal accountability process; specify for women)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The capability to adapt and self-renew</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>The organisation (management) responds adequately to trends and changes in the context and uses up-to-date strategies and knowledge.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>The organisation (management) encourages and supports internal learning and reflection processes. (Conditions, incentives)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Capability to maintain consistency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>The organisation is capable to maintain consistency between ambition, vision, strategy and operations. The management is able to deal strategically with external pressure and conflicting demands.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality 1</td>
<td>To what extent has the organisation formulated objectives with regard to the position of women and issues of gender equality?</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality 2</td>
<td>To what extent does the organisation have internal gender expertise?</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality 3</td>
<td>To what extent does the organisation maintain relations with key GW&amp;D actors in its context, e.g. women’s movement, women’s organisations, gender experts?</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42 Interview with Dyana Savina Hutadjulu, Expression and Engagement programme officer of Hivos’ Regional Office for Southeast Asia, December 2014
In the 2012 partner capacity assessment, Common Room scored lowest in its capabilities to act and commit and to maintain consistency. The assessment pointed to a number of internal capacity issues that required strengthening in the areas of organisation, management and administration. It also noted that Common Room had high ambitions, but required staffing and funds to support these. In the end line evaluation, we found that little progress has been made in improving the areas found to be weak in 2012. In fact the expected achievements that were put forth in the baseline report with regards to the quality of Common Room’s organisation have not been reached. With regards to networking Common Room expected to have 8 personnel, and it now only has 3. Common Room also expected to be less dependent on Hivos for funds and expected to have set up a running business unit. Neither of these have been achieved either.

During baseline in mid-2012, Common Room was in process of moving locations due to difficulties in agreeing to rental terms and conditions. Its current location is less central than its previous location. The new office no longer has a gallery to display artworks or space to hold exhibitions. It is located in the middle of a residential area, where only a low level of noise and smaller crowds are tolerable. For youth and university students, it is further away and less accessible making it less attractive for young people to gather at Common Room. As an internal factor, the new location may explain why Common Room has seemingly become less effective in implementing its regular activities, which includes Karinding classes and a practice space for heavy metal groups.

In addition, Common Room’s vision and its wide scope with regards to themes and target groups is rather utopian in the sense that it does not have an explicit political aspiration and practical vision of the organisation’s direction. This explains why Common Room has a vague definition of their target groups, as demonstrated by a lack of such a definition in their proposal or activity plans. While such a vague definition presents problems in measuring Common Room’s effectiveness and efficiency, it also contradicts the high dependency of Common Room on its director, Gustaff H. Iskandar. External actors interviewed during the baseline criticized Common Room for being a ‘one-man-show’. The evaluation team found that such criticism is still applicable for Common Room at present, and this was also confirmed by Hivos. The developments in the metal and Karinding scene could also be attributed to the promulgation of personal interests of the director, a fan as well as a prominent figure in the punk and metal scene.

5.5.2 External factors

An external factor that supported the achievements by Common Room is the enabling environment that exists in Bandung. The current mayor is generally supportive of art, culture and creative initiatives. He was the former head of the Bandung Creative City Forum (BCCF) before taking office. The mayor’s involvement in BCCF, which claims to accommodate the interests of the public, made him amenable to engaging BCCF as a partner in developing the city’s creative potential.

During the 2011–2014 period, similar initiatives for the creation of alternative public spaces have emerged in Bandung. These spaces include Simul Space 1 & 2 (provided by BCCF), Galeri Gerilya, as

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43 Common Room moved from Jalan Kyai Gede Utama to Jalan Muararjeun.
well as private sector initiatives such as Selasar Soenaryo Art Space, a gallery and cafe. In this sense, Common Room has had to compete with similar players in the arts and culture arena.

In 2011, the former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono established a new Ministry for Tourism and Creative Economy. Common Room received support from the government through this Ministry. Common Room was involved in the development of policies for creative economy for Bandung in 2013 and worked with the Ministry to support the revival of cultural centres. In 2013, 44 percent of Common Room’s funding came from the Ministry for Tourism and Creative Economy. Following the 2014 elections, there has been a cabinet reshuffle and the Ministry has been renamed Ministry of Tourism. For Common Room this change is likely to impact their ability to receive financial support from the government as there is no longer an emphasis on creative economy.

5.5.3 Relations CFA-SPO

Common Room received support from Hivos since 2005, even before it was officially established as a foundation. It received micro-funds from Hivos twice in the 2005-2009 period before a regular partner contract was prepared in 2011.

Funds from Hivos in the 2012-2014 period were also meant to support the strengthening of Common Room organisationally. Hivos’ support also helped cover the rental costs (20 percent of € 35,000 provided in 2012-2013), which were especially important when Common Room had to face the difficult decision to relocate. Other capacity development support provided by Hivos was in the form of two workshops on governance in the organisations (management, vision and mission) and on theory of change. Hivos contracted Penabulu to provide direct assistance to Common Room to improve their financial reporting systems. According to Common Room training provided by Penabulu and Hivos has helped improve the organisational management and structured the financial reporting resulting in better audit results.

As illustrated in the table in Chapter 5.1, one of the deliverables in Common Room’s contract with Hivos included the creation of synergy with other Hivos partners in the assistance of local cultural bodies. There is no evidence that this occurred, but there is evidence of collaboration between Common Room, ELSAM and ICT Watch in the area of internet governance. Common Room joined 14 other organisations to sign the Declaration of Internet Freedom in 2012.

Hivos has decided to discontinue the partnership with Common Room in 2014. In its current programme Hivos seeks to support integrated, multi-actor initiatives. Common Room is less of a strategic choice for Hivos because it seeks to create more vibrancy by bringing together actors under common platforms.

49 “Statistik Kegiatan 2009-2013”, Common Room
51 “Hivos Capacity Assessment Form Common Room”, Hivos, August 2012
6 Discussion

6.1 Design of the intervention

The interventions of Common Room between 2012 and 2014 were designed to develop a platform for expression and engagement with civil society through arts, culture and the use of technology Bandung’s urban area\textsuperscript{52}. Although Common Room has promoted the development of a progressive sub-culture amongst youth through the fusion of musical genres and the revival of Sundanese traditions, this has not yet led to larger influences in the creative industry or economy of Bandung. Karinding itself could well just be a temporary hype and there is little evidence to suggest that Common Room has tried to infuse principles of tolerance or human rights within its support to the emergence of these groups.

Policy advocacy was included as an activity in the 2012-2014 period, but no relevant actions were taken beyond 2012 that led to tangible results in the areas of arts promotion and creative economy reduction through forums and coalitions.

Besides the Karinding and underground metal groups, Common Room does not have specific target groups or a specialized area of expertise. With growing competition from other artistic platforms in the Bandung area, it is unclear what sets Common Room apart and how the organisation will sustain as an open platform to encourage interactions that promote pluralism and diversity. Common Room has not been sufficiently innovative and seems to have continued along with business as usual, which may well lead to future challenges if Karinding proves to be a temporary hype and given its less strategic location.

\textsuperscript{52} “Kerschet Common Room 1005103”, Hivos, 2012
7 Conclusion

Common Room’s interventions provided a platform for artists and musicians to collaborate and experiment with new forms of expression. The SPO laid the foundations for the emergence of a new sub-culture in Bandung. This is an important change because it has brought more marginalized music traditions and groups to the forefront and in public view. The revival of Karinding, a unique Sundanese instrument, and its fusion with the underground metal scene have benefitted both music genres and generated a greater appreciation amongst the general public and the local government.

Unfortunately, Common Room as an organisation was unable to bring about or influence policies and practices of the local government directly. Although they have successfully garnered public sector financial support and have been engaged to provide technical assistance and policy inputs, there was no evidence of significant influence in this regard. Common Room, together with a host of CSOs in Bandung did however manage to successfully convince the city government to preserve a city forest. But this is a result of campaign efforts that have been going on since the early 2000s, with Common Room providing support to the movement.

The organisational performance of Common Room has not improved in the way the SPO and Hivos had intended. Events, workshops, classes and other activities hosted by Common Room have been more diverse but have been unable to attract more participation and attendance. Only Karinding groups, or artist collaborations that are related to Karinding, have benefitted significantly from Common Room’s support. Common Room has not been able to sufficiently identify who its target groups are, other than Karinding and the underground metal community.

The organisation had to face a tough decision in 2012 to move locations to a less central and less attractive space. This has resulted in fewer individual artists and other creative collectives utilizing Common Room. Common Room has coped with this situation by collaborating with other actors, like the disaster risk reduction forum, who are less relevant to the organisation’s mission and vision. Internally, Common Room has also been unable to diversify its leadership and staffing structures.

Nonetheless, the outcome achieved with regards to Karinding’s current niche in Bandung’s youth culture is relevant in that it offers a non-mainstream and alternative form of expression. The achievement is relevant to the context of Bandung, which is known for its creative industry but where art and cultural forms are often commercialized.

Table 11
Summary of findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When looking at the MFS II interventions of this SPO to strengthen civil society and/or policy influencing, how much do you agree with the following statements?</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The CS interventions were well designed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CS interventions were implemented as designed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CS interventions reached their objectives</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The observed outcomes are attributable to the CS interventions</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The observed CS outcomes are relevant to the beneficiaries of the SPO</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Score between 1 to 10, with 1 being "not at all" and 10 being "completely".
References and resource persons

Documents by SPO
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### Resource persons consulted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of key informant</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Function in organisation</th>
<th>Relation with SPO</th>
<th>Contact details including e-mail.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gustaff Hariman Iskandar</td>
<td>Common Room</td>
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<td><a href="mailto:blauloretta@gmail.com">blauloretta@gmail.com</a></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td><a href="mailto:dharmadonna@gmail.com">dharmadonna@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iman Rahman (Kimung)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andar Manik</td>
<td>Common Room</td>
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<td>Staff</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budi Dalton</td>
<td>Bandung Cultural Figure</td>
<td></td>
<td>External resource person</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budi Rajab</td>
<td>Sociologist</td>
<td></td>
<td>External resource person</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man Jasad</td>
<td>Karinding Attack Band</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Intermediate Organization</td>
<td>+6282116856660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyana Savina Hutadjulu</td>
<td>Hivos</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>CPA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 1 CIVICUS and Civil Society Index

CIVICUS, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation is an international alliance of members and partners which constitutes an influential network of organisations at the local, national, regional and international levels, and spans the spectrum of civil society. It has worked for nearly two decades to strengthen citizen action and civil society throughout the world. CIVICUS has a vision of a global community of active, engaged citizens committed to the creation of a more just and equitable world. This is based on the belief that the health of societies exists in direct proportion to the degree of balance between the state, the private sector and civil society.

One of the areas that CIVICUS works in is the Civil Society Index (CSI). Since 2000, CIVICUS has measured the state of civil society in 76 countries. In 2008, CIVICUS has considerably changed its CSI.

1. Guiding principles for measuring civil society

*Action orientation:* the principal aim of the CSI is to generate information that is of practical use to civil society practitioners and other primary stakeholders. Therefore, its framework had to identify aspects of civil society that can be changed, as well as generate knowledge relevant to action-oriented goals.

*CSI implementation must be participatory by design:* The CSI does not stop at the generation of knowledge alone. Rather, it also actively seeks to link knowledge-generation on civil society, with reflection and action by civil society stakeholders. The CSI has therefore continued to involve its beneficiaries, as well as various other actors, in this particular case, civil society stakeholders, in all stages of the process, from the design and implementation, through to the deliberation and dissemination stages.

This participatory cycle is relevant in that such a mechanism can foster the self-awareness of civil society actors as being part of something larger, namely, civil society itself. As a purely educational gain, it broadens the horizon of CSO representatives through a process of reflecting upon, and engaging with, civil society issues which may go beyond the more narrow foci of their respective organisations. A strong collective self-awareness among civil society actors can also function as an important catalyst for joint advocacy activities to defend civic space when under threat or to advance the common interests of civil society vis-à-vis external forces. These basic civil society issues, on which there is often more commonality than difference among such actors, are at the core of the CSI assessment.

*CSI is change oriented:* The participatory nature that lies at the core of the CSI methodology is an important step in the attempt to link research with action, creating a diffused sense of awareness and ownerships. However, the theory of change that the CSI is based on goes one step further, coupling this participatory principle with the creation of evidence in the form of a comparable and contextually valid assessment of the state of civil society. It is this evidence, once shared and disseminated, that ultimately constitutes a resource for action.

*CSI is putting local partners in the driver’s seat:* CSI is to continue being a collaborative effort between a broad range of stakeholders, with most importance placed on the relationship between CIVICUS and its national partners.
2. Defining Civil Society

The 2008 CIVICUS redesign team modified the civil society definition as follows:

The arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market – which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests.

Arena: In this definition the arena refers to the importance of civil society’s role in creating public spaces where diverse societal values and interests interact (Fowler 1996). CSI uses the term ‘arena’ to describe the particular realm or space in a society where people come together to debate, discuss, associate and seek to influence broader society. CIVICUS strongly believes that this arena is distinct from other arenas in society, such as the market, state or family.

Civil society is hence defined as a political term, rather than in economic terms that resemble more the ‘non-profit sector’.

Besides the spaces created by civil society, CIVICUS defines particular spaces for the family, the state and the market.

Individual and collective action, organisations and institutions: Implicit in a political understanding of civil society is the notion of agency; that civil society actors have the ability to influence decisions that affect the lives of ordinary people. The CSI embraces a broad range of actions taken by both individuals and groups. Many of these actions take place within the context of non-coercive organisations or institutions ranging from small informal groups to large professionally run associations.

Advance shared interests: The term ‘interests’ should be interpreted very broadly, encompassing the promotion of values, needs, identities, norms and other aspirations.

They encompass the personal and public, and can be pursued by small informal groups, large membership organisations or formal associations. The emphasis rests however on the element of ‘sharing’ that interest within the public sphere.

3. Civil Society Index- Analytical Framework

The 2008 Civil Society Index distinguishes 5 dimensions of which 4 (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values and perception of impact), can be represented in the form of a diamond and the fifth one (external environment) as a circle that influences upon the shape of the diamond. Civic Engagement, or ‘active citizenship’, is a crucial defining factor of civil society. It is the hub of civil society and therefore is one of the core components of the CSI’s definition. Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

Level of Organisation. This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena. Key sub dimensions are:

- Internal governance of Civil Society Organisations;
- Support infrastructure, that is about the existence of supporting federations or umbrella bodies;
- Self-regulation, which is about for instance the existence of shared codes of conducts amongst Civil Society Organisations and other existing self-regulatory mechanisms;
- Peer-to-peer communication and cooperation: networking, information sharing and alliance building to assess the extent of linkages and productive relations among civil society actors;
- Human resources, that is about the sustainability and adequacy of human resources available for CSOs in order to achieve their objectives:
  - Financial and technological resources available at CSOs to achieve their objectives;
• International linkages, such as CSO’s membership in international networks and participation in global events.

**Practice of Values.** This dimension assesses the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. CIVICUS identified some key values that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society’s practices are coherent with their ideals. These are:

- Democratic decision-making governance: how decisions are made within CSOs and by whom;
- Labour regulations: includes the existence of policies regarding equal opportunities, staff membership in labour unions, training in labour rights for new staff and a publicly available statement on labour standards;
- Code of conduct and transparency: measures whether a code of conduct exists and is available publicly. It also measures whether the CSO’s financial information is available to the public.
- Environmental standards: examines the extent to which CSOs adopt policies upholding environmental standards of operation;
- Perception of values within civil society: looks at how CSOs perceive the practice of values, such as non-violence. This includes the existence or absence of forces within civil society that use violence, aggression, hostility, brutality and/or fighting, tolerance, democracy, transparency, trustworthiness and tolerance in the civil society within which they operate.

**Perception of Impact.** This is about the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perception of both civil society actors (internal) as actors outside civil society (outsiders) is taken into account. Specific sub dimensions are

- Responsiveness in terms of civil society’s impact on the most important social concerns within the country. “Responsive” types of civil society are effectively taking up and voicing societal concerns.
- Social impact measures civil society’s impact on society in general. An essential role of civil society is its contribution to meet pressing societal needs;
- Policy impact: covers civil society’s impact on policy in general. It also looks at the impact of CSO activism on selected policy issues;
- Impact on attitudes: includes trust, public spiritedness and tolerance. The sub dimensions reflect a set of universally accepted social and political norms. These are drawn, for example, from sources such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as CIVICUS’ own core values. This dimension measures the extent to which these values are practised within civil society, compared to the extent to which they are practised in society at large.

**Context Dimension: External Environment.** It is crucial to give consideration to the social, political and economic environments in which it exists, as the environment both directly and indirectly affects civil society. Some features of the environment may enable the growth of civil society. Conversely, other features of the environment hamper the development of civil society. Three elements of the external environment are captured by the CSI:

- Socio-economic context: The Social Watch’s basic capabilities index and measures of corruption, inequality and macro-economic health are used portray the socioeconomic context that can have marked consequences for civil society, and perhaps most significantly at the lower levels of social development;
• Socio-political context: This is assessed using five indicators. Three of these are adapted from the Freedom House indices of political and civil rights and freedoms, including political rights and freedoms, personal rights and freedoms within the law and associational and organisational rights and freedoms. Information about CSO experience with the country’s legal framework and state effectiveness round out the picture of the socio-political context;
• Socio-cultural context: utilises interpersonal trust, which examines the level of trust hat ordinary people feel for other ordinary people, as a broad measure of the social psychological climate for association and cooperation. Even though everyone experiences relationships of varying trust and distrust with different people, this measure provides a simple indication of the prevalence of a world view that can support and strengthen civil society. Similarly, the extent of tolerance and public spiritedness also offers indication of the context in which civil society unfolds.
Appendix 2 Evaluation methodology

This Appendix describes the evaluation methodology that was developed to evaluate the efforts of Dutch NGOs and their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) to strengthen Civil Society in India, Ethiopia and Indonesia. The first paragraph introduces the terms of reference for the evaluation and the second discusses design issues, including sampling procedures and changes in the terms of reference that occurred between the 2012 and 2014 assessment. The third paragraph presents the methodologies developed to answer each of the evaluation questions.

1. Introduction

1.1 Terms of reference for the evaluation

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System ('MFS) is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant programme which meant to achieve sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch Co Financing Agencies have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

One component of the MFS II programme addresses the extent to which the Southern Partners of the Dutch Consortia are contributing towards strengthening civil society and this evaluation assesses this contribution for Southern Partner countries in Indonesia, India and Ethiopia. The evaluation comprised a baseline study, carried out in 2012, followed by an end line study in 2014.

The entire MFS II evaluation comprises assessments in eight countries where apart from a civil society component, also assessments towards achieving MDGs and strengthening the capacity of the southern partner organisations by the CFAs. A synthesis team is in place to aggregate findings of all eight countries. This team convened three synthesis team meetings, one in 2012, one in 2013 and one in 2014. All three meetings aimed at harmonising evaluation methodologies for each component across countries. CDI has been playing a leading role in harmonising its Civil Society and Organisational Capacity assessment with the other organisations in charge for those components in the other countries. This Annex describes the methodology that has been developed for the evaluation of the efforts to strengthen civil society priority result area. We will first explain the purpose and scope of this evaluation and then present the overall evaluation design. We will conclude with describing methodological adaptations, limitations and implications.

1.2 Civil Society assessment – purpose and scope

The overall purpose of the joint MFS II evaluations is to account for results of MFS II-funded or co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern partners and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions.

The civil society evaluation is organised around 5 key questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
• Were the development interventions of the MFS II consortia efficient?
• What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

Furthermore, the evaluation methodology for efforts to strengthen civil society should:
• Describe how a representative sample of Southern partner organisations of the Dutch CFAs in the country will be taken
• Focus on five priority result areas that correspond with dimensions of the Civil Society Index (CSI) developed by CIVICUS (see paragraph 6.4 - Call for proposal). For each of those dimensions the call for proposal formulated key evaluation questions.
• Should compare results with available reference data (i.e. a CSI report or other relevant data from the country in question).

The results of this evaluation are to be used by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch Consortia and their partner organisations. The evaluation methodology has to be participatory in the sense that Dutch Consortia and their partner organisation would be asked to give their own perception on a range of indicators of the adjusted CIVICUS analytical framework in 2012 and in 2014.

2. Designing the methodology

2.1 Evaluation principles and standards

The overall approach selected is a participatory, theory-based evaluation through a before and after comparison. This paragraph briefly describes these principles and how these have been translated into data collection principles. It also describes how a ‘representative sample’ of Southern Partner Organisations was selected and how the initial terms of references were adjusted with the consent of the commissioner of the evaluation, given the nature of the evaluation component and the resources available for the evaluation.

Recognition of complexity
The issues at stake and the interventions in civil society and policy influence are complex in nature, meaning that cause and effect relations can sometimes only be understood in retrospect and cannot be repeated. The evaluation methods should therefore focus on recurring patterns of practice, using different perspectives to understand changes and to acknowledge that the evaluation means to draw conclusions about complex adaptive systems (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003)\(^53\). Changes in the values of the Civil Society Indicators in the 2012-2014 period are then the result of conflict management processes, interactive learning events, new incentives (carrots and sticks) that mobilise or demobilise civil society, rather than the result of a change process that can be predicted from A to Z (a linear or logical framework approach)\(^54\).

A theory-based evaluation
Theory-based evaluation has the advantage of situating the evaluation findings in an analysis that includes both what happened over the life of the project as well as the how and why of what happened (Rogers 2004). It demonstrates its capacity to help understand why a program works or fails to work, going further than knowing only outcomes by trying to systematically enter the black box (Weiss 2004). Theory-based evaluations can provide a framework to judge effectiveness in context of high levels of complexity, uncertainty, and changeability when traditional (impact) evaluation methods are not suitable: the use of control groups for the civil society evaluation is problematic since comparable


organisations with comparable networks and operating in a similar external environment would be quite difficult to identify and statistical techniques of matching cannot be used because of a small n. Because SPO’s theories of change regarding their efforts to build civil society or to influence policies may alter during the 2012-2014 period, it requires us to develop a deep understanding of the change process and the dynamics that affect civil society and policies. It is important to understand what has led to specific (non-) changes and (un)-expected changes. These external factors and actors, as well as the SPO’s agency need to be taken into account for the attribution question. Linear input-activities-outputs-outcomes-impact chains do not suffice for complex issues where change is both the result of SPOs’ interventions as those by other actors and/or factors. Therefore, the most reasonable counterfactual that can be used for this evaluation is that of considering alternative causal explanations of change (White and Philips, 2012). Therefore the SPOs’ Theory of Change constructed in 2012 is also related to a Model of Change constructed in 2014 that tries to find the ultimate explanations of what happened in reality, including other actors and factors that might possibly explain the outcomes achieved.

Triangulation of methods and sources of information

For purposes of triangulation to improve the robustness, validity or credibility of the findings of the evaluation we used different types of data collection and analysis methods as well as different sources of information. The CIVICUS analytical framework was adjusted for this evaluation in terms of providing standard impact outcome indicators to be taken into account. Data collection methods used consisted of workshops with the SPO, interviews with key resource persons, focus group discussions, social network analysis (during the baseline), consultation of project documents; MFS II consortia documents and other documents relevant to assess general trends in civil society

Participatory evaluation

The evaluation is participatory in that both baseline and end line started with a workshop with SPO staff, decision makers and where possible board members. The baseline workshop helped SPOs to construct their own theory of change with regards to civil society. Detailed guidelines and tools have been developed by CDI for both baseline and follow-up, and these have been piloted in each of the countries CDI is involved in. Country based evaluators have had a critical input in reviewing and adapting these detailed guidelines and tools. This enhanced a rigorous data collection process. Additionally, the process of data analysis has been participatory where both CDI and in-country teams took part in the process and cross-check each other’s inputs for improved quality. Rigorous analysis of the qualitative data was done with the assistance of the NVivo software program.

Using the evaluation standards as a starting point

As much as possible within the boundaries of this accountability driven evaluation, the evaluation teams tried to respect the following internationally agreed upon standards for program evaluation (Yarbrough et al, 2011). These are, in order of priority: Utility; Feasibility; Propriety; Accuracy; Accountability.

However, given the entire set-up of the evaluation, the evaluation team cannot fully ensure the extent to which the evaluation is utile for the SPO and their CFAs; and cannot ensure that the evaluation findings are used in a proper way and not for political reasons.

2.2 Sample selection

The terms of reference for this evaluation stipulate that the evaluators draw a sample of southern partner organisations to include in the assessment. Given the fact that the first evaluation questions intends to draw conclusions for the MDGs or the themes (governance or fragile states) for Indonesia a sample was drawn for the two or three most frequent MDGs or themes that the SPOs are working in. In 2012, the Dutch MFS II consortia were asked to provide information for each SPO regarding the MDG/theme it is working on, if it has an explicit agenda in the area of civil society strengthening and/or policy influence. The database then provided an insight into the most important MDG/themes covered by the partner organisations, how many of these have an explicit agenda regarding civil society
strengthening and/or policy influence. The entire population of SPOs in Indonesia was 120, of which those exclusively working on the governance theme (28 SPOs), those working on MDG 7ab (26 SPOs) and on MDG 3 (26 SPOs) where the most frequent ones. With regards to MDG 3 and MDG 7ab the evaluator decided to select MDG 7ab, which is a very specific and relevant MDG for Indonesia. Five 5 partner organisations were randomly selected for respectively MDG 7 (natural resources) of a population of 26 SPOs and 5 for the governance theme from 28 SPOs.\(^{55}\)

### 2.3 Changes in the original terms of reference

Two major changes have been introduced during this evaluation and accepted by the commissioner of the MFS II evaluation. These changes were agreed upon during the 2013 and the 2014 synthesis team meetings.

**The efficiency evaluation question**

During the June 2013 synthesis meeting the following decision was made with regards to measuring how efficient MFS II interventions for organisational capacity and civil society are:

[...] it was stressed that it is difficult to disentangle budgets for capacity development and civil society strengthening. SPOs usually don’t keep track of these activities separately; they are included in general project budgets. Therefore, teams agreed to assess efficiency of CD [capacity development] and CS activities in terms of the outcomes and/or outputs of the MDG projects. This implies no efficiency assessment will be held for those SPOs without a sampled MDG project. Moreover, the efficiency assessment of MDG projects needs to take into account CD and CS budgets (in case these are specified separately). Teams will evaluate efficiency in terms of outcomes if possible. If project outcomes are unlikely to be observed already in 2014, efficiency will be judged in terms of outputs or intermediate results (e-mail quotation from Gerton Rongen at February 6, 2014).

**Attribution/contribution evaluation question**

During the June 2013 NWO-WOTRO workshop strategies were discussed to fit the amount of evaluation work to be done with the available resources. Therefore,

1. The number of SPOs that will undergo a full-fledged analysis to answer the attribution question, were to be reduced to 50 percent of all SPOs. Therefore the evaluation team used the following selection criteria:
   - An estimation of the annual amount of MFS II funding allocated to interventions that have a more or less direct relation with the civil society component. This implies the following steps to be followed for the inventory:
   - Covering all MDGs/themes in the original sample
   - Covering a variety of Dutch alliances and CFAs

2. The focus of the attribution question will be on two impact outcome areas, those most commonly present in the SPO sample for each country. The evaluation team distinguishes four different impact outcome areas:
   - The extent to which the SPO, with MFS II funding, engages more and diverse categories of society in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimensions "Civic engagement" and "perception of impact")
   - The extent to which the SPOs supports its intermediate organisations to make a valuable contribution to civil society in the 2011 -2014 period (Civicus dimension "Level of organisation" and "perception of impact")
   - The extent to which the SPO itself engages with other civil society organisations to make a valuable contribution to civil society in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimension "level of organisation")

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\(^{55}\) See the evaluation methodology for the civil society component as described in the annex of the baseline report.
3. The extent to which the SPO contributes to changing public and private sector policies and practices in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimension “perception of impact”)

3. The CS dimension ‘Practice of Values’ has been excluded, because this dimension is similar to issues dealt with for the organisational capacity assessment.

The aforementioned analysis drew the following conclusions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>SPO in the in-depth analysis</th>
<th>Strategic CS orientation to include</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Indonesia | ELSAM, WARSI, CRI, NTFP-EP, LPPSLH | 1. Strengthening intermediate organisations AND influencing policies and practices  
2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable, then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |
| India | NNET, CWM, CEICOEDCON, Reds Tumkur, CSA | 1. Enhancing civic engagement AND strengthening intermediate organisations  
2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |
| Ethiopia | OSSA, EKHC, CCGG&SO, JeCCDO and ADAA | 1. Strengthening the capacities of intermediate organisations AND SPO’s engagement in the wider CS arena  
2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |

Source: Consultation of project documents available in February 2014

3. Answering the evaluation questions

3.1 Evaluation question 1 - Changes in civil society for the relevant MDGs/topics

Evaluation question 1: What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?

Indicators and tools used
In line with the CIVICUS Civil Society Index, a scoring tool was developed in 2012 which comprises 17 indicators. The selection was inspired by those suggested in the terms of reference of the commissioner. Each indicator was, also in line with the CIVICUS index accompanied by an open evaluation question to be used for data collection in 2012 and 2014. In 2012 the scoring tool contained four statements describing the level of achievements of the indicator and scores ranged from 0 to 3 (low score - high score).

A comparison of the scores obtained in 2012 informed the evaluation team that there was a positive bias towards high scores, mostly between 2 and 3. Therefore during the 2014 assessment, it was decided to measure relative changes for each indicator in the 2012 – 2014 period, as well as the reasons for changes or no changes and assigning a score reflecting the change between -2 (considerable deterioration of the indicator value since 2012) and +2 (considerable improvement).

In 2012 and based upon the Theory of Change constructed with the SPO, a set of standard indicators were identified that would ensure a relation between the standard CIVICUS indicators and the interventions of the SPO. However, these indicators were not anymore included in the 2014 assessment because of the resources available and because the methodology fine-tuned for the attribution question in 2013, made measurement of these indicators redundant.

Also in 2012, as a means to measure the ‘level of organisation’ dimension a social network analysis tool was introduced. However this tool received very little response and was discontinued during the end line study.

Key questions to be answered for this evaluation question
In 2012, SPO staff and leaders, as well as outside resource persons were asked to provide answers to 17 questions, one per standard indicator of the scoring tool developed by CDI.
In 2012, the SPO staff and leaders were given the description of each indicator as it was in 2012 and had to answer the following questions:

1. How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to its description of the 2012 situation? Did it deteriorate considerably or did it improve considerably (-2 → +2)
2. What exactly has changed since 2012 for the civil society indicator that you are looking at? Be as specific as possible in your description.
3. What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what happened and to what change this led. It is possible to tick and describe more than one choice.
   - Intervention by SPO, NOT financed by any of your Dutch partners
   - Intervention SPO, financed by your Dutch partner organisation (In case you receive funding from two Dutch partners, please specify which partner is meant here)
   - Other actor NOT the SPO, please specify
   - Other factor, NOT actor related, please specify
   - A combination of actors and factors, INCLUDING the SPO, but NOT with Dutch funding, please specify
   - A combination of actors and factors, INCLUDING the SPO, but WITH Dutch funding, please specify
   - Don't know
4. Generally speaking, which two of the five CIVICUS dimensions (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values, perception of impact, environment) changed considerably between 2012 – 2014? For each of these changes, please describe:
   - Nature of the change
   - Key interventions, actors and factors (MFS II or non-MFS II related) that explain each change (entirely or partially).

Sources for data collection
During the baseline and the end line and for purposes of triangulation, several methods were used to collect data on each (standard) indicator:
   - Self-assessment per category of staff within the SPO: where possible, three subgroups were made to assess the scores: field staff/programme staff, executive leadership and representatives of the board, general assembly, and internal auditing groups if applicable completed with separate interviews;
   - Interviews with external resource persons. These consisted of three categories: key actors that are knowledgeable about the MDG/theme the SPO is working on and who know the civil society arena around these topics; civil society organisations that are being affected by the programme through support or CSOs with which the SPO is collaborating on equal footing, and; representatives of public or private sector organisations with which the SPO is interacting.
   - Consultation and analysis of reports that relate to each of the five CIVICUS dimensions.
   - Project documents, financial and narrative progress reports, as well as correspondence between the SPO and the CFA.
   - Social network analysis (SNA), which was discontinued in the end line study.

During the follow-up, emphasis was put on interviewing the same staff and external persons who were involved during the baseline for purpose of continuity.

3.2 Evaluation question 2 – “Attribution” of changes in civil society to interventions of SPOs.

Evaluation question 2: To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
Adapting the evaluation question and introduction to the methodology chosen

In line with the observation of Stern et al. (2012) that the evaluation question, the programme attributes, and the evaluation approaches all provide important elements to conclude on the evaluation design to select, the teams in charge of evaluating the civil society component concluded that given the attributes of the programmes it was impossible to answer the attribution question as formulated in the Terms of References of the evaluation and mentioned above. Therefore, the evaluation teams worked towards answering the extent to which the programme contributed towards realising the outcomes. For this endeavour explaining outcome process-tracing\textsuperscript{56} was used. The objective of the process tracing methodology for MFS II, in particular for the civil society component is to:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Identify what interventions, actors and factors explain selected impact outcomes for process tracing.
  \item Assess how the SPO with MFS II funding contributed to the changes in the selected impact outcomes and how important this contribution is given other actors and factors that possibly influence the attainment of the outcome. Ruling out rival explanations, which are other interventions, actors or factors that are not related to MFS II funding.
\end{itemize}

Methodology – getting prepared

As described before a limited number of SPOs were selected for process tracing and for each country strategic orientations were identified as a means to prevent a bias occurring towards only positive impact outcomes and as a means to support the in-country evaluation teams with the selection of outcomes to focus on a much as was possible, based upon the project documents available at CDI. These documents were used to track realised outputs and outcomes against planned outputs and outcomes. During the workshop (see evaluation question on changes in civil society) and follow-up interviews with the SPO, two impact outcomes were selected for process tracing.

Steps in process tracing

1. Construct the theoretical model of change – by in-country evaluation team

After the two impact outcomes have been selected and information has been obtained about what has actually been achieved, the in-country evaluation team constructs a visual that shows all pathways that might possibly explain the outcomes. The inventory of those possible pathways is done with the SPO, but also with external resource persons and documents consulted. This culminated in a Model of Change. A MoC of good quality includes: The causal pathways that relate interventions/parts by any actor, including the SPO to the realised impact outcome; assumptions that clarify relations between different parts in the pathway, and; case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance specific attributes of the actor or socio-cultural-economic context. The Models of Change were discussed with the SPO and validated.

2. Identify information needs to confirm or reject causal pathways as well as information sources needed.

This step aims to critically reflect upon what information is needed that helps to confirm one of causal pathways and at that at same time helps to reject the other possible explanations. Reality warns that this type of evidence will hardly be available for complex development efforts. The evaluators were asked to behave as detectives of Crime Scene Investigation, ensuring that the focus of the evaluation was not only on checking if parts/interventions had taken place accordingly, but more specifically on identifying information needs that confirm or reject the relations between the parts/interventions. The key question to be answered was: "What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one part leads to another part or, that X causes Y?". Four types of evidence were used, where appropriate:\textsuperscript{57}

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\textsuperscript{56} Explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented. The aim of process tracing is not to verify if an intended process of interventions took place as planned in a particular situation, but that it aims at increasing our understanding about what works under what conditions and why (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

\textsuperscript{57} Beach and Pederson, 2013
Pattern evidence relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. This may consist of trends analysis and correlations.

Sequence evidence deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A. However, if we found that event B took place before event A, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).

Trace evidence is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of meeting minutes, if authentic, provides strong proof that the meeting took place.

Account evidence deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

3. Collect information necessary to confirm or reject causal pathways

Based upon the inventory of information needs the evaluation teams make their data collection plan after which data collection takes place.

4. Analyse the data collected and assessment of their quality.

This step consists of compiling all information collected in favour or against a causal pathway in a table or in a list per pathway. For all information used, the sources of information are mentioned and an assessment of the strength of the evidence takes place, making a distinction between strong, weak and moderate evidence. For this we use the traffic light system: **green letters mean strong evidence, red letters mean weak evidence** and **orange letter mean moderate evidence**: The following table provides the format used to assess these issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal pathway</th>
<th>Information that confirms (parts of) this pathway</th>
<th>Information that rejects (parts of) this pathway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pathway 1</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 1.1</td>
<td>Source of information</td>
<td>Source of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 1.2</td>
<td>Information 2</td>
<td>Information 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etc</td>
<td>Source of information</td>
<td>Source of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathway 2</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 2.1</td>
<td>Source of information</td>
<td>Source of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 2.2</td>
<td>Information 2</td>
<td>Information 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etc.</td>
<td>Source of information</td>
<td>Source of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathway 3</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Assessing the nature of the relations between parts in the model of change

The classification of all information collected is being followed by the identification of the pathways that most likely explain the impact outcome achieved. For this the evaluators assess the nature of the relations between different parts in the MoC. Based upon Mayne (2012) and Stern et al (2012) the following relations between parts in the MoC are mapped and the symbols inserted into the original MoC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the relation between parts and other parts or outcome</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The part is the only causal explanation for the outcome. No other interventions or factors explain it. (necessary and sufficient)</td>
<td>![Green Symbol]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part does not explain the outcome at all: other subcomponents explain the outcomes.</td>
<td>![Red Symbol]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part explains the outcome but other parts explain the outcome as well: there are multiple pathways (sufficient but not necessary)</td>
<td>![Green Symbol]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part is a condition for the outcome but won’t make it happen without other factors (necessary but not sufficient)</td>
<td>![Orange Symbol]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part explains the outcome, but requires the help of other parts to explain the outcome in a sufficient and necessary way (not a sufficient cause, but necessary) → it is part of a causal package</td>
<td>![Yellow Symbol]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Mayne, 2012; Stern et al, 2012
6. Write down the contribution and assess the role of the SPO and MFS II funding

This final step consists of answering the following questions, as a final assessment of the contribution question:

- The first question to be answered is: What explains the impact outcome?
- The second question is: What is the role of the SPO in this explanation?
- The third question, if applicable is: what is the role of MFS II finding in this explanation?

7. Sources for data collection

Information necessary to answer this evaluation question is to be collected from:

- Interviews with resource persons inside and outside the SPO
- Project documents and documentation made available by other informants
- Websites that possibly confirm that an outcome is achieved and that the SPO is associated with this outcome
- Meeting minutes of meetings between officials
- Time lines to trace the historical relations between events
- Policy documents
- etc

3.3 Evaluation question 3 – Relevance of the changes

Evaluation question 3: *What is the relevance of these changes?*

The following questions are to be answered in order to assess the relevance of the changes in Civil Society.

- How do the MFS II interventions and civil society outcomes align with the Theory of Change developed during the baseline in 2012? What were reasons for changing or not changing interventions and strategies?
- What is the civil society policy of the Dutch alliance that collaborates with the SPO? And how do the MFS II interventions and civil society outcomes align with the civil society policy of the Dutch alliance that collaborates with the SPO?
- How relevant are the changes achieved in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating?
- What is the further significance of these changes for building a vibrant civil society for the particular MDG/ theme in the particular context?

**Sources for data collection**

For this question the following sources are to be consulted:

- Review of the information collected during interviews with the SPO and outside resource persons
- The 2012 Theory of Change
- Interview with the CFA liaison officer of the SPO;
- Review of reports, i.e: the civil society policy document of the Dutch Alliance that was submitted for MFS II funding, relevant documents describing civil society for the MDG/ theme the SPO is working on in a given context.

3.4 Evaluation question 4, previously 5 - Factors explaining the findings

Evaluation question 4: *What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?*

To answer this question we look into information available that:

- Highlight changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO
- Highlight changes in the relations between the SPO and the CFA
• Highlight changes in the context in which the SPO is operating and how this might affect positively or negatively its organisational capacity.

**Sources for data collection**

Sources of information to be consulted are:

- Project documents
- Communications between the CFA and the SPO
- Information already collected during the previous evaluation questions.

4. Analysis of findings

A qualitative software programme NVivo 10 (2010) was used to assist in organising and making sense of all data collected. Although the software cannot take over the task of qualitative data analysis, it does 1) improve transparency by creating a record of all steps taken, 2) organise the data and allow the evaluator to conduct a systematic analysis, 3) assist in identifying important themes that might otherwise be missed, and 4) reduce the danger of bias due to human cognitive limitations, compared to "intuitive data processing" (Sadler 1981). The qualitative data in the evaluation consisted of transcripts from semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions workshops, field notes from observation, and a range of documents available at the SPO or secondary information used to collect reference data and to obtain a better understanding of the context in which the CS component evolves.

To analyse this diverse collection of data, several analytical strategies are envisioned, specifically content analysis, discourse analysis, and thematic analysis. Although each of these strategies can be understood as a different lens through which to view the data, all will require a carefully developed and executed coding plan.

Data have been coded according to: standard civil society indicator; outcome included for in-depth contribution analysis; relevance, and; explaining factors.

This qualitative analysis will be supported by a limited amount of quantitative data largely arising from the score assigned by the evaluation team to each performance indicator described in the civil society scoring tool. Other quantitative data in this study are drawn information provided in background literature and organisational documents as well as the Social Network Analysis method.

5. Limitations to the methodology

5.1 General limitations with regards to the MFS II evaluation

**The MFS II programme and CIVICUS**

Although the MFS II programme stated that all proposals need to contribute to civil society strengthening in the South, mention was made of the use of the CIVICUS framework for monitoring purposes. The fact that civil society was to be integrated as one of the priority result areas next to that of organisational capacity and MDGs became only clear when the MoFA communicated its mandatory monitoring protocol.

In consequence, civil society strengthening in the MFS II programmes submitted to the ministry is mainstreamed into different sub programmes, but not addressed as a separate entity.

This late introduction of the Civil Society component also implies that project documents and progress reports to not make a distinction in MDG or theme components vs those of civil society strengthening, leaving the interpretation of what is a civil society intervention our outcome and what not to the interpretation of the evaluation team.

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At the same time the evaluation team observes that SPOs and CFAs have started to incorporate the organisational capacity tool that is being used in the monitoring protocol in their own organisational assessment procedures. None of the SPOs is familiar with the CIVICUS framework and how it fits into their interventions.

**Differences between CIVICUS and MFS II evaluation**

CIVICUS developed a Civil Society Index that distinguishes 5 dimensions and for each of these a set of indicators has been developed. Based upon a variety of data collection methods, a validation team composed of civil society leaders provides the scores for the civil society index.

Major differences between the way the Civil Society Index is been used by CIVICUS and for this MFS II evaluation is the following:

1. **CIVICUS** defines its unit of analysis is terms of the civil society arena at national and/or subnational level and does not start from individual NGOs. The MFS II evaluation put the SPO in the middle of the civil society arena and then looked at organisations that receive support; organisations with which the SPO is collaborating. The civil society arena boundaries for the MFS II evaluation are the public or private sector organisations that the SPO relates to or whose policies and practices it aims to influence.

2. The CIVICUS assessments are conducted by civil society members itself whereas the MFS II evaluation is by nature an external evaluation conducted by external researchers. CIVICUS assumes that its assessments, by organising them as a joint learning exercise, will introduce change that is however not planned. With the MFS II evaluation the focus was on the extent to which the interventions of the SPO impacted upon the civil society indicators.

3. CIVICUS has never used its civil society index as a tool to measure change over a number of years. Each assessment is a stand-alone exercise and no efforts are being made to compare indicators over time or to attribute changes in indicators to a number of organisations or external trends.

**Dimensions and indicator choice**

The CIVICUS dimensions in themselves are partially overlapping; the dimension ‘perception of impact’ for instance contains elements that relate to ‘civic engagement’ and to ‘level of organisation’. Similar overlap is occurring in the civil society scoring tool developed for this evaluation and which was highly oriented by a list of evaluation questions set by the commissioner of the evaluation.

Apart from the overlap, we observe that some of the standard indicators used for the civil society evaluation were not meaningful for the SPOs under evaluation. This applies for instance for the political engagement indicator “How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?”

**Measuring change over a two-year period**

The MFS II programme started its implementation in 2011 and it will finish in 2015, whereas its evaluation started mid-2012 and will end in the beginning of 2014. The period between the baseline and the end line measurement hardly covers 2 years in some cases. Civil society building and policy influence are considered the type of interventions that requires up to 10 years to reap significant results, especially when taking into account attitudes and behaviour. Apart from the fact that the baseline was done when MFS II was already operational in the field for some 1,5 years, some SPO interventions were a continuation of programmes designed under the MFS I programme, hence illustrating that the MFS II period is not a clear boundary. Contracts with other SPOs ended already in 2012, and practically coincided with the baseline assessment being conducted at the moment the relationship with the CFA had practically ended.

**Aggregation of findings**

Although working with standard indicators and assigning them scores creates expectations of findings being compared and aggregated at national and international level, this may lend itself to a quick but inaccurate assessment of change. Crude comparison between programs on the basis of findings is problematic, and risks being politically abused. The evaluation team has to guard against these abuses by ensuring the necessary modesty in extrapolating findings and drawing conclusions.
**Linking the civil society component to the other components of the MFS II evaluation**

The Theory of Change in the terms of reference assumes that CFAs are strengthening the organisational capacity of their partners, which is evaluated in the organisational capacity components, which then leads to impact upon MDGs or upon civil society. Because the evaluation methodology designed for both the organisational capacity and the civil society evaluation require considerable time investments of the SPOs, a deliberate choice was made not to include SPOs under the organisational capacity component in that of Civil Society. This may possibly hamper conclusions regarding the assumption of capacitated SPOs being able to impact upon civil society. However, where information is available and where it is relevant, the civil society component will address organisational capacity issues.

No such limitations were made with regards to SPOs in the MDG sample, however, apart from Indonesia; none of the SPOs in the civil society sample is also in that of MDG.

### 5.2 Limitations during baseline with regards to the methodology

A very important principle upon which this evaluation methodology is based is that of triangulation, which implies that different stakeholders and documents are consulted to obtain information about the same indicator from different perspectives. Based upon these multiple perspectives, a final score can be given on the same indicator which is more valid and credible.

For Indonesia this has not always been possible:

- For 7 out of 10 SPOs a Survey Monkey questionnaire was developed to assess the intensity of the interaction between stakeholders in the network. Out of 156 actors that were invited to fill in this 5 minute questionnaire, only 7 actors effectively filled in the questionnaire = 4.5 %. The online Social Network Analysis aims at having both the opinion of the SPO on the intensity of the interaction with another actor, as well as the opinion of the other actor for triangulation. Important reasons for not filling in this form are that actors in the network are not technology savvy, or that they have difficulties in accessing internet. Data obtained by survey monkey were not used in the baseline. Instead the evaluation team did a social network assessment during the baseline workshop with the SPO.

- With regards to filling in offline interview forms or answering questions during interviews a number of civil society actors did not want to score themselves because they do not benefit from the interventions of the MFS II projects. Having the scores of their own organisations will help to assess the wider environment in which the SPO operates and possibly an impact of the SPO on other civil society organisations in 2014.

- With regards to public officials the evaluation team faced difficulties to have their opinions on a certain number of indicators such as perception of impact on policy influencing and relations between public organisations and civil society. Public officials fear that they will be quoted in the assessment, which may have repercussions for their position.

### 5.3 Experiences during end line from in-country teams - Indonesia

The in-country team experienced difficulties in working on the first evaluation question regarding changes in civil society. The team would have preferred a similar workshop as during the baseline that would recapitulate the essence of the CIVICUS model and the content of each standard indicator developed. Although some members of the in-country team were also involved in the 2012 base line assessment, they and their new colleagues experienced a kind of “CS dimension shock” when these topics where not addressed during the workshop, where a lot of time was spend to work on the second evaluation question on contribution. A guidance sent later in the year was helpful but came late according to the Indonesian team.
The many appendices prepared for data collection and meant as a step-wide approach for the end line study, sometimes became a burden and a limitation when applied directly in collecting data. Like mentioned for the baseline study the questions sometimes limited the probing for information. In addition, in-country team members had to deal with the “CS dimension shock”.

The organisation of the entire MFS II evaluation did provide very little opportunities for SPOs to engage with the evaluation and to feel concerned. For many of the SPOs the evaluation does not provide a strategic value in terms of drawing lessons. This lack of ownership is felt more strongly with those SPOs that already ended their contract with the Dutch MFS II organisation and with those SPOs that due to high staff turn overs were confronted with past tense issues that they did not experience.

Some of the SPOs simply didn’t care about the evaluation. This could have been anticipated if there had been a special workshop (for the directors, perhaps, and the CFAs) prior to the endline. Via such workshops, appointments and agreements could have been set, allowing the in-country teams to plan their time and schedule. What ended up happening was that many of the SPOs kept putting off appointments and this also affected the schedule of the team.

Many SPOs are unfamiliar with the CIVICUS framework and the in-country team tried to ease them into it by sending background information and the indicator questions regarding changes in civil society prior to the workshop. This was effective for some SPOs (Common Room, WARSi), but not very effective for LPPSLH, RUANGRUPA, and CRI. The latter three found it too difficult to answer these questions by themselves. Common Room, on the other hand dedicated a special discussion session to discuss the questions internally. The questions were however the same as those dealt with during the baseline and possibly high staff turnovers may also explain this “CS dimension shock”.

Fieldwork was sometimes inefficient since the in-country team assumed that each step (workshop, interview, drafting model of change, selecting outcome, finding evidences) would neatly fall into sequence and could be packed tightly within 4 or 5 days with strong commitment from the SPO. This often did not happen.
## Civil Society Scoring tool - baseline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Outcome domains</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
<td>Needs of marginalised groups</td>
<td>How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Involvement of target groups</td>
<td>What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political engagement</td>
<td>How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Relations with other organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs?</td>
<td>Networking - Cooperation: Inform each other; roles somewhat defined; all decisions made independently</td>
<td>No interaction at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Outcome domains</td>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO</td>
<td>In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with?</td>
<td>0: No interaction at all&lt;br&gt;1: Less than 2 times a year&lt;br&gt;2: Between 2 and 3 times a year&lt;br&gt;3: More than 4 times a year</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because.....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Defending the interests of marginalised groups:</td>
<td>Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs?</td>
<td>No interaction at all&lt;br&gt;Networking - Cooperation: Inform each other; roles somewhat defined; all decisions made independently&lt;br&gt;Coordination - Coalition: ideas and resources shared; roles defined and divided; all have a vote in decision making&lt;br&gt;Collaboration: organisations belong to one system; mutual trust; consensus on all decisions.</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because.....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Composition of current financial resource base</td>
<td>How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendants to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking?</td>
<td>Depends on 1 international donor&lt;br&gt;Depends on few financial sources: one fund cover(s) more than 75% of all costs.&lt;br&gt;Depends on a variety of financial sources; one fund cover(s) more than 50% of all costs.&lt;br&gt;Depends on a variety of sources of equal importance. Wide network of domestic funds</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because.....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Practice of Values</td>
<td>To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them?</td>
<td>(financial) information is made available and decisions are taken openly&lt;br&gt;They fulfil their formal obligation to explain strategic decisions and actions&lt;br&gt;They react to requests of social organs to justify/explain actions and decisions made&lt;br&gt;Social organs use their power to sanction management in case of misconduct or abuse</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because.....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Composition of social organs</td>
<td>What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for?</td>
<td>Between 0-10 % of all members of the social organs&lt;br&gt;Between 11-30 % of all members of the social organs&lt;br&gt;Between 31-65 % of all members of the social organs&lt;br&gt;More than 65% of all members of the social organs</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because.....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Outcome domains</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>External financial auditing</td>
<td>How regularly is your organisation audited externally?</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Perception of impact</td>
<td>Client satisfaction</td>
<td>What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns?</td>
<td>Majority of target groups are NOT satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil society impact.</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society?</td>
<td>You have not undertaken any activities of this kind but there is no discernible impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>Relation with public sector organisations.</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations’ objectives?</td>
<td>No direct interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>Relation with private sector organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations’ perspective?</td>
<td>No direct interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td>No activities developed in this area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Outcome domains</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence upon private sector agencies’ policies, rules, regulations.</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No activities developed in this area</td>
<td>Many activities developed in this area and examples of success can be detected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental context</td>
<td>Coping strategies</td>
<td>In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No analysis of the space and role of civil society has been done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>You are collecting information of the space and role of civil society but not regularly analysing it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>You are monitoring the space and role of civil society and analysing the consequences of changes in the context for your own activities. Examples are available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Many activities developed in this area, but impact until so far has been limited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 3  Civil Society Scores

This table presents the appreciation of the evaluation team regarding changes occurred for each indicator between 2012 and 2014 on a scale of -2 to +2  
- 2 = Considerable deterioration  
- 1 = A slight deterioration  
0 = no change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012  
+1 = slight improvement  
+2 = considerable improvement  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
<td>1 Needs of marginalised groups</td>
<td>How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies?</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Involvement of target groups</td>
<td>What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Political engagement</td>
<td>How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of organisation</td>
<td>5 Relations with other organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs?</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO</td>
<td>In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Defending the interests of marginalised groups</td>
<td>Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice of Values</td>
<td>8 Downward accountability</td>
<td>To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 Composition of social organs</td>
<td>What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 External financial auditing</td>
<td>How regularly is your organisation audited externally?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions of impact</td>
<td>11 Client satisfaction</td>
<td>What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns?</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 Civil society impact.</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13 Relation with public sector organisations.</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations’ objectives?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 Relation with private sector organisations.</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations’ perspective?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Influence upon private sector agencies’ policies, rules, regulations.</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COPING STRATEGIES</td>
<td>In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS context 17</td>
<td>COPING STRATEGIES</td>
<td>In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4  Changes in civil society indicators between 2012 and 2014

1. Civic Engagement

1.1. Needs of marginalised groups SPO

Common Room has been used as a space to share knowledge, exchange ideas, network and for actualizing expression and appreciation. On several occasions, Common Room was used as an incubation space for the exploration and development of potential creative ideas, including the development of discourses in the art and cultural arena, as well as developing knowledge and skills of individuals or groups.

From 2011 and 2013 the following activities took place in Common Room:

- 2011: 175 activities, 11 categories, 8 themes, 3,556 participants (24% women), 75% on a local scale;
- 2012: 110 activities, 8 categories, 8 themes, 2,020 participants (36% women), 86% on a local scale;
- 2013: 166 activities, 15 categories, 12 themes, 2,052 participants (30% women), 80% on a local scale;
- 2014 (up until June): 107 activities, 9 categories, 9 themes, 1,275 participants (28% women), 93% on a local scale

As illustrated above, there has been a decline in the number of participants and activities in 2013, when compared to the values in 2011. It can be concluded that Common Room has engaged fewer people between 2011 and 2013. Based on the increase in the number of categories and themes it is suffice to say that Common Room has served people with more diverse backgrounds or interests. However, there has not been a significant improvement in the number of female participants and it is not clear whether the participants were marginalised groups or not.

From the reports, the evaluation team also observed that the number of groups and organisations benefitting from Common Room’s assistance varied slightly from year to year. In 2011, there were 42; in 2012 23; in 2013 28, and; in 2014 28. When the situation in 2014 is compared to the 2012 baseline situation, there has been a slight increase in the number of beneficiary groups. There has however been a larger increase in the number of traditional music groups supported, from just eight in 2011 to 17 in 2014.

Common Room has supported ‘marginal’ forms of art such as Karinding and the underground metal scene. Individual artists and groups in these genres are not part of the mainstream market, and in a sense is part of a ‘counter-culture’. Through Common Room’s support, these musical art forms have become less marginal in terms of public attention and appreciation.

1.2. Involvement of target groups SPO

It is hard to determine the change in Common Room’s target group involvement since the SPO has a vague definition of its target group (see section 5.1). However, if Karinding music groups are presumed to be Common Room’s most prominent target group, then it does seem as though Common Room has given more space for them to plan, organize, or evaluate their own activities with little intervention. Common Room does take into account the needs of its target groups, specifically for the use of its space and facilities. Common Room activities can be said to have been planned according to the requests of its target groups. However, there is no evidence that target groups have been involved in Common Room’s long-term planning and organisational evaluation. Overall, there is no change in this indicator compared to baseline.
1.3. Intensity of political engagement SPO

Common Room has sought to benefit from the close personal relationship between its director and the Bandung and West Java government leadership. They rely on this personal relationship to garner support and to conduct lobby and advocacy. As such, changes in the government leadership of Bandung or West Java will potentially affect Common Room’s relationship with the public sector. In 2013, Ridwan Kamil assumed the office of Bandung’s mayor. Common Room is known to have a good relation with him, and Kamil is also a member of the Bandung Creative City Forum (BCCF), a Common Room-affiliated organisation. Although there is no clear evidence, Common Room may have benefited from this as there are improvements in Indicators 4.3 and 4.5. Despite receiving financial backing from the government and supporting the mayor of Bandung, Common Room has remained critical of the lack of government support for the creative industry in the region\(^{59}\). Apart from Common Room’s political engagement via lobby and advocacy, they also seek to communicate political messages through target groups’ artistic expression. For example, some of the lyrics of Karinding Attack criticize power-hungry politicians\(^{60}\).

2. Level of Organisation

2.1. Relations with other organisations SPO

Common Room currently perceives its closest relationship to be with the following groups or CSOs: Bandung’s Disaster Risk Reduction Forum (Forum PRB), Komunitas Anak Bertanya, Moedomo Learning Initiatives, the Indonesia Art Coalition (Koalisi Seni Indonesia), Bandung Creative City Forum (BCCF), and Karinding groups. Only the latter two were mentioned during baseline, while the likes of Openlabs, Bandung Oral History, Ruangrupa, are no longer mentioned. Common Room’s management explained that this change is a result of missing features of Common Room’s current location or building (see 5.1). But the change also signifies that Common Room is identifying more with youth groups and less with traditional contemporary art groups.

2.2. Frequency of dialogue with closest civil society organisation SPO

Apart from Karinding groups and Ujungberung Rebels, the CSOs and art groups with whom Common Room most frequently works have changed since the baseline. Common Room no longer reported to have frequent dialogue with the Bandung Creative City Forum, Rumah Cemara, and WALHI. During the end line, Common Room’s management reported to have more frequent dialogue with Forum PRB, Moedomo Learning Initiative, and the Indonesia Art Coalition. The frequency of this dialogue ranged from weekly informal meetings to regular monthly or biannual meetings. According to Common Room’s management team the nature or intensity of these relations are no different from the baseline.

2.3. Defending the interests of marginalised groups SPO

Although Common Room has a vague definition of target groups, some of the groups that have benefitted from Common Rooms interventions can be considered to be marginalized. These marginalized groups include those pursuing alternative cultural and artistic aspirations. While generally being side-lined politically and with little supporting infrastructure, a number of these groups are unique in the position they occupy in society. Underground metal groups tend have a negative public


image, especially amongst more hard-line religious communities. After an incident where 11 youth were killed during a concert in 2008, the space provided to underground metal groups was very limited. Similarly, Karinding was nearly non-existent as a traditional music instrument, with only a handful of artists mastering the instrument. The instrument was less known to people in Bandung, and was only performed in some ceremonies. Karinding also represented a marginalised Sundanese custom in the urban sphere of Bandung, which was dominated by hard-line religious interpretations and a ‘westernized’ urban sub-culture.

Box 1: Karinding

Karinding is a Sundanese traditional musical instrument from West Java and Banten, Indonesia. It is usually made from bamboo and palm trees. Karinding made of palm tree is traditionally used by male players, and bamboo instruments are used by female players. To play Karinding, one places the instrument between one’s lips, and one end is beaten by a finger to create vibrations. The rhythm of Karinding music is determined by the movement of the tongue and lips. The sound of Karinding is said to be similar to a frog. (source: Wikipedia)

Karinding Attack, is said to have been the result of Common Room’s innovation to combine two marginalized forms of music: underground metal and Karinding. With Common Room’s artistic and promotional support, and due to the popularity of the personnel amongst the underground metal community, Karinding Attack has gained popularity since the baseline. The group is now considered to be an icon given the emergence of a new contemporary sub-culture which is modern yet seeks to connect to Sundanese cultural roots. The band has been performing in many occasions throughout the country, as well as abroad, received wide media coverage, and has gone ‘viral’ among young audiences in Bandung. Karinding Attack has made impact in the societal landscape and has reduced the negative stigmas often associated with underground metal bands, while at the same time promoting a distinct Sundanese customary identity. As such, the underground metal community and Sundanese custom community have become more accepted by the general public and there is now space for the two to coexist.

2.4. Composition financial resource base SPO

From Common Room’s records there are observable changes in the SPO’s income (in terms of funding) and expenditures over the past four years:

66 Interview with Budi Rajab, Sociologist, Bandung, 10 September 2014
67 Karinding have been often been labeled as an occultism practice; Youtube, “Dua Dunia – Rahasia Musik Karinding [Full Video] 19 Maret 2014”. Available from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qj42NUYacXU (accessed 11 December 2014)
70 Interview with Budi Dalton, Bandung Cultural Figure, Bandung, 11 September 2014
### Table 12
**Overview of Common Room’s income and expenditure 2010-2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Income (IDR)</th>
<th>Expenditure (IDR)</th>
<th>Difference (IDR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% non-institutional</td>
<td>% institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>390,706,000</td>
<td>116,357,213</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>390,706,000</td>
<td>442,070,648</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>197,039,430.30</td>
<td>248,853,469</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>535,691,100</td>
<td>395,292,635</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>288,386,477</td>
<td>332,719,800</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2014 No data

Source: Statistik Kegiatan 2009-2013, Common Room

The table above indicates that the SPO’s income in 2013 was lower than that in 2010 and during the baseline in 2012, but higher than in 2011. The expenditures exceed the incomes for all years, except for 2012 and 2009. Non-institutional expenses (defined as program costs and media tools) in 2011 and 2013 were lower than the institutional expenses (defined as employee salaries and office costs). This could indicate issues in the financial health of Common Room, although there is insufficient information to draw this conclusion.

Common Room’s financial resource base has been decreasing over the past five years.

### Table 13
**Common Room Income Contributors 2009-2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total income</th>
<th>Funding Source</th>
<th>% of contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>390,706,000</td>
<td>Hivos</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bandung Creative City Forum</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES CLUB</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CCF Bandung</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>390,706,000</td>
<td>Hivos</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ASEF</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan Foundation</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CCF Bandung</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES CLUB</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Goethe Institute Jakarta</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Erasmus Huis</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>197,039,430.30</td>
<td>Hivos</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dinas KUKM Bandung City</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ASEF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>535,691,100</td>
<td>Hivos</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>City government</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>288,386,477</td>
<td>Hivos</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry for Tourism &amp; Creative Economy</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistik Kegiatan 2009-2013, Common Room

Although Common Room is less dependent on Hivos, as seen from the decrease is Hivos’ overall contribution between 2011 and 2013, there is less diversity in funding sources since 2011. Prior to 2011, Common Room was able to attract other sources of funding. Of notes is that in 2013, the Ministry for Tourism and Creative Economy provided Common Room with a consultancy fee for their services provided to the cultural centre revitalization project conducted in early 2012 (See 4.3 and 4.5). This was different from the funding provided through the Bandung City government in 2012, which Common Room was able to manage with greater flexibility.
3. Practice of Values

3.1. Downward accountability SPO

There is no significant change in Common Room’s downward accountability, as Common Room’s structure has not changed much. The board receives reports from the SPO’s executive arm on an annual basis and only holds meetings when necessary. However, the management team reported that they have been improving their reporting quality and have a better organisational policy in place through developing standard operational procedures and financial procedures. The evaluation team, however, did not proceed with asking for evidence of this since Common Room is basically still a ‘one-man show’. Common Room presently only consists of a director, a finance staff, and an administration staff\textsuperscript{71}. With such minimum personnel, improved procedures or policies would not be very relevant to the organisation’s overall accountability. Also of note is that the 2013 financial income figures show that institutional expenses are far higher than program expenses, which is considered a less healthy organisational practice, especially considering that the number of beneficiaries dropped in 2013.

3.2. Composition of social organs SPO

During the baseline in 2012, the evaluation team found that none of the board members represented the SPO’s target groups. Common Room has taken the findings of the MFS-II baseline into account and has subsequently appointed an additional board member from a Karinding group they support\textsuperscript{72}. As noted in the previous section, the executive of SPO now only consists of three staff. There has been no regeneration of staff members, and the director still controls all affairs and organisational direction.

3.3. External financial auditing SPO

Common Room has used Hivos funds to conduct external organisational audits for the financial year of 2011 in May 2012. They also claim to have allocated a budget to conduct audits for the financial years 2012 and 2013 (see table in 2.4), but the evaluation team did not receive copies of the financial audit reports for these years.

4. Perception of Impact

4.1. Client satisfaction SPO

The SPO does not measure client satisfaction, nor does it have staff with dedicated monitoring functions. The evaluation team was nonetheless able to draw a number of conclusions with regards to client satisfaction based on findings during the evaluation workshop and a review of documents and reports.

As previously noted, Common Room moved locations in 2012. Some missing features of the current space Common Room occupies (gallery, residency, attractive gathering space) have caused a decrease in the range and quality of services provided. As a result, some groups are no longer active in Common Room\textsuperscript{73}. Common Room has responded to this situation by offering its services to different (but less relevant) groups and organisations, like the Disaster Risk Reduction Forum of Bandung.

Common Room’s overall utilization has not decreased, but individual artists and non-Karinding bands no longer utilized Common Room’s facilities in 2014.

\textsuperscript{71} Common Room, “Profile (Bahasa Indonesia)”. Available from http://commonroom.info/about/ (accessed 11 December 2014)

\textsuperscript{72} Kharisma Prasetyo, “Evaluation Workshop Common Room”, MFS-II evaluation 2014

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid
4.2. Civil society impact SPO

The main civil society impact of Common Room has been its facilitation in the emergence of a new sub-culture. Karinding has become a new hype among urban youth in Bandung, with the following evidence:

- Increased demand for Karinding performances; Karinding groups are more satisfied with Common Room over the past two years due to the SPO's assistance in improving their artistic capabilities, which are important for developing the groups' identities. Karinding groups, more common on the outskirts of the city, also benefit from materials Common Room has developed for the music class, which they have been able to utilize without having to depend on Common Room or Karinding Attack. Karinding groups have also received more support and acknowledgement from Bandung and West Java government (see 4.5).

Not all target groups were less satisfied with Common Room despite the reduced facilities. Karinding groups are more satisfied with Common Room over the past two years due to the SPO’s assistance in improving their artistic capabilities, which are important for developing the groups’ identities. Karinding groups, more common on the outskirts of the city, also benefit from materials Common Room has developed for the music class, which they have been able to utilize without having to depend on Common Room or Karinding Attack. Karinding groups have also received more support and acknowledgement from Bandung and West Java government (see 4.5).

The evaluation team also interviewed another artistic community/group benefiting from Common Room's support, Illuminator, a community of illustrators in the metal music industry. Illuminator also reported that they have been satisfied with Common Room for the space provided for drawing classes, and especially in linking them with the metal and Karinding communities. Illuminator now has better collaborative relationships with music groups and bands, producing themed designs for merchandise items such as t-shirts, stickers, tote bags, and hoodies.

4.2. Civil society impact SPO

The main civil society impact of Common Room has been its facilitation in the emergence of a new sub-culture. Karinding has become a new hype among urban youth in Bandung, with the following evidence:

- Increased demand for Karinding performances;
- Artists have begun to combine Karinding with other music genres, such as blues;
- Karinding classes, facilitated by Common Room and the government, currently have 40 members and have resulted in the emergence of 8 new bands;
- Before Karinding Attack was formed, there was a growing Karinding trend, but performances were still limited to exclusive audiences. Karinding Attack believes that without Common Room’s intervention, Karinding would not be as popular as it is now;
- The emergence of a trend among youth in Bandung to bring their Karinding instruments everywhere, wearing iket –traditional headbands, to show their identity as part of Karinding groups and to socialize with individuals with the same interests;
- Although spells and mantras and burning incenses are often considered to violate Islamic rules, it has become an integral part of Karinding group performances.

Table 14
Common Room beneficiaries and groups utilizing facilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># of individual artists</th>
<th># of music bands</th>
<th># of artist communities, government agencies, NGOs/CSOs, media, &amp; others</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17 (16 of which Karinding)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


74 Interview with Man Jasad, Leader of Karinding Attack band, Bandung, 12 September 2014
80 Interview with Man Jasad, leader of Karinding Attack band, Bandung, 12 September 2014
81 Kharisma Prasetyo, “Evaluation Workshop Common Room”, MFS-II evaluation
As mentioned in 2.3, the popularity of Karinding has benefited the underground metal scene as well as the Sundanese customary community. For the Sundanese customary community, Karinding Attack is regarded as a successful example of how to cope with urbanity. From the perspective of underground metal groups, Karinding has helped them promote an alternative outlook for their community which has in the past been labelled as antisocial, westernized, and heretic. The growing popularity of Karinding, from what used to be considered an old-fashioned instrument into a new trend among urban youth, is seen as an achievement for urban groups whose identity has been marginalised by the hegemonic culture. However, from another perspective, it could also been viewed as a commodification which could be described as unauthentic and market-driven.

On an annual basis, Common Room has been organizing the Nu-Substance festival since 2007. Hivos supported the 2012 and 2013 Nu-Substance urban art and culture festivals. In 2012 the theme of the festival was ‘contested space’ and in 2013 the festival had the theme ‘re-connection’. Unfortunately, there is no documentation available showing the level of public interest and participation that the festival drew in each of the years. During the festival seminars, discussions, concerts, exhibitions, workshops and other events were held with the aim of stimulating creativity in Bandung and analysing social and cultural issues that exist in the city. According to external resources, the festival takes on an “experimental and/or scholarly perspective” to the creative industry. There is insufficient information to draw conclusions on the impact the festivals have had on the general public or on stimulating creativity of civil society.

4.3. Relation with public sector organisations SPO

Within the 2011-2014 period, Common Room related with the public sector through a number of activities. Common Room was a member of a number of coalitions and forums that engaged with public sector organisations. These included:

- Koalisi Seni Indonesia (Indonesia Art Coalition) through which Common Room lobbied the parliament to push government to issue regulations for art incentives;
- The Disaster Risk Reduction Forum (Forum PRB) which lobbied for the West Java provincial government to recognize the role of the multi-stakeholder forum in supporting risk reduction interventions;
- As part of BCCF, Common Room played a crucial role in providing inputs to the creative economy policy of the local government.

In 2012, Common Room was granted Social Aid Funds (Dana Bansos) by the Bandung city government. Due to limitations set by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Regulation No. 32/2011 on Guidelines for Dana Bansos), organisations like Common Room are unable to access such grants more than once. In addition, Dana Bansos is known for being largely misused and corrupted. The former Bandung mayor, who was in charge when Common Room received the funds, has been under investigation over bribery charges related to Dana Bansos handled under his administration. The fact...
that Common Room was selected as a grantee has left the SPO with a negative experience and a feeling of disappointment. Nonetheless, Common Room continued to collaborate with the local government through other initiatives.

In 2012, Common Room also cooperated with the West Java Provincial Development Planning Agency (Bappeda, specifically Pusdalisbang) to develop an academic paper entitled, ‘Utilization of Natural Resources and Local Culture for the Development of Ecotourism Destinations and Creative Economy’. In the same year, Common Room worked with the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy on the revitalization of cultural centres (Taman Budaya) around Indonesia. The Ministry had appointed Common Room to provide technical advice on the revitalization initiative. During the evaluation workshop, Common Room’s director expressed this cooperation was an unpleasant experience due to complicated payment issues and the precedent that such a consultancy assignment was merely a formality for the government, who needed to fulfil certain aspects of their program intervention.

Based on description above and the baseline report, it can be concluded that overall Common Room had more relations with the public sector since 2012. Findings under indicator 2.4 also support this conclusion.

4.4. Relation with private sector agencies SPO

Common Room does have regular or intensive relations with private sector agencies except for event sponsorships and a number of beneficiaries coming from the private sector. As such, there is no significant change from the conditions found during the baseline.

Larger private sector beneficiaries utilized Common Room’s space and collaborated in different ways with Common Room in the 2012–2014 period: These included media (Engage Media & TV One), an event organizer (Atap Organizer), and a digital entertainment company (Tinker Games).

4.5. Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations SPO

While Common Room’s lobby with Forum PRB, BCCF, and Koalisi Seni Indonesia has not yielded in tangible results; the collaboration with Bappeda and the Committee for Creative Economy of West Java resulted in the production of two policy recommendations documents. The first is a study of the development of eco-tourism destinations in 16 districts/cities of West Java. The second is on creative economic policy recommendations. Both documents became reference materials for the Regional Mid-Term Development Plan (RPJMD) in 2013. However, there is no clear evidence that the RPJMD 2013 significantly accommodated recommendations produced by Common Room.

With regards to Common Room’s services provided to the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy in 2012 on the revitalization of cultural centres, Common Room is pessimistic of their influence. They are under the impression that the project was largely ineffective, as the Ministry has not brought Common Room’s inputs into practice91. Design It Yourself (DIY) - a group that organizes annual design conferences from artistic communities, small businesses and academia in Surabaya – expressed that Common Room did have an influence. The group was thankful to Common Room for involving them in a national workshop92. As such, it seems that the interventions led by the Ministry may have actually adopted some of the material developed by Common Room, but that their policies are nonetheless rather abstract and without clear plans.

From 2011 to 2013, Common Room together with other CSOs (Aliansi Jurnalis Indonesia, Aliansi Keluarga Sunda Nusantara, Forum Diskusi Hukum Bandung, Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Bandung, Walhi, BCCF, etc.) and universities lobbied the government to withdraw their decision in authorizing a corporation (PT. Esa Gemilang Indah) to manage and change the designation of Babakan Siliwangi, Bandung’s city forest93. This is also an example of successful collaboration with other CSOs to

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91 Kharisma Prasetyo, “Evaluation Workshop Common Room”, MFS-II evaluation 2014
influence public policy. There is no indication however that Hivos funding contributed directly to this achievement. In fact, Common Room and other organisations began lobbying efforts for the preservation of Babakan Siliwangi and pressing their case against the conversion of the area into a business district since 2002.

Box 2: ‘Save Babakan Siliwangi City Park’ campaign

In June 2013, the Bandung Government revoked a building permit granted to PT Esa Gemilang Indah. The company had planned to set up a restaurant in the city park area of Babakan Siliwangi. The retraction of the permit was considered a victory for several groups in Bandung, including environmental activists, lawyers, concerned citizens and CSOs, who had voiced their concerns over plans that threatened to encroach on the city’s open green space since 2002.

In 2008, the coalition of concerned organisations and citizens had begun to raise money for a campaign and disseminate petitions against the commercialization and privatization of the area.

This campaign continued until 2013 by the Concerned Citizen Forum for Babakan Siliwangi (FWPBS), with protests expressed through art performances, demonstrations, more petitions and discussions, as well as hearings, with the city government. FWPBS gathered some 7,000 petition signatures and was supported by initiatives from a range a host of CSOs, including Common Room.

Last, Karinding groups have perceived that improved support and acknowledgement from the government within the past four years has stemmed from Common Room’s support. In 2011, the city government provided a public building space (Gedung Indonesia Menggugat) to groups to be used free of charge for Karinding classes. In addition, the provincial government has since included the Karinding instrument in exhibitions and local craft product fairs.

4.5. Influence upon private sector agencies’ policies, rules, regulations SPO

Although the private sector has little relevance to or relations with Common Room, the evaluation team noted that there has been an increased demand for Karinding music instruments, as well as accompanying instruments, and apparel products as a result of the new Karinding trend (see Indicator 4.2). Karinding Attack believes that bamboo craft producers are benefiting from this growing demand for their products, a justified opinion from evaluation team’s observations. In part, this seems to have been an intended result of Common Room since the SPO actually began actively promoting Karinding in 2008.

5. Civil Society context

5.1. Coping strategies

During the baseline in mid-2012, Common Room was in process of moving to its current location. While the SPO took its time to find a new location and move, their relocation had a number of drawbacks. The new location is less central than before, with no gallery or exhibition spaces. Located in a residential area, there is a low noise tolerance and the space Common Room now occupies is less attractive.

Between 2011 and 2012, Common Room received €54,000 from Hivos and was able to save office/building rental, which was basically free of charge. With just €35,000 in funding support from Hivos in the 2012-2013 period, Common Room had to cope with additional rental costs, allocating 20 percent of the budget to this. In addition to their growing financial woes, Common Room was unable to apply for more Social Aid Funding from the Bandung city government, which in 2011 had constituted 39 percent of their total budget.

Common Room have tried to cope with these problems by widening their range of supported target groups. However, this may have added to their existing problems of having vaguely defined target groups. With ill-defined target groups, a lack of focus and a majority of funding going towards institutional support and non-programmatic costs, Common Room is losing its strategic position. The organisation relies very heavily on its director for strategic direction and has not been able to be effective enough or innovative in the way they plan their activities and seek out additional support to sustain interventions.
Appendix 5  Common Room Statistics 2012-2013

Type of activities 2012-2013:

Themes 2012-2013:

Participants 2012-2013:
Expenses 2012-2013:
The Centre for Development Innovation works on processes of innovation and change in the areas of food and nutrition security, adaptive agriculture, sustainable markets, ecosystem governance, and conflict, disaster and reconstruction. It is an interdisciplinary and internationally focused unit of Wageningen UR within the Social Sciences Group. Our work fosters collaboration between citizens, governments, businesses, NGOs, and the scientific community. Our worldwide network of partners and clients links with us to help facilitate innovation, create capacities for change and broker knowledge.

The mission of Wageningen UR (University & Research centre) is 'To explore the potential of nature to improve the quality of life'. Within Wageningen UR, nine specialised research institutes of the DLO Foundation have joined forces with Wageningen University to help answer the most important questions in the domain of healthy food and living environment. With approximately 30 locations, 6,000 members of staff and 9,000 students, Wageningen UR is one of the leading organisations in its domain worldwide. The integral approach to problems and the cooperation between the various disciplines are at the heart of the unique Wageningen Approach.