Participation, Power and Local Ownership in Community-Driven Reconstruction Interventions in South Kivu, D.R. Congo

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Abstract

This study aims to gain understanding of how local ownership in community-driven reconstruction (CDR) projects is shaped by policy and practice. The typologies of participation (Pretty, 1995) and the power cube (Gaventa, 2005) are used as tools to analyse local ownership of CDR projects carried out in the territories of Uvira and Fizi in South Kivu, D.R. Congo. Qualitative data for this study was collected in fourteen villages through participant observations, focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews with beneficiaries of CDR projects implemented by VECO and ZOA. This qualitative data is supplemented by quantitative data from the MFS II impact evaluation survey conducted in the same villages. The results show that policy objectives and the power of the intervening NGOs are framing the actions of the CDR projects. Within that frame there is space for beneficiaries to use their power to participate, negotiate and shape the actions. Functional and interactive participation are the most prevalent typologies in the CDR projects, noting that the level of participation is lowest at the start and increases during the process of intervention. The level of participation is not determining the impact of the CDR projects. The participatory strategy is enhancing the feeling of local ownership of the project by the beneficiaries, but it is lacking to leave the initiative to the local people and to empower them.

Keywords: *Local ownership, community-driven reconstruction, South Kivu, DRC, participation, power, policy*

Preface

The past year has been a literal, personal and academic journey. With a backpack filled with years of studying development, disaster and conflict, the time had come to experience the practice of it in South Kivu, D.R. Congo. One of the most troubled places on this earth where every self-respecting NGO has settled in an attempt to contribute to development, stability and reconstruction. Included in my figurative backpack was the critical-analytical attitude that studying international development at the Wageningen University has brought me. This critical attitude towards the development sector urged me to examine the legitimacy of these NGOs, because: Are they doing any good or are they just contributing to the disorder that is already prevailing in the eastern Congolese society? Their policies are promising, but is it not just keeping up appearances? And how realistic are these policies actually, and are they adapted to the conflict-affected context?

Is it even possible to adapt development programs to such a fragile and unstable environment? All these questions have driven me to write this thesis. Without the illusion of finding answers to all of them, but with the hope that I myself and every other person who will read this will gain a little bit more insight in what is really happening on local level where development projects are implemented.

For making this thesis possible I want to give credit to whom it belongs. This all would not have been possible if Koen Leuveld would not have given me the opportunity to join the MFS II impact evaluation research team in DRC. Thank you for opening that door for me! Another big thank you goes out to Romy Appelman: it was nice to notice that our very different character traits went so well together and were usefully complementary in the field work. Thanks to John Quattrochi and Megan Lickley for your part in the MFS II research and mainly for being very nice and good company during my stay in DRC.

My thanks goes out to all the Congolese research assistants for what you have taught me about your country, for the help with translating, and most of all for being very nice to me and making me feel appreciated. I want to especially mention the people of the 'qualitative team' who took part in executing the focus group discussions with me: Barthélemy, Brigitte, Ephrem, Eustache, Jacques, John K., Pascal B., and Sophie. "*On est ensemble!"*

I want to thank all the respondents for making time and effort to talk to me. I am thankful that you wanted to share your experiences with me, even when it held you back from your work on the field.

Last but not least, special thanks to my supervisor dr.ir. E.P.M. Heijmans. Annelies, thank you for being strong and relaxed, and for always asking me the right questions to get my 'thinking-wheels' back in motion to head in the right direction again.

Alexandra 't Lam,

Wageningen, The Netherlands,

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List of abbreviations

CBD	Community Based Development
CDD	Community Driven Development
CDR	Community Driven Reconstruction
CGP	Comité pour la Gestion du Projet
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda
GBV	Gender Based Violence
IDP	Internally Displace Person
MDG	Millenium Development Goal
MFS	Medefinancieringsstelsel
NGO	Non-Governemental Organisation

1. Introduction

This thesis is about local ownership within Community-Driven Reconstruction (CDR) projects in South Kivu, DRC. This type of 'reconstruction from below' has gathered momentum in the discourses of donors and agencies and is now practiced in many conflicted-affected areas (Hilhorst *et al.*, 2010). Only few studies have, however, been done on the effects of the participatory approach within CDR projects. This research will strive to give a qualitative perspective on and analysis of the concept of local ownership within CDR projects.

1.1 Impact evaluation research MFS II

To contribute to direct poverty alleviation and the realisation of the millennium development goals (MDG), the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs gives out an amount of 1.9 billion euro to development organisations. This money is, in the period 2011 till 2015 distributed through the medefinancieringsstelsel II (MFS II)[1] as subsidies to 67 Dutch development organisations. In turn, these Dutch organisations work together with 4.000 partner organisations in developing countries (www.rijksoverheid.nl, 2014). One of these countries is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This research focuses on development projects financed by the MFS II carried out in the province of South Kivu in DRC (Fig. 1). These projects have different themes that they focus on such as good governance, agricultural development, natural resource management, basic education, and gender-based violence (GBV).

Figure 1: Map of DRC, South Kivu highlighted in green

To monitor how the MFS II subsidies are spend in DRC and what the impacts of the projects are, the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs has commissioned the department of development economics (DEC) of the Wageningen University & Research Centre (WUR) to carry out an impact evaluation research. That research mainly generates quantitative data for which a baseline study has been done in 2012 and the data for the end line study has been gathered from May till August 2014. In the impact evaluation the following Dutch NGOs that operate in DRC are included: IUCN, Leger des Heils (LdH), ICCO, Cordaid and ZOA. Within the broader impact evaluation study, this thesis research is carried out with the purpose to gather qualitative data on projects of Cordaid and ZOA who are using participatory development approaches in the province of South Kivu. In policy, these approaches have a lot of potential but there is a need to examine how this works out in

[1] MFS II is the second term of subsidies granted to NGOs. The first term of the MFS was from 2007-2010 (www.rijksoverheid.nl, 2014).

practice in the conflict-affected context of South Kivu. That is what this thesis is about. The (quantitative) data from the broader MFS II impact evaluation can be used to contribute to the qualitative data gathered for this thesis.

1.2 Participatory development approaches

Several paradigm shifts have taken place in the past decades in the strive for more effective development. One of these shifts was from *"a standardised top-down paradigm of things towards a diversified bottom-up paradigm of people"* (Chambers, 1994: 1). This paradigm shift started in the early 1990s and is characterised by the concept of participatory development. This concept is since explained and used in three different ways:

1) As a cosmetic label. Using participatory development approaches for good appearance because donors and governments require it, while in reality there is often a traditional top-down approach;
2) To mobilise local labour and reduce costs. Participatory development approaches are used as a co-opting practice, which often means that "they" (local people) participate in "our" project;
3) As an empowering process. A participatory development process in which a project is managed by the local people, including analysis, command and decisions, which should mean "that "we" participate in "their" project (Chambers, 1994: 2).

Participatory approaches are now widely acknowledged and adopted by official government and international development organisations' policy (Williams, 2004). There are several reasons for this wide adoption: participatory approaches strive to strengthen the commitment of local actors to the project and to ease the implementation of a project (Reich, 2006). There is a strive to involve actors that have a stake in the development program or project, to make it an integrative process that is widely supported. Furthermore, there is the aim to let the development be based in and driven by communities so that the community will have ownership over the development program. The concept of local ownership is interpreted in different ways, just like the concept of participatory development mentioned above. The ultimate goal is that local ownership is practised as an empowering process, where project management is done by the local people; it is their project. This interpretation of how development programs should take place is known as community-based and community-driven development (CBD and CDD). It aims for a more effective development process as compared to an externally imposed program because it would connect better to local reality and local needs. The terms "community-based" and "community-driven" are often used exchangeable, but in essence there is a difference between the two. CBD refers to projects that actively included local actors in design and management of the projects, while CDD refers to projects in which local actors and communities are in control of important project decisions and of the management of investment funds (Mansuri & Rao, 2004). CDD is initiated by the World Bank, which view it as *"a mechanism for enhancing sustainability, improving efficiency and effectiveness, allowing poverty reduction efforts to be taken to scale, making development more inclusive, empowering poor people, building social capital, strengthening governance, and complementing market and public sector activities"* (Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 2). The World Bank is very positive on this approach and has

adopted it as the main vision behind its Comprehensive Development Framework. Others are less positive for several reasons. One of these reasons is that implementing a CDD project could undermine the democratically elected government because local institutions are promoted within CDD-projects (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Another reason to be more reserved about the CDD approach relates to its implementation in conflict-affected contexts. CDD is then often referred to as community-driven reconstruction (CDR) (Kyamusugulwa, 2014). Conflict-affected contexts lead up to specific challenges for CDR projects:

- "*Communities where projects are set may be deeply divided;*
- *Power is unequally distributed;*
- *Lines between combatants and civilians may be blurred;*
- *A need to address past traumas may give rise to calls for inquiries or trials; and*
- *Economic recovery and basic services may be urgently needed"* (Strand et *al.*, 2003: 1).

Despite these challenges the CDR approach has been particularly popular in conflict-affected areas (like Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Aceh and Bosnia Herzegovina), among many development groups throughout the development world (Humphreys, 2013). The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a country that is also identified as a conflict-affected country (amongst others by the UN, OECD and the World Bank), and is so for decades already. Especially the provinces North and South Kivu, along the border with Rwanda and Burundi. Numerous projects in this area, set up by different NGOs, are using the CDR approach. ZOA and Cordaid are two of these NGOs which are carrying out projects in South Kivu, based on the CDR approach. The fieldwork for this thesis is carried out after these projects in South Kivu, to investigate local ownership within CDR projects and their specific challenges of the conflict-affected context. There is also looked at whether the project policies are in line with what is experienced in practice, and how the impacts of these projects can be explained in the light of how local ownership is put into practice.

Since this research is focused on the conflict-affected province of South Kivu, the community-driven approaches implemented in that context will in this report therefore be referred to as community-driven reconstruction (CDR). It must, however, be made clear that this does not mean that all community-driven projects are actively involved in reconstruction activities. These projects are often 'common' development projects with 'common' development activities. The conflict-affected context wherein these projects are implemented does, however, come along with serious challenges. These projects are thus taking place *in* conflict-affected contexts but they are often not working *on* (the consequences of) conflict.

1.3 South Kivu, DRC: A conflict affected context

The crisis in eastern Congo is one with a complex history and present. It has been described as the deadliest conflict since the Second World War (Lemarchand, 2013). Since the independence from Belgium in 1960 there have been numerous violent outbreaks and only few moments of apparent stability. In the wake of and the aftermath of the genocide in neighbour country Rwanda in 1994 many upheavals took place, characterised by brutal violence, murders, sexual abuse, displacements and destruction (Lemarchand, 2013). Many Rwandan

Hutu's have crossed the border with DRC and the Rwandan army has committed many atrocities in the border area in the name of securitisation. The years of 1996-1997 are indicated as the first Congo war, and the period between 1998 and 2002 as the second Congo war. Approximately 3.3 million people lost their life only in the second Congo war (Lemarchand, 2013). Next to these losses the region has to handle the even larger number of internally displaced people (IDPs). Formed through history and fuelled by the many atrocities and refugee movements, the conflict situation in eastern Congo became ever more complex. Lemarchand (2013) emphasizes the effect of flows of refugees and IDPs by describing them as "*major vectors of conflict within as well as between states*" (Lemarchand, 2013: 423). The complexity of the conflict situation is furthermore increased by the fact that local issues become mixed up with regional issues. To make it more specific and relevant for this research, the focus will be on the situation in South Kivu, in the territories of Uvira and Fizi (Fig. 2[2]). Different ethnic groups live in the *plain de la Ruzizi,* the area along the border with Burundi: the Fulero (also called the Bafuliro), the Banyamulenge and the Barundi. The latter group are migrants that have been living in the Ruzizi plain since before colonial rule, and together with the Banyamulenge they are the traditional enemies of the Fulero (Lemarchand, 2013). This is fuelled by ethnicity, conflicts over power and chieftaincy, and different use of resources. The Fulero and Barundi strive against each other for the rule over the region, to deliver the *mwami* (king). In 2000, when Floribert Ndabagoye, a Barundi, held the position of *mwami*, he sought support with a Rwandan-backed organisation called the *Rassemblement Démocratique Congolais* to stand firm against the Fulero who wanted

Figure 2 Map of territories of South Kivu



[2] Carte des Territoires du Sud-Kivu, www.reliefweb.int.
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1D75E3EB2A2B3CDCC1256F2D00484AA9-ocha_drcSKivu061103.pdf

to take over *mwamiship* (Lemarchand, 2013). The assassination of Ndabagoye in 2012 resulted in new upheavals of conflict. Next to the strive for the *mwamiship* the Banyamulenge are putting efforts in claiming territory and citizenship. It is also this group that is mainly involved in keeping cows, while the Fulero are mostly farmers cultivating the lands. In the past years several atrocities of theft of cows have taken place, often followed by violent acts of revenge. The massacre of Mutarule in the *Plaine de la Ruzi*zi is a tragic example of this. On the 7th of June 2014, thirty people including women and children were killed in a church in Mutarule, This was explained as an act of revenge after theft of cows. The research team passed the now deserted village of Mutarule several times, with the wooden crosses as silent (and at the same time screaming) references to what had happen (Fig. 3). In the territory of Fizi tensions between these ethnic are also significant and causing conflict and destruction. Furthermore the MayiMayi rebel group the FDLR (*Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda*) and the FARDC (*Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo*) are often a cause for tensions and disruptions both in Uvira and Fizi. This goes from theft, to murder and rapes. Throughout these different factors that are causing or at least contributing to the conflict situation the linkages between the local and the regional issues become clear. Furthermore, the different factors igniting conflict are divers which makes it altogether a complex mix of tensions.

Figure 3 Crosses after Mutarule massacre of 7 June 2014

The conflict situation of eastern Congo is just shortly touched upon in this paragraph. This does however illustrate the complex conflict affected context in which the CDR projects are implemented and the challenges that come along with is as also described by Strand *et al.* (2013) in paragraph 1.2.

2. Methodology

2.1 Problem statement

Even though participatory approaches such as CDD and CDR are widely adopted in development policy of many governments and development organisations, the evidence that these approaches are effective is still weak and not many impact studies have been carried out yet (Humphreys, 2013). The studies of social and economic impacts of CDD that have been done so far, show a mixed picture: CDD programs have shown to be particularly effective in establishing or expanding essential social services and physical infrastructure at local level (Humprheys e*t al.*, 2013). Mansuri and Rao (2004) also state that the impact studies that have been done show that there is some evidence that CDD projects create effective community infrastructure, but that there is no evidence for a causal relationship between the outcomes of a CDD project and the participatory strategy that is used to shape the process. That process is instead often shaped and dominated by elites. Furthermore, the quality of the process tends to be worse in more unequally divided communities in terms of power and resources (Mansuri & Rao, 2004).

These are challenges for the basic principle of CDR: local ownership. Why are there differences between what was intended as local ownership within CDR-policy and what is eventually happening in practice? Can a CDR-project in a conflict-affected context be completely locally owned? Who determines which people are selected to be involved in the project and how is the decision-making process taking place? These are all questions that are directly or indirectly linked to the concepts of participation and power, which seem to be crucial within the process of local ownership in CDR. To get insight in these issues a study on local ownership within CDR projects is needed.

2.2 Research objective

The objective of this research is to get an understanding of how local ownership in the CDR approach is translated from policy into practice, and how participation and power play a role in shaping this process.

This research will then serve as an assessment and evaluation of the practice of local ownership within the CDR projects, which gives the opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of local ownership in future projects within their particular context.

2.3 Research questions

2.3.1 Main research question

The central question of this research is:

- **How is local ownership of local committee-members in the selected community-driven reconstruction interventions in South Kivu, DRC shaped by dynamics of participation and power relations?**

2.3.2 Sub research questions

1. What are reasons for local organisations for choosing a CDR approach including local ownership in the selected cases?

2. How is the principle of local ownership implemented in practice, looking at the typology of participation that is applied in the selected CDR projects? (using the typologies of participation by Pretty, 1995)
3. How is the principle of local ownership implemented in practice, looking at spaces, places and power relations related to the selected CDR projects? (using the power cube by Gaventa, 2006)
4. How are the spaces, places and power relations related to the selected CDR projects influencing participation between local committee members?
5. How are the objectives of CDR and local ownership in policy translated in the practice of the selected CDR projects, and how can differences between policy and practice be explained?
6. What are the impacts and outcomes of the selected CDR projects and how can these be attributed to the way local ownership is applied?

2.4 Research design

To answer the research questions the main research methods are qualitative. The quantitative data that is gathered during the MFS II impact evaluation is however also used to contribute and complement the qualitative data. The CDR-projects of VECO in Uvira and of ZOA in Fizi are the main research units. The focus of the research will therefore be on community level where local actors interact with each other, negotiating spaces, places and power relations that influence local ownership of the CDR projects.

The field work is retrospective since it is meant to find out the process of participation and interaction in the implementation and execution of CDR-projects, especially on the aspect of local ownership. Once the field work and analysis are done, deriving from that data the research will take a prospective view to be able to transform the reflection into recommendations for future CDR approaches.

2.4.1 Data collection

The collection of data took place in the province of South Kivu in DRC, as part of a broader impact evaluation research of development projects financed through MFS II. Figure 4 shows the provinces of North and South Kivu and the projects involved in that impact evaluation research. These projects are handling various development subjects, including

Figure 4 Projects and locations included in the MFS II impact evaluation



women rights, primary health care, development of value chains, and education. For this thesis research two NGOs are selected: VECO and ZOA. These two NGOs have projects in the territories of respectively Uvira and Fizi. The selection of these projects is based on their approach which can be characterized as CDR. This selection is made by reading policy documents of the projects involved, talking to local NGO staff and doing participant observations during the MFS II impact evaluation research.

The data for this research is gathered in six villages in the territory of Uvira where VECO has implemented its project, and in eight villages in the territory of Fizi where ZOA has implemented its project. An overview of these villages can be found in table 1. The data will be collected in four ways, depicted in Table 2, including a short description of the research units, the strategy for data analysis and the theoretical concepts for which it will give information. With that information insights are generated in the process of implementation of the CDR projects, including participation, power and the characteristics of local ownership.

Table 1 Overview of selected villages

Village	Territory	NGO
Kabondozi	Fizi	ZOA
Katungula	Fizi	ZOA
Kenya	Fizi	ZOA
Lusenda	Fizi	ZOA
Mboko	Fizi	ZOA
Mukolwe	Fizi	ZOA
Sangya	Fizi	ZOA
Tchaboba	Fizi	ZOA
Kiliba	Uvira	VECO
Kilomoni	Uvira	VECO
Kiringye	Uvira	VECO
Luberizi	Uvira	VECO
Runingu	Uvira	VECO
Sange	Uvira	VECO

Table 2 Overview of data collection and analysis methods

Research methods	Research units	Data analysis	Theoretical domain
Desk study (secondary)	Literature study; policy documents	Discourse analysis	Policy – practice
Participant observations (primary)	Practices of everyday life; actors interactions	Coding field notes	Policy – practice; participation; spaces, places, power
17 Semi-structured interviews (primary)	Beneficiaries of VECO and ZOA projects; Staff of VECO and ZOA	Coding; Typologies of participation; power cube	Policy – practice; participation; spaces, places, power; local ownership
14 Focus group discussion (primary)	Beneficiaries of VECO and ZOA projects	Coding; Typologies of participation; power cube	Policy – practice; participation; spaces, places, power; local ownership

The participants observations have mainly taken place during the (quantitative) data collection for the MFS II impact evaluation. Fourteen focus group discussions were held, one in each selected village. Seventeen semi-structured interviews have taken place of which three with local staff members of VECO and ZOA and fourteen with beneficiaries of VECO or ZOA in the selected villages.

2.4.2 Data analysis

The overall perspective on the analysis of the data is the actor-oriented approach as explained in the theoretical framework in chapter three. To analyse the texts in policy documents of CDR project, and also to analyse what people have said in meetings, interviews and focus groups, discourse analyse will be a useful way to do that (Table 2). The concept of discourse originates from Foucault and his ideas on society and power influence the discourse analysis. An important role in this analysis is that of language, both in writing and speech. Language is seen as 'social practice' and the context of that language is crucial (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Discourse is constructing "*situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people*" (Wodak & Meyer, 2009: 6). The notion of power is also at the core of discourse analysis, as discourse is producing and reproducing power relations between different people and groups of people through the ways in which things are presented and people are positioned (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). This relates to the concepts of participation and power and how they can influence local ownership within the selected CDR projects. Discourse analysis will therefore be used to analyse 'language' of speech and writing, including the context in which they take place. For analysing the concept of local ownership this research focuses on two main building blocks of local ownership: participation and power. The typologies of participation (Pretty, 1995) and the power cube (Gaventa, 2006) are the tools used for analysing these concepts. These tools have also been a basis for structuring the interview topics and the focus group discussions.

2.5 Limitations

The data collection for this research has been carried out within a larger impact evaluation research and will also provide qualitative data for that research. The double agenda that had to be executed as result of the double role caused possibilities as well as limitations. The main limitation has been in the time that could be spend in selected village. The responsibilities for the larger impact evaluation research restricted that time resulting in limited depth of the data. It did however open the door to collect more data in a larger number of villages.

The main approach of the larger evaluation research is a based in the structuralist thinking, while this thesis research is taking an actor-oriented approach. Long (2001) describes the difference in analysis between these approaches as the division between *"scholars concerned with testing the general structural models and those interested in depicting the ways in which people manage the dilemmas in their everyday lives"* (Long, 2001: 10). This displays the different angles of incidence of on the one hand the broader evaluation research and on the other hand this research. Long (2001) explains that it is difficult to integrate the structural and actor perspectives because their *"theoretical and epistemological assumptions diverge"* (Long 2001: 10). He does however adds that it is not impossible to combine the two perspectives within one research. This research is the proof that it is not impossible to combine the two perspectives, although it has proven to be difficult to uphold the in-depth quality that is needed for a qualitative research.

3. Theoretical framework

The main theory to structure, analyse and interpret the data is the actor-oriented approach. The theoretical concept of local ownership will be analysed from an actor-orientation. Examining local ownership is done by looking at two main concepts: participation and power. The typologies of participation (Pretty, 1995) and the power cube (Gaventa, 2005) serve as the analytical tools.

This chapter will start with explaining the actor-oriented approach and its linkages with local ownership (3.1). The concept of local ownership itself will be explained in paragraph 3.2, including the typologies of participation and the different elements of the power cube. Paragraph 3.3 will discuss the implications of differences between policy of local ownership and how it is put into practice in CDR projects.

3.1 Actor-oriented approach

The actor-oriented approach can be viewed as the counterpoint to structural analysis, meaning that social change is not just determined by external forces, but that social change is to a large extend internally shaped by everyday life experiences and perceptions of individuals and groups (Long, 2001). These individuals and groups, the actors, have agency that they can use in their everyday life. Agency entails *"the generation and use or manipulation of networks of social relations and the channeling of specific items (such as claims, orders, goods, instruments and information) through certain nodal points of interpretation and interaction"* (Long, 2001: 17). Agency is therefore embodied in social relations and is only effective through them (Long, 2001).

The core of the actor-oriented approach that is used for this research is that reality is shaped by everyday practices and interactions between people with agency, and those practices and interactions take place in a certain arena (Long & van der Ploeg, 1989). Or in other words: *"Social actors reflect upon their experiences and what happens around them and use their knowledge and capabilities to interpret and respond to their environment"* (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010: 1120). The notion of agency can thus be described as the knowledge and capabilities of actors and the way these are used by the actors. Long (2001) adds to this that knowledge and capabilities only get full meaning if they are culturally translated, which would in the field of development mean: *"analysing how differential conceptions of power, influence, knowledge and efficacy may shape the responses and strategies of different actors"* (Long, 2001: 19). These conceptions are all formed in processes of interaction, which means that knowledge, capabilities and power are not just 'givens' or something that can be possessed, but they get meaning within relationships and interactions (Long, 2001).

The main task of analysis within the actor-oriented approach is, according to Long (2001: 20) identifying the different practices of the actors that are directly or indirectly involved in the CDR project, their strategies and rationales, and the conditions under which they occur, how they interlock, their effectiveness, and their wider social ramifications. The main focus of this research, partly derived from Long (2001), is on how local ownership is interpreted and given meaning through interactions between the actors with agency. As mentioned earlier, the interactions take place in a certain environment and under certain conditions which can be explained as the social space. That space is known as an arena where social negotiation between actors takes place. There are different types of arenas (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010) and they can be at international, national, regional and

local level (Fig. 5). For this research the focus will be on the local arena, meaning the particular locality in which a CDR project is implemented. There are however numerous linkages to the regional, national and international level: from policy requirements set by international donors and NGO headquarters to local partner organisations that implement and monitor the projects. To demarcate the space of research, the focus is on the local level, the arena in which the CDR project is implemented and local actors interact and negotiate the outcomes. The two main groups of actors within this research are the local implementing organisations VECO and ZOA and the beneficiaries of the projects living in the selected villages.To see how and what these groups of actors negotiate in the local arena of the CDR project, there is looked at how they *"interpret the context, the needs, their own role, and each other"* (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010: 1120). It is within the interaction that interpretations and reflections on local ownership are formed together with the notions of participation and power.

Figure 5: Levels of arenas



Viewing a CDR project and the locality in which it is implemented as the arena where interactions between actors take place demarcates and structures the area of study. At the same time this demarcation is a simplification of reality whereas projects are always part of a chain of events within a broader framework of activities of institutions and civil society, and it is linked to previous interventions (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989). A project is thus not an event that has clear boundaries in time and space, but in development-policy this kind of "project-thinking" is, however, prevalent. Long and van de Ploeg (1989) therefore argue that it is needed to deconstruct a development intervention to be able to see and examine the socially constructed negotiation process that it is. That is what this research aims to do: to deconstruct the concept of local ownership within the CDR project interventions.

3.2 Community-Driven Reconstruction

Community-Driven Reconstruction (CDR) is an instrument for post-conflict reconstruction which can play an important role in promoting local ownership (Cliffe e*t al.*, 2003). The two main objectives of CDR are:

1) *"Speedy and cost-effective delivery of reconstruction assistance on the ground; and*
2) *Building a governance structure that stresses local choice and accountability."*
   (Cliffe et al., 2003: 2).

Kyamusugulwa (2014) agrees on these two objectives and further describes that the activities through which the objectives of reconstruction and good governance are shaped are the formation of local committees and the implementation of projects. What the important steps of these activities are to reach the objectives, will be explained in this paragraph.

CDR projects apply the methodology of community-driven development (CDD), but adapt it to and implement it in a conflict-affected context (Cliffe e*t al.*, 2003). This methodology reasons from the principle that local communities are in a better position to identify their needs than the larger institutional structures (Cliffe e*t al.*, 2003). CDR further aims to empower local communities, and the most common strategy that is used to establish this is the formation of local committees through which decisions are made and projects are implemented (Kyamusugulwa, 2014). Within these committees five steps can be distinguished that are or should be carried out by the local community actors within the CDR process: identifying needs; deciding on projects to address these needs*;* managing resources and contracts; monitoring implementation of projects*;* and evaluating outcomes (Cliffe *et al.*, 2003: 2). These five steps are in line with the basic elements of project implementation: 1) Context analysis; 2) Action plan; 3) Implementation; 4) Monitoring; 5) Evaluation. To examine how local ownership is shaped and practiced through participation and power, that intervention process will be deconstructed in these steps. How local ownership within CDR projects is viewed and defined for this research will be explained in the next paragraph.

3.3 Local Ownership

As mentioned in the introduction (chapter 1) the participatory approaches came up in the 90s as opposition to large-scale, top-down development. This is described by Mansuri & Rao (2004: 10) as *"the active involvement of members of a defined community in at least some aspects of project design and implementation."* (Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 10). The idea behind the participatory approach is that a project can connect better to local needs and that it empowers local people. Participatory development has the empowerment of local people as ideal aim *"to enable people to present, share, analyse and augment their knowledge at the start of a process. The ultimate output is enhanced knowledge and competence, and ability to make demands, and to sustain action"* (Chambers, 1994: 1266). These citations are linked to the concept of local ownership which is a basic principle of CDR approaches. Local actors are in control of the project management and important project decisions. Beneficiaries of a project that is funded by an international development cooperation feel that the projects is theirs, that is what Kyamusugulwa (2014) describes as local ownership. This is linked to the third point of the ways in which participatory development can be put into practice (described in chapter 1), where "we" participate in "their" project. This is explained as an empowering process where local people are in control of the project management, including analysis, command and decisions (Chambers, 1994). Reich (2006) explicates this as follows: "*Local actors would not only be involved in the information gathering process or strategy development, but should have the means to decide about the agenda, strategy and budget management themselves, even decide who the beneficiaries of the project should be"* (Reich, 2006: 13). In the reality of the development discourse, however, local ownership hardly ever means full control of the whole process of a development program or project by local actors (Reich, 2006). Therefore, it is important to study how the principle of local ownership, which is a basic principle of CDR policy, is carried out in the practice of CDR projects. Important factor of influence to this process is how participation within the CDR project is taking place how power relations are influencing that process. These two factors (participation and power) and how they relate to local ownership, will be elaborated upon in the next two paragraphs.

3.3.1 Participation

Local ownership of CDR projects cannot be established without local actors participating in the activities of CDR, which is often done in the form of local committees. Issues on participation that will be discussed in this paragraph are: What does the concept of participation mean and what are different types of participation that can be practiced in CDR projects? According to Sanoff (2000) there are three main purposes of participation:

1) *"To involve people in design decision-making processes and, as a result, increase their trust and confidence in organizations, making it more likely that they will accept decisions and plans and work within established systems when seeking solutions to problems;*
2) *To provide people with a voice in design and decision making in order to improve plans, decisions, and service delivery;*
3) *To promote a sense of community by bringing people together who share common goals"* (Sanoff, 2000: 9,10).

By using participation for these purposes it should meet the local needs better and generate an increased sense of influence on the decision-making process and awareness of consequences of the decisions made (Sanoff, 2000). These issues are very much in line with the aim of local ownership within CDR projects, especially on the feeling of influence on decision-making. Gaventa (2006) deepens these definitions of participating by stating that true participation not only means involvement in a given space, but also defining and shaping the space in which participation takes place. This will be further explained in the next paragraph. Sanoff (2000) describes four categories or 'experiences' of the process of participation:

- Awareness: Getting in line with realities of the situation so that everyone who participates speaks the same language, based in their experiences in the field in which change is proposed;
- Perception: Going from awareness to understanding of the participants perceptions and expectations of what is at stake and the context in which it takes place. These perceptions and expectations can than become resources for planning, instead of hidden agendas.
- Decision-making: Working from awareness and perception to a program for which participants create designs, based on their priorities.
- Implementation: Participants responsibilities carry on in the phase of implementation where they act upon the questions of 'how-to, where-to, when-to and who-will-do-it.

  (Sanoff, 2000: 10, 11)

These four categories can be seen as the phases through which the process of participation can be going through, and it is interesting to examine whether these phases are to be seen in the selected CDR cases. Participation, however, means different things to different people and Pretty (1995) distinguishes seven different perceptions and levels of participations. These typologies of participation are ranging from a type of participation that is only used as a label to generate donor resources to a type of participation in which local actors are in control of project decision-making and management. Table 3 displays the seven typologies with their characteristics. In examining the CDR projects and how local ownership is practiced within these projects, the seven typologies of participation are used to categorize the way in which people interact and participate.

Based on a particular typology of participation, implications can be made on issues of inclusion and exclusion, power relations and most of all on local ownership.

Table 3 Typologies of participation (Pretty, 1995: 1252)

Typology	Characteristics
1. Manipulative participation	Participation is simply a pretence, with "people's" representatives on official boards but who are unelected and have no power.
2. Passive participation	People participate by being told what has been decided or has already happened. It involves unilateral announcements by an administration or project management without any listening to people's responses. The information being shared belongs only to external professionals.
3. Participation by consultation	People participate by being consulted or by answering questions. External agents define problems or information gathering processes, and so control analysis. Such a consultative process does not concede any share in decision-making, and professionals are under no obligation to take on board people's views.
4. Participation for material incentives	People participate by contributing resources, for example labour, in return of food, cash or other material incentives. Farmers may provide the fields and labour, but are involved in neither experimentation nor the process of learning. It is very common to see this called participation. Yet people have no stake in prolonging technologies or practices when incentives end.
5. Functional participation	Participation seen by external agencies as a means to achieve project goals, especially reduced costs. People may participate by forming groups to meet predetermined objectives related to the project. Such involvement may be interactive and involve shared decision-making, but tends to arise only after major decisions have already been made by external agents. At worst, people may still only be co-opted to serve external goals.
6. Interactive participation	People participate in joint analysis, development of action plans, and formation or strengthening of local institutions. Participation is seen as a right, not just the means to achieve project goals. The process involves interdisciplinary methodologies that seek multiple perspectives and make use of systemic and structure learning processes. As groups take control over local decisions and determine how available resources are used, so they have a stake in maintaining structures or practices.
7. Self-mobilization	People participate by taking initiative independently by external institutions to change systems. They develop contact with external institutions for resources and technical advice they need, but retain control over how resources are used. Self-mobilization can spread if governments and NGOs provide an enabling framework of support. Such self-initiated mobilization may or may not challenge existing distributions of wealth and power.

3.3.2 Power

The power cube is used to assess the ways in which power works in the process of local ownership and participation in the CDR projects and to assess the transformative abilities of participation in various spaces and places. This paragraph is mainly based on Gaventa's (2006) article in which he explains the power cube with its different forms of spaces, places and power, and the interactions between them (Fig. 6).

Figure 6 Power cube (Gaventa, 2006)



Spaces: Gaventa (2006) explains that the notion of 'spaces' can be defined in various ways, were it as political spaces, policy spaces or democratic spaces. Gaventa (2006) uses the definition of spaces as "*opportunities, moments, and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions and relationships which affect their lives and interests*" (Gaventa, 2006: 11). Spaces are not isolated nor neural, but they are shaped by power relations. These power relations also demarcate the boundaries of the spaces of participation by setting what is possible within them, who are allowed to enter, with which identities, discourses and interests (Gaventa, 2006). In the selected cases of CDR projects it is thus important to define what the particular local space for participation is, how and by who that space is created and how power relations shape the process of participation within that space.

As seen in the power cube, spaces can be divided in closed, invited and claimed/created spaces.

Closed spaces: Decision-making spaces that are closed for participation of local actors and often literally take place behind closed doors.

Invited spaces: In these spaces local actors are invited to participate by different kinds of authorities such as the government, supranational agencies or non-governmental organisations.

Claimed/created spaces: These spaces are claimed by less powerful local actors against power holders, or these spaces are more autonomously created by local actors.

The most important point to the notion of spaces is who is creating a space, because that is mostly likely also who is holding the most power within that space (Gaventa, 2006). Furthermore it is noteworthy to say that the three spaces are not static but are in a dynamic relationships to each other through which spaces are constantly (re)negotiated. Gaventa (2006) therefore argues that a space should always be assessed in relation

to the other spaces which surround it. In the case of the CDR projects the 'project space' can therefore not be examined isolated, but in relation to other spaces where power relations are active. For example other institutional arrangements and decision-making processes within the local community. When a new space is created where there are no other participatory spaces, this new space can easily be captured by elites that are already in power (Gaventa, 2006).

The three kinds of spaces share elements with the typologies of participation explained in paragraph 3.3.1. Closed spaces can be linked to manipulative and passive participation; invited spaces can be linked to participation by consultation, participation for material incentives, functional participation and interactive participation; and claimed/created spaces can be linked to self-mobilization.

Places: Places are described as the locations of power, also referred to as the arenas of power. These places or arenas can be on different levels: local, national and global. A similar division in shown in paragraph 3.1 in figure 5, as part of the explanation of arenas within the actor-oriented approach. It is already stated that the focus of this research is on the local arena in which a new space for interaction is created by the intervention of a CDR project. It is also explained that there are various linkages to the other arenas, and Gaventa (2006) stresses the dangers of focusing on a local arena in a globalising world. It is a dynamic process in which spaces, places and power are interacting and constantly shaping and negotiating each other.

Power: Power is not something that can be possessed like a resource can be possessed, but it is created, used, shared and negotiated in multiple ways by actors involved. The dynamics of power are shaping the inclusiveness of participation within spaces and places (Gaventa, 2006). Three forms of power are distinguished within the power cube.

Visible power: This form of power is about observable decision-making, including the formal rules, structures, authorities, institutions, and procedures of decision-making (Gaventa, 2006). Changing this level of power is often directed to changing the 'who, how and what' of policy-making.
Hidden power: Hidden power is about setting the political agenda by controlling who is participating in decision-making and what is on the agenda (Gaventa, 2006).
Invisible power: Through the hidden form of power the psychological and ideological boundaries of participation are shaped (Gaventa, 2006). This is a step further than hidden power, because with invisible power there are not only issues kept from the decision-making table but also from the minds and awareness of actors involved. In such a way that people can be influenced in how they think about these issues, their environment and themselves in relation to that.

When examining local ownership of CDR projects the different forms of power within such a process cannot be ignored. Especially interesting for the process of local ownership is to look at who is setting the agenda and

who is controlling who is allowed to participate in decision-making (hidden power). Inclusion and exclusion are central concepts to this form of power and will shape participation within its space and place.

Concluding it can be said that space, place and power are dynamics that exist in relation to each other and will influence participation within the selected CDR interventions in South Kivu. For this research the power cube is an analytical tool, used to become aware of forms of spaces, places and power that shape and negotiate local ownership in the selected CDR projects. Furthermore it will help to analyse how the CDR intervention process is influenced by space, place and power,

3.4 Policy-practice discrepancy

How a CDR-project is implemented starts with the idea or set of ideas (discourse) behind a development project intervention. A prevalent discourse of project intervention is that a project is demarcated by space and time. This kind of 'project-thinking' often leads to dividing development in different sectors, such as agriculture, health and education (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989). The policy within the project-thinking is furthermore often structured along a project cycle, which is a clear tool of linear thinking (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989). Reality is however more complex. A project cannot be isolated from its context and it is part of a chain of activities of institutions and civil society and different sectors are interlinked (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989). The idea of separated internal and external factors is also often viewed in development project policies. In practice there is not such a separation between internal and external factors, but the intervention is a socially negotiated process between these factors (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989). What is, for example, perceived as an internal factor is the local population. The project (intervention) is then perceived as an external factor to the local community to generate change in that community. The assumption behind this way of thinking is that the external factor provides better solutions to problems than the means that already exist (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989). In some cases there is even a disregard of local knowledge and local development capabilities (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989).

In the case of the selected CDR projects in South Kivu, the policy-practice debate is particularly interesting because the CDR approach seems to be a way of 'project-thinking'. At the same time it incorporates the idea that development should be internally driven by the community, using their capacities. So this is not just implementing an external factor (the project) into a local community to generate change, but it aims to let the change be internally driven. The question remains how internally/community-driven the CDR projects are in practice and how the whole process of designing, implementing and monitoring is locally owned. Even when local ownership is used and promoted as the strategy for project implementation using local knowledge and local capabilities, it is often the case that in practice these strategies are still in the hands of the 'development experts' which are external factors (Long & van der Ploeg, 1989).

From the view of the actor-oriented approach reality is shaped by everyday practices, between people with agency. So is the process of local ownership within CDR projects shaped. This means that it is not mainly shaped by policy, but by interactions and everyday practices between the actors involved. Therefore the focus of this research is on those practices and on what is actually happening during participation within a

development intervention and the *"forms of interaction, procedures, practical strategies, types of discourse, cultural categories and the particular stakeholders present in specific contexts"* (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989: 226, 227). It has been acknowledged for decades now that the process from policy formulation to implementation to outcomes cannot be perceived as a linear process. Instead, policy is interpreted and reinterpreted during the process and external factors are also impacting the process (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989). In line with this, Hilhorst & Jansen (2010) state that socially negotiated ideas acquire meaning in practice. This research therefore examines how CDR policy is implemented in practice, and what reasons there are for the discrepancy between the two. This is done by focusing mainly on how the aspects of participation and power shape local ownership in the intervention process.

4. What determines how things are done?

This chapter gives insight in the policy objectives of community-driven reconstruction and local ownership and how these are translated into practice. This will be described in four parts: An introduction to what is meant by policy and how it can or cannot shape action on the ground (4.1); the objectives and strategies of two community-driven reconstruction programs of the two local NGOs (VECO and ZOA) that are the subject of this research (4.2); explaining the chain through which development aid runs, to get an understanding of how policy and funding is steered and (re)negotiated by policy and funding requirements from high up in the chain and by the reality and activities on the ground, at the bottom of the chain (4.3); and in the concluding paragraph the question of what determines how the selected community-driven reconstruction programs in South Kivu, DRC are carried out will be answered (4.4).

4.1 What is policy?

The important question to ask is what the link is between a policy objective and the action: what is the role of policy in determining how things are done? Colebatch (2002) argues that policy is a way of making sense of the action; policy frames the action rather than describing it. Policy as a frame for action means that policy is setting boundaries within which the action can take place. The policy frame can also attach interpretations to the actions but it is not predetermining the action. There is space within the policy frame to shape and negotiate the action. This is different from policy as a description of the action where there is less space for shaping and negotiating the action since it was already described. The relation between policy and practice works both ways though: policy frames the action, but on the other end it is also practice that shapes the action (Colebatch, 2002). Both policy and practice thus shape the action.

What then, is policy? According to Colebatch (2002) policy has a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The vertical dimension has a focus on the authorities that make decisions, that check whether these decisions are well executed and have their desired effect. The horizontal dimension of policy focuses on the range of participants, their diverse agendas and on policy activity as negotiation and coalition-building. Linked to this view is the perspective of policy as structured interaction which describes the ways in which the range of participants with their diversity of understandings of the situation and of the problem interact with each other (Colebatch, 2002). In the case of the CDR interventions in South Kivu this can for example be seen in the composition of the local committees. Men and women in the local committee might have different understandings of what is needed in their village as a result of the different roles they play within that community. A complicating factor is that in organisations there are different departments with different functions, and often geographical subdivisions, which will be made insightful for the development organisations in paragraph 4.2 The idea behind policy is to try to enhance the organisational cohesion, so that different parts of the organisation and the different participants will have shared purposes to strive for. It is however true that *"policy does not start with a purpose and proceed to action: people seek to make sense of the action, and frame and refine statements of purpose. It is a continuing process of interaction between the interpretation and the action to which it relates"* (Colebatch, 2002: 52). In line with this are the ideas of Long and van der Ploeg (1989) who state that it has been acknowledged for decades now that the process from

policy formulation to implementation and to the outcomes cannot be perceived as a linear process. Instead, policy is interpreted and reinterpreted during the process, and external factors are also impacting that process.

Ambiguity and tension exists between the vertical and horizontal dimension of policy, namely between how policy is written down including the terms that are used, and how participants experience it (Colebatch, 2002). To get insight in this ambiguity and tension within the CDR programs carried out in South Kivu, it is needed to explore the policy objectives written down and the terms used to shape the action on the ground. Next to that, insight needs to be provided on which different (groups of) participant are involved and how they experience and negotiate these policy objectives. The next paragraphs will deal with these questions.

4.2 Policy objectives and strategies of VECO and ZOA in South Kivu, DRC

4.2.1 VECO projects in Uvira

The program of VECO aims for the pacification of the east of the DRC through the development of the carriers of the agricultural sector, in the timespan between 2010 and 2014. The carriers of the agricultural sector are explained as the farmers cooperatives and the farmers markets. Within the policy document there is no further elaboration on what is exactly meant by the pacification of the east of the DRC. It is commonly known that there are a lot of tensions between ethnic groups, rebel groups, and the army in that area (the conflict situation is shortly described in paragraph 1.3), but how the CDR program of VECO will contribute to the pacification is not made specific in the policy documents. The main policy objectives of VECO to reach the above mentioned goal within the territoriy of Uvira in South Kivu are formulated as follows:

1. The organized farmers of Uvira territory in South Kivu have a raised level of revenues and food security thanks to the development of local value chain of rice with a strong participation of women.
2. The farmers involved in the development of agricultural value chains are organized into strong, commercially oriented ,farmers' organizations with a very active participation of women that guarantee stability, peace and good governance.
3. The team of VECO DRC contributes effectively and efficiently to the development of the agricultural and financial services essential to the pacification and in eastern DRC.

(VECO 1, 2010).

To reach these objectives, VECO is connecting farmers to already existing local farmer cooperatives called COOPA and COOSOPRODA. A connection is in this way made to a process that has already been started and that VECO values as a relatively strong organisation for the conditions in which they have to operate, with agricultural producers who are already organized and working on the issues that VECO wants to focus on.

On a more general level, VECO has six strategies for carrying out their programs. These strategies are (1) Poverty reduction, (2) Livelihoods strategies, (3) Rights Based Approach (RBA), (4) Participative methods, (5) Gender approach, (6) Chain approach (VECO 2, 2010). For the purpose of this study the focus will be on the strategy of the ‘participative methods’ through which the target group of the program should be directly

involved in the planning, monitoring and evaluation of programs (VECO 2, 2010). Other strategies related to achieving local ownership of the projects are however not overlooked, such as the gender approach and the rights based approach. The formation of grassroots groups of producers is a policy objective that is flowing forth from the participative methods. These grassroots groups are formed for the active participation of farmers in the organisation of the rice sector; in the entrepreneurship, management, strategies to get access to financial means, and in specific advocacy activities related to the rice sector (VECO 3, 2010). Related to this is the objective to establish a platform for stakeholders through which the development of the agricultural production chain is supported, where forces can be joined for advocacy, and through which the work of the local committees can be enforced. Furthermore, there is the objective of setting up mutual solidarity (MUSO) groups to set-up a local savings and credit structure. These MUSO groups will be self-managed (VECO 3, 2010).

In all this VECO aims to accompany the program in consultation, project planning, monitoring and evaluation, in which VECO sees its role as that of a facilitator (VECO 2, 2010).

4.2.2 ZOA projects in Fizi

ZOA works in the territory of Fizi which is located a bit more to south from Uvira (Fig 2, chapter 2).The objectives of ZOA with the projects in Fizi are within four main domains of intervention: (1) Agriculture; (2) Livestock rearing; (3) Savings and credit (MUSO); and (4) Governance. For the governance domain there are project management committees (CGPs). ZOA also facilitates meetings on gender equality to improve the position of women in Fizi.

Figure 7 Structure of committees within ZOA projects



The approach of ZOA is similar to the approach of VECO: ZOA works through local organisations such as GEADES, ASMAKU and CEPROF. ZOA explains why they work with local partner organization as that it contributes to the local capacity which is so much needed for the recovery of the Congolese society and because they are able to work in areas that are inaccessible for non-local organisations (ZOA, 2015).

For the management of the projects of ZOA in the selected villages in Fizi, a local committee is formed. This local committee is called a *Comité pour la Gestion du Projet* (committee for the management of the project, CGP). Furthermore, there are some *groupements* (sub-committees) that are each dealing with a part of the project. There is a sub-committee on agriculture, on livestock rearing and on Mutual Solidarity (MUSO). The CGP coordinates these sub-committees (Fig. 7). The three sub-committees each represent one of the policy objectives of ZOA with these projects. The fourth objective is to strengthen local governance. The strategy to achieve this is the installation of the CGP that coordinates the development programs in the selected villages. The further objective of the CGP and the *groupements* is to increase solidarity amongst the community members (ZOA, 2015). In selecting beneficiaries for the projects ZOA is looking for the most vulnerable households and sees IDPs and returnees as vulnerable groups.

4.3 Steering, shaping and negotiating policy objectives

4.3.1 Policy frame throughout the aid chain

The Dutch ministry of foreign affairs hosts the *medefinancieringsstelsel* (MFS), a funding system to support social organisations based in the Netherlands. A large amount of the MFS funding is awarded to Dutch-based NGOs in the development sector, such as Cordaid and ZOA. These organisations have their head quarter in the Netherlands, but their work is decentralized to the countries where their development programs offices that coordinate the development programs within the country. The country offices on their turn work with local partner organisations who work with already existing local cooperatives and/or local committees, or they initiate the formation of such cooperatives and/or committees. In the case of ZOA, there are also local *groupements* placed under the management of a local committee. Each *groupement* is responsible for a specific aspect of the development program, such as livestock rearing.

Figure 8 Aid chain



In figure 8 this chain of aid is displayed, showing how funding 'travels' along different entities on different levels (regional, national, provincial, local) from the office of the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs to eventually reach the local communities in South Kivu, DRC.

For (amongst others) ZOA and Cordaid to receive funding from MFS II, there is a set of conditions and requirements that have to be met. The most important one is that with their development programs ZOA and Cordaid would contribute to the realisation of the millennium development goals (MDGs). In the MFS II policy paper emphasis is placed on the way that is carried out in which cooperation and synergy between different channels are goals to make the development more effective (MinBuZa, 2009a). The focus should be more on structural social changes in favour of development, with an increasing involvement in development cooperation of citizens in the North and the South, to join forces, counter fragmentation and enhance effectivity. Furthermore the development cooperation needs to strive for a better connection to local problems (MinBuZa, 2009a). These notions appeal to the community-driven strategy that is applied nu VECO and ZOA in the local projects in South Kivu, where there is worked together with local partners and where citizens are involved in local project committees to make a direct connection to the problems at local level. Whether this is can also be considered local ownership will be discussed further on in this report.

For reconstruction in fragile states, the ministry of foreign affairs has released an extra fund with the aim to promote reconstruction and development in post-conflict areas with a view to restoring peace and creating enabling conditions for human security, by:

1) *"Improving human security and promoting rule of law. This approach fosters stability in fragile states, and this in turn is important for the security of the Netherlands;*
2) *Contributing to legitimate governments with enough capacity to carry out the most essential tasks;*
3) *Achieving visible results (peace dividend) through rapid delivery of services and employment"* (MinBuZa, 2011: 15).

Together with the more general requirements of the MFS II funding, these conditions form the policy frame (Colebatch, 2002) in which the Cordaid and ZOA develop and shape their own policy objectives for their programs in South Kivu, DRC: a conflict affected context.

4.3.2 Policy frame on local level

When asking in a focus group discussion with beneficiaries what project activities of VECO are taking place in their village, 'agriculture' is in all cases mentioned as the main, and often as the only activity. More specifically this includes technical training of farmers on agricultural methods, the handing out of seeds and the storage of harvest in a shared depot. This is also mentioned as important causes of positive changes in food security. However, when negative changes in food security are experienced the beneficiaries often mentioned insecurity as a cause. A bit more specific it was regularly mentioned that the insecurity in the region makes it difficult to have access to markets to sell agricultural products. Furthermore, in the individual interviews with beneficiaries of VECO, self-management is one time mentioned as a principal objective of the project next to the improvement of the agricultural production. When asked about the activities of the project the same person did however not mention specific activities that would contribute to the objective of self-management but only specific agricultural activities such as the construction of canals for irrigation. Only one beneficiary of VECO also mentioned as a principal objective the focus on peaceful coexistence.

When talking to beneficiaries in the villages in Fizi where ZOA has its projects, it becomes very clear that they are having practically the same activities in each of the selected villages: agriculture, breeding of goats and a form of micro-finance or mutual solidarity. In some of the villages also fishery is mentioned as an activity. In the focus group discussion in Mboko, beneficiaries mentioned as a future objective to be less dependent on fishery because fish in the lake becomes more rare and they rather do more with the goats, while fishery was also (next to the breeding of goats) a main activity within this village. In another village, Tchaboba, the beneficiaries mentioned as a future objective that they want training on how to treat and handle a goat. That knowledge was at that moment still lacking while this is a main activity of the project. So they are given a goat, but do not yet know how to properly treat it to make it beneficiary for the household. These are the things that show that policy on paper is not enough but that it finds its meaning and shortcomings in practice.

In individual interviews with ZOA beneficiaries, self-management was twice mentioned as one of the principal objectives. The same two beneficiaries mentioned as a project activity the formation of a committee for the mediation for peace or sensibilisation on living peacefully together. Furthermore, for the ZOA-projects good governance was mentioned by a few beneficiaries, together with initiating commonly owned and maintained fields. Most beneficiaries did however not mention 'good governance' as an objective.

That the majority of responses in focus group discussions and individual interviews relate to specific agricultural activities, and less to stabilisation, pacification and participation, may either mean that the agricultural part is the most practical and visible on the ground, while the strategy to reach it may have other elements of the policy objectives in it, like the formation of a local committee for project management which has taken place in all villages. Within these local committees not only specific agricultural activities are discussed, but members of local committees often mentioned that the committee meeting is also a place to discuss problems and conflicts that are present in the community. It is, however, also possible that the less tangible goals get 'lost in translation' when they travel from the desk of the Dutch NGO (Cordaid or ZOA) to the desk of a local partner-NGO, to a cooperative, to a local committee.

When asked about future objectives the 'ultimate goal' that the beneficiaries mentioned was to improve the life conditions of the population, for example through buying machinery for cultivation and having a market closer by. The 'ultimate goal' in the policy framework of VECO is the pacification of Eastern-Congo by the development of the agricultural sector. That this is not experienced as the 'ultimate goal' by the beneficiaries of the project can still have multiple reasons:

- On local level the agricultural needs seem more relevant for daily life, having enough to eat every day and finding a market to sell their products to earn some income;
- Pacification is a less tangible subject with less tangible activities leading to less visibility;
- Conflict is too complex to deal with it practically.

The link between agricultural development and pacification that VECO makes in its project objectives is a link that is not (yet) experienced by the beneficiaries of these projects.

4.4. Analysing policy dimensions

This chapter has so far shown that policy is shaping the action, but that the action is also shaping policy. It works both ways. How this process of shaping policy and action is taking place in the selected CDR programs in Uvira and Fizi, and what is determining how these programs are carried out, will be further analysed in this paragraph.

It has been acknowledged for decades now that the process from policy formulation to implementation to outcomes cannot be perceived as a linear process. Instead, policy is interpreted and reinterpreted during the process and external factors are also impacting the process (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989). How is policy shaping how things are done on the ground? What kind of activities are done on the ground has become clear through being in the field, talking to staff of VECO and ZOA, and listening to beneficiaries of the CDR projects.

The activities revolve around efforts to improve agricultural production. How are policy and practice influencing and determining these activities?

4.4.1 Vertical dimension of policy

The funding requirements from the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs can be seen as the vertical dimension of policy as Colebatch (2002) explains it. The funding requirements are shaping the actions 'from above' by creating a frame in which policy objectives of Dutch NGOs like Cordaid and ZOA have to be formulated. For reconstruction in fragile states and conflict affected contexts such as South Kivu in DRC there are specific goals that need to be achieved by the Dutch NGOs that receive the MFS II funding. In their project proposals they must show that their projects fit within the policy frame that is drawn by the ministry. Cordaid and ZOA succeeded in this and received MFS II funding with which they set up projects in respectively Uvira and Fizi. The main element of this policy frame is to be contributing to the MDGs and more specifically for fragile states this includes: human security; contributing to legitimate governments; achieving visible results in terms of service delivery and employment (MinBuZa, 2009b). Cordaid and ZOA are both focused on the MDG 1 of food security and MDG 3 on promoting gender equality, which are of course within the policy frame of the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs. Another important requirement of the MFS II funding is that visible results need to be delivered. This stimulates a results based strategy of Cordaid and ZOA. For Cordaid this comes particularly to the fore when looking at the process of selecting local farmer cooperatives to work with in Uvira. VECO, the local partner of Cordaid, selected cooperatives that functioned already relatively well, to be able to achieve (better) results. To connect that again to the policy frame of the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs, this allows them to deliver the visible results in the time span of the MFS II funding.

The vertical dimension of policy is thus seen as a policy frame that is imposed 'from above' by the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs, on Cordaid and ZOA. The next step is now made to how policy is traveling through the aid chain and how the different actors within that chain are using the space within the policy frame to shape and steer action, and vice versa.

4.4.2 Through the aid chain

The project objectives of VECO hide several assumptions on how the pacification of the East of DRC can be reached. The first assumption is that agricultural development will contribute to the pacification of the area. This link is backed up by the theory of change for the projects of VECO in Uvira. This theory revolves around the notion that peace can be promoted through the development of agriculture, because farming is said to be the most obvious alternative to fighting, and perhaps this works the other way around as well, meaning that fighting is the most obvious alternative to farming. The assumption that is thus made is that when people have high yielding fields to work on, they will have no interest in fighting and the East of Congo will experience more peace (Evaluation plan DRC, 2014). Another assumption that is found in the policy objectives is the value that is given to the role of women in the process. A strong and active participation of women in the local farmers cooperative would lead to a raised level of revenues and food security as well as contributing to peace, stability and good governance. An explanation for these assumptions are not found in the policy documents of VECO. Gender equality is however an important MDG that is high on the agenda of international NGOs and donors,

especially when it comes to development programs in Eastern DRC. With these project objectives VECO shows that its projects are contributing to achieving the MDG of gender equality. Next to the livestock rearing, agriculture and MUSO, ZOA also pays special attention to gender by facilitating sensibilisation meetings in Fizi on gender equality. Furthermore, ZOA states that the strategy of forming local committees for the management of the different elements of the projects contributes to good governance. VECO also mentions good governance in their objectives but does not specify how they want to achieve that. The assumption in this objective is that good governance can be achieved by means of local committees for the management of development projects. Since the legitimate government is very weak in South Kivu, the local committees could provide in training local people in government tasks and accountability.

Chapter 5 will further elaborate on whether these assumptions are justified, but for now it is important to state that these assumptions are shaping how the CDR intervention is going to take place and what activities will be carried out. In this way the policy objectives, even the assumptions made in the policy objectives are steering the action on the ground. These assumptions are, in turn, given in by funding requirements that focus on stabilizing fragile states, contributing to gender equality and good governance.

4.4.3 The horizontal dimension of policy

The horizontal dimension of policy (Colebatch, 2002) is the way in which policy and actions are shaped by the local reality on the ground. It seems like the policy objectives loose a bit of their dictating power when it comes to steering how the objectives are carried out and given meaning in practice. It is rather the circumstances and the people (participants) that are shaping this process, with their specific needs and abilities in mind. This can be illustrated by the example of Tchaboba where beneficiaries mentioned that they did not know how to treat the goats given by ZOA and that they would like to receive training on that. These local, practical needs are now shaping the activities formulated in policy. Livestock rearing needs to go hand in hand with instruction and training on how to treat the goats. For the VECO projects the very practical needs became clear in interviews and focus group discussions. The beneficiaries explained for example that insecurity is an important cause of negative changes in food security and access to markets. So, the VECO objectives assume that through agricultural development more security will be established, the practice, experienced by the beneficiaries, is that the insecurity is prohibiting this agricultural development.

These examples show how the local reality, the beneficiaries and the specific needs of the environment and of the beneficiaries are (re)interpreting policy objectives 'from below'. Or in Colebatch's own words: *"policy does not start with a purpose and proceed to action: people seek to make sense of the action, and frame and refine statements of purpose. It is a continuing process of interaction between the interpretation and the action to which it relates"* (Colebatch, 2002: 52).

Concluding it can be said that the policy objectives of VECO and ZOA are trying to please funding requirements higher up the aid chain, and at the same time trying to connect to the needs of the beneficiaries at the end of the aid chain, while searching for ways in which they can generate visible results.

This chapter has mainly given insight in how policy influences the design of CDR interventions in Uvira and Fizi. The next chapter will elaborate on the process of the CDR interventions itself and will zoom in on local

participation and the relationship between the NGO and the beneficiaries. This will give insight in how participation is given meaning in the local reality.

5. Participation in the intervention process

From the policy objectives and how they are or are not translated in the practice of the CDR projects of VECO and ZOA in Uvira and Fizi, this chapter will carry on to focus on the process of intervention of these projects and how participation plays a role in these interventions. Starting with a theoretical notion on what a development intervention is and which implications for participation often come along with it (5.1) and a discussion on the structure, strategy and content of VECO and ZOA (5.2). Subsequently the focus will be following the main elements of the CDR interventions in relation to participation, starting with initiative-taking and who is the leading actor therein (5.3), continuing with the consultation of the community by the NGOs (5.4) and the formation of local committees for the management of the projects (5.5). Describing and analysing the intervention process will give insight in one of the essential aspects of local ownership: the typologies of participation (5.6). Paragraph 5.7 provides an analysis on the intervention, the typology of participation and its meaning in shaping local ownership.

5.1 Theoretical notion on development intervention and participation

Intervening in a locality by setting up a development project is within the discourse of project intervention viewed as an act that is demarcated by space and time (Long & Ploeg, 1989). The reality is, however, that projects cannot be isolated from their context and they are always part of a chain of events within a broader framework of activities of institutions and civil society, linked to previous interventions (Long & Ploeg, 1989). Moreover, during an intervention a project becomes subject to local political processes and power contestations*; "interventions are anchored in political, economic and socio-cultural processes underway in any locality or nation"* (Hilhorst, Christoplos & Haar, 2010: 119). For this reason it is important to deconstruct the development intervention to see which political, economic and socio-cultural processes are playing a role in how an intervention is carried out and how it is received and by the local population. This will also display the negotiation process between the internal and external factors (Long & Ploeg, 1989). In the CDR intervention the local population can be viewed as the internal factor whereas the intervening party, the NGO or cooperative, is the external factor that aims to generate change. This is a kind of 'project-thinking' that holds the assumption that the external factor always provides better solutions to problems than the means that already exist in the local community (Long & Ploeg, 1989). This might lead to a disregard of local knowledge and local capabilities for development. On the other hand it might show how local people make use of their knowledge and capacity through the development intervention to realize their own agendas. Deconstructing the intervention process, with a focus on the element of local participation within that process will reveal whether these trends are present in the selected CDR projects in South Kivu.

To see how local participation is used and experienced within the development intervention, it is first of all important to explain the main ways in which participation can be used. Based on Chambers (1994) and Pretty (1995) there are three main uses of participation in development programs:

- Participation as a cosmetic label for good appearance to, for example, donors and governments, but in reality there is little to no participation;

- Participation used to increase efficiency. Using participation in this way it is a means to achieve a more efficient development intervention. The reasoning behind this is that more local involvement would also generate more local support for the development intervention;
- Participation as a fundamental right. Main characteristics of this use of participation are local collective action, empowerment of participants and institution building.

There have been several studies that pointed out that participation is one of the critical components of 'success' of a development project (Pretty, 1995). This is the case because of increased ownership of policies and projects by stakeholders. Pretty (1995) states that the element of participation is furthermore associated with *"greater efficiency, understanding and social cohesion; more cost-effective services; greater transparency and accountability; increased empowering of the poor and disadvantaged; and strengthened capacity of people to learn and act"* (Pretty, 1995 : 1251).

Pretty (1995) has made a more elaborate division of levels of participation as the seven typologies of participation (Table 4).

Table 4 Typologies of participation (Pretty, 1995)

Typology	Characteristics
1. Manipulative participation	Participation is simply a pretence, with "people's" representatives on official boards but who are unelected and have no power.
2. Passive participation	People participate by being told what has been decided or has already happened. It involves unilateral announcements by an administration or project management without any listening to people's responses. The information being shared belongs only to external professionals.
3. Participation by consultation	People participate by being consulted or by answering questions. External agents define problems or information gathering processes, and so control analysis. Such a consultative process does not concede any share in decision-making, and professionals are under no obligation to take on board people's views.
4. Participation for material incentives	People participate by contributing resources, for example labor, in return of food, cash or other material incentives. Farmers may provide the fields and labor, but are involved in neither experimentation nor the process of learning. It is very common to see this called participation. Yet people have no stake in prolonging technologies or practices when incentives end.
5. Functional participation	Participation seen by external agencies as a means to achieve project goals, especially reduced costs. People may participate by forming groups to meet predetermined objectives related to the project. Such involvement may be interactive and involve shared decision-making, but tends to arise only after major decisions have already been made by external agents. At worst, people may still only be co-opted to serve external goals.

6. Functional participation	People participate in joint analysis, development of action plans, and formation or strengthening of local institutions. Participation is seen as a right, not just the means to achieve project goals. The process involves interdisciplinary methodologies that seek multiple perspectives and make use of systemic and structure learning processes. As groups take control over local decisions and determine how available resources are used, so they have a stake in maintaining structures or practices.
7. Self-mobilization	People participate by taking initiative independently by external institutions to change systems. They develop contact with external institutions for resources and technical advice they need, but retain control over how resources are used. Self-mobilization can spread if governments and NGOs provide an enabling framework of support. Such self-initiated mobilization may or may not challenge existing distributions of wealth and power.

From this so called ladder of participation the following key elements of participation are derived: Initiative-taking for the development intervention, knowing and determining the objectives of the development intervention, making decisions within the development intervention, and being in charge of the management of the development intervention. The results from the focus group discussions and interviews on these themes are elaborated upon in the following paragraphs.

5.2 The interventions: strategy, structure and content

Figure 9 Map of territories of South Kivu



VECO started the work in the *Plaine de la Ruzizi* (Uvira territory) by analysing what was needed in the area and to which needs VECO could connect. Three main issues for development came up from that preliminary analysis: Market, water and seed quality. These three themes have then become the focus of the activities of VECO in Uvira. Subsequently an inventory and assessment of the existing farmer's cooperatives in the *plaine* was carried out by VECO. On the basis of that assessment VECO selected local cooperatives of agricultural producers that they found relatively strong, or in the words of VECO's head of the program in Uvira: *"The only ones that function at all"*. These cooperatives are COOPA and COOSOPRODA. Making use of local cooperatives is a strategy to connect to a process that has already been starting up, with agricultural producers who

are already organized and working on the issues that VECO wants to focus on. The criteria for selecting COOPA and COOSOPRODA show a results-based approach of VECO to implement their program in Uvira, while the preliminary analysis that was carried focused on the needs side of the potential development intervention.

This illustrates the vertical and horizontal dimension of policy discussed in chapter 4. The vertical dimension is seen in the results-based approach, as a strategy to fit the policy frame and meet the funding requirements that are set by NGOs, donors and the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs higher up the aid chain. The horizontal dimension of policy is seen in the link that VECO makes to the needs of the beneficiaries which is also shaping the approach of VECO in Uvira. What the approach of VECO contains in the selected villages on the *Plaine de la Ruzizi* is: providing (improved) seeds through the establishment of seed banks in Kiliba and Luberizi; providing storage houses to stock the yields, lending tractors for cultivation and providing technical agricultural assistance via training and seminars.

ZOA works in the territory of Fizi which is located a bit more to south from Uvira (Fig. 9). The approach of ZOA is similar to the approach of VECO in the way that ZOA also works with local organisations such as GEADES, ASMAKU and CEPROF. For the management of the projects of ZOA in the selected villages in Fizi, a local committee is formed. This local committee is called a *Comité pour la Gestion du Projet* (committee for the management of the project, CGP). Furthermore, there are some *groupements* (sub-committees) that are each dealing with a part of the project. There is a sub-committee on agriculture, on livestock rearing and on Mutual Solidarity (MUSO). The CGP coordinates these sub-committees (Fig. 10). The three sub-committees each represent one of the policy objectives of ZOA with these projects. The fourth objective is to strengthen local governance. The strategy to achieve this is the installation of the CGP that implements the development programs in the selected villages. The main activity in the domain of agriculture is the establishment of seed banks. The exact recipients of the seeds are determined by a meeting of ZOA and village representatives. After the seeds are disbursed, the recipients are responsible for returning the same amount at the end of the growing season. The *groupement* on agriculture is responsible for the storage of the seeds in-between the growing seasons. In the new growing season, a different recipient will be selected. In the domain of livestock rearing a part functions under the similar process: goats are handed out, and the recipient has to return the firstborn young goat. Within the saving and credit domain MUSO groups of fifteen to twenty people are formed. Members of these groups contribute a monthly amount to a common pot and they can obtain credit from this common pot (Evaluation Plan DRC, 2014).

Figure 10 Structure of committees within ZOA projects



In table 5 an overview is displayed of the villages where the focus group discussions and the individual interviews were held, by region and NGO/cooperation. In each of the fourteen villages one focus group with beneficiaries was held, and one interview with a beneficiary. Furthermore there have been three interviews with local staff of VECO and ZOA. Additionally some data from the larger MFS II impact evaluation research is used.

Table 5 Overview of selected villages

Villages	Region	NGO/cooperation
Total # 14	**Fizi: # 8/Uvira # 6**	**ZOA: # 8/VECO: # 6**
Kabondozi	Fizi	ZOA/CEPROF
Katungula	Fizi	ZOA/ASMAKU
Kenya	Fizi	ZOA/ASMAKU
Lusenda	Fizi	ZOA/GEADES
Mboko	Fizi	ZOA/CEPROF
Mukolwe	Fizi	ZOA/GEADES
Sangya	Fizi	ZOA/ASMAKU
Tchaboba	Fizi	ZOA/ASMAKU
Kiliba	Uvira	VECO/COOPA
Kilomoni	Uvira	VECO/COOSOPRODA
Kiringye	Uvira	VECO/COOSOPRODA
Luberizi	Uvira	VECO/COOSOPRODA
Runingu	Uvira	VECO/COOPA
Sange	Uvira	VECO/COOPA

5.3 Initiative for the development intervention

Looking at who is taking initiative for the start of a project gives insight in the level of participation as Pretty (1995) describes it. Self-mobilization is in this ladder of participation the highest level of participation (Table 4), meaning that people take initiative independently from external institutions with the purpose to change systems. Subsequently they can get into contact with external institutions for resources or technical advice, but the essential characteristic of self-mobilization is that local people, and not the external actors, are and stay in control of the process.

From the focus group discussions it became clear that in the majority of villages it has been the NGO that has taken the initiative to start a project and that there is not much difference between the villages where VECO is active and where ZOA is active. For both NGOs there is an example where beneficiaries of the project explained that all the initiative for the project was taken by the NGO without really involving the beneficiaries or the

broader local population. In Mukolwe the participants in the focus group discussion told that "*ZOA just gives us its program and the rest we don't know*". In Kiliba, where VECO is active through a local cooperative called COOPA, the participants said that no initiative was taken by the local farmers. Instead it was only COOPA that took the initiative to start the project and that it is also only COOPA which has executed it without participation of its beneficiaries.

In most cases, however, is it explained that the NGO initiated the project, but that it was not executed without the participation of the local farmers. This is for example the case in Kabondozi where the beneficiaries present in the focus group mentioned that it is ZOA that conceives the ideas of the seed and goat distribution and the MUSO group. ZOA submits these ideas to the beneficiaries to discuss those ideas together and give it practical content (criteria, type of seeds, who to involve etc.) to come to a joint agreement.

There are also some examples where the local population has created ideas for development themselves and took initiative to realize these ideas. In Sangya for example, the participants in the focus group explained that the ideas to create their own cooperative came from themselves and that ZOA just came to help them with finances and to organize it well. There is also an example of local initiative for a VECO project, namely in Luberizi where the local farmers mentioned that a lot of initiative was taken by themselves, before VECO came into the picture. They organized themselves already for the improvement of the maize production, but "*because we did not know how to use the fertilizer it was the NGO that came to help for better development*".

In the cases where the participants in the focus group discussion mentioned that the local farmers had taken initiative for the start of the project, the reasons for these initiatives become clear through individual interviews held with project beneficiaries. These reasons are: agricultural needs; lack of food and food security; to increase revenues; to improve agricultural production; and to create a general income. Furthermore, in Tchaboba a beneficiary of the ZOA project explained that the local farmers were "*in need of training in agricultural techniques and in the surrounding villages there were already projects, so we wrote letters to NGOs to ask for a project*".

All in all, it was in the majority of villages the case that the NGO or local cooperative took the initiative for the start of a project. In two villages, one where VECO is active and one where ZOA is active, it was explicitly mentioned in the focus group discussion and the individual interviews that this process was experienced as non-participative by the beneficiaries and that all was in the hands of the NGO or the cooperative. There are, however also some villages that started organizing themselves and creating their own ideas on agricultural development, before they called in the help of an NGO for further financial and technical support.

5.4 Consultation of the community about the development intervention

In addition of local initiative taking for starting up a development project, consultation of the local community is another aspect that gives an indication of the level of participation in a development intervention. Participation by consultation is a type of participation in which external agents consult people, for example on their needs, with the aim to gather information, define problems and determine project objectives. On the

ladder of participation of Pretty (1995, Table 4) participation by consultation includes that the control remains with the external agents who are in charge of decision-making and who do not even have to use the input of the local community that was consulted (Pretty, 1995).

The discussions in the focus groups on the theme of determining objectives showed differences in the level of involvement of the beneficiaries of the project. In Lusenda the beneficiaries of the ZOA-project there mentioned that the objectives for the project were determined by ZOA, without consultation of the community. In Kiliba the determination of objectives was experienced the same way: all was determined by COOPA without local consultation let alone participation. On the other side there are villages such as Sangya where ZOA is active, and Sange where VECO is active, where the beneficiaries express that the project objectives are determined by mutual agreement between the NGO and the beneficiaries. Beneficiaries of ZOA in Kenya told that ZOA has asked the population to list different problems and needs, and based on these problems and needs ZOA has intervened. This form of consultation was also experienced by the beneficiaries of ZOA in Mukolwe and Kabondozi where local population was consulted about their needs so that project objectives could be based on those needs. In the case of Mukolwe the beneficiaries however added that ZOA has taken the final decision in determining objectives.

The individual interviews display less difference than the outcomes of the focus group discussions on the theme of consultation of the population. For the projects of VECO this was even in all villages the case, and in two villages where ZOA is active the interviewees mentioned that they did not consult the population. In the villages where the population was consulted, in most cases the interviewees mentioned that this was a consultation on the needs of the population, and on agricultural matters. Another intention of consultation was mentioned by the interviewee in Kiliba, namely to find members for a local committee.

Table 6 and 7 on the next page display the results on the experienced level of participation by the beneficiaries, indicated for each element (initiative taking, determining objectives, decision making and management) with a number between 1 and 5. References to these tables will be made throughout this whole chapter.

Level of participation on a scale from 1 to 5:
1 = All is done by the local beneficiaries
2 = A lot is done by the local beneficiaries, some by the NGO
3 = All is done in mutual agreement between the local beneficiaries and the NGO
4 = A lot is done by the NGO, some by the local beneficiaries
5 = All is done by the NGO

Table 6 Level of participation ZOA

Village	Region	NGO/cooperation		Level of participation			
			Initiative taking	Determining objectives	Decision making	Management	*Average level of participation*
Kabondozi	Fizi	ZOA/CEPROF	4	4	4	3	*4*
Katungula	Fizi	ZOA/ASMAKU	5	5	5	5	*5*
Kenya	Fizi	ZOA/ASMAKU	5	3	3	5	*4*
Lusenda	Fizi	ZOA/GEADES	5	5	4	2	*4*
Mboko	Fizi	ZOA/CEPROF	3	4	2	2	*3*
Mukolwe	Fizi	ZOA/GEADES	4	4	4	4	*4*
Sangya	Fizi	ZOA/ASMAKU	2	3	2	1	*2*
Tchaboba	Fizi	ZOA/ASMAKU	2	3	3	2	*3*
Total Average	Fizi	ZOA	**3,8**	**3,9**	**3,4**	**3**	**3,6**

Table 7 Level of participation VECO

Village	Region	NGO/cooperation		Level of participation			
			Initiative taking	Determining objectives	Decision making	Management	Average level of participation
Kiliba	Uvira	VECO/COOPA	5	5	5	5	5
Kilomoni	Uvira	VECO/COOSOPRODA	1	4	1	1	2
Kiringye	Uvira	VECO/COOSOPRODA	5	4	4	1	4
Luberizi	Uvira	VECO/COOSOPRODA	2	3	2	1	2
Runingu	Uvira	VECO/COOPA	2	1	1	1	1
Sange	Uvira	VECO/COOPA	5	3	3	5	4
Total average	**Uvira**	**VECO**	**3,3**	**3,3**	**2,7**	**2,3**	**3**

The person that was interviewed in Sange explained that the population was consulted about their needs and that the NGO and the local population talked together about the needs, conditions, distribution and identification of beneficiaries. In some other villages it was explicitly mentioned by the interviewees that the local population was indeed consulted by the NGO, but that it was only about their needs and not about any project plans in which they would have wanted to have more say. Furthermore, some interviewees mentioned that the big decisions were eventually made by the NGO, indicating that the local needs were not always taken into account in these decisions.

The way that the NGO consulted the local population was either by a door-to-door strategy or in a local community meeting. Except in Kiringye where the interviewee mentioned that there was a form of consultation by VECO through a seminary on agriculture in the *plaine d'Uvira*. Furthermore, interviewees often mentioned that the consultation went via the chief of the village, which is a common strategy and a way of showing respect when entering a village as an external agent.

5.5 The formation of local committees within the development intervention

The formation of a local committee is currently a common way to involve local communities in project management. This is also the case in the projects of VECO and ZOA in respectively Uvira and Fizi in South Kivu. The way these committees are formed and who are and who are not involved in this process will give insight in the level of participation. On the ladder of participation of Pretty (1995, Table 4) the formation of local committees can in general be described as 'interactive participation' where people participate in joint analysis, project plans and the strengthening of local institutions. Participation is in that case viewed as a right rather than as a means to achieve project goals which is the case in 'functional participation'. On that level local groups are formed to meet predetermined goals and the participation tends to arise only after major decisions have already been made (Pretty, 1995). The other form of participation that can take place through the formation of local committees is 'participation for material incentives'. People participate in a project by contributing resources in return for some kind of material incentive. Important herein is that the people who participate have no stake in prolonging the project when the incentives stop. This paragraph will examine the three main points of attention when looking at the local committees formed within the project frame of VECO and ZOA are: (1) The formation and composition of the committee; (2) The relation to and division of tasks between the NGO and the local committee; (3) The contribution of resources to the project. From that examination it will be possible to reflect which typologies apply to these projects and which implications come along with it.

5.5.1 Formation and composition of local committees

In all villages a local committee has been formed within the project plan and these committees are all formed through a process of election. In Mukolwe the interviewee told that the local committee was formed through elections by the members of the association, so not by all the inhabitants of the village.

A local committee commonly exists of eight or nine persons in the functions of president, secretary or treasurer. For each of these functions there is also someone who is vice-responsible. Furthermore there are some advisors who are often the pastor, the chief or another notable of the village. In many cases these

advisors of the committee are not chosen by elections as the other committee members, but the level of respect that their position in the village enforces makes that it is unthinkable to not involve them. This is also respected by the NGOs, especially the beneficiaries of ZOA mentioned that ZOA always contacts the village or the committee by first visiting the chief of the village and explaining their plans and intentions. This respect for the chief is widely supported as follows from the results of the MFS II impact evaluation village survey where there was a section on this topic. Three propositions were stated for the inhabitants of the village to respond upon on which there were five response options.

Propositions:

1) I have a lot of respect for our village chief;
2) I can turn to our village chief if I need help;
3) Our village chief can act in my interest.

Response options:

- Strongly disagree;
- Disagree;
- Neutral;
- Agree;
- Strongly agree.

For the villages where ZOA is active and focus groups and interviews were held, a trend occurs that respondents agree to strongly agree on having a lot of respect for their village chief. For the second proposition about turning to the village chief when in need of help, the respondents still agree be it slightly less strongly stated. This trend continues for the proposition that the village chief can act in their interest; although on general average they still agreed with this proposition, the full picture shows that the respondents more often reacted with neutral, disagree or strongly disagree. For example in Mboko the village survey was held with nine people. In the following table (Table 8) the responses per proposition are displayed, showing the explained slight trend.

Table 8 Position of the chief experienced by beneficiaries of ZOA

Proposition	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
1) I have a lot of respect for our village chief;	0	0	1	5	3
2) I can turn to our village chief if I need help;	0	0	2	6	1
3) Our village chief can act in my interest	1	2	1	5	0

For the villages where VECO is active and focus groups and interviews were held, a similar trend occurs as in the villages where ZOA is active. One example of this trend is seen in the results of Runingu where fourteen persons were surveyed (Table 9).

Table 9 Position of the chief experienced by beneficiaries of VECO

Proposition	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
1) I have a lot of respect for our village chief;	0	0	0	9	5
2) I can turn to our village chief if I need help;	1	0	0	9	4
3) Our village chief can act in my interest	2	1	4	6	2

This displays that respect for the village chief is very high amongst the villagers, but that the same villagers are more reluctant when it comes to trusting the chief for help and to handle in their interest. From observations during focus group discussions it also became clear that when a chief or another notable also was a participant in the focus group discussion, he was often the person to respond first, despite the effort that was made to equally divide speech among the participants. Furthermore, some participants tended to follow the line of argumentation that the chief had started. This gives insight in the influence that a chief or another notable has, just because he is chief or notable. It is therefore likely that this works the same in the local committees where notables are present as advisors. Together with the outcomes that show that despite the respect people have for the chief there is less confidence that he can work in the interest of the villagers, this shows something of inter-village/inter-committee relations that will be determining for how discussions, negotiations and decisions are influenced by local power relation that are also present within the local committees. Next to the role of the chief and notables another important aspect of the formation and composition of the local committees was found to be the role of women in the local committees. On several occasions in different villages at projects from both VECO and ZOA this topic was explicitly addressed by the respondents without specifically asking about it. For example in Kabondozi the interviewee explained that yes, there was a committee formed through elections, but a pre-condition for these elections was that there would be women in the CGP (Comité du Gestion de Projet). Within the focus groups the role of women was however discussed and in all villages where VECO is active a positive change was mentioned in the economic opportunities between men and women, meaning that the economic opportunities for women have improved since 2012. The main causes mentioned for this change are:

- Sensibilization by NGOs. In Kiliba the names of FAO, VECO and ADPEA are explicitly mentioned as NGOs that were responsible for this sensibilization;
- Women now have income generating activities;

- Women can have responsible positions in groups where men are also present, such as associations, local committees and NGOs. In Kiringye the participants in the focus group added that women seem, however, to have a fear to take up certain responsibilities;
- Women are involved in the resource allocation of the household. In Runingu the participants in the focus group added that some men are still reluctant on this point.

Furthermore, the participants in the focus groups mentioned several times that men and women do the same work.

In the villages where ZOA is active a clear positive change was experienced by the participants in the focus groups in relation to economic opportunities between men and women. It was very clear that there has been sensibilisation by NGOs on this theme which is also often mentioned as reasons why women now have income generating activities, have better opportunities for education, occupying the same positions in associations and committees as men, and are more often consulted by their husbands on the allocation of the household income. In some cases the names of the NGOs that have been active on this theme are mentioned: ZOA, ADRA and TEAR fund.

It is remarkable that very similar aspects were discussed by participants in the different focus groups in different villages, related to different projects, even the same specific terms were used like 'income generating activities'. This might very well be a result of the sensibilisation by NGOs (which is in itself such a term). It became also clear that several other NGOs, besides VECO and ZOA are working on this theme in Uvira and Fizi.

5.5.2 The relation between NGO and local committee

From paragraph 5.4 on the consultation of the community it already became clear that in most of the cases the project objectives are decided upon by the NGO, to a greater or lesser extend based on the needs that people expressed when consulted by the NGO. Based on the responses to the theme of the relation between the NGO and the local committee, in five of the seven villages where ZOA is active and where interviews were held, the role of ZOA is described as advisory, facilitating and/or accompanying for the local committee. Communication between the committee and the NGO is done through reporting as was mentioned by the interviewees in Lusenga and Katungula. In Tchaboba, Kenya and Katungula the interviewees mentioned that the communication between the NGO and the local committee is indirect because it either runs via the village chief or via the local partner association. In Mukolwe it is the committee that manages the project on village level, for that it receives the calendar of ZOA which the committee communicates to the population. The role of ZOA is by the beneficiaries in Mukolwe experienced as facilitating for the committee; the committee presents their needs to the NGO which gives possible solutions. "*The decisions of ZOA are often a response to the requests of the population but the management by the committee is not done very well because we are not involved*".

This shows that communication works two ways in this case:

- The beneficiaries request their needs to ZOA to which ZOA often responds;

- From the NGO to the local committee and from the local committee to the larger group of beneficiaries. ZOA gives a calendar with tasks and activities that need to be done through the year and it is the local committee that communicates this to the beneficiaries.

In the specific case of Mukolwe the larger group of beneficiaries is not satisfied by the way the local committee communicates or lacks to communicate to them. The lack of involvement of beneficiaries that are not in the local committee is perceived as a flaw of the management of the local committee.

In Lusenga the interviewee explained that the committee was formed through elections. The way the management of the project takes place is found participative but the last word is always for the committee. Even though the same person also explained that the objectives are already decided upon by ZOA. For the broader outlines of the project (objectives, calendar) it is ZOA who has the last word and for the smaller decisions and management 'on the ground' it is the local committee that is in charge.

For the villages where VECO is active and where interviews were held, it becomes clear that VECO plays a distant role and that it is the local association (COOPA or COOSOPRODA) that communicates with the local committee. The role of COOPA and COOSOPRODA is in the majority of the villages explained by the interviewees as accompanying, supporting and/or advisory to the local committee. The communication and decisions-making is in all cases, except one, explained within terms like 'direct', 'horizontal', 'good' and 'in joint agreement'. The exception is Kiliba where the interviewee explained that COOPA does not really help the committee and that all decisions are taken by COOPA.

5.5.3 Contribution of resources

In all but two villages (Kiliba (VECO) and Mukolwe (ZOA) where the contribution of resources was not elaborately discussed), all interviewees mentioned that they contributed something to the project. What this contribution was exactly comprised of differs. For the villages where ZOA is active the interviewees mentioned the following about what they contributed to the project:

- Field/parcel (Kenya, Lusenga);
- Materials (Kabondozi);
- Work on the fields (Sangya, Tchaboba);
- Money (Sangya);
- Advice (Tchaboba).

All interviewees mentioned that they did not really received anything in return for their contribution, but the their contribution was benefitting for the project and through that also benefitting for them. In Kenya it was mentioned that in return ZOA assists with seeds and materials such as a tractor.

The contributions that were done to the projects of VECO in Uvira are:

- Field (Kilomoni and Kiringyi);
- Work: for the construction of the depot and to transport materials (Runingu), or working on the fields (Kilomoni and Luberizi);

- Money for being member of COOPA (Sange);
- Material (Kiringyi).

A person interviewed in Luberizi mentioned that he had done a contribution to the project by working on the project fields, in return he had received part of the harvest. Furthermore, when the products are sold he receives a sum of money, and for all beneficiaries of the project there is a price reduction on the agricultural products produced as part of the project. In the villages it was mentioned by the interviewees that they had not directly received something in return for their contribution.

5.6 Level of participation within the development intervention

Within the focus group discussions the beneficiaries were asked to indicate how they experienced the level of participation within the project of ZOA and VECO on a scale from one to five. One indicates that all is done by the local beneficiaries and five indicates that all is done by the NGO. This question was asked on each of the four themes elaborated upon in this chapter. In the tables 6 and 7 depicted earlier in this chapter the outcomes are displayed in a quantitative way. In the previous paragraphs the further elaborations on these themes are described. In table 10 the total averages of the experienced levels of participation for ZOA and VECO are brought together.

Table 10 Total average of level of participation for ZOA and VECO projects

Village	Region	NGO/cooperation		Level of participation			
			Initiative taking	Determining objectives	Decision making	Management	Average level of participation
Total average	Fizi	ZOA	3,8	3,9	3,4	3	3,6
	Uvira	VECO	3,3	3,3	2,7	2,3	3
	Total average	ZOA & VECO	2,7	3,6	3,1	3,6	3,3

Some points from table 6, 7 and 10 stand out. On all four aspects the averages for VECO are lower than the averages of ZOA; meaning that the level of participation by the local beneficiaries in the projects is experienced higher by VECO beneficiaries than by ZOA beneficiaries. On 'determining objectives' and 'taking initiative' the level of participation is experienced the lowest out of all four aspects. This is the case for both ZOA and VECO projects. On the aspect of 'management' the level of participation is experienced the highest out of all four aspects, for both ZOA and VECO projects. In the focus group discussion in Katungula (ZOA) and in Kiliba (VECO) the level of participation was on all aspects experienced as 'all is done by the NGO'. In Kiliba it was explained that it was the farmers' cooperation COOPA who determined everything of the project, from taking the initiative for the start of the project and determining objectives to decision-making and management. In Katungula the beneficiaries of the ZOA project said that it was ZOA who determines all and executes all. In

Runingu (VECO) the level of participation is experienced as 'all is done by the local beneficiaries'. Here it needs to be explained that even though it is said in the focus group discussion that a lot to everything is decided upon by the beneficiaries, it was mentioned that this is done individually and 'at the expense of the group'. This was experienced as a negative way of handling. So in Runingu it is indeed the beneficiaries who are in charge of the project in their village, but the way this is taking place between the beneficiaries is not cooperative. This was experienced as a negative way of dealing with project management, and even though all is determined by the beneficiaries, it is detrimental to social cohesion.

The outcomes, displayed in the tables 6, 7 and 10 show a mixed picture. On the one hand there are examples where it is experienced that the NGO determines everything to examples on the other hand where it is experienced that a lot is determined by the beneficiaries. There is however a trend that shows that the aspects of the intervention process that mainly take place at the start of the intervention (initiative taking, determining objectives) have a lower experienced level of participation and that this level is increasing when it comes to decision making and management. In the following figures this trend is made visible. Figure 11 and 12 are showing the trend for the ZOA interventions in Fizi and figure 13 and 14 are showing the (same) trend for the VECO interventions in Uvira. Figure 11 and 13 are directly based on the numbers from table 6 and 7; using the indicators 1 to 5 for the level of participation. Because these indicators are a bit misleading in the fact that 1 is representing the highest level of participation and 5 the lowest level of participation, in figure 12 and 14 the inverse is taken. The upward trend in the level of participation throughout the intervention process that is derived from the data is then 43visualized accordingly.

Figure 11 Trend of level of participation (ZOA) using indicators 1-5



Figure 12 Trend of level of participation (ZOA) inverse of Fig. 11



Figure 13 Trend of level of participation (VECO) using indicators 1-5



Figure 14 Trend of level of participation (VECO) inverse of Fig. 13



Besides the trend of an increasing experienced level of participation during the intervention process, it is interesting to look whether the level of participation can be related to the impacts and outcomes of the projects. Looking at the general picture of participation linked to the changes in the (food) security situation, some striking examples come to the fore. In Katungula the participants in the focus group indicated that for the project of VECO in their village all is done by the NGO. At the same time the changes on (food) security since 2012 were viewed as positive. This was similar in Kiliba, but there the positive changes in the (food) security situation were even explicitly linked to the efforts of VECO and COOPA. In Sangya people mentioned in the focus group that they themselves were for a great deal in charge of the project. The changes in the (food) security situation were however experienced as negative.

The policy objectives of VECO assume that the active participation of local farmers and especially also of women will lead to more stability, peace and good governance. Taken into account that changes on these themes take a long time, it is evidently clear that no positive change is achieved on these themes in the villages in the '*Plaine de la Ruzizi*'. From the focus group discussions on behavioral changes of the local population in relation to the security situation, on average the participants in the village where VECO is active experienced a negative change of the security situation. There are however also some examples of positive changes. In one village (Kiringi) there was no change in the security situation experienced by the participants in the focus group. The main causes mentioned for the negative changes are:

- Killings, in several cases specifically mentioned that these come forth from tribalism and repetitive conflicts between Bafulero and Barundi;
- Passivity or incompetency of the government;
- Theft, of harvests and cows.

The most important behavioral change as result of the increased insecurity is explained by the focus group participants as the fear of going to the fields to cultivate them, and not being able to freely walk around. Another aspect was mentioned by the participants in Runingu who explained that families currently rather receive money as dowry for their daughters instead of cows because the latter would attract too much negative attention of other people in the village.

In a couple of villages a positive change was mentioned, often next to some negative changes. The main cause of a positive change in the security situation since 2012 is the deployment of militaries in these villages. The result of this is that the local population can walk more freely and has less or no fear to go to their fields to cultivate them. In Sange there was an overall negative change experienced by the focus group participants, but one positive behavioral change related to the security situation was mentioned namely the construction of houses out of more durable materials. This shows that people have more confidence in the future. Kiliba was the only village where only a positive behavioral change was mentioned by the participants in the focus group, with the work of the government as explanation for this positive change.

In the villages where ZOA is active, in the territory of Fizi, on the contrary an on average positive change in the security situation is experienced by the participants in the focus group discussions. The causes for this positive change is explained as:

- Sensibilization by local chiefs and/or by NGOs (no names of NGOs mentioned);
- Involvement of the government;
- Patrol of militaries.

The change in behavior that characterizes this positive change is that people can now walk freely around without fear and to go to their fields without the fear of being assaulted or raped. Furthermore it is mentioned by the participants in the focus group discussions that people start building their houses out of durable materials and start up little projects which might indicate that they have more confidence in a stable future. When negative change is experienced by the participants in the focus groups in the villages where ZOA is active, this was explained to be caused by:

- Bad governance;
- Unemployment which makes youths to join armed groups;
- Impunity.

Changes in behavior caused by these negative changes in the security situation were not mentioned.

5.7 Intervention, participation and local ownership

5.7.1 'Anchored' interventions

"*Interventions are anchored in political, economic and socio-cultural processes underway in any locality or nation*" (Hilhorst, Christoplos & Haar, 2010: 119. Interventions do not start nor end at a blank page, but in a context where all kinds of processes are underway and negotiated. Whether and how the interactions between VECO, ZOA, the beneficiaries and the further political, economic and socio-cultural processes are shaping the intervention process, will be analyzed in this paragraph. A connection to the political and socio-cultural

processes underway is seen in relation to the position of local authorities and power relations. Notables and chiefs are in all cases involved in the local committee, in most cases as advisors of the committee. There is an interaction between the intervention that was initiated by VECO and ZOA, and the existing structures of authority. These authorities receive a lot of respect form the villagers, but they have less trust that the chief will work in their interest.

There is no real connection to the political and socio-cultural processes seen in the security situation. This is something that transcends the locality, but as of now there is no relation noticeable between the CDR projects and the (in)stability in the region. VECO has however the objective to increase stability in the region through its projects, so through improving the agriculture sector. This might give a more stable situation considering food security, but no link is appearing between that and the overall security situation or the stabilization of the conflicts in the area. Instead, it seems to be a risk factor to have more fields, good yields and/or more cows. As one interviewee mentioned that receiving cows as dowry is attracting negative attention, and going to fields that are more remotely located is dangerous with respect to possible assaults and stealing of harvests. The assumption that development brings peace (Hilhorst *et al*., 2010), which is behind the objectives of VECO has not justified itself in practice (yet).

A connection to the economic processes is seen in the strategy of VECO to connect to cooperatives that already work in the villages and to connect to the previous 'chain of activities' (Long & Ploeg, 1989). In the case of the projects of ZOA it is often ZOA that is initiating a project with an already made plan. For the practical content it connects however to the local actors to come to a joint agreement. Those actors interact with the NGO and its plan to negotiate it and shape it according to their practical needs.

In some cases, where community members took the initiative to request for an intervention, this is directly coming forth from the local processes. In Luberizi the villagers formed a local group for the improvement of the maize production before they reached out to VECO for support. Once VECO came into the picture, the local group on maize and VECO interacted and negotiated each from their own experiences and interpretations. The local group used their experience and knowledge on improving the maize sector when discussing and determining the proposed objectives of VECO for improving the rice production.

Referring back to Hilhorst e*t al.* (2010) and Long & Ploeg (1989) on anchored interventions it can be concluded that, even though ZOA and VECO are determining most at the start of the interventions, their objectives and decisions are not a one-way traffic. Instead, they are influenced by the knowledge, experience and interactions with the beneficiaries and the possibilities and limitations in the economic, political and socio-cultural context. Local participation is therefore essential to anchor the intervention in that context, to interact with that context, and to be able to make the intervention meet the possibilities that lay within that context.

5.7.2 Appearances of participation

On participation in development programs there are three main uses explained by Chambers (1994):

- Participation as a cosmetic label;
- Participation used to increase efficiency;
- Participation as a fundamental right.

The CDR projects of ZOA and VECO in Fizi and Uvira have characteristics of all three appearances of participation. Examples of participation as a cosmetic label are found in few particular localities where it is the beneficiaries who experience that the NGO is determining all what happens within the project. For example in Kiliba. VECO and COOPA present the project as participatory by installing a local committee for the management of the project, but the beneficiaries experience that in practice they cannot really participate in determining the course of development. This is foremost caused by the fact that the objectives are determined by COOPA. Objectives determine for a great deal the further course of the project. This chapter has however shown that the level of participation increases during the intervention process, but this is only within frame of the already, less-participatory, predetermined objectives.

In the selection of villages and local farmers' cooperatives by VECO, participation appears as a means of efficiency. VECO wants to work with cooperatives that function sufficiently so that the implementation of the projects will be relatively easy and results can be booked more efficiently.

The appearance of participation as a right is seen in the projects of ZOA, where the installation of the local committee and sub-committees is deliberately used to increase good governance, a form of institution building. It can, however, not clear whether it is really building institutions since this is something that cannot be properly measured over two years, which is the period between the baseline and the endline MFS II impact study. Jütting (2003) explains in his article on institutions and development that institutions related to the social structure of society take a very long horizon for change of over a hundred years. Wanting to achieve good governance in the timespan of a development project that will likely not last for more than a couple of years, seems therefore unrealistic. Jütting (2003) does however also state that in times of shock these institution can change in a short time span. This can be illustrated by the example given in chapter 1 on the massacre of Mutarule in the territory of Uvira. Over thirty people were killed in a relatively small community. All other inhabitants of Mutarule fled their houses. This is severely disrupting the social, economic and political structures. Such a tragic event can be seen as a shock that Jütting describes through which the institutions related to the social structure of society can be changed in a short time span. These kind of shocks occur regularly in Fizi and Uvira, but they do, however, not justify the assumptions made in policy to achieve good governance through the projects of VECO and ZOA. Jütting (2003) explains that it is through shocks that these institutions can be changed quickly, but it is exactly these shocks that VECO and ZOA want to prevent by means of agricultural development. Therefore the policy assumption is not justifiable.

The examples of the villages where the beneficiaries experienced that all was determined by the NGO show the dissatisfaction of these beneficiaries when they cannot really participate. This dissatisfaction seemed at the same time to raise suspicion towards the NGO. This can lead to difficulties in conserving the project in the long run, and thus be inefficient. There have also been several studies that pointed out that participation is one of the critical components of 'success' of a development project (Pretty, 1995). Pretty (1995) states that the element of participation is furthermore associated with *"greater efficiency, understanding and social cohesion; more cost-effective services; greater transparency and accountability; increased empowering of the poor and disadvantaged; and strengthened capacity of people to learn and act"* (Pretty, 1995 : 1251).

5.7.3 Participation and local ownership

The first component of local ownership, namely participation, is elaborately discussed in this chapter. Participation in different stages of a development intervention have shown a mixed picture of how this is experienced by the beneficiaries of the selected projects. Throughout the process of intervention there is however a trend of an increasing level of participation experienced by the beneficiaries. At the start when initiative is taken and objectives are determined the level of local participation is on average experienced lower than in the further course of the intervention process, when it comes to decision making and project management. Referring to the trend of increasing level of participation during the intervention process, the typology of participation at the start is 'functional participation'. This levels up to interactive participation in the course of the intervention process. In essence participation in the CDR projects in Uvira and Fizi is used as means for efficiency but in the course of the intervention process and shaped by the beneficiaries this shifts to interactive participation. This seems a positive trend, knowing that CDR projects are temporary and the support of VECO (and of MSF II financing higher up the aid chain) will not last long, but when participation and local ownership keep increasing over time, the projects might endure because it will be all in the hands of the beneficiaries who can carry it on by themselves.

Further findings are that the participatory strategy is not linked to better outcomes of the main projects goals of food security and security. Furthermore there is no link found between improved agriculture and stability in the region which is assumed in the project objectives of VECO. Furthermore, the role of authorities within the local committees is an interesting one since the authorities are owed a lot of respect, but the villagers are more reluctant to trust them when it comes to defending their interests. Power in the local community plays an important role herein and this notion of power and how that also relates to participation and local ownership, will be elaborated upon in the next chapter.

6. Spaces, places and power in the intervention process

Next to participation, power is the other important determinant of local ownership. To see how power plays a role in the selected CDR interventions this chapter will be using the power cube of Gaventa (2006) (Figure 1). The power cube consists of three main elements: Spaces, places and power, which are each divided in three types. There are a lot of interfaces between spaces, places and power within the power cube. And even though it is a simplified artificial model, these interfaces are also seen in the realities of the selected CDR interventions in Uvira and Fizi. These selected CDR interventions are found in the 'local place', the lower layer of the power cube. There are various linkages between the the local, national and global place, as is also explained in chapter four with the 'aid chain' through which aid travels from an international to a local level. This research has its focus, however on the local place and its interfaces with spaces and power. In this chapter these interfaces between the three elements of the power cube will be discussed.

Figure 15 Power cube



6.1 Spaces and power relations in the intervention process

A locality, community or village within the frame of a CDR intervention can be described as a space on the basis of Gaventa's (2006) definition of spaces as "*opportunities, moments, and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions and relationships which affect their lives and interests*" (Gaventa, 2006: 11). Are the selected CDR interventions such spaces through which policies, discourses, decisions and relationship can potentially be affected? That's the question of interest of this paragraph since the answer to that question will show whether a CDR intervention is really a means of local ownership to steer the development in the direction pursued by the local population. Furthermore it will give insight in whether the local population really has the power to negotiate and achieve change through local ownership and participation. To get an answer to these questions this chapter will look into three types of spaces that each find their expression in the CDR projects in Uvira and Fizi: Closed spaces (6.1.1), invited spaces (6.1.2) and created spaces (6.1.3).

6.1.1 Closed spaces

Closed spaces are decision-making spaces that are closed for participation of local actors and often literally take place behind closed doors (Gaventa, 2006). This can be seen as a so called pre-determined frame of a CDR intervention. The ideas and strategies of CDR are often already decided upon by the (I)NGOs and donors. The objectives that are often already set by the local NGOs VECO and ZOA are also an indication of closed space in that stadium of a CDR intervention since local actors can often not participate in setting the objectives. This is illustrated by a quote from a beneficiary of ZOA in Mukolwe who said: "*ZOA just gives us its program and the rest we don't know*" (beneficiary in Mukolwe).That program is made in a decision-making space that was closed

for participation of local actors like this beneficiary. A similar story was told in Kiringye where the beneficiaries explained that the cooperative through which VECO implements its project had given the objectives. This is however not the case in all selected villages nor for the whole intervention process of CDR projects as will be seen in the next paragraphs.

6.1.2 Invited spaces

In invited spaces local actors are invited by different kinds of authorities such as the government, supranational agencies or non-governmental organisations to participate in decision-making (Gaventa, 2006). This type of space is often present in the strategy of intervention of VECO and ZOA as they often consulted the local people, often via a local authority such as the village chief. Through this consultation local actors were asked about their needs and often invited to join the cooperative and/or the local committee to be formed for the CDR project. Through this way of handling local actors can be in this invited space of decision-making. The local committee can be seen as such a space since in most cases the initiative and in this case the invitation/consultation comes from the side of the NGO, but local actors can in that space participate in decision-making. A beneficiary of VECO in Kilomoni explained that he was consulted "*about needs of the community and on agricultural techniques*". This consultation was an invitation to come up with needs that should be taken into account in a CDR project, but it is not a real invitation through which the beneficiary can take part in decision-making of the project. This kind of invited space is often indirectly created through the local committees that have been formed through election. Local actors can participate in decision-making by electing people in the local committee, and in that sense the local committee becomes an invited spaces where the (elected) members participate in decision-making on the CDR project. In some cases the local committee seems to change into a closed space after its formation; of course the local population should be represented in the local committee through the elections, but the local committee members and the NGO are the ones who are in the (invited) space of decision-making. There is communication from the local committee towards the other beneficiaries of the project, for example in the form of handing out the work planning which was said by a beneficiary in Mukolwe (ZOA). But the local committee, together with the NGO, is in the space of decision-making.

6.1.3 Claimed/created spaces

Claimed or created spaces are claimed by less powerful local actors against power holders, or these spaces are more autonomously created by local actors (Gaventa, 2006). When initiative is taken by local actors, this is the beginning of claiming and/or creating a space for decision-making. In Luberizi (VECO) beneficiaries in the focus group said that "*before* (the project) *we organised ourselves already in a maize-group to improve production*". In an individual interview held in Luberizi the interviewee explained that "*we ourselves have started the project, to improve the production and the environment, and to create income generating activity".* A similar story was told in Sangya (ZOA) where the beneficiaries in the focus group explained that the idea to create their own cooperative came from themselves and that ZOA just came to help them with finances and to organize it well. In these cases the initiative was locally taken, ideas were developed and actions taken. It was from the initiative of the local actors that VECO and ZOA were involved in respectively Luberizi and Sangya.

Explaining that the involvement of outside party will always lead to less 'self-creation' of spaces. It is interesting to look at the role of the local actors and that of the NGO ones the NGO has become involved with the project. In Luberizi the interviewee described the role of VECO as helping to improve our productive capacity, amongst others through training about grains and agricultural techniques. The interviewee in Sangya described the role of ZOA in a similar way, ZOA is "*empowering our capacity and helping with self-management".* It is difficult to tell who is holding the power within the decision-making space, whether these are the initiative takers (the local actors), or the NGO who is providing the means and support for the continuation of the project. In the focus group discussion held in Luberizi, the beneficiaries agreed that the management of the project is completely in their own hands stating that "*It is the committee that manages the whole project. The NGO helps us generally for the capacity of the committee to manage the project better".* The same feelings about the role of the beneficiaries and of the NGO came to the fore in the focus group discussion in Sangya. This shows that in the space of decision-making that was created by local actors, these local actors remain to be the main power holders that continue that space for decision-making for the project.

6.2 Places and power relations in the intervention process

The objectives of VECO and ZOA are not just focused on the local arena, but they transcend that level. Especially VECO aims to achieve stability in the region through their CDR projects in Uvira. These policy objectives are explained in chapter four. The main activities do however take place within the local arena where a local committee is formed for the local management of agricultural development. For this agricultural development VECO seeks to make linkages to a more regional level for the creation of markets and yield storage. Other linkages to higher levels of arenas of power in Fizi are to be found in policy, objectives and standards that are determined by donors, the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs, INGOs, NGOs and local farmers' cooperatives. From the project in the local arena VECO tries to improve the stability on a higher level, and ZOA tries to improve or establish good governance through its CDR strategy on local level. For the current timespan, however, no strong link appeared between the CDR activity of VECO on local level in and its assumed outcome on a higher level in the *Plaine de la Ruzi*zi. In chapter 5 this is explained already: the beneficiaries in Uvira experienced even more instability in the region over the past two years. The insecurity is explained as an increase in killings, repetitive conflict between Bafuliro and Barundi, passivity and incompetency of the government, and theft of cows and harvests. The latter cause shows that there is a link with agriculture, but there is no indication that there will be more stability when agriculture would be further developed since an important aspect of the instability lies in the ethnicity of different groups of people living in the *Plaine de la Ruzizi*. So next to the fact that there is more instability experienced by the beneficiaries, it is questionable whether the link between participatory agricultural development and stability, that VECO makes in its policy, exists at all since the causes for instability are not found in agriculture.

An important policy objective of ZOA is the improve good governance in Fizi, through the formation of local committees for the management of the projects. The beneficiaries in the focus group discussions have experienced slightly more positive than negative changes on the theme of good governance over the past two years. Good governance was herein related to the quality of public services and how this was managed. Just as

with the projects of VECO in Uvira, here there is no strong link found between the CDR strategy and the changes experienced on good governance. The main positive changes on this theme are seen as road rehabilitation, health services and water provision. Themes that are not directly targeted by ZOA. As main causes for negatives changes on public services and governance are mentioned: corruption in police and justice system, lack of medication, and bad governance. Corruption was even mentioned in six out of the eight villages as cause of bad governance. Despite the fact that there are more positive than negative changes mentioned on governance, this doesn't seem to be owed by ZOA's CDR strategy.

VECO and ZOA have made causal linkages between the local and the regional level within their policy objectives. The outcomes of the focus group discussions show however that these linkages are not causal. The strategy of CDR does therefore not necessarily contribute to achieving the objectives of stability and good governance stated in policy. CDR does however also no reason to think CDR detracts from these objectives.

6.3 Power and local ownership in the intervention process

Gaventa (2006) describes three types of power: Visible, hidden and invisible. These types will respectively be explained and discussed in the light of the CDR projects in paragraph 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3.

6.3.1 Visible power

Visible power is understood as observable decision-making, including formal rules, structures, authorities, institutions, and procedures of decision-making. Changing this level of power is often directed to changing the 'who, how and what' of policy-making (Gaventa, 2006). In the CDR projects this visible power is seen in the elections held for local committees, a seasonal work calendar from ZOA, the construction of a storage building, signs and flags of NGOs working in a village. Another aspect of visible power can be the involvement of the chief and other local authorities as advisors in the local committee. Local people view them as power holders and have respect for these authorities, in this sense it is a visible form of power, but as seen in the next paragraph it can also be linked to a more hidden form of power.

6.3.2 Hidden power

Hidden power is about setting the political agenda by controlling who is participating in decision-making and what is on the agenda (Gaventa, 2006). For the CDR projects it is therefore interesting to look at what is already predetermined by the NGO and who are the people in the local committee who can set the agenda and influence decision-making. In almost all cases the project objectives are predetermined by the NGO, this can be seen as a frame in which the project takes place and which already gives a direction to the development that is supposed to take place. Furthermore, the composition of the local committee is made by means of elections. There are however advisors appointed to the local committee who are not elected but are often people who already hold power in the community, such as the chief and the pastor. In chapter 5 it is already shown that although the community tends to have a lot of respect for the chief, there is less trust in him working in the interest of the local people. Combining these two makes a chief a hidden power who can, by the respect that is owed to him, influence agenda-setting while that will not always be in the interest of the community.

6.3.3 Invisible power

Through the hidden form of power the psychological and ideological boundaries of participation are shaped (Gaventa, 2006). This is taken a step further from hidden power, because with invisible power there are not only issues kept from the decision-making table but also from the minds and awareness of actors involved. In such a way, people can be influenced in how they think about these issues, their environment and themselves in relation to that. Invisible power is shaping meaning and that what is considered acceptable (Gaventa, 2006). Since it is invisible power, it is complex to examine whether this is taking place in the selected communities where the CDR interventions take place. One example that might make this form of power a bit visible was seen in the things that were said on women's rights and gender equality. It became clear that a lot of NGOs have activities of sensibilisation on these themes in the communities in Uvira and Fizi. Even when not asked about it, in a lot of focus groups and individual interviews people came up with the issue. For example, when the composition and formation of the local committee was discussed it was several times explicitly mentioned that women were represented as well (e.g. Kenya), or that the formation of the committee was done through elections but that beforehand it was made sure that half of the committee would consist of women (Kiliba). Whether this was an outcome of the changed conviction on the role of women in the community by the local people or whether this process was deliberately shaped into that direction by the NGOs with links to western ideologies seems to be a reasonable question in this context. The references made to the sensibilisation activities of several NGOs on this theme make it likely that it was the more or less invisible power of the dominant ideology on gender equality that shaped and steered the ideas of the beneficiaries of ZOA and VECO on this theme. Knowing that this is an important theme for the NGOs, the beneficiaries might have mentioned this theme so obviously in the hope of receiving more money from these NGOs in the future. This is a form of invisible power within the relation between NGO and beneficiaries and, moreover, probably the invisible power of money and how this shapes peoples thinking and handling.

6.4 Analysis: Connecting spaces, places and power

By using Gaventa's (2006) power cube this chapter has shown how the different types of spaces, places and power play a role in the CDR projects. In this paragraph Gaventa's power cube will be used as a tool to analyse the interactions between the spaces, places and power in the selected CDR interventions.

First of all it is essential to be aware that spaces are not neutral, but influenced by visible, hidden and invisible power. In the (invited, closed, created) spaces beneficiaries and the NGO negotiate and shape the CDR projects by using (visible, hidden, invisible) power. In a conflict-affected context like South Kivu it is especially important to be aware that such a context leads up to specific challenges for CDR projects. An unequal distribution of power is a main challenge of a conflict-affected context (Strand *et al.*, 2003). As shown in chapter five the NGO often uses its power by setting the boundaries of the project in the formulation of objectives. In Tchaboba (ZOA) a beneficiary mentioned in an interview that a manner in which ZOA executes power within the course of the project is encouraging those who work well by giving them seeds, and discouraging those who work bad by withdrawing finances. In this way it is the NGO that is in control. It is the NGO that has the money and the resources and take up the power to decide who are and who are not receiving.

It is the NGO that uses its power to set objectives in a space that is not open for much negotiation with the beneficiaries. Within the local committees, which can be seen as an invited space, the beneficiaries are more able to negotiate, shape and affect the course of the project. There are some examples where the local committee did not just discuss and decide on the basic project issues such as the distribution or storage of seeds, but within the invited space of the local committee they created more space for discussing and negotiating other issues relevant for the community. In this way the beneficiaries used their power as an elected committee member for the management of the project of VECO or ZOA in a broader way than only for the management of those projects. An example of this is seen in Lusenda (ZOA) where also conflicts between members were discussed in de local committee. In Runingu (VECO) the interviewee mentioned that they would also talk about land disputes and conflicts related to (access to) water in the local committee. In Sange (VECO) the local committee aimed at the development of Sange on a general level, according to the interviewee.

Talking about the interface of power and participation in the selected CDR projects, it is interesting to look at the start-up phase of the project where local cooperatives, villages and beneficiaries are selected. As explained in chapter 5, the selection of cooperatives and villages started with indicating the needs, but lead to a more results-based process of selection of cooperatives. By selecting cooperatives that function relatively well, VECO supports these cooperatives so that the results on agricultural development will be in shorter reach, whereas they could also have chosen to build capacity of the cooperatives that are now considered too weak to work with. By making a decision like this, VECO uses its power to create a space of negotiation and participation with the cooperatives COOPA and COOSOPRODA and with the villages they work in. For the cooperatives and villages that are not selected, such a space is not created. This to indicate that the process of selection is a process of power.

When interviewees were asked who can become a beneficiary of the projects of VECO the basis of most answers is that they need to be farmers. In several villages there were criteria added to this such as having a good morality, being capable of working in a group and paying the price of membership (Luberizi - VECO). For the villages where ZOA is active it was more explicitly mentioned that the project aims at vulnerable people such as refugees, displaced people and returnees, and that these are the people who can become beneficiary of the project. In Katungula it was added that you must like the activities of ZOA to become a beneficiary. The village chief and other notables are in most cases directly involved in the project plans and are automatically participating in the local committee, often in an advisory role. These are the local power holders, so in that sense this way of dealing with the local committee is respecting these existing local powers and through that enhancing local ownership of the project. On the other hand, it has been explained in chapter five that the chief is owed a lot of respect by the local community members, but that their trust in the chief to work in their interest is lower. This means that the NGOs respect the local power structures, but this does not have to mean that it enhances local ownership when it comes to the ‘normal’ local citizens. Moreover it seems to foremost confirm local power holders. To a lesser extend it is also the local community members that can contribute, negotiate and shape the course of the project by participating in the local committee. An important aspect of local ownership and participation is that it can be empowering for local people. By involving local

community members in the project management, they can be empowered, they can use their power to negotiate and shape the course of the project and through that of the development of their community. Furthermore, the beneficiaries of the projects are empowered by the training on agricultural methods that the NGOs provide through which they gain knowledge and skills to cultivate their land more effectively. However, the empowerment of the local committee members seems to have its boundaries since the existing local power holders are also part of the committee and their say is more powerful than that of 'normal' committee members. This is also what Kyamusugulwa (2014) found in his PhD research on local ownership in eastern Congo when he describes it as *"the outcome of existing power holders actions"* (Kyamusugulwa, 2014: 139).

Predefined objectives, predetermined selection of cooperatives, and predefined selection criteria for local committee members are ways in which the NGOs can apply their power to shape the CDR interventions. This means that this power, at the beginning of a CDR intervention, is not given to the local community. The power of the NGOs seem to be narrowing the space for negotiation, but this is primarily at the start of the intervention. There are however some examples on the contrary where a space is created by local actors. In these cases the average experience was that these local actors were more in charge of project management and decision-making than when the initiative and the creation of the space came from the NGO only. Despite some of these examples the average experience is that participation during the intervention increases, to the point that the highest levels of local participation are experienced in the management of the project. There it is moreover the local beneficiaries who use their power to negotiate and shape the course of the project. Furthermore, the local committee members use the power of the local committee and their membership of it to negotiate not only the project issues, but also other important issues that are going on in the community and that are valued important for the development of the community. So the whole intervention process, including the local committees can be seen as invited spaces. It is, however the NGO that has the power of opening and closing these invited spaces, or in other words, to set the boundaries of these spaces. Gaventa (2005) argues that the actor who creates a space, is also likely to be holding the most power in that space. Albeit it is the power of the NGO that is in most cases shaping the spaces and places of negotiation and setting the boundaries for it, within those spaces and places it is the local community members that can use their power -be it under the higher power of the local power holders - to further shape and negotiate the course of the project and extend it to other local development issues.

After shedding some light on how places, spaces and power are influencing the intervention process, the next step is to see whether this is also influencing the outcomes of the CDR projects. Gaventa (2005) argues that changes might occur very quickly wen spaces and places are aligned. For the selected CDR projects in South Kivu this might mean that the policies and actions on international, national, regional and local level are not contradicting but moreover supporting and strengthening each other. In chapter four some discrepancies in policy on the higher level and the practices on the local level are described. *"The local, national and global agenda affects the opening and closure of invited spaces"* (Gaventa, 2005: 15). Chapter four gave insight in these local, national and global agendas and the difference between them, together with all the different

stages the aid has to travel through. When policies are not aligned with the local reality, when the different forms of places, spaces and power, and the different actors holding this power are not serving the same goal, it can be seen as the power cube being *"chaotic, random and confused"* (Gaventa, 2005: 16). According to Gaventa (2005) the impact of the CDR projects will be achieved faster when the different dimensions are not chaotic, random and confused but are aligned with each other. For the CDR projects this would mean that policies and agendas are connected to the local reality, that agendas on local, national and global level are serving the same goal, when power holders such as policy makers, donors, local NGO staff, village chiefs and local committee members use their power to shape and negotiate the intervention process in line with the common goal. The alignment of these dimensions described in the power cube does not happen often (Gaventa, 2005). This chapter and the former chapters have shown that the engagement and synergy between the different actors and dimensions in the CDR intervention process is often hard to find.

7. Concluding reflections on local ownership of CDR interventions

Even though participatory approaches like CDR are widely adopted in development policy of many governments and development organisations, the evidence that these approaches are effective is still weak (Humphreys, 2013). Especially the conflict-affected contexts where CDR is implemented brings about difficulties for translating its conceptual principles of local ownership and participation into the local reality which is marked by inequality and instability (Mansuri & Rao, 2004). These statements led to conducting this research with the objective to gain understanding in how local ownership in CDR interventions in South Kivu, DRC, is shaped by dynamics of participation and power. Examining the intervention process, from policy to practice, and analysing the data by using the typologies of participation (Pretty, 1995) and the power cube (Gaventa, 2005) gave insight in:

1) Reasons behind choosing and using a CDR approach, and the translation of policy objectives of CDR and local ownership in the practice of selected CDR projects in South Kivu, DRC;
2) How local ownership is implemented in terms of the typologies of participation;
3) How local ownership is implemented in terms of spaces, places and power;
4) The relation between local ownership and the impact of the CDR interventions;
5) Shaping local ownership through participation and power.

The conclusions and reflections on these themes will respectively be discussed in the following paragraphs, to eventually come to recommendations on local ownership in CDR interventions and for further research.

7.1 Shaping CDR interventions through policy and practice

In policy and theory CDR is a promising strategy for reconstruction and development in conflict affected contexts. Concepts like 'participation' (both functional and as empowerment), 'community-driven' and 'local ownership' are the pillars of the CDR approach. This research showed that these concepts are formed and shaped in three main ways: as vertical policy, through the aid chain, and as horizontal policy.

CDR interventions of VECO and ZOA in Uvira and Fizi are first of all shaped by vertical policy. This means that the policy and funding requirements from the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs are steering the policy objectives of VECO and ZOA. The Dutch ministry of foreign affairs has special guidelines concerning the strategy and goals for development programs in conflict affected contexts. To be able to profit from the funding from the ministry, Dutch NGOs like Cordaid (of which VECO is a local partner) and ZOA need to fit their programs in South Kivu within the frame that the ministry has set. This policy frame is at the same time stimulating a results based strategy so that accountability for the received funds can be shown.

From the headquarters of the Dutch NGOs the policies are further traveling through the aid chain to country offices and local partner organizations who implement the programs in the local reality of Uvira and Fizi. At every stage in the aid chain the policies and objectives are shaped and negotiated to fit the particular stage in the chain. This shaping and negotiating of the CDR objectives is also going on in the villages where the projects are implemented, between the local partner organisations and the community members. At the level of the

local partner organisations (VECO and ZOA in respectively Uvira and Fizi), some assumptions are found within the specific project objectives. These assumptions are:

- *Participatory agricultural development will contribute to stability in the region.*

On local level a participatory way of developing agriculture can indeed stimulate working together peacefully. The research showed that within the local committees issues of conflict within the village are discussed as well as the practical issues for improving agricultural outputs. Conflict in the region, which is transcending the local level, keeps on being a severely disruptive factor for agricultural development. There is no link found between the efforts of VECO and ZOA to improve agricultural development and the conflict situation in the region, which does not justify the assumption made in the policy objectives.

- *The participation of women will contribute to stability in the region.*

An effort has been done to get women more involved in economic activities and decision making. A lot of sensibilisation activities have been carried out on this theme, not only by VECO and ZOA but also by several other NGOs working in Fizi and Uvira. How this would or could be contributing to stability is not made specific in policy and a direct link is not found in practice.

- *The CDR strategy will contribute to good governance.*

ZOA has the strategy to form local management committees for the projects to contribute to institution building and good governance. According to Jütting (2003) institutions related to the social structure of society take a very long horizon of change. Therefore this would not be noticeable in the two years the project is running. In times of shock, it is however possible for these institutions to change quickly. Shocks occur regularly in the conflict affected context of Fizi and Uvira, therefore an institutional change in the social structure would be possible. However, both ZOA and VECO strive to establish more stability by means of their projects, meaning that they are trying to prevent and/or soften such shocks. Together with the fact that no significant positive institutional changes are experienced by the beneficiaries of ZOA and VECO, the assumption that the CDR approach would contribute to good governance is so far not justified nor achieved.

The horizontal dimension of policy explains how local beneficiaries and their practical needs reinterpret the CDR policy objectives 'from below'. The beneficiaries and local committee members can shape and negotiate the course of the CDR intervention in their village by bringing their needs and knowledge to the negotiating table. It is in the interaction between beneficiaries, and between the NGO and the beneficiaries that policy objectives are negotiated and gain new meaning in practice.

7.2 CDR interventions and the typologies of participation

The level of participation experienced by the beneficiaries of VECO and ZOA varies a lot between villages and between the four main aspects of initiative taking, determining objectives, decision making and management. The average experienced level of participation in the practice of the CDR interventions is described as a mutual agreement between the NGO and the beneficiaries. Despite the mixed picture, there is a trend of an increasing level of participation during the intervention process. The two aspects of initiative taking and determining objectives show a lower level of participation than the aspects of decision making and management.

The typologies of participation (Pretty, 1995) which are prevalent in the CDR interventions of VECO and ZOA are functional participation and interactive participation. The formation of local committees for the management of the projects where beneficiaries and the NGO participate in joint analyses, project plans and management fits within the typology of interactive participation. The reasoning of VECO and ZOA behind the formation of local committees and the participation of beneficiaries in the project are more to be found in the typology of functional participation, since this is partly results-based and carried out to increase project efficiency. In relation to this latter statement it is interesting that this study did not find a link between the participatory strategy conducted in the intervention process, and the impact or outcomes of that intervention process. This means that there was no link between the level of participation and the impact of the CDR projects on food security, security or good governance.

7.3 Places, spaces and power in the CDR interventions

Albeit it is the power of the NGO that is in most cases shaping the spaces and places of negotiation and setting the boundaries for it, within those spaces and places it is the local community members that can use their power -be it under the higher power of the local power holders - to further shape and negotiate the course of the project and extend it to other local development issues. This process of negotiation mainly takes place within the invited space of the local committee for the management of the project. The boundaries for that space are usually set by the NGO and it is also the NGO that is often the inviting party. Pretty (1995) states that the one creating a space is also most likely to be holding the most power in that space. It could therefore be concluded that the NGO is holding the most power in the invited space of the local committee. This study showed however that the beneficiaries use their power to shape and broaden the space of negotiation by putting other issues on the agenda that they see as necessary for the development of the community.

Another element of power is the power within the local committees. The chief and other notables of the villages were in almost all villages involved in the local committee. This research showed that community members owe much respect to their chief, but that their trust in the chief to work in their interest is lower. VECO and ZOA have respected the local power structures, but this does not have to mean that including local power holders in the local committee will enhance local ownership. When it comes to the community members, their interest might very well be overruled by the chief. Respecting the local power structures therefore seems to confirm local power holders rather than enhancing local ownership of the 'normal' community members.

The places, spaces and power in the CDR projects are in most cases not aligned with each other but are rather chaotic. A better alignment of the places, spaces and power that are affecting the CDR interventions in Uvira and Fizi would lead to quicker changes and more positive impacts. This would mean that policy objectives would be serving the same interest and goals on global, national and local level, that the power involved throughout the aid chain and throughout the intervention process would not be contradictory but complementary in opening and closing spaces of negotiation. The question is however whether it is realistic that places, spaces and power throughout the aid chain will become more aligned with each other and will be serving the same objectives. All the different stages through which policy and funding have to travel whilst

being renegotiated and reshaped at each stage, driven by various interests, is a system that cannot easily become aligned. It would therefore be more useful to put focus on the things that the sector can still learn a lot about, namely the local context and how to better connect to the needs and possibilities of the local environment and the local actors. Enhancing local participation and increasing insight in local power structures can contribute to this connection with the local context. This would probably even generate more positive impacts of CDR interventions than the alignment of spaces, places and power.

7.4 Impacts and local ownership

No relation is found between the level participation and the impact of the selected CDR projects. Of course there are a lot more elements in the context that influence the impacts, but the CDR strategy is often presented in policy as if that strategy would be most efficient and would lead to the best outcomes. In previous research on CDR interventions this is however never proven to be right and the findings of this research confirm that.

The main objectives of the CDR interventions in Uvira and Fizi are found in the domains of agricultural development, security and stability in the region, women's involvement, and good governance. The level of participation and local ownership of the projects does not directly contribute to these domains. On the contrary, there are some examples of villages where the beneficiaries experience a low level of participation, whilst experiencing positive changes on agricultural development and the security situation. There are also examples of villages where the beneficiaries experience a high level of participation, whilst experiencing negative changes on agricultural development and the security situation. The villages on both sides of the story remain examples and cannot be considered a real trend. They are however interesting examples that make clear that the level of participation is at least not the determining factor for the desired impact of the CDR projects.

7.5 Shaping local ownership through participation and power

The level of participation experienced by the beneficiaries is for both VECO and ZOA is on average described as an equal relation between the NGO and the beneficiaries. In other words this is described as decisions within the CDR intervention are made in mutual agreement between the NGO and the local committee. Beneficiaries are involved and participating in the CDR interventions which enhances the feeling of owning the project and the activities that come along with it. VECO and ZOA are however the actors that execute power in the selection process of villages, cooperatives but also of beneficiaries and decide on who can and who cannot participate. This is prior to the formation of local committees when beneficiaries are invited to participate. The step before and the step after the selection of beneficiaries is setting boundaries to the participating power of the beneficiaries. These steps are the selection of villages and cooperatives before, and the composition of local committees and existing power structures after. Within these boundaries beneficiaries can use and are using their power to shape and negotiate agendas, bring topics to the table and have a say in the course of the intervention process.

When directly asked who is in charge of the development of the community, almost all respondents mentioned that it is the community itself that is in charge of the development of their own community. This

shows that there is a proper *feeling* of local ownership when it comes to development interventions. However, this feeling of local ownership and the level of participation within the CDR interventions are taking place within a frame that is in most cases pre-determined by the local NGO, which often follows policies and trends of national and international NGO policies and donors. This shows that the CDR interventions are *in principle* not locally owned because the initiative did not originate locally and they fail to really empower local community members.

7.6 Recommendations

Local ownership and participation in CDR interventions should not just be viewed as means for efficiency or for good appearance since several studies, including this one, have shown that an increasing level of participation does generate positive impacts. At least not in the way it is carried out at the moment. It is recommended to further examine the effects of local participation in the process of determining objectives for CDR interventions. This research showed that the level of participation is still rather low in this phase of the intervention process. When local community members will become more involved in the process of determining objectives this might generate a better connection to the specific local context the CDR project is implemented.

For further research on the theme of local ownership in CDR interventions it is recommended to collect more in-depth data. This can be done to focus on one or two specific communities, to gain more insight in why beneficiaries are experiencing a high or low level of participation within the CDR intervention process, and in how the specific local power structures are of influence for the intervention process. It is also recommended to take a broader focus by including not only beneficiaries of the CDR interventions, but also the community members that are not benefitting from the intervention. This will open a new study area of inclusion and exclusion, which is also strongly related to participation and power.

Talking about power and (local) power holders, it would be interesting and useful to further investigate the role of (local) power holders in the local committees. What is the influence of their position in the local committee on other committee members? A useful question for further research in this topic would be to look at ways in which these local power holders can be positively used to generate positive development and reconstruction impacts.

Policies of CDR interventions and the objectives that they pursue often sound promising but they have even so often proven to be too ambitious, misguided or driven by opposed interests. Getting these opposed interests aligned with each other to come to more effective CDR interventions seems to be unrealistic. Instead it is recommended to put effort in gaining more insight in the dynamics of power and participation in the local context. It should not be the well-sounding theoretical concepts and policy objectives that are framing and determining the course of CDR interventions, but the limitations and possibilities found in the practice of the local context.

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