The background of the cover features a faded, semi-transparent image of a person's face wearing safety glasses, overlaid on a bicycle. The bicycle is parked against a light-colored wall. The person's face is positioned in the upper left quadrant, looking towards the right. The bicycle frame and handlebars are visible, with the word 'VIRUS' printed on the handlebar grip.

MSc. Thesis

Emerging Eco-Practices

The Development and Governance
of Sustainable Consumption Behavior
in Ukraine

July 2014

MSc. Thesis by Robin Smale

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Emerging Eco-practices: The Development and Governance of Sustainable Consumption Behavior in Ukraine

MSc. thesis report

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Abstract

In the midst of political instability and economic hardship, some Ukrainians are changing their consumption behavior towards more sustainable practices. In this thesis, the emergence of sustainable consumption practices (eco-practices) in Ukraine over the last 10 years are investigated from a sociological practice theory approach. Two cases of emerging eco-practices were studied over the course of four weeks of field work: cycling in Lviv and organic food consumption in Kiev. Their development over the last 5 years is described in detail, analyzed and assessed from social, economic, political and cultural perspectives. The study reveals that a complex mix of demographic change, regional differentiation, increasing education levels and purchasing power, and renewed civic engagement drive the process of ecological modernization of consumption. Local leadership, minimal enabling social and technical infrastructure, and activist groups are found to be key elements in the (successful) promotion of the studied eco-practices. Finally, conclusions are drawn and recommendations are made regarding the governance of eco-practices in Ukraine.

Key words

Sustainable consumption, Lifestyle, Social and technical infrastructure, Ukraine, Practice theory, Organic food, Cycling.

Preface

‘Why go to Ukraine now? I am sure the Ukrainians have different issues on their mind than the environment, and no time to talk to a Dutch student about such trivial matters’ – is what some of my friends would reply when I told them about the research plans (and I asked myself that more than once as well). The idea to study emerging environmental trends in Ukraine for my Master thesis occurred well over a year before the Euromaidan protests. Rather than discourage me to conduct the study, the crisis in Ukraine reaffirmed my conviction that certain developments in Ukraine deserve the attention of environmental scientists and scholars. And I was happy to find that people were more eager to talk about environmental issues than expected. With the revolution and separatist crisis occupying so many conversations, thoughts, all of the media, people were happy to discuss other matters that are important to them – in essence, quality of life in Ukraine beyond politics.

What I found in Kiev and Lviv was definitely not what the propaganda from Moscow would have me believe: I found Ukrainians, young and old, doing away with cynicism and hedonism and committing themselves to a better future for their country. I found people who genuinely aspire true democracy and accountability. I found Kievians grouped together at the Maidan Square at night in the rain, watching an old and well-loved Soviet movie – not a blind rebellion by fanatics against everything reminding of Russia. Some have called the rise against Yanukovich’s attempts to crush demonstrations a ‘revolution of dignity’; dignity is what I found in those who I talked to during my research. Having experienced it all from close by, I now feel connected to the hopes and tragedies of Ukraine.

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Ir. Spaargaren, for his guidance and inspiration before and during the thesis project. I would like to thank all the interviewees for the time they made available to me and the wealth of information they were more than willing to provide - in particular Demyan Danylyuk and Oleh Shmid, who also contributed to making my field work a very enjoyable experience. Thanks go out to my mother, who patiently reviewed the thesis and corrected errors in English. Finally, this thesis would not have been possible without the help from my girlfriend, Iryna Zamuruieva, whose feedback, networking, translating skills were invaluable throughout the project.

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Chapter I: Introduction

Formerly communist states are typically not associated with ambitious or successful environmental reform. Despite the Europeanization of environmental policy in Eastern-Europe, much less ecological modernization took place after 1992 than expected. Continued air pollution, overexploitation of natural resources, pollution-intensive fuel use, inefficient energy usage and poor water management are the norm rather than the exception (Nazarov, 2001). While former Soviet republics have (almost uniquely in the world) seen a decrease in total CO₂ emissions in the last two decades, this can only be attributed to the post-communist collapse of industry, economy and trade (York, 2008). In Ukraine, an understudied new republic compared to for example the Russian Federation (Henry, 2010), state environmental authorities lacked institutional capacity and resources to pursue any agenda except for a 'strategy for survival' (Scherbak, 1992). Analyses of the (social) causes of environmental degradation in Ukraine predominantly have an 'upstream' focus – that is, on state environmental policy and legislation (Scherbak, 1992), industry (e.g. Ninjik (2004) on forestry, Vovk and Prugh (2003) on the mining industry), public policy (Nazarov, 2001) and geopolitics (Udovyk, 2008).

These studies thoroughly explore the upstream and structural factors that hinder ecological modernization in Ukraine, typically portraying a rather bleak future for environmental reform. In this thesis I set out to show a different side of Ukraine. From a more 'downstream' and everyday life practice-based perspective, I will attempt to paint a fresh, nuanced and informative picture of recent developments in the ecological modernization of consumption practices in Ukraine. Particularly now, in 2014, with the Maidan revolution and the turmoil in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, the attention of academics and media is drawn away from certain developments which might be highly relevant for the future of Ukraine: the emergence of sustainable consumption practices. In Kiev, I observed personally the emergence of eco-café's, organic supermarkets and smoothie-bars, and the like. The first 'green' laundry company has opened its doors in the capital. Lviv is now advertising itself online as the new cycling capital of Ukraine. Since in Ukrainian cities consumption is much more intense than in the countryside and consumption externalities become more and more apparent, the focus will be on sustainable consumption practices in the urban environment.

Unsustainable consumption patterns are detrimental to the local and global environment. The consumption of environmentally damaging goods and services place a burden on the (urban) environment and on global sustainability: for example, excessive car use leads to fossil fuel depletion, climate change, local air quality and urban planning problems. Sustainable consumption practices put less pressure on the environment and ultimately benefit the quality of life in the urban environment.

Researching recent developments in sustainable consumption in Ukraine is particularly interesting, because we can learn about the governance of sustainable consumption practices in a context of political instability, lack of government resources and capacities, relative poverty, and other adverse conditions; what and who drives the ecological modernization of consumption in spite of this, and how? In this way I hope to be able to distinguish and analyze *the most crucial* factors, drivers and

strategies involved in the governance of sustainable consumption practices, which might be relevant to policy-makers and researchers beyond Ukraine as well.

Furthermore, I will explore how European identity and ambition, geographical and cultural differences, and the recent political unrest relate to the development of sustainable consumption practices. Ukraine is a diverse and complex country, so the research must take regional differences and recent events into account. Therefore I will also examine how we can place the developments of sustainable consumption practices in the broader context of Ukrainian's recent history of social, economic, political and environmental development. Finally, I will investigate how sustainable consumption practices are governed in Ukraine – in what ways which actors support or hinder their development and spread, and what lessons we can learn from their successes and failures. As Fonte (2013, p. 232) suggests: “a perspective of consumer activities as an integrated consumption practice can suggest new forms of intervention to policy makers”.

Research questions

This research will answer the following main research question and five sub-questions:

- What sustainable consumption practices are emerging in Ukraine, how are they emerging and governed, and why?
 - What sustainable consumption practices are emerging in Ukrainian cities?
 - How are emerging sustainable consumption practices supported or hindered by various consumer lifestyles and systems of provision?
 - How are sustainable consumption practices governed, what actors are involved and what lessons can be drawn from their successes and failures?
 - How can we place emerging sustainable consumption practices in the broader context of Ukrainian social, economic and political development and environmentalism?
 - What are opportunities and threats for the process of further environmental reform of consumption in Ukraine the coming years?
 - How do geographical, cultural and political differences factor into the development of eco-practices?

Objective

By answering these questions, this MSc. thesis aims to expand our knowledge of the developments, opportunities and challenges in (the governance of) sustainable consumption practices in Ukraine, and ultimately contribute to overcoming sustainability challenges in Ukraine.

Chapter 2: Background

The idea of practice presents “action as an ongoing embodied and situated social process” (Fonte, 2013). In other words, practices are both *structured* and *structuring*. *Structured* in the sense that, if we wish to understand practices - temporarily crystallized in their current form - we must understand the historical background in which they developed. *Structuring*, since practices are always enacted by the purposeful actions of individuals, transforming the nature and meaning of the practices, as well as the infrastructures that enable them. The motivations of individuals and their (collective) identities are also to some extent historical constructs. Consumption is an act, organized in practices performed by consumers. Similarly, environmentalism (including activism, behavior, ideology, institutions) is rooted in the historical, socio-economic, political and cultural context in which it developed and is enacted.

For these reasons, this study of *emerging* sustainable consumption practices will necessarily start with a Background chapter on Ukrainian socio-economic (Chapter 2.1) and environmental (Chapter 2.2) history. The concepts mentioned above are elaborated further in Chapter 3.

2.1 Political and socio-economic development in post-independence Ukraine

In order to understand new developments in environmentalism in Ukraine, it is necessary first to explore this complex country’s recent history in some detail. This chapter draws on literature from various disciplines, including history, economics, and political studies, in an attempt to outline a brief and comprehensive (although not complete) story of socio-economic development in post-independence Ukraine. The chapter is limited to describing the key economic, social, cultural and political developments and events of the last 25 years; for detailed and more complete histories of Ukraine I refer the interested reader to authors such as Subtelny (2000), Wilson (1996, 2002), Kubicek (2008), and Åslund (2009). The goal here is to sketch the relevant broader context in which the studied empirical phenomena take place. As I will argue, the last 23 years in which Ukraine has been an independent state are the most relevant for this study.

2.1.1 The 90s: independence, economic decline and lowered living conditions

Independence

By 1991, Ukraine had been part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) for 69 years. Ukraine was the USSR’s second most populous republic (after Russia) and its most important industrial and military supplier, initially politically supportive of Russian imperial ambitions and ethnically intertwined (Jaworsky, 2005). In the Gorbachev era of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, efforts were made to please the constituent nations by allowing more autonomy and even the right to vote over separation from the USSR (Suny, 1993). Despite the political liberalization, the crumbling of the economic and political structures of the Soviet empire could not be halted (*ibid.*). National leaders discussed options for alternative, looser Unions. Conservative Soviets unsuccessfully attempted to reverse the reforms made by Gorbachev in the August Coup. Weakened by internal strife, Moscow

was powerless to stop Latvia and Estonia declare full independence by August 1991; many republics followed suit.

On December 1st 1991 Ukraine voted for its independence. An overwhelming majority (90.3%) voted ‘yes’, mostly motivated by prospects of economic improvements rather than nationalism (Wilson, 1996). Even in the pro-Russian south and east of Ukraine (housing many ethnic Russians) 60-80% voted in favor of independence, for an important part because no alluring alternatives were available (*ibid.*). Ukrainian nationalism, described as ‘a minority faith’ by Wilson (1996), provided little basis for national solidarity and unity: an ominous sign at the birth of a nation which had been dominated, suppressed and annexed by its neighbors for centuries. “The non-nationalist majority accepted the argument that independence would leave Ukraine better off economically, a notion that was soon proved to be totally without foundation” (Wilson, 1996).

Economic collapse

The fall of the Soviet Union left the Ukrainian economy in a state of shock. The GDP per capita dropped rapidly and inequality rose sharply (Figure 1). Although the Soviet apparatus had left a positive mark in the form of good infrastructure and a fairly well-educated population, the planned economy collapsed like a deck of cards. It proved to be “close to impossible to produce in a system ridden with overregulation and under stimulation” (Åslund, 2009). Economic output declined sharply in the first years of independence (*idem*).

INCOME AND INEQUALITY IN UKRAINE




Figure 1: Income and inequality in Ukraine, 1988-2011. The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality in which a value of 0 signifies perfect equality and 100 signifies inequality. Source: World Bank

Internal trade in Ukraine grinded to a halt, as provincial governments attempted to protect their regions’ economies through transit barriers, checkpoints, tariffs and trade regulations (Linn, 2004). Foreign trade remained strictly controlled, and the Soviet military-industrial complex in Ukraine

struggled to adapt to the new global order. By 1993, still only 15% of GDP came from the private sector, as state-owned enterprises continued to dominate Ukraine's economy (Åslund, 2009). The combination of price liberalization of goods, low economic output, decreased trade and over taxation led to skyrocketing prices. Hyperinflation, reaching 2730% in 1992 and peaking at 10155% over 1993, disrupted the totality of economic life (De Mènil, 2000). Hyperinflation was basically guaranteed, because of the maintenance of the ruble zone, excessive monetary expansion (up to 50% every month), and too large public expenditures (*ibid.*).

Åslund (2009) summarizes the desperate situation in 1994: "The old, centrally planned economy had stopped functioning, but no market economy had arisen". To survive, Ukrainians resorted to a booming underground economy, stamps, barter, foreign currencies and surrogate moneys (Sutela, 2012). In 1994, newly elected President Kuchma curbed hyperinflation through radical monetary and market reforms, taking the first major step on the path to economic repair from 1995 to 2000 (Åslund, 2008).

Privatization and corruption

In spite of governmental attempts (genuine or not is hard to say) to stem the tide, a wave of corruption and criminality swept over Ukraine (Kubicek, 2008). Presidential acts, parliamentary decisions and anti-corruption committees proved to be unable to bring a halt to fraud, bribing and the theft of public goods. After 1994, President Kuchma rolled out comprehensive privatization and market liberalization programs, for which Ukraine received a \$360 million IMF loan. The Soviet public goods and services complex was greatly reduced and dismantled. The distribution of previously governmental tasks to private parties was a major source of corruption; it created billionaire politicians and businessmen in a time of economic hardship. Political scientist Fukuyama (2011, in Sutela, 2012) summarizes the difficulty: "even after the initial privatization process, a state cannot necessarily protect newly private property - as long as assets can continue to be re-divided and wealth is secured by corruption and powerful private interests. Ukraine's oligarchs made their fortune in the chaotic 90s (from metallurgy, media, gas industry, banking) and have made their powerful mark on politics ever since. Sutela (2012) writes: "Sometimes the dividing line between legitimate capitalists and plain criminals is blurred, and elected politicians may be little more than covers for their interests." After his second term was "marred by political crisis and scandals" (Kuzio, 2005), President Kuchma's harsh reforms and inability to curb corruption led to his demise in popularity: Ukrainians wanted a different kind of president.

2.1.2 The 00s: growth and turmoil

Economic recovery

Major market reforms were completed in 2000. At that point Ukraine had become fully integrated into the global market. The national currency, the hryvnia, had gained in trust and replaced much of the shadow economy; after the deflation its value was low, which provided some competitiveness in international trade. What followed were 8 years of high economic growth, on average 7.6% GDP growth a year between 2000-2007 (Figure 1). Ukraine's key source of wealth was the export of metals, metallurgy, food and chemicals, aided by large scale government investments in industry (as a result

of which the government increased its debt from 7% of GDP to 80%). Sutela (2009) argues that government steered reforms were not the major reason for the positive 2001-2008 growth performance. Rather, growth was caused by ‘transient factors’ which merely needed to be properly managed; and were, by oligarchs. Sutela (2012) argues, based on studies by Godornichenko and Peter (2008) and Brown et al. (2006):

“Many of Ukraine’s large-scale capitalists—the oligarchs—are former Soviet-era industrial managers who succeeded on a grand scale when industries were privatized. Their wealth was originally based on a traditional, simple formula: convert cheap energy and raw materials into metals and manufactured goods. Oligarchs, in fact, were probably the best available domestic owners in terms of productivity enhancement” (Sutela, 2012).

At the same time, market prices for metals and chemicals rose greatly and the price of Russian gas remained low. The overall quality of life increased as goods and services became affordable again.

Orange revolution

However, corruption still crippled Ukraine’s democracy and public institutions. The 2004 presidential elections garnered great public interest and a big showdown between domestic oligarchic-political forces. Pro-Western presidential candidate Yushchenko “portrayed the election as a choice between change (represented by himself) and a continuation of the status quo (Yanukovych). Opinion polls showed that around 70 percent of Ukrainians favored a change in course” (Kuzio, 2005, p.30). Although both candidates pandered to pro-European sentiments, Yushchenko came to embody a real break from the past. What followed was a fraudulent and dirty election, which involved the poisoning of Yushchenko. Outraged, Ukrainians flooded the streets demanding a true democracy for their nation: the Orange Revolution. As Kuzio (2005, p. 42) observed, “The Orange Revolution and Yushchenko’s victory brought together three revolutions in one: national, democratic and anti-corruption.” Polls and literature of the time reveal the optimism experienced by the majority after the democratic victory (Karantnycky, 2005; Kuzio, 2005; Jawosky, 2005).

Tragically, the new government soon became a lion’s pit of political rivalry between Yushchenko, Timoshenko, and their respective clans. The divided government was incapable of implementing most of the more than one hundred proposals for social and economic reform made by Blue Ribbon Commission for Ukraine in 2005 (Sutela, 2012). By 2010, the World Bank noted that after the Orange Revolution “laws and institutions did not change materially” (*ibid.*). Some democratic reforms were passed. Russian gas became much more expensive. The Ukrainian hope of flame of the Orange Revolution fizzled out, resulting in widespread political apathy (Åslund, 2009).

2.1.3 The ‘10s: Russo-Ukrainian and Euro-Ukrainian relations revised

Euromaidan

After the failure of the pro-Western Yushchenko government (whose powerbase was in central and western Ukraine, Figure 3), the political pendulum swung in favor of pro-Russian Yanukovich (Southern and Eastern Ukraine, Figure 3 and 4) who was elected President in 2010. The Yanukovich

Box 1: Ethnic and national identity in Ukraine

Ukraine is an ethnically complex nation (Figure 2). The West and Centre are predominantly ethnic Ukrainian and Ukrainian speaking; with Lviv perceived as its cultural capital of national identity. South and Eastern Ukraine is predominantly Russian speaking, with a significant ethnic Russian population. 'European' values and ambitions often conflict with the Eurasian/Russian identity (Kubicek, 2008). To illustrate, 80% of Western Ukrainians evaluate their attitude towards the EU and Poland as 'warm', and only 12% feel the same about Russia; only 18% of Eastern Ukrainians think warmly of the EU, 59% of Russia (IRI, 2014). Figures 2-5 reveal the overlap in political orientation with ethnic and linguistic background. The four regions produce their own political parties with agendas reflecting regional values and interests. As mentioned, national identity remains a weak source of unity.

Civil society, following the Western normative definition, is stronger in Western and Central Ukraine. Kuzio (2010) argues that "civic nationalism ... is rooted in Ukraine's path dependence that has made civil society stronger in western Ukraine where Austro-Hungarian rule permitted the emergence of a Ukrainian national identity that was stymied in eastern Ukraine by the Tsarist empire" (p. 285).

administration sought closer cooperation with Russia, importantly closing a gas price retail deal in return for an extension of the Black Sea Fleet agreement in Crimea. In spite of necessary industrial reforms and the raising of pensions, Yanukovich's approval rate in Western and Central Ukraine was very low (Sutela, 2012). Having been hit very hard by the economic crisis, Ukraine approached bankruptcy as government purchasing increased while foreign investment declined.

When President Yanukovich abruptly broke off negotiations for an EU free trade agreement in favor of joining the Russia-led CIS, the Euromaidan protests started in Kiev on November 21st 2013. What started as a demonstration for closer European integration, soon became a massive anti-Yanukovich revolution as the cornered administration attempted to violently suppress the demonstration. Lviv's Major, Andriy Sadovyi, was the first high profile political figure to officially renounce Yanukovich, which gave him great popularity in Western Ukraine. Many influential oligarchs withdrew support for Yanukovich's Part of Regions, supporting the Euromaidan movement to preserve national unity. Throughout Western and Central Ukraine, as well as in a few major cities in the East and South (Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk), protestors seized government buildings (Figure 5). In February 2014 violence in Kiev escalated, ultimately leading to President Yanukovich's flight from the capital to Russia. A temporary nationalist and pro-European government took over rule in Kiev, supported by the EU and the US, and dismissed as fascist rebels by Russia. In a high stake political-military move President Putin, Russia annexed Crimea supported by its mainly ethnic Russian population. At the time of writing, tensions on Ukraine's Eastern border and in Transnistria in the West remain high, while pro-Russia protests continue in Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Donetsk.

Figures 2-5 reveal the deep political polarization between Western/Central and Eastern/Southern Ukraine. As described in Box 1, the divergent political orientations overlap with ethnic and linguistic

differences. A big public opinion survey conducted in March 2014 (IRI, 2014) illustrates that it is incorrect to ascribe this great division to ethnicity and language alone; more importantly, Ukrainians in the four areas have divergent political, economic and cultural visions, values and priorities. In the West, only about 5% of citizens believes that the general and personal situation in Ukraine will worsen after Euromaidan; in the South and East 64% and 61% is pessimistic about the future after Euromaidan. Although even in the South (53%) and East (69%) a majority of citizens believe Ukraine should remain a unitary country, the challenge is real: Ukraine is a deeply divided nation without a clear presidential candidate that could bring unity in the Presidential election of May 25th 2014.




Figure 2: Ethno-linguistic map of Ukraine. Source: Wikimedia Commons



Figure 3: Ukraine 2004 election results. Source: M. Fisher, Washington Post, 2014




Figure 4: Ukraine 2010 president election results. Source: M. Fisher, Washington Post, 2014




Figure 5: Ukraine 2010 election outcome and Jan. 2014 protest status. Source: M. Fisher, Washington Post, 2014

2.2 A short history of environmentalism in Ukraine

2.2.1 Environmental deterioration in Soviet Ukraine

The rapid industrialisation in Soviet Ukraine brought with it air pollution, overexploitation of natural resources, pollution-intensive fuel use, inefficient energy usage and poor water management (Nazarov, 2001); many problems which last in Ukraine until now. As Carmin and Fagan (2010) argue, this was almost inevitable: “unregulated state control over an economy based on heavy industry and the absence of new technology and capital investment in production, combined with censorship and mistrust of the public, compounded the environmental impacts of industrialisation” (p.691). Until the effects of environmental degradation on the population became too severe near the Soviet collapse, the communist governments (including the Ukrainian) paid little attention to environmental issues:

“Until then, communist governments had not manifested enthusiasm for the solution of environmental problems, partly because of the lack of finance, but mainly for ideological reasons. No obstacles, including environmental considerations, should impede socialist society on its way towards the communist paradise. The dense smoke of factory chimneys was presented as evidence of socialist well-being, and when a certain level of environmental degradation was admitted, it was presented as the inevitable but temporary cost of progress” (Jehlicka, 2003, p. 112).

Environmentalism through environmental organization (the civic movements we know in the West) had no place in Soviet Ukraine. Rather, there were state affiliated conservation associations which focused mostly on outdoor activities, clean-ups and education; in some cases these associations were used as platforms for giving feedback and critique to the state (Carmin and Fagan, 2010). By the late 1980s, however, a distinction emerged between the semi-state conservation associations and the “more radical political-ecology activists who clearly recognized the agentic value of environmental pollution as a means of lambasting the socialist elite” (Carmin and Fagan, 2010, p. 694).

2.2.2 Chernobyl and the 90s: ‘Strategies for survival’

In 1986 the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, north of Kiev near the border, had a meltdown resulting in a huge nuclear fallout. The Chernobyl disaster led to the creation of anti-nuclear, “eco-nationalist” movements and organizations; these were activist platforms for anti-communist sentiments first, and for environmental concerns second (Dawson, 1996). As a result, after the USSR fell apart the eco-nationalist movements subsided, with few true environmental movements to take their place. Overall, because of ‘widespread post-Soviet anti-political stances and mass postmodern disillusionment with the sphere of political activity’, civic and political activism was limited after the collapse of the USSR; environmentalism included (Stupenko, 2006).

As described in the previous chapter, post-independence Ukraine in the 1990s suffered under severe economic crisis, institutional weaknesses and governmental mismanagement. The Ukrainian government certainly had ambitions to ‘Europeanize’ its environmental policy and joined international initiatives, for example the Europe for Environment process (Carmin and Fagan, 2010).

However, the state environmental authorities lacked institutional capacity and resources to pursue any agenda except for a ‘strategy for survival’ (Scherbak, 1992). With Ukraine opened up to the world, Western grants aimed at stimulating civil society went into the country; the vision was ‘build environmentally proactive and participatory liberal democracies’ (Carmin and Fagan, 2010). Often, however, these grants were misused by ‘façade’ environmental NGOs brought to life for the sheer purpose of applying for them (Zamuruieva, 2013).

2.2.3 The 00s: slow rise of environmental NGOs

Between 1995-2004, public participation in ecological movements (including environmental NGOs) remained very low without any upwards trend (survey, N=1,800, in Stupenko, 2006): 1.7% of respondents in 1995, 1.1% in 2000, and 1.3% in 2004 with little fluctuation in between. With Ukraine’s investment climate improving, newer and more visible Ukrainian and international environmental NGOs succeeded better at attracting funding than the remaining conservation associations because of their more westernized administrative and operational standards (Carmin and Fagan, 2010). The Orange Revolution (temporarily) in 2004 boosted civil society into a flurry of new initiatives and increased public participation in NGOs, including environmental ones (Kuzio, 2010).

2.2.4 The 10s: current state of environmentalism

As I will argue based on the case studies, environmentalism in Western and Central Ukraine is more developed than Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Part of the reason lies in the difference in strength of civil society in either region (Kuzio, 2010). Jehlicka (2003), writing about Eastern Europe in general, offers another explanation for the relative absence of environmentalism in the industrial east and south of Ukraine: “since the regions of old heavy industry are especially vulnerable during the current recession and the process of economic restructuring, environmentalism is losing its strong regional basis. People facing unemployment and crime have replaced environmental devastation as top concern with social and personal security” (p. 129). In other words, for the majority of the population other problems come first. Lastly, interviewees indicated that the perceived distance between citizen and government is larger, and that the government attitude towards environmental concerns is less flexible in the East and South (Shmid, interview).

In the context of Ukraine’s rising urban middle-class population (young, highly educated, and politically active unlike the communist generation) the key perceived environmental problems in 2014 is the quality of the urban environment (Danylyuk, interview). Another important recent development is the spread of corporate social responsibility practices in multinational and Ukrainian companies; environmental NGOs such as “Let’s do it Ukraine” pioneered engaging companies and government in local and national environmental actions since 2012 (Zamuruieva, 2013). Overall, environmental NGOs are professionalizing and expanding their activities in both size and scope despite continued administrative burdens and taxes disincentives (*ibid.*). In high-end stores and supermarket more ‘green’ alternatives to products are becoming available (Smale, observation). Own observation also indicates the recent rise of specialist organic cafes and cosmetics stores in Kiev. Ukraine’s already large organic food demand is growing rapidly and expected to grow in the future, as surveys indicate the majority of Ukrainians is willing to pay more for organic food (Consumers Union UA, 2009).

Chapter 3: Conceptual framework

In this chapter, I will outline the conceptual framework which is applied throughout the research. In sections 3.1 and 3.2 I introduce the two related schools of theory (Practice Theory and consumption-oriented Ecological Modernization Theory) which, combined, make up the conceptual framework presented in section 3.3. In section 3.4 I go deeper into the practice theory debate regarding routinized versus emerging practices; Transition Theory is included into the conceptual framework to gain more insight into the dynamics and governance of eco-practices.

3.1 Practices as unit of analysis

3.1.1 An overview of practice theory

Practices are the unit of analysis in this study. Since Bourdieu's *habitus* (1977) and Giddens' theory of structuration (1984), researchers have contributed to a growing body of literature centered around the idea that 'the social exists in practice, not discourse, interaction or mental qualities' (Reckwitz, 2002). Reckwitz's very general definition provides a good starting point:

“A practice (Praktik) is a routinized type of behavior which consists of several elements, interconnected to one another: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, things and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge. A practice... forms so to speak a 'block' whose existence necessarily depends on the existence and specific interconnectedness of these elements” (p. 249-250).

Central to practice theory is the idea that practices *exist*: persistent but dynamic, lasting, independent of the actions of a single individuals, but dependent on the actions, thoughts and emotions of individuals and the things which support it. To some extent, practices have their own dynamics and 'lead a life of their own'. As Warde (2005) notes, 'practices have a trajectory or path of development, a history'. Practices require “tools” and regard 'things' also from a pragmatic point of view, not just semiotic (Reckwitz, 2002). Indeed, as Shove et al. (2007) argues, in practice theory “things” matter: they carry meaning and steer agency. Practices are necessarily tied to technological infrastructures which enables them; think of the kitchen and the practice of cooking. The meaning and uses of things are fluid and changeable by people, naturally, but 'material configuration leads to certain forms of socially valued practice and constrains others' (Shove, 2007). In other words, objects play a key role in shaping practices; not just people.

At the same time, practices must always be reproduced by actors (individuals) who perform them; therefore we can conceive of actors to be *carriers* of practices. Practices compete for the attention of practitioners, since practices often overlap and actors have limited time. Practices must always be performed by actors in a particular situation or place. But practices are not just meaningless routinized acts by individuals; they carry meaning and function. Attached to practices is the complete complex of meaning-making mentioned by Reckwitz (2002, p. 247) in his definition: background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge”. And the meanings and functions of practices are dynamic, bound in time and space, ever changing

and different from culture to culture. All this combined, we can view “social life as a series of recursive practices reproduced by knowledgeable and capable agents who are drawing upon sets of virtual rules and resources which are connected to situated social practices” (Spaargaren, 2011, p. 815).

But how can we characterize this ‘existence’ of practices, somehow different than just regular observable behavior? Røpke (2009, 2491) writes that “in the continual flow of activities it is possible to identify clusters or blocks of activities where coordination and interdependence make it meaningful for practitioners to conceive of them as entities”. It is useful to shed some more light on how we should conceive of practices being ‘enacted entities’. Following Schatzki (2002), we can distinguish two notions of practice to make the distinction between entity and enactment clear: *practice as performance*, and *practice as entity*.

Viewing practice as a *performance*, then practices are routinized, regular and skillful bodily activities. The (actions of the) body is then placed central. As Reckwitz (2002) writes, “the body is thus not a mere ‘instrument’ which ‘the agent’ must ‘use’ in order to ‘act’, but the routinized actions are themselves bodily performances (which does not mean that a practice consists only of these movements)”. These bodily actions include mental or emotional activities. Practices are always a mix-up of both, of bodily performances and mental activities. As Fonte (2013) notes, the ‘notion of practice presents action as an ongoing embodied and situated social process’. An example from Reckwitz (2002, 251-252) illustrates how the *practices as performances* perspective integrates action and meaning within the practice of playing football:

“Playing football consists of a routinized set of bodily performances. Yet, within the practice these bodily performances are necessarily connected with certain know-how, particular ways of interpretation (of the other players’ behavior, for example), certain aims (most of all, of course, to win the game) and emotional levels (a particular tension) which the agents, as carriers of the practice, make use of, and which are routinized as well. Without these mental and bodily activities, we could not imagine a practice of ‘playing football.’”(pp. 251-252)

If we limit ourselves to perceiving practices as performances, we underemphasize the material aspect and stability of practices. *Practice as entity* is “a set of bodily-mental activities held together by material, meaning and competence” (Røpke, 2009, p. 2492). Practices are a configuration of three elements: meaning, material and competence (Shove et al., 2012). The element *meaning* is about making sense of activities: the beliefs, understandings and emotions related to the activities. The element *material* ‘includes the objects, equipment, and bodies (or body parts) involved in performing the practice’(Røpke, 2009). The third element, *competence*, ‘covers the skills and the knowledge needed to carry out the practice, learned through experience and training, embodied in the practitioner’(*ibid.*). The linkages between these three elements “are provided by the practitioners, who integrate them in their performance of the practices” (Røpke, 2009, p. 2493).

Combining both perspectives, as Røpke (2009, p. 2491) writes, we can then view individuals as ‘carriers’ of practices: “Individuals face practices-as-entities as these are formed historically as a collective achievement; and through their own practices-as-performance, individuals reproduce and transform the entities over time. Individuals thus act as ‘carriers’ of practices.” Regarding the variety of practices, it is useful to note Schatzki’s distinction between “dispersed” practices (one type of action: describing, imagining, explaining) and “integrative” practices (cooking, teaching, mobility). The latter is more complex and situated than the former, but are often interconnected, as Warde (2005, p. 135) summarizes: “[integrative practices] include, sometimes in specialized forms, dispersed practices, which are part of the components of saying and doing which allow the understanding of, say, cooking practice, along with the ability to follow the rules governing the practice and its particular ‘teleoaffective structure’.

Reckwitz (2002) regards practice theory more of an ‘approach’, a ‘heuristic device’ or sensitizing ‘framework’ for empirical research, than a new grand social theory. By adopting the general ideas and vocabulary of practice theory, we are able to decentre ‘mind, text and conversations’, and bring back in ‘bodily movements, things, practical knowledge and routine’. Celebrated authors such as Bourdieu, Giddens, Latour, Foucault, Garfinkel, Schatzki, and Taylor, have successfully elaborated and wielded the practice approach in different ways with the goal of understanding better the consistency of human behavior. However, interesting is that the ‘practice-way-of-thinking’ need not be only an analytical exercise: it can also inspire radically different and comprehensive new philosophies, such as Sloterdijk’s (1987) kinetic ontology along the lines of Heidegger.

Still, one comprehensive and widely accepted underlying practices philosophy does not seem to exist. Current practice theorists work on sketching out a more comprehensive philosophy of practice, which builds on the notion of flat ontology (e.g. Schaefer and Schatzki, forthcoming). Put very briefly, flat ontology dismisses the typical sociological approach of isolating and investigating different scales of social reality (from macro- to micro-level, e.g. from capitalism to the social rules of conversation); rather, all the ‘layers’ of the social exist only as practices performed by (networks of) actors (Collinge, 2006; Schatzki, 2002).

The practice theory approach lends itself to the study of everyday practices, such as grocery shopping, commuting, waste separation, or showering (Shove, 2007). In the study of practices, researchers take up the role of ‘investigator’ as they attempt to develop a deep understanding of a specific (complex of) practice(s). For example, Shove et al. (2007) used a mix of qualitative methods (including interviews and (participant) observation) to explore in depth how material culture and practices are interdependent in case studies of kitchen renewal, DIY and digital photography.

To summarize this overview of practice theory, I quote Nicolini’s (2012) seminal work: “A practice-based view of social and human phenomena is distinctive in that it:

- Emphasizes that behind all apparently durable features of our world – from queues to formal organizations – there is some type of productive and reproductive work. In so doing it

transforms the way in which we conceive of social order and conceptualize the apparent stability of the social world.

- Forces us to rethink the role of agents and individuals; e.g. managers, the managed, etc.
- Foregrounds the importance of the body and objects in social affairs.
- Sheds new light on the nature of knowledge and discourse.
- Reaffirms the centrality of interests and power in everything we do” (p. 6).

Nicolini argues that within the school of practice theory there are two main tenets: a weak program and a strong program (pp. 12-14). The weak program to practice involves an “a-theoretical’ cataloguing of what practitioners do, sticking to describing practices and assuming (misleadingly) that the practices are self-explanatory”. In this thesis, I adopt the strong program, which goes a lot further than a-theoretical description of practices. The strong program strives to *explain* social phenomena on the basis of practices; practices are studied analytically, not merely descriptively – after all, argues Nicolini (p.14), “describing what people do is a theory-laden operation”. When we view practices as meaning-making, identity-building and order-producing activities, simple descriptions and lists of practices will not do; rather, uncovering these deeper processes requires in depth research in which one ‘zooms in’ and ‘zooms out’ of the studied practice. In this thesis I make an attempt to follow the strong program of practice theory as much as possible, despite the limited time and resources.

The practices approach has been an important inspiration in the study of consumption specifically; since this thesis focuses on consumption practice, the next subsection will briefly discuss some highlights in the consumption practices literature. With the theoretical overview of the practices approach in mind, we will be better able to understand the conceptual models used to analyze consumption practices. For a more comprehensive overview of the history of, and the different schools of and debates surrounding practice theory, I refer to the works of Reckwitz (2002), Schatzki (1996; 2002), Spaargaren (2011) and Nicolini (2012).

3.1.2 Consumption as part of practices

Practice theory is highly relevant to the study of consumption. After all, as Warde (2005, p. 137) notes, “most practices, and probably all integrative practices, require and entail consumption”. In other cases, consumption can be analyzed as a practice in itself (e.g. food consumption: Halkier, 2010). The study of consumption should not be the privilege of economics, since consumption should not be reduced to demand and terms of exchange alone. The symbolic significance of consumption and the use of the items should be taken into account as well, as an integral part of daily life (Harvey et al., 2001).

In this thesis, I adopt Warde’s (2005) practice theory based definition of consumption: ‘Consumption is a process whereby agents engage in appropriation and appreciation¹, whether for

¹ Appreciation meaning ‘a full understanding of a situation’, not ‘recognition of the good qualities of something’. To my understanding, appreciation refers here to agents applying their understanding of the meanings and competences attached to goods and services to evaluate their ‘utilitarian, expressive or contemplative purposes’.

utilitarian, expressive or contemplative purposes, of goods, services, performances, information or ambience, whether purchased or not, over which the agent has some degree of discretion’.

I adopt this definition for two reasons. Firstly, in this way we can view consumption itself not as practices, but rather as *a moment* in almost every practice (Warde, 2005, p. 137). This is useful because this allows for more flexibility in our understanding of ‘consumption’ as “using up” or “buying” goods; acquired goods are ‘appropriated’ according to the conventions and standards of practices instead of just consumed in the utilitarian sense. Broadening the conceptual framework of consumption practices in this way incorporates what is more important in the sociological study of consumption: in the case of this thesis, it is not about the limited act of buying a bicycle, but rather it is about the way in which the purchased bicycle is connected to the purchaser’s broader daily life practices, lifestyle and surroundings. Secondly, because of Warde’s emphasis on the process of appropriation and appreciations, his definition allows us to make the step from consumption - essentially an individual activity - to consumption practices, which are socially embedded and situated. Basically, engagement in practices precedes individual wants. As Warde (*ibid.*) argues, “it is the fact of engagement in the practice, rather than any personal decision about a course of conduct, that explains the nature and process of consumption.” To illustrate using Warde’s example (p. 138), “the paraphernalia of the hot rod enthusiast – modified vehicles, manuals and magazines, memorabilia, ‘records of auto-racing sounds’, etc. – are more directly the consequence of engagement in the practice of a particular motor sport than they are of individual taste or choice”.

This subchapter is intended to avoid confusion over the breadth with which I will analyze the emerging environmentally friendly consumption practices in Ukraine; this thesis is not a market research aimed at uncovering motivations and dynamics of consumer behavior. Rather, to summarize, in this thesis I investigate the process of appropriation and appreciation which connect consumption to the consumer’s broader daily life practices, lifestyle and surroundings.

3.1.3 Why the practice approach?

Why do I adopt this practice-based philosophy and sociology in this thesis? What are the advantages? I will briefly mention the key benefits of the approach as they are produced in literature. Then I will justify the choice for practice theory as conceptual framework.

Practice theory transcends the dichotomies between a discursive/structural perspective and that of the empowered/disempowered consumer (Shove, 2012). Instead, the practice perspective views collective action as ‘both performative and conditioned, focusing on both human subjects and non-human objects and the way they interrelate in the practices’. In other words, practices are always *performed* by actors (which always involves a process of appropriation, appreciation, change, etc.), but also *conditioned* by the technological, social, psychological, historical etc. infrastructure (which enables some and disables other practices). Such a position reminds of Giddens’ theory of structuration, which also breaks the agency/structure dichotomy by ‘having them meet in the middle’ – at the level of practices. In this way, practice theory is neither individualist nor holist (Schatzki, 2002): “they portray social organization as something other than individuals making contracts, yet are not dependent on a holistic notion of culture or societal totality” (Warde, 2005, p. 136). The practice

approach helps us steer clear of a narrow economical/rational agency perspective, which is unacceptably blind to structural factors (both technical and social). After all, notes Røpke (2009), practices ‘do not float free of technological, institutional and infrastructural contexts’. At the same time, practice theory leaves conceptual and analytical room for the purposeful and meaningful actions of individuals and the role which agency plays in the shaping of our social world; room which is unfortunately suffocated in the more dogmatic structuralist traditions. Spaargaren (2011) suggests the use of practices as key methodological units ‘as a way to avoid the pitfalls of the individualist and systemic paradigms that dominated the field of sustainable consumption studies’. Furthermore, in switching attention from individual attitudes and behavior to the interconnections among the different elements of a practice, as well as among the intersections of different practices, practice theory provides stronger intellectual grounds for policy interventions.

The practices perspective is therefore appropriate to study emerging environmentally friendly consumption practices in Ukraine: it helps us move beyond narrow consumer/market research to uncover the meaning-making, identity-forming and order-producing processes involved. At the same time, the practice approach “grounds us” in the real experiences, practices and meanings of Ukrainians living their lives; it prevents the researcher from generalizing and totalizing his or her findings, from being overly theoretical and abstract.

3.2 Ecological modernization of consumption

In the above I have outlined and justified this thesis’ practices approach to consumption. But how can we conceptualize (consumption) practices in their relation to environmental protection and sustainability? In the following section I will introduce the concepts and theories employed in this thesis to that effect.

3.2.1 Consumption-oriented Ecological Modernization Theory

To link consumption practices to environmental sustainability, this thesis builds on consumption-oriented Ecological Modernization Theory (EMT). Since the ‘consumerist turn’ in EMT, EM scholars have sought ways to theorize and analyze environmental reform with a contextual approach, being aware of the shortcomings of purely individualistic and systemic approaches. Three strands of contextual studies of sustainable consumption can be distinguished: an *infrastructural school*, focusing on the networks that provide households with utilities and public services; *political consumerism*, which addresses the greening of global production-consumption chains through politically motivated purchasing practices of consumers; and a *domestic technologies and everyday practices* perspective, emphasizing the interdependency between the norms governing social practices and technologies for different ‘practice areas’ (Spaargaren and Cohen, 2009). Aspects of all three, but most importantly the second and third variant, are applied in this research.

Inspired by Giddens’ structuration theory (the recursively shaping of human activity and social structures at the same time), Spaargaren and Van Vliet (2000) developed a conceptual framework (Figure 6) that effectively marries the three strands of contextual studies into one approach for studying consumption practices.




Figure 6: Conceptual framework of social practice in relation to human actors and social structures. From: Spaargaren and Van Vliet (2000)

Within this framework, in line with practice theory, social practices themselves become the unit of analysis. Social practices, within different domains such as food, travel, clothing, etc., are enacted, structured and reproduced simultaneously by human actors and social structures. Individuals live certain lifestyles, willfully participating in different ‘bundles’ of social practices (agency). To uncover the motivations and experiences of individuals as practitioners requires analysis of strategic action – not just descriptions of behavior, but the systematic uncovering of underlying meaning. However, the social structure places boundaries (through norms, rules, technology, etc.) on the available social practices, enabling and facilitating some, while hindering others. These systems of provision, which are both technical and social, allow social practices to become crystallized in a way which enables human actors to engage in them. To account for the social structural side, the researcher ‘zooms out’ of the studied practice – as Nicolini describes to – to analyze the institutional provisions and limitations. Spaargaren and Van Vliet’s (2000) framework captures the spirit of practice theory, and is applied fruitfully to the study of (more and less) sustainable consumption practices. To illustrate, “within this perspective food consumption may be perceived as a situated integrative practice, in which social agency is both enabled to act in accordance with subjective ends and also institutionally conditioned by the configuration of the economic and social structures (Fonte, 2013, p. 231).”

Let us examine one strand of consumption-oriented EMT a little more closely: *political consumerism*. Spaargaren and Oosterveer (2010) made a valuable contribution to this topic by conceptualizing three ideal-type forms in which citizens and consumers, often a double role, engage with environmental change in their daily life. Figure 7 emphasizes that the three forms overlap and merge into the ideal-type ‘citizen-consumer’. The citizen-consumer at the same time engages in three analytically separable affairs: ecological citizenship, which refers to the (good) citizen concerned with the environment in a political and civic way; political consumerism, which “refers to power relations in market contexts in particular” and the way in which consumers reflect on that; and lifestyle politics, which are “primarily about civil society actors and about dynamics of change, which go beyond states and markets” – most importantly moral issues (Spaargaren and Oosterveer, 2010).

In real life, people are committed and engaged with global environmental change in these three roles to various degrees; some individuals, for example, commit themselves to voting “green” in elections, but do not let their political motivations influence their consumption behavior in a significant way. To illustrate the point in relation to the thesis topic, a Ukrainian citizen-consumer may start to cycle as a lifestyle decision based on (moralized) health benefits, rather than motivated by a citizen-like duty to relieve pressure on the urban environment by opting out of motorized transport.




Figure 7: The three ideal-type forms of engagement of Citizen-Consumers (CCs) with respect to (environmental) change in reflexive modernity. From: Spaargaren and Oosterveer (2010)

Spaargaren and Oosterveer’s conceptualization of the citizen-consumer is a particularly useful framework for the study of emerging environmentally friendly consumption practices in Ukraine, as will become evident later.

3.2.2. What is Sustainable Consumption?

Above I elaborated a conceptual framework for the analysis of (consumption) practices with regards to sustainability, as it occurs in literature. But what is sustainable consumption, i.e. how can we analytically distinguish sustainable from un-sustainable consumption?

Seyfang (2009) constructed a theoretical framework of sustainable consumption, based on five dimensions: localization, reducing the ecological footprint, community building, collective action and building new infrastructures of provisioning (Table 1).

Table 1: Five dimensions of sustainable consumption (Seyfang, 2009; using Fonte's (2013) interpretation).

Dimension	Explanation	Examples
Localization	Progressing towards more self-reliant local economies	Buying local products, local sourcing in supply chains
Reducing ecological footprint	Shifting consumption to reduce its social and environmental impact, cutting resource use, choosing less carbon-intensive goods and services	Driving fuel-efficient cars, opting out of motorized transport in favor of bicycles and trains
Community building	Growing networks of support and social capital, building solidarity with other members of the group, encouraging participation and sharing of experiences and ideas, valuing the free exchange of work and skills as a means of fostering inclusive communities	Community currencies, community gardening
Collective action	Community-based decision-making and initiatives, changing the wider social context and institutionalizing new norms	Local energy citizen-collectives who buy a windmill
Building new infrastructures of provisioning	Establishing new forms of exchange between people and communities, on the basis of new values of wealth, work, progress, and ecological citizenship	Organic food production and consumption networks

Table 1 provides some framework for imagining what eco-practices, eco-lifestyles and eco-systems of provision may look like or have in common, although I believe that the list is not exhaustive. Consumption can be considered 'sustainable' if it contributes significantly or consists of one or more the dimensions. If we translate Seyfang's framework into the language of practices, we can read the five dimensions as the elements of a new – sustainable – practice. Paraphrasing Fonte (2014), 'the transition to an ecologically modernized consumption systems on the grounds of environmental and social justice may then be seen as a challenge to dominant unsustainable practices and the foreshadowing of a new practices, based on new norms and understandings, a new material infrastructure and a new agency.' Seyfang's framework highlights how different elements must come together to sustain a lasting transition towards sustainable consumption practices, a lesson learned also in practice theory research (e.g. Shove, 2010 and Fonte, 2014).

3.3 Routine vs. emerging practices: Transition Theory

At first glance, the use of practice theory for studying social change might be dubious; after all the focus is on routinized behavior. However, as Fonte (2013, p. 232) notes, "while many studies have

been designed to illustrate how specific practices are organized, questions about the emergence, transformation, stabilization and decline of practices in different cultural contexts have also been investigated”. For example, Shove et al. (2007) researched digital photography to examine the dynamic between new products and already established practices. How do some forms of practice endure and others disappear, if practice is just a repetition of an established social order? In that case study, Shove et al. interviewed hobby photographers to investigate the disruptive, destructive and transformative forces of the shift from analogue to digital. In this case, the practice changed due to technology – but how can we conceptualize changing practices more comprehensively? Building on Giddens (1984) and Shove (2012), Fonte (2013, p. 232) usefully conceptualizes the relation between stability and change through the dialectical relation between reflexivity and routine:

“A new practice is institutionalized when reflexivity (‘the monitored character of the ongoing flow of social life’, Giddens, 1984, p. 3) is expressed as new routines, when procedures become embodied, physical activities, i.e. practical knowledge, not just discursive knowledge (Giddens, 1984), with the constitutive elements consistently integrated through repeated performances (Shove et al., 2012).”

The reflexivity/routine-approach takes us a step in the right direction of ‘opening up’ practice theory to the potential of studying emerging practices. The idea of reflexive behavior in (consumption) practices ties in well with the notion of the Citizen-Consumer in reflexive modernity discussed above. However, in order to understand more deeply the process of institutionalization of a new practice beyond reflexive behavior I draw on *transition theory*.

Within transition theory, *niches* are conceptualized as relatively unstructured, unstable and novel configurations of (technological) innovations and networks of actors that support them (Geels and Schot, 2010). *Regimes* are more structured, representing the dominant socio-technical systems compiled of certain ‘rules’ that stabilize them (through for example technical standards, cognitive routines, and interest networks). The most structured level in transition theory is the *landscape*: socio-technical landscapes form a broad exogenous environment that is beyond the direct influence of regime and niche actors. Extending the niche metaphor to practices, I apply transition theory on the one hand to assess the contingency and vulnerability of eco-practices, and on the other hand to capture and determine the potential of these ‘niche’ ecological practices to transform the dominant (unsustainable) regimes. Transition theory conceptualizes different levels of scale (niche, regime, landscape), and therefore does not have a flat ontology like practice theory. However, I believe we can fruitfully draw on concepts from transition theory to analyze social change. At the same time, as Shove and Walker (2010) observe, the literature on transition management, or the governance of transitions toward sustainability, draws upon a narrow slice of what is in fact a much wider debate about social change, focusing on policy and corporate actors. It is equally important to understand the central role that practitioners themselves play in generating, sustaining and overthrowing practices.

3.4 Synthesizing the framework: Sustainable consumption practices

In Figure 8 I synthesize the theoretical approaches laid out above into a comprehensive conceptual framework for this thesis. I adapted Figure 6 in a number of ways to help understand *emerging* eco-

practices in Ukraine (organic food consumption and cycling as case study). I apply the practices model to conceptualize environmental reform of consumption as the emancipation or institutionalization of ecological rationality in lifestyles, practices and systems of provision. In those cases I speak of ‘eco-lifestyles’, ‘eco-practices’, and ‘eco-systems of provision’. Seyfang’s five dimensions of sustainable consumption (Table 1) are not included in Figure 8, but they provide some framework for conceptualizing what eco-practices, eco-lifestyles and eco-systems of provision *could* look like or have in common; ‘what makes eco, eco’. The individual engages in eco-practices as a citizen and a consumer at the same time, although the one role may be more relevant than the other depending




Figure 8: Synthesized conceptual framework, based on Spaargaren and Van Vliet (2000) and Spaargaren and Oosterveer (2010).

on the case. The citizen-consumer adopts the roles of ecological citizen, political consumer and lifestyle politician to different degrees. These types of engagement with environmental change require reflexivity, i.e. monitoring and reflecting on own behavior and lifestyle from an environmental perspective. A new practice is institutionalized when reflexivity – in different citizen-consumer roles - is expressed as new routines. For example, an individual may reflect on and adjust their meat-consuming practice as an ecological citizen. Of course, new practices emerge not only due to citizen-consumer reflexivity of lifestyle. The social and technological infrastructure side makes up the ‘virtual rules and resources which enable or disable practice’. For simplicity’s sake, no element of change is included on this side of the framework, although transition theory offers many insights into the dynamics of social structural/socio-economic change.

Chapter 4: Methodology

4.1 Study design

This research makes use of a *multi-case study design*, employing a *mix of qualitative methods* following the ethnographic tradition. The goal, in this study and typically in ethnography, is to understand an emerging phenomenon in depth and comprehensively; therefore, no methods are excluded a priori (Hammersly and Atkinson, 2007). The focus is on uncovering shared meanings behind the actions, events and contexts of a community in a specific area. Such in depth understanding requires an insider's perspective, making participant observation essential (*idem.*). The researcher is the primary tool for gathering data as 'investigator', who must rigorously mix research methods and data collection techniques to avoid bias and gather accurate data (LeCompte and Schensul, 2010).

In the study of practices, researchers take up this role of 'investigator' as they attempt to develop a deep understanding of the materials, competences and meanings involved in a specific (complex of) practice(s). For example, Shove et al. (2007) used a mix of qualitative methods (including interviews and (participant) observation) to explore in depth how material culture and practices are interdependent in case studies of kitchen renewal, DIY and digital photography. In a study of the emergence of Nordic walking, Shove and Pantzar (2005) conducted interviews with key promoters (distributors, producers, advocates, professionals) of the practice as well as regular practitioners, participated in a Nordic walking course, and reviewed websites and brochures. Fonte (2013) studied social food practices (Solidarity Purchasing Groups) in Italy through in-depth interviews, questionnaires, participant observation, as well as brochures, internal documentation and website information.

This empirical research consists of two exploratory case studies: organic food consumption in Kiev, and cycling in Lviv. The case studies are 'exploratory', because the emergence of eco-practices in Ukraine is a very recent and to my knowledge unstudied phenomenon (and my resources to go beyond 'exploring' are limited); two, because my goal is to understand a multifaceted –although fundamentally local- societal phenomenon, not a particular practice performed by one group of people. I gathered descriptive information through a mix of qualitative methods, including: semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and document/brochure and website research. As the field work went along, I built up a system of classification, in order to interpret the data systematically and build on my hypotheses. Although the search for eco-practices was theory-driven and the research questions were developed before field research, data was gathered in a flexible manner, open to revision during fieldwork.

There are two key weaknesses of the chosen methodology: the duration of the field work and the amount of case studies. Firstly, I was limited to three weeks of data gathering in two phases, whereas ethnography typically requires multi-phase research over an extended period of time (Hammersly and Atkinson, 2007). I have attempted to make up for this weakness as much as possible by triangulating my data and interpretations with secondary data (including market research, scientific articles, websites, etc.), zooming in on the practice and zooming out again. Secondly, two case studies in two

cities is little to go by if I want to generalize my findings about an emerging national phenomenon. Therefore, I cross-studied both eco-practices in the other respective city as well; that is, cycling in Kiev and organic food consumption in Lviv. Additionally, in interviews I asked questions about other Ukrainian cities and the country as a whole.

4.2 Case study selection

Delineating practices is a difficult task for empirical studies, as the philosophical basis for practice theory is abstract (Røpke, 2009). Therefore, “the point of departure must be phenomenological in the sense that defining something as a practice must make sense to people” (*ibid*, p.2494). Following that logic, I built on own observations, internet research, some literature study and conversations with Ukrainians to explore practices that could qualify as ‘emerging ecologically modernized consumption practice’. In other words, I made an attempt to select eco-practices based on the local discourses and definitions of sustainability or ecological protection.

Initially, I wanted to conduct research in three major Ukrainian cities: a Western Ukrainian city, the capital, and an Eastern Ukrainian city, in order to capture some of Ukraine’s social, economic, cultural and ethnic diversity. Lviv was chosen for its reputation as cultural capital of Ukrainian nationalist identity and its pro-European population (see Chapter 2); Kiev as Ukraine’s wealthy and trendy capital and for its (for Ukraine) large and upper middle-class; however, no Eastern European city was investigated due to the unrest of (and after) the Euromaidan protests. The assumption underlying the choice for major Ukrainian cities, is that these cities support broad middle-class populations who would sooner engage in sustainable consumption practices (which are typically more expensive alternatives to the norm). Ultimately, as case studies I selected *cycling in Lviv, and organic food consumption in Kiev*.

4.2.1 Cycling in Lviv

Applying the conceptual framework, cycling can be viewed as an ‘ecologically modernized transport consumption practice’. Bicycle mobility constitutes a sustainable alternative to motorized transport; cycling can decrease traffic congestion, causes no emissions, is healthy, and requires less parking space, and has other advantages which benefit urban areas in particular. As will be reported in detail in Chapter 5, Lviv has in recent years taken the lead in cycling to become the unofficial ‘cycling capital’ of Ukraine. By investigating the emergence of cycling as eco-practice in Lviv, we can develop our understanding of how this sustainable mobility practice evolved over time – reproduced, governed, stimulated and obstructed - to its current state, in the western Ukrainian context.

4.2.2 Organic food consumption in Kiev

Organic food consumption, although not without controversies (which I cannot go in to here), can be argued to be an ‘ecologically modernized food consumption practice’. Organic food will be considered the ‘sustainable alternative’, because it is regarded the healthy choice and subject to labeling which demands higher standards of environmental protection and/or social justice. As described in Chapter 2.2.4, organic food is booming in Ukraine, and in Kiev in particular. In high-end stores and supermarket more ‘green’ alternatives to products are becoming available (own observation). Own observation also indicates the recent rise of specialist organic cafes and cosmetics

stores in Kiev. Ukraine's already large organic food demand is growing rapidly and expected to grow in the future, as surveys indicate the majority of Ukrainians is willing to pay more for organic food (Consumers Union UA, 2009). By researching the emergence of organic food consumption as eco-practice in Kiev, I want to develop our understanding of how (consumption) lifestyles, market dynamics and other factors interacted within the 'evolution path' of this sustainable consumption practice, in Ukraine's capital.

4.3 Data collection

To investigate cycling as emerging eco-practice in Lviv, I conducted research (see Annex 1 and 2) over the course of six days on location (Figure 9) through:

- 3 in-depth interviews with key figures in Lviv's cycling scene, after internet research and snowballing;
 - Spent many informal and informative hours with two of them (± 2 full days total);
- Informal conversations with 5 cyclists;
- (Participant) observation (30 km cycling trip throughout Lviv);
- 5 official documents and reports with relevant background information;
- ± 10 websites with relevant background information;
- 1 municipality cycling brochure.

To investigate organic food consumption as eco-practice in Kiev, I conducted research (see Annex 1 and 2) over the course of 8 days on location (see Figure 9) through:

- 5 in-depth interviews with key figures involved in organic food and other products, after internet research and snowballing;
- Informal conversations with 5 organic food consumers;
- (Participant) observation in a number of organic product stores, cafés, restaurants and supermarkets with organic offer;
- 5 brochures and reports with relevant background information and 3 websites.




Figure 9: Map of Ukraine (12-04-2014), indicating Lviv (Lemberg) in western Ukraine and Kiev in central Ukraine.

Chapter 5: Case studies in Kyiv and Lviv: emerging sustainable consumption practices

5.1 Evolution of Cycling as eco-practice in Lviv

As mentioned, cycling can be viewed as an ‘ecologically modernized consumption practice’. Bicycle mobility constitutes a sustainable alternative to motorized transport; cycling can decrease traffic congestion, causes no emissions, is healthy, and requires less parking space, and has other advantages which benefit urban areas in particular.

Lviv is considered the cycling capital of Ukraine. In the last few years, Lviv has jumped ahead of the rest of Ukraine to establish cycling as an attractive alternative to private and public motorized transport. But how has cycling as a practice in Lviv evolved over time? This chapter reports the findings of case study 1. In order to apply the practices approach properly – the practice is the unit of analysis - I will describe the emergence of cycling as eco-practice in Lviv by using the heuristic of an evolutionary process. I discuss cycling in chronological order, taking several detailed ‘snapshots’ of the practice at key times in its development. Three in depth interviews are the main sources for this chapter and are referred to as (Interview O. Shmid), (Interview S. Dyak) and (Interview D. Danylyuk); see Annex 1.

Prior to 2009/2010 cycling enjoyed little popularity in Lviv, as anywhere in Ukraine except for the small, poor, rural villages. Lviv is a very compact city and in principle very suitable for alternative mobility. However, the systems of provision for cycling - both the technical and social infrastructure - were not ecologically modernized.



Figure 10: The heart of Lviv's historical centre, the Market Square. The cobblestones and tram tracks pose a challenge to cyclists. This photo is taken after cars were banned from the square to increase the touristic value of the area.

Regarding technical infrastructure, no specialized infrastructure or facilities for cycling existed. The city center's cobblestones make cycling uncomfortable in that area of the city where traffic speed and street layout would otherwise make cycling more attractive. The tram tracks pose a danger to cyclists who can get their wheels stuck and fall. Back then, cars were still allowed in all of Lviv's old center.

Bicycle parking facilities were nonexistent. Considering that a large part of Lviv's population lives in Soviet-style apartment flats, bicycle storage at home is a problem since storage space is limited. The Soviet city planners designed the residential areas around Lviv's historical center to cater towards automobilist in every way; along the edge of the city there are long desolate fields of garages



Figure 11. Soviet-style garages for cars (in Lviv they are located along the edge of the city).

intended for cars. This edge-of-city storage system favors car use. Storing a bicycle there takes away one of the attractive aspects of bicycle mobility – being able to park close right at your home. Car ownership has risen greatly since 1990, although it is still at a modest 25% (Interview O. Shmid). As the garages are becoming increasingly insufficient in amount and convenience, people park their car next to their apartment more and more. This is convenient (and free) for automobilists, but clutters the streets and obstructs pedestrians and cyclists, and it reduces the relative parking benefit of bicycle. Typically, there is no underground or ground floor cycling bicycle storage as is the case in most apartment flats in for example the Netherlands or Sweden. Specialized cycling paths did not exist, although experienced cyclists could move about the city with relative safety regardless (Interview O. Shmid). Public transport was in a state of disrepair and becoming less popular in favor of individual automobility. After the privatization of a large share of the *marshrutkas* (small line busses) in the 90s, quality and reliability of public transport decreased further (Interview D. Danylyuk).

Aside from the technical infrastructure, the 'social' infrastructure was also lacking. As the in 2010 appointed cycling advisor Shmid assesses, "the main and the biggest barrier of cycling development are the stereotypes concerning cycling". Cycling was associated with recreation. A fair amount of Lvivians own a bike (up to 20%, Interview D. Danylyuk), but only 1% of all trips in the city is made by bicycle (City of Lviv, 2014). One might cycle in good weather in the surrounding hills, or cycle as a sport in the weekend. The Lviv Bicycle Club hosted cycling competitions already back then. People viewed, and many still view cycling as dangerous, hard work, cumbersome (hard to park), expensive, and unattractive (an opinion shared even by many students in 2014 still). Owning an expensive car was (and is) associated with success and remains a status symbol (Interview S. Dyak). Cycling was not an issue on the political agenda and there was no organized pro-cycling activism.

Snapshot 2007: Cycling undeveloped

Overall, Lviv's infrastructure and urban mobility differed little from other major Ukrainian cities. No dedicated cycling infrastructure or facilities were available and government has no resources to make changes. Many of the foundations to enable cycling as practice existed: a compact, flat city with touristic value; a young and educated population; a booming IT industry; a relatively vibrant civil society; a smaller perceived distance between public and City Hall and an accountable and democratic government; a progressive Mayor; and geographical and cultural proximity to Europe.

However, there was no organized cycling activism or pro-cycling ambition in the City Hall. People mostly cycled for recreational purposes, perceiving dangerous, hard work, cumbersome, expensive, and unattractive and generally being unaware of the benefits.

The situation regarding cycling in Lviv I have described so far can be considered typical of many major Ukrainian cities which are coping with their communist legacy (see also Background). But 2009 proved to be a tipping point in the development of cycling in Lviv. In 2007 Ukraine and Poland won the UEFA Euro 2012 football cup bid, and the host cities were confirmed and accepted by UEFA in 2009 – Lviv being one of them. To prepare the city for the event and to grab the opportunity to boost the tourism industry and attract investors and companies, the Lviv City Council made plans to improve the urban infrastructure.

As S. Dyak puts it, '2009 and 2010 were an exciting time for the development of cycling in Lviv, as EURO 2012 offered a 'policy window' for improving the city's infrastructure and to lobby for cyclists' interests'. Dyak co-founded the Lviv Cycling Association with fellow students with the goal of promoting cycling in the city. Their methods were to popularize cycling through activism, educating both the public and policy-makers, and by engaging in an open NGO-government dialogue in the media. Danylyuk, Dyak and Shmid all perceive the distance between public and local authority smaller than in other Ukrainian cities, and that the local government is relatively accountable, transparent and progressive; this might be a key reason that the pro-cycling lobbying had effect. Lviv has 'European' ambitions, and cycling fits the European identity which the city wants to display particularly as the international spotlight falls on Lviv for Euro 2012. Ultimately, Lviv's city council decided 'that all refurbished road infrastructures will be complemented with cycling infrastructure.'

In 2010 a broad, general and ambitious infrastructure improvement plan was accepted by the Executive Committee of the City of Lviv, to be executed in the period of 2010-2019 (Interview D. Danylyuk), with a budget of small 1 million UAH (about €70.000). Included in the infrastructure plan were plans to construct 270km of cycling infrastructure in 2019 (see the map below, Figure 16). GIZ, the German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (society for international cooperation), assisted in making a detailed bicycle infrastructure plan up to European technical standards. The cooperation falls under the German "Climate-friendly mobility in Ukrainian cities" project.



Figure 12: Oleh Shmid is appointed as cycling advisor in 2010 (in the back). In this photo Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovyi signs the European Charter for Mobility Week 2013.



Figure 13: Road works in Lviv in preparation for EURO2012.

A working group was established to initiate cycling projects and activities and to monitor progress. The working group holds regular meetings and consists of members of the city administration, of planning and design institutes, of NGOs and of other stakeholders². The City Council hopes to extract external funding by seed investments, which it succeeded in doing via bilateral cooperation with GIZ. In addition, Oleh Shmid was appointed cycling advisor (see the photo above). Combining this position with his job at the municipal infrastructure company, his task is to oversee and coordinate all cycling related issues in Lviv. He engages in dialogues with the media, local cycling activists (such as the Dyak from the Lviv Cycling Association) and businesses and local policy-makers. Importantly, this involves reaching out to potential investors. The city actively promotes cycling by organizing activities together with local NGOs, bicycle dealers and other partners, such as the European Mobility Week (since 2011). In 2012 one of the interviewees, D. Danylyuk, was hired by cycling advisor Shmid to help promote cycling among citizens and urban planners and be a ‘criticaster’, while Shmid continued his main task of establishing the basic infrastructure necessary to make cycling an attractive practice. Another reason for the speedy acceptance and implementation of an ambitious pro-cycling strategy was the personal involvement of both the vice mayor, Oleh Synutka (head of the working group) and the official support of mayor Andriyy Sadovyy, who is said to be “fully supporting all activities and a cyclist himself (City of Lviv, 2011).

Snapshot 2009: Tipping point

From 2009 onwards, cycling as a practice developed rapidly after ambitious infrastructural renewal plans were accepted and implemented. The Euro 2012 football cup was a policy-window for improving urban infrastructure and mobility, with funding becoming available along with the political will to change. Cycling activists successfully lobbied for improvements at this crucial time. Several drivers led to a degree of ecological rationality being institutionalized in urban planning and policy-making; Euro 2012 sped up the development of cycling but is not the driver.

By 2011 the ambitious plans drafted in 2009 had been set in motion. As part of the strategy to prove Lviv a worthy and capable candidate for outside investment, the first cycling infrastructure works were financed by the city's own budget. The idea is, O. Shmid says, that “every 1km brings 3km extra”. A slow start would be rightly expected, as ‘until September 2011, 8 km of new infrastructure have been built’ of the 270km goal in 2019 (see the map on the next page). Only on blue highlighted roads separate bicycle lanes were constructed. The reasons for the slow start are described on the municipal webpage (City of Lviv, 2011):

“The development of cycling is hampered by outdated planning norms and the fact, that most planners haven't have yet the chance to plan and experience cycling infrastructure. Therefore, key issues for further work include – besides the further implementation of infrastructure – the update of national legislation and training for planners.”

In addition, some of the funding promised by the national government did not arrive (Interview D. Danylyuk) – in 2013, no extra bicycle infrastructure was built at all for this reason (Interview O. Shmid). Meanwhile, education and popularization activities and programs intensify, benefiting from good cooperation between local government and pro-cycling NGOs/activists. O. Shmid and newly hired D. Danylyuk work on convincing urban planners and policy-makers of the benefits of a cycling oriented city. Cycling activism reached a peak in popularity (Figure 14). The European Mobility Week in 2011 draws a crowd and receives a lot of media attention (Figure 15).




Figure 14: Lvivians signing a petition at City Hall to ask the City Council to invest in bicycle paths in December 2011. Source: <http://www.velolviv.org/>



Figure 15: European Mobility Week in Lviv, 2011, focussed on bicycle and pedestrian mobility. Source: <http://www.velolviv.org/>

Snapshot 2011: Infrastructure development, education and cycling activism

With ambitious pro-cycling plans accepted and implemented, funds made available, responsibility assigned, and international expertise (GIZ) attracted, cycling made a flying start in 2010. By 2011 however, legislative, financial and experience-related problems slowed down the construction of cycling infrastructure.

At the same time, education and popularization programs intensified, benefiting from good cooperation between local government and cycling NGOs/activists. The European Mobility Week 2011 received a lot of (media) attention. Overall, cycling retained a very modest share of the modal split.

Between 2011 and 2014 the development of cycling in Lviv continued at a slower albeit steady pace. By May 2014, 30km of specialized cycling infrastructure had been built, far short of the 130km goal for 2014 in the original cycling plan's timeline. No infrastructure was built at all in 2013 as funding ran out, since the national Cabinet of Ministers failed to provide the promised funding to assist with the Euro 2012 preparation (Interview, O. Shmid). It makes sense that O. Shmid's current key task is to attract external funding with the help of GIZ (*ibid.*). While maintaining the policy of 80% focus on infrastructure improvement (vs. 20% popularization efforts), O. Shmid admits that "the largest obstacle to promoting bicycle culture in Lviv is influencing behavior. Since there is no demand from the society for bicycling yet, I ask people to get on their bikes and push the cars out of roads" (Interview, O. Shmid). "Lviv's situation is unique in that cycling is not pushed for by its citizens at all, but by the local government", he continues. Hardcore cyclists are not very supportive of the City Council's plans (which prescribe stricter rules and less freedom also for cyclists), as they have become used to the tough cycling conditions. While inexperienced cyclists warmly welcome O. Shmid's work as cycling advisor, he expected to have reached a broader audience by now. The promotion of cycling as eco-practice in Lviv remains the affair of a few public and civic actors.

The pioneering cyclists who were the driving force behind the Lviv Cycling Association were primarily students, but now this small group of cyclists graduated, married and found steady jobs (many in IT) and/or started families. By 2014, the Lviv Cycling Association went dormant. Pro-cycling activism still exists, but the core group of urban mobility/infrastructure/public space activists shifted focus for now to illegal parking (Interview, S. Dyak). There does not appear to be the same level of (activist) interest in cycling among the current generation of students: 'our students are not even cycling', says O. Shmid. Cyclists are usually young professionals, often working in the IT sector.

A recent survey by Lviv's Urban Infographic Institute reveals the reasons why cycling remains so unpopular among students (City of Lviv, 2014), despite the fact that almost 60% of students own a bicycle. The main reasons are (1) the bad reputation cycling still suffers from ("unpopularity of bicycle/cycling is under the influence of the stereotype that bicycle is the transport of unemployed and kids"); (2) the difficulty of cycling and parking safely in Lviv (30,3% of bike owners use it only a few times a year for this reason); and (3) the initial expense of purchasing the bicycle. Almost all students (90,7%) express the desire for cycling storage facilities near the dormitories. Only 42.9% of respondents agreed that cycling is a safe means of transportation in the city. The survey justifies Lviv's policy of focusing most attention on providing the minimum required infrastructure before pursuing active persuasion strategies.

At the time of writing around 18-20% of Lvivians own a bicycle, but only 7% uses it regularly – and only 0,1-0,3% cycle daily, roughly about 3.000 cyclists (Interview O. Shmid). Especially daily commuting by bicycle is a rare practice. More than 60% of Lviv's citizens travel by public transport, although this amount is decreasing in favor of car usage. Car ownership is only 25% (very low compared to the OECD average), but rapidly rising and already causing problems in terms of traffic congestion and illegal parking.

Although Lviv emerges from the Ukrainian crisis as a political and cultural victor, fact remains that the political turmoil and economic crisis in Ukraine at the moment hampers the ability (and will) of the local government to pursue its ambitious sustainable mobility goals. Political reforms announced by Ukraine's new president Petro Poroshenko will give more autonomy to local government, while the regional government layer installed by Yanukovich's Party of Regions will likely disappear. The consequences those reforms would have for the development of cycling as eco-practice are hard to estimate. Ukraine's 'turn to the West' offers opportunities to Lviv for investment and tourism, but also risks of further economic recession (Western Ukraine remains very poor) if more regions of the country declare autonomy. Cycling has become an indispensable element in Lviv's promotion, reputation building and advertising strategy, used to attract tourists and resources from Europe; cycling matches Lviv's European identity and ambitions. Lviv has established a reputation as the 'capital of cycling in Ukraine'.



Figure 17: Vision of Lviv as bustling touristic city embracing alternative mobility. Source: European Mobility Week in Lviv presentation, 2013.

Snapshot 2014: Slowdown, consolidation, institutionalization

Behind schedule but improving steadily, Lviv's cycling infrastructure supports a slowly growing number of cyclists. The promotion of cycling as eco-practice in Lviv remains the affair of a few public and civic actors. Cycling becomes more and more institutionalized – people are increasingly aware of the benefits of cycling and know how to deal with cyclists in traffic. At this time, cycling is practiced mostly by middle/high class people who are highly educated and young. A fifth of Lvivians own a bicycle, but few cycle regularly and very few daily; cycling still suffers from its unsafe and inconvenient reputation. The technical infrastructure is not persuasive enough alone to drive a massive switch-over.

5.2 Evolution of Organic Food Consumption as eco-practice in Kiev

As mentioned in 4.2.2, the consumption of organic food can be seen as an ecologically modernized practice: the practice reduces ecological footprint, contributes to localization and to establishing ‘new forms of exchange between people and communities, on the basis of new values of wealth, work, progress, and ecological citizenship’.

Kyiv has become the capital of organic food in Ukraine in just a few years’ time. Before 2008 organic food was an alien word to most Ukrainians, but ever since the internal market has grown between 30-100% each year – with Kyiv supporting the most organic stores and restaurants of any Ukrainian city. But how has organic food consumption developed as a practice in Kyiv over time? Is there more to this story than simple supply and demand, with Ukraine just slowly catching up to European consumption practices? This chapter reports the findings of case study 2. Like in Chapter 5.1, in order to apply the practices approach properly – the practice is the unit of analysis - I will describe the emergence of organic food consumption as eco-practice in Kyiv by using the heuristic of an evolutionary process. Although the focus is on organic food *consumption*, I will also describe key developments in organic food production and distribution as consumption is deeply intertwined with systems of provision. I discuss organic food consumption in chronological order, taking several detailed ‘snapshots’ of the practice at key times in its development. Five in depth interviews are the main sources for this chapter and are referred to as (Interview, Y. Pyvovarenko), (Interview, S. Polivar), (Interview, T. Sitnik), (Interview, Z. Mishchuk) and (Interview, S. Hihat); see Annex 1.

First I will describe the situation of organic food consumption and production prior to the rapid developments from 2008 onwards. Ukraine being a major producer of agricultural products for the European market, responded to the high and rapidly growing demand for organic products already since the 00’s (Interview, T. Sitnik). Some of the bigger producers adapted their production to conform to the EU organic label; smaller producers tended to lack the expertise, motivation and starting capital to switch over (auditing/applying for an organic label requires an investment). None of the in Kiev operating MNC’s had made efforts to introduce organic products in their offer. Only the ‘WITHOUT GMO’ label was (and is) visible everywhere. The Ukrainian government (at any level) had no strategy or policy in place for the domestic organic food market (Interview, Z. Mishchuk). Many competing and conflicting ‘organic’ and other labels existed, without any government regulation.

In Kiev there were already signs of a growing interest in the ‘healthy lifestyle’. After 8 years of rapid economic growth and relative stability, Kiev’s rising middle and upper class are more and more able to and interested in following cosmopolitan, environmentally conscious, and hedonistic consumer trends (see Background). Since 2007 the vegetarian and vegan community/movement in Kiev grew rapidly in size and attracted a broader audience (Interview, S. Hihat).

Since organic products were not available in supermarkets or minimarkets, many Ukrainians were unaware of what ‘organic’ means and why one would buy it. However, a lot of Ukrainians dislike the quality of food products in the regular stores in Kiev and would prefer ‘home-grown products from a granny (Interview, Y. Pyvovarenko). Indeed, many Kievians attend local markets to buy fresh

products from villages near the capital (Figure 18). The perception of Ukrainians of ‘organic food’ was limited mostly to these sustenance farming based products. Very few Ukrainians were aware that for many years Ukraine had produces and exports major quantities of organic labeled products to the European market (Interview, T. Sitnik). Many Ukrainians believe that the good quality food products are exported, while the bad quality food is dumped on the domestic market. High-quality food products were (perceived to be) imported from abroad and very expensive; this was the accepted but disliked state of affairs.

Snapshot 2006: Organic food consumption undeveloped

Almost all organic products produced in Ukraine were destined for the European market. Specialty organic stores existed across Ukraine, but supermarkets and minimarkets did not have organic offer. Sustenance agriculture was the main source of organic products for the internal market - typically unlabeled, home-grown vegetables, fruits and dairy products sold by senior citizens at local markets.

There was a general sense of dissatisfaction with the quality and safety of food on offer which only the high-end imported products in exclusive supermarkets



Figure 18: A typical street view in Kiev, babushka's (grandma's) selling home-grown organic products on a metro exit.

2008 was a tipping point year for organic food consumption in Kiev, like 2009 was for cycling in Lviv. Businessmen came together in a series of meetings in Kiev to discuss the domestic market opportunities for organic products.² International cooperation projects – importantly bilateral projects with the Swiss Confederation and the German GIZ – helped Ukrainian producers, distributors and entrepreneur store owners organize the supply chain; T. Sitnik attributes 80% of the rapid expansion of the domestic organic food market to the influx of international expertise. Ukrainian entrepreneurs such as S. Polivar (interviewee) started their organic product business in 2008. He founded the first organic-only supermarket – Eco-Club UA – in 2008, starting as a small online store with 10 products catering towards safe food for parents; after communicating with other organic businesses, attending many eco-education programs, organic festivals and organic farm fares and international conferences, Eco-Club UA grew to an offline store selling over 5000 organic products.

Internationally, organic was high on the agenda, which S. Polivar cites as an inspiration to entrepreneurs. Stores which are now commonplace across Kiev, and have become household names,

² Unfortunately, I was unable to find out much more about who attended these meetings and what impact they had for the development of organic food in Kiev; the impression I got from the interviews was that these meetings inspired the creation of several organic product (not just food) stores and chains.

opened their doors around 2008 and 2009; for example, the Eco-Lavka store chain (organic cosmetics and foods) and Natur Boutique (organic products from basic to luxury). European chains such as the Swiss Glossary (organic cosmetics at first, now also organic food) also opened stores in Kiev. The domestic organic food market in Ukraine grew by a staggering 100% in 2008 alone (Interview, S. Polivar), and with 25-30% in every year since (Interview, T. Sitnik). Regular supermarkets started to include organic offer into their assortment (Interview, S. Polivar).

In 2008 the vegetarian and vegan food community/movement continued to grow exponentially. A key development at this time was that the movement started to communicate with environmental activist groups, which has led to a lot of cooperation, cross fertilization with members and cross-spread of ideas (Interviews, S. Hihat and Y. Pyvovarenko).

Snapshot 2008: Tipping point

In 2008 organic food consumption developed rapidly across Ukraine, and particularly in Kiev. International cooperation projects aimed at establishing an organic market, stakeholder and business meetings and other factors inspired entrepreneurs to explore the domestic demand for organic products. Improvements in labelling and supply chain management (with help of Swiss and German knowledge institutes and investment) improved the systems of provision for organic products.

New organic stores started to open their doors, foreign companies opened franchise stores and (high—end) supermarkets began including organic food in their assortments. Nationally organic food consumption rose by about 100% in a year. Food movements saw an increase in membership.

The staggering increase in the popularity of organic products continued for several years (roughly 30% increase per annum, Interviews Z. Mishchuk and S. Polivar³). This also had some negative consequences for the organic market. The fact that organic products are priced between 30-500% higher than ordinary products and that government regulation of labeling was absent (*ibid.*) created incentives to produce pseudo-organic food products (products which 'labeled' either fraudulently, or by unrecognized labels).

T. Sitnik conducted a study of the organic products offered at regular stores and supermarkets in Kiev. She found that people did/do not clearly differ between different labels (especially 'ecologically clean' vs. 'organic' and 'natural) is confusing). She also found that by 2013 there were *more pseudo-organic products than genuine ones* on Kiev's organic market (Interview, T. Sitnik). With many consumers unable to recognize, decipher and judge the wide variety of labels visible in stores, the pseudo-organic market flourished in the absence of governmental regulation. Only social activists (NGOs) reprimanded producers and distributors of pseudo-organic food products; the government (national or local) had no organic policy or enforcement capacity.

³ More detailed data about the development of the organic food market I have not been able to find; I am limited to what the interviewees told me.



Figure 2: "Do you know how to recognize organic products?" Information brochure explaining what the U-BIO-108 label looks like and cautioning against fake labels.



Figure 20: "Where can you buy these organic products?" Information brochure which lists all the organic stores in Kiev and other major cities in Ukraine.

To combat the rapid growth of pseudo-organic products on Ukraine's market, Ukraine's organic label organization (Organic Standard UA, which hold European standards) launched an information campaign together with the Swiss Cooperation Office in Ukraine, under the Swiss-Ukrainian Project "Organic Market Development in Ukraine" (2012-2014). The promotion/education tools include information brochures, the front pages of which are displayed in Figures 19 and 20 above (translated in the subtext); such brochures were spread across Kiev's supermarkets and specialty stores. ENGO MAMA-86 launched big campaigns to educate consumers about organic products and grow the

Snapshot 2012: Wild growth and consumer confusion

The staggering increase in the popularity of organic products continued at a steady pace in Kiev. The fact that organic products are priced between 30-500% higher than ordinary products and that government regulation of labelling was absent created incentives to produce pseudo-organic food products, which by 2013 made up the majority of organic labelled products in Kiev's stores. NGOs launch campaigns to educate consumers on organic food and labelling, foster critical consumerism and confront pseudo-organic producers and distributors.

critical consumerism which Ukrainians have not gotten used to yet (Interview, T. Sitnik).

In January 2014 a law/policy on organic products was passed by the soon-to-be-overthrown president Yanukovich: in essence this was a European style law/policy stating that the government broadly supports organic, and will actively reduce the amount of pseudo-organic products (Interview, T. Sitnik). No promises were made in this law/policy, and it was not very specific (Interview, Z. Mishchuk). The law makes a new definition of ‘organic’ vs. ‘ecologically friendly’ products and producers, and suggests that Ukraine should have its own organic market and certification scheme. While this marks a welcome first step by the national government to become involved in the governance of organic food production and consumption in Ukraine, its real effects will be limited unless more practical measures are taken – enforcement of labeling, deregulation, tax advantages, etc. (Interview Z. Mishchuk). Since the political turmoil of the Maidan revolution, organic food has been pushed off the political agenda entirely (“Let’s first take care that people aren’t dying anymore”, *ibid.*).

Currently, the pseudo-organic producers are not challenged by the troubled government, but are afraid of an anti-monopoly committee (Interview, T. Sitnik). The situation has improved since 2013, with consumers being more educated and critical and less pseudo-organic products on the market (*ibid.*). Still, the organic market is dominated by a few supermarkets which raise the prices (Interview, T. Sitnik). Meanwhile the ‘eat healthy – live healthy’ culture appears to grow steadily among Kiev’s more affluent citizens, exemplified in the steady growth of the vegan & vegetarian movement/community, and the popularity of yoga, organic cafés, etc. (Interview, S. Hihat).

By this time, organic food consumption is not limited to ‘foodies’, vegans, vegetarians or the health-obsessed – the variety of practitioners has grown along with the amount. Families with young children (who want safe food), and young and middle-aged professionals have entered the mix, although organic food remains an expensive luxury. Consumers in general are becoming more aware and knowledgeable of eco-labeling, and increasingly base their decisions on them (Interview, T. Sitnik).

The production and consumption of organic food and other products is distributed unevenly across Ukraine (see Figure 21). Kiev’s region and Southern Ukraine (organic wine amongst other products) host most of the organic food producers, and so do Lviv, Odessa and Kharkiv. Organic food

Snapshot 2014: Institutionalization and consolidation

The adoption of an organic products market policy (including a complex of laws) by the national government marks an important step in the institutionalization of organic food consumption as a desirable and supported alternative to standard products. Fewer pseudo-organic products exist on the market in Kiev today, and consumers are becoming more critical and educated thanks to the efforts of NGOs and international cooperation. Organic distribution and sale is currently dominated by a few large supermarkets which drive up the price.

Based on the fast increase in organic food consumption, as well as the rising popularity of vegetarianism and veganism, there appears to be – to some degree – a growing lifestyle reflexivity among the more affluent Ukrainian consumers with regards to food, health and the environment.

consumption matches the picture painted by Figure 21 to a large extent (Interview, T. Sitnik), with Kiev, Odessa and Kharkiv being major hotspots. This impression is backed by other brochures detailing the addresses of organic stores across Ukraine – Kiev makes up around half of the list.

These regional differences can be interpreted in a number of ways (based on all five interviews); economically, demographically and culturally. Ukraine's wealthier central region, especially Kiev, support the biggest organic market; Western and Eastern Ukraine is poorer and supports only a small organic food market, with notable exceptions in the wealthy regional capitals of Lviv and Kharkiv. The major regional capitals are inhabited by relatively rich, well-educated, well-travelled and young Ukrainians who make up a majority of organic food consumers. Culturally, the agricultural West of Ukraine is likely to be more receptive of the charms of organic produce, whereas citizens in the Eastern Ukrainian mining and industrial heartland might be less interested (Interview, Z. Mishchuk). Affluent Kharkiv appears to distort this picture, but then again Kharkiv is a world apart from the rest of Eastern Ukraine – rich, populous, highly educated and young. Southern Ukraine stands out as a major producer and exporter of organic products such as wine.




Figure 21: Map detailing the number of Ukrainian organic producers per region. Source: OrganicInfo.ua's Ukraine organic business directory booklet, part of the Swiss-Ukrainian project "Organic Market Development in Ukraine", June 2013.

Chapter 6: Governing eco-practices in Ukraine

Above I have described the development of cycling in Lviv and organic food consumption in Kiev in the last 5+ years. But what lessons can we learn from both case studies regarding the governance of eco-practices? In 6.1 the two case studies are analyzed by distinguishing key commonalities and differences in the development of the eco-practices. In the second section (6.2) the future is considered: what opportunities and threats are there for a consumer-driven ecological modernization process in Ukraine, and what role does (the governance of) eco-practices play in this? In section 6.3 I zoom out from the studied eco-practices to discuss the relation between European identity and ambition to consumption behavior, lifestyles and practices.

6.1 Commonalities between the case studies: installing an eco-practice

What can we learn from the two case studies, despite the obvious differences between cycling and organic food consumption as practices, in terms of both the development of and governance of eco-practices?

In the development of both cycling in Lviv and organic food consumption in Kiev I distinguish several common elements; and in terms of the governance of eco-practices, we can learn several lessons.

1. An eco-practice must be *enabled* before it can become inviting to practitioners; for that, a minimal technical and social infrastructure must be put in place (e.g., cycling paths and organic labels);
 - Constructing these infrastructures requires leadership and ambition, since simple demand-based policy (e.g. based a survey, ‘how many people want to cycle?’) would not stimulate policy-makers to invest in providing the necessary basis for eco-practices. In effect, demand for the eco-practice *follows* provision of enabling factors.
 - The Lviv experience also learns that it can be important to have the eco-practice be part of a larger ‘project’, a visionary vehicle such as Lviv’s European ambition. Such a vision would be persuasive for potential practitioners, but importantly, also decision-makers. An example text from a website of the City of Lviv illustrates the persuasiveness of such a communication strategy:

“The Western Ukrainian city of Lviv has taken the strategic decision to develop cycling as regular mode of transport: Improved cycling infrastructure and active promotion of cycling as modern, clean and truly European mode of transport will help to increase the share of cyclists. This will make Lviv a healthier, cleaner and more sustainable place for its citizens and guests.”
 - Building ecologically modernized systems of provision requires investments, and environmentally friendly behavior/consumption is not a political priority in Ukraine. Therefore, in order to be effective, it is important for policy-makers and NGOs/advocacy groups to time their efforts well to match policy-windows (such as the EURO2012 in the case of cycling in Lviv). Structural and strategic funding for

environmental innovations are lacking in Ukraine; but accidental funds might be attracted from domestic and foreign sources if timed well.

- I suggest that acting ‘ahead of demand’ is important for successful policy-making - but how can policy-makers know if the ‘time is right’ to take the lead in promoting a particular eco-practices? This research project can only provide a general answer to that: policy-makers could broadly look to demographic, economic and cultural indicators, as well as the existence of pioneer/niche groups who are suitable early adopters of the eco-practice. The popularization process of the desired eco-practice in other countries could be studied for general guidelines and suggestions for assessing ‘if the time is right’.
2. Both case studies suggest that the key motivation for switching to an eco-practice is reflection on one’s own lifestyle – less so ecological citizenship or political consumerism;
 - For this reason, education and promotion campaigns aimed at to grow eco-lifestyle reflexivity could be crucial. A persuasive communication strategy would address the personal benefits which the desirable eco-practice brings to the consumer (especially healthiness, safety and luxury are appealing).
 3. In both the cycling and organic food consumption case studies, ENGOs and advocacy groups played a crucial role in the popularization of the eco-practices; their education campaigns, petitions, events, promotional activities, etc. reach a big audience, with or (mostly) without the help of government.
 - It is important for policy-makers to map in detail the niche or pioneer (lifestyle) groups who are/would be early adopters of the desired eco-practice. These groups or individuals, organized or not, could be supported and incorporated in the effort to popularize the eco-practice, making good use of their enthusiasm; they can help stimulate eco-lifestyle reflexivity among non-practitioners. After all, early adopters are most experienced.
 4. It appears that few actors are necessary to make significant progress in transitioning to eco-practices, if certain conducive factors (the demographic, economic and cultural factors mentioned above) are present already.
 - Especially in a country like Ukraine, in which governmental environment authorities and ENGOs have limited resources at their disposal, it is crucial for policy-makers who wish to govern an eco-practice to seek cooperation with societal actors; they must embrace cooperation with advocacy groups and involve specific eco-lifestyle groups in popularization programs. Early adopters, by virtue of their pioneer enthusiasm and experience, can play an important role in growing and governing an eco-practice.
 - The Lviv case study reveals that clearly assigning responsibilities and tasks is important for optimizing the use of the limited resources.

6.2 European identity and consumption behavior

Broad questions posed in (almost) every interview support the impression that Eastern Ukraine lags behind on the ecological modernization process, both on the levels of environmental regulation, industrial policy, urban planning, environmental activism, eco-products and the mentality of its inhabitants. Some argue that local government is less flexible and mainly interested in protecting industry (Interviews, O. Shmid; D. Danylyuk); others emphasize that Eastern Ukraine’s more

‘fatalistic’ population has a more soviet-mindset – and the environment is not their primary concern (Interview, Z. Mishchuk). Most of the interviewees agree that the more pro-European attitude of the Western and Central Ukrainian population is related to environmentally friendly behavior; ‘environmental concern’ is a European theme.

However, it would be a mistake to attribute the difference in environmentalism in either region to *European ambition* – that is, the idea that wanting to be more European is the driver behind being environmentally conscious. In other words, Ukrainians are not turning to cycling and organic food because they want to be ‘more like Europeans’. Rather, we should observe the other factors which increasingly appear to enable and stimulate environmentally friendly consumption behavior: increased wealth, education and international mobility. The ambitions of the post-communist generation, more wealthy and educated than ever, might coincide more with European values; and clash with the soviet-style ideas of the good life in Eastern Ukraine. As Oleh Shmid put it, ‘environmental behavior is simply a part of that’.

In Central and Western Ukraine, as well as major regional capitals like the Eastern Kharkiv, we can expect, and to some extent already observe, a revival of civic consciousness and nationalism similar to after the Orange Revolution (Interview, Z. Mishchuk). As fatalism is replaced by cautious optimism and commitment, these attitudes are potentially positive signs for environmental reform in Ukraine. For perhaps the first time in country’s history, many Ukrainians have become ‘political consumers’: I observed that boycotting Russian products in favor of Ukrainian ones is widely practiced. The younger generation is less hedonistic than before, caring more about matters such as public space, politics, and Ukraine’s future in general. To illustrate, one of the interviewed cycling activists, S. Dyak, says: ‘before the revolution I was considering moving to Europe, just like many of my friends. After Maidan I am optimistic about positive changes happening in our country, and I want to contribute to that - I have joined a local political party.’

The Maidan revolutions sharpened the differences between Central/Western and Southern/Eastern Ukraine. As the new administration in Kiev and its supporters embark upon their pro-European course, more European-style policies, narratives and visions for Ukraine can be expected, which include environmentalism, political/critical consumerism, and ecological modernization. However, the future remains very uncertain, and environment has little priority in Ukraine at the moment.

6.3 Opportunities and threats for Ecological Modernization of consumption

If we look beyond the two case studies, how might environmentally friendly consumption practices develop in Ukraine the coming years? Based on the literature, field work and analysis so far, I distinguish several opportunities and threats for the process of further ecological modernization of consumption. With ‘ecological modernization of consumption’ I mean the process of institutionalizing and spreading of ecological rationality into lifestyles (including consumption behavior), consumption practices, and the enabling systems of provision.

The mentioned revival of civic engagement after the Maidan revolution provides fertile grounds for the spread of environmental consciousness. In particular, many Ukrainians have become more involved with public affairs not only as a citizen, but also as a consumer (the boycotting of Russian products as political-consumer). The slow but steady rise of critical consumerism, in particular reflection on personal choices and lifestyle in light *both* personal and non-personal affairs, could provide opportunities to ecologically modernize consumption. The pro-European turn of the new government and its followers, sharpened by the conflicts, will likely produce European-style policies, narratives and visions for Ukraine which – de facto – include an environmental agenda. Ukraine's turn to Europe and planned political and economic reforms will undoubtedly attract Western investors, who may take ecological rationality into account to a greater extent, thus stimulating and intensifying the ecological modernization process. Added to that will be the increasing influx of EU standard products and services due to the Free Trade Agreement, also causing an increase of production of eco-products for the European market – both of which spread ecological rationality into Ukraine's consumption and production systems. Environmental NGOs are professionalizing and spreading its wings to cooperation with the public and the private sector; this is unexplored terrain with a high potential for environmental benefits (Zamuruieva, 2013). Lastly, Ukraine's tumultuous recent history make demographic developments very important. The post-communist generation is entering the labor market and gaining purchasing power; as mentioned in the Background, this generation is very different from the older generation in terms of their priorities, attitudes, ambitions, experiences and consumption behavior - including environmental consciousness. The rise of the post-communist demographic will likely provide ample opportunities for expanding the market for eco-products and spread eco-practices, grow the influence of ENGOs and other civic organizations, as well as for environmental reform at a policy level.

However, there are also several threats to the ecological modernization of consumption in Ukraine. The Ukrainian political and economic crisis has left environmental reform low on the political agenda. At a time when the government can barely avoid bankruptcy, resources for environmental matters are extremely limited. For these reasons, little can be expected from the government in terms of investments into the ecological modernization of consumption. The economic recession, most notably the devaluation of the hryvnia, severely limits the purchasing power of consumers. Especially the market for elastic luxury goods, which eco-products unfortunately are, is likely to take a big hit. Finally, continued political instability can deter investors who have an environmental agenda.

Chapter 7: Conclusion and recommendations

First of all, I will summarize the research project in a few sentences. I documented and analyzed the emergence of sustainable consumption practices in Ukraine with the goal of gaining a deeper understanding of the dynamics, drivers and actors involved in the development of environmentally friendly practices in this country. I summarized key social, economic, political, and environmental developments in Ukraine in the past 20 years to set the context. Through the theoretical lens of practice theory I investigated two case studies: the emergence of cycling in Lviv and the development of organic food consumption in Kiev, both in roughly the last five years. Through interviews, scientific literature, reports, websites and other documents I attempted to paint a detailed picture of the ‘evolution process’ of both eco-practices. Finally, I examined what the communalities between the two case studies can teach us about governing eco-practices; I explored opportunities and threats for ecological modernization of consumption in Ukraine; and assessed the role of European identity and ambition in relation to consumption behavior.

The research results can be summarized in the following core findings. An eco-practice must be enabled before it can become popular; for that, a minimal technical and social infrastructure must be put in place (in the case studies, for example, cycling paths and organic labels). ENGOs and advocacy/activist/interest groups played a crucial role in the popularization of the studied eco-practices; their education campaigns, petitions, events, promotional activities, etc. reach a large audience, with or (mostly) without the help of government. Few actors appear to be necessary to make significant progress in popularizing eco-practices and promote ecological rationality, if certain conducive (demographic, economic and cultural) factors are present already. Both case studies suggest that the key motivation for switching to an eco-practice is reflection on one’s own lifestyle – mostly in terms of personal benefits, less so ecological citizenship or political consumerism (with the notable exception of the boycotting of Russian products). The lure of quality, healthy or luxury eco-products is particularly strong, although the emergence of eco-practices is certainly not just a new expression of ecologically and politically disinterested hedonistic behavior. The focus on lifestyle reflexivity might be due to the (perceived and relative) lack of (structural) opportunities to meaningfully express and act upon political, moral, and other conviction beyond the personal sphere. Norms appear to be shifting towards encouraging civic engagement and leading (eco-)conscious lifestyles particularly among the post-communist generation, of which consumption practices are an element. Consumers are becoming more aware and knowledgeable of eco-labeling, and increasingly base their decisions on them.

Regional differences in the development of eco-practices in Ukraine exist. Eco-practices are developing mostly in the major cities across Ukraine (excluding the far South-East), where the wealthy, educated and travelled post-communist generation is asserting itself after having entered the labor market. The more pro-European attitude of the Western and Central Ukrainian population appears related to environmentally friendly behavior; ‘environmental concern’ is a European theme. However, it would be a mistake to attribute the difference in environmentalism in either region to *European ambition* – that is, the idea that wanting to be more European is the driver behind being environmentally conscious. Increased wealth, education and international mobility, rather, appear to

enable and stimulate environmentally friendly consumption behavior. The ambitions of the post-communist generation, wealthy and educated, might coincide more with European values of which environmentalism is simply an element; and clash with the soviet-style ideas of the good life in Eastern Ukraine. In Central and Western Ukraine, as well as major regional capitals like the Eastern Kharkiv the revival of civic consciousness and political engagement provides a powerful vehicle for the spread of eco-conscious lifestyles. As fatalism is replaced by cautious optimism and commitment to public affairs, these attitudes are potentially positive signs for environmental reform in Ukraine. As the new administration in Kiev and its supporters embark upon their pro-European course, more European-style policies, narratives and visions for Ukraine can be expected which include environmentalism, critical consumerism, and ecological modernization.

I distinguish several opportunities and enabling factors and drivers to further ecologically modernize consumption practices in Ukraine the coming years: the rival of civic engagement and political engagement, the new government's pro-European turn and reform agenda, Western investments into Ukraine, intensifying trade between the EU and Ukraine, the increasing reflection on personal lifestyle especially in relation to public affairs (critical consumerism and lifestyle politics), the growing capacities of ENGOs, and the rise of the post-communist demographic. The ecological modernization of consumption process is threatened and slowed down by political instability, economic recession and the devaluation of the hryvnia, the lowering purchasing power of the consumers who buy the elastic eco-goods, and the lack of government resources available for – low priority - environmental reform.

These developments, opportunities and threats should be considered in the governance of eco-practices in Ukraine. As Fonte (2013, p. 232) writes, “a perspective of consumer activities as an integrated consumption practice can suggest new forms of intervention to policy makers.” Based on the analysis above, I suggest the following recommendations and conclusions regarding the governance of eco-practices in Ukraine:

- Demand for the desired eco-practice *follows* provision of enabling factors to a significant extent. Therefore, constructing these infrastructures (or ecologically modernizing existing systems of provision) requires leadership and ambition; simple ‘demand-based’/reactionary policy would not stimulate policy-makers to invest in providing the minimum basis to support eco-practices. Such ambition and leadership might have a better chance to succeed if the eco-practice is incorporated in a broader vision for the city, region or country, which his persuasive to both potential practitioners and decision-makers.
- To assess if the ‘time is right’ to invest in systems of provision for an eco-practice ahead of demand, policy-makers should broadly study if key social, demographic, economic, cultural and technical ‘enabling factors’ exist (which are case dependent), as well as investigate pioneer/niche groups who are suitable early adopters of the eco-practice. The popularization process of the desired eco-practice in other countries could be studied for general guide- and timelines.

- It is useful to map in detail the niche or pioneer (lifestyle) groups who are, or would likely be, early adopters of the desired eco-practice. These groups or individuals, organized or not, should be supported and incorporated in the effort to popularize the eco-practice, making use of their enthusiasm and experience; they can help stimulate eco-lifestyle reflexivity among non-practitioners.
- Education and promotion campaigns should aim to grow eco-lifestyle reflexivity. A persuasive communication strategy would address the personal benefits which the desirable eco-practice brings to the consumer (especially healthiness, safety and luxury are appealing).
- If faced with limited resources, it is crucial for policy-makers who wish to govern an eco-practice to seek cooperation with societal actors; they must embrace cooperation with advocacy groups and involve specific eco-lifestyle groups in popularization programs.
- Clearly assigning responsibilities and tasks for governing eco-practices is important for optimizing the use of the limited resources.

I suggest that these findings and recommendations could be relevant to policy-makers, NGOs and other societal organizations beyond Ukraine as well.

Chapter 8: Epilogue

On the practice theory approach

I am not convinced that the practices approach was particularly useful when analyze the development of organic food consumption (at least, in the way I applied it). I believe that the analytical merits of practice theory are smaller when the studied practice involves the purchasing of the ecological alternative product: in most cases, the practice has all the same elements. People go to a store to go grocery shopping, make a (mental) list of what to get, and buy what they need; the eco-product could be just a few steps away from the standard product. It seems a little arbitrary or futile to try to overanalyze the ‘bodily movements’ involved, in this case; only some symbols and motivations are different. In other words, the practice approach might not be as applicable in the study of political consumerism in the very standard consumption environment of a supermarket. In studies of truly different (and ‘sustainable’) food consumption practices, such as Fonte’s (2013) study of food solidarity purchasing groups in Italy, the benefits of practice theory are much more apparent.

One aspect of practice theory I was not able to apply in this thesis: the notion of ‘re-invention’ of practices, or the evolution of previous practices into new ones, which according to Shove (2009) is an important element of practice theory. I did not explore this perspective in the case studies, which might have improved the analysis otherwise; on the other hand, the ‘practices out of other practices’ notion did not naturally present itself to me.

Furthermore, I found that it is pitfall when using practice theory to focus too much on describing and documenting practices. The researcher, in my case at least, has to constantly remind himself or herself to keep in mind that the goal is not just to describe practices in detail, but also to find solutions. Perhaps due to my lack of experience with practice theory research, it was difficult to integrate a solution-oriented way of thinking with the practices approach throughout the project. This is a challenge that I want to meet in the PhD research that I will be starting soon.

On ‘sustainable consumption’

After the fact I believe that I was a bit too quick to use Seyfang’s five dimensions of sustainable consumption. The comments made by my supervisor made me realize that I selected Seyfang’s dimensions without regards to other interpretations of ‘sustainable consumption’, in particular with reference to the concept of ‘ecological rationality’ which I use so frequently and freely in this thesis. As it stands, there is an un-discussed relation between the idea I introduce of ‘ecologically modernized consumption practices’ and ‘sustainable consumption’ as it is theorized in literature; unfortunately, I am unable to resolve this anymore due to time constraints.

On the findings

I believe that I succeeded in describing the evolution of two eco-practice over the last 5+ years in Ukraine. However, during the field work I focused maybe overly much on ‘what happened and what is happening’, in order to get to know all the elements, actors and drivers involved in the development eco-practice (the ‘description-trap’ I mention above). As a result, I think that I did not investigate the governance question as much as I should have: that is, how eco-practices can

successfully be managed and developed. Many of the recommendations regarding the governance of eco-practices in Ukraine I have not been able to discuss with the interviewees; they were formulated upon return only. I believe that the recommendations I make are valid, but if the research had been more of an iterative process, it would probably have benefitted strength of the recommendations and conclusions.

Moreover, the two studied eco-practices are very different in nature. Although I attempted to isolate the commonalities between the two as much as possible to base general conclusions and recommendations on, the question remains how useful that is. Perhaps it would have been more useful to answer the questions “how to govern cycling as eco-practice in Ukraine” and “how to govern organic food consumption in Ukraine” separately; this would have allowed for more detail. The goal of describing the development of eco-practices in general via two case studies in Ukraine would have been maintained, but with the added bonus of more specific recommendations.

On the project as a whole

Aside from the specific goals of the MSc. thesis project, I had broader goals which motivated me to conduct this research. My main goal was to describe and try to understand some of the rapid progress in environmentally friendly behavior occurring in Ukraine since a few years (which go unreported and undocumented), and share this at home. My personal goal was to learn to conduct theory-laden fieldwork abroad, and train my ability to secure and conduct interviews in a completely different environment. Regardless of whether or not the specific goals formulated in the introduction were met, I consider this MSc. thesis project a great learning experience – and successful based on these broad goals.

In the course of the project I learned a great deal about both present day Ukraine and its history, which also resulted in the (I can say now) rather ambitious and long Background chapter. However, although ultimately the Background chapter is referred to only sparingly, I have no regrets about the efforts I put into writing it; it contributes to understanding current Ukraine’s political crisis and helps place the development of eco-practices in the proper context. As my supervisor suggested, the section could have been improved greatly if I had ‘harvested’ the most important takeaways from Ukraine’s socio-economic, political and environmental history regarding their relevance in this study, in a subchapter below it. Ultimately I was not able to do so due to time constraints. For the same reasons, I did not properly introduce the concept of governance in the context of ‘practices’; quite unforgivable I would say, afterwards, because I think a theoretical discussion on the ‘governance of eco-practices’ could have been quite fruitful. Furthermore, the project has given me a thorough introduction to practice theory – its merits as well as its pitfalls. Overall, the study might also have benefited from a comparison to the development of sustainable consumption practices in different countries; a detailed nation-based description of an environmental phenomenon begs to be put into cross-national perspective. Lastly, the field work itself was an incredibly useful learning experience in which I practiced my interview and research skills, and more broadly, learned how to quickly immerse myself into a phenomenon as an academic in an unknown environment.

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Annex I: Overview of interviews

Case study I: cycling in Lviv

This subchapter gives an overview of the interviews conducted for *Case study 1: cycling in Lviv*, between March 18th and 22nd, 2014 in Lviv, Ukraine.

Interview 1: Demyan Danylyuk (19-03-2014, 10:00, Lviv)

Profile: Demyan (25) is civil initiative developer at the Lviv City Administration. His work involves building awareness of and promoting sustainable transportation, among Lviv's general population as well as within the City Hall. Active in cycling scene since 2009 (started with dubbing short films of bicycle-friendly European cities). He is employed to be a 'criticaster' and to change the mentality of citizens and Lviv's urban developers.

Key points:

- In 2010 a broad, general and ambitious plan was accepted by the City Council to improve Lviv's infrastructure between 2010-2019 (goal: 239km of cycling infrastructure in 2019);
- Without EURO 2012 infrastructure renewal and development would have been slower, but it is not the sole reason for the ambitious plans;
- Lviv City Administration is facing financial difficulties, because of unfulfilled budgetary promises from the national government; currently the bicycle infrastructure is behind schedule;
- Main obstacle for cycling: perception of cycling. People (both in City Hall and regular citizens) are generally unaware of the advantages. They often view cycling as dangerous, hard work, cumbersome (hard to park), expensive, and unattractive (cars give status);
- Cyclists currently are mostly middle and higher class people, highly educated and young;
- 18-20% of Lvivians own a bicycle, but only 7% use it regularly, and only 0,1-0,3% cycle daily (about 3.000 cyclists): people hardly commute by bike;
- Car ownership is increasing rapidly as people shy away from public transport, causing major congestion problems (traffic and parking) throughout the city;
- Public transport is aged and in poor condition; service has a poor reputation; 1/3rd of busses is privately owned by the bus drivers (wild growth of busses in the 90s, unregulated and chaotic); but some improvements are being made at the moment;
- Pioneering cyclists are often young people (students, IT technicians) who went to Europe for a longer period, and came back inspired to cycle in Lviv: it is stylish and hip, healthy and fits Lviv's European identity;
- It would be difficult to make similar ambitious plans in other Ukrainian cities, because:
 - More rigid, soviet mentality at government agencies; and disinterested citizens/weak civil society. Governments hardly respond to the cycling lobby. In Lviv, the distance between the citizens and local government is much smaller than in other (especially Eastern) Ukrainian cities, although Lviv also has its fair share of disinterested and uninformed citizens;

- *Collective cycling initiative:* Demyan co-organizes weekly “cycling patrol” nights, where he and his friends and other activists cycle in groups around Lviv to keep the neighborhood safe. This group often goes on cycling picnics in weekends.

Interview 2: Slavik Dyuk (19-03-2014, 12:30, Lviv)

Profile: Slavik (29) is software engineer at a local IT company. He was co-founder of the Lviv Cycling Association in 2009, which actively engaged in public dialogue with the Lviv City Administration from 2009 to 2012 to lobby for cycling issues, and to co-develop early bicycle infrastructure plans. Identifying himself as ‘progressive’, he was an active protestor at the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan, and continues to be a member of several local civil society groups and a pro-democratic political party.

Key points:

- 2009 and 2010 was an exciting time for the development of cycling in Lviv, as EURO 2012 offered a ‘policy window’ for improving the city’s infrastructure: to lobby for cyclists’ interests, Slavik co-founded the Lviv Cycling Association;
- Lviv Cycling Association started as ‘initiative’ without any documentation (not necessary until they received a grant, at which point a partner organization helped them receive it);
 - They did a competition for cycling promotion billboards;
 - They make videos, do promotion, gather information from the local government (officially requesting it) and making it public via the media (friends as journalists);
 - Goal: to engage in an open NGO-government dialogue in the media;
 - Popularization of cycling, public relations management for government, helping government with feedback
 - Work together and give feedback to with cycling advisor Oleh Schmid (see below); Slavik considers him active, enthusiastic, but only so powerful;
 - In 2014 they will do the paperwork and become an official organization
- Lviv Cycling Association is not active since 2013: the key activists (like him) are no longer students, but now have jobs and kids;
- Cycling in Lviv is growing. A friend of Slavik opened a bicycle store and sees a 10% increase in sales every year (Nazar from Action Bike, *was not able to meet him*);
 - Students, and many ITers (seen as typically ‘progressive’ people), cycle;
 - Lviv is IT capital of Ukraine, and they make a good amount of money (cycling described as luxury issue);
 - About 70% of Lviv Cycling Association activists are ITers ;
 - To lead a better (healthier) lifestyle;
- Why is Lviv the cycling capital of Ukraine?
 - Lviv has an active cycling community because it is close to Europe: many young people return from Europe inspired to bring cycling to Lviv;
 - Lviv has always had an active civil society (“public activity” initiatives)
 - Lviv is close to Europe, copies the EU, and the EU mentality;
 - Generally a committed and active city (pride)

- Small villages in Ukraine have many more cyclists (out of necessity/poverty), but in Lviv people are richer and buy cars (car = status);
- He does not believe that people's mentality is the problem; through infrastructural changes many more citizens will want to try cycling;
 - Cycling rules are not actual;
 - Drainage is a problem (huge puddles of water everywhere);
 - Cobblestones are uncomfortable to cycle on;
 - Every year cars treat cyclists better, but the increasing amount of cyclists on the road also lead to more breaking of the rules;
- He cycles to work daily, and brings his daughter to school by bike;
- "Like many of my friends, I wanted to pursue a better life in Europe. But after Euromaidan I have hope for change and want to make my city, and Ukraine, a better place." At the Orange revolution in 2004 "Then we had a chance and we lost it"
- Slavik's local IT company supports the families of those who died at Euromaidan with fundraisers, and they have also done eco-initiatives in the past;
 - Recently a few companies in Lviv are offering their employees bicycles
- After Euromaidan, he expects that local governments will receive more authority;
 - This will be good for cycling in Lviv, because Lviv's progressive Major Andriyy Sadovyy will have more capacity to make improvements;
- Together with a group of friends and activists, Slavik decided to do something about illegal parking (which is rampant throughout Lviv, while enforcement is minimal): they attach stickers to the most obnoxiously illegally parked cars which read texts like "Move it bastard" and "Member of Party of Regions" [*Yanukovich's party, which has a very bad reputation in Western-Ukraine*].

Interview 3: Oleh Shmid (19-03-2014, 15:00, Lviv)

Profile: Oleh Shmid (57) is advisor to Lviv's Major on cycling issues since 2010, which involves supervising the construction of cycling infrastructure, attracting funding, handling public relations, and reporting to the Major. He is employed at Lviv's governmental infrastructure company as the department head of bicycle infrastructure development, although he now works on all alternative mobility infrastructure. He is an experienced cyclist and has extensive knowledge of bicycle infrastructure (development) and culture in Europe.

Key points:

- Why is Lviv now the cycling capital of Ukraine?
 - Very pro-EU Major, who wants to make EU more European (like Lviv's citizens). Confirms that the Major wasn't exactly a pioneer on cycling, but by now alternative mobility is a necessity of Lviv. A whole complex of reasons related to the quality of life in the city is the motivation to pursue cycling as alternative mobility option;
 - Good democratic situation in Lviv: public to government distance is small, and citizens ask for more accountability, responsibility and transparency from local

- government (very different from Eastern Ukraine). Citizens have experience with European democracy;
- Lviv's culture is closer to Europe. Cycling is a part of that;
 - EURO 2012: International specialist GIZ (German foreign cooperation knowledge institute) helped prepare quality documents for very ambitious cycling plans in 2010, which were accepted by the City Council and since developed into actions;
 - Lviv's compactness makes it attractive to develop cycling, although there are some hills.
- Lviv is behind schedule with building ambitious cycling infrastructure. The goal is 270km in 2019 at a high 40-45% car/cycling infrastructure ratio), now at 30km while they should be at 130km already. Reasons for delay:
 - Fast start because of EURO 2012;
 - But the national Cabinet of Ministers did not give the promised money to fix the existing infrastructure for EURO 2012, which resulted in no extra km's of cycling infrastructure built in 2013;
 - Recent cycling infrastructure expansion came through German money, implemented by GIZ;
 - Oleh's key current task is to promote Lviv as investment opportunity for external funders, with help from GIZ;
 - He is optimistic that funding will come, Euromaidan revolution doesn't change that;
 - Lviv has to show to investors that they *can do it*, then money will come: "Every 1km brings 3km extra" .
 - Current cyclists:
 - Few overall. See interview online: "Lviv's situation is unique in that cycling is not pushed for by its citizens at all, but by the local government";
 - 'Our students are not even cycling'. Young professionals, e.g. in the IT sector cycle
 - "the largest obstacle to promoting bicycle culture in Lviv is influencing behavior. Since there is no demand from the society for bicycling yet, I ask people to get on their bikes and push the cars out of roads."
 - Oleh expected a broader audience of cyclists by now, but that did not happen (yet). Hardcore cyclists are not even very supportive to his plans, as they are used to having a hard time on the road and learned to cope with it. Inexperienced cyclists warmly support his work.
 - 60%+ of people travel by public transport, although this is decreasing; car ownership only 25% but rapidly rising;
 - Key philosophy in the development of cycling in Lviv: infrastructure first, mentality second. This is reflected in Lviv City Administration's division of efforts on cycling currently: 80% on infrastructure, 20% on awareness building and promotion. Later, this will be flipped around;
 - Oleh confirms that the distance between the public and government is much smaller in Lviv than anywhere in Ukraine (e.g. you can enter the City Hall without appointment, Council members go in the street without protection, and the Lviv's Major Andriyy Sadovyy is transparent in how he lives his life and what his philosophy for Lviv is)

- Cycling elsewhere in Ukraine:
 - In Kiev they have troubles with a more rigid government, and a much larger city. Districts are targeted slowly one at a time. In Donetsk there is little success, no money is invested in cycling and there is no real cycling culture/cycling doesn't fit the Russian culture there. Cycling is not (yet) a piece of urban culture there.

Organic food in Lviv

First organic restaurant in Lviv: "Green"

They opened February 2014. Owners are designer, cook, artistic people. Designer is the main figure, who leads his own personal healthy lifestyle; he met other people who have similar lifestyles, and they thought to start this café/restaurant as the first in Lviv (first for themselves). In Kiev there is a place like this but they only sell alcohol there. Here on the 2nd floor they will make an art exhibition and organize other cultural events. <https://www.facebook.com/greenlviv>

- I did not find other organic food or urban agriculture related initiatives, events, organizations or stores in Lviv.

Case study 2: organic food in Kiev

This subchapter gives an overview of the interviews conducted for *Case study 2: organic food in Kiev*, between May 13th and 21nd, 2014 in Kiev, Ukraine.

Interview 1: Yura Pyvovarenko (co-founder Let's Do it Ukraine) 15-05-2014, 11:00-12:00, Kiev)

Profile: Yura Pyvovarenko (31) is co-founder of Lets Do it Ukraine. Vegetarian because he doesn't want to have animals be killed for him. IT software developer for a big US IT company, studied chemistry.

Key points:

- Got into environmentalism because he saw the park of his childhood turn into a mess. He organized a clean-up and did some research there (2009). Noticed people all care but don't take the initiative. After this event he was approached to start Lets Do it Ukraine.
- Being a vegetarian in Kiev: people are skeptical (healthy?). He is part of a vegetarian community, via VK (they meet regularly). Since 1 year there are vegetarian cafes/restaurants.
- Like most people, he is very negative of the quality of food in Ukrainian supermarkets (junk food). He is also skeptical of organic products: they are expensive, he can get them from his grandma.
- Organic food business in Kiev took off 4/5 years ago. There were meetings, out of business interest. Maybe it came from Europe. As Kiev became wealthier, there is more demand. The market for organic products is the middle and higher class.
- People in their 30s right now have seen a bit of the soviet times; both the good things and the bad things. They can compare and make up a balance, have a clearer vision.

- Yura is glad that the revolution happened. “We’re different people now”. More can-do attitude, responsibility and solidarity. Opened the eyes of many people. More open, care to do something for society. “ We are the power”
 - He sees people being more active, people are setting up initiatives, organizations, etc. Boost in civil society
 - Not eco specifically; but there is also more room and motivation for that. Mostly IT and politics. IT projects want to help solve social and political problems by connecting people, information, etc.
- Why organic food in Kiev? Kiev is the richest, and organic food is for the wealthy people. In Eastern Ukraine it will probably come up (if it hasn’t already) the coming years, starting with Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk (fairly progressive and rich), could emerge market for that. People generally care less for the environment though. But its business.
- Ukraine (projects/organizations) lack resources, are learning to attract funding and to improve their activities. They need to prove themselves to investors. More accountability of government is key.
- Organic Era: is/was an NGO that promoted organic product proliferation
- In 2013 there was an effort to organize all eco-initiatives under one umbrella website + regular meetings/mutual agenda, etc. Yura learned that the eco-organizations in Kiev are not ready to merge into associations, they can only fruitfully work together on projects.

Interview 2: Sergey Polivar (16-05-2014, 13:30-14:30, Kiev)

Profile: Sergey Polivar (±35) is an entrepreneur in eco-products. As a stable job he works for a communication service agency.

Key points:

- SP founded the first organic-only supermarket – ECO-CLUB UA – in 2008/2009. After 5 years he sold the business. Started as an internet shop with 10 products, which catered towards parents. He also came to schools and took part in eco-education programs, organic festivals and organic farm fares + represented Ukraine in international conferences. Then, he started to communicate with similar businesses. Now ECO-CLUB sells over 5000 organic products.
- Now he works on a new project: sustainable furniture; furniture which is customizable, ecological, appeals to young people and artists.
- In 2008/2009 there was nothing organic in the shops yet. Organic was a “strange word”. After 5 years organic market develop a lot. Big markets started to include organic offer into their assortment.
- Currently the market is unfavorable because of the crisis in Ukraine.
- SP doesn’t believe that organic products are a luxury product, but sees that they are more expensive.

- Kyiv focus: biggest population of organic mindset, and people travelled a lot. Lviv (European mindset), Odessa (cheese), Dnipropetrovsk (Kosher) and Kharkiv (similar to Kiev) are also big markets.
- Organic market is growing rapidly: +100% in 2008, +25-30% every year since. 2008/2009: worldwide organic high on agenda. In 2010 Davos highlighted that organic products are hugely important/big trend.
- Consumers buy organic alternatives for all the mix of standard reasons. Marketing is very broad, since the consumer audience is equally broad. ECO-CLUB: 'healthy food for all the family'.
- Natur Boutic sells organic tea and coffee. Glossary sells cosmetics, food, etc.
- East vs West of Ukraine: no difference, because the target audience is very specific.
- Producers need to invest to be able to qualify for the organic label. Need international vision. The last 4 years, the government has done nothing to help.
- Future:
 - he is optimistic. Producers are creative and show efforts, and export is on the rise. Supermarkets are increasingly interested in making good statements.
 - Environmental mindset of people will continue to grow over the next 10-15 years. There are many market opportunities which MNC's will pick up on.
- Farmers/producers can have an advantage if they switch early to organic label, because integration with EU mandates high standards for exports.

Interview 3: Tatjana Sitnik, associated with MAMA-86 (19-05-2014, 16:30-17:30, Kiev)

Profile: Tatjana Sitnik (±35) is a researcher and entrepreneur who does educational projects in the sustainable product market, primarily from the perspective of labeling. She conducts research to build knowledge for companies/farmers/producers who want to make the switch, and for NGOs like MAMA-86. She was always interested in nature and the environment. In Cherkasy she fought against a GMO plantation.

Key points:

- **Because of the crisis in Ukraine, she can only tell us her observations until December 2013. No data after that.**
- Since 2008, the organic products market has grown roughly 30% each year. Across Ukraine, there are around 110 organic operators (stores etc.), and 160 producers/farmers. In the West and South there are the most.
- In Russia there is also a development of the organic market.
- Law passed in January 2014 in Kiev: European style law that government broadly supports organic, and will reduce the amount of pseudo-organic products. No promises were made in the law/policy, not very specific. The law makes a new definition of organic vs. ecologically friendly products and producers. The law suggests Ukraine should have its own organic market and certification scheme.

- Producers who are switching to organic can choose out of a list of labels.
- In Ukraine, EU companies/institutions and GIZ helped set up the organic market as part of the broad sustainable development program. Swiss cooperation helped a lot also.
- 80% of the increase of organic product market is thanks to outside help:
 - Education of farmers of the advantages of switching.
 - Linking of producers are buyers, organizing reliable supply chains.
- Ethnoproducer: Ukrainian farmers started in 2008 with certification of land & soil, many dairy and meat products. Every year recertified.
- **Problem:** distinguishing bad and good certification. Ukrainian government just started to regulate the certification (2014 law).
 - In 2013, there were in Ukraine very many pseudo products. There were more pseudo-organic products than real ones. Now there is a turnaround, thanks to NGO policing (social activists), government law/policy and more consumer awareness.
 - Big campaign from MAMA-86 to educate consumers.
- In all supermarkets there is some form of eco-product offer. Up to 300 specific eco-only shops exist.
- **First focus:** on organic product market was export. 4 years ago only 100 people in Ukraine really knew what organic food really was, and that we produce it.
 - Production of organic food for export started years before introduction on domestic market.
- Tatjana conducted research at health fairs on how consumers perceive organic products, and how they distinguish between the labels and quality (see brochure).
 - People in her study attended the health fair; young people with kids, students, healthy lifestyle.
- At a recent international conference she presented about the Ukrainian organic product market. Most people didn't know about it. Attitude among producers was skeptical: they want to intensify and grow. But they were curious.
- Critical consumerism is a very recent development in Ukraine. NGOs are doing big campaigns to promote it.
- In 2013 she conducted a study of organic product offer at regular stores.
 - People do not differ clearly between different labels. Ecologically clean vs. organic is confusing. There is also 'natural'.
- Tatjana would want to have organic market not be dominated by supermarket who raise the prices (like the vice-chief of MAMA-86).
- Currently, the pseudo-organic producers are not challenge by the troubled government, but are afraid of the anti-monopoly committee. There are some products in the market right now which are illegally labeled, but it is hard to punish.
 - Control almost exclusively through social activists.
- Tatjana's strategy/philosophy: work with consumers to bring out their desires to become critical consumers.
- Future:
 - Borders will open more for exportation, opportunities for producers.

- 3 weeks ago there was a meeting with producers to think about the organic market opportunities for the EU. Lots of production already goes to the EU, where the demand is very high.
- The map says something about both supply and demand: in Kiev, Odessa and Kharkiv a lot of organic products are sold. In Kharkiv, some of the trade networks/big company networks committed themselves to take the lead in selling organic produce.

Interview 4: Zoryana Mishchuk, vice-director of major Ukrainian environment NGO MAMA-86 (19-05-2014, 15:00-16:00, Kiev)

Profile: Zoryana Mishchuk (+30) occupies a high position at MAMA-86. She conducts research and does advocacy for environmental issues at a high level (national government). MAMA-86 is a professionalized environmental NGO with a long history and big name, and its activities resemble the larger ENGOs in Western Europe. She studied in European studies, foreign affairs and economics in Budapest and only later came to the environmentalist sphere through a project on sustainable development.

Key points:

- MAMA-86 has worked on sustainability in Ukraine for 24 years already, and sustainable consumption is one of its key topics. They operate at a high level, attending international conferences. They also implement UNEP initiatives.
- Growth of organic food market:
 - Demand from consumers
 - Supply was already there, it was oriented towards export to the EU
 - Lately there are also small and medium sized organic food producers
 - Living standards increased in Ukraine in general, people can afford it
- Organic food can be between 30-500% more expensive
- Obstacle: what is organic? Labeling is unclear, there is lots of uncertainty.
 - MAMA-86 is involved in promoting critical consumerism through all sorts of actions
 - Green Consumer Week
 - Roundtable discussions on the topic of ‘environment on your plate’
 - Everybody wants it, but it is hard to synchronize supply change, there is a need for knowledge.
 - Last year, the new law improved the situation, but there is a need for by-laws to make things more specific.
 - MAMA-86 does not lobby directly for it, but rather does advocacy.
- European turn of Ukraine: good for organic market. Farms can immediately adapt the new high standards. There is a high demand from the EU side
- She believes it is of key importance to develop small/medium producers.
 - But, many complain about the process of labeling, certifying. Overall there is a lack of knowledge and awareness.

- The economic situation of Ukraine does not do the organic market any good. Organic is also extremely low on the political agenda.
- Who buy? Families with kids, young people, young and pregnant women, etc. Mostly in the bigger cities.
- Local towns have local organic products.
- Organic food is not quite a fashion, it is a process which is part of the spread of environmental awareness in Ukraine.
- Geographical differences: related to economical situation and environmentalism
 - In the East, there is a certain degree of fatalism. People are also quite poor.
 - In the West, people are also poor but there is a lot of agriculture. People have a closer connection to the natural environment.
- Right now it is important to create conducive conditions on a local level to stimulate environmental activities.
- After Maidan:
 - Strengthening of responsibility and feeling of civic consciousness among ordinary people.
 - There is not necessarily an increase in ecological initiatives.
- Environment is not a topic in current political discussions at any level.

Interview 5: Sergey Hihat, environment/vegan activist (19-05-2014, 17:00-18:00, Kiev)

Profile: Sergey Hihat (26) is vegan, environmental and animal rights activist. He plays a key role in the Kiev (and to some extent national) vegan/vegetarian community. He also makes money selling organic shoes. He attends international conferences, such as COP's, often representing Ukraine. He studied psychology.

Key points:

- Since 2007 the vegetarian/vegan community/movement in Kiev grew a lot. Now more than 15 vegan/vegetarian cafes restaurants. Now, in a small café 100 people might show up for a community event.
 - Established in the 90s already. Sergey joined in 2007
 - There are subgroups with specific focuses and communities, e.g. focus on dog animal rights
 - At festivals they organize up to 15.000 show up.
 - The movement grew rapidly in 2010. Why?
 - Before only in big cities (1 million+, often they have chrisna societies)
 - Firstly the movement was only about animal rights
 - They made the veg/veg starter kit, and did a lot of easily accessible and popular promotion with familiar icons.

- Only in 2008 the movement started to communicate with environmental activists/groups, which has since led to a lot of cooperation and cross-spread of ideas.
- Who? At first only young people, now increasingly older people too. For that reason they have made age-specific information brochures.
- Some of the products he purchases are organic. But he does a lot of home growing and preparation.
- Still there are a lot of fake organic products. In supermarkets the offer is not always there, but on the market you can always find something and it is much cheaper.
- Why is organic becoming popular now?
 - Animal care is not the main concern for most people
 - Healthiness aspect is most relevant to most consumers
 - Religion for some, for vegans and vegetarians
- In Kharkiv, the community is large. Little (Chinese) shops are great promoters of veganism and vegetarianism. There are good facilities.
 - Like in many Ukrainian cities, the pioneers of organic, vegan and vegetarian shops/cafes/restaurants were religious people (Chrisna in the East for example).
 - Since then, it has become more businesslike and popular
- Sergey doesn't observe many regional differences when it concerns the vegan/vegetarian movement.
- Future:
 - He is optimistic
 - Yoga is getting more popular, which is getting people interested in health and vegetarian/vegan → co-practice
 - Ukrainians have become more aware of health and food quality
 - Dietologists are also starting to promote vegetarian and organic food
 - Celebrities and athletes are 'coming out' for being vegan or vegetarian, popularizing it
- Why did organic food start late in Ukraine?
 - Maybe historical process → Maslow-pyramid
 - Internet development now, as well as more travel to Europe
- He believes the community and movement will grow, there will be more attention to animal rights.
- A problem is the show-off culture.

Annex 2: Index of brochures, links and other material

Case study 1: cycling in Lviv

(1) The following offline or non-digitalized documents were researched:

European Mobility Week 2011 report by Lviv City Administration (2011)
 Cycling promotion brochure from Lviv City Administration (2011)
 Map of Lviv, including current bicycle infrastructure (2011)
 Renovating Lviv's Old Town, German educational report (2008)
 ELTIS Case study Zero Carbon Mobility: Cycling in Lviv (2012)

(2) The following websites were consulted for background information on cycling in Lviv:

Main page on Cycling in Lviv: <http://www.mobilnist.org.ua/en/velolev.html>
 Sustainable mobility in Lviv: <http://mobility.lviv.ua/en>
 Ukrainian Center for Cycling Exp.: http://www.mobilnist.org.ua/mfwl/UCCE_release_eng.pdf
 SUTP interview with Oleh Shmid: <http://www.sutp.org/documents/DOC-SUTECA-OSHMID-EN.pdf>
 ELTIS Urban mobility portal: http://www.eltis.org/index.php?id=13&study_id=3169
 Cycling enthusiast organization Lviv: <http://www.velolviv.org/>
<https://www.facebook.com/velolviv?fref=ts>
 Lviv bicycle club: <https://www.facebook.com/LvivBicycleClub?fref=ts>

(3) Observations were made during the cycling tour through Lviv, and in general moving about the city. I also had casual but informative conversations with regular cyclists and the three interviewees. Notes and photos were made, but deemed not informative enough to be included here (the noteworthy ones are included in the text).

Case study 2: organic food in Kiev

(1) The following offline or non-digitalized documents were researched:

Strategic encounter: Organic products in retail stores, Research Institute of Organic Agriculture (FiBL, Swiss research institute), Kiev, 2013
 Ukraine Organic Business Directory, OrganicInfo.UA, FiBL and Organic Standard, 2013

(2) The following websites were consulted for background information on cycling in Lviv:

Organic Ukraine, NGO with informative website: <http://organicukraine.com/>
 FiBL press release statement of the “Organic Market Development in Ukraine” project, 2012: <http://www.fibl.org/en/media/media-archive/media-release/article/organic-market-development-in-ukraine.html>
 Organic Market Info, 2013: http://www.organic-market.info/web/Know_How/Ukraine/219/0/0/15413.html

(3) Observations were made in several organic stores, supermarkets and minimarkets. I also had casual but informative conversations with a few two consumers and a shop owners. Notes and photos were made, but deemed not informative enough to be included here; again, the noteworthy ones are included in the text.