The Experience of Power Sharing Through Bosnia-Herzegovina

16-07-2014
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'Misunderstanding of the present
is the inevitable consequence of ignorance of the past.'
- Marc Bloch

This paper functions as a bachelor thesis for the
bachelor International Development Studies.
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Content

Chapter 1 Introduction

The tumultuous history of Bosnia and Herzegovina peaked at the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the proclaimed independence in 1992. Bosnia had always been a highly diverse ethnical country but after the dissolution for Yugoslavia, tensions between the three main ethnicities started to rise and peaceful coexistence became to crumble. The three constituent ethnicities opposed each other and were heavily divided over the future of Bosnia. The ensuing Bosnian War was characterised as an intense violent conflict with severe cases of atrocities and ethnic cleansing. Desperation for an international solution increased and peace was finally reached in the form of a power sharing arrangement included in the Dayton Peace Accords. The consequences of the Bosnian War and the Dayton Accords are still the main focus of attention and seen throughout the Bosnian society today. The Bosnian case is an example of eacebuilding through power sharing institutions by the international community after an escalated internal conflict. Power sharing was seen as the only adequate way of stabilising the conflict and working towards sustainable peace. But today the country is still divided along ethnical lines, despite international support to create peaceful coexistence (Freedom House, 2013). Did something go wrong with the implementation of power sharing in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

The primary idea of power sharing is that it transforms opponents in cooperative partners, which is especially helpful in multi-ethnical societies divided along cleavages (Norris, 2008). The concept of power sharing can be considered a theoretically adequate political tool for peacebuilding in post-conflict nations. However in practice it is rather difficult to solve deeply ethnical conflicts through power sharing and is often insufficient in achieving its goals. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) can be regarded as such a case of potential failure concerning the power-sharing arrangements, which seemed to have only reinforced the ethnical identities (Norris, 2008). This brings up the question whether, and in which regard, power sharing as a means of peacebuilding in fact has failed in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and whether this affected the concept of power sharing in general. Has the international community (e.g. the UN, IMF, EU and other international organisations regarding the implementation of peacebuilding operations), learned from the experience in this particular country? What were the lessons learned and were they taken into account for the implementation of other peacebuilding operations in other cases?

Power sharing is often described as having failed in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The research question is aimed at looking at whether this is actually the case and if, in this case, there were important lessons learned which altered the implementation of the concept? These questions lead to a general research question supported by additional sub-questions.

Research question: 'Has the concept of power-sharing institutions changed through the experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina?'

- What is the concept of power sharing?
- What happened in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
- Which examples of power sharing are found in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
- What were the implications regarding the implementation of power sharing in
  Bosnia-Herzegovina?
- What are the lessons learned from the implementation of power sharing in the case of
Bosnia-Herzegovina?

This paper revolves around different concepts such as power-sharing institutions, peacebuilding, power relations, conflict and multi-ethnical society. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a multi-ethnical society in which three main ethnicities coexist alongside one another; Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats. The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina is essentially about a conflict between different ethnicities who all try to secure their existence within the country and try to maintain and defend their own power, culture and legacy. But the most important concepts for this thesis are power sharing and peacebuilding. Power sharing can be seen as a means of peacebuilding where power-sharing institutions are implemented to restore communal interests and try to prevent future conflict from breaking out. Power sharing is closely associated with Arend Lijphart's consociationalism and entails the sharing of executive power, proportionality, group autonomy and veto rights but also contains features beyond these four traditional consociational facets (Byrne & McCulloch, 2012). Additionally, power sharing can also been seen as a way of enhancing the democracy level present in a nation. By dividing executive power and giving multiple actors a stake in the decision-making and political process, power is decentralised and different actors can feel more equally treated in the overall political process and thereby mitigating the conflict.

This research functions as a bachelor thesis for the bachelor International Development Studies. Power sharing is a very current topic in international politics and is very relevant for the structure and development of peacebuilding operations. Lessons learned from cases such as Bosnia can be taken into account for future peacebuilding missions were power sharing can be implemented. The content of this thesis will include a theoretical framework explaining the general concept of power sharing. This is applied to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina; e.g. what kind of power-sharing institutions have been created here and what were the implications? Hereafter a critical review on both the concept of power sharing in general and specifically in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina is provided. Additionally it is examined whether the concept and implementation of power sharing have transformed through the experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina and what lessons can be learned for future peacebuilding operations. This research completely consists out of a literature study. This means that appropriate and relevant literature is used, both on the concept of power sharing itself and on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given the short period of time it was not within reach to do more than a literature study.

Chapter 2 Theoretical concept of power-sharing

Power sharing is a term often used in literature concerning post-conflict management. Despite the large amount of definitions available, it is of importance to first clarify the concept of power sharing and make a definition before looking at the possible transformation it has made. This chapter contains the explanation of power sharing in current literature; the concept is applied in the context of peacebuilding and applied in the context of democracy.

2.1 Theoretical concept

According to Norris (2008) 'the primary idea is that in multi-ethnic societies divided into different linguistic, religious, or national communities, power-sharing institutions and procedures turn political opponents into cooperative partners, by providing communal leaders with a guaranteed stake in the democratic process' (p. 4). This understanding of power sharing can be applied in two situations. Power sharing can be a part of peacebuilding in where it tries to 'solve' the conflict by giving all parties a stake in the executive power, thus making the return to armed conflict less plausible. It is a way of initial response in managing a post-conflict situation. Furthermore, power sharing can also be used as a tool to increase the democracy level in divided societies, which are not necessarily characterised by conflict but do cope with problems of coexistence by different groups in society. These two perspectives of power sharing correspond with existing political and conflict-management literature; power sharing can be understood as the combination of the principles of ethnic conflict management and the practice of democracy (Sisk, 2013). Thus the implementation of power-sharing institutions can be perceived to have a dual significance; either as tool for solving conflict or as a way of increasing the level of democracy. This does not imply that it is of an either-or matter; certainly the level of democracy is also addressed in the case of peacebuilding.

Consociationalism

Power-sharing is closely associated with the concept of consociationalism of Arend Lijphart. According to Lijphart (1969) 'consociational democracy means government by elite cooperation designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy' (p. 216). A big part of Lijphart's study was based upon the analysis and experience of the Dutch society during the *verzuiling* (pillarization)[1]. Here the different pillars represent the difficulty in coexistence in the form of vertical segregation, but manage to work together due to elites who gather in the political arena (at the top of the pillars). So he claimed that a nation can still be qualified as a stable democracy, despite vertical segregation, if the elites of every group would work together on the political aspect. Although Lijphart draw heavily on the analysis of Dutch society, the concept was applicable to multiple cases besides the Netherlands.

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[1] The pillarization was a time in the Netherlands were there were four distinguishable groups (Catholics, protestants, socialist and liberals) who lived segregated from each other in all dimensions of society; different schools, hospitals, newspapers, television programmes among many other examples.

Institutionally consociationalism entails the sharing of executive power, proportional distribution, segmental autonomy and veto rights on issues of vital importance (Byrne and McCulloch, 2012; Kauffman, 1996; Schneckener, 2002). Due to a grand coalition[2] all groups are represented and share the executive power. Proportionality serves as a method to distribute for instance governmental functions equally over the different groups. In this way the groups can influence the political system in proportion to their numerical strength (Lijphart, 1977). Group autonomy guarantees a certain degree of independence to the different groups; on common matters all groups decide together and on important matters according to groups, the groups decide themselves. Minority veto serves as a security principle that guarantees political protection for the different groups (Lijphart, 1977). This is very similar to power-sharing arrangements; consociationalism creates guarantees for minority groups in the political process by veto rights and thereby safeguarding their position.

It is important to acknowledge that not every case of cross-party cooperation in a nation qualifies as consociationalism. There is consociationalism when there is both segmental cleavages and elite cooperation; so it describes a specific type of society and a way of government (Schneckener, 2002). A nation where there is just elite cooperation and no segmental cleavages does not qualify to be named consociationalism, but instead refers to corporatism. The difference is for instance noticed in the cases of Belgium and Austria; both are considered to be European examples of power sharing but compose of substantive different societies. Belgium needed power sharing to keep two ethnical groups (Flemings and Walloons) into one nation, in contrary Austria used power sharing to maintain two different political groups (conservatism and socialism) in one nation (Schneckener, 2002). Belgium does have a segmental cleavage, e.g. linguistic, and Austria does not have a segmental cleavage. So from this it can be suggested that consociationalism is defined in cases where there are clear segmental cleavages who jointly take executive decisions in the political system.

Dimensions

Consociationalism can be seen mostly as power sharing at a political dimension, but power sharing arrangements can also takes place on other dimensions. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) note that 'although the political arena is important, it is not the only sphere in which competing groups may agree to share power' (p. 320), e.g. other dimensions such as territorial division or access to economic resources can also be of importance. Power-sharing institutions can thus be of political, military, territorial or economic nature (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Jarstad and Nilson 2008). Political power-sharing can be considered as distributing executive power amongst adversary groups and thereby providing a sphere of equal importance amongst the groups. One means of achieving this is by implementing proportional representation[3] in where the one-man-one-vote system entails for a corresponding portray of a divided society in the political arena. When the autonomy between the levels of government is divided through federalism, decentralisation or other regional

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[2] A grand coalition is a coalition in were two or more opposing groups share executive power
[3] Proportional representation is a form of voting in which the number of seats won are proportionate to the number of votes.

arrangements, there is territorial power sharing (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). In this way executive power is not concentrated in a central unit, but divided over different regions.

Military power-sharing is more difficult to define, but mostly applies in a way of conflict resolving by for example agreeing that former combatants are accepted in a new national army. Thus making military power-sharing more applicable in the case of conflict management, than as means of creating long term peaceful coexistence. The economic dimension of power-sharing can be seen in a more general social dimension, it contains the equal access to economic resources, job opportunities, education and health care and so on.

Political and territorial power-sharing are related to consociationalism; the same as with political power-sharing, consociationalism guarantees the sharing of executive power and territorial power-sharing can be linked to segmental autonomy. Military and economic power-sharing are not addressed in the concept of consociationalism. Consociationalism can thus be seen as political power-sharing, since it does not really correspond with the other two dimensions. The expectation of power sharing in general is the creation of peaceful coexistence amongst adversaries, in varying cases of societies divided by cleavages or in post-conflict societies. In the case of nations struggling with conflict, power-sharing institutions are often implemented by third parties as conflict management. Conflict management can be seen as containing the violence and stabilising the conflict. In the next section, power sharing is further exemplified in the context of two purposes; power sharing as peacebuilding and power sharing as means of enhancing democracy.

2.2 Peacebuilding

The main aim of power sharing in terms of peacebuilding is post-conflict management; creating a secure environment in where the likeliness of the fallout of further conflict is prevented. This is closely associated with conflict-management; containment of violence and stabilising the situation. A secure environment is necessary in order to get former combatants to agree upon common ground; they need to be safeguarded that their former opponent will not be able to use power that threatens their interests or survival. Power-sharing institutions create this assurance and offer safety by providing a stake in the political process for all groups. The lacking of such a secure environment could create feeling of suspicion or aggressive intentions, which can obstruct the peace project. Decentralisation of power can be offered to give minorities or opposing groups a share in executive power. In this way the supposed threat of central authority, feared by rival groups, can be reduced and institutions that guarantee security can be crafted (Hartzell et al., 2001). A third party is often involved in post-conflict management which is tasked to contribute in stabilising the situation. They can assist in reaching a peace settlement by offering a security assurance (Hartzell et al., 2001). In the case of ethnic conflict, eventually ethnic integration is pursued which can be seen as a requirement for peaceful coexistence. However it can be stated that in this stage of peacebuilding, ethnic integration is not really addressed yet since the mere focus lies with stabilising the conflict.

Peacebuilding nowadays contains more than the mere seperation of opponents and stopping the conflict, it also aims at addressing the causes of the conflict and wanting to create a democratic society build around sustainable peace in where opposing groups can coexist. Peacebuilding is more and more focused on the creation of democractic states (Call & Cook, 2003). Processes of making a constitution, holding early elections, building of a strong civil society and the creation of state institutions are important in this democratisation process according to Call and Cook (2003). By stimulating a strong and diverse civil society, a foundation for a post-war democratic transition can be structured (Belloni, 2001), which will contribute to the eventual goal of peacebuilding; creating peaceful coexistence among opposing groups. Democratisation seems to play an important role in peacebuilding. This is plausible since peacebuilding aims at rebuilding a peaceful society and restoring equal changes for everybody.

Furthermore, the more power-sharing takes place, on numerous dimensions, the more unlikely future fallouts will happen. This is confirmed by Hartzell&Hodie (2003) who state that examples where all four dimensions of power sharing were used in civil war peace settlements had a higher rate of success than those which only included one dimension of power sharing. This seems plausible, since antagonistic groups are more likely to agree with each other when power is shared on multiple dimensions instead of just one. Also the conflict between opposing groups is multifaceted, therefore power sharing on numerous dimension can contribute more towards peace between the groups than just power sharing on one dimension since it addresses more critical issues perceived by the opposing groups. Additionally, another argument can be advocated. Since not all political decisions are always implemented – later on things may seem unachievable which was perceived differently at the time of decision – one can always fall back on those agreements made and which were able to be successfully implemented. In the case of post-conflict settlement this means that when there is decided upon multiple power-sharing agreements – with the change of one failing among other agreements – it is able to fall back on those power-agreements that were successful. Instead of returning to scratch when the one dimension of power sharing has failed, in the case of power sharing on multiple dimensions it is possible to fall back on other successful agreements and that this would decrease the likelihood of returning to combat.

So it can be stated that in the context of peacebuilding, power sharing contains three important goals; creating a secure environment, prevent future fallouts and start the trajectory for a long term peace project. The initial response of peacebuilding is to terminate the conflict and start to create a long trajectory for sustainable peace. One key component of peacebuilding here is democratisation. According to Chandler (1999) peacekeeping organisations of the United Nations in the Cold War era were merely of military nature and aimed to keep armed groups apart from each other, instead of resolving the conflict. Besides this military assistance they also promoted liberal market democracy as the best model of political and economic organisation (Paris, 2004). Since then a trend of democratisation has appeared in were peacebuilding contained more than the mere separation of armed forces. 'This new concept of post-conflict peacebuilding was developed and defined as action to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace, including the monitoring

of elections, protection of human rights and reform of governing institutions' (Chandler, 1999, p. 109). The scope of peacebuilding has extended beyond mere military intervention and a new attention towards the social, economic, and humanitarian appeared. This shows that there was increasing attention towards the democratisation process in peacebuilding and that now these two concepts are more and more intertwined.

2.3 Democracy

As stated before, there is a new profound focus on the democratisation process within peacebuilding. The primary task of democracy is to transform antagonistic groups into adversary groups; the difference lies within being enemies or agreeing to disagree. Power sharing is one way of enhancing the level of democracy within a nation since it is aimed at including everyone at an equal level. Power sharing, broadly defined, is a set of institutions and processes that prioritize inclusion, consensus decision-making and the institutionalisation of norms of peaceful coexistence in the state (Sisk, 2013). Through the use of power-sharing institutions power is diffused and not centralised. This makes it more difficult for one dominant group to seize power and use it solely for their own benefit. Different types of power-sharing institutions can contribute to the creation of peaceful coexistence in a society and play a primary role in the consolidation of democracy.

In the book *Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?* Norris describes four formal institutional features that can be of great significance for the democracy level present within a nation. She makes the distinction between power-sharing regimes and power-concentrating regimes. The former being societies characterised by formal institutional rules which give multiple political actors a stake in the decision-making process and the latter being societies characterised by restrictive formal institutional rules which limit office to a smaller range of actors (Norris, 2008). The type of regime is conceptualised on the basis of four formal institutional features consisting of: the basic type of electoral system, the horizontal concentration of power in the type of executive (parliamentary or presidential), the vertical concentration of power in unitary or federal states and the structure and independence of the mass media (Norris, 2008). All these institutional features contain different types of domains of power sharing and can contribute towards the level of democracy.

A free electoral system that adheres by formal electoral rules is the first and most effective way of letting the voices of the people being heard. Official policies, regulations and procedures are all included in formal electoral rules which aim is to govern all steps in the process of elections; from ballot to elected office (Norris, 2008). By having free elections which are easily accessible to all different groups in society, each individual can contribute to the political process. Proportional representation and a low threshold provide a political system in where not only dominant groups but also minorities are represented. Norris concluded that an electoral system based upon proportional presentation is more democratic than a voting system based on majority rule (Norris, 2008). This seems very plausible since through this system society is proportional represented in executive and legislative offices. The electoral system may have fewer links towards power sharing, since power is not really divided among opposing groups. But the proportional representation as an electoral system

does guarantee all groups a say in the decision-making or political process according to their numeral strength; and is therefore closely associated with consociationalism.

Horizontal concentration of power in the type of executive suggests something about the constitutional design of a country. Different constitutional designs have different outcomes on the legitimacy and authority of the government. Norris has made a typology according to three key aspects; (i) the constitutional adaption of a unitary or dual executive, (ii) the constitutional process of accession for the head of state and the head of government and (iii) the constitutional rules governing tenure in office (Norris, 2008). The constitutional adaption of a unitary or dual executive feature includes whether the head of state and the head of government are combined in one office (unitary) or separated (dual). The constitutional accession expresses how the executive of a state is chosen, either through hereditary process (e.g. monarchy) or through indirect/direct elections (e.g. presidential republics). The third aspect, the constitutional rules of governing tenure in office, describes the official length one executive can be in power. For instance, for a monarchy it is often a lifetime position, in contrary to a presidential republic where there is a fixed term of office. All the variations possible within the type of executive have a different outcome on the structure and the level of democracy in a country. Parliamentary monarchies are considered to be more democratic than for instance presidential republics, according to Norris (2008), because this type of executive faces multiple check and balances on their power; such as regular elections and accountability towards the parliament. By installing multiple checks and balances on a type of executive it is more difficult to exercise dominance over the political process and making it in its whole more transparent.

The third institutional feature, the vertical concentration of power in unitary or federal states, covers the territorial-administrative model of a country. Vertical power-sharing among multiple layers of government is generated by federalism and decentralisation. Decentralisation can be understood as the delegation of authority and responsibilities from the nation level to subnational levels. In this case the national level is still the legislative authority, but now the subnational parts are responsible for the implementation of certain policies. Here the degree of decentralisation is important to see whether it is considered to be actual power sharing. When there is a high level of decentralisation and municipalities or provinces have great influence in decision-making and implementation process, it can be considered to be a form of power sharing. But when there is decentralisation in the form of simply executing decisions made from the central authority, it can be stated that there is no real power sharing taking place since the municipalities or provinces do not have a real influence in the matter. With federalism, subnational parts and the national parts are combined within in one nation and both carry a certain independence and authority aside from each other. A federal model is seen as more democratic than a unitary model[4], according to Norris (2008), since is divides executive power instead of centralising it. Especially fragile multinational states are best beneficiated by federal forms of power sharing since they are generally perceived as accommodating all different groups the best (Norris, 2008).

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[4] A unitary state model consists out of state where there is a central authority which governs the whole nation; subnational parts only execute those tasks delegated by the central authority.

The last institutional feature by Norris contains the structure and independence of the mass media. According to Norris (2008) 'the existence of an unfettered and independent press within each nation is essential in the process of democratization' (p. 186). The media serves as an observer of politics; revealing corruption and other malpractices, provides information to the public about the current political situation and it can channel citizens' concerns to decision-makers. Equal airtime for different groups or different television channels linked to different groups can provide a diverse picture and gives people the feeling of being represented. So the structure and independence of mass media gives an understanding in where people are able to retrieve information and whether this is unbiased. Unbiased information provision is linked to democracy since people have access to fair information and are therefore able to make critical choices concerning politics. Certainly does the structure of mass media play a role within democracy and it can definitely contribute in bringing opposing groups together, however its relevance here is questionable. Although the structure and independence of the media does tell something about the democratic status of a nation, is does not really address power sharing. Therefore the focus in this thesis will be on the other three institutional features.

With these institutional features it is possible to look at the presence of horizontal and vertical accountability. Horizontal accountability strengthens the democracy by the presence of multiple checks and balances on political leaders, for instance regular elections, legislation on tenure office or a dual executive. When the decision-making process is shared amongst the multiple layers of government, by for example decentralisation or federalism, one can speak of vertical accountability (Norris, 2008). Horizontal and vertical accountability contribute to the separation of powers, which makes it difficult to centralise power by one political group since powers and authorities are distributed across different institutions.

How do these perspectives of power sharing as peacebuilding and as enhancement of democracy connect? Do they reinforce each other or is there also contradiction? Power-sharing in terms of peacebuilding and democracy are very much interrelated. It is perceived that the higher the degree of institutionalisation in terms of providing for several different types of power-sharing, the more likely that peace will last (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008). Nevertheless one could argue that peacebuilding and democratisation can oppose each other. It is important to acknowledge that democracy must also allow choosing against power sharing. This however, would be destructive for the peacebuilding process in a country trying to solve conflict. Nonetheless, both the peacebuilding aspect and the democratisation aspect are of significance within power sharing and both can contribute in solving or at least mitigating intrastate conflict.

Chapter 3 Bosnia-Herzegovina

Bosnia-Herzegovina is considered to be one of the examples were the concept of power sharing has been applied. It operates as a key example within peace building theory and is often referred to, mostly to name cases where power sharing has blundered. But before looking at the possible transformation of power sharing through the experience of Bosnia, this case must be further exemplified to fully understand the context in where power-sharing institutions were implemented. First a brief introduction of the nation is given to describe its key characteristics. Then, the run-up to and the actual Bosnian War are addressed to understand the nature of the conflict. Finally the power-sharing institutions that are implemented in this case are mentioned. To analyse power sharing in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina the focus is more on the political and the territorial dimension, for they are of more significance.

3.1 General introduction

Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged as an independent state in 1992 after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The former socialist Yugoslavian republic entered a tumultuous period after the proclaimed independence in where an ethnic War was fought, which will be addressed more elaborately later. Although under Yugoslavian rule the different ethnicities were able to live alongside each other; today society is characterised by a clear ethnical cleavage which coincides with religious differences, with the population consisting out of three major ethnical groups: Muslim Bosniaks, Orthodox Serbs and Roman Catholic Croats (Freedom House, 2013). Geographically the country is located in the Balkans in Southeast Europe. The capital is Sarajevo, where the government is located and the nation is governed. The territorial design is somewhat peculiar compared to other states. After the Dayton Peace Accords, to end the Bosnian War, a federal model was implemented with the state composed out of two entities: a Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Serb Republic Sprska (Freedom House, 2013). In 2000 a third entity was added; the Brčko District[5]. The Office of High Representative (OHR) has significant powers and overviews the implementation of the Dayton Accords.

3.2 Bosnian War

From the start, 1918, Bosnia-Herzegovina was as part of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was a federal republic, known under different names and was renamed on numerous occasions. It consisted out of six socialist republics; Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and two autonomous provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo. The most known leader of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) [6] was Josip Tito who ruled the country in an authoritarian way until his death in 1980. During his rule he managed to keep the ethnically diverse countries together under the guiding principle of *brotherhood and unity*[7] in one federal republic (Percy, 1995). The death of Tito brought increasing

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[5] Self-governing unit, which is officially part of both the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republic Sprska.
[6] Renamed in 1963
[7] Brotherhood & unity was a popular slogan and guiding principle of Yugoslavia's inter-ethnic policy

nationalistic uprisings, which prior had been dejected. The relations between the countries declined and tensions started to rise.

Slobodan Milosevic, who started as politician trying to defend minority rights of Serbian people in the other Socialist Republics of Yugoslavia rose to become president of Serbia and executed his dominance throughout the whole federal republic (Percy, 1995). His actions were aimed at regaining – for Serbia perceived rightfully – territory, mostly aiming at Kosovo. The autonomy given to Kosovo during Tito's rule to balance the power of Serbia was now reversed and Kosovo became subordinate to the administration of Serbia. Slovenia and Croatia increasingly criticised Milosevic's policy and decisions and started to favour more independence. Nationalistic feelings started to rise in Croatia and the checkerboard flag started to reappear. The checkerboard flag caused feelings of fear for the Serb minority in Croatia, since it is associated with the collaboration of Croats with the Nazi's in the Second World War; a time when the Serbs were widely persecuted. (Percy, 1995) Despite the increasing tensions between the countries, both Slovenia and Croatia held elections and proclaimed independence against the wishes of Milosevic; who wanted to maintain a powerful Yugoslavia. The independence claim of Croatia was accepted before the minority rights of Serbs were properly institutionalised causing even more tension between Croatia and Serbia (Jeffrey, 2007).

In contrary to Slovenia, Croatia was of great importance to Milosevic because of the numerous Serbs living there and the conflict intensified severely after its proclaimed independence. A proposal from the European Union, the Carrington Plan, meant to stop this Yugoslavian conflict and tried to prevent drawing Bosnia-Herzegovina into the conflict. Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, the President of Croatia, had the intention of splitting Bosnia-Herzegovina in half; the Serbs would go to Serbia and the Croats would go to Croatia (Silber & Little, 1996). In this picture there was no solution for the Bosnian Muslims and both statesmen did not seem to care. Milosevic was not willing to sign the Carrington Plan because this would mean making all constituent Yugoslavian states sovereign and tying them in a loose economic federation. For Milosevic the survival of Yugoslavia, but mostly a greater Serbia with all parts inhabited by Serbs – including the Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina parts –was essential (Silber & Little, 1996). Bosnia was on the verge of conflict.

Running up to the first free election in BiH in 1990 each constituent groups had formed own political parties (Silber & Little, 1996), which can be seen as the start of further reinforcing the differences between the three ethnicities. The nationalistic parties won the elections considerable in contrary to the communist party and joined together in a coalition in where the Muslim Bosniak Izetbegovic became the executive president. Bosnia-Herzegovina had endured the most of the repressive regime of the communist in Yugoslavia and the brotherhood and unity principle was implemented in all parts of society; even trials rotated amongst the ethnicities (Silber & Little, 1996). Nationalistic uprisings and sentiments in the neighbouring countries Croatia and Serbia spread to Bosnia. With the independence claim of Slovenia and Croatia, a more Serb dominated Yugoslavia became reality in where Bosnian did not want to take part. Following this strive for independence by Slovenia and Croatia,

Bosnia-Herzegovina eventually held a referendum to see whether its people also wanted to secede from Yugoslavia (Polity IV, 2010).

The ethnicities were divided; the Croats and Bosniaks favoured secession while the Serbs refused to vote and wanted to remain in Yugoslavia. In a new sovereign Bosnian state the Serbs would become a minority and no longer had the assistance and guarantee of Serbia. Independence from Yugoslavia was the breaking point for Bosnian Serbs; if this were to happen they would create their own state. Nevertheless, the Bosnian government proclaimed independence in 1992 – also without guaranteeing minority rights in the new constitution (Jeffrey, 2007) - which was internationally recognised. Hereafter the Bosnian Serbs proclaimed independence from Bosnia-Herzegovina in their Republika Sprska; this included all regions where the Bosnian Serbs were a majority. After this, intense conflict broke out in where Republika Sprksa tried to defend and expand their new borders, with the assistance of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). Prior to these events, every Bosnian Serb serving in the Yugoslavian army was already transferred so that when the JNA had to leave Bosnia (after independence) there was still an enormous military presence in favour of the Serbs (Percy, 1995). This was all with the approval of Milosevic.

Supposedly the conflict physically started over a Bosnian attack on a Serb wedding in Sarajevo, which caused the death of the father of the bride, resulting in picking up the arms by both camps and transforming Sarajevo in a labyrinth full with roadblocks (Silber & Little, 1996). Different town in North-eastern Bosnia were shelled by the Serbs; men and women were separated followed by ethnic cleansing of the male Muslim population living there. Izetbegovic had to reply and called out a general mobilisation in where the population was asked to form a front against the Serbs; however the Serbs would not be willing because they would have to fight against their own people (Percy, 1995). After this the conflict intensified even further in where many cities underwent shelling, bombing and ethnic cleansing. The Serbs had military advantage and thus were in control. The conflict caused the death of nearly 60.000 Bosniak Muslims, 7.500 Croats and 24.000 Serbs[8].

The lacking of an institutional guarantee for minority rights could have led to increasing insecurity for the Serbs and therefore felt threatened – for the second time around. Ethnic Serbs tried to seize as much territory as possible with the assistance of Milosevic, Croats also wanted own territory and turned against their former ally the Bosniaks; leaving the Muslim Bosniaks extremely vulnerable (Percy, 1995). There had already been an underlying tensions between the three constituent groups before the conflict; Croats and Serbs were convinced that Bosniaks were simply Croats and Serbs themselves but over the course of history had surrendered to pressure of the Ottoman Empire and converted to Islam (Silber & Little, 1996). This explains the territorial expansion of both the Croats and Serbs, since they did not see the Bosniaks as a legitimate group. The Ottoman Empire was another point of friction; according to Serbs it was a period of occupation, whereas the Bosniaks see it as a period of time where there origin lies (Silber & Little, 1996). All of these differences and tensions had caused the reinforcement of different ethnicities and where each group more and more focused on their

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[8] The numbers include soldiers and civilians and were derived from Wikipedia.

own. The three ethnicities, who earlier managed to coexist within one nation, started to oppose each other. The conflict was characterised by ethnic cleansing and severe atrocities against the Muslim Bosnian population. The war had caused for tens of thousands deaths and had forced half the population to become refugees and flee their homes (Freedom House, 2013).

As desperation grew for an international solution for the conflict, international actors such as the European Union and the United Nations got involved in the situation, trying to come up with a solution. Peace talks went on for quite some time, but a final accord was eventually reached in December of 1995 with the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement). Now Bosnia was divided amongst two entities; a Muslim Bosniac-Croat Federation and a Serb-held area, named Republika Sprksa (Chandler, 1999). By separating the two entities it was believed to stop the fighting and to resolve the conflict. This Dayton Agreement was designed by United States governors and placed significant powers for international institutions to govern Bosnia-Herzegovina (Chandler, 2001). The Office of High Representative oversees the civilian implementation of Dayton and the NATO and the European Union implement the military aspects. A period of transition was proclaimed right after the Dayton Agreement to guide Bosnia to a self-governing status, however this period was lengthened on numerous occasions by the international administration. Today the Office of High Representative still exercises influential powers which restricts the ability for the Bosnian people to manage their own affairs.

3.3 Power-sharing institutions

The Dayton agreement is a classic example of a consociational model and was believed to be the only way to stop the fighting and to create peace. Anything other than power sharing was considered to be incapable of resolving the conflict (Byrne & McCulloch, 2012). But why was power sharing the only solution to resolve the situation; why not give independence to the constituent ethnicities or let the Bosnian Serbs join Serbia for example? Why did the international administration choose to maintain one Bosnian state, when neither the Bosnian Croats nor the Bosnian Serbs accepted a Bosnian state? The motives of the international administration probably had something to do with the fact that they did not want to give Milosevic more numerical strength – population wise and territorial wise – since he had claimed to unite all Serbs within one entity. This would lead to a greater power imbalance in the Balkan region. Furthermore, the option of breaking up the sovereign state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and recognising Republic Sprska as a sovereign state, would lead to implications for other possible secession cases. 'Allowing' secession in this case, also means addressing other cases of secession such as the Basque in Spain or the Scots from the United Kingdom.

Territorial power-sharing

Despite the motivations behind this solution, an 'elaborate set of checks and balances, grounded in the theory of consociationalism, was created at Dayton to guarantee the political representation of each national group at the institutional level, to protect the group's rights to self-government and to promote inter-ethnic accommodation and compromise' (Belloni,

2004, p. 336). As stated above, the Dayton Agreement also contained the territorial separation of the ethnicities and created two entities: 51 per cent of the nation was occupied by a Muslim Bosniak-Croat Federation and the other 49 per cent of the nation was assigned to Republika Sprska (Chandler, 1999). Below, the figure shows the division of ethnicities in BiH before and after the War. Additionally the territorial power sharing is also shown in the 1996 side by the white line representing the boundary line between the Bosniak-Croat Federation and Republika Sprksa.


Figure 1. Bosnia before Dayton and after Dayton

Dayton evidently included a territorial power-sharing settlement, shown by the two figures. Territorial power-sharing clearly corresponds with the institutional feature of vertical concentration of Norris; both advocate using federalism of decentralisation in order to provide territorial autonomy. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina there was chosen for a federal system in where the national ethnicities were separated by territory. There is significant autonomy granted to both entities, since they each have their own presidents, parliaments and other governing bodies, which are responsible for policymaking on the entity level (Freedom House, 2013). Territorial power-sharing is further seen in the House of Representatives (42 members), since 28 seats are reserved for the Federation and 14 seats are reserved for the Republic Sprska. In this way both entities have a say in the overarching parliament and decision-making on the national level thus takes place with the participation of both entities. There is vertical power-sharing, because the federal subjects have significant influence in the political arena. Due to this vertical power-sharing, created by the House of Representatives, there is vertical accountability present in Bosnia-Herzegovina which limits the sole executive

power of the other House in parliament. Here the intention is to guarantee the protection of the national groups who are divided among these federal subjects.

Political power-sharing

Additionally there is also political power-sharing taking place. The political dimension includes the type of executive (horizontal concentration) and the type of electoral system, both features provided by Norris (2008). The type of executive suggests something about the constitutional design of a country and how power is organised. The executive power of Bosnia is organised by a three-presidency. So instead of having one president, the entire population of Bosnia is represented by a three-presidency which consist out of a Bosniak, a Croat and a Serb (Freedom House, 2013). This is a key example of political power sharing. This way of organising the function of president implies that every ethnicity has an equal share in power and tries to safeguard the sentiments of the main three ethnicities. So the executive power lies with these three presidents, but the executive authority rotates every seven months among the three members for the implementation of policy (Polity IV, 2010). The executive is separated in where the presidency functions as head of state and the council of ministers functions as head of government. The officials for presidency are elected for a four year term by the population.

Political power-sharing is also expressed in their bicameral parliament; the 42 seats of the House of Representatives are chosen by proportional representation which results in a corresponding reflection of the population. The seats in the other house, House of Peoples, are equally divided amongst the ethnicities. Here five seats are assigned to each ethnicity, which are elected by the Federation and the Republic Sprska themselves (Freedom House, 2013). Here interest of the three main ethnicities are balanced by given them all an equal share and no law or decisions passes unless all groups agree on it. Additionally this division also provides a check on the power of the House of Representatives and makes sure that not one ethnicity has full power. Furthermore, ethnic quotas are designed to guarantee the equal representation of the ethnicities throughout all levels of government and other functions within the public administration (Belloni , 2004).

The other feature under political power-sharing is the type of electoral system. According to the Freedom House (2013); Bosnia-Herzegovina is classified as an electoral democracy. This means that it adheres appropriately to formal electoral rules. By having free elections which are easily accessible to all different groups in society, each individual can contribute to the political process. Every ethnicity is able to vote freely and thus making their contribution to the political process, election-wise, equal. The one-man-one-vote system (i.e. proportional representation) provides an equal representation of the population and seems the most appropriate system for this country. A majority rule, a system where a majority of the votes is required, would have been a debacle since in this way the largest ethnicity group would always win. The proportional representation electoral system gives the national groups a say in the political decision-making process in proportion to the size of the national groups.

There is chosen not to pay attention towards the military and economic dimension of power sharing here, since political and territorial power-sharing are of more importance in the case

of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is perceived that these two dimensions are of more vital importance towards creating an environment for peaceful coexistence. This does not mean that military and economic power sharing cannot contribute to this matter, but for here the focus is on the other two dimensions.

There is clear political and territorial power sharing found within the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Politically and territorially arrangements are designed to guarantee every constituent ethnical group own autonomy and a stake in the decision-making process. There are a variety of checks and balances on the executive power which creates political legitimacy and the federal system with parliaments on entity level provide vertical accountability. Although significant rights are assigned to the three constituent groups, it is important to acknowledge that other groups who do not belong to one of these three groups have less legitimacy and are somewhat neglected in the political process.

Chapter 4 Critical Review

The main advocates of power sharing claim that power-sharing arrangements bring opposing groups together in the political arena. Although many agree on this point, it does not mean that the concept is not criticised. Therefore it is important to include a critical review about the concept of power-sharing and to analyse under which circumstances it was implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina and what the implications of power sharing were for BiH. In this chapter there is sometimes referred to the consociational model, which is considered to be similar to power sharing. The first part contains general critique on the theoretical concept of power sharing which will be linked, in the second part, to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4.1 General critique

The general critique on power sharing as means for post-conflict settlement seems to consist of three main points; conditions for power sharing, an immobilism problem and ethnic integration. Each of the three points is addressed in the following.

Conditions for power sharing in conflict settings

What seems to be the main critique point is that it is unsure under which conditions power-sharing institutions or arrangements work and are accepted (Horowitz 2014; Sisk 2013). This is referred to by Horowitz as the 'adaption problem'. There seems to be a lack in literature about 'the conditions under which particular prescriptions for severely divided societies can be adopted' (Horowitz, 2014, p. 8). There is no consensus about which conditions are vital for effective use of power-sharing arrangement for solving ethnic conflict. For power-sharing institutions to work, it seems of importance that opposing groups accept each other's legitimacy. This can be rather difficult to achieve after intense violent conflict. Challenges around the adaption of consociational institutions are: asymmetric preferences, general risk-aversion, biases around negotiators and the availability of alternatives (Horowitz, 2014).

Asymmetric preferences are found between majorities and minorities. Majorities are considered to only accept power-sharing arrangements when they are weak; why would they otherwise compromise to their own power? This suggests that the possibility of accepting a power-sharing settlement has something to do with the relative strength different groups have. Additionally the fear of failure seems to contribute whether elites are willing to make concessions and choose for a power-sharing settlement (Sisk, 2013). The fear that not choosing for a settlement, but instead remain fighting in the hope for a better outcome could turn into something worse - potentially self-harming - can be a contributing factor in why eventually there is chosen to accept power sharing. This could mean that a cost-benefit analysis is made to see whether power sharing has more to offer than to keep pursuing military victory. Risk-aversion is due to the familiarisation of the current system and not knowing what alternatives might bring. Adapting a new system is seen as being risk-full, for it is not known how their new position will be and it is better to maintain with what is familiar. Additionally negotiators, especially ones of opposing groups, always have biases

about one another which threatens the negotiation and cooperation process. Armed conflict strengthens feelings of distrust and makes it difficult for opponents to agree on a settlement which forces them to accept each other as equals. Furthermore, the availability of attractive alternatives makes it more difficult to reach an agreement since sometimes it is believed that the group can gain more from other options, e.g. rearming and keep on with fighting. All these challenges show that reaching an agreement is complex and difficult.

Although, a lack of consensus about conditions for power sharing is mentioned on numerous occasions, the author Scheckener (2002) does pose eleven favourable conditions which can contribute towards the success of power-sharing arrangements. First, a *relative equilibrium* concerning the size of the ethnical groups makes it more likely for power-sharing arrangements to be accepted, since no group exercises the majority. Second, there ought to be *no significant socio-economic differences*. Consociationalism is easier reached when there are no large differences between the different groups (Schneckener, 2002). This seems plausible; a group that is not disadvantaged at all may be less likely to compromise towards a group which is disadvantaged; since they do not see a problem with the status quo. Third, power-sharing arrangements are easier accepted when there is already a degree of *territorial segmentation*. Already present territorial regulation can be properly combined with power sharing; plus groups already are used to some degree of self-ruling.

Fourth, different groups can be held together when there is some form of an *overarching loyalty* (Schneckener, 2002). An overarching loyalty such as a royal family, who all groups favour, can prevent further segregation between groups and provide some common ground on which they agree. Fifth, *cross-cutting cleavages*[9] create more diverse groups and thus create a more stable consociational democracy. When characteristics of identities are not fixed but in contrast contain all sort of varieties – not standard religion A with society level B – more contact takes place with all sort of peoples of society instead of just limited contact with own groups. In this way a Christian can have common ground with a Muslim, for example, because they both belong to the same level of society (e.g. working class). In the case of no cross-cutting cleavages different groups have no common ground on which they can relate to each other making peaceful coexistence more fragile, whereas with cross-cutting cleavages people can relate to each other because there are areas where they might think alike. The more cross-cutting cleavages, the more stable the consociational democracy (Schneckener, 2002). The sixth favourable condition contains *moderate pluralism vs. national fronts*. This refers to the diversity found within in political representation. Either it is the case that groups are represented by a multitude of political parties or they are represented by one national political party. It is believed that moderate pluralism is more favourable for a consociational model.

These first six conditions were of structure-oriented nature and contain prescriptions for a more ideal society, whereas the next five conditions are of actor-oriented nature and suggest something about favourable behaviour of actors within society. The seventh condition is

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[9] Non cross-cutting cleavages consist out of, e.g., a religious cleavage which coincides with an ethnical cleavage; someone of ethnical group A automatically is from religion C and someone of ethnical group B is automatically from religion D. In the case of non-cross cutting cleavages, a BC or AD combination does not exist. In the case of cross-cutting cleavages these combination do exist and there are no prefixed types.

dominant elites who are able to make agreements in behave of their represented group. They can either act independently from their followers or have a more clientistic relationship in where they are more constraint in their actions (Schneckener, 2002). Additionally there are also able to stand above the difficulties perceived by the groups and act within best interest for the entire nation on the political dimension. Eight, all parties have to *respect the status quo*; all parties are committed to the survival of the consociational model which makes it less likely to break down. The ninth contains the *traditions of compromise and mutual understanding*. In nations were they already have had the experience of making compromises among multiple groups, it is easier to implement power-sharing arrangements. Although these can contribute, it is important to take into account that it is not a fixed guarantee (Schneckener, 2002). Tenth, *comprehensive participation* states that all relevant parties must be included in the decision-making process. Finally, the eleventh condition, expresses *internal compromise vs external compromise*. This condition makes the distinction in whether the power-sharing arrangements were chosen internally or forced upon by an external actor. Obviously it is more favourable that a nation itself choses for a power-sharing settlement instead of being forced by a third party. Power-sharing arrangements are less likely to survive and generate sustainable peace when there are externally imposed (Norris, 2008). In the case of internal compromise, the different groups are more likely to commit to the power-sharing arrangements since they themselves chose such an arrangement. The danger of external imposition of power sharing is that different groups do not feel connected or obliged to make it work.

Although this may seem as a feasible list for power-sharing conditions it is important to take into account that it does not determine exactly whether a consociational model will succeed. It is also not sure which conditions are of more importance and therefore uncertain which conditions are a must for power sharing to succeed. There are also numerous correlations found between the conditions such as a tradition of power-sharing arrangements, condition nine, which probably has a positive effect on whether the status quo is accepted, condition eight (Schneckener, 2002). Additionally it should also be considered whether this list applies in a post-conflict settlement. Conditions such as an overarching loyalty and crosscutting cleavages is preciously something missing in a conflict situation and a power-sharing settlement aims at providing common ground between opposing groups. This 'paradox' makes the list of favourable conditions difficult to use as a check list for power sharing to succeed in a post-conflict situation, because often power sharing arrangements try to create these conditions in the first place. Despite this difficulty, afterwards this list can be used to see whether there were favourable conditions in the case of BiH and see if power sharing was a feasible option.

Immobilism problem

Another fundamental challenge to the consociational model is the 'immobilism problem', according to Horowitz (2014). The immobilism problem basically means a political deadlock. Power-sharing arrangements create, so to speak, veto rights for every participating group which means that every demand from one group can be denied by another group. This characteristic slows down the decision-making process and regularly leads to a standstill. It is

often acknowledged that these consociational arrangements need to be modified, but the political stalemate makes this difficult. 'Consociational guarantees are suitable for calming a conflict in times of crisis or civil war, but once tranquillity has been achieved – and especially if immobilism sets in – it ought to be possible to move to other institutions' (Horowitz, 2014, p. 12). This suggests something about the period of time in which power-sharing arrangements can be beneficial.

This leads to the following argument that power-sharing arrangements in terms of post-conflict settlement can be considered to be more a short-term solution, thus making its contribution to long-term sustainable peace questionable. Initially power-sharing settlements are critical in ending a war by giving institutional guarantees and territorial autonomy; it is not conducive to long-term peace (Sisk, 2013). These fundamental institutional guarantees in power-sharing agreements that create group autonomy and security are critical for terminating the war, but its long-term effect of political deadlock limits the ability for progress. Long-term peace seems to be depended on the level different groups have learned to cope with one another, while power-sharing arrangements are more suitable for creating a power balance and stabilising a post-conflict situation (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). This indeed suggests that for long-term sustainable peace to be developed, opposing groups eventually have to learn to live together again and formulate the perception of 'agree to disagree'. It maybe also depends on which definition is taken for peace; preventing further violent conflict or long-term peaceful coexistence.

Ethnic integration

Advocates of a consociational model state that it stimulates cooperation among opposing groups in a secure political environment. Contrary to the advocates of a consociational model, critics such as Horowitz argue that institutions that stimulate pre-election interethnic cooperation reduce the likelihood of violent conflict better than a consociational model (Sisk, 2013). A centripetalist model advocates such inter-ethnic cooperation before elections. This model includes incentives for interethnic cooperation, making political parties to reach out beyond own ethnicities and represent a wider range of people. In contrary to the consociational model were political parties each represent their own ethnicity and were inter-ethnic cooperation only takes place at the phase of a grand coalition. So both the consociational and centripetalist model aim at interethnic power sharing, but try to achieve this in a different way. The former advocates interethnic cooperation after elections in a grand coalition, whereas the later favours interethnic cooperation before elections (Horowitz, 2014), and thus representing the different ethnicities already in the political parties instead of only in a grand coalition.

The centripetalist model forces political parties to make inter-ethnic contact before elections which potentially in the long-term creates sentiments of acceptance. Although this may lead to more ethnic mingling, it does not come without constraints. A method called vote pooling is often used in centripetal models where political parties not only attract their own ethnicity but also votes of other ethnicities. However, tension between a majority and minority within a political party can rise and create imbalances of influence, resulting in growing minority

disaffection (Horowitz, 2014). These tensions can eventually lead to a less significant role in the political party and therefore reduces their political influence.

4.2 Critique related to Bosnia-Herzegovina

Whereas the former part introduced a critical view on power sharing in general, the second part contains critique in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The three topics included under general critique will be linked to Bosnia here and it will additionally contain other topics of critique from the Bosnian case; the Dayton Agreement and dominant international presence.

Conditions for power sharing

It is unsure under which conditions power-sharing institutions or arrangements work or accepted, making it also uncertain whether Bosnia had the right conditions for a power-sharing settlement. Despite the lack of knowledge whether power sharing would work in the case of Bosnia, it was considered to be the only tool to resolve the conflict and to create peace. In hindsight, a checklist can be made to see if Bosnia at least had some favourable conditions according to Scheckener (2002). Although the Muslim Bosniak group was larger than the other two groups, number-wise, it still can be said that Bosnia had a relative equilibrium, since it was not dominated by a clear majority of on ethnical group[10]. This could have contributed in whether a power-sharing settlement could succeed, since no group had absolute dominance and could continue with own goals. However, the groups were heavily divided over the pathway Bosnia-Herzegovina should take; neither was really willing to compromise. During the War it can be said that the socio-economic status of the different groups were not completely equal since the Serbs and the Croats got significant assistance of their neighbouring countries. All groups have suffered during the war, but enormous atrocities were conducted on the Muslim Bosnians so there are differences between the groups. This would have mean that implementing a power-settlement would be rather difficult since, especially, Serbs would not be able to surrender since they still favoured military assistance from Yugoslavia and Milosevic.

It is clear that there was already some degree of territorial segmentation present in where certain groups favoured majority in certain parts of the country. This degree helped in the case of choosing a federal system since there was already some form of territorial segmentation. However, this does not mean that it was an easy solution since there were no clear borders and many parts with different majorities overlapped. Now territorial segmentation can be seen as finalised with a federal system in where the groups are divided over two federal subjects. No common overarching loyalty was found; Bosnian Muslims felt related towards the Bosnian state whereas Serbs felt related towards Yugoslavia and perhaps Serbia (Schneckener, 2002). One can also state that this should not be hold against choosing for power sharing, since one of the aims of a power-sharing settlement is in fact creating such an overarching loyalty. It is even questionable whether power sharing is needed when there is

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[10] Bosniaks 48%, Serbs 37,1% and Croats 14,3%

already some form of overarching loyalty present. Since, in this case they apparently already have some common ground to relate on. The same goes for cross-cutting cleavages. Although there were and still are no cross-cutting cleavages – ethnicity coincides with religion: Muslim Bosnians, Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats –, power sharing aims at the creating of a more diverse society in where different groups cooperate. Therefore such a condition cannot be very deterministic whether power sharing is the solution in the case of post-conflict settlement. There remains a focus on nationalistic rhetoric used by national political parties who represent the constituent ethnicities. This causes for a lack in political pluralism and limits the possibility for ethnic integration. Moderate pluralism is seen as being favourable for consociationalism, so Bosnia-Herzegovina does not meet this condition.

Concerning the actor-oriented conditions it can be said that the different groups in Bosnia were represented by dominant elites. They could contribute in choosing a power-sharing settlement. They could make the choice for a power-sharing settlement at the political level and passing it on as a good decision to their own groups, thereby influencing the way the different groups perceive power sharing. Respecting the status quo is rather difficult in a conflict situation; since neither party is content about the situation hence the conflict. Whether the all respect the power-agreement and are committed to its survival is also debatable, since there have been sounds advocating a transformation of the current consociational model. The current system often leads to political deadlock and does not stimulate progress. Bosnia has had experience with different ethnicities living together and thus making compromises in the political system which would make it easier to arrange power sharing since they are familiar with such arrangements. However, the war has disrupted society in such a severe matter that the peaceful inter-ethnic cooperation during the Yugoslavia period has long been forgotten (Schneckener, 2002). Additionally it is difficult to sit at one table again, accept each other legitimacy and share the power, when a severe conflict just happened. Furthermore, the power-sharing arrangements were, unfortunately, forced by a third party and the constituent groups were not really represented at the negotiation table which damages the support for a consociational system. The imposition of a consociational model can severely limit the commitment towards its survival.

So overall one can state that out of the 11 favourable conditions, Bosnia met two conditions; it already had a degree of territorial segmentation and the groups are represented by dominant elites. But still it cannot simply be said that power sharing would have not worked in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, since these conditions are hardly deterministic and this seemed the only reasonable measure to stop the conflict and create a secure environment for starting to build on peaceful coexistence. Additionally it is questionable if these conditions can be used as an indicator for the success of power sharing since they do not seem to fit within a post-conflict nature. Often power sharing tries to create such conditions; which make it senseless if they were already present. This is something to take into consideration.

Immobilism problem

Although power sharing may seem as a favourable solution towards solving a conflict and giving all parties a stake in the political process; it also has one major flaw; political deadlock. In the case of Bosnia each constituent group can declare something to be of 'vital interest', which automatically blocks political actions (Schneckener, 2002). Every constituent groups can use their veto right to block decision-making which does not seem favourable to them. In return the other group can then use their veto right to block other decision-making. This can result in the irritating situation that there is not decided upon anything. Every group can use their veto right to block the decision of others and so long as nobody gives in at one point, nobody is going to cave. This use of veto rights can potentially endanger the long-term decision-making process and lead to a political deadlock. Bosnia also camps with a lacking of executive capacities of their bicameral parliament, since significant powers remain with the Office of High Representative (Chandler, 2001). The OHR has the ability to dismiss elected officials when it is perceived that they disrupt the Dayton Accords. The significant powers of the OHR limits the political accountability of the elected offials and obstructs the process of making own policy.

Ethnic integration

Most advocates of power sharing claim that these institutions create interethnic cooperation (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003) and that it was the only solution in severe ethnic conflict such as Bosnia-Herzegovina. This interethnic cooperation is generated by giving every constituent group a stake in the decision-making process and that decisions can only be made on the basis of consensus; cooperation between the groups is thus necessary to come to an agreement. The presidency exists out of three members – representing every ethnicity – and to make this a functional institution, cooperation is mandatory. Though in theory this is assumable; in practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina little interethnic cooperation has taken place. Belloni confirms this and states that the nation is still characterised by constant tension between the three constituent groups (2004).

The proportional representation electoral model has created the incentives to focus on own national ethnicities, resulting in still existing powerful national political parties. Electoral success under this system is achieved by playing the ethnic card, which poses serious threats for the democratisation process (Belloni, 2004). Ethnic integration would maybe occur more if incentives were included to cooperate with different ethnicities at an earlier moment than in the grand coalition. These incentives for pre-election cooperation, located within a centripetalist model, force political parties to gain support from different constituent groups in order to compete with elections. This leads to more political pluralism in where political parties represent a wider range of people rather than just own ethnicities. Additionally, since politicians are encouraged to make interethnic contact, they might come to see their former opponents as legitimate political adversaries (Belloni, 2004). Here an 'agree to disagree' basis can develop which contributes to the overall ethnic integration process. \

It is maybe not completely fair to require ethnic integration to happen so shortly after intense conflict. It can be too soon to ask for ethnic cooperation immediately after a violent war where the ethnic groups of Bosnia just faced each other. But eventually, for the long term development of ethnic integration, a more integrative approach to the electoral model should be incorporated. Although the current electoral model, based upon consociationalism, guarantees an equal share for all constituent groups, it does not stimulate interethnic cooperation enough resulting in little ethnic integration. So in order to address long term ethnic integration the electoral system should be modified in where more incentives for ethnic cooperation are included.

Dayton Agreement and dominant international presence

There was a general consensus and fear that Bosnia would fall apart after military presence would retreat, so the Dayton settlement was intended to be a short term necessary solution to create a secure environment in which the conflict could be tempered. The Dayton Agreement is considered to be both a blessing and a curse (Weller & Wolf, 2006); on the one hand it arranged the settlement of the Bosnian War and stopped the conflict but on the other hand it failed to institutionalise a long term trajectory towards sustainable peace. 'The settlement seemed morally wrong and politically impracticable, but still necessary in order to end the violence' (Weller & Wolf, 2006, p. 1). Such a statement suggests that although a power sharing arrangements comes with its disadvantages for the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it nevertheless seemed as the only option available. General criticism against Dayton is that it seemed to freeze the conflict situation and institutionalise the ethnic divisions (Sebastián, 2012; Weller &Wolf, 2006). National parties were not banned, enabling them to remain focused on nationalistic rethoric and not to cooperate with other parties outside their ethnicity. The agreement also promised to decentralise power and create a multi-ethnic state in which the constituent groups were assured of a stake in the political process and guarenteed autonomy. But instead of decentralisation, it transferred the political power to international institutions such as the High Representative (Chandler, 2001). All local input from Bosnia was excluded by the international administration concerning BiH, highly contrasting with earlier international interventionist adminstrations such as with the post-Second World War cases of Germany and Japan where local input was encouraged to create legitimacy and popular support (Chandler, 2005). Instead, the Dayton agreement lacked severe domestic legitimacy; local actors were not involved in the negotiation process and had little influence in the decision-making process concerning the constitutional structure of Bosnia.

The most powerful international institution in Bosnia is the Office of High Representative which observes the civilian implementation of the settlement with special regard to economic, judiciary and political regulations. Additionally it also has the authority to dismiss elected officials when they harm the peace process according to Dayton standards (Polity IV, 2010). These significant powers limit the ability for the Bosnian government to manage own affairs and reduces their legitimacy as real political actors. According to Chandler (2005), ten years after the Dayton Agreement not one substantial political decision has been made by Bosnian politicians. So instead of creating autonomy, a 'United States-run international protectorate' was constructed (Chandler, 2001). The international administration did intent to leave after a

transitional period. But this transitional period, created after the Dayton Agreement, to oversee the political process in Bosnia was lengthened for several times, enabling the international community to remain influencing matters in Bosnia. 'Any opposition from Bosnian officials was met with the threat to cancel donors' meetings and World Bank and International Monetary Fund refusal to release construction aid' (Chandler, 1999, p. 115). This strongly suggest the influence of the international administration and other key institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF; implying that policy is only accepted when they meet their standards. This could result in not making the best political decisions in context of Bosnia, but making those decisions which pleases international actors.

There has been increasing critique on the Dayton Agreement, by local and international actors. Limited progress after Dayton, an incompetent state deprived from real executive capacities and a slow decision-making progress released these sentiments advocating a transformation of the Dayton Agreement into creating more executive possibilities for the Bosnian government. The desire for constitutional reform was a reaction at the failed peacebuilding and state building process and considered to be crucial for overcoming the still existing ethnic divisions (Sebastián, 2012). Although a transformation of the consitution might bring some progress in the political system of BiH, this mere focus on constitutional change also poses some threats; that is failing to recognise that there is still a lack of interethnic cooperation since the dissolution of Yugoslavia at the heart of the problem (Sebastián, 2012).

Chapter 5 Lessons learned

Although the experience of state building after civil conflict in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina was rather unique, important lessons can be drawn for the international community (Weller & Wolf, 2006). So what are these lessons that can be drawn from the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the context of peacebuilding and power sharing? Do these lessons have any implications for other peacebuilding operations? This chapter contains the implications of the rule of law approach in the context of peacebuilding for BiH. It also address an alternative strategy proposed by Roland Paris; called institutionalisation before liberalisation. Additionally the dominant international presence is also addressed.

Rule of law

Peacebuilding currently emphasizes the rule of law which is believed to be the foundation for post-conflict reconstruction. The principle of 'rule of law' means that the nation is governed by law instead of individual officials. The law exercises an influential role throughout society in this way and becomes the key characteristic on which society is build. In other words; the law dictates society. According to Lord Paddy Ashdown[11], the interference in BiH failed to prioritize the rule of law from the first moment which has caused its slow progress and therefore should be immediately implemented in the case of Iraq (Chandler, 2004). It is perceived that neglectance of rule of law in the case of Iraq, which at the time of the article was in transition from a post-war situation towars self-government, shall lead to criminalisation or a new outbreak of war between ethnic and religious groups (Chandler, 2004).

However, this rule of law approached is critised by Chandler, stating that the rule of law could pontentially lead to more instability and fragementation in Iraq by overlooking the importance of the political process (2004). The international administration gave little attention towards the political sphere in BiH under its rule of law approach. It was believed that the rule of law could be executed separately from the political process (Chandler, 2004). This means that the international administration implemented a rule of law approach without acquiring popular consent through the political process of Bosnia. This is very problematic since the political process creates legitimacy for such measures; so going beyond this stage the legitimacy of the rule of law is not adressed.

Not addressing legitimacy seems to fall within a general trend of state building; state building is increasingly seen as a technical matter in where popular consent for policy-making is not required (Chandler, 2005). Without political legitimacy there can be no rule of law; 'the ultimate authority of law derives from politics' (Chandler, 2004, p. 327). Here a sort of paradox seems to appear according to Chandler(2004); prioritizing the rule of law above politics actually undermines the legitimacy of this rule of law. People need to accept the law in order to fully behave by them. Without popular consent there is a risk that people might not feel obliged to obey the law and therefore significance and meaning of this law is reduced.

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[11] Lord Paddy Ashdown was the High Representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina from 2002-2006.

Furthermore the external imposition of laws does not benefit the popular consent as well and gives no sense of ownership or being able to participate in the political process among the population. So this priority of rule over law over the political sphere did not resolve any problems of insecurities perceived by the constituent groups and has discredited the political process (Chandler, 2004).

The external imposition of the rule of law in the case of Bosnia has been very troublesome, acknowledged by Chandler. From the experience from Bosnia and Herzegovina it became clear that this focus on the rule of law has undermined the political process, the law itself and the shift towards self-government (Chandler, 2004). Additionally there seems to be a gap between the law and decisions implemented and the laws and decisions needed by the Bosnian people. Often external experts from international administrations are not completely aware of the context or are more focused on their reputation and making a career. One way of resolving this would be to give more responsibility to Bosnian officials in order to increase their influence in the decision-making process (Chandler, 2004).

The international administration tried to implement the rule of law outside the political sphere, thus lacking the popular consent and making its legitimacy insufficient. Without the consent of the population, people feel less obliged to follow them, especially when they are externally imposed. Therefore prioritizing this rule of law in cases of peacebuilding, such as Iraq, could potentially create further instability and fragmentation (Chandler, 2004). So a different strategy could be *institutionalisation before liberalisation,* proposed by Roland Paris. Instead of immediately trying to implement a liberal democracy with the foundation based on rule of law, the primary goal should be to focus on institutionalisation. This strategy is addressed in the following.

Institutionalisation before liberalisation

The aim of peace builders is to transform post-conflict states into functioning liberal market democracies through the creation of 'rights-based constitutions, holding multiparty elections, liberalising the popular media and political activity and implementing market-oriented economic reforms' (Paris, 2004, p. 187). However, in many cases, the result was societal competition instead of cooperation, even before institutions were designed to regulate such competition. He poses an alternative for peacebuilding, called *institutionalisation before liberalisation*. This strategy refers to the construction of a framework with effective institutions before competition, political-wise and economic-wise, is stimulated (Paris, 2004).

Paris advocates postponing liberalisation until the right conditions are created for a smooth transition towards a democracy. Hereby it is important to wait with elections before moderate political parties exist, moderation is stimulated by elections, civil society with cross-cutting cleavages is promoted, hate speech is controlled, moderate economic reforms are encouraged and a functioning bureaucracy is developed (Paris, 2004). Paris further emphasizes the dangers of having early elections right after civil conflict. Although this may seem as very democratic measure to give the people the opportunity to manage own affairs, moderate political parties and institutions have not been properly developed, resulting in the reinforcement of existing nationalistic political parties who keep on emphasizing the ethnic

card. This corresponds with the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The three-presidency of Bosnia was designed to achieve moderate political executives in where all three presidents needed to cooperate and make decisions on the basis of consensus (Paris, 2004). However, little interethnic cooperation between the constituent groups was encouraged, resulting politicians to only appeal to own ethnicities. The divided electorate results in a system were the constituent presidents only have incentives to communicate with own ethnicities and not cooperate with each other, making the three-presidency futile in decision-making (Paris, 2004).

If the peacebuilding operation would have operated from an institutionalisation before liberalisation approach – political and economic institutions were reconstructed and civil society with cross cutting cleavages was promoted before elections – Bosnia-Herzegovina could have been a better functioning state compared to what it is now (Paris, 2004). One of the lessons learned here is that an early election after civil conflict, without actively encouraging moderate behaviour, reinforces the ethnic divisions of the war instead of promoting interethnic cooperation as seen in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Interethnic cooperation so soon after intense conflict is difficult to achieve and maybe also not fair to request from opposing groups who still camp with the traumatic experiences of the conflict. Therefore interethnic cooperation may not be the first primary focus, instead elections can be postponed for a brief period of time and in the meantime moderate political parties and institutions can be stimulated to contribute towards the long-term peace project. In this way the bureaucratic system can adopt a moderate system while the tensions between the constituent groups can soften and make way for eventual interethnic cooperation, which benefits the political process.

Institutionalisation before liberalisation approach is not necessarily always linked to power sharing, but it can certainly contribute in making it more executable. By giving all parties an equal stake in the political process, power sharing aims at bringing opponents together in the political arena in order to let a divided society function democratically. But from the Bosnian case it seems that power sharing does not always generates this goal. Through the electoral system and proportional representation the constituent ethnicities are equally represented and forced to cooperate beyond their own ethnicities in a grand coalition. However in BiH, this electoral model does not stimulate interethnic cooperation enough. Here institutionalisation before liberalisation can contribute in creating a basis of moderate political parties and institutions in order for power sharing to fully work and stimulate interethnic cooperation while still maintaining the safeguarding of the rights of the constituent groups themselves. This does not mean that institutionalisation before liberalisation approach is necessary for power sharing to work; but in a very deeply divided society such as Bosnia-Herzegovina this can benefit the process overall.

Additionally it is important to take into account that the encouragement of moderate politicians and moderate political parties is futile in an electoral system where politicians keep being 'rewarded' by playing the ethnic card for electoral success (Belloni, 2004). So without addressing the current electoral system in BiH, no progress will be made in terms of moderation. Additionally the severe emphasis on elections in Bosnia – according to Belloni

(2004) there have been 16 electoral races from 1996 to 2004 – makes politicians more occupied with winning elections than making moderate political decisions. An emphasis on elections alone is not enough for building a working democracy.

Paris also brings up the statement whether the consociational model was an appropriate model for Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to Lijphart himself, consociationalism is the best model for a deeply divided society. However in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the consociational model only seemed to reinforce the ethnic identities since politicians faced little incentives for seeking popular consent outside own ethnicities. The idea of all groups being represented in one president function seemed appropriate but due to the lack of interethnic cooperation its executive capabilities and legitimacy is insignificant. Paris therefore brings up the idea of a one-presidency who is required to appeal a plurality in whole Bosnia and to gain a significant percentage out of the ethnic communities of geographical regions (Paris, 2004). Although this eliminates the paralysis of the three-presidency system, it seems rather difficult to achieve popular consent with all three constituent groups without those groups accepting each other themselves. Nevertheless it surely starts creating incentives for interethnic cooperation, which benefits the long term prospect of Bosnia in general.

Dominant international presence

Peace builders may have succeeded in preventing further violent conflict in Bosnia, but the real goal was to create sustainable peace through power sharing and pluralism (Paris, 2004). They tried to achieve this by transforming the state into a liberal democracy immediately without properly designing the right institutions. So the democratisation project created an opposite effect in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and reinforced the ethnic identities instead of creating interethnic cooperation (Paris, 2004). This failing of creating political and social pluralism is answered by the international administration through increasing their influence and power over Bosnia, since they perceive them not ready to deal with own matters. This seems to create a negative vicious circle; the system does not include incentives for interethnic cooperation making the international administration to further intensify their control because they believe there is too little interethnic cooperation taking place.

Severe contradictions are found within the case of BiH; 'the existence of a formally sovereign state with regularly contested elections at state, entity and local levels and, alongside this, the existence of a parallel administration headed by unaccountable international appointees with the power to draw up an impose legislation and sack elected officials' (Chandler, 2005, p. 314). The political legitimacy is reduced since Bosnian officials are in fact more accountable towards the international administration than towards their own population. In this way the elections are not a check on the Bosnian representatives, but actually on the international administration. Thus it can be stated that Bosnia-Herzegovina really is a façade democracy; the international administration keeps up the ideal of a liberal democracy with fair contested elections while in fact the political sphere lacks real executive power and Bosnian politicians remain accountable towards the international administration instead of towards the population. Lessons here are that the international community should not aim at building a liberal democracy at once, first the right institutions should be created and local actors should

be given more influence in the process. It is understandable that the international community is hesitant about immediately giving up power to the local actors soon after a conflict– in fear that the conflict will grow out of control again –, but for successful state-building it is important that local actors eventually take the reigns over and make own decisions.

Peacebuilding needs a well balanced approach which combines consociational measures, moderate policies and a focus on the wider context of the region sustained by international administrations (Weller & Wolf, 2006). Weller and Wolf (2006) state that Bosnia-Herzegovina did not fulfil all these requirements since the international project failed to design effective institutions. Its main focus on the rule of law, failed to incorporate the importance of political legitimacy. Institutionalisation before liberalisation may be a better approach since moderate political institutions and parties are fist encouraged before post-conflict nation is transformed into a liberal democracy. Hereby the dangers of nationalistic parties and a lack in interethnic cooperation is mitigated. It also remains important to include local actors in the political decision-making process to enhance popular consent and legitimacy for the system. International institutions should pursue a paradigm shift towards a more integrated approach (Paris, 2004). Such an integrative approach can be the start for a successive transition period in were eventually Bosnians take over the reins themselves.

For other peacebuilding operations numerous things should be taken into account. The mere focus on implementing the rule of law without considering the political dimension of a country severely undermines the legitimacy of this same rule of law. External imposition gives no sense of ownership or being able to participate with the population, leading people to feel less obliged to follow this approach. It is important to first encourage moderate political parties and institutions before elections are held and a democracy is assumed to be fully functioning. An emphasis on elections, as an indicator for democracy, is not enough. Right institutions should be implemented first. Immediate elections after intense conflict can create the possibility of institutionalising the divisions, as seen in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The theoretical concept of power sharing does not seem actively changed through the experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It still contains the institutional facets mentioned in chapter two. Its implementation in BiH could have been better executed. Power sharing in itself does not seem to be adjusted for other peacebuilding operations. This does not mean that there are no important lessons to be drawn from Bosnia-Herzegovina; perhaps the lessons learned here cover more peacebuilding in general than power sharing specifically.

Conclusion

Bosnia-Herzegovina is marked by an intense conflict which caused immense ethnical cleavages throughout society. The international administration tried to resolve the conflict by implementing a consociational model with clear political and territorial power-sharing arrangements included in the Dayton Agreement. Bosnia-Herzegovina was territorially divided amongst the ethnical groups and segmental autonomy was granted in the form of own parliament and a say in national legislation. Examples of political power-sharing in BiH are veto rights, fixed seats in parliament and the three-presidency function where every constituent ethnicity has one representative in the presidency. This consociational model was perceived to be the only way to stop the violence and built towards peaceful coexistence among the opposing groups. Although the Dayton Agreement did stop the violence and stabilised the conflict, it is also heavily criticised since it only seemed to institutionalise the ethnicities. Furthermore the international presence remained overly present and exercised its dominance throughout the political process, making it difficult for the Bosnian population to gain ownership and real legitimacy. Power sharing implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina was clearly a way of stabilising the conflict and was a peacebuilding method. Democratisation has been addressed, since it is one of the main objectives of the international administration, but it was not a top priority.

One can ask whether Bosnia-Herzegovina has already entered a phase of tranquillity yet and is therefore capable of moving towards other institutions. Fundamental institutional guarantees in power-sharing agreements that create group autonomy and security are critical for terminating the war, but its long-term contribution to peace is debatable. Power sharing continues on the road of ethnicities as cleavages; especially in Bosnia where its electoral system continues to reinforce ethnic identities and limits possibilities for interethnic cooperation. It maybe also depends on which definition is taken for peace; the power-sharing institutions have definitely helped in preventing violent conflict from breaking out in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But if one takes peaceful coexistence and accepting each other on a basis of interethnic cooperation as sustainable peace, it is very questionable if peace is achieved in this case.

Theoretically, power sharing comprises all facets to transform enemies in adversaries, but in practice has institutionalised the ethnicities and failed to put real executive capabilities with the Bosnian government due to dominant international presence in Bosnia. The theoretical concept of power sharing maybe does not need to be revised but is perhaps more suitable for mildly cases of divided society instead of a peacebuilding method for severe divided societies. Cases were nations are divided over political affiliations, for example, can use power sharing perfectly to bring different groups together and share executive tasks. But in cases were societies are divided over more severe cleavages, such as religion or ethnicity, it is more difficult to ever achieve peaceful coexistence, especially when there have been events of conflict between the different groups. The concept of power sharing maybe more applicable in cases such as Belgium or Switzerland, where the nation is divided over some linguistic or political affiliation cleavages. Thus power sharing can be recommended in mild cases of divided society where power sharing can function perfectly to channel multiple views.

From Bosnia it is clear that too much has happened between the constituent ethnicities, which makes it doubtful if these groups are ever able to coexist. This leads up to the argument whether the desperate hold by the international community to keep sovereign nations together, especially in the case of BiH, is the right. Lessons learned from BiH are that the political legitimacy should be addressed and more incentives for ethnic cooperation should be included. Early elections after conflict reinforce nationalistic parties who only appeal to own ethnical groups. It is important to first establish moderate institutions and political parties, without these developments the long term project of creating sustainable peace is threatened. Lesson learned from Bosnia seem to contain more about the dimension of peacebuilding in general than specifically for power sharing.

Over time the consociational model of Bosnia should gradually transform and include more incentives for interethnic cooperation to eventually terminate the cleavages of the Bosnian War (Sisk, 2013). The security guarantees of power sharing are important, because this gives a guarantee to the ethnicities that their rights are secured. But in order for the political system to gain actual executive capacities, the international administration needs to decrease their influence and let the Bosnian government take over the reins. The electoral system needs to incorporate more incentives for interethnic cooperation before elections in order to create more political pluralism which can lead the long term process of accepting each other as legitimate adversaries. This is in the best interest for state building and to really stabilise Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Summary

Power sharing is a concept much discussed within the literature concerning peacebuilding in post-conflict nations. Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the cases were power sharing is perceived to have blunder in its aim of creating sustainable peace between opposing groups in a deeply divided society. What are the lessons learned from Bosnia and Herzegovina for power sharing and peacebuilding? This bachelor thesis tries to analyse whether the concept of power sharing has been altered within peacebuilding through the experience of BiH? The findings of this bachelor thesis are addressed in the conclusion.

The aim of power sharing is to bring opposing groups in heavily divided societies together by giving them a stake in the political process. Power sharing can be used as a way of peacebuilding but can also function as a way of enhancing the democracy level in a country. Peacebuilding derives around creating a secure environment, preventing future fallouts of violence and start building up a trajectory towards sustainable peace. Under peacebuilding, democratisation seems to play an increasingly important role. The construction of democratic institutions favours inclusion of everyone.

Bosnia-Herzegovina entered in a tumultuous period during the nineties of the 20th century. Tensions started to rise within Yugoslavia as Croatia and Slovenia began to criticise Milosevic's policy and claimed independence. Bosnia faced the option of also claiming independence or staying within a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. Independence was the most favourable option according to Izetbegovic. However this was the breaking point for ethnic Serbs living in Bosnia, who wanted to remain in Yugoslavia. The regional conflict between Croatia and Serbia continued further in Bosnia-Herzegovina and were aiming at dividing the country between the two. The conflict heated up between the ethnicities when Serbs claimed independence for Republika Sprska after Bosnia's independence claim. The conflict was characterised by severe atrocities against the Muslim population, since the Serbs favoured military advancement through assistance of the Yugoslavian army. Severe cases of ethnic cleansing occurred and the war had caused many deaths and displaced people. Eventually an international solution was created by implementing a consociational model through the Dayton Agreement with clear territorial and political power sharing. The nation was divided among ethnicities and political decision-making happened through consensus from now on.

Although this consociational model seemed the only proper solution at stopping the conflict, it has not come without criticism. Dayton has institutionalised the ethnicities and created little incentives for interethnic cooperation. National parties were not banned from the political spectrum, causing the parties to keep using nationalistic rhetoric to only appeal to own groups. The severe international presence and influence over the political sphere has limited the legitimacy and real executive capabilities of the Bosnian government. Sentiments of transforming the consociational model among local and international actors are increasingly emerging, but fail to come through because of the international influence. This transformation was aimed at moving away from the political deadlock and lack of progress due to the consociational model implemented by Dayton and creating more executive possibilities for the Bosnian government themselves. Although such a transformation could benefit BiH, it

also poses the threat of failing to recognise the underlying problem of still not having interethnic cooperation taking place.

Peacebuilding currently emphasizes the rule of law in where a nation is completely governed by law. Lessons learned from Bosnia-Herzegovina contain that the rule of law approach undermines the political sphere. It was perceived that the rule of law could be implemented outside the political sphere, resulting in not addressing the legitimacy for this approach. State building is seen as a technical matter were popular consent is not needed. This priority over rule of law has discredited the political process and did not resolve any problems of insecurities perceived by the constituent groups. An institutionalisation before liberalisation approach would be more suitable for peacebuilding. Here liberalisation is postponed after moderate policies, institutions and political parties are created. A one-presidency is proposed in where interethnic cooperation is stimulated and a broad appeal to all groups is required to become president.

The concept of power sharing in itself may not have changed; nevertheless the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina did bring some lessons forward concerning peacebuilding in general. A gradual transformation of the consociational model in where more incentives for interethnic cooperation are included is beneficial for the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina to overcome the ethnic divisions (Paris, 2004).

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Figure 1 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13564139