Wageningen University - Department of Social Sciences

Third parties dealing with spoilers in peace processes.

Master Thesis Disaster Studies - RDS 80733

Written by: Lenneke Ostendorf
870427-631-060
MSc International Development

Supervisor:
Georg Frerks, Wageningen University

28 June 2013

Abstract

This thesis discusses the problems concerning spoilers in peace processes. First an analysis is made of the existing definitions of spoilers. Based on this analysis some problems of the definitions arise, and these will be tackled in the first part. In the second part a distinction is made between different types of spoilers. Of each type of spoiler the motivations, interests and weaknesses will be analysed. Strategies to manage the spoilers and the most appropriate third parties for these strategies will be linked. Finally, three case studies will be discussed to show the complexity of conflicts and the ways to manage spoilers. Also recommendations will be made for a current conflict involving spoiler activity.

Key words: Spoilers, mediation, intervention, spoiler strategies, spoiler management, peace process

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Introduction

Today there are many active and slumbering conflicts in the world. Because of globalization we are all aware of these conflicts, and more parties have an interest in these conflicts. Because violent conflict is an unwanted state to be in, governments are spending enormous amounts of money to achieve a more stable and peaceful state. Unfortunately there are many obstacles that stand in the way. Differences in ideology, religion or deep rooted feelings can make a step towards peace extremely difficult. In lingering conflicts feelings of revenge can play a role. But in the end, everybody is worse of when war takes place.
Or are they? An important debate discussed by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1999) suggests that people may not be fighting because of grievance, but because of greed. Grossman (1991) typifies some acts of rebellion as merely a profitable opportunity for people due to the atypical circumstances. This means that some wars are initiated or prolonged only because some people can make money out of the war. For some people, like warlords, the benefits of living in a peaceful environment do not outweigh the financial benefits and power that they have during war. So they have a preference for war, and see peace talks as a threat. Sometimes so much so, that they will sabotage peace talks and in this way "spoil" the opportunity for peace. For this reason they are named spoilers (Stedman 1997). As one can imagine, spoilers and spoiler activities can prolong or even stop a peace process, even if this is not the intention of the identified spoiler. This can cause many unnecessary deaths and may further impede new peace negotiations.
So it is safe to say that spoilers and spoiler activities bring along several problems that should be taken into account when trying to negotiate peace. Therefore, it is important to know how to identify spoilers and how to deal with them during a peace process. This is easier said than done.

When discussing spoilers there are several problems that we encounter. First of all, we need to know what exactly a spoiler is. At the moment there exist many definitions in literature, that do not include the same actors, possible spoiler actions, and type of spoiler. Without a clear definition is it impractical to discuss the spoiler concept, because it can be interpreted differently, causing confusion. Since the spoiler concept is an complex subject, problems will arise regardless the definition. Here we can think of problems like the real objective of a spoiler and the normative framework in which we classify a group as spoiler.
The second problem we need to analyse is how the classification of spoilers needs to be done. Depending on the reason to spoil, appropriate strategies need to be found. What strategies are there, and what strategy works best for what type of spoiler? This strategy needs to applied by a third party. The involvement of such a party has it own implications, that need to be considered as well. Furthermore, different types of third parties exist, with their own strengths and weaknesses. Not every type of third party will be suitable to mediate a peace negotiation.

Because spoilers can cause such big problems, it is worth investigating how we can deal with spoilers in a proper way. The main question of this thesis will therefore be: "How can third parties best deal with spoilers during and after peace negotiations?" To answer these questions we will first have to try and make a clear and unambiguous definition of what a spoiler is. Here we need to take into consideration the actors involved that can be a spoiler and the actions that we can label spoiler activities. Further, we need to identify the types of spoilers that exist, and what their goals and commitments to these goals are.
When wanting to intervene in a conflict, we first need to investigate when peace talks should be initiated. If the timing of the peace process is wrong, good intentions can lead to disastrous consequences. If the timing is right, the different aspects of attention need to be clear, so a proper (possible) spoiler analysis can be done. Besides this we need to explore the strategies to deal with spoilers, and which strategy can be best applied to what type of spoiler. Finally the type of third parties, with its strengths and weaknesses need to be discussed, to find the optimal spoiler-third party- strategy combination.
The problems discussed above will form the main framework of my thesis, and will be discussed in parts I and II. To show how difficult it is to deal with spoiler problems in practice, in the third part I will describe some case studies. From these case studies we can draw lessons about what went wrong and why it went wrong. These lessons can be applied in future peace processes. Finally I will also discuss one active conflict to show how theory can be applied , and take into account the lessons learnt from the other case studies. I will also make recommendations for future actions of the third party about which strategy to follow and what the pitfalls of these processes might be.

Because of the complexity of conflicts and peace processes, there are many factors that can influence the way a peace process is shaped. Therefore, there is no fixed way in how to deal with spoilers, even if you know what type of spoiler you are dealing with. But there are some fixed patterns, like the motivations and actions of spoilers. If we can determine these variables, then we have some handles to deal with spoilers.

Part I

What are spoilers?

The concept of spoilers is largely unknown by the large audience. Within the scientific community people have a general idea of what spoilers are, but the specific characteristics differ from author to author. In literature there do exist definitions of spoilers, but these definitions have important differences on some points, which can have a great effect on what specific group of people can be named spoilers. Because of this it is important to know these differences, and come up with a definition that is unambiguous and leaves no room for personal interpretation. This is especially important for planning strategies to deal with spoilers during peace processes, because the emergence and management of spoilers can depend greatly on the definition.

At the core of any definition of spoilers is that their actions will work against the agreement of a peaceful settlement. The reasons for this can vary greatly, as well as the means used to achieve this (Newman and Richmond 2006). Which reasons to spoil are included in the spoiler concept and which do determine whether a particular group is a spoiler group or not. By setting clear standards for what is a spoiler and what not, we can also avoid party bias. What in the eyes of one group is spoiler behaviour can in the eyes of an other group be legal resistance.

Because of the sensitivity of the word spoiler it is important to have a clear understanding of what the word means, and to whom it applies. By reviewing literature I will come up with a definition that can be used by third parties managing or intervening in a peace process. I will look at the most important aspects that should be in the definition, and analyse aspects that are different in the definitions of several authors. What parts are important to include in the definition and which are not?

The first major contribution to the spoiler concept was made by Steven Stedman in 1997. His first definition of spoilers was: "[....] leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it" (Stedman 1997:5). Many authors have criticised this definition (e.g. Greenhill and Major 2007), because of problems that this definition poses, and leaving out certain parties that generally are seen as spoilers. These critiques will be discussed later in more detail. Because of the critique Stedman has changed his definition, arguing that spoiler are parties that are willing to use violence (but not necessarily will) (Stedman 2008). Several other authors have also come up with their own definition. For Karen Aggestam (2006) spoilers are: "Leaders and factions who view a particular peace as opposed to their interests and who are willing to use violence to undermine it" (2006:23). A more broad definition is offered by Newman and Richmond (2006) who define spoilers and spoiling as: "groups and tactics

that actively seek to hinder, delay or undermine conflict settlement through a variety of means and for various reasons". Finally Wanis-St. John (in Harris, 2010) states that possible spoilers are "civil society groups that could have a significant role in undermining an agreement or fomenting instability in the peace building phase". Although more definitions exist, we can already see there are some large differences in regard to which groups can become spoilers, as well as the characteristics these groups can or must have. For example the definitions of Aggestam and Stedman are very specific, whereas the definition of Wanis-St. John is very broad. Based on these four definitions I will make an analysis why is it so difficult to come up with a definition that encompasses everything we want to label spoiler or spoiler behaviour, but that cannot be misused.

What is apparent in these definitions is that all four speak about groups in their definitions. But later in their papers it becomes clear that it is also possible for individuals (that are not leaders) to be spoilers. In fact, it seems that anyone with the means to spoil can become a spoiler, whether in- or outside the conflict, in- or outside the peace negotiations. What is also pointed out by the authors is that spoilers can only exist when there is some sort of peace negotiation going on, or that there is at least one party that formally announced it is willing to enter peace negotiations. This makes sense, because without a possible peace to spoil, spoilers can not exist.

In great lines, we can draw from these definitions that when a peace process fails, the spoilers succeed (Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 2011). But the spoiler concept in their opinion has been stretched too far in recent publications. This leads to ambiguities in the concept, making it difficult to draw a line when something is spoiling and when it is not. This does undermine the usefulness of the concept, as well as valuable research information on the precise topic is harder to get. Besides, different theoretical approaches have different implications of how to identify spoilers and how to manage them. Therefore having a workable definition for all mediating parties will help unify the knowledge on the topic of spoiler identification and management, and can therefore target the right group and thus become more efficient.

The differences between these definitions, as has become clear, carry some problems within scientific literature. First, discussion is raised about the use of violence. Even though violence can have devastating effects, non-violent strategies may be very efficient as spoiler activities as well. Secondly, we have the problem of spoiler identification. How can spoilers be identified before they actually have engaged in spoiling behaviour? And also, which parties should be included in a spoiler analysis? And finally, what can be the effects of spoiling, and is its objective always derailing the peace process? These questions I will answer in the upcoming paragraphs.

Violence

What we see in the definition of Stedman and Aggestam, and what was criticized most, is the use of violence that is necessary for parties to be labelled spoilers. According to their definitions, a person or a group is only a spoiler if it used violence. This means that groups that obstruct a peace process in an other way would not be spoilers. However,

later in his article Stedman describes that spoilers can use "strategies of stealth", and thus not necessarily need to use violence to be labelled spoilers. Even though he changed his definition to 'the willingness to use violence' it is hard to establish when a group is willing to use violence, without ever using violence. Besides this, his initial definition, and also that of Aggestam amongst other authors, have led to a lot of research on the linkage of violence and its effects on peace processes. Also terrorism has been drawn into the spoiler debate. These studies also use the concept of spoiling and partly overlaps with the mainstream debate on spoilers.
In some way it makes sense that researchers focus on violence during peace processes. Violence is one of the gravest and most serious treats, and the effects can be measured in absolute numbers. It may also have the most serious consequences. However, there are many authors (a.o. Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs, Zahar, Newman and Richmond, Findley) that believe that spoilers have both violent and non-violent strategies at their disposal and that this is crucial for spoilers, although the relation between them is not well understood (Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 2011).
The definition of Newman and Richmond offers a more broad range of spoiling behaviour, including non-violent acts. Examples of non-violent spoiling include systematically refusing to negotiate at all, or only entering negotiations to never fulfil promises. If parties 'drag their feet' in regard to demobilisation or disarmament, this should also be defined as spoiler behaviour as well (Zahar 2008). Other examples of non-violent spoiling can be parties that join a peace process but are not interested in peace or parties that are not willing to compromise on any of their demands. In these instances, parties are using negotiation processes as a means to gain attention or legitimacy, time, materials, weaponry or to avoid international sanctions. These are called devious objectives.

Identification of spoiler activities
A second problem we encounter in the different definitions is the possibility of identifying spoilers. In many cases, we can only see in retrospect whether a certain action was a spoiling action. For example, at the moment a party enters peace negotiations, we do not know it does so because of devious objectives or because it is truly interested in making peace. This poses a great problem to prevent spoiling activity, because spoiling can only be identified after it has taken place. There are of course aspects one should pay special attention to when dealing with parties that might spoil peace (as I will discuss later), but it would be wrong to call a party a spoiler before it actually has spoiled (Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 2011). This is the main reason that the term 'possible spoiler' should be preferred, because this includes all parties that have the possibility to spoil, but does not mean that they are spoilers. The problem with this concept however is that then "all parties to a conflict are possible spoilers" (Greenhill and Major (2007:37)). However, they also say that "only the powerful ones tend to become manifest threats". In my opinion they are right that all parties are potential spoilers, and that powerful parties have more resources to become a threat, but they will not necessarily become a spoiler party. This depends on much more, like

their relationship with other parties, shifting power balances and the agreement that is currently on the table. The term spoiler should be used with much sensitivity, because (mis)labelling a party as a spoiler can hurt relationships in a peace negotiation.
For example, we should make a clear distinction between spoiling and legal politics. However, this difference may be hard to make, since some actions are spoiling activities in the eyes of one party, but totally legal actions in the eyes of another. Especially 'neutral' third parties should be aware of this difference, and seriously look into the claims of a 'spoiling party' before calling their activities spoiling. According to Newman and Richmond (2006a) when terms and conditions are perceived as unfair, parties have the right to object to these terms and conditions. In that case, the objection is called politics, since there is unfairness. However, when the terms and conditions are perceived as fair and parties still object, it should be called spoiling. The remaining question then is; to whom must the terms and condition be seen as unfair? The spoiler concept is heavily depending on normative underpinnings. Heaven (2010) suggest that the spoiler concept only has meaning in relation to the core assumptions of the so-called Liberal Peace Framework (LPF). So, actors that behave consequently with this paradigm will be labelled as behaving in a fair and legitimate way, where as others that do not behave according to the LPF will be considered spoilers. This in turn will determines how the key peace custodian responds to various actors in the peace process. However, the LPF was developed by Western researchers, and may hold norms and values that are not legitimate in the whole world (Newman and Richmond 2006a). These normative dimensions mainly shape the spoiler concept. Therefore, from a practical policy perspective this may be very problematic and may even be counter productive, especially when we look at how the spoiler concept is used to date (Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 2011). However, from an analytical point of view they say the spoiler concept can be used, as long as these normative underpinnings are recognized. Besides this, the normative underpinnings may change over time. An example is that after 9/11 groups that could be labelled spoilers are now labelled terrorists instead.
In an other article, Newman and Richmond (2006a) argue that the difference in spoiling lies in the behaviour of the opposing party. When actions of a party do not call into question the integrity of the peace framework or use violence this may be regarded as acceptable. Groups that spoil often do so because they feel that the peace process undermines their rights, or limiting their privileges or access to resources. Another possibility is that they rejected the LPF. A party can try to change this by violent and non-violent means. It is however easier to gain attention when one uses violence, and often spoiler groups are willing to use it.

Objectives of spoilers
If we look at the definition of Stedman, spoilers should only be interested in preventing peace. But it might also be possible that a group doesn't agree to the current agreement (Zahar 2008). They may only wish to alter the negotiations so that their interests are heard, or so that they are included in the negotiations. So it is possible that they might

want peace in another form, for example one in which they have more power, or certain promises are made regarding their future situation.
Spoiling can have two effects, also depending on what the intention of the spoiling group was. As we have seen, spoilers can have two objectives. First, the objective can be to completely derail a peace process. This is the case when spoiling parties do not want peace and succeed when a peace process fails. Secondly, when a party does want peace, but does not agree with the current peace process, the peace agreement may be changed. In this instance, a spoiling activity has succeeded when new questions are raised within a peace process, when attention to the peace process has been diverted, when marginalized actors get a voice or illustrate the need to include other actors in the process (Newman and Richmond 2006). So, spoiling at its most efficient, leads not to the end of a peace process, but to the inclusion of new ideas, and better commitment of certain parties. Spoiling then is balancing the threat of the end of a peace process with the desire to reach peace with a new set of interests. In this way, we can see spoiling as a normal part of a peace process, where opposition and recalcitrance are always present. Spoiling therefore is not necessarily a sign that the peace process is in a crisis, and that peace is not supported by all parties. The opposite can even be the case, because marginalized groups want to be a part of it because they see the chances of the peace succeeding as very large.
So although spoiling activities can be considered a normal part of a peace process, it is also very risky. Not every peace process can absorb an equal amount of spoiling before it collapses. Newman and Richmond (2006) link this directly to the willingness of groups to cooperate. Peace processes in general can not sustain high levels of violence. So, when this does occur, Newman and Richmond claim, we are dealing with groups that cannot be reconciled to a compromise. In my opinion this might be true in some cases, but willingness of groups is not the only factor involved in the success of a peace process. Therefore, it is too simple to say that when a peace process fails because of spoiling, it is because the groups were not ready to be reconciled. Other reasons can be that they do not know how to reach their interests in an other way, or that the third party involved has not thoroughly enough explored the options for both parties. Only when we can exclude all other factors being a reason for the collapse of a peace process we can say that it is because the parties were not ready to be in a peace process. Later in my thesis I will further discuss this.

Why do spoilers become spoilers?
As the goal of this thesis is to give more insight in the way spoilers work and how their actions can be counteracted, it is necessary to know why groups will take on spoiling strategies. Spoilers have a range of reasons why they want to counteract the peace process. According to Stedman the greatest risk comes from spoiler leaders and other parties, that believe that a peace agreement threatens their power and interests. The better the strategy is adjusted to the power and interests of the spoilers, the better the chances are that a sustainable peace agreement can be reached (Stedman 1997). But how do these fears arise. It is important to know why spoilers become spoilers, to better

understand their motives and goals, and therefore better address the causes that make these spoilers go violent.
The main reason for groups to use spoiler strategies is because spoiling often works (Newman and Richmond 2006a). Spoiling activities may achieve tangible outcomes, like reconsideration of a spoiler party as a negotiation partner, or a review of the current agreement. However, there are two different views of how possible spoiler groups become spoilers. One explanation argues that depending on the spoiler type there are several outcomes of spoiling activities possible. This would mean that the spoiler groups have (or not have) the power to make changes, and thus would "spoiler type" be the dependent variable. On the other hand, Greenhill and Major (2007) propose that the possible outcomes of a certain context determine which type of spoiler will emerge. According to them, spoiler groups will be as greedy as they can be, and thus only emerge when they have something to gain. This may be very interesting, because according to Greenhill and Major there would be only one spoiler type, namely greedy spoilers. If we look at the table Zahar made (see Table 1, page 11), this could be possible, since greedy spoilers can have both limited and total goals.

Reasons to become a spoiler
Not every civil society group that is outside a peace process will turn into a spoiler. Many groups will take on other measures than violence to influence the peace process. So there must be reasons or incentives that do turn civil groups into spoilers. One of those reasons can be that the ideology of such a group is based on fighting the enemy. When the situation may occur that they will have to cooperate with that group violence can increase. The leaders of that group will not tolerate this peace process even though it may be beneficial, because when they do cooperate it will be the same as political suicide. Second, there are groups that financially benefit from the war. If a peace agreement is reached their current livelihood collapses and they will have to find new ways to make a living. In many cases they will generate less income than they do in the war (Zahar 2010). Often poverty and the prospect of a better financial future drives young men to join a rebellion group. It is therefore not surprising that these groups will try to prevent peace to keep their economic status (Collier 1999).
A third reason, and probably the most important reason to continue fighting, is fear. There are scholars that believe fear is the only reason for spoilers to emerge (Stedman 1997). This can be fear of losing the influence they have in the war. This is of particular importance for mediators because these groups will need a confirmation that their influence is not completely lost. This may even be the case when the group is considered relatively insignificant (Zahar 2010). The fear can also derive from insecurity. Some groups are afraid that the peace agreement will benefit the other parties more than their own party. The other groups may abuse these benefits and eliminate the group. This can only be overcome if the group has faith in an overarching authority that secures their safety in peace. If this would be the only motivation for spoilers, the mediator has to ensure that all the fears are addressed. International guarantees will be needed to stop spoiling behaviour (Stedman 1997).

Possible spoiler groups

In his original work, Stedman made a typology of spoiler types. However, there is not one way to distinguish spoiler types. Here I will discuss the different ways to subdivide spoilers, and what the advantages of such a typology would be. An important question then is, which groups can be identified as spoilers. Can it be only groups that are in direct contact with the conflict, or can groups like diasporas also be identified as spoilers. These groups may not directly spoil, but their (financial) contributions can have a great influence on the ability of other groups to spoil.

A related question is which parties should be considered as potential spoilers, since there may be many layers within a conflict/negotiation. In Stedman's original work it was implicit that the spoiler concept was limited to an analysis of the key warring parties to the armed conflict. The choice for this seems logical, since these groups have much at stake in the conflict and have at some point been willing and able to use violence and could do this again (Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 2011). However, in literature this choice has not always been supported. Some authors have focussed on non-state armed groups, such as rebel groups or insurgents, or factions of these groups. In some cases, it was possible to single out one such a group that stalled the peace process (e.g. Hamas in the Israelian-Palestine conflict). Other authors have put forward reasons to also include (possible) spoilers on the government side, such as paramilitaries and decision makers.

From the field of critical studies, a much broader approach has been put forward. Newman and Richmond for example suggest that also other groups that have an interest in the conflict should be included as possible spoilers. These can be Diaspora groups, foreign patrons or even multinational corporations. In their opinion "the activities of any actors that are opposed to peaceful settlement for whatever reason" should be taken into account (2006 and 2006a).

However, Sartori (1984) and Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs (2011) argue that the spoiler concept should not be stretched too far. The main reason for this is that in the reasoning of Newman and Richmond practically anyone who has the slightest interest in a conflict could be a potential spoiler. To take into account all these groups and their interests would be not only impractical, but also undesirable. It could lead to making adjustments in the negotiations for any group that may have some connections to the conflict, which would lead to unnecessarily extended agreements which would prolong the process. Besides, the spoiler concept would be undermined, making it useless and meaningless (Sartori 1984). So even though these authors agree that actors such as Diaspora groups and neighbouring governments can have a negative impact on the peace process, it is more practical and reasonable to limit ones focus to the former warring parties during civil war, both state and non-state groups, and new armed groups that may have emerged.

Inside and outside spoilers

The first division is very clear and leaves no room for misidentification. It depends on whether a groups is part of a peace negotiation (inside) or is not included (outside).

Although this division may not give much information about the possible spoilers and their strategies, it is a clear division, and it is impossible to misidentify a group. However, this is not a static typology, as non of the existing typologies are. It is possible that groups that were excluded from peace talks in the beginning obtain a place at the table in a later stadium or vice versa.
Even though it offers only little guidance, Stedman (1997) made a distinction in spoiler strategies for inside and outside spoilers. Inside spoilers are important political leaders that are part of the negotiation process. Their way to spoil the peace is by stalling the finalization of the peace agreement for their own benefit, secretly passing on vital information and not keep promises made in the peace agreement. In this way they try to keep their important position in society. Although they do not use violence to reach their goal, they may provide reasons for others to justify their violent actions[1]. Outside spoilers on the other hand are not in the peace process. They influence the peace by the use of violence.
Zahar (2006) links the difference of inside and outside spoilers to the range of means and methods available. Not all parties that want to use violence can do so, and not all parties that can use violence will choose to do so. This decision depends not only on capacity, but also on considerations of opportunity and constraints on violence posed by the commitment of actors in a peace process. This argument is more nuanced than the difference in actions that the different groups may take (Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 2011).

Spoiler types
An other way to categorize spoilers is by their goals and the commitment of the party to these goals. This is what Stedman did in 1997. Several authors had critique on this classification, but as it is the most concrete categorization to date, I will describe the different types here.
The types that Stedman identified are limited spoilers, total spoilers and greedy spoilers. In table 1 a cross reference with goals and commitments is made (Zahar 2010). As we can see, limited spoilers are the least ambitious. They have limited goals, but can be very committed to these goals. Often they want recognition and redress of grievances and basic security of followers. An other goal can be a share in the power, especially if their power is currently constrained by an opposition (Stedman 1997).
The total spoilers are the most intensive spoilers. They want total power and authority, and will not share power with other parties. Their preferences are unchangeable, and there is little or no room for negotiation. This type of spoilers are usually led by persons who see the world in all-or-nothing terms. The leaders do not have the ability to see the

[1] Here we see again the problem with violence in the definition. The definition of Stedman (where he states that all spoilers use violence) en his typology of inside and outside spoilers (where inside spoilers do not use violence) come from the same article. This shows again that solid definition of the spoiler concept is needed to avoid confusion on the topic.

world in an objective way. This type of spoiler has radical ideas about change, and see violence as a way of achieving their goals as quickly as possible.
The third type, the greedy spoiler, has goals that are based on costs, risks and profit. The goals they are trying to reach therefore depend on the risks involved. When the risks are worth the possible outcome, they will try to spoil the peace. This means that when a goal has high risks, the goal is comparable to the goals of a total spoiler.

Table 1; Actor preferences over outcomes and actions as per Stedman's typology. Source; Zahar, 2010

	Preferences Over Outcomes	Limited Goals	Total Goals
Preferences over actions	Low commitment	Limited or greedy spoilers	Greedy spoilers
	High commitment	Limited spoilers	Total spoilers

There are however a number of problems with these spoiler types. First and foremost, the spoilers types are not fixed. Group ideas can change, by influences from outside the peace process. Unless you know how to change the types, a mediator must constantly keep an eye on all (possible) spoiler groups and adjust his strategy. That is, if he can identify the different spoiler types beforehand. It is easier to categorize spoilers after the process when it is possible to see the larger picture. This is much harder to do when the process is in progress. Lastly, the typology of Stedman implies that total spoilers are not open to arguments. Zahar (2010) however points out that in some cases extremist groups were part of the negotiations and proved to be reliable partners.
So, although the typology of Stedman may provide a first step in dealing with spoilers, it is important to continuously observe them and adjust the strategy of dealing with them when necessary. A mediator should also not forget that within a typology there are nuances. When encountering total spoilers he should not immediately dismiss them from the negotiation table.

Pearlman (2009) agrees with the actor oriented framework of Stedman, but looks more at the internal dynamics of a group. The difference with Stedman is that Pearlman focuses on what spoilers want, whereas Stedman looks at how much spoilers want . According to her, the internal dynamics mostly determine whether a groups will become a spoiler group or not. Her hypotheses however only apply for non-state group, as the dependent variables are not an issue of discussion for state actors. According to Pearlman there are two factors that depend whether a group will spoil or not. The first hypothesis is that spoiling is more likely to occur when one or more parties lack an institutionalized system of legitimate representation. This has mainly to do with who has the right to speak on behalf of the group. When groups have a legitimate system of representation, in times of conflict they can focus on the issues at hand with the other groups. However, when this is not the case, contenders within the group will continuously try to influence the process from within their community. They will

bargain within their group and address themselves to the conflict with an external adversary.

The prospects of a peace agreement can heighten the contestation over who is the legitimate representation of a group. Especially because a peace agreement can benefit some factions within a group, but not others. Some actors in a non state group want to collaborate with a peace agreement, because this means they will have an advantage over other groups. Groups that can not be part of the negotiation will try to seek other ways to improve their position, often by use of violence. When there is no system of collective decision making, factions try and outstrip each other.

Secondly, the internal contestation motivation of a party can lead both to peace making or spoiling. This depends on both the policy preferences of a group and on the balance of power within their community. In the internal contestation model actors choose to negotiate or spoil the peace based on the expected utility of each strategy for improving their position in an internal balance of power (Figure 1). In this figure we can see that when a group wants to improve their position in the internal balance of power, they expect certain benefits by either negotiation or spoiling. The behaviour that will gain the most benefits will be the strategy chosen by the group. This however only account for the internal contestation, not on the peace process at hand.



Figure 1; Internal Contestation Model (Pearlman 2009)

There are three factors that shape how factions deal with internal struggle. First, we have the position a group occupies in the internal balance of power, secondly, the resources that it expects will improve that position and thirdly how it expects that negotiation or spoiling will affect access to those resources. That the decision of a group to spoil or support a peace process depends on both policy preferences and their position in the internal balance of power has two implications. First, in any non-state group leaders of the dominant faction will most likely collaborate with the peace process, as they have the most to gain from a seat at the negotiation table. They will gain more recognition as a leader and it will increase their access to resources. For the same

reason, leaders of subordinate factions are likely to have the most to lose from peace negotiations, and thus be the most likely to undertake spoiling behaviour.
It is also possible that factions undertake actions to influence other groups than their external adversary. They may try to influence public opinion, and by looking at what the audience wants adjust their strategy to maximize their support. So, when the public is frustrated with a peace process, a group may gain support by spoiling the peace, and the other way around. Under other circumstances, a group may be most interested in influencing leaders in their own faction.

Opportunistic spoiling
However, there is much criticism on this typology of Stedman from several authors (a.o. Greenhill and Major, Zahar, Blades and De Maio, Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs). The first argument why Stedmans spoiler model is not complete, is that is only looks at the type of actor involved. This not only makes it hard to determine spoilers and spoiler type beforehand (Zahar 2008), but also neglects the context of a given situation (Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 2011). In my opinion, and that of many authors, it is impossible that the context does not have any effect on the developments of the process. Also, if we would only look at a group's characteristics, we can not explain why a group changes their behaviour (which is possible in Stedman's model) during one peace process.
This would mean that it is necessary to include the context into the spoiler model. Greenhill and Major do even go so far as to say that the group's characteristics do not say anything about being a potential spoiler, but that whether a group will spoil or not completely depends on the context. In their opinion "every real or potential spoiler will be as greedy as he think he can afford to be" (2007:11). They add that sometimes a spoiler needs to be greedy, in case peace would mean a death sentence for them.
Greenhill and Major are the largest proponents of this explanation. They argue that the spoiler model of Stedman does not make a good distinction between greedy/limited spoilers and genuine hard bargaining. In this way, a group becomes a spoiler when the actions of a group spoil the peace process. This however depends on both the group in question as well as on the other groups involved. So, who is labelled a spoiler depends mainly on which groups the custodians of peace can suppress, and not so much on the determination of the goals and personalities of the elites in question.
An other way of looking at it is saying that people are opportunistic creatures, and often have a reasonable idea of how far they can push the boundaries to achieve a certain goal (Collier 1999). This would mean that regardless of ideology, groups and persons can look at a certain context and more or less calculate what their gains from that context could be. This has great implications for third party interventions, since it would mean that they need to change to context in stead of the spoiler group. The variables would change, and they could be focussing on the wrong variable. If Greenhill and Major are right, we should look at the opportunity context and examine the role that it is playing in the decision making of potential spoilers and spoiler type should not even be taken into consideration at all.

When looking at case studies, parties do adjust their goals according to the prevailing opportunity structure. According to Greenhill and Major the most significant determinant for the success of a peace process is the distribution of power. This counts for both parties implementing the peace and the parties on the ground (2007:9). Therefore, parties that do have the power to change the power balance in a peace process will do that, while parties with less power will pursue peace, because they may lose their power position otherwise.

Zahar (2008) tries to find some middle ground between group characteristics and opportunity structure. She states that there are mainly two types of costs that parties will take into consideration when deciding to spoil or not. First there are costs associated with renewed fighting, and the costs associated with the loss of peace dividends (political influence, power or access to resources). Besides this she also specified some factors that have the largest influence on a spoilers assessment of its capabilities and opportunities. For the capabilities the most important are access to valuable tradable commodities and foreign patrons. For the opportunities the two most important factors are the presence and commitment of an international peacekeeping force and a party's loyalty and vested interest in the peace process (Zahar 2006).

Blades and De Maio (2010) point to an other structural factor that may be of importance, namely the exclusiveness of the peace process. They say that the more exclusive a process is, the more likely it is to see violent attacks from excluded parties. But they too see this only as a part of the explanation, as the nature of the rebel organization is of importance as well. They state: "[when] rebel groups themselves are inclusive and characterized by internally democratic situations this reduces the incentive for spoiler violence"(2010:23).

At the basis of both types lies the thought that people are greedy and try to gain as much as possible for themselves. The differences lies in that Pearlman seeks the explanation in the representation of the group, while Greenhill and Major only looks at the structural factors. However, one should note that even though Pearlman look at the characteristics in the group, in the internal contestation model the only behaviour possible by group faction is greedy behaviour. This supports the hypothesis of Greenhill and Major that indeed all parties are as greedy as they can be. In my opinion, both factors (context and group characteristics) are important when dealing with spoilers. The main reason for this is that one factor can not explain all the spoiler behaviour that is observed up to date. For example, as mentioned before, group characteristics by itself cannot explain why spoiler choose to change their behaviour and also fail to offer reasons why total spoilers can be reliable partners. On the other hand, if everything would depend on the opportunity structure we cannot explain why strong and resourceful parties sometimes stick to a peace agreement, when they would probably gain more by spoiling the process (Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 2011). Therefore, a more complex model than that of Stedman is needed that considers both position and type of the possible spoiling party and the capability and opportunity in the specific situation.

Conclusions part I

In this part I wanted to explore what exactly a spoiler is. As became clear early on, there are many definitions that cover a broad range of possible actors, spoiler activities, and other factors that can be attributed to spoilers. However, this variation in definition is not beneficial for the application of the concept in practice. If different parties use different definitions, there will be miscommunication. This can endanger the peace process. Therefore, a uniform definition is needed to be able to use the spoiler concept and come up with strategies to manage these spoilers.

First, we must decide which groups can be named spoilers. We have seen that there are some ambiguities concerning which groups can en should be labelled spoilers. There are legitimate arguments to use the spoiler concept in a very broad way, also including international corporations and diaspora groups, as they too can have a great influence on the process of peace negotiations. However, to include all these groups in one's analysis of possible spoiler groups is not feasible, and because of time issues in my opinion also not desirable. When making an analysis concerning a certain conflict these groups should be a factor in a mediator's considerations on which strategy to follow, but putting too much emphasis on these groups will divert attention from more direct parties. Also, as Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs have pointed out, the spoiler concept would become useless, as it could be applied on too many groups and situations. Therefore I argue that only groups that are directly involved in the existing conflict can be a possible spoiler group. Both groups included en excluded from the peace negotiations can then be spoilers. This does not mean that groups outside of the conflict cannot contribute or provide incentives to spoil, but for reasons of practicality they are excluded from the definition. Dominant external actors should however not be forgotten when drawing a peace agreement.

Secondly, we need to include the goal of a (possible) spoiler group. We have seen two categories that exist. We can say that a) a group is only a spoiler group if it wants to completely derail a peace process, or b) a spoiler group does want peace, but not on the conditions that are currently on the table, since their interests are not taken into account sufficiently. However, many authors (a.o. Collier, Greenhill and Major, and Pearlman) believe that people are greedy, but rational beings, that will try to gain as much from a situation as possible. Important to note here is that although people generally try to maximize their gains from a agreement, they may have good reasons to stop a particular agreement. When their identity as a group is under threat or when the agreement threatens the existence of the group it is no more than logical that they want to stop this agreement. But when a deal is beneficial for the group, they will take it. This means that for every group, a peace agreement exists that they would be willing to comply to. Therefore, we do not have to make the distinction between objectives, but we can say that spoilers only object to the peace agreement that is currently on the table. This does not mean that the peace agreement a group would agree to is rational in the eyes of other groups.

Thirdly, we must identify the means that spoiler groups use as a strategy. The most important question here is, is a group only called a spoiler when is uses violence, or can

it use other strategies as well. Stedman stated in his definition that only when violence was used, a group was labelled a spoiler group. But as became clear, this poses many difficulties, and in his own work he described non-violent strategies for spoilers as well. Zahar pointed out that non-violent strategies can be very effective as well, and both types of strategies belong to the arsenal of spoiler groups. Thus it is safe to say that spoilers, regardless their position in the conflict, can use both violent and non-violent strategies. This still leaves the problem when an action is spoiling and when it is a political actions. Therefore I propose to add 'actions that can not be justified in that specific context'. By using this we are no longer bounded by a normative framework, but only look at the situation at that point, including culture, habits and history. It also allows us to take into account the magnitude of the means involved to reach a certain goal.
A last issue regarding the definition of spoilers is why a group becomes a spoiler group. Does this depend on their characteristics as a group or on the context that provides opportunities to spoil? We already established that human being are greedy and rational, and therefore opportunity structure plays an important role in whether a party will spoil or not. But this cannot be the only factor, for it does not explain why powerful parties stick to a peace agreement, when that would mean a loss of power. Therefore, the nature of a group is also of importance whether a group will spoil. Because in my opinion both orientations are of importance, I will not explicitly mention this in the definition.

These factors taken into account, I propose a new definition for the spoiler concept. A spoiler is: *Any group or individual that is directly involved in the current conflict, that sees a particular peace agreement as opposed to its interests and undertakes actions that can not be justified in that specific context to stop this particular agreement.*

Even though I think this definition covers a majority of the issues discussed in this first part, there are still some issues that are not resolved. First of all, I state that spoilers do undertake actions "that can not be justified in the current situation". The problem here lies in the fact that someone has to decide whether something is justified or not. But this will always be a problem, and cannot be solved by merely a definition. We need a normative framework that all parties can agree to, otherwise there will always be discussions about what can and cannot be done to defend your interests.
Secondly, we still have the problem of not being able to identify spoilers before they have spoiled. In my opinion, this is not necessarily required. It would be unfair to call a party a spoiler before you are absolutely sure it is a spoiler. The only way to know this is when the spoiling has already occurred. However by using the term possible spoiler (i.e. a*ny group or individual that is directly involved in the current conflict, that* ***may*** *see a particular peace agreement as opposed to its interests and* ***may*** *undertake actions that can not be justified in that specific context to stop this agreement*) and doing a proper context analysis we can point out the most likely spoilers. A strategy to manage these possible spoilers can then be designed.

Part II

Intervening in spoiler situations.

Now we determined what exactly are spoilers, we need to identify strategies to keep their influence at a minimum. There are several aspects that have an influence on the strategy. First, the parties must be willing to commit to a peace agreement. If they do not the peace agreement will not be sustainable, and it would be a waste of time and resources to engage in such an undertaking. Besides this the type of spoiler needs to be taken into consideration. Not all spoilers spoil for the same reason and same goals, and they will do so by different means. It is therefore no more than logical that different strategies need to be applied. These different strategies will be discussed. Finally, often a mediating party will be involved. The involvement of such a party itself can lead to problems with spoilers, that need to be taken into account. Since there are different types of third parties, they do not all have the same strengths and weaknesses, and some type of parties will be more suitable to act as a mediating party than an other. Finally, we have to link strategies for a certain type of spoiler to a third party that is able to execute that strategy.

Time of intervention

Even though peace seems the optimal situation to live in, as we have seen there are enough incentives for certain groups to continue the war. This is according to Greenhill and Major (2007) a rational calculation of these groups, weighing the benefits against the disadvantages. As long as the benefits outweigh the costs, war will continue. However, at a certain point this may change, and the costs of the war will become too high to continue. At this point the warring parties realize that conciliation is more favourable, and they will have reached a mutually hurting stalemate. When the stalemate is reached, parties will be more willing to enter negotiations and find a solution together. This is the moment for third parties to step in and encourage the warring parties to enter negotiations. Zartman and Touval (2007) call this the ripeness theory. The trick for third parties is to identify the moment in which this ripeness is reached. This is not, as one would think, when there is clear evidence that the mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) is reached (there are more costs than benefits), but when parties recognize they are in one (even though there may be little evidence for that). Similarly there exist what Zartman calls the mutually enticing opportunities (MEO). Instead of focussing on the negative aspects of war, the MEO looks at the positive sides of peace (Zartman 2008). These positive prospects might persuade warring parties to reconsider a peace agreement. However, few examples of a MEO have been found in reality.

The other condition for negotiations is that all parties must have the feeling that a negotiated solution is possible, and that the other parties is willing to enter negotiations as well. These two together Zartman calls ripeness. Ripeness in itself is not sufficient for the initiation of negotiations (Zartman 2008:23). The ripeness must be 'seized', either by the warring parties themselves or by a third party. The ripeness theory does not predict when a situation will become 'ripe', but there are some elements that indicate that a situation is ripe. Subjective expressions of pain, impasse and inability to account for the costs of further escalation, data on number and nature of casualties and material costs are indicators that a conflict might be ripe to seize.

Pruitt expanded this theory by providing a precondition that the current struggle is no longer an acceptable alternative. Reasons that point to this are a low likelihood of success, severe costs of continued struggle, severe risks in continued struggle, and heavy pressure from important third parties (Pruitt in Shedd, 2008:97). Third parties are not a requirement for negotiation to start, but all the other strategies available to the warring parties must be ruled out (such as further escalation, seeking new allies).

According to many authors, peace accords are only signed when the fighting parties have reached a mutually hurting stalemate (a situation in which the conflict is for none of the parties beneficial). The way a peace accord is signed depends on four characteristics: relative power of the indigenous parties to the conflict; the mandate, willingness and ability of international custodians to redress this balance and maintain it once in place; actors' willingness to accept the risks and costs they would have from a return to the battlefield; their different policy preferences. These characteristics depend mostly on the context of a conflict situation, which adds to Greenhill and Majors beliefs that context is the most determining factor. However, they admit that the third and the fourth factor can be partly ascribed to spoiler type, but as these actor-specific characteristic do not change on short terms, they cannot be a basis for renegotiation (or spoiling) of the peace agreement in a later stadium.

The ripeness and readiness theory provide an understanding of the reasons that spoilers arose in the Russo-Chechen peace process. All peace processes and agreements have weaknesses. Flawed peace agreements may be better than no agreement if they provide the basis for he rebuilding of relationships between the parties and renewal of ties that inhibit violence. In the case of the Russian-Chechen peace agreement, the agreement itself took potential spoilers and turned them into actual spoilers. In the interests of stopping immediate violence, neither side insisted that the initial agreements solved the permanent issues of status. The rush to reach a agreement for internal political and security reasons allowed the parties to declare the war 'over' based upon very little actual negotiation. The vagueness of the agreement meant both parties could interpret it in very different ways, while neither had the motivation to work through the details. It is important to emphasize that this process was concluded with little external assistance. The presence of an external mediator may have been able to pressure the parties to resolve more important issues (Shedd, 2008).

Aspects of spoiler intervention

When dealing with spoilers, third parties should consider three main issues concerning spoilers, namely the position of the spoilers (inside or outside), the number of (possible spoilers and the locus of the spoilers. As we have seen in the previous chapter, groups outside the peace process may behave different from parties that are included in the peace talks. This should be taken into account by parties trying to reach an agreement, because they may need to take measures to prevent the spoiling activities (Stedman 1997).

Secondly, we should be concerned with the number of possible spoilers. Even though we can say that any party that is only slightly related to the conflict can be considered a possible spoiler, in the previous chapter we have defined that possible spoilers can only be parties that we actively included in the conflict. This can be by being a (armed) warring party, either state or non-state, or by having a big influence in the conflict. Custodians of peace should be very considerate of this when they choose a certain strategy to counteract a certain spoiler group or spoiler activity. Besides this, they should also be aware of the influence of a strategy for one group of spoilers has on an other group of possible spoilers. The way they treat one group of spoilers will have an effect on spoiler strategies of other groups.

Finally, one should consider the locus of a spoiler group. With this Stedman means whether the spoiler is a follower or a leader. This is important to know, because if the spoiler drive is the leader, that the group can easily change spoiler type when the leader changes (Stedman 1997). That the locus of the spoiler group can differ also has important implication for dealing with it, because this means that spoilers are not homogeneous groups, but consists of many individuals and factions that may have different interests or goals.

The internal dynamics of the group will also have an effect on whether a group decides to continue spoiling or whether to commit to a peace process. However, not much attention is paid to this internal dynamics in literature. Nilsson and Söderberg (2011) argue that this is because many authors only look at the context (as discussed in the previous chapter) on not at the group at all. Therefore Stedman's actor oriented framework should be used more when finding ways to deal with them. However, I feel that even though Stedman does focus more on the actor, he also focuses very little on internal dynamics of spoiler groups.

Pearlman (2009) does acknowledge the importance of internal dynamics. She argues that parties do not only want to achieve their goals in relation to their opponents, but also towards their internal constituencies. Therefore, each decision of the group is not only made on concerns on the content of the peace agreement, but also on concerns of the group's internal power balance. This is more likely the case with non-state actors, especially if they lack an institutionalized system of legitimate representation. She says that leaders of dominant groups are more likely to negotiate because this often gives them access to material resources and gives them external recognition. Leaders of subordinate groups are less likely to benefit from these benefits and therefore more likely to become spoilers. Adding to this Atlas and Licklider (1999) have observed that a

peace process often breaks down because the relationship between allies breaks. This can be because one party or faction within a party will benefit more from the agreement then the other.

Management strategies

In the original paper of Stedman on spoiler problems, three strategies of dealing with spoilers are mentioned; coercion (hardest power), socialization and inducement (softest power) (Stedman 1997). This is in correspondence with the three main approaches for dealing with non-state armed actors (Hofmann and Schneckener 2011), where they distinguish the realist, constructivist and institutionalist approach. However, within each of these approaches hard and soft power can vary, and during intervention more than one strategy can by applied - either in sequence or simultaneous.

Realist approaches mainly include the use of force to make the spoiler group adapt to the new situation. The bottom line of realist approaches is that as long as the mediator is able to put enough pressure and can offer reliably rewards and punishment, spoiler will ultimately comply. This strategy is also known as 'sticks and carrots' (Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 2011) The coercion strategy of Stedman falls under this approach, where the use of punishment or threat is applied to change the behaviour of the spoiler and reduce its capability to influence a peace process. This approach is often accompanied by law enforcement on a national or international level (Hofmann and Schneckener 2011). However, mediators are most times reluctant to use direct force. The disadvantage of using force, as Werner and Yen (in Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 2011) state, is that the use of force may provoke radicalization in the moderate parties.

To apply the coercive approach successfully, there are some factors that a third party should take into consideration. First, the coercer needs to be very clear about what it wants from the spoiler group. Second, the third party needs to push the spoiler group in terms of time. Otherwise there are little incentives for the spoiler group to comply. The punishments for the spoiler groups have to be credible, and the third party must be willing to accept costs and risks. Finally, threats of punishments have to be alternated with positive inducements (Art and Cronin 2007).

One variation of this strategy is the 'departing train' strategy, where the mediator sets an ultimatum for the spoilers to join the negotiations on his terms (*ibid.)*. This usually comes in the form of an election. If the spoiler group chooses not to join, the peace process will continue without them. An other variation is the 'withdrawal' strategy. This strategy is based on the international attention that the spoiler group seeks. If a mediating party threatens to leave the negotiations, the international interest will be lost. The disadvantage of this strategy is that parties that have fulfilled their obligations will be punished as well (Stedman 1997).

Other types of strategies that fall under the realist approach are 'control and containment' where the mediator diminishes the freedom of the spoilers to move and communicate. Often this is done by using police and intelligence measures. 'Marginalization and isolation' aims to reduce the political influence of the spoiler group.

This strategy works best for weaker groups, because it will be easier to convince other groups to ignore them. A final strategy, but with questionable ethics, is 'bribery and blackmail'. Members of spoiler groups may be corrupt and can be seduced with material incentives to act in a certain way. In this way, the mediator can collect information that would otherwise stayed unknown (Hofmann and Schneckener 2011).

The constructivist approach aims at changing the policy preferences of the spoiler groups involved. Custodians will set a set of acceptable norms and try to convince all groups involved to stick to these norms. The main strategy to do this is the 'process of socialization', whereby spoiler groups are included in the processes and institutions are installed during peace implementation. In this way, spoiler groups will be socialized, and accept the new norms stated by the mediator. This strategy includes both material rewards and the intellectual persuasion. The mediator needs to balance these two components in such a way that intellectual change, or the adaption of new norms, is positively enforced by material rewards, but not so much that the material rewards become a goal on its own (Stedman 1997).
The other strategy within the constructivist approach is 'naming and shaming'. The 'naming and shaming' strategy is used to organize social pressure against practices of spoiler groups. This will harm their legitimacy, and they will lose support of their followers. This can be done both at the national and international level. In this way, spoiler groups can be forced to accept certain norms, because the alternative could mean their position is significantly weakened. This strategy works best for groups that need support from abroad (Hofmann and Schneckener 2011). The question with this approach is whether this forced acceptance of norms will change the norms of the group sustainably.

The institutionalist approach encompasses the power of bargaining. By means of bargaining mediators try to establish procedures and rules to try and reach a peaceful co-existence. These processes need to be implemented, guaranteed and controlled internationally. The two strategies within this approach are 'mediation and negotiation' and 'co-optation and integration'. In mediation and negotiation the mediator will try to call a stop to the use of violence, and ask the groups to revise their (maximalists) demands (Hofmann and Schneckener 2011:611). In the process of negotiation the pros and cons of each solution are weighed against each other to come to a solution is works for all.
Within negotiation, Weiss (2003) determined three main strategies, depending on the trust between parties. When there is little trust, according to Weiss, gradualism is the best option. In this strategy the mediator starts with simple issues between the parties, that are more easy to solve. When this is done, trust between the parties will grow, and more complex issues can be dealt with. It is a very cautious approach, which may be wise when dealing with warring parties. However, this approach is susceptible for manipulation and is very vulnerable for spoilers because the slow pace of the process gives spoilers the time to undermine the trust that is built.

The 'boulder-in-the road'-approach works in the opposite way from the gradualism approach, by dealing with the most complex issues first. Once this 'boulder' is remove, other issues will be dealt with more easily. This is a quick way to determine the sincerity of the parties. Of course, when this strategy fails, one risks a blockage for further negotiations (*ibid*.)
The 'committee' approach divides the problems highlighted by the parties over several committees, that all work on their own problem simultaneously. The assumption of this approach is that the smaller groups will work together in a problem solving mode because their partial solution is not the whole solution. An advantage of this approach is that parties that want one issue to be discussed before negotiations go on can be included, without the risk that the discussion on that one issue derails the whole peace process. Another advantage of this approach can be that parties are forced to discuss issues that were previously taboo. The division of problems makes this approach also extremely flexible. Limitations are that the mediator cannot always be part of the discussion group, and therefore does not know how an agreement was reached. Besides this, because of the division in smaller groups, one issue can not be leveraged with an other (*ibid*.)
The strategy of 'co-optation and integration' assumes that spoilers can be co-opted and integrated into the political setting. This means that spoilers will get some sort of share in the power, with leaders of spoiler groups being involved in day-to-day politics, be it at local or national level. In contrast to the realist approach which assumes greed as the main driver for spoiler, the institutionalist approach states that spoilers are driven by grievances and political demands. By giving spoilers part of the responsibility, they might feel pressured to deliver, and will change their norms (Hofmann and Schneckener 2011). An other positive effect may be that by offering a high political position to greedy leader of spoiler groups, these leaders have less incentives to back to spoiling. How trustworthy these leader will be remains questionable.
Part of the institutionalist approach is inducement, or giving the spoiler what it wants in order to get them to join the peace process. This is particularly the case when spoilers claim their behaviour comes from fear, fairness or justice. It is up to the mediator to verify these claims, and see what type of inducements can be made. This can be as concrete as meeting the demands, or as vague as a promise to be able to join further negotiations. In practice, this strategy is applied as a convenient strategy without consideration whether it is a appropriate strategy or not (Stedman 1997).

Matching strategies to spoiler type
To link a strategy to a certain spoiler type, we first need to establish the type of spoiler we are dealing with. This is only needed if we follow Stedman typology, because according to Greenhill and Major all spoilers are as greedy as they can be. They state that spoilers should never be included in negotiations or inducements, because this would only lead to higher demands from the spoilers if they think they can afford it. The main intention of a third party should be to change the "decision calculus of active or potential spoilers by identifying (dis)incentives that can be put in place to discourage or forestall

their emergence and the steps that can be taken to change the potential payoffs associated with cooperation versus confrontation" (Greenhill and Major 2007:8). This can be done by both co-option or coercive measures. The parties involved in the process should be able to punish or defeat spoilers, possibly with force. In this way they can form a power block, which would give potential spoilers a warning not to engage in spoiling activities.

If we would take Stedman's spoiler types as a basis, we have three different types to deal with. According to Stedman (1997), total spoilers cannot be accommodated in a peace process and thus need to be defeated or marginalized in such a way that they can do little damage. Therefore, two strategies may be used against total spoilers; the use of force and the departing train strategy. Few parties are willing to use force, and I also think that the use of force is only a temporary solution. In time, identified spoiler groups will regroup and derail the peace process, or if peace is already establish may induce new conflict. Only when the agreement reached is strong enough to counteract their efforts, the use of force may be useful in the long term. The departing train strategy can be used to legitimize parties in the negotiation, and delegitimize the ones that are not (Stedman 1997).

A greedy spoiler with total goals may be included in the peace process if the costs of violent conflict are very high. A greedy spoiler with limited goals can also be accommodated, but third parties should be aware that this may induce higher demands. Stedman argues that to counteract this, greedy spoilers need socialization, since there is a possibility that their norms can change. The third parties should be careful with inducement, because the greed of the spoilers could grow. But it is possible that greedy spoilers have security fears as well, and in that area inducement may be necessary. When dealing with greedy spoilers, it is very important to differentiate legitimate and illegitimate requests (*ibid*).

Finally limited spoilers can be included in a peace process by meeting its nonnegotiable demands (Stedman 1997:14), but only if they are acceptable to the other parties. Inducement would therefore be a good strategy for limited spoilers, but only if they fit within the boundaries already set by the negotiating parties. Realist or constructivist approaches can also be used, but especially the use of force may lead to counter escalation of violence.

Third party involvement

Whenever third parties are involved, they will encounter a couple of problems. First and foremost, they have to deal with parties that have an intractable dispute and cannot solve their problems on their own. Besides this, resolving the problems between these parties can be very rough due to problems like communication barriers, emotional barriers, cultural barriers and unrealistic expectations (Hoffman 2011). However, I do not want to go into specifics, because although this is very important for a successful negotiation, there is not one type of barrier that is specific for dealing with spoilers[2].

[2] For more information on the different barriers present see Hoffman 2011

Regarding the spoiler problem, the third party faces a number of uncertainties for which skilled diagnosis is needed. These are; the goal of the spoiler; the intent behind the acts of noncooperation; the degree of commitment of the spoiler; the degree of leadership command and control of followers; the degree of unity within the spoiler group and; the likely effects on the spoiler, other parties of the conflict and interested external actors (Stedman 1997:17).

An important issue that will always be a part of the problem is the presence of the third party itself. Bringing in a third party as mediator can only work as long as all parties approve of the mediator. If not, the mediating party does not have any leverage in the negotiation of the agreement and cannot make a contribution. Secondly, a third party can bring incentives, like resources, aid, and international attention to the negotiation table (Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 2011). These aspects can be used as incentives for spoilers to collaborate, but they can also increase the chances that potential spoilers will indeed spoil, especially the greedy spoiler of Stedman, or all potential spoilers according to Greenhill and Major. Therefore third parties should be very careful when using these incentives

Thirdly, even though all parties have to agree on the mediator if negotiations are to be successful, third parties are never neutral. Even though they are not parties to the conflict, they always have an interest in the outcome of the negotiation, otherwise they would not engage in it. Negotiations take up much time, money and effort, and mediating parties face high risks if negotiations would fail (Aall 2007). The costs of their involvement may also affect the strategy chosen by the mediator. After analysis, the most appropriate strategy for a certain situation may be too expensive and time consuming for the mediator. This may co-depend on the interests of the mediating party, especially when the conflict takes place in small and less important (for the mediator) regions (Stedman 1997). For this reason, third parties may choose a 'quick fix', where the main goal is their own exit. However, after negotiation more help may be required, for example, to monitor the progress and hold parties to promises made. Especially when a third party has promised to safeguard one (weaker) group, it is important that they stay present. Otherwise the weaker party may be reluctant to, for example, demobilize and in that way become more vulnerable (Greenhill and Major 2007)

Because of the costs and risks involved it can be expected that third parties are not merely observers and catalysts, but will steer the negotiation in a direction that is profitable for themselves as well. If they do this too openly or will favour one party more than another, negotiations are likely to fail. This is especially true for asymmetrical conflicts. In asymmetrical conflicts the larger parties will have more influence at the negotiation table. When the interests of the weaker groups are not sufficiently covered, these groups will feel that the negotiations are 'rigged' against them (Newman and Richmond 2006). When this happens, the negotiations become very vulnerable for spoiling.

Greenhill and Major discuss the probability of spoiler action during a certain peace negotiation on both the relative power of the custodians of peace and the domestic oppositions relative power. If both relative powers are strong, the probability of spoiler

action is very low, and if there is any, their goals are likely to be smaller. On the other hand, when both custodians of peace and the domestic opposition is weak, spoilers will find much room to wiggle, and therefore be very greedy. If one of the powers is weak and the other strong, there is a medium chance of spoiler behaviour, and spoilers will be moderately greedy. This can be seen in Table 2. Of course, the fear of punishment that can be executed by the mediator will add to the cooperation of parties (2007).

Table 2; Probability in spoiler emergence and predicted level of greed for a given distribution of power (Greenhill and Major 2007)

		Domestic opposition	
		Strong	Weak
Custodians of Peace	Strong	Low Latent nonspoiler (least greedy)	Medium Greedy to greedier
	Weak	Medium Greedy to greedier	High Greediest

A problem that occurs when analysing the relative powers is that the situation is not static. So, on one moment one strategy may be more appropriate, but when power balances shift (as they very likely will do during extended negotiations) a new strategy may need to be chosen. This also depends on the structural factors that account for opportunity possibilities for spoilers. In the eyes of Greenhill and Major, spoilers then can and will become more greedy. This also asks for a new involvement strategy. They therefore advise mediators to keep the context as constant as possible. For this, mediators need to be independent, and have the will, means and mandate to counteract any changes that might occur that affect the status quo. It is important to note that keeping the context perfectly constant is not possible, as the presence of a third party will change it immediately. But it is important to keep all factors as much the same as possible, even though this may be very difficult in practice.

Possible third parties, strengths and weaknesses.

As discussed before, all parties in a mediation should be satisfied by the third party involved. If not, they will not listen to what they have to say, and third parties cannot exert power. Rubin (in Aall 2007) distinguished six types of power that third parties can have. However, not every type of third party can use every type of power described below. This mainly depends one the means and resources the parties have access to. Here, I will first describe the types of power according to Rubin.

The first is legitimate power, or the mediator's right to make a request. This power is therefore given by the warring parties to the mediator. This power can be given because the mediator comes from an important institution or because it has had a long term

relationship with the parties in the past. The issue of legitimacy can be complex for all types of mediators, as each side of the conflict will have their own reasons for finding the mediator legitimate. All sides will want the mediator to understand (and favour) their position and will attempt to win the mediator over. Taking hold of and keeping this power is complex for third parties, as they are usually involved in the talks only because the parties want them to be (Rubin in Aall 2007).

Referent power is the power to influence one or both sides because the parties to the conflict value the relationship with the third party. This power is often associated with a powerful state. A powerful state is attractive for parties to be a mediator, because it can provide resources and protection. Third parties from 'inside' the conflict can have great referent power. This is usually not because of the objectivity of the mediator (as mediators are never 100% objective), but because of connectedness and the knowledge that a mediator will not leave the conflict after negotiations. A valuable relationship does not necessarily mean a public one. At times, parties of a conflict do not want a strong relationship with the third party or close identification with a peace process. This is especially true when the parties of a conflict run the risk of abandonment by their own constituencies because they meet or even consider meeting the other side. A low-key mediator who can be dismissed as unimportant if the early moves toward peace fail is an advantage in these circumstances (*ibid*.).

Information power allows the mediator to be able to act as an agent of communication. This mainly involves giving parties the information that they need, be it bringing information from one side to the other (due to communication barriers, i.e. Hoffman) or information from outside the conflict. Besides this, with informational power mediators can help parties redefine and better articulate their needs and possible areas for negotiation. The mediator can first try to find common ground, and from that point on bring parties closer together. This power can be very important, since protracted conflict often lead to a taboo on direct talks. Talking to the other party can be taken as a sign of weakness by their followers. By having informational power, a mediator can creatively establish relationships and bring parties together. Employing informational power requires that the mediator already possesses both legitimate power and referent power; they need to be legitimate in the eyes of both (all) parties and have a strong enough relationship with both to be viewed as an honest broker (*ibid*).

Expert power is the power that mediators have because they know more, or appear more to know than the other parties. This can be analytical insight and the latest information of the conflict, or having the expertise to design possible solutions to the problems of the warring parties. In some cases, mediators may have had prior experience and relationships that lead parties to believe that they have a unique understanding of some part of the involvement process. Expert power does not always work in the favour of the mediator. This is the case when negotiating parties know their demands are too high, and are afraid that the expertise of the party will uncover this.

Reward and coercive power are here treated as one, but are two distinct powers. Touval and Zartman (2007) argue that these powers are essential for a third party to succeed. With these powers, mediators can offer rewards and make credible threats. Not all

possible third parties have the means to make credible threats and keep their promises. However, all parties can threat to leave a conflict, which can have quite an impact on parties that want more attention to their interests.

As stated before, there are several types of third parties, each with their own advantages and disadvantage. The three main types of possible third parties are (1) official third parties, including states and governments, (2) the UN, which is not a state actor, but is made up out of many governments, and (3) non-official actors, that can be NGOs, private companies and individuals.
On first glance, it looks like the official mediator may have the most power. It has access to aid and resources, can promise a special and useful relationship to the parties, or can use trade to favour a party. They are the most powerful ones when it comes to reward and coercive power, because they have the resources to carry out promises and punishments. However, official mediators also run the highest risks regarding referent power. If the official mediator has a good relation with all parties involved, they run the risk of losing this good relation depending on the outcome.
The UN is limited in its power in regard to the need of consent from the Security Council. It can also have less means at its disposal to use reward and coercive power, depending on the interest in the conflict by all parties involved. However, its expert and referent power may be very high, since they can offer diplomatic expertise in involvement and have applied this in many cases. The UN can also offer legitimacy to parties, more then official actors can. The conflict would get international attention and the outcome of the conflict would become more important. This attention can be worth a great deal to both weak governments and rebel groups struggling to gain support for their side of the conflict.
Non-official parties may seem the weakest mediators. The cannot offer tangible promises or threats, or give legitimacy to parties. But they can threaten to leave a peace negotiation if parties do not comply to the agreement. This can be an effective strategy if the third party provides something the parties want, like international attention. Besides this, they can raise international interest in the conflict when official actors and UN are not interested yet. They are often the first that want to engage in dialogue, which can be worth a lot to warring parties, because they provide a moment in which change is made possible. Also because of the low profile of non-official parties, the risks of entering a negotiation are very low for warring parties. They do not have to worry about important relationships that might be jeopardized if negotiations fail. The nature of their profession or area of expertise may provide more interests from the parties, and often they have more local knowledge than the more powerful parties. Although these are not robust powers, nonofficial organizations should recognize them as elements that they can use in the attempt to focus warring parties attention on the negotiation and the costs of its collapse and return to (violent) conflict.
The leverage, or influence a third party has does not only rely on these power, but also on the skilful use of them by the mediator. What is important is having a strategic approach to the involvement, understanding the nature of the obstacles and knowing

what the interests of the parties are and especially why they have these interests. Knowing this, they can make a good estimation of which of the following strategies is most appropriate for a certain situation (Aall 2007).

Linking strategies to third parties.

As has become clear there are many ways to manage spoilers, and not all strategies are equally appropriate or attainable for the different kinds of third parties. Each strategy requires different kinds of power, resources, time investment and risks, that may not be available for the parties interested to act as a third party. Also, on many occasions a third party that is already involved may find that the they cannot execute the best fitting strategy. At that moment they have to chose for another (less fitting) strategy or to find a third party that is capable of delivering the strategy that is needed. However, it is not certain that the new third party is trusted by the warring or spoiling parties.

As we have seen, coercive strategies require a great deal of resources to carry out the threats and promises made by the third party. Therefore, this strategy is best executed by official actors, since NGOs cannot access these resources and the UN needs consent from the Security Council. This may take too long for the warring parties (Hofmann and Schneckener 2011). Furthermore, as official parties are often interested in a quick fix, the coercive approach is also suitable, since it is best applied to limited goals that require only short term investments (Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 2011). In case the coercive diplomacy fails, official actors are also best equipped to use force against the spoiling party (Art and Cronin 2007).

The UN can use both institutionalist and constructivist approaches, but because of the incentives and international attention they can gain, they are especially fit to act as a mediator, especially since they are better capable to meet the demands of spoiler groups if necessary. The UN seldom uses force and is therefore not suitable to use coercive strategies, because their claim would not be credible. Although this is changing as described in chapter VII of the UN charter (un.org), the UN will still need the consent from the Security Council, and this does make the use of force by the UN more difficult. The experience of the UN to act as a mediator gives them more expert power, and are trusted by warring parties sooner than other actors.

Finally, although non-official actors bring little resources, they are usually the ones that are willing to stay for the long term. This gives warring parties faith, and for this they can be accepted as third party. The constructivist approach is therefore most applicable for non-official parties, because long term engagement is required. Also, non-official actors may have a set of less preset norms that need to be used for socialization. Warring parties have therefore more room to insert their own norms and values. The non-official actor may be the most objective of the third parties described here. Non-official actors also have a lot of power mobilizing media for or against a cause that they can use in the process. However, depending on the non-official actor, the institutionalist approach can also be applied.

Even though some strategies can be best executed by a certain type of third party, they are not exclusive. The most important thing for a third party is that the warring parties

listen to the third party, and consider its proposals for change. But besides the most suitable strategy for a third party we also must consider the best strategy for each type of spoiler, and the characteristics of the specific situation.

Conclusions Part II

When peace negotiations begin, the most ideal scenario would be that all parties want peace, and no spoiling activities will occur because there is an agreement that all can and want to comply to. Unfortunately, this is seldom the case, and potential spoilers need to be managed. Many authors (a.o. Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs, Newman and Richmond, Zahar) feel that it is best to prevent the emergence of spoilers, so that the peace process is at little risk. This can be done by including as many parties as needed (Blaydes and De Maio, Shedd). But other research suggests (Pearlman and Findley) involvement of third parties is a good step to prevent and manage potential spoilers.

Since there are many types of spoilers, third parties and strategies, it is not always easy to identify the optimal combination for spoiler management. Total spoilers can be best dealt with by coercive measures. Since official actors are in the best position to use this strategy, logically they should be the third party when total spoilers are involved. In the same manner greedy spoilers can be best dealt with by nonofficial actors, because their long-term commitment is needed for processes of socialization, and since they do not have access to a lot of resources, the greediness of the spoilers is limited. Limited spoilers then can best be dealt with by the UN, since they have the expertise in seeing if the claims fit within the current process.

Of course, strategies and approaches discussed here are much more complex in practice, where they may be mixed, and changed over time or different strategies need to be applied to different parties. It is not always possible to match the best strategy with the type of third party and spoiler, simply because there is no other party willing to be the mediator, and it does not have the resources needed for the best fitting strategy.

Part III

In this final part I will apply theory to three case studies. First, I will discuss two case studies from conflicts that are more or less stable at the moment. I will shortly describe the background of the conflicts, which parties were involved en which actions were taken by the most important parties involved. Next to this I will choose one case study of a conflict that is still in progress. Besides analyzing this case study I will also do a more in depth problem analysis and give recommendations for further proceedings. The reason I will do this is because in retrospect it is easier to see where things went wrong or how one should have acted, while it is very hard to do so during the conflict itself.
The case studies I have chosen are the conflict in Cambodia and the case of Northern Ireland. The reason that I choose these cases that they are very different in location, background, spoiler type, and parties involved. As current conflict I have chosen the Democratic Republic of Congo. This is a conflict with a lot of history, already identified spoilers and several (failed) solutions to deal with these spoilers. All this together makes it also harder to find a new solution that will work. As of last February a new peace accord has been signed, but already rebel groups are using violence to try and start new peace negotiations.

Case study 1; Cambodia

Background
The Cambodian conflict started in 1975, after a communist take-over. Three years later Vietnam invaded Cambodia, ending the reign of the Khmer Rouge, but this did not end the war. During this war a group called SOC/CPP (State of Cambodia / Cambodia's People Party) was the largest group on the battlefield. There were three other groups that were active in this war as well; the Khmer Rouge (KR), the Khmer's People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC). These last three groups sometimes fought together, but also separately and amongst themselves. The SOC/CPP got support from the Vietnamese army. For nearly 10 years neither party could defeat the other parties definitely (Greenhill and Major 2007).
In 1987, first steps were taken to get the parties to the negotiation table. This failed a few times. In 1989 Vietnam withdrew its support to the SOC/CPP, leaving this party weakened. Because the SOC/CPP was no longer the strongest party eventually, a hurting stalemate was reached, giving way to new peace negotiations. Beside this favourable condition the Cold war ended and external donors grew tired of the stalemate, pressuring their party to join the negotiations. Parties were therefore more or less forced to find an agreement. This eventually led to the Paris peace accords in 1991.

However, parties were reluctant to give up their unilateral goals (*ibid.)*. But, under the pressure of their external donors a peace agreement was signed on October 23, 1991 (Stedman 1997). This agreement encompassed a comprehensive settlement in which the UN was given full authority to supervise a cease fire, disarm and demobilize the factional armies and to prepare the country for free and fair elections.

Spoiling behaviour

In retrospect we can say there are three parties that are most important for this analysis. First, we have the UN, which had UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia) in Cambodia after the accords were signed. This was one of the biggest UN missions, with a budget of $2.1 billion and a staff of more than 20,000 people (Curtis 1998). Second, the KR is an important player in this case. During its reign between 1975 en 1978 it killed around two million people. Its strength mostly lied in its military force. The third important party was the SOC/CPP. It was the largest force at the time in Cambodia.

After the signing of the peace agreement both the KR and the SOC/CPP violated the accords regularly. The UN could do little to stop this, as both parties claimed the reason for this spoiling was the non-compliancy of the other party. They said they feared the consequences if they did not stand up. The process did, despite of this, more or less stay on track.

UNTAC had identified the KR as the most important threat to the peace process. This had mainly to do with their violent history and the fact that they seemed unwilling to comply to the Paris Accords. The measures taken by UNTAC against the KR lead the KR to believe that UNTAC had a preference for the SOC/CCP, which was not completely without good reason. Besides this, the KR tried to open a political office in Phnom Penh (after the signing, but before UNTAC arrived) and was attacked by SOC rioters. About the same time SOC proposed a SOC-FUNCINPEC coalition, which was a violation of the spirit of the Paris Accords. This damaged any willingness of the KR to cooperate. On the other side the KR did obstruct the implementation of the peace agreement, by only to sporadically demobilize and not giving representatives of UNTAC access to monitor KR areas.

Next to these actions, the KR also misinterpreted some parts of the peace accords. First of all, the agreement stated that "Immediately upon entry into force of this Agreement, any foreign forces, advisers, and military personnel remaining in Cambodia, together with their weapons, ammunition, and equipment, shall be withdrawn from Cambodia and not be returned [...]" (Paris Peace Agreement, Section IV, Article 8). The KR interpreted this as the removal of all foreign people from Cambodia, in particular the ethnic Vietnamese. The UN, of course, could not comply to this, as it would violate human rights. A second misunderstanding by the KR was that they believed all SOC/CPP institutions would be disengaged. Since these institutions were vital for every day life of the people and because the UN did not have the capacity or the knowledge to replace them, this was also not possible. The KR then did no longer comply to the agreement.

The KR was identified as a "total spoiler", and the UN applied the leaving train strategy. The KR was told that elections would go on, whether they joined or not. By leaving the door open the UN tried to avoid that the followers of the KR became a "permanent disgruntled minority" (UN 1995: 206). Also by aggressively targeting the KR, the UN was afraid that all UN personnel would become targets. In the end the KR did not join elections, but also did not execute attacks directed at the elections.

Because UNTAC focussed so much on the KR, they did not see the SOC/CPP as a potential spoiler, despites warnings by some UNTAC human rights officers (Stedman 1997). SOC/CPP did cooperate on several levels, and UNTAC never took control of SOC/CPP's administrative structures. Even tough SOC/CPP did violate human rights, UNTAC chose not to act upon this because it would endanger the elections and thus the peace process. Also, in the spirit of the accords, UNTAC tried to avoid public reprimands. The SOC/CPP did in no way tried to obstruct elections, convinced that they would win. This belief was strengthened by their use of physical assault and assassinations of opposing parties. UNTAC did not intervene in these actions. Like all other parties, except the KR, SOC/CPP was asked by the UN to give military assistance at elections bureaus.
After it became clear that FUNCINPEC had won the elections, and not SOC/CPP, SOC/CPP immediately claimed that the elections were a fraud. UNTAC responded to this by promising to investigate the results and urged FUNCINPEC to be conciliatory to the SOC/CPP. But SOC/CPP blackmailed both FUNCINPEC and UNTAC, and this was largely successful. In the end SOC/CPP got more power than it should by elections (*ibid.)*.

Analysis
Although I only took two main parties into account (as did Stedman and Greenhill and Major) this does not mean that the other parties were not of importance or were not possible spoilers. However, it would be too extensive for this thesis to take into account all the parties. Already in this short description we can identify some problems and lessons for future processes.
First of all, the conditions of the peace accords were not clear for all parties. This is a important problem, because it means that not all parties have agreed on the same things. One party could think that the others are not abiding the accords, and therefore they would have legitimate reasons to spoil. This can cause a chain reaction, where either party will spoil in turn because of the behaviour of the other. By making clear what will and will not be done, and checking this with all parties before signing an agreement, this type of unnecessary complications can be avoided.
Also, UNTAC labelled KR as a total spoiler, and therefore applied managing strategies in accordance. However, there were signs that (not all of) the KR was in fact a total spoiler. Some factions did demobilize, a sign that they would at least wanted to see where this process was going. In that case they can not be categorized as a total spoilers (Heder 1996). Others believed that this was part of a tactical strategy of the KR, but that they never intended to abide the peace accords. Even though it is now impossible to say what was their true intention, we can draw from this that it is not always clear which type of

spoiler a party is, and therefore one should not be too rigid in applying a certain strategy.
Thirdly, UNTAC had a clear preference for the SOC/CPP. While it is understandable that they mistrusted the KR because of their violent history and behaviour during the process, it is not wise to show this preference openly. It will damage the relationship and trust with the other parties, as was here the case with the KR. Beside this, UNTAC never perceived SOC/CPP as a possible spoiler. In my opinion this was a big mistake, as all parties directly involved in the conflict should always be considered possible spoilers. By preferring the SOC/CPP UNTAC was less strict in its rules when dealing with them. This led the SOC/CPP to grow even stronger, while UNTAC would have had problems to coerce SOC/CPP in the beginning of the process. Because of its strength SOC/CPP could successfully blackmail the election results, assuring them of more governmental power than they deserved.
Related to this problem is the strength of UNTAC in this case. Even though a lot of money and international staff was available, UNTAC did not have the knowledge or capacity to control all parties (for example the administrative structures of SOC/CCP). Because of this it could not force certain behaviours of all parties. In the words of Gerald Porcell, the head of UNTAC administration "[UNTAC's] control cannot but be ineffective" (Porcell in Findlay 1995:63)
What stands out in the behaviour of UNTAC is that they did not use any force in the process, although there were several instances where it could have been applied. It was even recommended by Jean-Michel Loridon, a French general. In the end UNTAC chose not to do this for several reasons. The use of force, or even the threat to use force could be seen as the same as going to war, something that is completely opposed to creating peace. Using force would also endanger any possibility to negotiate compliance and would disrupt the peace process. Also UNTAC was not organised for offensive operations. The changes of a successful operation were therefore very slim, and would only weaken the position of UNTAC.
An other interesting fact that we see here is that the KR is included in the negotiations. As anticipated the KR exhibited some disruptive behaviour. This behaviour could easily have broken the peace accords. The reason why the KR was included was because the problems they could have caused when not included were thought to be even bigger. The peace accords were overall a very inclusive process; no less then 21 parties signed the Paris accords. It would have been very difficult to exclude a party that has had that big of an influence in the countries history, even though they were not the most peaceful party.

Case Study 2; North Ireland

Background
The North Ireland conflict can be essentially stripped down to two sides, the Irish Catholics that want an independent Republic of Ireland, and the British Protestants that want Northern Ireland to be part of Great Britain (Unionists). Within these two sides

there are several parties that each have their own preferences and interests. On the Irish side we find Sinn Féin (SF), the political party that is linked to the IRA (Irish Republican Party). In a later stager two splinter groups formed, the Real IRA (RIRA) and the Continuity IRA (CIRA). On the other side we find the British government, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Ulster Union Party (UUP), and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Of these groups the IRA and UVF were paramilitaries.

The conflict in Northern Ireland is a complicated conflict that can be dated back to the 17th century when British government suppressed the Catholic community living in Ireland. It was not until the end of the 19th century that Irish nationalism escalated, fighting for their (civil) rights and reformation. The conflict has little violence in absolute terms, but because of the small scale can be described as a fairly violent conflict (conflictenteller.nl).

In 1916 the Irish party Sinn Féin won the elections, declaring itself independent from Great Britain, and founded the Irish Republican Army (IRA). There were a few quieter periods regarding this specific conflict during the first and second world war. In the sixties violence started again, on which the British government responded by taking over control and re-establishing British control. This action was received with much protest, and lead to the Bloody Sunday, where 14 men were killed by the British army in a peaceful but illegal protest, and Bloody Friday where IRA bombing killed 11 persons. This lead to further polarisation between Catholics and Protestants (Mac Ginty 2006).

In 1983 Sinn Féin won elections again, and negotiations were reopened. However, the Irish state lost much support after IRA planted 20 bombs, killing 9 people and wounding many. Despite this in 1993 the Downing Street Declaration was signed. In the year after that the IRA installed a cease fire, and the British army would not use any violence as well as long as the cease-fire was respected. Unfortunately, this lasted less than two years. Finally the Belfast Accord was signed in 1998, after which the violence became less, although there were riots again in 2012. In certain cities Catholics and Protestants are still separated by a stone wall, and people are still living separate lives.

Spoiling behaviour[3]

The peace process was in the end organised because of the mutually hurting stalemate. Furthermore, the impact of dialogue and the working relationship between the Irish and British government had a positive impact on the creation of the peace accords. The goal was to come up with a accord that would appeal to the majority of the people on both sides. An important question before starting the negotiations was who to include. Both governments had spent much money on demonizing the use of violence of the opposing party. To include them now would make them lose face. In the end it was decided that groups could join, as long as they declared a cease-fire and showed genuine interest in the peace process.

[3] The British government and former president of the United States Bill Clinton also played an important role in the negotiations. However, because of the limited space and the complexity of the conflict I will not discuss their actions here.

The conflict in Northern Ireland does not have the clearest examples of spoilers. The most evident spoilers were the UVF on the Unionist side and the IRA on the Republican side. For them it was not always clear what benefits the peace process would give them. Even though a cease-fire was installed, between February 1996 and July 1997 the IRA launched some attacks. This can be seen as spoiling, although the IRA stated that it was only to get the peace process to move on, as it had more or less stalled at that time. This can be supported by the fact that the violence was not as large as the IRA normally would do, and it was not enough to stop the peace process. The attacks were mainly aimed at the British army and not at civilians. In this way the IRA tried to keep the door open for themselves to re-enter negotiations at a given point (Mac Ginty 1996).

Around this time the RIRA and CIRA came to existence. However, they did not gain ground with a wider public and therefore did not become very strong. This can be seen in the way their attacks were executed; very sporadically and the attacks failed on many occasions. However, they often targeted Protestant neighbourhoods, in order to force the Protestant political parties to leave the peace process. In that way it would look like the Protestant side had given up en they would be responsible for the failure of the peace process.

The UVF had more or less the same plan. They attacked some catholic people in the hope of luring the IRA, which was considered to be the military division of Sinn Féin, to use violence in order to protect their people. If their plan would succeed and the IRA would use violence, the Sinn Féin party would have been thrown out of the negotiations, having no say anymore in the peace process.

The DUP did not use violence in contrast to the UVF, but they were against the peace process. They mainly refused to join the peace process because SF was a part of it. They did win the elections of 2003, and therefore were required to join the Assembly, but they refused this until the accords were renegotiated. In this way they stalled the peace process for a long time, and in the end got a renegotiation aggravating the requirements for SF to stay in government.

The SF and UUP also did not use violence to stall the peace process, but tried to exclude each other from it. Because of the linkage between IRA and SF, many things the IRA did were reflected on SF. For example, the IRA refused to demobilize after the agreement was signed. The UUP did see this as not showing a genuine interest in peace, and indeed this could be seen as undermining the peace process. The SF however saw the stalling of the demobilization as a tactical move to try and gain more from the negotiations. In any way we can conclude that it did not contribute to the trust between the parties. The UPP on the other hand stalled the peace process as well. They were part of the negotiations, but had a "slow minimalist" approach, and were not willing to make any concessions.

Finally there were some actions that Mac Ginty describes as "accidental spoils". These are not spoiling actions per se, as it is not direct towards the peace process, but were more of a way to let out the frustration with the proceedings of the peace process. The UVF was very unsatisfied with the way things were going and initiated riots in parts of Belfast where Catholics and Protestants lived in close proximity. Catholics had to leave their houses and a number of them was murdered. Even though this violence was not

directed at the peace process, it did very much to lower the trust between the parties, affecting the peace process severely.

Analysis

The first conclusion we can draw from this short overview is that most of the spoiling was done to shape the peace process, more than to completely derail it. This makes sense, since a mutually hurting stalemate was reached, and parties saw the need for peace. This also shows that the time was ripe for a peace process to develop. On the other hand, the amount of violence over a long period of time and by different parties tells us that the implementation of the agreement did not go in a optimal way.

The case of Northern Ireland provides us with some examples of how difficult it can be to determine whether a group does spoil and when something is a political action. The clearest example is that of the unwillingness of the IRA to demobilize. While they saw it as a political strategy to optimize their gains from the peace process, the UUP thought their actions were harmful to the peace process, and therefore should be labelled as a spoilers. The lesson we can draw from this is that it is very important that there is no room for parties to manipulate what they can and cannot do.

Also, it is debatable whether the violent actions of the UVF against Catholic citizens should be labelled spoiling. According to Mac Ginty, these are accidental spoils, because they were not necessarily directed against the peace process. For him it was an expression of frustration, more than it was actual spoiling. On this point I do not agree with Mac Ginty. As we have seen in previous parts, the goal of spoiling activities is rarely to derail a peace process. Mostly people do want to obtain peace, but are not satisfied with the current agreement, or in this case with the way the peace process was developing. Furthermore, the actions of the UVF were very harmful indeed, both for the people as well as for the peace accords themselves. I would therefore label these activities as spoiling.

An other lesson that we need to take into consideration is the continuity of the peace accords. When the DUP was elected in 2003 they were able to stall the peace process, because they refused to join the Assembly unless the peace accords were altered. To me is seems strange that five years after the accords were signed it was possible to make such a statement. This should have been foreseen and either made strict regulation for this in the peace accords, or the view of the DUP should have been given more attention when making the accords. For me it is less clear whether this was a spoiling strategy, or a political action to draw more attention to the standpoint of the DUP. They were against the Good Friday agreement from the beginning. Their actions did no doubt negatively influence the relationship of trust between the different sides of the conflict.

In contrast to the example from Cambodia, there were no explicit measures taken to prevent spoiling, or paid extra attention to one or more parties that were potential spoilers. The only "measure" there was taken was that parties that wanted to join the peace process must declare a cease-fire and show a genuine interest in peace. To me this seems like a good idea, because you leave it to the parties whether they want to join or not. By this you will avoid spoiling of parties that feel excluded from the negotiations. In

the end, you need an accord that suits everybody's interests sufficiently, otherwise the agreement will not hold. Besides this, if parties try to sabotage the peace process from within the facilitators have legitimate and previously indicated reason to exclude those parties.
If we analyse the behaviour of the different (potential) spoilers, we can also conclude there were no large parties that could be identified as total spoilers, and therefore we can say it was okay to include all parties in the agreement. Furthermore we can say there were mainly limited spoilers, that wanted some core issues to be included. Furthermore there were some greedy spoilers, that tried to change things when they got more power. The actions of the DUP are a good example of this. The reason no real actions were taken against spoilers can be explained by the fact that none of them were strong enough to derail a peace process, and often did not even want to do so, only draw attention to certain conditions that they found important. Spoiling was thus very much part of the peace process and played an important role in shaping it, even though other means would have had the preference.

Case 3; Democratic Republic of Congo[4]

Background
The conflict in the DRC is one of the most complex conflict of all times, because of the many parties involved. In May 1960 the DRC became independent, and after the first elections Kasavubu became president. After five years, chief of staff Mobutu took over power with the support of the United Stated and Belgium, when a dispute emerged between Kasavubu and his prime minister Lumumba, after which Lumumba was murdered in Jadotstad. The support from the US mainly was given because of the anti-communism attitude of Mobutu during the Cold War, and to keep order in the DRC. Mobutu declared himself head of state, and while it was a relatively quiet period in terms of violence, there was corruption, violation of human rights and political repression. Mobutu kept much of the country's money to himself, enriching himself with the international loans given to help the DRC in its development.
in 1996, after the violent conflict in Rwanda, many extremist Hutu's fled to the DRC. In refugee camps, the military forces regrouped into the Interahamwe and together with the Congolese army they targeted Congolese Tutsi's. Around the same time, Uganda and Rwanda joined forces to overthrow Mobutu and gain control over the mineral resources of the DRC. Together with Laurent Kabila they formed the AFDL (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre). This resulted in the First Congo war that ended in May 1997. Mobutu fled the country and Laurent Kabila became president.
Laurent Kabila then asked his allies, Uganda and Rwanda, to leave the country. The main reason for this was that Kabila was afraid that Rwanda wanted to install a Tutsi leader and he therefore no longer would be in power. Rwanda and Uganda retreated, but Rwanda formed the RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie) to fight against

[4] What is now called the Democratic Republic of Congo has had many different names in the past. I will only refer to it as the DRC, to avoid confusion.

Kabila. Uganda created the MLC (Movement for the Liberation of Congo) under the leadership of warlord Bemba. In 1998 they attacked Congo in the Second Congo War. Kabila got support from Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad and Sudan. In 1999 a cease-fire agreement was signed, but right after this violence escalated. Laurent Kabila was killed in 2001, and was succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila.
After succession of Joseph Kabila, peace talks were initiated. This led to the Pretoria Accord in 2002, in which was agreed that the Rwandan army would leave Congo in exchange for international commitment to disarm the Hutu Interahamwe, and to the Global and All Inclusive Agreement, where was decided that there would be a transitional government, and elections would be held. This however also led to instability as some parties did not want to give their power to a neutral and centralized national administration (Fuamba et al. 2013). The DRC did not have the power to control the areas that were now being "freed" from foreign troops. It even asked Uganda to leave 1000 troops in Ituri to police that part of the province (Thom 2010). In the east the UN mission had to take over control to keep civilians safe. But in the end, in June 2003, all armies except that of Rwanda had left Congo.
Finally, in 2006 the elections were held. Because of an election dispute between Kabila and Bemba over the election results, riots broke out in the capital Kinshasa. After new elections Kabila won with 70% of the votes. The conflict however continued in Kivu, in the east of the country, because Nkunda, a member of the RDC, left the army with troops that were loyal to him. They established the CNDP (National Congress for the Defence of the People), and with the support of Rwanda attacked Hutu people. In March 2009 an accord was signed in which was established that CNDP would become a political party and its military force would be integrated in the Congolese army. However, in 2012 Nkunda started to mutiny again and took Goma. After five days they asked for peace negotiations. On February 2013 a new accord was signed to establish peace in the region.

Spoiling behaviour
The Lusaka cease-fire was signed after many failures. There were so many different parties, all with other interests, that only a cease-fire was possible at the time. This agreement was signed by rebel groups and six African governments. What strikes about the included parties is that Rwanda was not one of them. The reason for this is that they first denied having troops in the DRC. Therefore there was no need the include them. Later they admitted that they did had troops in the DRC and therefore were entitled to a place at the negotiation table, but their demand was not honored. After signing the UN installed a monitoring force. After the signing there was immediately a violent outbreak. The Interahamwe launched an attack at Rwanda. At this point the mediators returned to a separate set of negotiations in Pretoria which included governments only. This led to two agreements, one between Rwanda and DRC and one about Ugandan troops in the DRC. The agreements included the behaviour of the governments themselves and as patrons of rebels in DRC.

In 2001 a transitional government was formed with the inclusion of major and small armed groups, local militias, representatives of civil society leaders, political parties of opposition and the Kinshasa government. However some possible spoiler parties were left out, like the Interahamwe, small splintered RCD groups, and resource exploitation networks. The included groups splintered in smaller groups, claiming a seat at the negotiation table as was. As their requests were honoured more splinter factions arose claiming inclusion as well. Mediators had no choice but to engage with whomever was willing.
During the negotiation soft issues were debatable, but disagreement over power sharing stopped the whole process. MCL was content with any share of power, RCD wanted a share proportional to what it already controlled in territory and commercial contracts. They would not back down and in the end had the veto power over the negotiations. (Weiss 2000, Boshoff and Rupiya 2003). After the Global and All Inclusive agreement was initiated in 2003 violence intensified again and new armed groups emerged. The transitional governments did not seem too interested in wellbeing of people. Resources were still exploited by government such as Burundi, DRC, Tanzania and Uganda, who were linked to people in France, Germany and Spain.
We can identify Rwanda as the biggest spoiler. Not only because of the overspill of their conflict in the DRC but also because of the many invasions and support to rebels. Even though they lied about their involvement on several occasions they were included in most negotiations, as was Uganda, another big spoiler. Most spoilers in this conflict are greedy, if the opportunity does arise it is very likely they will attack the DRC again despite a peace agreement. Since the DRC has many mineral resources, there was much to gain for the spoilers, and therefore the chances they would take were bigger. This is shown by the CNDP when taking over Goma and within five days asked for peace negotiations. Also neighbouring countries, especially Rwanda and Uganda were attracted by the resources the DRC could offer them, and for them this provided enough incentives to invade the DRC several times. And at times they were not able to invade themselves they supported rebel groups to do that for them.
However, we can identify one total spoiler during this process, namely the RCD. They demanded that their share in power was proportional to the territory and resources they had at the time. This was not up for negotiation, and in the end the process came to a halt because of them. In retrospect we can say that since it was a total spoiler, the departing train strategy would have been best. I do however not know if without the RCD the other parties were strong enough to carry out such a strategy, and whether the UN was able to stop any attacks of RCD, even though they had 17,000 personnel at their disposal.

Analysis
What strikes most about this case in comparison with the others is that nowhere is mentioned parties found themselves in a mutually hurting stalemate. Because of the many parties involved it will be harder to reach such a stalemate, but if we take into consideration the theories of Zartman and Pruitt, a stalemate or at least some sort of

ripeness is needed for a successful negotiation. Even though there may have been parties that were “ripe” to enter a peace agreement, the difficulties of the negotiations and especially their implementations do support to the fact that there were parties to whom the conflict offered enough lucrative opportunities.

Another factor that made negotiation more difficult are the smaller conflicts within the overarching conflict. The main conflict in the DRC was about who had control over power and resources within the DRC. After the reign of Mobutu, who kept the country's money to himself, they country was broke and the people poor. Because of the richness of Congo, there were several parties that wanted power, both inter and intrastate. The conflict in Rwanda did have a great effect on the conflict in DRC, as Hutu/Tutsi conflict was fought in the DRC as well. This did very much intensify the already existing problems in DRC, and made the Hutu/Tutsi problem embedded in the DRC conflict. We can also argue that the conflict even was a part of the Cold War, as the USA supported the DRC during the cold war because they were anti-communist.

Different conflicts also mean many actors involved. Beside the three main governments and many rebel groups from within and outside the DRC, support was given to the DRC by the US and African countries as Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad and Sudan. From time to time Burundi and Tanzania caused problems as well because of their involvement in the exploitation of natural resources. The latest agreement, signed in February 2013 was signed by no less then 11 governments. With this many actors that all have different interests it is not hard to imagine the difficulty of finding a solution that suits everybody's needs and interests.

A third problem is the shifting loyalties of the parties involved. The case of Kabila overthrowing Mobutu together with Uganda and Rwanda is a good example. As soon as Kabila had taken over he ordered Uganda and Rwanda to leave the DRC. Not surprisingly, they then turned against him, attacking him and the DRC within a year. These short-lived relationships between allies do not provide a stable basis for a sustainable peace agreement.

A last problem is the capacity of the governing power. As we have seen, the government of the DRC did not have the power to maintain control over its territory. At one point it even had to ask one of its invaders to stay so they could police a part of the state. As long as the government does not have this capacity, it is unlikely that any agreement will hold for a long time. Collaboration between parties could help solve this problem, but because of the mistrust between the parties this is a very unlikely scenario for the near future.

The choice of mediator probably was correct. The UN had many troops and a budget at its disposal and the ability to invest time in the conflict. One problem of the UN will always be that they are restricted by their mandate. Changes go very slowly, while the conflict in the DRC was very volatile. The fact that beside the warring parties the USA interfered with the conflict substantially did not make it any easier. The rush to organize elections is understandable, as the conflict cost more than one billion US dollars a year (UN 2009). But I think building institutions with different parties would contribute more to peace than elections that are only supported by the winners.

Problems of the peace process

The first question is whether peace negotiations should have been initiated at the time they did. Even though Kabila may have been ready to stop fighting, the same can not be said of all other parties. The escalation of violence after the agreement proves this. It is very understandable that these negotiations were done, since violent conflict is not a desirable state to be in, and the moment one party is willing to step out and negotiate this opportunity is immediately seized. However, in this case it might have done more wrong than right, as did the many of the other agreements. The failure and immediate return to violence will have caused more distrust between the parties, making it more difficult to pick up negotiations in the future. It is very important to wait for the overall "ripeness" of a conflict. The problem is that it is very hard to spot this moment.

The second thing that should have been done more in my opinion is working on the trust relation between the different parties. There were so many parties that it is impossible that none of them had overlapping interests. During talks focus on these common interest should have been key. When starting with smaller issues, as the gradualism approach of Weiss describes, trust can be built. In the cease-fires only the violence is removed, not the underlying cause. This can not be anything but a temporary solution, as the reason for the violence still exists. It is however a good start because parties can talk in a more quiet environment, but they will always have their weapons at the ready. I would also have used the committee approach. This has the advantage of several commissions that do discuss a single subject. Only the parties involved in that subject needed to be included, and groups can be mixed. So every party will have a say on the subject it wants, and can keep its own greater picture.

The final large mistake, in my opinion, is the continuing inclusiveness of the negotiations. I like the fact that these negotiations were open so that all that wanted could join, but at a certain point the greediness for more influence took over. What should have been done is to make the number of representatives of the parties proportional to the size of their group. A second thing that should have been done is set a deadline for parties to join, as the departing train strategy dictates. Even though this strategy is mainly used when dealing with total spoilers, I think in this case is was also needed because greedy spoilers kept coming back for more. So, they had to decide they priorities and interest in time if they wanted to be included. If the representatives are proportional to the size of the party, splintering groups would also not have been necessary.

Recommendations

The problems and mistakes described above can unfortunately not be undone. So in the future, we will have to deal with those as well. This makes the peace even more fragile and difficult, but because of the involvement of the UN for many years now it is no longer an option to let the conflict go its course and wait for a new "ripe" moment. Foreign powers would lose all credibility and trustworthiness, and would only be accepted as mediator if they had resources to offer. As we are dealing with mostly greedy spoilers here, this is not the kind of mediator that is preferred.

Even though on the 24th of February 2013 a peace accord was signed concerning the security of the central Africa region, fighting in the eastern part of the DRC has already resumed. The main cause is the rebel group M23, that want their leaders to be integrated in the government. On the 10th of June reports of possible new peace talks have risen (allafrica.com).
As much as I would like these talks to succeed, I doubt this would lead to a sustainable peace accord. The conflict is so extended, that I do not think all issues can be resolved between the rebels and the government, as the government has other issues to take into consideration as well. When dealing with the M23 rebels, one should keep in mind that these are greedy spoilers that will take every opportunity to get more out of the peace deal. If the outcome this time is much more beneficial than the other ones, one can count on them to start spoiling after the new accord again.
If the total agreement would break, new negotiations will have to start. Because the conflict has been so complex, it is impossible to predict which parties will be involved. As we know that the M23 is at the moment giving problems, it is safe to assume they will be involved, as well as the government and other rebel groups within the DRC. Surrounding countries, especially Rwanda and Uganda considering their actions in the past, will closely watch if there is an opportunity for them to get access to the resources of the DRC.
If this scenarios is to happen, Stedman advices to use a constructivist approach to deal with greedy spoilers with limited goals in a process of socialization. However, because of the low trust between parties, the gradualist approach to take small steps and work on trust and peace in this way may be preferred. Subsequently building on institutions to form new norms would be an option, while rewarding all parties enough to stay in the process but not too much so they want more and more. Facilitators of these talks (the UN), should realize that this is a long term process that requires much time and energy. New elections, if applicable, should only be held after trust has grown between parties, otherwise there will be claims of fraud. Also, a new government can not take over control until they are capable to maintain order in the whole country. By building trust amongst the parties, larger police forces can be created and in small steps they can maintain peace in the whole of DRC. Again, this will take time.
What is most important for a third party in negotiation is that they have a clear image about what all parties want, and why they want something. Often a solution can be reached in an other way than the warring parties could imagine. Also, by stating at the beginning of the negotiations exactly what they want avoids greedier demands later. Also, as we have learned from the conflicts in North Ireland and Cambodia, it is crucial that all parties are aware of what exactly is discussed and the requirements that are described in the peace accords. Only then there is a chance that a peaceful period will start for the DRC.

Conclusions Part III

Dealing with spoilers is much easier in theory than in practice. Even though we can classify spoilers and use strategies accordingly, this is no guarantee for a successful

outcome. Since every conflict is different in many aspects, there is no standardized solution that can be modified according to the conflict. But cases from the past can help us avoid making the same mistakes again and show us important lessons. By looking at these three case studies we can identify some of these lessons.

First, in any agreement, whether there are spoilers present or not, it is crucial that everything in the agreement is a 100% clear to all parties involved. This needs to be controlled by the mediator, but also requires honesty of the parties in case they do not understand. The biggest problem in this regard are spoilers that decided to join the process only for the rewards involved. If the turnout of the agreement is too low, a loophole can be their way out. So, if they find one they will not say so. Besides this clear agreements need to be made about what the consequences are if one does not stick to an agreement, to avoid counter spoiling, as was the case with the Northern Ireland conflict. This requires a mediator who has the resources to do so.

Secondly, determining the right moment to get involved and start a negotiation is very important, but very difficult as well. In the example of the DRC we have seen that without a mutually (meaning almost all parties included) hurting stalemate it is very difficult to get all parties to commit to the agreement. Where in other cases the parties at least had a "let-look-and-see" attitude, in the DRC conflict parties returned to violence right after the signing of the agreements.

The mediator involved should be up for the task. A proper conflict analysis needs to be done, including possible spoilers and strategies to deal with them (including resources needed for these strategies). More importantly the mediator should be willing to invest its time in the conflict as long as needed, and not wanting to rush out after elections. Only in that case should a mediator become involved. In many cases this will be the UN when it comes to larger conflicts because they have the experience and the means to do this.

The involvement in the conflict is not only about organizing elections. In my opinion this is too often the "holy grail" for peace agreements. I agree that elections are important, although I realize that a democratic society is a western idea and does not necessarily will work for the whole world. But unless there is another form of government that works for that country, it is probably the most acceptable form. The elections should however only be organized when there is confidence that the parties involved will accept the results. This moment is often later than mediators would like to. Also one should remember that elections are only the beginning, and much more help and guidance is needed afterwards.

After analysing these case studies, we can conclude that both Stedman and Greenhill and Major were right in why spoilers do spoil. Both the character of the spoiling group as well as the opportunity context depend whether a spoiler will spoil and in what way. The example from Cambodia shows that even though there could be something to gain for the KR, they did not join the elections. On the other hand the example from the DRC shows that groups will spoil as long as there is an opportunity. We see this in the attitude of Rwanda and the splintering of groups during a continuous including peace process.

Strategies applied to the spoiler in question should not be too rigid. Spoiler types may change over time, requiring an other strategy. Or the analysis shows that we are dealing with one type of spoiler, while in reality this is not he case. The analysis is thus very important but also very hard to make. The strategies that are matched with the spoiler type are also not as preset as may seem at first glance. Multiple strategies can be applied at the same time that come from different approaches. So even though we might be dealing with a greedy spoiler, it is possible to apply a strategy for limited spoilers as well, because it will serve an other part of the peace process.

The final conclusion is therefore that spoiler management will always be difficult. All parties should be able to make their interests and concerns clear to come to an honest and sustainable agreement. But when a good analysis is made, the mediator has the resources and is willing to invest in the conflict, and clear agreements are made with requirements and conditions peace agreements have a chance to succeed. But this will never be easy.

General conclusion

In this thesis I set out to identify the most appropriate and practical ways for third parties to deal with spoilers in peace process. For this we first had to establish what we mean by spoilers. In literature there do exist many definitions. Ambiguities regarding to the spoiler concept had to do with the use of violence, the exact objective of the spoiler groups, and the distinction between spoiling and political actions.
A difficult aspect of the spoiler concept was the question why spoiler groups would start spoiling. This question is very important, as third parties will need to remove the incentive to come to a sustainable peace agreement. In this respect there exist two theories. The first one says that each group of spoilers has its own characteristics, and therefore this is the dependent variable that needs to be taken into account when choosing a management strategy. The other one states that possible spoiler groups will spoil when the context provides incentives to spoil. By removing these incentives the spoilers can be managed. The reality shows that both these theories are necessary. Some decisions of spoiler groups can simply not be explained by either one.
Also who to include in the spoiler concept raised some questions. Some authors argued that external parties of the conflict can have a negative influence on the peace process, and thus should be considered as spoilers as well. Others, such as Nillson and Söderberg-Kovacs, point out that stretching the concept too far will make it useless, and therefore only parties directly involved in the conflict should be considered as possible spoilers. To take all this in consideration a new definition for spoilers was made. But as it is not possible to identify a spoiling party before it has spoiled, the term possible spoiler is preferred. A possible spoiler was defined by me as: "*Any group or individual that is directly involved in the current conflict, that sees a particular peace agreement as opposed to its interests and undertakes actions that can not be justified in that specific context to stop this particular agreement".*
This definition however does not completely solve all problems. Especially "actions .... can not be justified in the current context" can be interpreted differently by different parties. This problem cannot be solved unless the whole world abides to the same normative underpinnings. However, most of the ambiguities discussed are no longer unclear. The fact that parties outside the conflict can thereby not be labelled as spoilers does not mean that third parties can ignore their role in the conflict.
In the second part we looked at the problems of managing spoilers. Before a party can manage a spoiler, it should know the goals of the spoiler and its commitment to this goal. Based on these two aspects we can classify a spoiler group as a total, limited or greedy spoiler. Besides this we should look at the context and see if there are incentives for spoilers. From here we can decide on a strategy to deal with each specific spoiler.
We can distinguish three different types of strategies. The realist approach, that uses strict regulations for spoilers. The use of force and the 'leaving train' strategy are part of the realist approach. The constructivist approach will try to change the norms to which a spoiler group abides. An other strategy within this approach is 'naming and shaming' designed to put social pressure on a group. The institutionalist approach uses mediation

and negotiation to look for a sustainable solution between parties. This can be done by tackling the smaller problems first to build trust, by tackling the big problems first so that smaller problems will become easier to solve, and by dividing all problems over several committees to that partial solutions can be created.
Third parties involved can generally be a state, the UN, or a non-official partner. Non-official parties have the least resources, but can invest more time and build more trust. The UN has much experience, and resources available. They are however restricted in their flexibility since they are bound by their mandate. States have resources as well, but are seldom anything close to neutral. As a third party they have to invest time and money, and normally they are not willing to invest this unless they have an interest in the outcome as well.
Linking spoiler type, strategy and third party is not easy. Even if a spoiler type is identified, it is possible it changes and thus a new strategy needs to be applied. The most appropriate strategy can not always be executed, as the third party involved does not always have the resources to apply this strategy. Ideally first a spoiler analysis should be made, and the required strategies identified. After this, the most suitable third parties should execute this. In reality this is very unlikely, because of the complexity of the conflict and the available third parties.
Analysing the case studies we learned some valuable lessons. First, a party should only start negotiations when the time is ripe. If this is not the case the chance of successful agreements is very small. Many problems arise because agreements are not clear or can be interpreted in multiple ways. Therefore, a third party should always make sure all parties involved understand what is being agreed on. We have also seen that it is indeed necessary to see all parties as possible spoilers. Misinterpretation of a group not being a spoiler can lead to strengthening of that group, making it too influential to do manage them at a later stage.
Besides this, third parties often see elections as the ultimate goal of their involvement, and try to organise one as soon as possible. The result of this is that elections often fail, and claims of fraud are made. Improving the trust between the parties is therefore very important before engaging in elections. This can be done by building new institutions with all parties involved.

In general, we can conclude that dealing with spoilers is very complex and there is much room for error. There is not one standardized solution, but a range of approaches that can be altered according to the spoiler type involved. The best that can be done by a third party is to look at its strengths, and think of ways to apply them in a way that is appropriate for the spoiler type in question. Ideally it would be the other way around, but this is unfortunately seldom possible as parties do rarely want to invest their money and time in an conflict that will not yield anything for themselves.

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