

# Rural Realities between Crisis and Normality

Livelihood Strategies in Angola, 1975-2008



Hilde van Dijkhorst

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# **Rural Realities between Crisis and Normality**

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**Hilde van Dijkhorst**

## **Thesis**

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# Acronyms

ACF	Action Against Hunger
ACORD	Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development
ADESPOV	Associação de Desenvolvimento e Enquadramento Social das Populações Vulneráveis
ADRA	Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiental
AME	Alliance Missionaire Evangélique Suisse
AMEH	Associação das Mulheres Empresarias e das Negócios da Huíla
ANC	African National Congress
CAN	African Cup of Nations
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CDC	Community Development Committee
CLUSA	Cooperative League of the United States of America
COIEPA	Inter-Ecclesial Committee for Peace in Angola
CRP	Community Rehabilitation Programme
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DDR	Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration
DfID	Department for International Development
DGIS	Directorate General of International Cooperation
DPA	Provincial Department for Water
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECP	Estrategia de Combate A Pobreza
EDA	Agricultural Development Station
FAA	National Armed Forces
FAC	Armed Forces of Cabinda
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FAPLA	People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola
FFS	Farmer Field School
FLEC	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave
FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FONGA	Forum of Angolan Non-Governmental Organisations
GoA	Government of Angola
GRAE	Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile
GURN	Government of National Unity and Reconciliation
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDA	Agrarian Development Institute
IDF	Institute of Forest Development
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IECA	Igreja Evangélica Congregacional de Angola
IESA	Igreja Evangélica Sinodal de Angola
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRSEM	Institute of Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Combatants
JPP	Junta Provincial de Povoamento de Angola
LRD	Linking Relief to Development
LRRD	Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development
MAF	Mission Aviation Fellowship

MINADER	Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development
MINARS	Ministry of Social Assistance and Re-integration
MINSÁ	Ministry of Health
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PNEAH	National Emergency Programme for Humanitarian Assistance
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SADF	South African Defence Forces
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
SEAS	State Secretariat for Social Affairs
SOPR	Sociedade de Desenvolvimento de Perímetros de Angola
SRPA	Special Relief Programme for Angola
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
TEC	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
UCAH	Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit in Angola
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDRO	United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola
UN SC	United Nations Secretary General
UPA	União das Populações de Angola
USAID	US Agency of International Development
UTCAH	Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid
WFP	World Food Programme

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# **1. Investigating the outcomes of humanitarian aid on the livelihoods of people in rural Angola**

**Introduction**

**Background to the research**

**Research set-up**

**Fieldwork: methodological approach, choices and constraints**

**Outline of the book**

## **Introduction**

In times of conflict, rural livelihoods are affected in various ways: people lose access to their assets, options and networks. Aid agencies aim to assist conflict-affected people in re-establishing themselves and their livelihoods during and after conflict ends. During 27 years of civil war (1975-2002), Angola was faced with grave humanitarian crises; massive displacement of its population, high levels of malnutrition and mortality, a collapse of social service delivery, high unemployment levels, and destruction of the country's infrastructure. Humanitarian aid was made available to assist the crisis-affected population. The question is what role aid has really played in society, especially with reference to recovery of rural livelihoods?

This thesis analyses how people's livelihoods are affected during crisis, and how aid interventions shape the livelihoods that people have created for themselves in Huíla province, Angola. It is based on fieldwork in two municipalities in the province of Huíla into the livelihoods that emerged with or without the availability of different types of aid. The fieldwork in the villages enabled an understanding of the type of livelihoods that existed before, during and after conflict, and how people were able to adapt to changing and difficult circumstances. The role that aid played in the support or transformation of these livelihoods was investigated by following aid programs as well as analysing the discourses and practices of aid actors.

This chapter discusses the background and rationales of the research, the research objectives and questions as well as an introduction to the theoretical pillars of this thesis. Also, the chapter presents the methods that I used for data collection, and gives an overview of the fieldwork period with a discussion of some of the difficulties encountered in the field.

## **Background to the research**

Livelihoods are never static; they change over time by external influences and the choices that people make (Scoones 2009). Aid interventions that have the aim to assist livelihoods can sometimes have unexpected outcomes. The interface between these two dynamic systems can have such consequences that actually make it more difficult for people to secure the assets and activities that make up their livelihoods. During my fieldwork in the village of Nonguelengue I encountered such an example in which people's livelihoods were negatively affected by external interventions. This small village lies in the southern municipality of Chibia, and consists of a group of 120 people of the Khoi-San ethnicity. The village only exists since May 2007 when the Ministry of Social Assistance and Re-integration (MINARS) took the group of 120 people from an area nearby and placed them in Nonguelengue. The population had until that time practiced small-scale agriculture, sometimes worked fields of neighbouring farmers, and mostly deployed hunting and gathering activities. The official

rationale of MINARS behind the relocation was to improve the families' living standard, make aid delivery more effective, and ensure a livelihood of crop production that was deemed more sustainable than hunting and gathering. Underneath these official claims, other hidden objectives seemed to have played a role. A MINARS official told me:

I find that both the Khoi-San as well as the Nyanekas<sup>1</sup> live very traditional lives. Such a traditional lifestyle is not sustainable or wanted in this time of globalization. This is why MINARS is trying to offer them alternative lifestyles. This often fails because of their unwillingness to change traditions. MINARS is mostly offering agriculturally-based projects as alternatives to a hunter-gatherer lifestyle.

The Government of Angola (GoA) forced these people to abandon their traditional lifestyle, under the pretext of offering them assistance towards an alternative and more sustainable way of life.

Since the GoA's relocation of this group of Khoi-San in 2007, the people in the village have become completely dependent on food aid. Seeds and tools were handed out soon after the relocation and building of the village had started, yet land hadn't become legally available and/or prepared. Access to water was also problematic, only possible at a borehole of a neighbouring large landowner. Consequently, the seeds and tools that had been handed out in 2007 were already eaten or sold by the time of the fieldwork from May to August of 2008. Next to the food aid distributions that were becoming increasingly erratic, due to the inability of MINARS to ensure regular transport to Nonguelengue, people were seeking other strategies to secure food and cash. For example, most women in the village were weaving baskets and selling them to neighbouring villagers. Men still went hunting for some small wild animals in the area, as well as collecting honey. Both men and women worked on the field of their Nynaneka neighbours, for which they often received compensation in the form of maize or alcohol instead of cash. People continued pursuing the strategies that had enabled their survival before, but the conditions in their new environment were insufficient to rely on completely. The health situation in the village had deteriorated and a United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) nutrition assessment amongst the children of the village in August 2008 revealed malnutrition rates of 71%. A newspaper article of September 2010 revealed that the government was still handing out food and clothes items to the Khoi-San population, and that the process to assist the Khoi-San towards a agro-pastoralist lifestyle to replace hunting and gathering was moving very slowly due to people's resistance to changing livelihood practices, despite handing out agricultural tools and inputs.<sup>2</sup>

The experience in Nonguelengue follows the surprising move of the Angolan state to relocate a group of people in peacetime, and in doing so making them dependant on food aid. At the same time, it uncovers some of the core issues of this research. First of all, instead of supporting the populations existing livelihoods, they have actually disconnected them from their former livelihood options. It is important for livelihood interventions to build on existing practices in order for them to be relatively successful. In the case of Nonguelengue an 'alien' livelihood was promised but not delivered as the necessary conditions (water and land) were not in place. At the same time people's traditional ways of life were obstructed. Also, no further follow up took place except for food aid distributions. Secondly, it showed the fragility of rural livelihoods six years after peace was signed, in contrast with Angola's economy that is said to have recovered remarkably well, mostly due to the oil export revenues. As in most of the villages where the fieldwork took place, aid interventions

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<sup>1</sup> Predominant ethnic group in the Chibia area that mainly practice pastoralism.

<sup>2</sup> [http://www.portalangop.co.ao/motix/pt\\_pt/noticias/sociedade/2010/8/37/Administracao-municipal-assegura-apoio-comunidade-San-Chibia,9b23e766-caf8-499b-b3bd-d2c22d10c148.html](http://www.portalangop.co.ao/motix/pt_pt/noticias/sociedade/2010/8/37/Administracao-municipal-assegura-apoio-comunidade-San-Chibia,9b23e766-caf8-499b-b3bd-d2c22d10c148.html) 19-09-2010

focusing on rural livelihoods followed a uniform pattern of handing out seeds and tools, often without needs assessments, follow up, or understanding of the different livelihoods that people pursued. Aid interventions, however well intended, can have very unexpected and negative outcomes. As in the case of Nonguelengue the village was left with malnutrition levels reminiscent of wartime, even after relocation, food aid, and seeds and tools interventions. Hence, people in the village continued pursuing the livelihood strategies that had helped them survive the war in the first place. This thesis will show how people's livelihoods are affected during crisis, and how aid interventions shape the conditions and strategies that people have created for themselves.

### *Rationales and relevance of the research*

There are a number of reasons why this research is relevant. Humanitarian agencies have seen their area of work increasingly move from basic relief to more development oriented projects and programmes (Hilhorst 2007). And by incorporating this developmental orientation agencies have made interventions that impacted livelihoods significantly, although evaluation practices have not always been adapted accordingly. "Taken as a whole, the humanitarian system is poor at measuring or analysing impact, and the introduction of results-based management in headquarters has yet to feed through into improved analysis of impact in the field" (Hofman et al. 2004, 2). Academic analyses of especially the unintended consequences of humanitarian aid in relation to livelihoods first addressed the phenomenon that aid can contribute to and prolong war and conflict, increases migration to food aid centres and how food aid distributions leads to competition with local farmers resulting in low market prices (de Waal 1989, Hofman et al. 2004). Increasingly more comprehensive meta-evaluations and joint evaluations of the impact of humanitarian aid interventions on livelihoods and livelihood practices on a broader scale have been undertaken<sup>3</sup> (Beck and Buchanan-Smith 2008). One example of such a comprehensive and joint evaluation of an unprecedented humanitarian response to disaster has been the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) evaluation report of 2006 after the 2004 Tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia.<sup>4</sup> The TEC specifically targeted six different thematic areas for a cross cutting country and agency wide evaluation, one of which focused on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) with reference to livelihood recovery as part of the humanitarian response. The research at the heart of this thesis distinguishes itself from these earlier research programmes and evaluations by the examination of the long history and range of different aid interventions, and its consequences, both intended and unintended, on livelihoods. The analysis starts from the life worlds and experiences of people and their own efforts to rebuild their livelihoods, to understand how aid supports those efforts.

People living in prolonged crisis situations continue to find ways of making a living and sustaining themselves and their families. There is also normality in crisis: "Although economies may largely collapse during war, people hold on to normality as much as they can and continue planting their fields and trading their products" (Hilhorst 2007, 8). Although violence, chaos and displacement can affect their lives significantly, they also cope and adapt their livelihoods to new circumstances. In this thesis the concept of a livelihood is understood

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<sup>3</sup> One of the most prominent research institutions that carry out meta-evaluations, amongst others on humanitarian aid and livelihoods is the Feinstein International Center of Tufts University.

<https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Feinstein+International+Center>

<sup>4</sup> The TEC was hosted by the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), a forum for learning which was founded following a recommendation from one of the first humanitarian sector-wide evaluations after the 1994 Rwanda genocide.

as those assets, activities and access to these that determine a persons or households means of living (Ellis 2000a). In the process of securing and rebuilding livelihoods especially in a post-conflict setting, aid actors implement interventions that can have long-lasting and sometimes unintended outcomes on people's own efforts of restoring their livelihood activities. This research investigated the way conflict and aid have impacted on the assets and activities that comprise many rural livelihoods of people in Huíla province, Angola.

Humanitarian agencies and development agencies increasingly encroach upon each other's working terrains (Hilhorst 2007). The debates on Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), have attempted to bridge humanitarian and development approaches, including livelihoods recovery, by creating space within relief programs to enter into rehabilitation and development activities (Christoplos 2006). Although the LRRD approaches have gained momentum among humanitarian agencies, experiences that were recorded from the relief effort after the Tsunami of 2004 in Asia on livelihood recovery programmes showed some fundamental differences and flaws in the way agencies deal with LRRD (Christoplos 2006). As the Tsunami relief effort had access to an unprecedented amount of funding for relief and recovery activities, available budget and finances weren't major constraints to effective implementation of LRRD as many had argued was the case before (Christoplos 2006). The debates on LRRD also uncover some of the major differences in the way humanitarian and development organisations approach the issue of livelihood recovery. Christoplos stated that "humanitarian livelihoods programming is usually fundamentally different from the kinds of interventions that would be chosen in development efforts. This is a central issue in LRRD since developmental approaches could be expected to emanate from the livelihood strategies of the affected populations themselves, whereas humanitarian approaches tend to reflect what aid agencies think the target group should be doing" (Christoplos 2006, 29). This reflects a thought pattern in which it is considered that in emergencies there are little strategies to build on, and where interventions are not necessarily informed on existing needs. In practice this all too often means that the formulation and implementation of aid programmes is based more on what organizations can offer and manage. Ensuing interventions that follow this line of thinking can create unintended outcomes on livelihoods by its mismatch with practice.

This PhD research is part of a larger research programme investigating the history, principles and practices of humanitarian aid in Angola. The idea for this programme was born from the realization that aid actors in the Angolan context have played significant roles in the ordering and reordering of Angolan society. The research programme studies the "humanitarian complex through studying the everyday practices of policy and decision making and by following programmes at the interfaces of intervention" (Hilhorst 2005, 1). The value of studying humanitarian aid through everyday practices and at the interface of intervention is that it allows for a more thorough understanding of how aid is actually shaped and gains meaning in local realities through everyday interaction of social actors (Hilhorst 2007, 10). The research program which investigates local institutions, livelihoods and aid in conflict enables a comprehensive and extended case study of humanitarian aid in Angola and its consequences from a historical perspective.

My interest in the influence of aid interventions on livelihoods, especially in war and post-conflict situations, was further triggered by a chapter by Utas (2005) in the book entitled "No Peace, No War" (Richards 2005) on skills training for young ex-combatants in rural Liberia by the Belgium Red Cross. He describes how these ex-combatants received training to become mechanics, and electricians when there were already some unemployed mechanics and no electricity system in the area. His research with these rural young men in Liberia uncovered the unexpected result of increased migration to urban areas after the skills training ended. The aim of the aid programme had however been exactly the opposite; to assist the

social reintegration process of these young men back in rural Liberian society. This example triggered my interest in how livelihood approaches are perceived and incorporated by organisations that are considered to be humanitarian, and therefore more equipped to providing aid that is life-saving. Livelihood approaches are considered as more long-term development interventions that are not so easily reconcilable with the more restricted or narrow mandates of humanitarian organisations, yet there is an increasing move towards integrating these approaches in the humanitarian sphere, especially under the LRRD discourse.

The scientific relevance of the research lies in furthering the discussion on how people deal with crisis and what role aid plays in assisting their recovery processes. This research investigated how aid and livelihoods feed into each other over a longer period of time, especially in the particular political context of Angola. Furthermore the research also has policy relevance for organisations that engage in humanitarian as well as development issues as it shows the longer-term impact and consequences of their work in these contexts, and the challenges of applying LRRD in practice.

### *Introducing the fieldwork area*

Angola has seen nearly 40 years of conflict, starting from a struggle for independence from Portugal, to a civil war between the government-led Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). The Cold War significantly impacted the conflict through interference by the former Soviet Union, Cuba, USA and South Africa (Vines 2000). Peace accords were reached in 1991 and 1994, but did not lead to sustainable peace. Rather, in the post-Cold War period one of the most violent and destructive stages of conflict in Angola commenced, which ended in 2002 with the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. Conflict in Angola has most often been portrayed as a struggle over control of Angola's oil and diamond reserves exacerbated by a combination of factors such as ethnicity, the heritage left by colonialism, and the influence of external parties during the Cold War which shaped the different stages of conflict (Hodges 2004). Revenues from oil and diamonds certainly contributed to the long duration of war in Angola, as both parties found means to finance their military operations, but they cannot in itself explain causes, courses and local complexities and experiences of war. The years of conflict were marked by 'no peace, no war' contexts, where peaceful periods were alternated by periods of active conflict, and this differed throughout the country. The war created massive population movement, where at some point an estimated 4 million people were displaced, much of the infrastructure was destroyed and service delivery from the state came to a near standstill (Sogge 2006, Birkeland 2002, Christoplos 1998). Warfare directly impacted people's lives and livelihoods, as battles took place in both rural and urban areas. Markets collapsed, industries were abandoned or destroyed, and agricultural production became increasingly difficult as the result of violent attacks, the placing of mines, and constrained access to assets and important institutions. Peace was achieved in 2002 after the death of Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA. By that time the social, economic and institutional fabric of rural society was severely affected, parts of the country's infrastructure had been destroyed, and economic inequality reached unprecedented levels. In 2001, 68% of Angola's population lived below the official poverty line of \$1.70 a day, whereas the richest 10% of the population received 42% of the national income in the same year (Sogge 2006). At the same time Angola's formal economy grew rapidly since the end of the war, reaching a 9.7 % growth in the period 2002-2004 primarily due to its oil exports. Reconstruction programmes of the government since 2002 have focused mostly on urban areas and the rebuilding of



infrastructure. Provision of post-conflict reconstruction in the rural areas has often been left at the hands of aid organisations.

The long awaited peace in 2002 created more space for (international) humanitarian agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to implement aid programmes aimed at the reconstruction of Angola. The international aid organisations that were in Angola during the conflict were divided across the country along warring party-lines, with UN agencies in MPLA territory and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in UNITA controlled areas (Richardson 2000). Most of these agencies started their work in Angola at the end of the 1980s, beginning of the 1990s, and often stayed for prolonged periods of time. Humanitarian agencies continued their programmes after 2002, but changing their activities from basic relief to resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction. This continued until 2007, when specifically Huíla province saw a massive exodus and closure of both national and international agencies, many of whom had been implementing aid programmes in Angola for many years. Their work has so far not been taken over by development agencies and the state, leaving a gap in the implementation of the idea of linking relief and rehabilitation to development.

The reasons to situate this research in Angola were primarily because the country had seen 27 years of civil war which created a grave humanitarian situation. The conflict in Angola saw different phases with varying ideologies and intensities in violence, which also influenced the extent of the role that humanitarian agencies played in assisting the affected population, as well as the assumptions and conditions for aid. Assistance was given by different types of aid actors (humanitarian, development, national/international, church-based, state, military, etc.) which made a variety of interventions where and when the political and security situation would allow. Also, due to the inaccessibility of the country during so many years of war, compounded by the difficulty of obtaining a visa to enter the country, let alone a research permit, the amount of academic research that has been done in Angola had been very limited.

Zooming in on the different possible locations in Angola, the choice was made to implement this research in the province of Huíla, located in the south western part of the country. One important reason for choosing this location was the fact that the provincial capital, Lubango, had been a relatively safe and stable base for a high number of diverse aid agencies that had been operational in Angola. Lubango had served as an important location from where aid supplies arriving at the port of neighbouring province Namibe could more easily be distributed to the other southern provinces of Cuando Cubango, Cunene and Namibe. These circumstances were conducive to choose Huíla province for a comparative analysis between the different NGOs present, their strategies and projects. This province also had the second largest group of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and returned refugees, some areas had been severely affected by the conflict and it was battling with land issues and conflicts at the time of the fieldwork.

## **Research set-up**

This section discusses the objectives and research questions that are at the core of this research. Also, I introduce the theoretical pillars underlying this thesis.

### *Objectives and research questions*

The objective of this research is to analyse how people's livelihoods are affected during crisis, and how aid interventions shape the livelihoods that people have created. Conflict and

natural disasters profoundly affect livelihoods in many ways, and force people to make far-reaching decisions about the future of their livelihoods. Next to the direct effects of crisis and people's decision-making processes to cope with these effects on their livelihoods, aid interventions are implemented that aim to further shape livelihood options. This research aimed to uncover which livelihood interventions humanitarian agencies have implemented in the past and continue to do in the post-war period, on what analyses and approaches these interventions are based, and to see how these approaches and other interventions are responded to by aid beneficiaries. The purpose of this analysis is to create a better understanding of the way in which people survive during crisis, which choices they have and make in terms of their livelihoods, and which intended and unintended outcomes aid interventions have on the livelihood options of people. This does not imply that the research consisted of an evaluation of the impact of organisations' interventions but rather focused on defining factors that have influenced people's livelihood strategies.

In the absence of state and development institutions, humanitarian agencies become crucial agents for addressing issues of livelihoods in war-affected areas. By helping people to re-establish themselves, wittingly or unwittingly agencies have impact beyond their activities for the social ordering and reordering of society. In a post-conflict situation, aid agencies have to adapt to the changing circumstance and organizational space and reformulate their positions, programs and practices accordingly. Investigating the changing organizational space can be done by studying the agencies' discourses on issues such as participation and partnerships. This research has analysed some of these changing organisational discourses and the manner in which they were translated into practice.

Aid interventions are conceptualised as social interfaces, where the programmes with their mandates, objectives and styles of intervention encounter the life worlds of local people with their own differentiated situations and aspirations (Hilhorst 2005). One of the problems in situations of (post) conflict is that livelihood programmes implicitly aim to restore 'normal' development. With conflict since 1961, the majority of Angolans has no experience with peace and there is thus no 'normality' to fall back on. This is especially relevant when related to LRRD debates in which the assumption is that livelihood programmes serve as a natural bridge from food aid and food security interventions to reaching sustainable development, or 'normality'.

The starting point of this thesis is that aid, no matter its intentions, always affects the livelihood conditions of local people. This resulted in the following central research question:

*How are people's livelihoods affected in times of crisis, and how do aid interventions influence the livelihood options that people have in Huíla province, Angola?*

This main research question was divided into the following sub-questions:

- What are people's past and current livelihoods and how have they been affected and influenced by crisis?
- How have different aid interventions influenced and transformed the livelihood options that people have nowadays?
- How do agencies with different mandates analyse and organize their interventions and how does the livelihood approach fit into the everyday practice of humanitarian agencies?
- What have been people's responses to aid interventions?

These questions are the result of adaptation during fieldwork of the initial questions raised in the research proposal. The adaptation was necessary to incorporate important and interesting issues arising in the fieldwork context. The major changes have been that the research

became less aid-centred and gained a stronger focus on reconstruction processes.

A first focus on aid interventions changed to incorporate the ways in which people themselves re-establish their lives and livelihoods and if and how aid plays a role in the outcomes of these livelihoods. People re-established themselves already in various ways before the first aid agencies appear. Also, many people who had never received aid, continued their livelihood activities next to the people that had. It was precisely the way in which aid interventions interface with people's livelihood strategies that became the focal point of this research.

At the start of the research, a separate question on labelling was included, to understand how distinctions made between different client groups contributed towards perceptions of communities and identity, but also how the different aid organisations (humanitarian or developmental, local or international, principled or not) were perceived by the client groups. This last aspect of labelling however, was difficult to approach in fieldwork practice. People did not see a difference between development and humanitarian aid, also because in the Portuguese language, such distinction is used only amongst the relevant institutions, not something people use or distinguish on an everyday basis.

An issue that became very important throughout the fieldwork was the notion of a society being in transition, which influenced the context, institutions and type of aid interventions that were developed after the war ended in 2002. Often, during interviews people were not able to say that the situation they found themselves in was that of an emergency, or rather a stable context, yet they kept on referring to Angolan society as being in transition, with an occasional step backwards or forwards. The idea of society being in transition, the aid and state agencies' response to this connecting to debates on LRRD policy and practice, became an additional focal point in this research, in which much of the collected data has been framed.

### *An introduction to the theoretical framework*

Here I want to introduce the main theoretical pillars of this research. The conceptual framework is elaborated in the next chapter. This research is grounded in the actor-oriented approach developed by Norman Long, in which issues of development are approached through the notion of agency that people and institutions have in acting and fostering change in their surroundings (Long 1989b, Hebinck et al. 2001). Actors and their agency are central in understanding how planned development and social change follows from negotiation between social actors rather than from external and linear models to development (Long 1989b, Long 1992). Actors are not passive recipients of interventions, but active brokers in the development and change processes bringing their own knowledge, power and interests to the table (Long 1992). Following from this actor orientation to development this research has included social interface analysis as a method to investigate aid interventions as processes of negotiation amongst a variety of actors, instead of an external event. The social interface was conceptualized as: "a critical point of intersection or linkage between different social systems, fields or levels of social order where structural discontinuities, based upon differences of normative value and social interest, are most likely to be found" (Long 1989b, 2). By viewing interventions as an interface where differences in power and knowledge are made visible, it serves to understand how outcomes of aid interventions are shaped in negotiation amongst the various actors (Long 2004).

In this thesis, humanitarian aid is considered as assistance which is given to alleviate human suffering, and is supposedly needs-based and void of any political motivation (Hilhorst 2007). In contrast, development aid focuses on long-term processes of achieving social equity and economic modernisation (Smillie 1998, Duffield 2000). In practice the two

approaches have increasingly become intertwined. A translation of an actor-oriented approach towards the humanitarian domain is made by applying the concept of the *humanitarian arena* (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010). The concept of a humanitarian arena emphasizes the multitude of other actors (state, churches, the military and people themselves) beside humanitarian organisations alone that shape the outcomes of aid. Furthermore, it stresses the importance of an empirical approach to aid, incorporating the everyday realities and politics that tend to be neglected when using the normative framework of principled aid alone (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010).

In this thesis a livelihood is conceptualized, following the definition provided by Ellis (2000a, 10): A livelihood comprises the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social capital), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by the individual or household". Livelihoods change over time, influenced by different circumstances and choices. During a protracted crisis, as in the case of Angola's civil war, the activities, the assets, and access are put under pressure to adapt, when institutions change or stop functioning all together, basic services are halted, and displacement occurs. On-farm and non-farm livelihood diversification offer rural people a way to divert livelihood risks brought about by conflicts and disaster, yet options for diversification are constrained in times of crisis. Assistance to livelihoods is one of the main pillars in LRRD policy and practice. Relief is supposed to provide 'a springboard to recovery', after which development aid can reduce people's vulnerability to future shocks (Harmer and Macrae 2004). With LRRD, the relief mandates are stretched, which puts different demands on humanitarian organisations when it comes to organizational capacity and approaches. An approach towards recovery and development requires increased linkages with state institutions, a more holistic view on the present socio-economic conditions, and providing inputs and services from which people can draw to sustain their ways of making a living.

## **Fieldwork: methodological approach, choices and constraints**

This section will start with an explanation of how the areas of fieldwork were selected. Then it will elaborate on how the two PhD projects in this research program on Angola were complementary to each other in theme and fieldwork. This is followed by an overview of the main research methodology, and a discussion of the different methods that were used in this research, complemented with some examples of how they were used in practice.

Furthermore, a discussion is included of some of the difficulties encountered in the field which impacted the course of the fieldwork.

### *Selecting the fieldwork areas*

I started my fieldwork in Lubango, the capital of Huíla province, to establish contacts and conduct interviews with various organisations. These included the national and international NGOs, the UN organisations, state institutions, church organisations, and the local university. During these first three months I interviewed 21 staff of organisations in Lubango, and presented my research at an Action Against Hunger (ACF) seminar. With one of the organisations I visited the municipality Cacula, where part of their food security program was being implemented. I stayed there for one week to get an idea of rural reality in Angola and conduct some preliminary interviews with people living in villages in the area. The municipalities were selected during the first phase of the fieldwork in Angola, on the basis of data from interviews, reports, and some initial field visits. Initially the intention had been to

select three municipalities for case study comparison on the basis of the following distinctions: 1) a municipality that had received extensive aid and interventions that had specifically targeted people's livelihoods, 2) a municipality that had only received relief aid, and 3) a municipality that had received no aid. But logistical and ensuing planning problems made this selection unfeasible. Hence, I was unable to conduct further fieldwork in the municipality of Chicomba (category 2), and instead focused on two municipalities: Caluquembe (category 1), and Chibia (category 3),

A Vulnerability Assessment report of the UN (2001) with regards to the humanitarian situation in Huíla made a distinction between three different regions in the province on the basis of vulnerability to food insecurity. The three regions were referred to as Livelihood System 1, 2 and 3. Livelihood system 1 was considered to be a mixed farming environment with a well-developed access to markets, where food deficits only occasionally occurred. Livelihood System 2 was characterized by large scale cattle production and moderate food insecurity. Livelihood System 3 used to revolve around maize and livestock production, but as most livestock disappeared during the war the asset base on which people relied in times of crisis was considered to have diminished considerably, leaving the population in these areas highly vulnerable to food insecurity (UN 2001, 3). Decisions of UN organisations about the amount of humanitarian interventions and food assistance were made on the basis of this type of information. Under this framework my fieldwork in Caluquembe (in the north of the province, much conflict, and much aid) would fall under Livelihood System 2. My second selected municipality of Chibia fell under Livelihood System 1 (in the south of the province, little conflict, little aid), and the third municipality of Chicomba would follow Livelihood System 3 (northeast of province, much conflict, limited aid due to accessibility).

Fieldwork in both Chibia and Caluquembe took place for several months in total, giving sufficient time to make a comparison between the local livelihood practices, and to assess how issues such as conflict, displacement, reconstruction efforts, and aid interventions had shaped the livelihood practices in six villages. I made comparisons amongst villages within the two municipalities. In each municipality I selected three villages that had different histories in terms of displacement and aid encounters. In Chibia, I selected three villages of different ethnic backgrounds, due to displacement. The comparison between these six very different villages made the case studies richer and more varied, strengthening the finding that uniform livelihood approaches are not always appropriate when the differences between the inhabitants also mean differences in experiences, skills, needs and aspirations when it comes to livelihood strategies. The comparison between the different localities highlighted some local specificities that contributed to changes in livelihoods. Certainly, issues like conflict, displacement and aid altered the availability of and access to assets in all the villages to different degrees. Moreover, livelihoods remain inspired by personal preference, skills, and experiences. Yet, from the comparative research amongst the villages a clear picture emerged of how the availability and type of aid interventions shaped the livelihoods in villages thoroughly. This is done by the choices the aid agencies make not only by making an item available for one and not for the other, but also by supporting certain livelihood activities and not others for instance.

### *Two PhD projects, one province*

Humanitarian aid influences livelihoods, whether it is through direct interventions, or unintentionally through other actions. At the same time, aid is often channelled through local institutions in order to reach the beneficiaries, or at some instances agencies even take over social service delivery when local institutions have become too weakened by conflict and state collapse (Christoplos 1998). These two important aspects in which humanitarian aid

takes on a considerable role in rural societies by its influence on both livelihoods and institutions, have been captured in the research program through two PhD researches. Livelihoods and institutions are not separated, they are interconnected and influence each other. Although local institutions are affected by conflict institutional arrangements and processes of ordering continue (Hilhorst 2005). Livelihoods are mediated through these local institutions that surround them. Institutions can support and/or constrain people's livelihood activities as it is in institutions that issues of power and access are played out, which in turn define the extent to which people can pursue certain livelihood strategies (Ellis 2000b, Scoones 2009). For instance, lack of access to institutions such as markets, and social service providers hampers the economic and technical advances that people can make with respect to their livelihoods (Dorward et al. 2003). Addressing livelihoods and institutions in two separate PhD projects enabled the researchers to emphasize, analyse and address their specificities, especially in relation to the interaction of aid with these two themes. The combination of the two PhD projects allowed for a comparison amongst four very different municipalities on different terrains, enabling an extensive study on Huíla province, covering both fundamental themes as well as geographically wide data collection.

## *Methodology*

### *Historical ethnography*

How people's livelihoods were affected during crisis, and how aid interventions shaped the livelihoods that people have created for themselves were mainly investigated by ethnography: participant observation in villages of local farmers, IDPs and ex-combatants, complemented with observations of the implementation of NGO programmes in the field at the level of intervention. Conducting ethnographic research has long been considered as something "you just go and do", requiring little preparation in terms of research design (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983). However, when considering the fieldwork, there has to be a prior conceptualization of the theoretical interests, issues, places, types of organisations, and especially the particular items in social life that will be of most importance in the research. Therefore, I designed the fieldwork in such a way that it gave me sufficient research focus, yet allowed me enough flexibility to follow more interesting leads that would emerge from the interviews and information during the actual data collection. As Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) point out, narrowing down the research problem often starts by exploring the secondary data to better define exactly those themes, places and periods that will be most interesting for ethnographic investigation.

This research took an historical ethnography approach to analyse how people's livelihoods were affected during crisis, and how aid interventions shaped the livelihoods that people created for themselves. According to Silverman and Gulliver (1992, 16) "A historical ethnography provides a description and analysis of a past era of the people of some particular, identifiable locality, using archival sources and, if relevant, local oral history". Historical ethnography as a separate approach from ethnography seems to be an overstatement in the sense that ethnography cannot do without a historical approach to understand current practice in societies (Radcliffe-Brown 1951, Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). Researching a society's history is indeed an integral part of ethnography and understanding of current social phenomenon and realities. Comaroff and Comaroff (1992) argue that historical ethnography should pay attention to the context, power and meaning of the situation that is analysed. Without taking those aspects into account it will remain just people's stories. Historical events are analysed in order to understand how certain outcomes are shaped. Outside interventions change socio-economic structures in villages and societies sometimes

unwittingly, in a way that they become an integral part of history. In Angola's context it might be hard to distinguish certain historical changes as there are many factors that have contributed to a changing society or practice: colonialism, war, displacement, aid interventions, national reconstruction programs, etc. In this research changes that occurred in people's livelihoods, and the factors that contributed to those changes, are central. By using archival sources in the provincial capital and municipal administrations, organisational and employers' discourses and experiences, and experiences and life histories of local people, this study attempted to unfold the histories of the two municipalities and its current inhabitants. Also, the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino archive in Lisbon revealed interesting documentation on the colonial history of Angola, and Huíla province in particular. I used some of the information collected in that archive for chapter 4 on colonial policies as well as for the chapters on Chibia and Caluquembe.

One feature of my interviews and surveys was to ask what people's livelihoods looked like in 1975, 1990 and now, to understand how they evolved over time and compare them to the start of the war (1975) and in the middle of the conflict period (1990). I would, for instance, ask what income-generating activities people had at that time compared to now, the difference in amount of land they had access to, if they had remittances from family members that had migrated, what type of crops they produced in comparison to now, and then compare this to the type and amount of aid they had received throughout these years.

Villages and organisations were the units of observation in this research, with interface analysis as a main method to identify the linkages, networks, and struggles that exist between the inhabitants of the villages and staff of the aid organisations (Long 2001). The interface that Long (1989b, 2001) refers to is the symbolic space where planned development and social change is negotiated amongst social actors that all bring in their own meaning, negotiations, desires and needs into the process. Interface analysis deepens the understanding of aid interventions as transformational processes amongst actors, shaped through interaction (Hebinck et al. 2001). In this research interface analysis was used to uncover these processes of transformation during and after aid interventions.

## *Methods*

### *Participant observation*

Dewalt and Dewalt define participant observation as "a method in which an observer takes part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions, and events of the people being studied as one of the means of learning the explicit and tacit aspects of their culture" (DeWalt and DeWalt 1999, 260). There are some misconceptions surrounding the term participant observation, with a specific emphasis on the word participant. DeWalt and Dewalt (1999) distinguish between four levels of participation. These are: Nonparticipation (for instance only by reading), Moderate Participation (compared to commuting to the community instead of staying there), Active Participation (ethnographer engages in everyday life of the community), and finally Complete Participation (the ethnographer becomes a full member of the community). My aim was to engage and interact with inhabitants within a village in order to get a fuller understanding of people's everyday life, and at the same time ensure that the people I interviewed would no longer view me as a complete outsider, to create a level of trust. The same applied to my studies of the organizations. I would make regular visits and sometimes use their office space, participate in workshops and seminars, and accompany staff on field visits. This form of participation resembles that of Active Participation as explained above. The method can have valuable influences on the research itself, and may also create more acceptance for the presence of a researcher. It serves as both a data collection

instrument as well as a data analysis or interpretation tool (DeWalt and DeWalt 1999, Russell Bernard 2006).

For this research the emphasis lied primarily on understanding people's daily interactions with each other and with aid agencies as well as the way people went about safeguarding and sustaining their livelihoods on a daily basis. Observation uncovers the practices and village dynamics that cannot be captured by interviews alone, as it entails "experiencing the lives of the people you are studying as much as you can" (Russell Bernard 2006, 344). It shows the context in which people live and the realities of everyday life in rural villages in Angola. Participant observation also revealed the personal dynamics and practices of aid, by studying the daily interactions of aid actors one can get a better grasp on how certain aid interventions get shaped in practice beyond the formal policy document formulations. Observation creates understanding of how aid is shaped in practice and as a result of negotiation between so called 'aid providers' and 'aid beneficiaries'.

### Discourse analysis

One of the ways in which it can be assessed how members of an organization give meaning to their activities and to their interactions with local people, is by using discourse centred approaches. "These approaches distinguish themselves by focusing on the dialogical processes through which persons, social institutions and cultural knowledge are socially constructed through spoken discourse and other signifying acts/forms of expressive performance" (Farnell and Graham 1998, 411). Discourse in language, documents and practices allowed for collecting in-depth knowledge on the way people in these organizations perceived not only their organizational mandate but also how they viewed their work and role. Hilhorst (2003) discusses the 'duality of discourse' in which multiple discourses co-exist, and are negotiated amongst various actors but at the same time they can become so powerful and unchallenged that they become part of local reality. "The more dominant a discourse, the more it operates as a set of rules about what can and cannot be said and done, and about what. As a consequence, actors, through their discursive practice, may turn these discourses increasingly into reality" (Hilhorst 2003, 216).

For this research, discourse analysis was valuable to understanding how the organizational discourses influenced the formulation and implementation of interventions by aid actors. Discourse analysis in this research was specifically relevant for analysing labelling, a practice which is discussed more in depth in chapter 2 of this thesis. Labelling people as being part of a group of "subsistence farmers", "ex-combatants", a "community", "displaced", or "most vulnerable" is an organizational practice that legitimizes the targeting of specific groups of people for aid interventions. Labelling practices brushes over social differentiation and informs the consequent interventions for very specific groups of people, or can lead to non-intervention. In this study organizational discourses were uncovered in which people were labelled as suffering from dependency syndrome, a term used to describe aid beneficiaries as having become passive and lacking initiative after long periods of humanitarian assistance (Harrell-Bond 1986). This label was used to explain the perceived lack of development in certain villages, and motivated decisions to not respond to stated needs of the population as this would increase people's dependency on aid. This specific labelling discourse has vanished in policy language, but continues to appear in practice even used beside participation discourses. Discourses on dependency syndrome highlight a preoccupation with overreliance on relief, whereas people stating a certain need could be interpreted as participation in the development process instead. Analysis of these organizational discourses are presented in chapter 7 on the humanitarian arena.



### Life histories

Recording life histories is an instrument to analyse how people have perceived changes, events and developments in their lives and the way these have personally affected them and the further choices they made in their lives. In this research life histories were used to understand the way people encountered and perceived aid and conflict and how those factors affected the choices they made in relation to their livelihoods. Debates that surround the use of life histories in research include the issue of subjectivity, and lack of reliability and validity of the data that is gathered through recording these histories (Powles 2004, Brettel 1998). Critics claim that life histories are very much individualistic and isolated accounts of persons, from which no further analysis can be derived. Also, they point at the role of the researcher at deriving further conclusions from the life histories and narratives. In this particular research, life histories did not stand alone to explain how people have coped with conflict, and how they make sense of interventions and livelihoods, however valid this may be in other studies. The aim of using life histories in this research is to understand, next to information gathered from archival sources, semi-structured interviews, surveys and interviews with organisations, how aid has impacted on the lives of people in the area of study. It is integral part of explaining the situation and people's perceptions of their life course. Furthermore, life histories, especially when collected over a number of areas and cases, uncover some shared experiences of conflict and aid, as well as alternative ways of dealing with them.

In total, 9 life histories were recorded from the various villages. They were personal stories of someone's life course, related to the impact that important external events had on them. Also, people would indicate to me names of people that had much knowledge about the village's history, sometimes dating back to colonial times. During interviews with NGOs I would sometimes receive information regarding local historians, or persons with very specific knowledge and experience on themes pertaining to local livelihoods or conflict experiences. I would follow up these suggestions and approach these people for a more extended interview in which the person's history and experiences would be noted. Specifically I would ask questions about village life in the colonial period and during conflict, what changes occurred in people's livelihoods over the years, what choices they made to deal with the effects of conflict, and what experiences people had with aid. Recording life histories in the villages during fieldwork revealed much more in-depth information about the personal encounters with conflict, livelihoods and aid.

Although this might not have been implied by Powles (2004), Brettel (1998), and others in the term life histories, in this research the life history of a particular project or programme initiated by a humanitarian agency were also drawn up in much the same way. By speaking to the people that were involved through the most part of developing and implementing a programme in a locality as well as reading the different project documents, one can trace the initial idea and goal and eventual outcomes. The life histories of two Dutch NGOs that were operational in Huíla province were constructed, in order to compare their mandates, activities and exit strategies. This enabled understanding of how organizations view their own role and work in the context of LRRD, as well as the decision-making processes in defining their presence and strategies towards aid delivery in a country.

### Comparative analysis and case studies

Ragin (1994) states that comparative research is especially well suited for research that tries to interpret historically significant phenomena across a number of comparable cases. In this research the six selected villages were the cases which were compared on the basis of historically significant phenomena such as the influence of colonialism, encounters with (and effects of ) conflict, the availability of aid and reconstruction programs, and (changes in)

livelihoods. The overall research program also takes a new approach to comparative research on aid by comparing different forms of aid in situations of conflict and post-conflict from a perspective of everyday practices, and is as such an extended case study of aid in Angola (Hilhorst 2005).

Ragin (1994) notes that although one case study can create in-depth knowledge on a specific situation, “Often, however, it is best achieved by studying several instances of the same thing because different aspects may be more visible in different cases” (Ragin 1994, 86). The six villages in two municipalities in Huíla province were the case studies in this research. By observing the everyday practices of people in these villages, recording their stories, conducting surveys, and consulting written sources from the archives, municipal or NGO reports, a case emerges of social and historical dynamics in a village that co-shape the way its inhabitants cope during crises and make a living. They show how the (livelihood) dynamics of these villages have changed under the influence of conflict, displacement and return, and aid interventions and reveal the similarities and differences there were amongst people in the way they made a living and coped with important events. Also, specific events, projects or interventions are approached as a case study in itself in this thesis, as this allows analysing the variety of social, economic, institutional and political factors that determine intended and unintended outcomes of aid.

#### Qualitative and quantitative analyses

This research is qualitative in nature, as it relies on qualitative methods such as participant observation and open interviews to understand how people’s livelihoods are affected during crisis, and how aid interventions shape the livelihoods that people have created for themselves. I used open or semi-structured interviewing techniques to collect data on people’s livelihoods, the context and history. However, during my fieldwork I have used a quantitative survey method next to the mainly qualitative approaches and methods. There has been much debate and discussion on whether social scientists and anthropologists should venture into using more quantitative data, as if the use of these data would make the researcher any less of an anthropologist. As Hammersley (1992) points out well, the issue is all about precision and accuracy. The main criticism of quantitative researchers on ethnographic work is that this type of research lacks precision. According to Hammersley (1992, 160) these quantitative researchers are arguing that “ethnographers are insufficiently precise in their claims, and that the necessary precision requires quantification”. In my view this does not entail that ethnographical methods lack the ability to make valid claims, but rather that at times ethnographic work could benefit from using quantitative methods as well. In this research for instance, the quantitative information serves as background to the data that were gathered qualitatively in the field. The data from surveys act as quantitative information that helps to further understand some particular elements from the research localities which support the qualitative data and observations that form the backbone of the study.

Quantitative methods focus on exploring patterns and relationships amongst variables (Ragin 1994). Quantitatively assessing changes in crop production over a period of time and relating these changes qualitatively to people’s practices, life histories and village dynamics, made it easier to explore the relationship and impact of humanitarian interventions on these changes. I conducted 58 surveys with the objective to assess the amount and types of livelihood activities that people practiced, and see how they have evolved over time. I would select people while walking through the villages, ensuring as much as possible an equal respondent representation in terms of gender, age, and power. For instance, although village chiefs many times tried to put forward their own selection, I would make clear this was left to me to ensure equal representation as much as possible. Questions on household composition,

remittances, linkages to community institutions and the amount and type of received aid were included. The surveys that I used during my fieldwork in the villages acted as a support tool to the qualitative methods. By starting a conversation with a survey, people felt comfortable as they often knew what to expect from experiences of other inhabitants in the village. Some questions in the surveys then paved the way to discuss in depth any particular or interesting issues that would appear in conversation. In this way the surveys served as good entry points to understanding many of the phenomena in the village and personal histories of its inhabitants, as well as giving some structure to both the interviewer and interviewees. The data obtained from the surveys are analysed and presented in chapters 5 and 6 on Caluquembe and Chibia.

### *Fieldwork in a complex context*

Fieldwork in complex settings such as post-conflict countries can create special challenges, affecting the outcomes of research. The first challenge is related to the practical logistics and planning of the fieldwork, and the second recounts an experience with the brutal reality of rural poverty in Angola. These experiences have shaped my fieldwork and my perceptions of Angolan society.

### *Visa as a constraining factor to the fieldwork*

In this section I highlight an issue that has had severe consequences for my fieldwork, in terms of time, planning, and even choice of municipalities. The problematic procedures for obtaining a visa in Angola, allowing the researcher to be in the country long enough to do 1.5 years of fieldwork, has been a major constraining factor in the fieldwork period, and also explains some of the particular constraints of working in Angola, not just for researchers but also for most of the international aid workers.

A request for a work visa was compiled and handed over at the Angolan Consulate General in The Netherlands before leaving for Angola, so was a request for an ordinary visa for one month, that could be extended twice after which I should leave the country. The prospects of actually getting the work visa were unsure. The first three months of fieldwork were marked with many uncertainties surrounding the visa, and even its monthly extensions. Every month I was struggling to find an organisation willing to write a letter to show at the immigration office for another month extension. The unwillingness of organisations to do this was understandable due to the many problems that existed for expatriates and organisations to obtain a visa, and the ensuing visits that the immigration officers would make to verify the validity of the visa that had been issued with cooperation of organisations. At the end of the first three months I had to leave the country. After coming back with a new one month visa, the problems started all over again, until I came into contact with the Provincial Director of the Ministry of Social Assistance, who committed that the ministry would help with the application of the visa, as well as the work visa. After that, much time was spent on all subsequent bureaucratic procedures of getting the right documents, ranging from the Ministry, to the local immigration office, and the Angolan Consulate in The Netherlands. These procedures prevented me from staying in the remote villages for prolonged periods of time, but eventually had the result that I was able to enjoy the unexpected granting of a work visa during the last three months of my one and a half year fieldwork period. My visa experience was anything but exceptional in Angola. Throughout the fieldwork and interviews with all expatriate staff in Angola, the visa issue came up. It was the talk among expatriates: “Has your visa been issued already?”, “When do you have to leave the country to get an extension again?”, “How many years have you been waiting for the work visa to be issued?”, etc. During a Forum of Angolan Non-Governmental Organisations (FONGA) meeting held in

Luanda in 2007, the whole conference was dominated by the recounting of personal experiences by expatriates with their visa issues, and a person from the immigration department was invited to explain the official procedures and answer any personal questions. Overall, it seems to be a problem that affects all people coming to work in Angola, either through invitation by Angolan government institutions, international organisations, and commercial enterprises. Many international aid organization staff has seen their work being affected by having to leave the country for a visa extension without knowing if and when it would be possible to return, or having to work from home if the immigration officers would make regular visits to aid offices to check people's work visas.

The visa complications did have their effects on the planning and implementation of fieldwork in especially Caluquembe. To reach Caluquembe it took a 4-6 hour drive, depending on whether it was the rainy season or not. As the town was very isolated due to the bad state of the road, there was little traffic between Lubango and Caluquembe. For the visa renewal procedure I always needed at least a week to make sure all the bureaucratic procedures were in order, from visits to the ministry and provincial government to getting the letters ready, photocopies made, coloured photocopies made, back to the immigration office, etc. The problems surrounding the visa applications and procedures did affect my planning in such a way, that I was never able to stay in Angola for more than three months in a row. Also, during those three months much time was lost with the logistical and administrative procedures to obtain the visa or extension on time. Eventually this meant I had to abandon the initial idea to do a comparative research between three municipalities in the province, and instead focussed on two: Caluquembe and Chibia. In the beginning, I was able to visit the third municipality, Chicomba, for one week. Unfortunately soon after that introductory trip it became apparent that I would have to limit the fieldwork to only two municipalities. However, during this week in Chicomba, I did encounter a situation that made a severe impression on me and the rest of my fieldwork period as it brought together human suffering, the true extent of rural poverty, a tremendously weak health system and the way aid and assistance is given in these extreme situations.

#### Rural poverty in Chicomba: realities of humanitarian aid

In this final section I recount an experience during my fieldwork in Chicomba that influenced the manner in which I viewed the complex context that local people and humanitarians are faced with, giving a face to the people directly affected by conflict and extreme poverty, as well as the people that try to assist them in these circumstances.

During a fieldwork visit of a week in Chicomba, a municipality in the centre of Huíla province, I stayed at the Catholic Mission. This Catholic Mission was located just outside of the municipal centre. The Catholic Mission of Chicomba consisted of various buildings, including a school which was bombed in 1993 but was still more or less functioning, and a health post. During my time there Sister Leonor, a Spanish lady of close to 80 years old who had been working and living in Huíla province for 27 years, guided me across the mission compound. As we were walking along the little health post we were asked to come in by one of the Sisters and have a look at a baby girl that had been brought in by her parents that morning. The baby had contracted malaria, which had been left untreated for too long resulting in her being severely anaemic. Sister Leonor told the parents to pack some stuff to take to the hospital of Chicomba. Arriving at the hospital the parents were told that the girl urgently needed a blood transfusion. The hospital of Chicomba does not have the facility to test blood on the presence of an HIV infection, therefore blood transfusions are not allowed at the hospital. The baby therefore needed to be urgently transported to the hospital in Matala (a 1.5 hour drive) or Lubango (a 4-6 hour drive). The child and her mother were checked into the hospital, and were told that the only available ambulance at the hospital had broken down

some weeks ago, and there had been no possibilities to fix it. Sister Leonor then took the father to the local market, where they tried to locate a taxi, or any other form of available transport to Matala or Lubango. When the taxi arrived and I entered the hospital I found Sister Leonor and the mother in the hallway. Sister Leonor was pouring water over the baby's head. The baby had stopped breathing and her eyes were half open. I went back to the car and Sister Leonor followed me a bit later and told me that the baby had just died. After we had returned to the mission Sister Leonor said that the child had been about 8 months old. The parents had not started medicines yet as they didn't have the necessary cash. The mother had told Sister Leonor that they were still preparing the baptism for the child, but hadn't succeeded yet in getting sufficient money for the ceremony and party. The mother had been very concerned about what was going to happen to the child if she died without having been baptized and therefore had asked Sister Leonor to perform a quick baptism in the hallway of the hospital.

For me, this experience brought many dimensions of my research together. First of all, it served as a strong reminder of the extent of poverty in rural Angola. The family did not have sufficient money to obtain medicines for their baby, or organise a baptism which they deemed essential. They had neither (financial) means of transportation nor belongings they could take with them when planning to stay at a hospital in Lubango or Matala for an extended period of time. Furthermore, the state of health services in Angola was revealed through the non-functioning ambulance, the lack of neither HIV-testing nor blood transfusion facilities. It was a reminder of the extra-ordinary high level of child mortality (under the age of five) in the country, which in 2003 was estimated at 260 per 1000 live births (WHO 2005, 182). Although I had heard this mortality rate mentioned before in connection with Angola, what it signified in reality only became clear to me in Chicomba. For me, the reality behind the numerous NGO reports, policy documents and research papers about the humanitarian situation in Angola was given a face. Another dimension of this experience involved the extent to which people, like Sister Leonor, continue aiding people in the most difficult of circumstances without losing their commitment and humanity, even after witnessing the extreme poverty, misery and violence for decades. Some weeks after my visit to Chicomba this was accentuated when I heard that the Sisters at the Catholic Mission in Chicomba had been attacked and robbed by four armed men.

The mission work that these women were so dedicated to, is in practice based on the similar objectives of humanitarian assistance. Observing their daily practices to enhance the quality of life of the people living around them for years on end, while being vulnerable to violence themselves, offers an understanding of what humanitarian aid is about. The principles of humanity, to relieve the suffering of people wherever they are found, are the principles that shaped the emergence of humanitarian aid, and are still found to be practiced by people, even if they themselves would not call it humanitarian aid per se (Hilhorst 2007). Humanitarians are vulnerable to attacks by belligerents, even though the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality would entitle them to protection and security in these violent contexts. In recent years, the number of humanitarian staff encountering violence has increased significantly. A study by Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico (2009, 1) has shown that in the period 2006-2008 127 violent incidents occurred in which 95 aid workers were killed, with the 2008 fatality rate for international aid workers even exceeding that of UN peacekeeping forces.

Debates on humanitarian aid often revolve around its effectiveness, policy instruments, humanitarian principles, and many other subjects that at times seem distant from the realities that organisations and their staff find themselves in on an everyday basis, and the way the affected people themselves perceive it and/or transform it to fit their own needs and aspirations. This reality of aid, its different dimensions, and the context and difficulties

people encounter were revealed to me during many stages of the fieldwork. The death of the baby girl in Chicomba, the poverty that surrounded it, the lack of functioning basic services, and the commitment of people working to uphold the basic principle of humanity, gave me a personal perspective on the reality I was faced with. It showed me the context in which people make choices regarding their livelihoods, as they are the result of many different processes, like availability of resources, perception of risks, need for monetary resources, availability of aid systems, strength of local institutions, health risks, access to education, availability of family or other network support, etc. Livelihood options and choices in the context of extreme rural poverty, conflict and displacement can literally become a matter of life or death.

## **Outline of the thesis**

Chapter 2 starts with a discussion of the theory and debates underlying the concepts that are central to this research: livelihoods and humanitarian aid. The chapter will present how theoretical, policy and practice discourses on humanitarian aid have changed over time, slowly encompassing much more than just the life-saving activities it was first designed for. In this chapter I will argue for the importance of studying humanitarian aid as an arena which allows for a more empirically-based understanding of aid outcomes and the role of various actors in this process, rather than understanding humanitarian aid from the normative framework of principles. Improving people's livelihoods is a popular but complex objective which has increasingly entered humanitarian aid's policy and practice. Livelihood approaches that are adopted by aid organizations try to incorporate as much as possible of the different components that make up a livelihood, yet do not always take into account the changing and non-linear nature of livelihoods. This chapter will argue for a stronger focus on people's own efforts to rebuild and secure their livelihoods during and after crisis, and seeks the various ways in which aid actors support or hinder these efforts.

In chapter 3 the history and experiences of conflict in Angola are analysed. It starts with an historical overview of different stages of war in Angola, including the main actors, motivations and effects. The chapter then analyses Angola's conflict through a political economy of war approach, by focusing on processes of distribution of power and wealth. Furthermore, the chapter argues for an increased understanding of local experiences and manifestations of war. By introducing empirical data from fieldwork in the municipalities, a case is made for a socio-institutional approach to war, which focuses on the local level where conflict interacts with local norms and power relations. The chapter argues for a focus on the everyday realities of war to understand how conflict plays out locally.

Chapter 4 introduces the colonial history and its impact on rural socio-economic life in Angola, and rural livelihoods in Huíla province specifically. It starts with a characterization of Portuguese colonialism, and the major economic developments and policies during the colonial rule in Angola. These colonial economic policies by the Portuguese in Angola are then translated to the regional application and effects on rural economies and societies. People's experiences with the colonial institutions and policies in their villages are presented, to create understanding of how major colonial policies were actually experienced and influenced people's everyday lives. In the last paragraph in this chapter, leaps in history are made around periods of colonialism, independence, and various stages during the civil war. Throughout this timeline information regarding changes in livelihoods and the rural society is presented. Specific attention is paid to rural institutions that play a role in the assistance of livelihoods, and how these have also changed over time and were affected by colonialism and conflict. The chapter is based on both a review of

(historical) literature, archive material as well as data from fieldwork in Lubango, Caluquembe and Chibia. The chapter argues that colonialism and conflict have severely affected the rural economy and institutions. The disappearance of the colonial trading system and economic institutions, even though highly exploitative in nature, has reduced the options for rural livelihoods significantly. Furthermore, colonial policies and post-independence rural policies are shown to have influenced the post-conflict reconstruction efforts of the Angolan state.

Chapters 5 and 6 contain the empirical data from fieldwork in six villages in the two municipalities Caluquembe (chapter 5) and Chibia (chapter 6). The case studies consist of an analysis of past and current livelihood practices of village and inhabitants. The histories of each village are presented, highlighting social and economic changes and the effects of war. By looking at the different critical events in village and personal life, war, displacement, migration, and aid the changes in livelihoods are drawn. The chapters argue that rehabilitation of livelihoods in Caluquembe is an example of an externally driven type of recovery in the context of post-war Angola, whereas the history of inhabitants in Chibia offers insight into processes of self-recovery, as well as processes of state recovery. The two chapters bring the observation and analysis of the practices of humanitarian organisations and actual livelihood activities in the case study villages together, based on empirical material collected through open and semi-structured interviews and surveys with inhabitants of the six villages, as well as interviews with staff from organisations and other key actors in the areas.

Chapter 7 analyses the humanitarian arena in Huíla province through past and current practices of various aid actors. The chapter starts with an historical overview of aid interventions in Angola. It then identifies the diversity of actors that were part of the humanitarian arena historically and currently operating in Lubango and Huíla province, to analyse their activities and approaches to relief, recovery and development. From analyses of interviews, observations in the field and offices and written information, a picture of the history of humanitarian aid in the province, its changing discourse, practice and policy over time emerged. In 2007 most of the national and international humanitarian organisations closed their offices in Lubango; this has not been followed by a surge of developmental organisations coming in. This chapter explores the various reasons for this phenomenon, how organisations and their staff struggled with the decision to stay or go, and what they have left behind institutionally and programmatically through their partnerships with local organisations. This is illustrated by a comparison between two Dutch organizations, one with a humanitarian and the other with a development mandate. The comparison shows that despite the different approaches used, not just programmatically but also in terms of partnerships, their organizational decision-making and exit strategies have not been informed by different mandates *per sé*.

Chapter 8 discusses the challenges in post-war Angolan society as they were identified in 2002 and compares them to the rehabilitation and recovery efforts from the Angolan state, aid agencies and people themselves that ensued afterwards. The chapter focuses on the so-called transition period after the conflict ended in 2002, from the perspective of rebuilding rural livelihoods. This transition period is analysed by looking at people's opportunities, constraints and efforts to rebuild their lives in rural settings as well as the state agencies and NGO responses to these efforts. The chapter starts with an analysis of the goals that were set for rural rehabilitation and whether those goals have been achieved when zooming in on the current state of the recovery of rural livelihoods. From the interviews with state and aid agencies as well as beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of these reconstruction efforts in rural Huíla, a picture emerges of a quite uniform approach to rebuilding rural livelihoods. In this chapter I argue that although conflict and displacement have had significant effects on the livelihoods choices people make, state and aid agencies

sometimes unwittingly limit or redirect the livelihood options by choosing a uniform and simplified approach to rural livelihood recovery: seeds and tools programs. The chapter analyses the differences in livelihood options by conceptualizing livelihood recovery through three pillars: externally driven, state recovery and self recovery.

Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter of the thesis, analysing the information from the previous chapters, and providing answers to the research questions put forward in chapter 1 on the intended and unintended outcomes of humanitarian aid on rural livelihoods in Huíla province, Angola. The chapter underlines the importance of understanding how people survive during crisis, which livelihood strategies they deploy, and how both aid interventions and processes of state reconstruction actually support or hinder these efforts in practice. Specifically it argues that in the context of Linking Relief to Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) processes, such a process in Angola has been left unfinished. By following this process and the outcomes on livelihoods when LRRD is stopped halfway and lacks follow up, this thesis questions the conditions under which livelihood recovery interventions should be started if long-term goals and objectives cannot be reached.





## 2. Conceptual framework

**Introduction**  
**Humanitarian aid**  
**Livelihoods**  
**Conclusions**

### Introduction

This chapter gives an overview of the theory and debates around the concepts that are central to this research. The chapter will present the way theories, policies and practice of humanitarian aid have changed over time, gradually encompassing more than the life-saving activities it had started out with. I will argue that although humanitarian and development aid in theory and policy terms are presented as being disconnected, the everyday organizational discourses and practices often do not follow this separation at all. In this chapter I will also argue for studying humanitarianism in line with what Hilhorst and Jansen (2010) have called the ‘humanitarian arena’, which is based more on an empirically-based understanding of the outcomes of humanitarian interventions through the interplay of various actors, rather than a normative framework of principled action.

Improving people’s livelihoods is a popular but complex objective for many aid actors, especially those who try to apply linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development. A livelihood can be understood as the way an individual or household makes a living through the assets (material and immaterial), activities and access to these assets and activities (Ellis 2000a). In order to make interventions on livelihoods more manageable, livelihood approaches and tools have been developed which try to define assets in ‘capitals’ (such as social, human and natural capitals) that need to be addressed. These policy constructs do not always take into account the changing and non-linear nature of livelihoods, nor do they capture the complexity and diversity of ways in which people make a living in times of crises. People’s own capacities and initiatives in surviving crises are often deemed unsustainable when viewed from these pre-defined livelihood frameworks, and little attention is paid to the diversification strategies that people deploy. In this thesis, I argue for an improved understanding of people’s own efforts to rebuild livelihoods during and after crises, and the need for increased flexibility in responding and assisting these efforts.

### Humanitarian aid

#### *History and principles of humanitarian aid*

Humanitarianism or the ‘humanitarian impulse’ finds its roots in diverse political discourses, religion and philosophy dealing with notions of commiseration, human rights and solidarity (Weiss and Collins 2000). The notion of humanitarianism as we think of it today was first introduced by Henri Dunant in 1859, when he witnessed the battle of Solferino in Italy. He negotiated access and mobilised the local population to attend to and assist the wounded soldiers that were left behind on the battlefield. His experiences at Solferino and his belief in the need for a neutral aid organisation in war-time led to the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1864, as well as the codification of humanitarian principles during the 1864 Geneva Convention (Weiss and Collins 2000). The fundamental idea of humanitarianism that was put forward at that time was that assistance should be given

to alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Therefore, it is supposed to be purely based on existing needs and lacking any politically motivation (Hilhorst 2007).

The impulse or imperative to give assistance to people in need, was translated by the ICRC into the classic humanitarian principles underlying relief assistance: neutrality, humanity, and impartiality. The principle of humanity has been put forward by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies as “a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield....to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples” (IFRC 2001). Neutrality, one of the most debated and abandoned principles in the humanitarian field, was defined as “In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature”. And finally, the classic principle of impartiality dictates that an organisation “makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress”. Furthermore, the principle of independence states that the ICRC should maintain its autonomy in relation to its donors (Hilhorst and Jansen forthcoming). Humanitarian principles lean heavily on the idea of non-interference in war and politics, and especially neutrality and independence were seen as essential to give ICRC the protected status to work in situations of war as was agreed under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (Leader 2000, Hilhorst and Jansen forthcoming). IHL consists of the human rights law as stipulated in the Geneva and Hague conventions at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and described the need for protecting civilians during armed conflict (Kleinfeld 2007).

Increasingly, humanitarianism and humanitarian principles have come under fire, especially regarding the underlying notions of non-interference and aid being apolitical. The applicability of principles has been questioned by the changing nature of contemporary conflicts, the contexts in which humanitarian agencies operate and the increasing number of agencies (Leader 2000). Humanitarian aid has become a tool for donors and the international community to reach certain political objectives, a process that started during the Cold War and gained prominence after the 9/11 attacks where aid was seen as a contribution to counter-terrorism efforts (Harmer and Macrae 2004, 4). The principle of neutrality had slowly been abandoned by agencies, realizing that aid always gives advantage to either warring party during conflict, and giving agencies space to address issues of injustice (Slim 1997). However, after the increasing use of aid as a tool in wars such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, agencies were advocating a return to neutrality as a basic guiding principle in humanitarianism (Hilhorst and Jansen forthcoming). The principle of impartiality would work if agencies accept the conclusion that they need to withdraw when belligerents violate that principle, yet NGOs very rarely decide to not enter or withdraw if this principle is violated (de Waal 1997). The principle of humanity has seen less debate than the first two principles, although interpretations amongst organisations have differed ranging from material provision of aid alone, to dictating the non-negotiability of aid in war (Slim 1997). This moral positioning of agencies through principled action happens mostly to clarify its distinct role in contemporary wars. The position has become increasingly blurred by international military operations that were legitimized using the language of humanitarian needs. One example of this is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) bombing of Kosovo which was presented as a humanitarian intervention (Hilhorst 2002). The military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that often take place under the banner of humanitarian aid,

add to these complications in understanding what is humanitarianism and what is not.<sup>5</sup> Critics feel that these increased linkages between the military and humanitarians has made aid workers more vulnerable to violence due to being perceived as political actors in conflicts themselves (Stoddard, Harmer and Haver 2006, 3).

Leader (2000) challenges the universal character of these principles as a historical compromise between political-military realities and the concept of humanity. “What are now commonly referred to as ‘humanitarian principles’, notions such as neutrality and impartiality, were in fact only the conditions imposed on humanitarian agencies by the military elites of states in return for respecting which agencies would be allowed to operate” (Leader 2000, 12). He therefore argues that these principles should be continuously re-assessed when applied in new contexts to understand how they gain meaning in specific situations and by different actors.

The humanitarian world is shaped by different policies and standards on what entails good practice of humanitarianism. In 1994 the Code of Conduct was introduced by the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and the ICRC in response to criticism on issues of fundraising and programming in the relief efforts in Sudan at the end of the 1980s (Gostelow 1999). A need for a more practical application of the Code of Conduct, a growing fear amongst NGOs for external regulation, as well as different agencies’ efforts on developing operational standards, together led to the Sphere project (The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response) in 1998 (Walker and Purdin 2004). These documents not only list the principles that humanitarians should aim for in their policy and practice, it further sets minimum standards for humanitarian practice with reference to building on local capacities, participation of the target groups, specific vulnerabilities, etc. The Code of Conduct and Sphere have been intended to enhance effectiveness, quality and accountability in aid response (Gostelow 1999, Walker and Purdin 2004). Furthermore, the Sphere project has attempted to link a rights-based approach to the minimum standards, directing more attention to the rights and dignity of the people that receive aid, instead of viewing humanitarian aid purely from the supply side of the aid agencies (Walker and Purdin 2004, 110). As such it has attempted to incorporate a more distinctive view on the efforts and capacities of people themselves. Although the Code of Conduct and Sphere provide principles and standards, they are not organisational guidelines. They are in fact the practical translation of the normative framework of humanitarian principles, which only gain meaning through the everyday application by aid actors.

#### *From Classic to Developmental Relief: the LRRD debate*

‘Classic’ humanitarian aid in practice consists of actions and interventions geared at saving lives and assisting people in need, acute needs that are followed by conflict as well as natural hazards, such as floods, droughts, earthquakes, etc. Although humanitarian aid is originally intended to provide short-term relief, over the last decade’s agencies are confronted with the need to look at strategies for long-term presence and interventions due to the changing nature of crises and conflict (Russo et al. 2008). In recent years we have seen humanitarian agencies shifting their mandates from “relieving immediate human suffering” to taking on more development oriented tasks. Where relief in its basic form is concerned with saving lives through provision of goods and basic services, and giving protection to affected populations,

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<sup>5</sup> New forms of linking reconstruction with military operations under the banner of humanitarianism, like for instance Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), further complicate the position and work of relief agencies within international political and military settings. CIMIC operations are on the rise, where militaries do short humanitarian and development projects to “win the hearts and minds” of the civilians involved, to create acceptance for the military part of their operations.

“development connotes peace, justice, social equity and the absence of, or at least a declining trend in, ignorance, disease and poverty” (Smillie 1998, xx). According to Duffield (2000, 101), “During the Cold War, relief and development were usually considered as separate activities. The former related to short-term help to allow societies to overcome temporary external shocks, such as, droughts or floods. The latter concerned long-term assistance to help societies modernise their infrastructures and economies”.<sup>6</sup>

In the 1990s aid actors increasingly came to the realization that the sharp distinction between humanitarian and development aid was no longer helpful or needed in dealing with primarily natural disasters as well as the complex emergencies and protracted crises that agencies were faced with (Harmer and Macrae 2004, Russo et al. 2008, Duffield 2000). The African food crises in the 1980s led to a gradual shift towards prevention through linking relief to development (LRD) strategies (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 2005, Christoplos 2006). An understanding of these types of complex emergencies as not just short disruptions of normality, but rather deeply rooted and enduring social and political crises, demanded different responses from the aid community (Duffield 1994a, White and Cliffe 2000). The linkage discourse was taken on board by the UN in 1991 where relief activities were considered in support of recovery and development efforts (White and Cliffe 2000, 316). The term ‘relief to development continuum’ was coined by the UN to reveal this need for complementing the short-term approaches by humanitarian agencies with the long-term activities of development organisations for more effective interventions that benefitted societies on the long term. The rationale was that development aid could reduce the vulnerability of people to natural hazards and prevent future conflict, whereas humanitarian aid could provide the groundwork for future development interventions, as ‘a springboard for recovery’ (Harmer and Macrae 2004). The initial ideas on linking and the ‘continuum’ were followed during the 1990s by a proliferation of literature on how these two aid styles could be more complementary to each other and much debate amongst both humanitarian and development agencies as to how to deal with this changing reality in policy and practice. The idea of a continuum was quickly replaced by the notion of a relief to development contiguuum instead, which acknowledged that societies in crisis do not tend to follow these phases back to ‘normality’ in sequence, but these rather happen simultaneously and overlap (Russo et al. 2008, Duffield 2000, Christoplos 2006).

The concept of rehabilitation was introduced to term the grey space and processes between relief and development, as criticisms were increasing over the supposed gap between the two distinct approaches, rather than the bridge that had been intended (Longley et al 2006, Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 2005). The approach is called Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). Rehabilitation was intended to guide socio-economic changes and to be used as risk reduction mechanism, for instance by promoting better land-management and agricultural systems (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 2005, Christoplos 2006). Post-conflict rehabilitation requires a shared vision among relevant stakeholders like state, people, private sector and civil society and is not a matter of simply rebuilding the country to pre-war conditions; of going back to ‘normality’ (Christoplos 1998, Pacheco 2002, Hilhorst 2007, Bakewell 2000, Barakat 2005). As this is usually a long process in which few quick fixes exist, this places considerable strain on the role and mandates of humanitarian organizations who become involved in LRRD approaches.

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<sup>6</sup> In these definitions of humanitarian versus development by Duffield (2000), the emphasis on development aid concerning mostly infrastructure and economies seems somewhat incomplete. One of the most profound differences between the two approaches is certainly the degree of engagement with local and state institutions in order to fulfil the set objectives of aid programmes. Also, it denies the role development aid on social processes and change.

Much criticism on linking and continuum thinking was aimed at the fear that humanitarian core principles would be eroded by the increased push towards developmentalist thinking (White and Cliffe 2000). Duffield (1994a) in his critique on the LRRD saw the roots of the debate as following:

“The linking debate is primarily an argument over resources, a defensive move by an institutional interest which fears for the object of its existence: stable societies that can sustain socioeconomic improvement. The shift in aid flow towards emergency spending has accentuated this crisis. Developmentalists have been forced to argue their centrality in a space that, in the past, was willingly abandoned to relief” (Duffield 1994a, 41).

In his view humanitarian and developmentalists were claiming their space in the aid arena, and LRRD was a means to ensure their co-existence. Furthermore, LRRD was considered to approach the strengthening of local capacities and civil society in conflict settings in the same way as in natural disaster sites, neglecting complex political contexts. “As with a natural disaster, civil society is thought of as having no self-interest or agency. In relation to internal war, this is a big assumption” (Duffield 2000, 103). Although the literature and debate on LRRD continued, and received a new impulse after the 9/11 attacks in New York where the linkages between aid, security and political context were brought on board, LRRD practice has been slow to follow (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 2005). “The bottom line - how aid funding is made available – is often most revealing of the extent to which brave policy statements on LRRD have actually been translated into practice” (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri 2005, 36).

In order to understand how relief, rehabilitation and development practices differ analytically and in practice, I present a table in which these concepts are distinguished by its main characteristics. This is not to deny the many grey areas in between these concepts as well as the fact that aid activities can take on aspects of all three approaches simultaneously. The characteristics of these phases and interventions presented here apply to the rural livelihood domain.

Figure 1: Ideal-typical dimensions of relief, rehabilitation and development phases and interventions<sup>7</sup>

	<b>Relief</b>	<b>Rehabilitation</b>	<b>Development</b>
<b>What people do</b>	- (Forced) migration - Sell assets - Deploy further survival/coping strategies	- Resettle to areas of origin - Reconnect to physical and social environment - Recover assets and activities	- Obtain employment - Sustain future and durable livelihood strategies
<b>Intervention characteristics</b>	- Short-term - Top-down - Distribution of material and logistics	- Introducing participatory elements - Physical reconstruction	- Long-term impact and socio-economic change - Underlying processes
<b>Objectives of interventions</b>	Survival	Rebuilding livelihoods	Economic growth

<sup>7</sup> This table partly builds on the dimensions of relief and sustainable development, as presented by Frerks, Hilhorst and Moreyra (1999, 32).

<b>Beneficiary focus</b>	Individuals/households	Households/villages/society	Villages/society
<b>Engagement with state</b>	Taking over basic service delivery	Integrating services with government institutions	Long-term integration with state plans
<b>Underlying assumptions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-No local capacity</li> <li>-Undesirability of coping strategies</li> <li>-People have no assets left</li> <li>-Markets have stopped functioning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Dependency syndrome</li> <li>-Assets base is restricted</li> <li>-Agricultural production as key to livelihood recovery and development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Need for socio-economic and institutional reforms</li> <li>-Strong state engagement</li> </ul>

One of the main differences between these approaches is that relief tends to focus on addressing individual vulnerabilities, whereas on the other end of the spectrum aid is aimed at society in general, with a strong focus on markets and engagement with state institutions and efforts. This follows from the aim of development aid for more sustainability and institutionalization of the implemented projects due to their long-term nature and objectives. Along the way, moving from the individual to household, village and finally society level, requires great adaptation and deliberation as to how inclusive the interventions get and to what extent the state becomes a partner in the process rather than a potential danger to the humanitarian principles of relief organizations.

Another related problem with LRRD is that the concept implies that a process is being started which will lead to a clear finish, namely sustainable development and a return to the situation prior to crisis. Firstly, underlying causes of conflict often are entrenched in exactly those political and economic features of a pre-conflict period (Frerks 2004, 170). Secondly, there is no guarantee that the groundwork laid down by relief and rehabilitation efforts will actually be followed by development. Funding may simply run out, or other emergencies demand the attention of organisations to be focused elsewhere, the state itself may prioritize other matters in the meantime. This means that the process might be stopped halfway. It therefore can be questioned whether it is useful to start developing 'linking' activities when there is no clarity on whether those efforts will either be integrated locally, incorporated within state institutions, or taken over by other agencies more equipped to deal with developmental approaches. Practice has often shown that long-term impact assessments do not take place, even if the interventions started in the relief phase extend well into the development phase (Levine and Chastre 2004). Furthermore, there is danger that relief intervention logics are maintained far beyond emergency situations (Hilhorst and van Leeuwen 2004, 189). Also, needs might be extrapolated from the relief phase, which then inform future intervention directions in the rehabilitation and development phase. This will deny the efforts and activities that people themselves develop, and the changing needs for their future strategies.

The decision to start more developmental relief projects requires deliberation on the part of humanitarian organisations about what this entails with reference to their status, organisational capacity and practice. Although on paper humanitarian and development aid seem to be more complementary and intertwined, the dichotomy still exists in the organising practices around the two approaches. Levine and Chastre (2004) show that for instance funding modalities do separate clearly between the two, making some interventions on the LRRD spectrum simply impossible for lack of funding. In terms of the financial and administrative organisation of humanitarian aid, not much has changed in the sharp separation between relief and development. Funding of humanitarian aid projects happens on

the basis of an assumption of short-term engagement, with an exception in situations of chronic food insecurity (Hilhorst 2007). In reality, humanitarian agencies increasingly end up implementing their programmes in countries for years, especially when faced with situations of protracted crises. Still, the largest percentage of humanitarian aid interventions focuses mostly on the following terrains: food aid, access to safe water, rehabilitation of health and sanitation facilities. The volume of relief aid budgets has increased rapidly during the last few decades, growing from 680 million USD (OECD, excluding food aid) in 1980 to 2.7 billion USD in 1996, signifying the increasingly protracted nature of crises around the world (Macrae 1999).

Calls for LRRD approaches have increased due to the changing situations in which aid organisations find themselves. Development organisations are faced with natural hazards and outbursts of conflict in the areas they are working in, and complex emergencies and the increasingly extended nature of humanitarian crisis call for prolonged and diversified presence of humanitarian agencies. Although a sharp separation between relief and development is no longer a reality, and rather unwanted in my view, seeking and implementing linkages in practice poses considerable challenges to aid organisations. It requires organizational adaptation and consideration of the possibilities and limitations of such a new approach. Stronger engagement with state and local institutions is necessary when sustainability is the objective, yet countries in crisis often suffer from institutional weakening, making it difficult to implement more structural measures (Frerks 2004, 171). It demands a different mind-set amongst the staff, and a different way of viewing projects and programs. Instead of focusing on individuals and their vulnerabilities, deeply rooted economic, institutional and political processes in society need to be addressed. LRRD processes need long-term commitment which in the changing world of aid policy can never really be ensured. What happens to LRRD processes when they are abandoned prematurely? In this research LRRD activities have been analysed to understand how they complement people's own efforts and strategies, and to see the difficulties in starting rehabilitation and development activities which have no guarantee of reaching a desired status of (sustainable) development.

#### *LRRD and assumption on communities*

What is apparent in the LRRD phases is the slow shift from a focus on the individual to society. The idea of community as a reference point for interventions that are considered to be more inclusive, becomes apparent in organizational discourses on Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction, Community-Based Disaster Management, Community-Based Reconstruction, etc. They rely on the assumption that, even in times of prolonged political crises, communities as islands of self-help and strong networks continue to exist and function, and where community-based interventions will thus benefit all. In this paragraph I would like to challenge this powerful discourse on community, and especially its applicability in the Angolan context.

In sociological research the concept of community as a unit of social organization is often central but at the same time is highly problematic in theoretical as well as practical perspective. Community is historically used in anthropological studies to denote the particular community of the researcher in geographical terms, but throughout the social science the term community is much more about social ties, networks, structures, shared history and belonging than about its spatial limitations and boundaries (Poplin 1979). Hillery (1955, 118) asserts that "community consists of persons in social interaction within a geographic area and having one or more additional common ties". This definition does put focus on location, yet also calls attention to social interaction and common ties, thus some



level of interdependence that binds people in those specific localities. Many ethnographic studies start with a focus on one or more communities, yet it often remains unclear if they are dealing with a village or community instead. Although communities are used in (development and humanitarian) practice to define the geographical locations of “target groups”, its use in scientific terms has quite different connotations and has been approached with care. The use of the word community brings forth romantic and positive notions of a group of people that share the same beliefs and ties. In this research I want to apply a distinction in the use of village and community as being two separate things. The village in this regard is a spatially defined area in which people interact and share the same geographical space. Community on the other hand is a much more fluid collection of people that share something specific, which carries across time and space. This is, for example, closely observed in the strong ties that transnational diaspora communities have (Horst 2002).

Day (2006) in his book on the use of community as a concept in social scientific theory and research notes that the term has been highly criticized over the years, yet it always comes back in social scientific debates. He refers to this common notion of villages in the following way, “As places in which agricultural work is done, villages tend to be looked upon as long established, slow growing, close to nature, and in harmony with their environment, surely the most ‘organic’ of human contexts” (Day 2006, 40). This might be the case in some villages, it can however be questioned to what extent this also applies for a village in Angola, with a volatile history of conflict, forced displacement and migration. Such villages might not be long established but rather a result of a sudden or gradual process of displacement of internal refugees, returnees, and labour migration. All communities are differentiated in terms of age, gender, needs, interests, power and economic positions. Furthermore, community also entails conflict and divisions as well as mutual interests to some degree (Day 2006).

Crehan (1997, 10) in her study of two villages in Rural Zambia addresses the issue of community in the following way: “Rather than seeing Kibala and Bukama as two distinct communities, it may be better to think of the people of Kibala and Bukama as caught up in a whole range of different but entangled collectivities or communities, all of which were themselves socially differentiated, and which impacted on one another in complicated ways”. She therefore does not attempt to do a community study of these two villages but rather to show the inhabitants of those two villages as having all forms of interrelationships, themselves constituting small communities within the spatial localities.

The fieldwork for this research has taken place in six selected villages in the province of Huila. Within the villages one might see people belonging to different communities, for instance through political affiliation, ethnicity, family ties, shared histories of displacement. Therefore, I use both concepts in which “village” points at the geographical collection of people, and “community” entails the various forms in which people are socially and historically connected with each other. The villages were selected on the basis of geographical boundaries, and their histories in terms of humanitarian interventions. The people living in the villages did not have similar shared experiences of war, of interventions, of livelihoods and of labelling. They have different life histories and backgrounds, are positioned differently to the social institutions and networks affecting the intra-village power relations, and have different livelihood practices. They do not constitute a historically bound community, due to (forced) migration and displacement during the war. Brinkman (2005) shows how during the wars (both war of independence as well as civil war) populations were forcefully displaced by all warring parties. She refers to it as being a war for people, in which whole villages were captured, or ‘liberated’ as parties would call it, and villagers would be placed in resettlement camps. These targeting and resettlement practices are what Brinkman (2005, 58) calls “the destruction of village life”.

Brinkman (2003, 212) offers insight into how during the Angola war categorization of people from the bush, village, and town gradually shifted and gained importance as a way of defining political identity. During the colonial period, town as a categorization had been added, next to various ways in which people in the rural areas distinguished varieties of bush and village life. With the start of the war villages were increasingly targeted, with people having to choose between fleeing to town or staying in the bush. Village life effectively came to a halt, and village as a category disappeared from discourse. During the war town and bush became the only defining categories, which had to do with the fact that towns had fallen almost completely in hands of the Portuguese and later those of the MPLA, whereas the bush was restricted to guerrillas and later on mainly the UNITA. The country was divided in terms of town and bush people, not just because of ideological affiliation but to the fact that parties cut off access from one area to another (Brinkman 2003; 2005). People were left little choice where to reside. Attempts to move into town from the bush, and vice-versa, could be seen as treachery and therefore punishable. These movements and forced displacements were differently termed by all actors, showing the different discourses around these practices but also showing the importance of the population as pawns of war. “Both parties were accused of ‘stealing’ or ‘catching’ people, civilian informants did not speak of ‘liberation’ or ‘recuperation’” (Brinkman 2005, 67). Angola’s experience of war has had a tremendous impact on rural societies, making it even more problematic to view village inhabitants as ‘a community with shared interests and social ties’. This has repercussions for aid agencies that assume the existence of these community characteristics in the design of their programmes.

### *The humanitarian arena*

When discussing policy and practice of humanitarian aid, the term humanitarian space is often used to point at some geographical, symbolic room for manoeuvring in which humanitarians can operate safely. Spearin (2001, 22) provides the following, normative, definition of humanitarian space that entails these above-mentioned elements: “a consensual environment where humanitarians could work without hindrance and follow the humanitarian ethic’s principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity”. In his article on humanitarian space, specifically highlighting Médecins Sans Frontières’ (MSF) use and conceptualization of the term humanitarian space, Robert DeChaine (2002, 362) offers the following definition: “a supposed boundless zone or zones of action in which challenges to traditional conceptions of sovereignty are made”. In his conceptualization of the term, humanitarian space refers mostly to humanitarian organisations, their room to manoeuvre, their actual physical space in which they operate and the way the humanitarian principles are applicable to the politically sensitive areas in which they operate. In the author’s observations and interpretations of MSF’s policy and practice, the concept of humanitarian space emerges in three themes: as a space for ethical and humane practice, a freedom to act, and a form of operational responsibility (DeChaine 2002). MSF ‘humanitarianize’ space, and in doing so, engage the public’s perception of humanitarianism which in turn fosters humanitarian engagement (DeChaine 2002). MSF’s formulation of humanitarian space makes it clear that this space is reserved only to humanitarian agencies, leaving aside other relevant actors that in combination influence aid interventions and outcomes, such as the state, the military, churches and aid beneficiaries. This is one of the shortcomings of the notion of a humanitarian space for which it has recently been criticized (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010). For instance, the idea that the humanitarian space is distinct and separated from political space is being challenged by the way politics are played out and intertwined with humanitarian action (Kleinfeld 2007). Studying humanitarianism through the normative framework of principled action depoliticizes aid, and is regarded as insufficient to explain the political effects and

outcomes of humanitarian assistance in societies faced with crisis (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010). Also, the role that aid recipients play in shaping the outcomes of interventions deserves more attention than the concept of humanitarian space currently allows. Therefore a new term has been introduced to encompass more the everyday realities of aid and how all the actors involved shape aid in practice: the humanitarian arena.

Humanitarian space often focuses on the important role that humanitarian principles play in intervention and negotiating processes, yet this tends to foreclose the actual dynamics of assistance processes. Hilhorst and Jansen (2010) propose that the study of humanitarian aid should be much more grounded on the basis of empirical data of how aid actually gets shaped in practice. How everyday practice of humanitarians are influenced by principles, and how these practices shape policies is well illustrated in the article by Hilhorst and Schmiemann (2002) on staff from *Médicins Sans Frontières* and their translation of humanitarian principles in everyday practices. It shows how humanitarian principles are negotiated and interpreted by the people that eventually assess their appropriateness and applicability; the actors that shape humanitarian aid in everyday practice. Therefore, humanitarian aid cannot be understood by merely looking at the formulation of humanitarian principles as core to all its functions.

Despite all the humanitarian policies and tools, the practical implementation of humanitarian work is ultimately dependent on the people that work in the field, and the way they translate these policies into their own mind-set. Policies are influenced by the people that implement those policies in practice and the way in which they interpret, define and give meaning to them. Policies are not pre-formulated conditions with fixed outcomes that are non-adaptable to the local realities they are implemented in. Rather, they depend partly on the people who have to implement them. In this research humanitarian NGOs are not viewed as set structures but as a collection of actors who do not simply convey an assignment from head office, but rather shape and give their own meaning to their work. Hilhorst (2003) states that NGOs are processes and not solid things, thus we should rather research how “NGO-ing” is done in practice than study an NGO as an object. Actors that represent a specific group or institution do not automatically act in the interest of those groups or institutions under which label they enter into the interface (Long 1999). Therefore, NGOs, just like villages, consist of a group of multiple actors with their own interests, knowledge and power, which shape NGO practices.

For this research the study of the intended and unintended outcomes of humanitarian aid on rural livelihoods, entailed a study of the humanitarian arena in the context of Huíla province in Angola. It investigated how the different actors in the humanitarian arena negotiated and shaped humanitarian interventions in everyday practice.

“In studying humanitarian spaces as arenas our understanding of the dynamics of aid should focus on the manner in which actors engage with and respond to their surroundings. It requires a grasp of the formal dimensions of aid as much as what is happening between the lines and in informal daily interaction. By focusing on the everyday practices of aid it becomes clear how humanitarian headquarters claims to political neutrality and the application of universal normative values are negotiated through the micro-physics of power in humanitarian arenas” (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010, 1137).

The humanitarian arena does not consist of humanitarian agencies alone as it is often perceived, but rather focuses on all the actors involved in the aid arena, be it state, churches, aid beneficiaries and the military. Specific attention in studying the humanitarian space as arena is required for so called aid beneficiaries, in order to combat the prevailing idea of aid beneficiaries as passive receivers of aid. This image of beneficiaries denies the ways that

people seek and negotiate aid, using their agency to influence outcomes of aid processes (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010). By viewing humanitarian space as an arena in this research allowed for an understanding of the different actors that played a role in shaping humanitarian assistance processes, and the prominent role of local people herein. It made the investigation move away from a focus on humanitarian principles and programs as essential to aid outcomes, but rather viewing outcomes as an interplay between the life worlds of local people (beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) and the everyday practices of assistance by other actors. It is crucial to see how interventions are negotiated and evaluated amongst all the different actors, and how they fit in with actors' life worlds, experiences and knowledge on both sides, to understand how outcomes of aid interventions are shaped in everyday practices and encounters. When do aid actors consider their programmes to have been successful and when do local people consider interventions to have been successful? Based on what criteria are interventions assessed in this regards? How do these programmes get shaped in practice, and which meaning is given to them before, during and afterwards, by organisational actors as well as the people these interventions have been geared towards? This thesis will show who the different actors were that consisted of this arena over time, and how their interactions at the interface of this arena shaped the outcomes of aid on rural livelihoods in the province. Chapter 7 of this thesis is an analysis of the actors that made up the arena over the years, and explores the everyday practices and realities of aid in Hufla province.

#### *The interface between aid recipients and aid givers*

Linked to the idea of the humanitarian arena is the concept of a social interface which was introduced by Norman Long in relation to planned development interventions. The social interface was conceptualized as: "a critical point of intersection or linkage between different social systems, fields or levels of social order where structural discontinuities, based upon differences of normative value and social interest, are most likely to be found" (Long 1989b, 2). The social interface follows from the actor-oriented approach that was also introduced by Long to point at the importance of actors and their agency in explaining how planned development and social change is never a linear and external process but rather a form of negotiation between social actors that all bring in their own meanings, negotiations, desires and needs into the process (Long 1989b, Long 1992). "Aid recipients" should not be seen as merely passive objects of interventions, but as active participants in the development and change process through their individual knowledge, power and interests (Long 1992).

Furthermore, it is at these interfaces that differences in power and knowledge are also most clearly identified and understood, that explain how outcomes of interventions can be different than was conceptualized at the onset of development or humanitarian programming (Long 2004). Interface analysis is deemed to be crucial in order to understand aid interventions as transformational processes amongst the various actors, and not just a linear top-down and external intervention that is accepted without struggle or negotiation (Hebinck et al. 2001). The central idea is that policy, implementation and outcomes of interventions are not separated and linear processes, but rather are shaped in the interaction between the various actors through the meanings they give to it. "Interface analysis recognises that 'the subject' in rural change is knowledgeable and active" (Arce, 1993, 13). The interface in this sense is the symbolic space where actors meet and negotiate these interventions, transform them, and influence outcomes on the basis of their own agency. Agency is understood as "the capacity to process social experience and to devise ways of coping with life, even under the most extreme forms of coercion" (Long, 1989a, 223). Agency is a concept that directly counters the notion of aid beneficiaries as being passive bystanders to which the intervention 'happens'. They give meaning to interventions, and shape them to accommodate their own

desires and experiences. (Rural) social change does not happen to ‘them’, actors negotiate change according to their own agency. Interface analysis helps to understand these processes around interventions.

Interface analysis requires the identification of the relevant actors around a certain intervention and consequent following of the process of implementation and the struggles that emerge. Interactions at the interface can generate conflict when the interests and power relations of the actors involved diverge (Long 1999). Outcomes of these interventions and interactions ultimately depend on the different actors perspectives, how they change over time, and which room for manoeuvre they have to do that (Bakewell 2000). An example of the usage of interface analysis in research put forward by Long (1989b) shows its relevance and applicability to the research objectives presented in this thesis.

“We need to develop a sounder comparative analysis of the processes by which ‘target’ and ‘non-target’ populations respond to planned intervention. Such an analysis would aim to explore how different types of households, peasant groups and communities (including both those directly and indirectly affected) develop strategies for dealing with the new circumstances they face due to the introduction of new development initiatives, Such an approach necessarily entails contextualizing the new types of choices generated by specific interventions within the framework of the livelihood and organizational problems faced by peasants and other classes” (Long, 1989, 4).

This research has aimed to follow the relevant actors and uncover how they participated in the different interventions taking place over time, and how policy, implementation and outcomes have evolved. It also shows people’s responses to these interventions, and how these outcomes continued to be shaped after the intervention ended. In order to compare different villages that have had varying degrees of aid encounters and their outcomes on livelihoods, interface analysis is highly applicable to the research. The interface in this research thus can be conceptualized as the whole range of actors making up the humanitarian arena in Hufla province: village inhabitants, state institutions, churches, the military and NGOs, and the interventions where these actors meet and negotiate the outcomes of aid interventions.

Long (1989a) discusses in the quote above how ‘target’ and ‘non-target’ populations respond to interventions, but the decision-making process to establish who is targeted and why, as well as the effects of targeting also deserves further analysis. Usually, the start of a humanitarian programme is marked by an assessment by the humanitarian organisation and/or the local governance structures, to identify the most vulnerable population group and associated needs. This targeting of specific groups is what I refer to in this research as a labelling process. “Labelling is a way of referring to the process by which policy agendas are established and more particularly the way in which people, conceived as objects of policy are defined in convenient images” (Wood 1985, 1). Labelling theory has most often been applied to the categorization of refugees in humanitarian policy (Zetter 1991, Zetter 2007, Bakewell 2000). Labels are used for accountability towards donors and public, but also to enable developing and implementing programmes towards the most vulnerable, a more administrative purpose (Christoplos 1998). As administrative devices, they have far reaching consequences for the people that either fall inside or outside these bureaucratic labels, and tend to shape reality accordingly. “Labels do not exist in a vacuum. They are the tangible representation of policies and programmes, in which labels are not only formed but are then also transformed by bureaucratic processes which institutionalize and differentiate categories of eligibility and entitlements” (Zetter 2007, 180). In this research context one can think of a manifold of labels like: Internally Displaced Person (IDP), refugee, returnee, ex-combatant,

female-headed household. Using these labels can have consequences for people's relationships within communities (Christoplos 1998). Addressing people in terms of their perceived identities as IDP, ex-combatant or returnee might have no relation at all with the way people themselves view their identity and that of others. Bakewell (2000) shows that the Angolan population living across the border in Zambia actually did not recognize the distinction humanitarian agencies made by using the labels "refugee" or "economic migrants" to identify which group was eligible for aid and assistance. In the case of Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes ex-combatants will be labelled as a vulnerable group because of the stigmas they face within society and a loss of social networks (or social capital). Programmes aim to reintegrate them into society by offering them a stable livelihood (for instance through seeds and tools programmes and skills training). However, specifically addressing ex-combatants as target group in livelihood programmes and skills training may be perceived by the very people that were affected by the warring parties as rewarding ex-combatants for their behaviour during the conflict. Labelling people within communities can create divisions where these did not exist or were felt prior to the interventions, and therefore contribute to different perceptions on identity, belonging and society. Organisations label their clients in specific ways to be able to distinguish who are the most vulnerable groups within a specific context in order to formulate guidelines for targeted actions. Labelling is then used as an administrative device, which informs subsequent practices based on presumed needs of that particular group (Zetter 1991). Labelling practices in this case can lead to insufficient or even lacking needs assessments, as it is assumed that the labels speak for themselves. Consequently, interventions are then based on those unquestioned labels. This is exacerbated by the 'culture of speed' which is common in the humanitarian sector, but which no longer applies to many of the long-term aid interventions that some organisations are implementing (van Dijkhorst and Vonhof 2005).

The 'culture of speed' mentality also stands in the way of incorporating beneficiary participation in organizational practice (Hilhorst 2002). Although the importance of participation is acknowledged as important tool and practice that guides the formulation and implementation of aid programs, gives beneficiaries increased ownership over the aid process, as well as ensures the enhancement of aid quality, it often is neglected. The lack of incorporation of beneficiary participation is still too often blamed on the emergency situation, even though aid agencies increasingly operate in long-term and post-emergency settings (Hilhorst 2002, 205). Also, the absence of direct participation in aid programmes has more to do with issues of power and control over aid processes and outcomes than on the perceived lack of capacity on the part of beneficiaries (Bakewell 2000, 111). Bakewell (2000) convincingly raises this issue, by highlighting that although relief programmes are designed in very top-down and non-participatory ways, local people use their agency to shape the outcomes of aid programmes in ways that suits their interests best. The interface between aid givers and aid recipients is one of unequal relationships of power, in which it is up to the aid giver who 'deserves' aid by fitting into certain categorization or labels, in which needs are assumed or interpreted and not assessed, and where participation of aid beneficiaries can be mere rhetoric but not practice. However, aid beneficiaries do not passively sit around and wait for aid to be delivered and view the outcomes later, they use their agency to shape processes of aid to best suit their own aspirations.

## **Livelihoods**

This section discusses the concept of livelihood and livelihood approaches, as they have gained momentum in development and humanitarian studies over time. Increasingly,

livelihood approaches are used by humanitarian organisations, even in contexts where long term interventions and commitments that fit these approaches are difficult to realize. This section highlights some of these complexities surrounding the use of livelihood approaches by humanitarian actors.

### *Conceptualizing a livelihood*

Scientific livelihood studies, characterized by their cross-sectoral and locally grounded nature, have existed for decades, although not having been labelled as such at the time (Scoones 2009, 173). The definition of livelihood as a way to explain how people make a living existed for quite some time, and increasingly was extended to be understood as the assets and capabilities that people possessed or required to make a living (Chambers and Conway 1992, Sen 1993, Ellis 2000a, Kaag et al. 2004, de Haan 2007, Scoones 2009). The term livelihood gives attention to the non-economic dimensions such as the social institutions and relationships that determine ways of making a living, as opposed to other ways of defining income generation (Ellis 2000b, 290-291).

The household was mostly used as the social unit of analysis for livelihood studies as “the household is a site in which particularly intense social and economic interdependencies occur between a group of individuals” (Ellis 2000a, 18). The household does not necessarily entail a family in the strict sense of the word, but is a family-based unit of co-residence that share a major part of the household resources and activities (Ellis 2000a). Although the term household aims to encompass all members, the term has also been criticized for neglecting gender-based intra-household inequalities (Niehof 2004). Kaag et al. (2004) also point at the danger of excluding women and children as well as power relations from livelihood studies, as it would give a much too positive image of the livelihoods, neglecting issues of gender-based power and access to resources. Gender, understood as the socially constructed roles and relationships between men and women, influence the type of livelihood activities that men and women can deploy (Moser 1993).

Criticism on the lack of inclusion of institutions and social relations in the existing definitions, as well as increasing attention for the different type of assets and the access to these necessary for sustaining livelihoods emerged (Bebbington 1999, Ellis 2000a, de Haan 2000a). In this thesis I follow Ellis’ (2000a, 10) definition of a livelihood as comprising the assets, activities and the access to these mediated by institutions and social relations that determine the living gained by an individual or household. Although in his definition Ellis distinguished the different assets by referring to ‘capitals’ I step away from these very economics centred and pre-defined labelling of assets, because this may lead to a tendency to treat them as boxes that need to be ticked. The strength in his definition lies in stressing the importance of access, as well as the institutions and social relations that shape the access people have to the assets and activities that constitute their livelihoods. Also, a view on social relations and institutions enables power relations to be revealed which further determine access, an issue that was neglected in prior livelihood conceptualizations (Kaag et al. 2004). The way power determines access and inclusion/exclusion to livelihood opportunities and assets should, according to de Haan (2007), be studied in the institutions that surround livelihoods, as it is in those institutions where issues of power are played out most visibly (de Haan 2007).

### *Livelihood diversification*

Rural people often use livelihood diversification as a strategy to avert risks. “Rural livelihood diversification is defined as the process by which rural households construct an increasingly

diverse portfolio of activities and assets in order to survive and improve their standard of living” (Ellis 2000a, 15). Livelihoods in rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa often are assumed to centre on (subsistence) farming of just a few staple crops, and interventions geared towards supporting rural livelihoods follow this assumption. Many authors have written about the diversification of rural livelihoods (Ellis 2000a, Brons 2005, Bebbington 1999, Barrett et al. 2001) into non-farm livelihoods and they point at the need to look beyond agriculture as the main livelihood practice in rural areas. “Despite the persistent image of Africa as a continent of ‘subsistence farmers’, nonfarm sources may already account for as much as 40-45% of average household income and seems to be growing in importance” (Barrett et al. 2001, 316). Bebbington (1999) criticized the one-sided focus on agricultural viability for peasant farmers in the Andes and access to resources, without taking into account the space and use of other livelihood options. Niehof (2004) furthermore, calls attention to on-farm diversification, and uses the example of a study in rural Ethiopia that revealed that people preferred cultivating a large variety of plants which was seen as a sign of status. Also, on-farm diversification further limits the risk of dependency on just one crop, in case of unavailable or nonfunctioning markets, or a failing crop, and decreases vulnerability to crop diseases.

Risk aversion is seen as a key push factor that encourages people to diversify their livelihoods (Barrett et al. 2001). The absence of safety nets provided by governments, communities and relief agencies as well as diminishing returns on productive assets, missing or incomplete markets and coping with shocks further account for rural people’s reliance on (non-farm) income diversification (Barrett et al. 2001). Brons (2005), in his book on livelihood diversification in Burkina Faso, zooms in on the importance of non-farm activities, or supplementary activities as he calls it, for rural livelihoods. From his research it becomes clear that there is a wide variety of non-farm activities, such as beer brewing, cotton spinning and gold mining, although their contribution to the household economy is not as significant as expected and diversification is not automatically born out of risk aversion. He noted that people that were risk-averse actually had less diversified livelihoods (Brons 2005).

The level and extent of diversification also differed between men and women. In his study he states that men tended to prefer specialisation and women would prefer diversifying their livelihoods. This might be related to what Niehof (2004) notes is the gendered differences in risk attitudes which influences the choices that men and women make in taking up diverse income-generating activities. Also, daily time allocation is a very important variable that influences income generation and diversification options, and this variable is particularly gender sensitive due to women’s daily responsibilities in for instance child care and the fetching of water and wood (Niehof 2004).

In addition, Brons (2005) makes a strong case for the importance of individual preferences and strategies, instead of the tendency to explain all livelihood decision making processes from a focus on the household. Diversification or specialisation in the context of Burkina Faso seems to very much be an individual preference, and is also related to gender specific needs and choices. Both household and individual strategies determine people’s livelihoods and the level of diversification.

Livelihoods are not only highly dynamic; they are also not bound to one locality. This can be seen for instance in the work by Horst (2002) who shows the global connectedness of Diaspora communities with local livelihoods in Somalia, through the sending of remittances. Labour migration also underlines that livelihoods are not bound to one single locality. Migration is another key factor of livelihood diversification (Barrett et al. 2001). Bebbington (1999) addresses the issue of (labour) migration which should not be seen as merely a survival strategy for rural people but “part of an accumulation strategy (either in the form of housing or productive investment)” (Bebbington 1999, 2027). One of the positive aspects of migration, in addition to the material and monetary returns it provides, is that it also adds to




social capital. Migration ensures the formation of extended social networks on which people can draw when pursuing their livelihoods (de Haan 2000b). Ellis (2000a) identifies 4 types of migration as a way of livelihood diversification: 1) seasonal migration (migration related to peaks in agricultural activity); 2) circular migration (temporary migration related to needs in labour); 3) permanent migration; and 4) international migration. Migration centres on remittances (according to Ellis 80-90% of migrants send remittances) and migration as a way to remove another mouth to feed from the household (Ellis 2000a). Labour migration is highly prevalent in southern Africa.

### *The emergence of the livelihood approach as a policy construct*

Following from the attention for livelihoods as a focal point in academic, policy and practice debates on poverty reduction and development strategies, livelihood approaches were formulated with an added objective of sustainability. The concept of a livelihood perspective or approach as is currently in use in development policy circles emerged in the 1990s (Ellis 2000a, Scoones 2009). Livelihood approaches in (rural) development programmes were an answer to the macro-economic approaches in the 1980s as embodied by the Structural Adjustment Programmes prevalent during that time, as they tried to explain the different aspects of livelihood practices on a micro-level (de Haan 2007). Calls for more people-centred approaches were made which included the multidimensional and micro level processes that affected poverty, rather than just focusing on the broader economic policies (Kaag et al. 2004). Development institutions have since then been trying to capture livelihood approaches in frameworks and tools. The Department for International Development (DfID) has been one of the most prominent advocates of a sustainable livelihood approach. Their conceptualization of livelihoods has become an influential policy construct over time. Their tool or framework is inserted below and emphasizes the different aspects that make up people's livelihood, functioning as entry points which can be addressed by aid interventions in poverty eradication programmes:

Figure 2: DfID's sustainable livelihoods approach



Livelihood approaches adopted by development organisations are characterised by looking at assets (material and non-material), or resources and capabilities which are present (for instance social capital, financial capital, institutional infrastructure) and incorporating these assets into a framework from which the opportunities and constraints surrounding those particular livelihoods can be explained (Bebbington 1999, Chambers and Conway, 1992). These livelihood approaches focus on people's agency instead of portraying them as mere victims, advocating a more participatory approach (Kaag et al. 2004). They also tend to be bottom-up in nature, with aid being channelled through NGOs instead of the state.

Bebbington (1999) has introduced and called specific attention to the issue of cultural capital in DfID's framework above by stating that: "Over and above the meaningfulness of a particular set of assets, then, there is a meaningfulness associated with the set of cultural practices made possible (or constrained) by the patterns of co-residence and absence linked to certain livelihood strategies" (Bebbington 1999, 2034). The concepts of cultural capital and social capital stress the non-productive assets that enable or constrain the pursuit of certain livelihoods. Although initially intended to be cross-disciplinary in nature, the livelihood tools and frameworks that were developed echoed a strong influence by economists through the inclusion of different 'capitals' and the asset pentagon (Scoones 2009, 177).

Although livelihood approaches are still in use, over the last decade its instrumental and normative application to complex realities have come under further criticism. (Scoones 2009). The above framework used by DfID (1999) has been criticized by Kaag et al. (2004) for not taking into account the complex dynamics of livelihoods, and the tendency that the approach tries to capture social reality in pre-defined schemes and diagrams. This could lead to ignoring risks, variations, opportunities and constraints that arise within livelihoods. "Indeed we advocate a conceptualisation of livelihood practices as embedded action and of livelihood as fluid, moving with changing circumstances and responding to but also influencing external conditions" (Kaag et al. 2004, 55). The fluidness of livelihoods is also further demonstrated by the importance of (seasonal) migration and remittances for (rural) households.

The perceived strength of livelihood approaches in capturing local realities has at the same time been subject of critique. "Livelihoods approaches, coming as they did from a complex disciplinary parentage that emphasized the local, have not been very good at dealing with big shifts in the state of global markets and politics. In the frameworks, these were dumped in a box labelled 'contexts'. But what happens when contexts are the most important factor, over-riding the micro-negotiations around access to assets and the finely-tuned strategies of differentiated actors" (Scoones 2009, 181). Livelihood approaches as a policy construct, through its tendency in capturing complex processes in pre-defined frameworks and tools have seemed to devalue the concept of livelihood as an analytical tool in academic studies, as if tainted. However, the value of using the concept of a livelihood in understanding and analysing the assets, activities and access that determine the way people and households make a living, is still relevant in locally grounded and cross-disciplinary academic studies.

### *Livelihoods in conflict*

People's livelihoods are affected in many ways during conflict, sometimes directly through displacement, the looting of assets by soldiers, or the inability to work on the land as it has become a direct place of fighting. They are also affected in more indirect ways by, for example, changing power relations, reduced access to markets and roads (Lautze 1997). People that are caught up in conflict not only suffer from lack of material assets, but power relations also undergo transformations during conflict that either help or hinder the pursuit of certain livelihood strategies. Refugees and IDPs get disconnected from social assets, losing

their families and networks through which they maintained their livelihoods prior to the conflict forcibly displacing them. Livelihood adaptation, diversification and de-diversification of livelihood resources takes place in times of crises, with possible detrimental effects for the future of household's livelihoods. Income sources might increase in times of stress due to diversification strategies, but this is often accompanied by the selling of assets and cashing in claims which in turn de-diversifies the household's resources (Niehof 2004). At the same time, people try to pursue those strategies and activities that they have relied on before, or venturing into other activities if the opportunities present itself. They do not lose sight of the future, nor simply wait and see what will happen or whether relief aid will reach them. "Even in the worst of disasters, decisions made by disaster-affected groups reflect an awareness of life beyond the emergency" (Lautze 1997, 6). Livelihoods are not uniformly affected during crises. Just as people's experiences with conflict are varied so are people's responses. "People's livelihood strategies depend upon a broad range of factors, including location, security regimes, the strength of local governance structures and social networks, and access to roads, markets and water. There is consequently a great deal of variability among areas, groups, and even villages and households within the same locale" (Collinson 2003, 16).

In her article on the way that refugees pursue livelihoods and their interactions with the host communities therein, Jacobson (2002) shows how refugees' goals and aims pertaining to their livelihoods differ significantly due to the situation they are facing. "Refugees' immediate goals are likely to include: physical safety from violence, the threat of violence, or intimidation; reducing economic vulnerability and food insecurity; finding a place to settle; and locating lost family members" (Jacobson 2002, 9). Assisting the livelihoods of refugees and IDPs requires a different approach by agencies than merely looking at protecting or replacing assets. It also needs to involve aspects of protection from violence, and creating a safe space to pursue livelihood strategies.

In this thesis I want to address the difference between a coping strategy and a livelihood strategy, conceptualizing certain coping strategies as a household's way to diversify the rural livelihood, making it less vulnerable to crisis and future shocks. Activities such as the collection of wild foods or intercropping are deemed coping strategies when they are employed in times of crisis, such as droughts, famines and conflict. Coping strategies are associated with short-term and risky behaviour that might compromise a household's socio-economic recovery after crisis. A livelihood strategy, on the other hand, is deemed a sustainable set of activities that do not compromise the household's ability to recover (Ellis 2000a). Labour migration during crisis is often interpreted as a coping strategy. The differences between labour migration and forced migration due to conflict can be rather artificially created based on outside assumptions. Migration in Angola might actually be perceived by humanitarian agencies as displacement, and therefore not taken into account as a way to diversify people's livelihoods. Brinkman (2005), in her book on the history of people of South-East Angola, shows the significance that labour migration played for people throughout history. Many young men had labour ties with then Northern Rhodesia or went to work in mines in Namibia and South-Africa; many women were in trade-businesses along migratory route. Other reasons for people to move from one village to another were for instance for agricultural purposes but also due to "death, disease and witchcraft" (Brinkman 2005, 29).

Many livelihood approaches and frameworks, such as the one by DfID (1999) have the objective to make livelihoods more *sustainable*, that is to increase the ability to recover from and cope with (external) shocks, while at the same time maintaining and/or enhancing the capabilities and assets (Chambers and Conway 1992, Niehof 2004). Schafer (2002) has pointed at some difficulties within the livelihoods approach when it is implemented in

situations of conflict, especially regarding the issue of sustainability. For instance, how can a livelihood be sustainable when people rely on humanitarian aid? Jacobson (2002) therefore makes the case for a “livelihood in conflict” approach that instead of focussing on sustainability, looks at ways to reduce people’s vulnerability and risk: “In communities facing conflict and displacement, livelihoods comprise how people access and mobilize resources enabling them to increase their economic security, thereby reducing the vulnerability created and exacerbated by conflict, and how they pursue goals necessary for survival and possible return” (Jacobson 2002, 99).

#### *Rural livelihoods and the war economy*

Not all livelihoods are negatively affected in times of war. The political economy of war approach calls attention to how some people benefit from war, and therefore have an active gain in maintaining the war economy. The political economy of war approach requires the analysis of the production and distribution of power, wealth and destitution during war, to capture the motivation and responsibility of those involved from a historical perspective (leBillon 2000b). Perpetuation of the war economy through conflict and violence can sustain certain people’s economic profits and power, thus creating a major incentive for continuation of conflict (leBillon 2000a, 2000b and 2001). War economies are linked to wider global networks of drugs, arms, resource and human trafficking, yet also appear in the normal everyday economic activities that people develop in times of war (Hilhorst 2007). War profits are not just gained by the warlords, but also on a much smaller scale by people that are trying to sustain themselves and their families during war by for instance trading their agricultural produce with soldiers and rebels. This feature of economies in conflict can also be termed the ‘economy of survival’ (Hilhorst 2007).

Nordstrom (2004) refers to the extra-state economy that becomes most visible in societies dealing with war as the ‘shadows’: “the complex sets of cross-state economic and political linkages that move outside formally recognized state-based channels” (Nordstrom 2004, 106). These linkages demonstrate itself in various forms; from a network of arms smugglers to a street child vending illegal cigarettes. Whereas leBillon (2000b and 2001) uses the political economy of war approach to call attention to the power struggles around resources that sustain and prolong wars, Nordstrom (2004) demonstrates how the political economy of war is applicable to all economic layers of societies in conflict. It does not only concern the big businessmen that make huge profits from supplying rebels groups with necessary arms to continue waging war, as it is just as much about the people trying to survive on a daily basis by trading in goods that might be acquired through illegal channels. They are all part of international networks that in some way or the other gain power and economic profits through the war economy.

Collinson (2003) draws attention to the coping or survival economy, from a political economy of conflict perspective on rural livelihoods. This explains the more micro-dynamics and localized effects of the war or shadow economy, in that it views issues of power and wealth in conflict from the perspective of rural people and the way they cope with the increased risk to their livelihoods in times of crises. She addresses examples of villages where subsistence agriculture might be complemented by smuggling or poppy cultivation as a way to spread risk and diversify their livelihoods, as well as the localized effects of a coping strategy of Coltan mining in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which affected agricultural productivity and increased food insecurity in the region (Collinson 2003, 15). The political economy approach is helpful in understanding these localized effects of conflict on livelihoods and increased occurrence of illegal activities.

Political and social exclusion are factors that undermine certain livelihood strategies and increase vulnerability (Collinson 2003). For instance, how does (perceived) political and social identity determine people's access to aid? In this research political and social exclusion, but also processes of inclusion are analysed to understand how people's livelihood opportunities have been constrained or enhanced, and how this also determined people's access to assistance during and after conflict.

### *Livelihood interventions in humanitarian aid*

Humanitarian agencies tend to approach supporting livelihoods very different from their development colleagues. Development organisations usually try to support livelihoods on the basis of what people do themselves, and make small interventions to complement these efforts. Humanitarian organisations on the other hand tend to distribute assets on a large scale, due to the supply-side bias of the humanitarian sector (Christoplos 2006). Jacobson (2002) identifies two ways in which humanitarian agencies affect people's livelihoods. First, there are the formal livelihood programmes ranging from the obvious income-generating programmes to restoring food security, education, health and sanitation services (Jaspars and Maxwell 2009). Second, informally agencies impact people's livelihoods by the aid they provide which often is traded within communities and camps, as well as the jobs that agencies offer to people like for instance assisting in the logistics of a refugee camp. Whereas the first type of interventions is aimed at livelihoods directly, the second type offers more indirect, unintended and possibly very significant consequences for people's livelihoods. In this research consequences of both these direct and indirect effects of aid are analysed.

Jaspars and Maxwell (2009) identify three objectives of these direct interventions on livelihoods in situations of conflict and protracted crises. First they talk about *livelihood provision*, in which agencies try to meet the basic pressing needs of populations, where interventions are mostly consisting of food aid. Examples of these interventions also include cash transfers and food for work schemes. Second, *livelihood protection* is used as a way to protect or recover assets that people need to be able to continue with their livelihoods (examples are: diversifying livelihood opportunities, recovery of livestock and agricultural inputs). The last objective is called *livelihood promotion*, where the aims are focused on supporting institutions, people's access and rights to land, and skills training (Jaspars and Maxwell 2009). In these three objectives a certain chronology or contextual analysis can be noted. Not all of these objectives can be aimed for in the same contexts and at the same stage in times of crisis. "Whilst in the first stages of conflict, the focus of interventions might be livelihoods provisioning, during protracted conflict it may be possible to incorporate elements of livelihood promotion. This will depend on the severity of the crisis, and must not compromise the principle of meeting immediate humanitarian needs first. It should be noted that livelihood promotion in this case is unlikely to lead to sustainable livelihoods, but rather attempts to address the constraints people face in carrying out their livelihood strategies, thereby helping to meet basic needs (Jaspars and Maxwell 2009, 9)".

Often relief agencies see livelihood assistance as a way to increase food security in the region of intervention, thereby reducing people's reliance on food aid. This type of reasoning makes subsistence farming seem to be the most appropriate livelihood option for interventions; subsistence agriculture leads to household food production, therefore decreasing the necessity for reliance on food aid, and any possible surplus can be sold (Levine and Chastre 2004). The singular focus on food production as a livelihood intervention in rural areas is also related to the institutional gaps between government and research institutions, and NGOs in dealing with rural livelihoods. Barrett et al. (2001) describe this gap as follows: "Being nonfarm means that agricultural researchers and policy

institutions do not usually believe that it is in their 'mandate'. Being rural, informal, and usually small-scale means that those involved in industry and employment policies and research usually eschew it for urban, medium-large scale, and formal enterprises" (Barrett et al. 2001, 327). Seeds and tools distribution tends to be the most popular intervention for various reasons; amongst others it produces tangible results to satisfy the needs of donors, seed companies profit from this intervention and will use their influence to ensure its continuation, seeds and tools project are manageable to agencies and make good publicity, etc. (Levine and Chastre 2004). Relief programs for livelihood support continue to rely on pre-set assumptions of the aid beneficiaries that influence these standard-package solutions (Christoplos 2006).

Longley et al. (2006) have noted that very often livelihood interventions by humanitarian agencies are focused primarily on the distribution of seeds and tools, without analysing the further context of the farmer (maybe the farmer already has seeds, poor quality of provided seeds, etc.), and without taking into account broader livelihood practices than just agriculture. Utas (2005) gives a striking example of an aid agencies' skills training programme for the reintegration of ex-combatants in Liberia which, maladjusted to the particular rural context, actually increased the urbanization amongst these unemployed youth. This example, together with the examples mentioned above on a too rigid look at agricultural interventions as main option for supporting rural livelihoods, uncovers the uniform and quick-fix thinking in humanitarian interventions on livelihoods, and the unintended outcomes they can have.

Reality however has changed for organisations, which see their work increasingly expanding into longer periods of time, from relief to recovery and rehabilitation. As mentioned before, livelihood programmes fit neatly into this agencies' space shifting from relief to development. As far as livelihood programmes are concerned there are some clear examples of the differentiated view on what is helpful to men and what is helpful to women. The evaluation of the humanitarian response to the Tsunami disaster of 2004 has uncovered some of these striking examples. Livelihood approaches during the Tsunami response focused on restoring lost assets, but did not take into account the rehabilitation of trade and markets, which are primarily the work domains of women (Christoplos 2006). Women were given more stereotypical livelihood training, and perceived those trainings as more psycho-social activities than efforts to restore their livelihoods (van Dijkhorst and Vonhof 2005). Fithen and Richards (2005) in their chapter on demobilisation of rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF) fighters in Sierra Leone, also noted this gender-biased approach, in which young women that joined the RUF were not represented in demobilisation and reintegration programmes. This has various reasons, one of which was that these women did not let themselves be registered as ex-combatant out of fear of further stigmatization in society. Therefore they were largely left out of programmes aimed at livelihoods and skills training as a way to reintegrate ex-combatants into society. The research in Angola will take gender into account by looking at the different livelihood practices of both men and women and the way humanitarian aid has incorporated gender into their programmes.

Humanitarian interventions that do not have a specific and direct livelihood aim can still have unintended consequences for people's livelihoods as identified by Jacobson (2002). This was captured well by Anderson (1999) who advocated the 'Do no Harm' approach amongst aid workers to reflect on these unintended and negative effects of aid. It showed how external aid can reinforce and exacerbate conflict, and how it in some instances actually did harm instead of good to local economies and livelihoods. Amongst others she highlights that aid can reinforce market distortions, production and trading patterns when the distributed goods that are imported instead of procured locally (Anderson 1999, 42-43). In this way aid enters in direct competition with local producers and traders. Especially during the 1980s and

1990s examples of negative side-effects of relief aid were being brought to the forefront, indicating how relief aid was undermining local markets and local capacities, making people dependent on aid, as well as actually prolonging conflict (Macrae 1998, Hilhorst 2007, de Waal 1989, Harrell-Bond 1986). This was the case in Rwanda, where relief organisations were accused of not only feeding the militias that were responsible for the 1994 genocide enabling them to regroup in the refugee camps, but also placing them in places of power within the administrative structures of the camp from where they could further exert power over the refugees fleeing from the terror these militias had caused in the first place (Middleton and O'Keefe 1998, de Waal 1997). Criticism on especially food aid (especially in bilateral aid relations) also revolved around its use as political instrument by attaching certain conditions to the receipt of aid, and the dumping of agricultural surplus by some donor governments (Devereux 1993). Middleton and O'Keefe (1998) give a striking example of this point in the case of Somalia. The delivery of food aid by the UN as a response to the famine of 1991-1992 that hit Somalia had negative consequences for local food production. This local production had just resumed and was beginning to reach local markets again when the UN's food aid distribution flooded these markets with cheap food, undermining people's ability to resume their livelihoods (Middleton and O'Keefe 1998). In conclusion, humanitarian aid in practice has intended and unintended consequences for people's livelihoods, and this research has analysed these possible outcomes of aid interventions.

## **Conclusions**

This research starts from the life worlds of people to see how they cope and respond to crises by adapting their livelihoods accordingly. Livelihoods comprise the assets and activities that people employ to make a living, and the access to these (Ellis 2000a). Livelihoods change profoundly during conflict, in both positive as well as negative ways. People get stripped of their assets through forcibly selling them, looting and displacement. The political economy of war approach highlights that in time of crises not all livelihoods are affected negatively, people profit from instability. Processes of political and social exclusion and inclusion determine livelihood outcomes as well, and the access to assistance. Aid is one of the many strategies that people rely on for their survival in times of crisis.

This chapter started with a historical overview of the emergence of humanitarian aid, its principles and practice. Furthermore, humanitarian practice has changed due to the more protracted nature of the crisis situations it operates in, making aid more long-term in nature. This has consequences on many terrains, as it requires different approaches that incorporate more development aims and practices, which poses many challenges. I have argued that strong engagement with the state, a shift from a focus on individuals to society, and the uncertainty of being able to finish the job demands extensive analyses, flexibility and consideration on the part of aid agencies that engage in relief to development linkages.

I have argued that studying humanitarian aid through the normative framework of principles is not sufficient to understand its practice and outcomes since it neither gives attention to the multitude of actors that actually shape aid nor explains how outcomes are shaped through the interaction of these actors in everyday practice. The concept of a social interface in which actors meet and negotiate the outcomes of interventions through their own agency, is elaborated to show the symbolic space where aid agencies and beneficiaries meet and where the outcomes of aid are shaped. It is at the interface where people's own livelihood efforts meet the policy and intervention constructs of aid. In this research I have analysed how these fit together or mismatch, and what the consequences are of these processes.

### **3. The history and experiences of conflict in Angola**

#### **Introduction**

#### **History of the Angolan war**

#### **A political economy and socio-institutional approach to Angola's war**

#### **Multiple realities of the Angolan conflict**

#### **Conclusion**

#### **Introduction**

Angola has lived through a long history of violence. Much of the literature on the conflict history focuses on the civil war that followed independence from the Portuguese in 1975. The civil conflict was dominated by fighting between MPLA and UNITA for control of the country, and ended in 2002 with the death of UNITA's leader, Savimbi. During the post-independence war, the country underwent rapid and profound social change. The different stages of the conflict were accompanied by new waves of population displacement, both internally and across borders, resulting in a multiplicity of humanitarian needs. In the post-conflict period, the legacy of the war remains an important part of Angola's socio-economic situation. It has resulted in the erosion of the economy, infrastructure, basic services and institutional capacity. People's human and physical security continues to be threatened by high levels of poverty and vulnerability, fragile livelihoods, and factors such as the presence of landmines. This chapter looks at the history and experiences of conflict in Angola. It explores different aspects including the main actors in the conflict, the motivations and root causes, as well as its effects. Furthermore, the chapter intends to shed light on how such perceptions of the Angolan conflict informed the response of the international community to the war, in terms of conflict-resolution, the humanitarian response and post-conflict reconstruction. This chapter is based on a preliminary analysis of the history of conflict in Angola, carried out jointly with Maliana Serrano. The text has been adapted according to the specific analysis in each of our individual theses. The chapter consists of an analysis of the conflict dynamics, through a political economy and ethnographic lens, of the various stages of the post-colonial civil war. It draws on key literature as well as on interviews and fieldwork conducted independently in 2007 and 2008, in different parts of Huíla province. The chapter provides a review of key developments in the political life of the country, with attention to both the internal and external factors affecting the conflict. It is primarily concerned with the history of conflict after independence, but starts with a review of the late colonial period, from 1961, when the armed struggle for liberation officially began.

We argue that the Angolan conflict is the outcome of the interplay of several factors with varying relative importance over the years. We build on Richards' (2005) ethnographic approach to war which stresses the importance seeing war as a social process, by focusing on its localized and everyday realities and manifestations. We partly draw on a political economy of war approach in order to analyse the production and distribution of economic and political power in the Angolan conflict, including by international forces (Le Billon 2000b). Our analysis furthermore highlights the role of socio-cultural institutions that influence the relations of power. Through the analysis of case studies from four municipalities in Huíla province, we demonstrate the role of these institutions (and the interaction between them) in the localised dynamics of conflict and how the big politics of war have been expressed and experienced in the everyday lives of local people over the years.



## History of the Angolan war

Although we focus our analysis of the conflict on the post-independence and post-Cold war periods, we find it important to contextualise it in the broader history of violence. Events that preceded this phase were crucial in shaping the political landscape that emerged at independence and therefore in understanding the dynamics of the civil conflict (Cramer 2006, Birmingham 1997). We therefore start by giving an overview of the late period of colonial occupation, from 1961 to 1975, during which the liberation movements were formed and the armed struggle for independence intensified. The dynamics of the civil war that followed were affected by internal political developments but also by the involvement of external actors and the available resources for financing the war efforts of both factions. These played an important role in defining the characteristics that determined the different phases of the conflict. In this chapter, we distinguish between the liberation war from 1961 to 1975, and between three different periods of the civil war. The latter have been defined according to major political markers, such as the signing of peace agreements or cease fires. They include the period from 1975 to the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords; from the re-ignition of the war in 1992 to the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, and from 1994 to the signing of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding in 2002. Nonetheless, we recognise that this represents only one of the ways in which the conflict history can be characterised and divided. Pacheco (2005) for instance refers to five separate wars during the conflict years: 1) the war of independence (1961-75); 2) the war for power between the three liberation movements (1975); 3) the civil war between MPLA and UNITA with foreign influences (1975- 91); 4) the aggression by South Africa in support of UNITA (until the 1980s when Namibia won independence and apartheid ended); and 5) the post-election war, following the rejection by UNITA of the election results, largely financed by natural resources and causing the greatest destruction (1992 – 2002). We found through our fieldwork that the way history is perceived and recollected depends on people's localised experiences of conflict and of other events such as periods of hardship and instability resulting from droughts, floods, and other natural disasters, or from illness or loss of family members.

### *Decolonisation and the liberation war: 1961-1975*

Angola's contact with Europeans started some 500 years ago. The Portuguese reached its coast at the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> Century, in search of profitable economic activities (De Maeseneer et al. 2008, 61). Prior to colonisation, Angola's people already had a history of alliances, conflicts, networks of trade and population movements (Neto 2001, 30). Actual colonial occupation varied significantly across different parts of the country. Luanda's occupation lasted 400 years, much longer than that of other cities. Huambo, which became the second most important city in the late colonial period, was only effectively colonised during 72 years (Neto 2001, 32). Intensification of the colonial occupation process and economic diversification came in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and effective administrative control over the whole colony came only after World War II (Malaquias 2007). This impacted on local populations through different forms of forced labour, taxation systems (hut tax) and the production of compulsory crops imposed by the colonial administration. Such measures led to the early revolts in Bailundo and Bakongo regions in 1902 and 1911-13 respectively (ibid). In 1961, in the northern province of Malanje, uprisings of cotton and coffee plantation workers, to large land expropriations and poor working conditions, marked the beginning of the struggle for liberation. This episode resulted in a violent response from the Portuguese. Between 250 and 1000 white planters and traders and thousands of black farm workers are

estimated to have been killed, and many more to have fled across borders (Birmingham and Meijer 2004, 13). The organised nationalist movements started to emerge in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The MPLA and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) were established under the leadership of Agostinho Neto and Holden Roberto respectively. The MPLA drew its support from the Mbundu and the African and mulatto elite in the Luanda area, whereas FNLA was linked to the Bakongo peoples (Malaquias 2007). In 1966 Jonas Savimbi established UNITA after leaving the FNLA and its Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE). Savimbi's support came from the rural areas of the Ovimbundu - the major population group in the country. UNITA developed a system of self-reliance strongly linked to its support-base (ibid). As Birmingham (1997, 440) explains, the waves of violence after 1961 fed directly into the social mobilisation and support-base of the three parties. Educated and westernised Africans formed the MPLA following the persecution by white vigilantes in the aftermath of 1961. Conscripted labourers that fled to the highlands following killings by angry coffee-pickers, joined UNITA. FNLA drew support from the thousands of migrants that fled abroad, mostly to Zaire, following another violent wave, led in this case by the Portuguese.

With the start of the armed struggle, the Portuguese stepped up immigration into Angola and expanded economic activities, rather than preparing for decolonisation. In the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, immigration had been modest, but it was significantly increased from 1950 onwards. With the arrival of a quarter of a million Portuguese, Angola became one of Africa's most dynamic colonies and the largest white colony in Africa after Algeria and South Africa (De Maeseneer et al. 2008, 24). The intensification of colonial expansion further dispossessed local peasants. In addition, populations were displaced at various times during the 1960s and 1970s, as a result of violence linked to the smaller scale guerrilla wars (Robson et al. 2006).

#### *Civil war: 1975 to the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords*

Immediately after independence, which was negotiated between Portugal and the three independence movements, the three parties entered into conflict as they raced to gain control of the capital Luanda. This course of events was strongly shaped by the interference of external political players, within the context of the Cold War. The Angolan conflict at that time was a typical case of superpower struggle for influence and control. Cuba and the Soviet Union supported the MPLA. It is widely acknowledged that Cuba's support was decisive for the MPLA's control of Luanda at independence. The FNLA and UNITA were supported by South Africa and the United States, particularly the latter heralded as an anti-communist insurgency (Vines 2000). Other actors were also involved in the unfolding of events, including Eastern European countries and African nations. Guiné-Bissau sent troops to Angola in support of the MPLA (Pinto de Andrade 2010, Vines 2000).

South Africa's involvement in Angola, based on a 'divide-and-rule' strategy, aimed at preventing support for Namibia's independence movement South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and for anti-apartheid movements such as the African National Congress (ANC). It entailed aggressive invasions through the south of the country (Hodges 2001). The Cassinga Massacre in Huíla province is a well-known example, in which the South African Defence Forces (SADF) killed hundreds in an operation allegedly targeting a camp of SWAPO members.<sup>8</sup> The US' support was initially covert given the approval of the

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<sup>8</sup> Groups of Swapo members (as well as ANC members) went into exile in Huíla's provincial capital, Lubango in the 1980s. In Lubango 700 Swapo members were suspected by Swapo leadership to be spies and held in detainment centres in the city, and who subsequently went missing (Saul and Leys 2003). Attacks on ANC members residing in Lubango by South Africans also occurred, with the case of Marius Schoon as a primary

Clarke Amendment in February 1976. The amendment was established in the aftermath of the Vietnam conflict and was intended to prevent the USA from giving aid to military groups in Angola. Nonetheless, it only partially limited US action and was unable to prevent financial support and the continued recruitment of mercenaries for destabilising activities (Brittain 1998). It was repealed in 1985 by the US Government, after which time the US openly stepped up its support to UNITA. The FNLA which had initially also been assisted by Zaire (and China) became weakened and soon disappeared, leaving the MPLA and UNITA as the two protagonists of the civil war for the following 27 years.

The role of foreign (military) interference marked this period of the conflict, until the signing of the Bicesse Accords. While external influences did not themselves create the divisions within the liberation movements, they did provide both the means and legitimacy for the war proponents to be strengthened and for violence to escalate, fuelling and consolidating its dynamics in the proceeding period (Messiant 2004b, Meijer 2004, Brittain 1998). In later years, when the churches emerged as important actors in peace-building efforts, they argued that it was the inability of the parties to reach consensus that allowed the internationalisation of the conflict. On this basis, they advocated that peace could only ever be achieved through dialogue between the parties (Comerford 2004, 34).

Although both the MPLA and UNITA were ideologically based on Marxism, they had distinct support-bases and developed into different regimes. The MPLA had urban support and experience in major cities, and struggled to adapt itself to the rural realities of the people of the north and the highland regions of Angola (Birmingham 2003, 184). UNITA also followed a Marxist ideology and was organised around Maoist principles and practices of guerrilla warfare and self-reliance (Malaquias 2007). It has been described as having developed a society resembling a military dictatorship, controlled by a 'Stalinist-type discipline' and characterised by 'truly totalitarian social relationships' in which any tolerance was absent (Messiant 1994, 169-170).

During this first period of war, fighting was mostly contained in rural areas where UNITA had its strongholds. External support had given it control of large parts of the south and central regions of the country (Hodges 2001, Hodges 2004). This contributed to increased urbanisation as people fled towards towns and cities. Only at the end of the 1980s, with the changes of the international context - the fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the achievement of Namibian independence – did Angola's strategic importance to the superpowers decrease, allowing for the first steps to be taken towards peace negotiations. At the end of 1988 a Tripartite Agreement was signed by the Angolan, Cuban and South African governments, committing to the withdrawal of Cuban troops by July 1991. This announcement, combined with the major battle of 1987/1988 at Cuito Canavale, in which neither side came out as the winner but South Africa suffered a 'psychological defeat', led to the withdrawal of its troops from Namibia in 1989 (Vines 2000). In the aftermath of the Cold War, the dynamics and motivations for the conflict changed. It became increasingly apparent that it was turning into a personalized power struggle between ruling president Dos Santos and UNITA's leader Savimbi (Douma 2003). In June 1989, the two parties attempted but failed to negotiate a cease-fire. During the course of 1990, negotiations led by a troika of Portugal, the US and the Soviet Union eventually led in May 1991, to the signature of the Bicesse Accords. These called for a cease-fire, demobilisation process, and parliamentary and presidential elections. They gave the MPLA the recognition as the legitimate interim government until the set up of elections (Vines 2000). The implementation of Bicesse was however, fraught with difficulties. There was widespread concern with the preparation of the

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example. The prominent anti-apartheid activist's wife and child were killed by a letter bomb at their apartment in Lubango, where they had sought safety from the South African security police.

elections, given the low demobilisation rates, particularly by UNITA. Nonetheless, the international community pushed for the scheduled date of September 1992. With 55% of the votes from a 92% voter turnout, the MPLA had a majority win over UNITA's 33% (Britain 1998, 55). Savimbi rejected the election results, leading to the suspension of the second round of presidential elections and the return to war. Attempts by the troika and the peace-keeping efforts of the UN to secure peace quickly evaporated due to the '*deadly pursuit of military victory and hegemonic power*' by both parties, as well as the different interests of the international community (Messiant 2004b). Its role during this period was greatly criticised for the failure to establish and maintain peace through its two peacekeeping missions – United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) I and II, established in 1981 and 1991 respectively.

Margaret Anstee (1996), the UN's Secretary General's Special Representative for Angola from 1992-93, refers to Angola as the 'Orphan of the Cold War'. She highlights the lack of international interest in the conflict after the Cold War, which translated into limited support for the UN to perform its role. Restrictions in mandate as well as lack of human and financial resources of its peacemaking and peacekeeping missions made the monitoring and enforcement of the peace process virtually impossible. The focus on the Bosnian conflict further contributed to the 'invisibility' of the Angolan crisis (Birmingham 1997). The fact that the second UN mission (UNAVEM II) had a budget of \$18.8 million compared to the \$430 million of the UN's equivalent mission in Namibia, illustrates the modest commitment to the Angolan case (Paulo 2004, 29). External interests also influenced the course of the peace processes and its subsequent failure. The US' intention to get UNITA to power was also seen as contributing to the rush towards elections, given their assumption that UNITA would win (Birmingham 1997, Messiant 2004b). With the victory of the MPLA however, UNITA was technically rendered as an illegitimate rebellion whilst the MPLA power was consolidated (Messiant 2004b).

#### *From 1992 to the 1994 Lusaka Protocol*

The post-election war of 1992 was unprecedented in its scale and intensity, with an estimated 1000 deaths per day reported by the UN at the height of the crisis (Lanzer 1996, 19). It is often referred to as the 'war of the cities' as it reached major urban centres for the first time. By September 1993, UNITA was estimated to control some 70% of the national territory, including several provincial capitals (Accord 2004). As urban centres became unsafe, large scale displacement continued, leading to one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 1990s. With one in every three children dying before the age of 5, Angola became known as the worst country in the world to be a child (UNICEF 1999 in Ostheimer 2000). It was at this time that humanitarian efforts were scaled up considerably.

During the course of 1993 and 1994 several attempts led by the UN and the Troika mediation team ended in deadlocks. After this tense period of negotiation they brought the warring factions together and eventually led to the adoption on the 20th November 1994, of the Lusaka ceasefire protocol. Crucially however, the Lusaka process was not able to address the deep mistrust between the two parties, a reason identified as key in its failure to achieve peace and in the unfolding of events after (Messiant 2004b).

#### *1994 to the Luena MoU in 2002*

After such tense negotiations the signing of the Lusaka protocol did not signify the end of violence, but rather created a situation of 'quasi-peace' (Hodges 2001). During the early years of its implementation, important political developments took place. The Government of

National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) was created in 1997, incorporating members of the opposition parties, including some 63 UNITA's representatives in parliament. The National Armed Forces (FAA) also absorbed some of UNITA's troops. (Vines 2000). In this climate of no peace, no war, fighting and human rights abuses were still widespread (Robson 2001, 4). Once again, the international community was unable to revert the situation, despite the deployment of its third peace keeping mission (UNAVEM III) in 1995. The clear lack of political commitment to the implementation of Lusaka by the warring parties and particularly by UNITA, eventually led the United Nations Secretary General (UN SC) in June 1998 to reinforce sanctions against UNITA. The first sanctions had been passed in 1993, banning the sale of arms and fuel. New sanctions ranged from restrictions on travel to the freezing of bank accounts and the banning of the purchase of UNITA diamonds (Hodges 2004, 178). Notwithstanding critics of the potential impact of the renewed sanctions on conflict resolution, their focus on diamonds as UNITA's main source of funding, reflected the growing importance of natural resources in the understanding of the conflict dynamics. These had become particularly important after the collapse of the Bicesse Process and the withdrawal of assistance from external political actors. Moreover, insider accounts revealed that the effects of the sanctions were felt within the UNITA regime. As explained by a UNITA official working closely with Savimbi "It was the sanctions that destroyed the armed faction of UNITA and culminated in the surrender of UNITA in the cities. Initially there wasn't a lot of concern because we could organize the people to do this and that for us. But the people also needed other things to live and work and these things, like salt, eventually ran out. Our money abroad was frozen. Many UNITA people in embassies and key positions began fleeing their posts and coming to join us in the bush."<sup>9</sup>

By mid-1998, the peace process was once again in crisis as the government grew increasingly impatient with UNITA whilst UNITA in turn accused the Troika of pro-government bias. In August the government ended the peace process and stopped dealing with UNITA, adopting a 'war-for-peace' approach and reverting once again to full-scale war. A new faction of UNITA (UNITA-Renovada) was established by former UNITA commanders, which the government considered its only legitimate negotiating partner thereafter. The UN observer mission United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) which replaced UNAVEM III in June 1997, was ended in early 1999 (Paulo 2004). This last stage of the conflict was characterised by the intensification of the fighting. The impact on local populations was aggravated due to the tactics of conflict towards guerrilla warfare and scorched earth practices. From this point onwards, areas under UNITA control were no longer accessible to the humanitarian community until the official end of the war, almost four years later. The significance of this for the humanitarian situation of people in these areas is discussed in other Chapters. Several security incidents such as the shooting down of two UN planes in December 1998 and January 1999 (ibid, 30) indicated that UNITA would no longer secure humanitarian access. As UN sanctions on UNITA were tightened and the government stepped up its military offences in the course of 2000, UNITA was further weakened losing several of the strategic areas under its control. With the limited results of the international community in negotiating peace, the national churches gained prominence at this stage, as advocates for peace-building, conflict resolution and human rights. As Comerford (2005) explains, the churches contributed to a shift in the notion of Angola's conflict as a 'war against the people', through initiatives like the Inter-Ecclesial Committee for Peace in Angola (COIEPA) and the Congress for Peace. Other actors such as civil society organisations, associations and NGOs, the media and political opposition parties, made up a 'civic

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with ex-UNITA official, 15 October 2008, Bunjei.

constituency' that established a peace movement. They saw peace not as non-fighting, but as the creation of a just and equitable society (Comerford 2004).

Angola's conflict eventually came to an end, not through negotiation and settlement of political differences, but through military victory. Savimbi was killed in combat on the 22 February 2002 in Moxico, and peace negotiations were set in motion by the government immediately after. The GoA's priorities included an amnesty for those directly involved in the conflict, the demobilisation of UNITA soldiers and their reintegration in society. This process culminated in the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Luena, on the 4<sup>th</sup> April 2002 – the official date of the establishment of peace. In this instance, the involvement of the international community in the mediation of negotiations was minimal. With the exception of the Cabinda Enclave, the Luena MoU has become the marker of peace in Angola, which has been effectively maintained and consolidated ever since. The 2008 legislative elections have been considered by many as the ultimate indicator of short-term stability. The MPLA won with a huge majority of 81.7% of the votes from a voter turn-out of 87% (HRW 2009). Luena has not been uncontroversial however. As several commentators have pointed out, just like Bicesse and Lusaka, the Luena MoU was agreed between the warring factions, without the participation of other political, civic and religious actors. This compromises the ability to accommodate the wider interests of society, and may undermine future democratisation processes as power continues to be concentrated within the governing elite (Messiant 2004b, Griffiths 2004, Comerford 2004). According to Vidal (2006a), the uneven power-balance between MPLA and UNITA at the time of Luena, came to characterise the multiparty political system in Angola since.

The history of conflict in Cabinda warrants specific attention outside of the discussion of the broader civil war, because although not completely separate, its conflict developed its own dynamics and attests to the need to understand conflict locally. The province of Cabinda is an enclave separated from mainland Angola to the North, by the Congo River. Cabinda has long been a strategic and highly contested territory given its natural mineral wealth, particularly oil and to a lesser extent, diamonds. The Cabinda issue has regularly come under the spotlight in recent years. During the 2010 football African Cup of Nations (CAN), Cabinda made international headlines as it became the site of a violent incident when in the lead up to hosting some of the games, a road convoy taking the Togolese team to Cabinda city suffered an armed attack in which 2 people were killed. The attack was claimed by a faction of the separatist movement FLEC - Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda, specifically known as FLEC/FAC (FLEC/Armed Forces of Cabinda). The incident highlighted the continuation of violent contestation in the region and of local grievances, despite the national peace discourse dominant since 2002. Official developments in the politics of the conflict have been experienced rather differently in Cabinda from the rest of the country. The interlude of peace created by the Bicesse Accords of 1991 was not felt in Cabinda given that FLEC was not part of the deal. This was repeated in the 1994 Lusaka process. In addition, the Luena MoU of April 2002 did not result in an immediate cease-fire in Cabinda as was the case in the rest of the country. In October of that year, the GoA was still launching its 'final' counter-insurgency campaign in the province, before entering into a series of talks with the FLEC leadership (Accord 2004). In 2006, the GoA signed a peace agreement with FLEC/Renovada, the officially recognised faction of the movement. The agreement established an amnesty and called for the demobilisation and integration of individuals into the FAA. Other factions were left out and were not recognised by the GoA, which branded them as criminal groups (Monteiro 2010). A recent Human Rights Watch publication quotes that "between September 2007 and March 2009, at least 38 people were arbitrarily arrested by the military in Cabinda and accused of state security crimes." (HRW 2009). Previous reports from human rights organisations show a similar pattern of violence,

and the government response to the attack on the Togolese team has been considered heavy-handed, with military intervention and several arrests. Yet, attention to this incident has done little in the way of further scrutiny of the political situation of the province, as the GoA labelled it as the work of bandits and terrorists (IRIN 2010c). “It turned an embarrassing situation into an occasion to be shown as a member of the fight against terrorism, with the blessing of the international community, thus managing to reinforce its international legitimacy.” (Monteiro 2010, 11). Moreover, developments in the course of 2010 in the organisation and leadership of the exiled factions of FLEC, have sparked new tensions between the separatist movements and the GoA. N’Zita Tiago, the new leader in exile in France, called on the population to continue the struggle for sovereignty of the region (IRIN 2010b). These movements reject the peace accord, while the government continues to deny the actual existence of the FLEC as an organised movement that threatens security (IRIN 2010a).

This overview of the history of the Angolan conflict has brought to the forefront the different actors and motivations involved in the dynamics of conflict over the years. It shows that during the various phases of the war the dynamics of conflict changed as a result of the interplay of both internal factors and the external political environment and interests. Moreover, the legacy of the colonial regime and anti-colonial struggle also influenced the course of events after independence. The relative importance of the international response to the conflict varied with time, but clearly became intertwined with political developments that shaped the conflict.

### **A political economy and socio-institutional approach to Angola’s war**

The political economy approach to war refers to “analysing the production and distribution of power, wealth and destitution during armed conflicts, in order to expose the motives and responsibility of those involved, within a historical context” (le Billon 2000a, 1). Conflicts are not simply understood by looking at ideology or state control, rather they encompass much more complex processes and issues of power. Also, conflict does not only lead to chaos and destruction, some groups gain socially, politically and economically from maintaining a situation of war which in turn can drive processes of social transformation (Duffield 2001). Warring parties are rarely homogenous groups that fight over one shared issue or ideology, they are a collection of individuals that each have their own motivation to continue a conflict.

#### *The political economy of Angola’s war*

In the case of Angola, much attention has gone to the economic elements for the start or continuation of the war, but recent works see these as only one aspect of the development of war. Angola’s exports have been largely limited to its oil, which together with diamond reserves, have been objectives of control during the war due to the monetary resources they generated to sustain military action. Hodges (2004) has written extensively about the economic drive for the continuation of war in Angola. He contends that control over resources made the continuation of the war possible, rather than being the cause of the conflict, as the eventual control over resources became a driving factor for both parties. “It was a war driven by personal ambition, mutual suspicion and the prize of winning or retaining control of the state and the resources to which it gave access” (Hodges 2004, 18). Moreover, such control implied opportunities to exercise patronage and could be a reason for UNITA never to seek secession of its territorial stronghold (Howen 2001, 20). Cramer (2006) notes in turn that it is not so much about the commodities as it is about the social relations

that shape the role of commodities throughout the conflict. Sogge argues that the theory of resources leading to political chaos is not so in Angola, given that “mere plunder and oppression to the neglect of statecraft has never been the MPLA approach” (2010, 3). He contends that a sophisticated centrally-managed patronage system has allowed the distribution of wealth in a way that has actually been stabilising. In Angola, there was a relatively neat division between the warring factions whereby the government controlled oil resources whereas UNITA had access and control of large diamond areas, a resource much more suited to guerrilla style structures. Without the presence of the natural resources in Angola the war could have ended sooner due to the lack of financial back up for military expenditure, and taking away a strong incentive for power (Le Billon 2001). The sanctions passed on UNITA, as described earlier, were based on this logic. At a certain point, the government even used access to diamonds as a negotiation tool with UNITA, by offering them a large diamond area in return for the control of other places (Hodges 2004). The troubles in the Cabinda enclave can also be seen as an example of a conflict where control over resources motivates the desire for secession. As le Billon (Le Billon 2000a) describes it, the desire for sovereignty of this province can be related to the fact that benefits from its oil-wealth flowed mostly to outsiders, motivating the rebel faction FLEC to seek secession, and explaining why a peace accord did not run parallel to the rest of the country.

The political economy of war starts from the premise that globalisation, state failure and war profits are important themes that influence the course of modern-day conflict (Le Billon 2000b). Globalization refers in this sense to the increased effects of the global economy on states internal affairs, which is why le Billon (2000b) asserts that the term intra-state wars is misleading as it denies the international economic linkages that have powerful effects on how conflicts are played out and find their financial sources as well as access to arms. Cilliers (2001) argued that in order to end the Angolan conflict, the international political and business communities would have had to seriously engage in the clean-up of the oil-sector, as it served as the basis for the consolidation and conservation of power with the ruling elite. Sogge’s analyses of the Angolan context over the years have highlighted in particular the role of external economic interests, primarily linked to oil, in the creation of Angola’s extroverted political economy and its contribution to war, corruption and poverty (Sogge 2007, Sogge 2006, Sogge 2009). He therefore argues that ‘global good governance is also needed’ to address Angola’s development challenges (Sogge 2006). “In a context of economic recession and decline of external support, the state has often been left as little more than an instrument of power for the ruling group, rather than a provider of public goods and arbiter for social justice. What this amounts to is state failure – the erosion of the state’s sphere of competence, its power and legitimacy” (Le Billon 2000b, 3). In this perspective, state failure is seen as much as a driver of conflict as it is its outcome.

Le Billon (2001) points at a combination of factors concerning identity politics, unequal distribution of wealth, and opposition against colonial rule as primary factors that started the conflict. He further focuses his analysis into the course of the conflict on resources, geo-political and ideological influences during the Cold War, and the personal dynamics between the two leaders and their entourages (ibid). Access and control over oil and diamond reserves became especially important after the end of the Cold War and the subsequent withdrawal of international financial backings to both parties (Hodges 2004). The extent of the monetary importance of both oil and diamonds for both parties, as well as the unequal budget availability for military spending amongst them, become clear from the following figures: in 1998 the oil revenues for the MPLA government totalled some 3 billion USD per year, whereas UNITA gained 500 to 600 million USD annually from its diamond resources (Hodges 2004, Le Billon 2000a). Especially UNITA’s ability to secure financial sources for continuation and even intensifying of war after the Cold War ended, and despite



UN sanctions on its diamonds, according to Duffield (2001) is an example of the complex processes of social transformation and adaptation. However, near the end of the conflict in the beginning of 2000, UNITA increasingly had trouble keeping control of its diamond territory, resorting to trading the stock they had retained until that point, which only gave a revenue of some 100 million USD per year (Hodges 2004). This was linked to the GoA's increasing military successes over UNITA, lack of investment in new mines, as well as the UN sanctions on UNITA's diamond trade (Le Billon 2001). This decline in UNITA's revenues contributed to the MPLA's victory over UNITA in 2002.

The spatial distribution of oil and diamonds made a military victory of either party over the territory of the other difficult. Thus, a political and military standoff resulted. Significantly, those with an economic stake in the management of these resources profited from the status quo. Le Billon (2000a) explains:

“Similarly, lax controls on export licensing allowed UNITA to sell diamonds through government controlled channels, with handsome profits for officials and middlemen facilitating this laundering. In this type of relation, opposing parties may have an interest in prolonging a profitable military stalemate in order to preserve economic interest that could be threatened by a total victory and subsequent peace” (le Billon (Le Billon 2000a, 30).

The element of war profits can be fundamental in explaining the political and economic gains that can be derived from continuation of war rather than a victory. A state of war and disorder can be a favourable climate for profitable activities and financial gain for a whole range of people caught up in the war context. Keen (1998) points at a variety of these more short-term economic benefits that can be accrued in war by combatants, leaving aside the struggles to take control over oil and diamonds. These benefits can be obtained through pillage, protection money collected by local warlords, controlling trade, and stealing aid supplies amongst others. His analysis sheds light on the potential benefits that war can create for some, and how ‘winning a war’ is not always the preferred outcome of violence and conflict to every party involved. Keen (1998) finds that war can also be seen as an alternative system of profit and power. This argument holds more true for elites and people in positions of power already, than the rural poor to which conflict rarely offers opportunities but rather causes destruction, displacement, loss of life and livelihoods.

Le Billon (2000b) argues that “the state of poverty and distress of most Angolan people show that they have not been considered as relevant to the political economy of the conflict and the interests of the belligerents”. We would argue that they have in fact been of importance in the political economy of war and interest of the warring parties, as we showed above, but that as far as war profits go, indeed they have not benefitted from the mineral wealth the country has to offer. Firstly, because the benefits from those resources during the war were used for further funding of the war machine instead of basic service delivery for the population. Secondly, after the war oil revenues especially were still distributed to a small percentage of the population, namely what le Billon (2000a) calls the oil *nomenklatura*, which are the state and private companies and some powerful elites closely allied to the President of Angola. These processes of empowerment of a few and the disempowerment of the majority of Angolans shaped social relations (Sogge 2007).

Another motivation for the MPLA government to continue a state of war, according to le Billon (2001) was linked to the political and economic reforms it would have had to implement in a post-war situation. As corruption and economic mismanagement was somewhat masked under the banner of a conflict situation, peace time would require a more accountable and legitimate state, where state budgets would come under increased scrutiny. War in this regard offered a state of abnormality for governance structures in which budget

expenditures that could not be accounted for, or were redirected from basic service delivery for instance, could be blamed on the war situation. As it turned out however, this argument did not hold up in the post-war, given that the GoA continued to reject negotiations with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) after the war and until 2010. This is linked to its reluctance to increase international accountability on the national budget and financial flows, mainly from oil exports, to service delivery and social sectors.

### *The local political economy of Angola's war and social institutions*

Political economy of war does not just play itself out on state and international (economic) levels, but rather gets shaped and sustained in everyday practices of rebel groups, militaries and the people that are affected by war on an everyday basis. The incentives to continue war were growing throughout the years, with the increasing discoveries of Angola's natural wealth's like oil and diamonds. But with it, the impact of the war on local economies continued to grow as well. In the rural areas it became a war of controlling people as well as resources. War tactics meant that people were the resources, be it as soldiers, human shields or agricultural producers (Brinkman 2003). People were forced to choose sides, participate in the war as soldiers, and start producing crops to feed the soldiers from either sides, depending on who was controlling the areas. Especially UNITA was known to kidnap people and force them into agricultural labour. At the other side, MPLA was known to have conducted a 'scorched earth policy' so as to effectively cut off access to food for UNITA rebels, while at the same time destroying peoples livelihoods and forcing them to abandon the rural areas. "The fact that the troops are extremely poorly paid, and often paid months in arrears, has also meant that, during the war, the government soldiers, like their counterparts in UNITA, had to live off local populations, through pillaging and extortion" (Hodges 2004, 74).

A very insightful view on the micro-economic networks that arise during a war, and actually thrive on a state of war, has been offered by Nordstrom (2004) in her book on violence, power and international profiteering with Angola as an example. Her work unveils how extra-state war economies function on all levels in society, where ordinary people profit from the lack of state control and shadow networks develop involving both ordinary commodities as well as resource and arms trade. "*Shadows*, as we define them, refer to the complex sets of cross-state economic and political linkages that move outside *formally* recognized state-based channels. We use the term *shadows* (rather than 'criminal' or 'illegal') because the transactions defining these networks aren't confined solely to criminal, illicit, or illegal activities, but cross various divides between legal, quasi-legal, and downright illegal activities" (ibid, 106). By describing people's stories from an ethnographic perspective she is able to give a compelling picture of the size of the informal economy during wartime as well as the extensive networks that are needed to trade diamonds from Angola. Wartime economies do not just play out through big international networks, but are also part of local economies where goods are traded for instance between the local populations and soldiers. Although economies are severely disrupted in wartime, there is continuity in the way people try and maintain some normality in their lives and livelihoods (Hilhorst 2007).

We subscribe to this type of analysis that considers how power and resources are played out and affect the course of conflict, as well as the role of socio-cultural institutions in shaping conflict. The role of the traditional authorities, of existing relations of trust or patronage, are all key in defining the distribution of power and resources at the local level. Even the political economy approach, which focuses on the role and interplay between resources and power, is engrained in socio-cultural institutions. Social institutions and power relations affect conflict dynamics and develop beyond and irrespective of political or economic motivations alone. An observation that le Billon makes in relation to the impact of

war on Angola's population seems to hint at an overreliance on economic rationality versus consequences of war and violence. "While the war has had a dramatic impact on many people, it is worth noting that the vast majority of the population has been sheltered from the direct consequences of war. Most of their suffering arises from economic mismanagement and a lack of employment opportunities" (ibid, 34). Le Billon's point denies the effects of the war on especially the rural population, as the high number of civilians deaths from direct violence or hunger can hardly be blamed on economic mismanagement. There is a need to go further than a political economy of war analysis and its focus on a market-oriented explanation war. Moreover, a socio-institutional approach to war implies a focus on the local level, where the forces of the broader conflict interact with local norms and power relations, and the micro-dynamics of conflict are shaped. Bakonyi and Stuvøy's (2005, 361) analysis is an alternative to rational economic or rational-political explanations of war economies. "In addition to examining the functions of violence for economic purposes, the role of social institutions, norms, and rules for the behaviour of actors and for their economic activities in war must be addressed. [...] The conduct of economic activities is not isolated from patterns of authority, and thus, the market can neither be the sole nor the central institution of war economies". They argue that such explanations on the one hand ignore the role of social institutions by reducing the motivation for violence to individual economic gains. On the other hand, they do not take into account that despite the forces of globalization on conflict, it is at the local level that the competition from globalised economies is negotiated and that violence is therefore influenced by local institutions and actors on the ground. Where we diverge from their analysis of the Angolan case, is in their claim that UNITA drew considerable legitimacy from its social welfare services and its support with the administration of villages in exchange for food (Bakonyi and Stuvøy 2005, 369). As the case studies of the proceeding section will demonstrate, such services were very limited in time and coverage as they were reserved for those with direct links to the military regime within UNITA's headquarters. Additionally, the practice of feeding troops with the produce of local people was frequently referred to as abusive and violent, involving informal taxation or outright pillaging, rather than as a neat 'division of labour' as the authors label it. Our case studies also reveal how local actors through their strategies shape the micro-dynamics of conflict. In other words, we draw on the notion of agency of individual actors, in line with Long's actor-oriented approach (1992), to analyse how local actors, both perpetrators and victims of violence, shape and respond to violence.

### **Multiple realities of the Angolan conflict**

Richards (2005) argues that further research on conflict should focus on war as a social process in order to understand what actually happens in practice, rather than trying to uncover one particular root cause for it. Trying to attribute assumed root causes to wars obscures the variety of elements at play during conflict, which also change over time. Causes of conflict in Angola must be sought in combinations of different internal and external elements, as well as the historical power void left by Portuguese colonialism, as newly formed parties struggled to take control over the country. The Cold War influenced the course of the Angolan civil war tremendously, but the violence did not end together with the demise of the international influence in the conflict. Moreover, what the reason for fighting in one locality was, might have had no connection at all in explaining violence in another area. Individual loyalties in civil wars are often more informed on locally based cleavages than on these impersonal discourses of war, or connected to local and personal conflicts (Kalyvas 2001). Focusing on everyday realities of war instead of on root causes, allows for an analysis of how these

localized factors of conflict play out and connect to the macro processes of war. This corroborates Richards' (2005) case for an ethnographic approach to war, in which these societal processes that cause war to happen and continue should be studied in practice to better understand the dynamics at play in times of conflict. Although this research did not take place during the war, understanding how conflict affected people's lives, livelihoods and capacities was key to the study of aid in conflict. We were interested in grounding the analysis of conflict in the local experiences of the conflict, by collecting people's narratives and perceptions. By looking at localized and multiple realities of war through four case studies, we uncover the meaning of war for the people that were affected by it on a daily basis. In this section we focus on the everyday realities of war, to understand how political events at the macro level unfold on the ground, and connect with local processes and dynamics of war. We are specifically interested in the diversity of experiences and perceptions of conflict through the everyday life of local populations. The intensity of the fighting varied considerably over the 27 years of conflict and across Angola's national territory. It therefore produced quite distinct localised effects. Nevertheless, the impact of the war on local people can be characterised by some more generalised processes. These included population displacement, urbanisation and the abuse by both parties of civilian groups. In Huíla alone, the number of displaced people by September 2002 reached between 191,000 and 315,941, according to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and MINARS, respectively. The greatest concentration of displaced people was found in the municipalities of Chipindo, Kuvango, Quilengues and Caconda (Porto et al. 2007, 31). In addition to physical displacement, the loss of assets, forced recruitment of soldiers and women, the collapse of basic social services and infrastructure, the breakup of communities and families and of rural institutions of solidarity, all had a great impact on people's lives and coping capacities (Robson et al. 2006).

These different contexts are presented in the next section in our review of four municipalities of Huíla province. These four municipalities are the fieldwork areas of the two PhD projects on which this chapter is based. The data presented in these four case studies was collected over a period of one and a half year in various villages in the municipalities. Semi-structured and open interviews, life histories and surveys were used to collect people's experiences with conflict and its localised dynamics and effects on their everyday lives. The four municipalities represent various positions in terms of the political situation (government or UNITA controlled), the nature of displacement, the degree of urbanisation, the intensity of direct fighting and the overall effects on the everyday life of local people.

### *Chipindo*

Located 460km to the north-east of Lubango, along severely disrupted road infrastructure, Chipindo is likely the most remote and isolated *município* of the province. It has little in the way of a formal economy and most local people live from subsistence agriculture and basic trade for non-food items.

Chipindo is known for the severity of the conflict on its local people, as it was situated at the centre of the territory contested between the warring factions. It remained under the control of UNITA for most of the duration of the war, with only occasional attempts of takeover by government forces. The first large waves of displacement started in the early 1980s. In the northern area of Bunjei, people recall the deterioration of security and living conditions being marked by the take-over of the mission-hospital of the Igreja Evangélica Congregacional de Angola (IECA) by Cuban troops. This foreign interference in the war was seen as damaging for their situation. In addition, the local mission and its workers had played a crucial role in supporting the local population in terms of access to health and education

services, already during the colonial period. The departure of foreign missionaries due to insecurity and the physical take-over of the mission, directly impacted on people's welfare. Over the years, areas like Bunjei became completely deserted as people fled primarily to the 'bush' rather than camps. Official government figures estimate that 98% of the current population are ex-IDPs, although we did not come across a single individual who had not been displaced. For the majority, displacement became a permanent condition as they spent as long as 15 or 20 years on the move. Many were born and raised in displacement, in UNITA-controlled territory.

Many youngsters were forcibly recruited by UNITA as soldiers, whilst other individuals were abducted to work for the regime in its Jamba headquarters. The main targets were skilled people, such as health workers and teachers. Many of these people were (staff) members of IECA's local mission. On the one hand, they made up the educated elite with the skills needed by UNITA. On the other, UNITA's links to the protestant church meant that IECA members were seen as brothers and sisters, and were given preferential treatment. Some young men were spared from military life because they were sons of IECA, and should be educated to become the future leaders. Bakonyi & Stuvøy (2005) describe the use by UNITA of its links to the protestant church to mobilise support and gain legitimacy. The experience of the conflict years of individuals within the UNITA regime and their families was significantly different from those of others displaced to the bush. Despite their violent recruitment, they were given access to basic services such as schooling, healthcare, food and physical security, until UNITA started to weaken at the end of the 1990s. The remainder of the population fended for themselves, mostly through farming wherever and whenever possible. They were often required to contribute part of their harvest to the regime, or to work on communal *lavras* (fields) for their food production. Basic services were non-existent and people had no access to any form of external assistance throughout the war. They attempted to reproduce village life through smaller settlements and by electing new traditional authorities. In the post-war years, as people returned to their areas of origin, leadership positions sometimes had to be renegotiated as old and new leaders came to cohabit the same communities. Although tradition normally reinstates the original *soba*, tension between individuals emerged in some communities, particularly where competing individuals were aligned with opposing political parties.

The localised experiences of the conflict for Chipindo's population, broadly followed the military developments of the conflict, in terms of displacement and violence. However, people's accounts reveal that often they were unsure of who was persecuting them, particularly after the 1998 return to war, when both UNITA and the government resorted to their exploitation and brutal treatment. From 2000 they were constantly on the run, unable to retain assets, produce food or build shelter. In the final months of the war, hundreds of thousands were forcibly rounded up by the FAA into make-shift camps.<sup>10</sup> Most striking about the conflict experience of this region is that contrary to dominant perceptions of the civil war, it was at the time the conflict ended that the population suffered the greatest humanitarian impact. Bunjei was infamously referred to as a 'cemetery town' at that time (Messiant 2004a). "*Chipindo experienced the worst of the immediate post-war humanitarian crisis with very high levels of disease and mortality.*" (Porto et al. 2007, 37). Aid in this area does not figure as a direct contributor to changing social relations during the conflict, given that it was unavailable throughout that time. The legacy of partisan politics that shaped the conflict are very much alive in Chipindo, reflecting its strong links with UNITA. As part of the national

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<sup>10</sup> According to early NGO assessments, the population of Caquela *bairro* (a major IDP reception area in Bunjei) went from 1,500 in February 2002 to 24,000 by August 2002 ZOA & ADESPOV 2002. Projecto de emergência com deslocados e reassentados em Bunjei: Relatório de Progresso, Setembro a Novembro 2002. Lubango: ZOA Refugee Care.

reintegration and reconciliation programme, the government has allocated several jobs to ex-UNITA cadres, namely in local health services. However, recent appointments of school teachers are said to be discriminating against local teachers because of their links to UNITA. IECA has re-emerged as an important actor in local development, although still struggles to assert its neutrality and avert co-option by politics.

### *Caluquembe*

From 1975 onwards, war only slowly started affecting people's lives in Caluquembe municipality, located in the North of Huíla province. First, it became increasingly difficult to access the area, due to fighting along the access roads. Goods were not coming in anymore, and people from surrounding areas started moving towards the municipal center to find food as it became more difficult to continue producing food, either due to lack of inputs or because the area became the site of active fighting. During the 1980s the municipal center, Caluquembe-Sede, expanded substantially due to the influx of IDPs from other provinces, as well as from neighboring remote areas where troops were starting to fight each other. During the 1990s the influence of UNITA in Caluquembe expanded, and the area continued to encounter conflict and violence, especially before and after the 1992 elections. The Caluquembe hospital and Igreja Evangélica Sinodal de Angola (IESA) mission had become a battleground for both troops. As Savimbi had a connection and affinity to this church, having been educated on an IESA mission school himself, the mission and hospital struggled with issues of neutrality throughout the war. Christians were assumed to be in support of UNITA due to their religion, and staff of the hospital and mission were asked to show their support to UNITA in aiding the troops. In 1993 UNITA effectively took over the hospital and mission. The hospital administrator watched the local population loot the hospital equipment, and after the war went from door to door to reclaim the goods. In 1994 the hospital and mission became the target of government bombing, after which MPLA regained control over the town, hospital and mission.

Depending on who you ask, the situation changed positively or negatively after 1994. For people that sympathize with MPLA the re-occupation of Caluquembe in 1994 by the government, ensured they could start living and working in town again. For people that were linked to UNITA, 1994 became a moment of displacement. Also, (assumed) connection to UNITA informed the access to aid that people had. For instance, the soba of one village near Caluquembe-Sede was said to have been ignored by local administration and aid organizations due to his affiliation to UNITA. UNITA received the majority of the votes in Caluquembe during the 1992 elections, which was an uncommon occurrence in the rest of the province (Schot 2009). During and after the war, UNITA retained a certain power and legitimacy in the region. The local government administration of Caluquembe consisted of both MPLA and UNITA representatives, also as part of the Government of National Unity as had been proposed in the peace agreements. Tensions in local government were high however. In 2004, a UNITA municipal administrator mysteriously disappeared, fuelling rumors and tensions between members of the administration linked to either of the 2 parties (Schot 2009).

Caluquembe town grew throughout the war. New neighborhoods were formed with refugees from surrounding areas. People were confined to the town as the roads had become too dangerous to travel on, and the surrounding bush was too dangerous to enter. People were not able to access their lands, or would do so in groups during the day, only to head back at night to the town to seek its relative safety. Firewood was collected within 10 kilometers of the town, leaving it deforested to this day. Displacement occurred in different directions, largely depending on party affiliation. For instance, most of the population from the villages

of Camucuio and Cue 1 which are located relatively far away from the municipal center and are considered to be in 'the bush', fled to the municipal town and stayed there for many years as their region had been taken over by UNITA. On the other hand, Catala, a village along the main provincial road and close to Caluquembe-sede, was deserted during the war as its inhabitants fled together with UNITA troops after Caluquembe-Sede was re-occupied by government troops in 1994. Some people from this village were also sent to so called 're-education camps' by MPLA for several years if suspicion of UNITA affiliation had fallen on them. These displacement movements brought along the curious situation that people from 'town' stayed in the deserted villages in the 'bush', which had been left behind by the people that in turn fled and occupied the empty houses in the towns.

Caluquembe is an example of an area that was severely contested by UNITA and MPLA and suffered the consequences. The local hospital and evangelical mission became central sites where war politics were fought out. Party affiliation remains a hotly debated issue in local politics and beyond. Displacement in Caluquembe occurred in different waves and directions, linked to the political outcomes of the war and real or perceived party affiliation.

### *Matala*

Matala, located in the south-east of Huíla, is traditionally an agricultural municipality consisting of farmers and herders. A large proportion of its population now live in and around Matala town (*Sede*) in roadside peri-urban *bairros*, and their livelihoods depend primarily on informal business (*negócio*). Matala town is one of the most thriving municipal capitals of Huíla with significant state and private sector investment.<sup>11</sup> Throughout the war, it remained under government control and was never occupied by UNITA. Today the MPLA remains dominant in local government offices and popular support. As an MPLA secretary of a local *bairro* explained, "UNITA representatives can come here all they like, but nobody goes to listen to them, they are not wanted here". Compared to other municipalities, there seem to be few (outspoken) ex-UNITA combatants in Matala. The town itself was never directly disputed in combat, because it was fiercely protected by a government army base, partly to safeguard the major hydro-electrical dam. However, fighting reached its outskirts at various times. The external influence on the civil war was witnessed directly by the local population, when Cuban troops in the 1980s helped the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) to secure the area against UNITA. The relative security of Matala transformed it into a major reception centre for IDPs fleeing from neighbouring areas during the conflict and in its immediate aftermath.<sup>12</sup>

Displacement affected the socio-economic makeup and relations of the area significantly, as various waves of IDPs arrived over the years. Matala's population today is ethnically very diverse as a result. People's experience of displacement was varied, according for instance, on their origin or time of arrival. Only those that lived within the relatively safe areas around town were never completely uprooted, as in the case of Monhanamgombe village. Yet, many recall several periods of having to 'sleep' in the bush, to escape night-time attacks to their villages. First wave IDPs arrived in the early 1980s and were hosted by local resident populations, mainly from the Muhumbi ethnic group. Through traditional practices of solidarity and mutual help, they were usually given land by the local *sobas* and assisted by residents with (free) seeds and the use of animal traction in exchange for labour. Local *sobas* thus carried significant power, even vis-à-vis the *sobas* of the displaced communities. As land

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<sup>11</sup> The local economy benefits from its geographical location between Cunene province (bordering Namibia) and Lubango, and on the Namibe-Lubango railway line.

<sup>12</sup> Moreover, because of its political situation Matala hosted the official state administration of Cunene province, which abandoned its post due to heavy fighting with South African troops.

became scarcer in later years, IDPs had to rent it and/or work for locals for as little as 2kg/day of maize flour. Many became fully dependent on humanitarian aid. Over the years, first wave IDPs were thus able to establish themselves in the area and secure their livelihoods. They became the 'better-off' IDP group with the (economic) power to help later arrivals. Many have been unwilling to return to their areas of origin with the end of the war.

The post-election war of 1992 was remembered as the period of greatest population influx. Residents of neighbouring *comunas* within Matala municipality, were forced to seek refuge in town from military attacks that reached their villages. Local residents of Mupindi community (Micosse *comuna*) fled to the *Sede* multiple times, usually on a temporary basis, ranging from a few days to a few months. They were mostly absorbed by family members rather than joining the swelling crowds in the IDPs camps of Visaka, Ndjenvei, Chipopia and Kanjanguiti. Many of today's *bairros* and villages were created as reception areas for IDPs which became permanent settlements. *Bairro* KM15 was created in 1984. Today it is one of the largest in population terms<sup>13</sup> and has its own state health centre and school. Other communities such as Calumbo, emerged from the initiative of local government to relocate IDPs from overcrowded areas to those where more land was available. These settlements led to a certain 'segregation' of ex-IDPs in the current demographics of Matala. From the mid-1990s Matala also became a hub for the distribution of relief aid by aid organisations. Initially, (food and medical) aid was exclusively targeted at recent IDPs, but as the general situation deteriorated, resident and older IDP groups also became eligible. Perhaps as a result of this change, we found few accounts of conflict between resident and IDP groups over access to aid. It was generally accepted that those that had lost everything were in greater need. With specific reference to the impact of aid, some individuals reported frustration with the long procedures and corrupt practices that emerged with its distribution. Humanitarian aid significantly empowered traditional leaders such as the *sobas* and village secretaries, by giving them the responsibility of defining beneficiaries. This enabled patronage and corruption in some instances. Matala suffers from a high crime rate and from rampant cattle theft. Victims often blame this on outside youth from neighbouring areas, where many IDPs have settled. Moreover, Matala's urbanisation problems stem directly from war induced displacement. Road access is so poor that 'in some areas you can't even remove the coffin of a dead body.'<sup>14</sup>

This case shows that conflict can develop localized dynamics, even where direct fighting is not involved. In Matala, the effects of large-scale displacement were behind the changes in the socio-economic conditions and in power relations, between residents and IDPs, within different IDP groups, and between people and their leaders. Its historic importance as a government-controlled area continues to influence its prosperity in the post-war.

### *Chibia*

Chibia is a municipality located in the dry southern part of the province. Its original inhabitants are Nyanekas who rely mostly on cattle breeding, and do some occasional agricultural production when the rains allow for it. The semi-arid region suffers from drought once every decade, which is usually followed by famines. This was also the case in 1988/1989 when a drought combined with unavailability of food stuffs and agricultural inputs due to the war, led to widespread hunger. Chibia wasn't a center of contention between MPLA and UNITA as other municipalities in the province had been. Most people were able to remain in their villages throughout the war, as they didn't come under direct attack. Most

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<sup>13</sup> The total population size is 4,200 individuals, but reached 6,000 at the peak of displacement.

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Municipal Administrator, 24 April 2008, Matala.



of the relatively large number of white settlers however, left the town from 1975 onwards and with them many of the shops closed, limiting the access people had to food, agricultural inputs and machinery and credit.

From the start of the war in 1975 displaced people from other parts of the province started to settle in Chibia due to its relative safety. A large area around the municipal center was vacated to allow displaced people to settle there. Within this area, Bairro 11 de Novembro is a neighborhood, consisting of a group of about 500 people belonging to the Ovimbundu ethnic group, who were displaced from Quilengues (municipality in the center of the province). They were resettled to Bairro 11 de Novembro by the government after fleeing to Lubango from Quilengues in 1994. In 2003, after the end of the war in Angola, the GoA in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) started a resettlement program. About half of the community members of Bairro 11 de Novembro made use of this program while others decided to stay in Chibia. The main reasons for staying were lack of resources to restart their livelihoods back in Quilengues, having found livelihood opportunities in Chibia, but also out of fear for the parliamentary elections of 2008, as one inhabitant mentioned: “we have seen the confusion after the elections of 1992, we will wait and see what the elections of 2008 will bring”.<sup>15</sup> Some families made use of the resettlement program to Quilengues, only to return to Chibia after some time as they found that life was better for them there. Another factor that played a role in their decision to return to Chibia was that on return many found that their plots of land had been confiscated by other refugees who had settled in their villages of origin since they themselves had become displaced.

With the arrival of the displaced in Chibia, local conflicts over land between displaced and resident populations started to erupt. Also, some resident populations resented the fact that only displaced people from different parts of the country were given aid by humanitarian organizations, while they felt an equal level of suffering due to droughts and subsequent periods of hunger. An inhabitant of Chibia noticed that the arrival of displaced from other ethnic groups influenced the Nyaneka population to adopt some of their socio-economic practices. “The Ovimbundu have a lot of different skills, they practice masonry, carpentry, and own bakeries. Nyanekas normally only do some agriculture if nature allows them. The Nyanekas only practice agriculture during the rainy season. After the rains finish they will wait for 6 months for the new rains to start, and in between the rains tend to their cattle. The Ovimbundu actively search for alternatives in case agriculture fails, they always have some type of job to do, they will use that in between time to work as masons or carpenters. They started up some small industries and businesses here in Chiba. This ensured that the Nyanekas also had some more job opportunities. Now you see that some Nyanekas are doing the same, and opening up small businesses”.<sup>16</sup>

Although the municipality was mostly spared from the same level of violence and destruction as seen in other parts of the province, the population also had to deal with the consequences of war, most significantly with hunger due to cyclical periods of drought combined with lack of food and agricultural inputs. Tensions between IDPs and resident populations erupted over land and availability of aid. At the same time, interaction with groups of displaced has also caused some socio-economic changes to occur amongst the host population.

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<sup>15</sup> Interview with Teresa Losinga, Bairro 11 de Novembro, 27 July 2008.

<sup>16</sup> Interview with Zé Carlos, Chibia-sede, 24 July 2008.

### *Analysis of the case studies*

Much of the current profiles of these *municípios* result from how their populations lived through the conflict. Stories collected in different parts of Huíla province reveal that the war affected people's lives to different degrees, in terms of empowerment and disempowerment processes, displacement, and access to socio-economic institutions.

The political outcome of violence between the two parties in the various localities, meant a constant reshuffling of local power relations. Other factors stemming from the conflict, including displacement and access to aid, also altered social relations. Traditional leaders were key in the distribution of resources among populations, including the allocation of land to IDPs and the access to humanitarian supplies. In some cases, leadership positions came under contestation in the post-war period when rural communities were (re)constituted.

Displacement was a widely used response to conflict, although it took different forms and directions. In some cases such as Bairro 11 de Novembro in Chibia it became permanent, in others such as Matala and Caluquembe it was a daily commute to hide from night raids. Whereas the overall perception is that people mostly flee from bush to town, these cases have shown that the opposite was also true. Displacement is sometimes informed by (real or perceived) party affiliation depending on which party had control over the region at that particular time. However, very often it is a matter of finding security, regardless of who the perpetrator is.

The period after the 2002 peace agreement saw the return and resettlement of people to their areas of origin on a massive scale. However, we found that some people chose to remain put, irrespective of location or age, in a wait-and-see attitude with respect to the outcome of the elections of 2008. The violent outcome of the 1992 elections left a deep mark on people's perception of the meaning of elections in securing peace. Furthermore, some displaced had also established new livelihood opportunities for themselves, that made a return to their areas of origin and former livelihoods less desirable. This also impacted on the socio-economic developments and local power relations between resident and displaced population, as in the case of increased competition between the Nyaneka and Ovimbundo of Chibia. In Matala, first wave IDPs became established and economically better-off than later arrivals, primarily due to their access to land and the help of resident communities. They make up the majority of people permanently settled in the area.

We found that people's experiences and memories of violence, are not always linked to the macro labels and political developments of war. They often refer to everyday encounters with other forms of violence such as looting, banditry or cattle theft. For Chipindo's population, the worst of the humanitarian crisis was not during, but after the end of the war. Moreover, suffering during war is also not always a direct consequence of political violence, but just as much to do with local events such as droughts. As the case studies show, the manifestations of the conflict and the nature of violence varied considerably in different localities, thereby creating micro-dynamics of war. The practices of the two parties and their treatment of people were far from uniform. UNITA provided for those directly under its regime, but it also forcibly abducted the same people. MPLA partly protected people in Matala, but equally abused those living in Chipindo to isolate UNITA. Similarly, people's resources to address their basic needs were very different. Many didn't access relief aid at all during conflict, either due to security restrictions or because of perceived links to UNITA. Others were helped by resident populations with land or seed, albeit only in the early phases of war. Empower and disempowerment processes were very much informed by party affiliation, whether real or assumed. While these cases show that the effects of war are very localized and context specific, the impacts on people's lives and livelihoods were widely felt. The conflict affected everyone in one way or another, either directly through violence, or indirectly through diminishing assets and services.

## Conclusions

The duration of the civil war had deep effects on the lives of local people, their livelihoods and institutions, at the centre of our research agendas. In this chapter we have analysed the history of the Angolan conflict and at its multiple manifestations, in order to shed light on its impact on the socio-economic realities of the country. By reviewing the course of events and major developments over time, we have demonstrated that at different stages, various internal and external forces came into play, and the motivations and dynamics of the war changed. This had varying effects on the lives of people. In its initial phase the conflict was understood as a proxy-war of the superpowers of the Cold War. However, as we have argued, these external influences interacted and played into internal dissonances, which had already developed under colonial rule, at the time of the establishment of the nationalist movements. As the international political context changed, the internal motivations and forces for conflict became more apparent, changing the character of the conflict. The historical experience of violence, including that of the colonial regime played a vital role in the way that Angolan society was transformed, in how the national movements were formed and in how the civil war developed.

We have proposed a perspective on conflict that takes into account the workings of the political economy of war, which focuses on the role and interplay between resources and power. However, we have also argued that economic activities and the control of resources are engrained in socio-cultural institutions, and that the role of such institutions must be considered in the study of conflict. A socio-institutional approach to war implies a focus on the local level, where the forces of the broader conflict interact with local norms and power relations, and the micro-dynamics of conflict are shaped. As such, in this chapter we have argued to look at everyday realities of war to understand how conflict plays out locally. This builds on Richards' (2005) ethnographic approach to war which advocates the need to understand war as a social process by studying its various dynamics in practice.

Our four cases of different municipalities demonstrate the diversity in experiences and perceptions of conflict and how they connect to macro-processes of war. The manifestations of conflict varied across time and space, based on a number of factors beyond just political affiliation. The micro-dynamics of conflict and its localised effects reflected and transformed existing social relations and institutions, as seen in the interactions between IDPs and residents, political and military actors, or traditional leaders and their communities. Failing to understand these differentiated everyday realities often results in assumptions about people's needs during conflict, so that the (humanitarian and political) responses tend to be rather standardised. Moreover, it can lead to a failure to recognise existing local capacities where these exist, for example in areas or periods of relative stability. On the other hand, the need to define a response strategy to conflict often leads to the labelling of individuals and groups into categories established along certain divisions: UNITA versus MPLA/Government areas; urban/city versus rural/bush people, displaced versus resident populations, (ex)-combatants versus civilians, etc. A look at the everyday realities of conflict quickly reveals that these categories are in fact fluid. Although displacement led to rapid urbanisation, it also involved population flows in various directions, including within rural areas. Many IDPs in these areas survived from informal trade rather than subsistence agriculture, as is often assumed in aid interventions that equate livelihoods support to agricultural recovery. Generalisations about specific population groups and assumptions about their needs have continued to inform post-

war reconstruction efforts whereby similar aid interventions are promoted in highly differentiated contexts.

In conclusion, we propose an understanding of the Angolan war i) as a social process, influenced by social relations and historically determined institutions, and ii) with multiple-realities and micro-dynamics influenced by individual and localised grievances.



## **4. History of rural economic developments, livelihoods and policies**

### **Introduction**

### **Economic policies and developments during colonial times**

### **Colonial policies and rural livelihoods**

### **Livelihoods in conflict, 1961-2002**

### **Conclusions**

### **Introduction**

This chapter discusses the colonial history of the rural society, economy and livelihoods in Angola, and specifically Huíla province. It starts with a characterization of Portuguese colonialism, and the major economic developments and policies during the colonial rule in Angola. Furthermore, I translate these economic policies by the Portuguese in Angola to the regional application and effects on rural economies and societies. People's everyday experiences with the colonial institutions and policies in their villages are presented, to create understanding of how major colonial policies shaped people's everyday lives. The interaction between white settlers and the African population was defined by forced labour practices, uneven competition on markets, and exploitative trading practices of the so called 'bush traders'. Yet, at the same time older Angolan generations maintain that the end of colonialism also diminished the availability of trade, commodities, industry and credit in the rural economy. In the last section in this chapter, an historical timeline is presented highlighting periods of colonialism, independence, and various stages during the civil war, to show how changes in rural society and livelihoods were informed by these events. The importance of this chapter for the thesis is that studies on Angola have often focused solely on the conflict period, and do not take into account what happened during the pre-independence period. However, the colonial history in Angola has co-shaped the future in setting parameters and forming expectations around rural livelihoods. The chapter is based on both (historical) literature and archive material as well as data from fieldwork in Lubango, Caluquembe and Chibia.

### **Economic policies and developments during colonial times**

This section discusses the major economic policies and developments during the Portuguese colonial history in Angola, to understand the underlying assumptions of policies and how these affected and shaped rural society and livelihoods. It also shows some specific characteristics of Portuguese-style colonialism and colonial policies. After a general history of Portuguese colonialism in Angola, and the main economic developments, more regionalized information will be presented in this chapter.

#### *Main economic drivers following a historical timeline*

The territory of modern-day Angola was initially inhabited by groups of Khoi-San, until Bantu migration from the North pushed them towards the southern African Kalahari region. When the first Portuguese arrived in the region of Luanda and the more northern regions of Angola, they met with the Bantu Population of the Congo Kingdom. Pre-colonial economic activity in Angola by its Bantu populations consisted mainly of livestock rearing and crop

cultivation, such as sorghum and millet, as well as some occasional fruits and vegetables (World Bank 1991). Although Angola was “discovered” as early as 1483 by Diogo Cão on his way to find a sea route to India, the region around present day Luanda wasn’t colonized further by the Portuguese until 1575, and the country only became an official Portuguese colony in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Angola wasn’t a very popular place for settlement to most Portuguese. During the first centuries of Portuguese presence in Angola, the white settlers going to Angola mostly consisted of so called *degredados*, or convicts (Bender 1978, Hammond 1975). This decreased steadily until the Second World War, at which time it was estimated that 20 per cent of all white settlers in Angola were former convicts (Birmingham 2006). The climate was considered unfavourable for white settlement, and white women were even nearly absent until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Bender 1978, Hammond 1975).

From the start of their conquests, Portuguese colonial policies focused mostly on using the revenues of trade to support the infrastructure development in Portugal itself (Clarence-Smith 1979). Angola was seen as a highly profitable overseas territory for Portugal. However, Portugal, itself a relatively poor country in comparison to the rest of Europe, lacked sufficient industry and capital to fully exploit the natural resources that Angola had to offer, even until well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Bender 1978). The World Bank (1991) broadly distinguishes 3 different economic periods in Angola through its exports over time. The first being the transatlantic slave trade directed mainly towards Brazil, followed by the coffee exports primarily to Portugal, and the third being oil exports to the US that have dominated the most recent years of Angolan economic developments (World Bank 1991).

The slave trade dominated the first period of economic policies by Portugal in its conquered regions, straight from the start in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Sugar plantations in Brazil and Sao Tomé became the point of destiny for an estimated 2.5 million Angolans throughout the period of slavery. The slave trade in Angola was mostly conducted between the merchants living on the coast and the African chiefs from the interior (World Bank 1991). The abolishment of slavery was a gradual process. First, slave exports were abolished in 1838, ending the profitable transatlantic trade of slaves from Angola to Brazil. The Portuguese officially adopted this prohibition on the transatlantic slave trade, but at the same time introduced various laws that accommodated the colony’s need for a cheap labour force before the abolishment of all forms of slavery would come. From the white settler communities much resistance grew towards the foreseen end of slavery, and creative policies and practices were designed to deal with this event, as the following quote from Bender (1978) shows:

“New guises were found under which to continue the old labour practices. For example, the 1875 legislation, supposedly designed to further refine categories of freed slaves, introduced a vagrancy clause which considered all ‘non-productive’ Africans as ‘vagrants’ and therefore subject to non-paying labour ‘contracts’. The determination of ‘productivity’ was usually left to local administrators, who had no difficulty finding enough ‘vagrants’ to meet the settlers’ demands for free labour” (Bender 1978, 139).

Only the complete abolishment of slavery in 1878 made an official end to slavery in Angola itself, although concealed slavery in the form of forced labour continued. No longer called slaves, African labourers were now *serviçaes* or *contratados*, who would sometimes forcibly be contracted by plantation owners for labour contracts of 2, 3 years or more. They would usually be paid in kind and work for 12 hours a day, often far removed from their families and areas of origin (Birmingham 1978). The system of forced labour that was introduced by the Portuguese after the official abolishment of slavery, as a way to continue providing cheap labour forces to the plantation owners, maintained similar inhuman conditions as slavery. In

1954 an estimated 10 per cent of the African population in Angola were considered to be contract workers, and some 35 per cent of these contract workers died during their 2 year contracts (Bender 1978). Forced labour as a new form of slavery was only ended in 1961 after the revolts on plantations in the north of the country, which marked the beginnings of the war for Angolan independence.

As revenues were no longer coming in from the traffic of slaves outside of Angola, attention was focused on seeking other export means in Angola, as well as the idea of creating an overseas market for Portuguese industry itself. However, apart from the export of Portuguese wine and rum to Angola, Portuguese industry had little to offer to the African market (Bender 1978, Birmingham 2006). Alternatively, Portugal focused its attention to introducing a plantation system reminiscent of that of Brazil. The worldwide rubber boom ensured Angola's first primary export product since the end of the transatlantic slave trade, and led to a countrywide production from 1870 until 1915 (World Bank 1991). Due to the growing rubber production in South East Asia in the 1910s, rubber prices dropped and reduced profitability for Angola (Clarence-Smith 1979). Rubber production slowly fizzled out until the mid-1920s when it was replaced by coffee as the number one export commodity.

Coffee production had been increased slowly in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, also in anticipation of the abolishment of the slave trade. Coffee exports grew until the 1890s when Angola could no longer compete with Brazil on the global coffee market (Birmingham 1978). In the 20<sup>th</sup> century coffee production was resumed, and increasingly became Angola's most important exporting commodity, with which the newly discovered diamonds could not compete. Coffee was the number one export commodity for Angola from 1946 until 1972, and was a driving factor behind the enormous increase of white settlers to Angola during this period (World Bank 1991). Although coffee production was practised both by white settlers and African farmers, land and labour issues continued to be decided in favour of the white settlers, even if fears existed about possible revolts by the African peasants (Birmingham 1978). Birmingham (1978), in his article on the history of the Angolan coffee industry in the district of Cazengo, quotes the conflict that surrounded the coffee industry (and eventually contributed to the peasant revolts of 1961 that officially marked the start of the struggle for independence) as example of colonial experimentation: "The system of credit which they (*Portuguese traders*) offered was usually ill-defined, but coffee trees and land were the essential security. This meant that at each crisis caused by drought or crop failure the trader took over the land from the producer. The spasmodic bankrupting of small African producers and the consolidation of landed estates by white immigrant traders remained a central feature of the economy of the Angolan coffee zones at least until 1961" (Birmingham 1978, 34).

At the end of the Portuguese colonial influence in Angola, a resource was discovered that proved to become the powerful engine behind Angola's post-independence economy, continuing to this day. In the 1950s and 1960s oil was discovered in respectively the Kwanza Basin and off the shore of Cabinda province (Le Billon 2007). Production soon started and by 1973 oil had surpassed coffee as the major export commodity in Angola (Hodges 2001). Due to these increasing oil revenues the World Bank (1991) called the financial situation of Angola at the time of independence in 1975 "excellent", although they noted this situation quickly changed due to the consequent collapse of distribution networks and production. After independence oil continued to be the number one export commodity of Angola, and much has been written about the role this resource played in financing and even prolonging the civil war that ensued after independence (Hodges 2001). For more on the role of oil in the Angolan war I refer to chapter 3.

One specific commodity deserves a special mention in this section on colonial economic history: alcohol. In much literature on the history of Portuguese colonial history, as well as from interviews during my fieldwork, the issue of alcohol as an important trading



commodity comes back repeatedly (Hammond 1975, Bender 1978, Birmingham 2006, World Bank 1991). Already in the pre-colonial period alcohol was a trading commodity. The palm tree was especially cultivated by African peasants to produce a liquor called *malufo*, and was one of the few handmade commodities at that time (World Bank 1991). Alcohol was seen as “the driving force of colonial penetration” (Birmingham 2006, 14), and played an essential role in the Angolan slave trade. Inland chiefs provided new slaves in return for *aguardente*, a local type of rum made from sugarcane. The slaves themselves were given alcohol to ensure they were kept under control during their transport to their new destination, and would sign their slavery contracts with less resistance under the influence of alcohol (Birmingham 2006). Since the 1850s white settlers had started to grow sugarcane to produce *aguardente*, whereas African producers were distilling similar types of alcoholic beverages from maize, pineapple, and sorghum (known under names like *macau* or *kizangwa*, etc.). When the Portuguese started treating their colonial territories as potential markets to export their own industrial goods, rum and wine became the principal export commodities to Angola. Meanwhile, local production of *aguardente* had risen to 15 million litres a year by 1899 (Hammond 1975). With the introduction of custom restrictions in 1892, Portugal attempted to make Angola a closed market for its wine exports, increasingly fighting the local manufacturing of alcoholic beverages (World Bank 1991, Bender 1978). Also due to increasing international pressure to fight alcoholism amongst African populations, *aguardente* production was banned in Angola effectively in 1911, enabling Portuguese winemakers to increase the exports of their, often inferior quality, wines to Angola. With reference to this trade of alcohol to its colonial territories, Bender calls it a classical example of imperial exploitation that had tremendous effects on society. “In large parts of Angola, Africans were unable to trade their cattle or agricultural produce for anything other than wine. Wherever this occurred the Africans had little incentive to expand crop production or increase their herds. Thus, the centuries old dependence on alcohol as the major item of trade in Angola enriched metropolitan interests and brought large profits to bush traders and a number of Portuguese businessmen in Angola; but economic development suffered in both the African and European sectors and alcoholism became one of Angola’s principal social problems” (Bender 1978, 147). Alcohol use of the African population also became a concern for the colonial authorities as it affected the health and efficiency of the labour force of the white settlers. Recommendations were therefore made to start handing out cooked meals to the labourers on the plantations, instead of paying them in cash or in food, as this might be traded for alcohol (Mendes 1958).

The effects of the Portuguese alcohol exporting policy, and linking trade with alcohol by the Portuguese can still be seen in Angola. Alcohol dependency is widespread both in rural and urban areas, crosscutting all classes and sectors of current Angolan society. Portuguese wines still make out the largest share on stock in Angolan supermarkets and restaurants. Also, to this day locally brewed liquor is a highly valued trade commodity in rural areas. Women mostly brew alcohol from maize or sorghum, and either sell it at the market or on the side of roads, but people also get paid for day-labour on fields of others in a fixed quantity of liquor. During fieldwork in the rural villages, I came across ingeniously designed liquor distilleries, as well as large buckets of fermenting drinks in nearly every village I visited.

### *Regional colonial expansion and policies*

The economic activities that became prominent in the Portuguese colonial territories depended heavily on the resources and possibilities that were to be found in each region. During the first centuries of the Portuguese presence in Angola, most white settlement was concentrated in and closely around the capital Luanda. For other parts of Angola, white

settlement in those times was barely noticeable. For example, in 1846 Luanda's European population consisted of a total of 1601 people, compared to 39 people in Benguela, and 20 in then Moçamedes, current day Namibe (Bender 1978). These were also all coastal towns, leaving a vast inland territory yet to be explored and exploited. Coastal settlement was considered to be essential in the first centuries of the Portuguese presence in Angola, because of the transatlantic slave trade with mostly Brazil.

Instead of farmers, the Portuguese state could only find *degradados* that could be sent to Angola to oversee commercial farming and industries for natural resource extraction, to increase Portuguese control over the more distant parts of the overseas territory, and to expand colonial markets for Portuguese exports (Bender 1978, Clarence-Smith 1979). Only during the 19<sup>th</sup> century did the Portuguese expansion into the interior commence. This search for other colonial settlement areas was linked to the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade, and the need for Portugal to increase revenues by introducing a taxation system for the African populations, as well as setting up a plantation sector equivalent to that in Brazil, which was lost by the Portuguese when it became independent in 1825 (Clarence-Smith 1979).

For the south of Angola this type of white expansion started in the 1840s, with Moçamedes as the second chosen place for white settlement after Luanda. Moçamedes was deemed to be of a suitable climate for settlement because of the absence of mosquitos that were linked to the high number of deaths amongst white settlers from malaria. After an initial wave of some 500 white settlers coming to Moçamedes around 1849 consisting mainly of Brazilians, the white settler population soon shrunk by half when they discovered that the desert-like climate and lack of fresh water limited the options for agricultural ventures and led to many crop failures (Bender 1978). Some of these settlers decided to resettle to Huíla province where the climate was deemed more suitable for agricultural production. The initial group of settlers in Huíla province halfway the 19<sup>th</sup> century did not expand much in the following years, and consisted of a few Germans, Brazilians, and 55 Boer families from South Africa (Urquhart 1963, 131). To most Portuguese the prospect of going to the inlands of Angola and starting a farm was not sufficiently appealing, instead they preferred to stay in the urban areas (Hammond 1975). The Portuguese state had to provide some financial incentives to emigrants in order to increase the number of settlement areas and thus be able to extend its control over the vast Angolan territory. Agricultural settlements were heavily financed by the Portuguese administration, as well as the actual travel to the overseas territories.

The southern coast of Angola, primarily the coastal towns of Moçamedes (current name Namibe) and Porte Alexandre (current name Tombua) in the province Moçamedes became important economic drivers for the fishing industry of Angola, and major exporting markets for dried fish (Clarence-Smith 1979). For Huíla province it meant a colonial economic policy that focused mostly on agriculture, due to the availability of rich water sources and fertile lands. Also, the cool climate of especially the Huíla Highland district was considered to be especially suitable for white settlement. However, many of the first white settlers in the province never entered into farming activities, instead preferring to go into public service, run shops and conduct trade which could be more lucrative and required less physical activity (Hammond 1975, Galvão 1929). The fact that the Huíla region was quite isolated due to the existence of only one access road, made settlement there less desirable for many Portuguese (Medeiros 1976). A group of around 300 Boers from the Transvaal region in South Africa had already settled in the Huíla Highlands at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and had been given lands by the Portuguese. This group of settlers continued to grow steadily, and relied mostly on their transport and hunting activities, rather than use their lands for large-scale farming. The Portuguese government decided to counter the ever growing

presence of the Boer population in the region, as it represented a threat to Portuguese sovereignty in the southern part of the Angolan territory, by encouraging Portuguese settlement there, most notably by a group of 1500 small farmers from the island of Madeira (Clarence-Smith 1979, Medeiros 1976).

Next to groups of Boers and Portuguese settlers, Huíla province also saw many white missionaries in the rural areas. A famous example of a missionary station in the province is the Swiss evangelical mission of Helí Chatelain in Caluquembe, which was founded in 1897. Although the initial objective of the Swiss missionary was to fight slavery in the region, the mission post in Caluquembe soon became an important trading post in the region for the African farmers and Boers. The anti-slavery fight was somewhat abandoned as to not disturb the trading relationships that the Swiss missionary had established with the Boer population. Much has been written about Helí Chatelain and his mission post in Caluquembe, most famous being the literature by Birmingham (1998) and Péclard (1995). More information about this mission post, and its transformation into an important regional hospital, as well as its political position during the civil war, can be found in chapter 5.

### **Colonial policies, institutions and practices for rural livelihoods**

This section examines the colonial policies, rural institutions and livelihood practices that historically existed in Huíla province. Colonial policies and institutions affected people's rural livelihoods in many ways, they set the boundaries in which people were able to move and make decisions on their livelihoods. Especially policies regarding forced labour, planned white settlement, and agricultural and industrial activities affected people's choices as well as the commodities that were available for production and trade. This section gives an overview of some of these colonial policies and institutions and the way they affected people's lives in Huíla province.

Colonial economic developments in Angola were introduced in the previous section and will be complemented in this section by micro economic developments and how these played out in the rural areas and on rural livelihoods, as well as the everyday experiences and encounters of people with the colonial system. The role of the Portuguese rural economic colonial system on the lives and livelihoods of people in the province will be elaborated by using data from interviews, fieldwork in Chibia and Caluquembe, archive material and literature.

The period discussed here mostly comprises the last century of Portuguese colonial rule, as most information gathered and available pertains to that specific time. It was during this last century (1850-1975), that colonial expansion increasingly affected people in Huíla province. Before this time the interior of Angola had not been explored extensively, although people had had previous encounters with colonial expeditions, or occasional wars between the Portuguese and local tribes. But after 1850, as white settlement rapidly increased, so did the colonial socio-economic and political frameworks that started to dictate everyday life in rural Huíla province.

#### *Agriculture and forced labour*

Policies on livelihoods during the colonial era were very much focused on increasing the profits in goods and monetary returns that overseas territories offered to the Portuguese economy. In order for the commercial expansion of the plantations to take place, and to satisfy the labour need of the white farmers, the system of forced labour was introduced as replacement for slavery which had been officially abolished in 1878. The new labour code

introduced in 1911 by the Portuguese government distinguished between two different types of forced labour workers: *voluntários* (those who entered into labour contracts without state engagement) or *contratados* (those who had been forced by the state) (Clarence-Smith 1979). More women than men worked on plantations, as they were thought to have more experience and skills with agricultural production, and because their salaries had been set lower in the new forced labour contracts. They were housed on the plantation grounds and usually worked from sunrise to sunset (Clarence-Smith 1979).

One of my interviews with an elderly man in Chibia, Mr. Manuel, gave a personalized historical perspective on white settlement in that municipality, and the role that the *fazenda* (big commercial farm) played on labour relations as well as migratory patterns of slaves in the area.

The area or *bairro* (neighbourhood) near the municipal centre of Chibia, which is now referred to as Fazenda Amélia is one of the oldest neighbourhoods in the municipality. The area used to be a big commercial farm owned by Portuguese settlers. People from the neighbouring province of Namibe were brought to the *fazenda* to work as slaves. The slave trade happened on an extensive scale during that period, and people were brought in from all over the Angolan territory, including the more northern provinces of Angola, from where the Kimbari people of Luanda originated of which some ended up in Chibia. Fazenda Amélia was privately owned by a Portuguese settler called Dr. Santos. The area was massive, reaching from the road towards Jau until the Huíla river. At the *fazenda* they produced mostly wheat, maize and sugarcane for specifically the production of *aguardente*. There weren't any machines and agricultural instruments available, so all the work on the land was done by manual labour. Many people from the Chibia region worked at Fazenda Amélia.

The family of Mr. Manuel has a long labour history at the *fazenda*. Mr Manuel's mother was born in 1901, at that time her father was already the supervisor of the *fazenda*. His father was a *mestiço* and lived most of his life in Alta-Bimbe, Humpata but was born in Chibia. When his father was 36 years old he left Chibia to go to Humpata. He had been a technician at Fazenda Amélia but started his own farm in Humpata. Mr. Manuel's father and grandfather both worked at the Fazenda Amélia, until the *fazenda* closed because its owner, Dr. Santos, left the country in the 1950s.

On the 5<sup>th</sup> of October 1914 Fazenda Amélia officially stopped using slave labour. Most of the former slave labourers who had been working at the *fazenda*, continued to live in the Chibia region either after termination of their labour contracts, or when the *fazenda* closed down. By that time they had already spent long periods of time away from their areas of origin.

This personal history allows us to see how the slavery turned into a system of forced labour, and how it functioned in practice. It also shows how people were disconnected from their areas of origin and found it hard to reconnect after the end of slavery.

Whereas many people were taken from other parts of the country to work as forced labourer on fazenda's in Huíla, as described above, opposite population movements also took place. Many people in Chibia entered into these *serviçaes* contracts for various reasons. The main ethnic group in Chibia are the Nyaneka-Humbi, whose central livelihoods revolve around agro-pastoralism. Cattle rearing was the central feature of the local economy and rural livelihoods during colonial times, and agriculture satisfied further subsistence needs, when the climate allowed for it. The payment that was received after termination of a forced labour contract was often used to purchase more livestock.

African farmers were allowed a more or less autonomous food production until the 1930s, and produced mainly to satisfy subsistence needs. In the Huíla Highlands, where predominantly Nyaneka people lived, cattle rearing was the primary livelihood activity. Cattle was an important asset, both for subsistence needs and the trading of hides and manure, as well as forming a steady monetary unit (Clarence-Smith 1979). Agricultural food production was the second major livelihood activity in the south of the province after cattle rearing, but was the most important activity in the north of the province amongst the Ovimbundu. The differences in livelihood possibilities between the two regions are mostly defined by favourable climates and access to water. Farming was a predominantly female endeavour. Men occasionally cleared plots of lands, but sowing, cultivation and harvesting were considered to belong to the women's work domain. Men on the other hand were involved in activities such as: hunting, iron- and woodwork, carpentry, and long-distance trading (Heywood 2000). For farming, little use was made of agricultural tools, save the plough. For crop production a system of shifting cultivation was practised, in which cultivation on alternating plots of land would allow the soil to recover its fertility during the fallow periods. Use was made of a diverse range of plots of land that was available to them, in which four different types could be distinguished: "*Ocumbu* - house garden, *Onaka* - low-lying lands along streams, *Ombanda* - plots sloping up from the river, and *Epia* - clearings in the forest" (Heywood 2000, 10). These plot types are still distinguished to this day, and especially the *Onakas* are considered essential for practising horticulture due to the proximity to rivers, and therefore easy access to a water source. The African population did not make use of irrigation systems. Rather, they practiced rain fed-agriculture, made use of rivers by locating their fields most favourably to it, and relied on the crops planted on the *Onakas* to overcome the dry season (Urquhart 1963, Heywood 2000, Medeiros 1976). Pre-colonial land was communally owned and through customary law, with usufruct rights regulated through the *sobas* who would appoint land, sometimes in return for food or labour. Land could be inherited if the *soba* chose not to intervene in the process. Usufruct rights only pertained to men, women were not considered to have rights over land, and also did not inherit land through this system (Medeiros 1976). If land was abandoned for some time, often because soil had become depleted, people would be able to use it after asking permission from the former user first (Medeiros 1976, 416-417). With the introduction of new land legislation at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century by the colonial authorities this land had been categorized as 'vacant' next to privately or state owned land (Clover 2005, 351). Although this categorization recognized the existence of land tenure by the African population, the colonial state did not extend property rights over it, enabling the expansion of land ownership for plantations by new Portuguese immigrants in the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Clover 2005). "At the height of the colonial period there were 300,000 colonial families who occupied 4,5 million ha of land and used only 11 percent of this, against while 4,3 million traditional families occupied 4,5 million ha of land and utilised 60 percent of this" (Clover 2005, 354).

Crop production for the markets had started slowly in the 1840s, but was boosted by the introduction of maize as a cash crop in the 1910s. Maize production was mostly a female endeavour, and enabled women to produce sufficient amounts for household consumption as well as some surplus for the markets (Heywood 2000). However, the African peasants found it increasingly difficult to compete on markets with the white settlers who had government backing in different forms (policies, power, institutions, input and further financial incentives). First of all, they sometimes saw themselves displaced from their lands by the arrival of new white settlers. Secondly, they also had to deal with uneven competition due to the white settlers' advantage on the markets deriving from improved access to water through irrigation, inputs and financial and technical assistance. In Huíla during the 1920s it was noted that local traders had migrated with the arrival of more white settlers, much to the

disappointment of the Governor of the province who had wanted them to “mobilize their resources to establish regular trading with the Europeans” (Galvão 1929, 135). In the 1920s and 1930s there were some further developments in the rural economy, which made the African population increasingly turn from trade to agricultural production of cash crops like: maize, beans, wheat and sometimes rice (Heywood 1988, Clarence-Smith 1979). One of the developments that stimulated production of cash crops was the arrival of the Benguela railway, linking Huíla province to the port of Namibe, thus creating the possibilities to export agricultural produce more easily (Heywood 1988, Gadiot 2006). With the establishment of the railway the number of white settlers along the railway line grew as they saw more opportunities for commercial farming and trade. Over the years white settlement in the province grew, and by 1927-1928 the European population consisted of 4.1 per cent of a total population of 125.764 (Galvão 1929).

As colonial expansion was to be realized through the development of agriculture the demand of the white farmers for forced labourers to work on the *fazendas* increased. A workforce of forced labourers had become easier to obtain by white settlers as a result of some new colonial policies that had impoverished and limited the options available to the African population. Since the establishment of the “New State” government by Salazar in Portugal in 1933, a renewed nationalist and imperialist focus commenced, which led to new colonial policies affecting Angola. These new policies had increased the demand for forced labour and limited the access of African populations to their own local markets, leaving trade mechanisms entirely into the hands of colonial institutions (Heywood 1988). Although agricultural production rose, the prohibition of trading on African markets in favour of rural colonial institutions, limited access to cash for African farmers. Colonial hut taxation, which required each African male to pay a certain amount to the Portuguese authority for each hut he owned, had at first been payable through agricultural commodities. However, as the tax amount increased substantially and became payable only in cash, many among the rural population became indebted, thus becoming unable to meet taxation demands and therefore running the risk to be enlisted as forced labourer until the debt had been paid off (Heywood 1988).

Alternatives to forced labour were not explored by the Portuguese government although it realized that the exploitative nature of the system needed to change or be abolished, as an article by Mendes (1958) about the productivity of native population in Huíla and Namibe shows. In the article Mendes voices concern about the increasing migration of native populations from Huíla to work in the mines in South Africa and current day Namibia. There, they would work under contract for 18 months and would be paid three times more in comparison with the labour contracts in Angola. On their return to Huíla, they would invest their cash earnings in cattle for instance, and could still enlist for the mines two more times. After three of these mining contracts, they usually had sufficient financial capital for their household survival to avoid being drawn into forced labour contracts in Angola. Mendes (1958) also added the risk of illness and accidents related to the work in mines, as well as the decrease in births due to the long duration of contracts as factors further reducing the future work force. Thus, migration to South Africa limited the availability of the native work force in Huíla for various reasons, and therefore the white settlers and colonial institutions in Huíla were looking into the possibility of investing in more agricultural machinery to cope with the lack of manual labourers (Mendes 1958). Investment in agricultural machines was deemed a more viable option at that time, instead of critically investigating and improving the labour contracts and financial remuneration for the African population. The Governor of Huíla in 1929, Henrique Galvão, responded negatively to a request from the Portuguese Delegation of the League of Nations when asked to respond to a questionnaire about a review of the system of forced labour and awarding more rights to the African population. As a new labour system

for the African population would go against the economic interests of the white settlers, revolts among these were not imaginary. Hence, Galvão justified his resistance to reforms with the humanitarian motive of protecting the African population against violent resistance from the white settlers (Galvão 1929)<sup>17</sup>.

### *Colonial institutions and rural livelihoods*

With the end of slavery, and the colonial expansion into the interior of Angola in search of alternative profitable economic activities, the Portuguese government started pushing for planned white settlements in the rural areas from 1900 onwards. To attract more interested Portuguese farmer immigrants to Angola, financial incentives were created by the Portuguese government. These incentives included payment of the travel expenses for the whole family to Angola, allotment of a plot of land, provision of a house, seeds, cattle, technical assistance, and even a small allowance to help the white farmers cope financially during the first period of their stay. Many of the Portuguese immigrants to Angola did not have any farming experience, and those who did were often poor farmers who did not bring a starting capital, and wanted to make quick money before returning to Portugal. Some of these planned settlements quickly failed due to the lack of capital and technical experience with African soils and crops (Bender 1978). The large agricultural planned settlements that were put in place by the Portuguese government were called *colonatos*. There were *colonatos* across the larger part of Angola, especially in the areas that were deemed to have a favourable climate for both white settlement and agricultural production.<sup>18</sup> Plots of lands were assigned to, most often, a group of *colonos* (Portuguese settlers) who started plantations assisted by a forced labour force from the original peasant communities in the area. Huíla had a few of these *colonatos* scattered around the province, differing in size and importance. One of the villages where my fieldwork took place was the site of a former small *colonato*, led by a Portuguese engineer. Some of the elderly in the village of Cue 1 in Caluquembe municipality, still remembered the *colonato* structure well, and had worked there themselves. Land, water and agricultural inputs were divided amongst village members. The distributed seeds needed to be returned to the *colonos* after harvesting. Any surplus harvest could either be retained by the labourers, or traded back to the *colonos* for other goods. This left the *colonos* with harvests gained through free labour.

In 1961 the government of Portugal decided to install a new institute in Angola that was intended to control the agricultural planned settlements in rural Angola, called the Junta Provincial de Povoamento de Angola (JPP). The JPP had as objective regulating the settlement of white farmers, as well as Cape Verdean immigrants in order to increase agricultural production. Increasingly feeling pressured by the struggle for independence and unrest among African populations, the JPP aimed for more multi-racial settlements, and included a military component to these settlement structures by explicitly inviting former Portuguese soldiers to enlist as new settlers in the Angolan territory (Bender 1978). One such *colonato*, which included this multi-racial component has been subject of an extensive study by Gadiot (2006). This *colonato* was located in the village of Lossolo, in Caconda

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<sup>17</sup> Interestingly, Henrique Galvão during the 1940s became a firm opponent of Portuguese colonialism, specifically regarding its forced labour policies that encouraged the exploitation and maltreatment of the native population. He was later suspected of organizing a coup to install a moral alternative Portuguese government in Angola in opposition to Salazar's regime.

<sup>18</sup> The *colonato* of Cela, located in the Central Highlands is a well-known example of a large agricultural settlement (Hammond 1975, Bender 1978). The initial plan for Cela had been to settle 1700 Portuguese families there, giving 45 acres of land to cultivate to each family. The results were disappointing however, as only 300 families stayed in Cela, and the large investments never paid off. Also, its policy of not hiring any local workforce, created much resentment amongst the African population (Bender 1978).

municipality. The *colonato* in Lossolo was started rather late, especially in light of political developments in Angola in the early 1960s that created much resistance amongst the Angolan population towards new expansions of colonial policy. In 1964 land was appropriated and houses built to accommodate the new *colonos*: a mix of Portuguese settlers with Cape Verdean immigrants. The objective for this *colonato* was to become a multi-racial and modernised agricultural society” (Bender 1973, Kuder 1971, cited in Gadiot 2006). As the liberation struggle became increasingly fierce, the Portuguese settlers left the *colonato* to seek refuge in the cities, until most of them left the country for good in 1975 when independence was declared. Most Cape Verdeans on the other hand stayed at Lossolo, claiming Angola had become their land now, and that they would fight together with the population to defend it. But by 1983, due to increasing pressure from the MPLA-led government, all Cape Verdeans had disappeared from Lossolo (Gadiot 2006). Although integration of Cape Verdeans in Lossolo society developed rather well, at least fulfilling one of the objectives the Portuguese had set for the new *colonato*, the Lossolo *colonato* did not become a prime example of modernised agriculture as the Portuguese had envisaged it. Rather, the Cape Verdeans were deemed to have adapted too much to the agricultural techniques that the African farmers had employed over time, as their own agricultural skills proved rather limited. The Lossolo experiment led to a decision by the colonial government to abandon further efforts in recruiting Cape Verdeans for settlement in agricultural communities such as the *colonatos* (Gadiot 2006).

Another important colonial institution that guided cereal production among specifically the African farmer societies were the cereal marketing boards, supervised by the *Instituto dos Cereais de Angola* (Angola Cereal Board). These institutions were established to control all wheat and maize production by African farmers. All cereals produced by African farmers were sold through this institution, and it regulated the prices for these commodities which were far below the prices that African farmers would be able to get on the normal markets (Heywood 1988). The drop in income from cereal production because of these fixed prices, compounded by depleted soils caused by this extensive cash crop production, and confiscation of fertile lands by white settlers, led to an increase in labour migration by African males (Bender 1978).

Agriculture and trade were the predominant livelihood activities, interacting at the local markets, where agricultural produce could be bought and imported goods sold (World Bank 1991). As shown before, these types of markets were effectively prohibited by the Portuguese government, leaving the African rural population few alternative spaces for trade. One alternative for these markets was the emergence of so called bush traders or *musseque* merchants (World Bank 1991). These Portuguese shopkeepers operated in either the ‘bush’ (rural areas), or the ‘*musseque*’ (urban neighbourhoods or slums inhabited by Africans), and effectively dominated all trade, import and export, credit, and agricultural seeds. They were known to exploit the African population in various ways, in order to round up enough capital in a short time span enabling them to start a more comfortable life elsewhere (World Bank 1991). Although it gave African farmers access to credit, the system supporting it was inherently exploitative in nature. “Transactions were based on the barter of goods, the value of which was set by the bush trader. Because Africans had practically no access to sources of credit, they were forced to rely on the bush trader for credit to purchase goods between harvests. The refusal of most traders to allow Africans to pay off their debts in cash prevented them from selling their products in the government-run rural markets (which usually paid higher prices, but did not extend credit). Furthermore, without access to the middlemen from whom the bush trader bought and sold goods, Africans were tied into a system in which they had to sell their products to the local bush trader, or not sell at all” (Bender 1978, 191). So, even though the bush trader provided a source of credit, the constraints placed on getting the



credit and paying off the debts, impoverished the African farmers further and limited their options of trading elsewhere.

### *Everyday rural life under the Portuguese*

During fieldwork in both Chibia and Caluquembe municipalities, I collected stories from village elders about their own experiences and the village history under the Portuguese colonial system. These stories either focused on experiences of being conscripted as *serviçaes* to work on plantations in the north of the country, with the rural colonial trade systems that existed prior to independence, or the planned agricultural settlements known as the *colonatos*. In this section of the chapter I would like to present some of these life histories concerning people's experiences with these colonial economic features which impacted their lives and livelihoods on an everyday basis.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the production, use and trade of alcoholic beverages were controversial, and at the heart of many encounters between the local population and colonial settlers. In Chibia, the production and trade in alcoholic beverages continues to be present in all aspects of everyday life, as it was during colonial times. A local brew of sorghum, known as *macau*, is made in many of the villages and neighbourhoods in the municipality, primarily by women. In the middle of the collection of huts, some big plastic containers of 50 litres stand in the sun, filled with the milky white brew. Villagers themselves and passers-by stop to drink a cup, sometimes paid for in cash but most often with a tradable good like food. This trade and use of *macau* has a long history in Chibia, and during colonial times *macau* was a commodity that was at the root of many disputes between local villagers and the white traders in the municipality, and hence became subject to colonial control.

“In the time of Joao de Almeida<sup>19</sup> almost all land was worked on by hand, there was hardly any livestock. Crops like beans, potato and sweet potato were introduced by the white settlers. During the colonial times one of the major income-generating activities, next to agriculture, was the illegal distilleries of *Macau*, which is a strong liquor made from *massambala* (sorghum). We would make it at home and sell it, but we were being hunted down by the police. You would risk 6 months of jail if they caught you making *macau*. The white shopkeepers would only sell you 5 kilos of sugar per day, so you had to go and visit all the different shops to get enough sugar for the *macau*. The shopkeepers did not want you to make and sell *macau*, to protect their own business of selling (Portuguese) wines. You would have to sell and drink the *macau* deep in the middle of the bush to prevent the police from finding you. In 1971-72 this changed a bit, we were allowed a little more freedom to do what we wanted. The municipal administrator at that time was a bit more progressive with regard to education and livelihoods of the black population. Another activity at the time was selling eggs and goats. In the colonial times all the fields were filled with wheat, and also some onion and garlic”. (Interview with 93-year old man from a Nyaneka Kimbo).

As the experience above shows, the brewing of *macau* was seen as an illegal activity by the white traders that wanted to protect their own source of income. With the prohibition of *aguardente* production in 1911, the Portuguese farmers in Chibia had already suffered when their wide scale sugarcane production could no longer be used for *aguardente* distilling and

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<sup>19</sup> João de Almeida was governor of Huíla province from 1908-1910 and had his residency in Chibia-Sede. The town was named after him (Vila João de Almeida) in 1927, and given its current name, Chibia by the time of independence in 1975.

its subsequent selling to the African population (Medeiros 1976). They had turned to selling fortified Portuguese wines instead. Increasingly, the local brewing and selling of *macau* made from sorghum was seen as a threat to the Portuguese market, and was being controlled by the police and through sugar rationing by Portuguese shopkeepers. The intensification of sorghum cultivation in Huíla was actually discouraged by its Governor in 1929 as the crop would be used for the production of *macau* (Galvão 1929). To this day, *macau* is not sold in any of the bars in the municipal centre of Chibia, it remains confined to the bush.

Mr. Zé Carlos, an inhabitant of Chibia and son of a former Portuguese shopkeeper in town recounted the trading that took place in his father's shop before independence. His father owned a shop in Chibia-sede and sold goods such as wine and rice on credit. People paid him back with the maize and sorghum that they produced. Mr. Zé Carlos appreciated the trading system and says that since independence and the disappearance of these types of trading posts, people are finding it increasingly difficult to obtain forms of credit. This sentiment was also voiced by Mr. Domingos from the village of Camucuio in Caluquembe municipality. He remembers the presence of the Portuguese shop traders in his village as a time when at least the availability of goods and trade was greater in comparison to the war and post-war period.

“In 1930 Camucuio received its name by the first Portuguese man that settled here to open a shop and started doing business with the local people. In 1955 a second Portuguese arrived in Camucuio, soon after which more Portuguese followed. In November 1975 all the white settlers fled Camucuio. Before they left we had many more agricultural plots, rain, goods, and we were able to trade a lot of our own produce at the shops of the Portuguese. The quality of our produce was also much better because we had access to oxen, rain and agricultural inputs.”

His opinion seems to have been shared by many older people I came across from the rural areas where fieldwork took place. They found that in comparison to the current post-war situation, people were better off during the pre-independence years under colonial rule when it came to the availability of goods, industries, employment and trade. At the same time, as the experience in Chibia on *macau* production above showed, the extensive control of the colonial regime over everyday activities of the local population affected their self-determination and freedom. The everyday encounters between the local population and the colonial regime in these villages was marked by both loss of personal freedom over activities and labour and at the same time a rural economic network that ensured more economic opportunities. So, even though relationships were unequal and exploitative, colonial structures provided a form of economic safety nets through which goods, employment and trade benefitted some people. When this disappeared with the start of the civil war people had to cope with the gap formed by the withdrawing colonial system and a newly formed state which was yet unable to provide a new socio-economic safety net.

## **Rural economic developments and livelihoods during colonialism and conflict: 1961-2002**

This section presents the historical timeline of how the conflict in Angola (pre-independence, the socialist era, and the fiercest part of the conflict until 2002) evolved and what effects these three different periods in the conflict and the ensuing differing policies and contexts meant for rural economic development and livelihoods in Angola.

During the 1950s nationalist movements emerged calling for independence from the Portuguese, and local resistance against plantation owners and poor labour conditions started

growing. This resulted in an outbreak of violence in 1961 by peasants revolting against the white plantation owners in the north of the country. This marked the start of the war for independence from Portugal that lasted until independence was achieved in 1975, only to lead the country straight into a destructive civil war that continued until 2002. During these almost 41 years of intermittent war, the rural economy and livelihoods of rural inhabitants were severely affected and shaped by the conditions and constraints that the wars and often consequent displacement brought with them. Colonialism and conflict define the parameters in which people can move freely and make choices regarding the livelihoods they wish to pursue within the availability of resources that they have. This section explains the changes that occurred in rural livelihoods in Huíla province during colonialism and conflict, with a focus on the type of policies and institutions that existed during these periods that guided the development of these livelihoods.

#### *1961-1975: rural economy and livelihoods during the independence struggle*

Calls for self-determination started growing during the 1940s and 1950s, initially mostly amongst the Angolan urban elites (Sogge 2006). During the 1950s groups calling for independence from Portugal had slowly become more politically organized with the foundation of nationalist liberation movements such as the MPLA and União das Populações de Angola (UPA). These political formations coincided with a growing unrest under peasant populations about the bad working conditions and payments on the plantations, and the forced cotton cultivation by the Portuguese authorities (Cornwell 2000). The start of the liberation war in Angola was violently marked by the Baixa de Cassanje revolt in the cotton sector in the Northern province of Malanje, on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of January 1961. The revolt coincided with a recession in Angola's economy, which affected the coffee, fishing and cotton industries heavily, leading to increased unemployment amongst African workers, as well as falling prices and salaries not being paid (Cornwell 2000). Le Billon (2007) links the founding of especially the MPLA with the discovery of oil in 1955 and Portuguese annexation of Angola as an overseas province in 1951. The World Bank (1991) makes a connection between the formation of the liberation movements and the coffee boom and subsequent influx of the Portuguese into the country. The coffee plantation system required more forced labourers, whereas the increased Portuguese settlers' presence coincided with the growing economic exploitation of the local population in the interior through the practices of the so called bush traders. "In 1960, in the north of the country, the coffee boom led many settlers to apply constant pressure to enlarge their plantations, disregarding the rights of the black owners. Simultaneously, deprivation and discontent in the countryside was attributed to the high prices charged by the traders in the hinterland and the low quality of the products they sold. While the resentment towards the bush traders was common in the whole territory, native property rights were more respected in the rest of the country than in the coffee growing region". (World Bank 1991, 160). According to Bender (1978), the bush traders had the image of being thieves and racists who exploited the African population where they could. Stories of balance scales being fixed when weighing cattle and produce, and paying extremely low prices for agricultural produce that the African farmers brought to the shops were common. The resentment against the bush traders was also known within the colonial structures, but not much was done about it (Bender 1978).

The rise of the nationalist movements articulating the need for independence, and the revolts of 1961 in which some 2,000 white settlers and 50,000 Africans were killed, demanded not only an armed response from the Portuguese government but also colonial policy changes (Bender 1978). The first policy change came in the subsequent abolishment of forced labour practices and land expropriation by white settlers in September 1961, as a first attempt to restore some peace in rural African societies. Secondly, steps were taken to

abandon inherent racist elements from the system by opening up the possibility for equal access to social, economic and education institutions to the African population. And thirdly, in order to keep the African populations out of reach of the nationalist movements, the Portuguese government started resettling them in villages, controlled by army and secret police. The latter two approaches were eventually incorporated into one, where resettlement programs for entire rural communities were implemented to bring both development to and exercise control over the population (Bender 1978). Next to the approach of resettlement to counter the expansion of nationalist movements and demands for independence, the Portuguese government tried to introduce some reforms in colonial policies. It started allowing more Angolans access to secondary education and employment in public administration, to try and correct the racial imbalance in these sectors (World Bank 1991).

The rural resettlement of the African population that eventually affected some 1 million people commenced in 1967 as Portugal's major response towards the nationalists call for independence. A further distinction was made between strategic resettlement (camps with barbed wire fences to limit the access of national movements to the population) and rural resettlement (unfenced villages) (Bender 1978). For the Ovimbundu of central Angola, which includes northern Huíla province, this type of resettlement was directly countering their own development to venture outside of village structures in search of improved economic opportunities. Diverse factors as soil erosion, overpopulation and cash crop production of maize, beans, coffee, and wheat had increased the need of the Ovimbundu for larger landholdings, instead of the small plots of land that were assigned through community structures (Bender 1978, Possinger 1973). The rural resettlement schemes ran counter with these developments and directly affected cash crop production by the Ovimbundu. For the Nyaneka populations in the south, the resettlement schemes were also detrimental to the maintenance of their livelihoods, and their social structures. Pastoralist societies, accustomed to herding their cattle over vast stretches of land and not used to living in village structures, now were forced into fixed villages, while the white settlers often took over the abandoned land to start large-scale cattle ranching. The Portuguese resettlement policies in response to the Angolans struggle for independence thus constrained the rural economy and rural livelihoods even further.

#### *1975-1991: rural economy and livelihoods and the socialist policies of the post-independence state*

When independence was declared in November 1975, a mass exodus of Portuguese from the country ensued. As there had been little investment in education and formal skills for the African population by the colonial regime before independence, the country was faced with a severe lack of technically skilled personnel and management (Kofi 1981). Small businesses, commercial farms, manufacturing industry and the rural trading system disappeared and economic sabotage took place by fleeing Portuguese, leaving the country in a deep economic crisis (Hodges 2004, Le Billon 2007, Bhagavan 1980). The departure of the Portuguese led to what Sogge (2006) calls the 'goods famine' in rural societies, where no products were leaving the areas, but also no essential commodities such as agricultural inputs were coming in. With the disappearance of colonial structures from the country, the white merchants in the rural areas also departed. Although they were the symbol of colonial oppression, racism and exploitation of the African population, the absence of the so called musseque merchants and bush traders, meant that certain exploitative yet important rural trade mechanisms ceased to exist. As seen in the previous section on peoples' experiences with the colonial system, the goods and credit could no longer be obtained through the bush traders after 1975, and this system was not replaced by other trading mechanisms to support the rural economy. This in

part had to do with the fact that the declaration of independence in 1975 was directly followed by a struggle for power amongst the nationalist movements, starting a destructive civil war that lasted until 2002. Financial means of the Government of Angola were thus mostly turned towards feeding the war machine, instead of making investments in the rural economy to support further employment possibilities, agricultural production, industries and trade (Le Billon 2007).

When independence was achieved the official rhetoric on the country's economic development strategy of the new MPLA-led Angolan government was that agriculture should be considered as the base, with industry as a dynamic factor (Young 1988). Furthermore, it stressed "the centrality of state ownership of productive resources and overall state control of the economy" (Young 1988, 170). The MPLA had strong ties with the Soviet Union who had backed their fight for independence, and continued supporting the party in keeping the other political parties like FNLA and UNITA at bay in their quest for power. MPLA's political ideology was strongly based on Marxism-Leninism, which in turn influenced their approach towards dealing with the country's economic downfall after independence, due to the loss of business and commercial agriculture in the country. The economy was nationalized and followed the centralized planning features of the Soviet Union's economic system. However, the centralized planning system failed due to misallocation of resources and inefficiency, which in turn affected the little industry still standing (Hodges 2004). Meanwhile, oil production and export was still on-going, whereas agricultural industry and trade fell into disregard, creating a clear division in the country with Luanda as an oil enclave where business was carrying on, but leaving the rural area and economy neglected (Hodges 2004, Le Billon 2007). With the withdrawal of colonial structures, the rural economy, distribution and transportation system collapsed, leading to food shortages (Bhagavan 1980). In order to deal with these food shortages, the MPLA-led government turned its attention to stimulating productivity of the abandoned large commercial farms by replacing machinery and supporting further mechanization (Kofi 1981). As peasant cultivation was considered backward, the state promoted a process of villagization in order to support modern agricultural development, but also to be able to provide social services to the dispersed rural population. Although large state farms were considered to also have a positive effect on peasant ways of production that were considered backward, in reality little efforts were made to connect the two ways of production (Young 1988). Furthermore, no efforts were made to commercially link rural and urban areas, moreover the state was nationalizing private wholesaling and even effectively limiting market activities (Young 1988, 178). The rural development strategy thus mostly consisted of state controlled large farms and nationalizing commerce, with little attention towards market and industry development or supporting peasant production in these rural areas.

Agriculture is influenced by conflict in many ways, such as the destruction of infrastructure, lack of access to markets, credit, and agricultural inputs. Furthermore, outbreaks of violence caused mass displacement of the population. The extensive use of landmines from the start of the colonial war in 1961 by all warring parties involved made large parts of agricultural land inaccessible. The Angolan war also affected the choices for crop production that people had. In a study by Paulo Filipe for Norwegian People's Aid (2005) about land tenure and land rights in Kwanza Sul province, changes in the types of crops that were produced during conflict occurred. One significant change was that of coffee production. Until 1976 this was one of the most important cash crops that Angola exported, but since then saw a steady decline. Primary reasons for this decline were the initial exodus of white farmers and accompanying migrant workers from other Angolan regions, and the ineffectiveness of the state's efforts to nationalize the coffee industry (Hodges 2004). Also, the war disrupted most of the production and marketing processes for coffee and affected its

distribution and transportation channels. Due to the fact that coffee is a long-term crop, needing up to five years for the plant to mature and start producing, it wasn't feasible anymore for African farmers to rely solely on this crop during conflict. Therefore, coffee production was increasingly replaced by cereals and other food crop production, such as maize, which need a much shorter period (Filipe 2005). Direct effects are summed up well by Hodges (2004, 94), as: "Food production was adversely affected by the collapse of the colonial market system in 1975 (due to the mass departure of the *comerciantes do mato*), the disruption of urban-rural trade by the war, the large decline in the rural proportion of the population (due to the exodus to the towns), the states post-independence focus on promoting unviable state farms and trading companies rather than peasant producers and private traders, and a pricing system (for agricultural commodities until 1980s and for foreign exchange until the late 1990s) which discriminated against rural producers in favour of imports and urban consumers". Most of these government approaches to the rural areas, as well as the effects that the war had on the rural economy continued to play a sinister part in the next period from 1991-2002, even when the state started abandoning its Marxist ideology that dictated the policy decisions like the reliance on state farms instead of smallholder producers.

*1991-until now: changing political ideology, mass displacement, and post-conflict rural rehabilitation*

In 1990 the MPLA abandoned its Marxist-Leninist ideology that had made its mark on its policy and approach towards the rural economy. The abandonment of the socialist policies was instigated not only by the breakdown of relations between the ruling MPLA party and the Soviet Union and, as a consequence, the latter's diminishing influence, but also by pressure from within the party. A combination of growing disappointment with the effects of centralized planning on the economy, as well as the emergence of class interests within Angolan society led to the disconnection of MPLA with its political ideology (Hodges 2004). This shift in ideology was followed by the introduction of multi-party democracy and the allowance for a growing civil society in the country. The period from the beginning of the 1990s until 2002 also marked the most violent and destructive period of the Angolan civil war. Where the rural economy and livelihoods had already been heavily affected initially by the changing economic policies of colonialism to Marxist-Leninism and the first period of war until 1991, the intensified war until its sudden end in 2002 also took its toll. Mass displacement took place during the 1990s, mostly from the rural areas towards the relative safety of urban and peri-urban areas. Rural livelihoods were abandoned during the war or became increasingly difficult to sustain due to the lack of infrastructure, transport, goods, finances, inputs and assets. Local markets stopped functioning, affecting the entire rural trading system, and food production was increasingly geared towards subsistence of the household. In 1993-1994 MPLA's practice of surrounding cities with minefields, after which UNITA would add another layer to prevent access to food and firewood severely affected the population's farming options, making farming a potentially lethal activity (Vines 1997, 23). Agricultural production in Angola therefore has plummeted in the last few decades and is not expected to regain its previous strong position in Angola's economy.

In the 1960s agricultural goods made up 56% of the total export of Angola, whereas in 1994 94% of the export consisted entirely of crude oil (Ferreira 2006). Ferreira points at the necessity to move away from the over-reliance on crude oil and export, to ensure a broader livelihood improvement for all: "Of highest priority is the recovery of agricultural production, beginning with basic food stuffs for domestic consumption before turning attention to export crops" (Ferreira 2006, 28). The underlying assumption here is that agricultural production for local markets will be more beneficial to local people's food

security than focusing on increasing the export of crude oil, however profitable this might be. Most of the national income derived from oil has not left the capital city of Luanda, and few investments in a diversified rural economy have been made. According to Le Billon it is exactly because of the abundance of oil that the rural economy has been left in the state it is in today: “Arguably, the availability of oil revenues meant the Angolan ruling élite cared little about the collapse of the rest of the economy, in particular that of the hinterland” (Le Billon 2007, 147). The oil sector has absorbed most skilled personnel in Angola, yet only employs 10.000 Angolans in total therefore creating little employment opportunities for the whole population (Le Billon 2007, Sogge 2006). Although oil in Angola has created opportunities and wealth for a few, its revenues were not yet used to invest in a more diversified rural economy, and might have even obstructed such developments taking place. As oil replaced agriculture as the main source of income over the last decades, attention to the revitalization of the rural economy is not necessarily the main priority when state income is already ensured through oil.

The main formal institutions that deal with the support and promotion of livelihoods in rural Angola can be summed up as markets, municipal administration frameworks, and village networks and structures. All three have been severely affected by the conflict, due to displacement, violence and the government’s funding of the military instead of making investments in other realms. After the war ended rural policies focused on resettlement, establishing food security and reconstruction of infrastructure. The state had relied heavily on the national and international NGOs to assist in the delivery of basic services in the rural areas during the war (Christoplos 1998). Aid organizations aimed to restore some of the functions of, for instance, the agricultural and veterinary institutions, or have even taken over these functions temporarily. Directing their interventions towards community structures, associations, and sometimes access to markets, they tried to replace some of the structures for rural livelihoods that had been considered lost during the long conflict. Especially community structures were revived, or (re)created to function as community seed banks. But these aid efforts towards food security and assistance to rural livelihoods were only slowly being accompanied by a state’s approach to revitalizing the rural economy. In line with the changing ideology of the government towards a more market-oriented economy, a return to parastatal organizations for agricultural support and marketing has been declared unwanted, the more so since they never were able to fulfil those tasks in the past. Yet, as the private sector so far has been largely absent from the rural areas, calls for more state involvement in farmers support for inputs and marketing have been made (Kyle 2005). So far, revitalizing the state’s rural extension services has been done in close cooperation with the national and international NGOs that operate in those regions. However, with the recent withdrawal of these organizations, the absence of private sector investments, and a state that seems more pre-occupied with the oil sector and the rebuilding of roads and urban centres than with its rural policies, revitalization processes go largely unassisted. The future of rural socio-economic development in Angola thus depends on rural people’s ability to cope with crisis and poverty and develop their own initiatives as they have been doing so far, making the most of the resources and opportunities at hand.

## **Conclusions**

This chapter discussed Angola’s history with specific reference to the rural socio-economic developments and how they were shaped and influenced over the years by colonialism and conflict until now. Colonialism and its economic policies and institutions had profound

negative effects on rural societies by indebting the local population through taxation, forced labour contracts, land grabbing and uneven competition.

With Angolan independence and the withdrawal of the colonial rural structures in 1975, the rural trading system where Portuguese shopkeepers and traders basically controlled all movements of goods, produce and credits collapsed. Even though the trading system was fraught with many exploitative elements towards the African populations, its collapse was destructive for the rural economic landscapes. The bush traders weren't replaced by an Angolan trading system due to the outbreak of civil war and a different economic ideology, leaving rural people without the agricultural inputs they had relied on before, and marketing and distribution channels for their produce ceased to exist. To this day, rural people would talk with a hint of nostalgia about the period before the civil war, when colonial institutions at least enabled them to have access to credit, seeds and tools, and employment. This nostalgia however doesn't imply nostalgia to colonialism per se, but can be seen as a testament to the next level of dispossession and lack of access to essential goods and commodities during the destructive civil war.

Understanding Angola's colonial history is essential in the analysis of the country's rural development today. Rural livelihoods and institutions have been co-shaped by the parameters which the colonial state set and enforced during its rule. As Angola was engulfed in a destructive civil war straight after reaching independence, many of these parameters were left unchanged due to the state's preoccupation with war. Meanwhile, Marxist ideology for some time informed the GoA's strategy of prioritizing centralized state farms over peasant production, and nationalizing and even suppressing rural-urban commercial linkages. The pre-independence years have had a strong influence on the state's conceptualization of the rural economy today, as demonstrated in its post-conflict reconstruction plans. For instance, as Portuguese colonial expansion in Angola also had focused mostly on major cities and ports along the coast for the first few centuries, so have reconstruction programs implemented since 2002. As seen, there are hardly any functioning and diverse rural economy and rural institutions left after years of colonization and conflict. Also, recent economic development statistics in Angola have indicated that the primary motor and focus of the economy remains oil, perpetuating the continuing neglect for improvement of rural economy, institutions and livelihoods. Colonialism and conflict have altered the rural socio-economic landscape profoundly through exploitative policies, violence, destruction of infrastructure and displacement.





## 5. Case study of Caluquembe

**Introduction**

**Introducing Caluquembe**

**Comparing the villages and changing livelihood practices over time**

**Encounters with aid interventions**

**Historical and current livelihood strategies**

**Externally driven recovery**

**Conclusions**

### Introduction

This chapter presents a case study of the municipality of Caluquembe in Huíla province, zooming in on three selected villages. The case study analyses the past and current livelihood practices of the village inhabitants. The history of each village is presented, highlighting social and economic histories of the localities and the effects of war. By looking at the different critical events in village and personal life such as: war, displacement, migration, and aid interventions the changes in livelihoods are made visible. Specific reference is made to the encounters people have with aid and aid deliverers. The chapter is based on interviews with NGO staff, local administration and other key figures in the area, as well as on interviews and surveys of inhabitants of the three villages.

This chapter investigates the different aid interventions that have taken place in Caluquembe municipality, to see how they changed in focus depending on how the conflict played out. Also, this case study of Caluquembe will allow for an analysis of how linking relief, rehabilitation and development worked out in practice. Because Caluquembe has seen a long and wide-ranging aid presence during and after the war, the case study allows to see what outcomes these different types and stages of aid have had on the livelihoods of people the fieldwork villages. Specifically the chapter will address the research questions on 1) people's past and current livelihoods and how have they been affected and influenced by crisis, and 2) how different aid interventions influenced and transformed the livelihood options that people have nowadays?

This chapter will argue that Caluquembe provides an example of an externally driven type of recovery in the context of post-war Angola. Conflict and displacement have diminished the resources people had to produce sufficient and diverse agricultural goods, conduct trade or find alternative sources of income. This combined with an externally driven approach by NGOs to livelihood recovery has led to a rural society with a limited variety of uniform livelihood options that remains vulnerable to shocks.

### Introducing Caluquembe

This section serves as an introduction to Caluquembe municipality. It argues that Caluquembe historically has been the centre of active conflict, and therefore in particular affected by mass displacement, loss of assets, resources and livelihood opportunities. The area's violent history and political importance is also marked by the events unfolding at one of the town's principal features, the IESA mission, church and hospital.

Huíla province is administratively divided into fourteen *municípios* (municipalities), each headed by a municipal administrator who is the government's representative on municipal level. These fourteen municipalities are subdivided into forty-five *comunas* (communities) each with their communal administrators, and which in turn consist of

*povoações* (usually a collection of villages), *aldeias* (one village), and *bairros* (neighbourhoods). The *soba* is the traditional leader or chief of the village, who mediates and acts as local judge, but also performs certain rituals when necessary, for instance in the case of drought as is shown in this chapter. The *soba* also enjoys formal legitimacy to a certain extent and supposedly receives a monthly fee from the government, although in practice this is often not the case (Tvedten and Orre 2003, 48).

Caluquembe<sup>20</sup> is a municipality that lies in the north-western part of the province, and its local municipal administration is located in Caluquembe-sede, the capital town of the municipality. Caluquembe municipality currently has approximately 247.000 inhabitants, of which about 100.000 live in Caluquembe-Sede. The entire municipal area consists of 4000 km<sup>2</sup>. The majority of the inhabitants of the Caluquembe municipality are of Ovimbundu ethnicity. The area has been the site of much conflict between MPLA and UNITA, mostly in the ‘bush’, but also in the municipal centre itself, with the MPLA carrying out an aerial bombing in 1994 to try and chase UNITA out which had taken over control over the area.

The reasons for selecting Caluquembe as one of my research sites were that it had been more affected by conflict and displacement than some other municipalities in the province, and because of the continuing presence of NGOs that had been and were still making interventions geared towards the recovery of livelihoods. Furthermore, the comparison between the municipalities of Chibia (see next chapter) and Caluquembe was also particularly interesting because of the different livelihood options due to climatic differences. Caluquembe mostly relies on rain-fed agriculture, whereas Chibia is semi-arid and livelihoods traditionally revolve around agro-pastoralism. Driving through Caluquembe municipality the landscape is characterized by maize fields scattered throughout seemingly abandoned bush. There is an asphalted road that links Lubango to Caconda<sup>21</sup>, which runs through Caluquembe-sede. During the rainy season this road was scattered with large muddy potholes that would increase the travel time from Lubango to Caluquembe from four hours (dry season) to six or seven hours. At the same time, some areas of land next to the road had still not been demined. At the end of the fieldwork large road repair projects were on-going with the intention to reduce travel time on this stretch of road to only three hours.

I made several trips to villages in the municipal area, either with or without the presence of NGO staff. After interviews and visits with NGOs working in Caluquembe, I identified three villages in the area in which I conducted the comparative fieldwork, through interviews and surveys. These villages were Camucuio, Catala and Cue I. The three villages differed in terms of location and accessibility, history of conflict and displacement, and aid interventions. In the next section I will introduce these villages in depth and describe their histories.

### *History of Caluquembe town*

Although most literature on Caluquembe deals with the colonial and post-colonial era, the municipal history goes back much further. A local historian offered me the following account of how Caluquembe was founded:

“The name Caluquembe signifies ‘don’t lie, tell the truth’, and derives from a man named Caluquembe that arrived there from Chiyaka (an area in Huambo province). He was a hunter of elephants. He was following a group of elephants until he reached a mountain (present day Caluquembe). Then, he organized a group of people and

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<sup>20</sup> Also known as Kaluquembe or Kalukembe.

<sup>21</sup> This road also links to the surrounding provinces of Benguela and Huambo, and was once an important highway that connected southern and northern Angola. Reconstruction efforts are ongoing to return this important function for Angola’s overall transport network.

founded Caluquembe. There were already people living in the area so he asked the *soba* if he could bring his family to stay with him in Caluquembe. Soon thereafter they gained control over the area and the municipality was given its present name. His official administrative power came to an end with the expansion of Portuguese colonial rule into Angola's interior. It is not known when exactly the Portuguese took over."<sup>22</sup>

The first registered encounters with the Portuguese that have been noted by Murray Childs (1970) were of a war between the Caluquembe Kingdom and the Portuguese between 1774-76. Despite the ensuing Portuguese colonization the traditional power structures in Caluquembe have remained largely intact, functioning in parallel to the newly imposed colonial administrative structures. And contrary to what Porto (et al. 2007) argue when they note that these traditional authority structures only survived in the south and central parts of the province where the conflict was less pronounced, Caluquembe still has most of these traditional authority structures in place. To this day Caluquembe municipality has a king, next to the municipal administrator that represents the modern-day authority structures. The current king of Caluquembe has been in power from 2005 onwards, following a line of rule that dates back to the founding of the Caluquembe kingdom around 1740 (Murray Childs 1970). Together with *sobas* from the area he holds regular meetings in front of the mission/hospital entrance, discussing relevant topics concerning Caluquembe and any further issues that the *sobas* bring to the meeting. These meetings also aim to report any forthcoming issues from the various villages to the municipal administration.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, the king is also responsible for organizing important ceremonies, of which I will give an example later in this chapter.

Caluquembe municipality is part of the region that Clarence-Smith (1979) defines as the Caconda Highlands, which essentially comprises of current day Caconda and Caluquembe municipalities. In 1960 the population of this region was estimated to consist of 260.000 people and the main cash crops at that time were sisal, cotton, tobacco and coffee whilst maize and livestock were mainly used for subsistence purposes (Clarence-Smith 1979). Wheat also played an important role in the colonial economy of Caluquembe. Archive records from the Huíla District Delegation of Agriculture and Forestry show that the amount of distributed wheat seeds (247700 kilo's) in 1966/67 was almost 10 times higher than for maize (29930) and 8 times higher than the amount of distributed bean seeds (38530) (Delegação Distrital de Agricultura e Florestas da Huíla 1967). Wheat has ceased to play an important role in cereal production since 1975 with the departure of the Portuguese which affected the availability of seeds. Livestock has always been an important asset, especially oxen that made it possible to cultivate large plots of land. Livestock rearing for meat was more important in the southern parts of the province where agriculture was less successful due to the semi-arid climate.

During the colonial period, Caluquembe saw a considerable number of Portuguese settlers who owned small shops, bakeries or rural trading posts. In the *comuna* of Vila Branca a sausage factory was located that offered some job opportunities as well as trading possibilities for people who were rearing pigs. Although the factory hasn't been operational

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<sup>22</sup> Interview with Daniel Camosso, staff member of the Sector of Education of the Municipal Administration, Caluquembe, 20 August 2007.

<sup>23</sup> During my presence at one of these meetings with the King and *sobas* from the region, I was given a list containing a timeline of kings of Caluquembe. The list of kings of Caluquembe went back to Dumbo Satchiyambo, who was considered to be the founder and official first king of Caluquembe. How far back this list stretched was difficult to say, the dates of the succession of kings had only been written down from 1902 onwards.

since it was destroyed in 1991, people continue rearing pigs as they used to do in the past. Caluquembe used to have a fair amount of coffee production, either on large commercial fazenda's or by individual smallholders. During the war coffee production ceased and is almost non-existent today.

### *The Caluquembe mission and hospital*

One of the central features of Caluquembe-sede is its hospital, which is said to have been one of the best hospitals of Angola during many years, also for a large part during the war. They were able to keep functioning with relatively high quality standards throughout most parts of the war, and many high-ranking people seeking medical assistance were flown in from Luanda. The hospital is run and administratively linked to the mission of the Igreja Evangelica Sinodal de Angola (IESA). This mission has its origins in an earlier missionary station founded in 1897 by Swiss missionary Héli Chatelain. The history of Héli Chatelain's travel through Angola and founding of the missionary station in Caluquembe has been featured in many historical accounts of authors such as Birmingham (1998, 2006) and Péclard (1995, 1998). His missionary activities, and more specifically his extensive trading with Boer populations, and negotiating with the Portuguese colonial authorities and the Catholic Church on issues of slavery and trade, were main features of the articles written about his life. He initially named his missionary station Lincoln, after the American president that abolished slavery, to highlight his intention to protect African population against slavery (Birmingham 1998). This created resistance from the Portuguese colonial regime, but his stance on colonialism itself was in effect not so different to those of the Portuguese. "He also had difficulty in recruiting supporters willing to accept his thesis that colonization did represent the road to liberty for Africa's peoples and that one had to be patient and pragmatic while waiting for the benefits of 'civilization' to trickle down" (Birmingham 1998, 352). In the years following the establishment of Lincoln, Chatelain increasingly distanced himself from his initial anti-slavery activities. His missionary station became a trading post with the Boer populations of the Huila Highlands.

Many Swiss missionaries followed Chatelains footsteps at the mission in Caluquembe, through the so called Alliance Missionnaire Evangélique Suisse (AME). In 1942 one of these Swiss missionaries from AME, Dr. Brechet, arrived in Caluquembe and he founded its hospital on the mission grounds in 1947. In 1964 AME was transformed into the IESA church. The process of transition from a mission station to an independent Angolan church was evaluated differently by the various stakeholders. Whereas Dr. Brechet in 1972 had called the transition a completed and brotherly process, the director of IESA in 1982 on the other hand stressed the fact that this transition was not fully completed yet as the foreign missionaries were unable to accept the church's full autonomy (Péclard 1998).

The Caluquembe hospital has historically been an important reference point for healthcare in the area, and a base from which many missionaries gave medical assistance to the population throughout the war. With the arrival of UNITA troops in Caluquembe in 1992 the Swiss missionaries fled, and the hospital was abandoned. The former hospital administrator witnessed the destruction and subsequent raiding of the hospital by the UNITA troops as well as by the local population from close by.<sup>24</sup> In 1992 he and his family had to flee when UNITA took control of the region and he was not able to continue working at the hospital. He subsequently moved into a house 100 metres from the entrance of the hospital, from where he would witness what was happening. From 1992 until 1994 the hospital was occupied by UNITA, and most of the (expatriate) staff fled. The hospital continued

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<sup>24</sup> Interview with Salomão Samuel Bolingo, Caluquembe-sede, 29 January 2008.

functioning to a certain extent during that time, and would for instance receive patients from the DRC that arrived through the humanitarian corridors which had been put in place by the ICRC. In 1994 the first government plane arrived carrying out a bomb attack forcing UNITA to flee. The first bomb fell at 30 meters from the hospital. In 1994 the government re-occupied Caluquembe, and the Angolan Red Cross was the first organization to supply the hospital with medicines, enabling it to become operational again. A Canadian missionary doctor remembers the raiding of the hospital as follows:

“The commander of the MPLA troops in 1994 said to his soldiers ‘you haven’t received salary in the last 8 months, go and collect it yourself’. After this the whole hospital of Caluquembe was robbed of its equipment. One nurse was able to move some equipment and supplies to the leprosy department, considering that no soldier wanted to enter that area of the hospital.”<sup>25</sup>

In January 1995 the Canadian missionary witnessed some of the stolen equipment from the hospital in Caluquembe being sold on the streets of Lubango. At the same time, one missionary nurse remembered that the destruction and looting of the hospital equipment had also taken place by the local population and staff of the hospital themselves. The hospital administrator himself went past all the houses of the people whom he knew had stolen equipment from the hospital in order to return them.

The mission, hospital and IESA church in Caluquembe had been struggling with their political neutrality throughout the war. Savimbi was linked to the IESA church, and felt that the people of Caluquembe would welcome him as a saviour of the people. One high-ranking IESA member in Caluquembe invited Savimbi to the mission and gave him a grand tour and celebration dinner, and recommended the people to vote for him. During his election tour in 1992, Savimbi was driven around in an IESA car through Caluquembe district (Schot 2009). IESA members and missionaries struggled with these political linkages. A missionary nurse working in Caluquembe from 1976 until 1992 witnessed these problematic linkages from close by. In 1992 she wanted to put the Red Cross symbol on the hospital, to accentuate the hospital’s neutrality, but was hindered by MPLA who saw the hospitals and IESA’s connection with UNITA as a sign that it was not neutral at all. She was unable, as she explains, to continue working at the hospital when staff from the church got involved in the termination of pregnancies at the hospital that were the result of young girls being forced into sexual relationships as part of UNITA rituals. She fled Caluquembe together with the other Swiss missionaries in 1992, but remained in Angola. In October 1993 the Swiss missionaries officially separated themselves from the IESA church, starting the *Solidariedade Evangelica*, to underline their independence and political neutrality. They continue working with IESA, but operate independently. The hospital became fully equipped and operational again after the war, with IESA’s headquarters moving to Lubango. The IESA mission continues to operate in Caluquembe, mainly through its bible school and educational training for nurses. Unfortunately, IESA’s linkages with UNITA were difficult to shed, and IESA members were considered traitors during and after the war.

### *Conflict in Caluquembe*

When the war started in 1975 the white settlers moved out of the Caluquembe area and countryside. This had direct effects on the local economy and availability of resources. From 1975 onwards people started fleeing to Caluquembe-sede, especially from the “warm” areas where troops from both parties were stationed. Fighting had already taken place in the area

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<sup>25</sup> Interview with dr. Steven Foster, Lubango, 4 August 2008.

from 1975 onwards, but was intensified in 1983 when UNITA was in control of most of the surrounding rural areas around Caluquembe-sede. In 1991 UNITA occupied Caluquembe for 45 days, trying to set up administration in town (Ruigrok 2007, 92). In 1992, after the elections and return to war, UNITA again occupied Caluquembe-sede for a period of two years. On the 4<sup>th</sup> of October 1994 the government bombed parts of Caluquembe-sede, especially the mission and hospital, and re-established control over Caluquembe-sede and its local administration. The surrounding areas however remained contested grounds between UNITA and MPLA troops, causing continued displacement of population from these remote villages (Ruigrok 2007). The local administration of Caluquembe for a long time consisted of both MPLA and UNITA representatives as part of the Government of National Unity created in 1997, as stipulated in the Lusaka peace protocol. The cooperation between MPLA and UNITA members in local government did not run smoothly however, and in 2004 the UNITA municipal administrator mysteriously disappeared, fuelling tensions between members of the administration (Schot 2009). The political tension in local government also affected the aid organizations working in the municipality:

“The Caluquembe area was UNITA territory, and had a UNITA administrator but the rest of the local governance structures were MPLA, this made governance very difficult. For example, when ZOA stated that they wanted to open the base in Caluquembe, the local authorities wanted to be involved in decision making about which local staff we would hire, if we had not accepted this we could not have started the base.”<sup>26</sup>

People from the municipality fled to other parts of the province or sought refuge in and close around the municipal centre, usually within a 10-20 kilometre radius from the town which was still considered to be relatively safe.<sup>27</sup> Population displacement in Caluquembe was further aggravated by the scorched earth policy of MPLA. MPLA was burning agricultural fields to force the rural population and UNITA soldiers to come closer to the cities to look for survival options there. People did not know if what they had been sowing would actually survive until the harvest period.<sup>28</sup> At the same time, landmines did prevent the use of some land around the town centre. Currently some fields next to the provincial road between Vila Branca and Caluquembe-sede remain inaccessible due to the known presence of landmines. Caluquembe is still considered one of the critical areas in the province that needs demining efforts.

Displacement within Caluquembe municipality occurred in different directions, often depending on stages of the conflict, occupation of the region by one party or the other, and real or perceived party affiliation. For instance, most of the population from the villages of Camucuio and Cue 1 fled during the 1980s when UNITA troops were closing in on the municipal centre and resided in the surrounding ‘bush’ where these villages were located. Catala, on the other hand, located close to Caluquembe-sede and along the main provincial road, was completely deserted only after the MPLA reoccupied Caluquembe in 1994. From 1995-1997<sup>29</sup> the entire population of Catala fled together with UNITA, with half of the inhabitants staying in abandoned villages in the ‘bush’, such as Camucuio. These displacement movements led to the curious situation in which people from ‘town’ resided in

<sup>26</sup> Interview Sander Schot, former Program Advisor ZOA Caluquembe, Lubango 21 April 2007.

<sup>27</sup> At the end of the conflict, between 2000 and 2001 this security perimeter around the municipal capital increased from 20 to 40 kilometres.


<sup>28</sup> Interview Sander Schot, former Program Advisor ZOA Caluquembe, Lubango, 21 April 2007.

<sup>29</sup> This period coincides with the ceasefire and peace accords of the Lusaka peace protocol, from 1994-1998. Whereas the inhabitants of Catala were never displaced during the war, they were forced to flee during peacetime.

the deserted villages in the ‘bush’, and vice versa. Interestingly however, no mention has been made by inhabitants of villages, government institutions and NGOs of land conflicts in Caluquembe. As displacement had occurred in different directions people were sometimes confronted with IDPs having settled in their villages. This however did not result in enduring conflicts over land as was happening in other parts of the country. Also, land grabbing has not occurred as in the case of Chibia, which I will elaborate in the next chapter. People have been able to maintain more or less similar sizes of land as before and during the war, with the main difference being not having sufficient oxen that facilitates an augmentation of the land under production.

The map below indicates the displacement processes in Huíla, as well as accessibility of the areas and presence of humanitarian organizations. It shows how people from neighbouring provinces and municipalities came into the Caluquembe area, as well as the accessibility of Caluquembe for humanitarian agencies.

Figure 3: Map of displacement processes in Huíla province



(Source: map taken from a Provincial Evaluation Group on Vulnerability, May 2002)

#### *Current socio-economic profile of Caluquembe*

In the municipality of Caluquembe there are about 2000 formally employed people, most of them teachers, health workers, and government representatives. Currently, the biggest formal employer in the Caluquembe region is the educational sector. This especially pertains to youth. Every year about 100-200 youths are recruited as teachers in the Caluquembe municipality. The health sector comes second as one of the main employers in the region due to the regional function of Caluquembe hospital. However, the majority of the population



relies on agriculture or small scale trade. The small industries and shops that used to give access to necessary resources for agriculture, provide job opportunities, and offer incentives to produce specific crops or rear livestock, are no longer there. People in Caluquembe feel that despite years of peace and various programs and interventions focusing directly or indirectly at livelihood recovery, the options to find diversified livelihoods remain limited. This pertains specifically to youths, who find that their livelihood options are limited to agriculture. Unfortunately, they have either lost those skills during displacement in urban areas, or feel disconnected from rural life altogether.

The Caluquembe market place is one of the most vibrant features of the town today. In 1982 a small market place emerged opposite the entrance of the hospital. However, when at the beginning of the 1990s Caluquembe came under attack by UNITA and MPLA troops, trading at the market came to a halt due to security reasons. In 1999 the current Caluquembe market was opened, where a variety of goods are being traded, increasingly so by the lack of shops in the municipality. All inhabitants are allowed to rent a vending spot on the market for 100 kwanza per day (1 euro). Most agricultural produce from the villages is traded at this market.

Industrial development in Caluquembe is non-existent. One of the problems associated with starting industrial development in modern-day Caluquembe, according to the head of the department of economy and production of the municipal administration, is that when there is a problem with equipment, machines or electricity supply, there are no places nearby to find spare parts or mechanics to fix the problem.<sup>30</sup> Production will come to a standstill in that case.

War and displacement changed the livelihood options people have in the region. Not only did certain opportunities disappear, new ones were introduced. Due to displacement, people encountered other traditions in the regions where they found refuge during the war. Certain cultural traditions became less strict, open to interpretation and change. This is illustrated by the following comments from the head of the department of economy and production of the municipal administration in Caluquembe-sede:

“When people fled during the war to other areas they also encountered different lifestyles and livelihoods from the ones that they were used to in Caluquembe. When they returned to their area of origin after the war they would take those different livelihoods along. Now you see other traditions appear. For instance, women are now allowed to climb into trees to collect honey from beekeeping. This used to be culturally unacceptable in the past. This difference comes from the encounters of people from this region with people from the Nyaneka tribes in the south of the province. At the same time the habits of the Nyaneka also changed through our presence in their areas. Another example is that now the practice of paying dowry is on the increase, which was never a tradition in the Caluquembe region.”

Displacement makes people acquainted with different livelihoods, and sometimes challenges and transforms certain gender roles as well.

## **Encounters with aid interventions**

Caluquembe saw a wide range of humanitarian and development NGOs, churches and state institutions assisting the war-affected population over the years. The humanitarian situation

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<sup>30</sup> Interview João Bernesse, head of the department of economy and production of the Caluquembe municipal administration, Caluquembe-sede, 07 February 2008.

was considered to be particularly grave due to the widespread displacement of people from the surrounding villages, who found themselves in the middle of fierce fighting between UNITA and government troops throughout various periods of the war. Furthermore, the municipality had become difficult and unsafe to access by roads, and the area had been mined. When access to the municipality was improved, especially at the end of the war, it created an influx of a variety of aid agencies. Caluquembe continues to have an aid agency presence to this day, although especially the international NGOs have closed their programs in the area. The current exit strategies for the aid agencies is to hand over their programs to the local Agricultural Development Station (EDA), who intends to push forward the idea of increasing agricultural cereal production as its main strategy for poverty reduction and creation of sustainable rural livelihoods in Caluquembe. This section discusses the history of aid interventions in Caluquembe, and their diversity in focus and areas.

### *Assistance to Caluquembe*

The Caluquembe area has seen many interventions ranging from emergency relief to more long term development aid, continuing to this day. Due to the effects of the intense conflict, and as many of the displaced from Caluquembe were part of resettlement programs after the war it became one of the focal points for different types of aid in the province. Also, from the point of view of cost-effectiveness, Caluquembe was easier to reach than a municipality like Chipindo that had been equally affected by the conflict, but required a 15-hour drive compared to the 5 or 6 hours that it would take to reach Caluquembe from Lubango. During the 1980s aid was mostly distributed through local churches or state institutions like the MINARS. Malnutrition at this time was not occurring frequently, as food was still being produced. Non-food items, such as clothes, had however become increasingly difficult to obtain. Therefore, food was being traded for non-food items through local church organisations. MINARS started distributing food and other essentials to the displaced people that began to arrive within the town's perimeters and were unable to produce food themselves. New neighbourhoods in Caluquembe-sede sprang up due to the influx of displaced people seeking safety and protection. One of these neighbourhoods that continue to exist to this day is *bairro* Havemos de Voltar, meaning "we must return"<sup>31</sup>. The neighbourhood started to form in 1982 on what used to be agricultural fields, when the war became more intense, and people were killed in the bush and forced to flee to towns. Most people in the neighbourhood originated from the provinces of Bié and Huambo, and neighbouring municipality of Chicomba. The first group to arrive there in 1982 came from Chicuma in Benguela, and they remain the largest group to this day. As people were arriving, the MINARS started handing out food and clothing in the neighbourhood.<sup>32</sup>

The municipality had become affected by a drought and subsequent famine in 1989, and food aid was handed out at the time through the churches, including some foreign missionaries working at the Caluquembe Hospital who obtained food aid through World Vision and World Relief Canada, as well as a private Angolan company that made 80.000 tonnes of beans available through the IESA mission. In the 1980s the conflict had already

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<sup>31</sup> This is also the title of a poem written by Agostinho Neto, Angola's first president, in 1960 in which he describes the natural beauty and wealth of Angola and how Angolans need to return to their own country when independence has been achieved.

<sup>32</sup> At this moment only about 70 families are left in *bairro* Havemos de Voltar. The current inhabitants indicate that they would like to return to their areas of origin one day, but do not have enough money or livestock to take with them in order to start a new life there. Some also awaited the outcomes of the parliamentary elections of September 2008, as many had been displaced or fled following the previous parliamentary elections of 1992, the results of which had been contested by UNITA and formed the starting point of one of the most brutal period in the Angolan civil war.

caused displacement, but not yet at the scale of the 1990s, when the town doubled in size (Schot 2009).

With the 1991 Bicesse peace accords in place, coinciding with the departure of Cuban troops and introduction of a multi-party democracy in Angola, a more visible and active civil society was able to develop. National NGOs started working throughout the country, and international NGOs were able to gain access to Angola. In 1991 the newly founded Angolan NGO Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiental (ADRA) started working in Caluquembe with a programme that focused on peace and development. They implemented a resettlement programme for displaced people by handing out agricultural inputs. The project was interrupted when the war broke out again in 1992, but ADRA was asked to return to Caluquembe when the war ended in 2002 to continue the projects they had started in 1991. World Food Programme (WFP), Caritas and the Red Cross were the other main organizations to enter Caluquembe in 1993. At that time UNITA was still occupying Caluquembe-sede, and the town was only accessible by air. There were less goods coming into town because of the fact that the roads had become inaccessible; littered with landmines and military roadblocks. Assets were stolen by soldiers coming into the area, and people were killed on the roads. In 1993 the Angolan Red Cross was able to enter to the town and started restocking the abandoned hospital with medicines and equipment and handing out food aid. WFP arrived once every two weeks to distribute cooking oil, maize, beans and blankets. This was mostly organized through the Canadian branch of the Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF), who played an important role in aid distribution during the time that Caluquembe was hardly accessible by road. Attacks on humanitarian convoys on the road between Lubango and Caluquembe also made the role of MAF in food aid delivery more important. Food aid initially was being distributed at the airstrip located in the middle of Caluquembe-sede. Caritas also started working in 1993 and handed out oil and maize to the affected population. IDPs arriving in Caluquembe could build clay-block houses according to a fixed lay out, with a small adjacent garden where they would be able to produce a sufficient amount of maize for household consumption (Schot 2009).

The real influx of NGOs started from 2001 onwards when the occurrence of violent encounters between MPLA and UNITA diminished in Caluquembe. The Dutch relief organization, ZOA Refugee Care, had already wanted to start programs at the end of the 1990s, yet did not get security clearance. In 2001 however it was finally able to enter Caluquembe district and started water, sanitation and road rehabilitation projects (Schot 2009). The road rehabilitation works were implemented through a food-for-work scheme, which continued for 2 years after which 180 km of road had been improved.<sup>33</sup> Displaced people who originated from Caluquembe began returning in 2002, just before the start of the new agricultural season, and NGOs assisted these returnees through distribution of food and other household essentials to bridge the period until the first harvest (Schot 2009). This was coupled to an approach of establishing food security through the distribution of seeds, tools and in some cases agricultural inputs and livestock. These types of projects have dominated the aid response in Caluquembe.

### *Practices of targeting in aid interventions*

Humanitarian practice in emergencies involves targeting of vulnerable groups, by labelling individuals to fit certain pre-set criteria for interventions (Bakewell 2000). Distinctions are made between “IDPs”, “most vulnerable”, “returnees”, “female-headed households”, “ex-combatants”, etc. There is a concern that these labels to describe, categorize, and then target

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<sup>33</sup> Interview Sander Schot, former Program Advisor ZOA Caluquembe, Lubango, 21 April 2007.

individuals for interventions might become self-perpetuating in the sense that people start using these labels themselves in order to gain access to valuable resources they are entitled to according to the set of criteria put forward by humanitarian organizations (Bakewell 2000). One example of a frequently used label is that of “most vulnerable”. It is often put forward to gear interventions to the people who are perceived to be worst off in communities, but this label is complicated to define, and at times the process and outcomes of selection of people fitting into the category are highly political. During the fieldwork this label was put forward most frequently by organisations to indicate which beneficiaries constituted their specific target group. When asked further, these groups usually consisted of people who had recently returned to their areas of origin. It can be questioned, however, whether this is a reliable indicator of vulnerability. People do not always return home empty-handed, and have often remained in towns to accumulate resources before they decide to return. This means that an urban setting actually provides them an opportunity to accumulate assets. Even if organisations have decided which criteria define people’s vulnerability, it remains vague as to how this is dealt with in practice.

In Caluquembe, during the period of food aid the selection for targeting was mostly done through a registration process, of which some people say they had been denied entry because they had registered too late. After the end of the war in 2002 food aid was followed by programmes geared towards resettlement of IDPs and establishing food security, whereby organizations became increasingly specific in the targeting of their beneficiaries. The municipal administration would be responsible for assigning NGOs to specific areas and villages. Most NGOs followed a similar approach when starting their interventions in villages and selecting the potential beneficiaries. They would ask the *soba* of the village to select the most vulnerable people in their village. For instance, NGOs would indicate that they specifically sought female-headed households, returnees, ex-combatants, subsistence farmers, etc. The *soba* would then provide a list of about 250 people that he considered met those criteria. Organizations working in the realm of food security distributed the agricultural inputs, and set up a village committee that overlooked the reimbursement and rotation processes. People were expected to reimburse part of their harvest to a community seed bank, coordinated by these village committees, in exchange for the agricultural inputs and use of oxen. The oxen would rotate throughout the group of beneficiaries to ensure that every household had a chance to plough their fields when necessary. This system of rotating oxen didn’t work well in every locality. Sometimes the number of distributed oxen was considered to be too little for the amount of land under cultivation, making it difficult to plough the land on time.

For ex-combatants, aid programmes were different. In order to facilitate their reintegration into their areas of origin, special aid programmes were designed and implemented which had a predominantly economic focus. The state’s institution Institute of Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (IRSEM) was responsible for overseeing the reintegration process of ex-combatants since the Bicesse peace accords of 1991. Together with some NGOs they offered ex-combatants a variety of options to ensure socio-professional reintegration into society. After 2002 the soldiers were stationed in demobilisation camps located in the north of the province, after which they were registered and receive documentation. If they chose to return to their areas of origin they had to register with the local municipal administration as soon as they arrived there. The municipal administration would then redirect them to the local IRSEM office. When ex-combatants returned to their villages of origin in Caluquembe, the reintegration process started with the development of a plan in collaboration with IRSEM. Ex-combatants could choose from a variety of skills training courses, educating them as carpenters, masons, locksmiths, plumbers, mechanics, and electricians. After finishing a specific course they received a work kit and further

assistance in setting up their own business. Furthermore, they could also choose to construct schools in their own villages, earning a salary of \$50 for six months (Ruigrok 2007, 94). A reintegration package could also consist of agricultural seeds and tools. The local IRSEM coordinator was positive about the reintegration process in Caluquembe:

“The reintegration process is mostly social in nature, focusing on harmonization of economic, social and productive life. The demobilized soldiers only know how to fight, you have to change their past spirit. At this moment Caluquembe municipality has 1087 registered Luena demobilized soldiers. Every village in the area will have demobilized soldiers living there. We hear very little stories about local conflict arising because of failed reintegration. Especially in villages where schools are built by demobilized soldiers you see no problems at all, because the whole village gains something from that.”<sup>34</sup>

Although in this interview he stressed the social nature of the reintegration process as essential, in practice reintegration was dominated by economic and productive strategies for reinsertion into society (Ruigrok 2007, 95). Within villages people found it difficult to indicate if there were ex-combatants living in their villages, and often were unaware of IRSEM’s work. In Cue 1, for example, people would point vaguely at another side of the village to say that they knew there were one or two ex-combatants living there but weren’t able to name them or tell me whether they had been fighting alongside UNITA or MPLA. Social reintegration and reconciliation have not been aspects of ex-combatant reintegration processes. The main focus has been on increasing their economic productivity on return in their villages.

NGO’s practice of requesting *sobas* to select 250 people from the villages as the most vulnerable, placed a considerable amount of power in his hands. In one village a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) was conducted as part of a programme evaluation, about a year after goods had been distributed. The evaluation uncovered that in fact the village chief had actually retained most of the distributed aid (consisting of livestock, seeds and tools) for himself. Not all areas and villages in the fieldwork region received (equal) assistance for the resettlement programmes and recovery of livelihoods. Some areas were deemed more vulnerable and conflict-affected than others, and sometimes the decision to assist or not was suspected to be the result of a strained relationship between community leaders. This was the case for a neighbourhood (*bairro*) in Caluquembe that fell under the authority of a larger village. Former staff of an NGO that had implemented a programme in that village recounted how power struggles amongst *sobas* had led to the denial of aid to the neighbourhood in question:

“When our NGO arrived in the village, the *soba* of the village refused that they would also give any aid to the people in the *bairro*, which is why the *bairro* actually never received any aid from NGOs. This is possible because the *soba* of the village is a *soba grande*, and the *soba* of the *bairro* a *soba pequeno*.<sup>35</sup> Therefore the *soba* of the village can make decisions with regards to aid being distributed to the *bairro*.”

Although from the onset of this research I assumed that the labels that aid agencies use were relevant within villages I studied, used to indicate who was better off or not, the reality was different. I found that in the fieldwork villages people did not refer to each other as being better off due to the fact that they had been labelled as returnee or demobilized soldiers, rather people found it difficult to indicate to me who these labelled individuals were

<sup>34</sup> Interview with Luis Joaquim, IRSEM coordinator, Caluquembe, 06 February 2008.

<sup>35</sup> Literally a *soba grande* means a big chief, whereas a *soba pequeno* is a small chief, in this case the small chief is the neighbourhood’s traditional leader.

in the village. When they talked about future needs they did not differentiate between “us” and “them”, they indicated that needs were community-wide instead of different for one group than the other.

Targeting in practice did not follow the objectives of the NGOs to reach the most vulnerable in communities. Actual distribution was subject to a sense of community whereby there was no “us” and “them” but distribution was done more or less for everybody that had farming experience and ambitions. However, placing the selection of beneficiaries as well as the distribution of aid in the hands of *sobas* could lead to access to aid and aid resources being rather easily diverted through power games by the *soba*. The debates that surround labelling of aid beneficiaries in that labels become self-perpetuating and can lead to intra-community conflicts in the case of ex-combatants for instance, were shown not to be relevant in this research.

### *Current aid strategies in Caluquembe*

At the time of the fieldwork there were nine NGOs implementing programs in Caluquembe, some of which had a field office in town. From these nine organizations three had a purely humanitarian mandate, one had a mixed mandate, and the other five were developmental in focus with a specialisation in agricultural development. All of them had already been working in Caluquembe for many years, and all had distributed seeds and tools in different communities in the area. Because of their agriculturally focused mandate, these NGOs were in close cooperation with the local extension service office the Estação de Desenvolvimento Agrário (EDA, Agricultural Development Station). This section of the chapter analyses this interface between aid agencies and local government institutions, and EDA specifically.

EDA's are the local representation or field stations of the Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agrário (IDA, Agrarian Development Institute) which in turn falls under the Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development (MINADER). The EDA's are responsible for providing extension services to the rural population, and sometimes this includes handing out agricultural inputs. They give training and agricultural demonstrations, also providing livestock vaccinations in partnership with the local veterinary station. EDA's were initially introduced in the 1980s to support peasant associations with technical, material and marketing services, but for a long time remained largely ineffective. “They face the same problems as all institutions set up to serve agriculture, notably a lack of training, an excessive centralization, and a lack of resources” (World Bank 1991, 232). Kyle (1994, 11) noted that EDA's role in extension was mostly theoretical, as field presence was only noticeable in the south of the country due to the effects of foreign assistance there. In 2005 there were only 54 functioning EDA's with staff totalling 1000 that needed to cover the entire rural areas of Angola (Kyle 2005, 48).

EDA selects the village they and NGOs work in, dependent on the plans that the government has for the region. The same type of problems that the World Bank noted in the early 1990s, seem to have continued in the post-conflict period. In 2007, the EDA in Caluquembe tried strengthening cooperation between them and the NGOs that were operative amongst farmers in the area. The cooperation consisted of sharing office space, and a further arrangement with several agencies in the area in which some NGO staff members would work at the EDA in Caluquembe part-time, aimed at a close sharing of information and expertise. This was part of a strategy for decentralization and better cooperation and integration of aid projects with the relevant government institutions. The vision behind it was that the agricultural development work of the NGOs complemented the work of the EDA and that, once the NGOs closed down, the EDA would take over the agricultural projects to warrant continuity in the projects. The EDA therefore had a good overview of the different

activities in the area. In the beginning of 2008 the coordinator of the EDA in Caluquembe identified the following major obstacles to agricultural development in the area: lack of livestock, no crop diversification and lack of commerce<sup>36</sup>. He therefore actively encouraged NGOs that had those skills and plans, especially regarding commerce and access to markets, to start aid programs in Caluquembe. The local farmers complained about lack of commercial opportunities, as they were struggling to sell their produce for a price enabling them to buy other necessities for the household. Although one NGO in Caluquembe was trying to restart coffee production in the area, it was still in an experimental phase at the time, and wasn't expected to create considerable opportunities for commercialization and income generation for the smallholder farmers in the near future.

One of the objectives of cooperation between the NGOs and EDA was for EDA to take over these food security programs and encourage further agricultural development in the Caluquembe region. At the time of the fieldwork, however, EDA did not have the sufficient resources and capacity to fully take over the role that the NGOs had played for so many years. Most international NGOs had started to leave Caluquembe, closing their offices, and sometimes officially handing over their programs to either the municipal administrations, the EDA, or to local partner organizations. The focus of strategies for livelihood interventions remained on pushing agricultural development through increasing cereal production, and not so much through crop diversification or commercialization. Broader livelihood interventions that did not necessarily focus on subsistence level farming were non-existent, except for those that targeted ex-combatants through skills training programs. Another, more participatory and alternative approach towards agricultural assistance was being tried by the international NGO, CARE, which started working in Caluquembe in 2007. They were planning to introduce the concept of Farmer Field Schools; forming groups of small-scale farmers within villages for shared learning and training on issues of soil conservation, seed storage and selection. They also aimed to encourage and assist the selling of maize harvests for better prices by taking out the middlemen in the marketing chain, and to introduce a micro-credit component and small business creation for women especially.

In Caluquembe, post-war recovery assistance for livelihoods has been a process mostly implemented by NGOs. The state was involved in the process, by allocating the villages where NGOs could start implementing their aid programs. NGOs identified the packages of aid they could provide, and the state indicated where these packages would go to. Little is known about needs assessments having been carried out in the villages. Therefore, recovery programs are based on assumptions and aid availability, rather than expressed needs and/or a comprehensive regional development plan.

### **Comparing the villages and changing livelihood practices over time**

This section is based on fieldwork done in the villages of Cue 1, Camucuio and Catala, and the comparison between them. In this research the three selected villages were the cases which were compared on the basis of historically significant phenomena such as the influence of colonialism, encounters with and effects of conflict, the availability of aid and reconstruction programs, and (changes in) livelihoods. This comparison reveals the similarities and differences there were amongst people in the way they made a living and coped with important events, and what role aid interventions have played in this process. This allows for an analysis of a variety of social, economic, institutional and political factors that determine the outcomes of livelihood recovery processes.

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<sup>36</sup> Interview with Sr. Belito, EDA coordinator, Caluquembe-sede, 13 December 2007.

The selection of villages started by gathering information about the specific context of conflict and aid in the municipality. On the basis of interviews with NGO staff and other key persons in Caluquembe, I selected three villages that differed in terms of their histories of conflict and displacement, and with the amount of aid interventions that consequently took place. In terms of population size they were more or less similar, around 300 people each. Between June 2007 and February 2008 I made repeated visits to these three villages, accompanied by research assistants that would help me conduct the surveys and translate from the local Umbundu language to Portuguese. On average, some 25% of the inhabitants of the three villages would speak both Portuguese and Umbundu. Permission to do interviews in the village would always have to be obtained through the municipal administration, and local *sobas*. The willingness to grant this permission and freedom of doing interviews differed from village to village, according to the perceptions on the research of these *sobas* and the extent to which they wanted to exert their power and control over the type of information that I would be collecting. I used the surveys, conducted amongst 48 households in the three villages, most often as an entry point for more in-depth open interviews. Often, more members of the household of the interviewee would participate in answering the questions, or elaborate on a certain issue within the survey or ensuing interview. Sometimes I would come back to the same household after some weeks if I felt that the first meeting had left some ends open that were interesting enough to follow up. Observation of the everyday practices of people in these villages, combined with recording their history, surveys, and additional information acquired through municipal or NGO reports or interviews with their staff, enabled the social, economic and historical dynamics to be drawn and compared to understand how they influence and shape the way its inhabitants cope during crises and make a living.

To give an idea of the different characteristics of the three villages I present this table below.

Figure 4: Characteristics of the three fieldwork sites in Caluquembe

	<b>Cue 1</b>	<b>Camucuio</b>	<b>Catala</b>
Location	22 kilometres from Caluquembe-sede, 8 on asphalt road and 14 on dirt road/small paths	45 kilometres from Caluquembe-sede, 20 on asphalt road and 20 on dirt-road, bordering Chicomba municipio	20 kilometres south from Caluquembe-sede, situated at asphalt road between Caluquembe and Lubango.
Colonial history	Portuguese came to Cue 1 in 1950 and started a colonato that functioned until 1975	Used to have some Portuguese settlers in the village, with 1 or 2 small shops	Portuguese settlers resided mostly in neighbouring Vatuco
History of displacement	Half of the inhabitants fled during the 1980s. The other half between 1996 and 2002, as the area was occupied by UNITA. Almost all stayed in Caluquembe-sede during displacement,	Almost all inhabitants of Camucuio were displaced from 1983 until 2003. They mostly stayed in Vila Branca, Negola and Lubango. Some returned in between, only to be displaced	Almost all inhabitants of Catala were displaced from 1995 until 1997. Half of the population fled into the bush together with UNITA, while the other half stayed in Caluquembe-sede.



	and returned after 2002.	again in 1996.	
Further characteristics	Access to water from river Cue.	Irrigation opportunities due to presence of river	Located on both sides of the road, with a little market place

The objective was to make a comparison between three different villages, specifically based on their encounters with aid interventions. So whereas Cue I was one of the villages that had received relatively many aid interventions over time, Catala had not. The reasons for this, NGO staff said, was due to their locations (Cue I was relatively difficult to access, whereas Catala was located next to the provincial road), and related levels of perceived vulnerability. Although aid interventions typically focus on the more accessible areas for logistical reasons, in the case of Cue I and Catala this logic seems to have been reversed. The assumed heightened levels of vulnerability in Cue I as opposed to Catala were difficult to ascertain in hindsight. Catala nowadays seemed to have more possibilities for commercial activities due to its location and new small market, in comparison with the other villages. Whether these possibilities also existed during the war is unclear. Villages were selected to receive assistance through the local administrations office, and it cannot be completely excluded that political motives would play a role in defining which village would receive aid and which village wouldn't.

### *Camucuio*

The first visit I made to Camucuio was in June 2007 when I joined an evaluation visit of Caritas to the village. The village consisted of small clay houses with grass roofing, spread out through a densely forested area. The river Cuio ran violently next to the village, and was said to be dangerous due to the crocodiles present. Next to the *jango*<sup>37</sup> a straight path ran through the village on which some eight Portuguese colonial houses stood. None of these houses were in use any longer, their roofs had collapsed and trees and bushes were growing inside. One of the houses had until recently been used as the village school, but was deemed to be unsafe, and was being replaced by a newly built school.

In 1930 Camucuio received its name from the first Portuguese man that settled there to open a shop and started doing business with the local people. The name of the village is derived from a story about the very first man that put a stick over the river Cuio in order to cross the river and reach this place. In 1955 a second Portuguese settler arrived in Camucuio, soon after which more Portuguese followed. The effects of the withdrawal of the Portuguese after independence and the subsequent experiences with war, was recounted by an inhabitant of Camucuio:

“In November 1975 all the white settlers fled Camucuio. Before they left we had much more fields, rain, goods, and we were able to trade a lot of our goods at the shops of the Portuguese. The quality of our produce was also much better because we had access to oxen, rain and agricultural inputs. The war was very bad in Camucuio. UNITA troops were stationed here, they were very bad people. I have seen many women being attacked during that time. We fled to Quipungo in 1987 after the government came to the village and told everyone to flee. We took all the stuff that we could carry with us and walked for four days to Quipungo. We could only walk

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<sup>37</sup> Community meeting place, characterized by a round open wooden construction with grass roofing.

during the nights, because it was too unsafe during the day. We came back to Camucuio in 2002.”<sup>38</sup>

About 75% of the village population fled in 1983, when UNITA first entered the Caluquembe area and resided in the bush near Camucuio. The majority of these people settled in Vila Branca and Negola in Caluquembe municipality, and returned between 1992 and 1995. During this first period of displacement people from Camucuio were suffering from hunger: “we were just like people from Somalia during that time”.<sup>39</sup> In 1996, they were all forced to flee once more to Negola until the end of the war in 2002. A few people decided to stay in Camucuio throughout the war, but they fell into the hands of UNITA. When the displaced population returned to Camucuio in 2002 those people were gone, and the village had been left deserted.

When the NGOs arrived in the village, the whole population received aid, irrespective of different levels of vulnerability. There were some demobilized soldiers in the village, from both MPLA as well as UNITA. They were actively involved in building the new school, as part of their reintegration process, as many had received skills training as carpenters and masons. At the time of the fieldwork Caritas was the only organization still working in Camucuio, and their activities were focused on supporting the construction of the school, and rehabilitating an irrigation canal from the Portuguese era that would facilitate agricultural production in the village. Caritas was making plans to further rehabilitate an old wooden mill used to grind maize into maize flour that had been constructed by the Portuguese in 1935. The mill had been abandoned and had become useless and its construction even dangerous.

Some people in the village also do some occasional labour on surrounding fields of others for which they would get paid 5 kilos of maize per day. Fishing takes place on a small scale, due to the fact that the river is considered to be dangerous, with strong currents and presence of crocodiles. Some individuals had managed to find ways to transport some locally produced goods to sell in neighbouring communities and even as far as Lubango, but this was highly dependent on availability of cash to pay for the taxi-fare, or finding a ride on the back of a passing truck. Trading options were also facilitated by having family members in Lubango, with whom the trader could stay.

### *Cue I*

Cue I is a village that lies on a mountain range overlooking the valley through which the river Cue runs. In 1950 Portuguese settled in the region and “founded” Cue I, II and III. In the same year a Portuguese engineer settled in Cue I and started a *colonato* with the help of a few Angolans he had brought along. They took a large tract of land near the river and divided it in little plots, and set up an irrigation system to cater for all those little pieces of land. *Colonatos* are a form of large-scale colonial agricultural schemes, where the Portuguese colonial authorities would use inhabitants for free labour purposes. The *colonato* would be headed by white settlers, overlooking the scheme, indicating the type of crop being planted, and overseeing the taxation in the form of a fixed exchange of seeds into harvest. The population of Cue I started working for the *colonato* as well, while at the same time maintaining the work on their own plots of land. They would get 100 kilos of wheat seeds from the *colonato* leaders. After the harvest they would have to give back 120 kilos of seeds to the *colonato*, but would be allowed to keep any surplus harvest for themselves. They could also opt to sell the surplus harvest back to the *colonato*. If, for instance, they needed soap, the

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<sup>38</sup> Interview with Domingos Mupembe, 31 January 2008.

<sup>39</sup> Interview with Veronica Tchela, Camucuio, 07 July 2007.

*colonato* managers would purchase soap from town and then trade it within the village for surplus harvest. The *colonato* in Cue 1 functioned from 1950 until 1975. One elderly man that I interviewed in Cue 1 remembered the system very well.<sup>40</sup> He didn't see it as an oppressive colonial system, but rather as an opportunity to obtain some more work and income for the household. When I later asked him about the variety of NGO interventions in the village, he listed the *colonato* as an NGO. He likened the *colonato* system to that of an intervention done by the Cooperative League of the United States of America (CLUSA) in 2002 that focused on creating farming associations, with a reimbursement system that didn't differ that much from the *colonato* taxation system.

About half the population of Cue 1 fled in 1983 and 1986 with the arrival of UNITA troops in the area. The other half fled in 1997 when UNITA's presence in the village prevented people from working on their lands. All of these displaced people from Cue 1 resided in Caluquembe-sede, and remained there until the war ended in 2002. To give a short example of how people's lives during the war in Cue 1 meant a constant reshuffling, going back and forth, and finding some way to sustain oneself during displacement I introduce the story of Sr. Domingos:

Sr. Domingos was born in 1962 in Cue 1. He talks about two wars, the first war lasting from 1975 until 1990, the second one from 1996 until 2002. His mother died when he was 5, and his father was taken away by UNITA troops in 1985, and never returned. This happened to many families in the village. Some men came back after the war but did not want to talk about what happened to them during that time. Sr. Domingos also does not know what happened to his father, but now believes that he is dead. In 1983 the war was very intense in the area and many of the village inhabitants fled to Caluquembe town, which lies some 25 kilometres away. They were allocated some small garden plots, or worked on the fields of others in town. In 1991 there was a "mini-paz" (mini-peace) and everyone returned to the village. In 1996 the war resumed here, but much more intense than before. In 1997 the village again fled to Caluquembe town. After this Sr. Domingos went to the province of Namibe to work for a construction company and came back to Cue I after the war had ended in 2002. This is when he started working on his fields again to start producing food.<sup>41</sup>

According to one person from Cue 1 there are demobilized soldiers from UNITA living in the village, but: "Nobody knows them. Some might admit that they are former UNITA soldiers, but this would only result in arguments within the village". Caritas, ZOA and CLUSA all started aid programs in the village when the people returned to Cue 1 in 2002-2003. A school and a health post were constructed by ZOA, and almost all NGOs handed out seeds, tools and occasionally oxen. Also, community development groups were set up through which aid was channelled, and with the intention that it would function as a community support network.

Cue I nowadays consists mainly of small scale farmers of maize and beans. They mostly trade food items within the village. There used to be coffee production in the village, before 1975. There is only one man that lives close to the village who is currently trying to start coffee production again. But people are still hoping to pass the knowledge of coffee production on to future generations, and to restart coffee production themselves as it has a much bigger value on the markets than maize, creating better income possibilities. The former coffee producers in Cue 1 had to stop producing in 1997 when the whole village had

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<sup>40</sup> Interview with Luis Dumbo, Cue 1, 26 January 2008.

<sup>41</sup> Interview with Domingos da Silva, Cue 1, 04 February 2008.

to flee. When they returned in 2002 all the coffee fields were destroyed. Currently, the livelihood options are limited to small scale farming, with little high value crop diversity. A woman from Lubango who was born in Cue 1 recently started building a village shop, selling and trading some household essentials for local produce.

### *Catala*

Catala is a village that falls under the *comuna* of Vatuco. The village is divided by the main provincial road connecting Lubango and Caluquembe. Catala lies some 20 kilometres from Caluquembe-Sede, and 3 kilometres from Vatuco which has a health post. Catala used to have a health post, but it had been destroyed in 1983 with the arrival of UNITA troops in the area. The village was deserted in 1995 with the arrival of the MPLA troops in Caluquembe-sede. Half of the population of Catala fled to other villages, more remotely located in the bush. The other half stayed in Caluquembe-sede. People started returning in 1997-1998 to Catala and found most of the village destroyed, or displaced people from other villages living in their houses.<sup>42</sup> The houses no longer had roofs, they had to start rebuilding the village from scratch. They were able to start producing food again right away, but this time only without their oxen.

The former nurse of the health post in Catala recounted his personal experiences during the war period, especially highlighting the consequences of his political affiliation. He kept me guessing whether he had actually or allegedly been affiliated with UNITA. In 1975 he and his wife arrived in Catala to work at the health post in the village. As a nurse he would sometimes give first aid at people's homes. At that time the only healthcare in the region was the health post in Catala and the hospital of Caluquembe. In 1978 his wife started working at the local school and continued working in the fields. They usually cultivated maize, vegetables and sweet potato. Mr. Nambi was sent to a re-education camp in Namibe for three years by the MPLA. This was a normal procedure for the MPLA when they had doubts about one's party alliance. He came back to Catala in 1979. In 1983 UNITA advanced into the Caluquembe region, and occupied Catala. The assistant-director of the health post of Catala fled to Caluquembe-sede, and the health post was completely destroyed in 1983. Mr. Nambi was offered a job at the hospital of Lubango, but he refused. The war was too fierce and there was the possibility of being transferred to a very distant place afterwards where the chances of attacks would be too great. His uncle had been transferred to a faraway village during the war, attacked and killed. They lost one son during the war. He disappeared while walking back home from Lubango to Catala. This happened in 1994 during the big MPLA offensive in Caluquembe. They have never heard from him since, or heard what exactly happened to him. They think he probably came across a troop of soldiers (either MPLA or UNITA) on his way back. On the 4<sup>th</sup> of October 1994 Caluquembe was taken over by the government. Mr. Nambi and most people of Catala fled to the bush together with UNITA troops. Catala was completely deserted at this time. They stayed in Chiluandi, a village some 20 kilometres away from Catala, and returned in 1997 to find the village destroyed.

Catala currently has a small market along the side of the main road with some bars and shops selling local agricultural produce, drinks, as well as locally made traditional reed mattresses. The market is controlled by the village soba. Although in principle all the inhabitants, both men and women, are allowed to sell their produce there, sometimes people hand over their produce to the soba who sells their goods and gives them other items in return, such as soap. Buyers are mostly truck drivers that travel between Lubango and Benguela or Huambo. The little market started two years ago but so far it is said not to

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<sup>42</sup> The period of displacement coincides with the time of the Lusaka peace protocol, 1994-1998.

generate much income yet. Inhabitants of Catala can sell their produce without paying a fee, which is not the case at the big market of Caluquembe where a daily contribution is demanded for the vending spot. The fields of Catala show a lot of maize and beans. Furthermore, almost every house has some fruit trees in the yard, mostly mango- and citrus trees.

### *Comparing the villages in terms of aid and livelihoods*

In this section of the chapter I present an overview of aid interventions in the three villages, and the types of livelihood activities that people employ.

Figure 5: History and type of aid interventions in Caluquembe

	<b>Cue 1</b>	<b>Camucuio</b>	<b>Catala</b>
<b>Aid organizations in years</b>	-ZOA 2002-2007. -Caritas 2002-2006. -Clusa 2002-now.	-Caritas 2005-now. -Alisei 2004.	-ZOA 2003.
<b>Food aid</b>	By ZOA and Caritas in Cue 1.	20% of the respondents received food aid in Camucuio from Caritas.	None.
<b>Seeds and tools</b>	50% of the respondents received maize and bean seeds, agricultural instruments.	90% of the respondents received maize, bean and sorghum seeds, and agricultural instruments.	50% of the respondents received maize and bean seeds and agricultural instruments during one distribution round.
<b>Livestock</b>	Oxen were distributed, through a rotational system by all three NGOs.	Goats were distributed to 90% of the respondents.	A few oxen were distributed.
<b>Rehabilitation works</b>	Health post and school.	Health post, irrigation canal, mill.	None.
<b>Other</b>	None.	None.	Blankets, pans, plates and cutlery hand-outs.
<b>Community groups/associations</b>	ZOA set up a CDC (Community Development Committee), which has stopped functioning. Clusa tried setting up farmer associations.	Community development group, set up by Caritas.	None.
<b>Able to produce food next to food</b>	All but one of the respondents indicated they had produced food	Yes.	Not applicable.

<b>aid</b>	next to receiving food aid.		
<b>Able to sell produce next to food aid</b>	All but one of the respondents indicated they had been able to sell food next to receiving food aid.	One respondent was able to sell food next to receiving food aid.	Not applicable.
<b>What produce was sold?</b>	Primarily maize and beans. One respondent was also able to sell sweet potato, another was able to sell vegetables.	Maize.	Not applicable

From this overview of aid interventions it becomes clear that the amount of aid that the three villages received differed considerably. Whereas Cue 1 has seen both different organizations and different interventions take place, the population of Catala received a limited amount of goods during one distribution visit by ZOA. The interventions in Cue 1 ranged from the distribution of seeds, tools and oxen, to construction and rehabilitation of a school and health post. Also, an attempt was made to set up a community institution through which it was envisaged that aid would be channelled, it would function as a support network for the entire community, and community development issues would be discussed. However, most households made no reference to these groups during the interviews. Other groups, such as associations have often been abandoned during the war. However, almost all households are part of a church in the community, through which assistance is organized if the household encounters difficulties in terms of health for instance.

All households in the three villages indicated that they practised agriculture as their main livelihood activity. In terms of the type of crops that were produced not many differences amongst the three villages were noted. Maize was the principal crop which every household produced. Furthermore, from the 48 households only 8 did not produce beans. Of these 8, 7 lived in Catala and 1 in Cue 1. It should be noted that in all three villages maize and bean seeds were distributed, although Catala only received them during one distribution round, whereas the other villages received long-term support, in the case of Cue 1 by various organizations. Fruit production and horticulture were activities practised on considerable scale in both Cue 1 and Catala, but not in Camucuio. Fishing on the other hand was practised by over half of the households in Camucuio, but not in the other villages. A woman in Camucuio explained that she has a little box-construction with which she catches fish in the river Cuio.<sup>43</sup> Once a week she catches some 20 fishes, which her son sells at the market in Caluquembe-sede. Usually fishing is done by the women, and/or the children in the household. Apiculture on the other hand is only practised by men. The division of labour concerning agriculture and livestock is more or less equally divided. The men most often plough the fields, whereas the women sow them. The women on the other hand are responsible for the grinding of maize into flour, which is very labour intensive and often is done twice a day.

The number of households that own livestock varied considerable amongst the three villages. In Cue 1 80% of the households owned one or more oxen, compared to 27% in Camucuio and 27% in Catala. The aid programs that were implemented in Cue 1 account for the differences. Small animals such as goats, chicken and pigs were owned by most

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<sup>43</sup> Interview with Joaquina Chilepa, Camucuio, 05 February 2008.

households in the three villages. Only inhabitants of Camucuio had received goats from an NGO, but small animals seemed to have been retained or bought/traded by most of the inhabitants in the three villages irrespective of the aid interventions. Especially chicken would be sold on the market if the household was in direct need of cash, for instance to pay for healthcare or education.

Only 5 members of the households in the villages have obtained formal employment in the municipality. There are two nurses and a teacher in Catala, one nurse in Camucuio and one nurse in Cue 1. Other members of the households have found formal employment in places like Lubango and other provincial capitals. Skilled labour is only found amongst household members in Catala, where two masons, a carpenter and a blacksmith practise their skills mostly in the village itself, often in return for food. It is unclear if these skills were acquired through a training program as part of the reintegration of demobilized soldiers.

Trade takes place in the villages itself, for instance by making and selling bread and charcoal, or selling surplus harvests at the market in Caluquembe-sede. From the respondents in Camucuio, 72% were selling a part of their produce, mostly maize and beans. In Cue 1 80% of the households were able to sell excess produce of maize and beans, mostly at the market in Caluquembe-sede. In Catala, only 55% of the households were able to sell produce. And although Catala has its own small market place, half of these households were selling their produce at the Caluquembe-sede market instead. Only some fruit, sweet potato and vegetables were sold at the Catala market, but other produce such as maize and potatoes were brought to Caluquembe-sede.

In terms of the differences in livelihood activities between 1990 and now, the respondents most often mentioned the fact that in 1990 they still had sufficient oxen which made work on the fields easier. With oxen they were able to prepare bigger fields, which also increased the harvests. Most oxen, however, were stolen by thieves, or left behind when the inhabitants had to flee. Furthermore, many mention that they were collecting firewood and working in the fields of other people to gain some additional income and food for the household. The differences in activities and life in general between 1975, the year that the civil war started in Angola, and now were recalled by the elderly household members. They indicated that at that time they had access to diverse goods, foods, animals and trade, which made life and agricultural production easier and more diverse. As one respondent commented: "Life was much better. We had wheat, soy, peanut and cassava. Now we can't get those seeds anymore". There were shops close by, or even in the village itself, and commodities were cheaper. Also, because they still had sufficient oxen, they were able to produce more. Some of the elderly men had done skilled labour at the time, but could no longer practise these skills due to their age.

All livelihood activities in the three villages are based on agriculture. There are differences in the range of crops, although maize and beans are produced by almost all households. These are also the crops that are sold most often, the quantity of which differs amongst the villages. The households in Cue 1 were able to sell the most of their surplus harvests of maize and beans, in comparison to the other two villages. People in Catala on the other hand seemed to have more options in terms of formal employment and skilled labour, which could be linked to the relative proximity to Caluquembe-sede. Any significant correlation between the scale of aid interventions and an increase of the diversity in livelihoods cannot be found. Rather, it can be noted that in a village like Cue 1 which has seen the most aid programmes implemented, there is very little diversity in livelihoods and crops. In all the three villages people indicated that their options for diversifying their on-farm livelihoods as well as obtaining non-farm livelihood options were limited.

## Externally driven recovery

In this section I will elaborate on the case of Caluquembe as an example in which post-conflict livelihood recovery has been characterized by an externally driven approach by NGOs. I will argue that the uniform approach to livelihood recovery has led to a decrease in livelihood options as well as increased vulnerability to shocks such as droughts, pests, labour shortages, failing commodities' supply, etc. Furthermore, I address the difference between a coping strategy and a livelihood strategy, and argue that what has sometimes been interpreted as an undesirable and unsustainable coping strategy, is in fact a way to diversify the rural livelihood to make it less vulnerable to future shocks. I use labour migration as an example of a livelihood strategy that might be interpreted as a coping strategy instead (by formulating it as displacement), but which can have very positive outcomes on the household's socio-economic position.

### *Externally driven recovery of livelihoods in Caluquembe*

As an approach to supporting livelihood recovery after the war and in the process of resettlement of IDPs in Caluquembe, humanitarian and development actors focused on developing and strengthening food security through agricultural development. From the start of these livelihood interventions in 2002/2003, assistance programmes followed a uniform approach to food security and livelihood recovery by providing people with seeds, tools, and sometimes livestock. The seeds that were chosen were selected on the basis of locally preferred staple foods of mostly maize and beans. These crops had survived the war and seeds were still freely available, unlike other historically produced crops like wheat and coffee.

In Kalonhohá however, a small village some 10 kilometres from Caluquembe-Sede an elderly man has managed to hold on to coffee production to this day. I want to recount the story of Sr. Oscar here as it exemplifies how some people struggle to hold on to one's knowledge, experience and passion for a livelihood despite all the adverse circumstances that war and displacement brought.

#### Senhor Oscar

Sr. Oscar was born in Kalonhohá in 1933. His father was a pastor who was transferred to a mission in Chicuma, in Caluquembe municipality. It was in Chicuma that Sr. Oscar planted his first coffee in 1952. In 1979 Sr. Oscar's house in Chicuma had slowly been turned into a warehouse filled with harvested coffee beans, with no available buyers or transportation means. In 1990 the price for one kilo of Arábica coffee was 157 kwanza, nowadays he can only get 77 kwanza. In 1998 soldiers came to Chicuma and put his house on fire, in which all his coffee had been stored. The house collapsed after the fire and the whole village smelled of coffee. In 1999 he fled into the bush with his wife because of this incident and the fact that war was becoming more fierce in the area.

He still owns a big fazenda in Chicuma, has a house and staff, and sometimes stays there for a week. When they left Chicuma in 1999 and settled back in Kalonhohá in the same year, he immediately started planting coffee. Now he has about 3,000 plants around his house in Kalonhohá and another 6000 on his fazenda in Chicuma. Every June he can harvest some 1,000 kilos of coffee beans. He now has 500 kilos of coffee ready to be sold. The problem with coffee production is that it takes a long time before the first harvest is ready, only after two years the plant will give the first



two cans of beans. A coffee plant can continue to produce for 100 years. He knows some plants in Chicuma that were planted in 1940 and are still producing.

The governor of Huíla has visited Sr. Oscar, and wants to help him with the production of coffee. Sr. Oscar shows me a letter written by the Governor on 2 February 2007, in which he states that he supports the plan of Sr. Oscar to introduce and start coffee production in Chicomba and Matala. Sr. Oscar wants to present this letter to the Minister of Agriculture to get further backing for his plans to restart coffee production in other parts of the province.

He can't sell his coffee at the market in Caluquembe, because no one wants to buy it, not just the beans but the roasted and ground coffee too. He needs transport so he can bring his produce to the factories in Lubango. He has some 100 kilos lying ready to be transported. Sr. Oscar does not want to stop producing coffee, because he says that would destroy Caluquembe. "Coffee is life".

Sr. Oscar has been able to maintain his livelihood, even throughout times of crisis and adversity. His passion and dedication to coffee production made him maintain this particularly risky livelihood throughout war and displacement. In Caluquembe he is seen as an example who inspires NGOs and others to start experimenting with different crops again. One NGO in Caluquembe has approached him to share his knowledge in other villages where they plan to re-introduce coffee on a small scale as a way to diversify their livelihoods over the next few years. The re-introduction of coffee production in the region is done on a small scale, and not as an immediate strategy to replace other crops entirely. As coffee plants take 2-3 years to start producing their first harvests it will take time before profits can be made. However, the NGO indicated that they would like to introduce coffee, particularly with female beneficiaries, both to create an alternative and more profitable livelihood in the future, and to diminish the labour burden that especially crops as maize and beans put on women.

Organizations that were active in the Caluquembe region selected villages in conjunction with the provincial and municipal administrations. Seed banks were created in order to build local seed reserves, and organize reimbursement schemes for future harvests. The intention was that villages would become self-sufficient in agricultural production, enabling food security to be strengthened. The way in which decisions on type and objectives of intervention were made, was explained by a former NGO director working in Caluquembe as follows:

"We started at the family level, with the objective to enable people to sustain themselves. We knew what people made a living from and that they continued to want to live off the land. There was a minority that included carpenters and so on, but we oriented ourselves only at the majority. We focused on the 'how' rather than on the 'what' people needed. That part we already knew – seeds, tools, cattle. This was clear even for a foreigner, so we didn't have to research that again. We wanted to recover what was already there, the livelihoods from the past."<sup>44</sup>

With the destruction of the trading system during the war, people chose to pursue those crops that they knew would be able to feed their families on the short-term, without the need to use cash and procure food elsewhere. However, people in villages explained that even though they now had been producing sufficient foods to sustain themselves, they still found themselves unable to meet any further household demands because of the lack of cash.

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<sup>44</sup> Interview with former Country Director ZOA Angola, Utrecht, 15 July 2009.

Revenues from maize and beans are low. Furthermore, maize in particular is a rather labour intensive crop, where women also play important and time-consuming roles in the grinding of maize into *fuba* (maize flour) after harvesting. The revenues at this particular time hardly outweigh the time and effort that it takes to produce, prepare and sell the maize on the local markets. Very little attention was given by NGOs to commercialization options. People did not have the means of transportation to get their produce to markets in urban areas where their produce might fetch a better price. Instead they found themselves competing at the local Caluquembe-Sede market, where there are vast quantities of maize and beans on offer. Inhabitants of Camucuio did not produce sufficiently to be able to sell large quantities. Therefore people mainly engaged in local trading to obtain items like salt, oil, and soap.<sup>45</sup> They either went to Caluquembe themselves, or waited for the “trading men” from Caluquembe who would stop by the village to do the trading there. Trading men were those people that had the financial and transportation means to trade local produce and transport it to urban markets such as in Lubango or Huambo.

Lack of industries and other livelihood resources, made farming of maize and beans in effect the only livelihood option that exists to this day in Caluquembe. These crops are highly vulnerable in times of drought, leaving people with very little alternatives to fall back on when a harvest actually fails. This same concern was already raised by various NGOs even before the war ended, as noted in the chapter on displaced people in Huambo province by Birkeland and Gomes (2001). “In some of the villages in which the displaced are resettling, the returning population and NGOs working in agricultural extension such as ADRA-Angolana, OIKOS (Cooperação e Desenvolvimento) and Development Workshop, organize agricultural campaigns to repair and build irrigation systems, propagate seeds, and introduce and promote greater varieties of produce. The latter is founded on a concern for food security and future access to cash income. With a greater variety of crops, the resettled population will be less vulnerable to changes in rainfall patterns and thievery” (Birkeland and Gomes 2001, 42).

For ex-combatants the livelihood options are extended to include skilled labour and small businesses due to the skills training programmes that were on offer through IRSEM in collaboration with certain NGOs. Nevertheless, the general lack of cash in the region makes it difficult for people to make investments in other terrains, be it commerce or any type of industrial development. Because livelihood interventions were so uniformly geared towards reaching food security through seeds and tools, and because of the lack of follow up in these food security programmes, be it micro-credit, crop diversification, or alternative livelihood options, the people in Caluquembe had little choice in how to rebuild their livelihoods. Overall, current livelihoods in Caluquembe are agriculturally-based, mostly practised on a small scale, production of a small variety of crops, with low or no inputs. Surplus harvest is either reserved for next years, or traded or sold in the villages or at the Caluquembe-sede market. But the income this type of agricultural generates is hardly sufficient to make investments in other areas and thus diversify and strengthen the household economy. During a focus group discussion in Vila Branca with the NGO Agromarket, this lack of diversity was discussed by the participants. They found that they had limited marketing options due to the fact that they were only producing maize and beans, of which there is an enormous amount on offer on local markets. They felt the need to diversify their produce.<sup>46</sup> Most people in the villages indicated that there are few possibilities for livelihood diversification, and that their livelihoods remain in a fragile state, vulnerable to shocks and events such as the 2007/2008 drought in the area. Thus, a very uniform rural society is in a sense sustained or even

<sup>45</sup> On average people would trade maize for the following quantities: 5 kilos for 1 kilo of salt, 15 kilos for 1 litre of oil, and 10 kilos for 1 bar of soap.

<sup>46</sup> Fieldvisit with Agromarket in Vila Branca, Caluquembe, 14 June 2007.

recreated. Livelihood diversity decreases people's vulnerability to deal with shocks to their livelihoods (Ellis 2000b). Rural survival depends on the ability to fall back on a range of activities if one of these activities fail for whatever reason. Therefore, it can be said that strengthening rural livelihoods by only focusing on increasing agricultural production on a very narrowly defined base might leave these livelihoods more vulnerable to food insecurity in the case of future shocks. This is further explained below in the section on vulnerable livelihoods.

### *The difference between coping strategy and livelihood strategy*

During conflict and displacement people in Caluquembe struggled to maintain the resources that made up their livelihoods. But, confronted with fighting and ensuing displacement they lost the opportunities to continue their jobs, trade and agricultural production. They developed various other activities that are often referred to as coping or survival strategies rather than alternative livelihood strategies. In this section I will argue that in fact there is a blurred line as to what constitutes a coping strategy as opposed to a livelihood strategy. Coping strategies are perceived as a sequence of steps that households take to deal with crisis (Ellis 2000a, Corbett 1988). An example of such a sequence of steps that households can take is presented by Ellis (2000a): first livelihood diversification takes place, then available social capital is tapped, some household members might migrate temporarily, assets such as livestock are sold, and finally the abandonment of land, house and so on (Ellis 2000a). A coping strategy is characterized by risky behaviour, short-term, and a non-preferred route to sustain a household. A livelihood strategy, in contrast, is considered to be sustainable in nature, comprising of multiple assets which can be used to deal with future shocks without compromising the household's ability to recuperate (Ellis 2000a).

People that had been forced to take refuge in and closely around Caluquembe-sede, because their villages had become targets during the war, saw their options to make a living diminishing. Some would try to continue working on their plots during the day, and return to the town area at night to avoid being caught by troops at night. Another option would be to seek day jobs at the few large commercial farms that were still operational. One day of work would be usually rewarded in kind, for instance three kilos of maize. Collecting firewood around town, and then selling it as charcoal, would be yet another option. Some of the most common survival strategies that IDPs in neighbouring Huambo province developed were similar to the activities that people in Caluquembe undertook during the war: collecting firewood, charcoal burning, working the fields of others, and trading fruits and vegetables (Birkeland and Gomes 2001). Most of these activities have continued after the war, although much less time is dedicated to them.

Livelihood diversification in Caluquembe, especially through non-farm activities, was hardly incorporated in the humanitarian and development actors' livelihood interventions, although ACF, working in the neighbouring municipality of Chicomba, have started to support beekeeping activities that were started by farmers during the war as a coping strategy. A staff member of ACF at the same time was afraid that their program was becoming too "maize and beans" focused, but that mandate forced them to do so, as well as an effort to minimize risk:

"Our program only includes an agricultural focus, with no attention for alternative livelihoods. It would be better to include an industrial component so that people can actually start making more profits on their produce, but this does not fit within the ACF mandate. ACF offices in other countries do include livelihood component besides just agriculture, they include for instance income-generating activities. Usually ACF supports existing agricultural practices, primarily production of maize

and beans. Some older generations of people in Huíla still produce wheat, but I feel it is too risky to try and introduce this on a large scale or introduce other new crops. This should be done by government institutions and not NGOs.”<sup>47</sup>

Ellis (2000b) makes a distinction between livelihood diversification out of necessity versus choice. Necessity for livelihood diversification usually occurs by event, when a changing situation or shock forces people to seek other ways to secure household income. Choice is when cash availability or market opportunities arise to make investments on other terrains viable options. Diversification of livelihoods out of necessity can be seen as a coping strategy, but they do not always result in negative livelihood outcomes. An activity that may have started out of necessity, may result in a broader livelihood base. For instance, if some members from a household are forced to seek work on farms of others, they may choose to continue doing so in times when work on their own farms does not require as much labour. Collecting mushrooms, or beekeeping activities may not feed a family directly, but could be required to generate the additional cash necessary to make investments in other parts of the household economy. Selling charcoal can have negative side-effects on the environment in the long term, but might make some necessary cash for the household to ensure that children have access to better education in the near future.

Studies on migration in Africa have for a long time focused on potential negative effects of migration, and although family, traditional leadership and social bonds can be weakened it does not lead to a breakdown of rural societies as a whole, as has been argued (McDowell and de Haan 1997). Migration and remittances can have very positive outcomes on rural livelihoods through the cash and goods flows stemming from it, as well as the economic, social and political transformations that migration can bring (de Haan 2000, Horst 2002, Savage and Harvey 2007). The research in the three villages uncovered some of the effects of displacement and migration. Of the 48 households in the three villages, 17 had one or more children that had migrated out of Caluquembe municipality. Often they resided in Lubango, Luanda or in other Angolan provinces, and all of them had found formal employment or had become commercial traders. Many young people from the villages had either stayed behind in the areas where they had ended up during the war, or chose to find employment in Lubango or other urban centres after the war. They indicated that they either had lost their agricultural skills during long periods of displacement, or found life in rural villages without health and education facilities too harsh. In Camucuio, people felt this lack of a younger generation but also saw the positive sides of this type of migration, especially possible remittances generated from employment. The young people that had been able to find employment in urban areas often sent parts of their salaries or goods to their family members in Camucuio. Remittances can be defined as “income (in any form) received by a household in one distinct place, from individuals or households living in another place” (Savage and Harvey 2007, 3). Of the 17 households in the villages that had children who had migrated and found employment, 7 of them received remittances in the form of cash and/or goods. Also, a shop was being constructed in Cue 1, where local produce could be traded for household essentials, by a woman who had migrated to Lubango but whose family was still living in Cue 1. Although this might not fall under the strict definition of remittances, it could bring a type of income or even employment to the family, but also benefit the entire village at the same time. Also, use was made of the trading networks that people had established in the urban areas. For instance, one young man who during the war had been displaced and settled in Lubango, had found work at the Joao de Almeida market, one of the biggest informal markets in Lubango. Having resettled again in Camucuio, he now made regular trips by taxi

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<sup>47</sup> Interview with Livio Mercurio, Food Security Coordinator ACF, Lubango, 07 March 2007.

to Lubango, taking with him local produce which he could then sell at Joao de Almeida market through his former network of vendors.<sup>48</sup>

As shown above in the example of Camucuio, migration can lead to the development of much needed networks of support and trade which benefits both household and village. Cain (2003) also noticed this in relation to increased urbanization in Luanda, where IDP's were unwilling to return to their rural areas of origin and give up their stakes in the urban informal economy. With some of the household members choosing to stay behind new economic linkages and networks were formed connecting the rural to the urban areas (Cain 2003, 8-9). Migration can lead to social networks being affected both negatively and positively at the same time.

Migration is often overlooked as a livelihood strategy, and regarded as a coping or survival strategy. Mass migration is often seen as a first indicator of famine and starting point for relief programs, acting as a sign that other household responses to cope with crisis have failed (Corbett 1988, 1099). However, it is difficult to ascertain what is migration or displacement in times of crisis. What is in fact labour migration to urban centres might be interpreted as displacement instead. Also, displacement might actually turn into labour migration if people were forced from one area by war and encountered employment possibilities in another area. The decision to then return to their areas of origin after the security situation improves is highly dependent on the livelihood assets and options that they feel they can pursue there.

### *Vulnerable livelihoods*

During January/February of 2008 I made one of my last fieldwork visits to Caluquembe. This visit coincided with a drought occurring in the region. Normally, rains should start around November, allowing the crops to grow and be ready for harvesting in June, but this season the rains were late to start. In December 2007 a rainfall of only 19mm was recorded which was significantly below average. Because of the drought a delegation of the governmental department on Segurança Alimentar (Food Security) was expected to arrive from Luanda to visit the EDA of Caluquembe. They planned to inspect the most critically drought affected areas in Caluquembe. The plans were made to set up a rapid response system, allowing droughts to be signalled earlier so as to allow a more rapid response to it. The local EDA coordinator indicated that if the situation of the lack of rains would not improve soon it was expected that there would be hunger again within the ensuing six months.

In every village I visited, people started conversation about their fears for the future because of the lack of rain. They indicated that they didn't have sufficient food reserves to rely on for the coming year until the next possible harvest. Selling available reserves from the previous years was put on hold. Rain, or the lack of it, was the recurring theme throughout all the interviews. In the village of Catala the *soba* told me about a rain ceremony they had held a few days earlier.

A mountain cave, about 40 kilometres away from Catala, in the area between Camucuio and Cue 1, constitutes a shrine which contains four skulls and skeletons of important ancestors. A delegation went there, consisting of five *soba grandes* including the King of Caluquembe, some sobas pequenos from the region, and villagers as well. When they arrived at the cave they took the skulls and skeletons from the cave and washed them. The sobas had taken white cloth with them in which they dressed the skeletons and skulls. They slaughtered a goat there which they had

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<sup>48</sup> Interview with Andres Jacinto, Camucuio, 05 February 2008.

brought along. They drank the three *garafaos* (old wine bottles of 5 litre each) of *aguardente*. According to the soba of Catala they had been told after the ceremony was finished that the rains would start on the 5<sup>th</sup> of February.

The first rain started falling on the 1<sup>st</sup> of February, and it continued raining non-stop until the afternoon of the 4<sup>th</sup> of February. Although it had finally started raining, the natural hazards did not end there. In March much of the remaining crops were eaten by a pest of the Lagarta Militar (African Armyworm or *spodoptera exempta*), that affected most of Huíla province. This pest occurs naturally in the region, but the extent of it was not comparable to earlier years. The worm occurred in such big numbers that it ate away most of the crops people had planted. No measures were taken or available at the time to combat the pest. The Ministry of Agriculture started introducing sweet potato and cassava crops to prevent widespread hunger. As there is a general overreliance on maize as staple food in the province, the Ministry went on to distribute these crops in some municipalities to prevent a reoccurrence of this situation the following year. As these natural hazards affected those very crops that people relied on the most for their livelihoods, the effects on rural life were enormous. It laid bare the vulnerable state of rural livelihoods in this region, and the dependence on such a limited variety of livelihood options. It becomes apparent that the aid interventions that were geared towards supplying people with only seeds and tools, were inevitably falling short of creating sustainable livelihoods that included a level of disaster preparedness. The outcomes of the interventions rather enhanced the risks to increased vulnerability when this uniformly shaped rural livelihoods system is confronted with shocks such as natural hazards.

## Conclusions

This chapter has started with an introduction to the history of Caluquembe municipality. It has shown that the municipality was heavily affected by conflict, control over the area was violently fought over by MPLA and UNITA, creating several waves of displacement in different directions: from town to bush and vice versa. With reference to people's past and current livelihoods and how they were affected by crisis I want to highlight the varying and profound effects that the war has had in this area. It caused destruction of the area's infrastructure, and made industry and trade come to a standstill, also diminishing the availability of employment, seeds and other agricultural inputs. Furthermore, displacement and looting by troops led to the loss of many household assets and livelihood options. People were forced to give up farming, and start collecting firewood, working on farms of others, or seeking other alternative strategies for household survival during the war and consequent displacement. In this chapter I have argued that some of these strategies to diversify the household's livelihood options have led to positive outcomes on the rural economy in Caluquembe. Labour migration for instance has given access to remittances, and created new social networks through which trading was enhanced.

In terms of the influence of different aid interventions on the livelihood options that people have nowadays, the case study of Caluquembe provides an understanding of aid processes along the LRRD line that have been left unfinished. Initially only food aid was available for the affected population, but towards the end of the war this was complemented with an extensive seeds and tools assistance programming from a large variety of aid actors. Especially these seeds and tools programmes have in the long term led to what I call a process of externally driven recovery. Because of the uniform approach to rural livelihood recovery, the choice of seeds to be distributed, and the lack of follow up, rural Caluquembe has a rather narrow livelihood base. Because of the undiversified crop production, people

within villages now have to compete with each other to get the same type of produce sold or traded at the same locations. As Ellis (2000b) notes, diversified livelihoods are often not as vulnerable as undiversified ones. And his remark rings especially true when confronted with the drought and pest as Huíla had seen in the beginning of 2008. It uncovered that rural livelihoods in Caluquembe are undiversified, and therefore lack the capacity to cope and be prepared when faced with a failed harvest.

## **6. Case study of Chibia**

**Introduction**

**Introducing Chibia**

**Encounters with conflict and aid interventions**

**The role of the state in Chibia**

**Comparing the villages and changing livelihood practices over time**

**Historical and current livelihood strategies**

**Conclusions**

### **Introduction**

This chapter represents a case study of Chibia municipality, its past and current livelihood practices and histories of villages and inhabitants. The chapter is based on interviews with NGO staff, local administration and other key figures in the area, as well as on interviews and surveys conducted with inhabitants of three villages. By looking at the different critical events in village and personal life; war, displacement, migration, socio-economic histories and aid, the changes in livelihoods are drawn. Specific reference is made in terms of the encounters people have with aid and state institutions.

As opposed to Caluquembe, Chibia has been significantly transformed by the Angolan government's post-conflict reconstruction plans. The municipality is in close proximity to Lubango, and located along the recently rehabilitated highway connecting the province with Namibia. Furthermore, the municipality has been the stage of some far reaching economic and infrastructural projects instigated by the state, such as the building of the Gangelas dam, and the Sogangelas agricultural development project. These reconstruction projects have contributed both to positive outcomes on livelihoods, such as employment opportunities, as well as negative consequences as relocation of the population which affected people's access to land and water.

This case study on Chibia shows the outcomes of self recovery and state recovery of livelihoods, instead of the mainly externally driven type of recovery by NGOs as happened in Caluquembe. The population of Chibia, both the original inhabitants as well as the displaced people that settled there during the war, have re-established themselves and their livelihoods during and after the war, largely without any assistance from aid agencies. Only in more recent years have state reconstruction efforts targeted the municipality, with diverse outcomes on livelihoods. This chapter therefore investigates these processes of self-recovery and state recovery

### **Introducing Chibia**

This section serves as a general introduction to the second municipality where my fieldwork took place. Chibia lies in the south-western part of the province of Huíla and is in close proximity to the provincial capital of Lubango. The reasons for choosing Chibia as a municipality for fieldwork are related to some specific issues that make a comparison with Caluquembe interesting. The context is markedly different from that of Caluquembe, due to the fact that Chibia only encountered the results of conflict (for example, displacement, lack of basic services, and lack of commerce and access to agricultural inputs and credit), whereas Caluquembe found itself in the middle of conflict. Furthermore, whereas the influence of aid agencies in Caluquembe is especially strong, in Chibia it is the Angolan state that has a strong presence and whose reconstruction programmes have influenced people's livelihoods



in both positive and negative ways. This comparison helps us to understand the importance of different forms of aid, and the way people themselves find ways to recover their own livelihoods.

This section starts by introducing the main characteristics of Chibia municipality as well as the people living in the region, their ethnic and cultural backgrounds and tradition, and the history of the region with specific reference to the period of colonization.

### *Characteristics of Chibia municipality*

The municipality of Chibia lays in the south-western region of Huíla province, with the municipal capital, Chibia-sede, at approximately 40 kilometres south of Lubango, the provincial capital. The municipality has some 140.000 inhabitants spread out over a surface of 5,281 km<sup>2</sup>. The town of Chibia-sede is divided in half by the main road that connects Lubango with the border of Namibia, some 400 kilometres further south. The municipality is part of the so called Huíla Highlands, an area that includes Humpata, Lubango, Huíla and Chibia and reaches altitudes of over 1,500 meters at some locations (Clarence-Smith 1979). The climate is semi-arid, and therefore more favourable for pastoralist activities than extensive rain-fed agriculture, although a mix of the two activities is mostly practised by the inhabitants. The municipality is well known as a source of good quality livestock and meat, which is sold on the Chibia market, located some 10 kilometres south of the municipal centre, along the road to the town of Santa Clara, which lies at the border with Namibia. Livestock that is traded on the Chibia market is supplied to most of the other parts of the province, as well as beyond the provincial borders.

At the time of the fieldwork Chibia-sede is a vibrant centre that is under reconstruction. Roads are being rehabilitated, houses and (commercial) buildings repaired and constructed. Among them is a school for professional training. There are some small shops, bakeries and bars. These businesses are most often owned by descendants of Portuguese settlers that either remained in Chibia during the war, or returned after 2002. Land ownership in this area is mostly regulated through customary law and communally owned. As Chibia is a predominantly pastoralist society, large amounts of land are needed for herding of livestock. Land that was abandoned by the Portuguese that left the area in 1975 automatically became property of the Angolan state. With two land laws passed in 1992 and 2004, land rights for the rural population has become increasingly weakened (Clover 2005). Although the latter land law included the recognition of traditional land rights, it reinforced the state's possibility to repossess community land for 'private utility' motives (Clover 2005, 360). Many members of the elite from Lubango own land in Chibia; both the governor of Huíla province and the Director of the Provincial Department for Water own fazenda's in the municipality. It was said that at one point a land conflict had arisen between local agro-pastoralists and a large landowner in the area, an Angolan minister. A human rights NGO that reported on the matter was denied further access to Chibia by the government.<sup>49</sup> Conflicts over land have occurred mostly in the southern pastoralist regions of the province. As this chapter will show, access to land and water had become increasingly problematic in Chibia with the implementation of the state's reconstruction projects.

The city seems to be developing in part also because of the presence of some international road construction companies, which have based themselves in Chibia from where they repair the important road linking Lubango with Namibia. When the fieldwork started, in May 2008 rehabilitation of the road between Lubango and Chibia had just started. The trip to Chibia was done on a dirt road running parallel to the main road, often taking 1 to

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<sup>49</sup> Interview with Zé Carlos, local historian, Chibia, 16 July 2008.

1.5 hours to bridge the distance of 40 kilometres. At that time many accidents happened on the road, especially with the *candongeiros* (taxi buses), which often speeded to compensate for the time lost due to the road works, in order to gain the same amount of income from their daily fares between the two cities. The road works were completed exactly at the time when the fieldwork in Chibia was finished, in August 2008. The speed with which the road work had been rehabilitated was quite remarkable, in comparison with other road rehabilitation projects in the country, and people in the province speculated that this had to do with the expected visit of Angolan president José Eduardo dos Santos in August, preceding the presidential elections at the beginning of September 2008<sup>50</sup>. People in Chibia expected that trade opportunities and overall commerce would really take off again as soon as the road between Namibia and Lubango would be fully functioning.

Furthermore, the town has a railway station, which was part of the Moçamedes (Namibe) railway line constructed in 1961. The branch of the railway on which Chibia lies, was 120 kilometres long and connected Lubango to Chiange. The Moçamedes railway formed an important means of transportation of agricultural produce, minerals extracted from mines, and other goods between Huíla and Namibe. The railway was abandoned during the civil war, and was no longer in use at the time of the fieldwork. However, in 2009 the railway became the site of controversy as reconstruction of the railway in Lubango had started, which led to the forced eviction of mostly IDPs by the provincial government, and the demolishing of their homes without notice or alternative housing on offer (Orre 2010, 2). This example of the Angolan state's attitude towards prioritizing reconstruction of infrastructure over social and economic development of the poor does not stand alone, as this case study of Chibia will uncover.

### *Inhabitants and tradition*

The majority of the population of Chibia municipality consists of the Nyaneka-Humbi ethnic group, who predominantly practice pastoralism (Urquhart 1963). Whereas in the North of the province, Umbundu regions, people live in village structures with houses placed next to each other, in Chibia people mostly live scattered over vast distances. They live in so-called *kimbo* structures, which are a collection of houses surrounding a central square where the (extended) families live, and *kimbos* in Chibia are separated from each other by large plots of land. Nyaneka-Humbi traditionally follow a matrilineal system, in which the household head is the oldest male of the family who is guardian over his sisters and their children. In the case of death of the household head, the inheritances go to the children of his sisters, not to his own children (Estermann 1957).

The Chibia region has 4 kings, who function as *sobas* in their areas. They are the traditional authorities and act as cultural representatives. The Angolan state doesn't officially acknowledge any formal authority of the kings. People can ask them for advice but they can't make any legally binding decisions. During colonial times, the influence and power of the *sobas* was already said to be diminishing. The population would increasingly seek to resolve issues by consulting the colonial authorities. This was said to be due to social transformation that took place through colonial expansion in the Chibia area (Medeiros 1976). Rather, the kings are consulted on spiritual issues, for instance to perform rain rituals. On the 15<sup>th</sup> of August, each year, the rain ritual starts in Jau. An ox leaves from Gambos (municipality that

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<sup>50</sup> It was rumored that president Dos Santos was not pleased with the state of reconstruction in Huíla during his visit to the province, and even cut his visit short. He officially opened the road connecting Lubango to Chibia, and was expected to perform more of these official openings of buildings that had only partly or hastily been finished. The running joke among people in the province at this time was that the president left on the plane back to Luanda with wet cement still stuck to his shoes.

lies to the south of Chibia) and visits all the *imbalas* which are the settlements or residences of the sobas in the region (Urquhart 1963). It is a week of tradition and the ritual is meant to appease the spirits. This tradition has a long history, and was practised well before colonial times. The role of the king in Chibian society was expressed during an interview with an inhabitant of Chibia-sede as the following: “The king is like a second god. You do not see him walking on the streets. You need to request an official audience with him. For instance, if you want to cut down a big tree you first ask permission from the soba, and if the issue can’t be resolved you go to the king”.<sup>51</sup> The king of the Chibia-sede region died three years ago, but until now no replacement has been realized as these processes usually take up to five years. A new king is usually selected on a hereditary basis, and as Chibia is part of a matrilineal society it can only be a cousin, not a son. The oldest cousin will usually become king.

Other ethnic groups that are found in the Chibia region are: Umbundu from the North that have mostly settled in Chibia due to displacement during the war, Nganguela, and Khoi-San. There are an estimated number of 5,000-6,000 Khoi-San living in Angola, and spread out over 3 provinces: Huíla, Cunene and Cuando Cubango (Estermann 1956, OCADEC et al 2007). The Khoi-San are considered to be the first inhabitants of Angola, before the Bantu tribes entered. Although groups of Khoi-San live scattered over most of the Southern African region (predominantly in South Africa, Botswana and Namibia) they share parts of their culture, customs, and livelihoods with other Khoi-San communities. Traditionally a group of hunter-gatherers, they increasingly find it difficult to maintain these livelihoods, due to, for instance, restrictions on hunting areas and forced relocations.<sup>52</sup> In Angola, the hunting-gathering activities have been restricted due to the war. It wasn’t possible to have access to all areas any longer, due to attacks and the presence of landmines. Furthermore, most wildlife had fled from Angola during the war and are only very slowly returning to the area. A considerable number had been shot and eaten by the troops. Before the war started the Khoi-San still mostly maintained the traditional hunter-gatherer lifestyle, and had a pragmatic relationship with the Bantus. They were trading animal products with their Bantu neighbours. But during the war most Khoi-San lost their habitats, they were displaced. Many fled to Namibia and South Africa during the war. An NGO working with Khoi-San in Huíla estimates that before the war there were some 10,000 San in Angola.<sup>53</sup> From the 1930s onwards they started practising small-scale agriculture as well to complement the food derived from hunting and gathering, because their access to the national parks had become restricted. Hunting has become prohibited in Angola, although no monitoring takes place. The Khoi-San face several difficulties in Angolan society. They have had trouble claiming certain rights, pertaining to land or education. For instance, most Khoi-San children, as the adults, do not possess a *cédula pessoal* (identity paper) which is essential in order to attend schools.

Characteristic features of the municipal centre Chibia-sede are the many old Portuguese colonial houses, shops, and churches that have remained in relatively good condition. It is a visible reminder of the fact that Chibia used to have a large white settler

<sup>51</sup> Interview with Paulo Manuel, Chibia-sede, 30 May 2008.

<sup>52</sup> The issue of forced relocation of Khoi-San was most prominently brought to the fore in the court case that a group of San presented against the government of Botswana in 2004 claiming that their relocation from the national Kalahari Game Reserve had been forced, by terminating basic services and effectively cutting off their access to hunting lands, and that they had thus been pressured into abandoning their nomadic lifestyle (Saugestad 2005). The case drew a lot of international attention, especially after a claim by Survival International that extraction of diamonds in the area was behind the government’s decision to cut off access to the area. The Khoi-San eventually won their legal case, but reports are still in the news about detainments of Khoi-San that are not able to show the hunting permits that the government of Botswana has since made them to apply for.

<sup>53</sup> Interview with Benedito Quessongo and Daniel Gaspar, staff of OCADEC, Lubango, 20 August 2008.

community during the colonial period, in comparison to the few settlers in most of the other municipal centres in Huíla province. Chibia was considered to be one of the more important centres of white settlement in Huíla in 1929, when 49 commercial white farmers resided there (Galvão 1929). The good condition of the colonial buildings is also due to the fact that Chibia was mostly spared from attacks and active conflict throughout the war. Another indicator of the history of white settlement in Chibia, compared to for instance Caluquembe, is the large *mulatto* community still present in Chibia.

### *History of Chibia*

Before the colonial settlers arrived, Chibia was locally known as Chivia. The region was mostly populated by the Nyaneka- Humbi. Little information or literature is available about the history of Chibia before white settlement. In 1881 a group of Boers from South Africa had started settling in the Huíla Highland region, and were given land ownership by the Portuguese colonial administration. They were engaged in some small-scale trading with the local populations, and employed some of them to work on their farms. To counter the growing influence and presence of the Boer population in this region (some 1000 more Boers had migrated to the region by 1928) the Portuguese colonial administration invited Portuguese immigrants, mostly from the island of Madeira, to settle in the same region (Clarence-Smith 1979). The increasing presence of white settlers caused pressures on land availability, cutting off the Nyaneka from lands that they used to let their cattle graze. With the arrival of the group of colonial settlers from Madeira in 1888, the village (or *povoação*) was officially founded and renamed to São Pedro da Chibia. In 1927 the status of current Chibia-sede was elevated as to become a municipal centre, called Vila João de Almeida. The name was derived from João de Almeida who arrived in Angola in 1889 to assist the Portuguese with defeating the local resistance to colonization. He was governor of Huíla province from 1908-1910, and had his residency in Chibia-sede. During the First World War, the international conflict was also affecting the Chibia region. The Portuguese were fighting the Germans at the Angolan border with Namibia in present day Ondjiva. The cavalry with artillery would move along the Chibia road, and use the town to get food reserves for their travels, affecting people's own food reserves and causing a famine. The town was given its current name, Chibia, when independence was reached in 1975.

One of my interviews in Chibia was with Manuel Chacomo, a man of 93 years old, who had lived in Chibia all his life and was known to have a lot of historical knowledge of the region. Below I would like to present the history of Chibia, and particularly the first encounters with colonialism and the effects it had on tribal representation in the area, as Manuel Chacomo told it to me:

Mr. Chacomo starts telling the history of Chibia with the arrival of João de Almeida who was the official founder of the town. Before his arrival there were already some white settlers in Chibia, mostly evangelical and catholic missionaries. After that the merchants came, followed by the colonial settlers. When João de Almeida arrived he gathered all the regional elders for a meeting. He explained that Chibia was about to see the arrival of a group of unknown people from Portugal. The African inhabitants had to go to the ports of Benguela and Namibe to await their arrival and help them travel to Chibia. This meant that they needed to use *Tipoia* (a wooden contraption meant to transport goods) to get all the belongings of these settlers to Chibia by foot. When the white settlers arrived in Chibia local people got frustrated, but João de Almeida said: 'You shouldn't get frustrated, they are bringing along wonderful goods, like machetes, axes, pickaxes, and hoes'. Only the ploughs were brought in later. The

first groups settled in the area called Mucanja, where now the airport of Lubango lies. After that they spread to other parts of the province like Huíla and Chibia. Little by little they settled here.

Among the first inhabitants of Chibia there were many conflicts. This changed with the arrival of the religious missionaries, who calmed the people down a bit. The word of God prepared the way for the arrival of the white settlers. Before João de Almeida you already had people living at Chibia-sede, like the Nyaneka-Humbi, Mucubais and Kwanyama. João de Almeida told them that the area would be occupied by Portuguese settlers. When the response of these groups was that they did not want those people to come because the land belonged to them, João de Almeida replied that the people who wanted to continue living on their land would have to pay an *imposto* (taxation). The Kwanyama and Mucubais refused to pay that, and left the land. Only the Nyaneka-Humbi agreed to pay and stayed in the area. During the time of slavery it was also mostly the Nyaneka-Humbi that were subjected to the slave trade. They did not resist this and said: 'it is no use to resist and fight this'. The Mucubais went to the mountainous and desert like area bordering the province of Namibe. They were able to adapt well to life in the mountains, which the white settlers weren't. The Mucubais do not eat fish, pork or chicken because they live like nomads, which made it easier to adapt to the new surroundings. The Kwanyama went all the way down south to Cunene.

Before colonial expansion took place in Chibia, slavery already existed amongst the inhabitants of the region. People from neighbouring areas were captured and forced to work the agricultural plots of the slaveholders. Different plots of land were cultivated, according to the household size. There were separate plots for the man and for his wives. Slaves were captured from neighbouring regions to work the man's plot which is usually the largest in size, but with the abandonment of slavery the size of the man's plot became reduced to a small field (Urquhart 1963). Normally plots of land in the bush were cleared to produce crops, such as maize, sorghum and millet for own consumption. These plots would be abandoned after some time to allow the soil to regain fertility. Cow dung was used to fertilize the soil, after which mostly maize and beans was planted. Only when the land became less fertile would sorghum and millet be planted, as these crops were less profitable (Medeiros 1976). However, agriculture took second place to cattle rearing. A large herd of cattle was a sign of the household's wealth and prestige within the Nyaneka society (Medeiros 1976). Agriculture was predominantly a female endeavour, males would only sporadically visit with their machetes to clear the fields. The herding and milking of cattle on the other hand was a male activity. Large cattle owners sometimes selected herders amongst relatives or friends, who were rewarded with milk, or a cow or calf for their work, making it possible for them to accumulate a herd of cattle themselves (Urquhart 1963). With the arrival of white settlers, other crops were introduced, such as: wheat, potato and vegetables (Estermann 1957).

What Urquhart (1963) called "intertribal raiding" for the purpose of slavery was halted with the arrival of the white settlers in the region, although slavery by the Portuguese subsequently took its place. The 'productive' African population was forced to work on the farms and plantations of the Portuguese owners, without pay and only being given a meal a day. After slavery had officially been abolished in Angola in 1878, a system of forced labour was introduced, which was also in use in Chibia (Clarence-Smith 1979). Many people from the southern parts of Angola were working on *fazendas* in the Northern regions. However, also in Chibia itself this took place. The livelihoods of inhabitants of Chibia were historically centred on agriculture and pastoralism. The youngest generations however, worked on the

coffee and sisal *fazendas* in the north of the country under contract, or in the fishing industries of Namibe. These contracts could last for 1, 2 or 5 years. After that period the contract was automatically ended, only after which payment took place. That money was taken back to the *kimbos* in Chibia to purchase more livestock, or to start one's own *kimbo*. Another important livelihood strategy amongst young men was labour migration to the mines in present-day Namibia, where they were able to earn 3 times as much salary a month than they would on Portuguese owned *fazendas* in Angola. In 1958 the migration of the indigenous labour force was of great concern to the colonial government, who investigated the options for mechanical agricultural to deal with the diminishing work force (Mendes 1958).

Influence of the large white settlement that formed in Chibia is still visible today, demonstrated by the European character of the town's infrastructure. The socio-economic history of Chibia is further marked by encounters between the white settlers and the original inhabitants of the region, predominantly the Nyaneka-Humbi, as well as with displaced Umbundus that sought refuge in the municipality during the civil war.

### **Encounters with conflict and aid interventions**

This section analyses the way conflict affected their lives of people in Chibia, and the history and types of aid interventions. Even though it was never at the centre of fighting, Chibia saw direct effects of the conflict in a number of ways. Very concretely this started with the high number of displaced people (mainly from the northern and eastern parts of the province) that were seeking its safe surroundings or were placed there by the Government as was the case of the people of Bairro 11 de Novembro. The war also had effects on livelihoods and employment options, as access to Lubango was hampered by lack of transport, white settlers moved away and took their businesses and trading opportunities with them, access to seeds, credit and fertilizer became restricted, etc. WFP's policy to buy food from within the country that was intended for distribution elsewhere proved a positive step for the farmers in Chibia. As Chibia is prone to recurring droughts, it did depend on additional food distribution itself during some periods in the war, most notably 1989/1990 and 1998/1999. The occurrence of drought and ensuing plague of the Lagarta Militar worm destroyed many of the crops during the agricultural season of 2007/2008, yet did not lead to renewed food distributions or other (aid) interventions.

#### *Chibia during conflict*

When the war started most white settlers living in Chibia left the town, often to (re-) establish themselves in Portugal. Other notable effects of the war on Chibia society and particularly on livelihoods included the loss of access to credit and trade options, compounded by the closure of industries and shops at the departure of the white settlers. For instance, wheat production had come to a standstill when the war broke out, due to the lack of seeds. Normally, these seeds had been provided for by the colonial state. Also, the materials and machinery needed for wide scale wheat production broke down or were stolen during the war. Chibia mostly suffered from the consequences of war, but hardly found itself in the middle of the battle itself as was the case in Caluquembe for instance. Just as in all other parts of the country, Chibia had supporters of all three liberation movements at the start of independence, who opposed each other, sometimes in violent ways. One battle took place, when the South African SADF forces ran into the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola

(FAPLA) troops and (suspected) Cuban troops on their way to try and capture Lubango during the start of the civil war in 1975 (George 2005).

With the start of the conflict displaced people from other areas and provinces fled to this region. Since 1975 the areas surrounding the town were vacated to accommodate the groups of displaced people. The displaced people that arrived in Chibia went to live in the surrounding areas mainly, not in Chibia-sede itself. Their arrival did result in some local land conflicts between the displaced and the original inhabitants of Chibia. The first big waves of displaced people arrived in Chibia from 1979/1980 onwards until 1985, and mostly originated from the provinces of Bié, Huambo, and from the Huíla municipalities of Chipindo, Cuvango, Caluquembe and Caconda. The biggest displacement camp in Chibia municipality was located in Lufinda, a town some 30 kilometres to the east of Chibia-sede. It was established in 1982/1983 and housed some 300 families. After the mini-peace of 1991 some 30% of those families went back to their areas of origin, the rest remained in Lufinda. However, after 1992 with the failure of the parliamentary elections and return to war, many displaced people arrived again at Lufinda. The state provided some aid whenever new people arrived at the camp. They don't receive assistance anymore today because they are considered to have settled and adapted well in Lufinda. Next to the displaced arriving in Chibia, there were also people fleeing from Chibia. In 1992, when the conflict reignited after the parliamentary elections, some inhabitants fled across the border to Namibia and Zambia. These refugees had mostly been UNITA supporters who were afraid that they would be targeted by MPLA supporters in Chibia and blamed for the renewed conflict.

Unlike other municipalities in Huíla, Chibia was not an area under siege by the warring troops. Although people in Chibia have also lost assets during the war due to forced selling in order to pay for other household necessities, as well as the fact that household goods were increasingly more difficult to obtain due to transport and commerce restrictions, they did not suffer from asset stripping as some of the more war-affected regions in Huíla did. This has certainly played a role in decisions on the part of humanitarian organizations for the locations of intervention and the type of assistance.

### *Drought and hunger in Chibia*

The semi-arid region of Chibia has historically been highly vulnerable to recurring droughts and ensuing hunger. Chibia lies in a very dry region, the available water flows out to the sea through the province of Namibe. There is very little rainfall throughout the year. The droughts have become part of life in Chibia. Natural hazards also had effects on the history of colonial expansion in the region of the Huíla Highlands. Between 1863 and 1869 droughts, locusts plagues and cattle diseases made the first Portuguese temporarily abandon their settlement at the Nyaneka homelands. However, a prolonged drought between 1879 and 1884 intensified the struggles over land between the Portuguese and the Boer population, which eventually led to the withdrawal of the Boers from the region (Dias 1981, 366-367). When the droughts were especially severe in their effects on crop production and food reserves, the population of Chibia was faced with hunger. One inhabitant of Chibia described this phenomenon in the following way:

“Hunger strikes in Chibia every 10 years, and always during the years ending with an 8. 1988/1989 was a very bad year due to the combination of drought with war, and in 1998 we had a famine as well. Now in 2008 we are hungry again due to the drought and the plague of *Lagarta Militar* that destroyed our remaining crops”.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Interview with Zé Carlos, Chibia-sede, 03 July 2008.

He explained that people would cope with these famines by eating the tubers of the *Mutunda* tree, if the cereal harvests failed. The use of *Mutunda* during years of hunger has a long tradition. By using only the female tubers of the tree they would be able to make a porridge. During famines people died because of eating the male tubers as well, which caused food poisoning. The *Mutunda* tree is considered to be sacred in the region, and no one would consider cutting the tree for firewood. He also remembered the famine that hit the region in 1978 as a consequence of drought, and compared it to that of 1989/1990:

“In 1978 there was a famine, but no aid came. People went to Cunene to try and buy some *massango* (millet). In order to buy bread you had to wait in line during one day to be able to pick up some bread the next day. There was no food or clothing; there were rows of people everywhere. The famine and general situation in 1978 were much more difficult (than the one of 1989/1990), but strangely enough people didn’t die. In 1990, however, many people died from hunger. People were getting diarrhoea from bread that was coming in from Namibia.”

The droughts in the region appear to be cyclical and inhabitants of Chibia have tried to find ways to adapt to the droughts and consequent famines. As is shown in the next section, food assistance commenced only at the end of the 1980s and again at the end of the 1990s, when a combination occurred of drought, famines, and effects of conflict. During the time of the fieldwork the inhabitants of Chibia were faced with another drought that had affected their crop production. Although this drought had been a ‘normal’ one considering the cyclical nature, the effects were detrimental due to the pest of the *Lagarta Militar* that followed. Many farmers had seen their remaining crops destroyed by the worm, and indicated that they were using their built-up reserves in order to be able to buy food for the household. MINARS was considering giving food assistance to affected households, but this had not taken place yet at the time of the fieldwork.

#### *Aid interventions in Chibia*

Chibia overall has seen little aid interventions take place, due to the fact that the southern part of the province was not as severely affected by the Angolan conflict as much as the other parts were, and mass displacement nor resettlement processes took place. The few aid interventions that targeted Chibia started at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s and were instigated by widespread droughts and consequent famine in the region. WFP at that time was the main agency implementing assistance to the drought-affected populations through distribution of food aid. Increasingly so, WFP coordinated and implemented the relief programmes in Chibia in cooperation with MINARS. Some inhabitants of Chibia also remember the Eduardo Mondlane foundation that handed out maize in that period.<sup>55</sup>

Most relief programmes were initially intended exclusively for the groups of displaced people that had settled in the Chibia region. However, some inhabitants from the Nyaneka kimbos recalled having received food assistance during some years when drought was affecting Chibia more heavily. Seeds and tools programmes, or livestock distributions weren’t commonplace in Chibia. WFP continued their food assistance in Chibia from 1990 until 1996, with some follow up to specific groups of IDPs, and drought affected households throughout the rest of the 1990s and beginning of 2000. The municipality benefited from WFPs policy to procure food for assistance locally. They bought some 3,750 tons of maize from farmers in Chibia between 1992 and 2002, and had been planning to buy an additional

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<sup>55</sup> The Dutch Eduardo Mondlane Stichting had been founded in 1969 to support African liberation movements in their struggles against Portuguese colonial rule. After independence of these countries it continued its material support for the former Portuguese war-affected countries, like Angola.



4,000 tons of maize in Chibia in 2002 (Dixie 2002, 27). After WFP withdrew from Chibia, MINARS took over the responsibility of food distribution. After the war ended in 2002 more aid programmes were started by MINARS to assist IDPs in the resettlement process to their areas of origin. At the same time Angolan refugees who had stayed in Namibia and Zambia for large parts of the war were returning to Chibia, from where they originated. MINARS assisted them by handing out food, blankets and machetes. At this moment, food assistance is only continuing in three Khoi-San villages in Chibia. There have been some other small NGOs working in Chibia, but their activities mainly consisted of the construction of schools or health posts. Soon after the emergency phase finished, assistance to Chibia from aid agencies has ceased. The Director of the local EDA formulated this as follows: “The NGOs that were working in Chibia were mostly doing palliative care. When the war and the emergency period came to an end they all quit their programmes. They did not have an exit strategy. There was no room for sustainable development planning.”<sup>56</sup>

One person made reference to what he called a system of asking help specifically from the white settlers in Chibia: “The word we use is *esmola*. *Esmola* means asking for help from others: begging. This system only started with the arrival of the white settlers. You would knock on their doors and they would give some bread or something else and then say *sai, sai* (go away, go away). Before the whites arrived we were unfamiliar with *esmola*. You only call it *esmola* when the white people give you something”.<sup>57</sup> Because of the community structures in Chibia, where people tend to live very dispersed and there are hardly village structures to speak of, people tend to rely mostly on their direct families when they need assistance.

The Angolan institute that deals with the reintegration of ex-combatants has also been active in Chibia. One of my interviews was with a shoemaker who was assisted with his profession by IRSEM. He joined the MPLA troops in 1978, but stepped on a mine and lost one of his legs in 1979 whilst fighting in the province of Cuando Cubango. Ever since then the predecessor of MINARS, the State Secretariat for Social Affairs, has given him a monthly subsidy. In 1997 he also received a kit to start up his shoemaker store, a business which he actually already started himself in 1994. To continue doing this business is becoming increasingly hard. With the introduction of cheap Chinese shoes, people are starting to get used to throwing their shoes away instead of getting them fixed when they get damaged. He is the only person in Chibia that has a shoemaker store, although there are some non-skilled shoemakers around the market.

During the time of the fieldwork a new school for professional training had been opened in Chibia-sede. It was the result of partnership between the Italian NGO Intersos, and the Director of the Provincial Department for Water (DPA). The history and development of this school were recounted by a representative of Intersos as follows:

“The idea for the School for Professional Training in Chibia was already developed in 1998 by DPA. DPA felt that they didn’t have enough capable people within DPA itself, which is why they wanted the school to focus on training their own people. But at that time it was still war, so the implementation was difficult. After the war DPA knocked on Intersos’ door for support. We thought it would be better to open up the school for a wider audience. Which is why we now also offer training programmes for metalworkers, carpenters, plumbers and electricians. We gave all the necessary machines for this. The idea is that the participants follow a course of 6 months and after completion they receive a kit with which they are able to start their own business. Entrance is open for everyone, and we want to actively select candidates

<sup>56</sup> Interview with Augusto Carlos Saballo, Director of EDA, Chibia-sede, 24 June 2008.

<sup>57</sup> Interview with Manuel Chacomo, Chibia-sede, 5 June 2008.

from the rural villages, 2 or 3 persons from each village. The idea is that they practise their skills in Chibia, and not move to Lubango, but you can't entirely force that on people. We don't have official age criteria, but we do aim to work primarily with youths. We have groups of 30 people for each course, and it is without charge. The participants earn some money with the things that they make during the course, like chairs and tables. We also want to start courses for women in the future. The reason why we don't have that yet is because the original idea was to train only DPA people".<sup>58</sup>

The project shows that Chibia is in the government's focus. In comparison to Caluquembe, Chibia is better positioned in terms of state projects that focus on enhancing employment possibilities in the region, outside of the agricultural domain. This could be explained by Chibia's proximity to Lubango, but also by the personal connections that some government officials have to Chibia through ownership of fazenda's in the region and other economic ties.

### *Institutions and services in Chibia*

The collapse of basic services and institutions occurred in Chibia during the war in Angola, as well as a breakdown and neglect of infrastructure. First of all, the exploitative yet important trade and credit mechanisms, industries and commercial farms disappeared when most of the white Portuguese settlers left Chibia in 1975. This affected the entire rural economy by lack of incoming goods and inputs, the inability to obtain credit, and the disappearance of employment opportunities at the Portuguese-owned industries and shops. Although the Angolan government tried filling the vacuum by nationalizing most of these industries and commercial farms following the centralized planning feature of their initial Leninist-Marxist ideology, this policy failed and was abandoned as capacity for management was weak and the war increasingly absorbed most of the state's attention and financial resources (Hodges 2008). Trade nowadays almost exclusively takes place at the Chibia market which has grown considerably over the years and is one of the most important sites of trade in livestock in the region. Cows are bought by middlemen and local merchants on the market and then resold to slaughterhouses, or to buyers from all over the country. Young livestock are bought by local farmers who raise them and resell them at the market once they have reached a certain weight. Livestock are most often sold at the end of the rainy season when they are most healthy and well fed (Dixie 2002). Because of the proximity to Lubango, most surplus agricultural produce is sold at the informal markets in Lubango, as transportation is facilitated by the rehabilitation of the main road.

In terms of agro-pastoralism support and development, the main state institutions are the EDA, the Veterinary services and the Institute of Forest Development (IDF). EDA's primary objectives in Chibia are: eradicating hunger, preparation of the agricultural campaigns, improving training for farmers, and forming groups and associations to obtain credit. Furthermore, they have a role in the distribution of seeds and inputs to various farmers. In the words of the local EDA coordinator, the selection of farmers and distribution of seeds in villages is done in the following manner:

"EDA tries to identify the farmers that are willing to practice agriculture. We are now at the stages of sensitisation. The selection of the aldeias where we work in and the families within those aldeias is done by the soba, who will indicate which family is entitled to aid. He will distribute the seeds and inputs to his people. The soba

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<sup>58</sup> Interview with Daniel Cerbaro, coordinator of Intersos, Lubango 14 August 2008.

can tell us who is a good worker in the village and who isn't. That is the criterion that we use to distribute seeds, rather than who are the most vulnerable. The state used to import potato seeds, but it was stopped as the benefits were negligible. The seeds that EDA is distributing originate from Zimbabwe and South Africa. We are waiting for the seeds to arrive, they are stuck in Lobito. Maybe we will start handing out local seeds because farmers know their characteristics better. But how are we going to get local seeds? In order to obtain local seeds for distribution we need technical knowledge. If we would be able to make more use of local seeds the country would develop rapidly.”

Even though the EDA in Chibia lacks the extensive NGO network that the EDA in Caluquembe has, they rely on the same targeting system in the villages by letting the *sobas* decide who is entitled to assistance and who is not. The difference in targeting objective and practice however is that where NGOs aim to assist the most vulnerable in villages, the EDA favours those farmers that are deemed the most successful in obtaining good harvests from the seeds that they have received.

The IDF falls under the coordination of MINADER, and their primary objective is the management of forestry resources in Angola. In practice they mainly monitor the use of wood to make charcoal, in order to fight desertification of the area. According to an inhabitant of Chibia the institute lacks a conservation strategy:

“Their only activity is giving out permits to cut trees to make charcoal. They earn lots of money that way, which they divide amongst themselves. There is no conservation vision behind that.”<sup>59</sup>

Other state institutions that play important roles in Chibia are MINARS and Ministry of Health (MINSA). Furthermore, the personal link of the Director of the Provincial Department for Water with Chibia, as his hometown, is reflected by the inauguration of the School for Professional Training. Although initially intended to train DPA employees, it now caters for a wider clientele in Chibia.

This section has shown that, even though Chibia hasn't been an actual battleground during the war, it has suffered from its effects. This was compounded by the cyclical droughts and famines that would occur regularly in the region. The effects of the conflict decreased people's capacity to recover from droughts. Next to food assistance, little aid has been handed out, or on a one-project basis like the construction of a school or health post. Although the civil war affected their agricultural production because of the incoming IDPs' ever growing encroachment upon their lands, lack of machinery, seeds and other agricultural inputs, no systematic distribution of seeds and tools or other types of livelihood interventions have taken place. Therefore, aid in Chibia has been mainly relief oriented, with no linking processes to rehabilitation and development by NGOs. That has been left mostly to the state's domain, with different beneficiaries and objectives and varying outcomes, as is shown in the next section.

## **The role of the state in Chibia**

In this section I want to highlight a case that reflects the strong role of the state in Chibia. Local governance structures have been left more or less in tact during the war. Unlike Caluquembe, Chibia has only had MPLA representatives in local administration throughout

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<sup>59</sup> Interview with Zé Carlos, Chibia-sede, 16 July 2008.

the war and after. Also, because its close proximity to Lubango, reconstruction programmes have been more extensively implemented. These reconstruction efforts from the Angolan state have affected the population of Chibia in various ways. First of all, the highway linking Lubango, and the rest of the country, to Namibia passes through Chibia-sede and was rehabilitated at the time of the fieldwork. Benefits have been drawn from the road reconstruction works, both by improved access to Lubango as well as the temporary employment possibilities it created. The construction companies working on the rehabilitation of the road, are based in various locations along the highway. Most companies working along these roads are from Portugal, Brazil and/or China, employing the engineers from those respective countries. In between the municipal centre and the livestock market of Chibia a base was constructed for these companies. They enable some form of employment for mostly young men from Chibia. This often consists of unskilled or semi-skilled (day) labour, without formal contracts. Also, this type of employment is limited in time, as road works around Chibia are nearing its completion, after which the construction companies will dismantle their base and move on to other road rehabilitation projects in the country.

In the case of Chibia some curious side-effects of national reconstruction have been noted as well. Although one would expect that a better road network is beneficial for the commercialisation of food crops, the following example points at an unexpected negative effect. A commercial farmer was complaining about the fact that whilst he had hundreds of kilos of onions rotting away on his field as he wasn't able to sell them to the supermarkets in Lubango, he was seeing big Namibian trucks filled with onions pass him by on the highway connecting Chibia to Lubango.

The national reconstruction projects have negatively affected some of the local population in other ways as the following case will show.

### *Sogangelas*

The Sogangelas agricultural project is currently being presented by the Angolan Government as a prime example of modern agricultural development in the country, and a means to combat unemployment and poverty. The objective of the project was to create at least 300 jobs in the sectors of agriculture, industry and commerce (Jornal de Angola 2010). This project started in 2005 with the reconstruction of the Gangelas dam some 20 kilometres away from the municipal centre, by the Government of Angola in cooperation with a Chinese construction company. Building of the dam had started in 1975, but was almost immediately halted by the start of the civil war in the same year. During the early 1990s Russians had been invited by the Angolan government to resume the project, but when the conflict restarted after the 1992 elections, the Russians engineers had to abandon the Gangelas construction plans. The renewed construction of the dam was followed by the appropriation of a plot of land of around 6,000 hectares that was being prepared for large-scale production of cereals, horticulture and fruits. Irrigation canals totalling 24 kilometres ran through the terrain. The Sogangelas agricultural development project was initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture in conjunction with the Provincial government of Huíla, and is managed by a state-owned company called Sociedade de Desenvolvimento de Perímetros de Angola (SOPIR) which obtained credit from China for the project in Chibia. SOPIR was created by the government to specifically deal with the overall management of irrigation projects in the country, and address issues of farmer participation and underfunding. Under SOPIR's management the contracted workers usually have 70% shareholding. Operational costs were envisaged to be shared between SOPIR and the agricultural workers, with agricultural workers paying user fees and SOPIR being responsible for maintenance of the irrigation structures (African Development Fund 2005).

Although the Sogangelas project has been initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture in cooperation with the Provincial government, and managed by the state-owned company SOPIR, locally Sogangelas is known as the EDA-project. The EDA office in Chibia carried out a market study to see which agricultural crops would be most profitable to start producing on such a wide scale. The Director of the EDA in Chibia felt that the project should focus on wheat instead of maize, because of its potential for bigger profits, and not enter into competition with small scale farmers in the same region who are selling their surplus maize on markets as well.<sup>60</sup> The intention was that the project would distribute small plots of irrigated land to interested big and small farmers in the area. Pilot production started in 2008 using some smaller size plots of the land, focusing mostly on maize, beans and some vegetable crops. In 2009, a further 29.000 fruit trees were planted, mainly orange, tangerine, lemon and mango. The harvest during the agricultural season of 2009/2010 had been only half of what had been expected, due to severe rains and lack of funds for fuel to keep the generators of the irrigation system running. (Angop 2010) In 2010 74 small and big farmers had been employed by the project to cultivate the pilot plot. Sogangelas indicated in the same year that they would need a further investment of 28 million Kwanza (300.000 USD) in order to supply the farmers with seeds, fertilizers, as well as fuel for the generators of the irrigation system (Angop 2011). It seems that the role of EDA in the project is minimal. The local EDA Director did not make any reference to EDA's involvement in the project, other than the implementation of a market study, the results of which seem to have been rejected by the project's management as shown by the initial focus on maize production.

All people living and working on the Sogangelas premises were relocated by the state. But not everyone has received compensation for their lost land and houses, its disbursement often depending on whether or not they had left their lands and houses within the allowed time limits. Most people I interviewed seemed to be interested in taking part in the project, next to maintaining their own livelihood activities. However, who was going to be eligible to participate, as well as the conditions pertaining to profit sharing were not known at that time. One woman living in one of the Nyaneka kimbos had become "displaced" as she called it when the Sogangelas agricultural project appropriated the area, where people had been living and had their plots of land.<sup>61</sup> She also had been cut off from the irrigation system, and consequently had seen her agricultural production options diminished. At the same time, her husband had found some employment at the same agricultural project that in her own words had displaced her. In another Nyaneka kimbo that was located close to the project the story was largely similar:

"The big EDA project started 3 years ago, which is when they started removing people from the land. The first few people that left their lands got a good compensation for it. But the people who refused to leave and stayed to wait and see what would happen hardly got compensation from EDA. I left my kimbo one year ago, because it was located in the middle of the EDA field. I would like to start working a piece of the EDA land as well."<sup>62</sup>

For the people living in Bairro 11 de Novembro, the start of the Sogangelas project meant the end of their agricultural activities. The land and water they had been using until that time had been assigned to Sogangelas. Furthermore, due to the reconstruction of the existing irrigation channels in the area, access to water had been cut off for other households. Access to water has not only become problematic for the people that live closest to the Sogangelas terrain. The reconstruction of the irrigation canals in Chibia has affected many other farmers in the

<sup>60</sup> Interview with Augusto Carlos Saballo, Director of EDA Chibia-sede, 24 June 2008.

<sup>61</sup> Interview with Helena Mobanda, Nolata kimbo, 22 July 2008.

<sup>62</sup> Interview with Jorge Armando, Tchimbandi kimbo, 24 July 2008.

region. Like Mr. Sililo, a local farmer who had been using water from an irrigation canal from colonial times:

“Until one year ago I was able to always irrigate all of my fields, because I had access to the irrigation channel across the street. But one year ago the Chinese came and reconstructed the channel, cutting off my access. Now I’m struggling to have enough water.”<sup>63</sup>

The Sogangelas project has aimed to create employment possibilities, and some inhabitants have benefited from it, but a number of negative results have been noted, such as:

- So far only 74 farmers are participating in the project, whereas many more have actually seen access to land and water disappear.
- Only a small portion of the cleared irrigated land is currently in use, and the project is already said to be suffering from lack of finances.
- The crops that are produced so far are in direct competition with the produce of local farmers, and are in contradiction with the advice of the local EDA station.

The state’s involvement in assistance and reconstruction in Chibia is strong, especially when compared to other municipalities in the province. This has provided the population with some additional livelihood opportunities. At the same time it has actually led to a part of the population becoming disconnected from their livelihoods, and has reversed some of the results of earlier assistance programmes, as in the case of Bairro 11 de Novembro where seeds and tools programmes have become useless due to a sudden lack of land and water. The long-term outcomes of the state’s Sogangelas project on employment and economic development of Chibia are still unclear. The project however symbolizes the presence of a strong and visible state, which is socially and economically transforming modern-day Chibia. It highlights the state’s preference for large-scale, high-tech and commercial agriculture, as a strategy to rural development in the country, instead of focusing on a more inclusive and wider reaching plan to fight rural poverty and support smallholder farming. Sogangelas can be seen as an example of ‘development aggression’, in which local people become victims, not beneficiaries, of government’s grand schemes for modernization of agriculture, industry and commerce (Casiple 1996, Heijmans 2004). These projects then result in man-made disasters which undermine people’s livelihoods in ways that are often more difficult to reverse than if displacement had occurred because of war or natural hazards (Heijmans 2004, 124).

### **Comparing the villages and changing livelihood practices over time**

This section presents the comparative analysis of fieldwork done in three villages in Chibia municipality. I will give an overview of the main characteristics, events and issues of the three sites, combined with personal stories of what livelihoods in these villages look like, what they have in common and where they diverge. This will be placed within the broader context of conflict, displacement, aid interventions, and the socio-political issues that are at play. This entails a historical description of each village, the main events, and the shaping and reshaping of livelihoods depending on the context people have found themselves in. The data is mostly derived from open and semi-structured interviews, and to a lesser extent from surveys in the three villages.

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<sup>63</sup> Interview with Mr. Sililo, Chibia, 25 June 2008.

The fieldwork in Chibia lasted from May 2008 until August 2008. All the fieldwork sites were relatively well accessible from Lubango. The fieldwork in Chibia started with interviews with relevant stakeholders from NGOs to state institutions (both in Lubango as well as in Chibia-sede) to understand the history of conflict and aid as well as other characteristics in the region, and subsequently select three different localities that could serve for a good comparison in terms of different livelihoods, histories, and encounters with conflict and aid. From the start this selection process and the characteristics of the villages were very different from what I had experienced in Caluquembe. Whereas in Caluquembe the three villages had, to a certain degree, been very homogenous in terms of histories, ethnic backgrounds, type of livelihoods and even crop production, this was not at all the case in Chibia. This has strengthened and widened the reach of the comparative research considerably. With such diverse people's backgrounds, livelihoods and the recovery of livelihoods can be analysed from all sorts of different angles; be it ethnicity, history of displacement and conflict, access to aid, and the role of the state, etc. It deepens the understanding of the diversity in experiences with conflict and aid, as well as the multiple ways and circumstances in which people recover their livelihoods and the different factors that play a role in this process.

Bairro 11 de Novembro was selected as an example of a village that had received different types of assistance through agencies and institutions present in Chibia during and shortly after the conflict. The *kimbos* of the Nyanekas that were closely located to Bairro 11 de Novembro, were selected on the basis of the lack of assistance they had received throughout the war and after. Nonguelengue was selected because of the continuing distribution of food aid and other types of assistance, which had only started in 2007 and was continuing to this day.

Figure 6: Characteristics of the three fieldwork sites in Chibia

	<b>Bairro 11 de Novembro</b>	<b>The Nyaneka Kimbos</b>	<b>Nonguelengue</b>
Location	7 kilometres from Chibia-sede, opposite the Sogangelas agricultural project separated by a dirt road.	Within 20 kilometres around Chibia-sede, most of them located next to the Sogangelas agricultural project and dam.	50 kilometres to the east of Chibia-sede, accessible only by dirt road, bordering the Bicuari National Park
Ethnicity	Ovimbundu from Quilengues	Nyaneka-Humbi	Khoi-San
History	Neighbourhood was created in 1994 by MINARS for a group of displaced from Quilengues	Inhabitants had recently been relocated by the Sogangelas project.	Village was created in 2007 by MINARS to resettle the Khoi-San
History of displacement	All the people living in the village fled from Quilengues in 1993-94 and were resettled in Chibia in 1994.	Not during the war, but now some families say they have been displaced due to the Sogangelas project.	People were relocated to Nonguelengue in 2007.
Further characteristics	Access to water and land cut off by start	Heavily affected by drought and pests	Access to land and water is limited,

	of new agricultural project	during 2008	drought of 2008 affected the village.
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### *Bairro 11 de Novembro*

Bairro 11 de Novembro is a neighbourhood in the municipality of Chibia consisting of about 200 displaced people from Quilengues (municipality in the centre of Huíla province). They fled on foot to Lubango in 1993-1994. MINARS directed them to Km 16 which is a big roundabout 16 kilometres south of Lubango where many displaced at that time were settled by the government. When the displacement camp became very crowded, people were dying from hunger and illness. The Angolan government then decided to resettle the people from Quilengues in the especially for that purpose created neighbourhood Bairro 11 de Novembro in Chibia in 1994. The neighbourhood lies along a dirt road to Chibia-sede, and opposite the irrigated plots of the Sogangelas project. Immediately next to the neighbourhood, the head office of SOPIR is located, which manages the Sogangelas project.

The inhabitants of Bairro 11 de Novembro received food aid from WFP and the GoA through MINARS from 1994 up to the first 3 months of 2003. At the end this aid programme was transformed to a food-for-work scheme whereby the beneficiaries built a school in the neighbourhood in exchange for food. In one instance they received maize, sorghum and millet seeds, tools, and blankets from the Angolan NGO Mafiku. In 2003 the GoA in cooperation with the IOM started a resettlement programme. About half of the inhabitants of Bairro 11 de Novembro made use of this programme and were resettled in their areas of origin in Quilengues, while others decided to stay in Chibia. The main reasons for staying were lack of resources to restart their livelihoods back in Quilengues, having found some kind of job in Chibia, but also fear for the parliamentary elections of 2008: “We have seen the confusion after the elections of 1992, we will wait and see what the elections of 2008 will bring”.<sup>64</sup> Some families made use of the resettlement programme to Quilengues, only to return to Chibia after some time as they found that life was better for them there, despite the lack of agricultural options. Another factor that played a role in the decision of some to return to Chibia was that on return they found that their plots of land had been confiscated by other refugees who had settled in their villages of origin since they themselves had become displaced.

Since the start of the land appropriation and preparation for the Sogangelas project, opposite of the Bairro 11 de Novembro neighbourhood, its inhabitants lost access to land and were unable to pursue their regular agricultural production. The only agricultural activities that they could continue were confined to the small plots of land they had available next to their houses. However, as the houses have been built with little space in between them, agricultural production is practically negligent. The people of Bairro 11 de Novembro say that they have not received compensation from this project, because they do not have any documents showing the right to use that land. Without access to land, agricultural livelihood options were limited. People of Bairro 11 de Novembro now have developed a diversity of livelihood activities, outside of agriculture. They have found either day-jobs or regular employment, for instance with one of the construction companies that are currently rehabilitating the main road to Lubango. Two of the interviewees had found employment at the head office of SOPIR, located directly next to the Bairro 11 de Novembro. Some men practice semi-skilled labour like masonry and carpentry. The women mostly make *macau* (a local beer or liquor made of sorghum, also important as a form of local currency) which they sell to passers-by, tend to the small agricultural plots next to their houses, or do small

<sup>64</sup> Interview with Teresa Losinga, Bairro 11 de Novembro, 27 July 2008.



business at the Chibia market. The market is located some 10 kilometres from the neighbourhood, and especially women from the village do business at the market, purchasing pigs for instance and reselling them after they fattened them. There is no cattle in the village, and theft of small animals is mentioned as a problem in the village.

### *The Nyaneka kimbos*

For my research in Chibia I selected Nyaneka *kimbos* that were all located around the terrain of the Sogangelas agricultural development project. Some of the inhabitants of the *kimbos* had been affected directly by this project, having had to abandon their plots and sometimes their houses, to make room for this project. I visited 4 different *kimbos*, consisting of extended families, often of some 20-30 people in total. The families consisted of the 3 or 4 wives of the household head, and their children.

Most households had received food assistance from WFP at some point, mostly during the war. They recall receiving food, especially during the 1998/1999 and the 1989/1990 season, because of the severity of the drought those years. No mention is made of ever receiving seeds, tools or livestock. The food aid distribution had been an incidental occurrence. Some people obtained employment in Lubango during the war, but found it increasingly difficult to maintain these jobs when the war intensified. There were no taxi-buses driving between Lubango and Chibia as there are now. And hitching rides with the trucks that moved between Namibia and Lubango was becoming nearly impossible during the war.

In Chibia these *kimbos* lie at great distances from each other, and not in village structures. This has to do with the need for grazing land for livestock, close to the family *kimbo*. Although rearing livestock is an important livelihood activity in this region it is almost always complemented by agriculture. One could say that agriculture is the source for people's direct daily food needs, whereas livestock is considered as a savings account, which will only be tapped into in times of crisis and immediate need for cash. For women, small business and trade at the Chibia market, or selling foodstuffs to passers-by from the *kimbo*, provides a source of additional income to the household. The women do some small trade by reselling rice, making *fuba* and selling it, buying meat at the market, frying and selling it, and the making and selling of *macau*. But selling these goods is always subject to negotiation with the male household head as the following quote from a woman in one of the *kimbos* shows:

“Sometimes we make *macau*, when we have sugar. We only sell it from the house, not in the marketplace. Now we can only make the *macau* with sorghum, because the maize harvest failed. Sometimes we also sell *fuba* and other items from the house like meat. If we need to buy shoes for the children we sell some *macau* for income. In August and September there might be some maize again, but your husband will beat you when you go out to sell maize, you need his permission to sell items from the household”.<sup>65</sup>

Furthermore, one household is producing sugarcane, and sells it at the market in Lubango. It is not uncommon for children from the households to go and live at the *kimbo* of the grandparents, to assist them with agricultural production and livestock rearing. Also, some of the children have been able to find employment in Lubango, as teachers or drivers, and send remittances home.

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<sup>65</sup> Interview with Helena Mobanda, *kimbo* in Nolata, 22 July 2008.

During the period of fieldwork people were recovering from the drought and ensuing Lagarta Militar (African Armyworm or *spodoptera exempta*) pest that had destroyed many of their crops in the area.<sup>66</sup> The Lagarta Militar plague is a relatively normal occurrence in Chibia, however this year the amount of worms had been overwhelming, and the pest had mostly attacked cereal crops such as maize, sorghum and millet. At the height of the pest the ground was covered by the worms, eating away any vegetation they could find. The inhabitants of Chibia indicated this had had severe impact on their livestock as well. The Lagarta Militar had caused livestock to die this year. Firstly, because sufficient grazing lands were more difficult to find because the worm had attacked most vegetation. Secondly, one woman explained that if a cow ate one of those worms, it would die within 3 to 4 days.<sup>67</sup> And thirdly, people had to sell their livestock in order to obtain food for the families after their crops had failed. No large-scale pest control by distributing or spraying pesticides had taken place.

### *Nonguelengue*

Nonguelengue is a small village in Tchicutiti *comuna*, located one and a half hour driving from Chibia-sede. Only accessible by small dirt paths, it lies adjacent to the fazenda of the Director of the Provincial Department of Water. Close to a mining company for granite, a small path of about 5 kilometres long leads to the village. The Tchicutiti region is rich in minerals, explaining the presence of mining companies that are extracting granite and iron ore. In 2004 there was talk in the Angolan media about possible presence of diamonds in the area. Nonguelengue is a village of Khoi-San inhabitants that consists of 42 families, comprising of 118 people. They have been relocated there by the government in May 2007. Until the time of their relocation they had lived dispersed in a nearby area bordering the national park Bicuari.

The people in Nonguelengue say they never encountered conflict directly, but rather noticed the effects of the war when they saw the wild animals moving away from the area, affecting their ability to hunt for their livelihoods. In 2006 MINARS started distributing food aid to displaced people in Tchicutiti and decided to also start distributing food to the Khoi-San living in the area. When I asked why the government had started food aid distribution at that time specifically, people in the village could not indicate a reason or situation that made food aid more necessary at that particular time. The rationale of MINARS behind the ensuing relocation in 2007 was to improve the families' living standard, make aid delivery more effective, and ensure a livelihood of crop production that was deemed more sustainable than hunting and gathering.

At this moment MINARS only distributes food aid in three Khoi-San communities in the region. The inhabitants of Nonguelengue receive food aid by MINARS, in a food-for-work scheme. They would receive food for the construction of their own houses in the village, and for preparing plots of land. Their houses were finished and the plots of land weren't in use by the time of the fieldwork, but food aid was continuing as they had not been able to produce their own food at the time. Every week they received 10 kilos of fuba, 10 kilos of rice, 1 litre of oil, and 2.5 kilos of beans per household. They also received 10 heads of oxen from MINARS. These oxen originally came from Bibala, and were not accustomed to the Tchicutiti environment. As a consequence, 8 of the oxen died soon after. Some seeds and machetes were handed out, but due to the bad agricultural season the people were forced

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<sup>66</sup> The Lagarta Militar is a well-known migratory pest in Africa, and affects mostly cereal production. Pesticides can be used to fight an outbreak, and small trenches can be dug across the path of the insects to catch them, after which they should be buried or drowned (Abate, van Huis and Ampofo 2000).

<sup>67</sup> Interview with Vihemba, *kimbo* in Nolata, 30 May 2008.

to eat the seeds and sell some of the machetes. The IESA church handed out clothes in the village.

The families would, before the relocation took place, only meet up for collective hunting trips as they did not live in a village structure. They went on walking trips twice a day to hunt for wild animals and collect foods, such as honey. Both men and women worked the fields of their Nyaneka neighbours, in return for 2 kilos of maize or 1 litre of alcoholic drink a day per person. Furthermore, most of the inhabitants also had plots of land on which they cultivated some maize, beans, sorghum and millet. At this moment, most activities that take place in the village are related to their traditional hunter-gatherer lifestyle, even though availability of wild animals is limited. They sometimes manage to catch a *cabra de mata* (wild deer), and are able to collect honey. This is furthermore complemented with occasional day labour in the fields of their Nyaneka neighbours, as well as the production and trading of artisans' goods. Most women in the village make *kimbilas* (reed baskets) and some men make agricultural tools which they trade with the Nyaneka neighbours. They had started clearing some plots of land, but so far had not received seeds for the next agricultural season.

The formal explanation on the part of the Angolan state, and MINARS specifically, to relocate the group of Khoi-San to Nonguelengue, was their unsustainable lifestyle as hunters and gatherers. These traditional livelihoods were unwanted, and therefore the relocation was deemed to pave the way for these people to start more agriculturally based livelihoods. However, the distributed seeds had already been eaten and many of the agricultural instruments sold, due to the fact that no land (titles) had been made available in conjunction with the relocation, and a drought had occurred. So therefore, parallel to the relocation, the government had started distributing food aid until they were able to start agricultural production. The people of Nonguelengue were relocated following the state's rationale to promote more sustainable livelihoods, yet were left completely dependent on food aid instead. Furthermore, the hunting-gathering lifestyle in their former location had for some time already been complemented by the agricultural activities that the state was promoting. Yet now, due to the inability to practise agriculture they had been forced to return to hunting and gathering as a way to complement the erratic food distributions by the state. The rationale and practice behind the relocation of the Khoi-San to Nonguelengue are contradictory, and the priority that the state has given to the Khoi-San in the light of all reconstruction and recovery needs in the country is remarkable. As one inhabitant of Nonguelengue explains the state's focus on Khoi-San: "The state's pretext is that we were suffering, but I think they just wanted control over us".<sup>68</sup>

### *Comparing the villages in terms of aid and livelihoods*

In this section of the chapter I present an overview of aid interventions in the three villages, and the types of livelihood activities that people deploy.

Figure 7: History and type of aid interventions in Chibia

	<b>Bairro 11 de Novembro</b>	<b>Nyaneka kimbos</b>	<b>Nonguelengue</b>
<b>Aid organizations in years</b>	-MINARS 1994-2003 -WFP 1994-1998 -Mafiku 1997	-WFP 1986, 1998, 1999	-MINARS 2007-now
<b>Food aid</b>	By MINARS and WFP	Occasionally by WFP	By MINARS

<sup>68</sup> Interview with soba Jorge, Nonguelengue, 29 May 2008.

<b>Seeds and tools</b>	All of the inhabitants received maize, sorghum and millet seeds, agricultural instruments during a single distribution by Mafiku.	None	Seeds, and agricultural instruments by MINARS, which have been eaten and sold.
<b>Livestock</b>	None	None	A few oxen were distributed, but most of them died.
<b>Rehabilitation works</b>	A school through a food-for-work scheme.	None.	Houses through food-for-work scheme.
<b>Other</b>	Blankets from Mafiku.	None.	Clothes from IESA.
<b>Community groups/associations</b>	None.	Farmers associations, not connected to NGOs.	None.
<b>Able to produce food next to food aid</b>	No.	Yes.	No.
<b>Able to sell produce next to food aid</b>	No.	No.	No.
<b>What produce was sold?</b>	Not applicable.	Not applicable.	Not applicable.

All of the households in the three villages have had encounters with aid throughout the war and after, which was mostly limited to food aid and an occasional seeds and tools distribution though. Only the Nyaneka kimbo had received food aid because of droughts, but never received other types of aid. The other two villages have both received seeds and tools, but due to circumstances have not been able to use these or pursue any significant agricultural activities. In comparison with Caluquembe, the few seeds and tools distributions that took place in Chibia were small and had no follow up. No community groups were formed, nor seed banks. Small animals were not distributed either. Only the population of Nonguelengue received 10 oxen, of which 8 have already died. Although Chibia remained relatively well accessible during the war, it seems that most of the international aid agencies based in Lubango have not developed any activities in these villages, except for WFP.

Agriculture as a livelihood activity is practised on different scales in the three villages. The households in the Nyaneka kimbo produce cereals, fruit and vegetables. However, their production had been negatively affected recently by the Sogangelas project, and the drought combined with the Lagarta Militar pest. In Bairro 11 de Novembro only some households produce cereals on a very small scale, in their garden plots. In Nonguelengue no agriculture is practised at all. The same goes for livestock and small animals. Whereas the households in the Nyaneka kimbo all own cattle, the households in the other two villages do not. Small animals are furthermore only held in Bairro 11 de Novembro

on a small scale, with the purpose to resell them at the market. Fishing does not take place, and only the people in Nonguelengue occasionally practise beekeeping.

Not a single household member from Nonguelengue has found formal employment, and unlike people from the other villages occasionally do day labour on fields of their neighbours. The households in the other two villages have found employment, most often in Chibia itself, and sometimes in Lubango. Furthermore, there are some men in Bairro 11 de Novembro and the Nyaneka kimbo that practise skilled labour. In Nonguelengue on the other hand all women do artisan work; making *kimbolas* and selling them to their Nyaneka neighbours.

Most households in the three villages trade either surplus produce or other goods. Whereas the women of Nonguelengue only trade *kimbolas* with their neighbours, the women in the other villages sell a variety of goods from their houses, or at the Chibia market. This is also dependent on location, as both the Nyaneka kimbo as well as Bairro 11 de Novembro find some benefit in their proximities to the Chibia market as well as the road construction companies that are present in Chibia-sede. Only one household in the three villages received remittances; one Nyaneka family received cash from their son who had obtained a job as a driver in Luanda. The division of labour in the villages is such that women are primarily responsible for agriculture and trade, whereas men find formal employment, skilled labour and tend to their livestock.

For people in Bairro 11 de Novembro life has changed considerably since 1990, as one inhabitant comments: “It was war and I didn’t sleep, but at least I was at home and we had some more farming conditions there”.<sup>69</sup> During that time they still had access to their fields and oxen, yet now they find that they have more employment possibilities: “it’s better now, because at least I have a job”.<sup>70</sup> The people from Nonguelengue, have also had to abandon their livelihood activities of 1990, and have so far not been able to secure any employment possibilities or alternative activities. For the households of the Nyaneka kimbo, life has changed the least. They have continued with more or less the same livelihood activities, although one household member noted that life was better in 1990 as there were more employment possibilities at that time. Between 1975 and 1990 no major changes in the type of activities that people deployed were noted. However, one respondent of a Nyaneka kimbo remembered that in 1975 they were still working in farmers’ associations which she considered hard work for little income, and that she felt more free to pursue different activities now.<sup>71</sup>

Overall it seems that only the Nyaneka kimbo still maintain mostly agro-pastoralist livelihoods, complemented by formal employment and trade. Earning capacities in Bairro 11 de Novembro consist of a mix of trade, employment and skilled labour. Due to their recent relocation to the village of Nonguelengue, the Khoi-San have as of yet not had the opportunity to secure (sustainable) livelihoods for themselves, due to lack of land, water and seeds and tools. Therefore, they are still dependent on food distributions by MINARS, the little trading of their handicraft products they manufacture, occasional day labour on the plots of their Nyaneka neighbours, and some hunting and gathering of honey and wild foods. Trading for the Khoi-San is limited to the little trade they do with their Nyaneka neighbours. However, in the other two villages trade is an important, predominantly female activity which takes place in several spaces: within the village, at the Chibia market, and even extended to the markets in Lubango. Livelihoods in Chibia are no longer primarily agriculturally based, but have become diversified through trade and employment possibilities. These changes in activities however have not always been voluntarily made, as certain circumstances, such as

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<sup>69</sup> Interview Augusta Teresa, Bairro 11 de Novembro, 01 August 2008.

<sup>70</sup> Interview with Moizes Katimba, Bairro 11 de Novembro, 27 July 2008.

<sup>71</sup> Interview with Helena Mobanda, kimbo in Nolata, 22 July 2008.

droughts and reconstruction projects and relocation have made it difficult to pursue agricultural activities.

### **Current livelihood strategies: self recovery and state recovery in Chibia**

This section discusses the current livelihood strategies that people employ in Chibia. This section argues that livelihoods that have been affected directly and indirectly by conflict in Chibia have gone through a process of self-recovery, in the sense that people have mostly (re-) established themselves during and after the conflict, and that aid has played a minimal role in assisting these processes. Furthermore, state recovery processes in the form of reconstruction projects have had an impact on the socio-economic development of the region, with both positive and negative consequences for livelihoods in Chibia.

#### *Current livelihoods in Chibia*

The lack of employment possibilities in Chibia were described by one woman I interviewed in a Nyaneka kimbo as follows: “There are no permanent jobs here, no contract labour. There is “desemprego tradicional” (traditional unemployment). People sit around all day waiting for a job opportunity. If you are lucky you can find a job that lasts from the morning to the afternoon”.<sup>72</sup> However, in comparison with Caluquembe the number of household members in Chibia that had been able to obtain formal employment was far higher. In Caluquembe (formal) employment was almost only obtained through migration, whereas Chibia offered more opportunities. So far, reconstruction programmes have been able to extend the possibilities of day labour, but especially formal long-term employment within these projects remains difficult to obtain.

Cattle rearing has always been an important livelihood strategy for the people living in the Chibia region. Although agriculture is practised mainly for their own food supply, livestock is a strong trade commodity and the number of cattle one owns is considered to be the prime indicator of someone’s wealth. Livestock is mainly traded when people need cash for funerals, clothes, and in case of illness for instance, although it was noted that especially the younger generations are more inclined to sell livestock in order to make investments in other livelihood activities (Dixie 2002). They rarely use livestock for own consumption, but rather trade it at the market when cash is needed. The main crops under production in Chibia are: maize, beans, peanuts and vegetables (like tomato, onion and garlic) and most of these products are sold at the Chioco market in Lubango, whereas livestock is mostly traded at the local Chibia market (Dixie 2002). One can also find many fruit trees in the region, as well as sorghum and millet production. Livestock and crop production continue to be the most practised livelihood strategies in Chibia municipality.

Trade is practised by almost all households in the three villages: in the village itself, with neighbouring villages, at the markets in Chibia and in Lubango. The products that are traded are diverse, ranging from surplus harvest, to homemade liquor and food, and *kimbalas*. Youth from the kimbos now also look for opportunities in the cities like Lubango, especially since the failed agricultural season of 2007/2008. Since then, inhabitants of Chibia also mentioned an increase in livestock theft, a phenomenon that has always been common in the region. Furthermore, people have been increasingly procuring employment with the construction companies that are present in Chibia.

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<sup>72</sup> Interview with Helena Mobanda, *kimbo* in Nolata, 22 July 2008.

### *Self recovery and state recovery*

Post-conflict recovery of livelihoods in Chibia has followed markedly different processes than the type of externally driven recovery as seen in Caluquembe. Chibia hasn't encountered the same amount and type of NGO interventions which targeted recovery of livelihoods directly. No large-scale seeds and tools distributions have taken place. Livelihoods in Chibia were affected by the conflict in many ways; employment possibilities diminished, access to necessary inputs, credit and goods became limited as well as the access to markets in for instance Lubango. Furthermore, due to recurring droughts in the area the households remained vulnerable to crop failure. With the arrival of displaced people in the region, the inhabitants were suddenly faced with pressure on land. For the displaced people arriving in Chibia, like the inhabitants of Bairro 11 de Novembro, assets had been lost during displacement, and they had to restart their lives and livelihoods in a new place without support from family, networks, or aid agencies. Recovery mostly occurred unassisted, as the effects of the war became less pronounced in the area and new livelihood opportunities appeared.

During and after the war, people in Chibia have been able to maintain their livelihoods of agro-pastoralism although some elements have been adapted such as choice of crops. Looking at livelihoods in Chibia today, one can see a diversity of options, from small trade, agricultural production and livestock rearing, day jobs, formal employment, commerce with Lubango markets, etc. Inhabitants of Chibia have recovered their livelihoods independently of aid interventions. They have been able to sustain most of their core livelihood activities during the war, due to the fact that violence and displacement did not affect their households directly. For the people of Bairro 11 de Novembro this was considerably different. They became disconnected from their livelihood through displacement, and have not been able to revive their agriculturally based livelihoods since arriving in Chibia, due to lack of land and water. At the same time, they have been able to develop a diversity of livelihood activities, ranging from small trade, skilled labour and formal employment, which has enabled them to fulfil their household needs. These activities have been developed within an environment that has offered them a broader range of perspectives compared to other areas of the province, where livelihoods are more restricted to a specific type of agriculture. Self recovery in Chibia means that people themselves have established a variety of livelihood activities, without having been targeted directly by aid interventions aimed at livelihood recovery.

Chibia's location close to Lubango has facilitated the implementation of national reconstruction programmes such as road rehabilitation and the Sogangelas agricultural development project. The role of the state in Chibia has been influential, either through personal linkages of the provincial political elite in the area, as well as through a number of large scale reconstruction programmes that were implemented. This strong influence has had both negative and positive consequences for people's livelihoods. On the one hand it has created several job opportunities, mostly for the male population of Chibia, improving transportation means between Chibia and markets in Lubango, as well as increasing Chibia's visibility as an emerging area for agricultural development. On the other hand, these projects have displaced many of the local farmers, cutting people off from access to water and land, mostly affecting smallholder farmers in the area. This process of state recovery in Angola has been marked by an overreliance on large-scale infrastructural forms of reconstruction, instead of a vision and strategy on rural development through assistance to smallholders. This has come to dominate the Angolan government's actions in the post-conflict reconstruction phase. As Orre noted with reference to the forced evictions in Lubango to make room for the

reconstruction of the railway: “The event thus illustrates the government’s reconstruction strategy centred on the fast development of large-scale infrastructure in a process which seemingly shows little concern for the more immediate needs of the vast masses of the urban and rural poor”(Orre 2010, 3). The state in Angola has continuously followed this line of mostly infrastructural development as a way to reconstruct the country in the post-conflict period, as will be further analysed in chapter 8 of this thesis. Furthermore, in the case of the state’s interventions in Nonguelengue, any self recovery that had occurred in the post-conflict period was reversed due to the state’s relocation and the inability of the state to provide the means, context and conditions in which the inhabitants could sustain themselves and their households. Under the heading of supporting more modern and sustainable livelihoods, these people have been cut off from land and resources with which they were able to survive in the first place, instead becoming reliant on the state’s food assistance.

How livelihoods develop in the future, and whether the people of Chibia will continue to see their livelihood options grow depends on a number of elements, including the continuation of the national reconstruction programmes, further attention for trade and commerce of agricultural products, and the ability of people to adapt to the recurring droughts and pests.

## **Conclusion**

Although Chibia hadn’t been at the centre of fighting, the region experienced the consequences of war, such as the large number of IDPs settling in Chibia, lack of goods and basic services, and recruitment of soldiers. Major aid interventions never took place in Chibia, apart from occasional food assistance by WFP and MINARS which was in the first place made available because of the cyclical droughts and famines that hit the dry Chibia region rather than the effects of war. Large-scale seeds and tools distributions, as in the case of Caluquembe, therefore took place on a very limited scale, primarily focused on the displaced populations residing in the area. Assistance to Chibia was therefore mostly relief oriented, consisting of an occasional goods distribution, without much interaction or cooperation with local authorities.

The comparative research in Chibia was done between three very different villages in terms of ethnicity, history of displacement, livelihoods and aid interventions. The comparison showed that especially in terms of effects on livelihoods, the village that had received the most assistance in the past (Bairro 11 de Novembro) seemed to have the most diversified livelihood options. However, the agriculture-biased type of assistance doesn’t seem directly related to the livelihood activities that developed and which were for a major part far from being agriculturally based (even after the distribution of seeds and tools). The only village still receiving assistance, Nonguelengue, was hit not by war, but by modernity.

Livelihoods in Chibia comprise of a mix of activities ranging from agriculture, cattle rearing, to artisan activities, (formal) employment, semi-skilled labour, and much trading. Although the livelihood options differ from one locality to another, they all seem to have more differentiated patterns than livelihoods in Caluquembe. As I argue in this chapter they are the results of processes of self and state recovery. National reconstruction programmes have contributed to a day labour type of employment, and given some farmers the opportunity to participate in the new agricultural development project of the government. However, as noted in this chapter, the rehabilitation of the road as well as the agricultural project had both positive and negative effects on people’s livelihoods. Reconstruction discourses by the state are strongly influenced by a view on rural development through large-scale infrastructure and commercial projects, viewing traditional livelihoods as unsustainable



and unwanted. This has influenced the interface between local people and the state, in which top-down approaches to reconstruction have meant a blatant disregard for people's developed activities and little space for negotiation.

The population of Chibia have managed to realize a type of self recovery of livelihoods without NGO interventions that targeted household's livelihood recovery directly. No linking processes from relief to rehabilitation and development took place. Rather, rehabilitation and development were firmly in the hands of the state, which chose a markedly different approach than aid agencies, and actually in some instances reversed the efforts of aid agencies by rendering seeds and tools distributions useless. State involvement on the other hand has both expanded options for a few, and forcibly closed options for others.

## 7. The humanitarian arena in Huíla

### Introduction

### History of humanitarian aid in Angola

### The humanitarian arena in Huíla

### The importance of neutrality in everyday humanitarian practice

### Organizational adaptation in a period of transition, the case of two Dutch NGOs

### Conclusion

### Introduction

This chapter contains an overview of the history of aid in Angola, linking the various aid actors and interventions to the course of the Angolan conflict. It investigates how humanitarian access in Angola was negotiated, what its policies were, and how it became politicized, and used as bargaining tool for both warring parties. The chapter then identifies the variety of different actors that were part of the humanitarian arena in Huíla province and analyses how aid was shaped in the everyday practices of organisations active in Huíla. From interviews, observations in the field and offices, and written information, a picture emerges about the history of humanitarian aid in the province, its changing discourse, policy and practice over time. Specifically, the interpretation of humanitarian principles in practice is highlighted. Analysis of negotiations and interaction at the interface between aid givers and aid beneficiaries further show how quality of aid is assessed and how organizational discourses shape perceptions on aid beneficiaries and consequent interventions.

A comparison is made between two Dutch organizations, one with a humanitarian and the other with a development mandate. The comparison will show the different approaches used, not just programmatically but also in terms of partnerships and exit strategies. This highlights the specific problems that aid agencies in Angola have faced in reassessing their country presence, and how these problems have affected LRRD processes.

### History of humanitarian aid in Angola<sup>73</sup>

This section of the chapter serves as a background and introduction to the history of aid in Angola, after which the chapter will zoom in on the various aid actors, with a specific focus on the everyday practices of aid in Huíla province.

Figure 8: Timeline of conflict, peacebuilding efforts and aid interventions in Angola

Period	Aid Interventions	International peacebuilding Actors	Aid Providers
1961-1974 War for Independence	Aid delivery to refugees in Zaire		-Local church organizations -UNHCR -UNIC
1975-1989	Large refugee flows	1981: UNAVEM I	-Local churches

<sup>73</sup> Some of content of the first section of this chapter is based on a preliminary analysis of the history of aid in Angola, carried out jointly with Maliana Serrano. The text has been adapted according to the specific analysis in each of our individual theses.

<b>Cold War</b>	to Zaire and Zambia	established	UNDP -UNICEF -WFP -ICRC -MSF
<b>1990-1992 Civil war and Bicesse Accords,</b>	Assistance to displaced and drought-affected people, demobilisation of soldiers, reconstruction	Troika: Portugal, Cuba, USSR  1991: UNAVEM II established	Special Relief Programme for Angola (SRPA): large influx of humanitarian organizations. UNDP is lead agency.
<b>1992-1994 Civil war</b>	Emergency relief and health programmes	1993: UN SRSG made responsible for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations	Limited humanitarian coordination -WFP -UNHCR -ICRC -Caritas 1993: DHA set up Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit in Angola (UCAH)
<b>1994-1998 Lusaka Protocol</b>	Demobilisation and reconstruction (food aid and food-for-work programmes)	1995: UNAVEM III established 1997: MONUA replaces UNAVEM III	UCAH in charge of demobilisation 1997: DHA becomes OCHA Humanitarian agencies have access but limited in some areas.
<b>1998-2002 Civil war</b>	Emergency relief	1999: MONUA withdrawn UNOA created  2000: COIEPA	1999: PNEAH <sup>74</sup> established -WFP -ICRC -UCAH UNITA areas inaccessible
<b>2002-now Cease-fire</b>	Reconstruction and rehabilitation	2002: UNOA replaced by UNMA	Both humanitarian and developmental organizations

*Source:* Compiled from various sources (Ball and Campbell 1998, UN archives, Gorman 1994, Richardson 2000, Robson 2003, Duffield 1994b)

The long-lasting and multi-dimensional character of the Angolan crisis resulted in the presence of a wide variety of aid actors with different mandates, perceptions and practices. In this section, the focus is on the history of aid interventions and the room for manoeuvre aid actors had with reference to the dynamics and shifting politics in the different phases of the conflict. The humanitarian arena is not limited to international agencies, but also of other major players in the humanitarian arena such as Angolan NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), the churches and the government. The emergence, interaction and interfaces between these actors are analysed in this section.

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<sup>74</sup> National Emergency Programme for Humanitarian Assistance (PNEAH)

*1961-1989: constrained room for humanitarian manoeuvre*

This period of war in Angola was characterized by a minimal presence of Angolan and international NGOs due to the political environment which restricted the emergence of Angolan NGOs as well as keeping doors closed to the international NGOs. The GoA influenced coordination and allocation of aid, yet lacked the funding to reach rural areas. An increased military expenditure ultimately led to amongst others an erosion of social service delivery by the state.

In 1961, when the war for independence commenced, the affected population primarily fled to neighbouring Zaire (now DR Congo) where they were assisted by church organisations and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Gorman 1994). Within its borders, despite evidence of famine conditions already occurring at the beginning of the 1980s, Angola only started receiving significant international humanitarian aid at the end of the decade, as is reflected in the fact that in 1988 as few as six international NGOs were present in the country (Duffield 1994b, 33). During the Cold War, national NGOs were effectively banned by the government whereas international NGOs were discouraged from entering Angola. UN agencies such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF and WFP were at this time operational primarily in government areas (UNHCR was the exception) (Lanzer 1996) and appeals were launched by the UN's Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO - later turned into DHA and then OCHA). The only international organisations working in UNITA controlled territory were the ICRC and MSF. ICRC also worked in MPLA areas and set up its offices as early as 1975. In 1979 it started its first orthopaedic centre and in 1981 began distributing humanitarian aid to Angola's displaced (ICIHI 1986). ICRC had to work with two Angolan Red Crosses until the Bicesse Accord – one from the government side and the other created by UNITA as a strategy to access external aid resources (Hilhorst and Serrano 2010). MSF's activities started in 1983 with a French mission, initially only in UNITA areas where they ran primary health care services in displaced camps, nutritional and other programmes and supported hospitals and smaller health structures. Although in 1989 MSF Belgium and Spain started interventions in war-affected government areas, MSF as a whole was for a while accused by the government for being partial to UNITA (Ball and Campbell 1998).<sup>75</sup> Church organisations such as the World Council of Churches, were also active in providing assistance to local populations in rural areas where many had their missions (UN archives). As described by Ostheimer (2000, 130), Caritas for instance had a major role in aid delivery in UNITA areas because of its local network of churches.

The GoA during this phase provided assistance through two main channels. The first involved subsidised food sales of imported commodities, but was ended in 1992 following the effects of the drop in oil prices and of structural adjustment programmes of the late 1980s. The second involved assistance given under the government's relief institutions, which in the 1980s was the State Secretariat for Social Affairs (SEAS, and later converted into MINARS). The SEAS did have some operational capacity in the 1980s in terms of warehouses and transport means, but relied on UN and bilateral financial aid rather than on government

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<sup>75</sup> Similar claims that MSF was supportive of anti-communist regimes have been made in relation to other conflicts in the 1980s. Terry (2002, 149) for instance argues that MSF had a "...strong aversion to both the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese regime in Phnom Penh. MSF withdrew support from the Khmer Rouge camps as soon as the emergency period subsided and restricted its assistance to the non-Khmer Rouge refugee camps." Furthermore, MSF is also said to have been the most active NGO in Afghanistan, particularly in Mujahidin controlled areas during the Russian occupation, with some 120 doctors on the ground by 1983 (Amstutz, 1986, 218).

funding and was criticized for its lack of coordination (Ostheimer 2000). In the 1990s as food aid replaced commercial food imports and gained importance, competition occurred amongst several state institutions concerning the responsibility for the coordination of emergency aid (Duffield 1994b). These government efforts however, were limited in capacity as they restricted aid to (urban) areas under their control and did not consider refugees or drought victims as eligible (ibid). Beyond such efforts, the government attempted to maintain a certain level of services to the population with substantial technical and personnel support mainly from Cuba, in areas such as health and education. However, during the 1990s the government's role in local service delivery was practically negligible again leaving people, particularly in rural areas, to fend for themselves. Ostheimer (2000) argues that Angola's state was delinked from society and therefore did not perform its function for disaster relief and engagement in social service delivery. UNITA on the other hand created structures parallel to those of government (such as the Red Cross, a Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator and a Social Department) in order to make itself eligible and prepared for receiving aid.

#### *1989-1992: emergence of NGOs and UN coordination*

This period of the conflict was characterized by the opening up of political space through which both Angolan and international NGOs gained increased presence in the delivery of aid. Governance and aid coordination responsibilities increasingly shifted towards UN agencies and international NGOs. This gave especially the UN a strong presence in the country, exemplified by the start of the first relief programme, SRPA. The SRPA was the result of a negotiation process in which humanitarian access and political interests had to be reconciled, resulting in defining the programme as a response to drought, while at the same time gaining access to UNITA areas, and viewing it as a potential tool for establishing peace.

With the end of the Cold War and the Bicesse peace negotiations of 1991, legal reforms allowed the establishment of independent associations, upon which a body of national civil society organisations emerged. Angolan NGOs and local churches over the years played an important role in reaching rural populations as they did not have the same security restrictions as INGOs and could use their local networks. This led to frequent 'sub-contracting' relationships between international and national organisations, shaping the latter's role as implementing partners, but also limiting the investment in building the capacity of Angolan NGOs in the long term. Several international NGOs also entered the country at this time to start up rehabilitation-oriented programmes in the new context of peace. Responsibility for basic service provision to the population was left to the aid community as international aid agencies effectively took over the role of public service institutions (Christoplos 1998). However, for a long time, the main focus of the humanitarian response was on food aid, with basic service provision being a secondary priority. And even then, little attention was given to institutional aspects of the crisis and to questions of local capacity. As such, with governance responsibilities shifted to UN agencies and international NGOs, these organisations had the power to impact local institutions and people's livelihoods, with intended and unintended effects.

Furthermore, the emergency approach within which international aid expanded was to persist throughout the war, despite the fact that, as we have seen, there have been several areas and periods of relative stability in the country (Cain et al. 2002, Robson 2003). Most of the NGOs that arrived in Angola became engaged in the first coordinated humanitarian intervention programme – the Special Relief Programme for Angola (SRPA) – launched under the coordination of UNDP, in September 1990. The SRPA included four so called 'peace corridors' enabling humanitarian access and safe provision of aid to mainly

government held territories. The SRPA was defined primarily as a response to a drought in Angola and in the second instance, as an instrument for peace (UNICEF 1991 in Duffield 1994b, 48). As argued by Duffield (1994b), the programme presented the drought as the main component of the crisis, at the expense of other structural causes. Earlier in 1990 the UN had launched an appeal for government controlled areas only, as its agencies were restricted to such areas, with the exception of UNICEF. But following pressure from the US's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the SRPA was to include UNITA areas as well. Some have argued that this was a political manoeuvre to attempt to replace South African assistance (Duffield 1994b, 42, Richardson 2000). Although the SPRA allowed more people to be reached by aid than before, the renewal of conflict in 1992 interrupted the programme. By then, the SRPA was considered to be unsuccessful by many, because of problematic assessment and information procedures, bureaucratic procedures blocking the speedy delivery of aid, and manipulation by two warring parties (Ostheimer 2000, Richardson 2000).

### *1992-2002: aid as a political strategy*

In this period aid became a powerful political instrument. Both UNITA and MPLA tried to enhance their access to aid, which ensured they could continue their military spending on winning the war over the other. Also, MPLA tried weakening its opponent further by cutting off access to aid to those areas under UNITA's control.

The start of the post-election war saw the suspension and withdrawal of many international actors as access and security became serious problems. The WFP, UNHCR, ICRC and Caritas were still able to transport some aid to a few provincial cities, but this was ad-hoc, and ICRC, MSF and Save The Children Fund (SCF) attempted but failed to negotiate access with GoA and UNITA separately (Richardson 2000). For the international NGOs that had just started rehabilitation programmes, the re-ignited conflict meant that many withdrew or had to switch gears to emergency relief, for which they were ill prepared. The SRPA was replaced by an emergency programme, this time under the coordination of the DHA (which became OCHA in 1997). The first consolidated appeal for Angola was launched in May 1993 and the Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UCAH) was created by DHA, to take the lead in the coordination of emergency operations and negotiation of humanitarian access with the warring parties. UCAH retained this mandate throughout the 1990s and until the end of the post-war emergency. Many argue that UCAH's role was positive "...at a time when there was no sign of an imminent ceasefire and humanitarian conditions were deteriorating" (Paulo 2004). However, this perception also changed as the approach of 'peace corridors' as had been stipulated under the SRPA relief programme came under increasing scrutiny as both parties to the conflict were seen to be using aid as a bargaining tool for meeting their political ends. Access to humanitarian aid had become even more strategically important to both sides with the end of the cold war and consequent removal of external support (Lanzer 1996, Richardson 2000, Ostheimer 2000). Both parties requested humanitarian assistance and UNITA even reorganised itself to be able to receive aid as it was running out of resources and needed to contest the new legitimacy gained by the GoA since the ruling MPLA had won the elections (Duffield 1994). At the same time the GoA was presenting donors with exaggerated numbers in terms of humanitarian needs, enabling them to continue financing military means instead (Hilhorst and Serrano 2010, S191).

Furthermore, humanitarian aid became increasingly integrated with the political and military UN operations as both were placed under the SRSG, which further contributed to the UN's general loss of credibility and growing unpopularity towards the end of the 1990s (Richardson 2000). The integration of humanitarian aid into the dynamics of conflict was further reflected in the fact that after 1998, as the Lusaka process came to a standstill, UNITA

areas were cut off from aid and were to remain inaccessible until the end of the war in 2002. This was a political decision both at the level of UNITA, but also by the UN which had at that point abandoned its mandate to negotiate peace and stopped attempts to deliver humanitarian aid to UNITA areas (Messiant 2004). Several areas under government control were also isolated from aid, whilst humanitarian needs continued to mount. These needs arose to a large extent due to the scorched earth policies employed by the belligerents, in which civilian, mostly rural, populations were forcibly removed from their homes to prevent them from providing food and support to enemy troops.

#### *2002-now: diminishing humanitarian presence*

With the end of the war in 2002, the opening up of newly accessible areas revealed a new peak in humanitarian needs and in the response by the humanitarian community. All major aid agencies present in Angola at that time were involved in providing assistance to the displaced populations, arriving by the thousands from the bush to IDP camps or quartering areas of ex-UNITA soldiers. UNHCR in turn, supported the return of thousands of refugees from neighbouring countries. The GoA also launched widespread relief operations through MINARS, although supplies were often irregular and programmes short-lived. Thereafter, the humanitarian effort centred on the processes of returning and reintegrating people into their areas of origin, supporting the recovery of livelihoods and the (re)building of social service infrastructure. Although this process is still on-going and agricultural recovery programmes remain the focus of many international and national NGOs' interventions at community level, by 2005 the government declared that all people had been resettled, reintegrated or returned to their areas of origin (IDMC 2007).

This marked a period in which many of the international aid agencies were re-assessing their presence in Angola, or redefining their activities to fit the changing circumstances in which development thinking evidently became increasingly appropriate. This transition process was not smooth and uniform; due to better access and favourable climatic conditions, one geographical area was more ready for development interventions relatively early, whereas in other places emergency aid was still called for as people continue to struggle to meet their daily food needs. This demanded flexibility and an extensive rethinking of agencies' mandate, funding modalities, capacities and activities. Organisations working in Angola have had to be flexible in their approaches due to the ever-changing nature of the conflict, the successive signing and breaking of peace agreements, and relative periods of stability and increased access.

The potential for lasting interventions by the aid community to significantly improve the future of Angolans, has furthermore been severely affected by a dramatic reduction in donor funds and in the number of aid organisations. This withdrawal of aid which has characterised the arena since 2005 comes from the fact that Angola is perceived as a wealthy country, mainly because of its oil, capable of funding its own reconstruction. Reduced funds have not just affected international agencies, but have also left Angolan NGOs and local churches struggling to survive, which would have been best positioned to support local development initiatives and broader democratisation processes. The GoA in the meantime has been able to finance its national reconstruction efforts through oil revenues and credit loans, chiefly from China, which nonetheless fall short of addressing the local needs and ensuring an equitable distribution of its benefits. The effects of the global financial crisis have already been felt in the GoA's annual budget through significant cuts and will undoubtedly also be reflected in the global reduction of Official Development Assistance (ODA), the consequences of which for Angola's population remains to be seen.

The problematic nature and history of aid in Angola has been shaped by the abuse by political actors to use aid as an instrument to further the war economy and politics. On the other hand, the way the international community defined and consequently dealt with the humanitarian crisis contributed to a further politicization of aid in Angola.

Organisations are drawn into global politics as was shown by the case of MSF's choices of intervention in UNITA areas. They also become enmeshed into local politics and adjust their practices accordingly, as is exemplified by the fact that the ICRC had to work with two Angolan Red Crosses, a practice that is not normally permitted under the organisation's regulations (Hilhorst and Serrano 2010). On the other hand, warring factions adapt their organisations and employ different mechanisms to make themselves eligible to receiving aid, UNITA by creating structures parallel to those of government and the GoA by inflating beneficiary numbers and needs. Together with the blatant manipulation of aid supplies by both belligerents that came with the negotiation of peace corridors, these make up the most common ways in which aid became politicised.

However, we argue that the very policies and practices of the international community were in themselves playing into the politics of conflict, by the way the crisis and responses were defined. Duffield (1994b) demonstrates for the case of the UN's humanitarian role from the late 1980s till the end of 1993, how this politicisation was done. The UN-led SRPA presented the Angolan crisis primarily as a situation of drought whilst promoting its potential for peace-making. Then in the 1993 Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), the crisis was defined as one of physical destruction, dislocation and material shortages which could be normalised with emergency aid, whilst a parallel process was drawing humanitarian and political interventions closer by putting them under the same management structure. Through a process of depoliticizing the humanitarian situation in Angola, it actually created space for setting up an aid structure that included political interventions. Furthermore, aid delivery was influenced by the interests of external actors such as the US' pressure to extend the UN effort to UNITA areas. In present day Angola, aid is being shaped by economic interests, as evidenced for instance, by a recent visit of the new US Secretary of State to the country to establish closer economic ties and support for reconstruction. Increasingly such support involves the private sector, through collaborations particularly between oil companies and the US Agency of International Development (USAID) (Pleming and Almeida 2009).

## **The humanitarian arena in Huíla**

As introduced in chapter 2, this research approached the study of humanitarian aid by conceptualizing it as an arena, which enables understanding of how aid actors shape the outcomes of aid through their own actions, agency and negotiation (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010, Hilhorst and Serrano 2010). Using this framework requires analysing the everyday practices and policies of all relevant humanitarian stakeholders and the interfaces between them, including those actors that might not be labelled as humanitarian per se but which still play fundamental roles in shaping the outcomes of aid (Hilhorst and Serrano 2010). This section of the chapter identifies the variety of actors that took part in the humanitarian arena during the emergency and post-conflict period in Huíla. It categorizes these actors, and shows how aid became part of everyday life and survival in the province.

### *Church organizations*

There has been a great diversity in the types of organizations implementing aid programmes in the province. Among the first and constant aid providers were the churches and church-



based organizations. Churches provided social and material support to the affected population throughout the different stages of conflict and in the most isolated of areas.

The predominant image of the relationship between religion and the colonial state in Angola was that the Catholic Church was considered an ally to the colonial policies of the Portuguese, whereas the protestant missionaries were mistrusted and considered to be too liberal, therefore threatening Portuguese colonial expansion (Péclard 1998). Although the Portuguese colonial rulers in the past placed great emphasis on the linkage with the Catholic Church which had permitted it to be present in all areas of the Angola territory, other churches, through missionary activities were gradually finding spaces for themselves in various parts of the country. In the pre-independence era Angola's protestant or evangelical churches had agreed to divide their respective mission areas in the country, more or less in the following way:

Figure 9: Historical distribution of churches in Angola

Church	Region
Methodists	North of Angola
IECA	Central Angola
Pentecostal	North-Central Angola
União	Southwest Angola
IESA	West-Central Angola
Lutheran	South of Angola

Catholic mission posts could be found throughout the country, and especially Portuguese missionaries were invited by the Portuguese colonial state, as they could assist the process of 'Portugalisation' of the local population (Péclard 1998, 168-169). However, as insufficient Portuguese missionaries could be found to fill the positions at the Angolan mission posts, missionaries had to be drawn from other European countries even though this compromised the colonial state's objective of 'Portugalisation' (ibid). In Huíla one Dutch Spiritan missionary, Father Piet Pubben, stayed at mission posts in Chicomba, Chipindo and Caconda from 1961 until 1999. His presence during the war sometimes ensured that people living in these areas were able to continue agricultural production, as he would join them in the fields ensuring protection against attacks from troops. The Spiritans, just like the humanitarian agencies, needed to take a very clear neutral position with respect to the conflicting parties in order to be able to continue their work. But as father Pubben said: "The MPLA and UNITA did not understand the concept of neutrality, they always forced you to choose. To which I always replied: I'm a foreigner and my bishop does not want me to choose".<sup>76</sup> Catholic missions have played and continue to play a strong role in providing education and health services. Caritas, the catholic relief organization that was established in 1961 in Angola, had access to both MPLA and UNITA areas due to the strong and widespread influence of Catholicism in Angola. However, Cardinal Alexandre do Nascimento, former Secretary-General of Caritas Angola, stated that they tried to restrict the distribution of aid to children in UNITA areas. He strongly disagreed with UNITA's war strategies, specifically their practice of placing landmines in agricultural fields to prevent agricultural production from taking place<sup>77</sup>.

Most evangelical churches traditionally had a strong link with rural areas, and this has continued to this day. The IESA church was founded in Caluquembe by the Swiss missionary Helí Chatelain in 1897. During the war in Angola, IESA had partnerships with international

<sup>76</sup> Interview with Father Piet Pubben, Gemert, The Netherlands, 13 November 2007.

<sup>77</sup> Interview with Cardinal Alexandre do Nascimento, Lubango, 3 November 2008.

organizations, like WFP, in order to distribute food to the population. IESA handed out meals in their churches in Lubango as well when access to the rural communities became too difficult. During the war they saw their role as twofold: “IESA’s practice of giving relief aid is that it remains intertwined with handing out spiritual aid. There is a fundamental difference in Christian and other aid. We do material activities, but we also hand out bibles next to seeds and food. The bible will give people spiritual food”.<sup>78</sup> However, IESA’s role in conflict and aid became increasingly compromised in the 1990s, when some IESA’s leadership in Caluquembe openly supported UNITA and asked the local population to do the same and vote for Savimbi in the 1992 parliamentary elections. This has affected IESA’s image and made partnerships with other aid organizations difficult (Schot 2009).

Next to aid being distributed through the head offices of these churches, nearly all local villages had church and/or missionary representations. These rural based churches played significant roles in aid, not only focusing on material but also social spheres, and creating a sense of continuity in people’s daily lives. In many ways churches and missionaries ensured protection of the population affected by the conflict. Missionaries were at the same time not exempt from attacks themselves, they too were killed or forced to walk great distances through the Angolan territory with the troops.

In the current process of transition many churches are struggling to redefine their role in material and social assistance. Although they have, for many years, played a major role in providing basic relief to the affected population, they now try to find new roles for themselves in the future, next to their spiritual role. Not every church organisation is equipped or willing to find a place in the development arena. Caritas continues to redefine its mandate in practice by following approaches based on strengthening food security. The Angolan Catholic Church itself sees its strength and qualities in its health and education projects. The health posts that they have built or rehabilitated over the years have often been taken over by the Angolan state.

Churches continue to play important roles in rural villages in post-conflict Angola. Data from the surveys conducted in the two municipalities shows that only 9 of the 58 households were not connected to a church in their village. Households that would face difficulties due to for instance illness of one of their members would often get assistance in the form of goods or agricultural labour from the church members in their villages. In situations where social networks and families have become disrupted due to conflict and displacement, as in the case of Angola, churches usually offer important networks for mutual assistance, support and aid within villages.

### *State institutions*

The immediate post-independence Angolan state was characterized as a one-party socialist regime which quickly found itself amidst an intense civil war to which it responded with authoritarian rule and centralization of core services (Vidal 2006b, 65). Although in the early post-independence years the Angolan state was engaged in aiding refugee populations from Namibia and Zaire, they soon had to turn their attention and finances to the war raging in their own country and the first signs of neglect of their own social services became apparent. Therefore, in 1977 and 1978 the Angolan government already had to request foreign assistance to meet the deteriorating humanitarian situation in their country. Core state functions and social service delivery by the state often suffer immensely by lack of accountability and priority when states are themselves in the middle of conflict and complex emergencies (Ostheimer 2000). This certainly seems to have happened to the Angolan state

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<sup>78</sup> Interview with Pastor Dinis Enrico, President of IESA, Lubango, 12 February 2008.

which increasingly abandoned social service delivery for which international aid agencies became responsible (Christoplos 1998). Also, coordination of humanitarian aid during the 1990s was primarily left in the hands of the UN, largely through UCAH. After 2002 post-conflict reconstruction was high on the agenda of the state, although this has centred mostly on rebuilding infrastructure in Luanda and some other urban areas.

The main state institutions in the province of Huíla which are responsible for the coordination and implementation of aid are MINARS and MINADER. MINARS holds some of the core humanitarian functions, through the departments of IRSEM and more specifically through UCAH (Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid). In Huíla, during the 1980s, MINARS would organize food aid distribution, coming from the port of Namibe. When the food shipments arrived MINARS was responsible for the administration and control, whereas WFP would do the financial auditing. When the influence of the UN expanded in Angola with the creation of UCAH as the main humanitarian coordination unit in 1993, the WFP started to obtain a more dominant role in the aid process, after which MINARS involvement was more reduced to the distribution of aid together with NGOs. MINARS had very little funds, and therefore lacked the means of transportation for the distribution of aid. Nowadays, the involvement of MINARS in aid processes varies per locality. Whereas it hasn't played significant roles in Caluquembe, in aid interventions or coordination of NGOs as this has mostly been run by the local EDA, in Chibia it has had a stronger influence. Food aid was still distributed by MINARS at the time of the fieldwork to three Khoi-San villages in the municipality. Also, many inhabitants of Chibia remembered having received aid by MINARS during the war.

In 1998/1999 UCAH offices were opened in all 18 provinces in the country with help from OCHA. Its aim was to control, coordinate, and evaluate all existing humanitarian programmes in the respective provinces. In Huíla, the role of UCAH was relatively small, consisting mostly of administrative functions, maintaining an overview of the activities of NGOs in the province and assisting in visa procedures for expatriate staff of NGOs working in the province. Most NGO's would work directly through the Provincial Director of MINARS instead, as they found it to be more effective. NGOs in Huíla would also sign protocols with MINARS to ensure government approval for their aid programmes (Schot 2009).

After achieving independence the GoA's agricultural policy was guided by its overall focus on a state controlled-economy, with a primary focus on creating big farms under state ownership. Also, the agricultural sectors for fertilizers, marketing, machinery and seeds were under state control during the war. The institutions created to provide these agricultural services did not function well and have increasingly been abandoned (Kyle 2005). MINADER's role, with the expansion of aid agencies programmes focusing on agricultural production, has become more prominent in recent years. In Huíla province it had official linkages with several international organisations, also sharing office space. On municipal level MINADER is most visibly represented through the EDA offices which aim to provide extension services in the rural areas. Their involvement in development processes and interaction with humanitarian efforts depended very much on personal vision and relationships, and the availability of resources. In the case of the municipality of Caluquembe some considerable efforts were done by the local EDA coordinator to cooperate with NGOs, in order to share knowledge and activities as well as maintain an overview of which projects were implemented in which location. An organisational set-up was made with several agencies in the area in which some NGO staff members would work at the EDA in Caluquembe part-time. In contrast, the EDA in Chibia did not have such schemes, or knowledge of the few NGOs that did projects in the Chibia region. After the war had ended, agricultural policies of the state focused mainly on road rehabilitation to facilitate the

transport of produce from the rural areas. Furthermore, a large part of the investments of MINADER were assigned to large-scale mechanized agriculture and not to the smallholder farmers (Kyle 2005). The agricultural policy of the Angolan state that favours large-scale irrigation schemes to smallholder development is also demonstrated in Chapter 6 of this thesis on Chibia where smallholder farmers had to make way for the implementation of a large-scale irrigation project.

Angolan state institutions' initial agricultural policies and social services from a socialist perspective were quickly undermined with the outbreak of the post-independence civil war. In Huíla, the little state funding that was available for institutions such as MINARS had to be reverted to food aid distributions and resulted in a weakening of attention to social services. With the arrival of the UN and international agencies these state roles were increasingly taken over by external actors. In the post-conflict period these state agencies regained some influence. For instance, aid programmes that have an agricultural component are increasingly integrated with MINADER's local institutions. The stronger engagement with the state that comes with adopting rehabilitation and development approaches is visible in Huíla through for instance the increased cooperation between the EDA and aid agencies.

### *Angolan NGOs*

With the political transformation from socialism towards a multiparty democracy taking place in Angola, a revision of the constitution was made in 1991, allowing for the emergence of local civil society. Directly after, many solidarity groups and organizations were formed or professionalized, that became involved in reconstruction and development projects as made possible by the Bicesse peace accords of 1991 (Vidal 2009). When the war reignited after the 1992 elections, most of these organizations switched to emergency relief, often acting as a distribution counterpart to the international agencies. Angolan NGOs have had to switch between relief and development mandates ever since, and they often had more organizational flexibility to do so as the more established international agencies.

Some of the Angolan organisations remained working in the realm of relief, others tried to maintain a development approach, even though the renewed conflict made access more difficult. These organisations had been able to identify thematic and geographical areas where they would be able to start development oriented projects, irrespective of the conflict or its effects. Organizations like ADRA, founded in 1990, started implementing projects which included participatory approaches, and a focus on community development instead of emergency relief (Pacheco 2002). The organization had partly been formed by ex-government staff from the agricultural extension services, which had increasingly ceased to function due to the war (Hilhorst and Serrano 2010). ADRA had also started programmes in Huíla province, and in the case of Caluquembe this meant suspending their project when the conflict intensified there, only to come back again to the same villages when peace accords made a return to the area possible. The fact that after 1990 conflict and peaceful periods succeeded each other rapidly, made it difficult to get continuity in these development oriented programmes especially in the rural areas. Many of the development organizations therefore worked mainly in urban or peri-urban areas, and very often focused specifically on the city of Luanda (Pacheco 2002).

Angolan NGOs became increasingly vocal during the mid-1990s about the government's lack of responsibility in addressing issues of poverty and services in the country. It led to what Vidal (2009) calls a parallel civil society in which primarily the president and his wife created aid organizations, in particular financed by oil companies, to do social projects in the country. This parallel civil society continued and increased after the war with the co-option of organizations through political and financial manipulation. The

organizations that were not co-opted struggled and still struggle to find space, support from relevant government institutions and funding to continue operating (Vidal 2009). Their existence and continuation is further threatened by the diminishing donor funds that are available for aid programmes in Angola.

### *International NGOs*

MSF, ICRC and a few other international humanitarian agencies had already been present in the country for a longer time. MSF started working in Angola in 1983, ICRC from 1975 onwards. ICRC had an office in Lubango from 1982 from where food aid arriving in the ports of Namibe and Benguela would be distributed to other provinces, including the heavily affected provinces of Huambo and Kuito. At the end of the 1980s the Lubango office only had local staff working there, and its office was a branch of the ICRC sub-delegation in Lobito. In 1989 ICRC was the only organization that worked in Cunene after the South-African army left, and logistics were arranged through the office in Lubango. At that time they implemented health, water and sanitation projects.

Many (international) aid organizations during the war had their offices in Lubango (often next to their head offices in Luanda). Lubango was considered a stable base for agencies from which to implement their programmes. Unlike cities such as Kuito and Huambo, Lubango never came under attack, leaving the city's infrastructure relatively intact. Due to the fact that Lubango was considered safe, and its vicinity to the port of Namibe, humanitarian goods could be distributed to the South of Angola (provinces of Cunene, Cuando Cubango, Namibe and Huíla).

Other humanitarian organisations which were operational in Huíla, after the political shifts at the end of the 1980s opened up space for national and international agencies, were amongst others Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Action Against Hunger (ACF), ZOA refugee care. These organisations started with the distribution of relief, and after 2002 incorporated rehabilitation and development approaches by focusing on food security and increasing agricultural production in those regions where they had assisted the resettlement process of IDPs. ICRC's post-conflict programme consisted mainly of their Tracing Programme: reuniting family members that had become separated due to the war. In 2008 ICRC closed its Lubango office, and in 2009 withdrew completely from Angola. Since the war ended MSF had implemented health and sanitation projects, with an additional focus on HIV/Aids. In 2007 MSF withdrew completely from Angola, based on MSF's consideration that the Angolan government should be fully capable of providing health services itself, financed by the oil and diamond production<sup>79</sup>.

Most of these organisations have closed their offices in Lubango, as well as their Luanda office if they had one. In more recent years at least two international agencies (Intersos and Handicap International) actually decided to move their country offices to Lubango because of better living conditions and rental prices as compared to Luanda. One international agency said that they felt increasingly uncomfortable to account to their donors and public that they were paying 6000 US Dollars per month for office space in Luanda alone, especially when comparing the costs to the overall budget they had for the programme they were implementing in Angola.

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<sup>79</sup> Interview with David Hannion, MSF-CH coordinator, Lubango, 09 February 2007.

### *UN organizations*

Different socio-political events at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, made it possible for the UN to obtain an important presence in the country. The increased role of the UN in Angola coincided with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the country and the arrival of the first UNAVEM mission to Angola. At that time the conflict between UNITA and MPLA was affecting Huíla province more severely than before, specifically in the northern and eastern parts of the province. This intensified fighting coincided with a drought and consequent famine in the agricultural season of 1988/1989. These droughts and famines were common, especially in the dry southern part of the province, but in this particularly changing political context also led to a negotiation process on humanitarian access to the affected population. As elaborated in the first section of this chapter, the SRPA was the outcome of this negotiation and included four 'peace corridors', one of which stretched from Lubango to Caconda, via Caluquembe (Richardson 2000). It made it possible for WFP to start distributing food not only to the war-affected but also specifically to the drought-affected population in the north-eastern part of Huíla province. The strongest presence of UN organizations in Huíla consisted of the WFP, IOM, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), UNICEF, UNDP, and OCHA. OCHA's role in Angola was especially far-reaching: starting in 1993 as UCAH, its mission was to provide security information as well as much needed facilitation of humanitarian coordination to the NGOs that were operational in Angola (Ostheimer 2000). It was also deemed, by international NGO staff working in Lubango at the time, to have a political role in addressing the detrimental scorched earth tactics that the GoA was using against UNITA areas at a certain point in time. Over the years many of the coordination tasks of OCHA were taken over by the WFP which had gained a prominent role in the Angolan humanitarian community (Ostheimer 2000). The WFP set up many partnerships with both local and international NGOs so as to be able to distribute food through those partners. At the same time OCHA was trying to involve the GoA in taking up more responsibilities in the humanitarian coordination, by for instance assisting the GoA in creating the UTCAH department. A UN staff member working in Huíla commented that OCHA's attempts to engage the government institutions went far from smoothly. He observed that OCHA lacked commitment when taking such leadership and said that it should have handed over the coordination responsibility much earlier, to avoid the institutional dependence that was created as government institutions had become accustomed to OCHA's leading and coordinating role over so many years.

OCHA, IOM and WFP do not have an operational presence in Huíla province anymore, which reflects the development orientation in UN's programming in Huíla. The strongest UN presence in Huíla at this moment is through FAO and UNICEF. FAO's project has a focus on land rights and providing land titles to rural populations, in cooperation with the provincial Ministry for Agriculture, MINADER. UNICEF is also taking a more developmental approach through their "Revitalization Project" which focuses on revitalizing basic services related to child health and education in cooperation with municipal administrations in the province. Both UNICEF and FAO are trying to engage state institutions as much as possible in their approaches. Regarding their more development oriented mandates, they could continue to be operational in Angola for some more years. At the same time, natural hazards, consequent cholera outbreaks, and high malnutrition rates amongst children forces especially an agency such as UNICEF to occasionally revert to relief programming.

### *Interface between aid givers and aid beneficiaries*

When investigating aid by conceptualising it as an arena, one's attention is drawn to the variety of actors that shape aid in practice. Often however, local people are overlooked as actors in aid processes but rather portrayed as passive 'recipients' or 'beneficiaries' of aid (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010, Harvey and Lind 2005). In this section I want to analyse aid at the interface to highlight two specific issues that emerged in the everyday interactions between aid givers and aid beneficiaries. First of all, the quality of aid is not only assessed by organizational and donor evaluations, but by the people that receive it. Organizational labels in practice are less important than the actual qualities of the items that are received, and undergo processes of local experimentation. Secondly, by defining negotiation processes at the interface between aid givers labelling aid recipients as signs of dependency syndrome, people's agency is denied, interpreted as negative, and leads to non-intervention on the side of the aid givers. I argue in this section that what might be labelled as dependency syndrome is actually a sign of active negotiation and participation in the aid process.

### *Assessing the quality of aid*

During the Angolan conflict people employed a multitude of survival mechanisms for themselves and their household members. Aid constituted one of these survival mechanisms. As food aid was becoming increasingly available during the 1990s, it was distributed by NGOs that came in all sorts of shapes, carrying a variety of labels, like: catholic, humanitarian, local, etc. This research found that aid beneficiaries actively assessed the quality of one organization compared to another, but that organizational labels had little effect on that assessment. I argue that differences between for instance the humanitarian and the developmental label, or religious and non-religious hardly play a role in people's perceptions. In the village of Cue I the quality of aid amongst the different aid providers (WFP, ZOA, Caritas and Agromarket) was judged by the amount and quality of goods that had been provided, not by organizational identity or specific principled approach. Maize was often handed out as food aid by various organizations, and people would sometimes try planting it. More specifically, the different types of seeds that were handed out by the various NGOs came under careful scrutiny by the local farmers, who assessed the differences in characteristics, production and commercial viability. One inhabitant of the village of Cue 1 assessed the quality of NGO interventions as follows. "I think that from all the NGOs ZOA was the best, because they gave the most goods. ZOA gave maize as food aid. The maize that they gave was also suitable for sowing, but wasn't as tasty as our own maize. The maize that WFP handed out was not suitable for production, it was only suitable for consumption"<sup>80</sup>.

The process of seed quality assessment is further demonstrated in the following encounter in the village of Cue 1:

"Mr. Miapia and Mr. Abel, two farmers from Cue 1 show me three different maize cobs: 1. red seed, 2. white seed, and 3. yellow seed. They explain that they historically used these maize varieties in Cue 1, but that there are a lot differences amongst them.

1. Regional maize, given by Agromarket, has more vitamins, easy to make fuba (maize flour) with, is more nutritious, and is worth 15 kwanza per kilo of seeds.
2. Popular maize, given by ZOA and Caritas, has the highest market price, 20 kwanza per kilo of seeds.
3. Canini, given by ZOA, has little flour, you need a mill to turn it into flour, 15 kwanza per kilo of seeds.

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<sup>80</sup> Interview in Cue 1, 26 January 2008.

Varieties 2 and 3 only take 3 months to grow, which makes them popular for quick production. Varieties 1 and 3 you can grow together in one field, but the white, popular, variety has to be grown separately. When the varieties mix they destroy each other.

They tell me that some time ago a man visited the village and asked the local farmers to concentrate on producing variety 1, red maize. The man indicated that a new factory had opened in Lubango which would be grinding and selling fuba. If he had not visited the village with that message they would have only produced 2 and 3. Unfortunately, the man had not been back to collect harvest or make any further arrangements at the time of the fieldwork.<sup>81</sup>”

In the case of this village, ZOA was assessed to be the best NGO because of the different varieties of maize provided, and the fact that their maize were producing quickly, compared to the other seeds. They had tried sowing the seeds that WFP had handed out, but this failed as they were meant for consumption only. Assessing the quality of aid organizations is more linked to the type and amount of aid, than organizational labels or approaches. The example above also shows that within seeds and tools programmes, difference in quality is assessed, and people actively experiment with the available seeds, and respond to commercialisation opportunities by growing different varieties. This is what Sperling (2002, 332) calls internal evaluation of seed aid. She shows how farmers in Kenya evaluated the seed aid they had received, how different varieties of maize were assessed by their properties, and how seed aid would also become a form of local currency, in which it was traded for items such as salt and oil. Sperling (2002) also notes how, in some instances, seed aid was given by different agencies at the same time, making it difficult for farmers to distinguish amongst the different agencies rationales and goals for the delivery of seed.

#### Dependency syndrome

People did not sit around and wait for outsiders to intervene. They survived throughout most of the war relying on themselves, their families and occasionally on the inhabitants of the places they fled to. Aid only started playing a role in the last decade of the war, and became one of many livelihood strategies that people deployed to cope with crisis. And when aid was made available they themselves actively participated in negotiating what aid they needed, although staff of aid organisations saw this differently. During interviews with staff from two local NGOs, an international development NGO, and a UN agency, they referred to people in rural areas as suffering from a “dependency syndrome” to indicate why community development had not been taking place yet after years of peace and interventions aimed at the reconstruction of livelihoods.

The term “dependency syndrome” was first described by Harrell-Bond (1986) as a blanket term used by fieldworkers to explain the undesirable social behaviour demonstrated by refugee populations as a result of receiving relief aid over prolonged periods of time. Dependency syndrome or mentality was considered as a symptom whereby people expected continued assistance because their initiative had been undermined and they had become passive due to the provision of aid (Harvey and Lind 2005). The existence of such a syndrome has been proven to be a myth based on various research and publications, yet it continues to be linked to humanitarian aid as one of its most destructive effects on local people (Kibreab 1993, Harvey and Lind 2005).

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<sup>81</sup> Fieldnotes Cue 1, 4 February 2008.



It has been argued that prolonged humanitarian assistance in Angola has caused dependency, passivity and has damaged the survival mechanisms of the local population and community institutions (Rafael Simões and Pacheco 2009). During interviews with staff of aid agencies, dependency syndrome was also mentioned most often when asked about the possible negative impact of humanitarian aid. One NGO staff also made reference to specific talks they had with village elders in order to “discuss and break this cycle of dependency and make clear that they (the community members) have to do it themselves now”. The fact that people would indicate that they needed pots and pans, other essential food and non-food items, different seeds, or livestock would be interpreted as a sign of dependency syndrome, and not as a statement of need. Even though people are now in the process of producing enough food to feed themselves and their families, their statement of not having clothes, pans or livestock was still seen as a sign that people were sitting by idly and waiting for hand outs without actively participating in their own development process. On the contrary, stating that livestock and different seeds were needed to lift their livelihood above subsistence level is more an indication that people wanted to have the opportunity to diversify and intensify their agricultural livelihoods.

The “dependency syndrome” discourse is very present amongst NGO staff in Angola, without questioning what it really entails. When a discourse becomes so dominant, it is viewed as reality instead of an actor’s interpretation (Hilhorst 2003). This then also influences decision-making on consequent action. By viewing the expression of certain needs by beneficiaries as a sign of dependency syndrome, the formulated needs can therefore be ignored. And following this logic, any intervention addressing that need would then even be counterproductive as it would reinforce the dependency syndrome.

These examples at the interface between aid givers and aid recipients allows us to see the differences in power, in which dependency syndrome discourse by aid givers can deny people’s access to aid in the future. Portraying dependency syndrome as the outcome of relief aid not only denies the actual causes of the situation people are in, but also overlooks the manifold ways in which people actively engage in processes of aid. An expression of need is not a sign of dependency syndrome, but rather participation in the aid process, as people are contributing their views on which strategies are needed to improve their lives and livelihoods.

### **The importance of neutrality in everyday humanitarian practice**

Humanitarian agencies often distinguish themselves from development agencies in their adherence to humanitarian principles, such as neutrality and impartiality. These principles assist agencies in walking the precarious path between securing access to the beneficiaries and sustaining a pragmatic interaction with the military players in the conflict. Humanitarian practice is said to be shaped by principles, but these principles in turn are also further reshaped by the people that interpret them and put them into practice (Hilhorst and Schmiemann 2002). Principles are therefore not static, their abstract meaning is concretised in practice by the people that have to work with them as guidelines for action (Hilhorst and Schmiemann 2002, Weiss and Collins 2000). In this section I want to highlight the principle of neutrality, one of the most debated principles and to a certain extent abandoned, realizing that humanitarian aid is never completely neutral. However, neutrality is still considered an organizational principle which should guide certain operational standards, and ensure a certain degree of distance between aid organisations and belligerents in complex political emergencies.

### *Neutrality as access*

Leader (2000) asserts that principles go through a process of continuous re-assessment in order to understand how they gain meaning in practice. In this section I give an example of this process for the principle of neutrality.

During interviews with staff of aid organisations such as Caritas, ACF and ZOA in Huíla about their policy and practice, very little mention was made of how humanitarian principles guided or shaped their work. The reference that was made to humanitarian principles was often of a very operational kind, pertaining to how the principle of neutrality can be linked to safety and non-interference. The following description of an event in 2008 is an example of this type of NGO discourse on principles and the practical translation and implementation of them by a Caritas staff member:

“On our way to Caluquembe we came across a motorcycle parked at the roadside, with two men standing beside it. One of the men is wearing a military uniform. They motion to JB, a staff member of Caritas in Huíla, that he should stop. JB stops the car, and the man in the military uniform tells him that the motorcycle broke down and asks if he could get a ride with JB. JB hardly waits for the soldier to finish his sentence and bluntly replies “vamos”. The soldier jumps in the back and I asked JB if Caritas has any rules pertaining to aiding militaries with transport. JB told me that during the war he had attended courses organized by OCHA, concerning safety of staff, safety of the offices, and safety on the roads. One of the aspects of that particular course was that NGOs should beware of being associated with either one of the troops, and therefore not transport them in agency cars. Caritas had also formulated organizational rules pertaining to those situations at the time. JB mentions that even though you were not allowed to give soldiers a ride, they in turn would still come and help you out when you would get stuck at the road with a broken down car. After the war ended Caritas staff became much more flexible with those rules, as, in JB’s words: ‘you only have one army now anyway’.”

This example shows that for staff operating under these circumstances, non-interference with military parties was interpreted flexibly. They would not openly drive around with militaries during the war, as it would compromise the organizations neutrality, making aid distribution to certain areas impossible, as well as endangering their own safety from attacks by the opposite party. However, if their ability to drive around and bring aid to the people was compromised, they would accept any help, even if it would mean being seen with a combatant from either side. This attitude is also in line with what Hilhorst and Schmiemann (2002) describe in their article on how humanitarian principles and policies are used in everyday practice, with MSF as an example. It describes how MSF volunteers would circumvent certain organizational policies and practices if they would stand in the way of getting the job done. Furthermore, the example above also shows the extent to which some NGOs went to have access to the affected population. The UN system in Angola had set up strict rules for their own staff regarding the areas where they could or could not operate. Angolan NGOs were more flexible with these rules, which ensured that they had greater access to the affected population than the international organizations. This in turn also ensured future access for international organizations easier. For example, when Caritas Angola decided to open a programme in Camucuí, the access road was considered by the

UN as a 'red road', indicating the presence of landmines and therefore not accessible.<sup>82</sup> However, once Caritas made use of the road and after subsequent inspection the road was opened for all traffic. Safety issues like these continued playing a role after the emergency period ended. Occasionally, access to the affected population was reversed because of these safety assessments. One international NGO closed down their base in Chipindo in 2008 after finding a mine on the only accessible road reaching the municipality. They immediately reported the incident, after which a UN organization that adhered strictly to rules regarding red and green roads, were forced to close down their operations in Chipindo as well. Some debate followed this event, whether it had been really necessary to report the presence of the mine in the first place at such a high level, as it was clear that the consequences would be detrimental for the delivery of aid to the people in Chipindo.

The examples above showed that even though the agencies in question were not explicit about principles, they approached neutrality in a very operational manner in which concern over access was a main driver. As such, principles only find their way in organizational discourse when securing access to beneficiaries is at stake.

### *Neutrality in peacetime*

The history of civil war in Angola made the principles of neutrality and impartiality highly relevant to aid agencies wanting to operate in the country. Every aid agency needed to ensure its access to the affected populations, and to highlight their neutrality to be able to do so. If doubt was cast on the organization or particular staff members' political affiliation it could seriously hamper the distribution of aid and access to villages. This continued to be of importance after the conflict ended in 2002. To illustrate this further I present an event from Caluquembe during the beginning of 2008:

"With Eduardo, a facilitator of an international aid organization working in Caluquembe, I arranged to observe his introduction of the Farmer Field School (FFS) in one of my research villages, Catala. Before going to Catala I asked my research assistant Antonio, who came along, to please remove his MPLA cap, which he does. Antonio is surprised at my explanation why, and says that he has always been wearing it, even when he was still working as a facilitator for an international humanitarian organization in the region. While Antonio and I are still conducting some surveys in the village, Eduardo shows up and has a conversation with the soba and five other village elders. After about 15 minutes Eduardo starts his presentation in front of the people that had gathered. The presentation is short and is interrupted by a downpour of rain. Afterwards Eduardo tells me that when he arrived in Catala to do the introduction of the FFS he first had to have a conversation with the soba and some of the village elders. Without waiting to hear what Eduardo came to say the soba said "go"! The village elders interrupted the soba and told him to listen to Eduardo first. When Eduardo explained the FFS project and the fact that he was from an NGO that wanted to start a project in Catala the soba changed his mind and gave him permission to do the presentation. Initially he did not want to participate in the FFS programme nor give Eduardo the full names of the village members who would participate, because he thought that Eduardo was from MPLA and would write down the names of the village members to be used during the upcoming elections. Eduardo thinks this could be partly explained by the fact that he is a *mulatto*, who are associated as

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<sup>82</sup> The UN uses this colour system to indicate the level of road safety in relation to (suspected) presence of landmines: red roads are inaccessible for UN agencies, yellow roads require caution, and green roads are open to all traffic. See for more information Angola's landmine monitor: <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/angola.html>

belonging to MPLA. Eduardo explains the Soba's initial resistance by saying "I know the soba is Unitel". He then starts explaining that the parties are referred to as Unitel (UNITA) and Movitel (MPLA), which are the two competing mobile network suppliers in Angola."

To this day people will refer to each other along political party lines, trying to assess whether you belong to MPLA or UNITA. In one incident, shortly before the parliamentary elections of 2008, a local facilitator of an international NGO was attacked in a village in Huíla province where he was visiting a project. He was driving his new project motorcycle around in one of the communities and people physically attacked him, accusing him to belong to UNITA. In 1992 UNITA had been handing out new motorcycles to its supporters before the elections, and this association took hold of people's minds for the next 16 years<sup>83</sup>.

Although neutrality is supposed to be irrelevant during peacetime, access and implementation of aid programmes is still contingent and subject to people's assessments of political affiliation. Especially for local staff of aid agencies, their political affiliation was continuously being assessed, making issues of neutrality still relevant in peacetime. Skin colour, clothing or comment would be interpreted as a sign of political affiliation, which could have severe consequences on the possibility of delivering aid to a particular area. The Weberian ideal of neutral civil servants that provide services to every citizen without prejudice is not believed or practised in contemporary Angolan society. Political affiliation clearly continues to affect service delivery performance.

### **Organizational adaptation in a period of transition, the case of two Dutch NGOs**

This section of the chapter focuses on the so called transition period, which officially started in 2005 when Angola was declared to no longer be in a situation of emergency. This marked a start of rehabilitation and development activities, which required many agencies to reassess their presence, and redefine their activities. In the following sections the organizational adaptation of two Dutch NGOs is analysed, to see how partnerships and exit strategies were informed by different mandates of relief and development, the changing Angolan context and other factors. A comparison is made between these two NGOs which worked in Huíla roughly during the same period in order to understand the differences in activities between relief and development organizations, how they adapted to the changing circumstances in post-conflict Angola and how this influenced their decision-making processes with regard to their organizational space. The comparison is used to analyse the obstacles and difficulties of a LRRD process in post-conflict Angola.

#### *ZOA Refugee Care*

ZOA Refugee Care is a Dutch Christian relief organization that was founded in 1973 and focuses specifically on assistance to refugees and IDPs in situations of conflict and natural disasters. Their overall mission is to assist people in rebuilding their lives to a level from which they can ensure their own road to development. In 1998 ZOA opened an office in Lubango with the aim to assist the IDPs in Huíla province alone, following LRRD approaches. In Huíla they found a strategic partner in the IESA church, which offered them an office space on its premises in Lubango. Although staff numbers fluctuated enormously during the period in which they operated, their base always remained in Lubango and their

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<sup>83</sup> Interview with Laurie Delstanche, Coordinator Handicap International, Lubango, 6 December 2007.

geographical focus on Huíla province. In 2004 their staff reached numbers (both local and expatriate) of around 250 people. They closed their office in Angola in the beginning of 2008, with the expectation to be able to continue providing further financial assistance for that year to one of their partners, the Angolan organization Associação de Desenvolvimento e Enquadramento Social das Populações Vulneráveis (ADESPOV).

When ZOA started their relief programme in 1998 access to the affected population was severely hampered because of security issues which limited their area of operations to Lubango and some IDPs residing in the Humpata area. These IDPs were originally from places like Cacula, Caluquembe and Chipindo (ZOA's future areas of project implementation). In 2001 a security corridor had been opened to start the resettlement of displaced people. With the peace agreement in 2002 ZOA started rethinking its strategy of providing relief and entered the significant phase of assisting the resettlement process of IDPs back to their areas of origin in Huíla. They distributed agricultural kits containing seeds and tools, as well as oxen to assist working the land distributed through rotational groups within the communities, to the people that were ready to return. In the following years they defined their 4 thematic areas of intervention as the following: 1. Food Security, 2. Education, 3. Health, and 4. Income-generating Activities. Staff working in Angola found that next to food security, especially water and sanitation projects seemed to be ZOA's strength and added value.

ZOA's programme in Angola received a further boost when they secured EU funding for their food security project called OKULIMA Project<sup>84</sup>, which ran from 2004 until 2007. The main objective of the project was to achieve food security for 6,000 people, amongst others by handing out agricultural inputs, creating market access for the commercialization of agricultural produce, creating community development groups, and capacity building of EDA stations as well as ADESPOV (Fret 2007). The municipalities where the project was eventually implemented were Cacula, Caluquembe and Caconda, all located in the north-eastern part of the province, and localities where ZOA had previously been working extensively in IDP resettlement programmes. In all three municipalities ZOA had a base, closely linked to the local administration offices. The OKULIMA project created so called Community Development Committees (CDCs) and seed banks through which the project's reimbursement system of seeds would run. The committees were also created with the intention that they would become formalized local institutions that would address further development issues in the localities, but according to an evaluation of the project in 2007 the CDCs were weakened and unable to gain legitimacy from local governance institutions (Fret 2007).

## SNV

SNV is a Dutch development organization which was founded in 1965 with the aim to let Dutch volunteers share their experiences and knowledge with people in the South. Throughout the years it has evolved into a professional development agency with offices throughout the developing world. SNV started working in Angola in 1997 with a developmental and capacity building approach during a time when most organizations were doing humanitarian work. At that time SNV chose to focus its programmes specifically on the provinces of Cunene, Namibe and Huíla, as these areas were not so much affected by active conflict as other parts of Angola and local government in Huíla was considered more stable. From 2003 onwards SNV had two teams in Angola, one in Lubango and one in Luanda. Luanda was important because of the advocacy component that SNV had

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<sup>84</sup> Okulima means 'to cultivate' in the local Umbundu language.

incorporated in its strategies for Angola. SNV Lubango initially focused mostly on Water and Sanitation projects. Overall, their programme in Angola centred on strengthening three main areas: civil society, local administrations, and micro-entrepreneurs.

SNV's objective was to convince and enable local administrations to adopt a participatory approach when designing development plans for their area. SNV however struggled for a long time to "sell" their development approach introducing capacity building and good governance to the aid recipients and government institutions involved.

"One of the difficulties of using a developmental approach in times of conflict is that the local government simply does not have the time to cooperate. Furthermore, the needs of people centre on food and concrete assistance, they are at that time not interested in capacity building. Capacity building stands a better chance when you also offer something concrete next to it. Five or six years ago the central government told SNV to stop their work, specifically regarding their emphasis on good governance. Currently the relationship with local government and the municipal administrations is much better. People understand the need for a participatory approach. The government's work in the municipalities still very much centres on reconstruction. They are not ready yet to look at developmental approaches because the institutions are weak and the government lacks the strategic views that are necessary."<sup>85</sup>

SNV's work to stimulate micro-entrepreneurship was never direct, but focused on training and advising local organizations that were active in that domain. One example of such an organization which received assistance by SNV was Associação das Mulheres Empresarias e das Negócios da Huíla (Association of Businesswomen in Huíla AMEH). AMEH provides economic assistance for women as well as highlights issues of human rights and violence. It has created linkages with banks regarding credit, as well as with local government institutions. The association was founded in 1997 at a time when the overall presence of associations was weak in the province. When SNV started its programme in Lubango it took an interest in assisting AMEH with capacity building in micro enterprise, and by bringing them into contact with people in the Netherlands and Europe from who they could ask technical assistance. They also received training from SNV itself, and became an official partner until SNV closed in 2008.

### *Partnerships*

Most international agencies in Huíla engaged in partnerships with local organizations, albeit very instrumentally. Partnerships are usually created to increase the effectiveness of aid and build local capacities (van der Haar and Hilhorst 2009). During the relief period in Angola the motives of international organizations to engage in partnerships with local NGOs had often to do with efficiency and access considerations; local organizations had better knowledge of local conditions and connections to local authorities, and were often able to reach a wider group of beneficiaries. This latter advantage enabled the aid organizations to circumvent the strict rules and regulations regarding access and mobility that international organizations had to adhere to. This allowed local partners and NGOs to take a much more risky approach in aid delivery. For WFP making use of local partners meant a larger operational range, and they relied heavily on both local and international agencies to assist them in food distribution.

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<sup>85</sup> Interview with Guilherme Santos, coordinator SNV Lubango, 20 February 2007.

Partnerships between Angolan and international NGOs have been described as paternalistic in nature, in that there was great dependency of national NGOs on the funding and aid strategies of international NGOs. Long-term partnership strategies hardly existed, most often not extending beyond one or two years (Pereira 2009). Ostheimer (2000) argues that there were simply no adequate local counterparts for international agencies to find with which they could implement their programmes. My findings suggest this is not the case in Huíla as there has been a considerable amount of partnerships between local and international agencies in Lubango. These partnerships however were rather instrumentalist, paternalistic and often short-term, which can be attributed to the relief context as well as the issue of trust. As most of the Angolan NGOs were formed in a relief context or were forced to switch to relief soon after they started, they were deemed insufficiently equipped to apply a more development approach when the situation would ask for it. Despite this criticism, the international partners however, invested little to build capacity in development approaches amongst their Angolan partner NGOs. Rather, it is argued, that the capacity of Angolan NGOs was further weakened by attracting, or ‘stealing’, the most qualified staff of these organizations to come and work with the international NGOs by offering considerably higher salaries (Rafael Simões and Pacheco 2009). Furthermore, the lack of trust often revolved around financial management of the programmes, and seemed to be based on the assumption that every institution in Angola is corruption-prone, even when there was no evidence of irregularities during the relief phase. The assumptions of corruption amongst Angolan NGOs also led to much insistence by the international partners on the implementation of rigid financial reporting mechanisms (Pereira 2009).

SNV, together with the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), was involved in a project to enhance the capacity of local development NGOs. The initial aim of this programme was “strengthening theoretical and practical capacity in development methodology” (Santos 2001). The project was aware of imbalances between international and national NGOs, and the danger of paternalistic relationships to develop. They therefore recognized that their usual capacity building approach might be inadequate when looking at the diverse backgrounds these NGOs had (*ibid*). SNV seems to have chosen a unique approach, more in line with their development mandate, as compared to other international organizations who were still viewing partnerships with local NGOs through an instrumentalist lens. ZOA on the other hand started with a partnership agreement with IESA which included such elements as mutual assistance and agreements on an eventual handover, as well as the construction of a partnership board in which members of both organizations would overview the implementation of the partnerships (Schot 2009). However, the partnership with IESA turned sour. ZOA’s explanation was that the partnership ended because IESA was deemed to lack the capacity, quality and autonomy needed for its community development department (*ibid*). According to IESA their initial partner agreement wasn’t met, and the partnership and capacity building components amounted in the end to a mere handing over of some office material and a car.<sup>86</sup> The other partnership of ZOA with ADESPOV, might have started out in a rather instrumentalist way with regard to relief distribution, but near the end of the programme in 2007 ZOA handed over its projects and municipal bases to ADESPOV. Capacity building training was done throughout that year, but financial commitments after the first transitional year could not be made. This relationship between ZOA and ADESPOV was not necessarily intended as a long-term partnership, but rather as an element in ZOA’s exit strategy from Angola. Their partnership was meant to ensure some continuity and follow up to ZOA’s program for which they themselves lacked the financial means and mandate.

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<sup>86</sup> Interview with Pastor Dinis Enrico, President of IESA, Lubango, 12 February 2008.

### *Operational space of the two agencies: mandates and exit strategies*

After the war ended in 2002 donor funding for Angola diminished rapidly, and so did the presence of international aid actors. Reasons for these were said to be the prioritisation of other countries as well as discontent with the GoA's limited efforts to take control over the reconstruction of the country despite the availability of its own substantial resources (Rafael Simões and Pacheco 2009). The decision to see Angola no longer as a country in emergency, announced at a donor conference in 2005, had further complicated the access to funding for many organizations that still felt their humanitarian mandates and the existing needs of the population were justifying their presence in the country. Following the LRRD logic this would have meant a starting sign for agencies to deploy activities geared towards rehabilitation and development. Agencies such as Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Action Against Hunger (ACF) were said to have switched their programmes to incorporate a focus from food security to livelihood thinking. However, linkages to development have been severely hampered due to the withdrawal of many agencies, mainly due to funding for Angola drying up.

The humanitarian arena in the period of 2007-2008 was a place of redefining the future roles of aid in Angolan society. This section focuses on how aid actors were struggling to define the meaning of their presence in a situation that was neither emergency nor development, and negotiating how these new realities could be fitted within their organisational policy and practices. These struggles and negotiations were characterized and resulted in an international institutional void in which many international agencies terminated their aid programmes in Huíla province, and Angolan NGOs struggled to continue their programmes due to lack of funding possibilities. This section analyses these changing realities and the complex processes of decision-making regarding humanitarian interventions and the adaptations organizations made. It also examines the decisions that need to be made on where to go, what to do, when to start if at all, and when to extend or end their activities (Heyse 2004). Adopting LRRD approaches means including participatory processes, building on what activities people themselves have already developed, a switch from the individual to society level, and a bigger orientation towards cooperating and integrating the projects and programmes with local state institutions. This requires extensive organizational adaptation, and revisiting of mandates, partnerships and exit strategies to decide what organizational space there is within a new context. The most common factors mentioned in connection with exit strategy discussions were lack of funding, overall cost-effectiveness, administrative and organizational constraints, and the need for re-engagement of the state in the recovery process. But notwithstanding these considerations there was a permanent feeling that there were still enough needs that had not been met, and that humanitarian mandates were still applicable. Heyse (2004) sees these issues come up when talking about a shrinking operational space where organizations need to reassess and redefine their presence in a country. She uses the example of MSF-Holland to show how decision-making processes on whether to stay or go are influenced by many different factors. For instance, operational space can shrink "due to contextual constraints, such as security reasons, the presence of other aid agencies, lack of access to the areas that needed aid most, or the absence of needs that fit MSF's mandate" (Heyse 2004, 129). In this case a situation can occur where organizations start searching for needs that meet the organizations mandate, or in other words, where "solutions started looking for a problem" (Heyse 2004, 130). This type of decision-making can be seen specifically with organizations that are highly specialized and therefore focus on very specific needs that they can address. In Huíla's context it can be seen



as the other way around: problems look for solutions, but there is a lack of organizational and financial capacity to be able to continue addressing those problems.

SNV and ZOA both started working in Huíla around approximately the same time. SNV started during a time of relative peace whereas ZOA started two years later when this peace process had already broken down. From the start their approaches and mandates differed, according to their organisational profiles of humanitarian versus development. ZOA was very much involved in resettlement of IDPs, and later in food security projects, whereas SNV chose to focus on micro-credit and supporting local civil societies' capacity for development. However, after 2002 their approaches appeared to gradually converge as both were involved in decentralisation and capacity building of local governments. Whereas SNV from the start had an integrating approach towards other institutions, local government, and participatory processes, ZOA initially embraced a more relief-distribution idea, and only later started integrating more development approaches like participation and engagement with local and government institutions. Although with different mandates, both Dutch organizations operated in the province during more or less the same time span. They differed considerably with regards to their methodologies, strategies, beneficiaries, and the way they chose and went about partnerships with local organizations. In the case of both ZOA and SNV a shrinking of operational space, certainly in 2007 and 2008 did not play a role. Needs that fitted both organizations' mandates were still present, albeit less for ZOA than for SNV. So, there might have been sufficient operational space, but little backing in terms of funding or support from head offices. Decisions to prolong programmes can normally also be influenced by the fact that organizations have had a long presence in the country, they feel a sense of commitment to finish their programmes even if the (financial and organizational) space to do that has become limited. This sense of commitment and obligation is especially relevant for organizations that focus on longer-term aid and building long-lasting relationships with their beneficiaries and partner organizations (Heyse 2004).

Both SNV and ZOA closed at more or less the same time, although not necessarily informed on the basis of their mandates. ZOA's reasons for closing were related to lack of funding. ZOA usually only works in emergency situations, and when during a donor meeting in 2005 Angola was declared to be no longer in an emergency situation, this had direct effects on ZOA's exit strategies. Although they had earlier formulated a strategy where they would continue their projects until 2009, they had to cut this back by two years. At the same time staff at ZOA Angola's office felt that their official mandate on rehabilitation would still enable them to continue their work in Angola<sup>87</sup>. Part of their exit strategy was to hand over their food security projects to their local partner, ADESPOV. This handover was material in that ADESPOV took over the local bases in the three municipalities and received financial backing for the duration of one year (Schot 2009). Furthermore, capacity building training took place in the last year of ZOA's presence in Angola. One of the recommendations that followed from an evaluation of the OKULIMA project was that ZOA should have established stronger partnerships with other organizations active in Huíla to ensure a more sustainable follow up of its activities after their departure (Fret 2007). As ADESPOV was only considered as a partner to take over its activities in a rather late stage, it was difficult to say how they were able to bring continuity, especially with the rather small financial support of one year by ZOA.

The end of SNV's programme in Angola seems to be more difficult to reconcile with its mandate to fight poverty. In 2007 SNV was reducing its activities and handing over projects to organizations such as CARE, ADRA, and other local NGOs. In their annual report of 2007 they indicate that the programme in Angola was closed after consultation with the

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<sup>87</sup> Interview with Evert-Jan Pierik, Programme Advisor ZOA Angola, Lubango 1 March 2007.

Dutch Directorate General of International Cooperation (DGIS), but no formal reason is stated (SNV 2007). According to two staff members of SNV Angola the decision to close down was based on funding obstacles and Dutch foreign policy:

“SNV has recently had a cut in their budget by the ministry, forcing them to close down several offices like Angola, Mali, and two other countries in Africa. The closure of these offices is not based on SNV policy or vision, but for operational reasons. The new criteria for funding as formulated by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs revolve around measuring impact. The results of the work that SNV does is very hard to catch and express in figures. Capacity building and strengthening civil society organizations is a long process, and cannot be instantly expressed in terms of results or made visible.”<sup>88</sup>

The former director of SNV Angola saw the reason for the decision to end the programme in SNV’s approach of working at the meso-level: “to change poverty here you have to challenge the central government”. Also, the “bad will and arrogance” of the Angolan government was seen as a reason for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to cut back funding, leaving them unwilling to include Angola as a partner country when negotiating a new contract for SNV. Furthermore, SNV had recently switched its attention to other mostly Francophone African regions. And finally, the high cost of keeping an office in Angola operational was not conducive to reaching a decision to stay.<sup>89</sup>

Both organizations operated in the province during more or less the same time span and staff of both organizations felt they could have continued working in the province for many more years, when considering the needs of the beneficiaries. This reiterates the fact that LRRD is not a linear process, but that relief and development programming can co-exist (Russo et al. 2008, Christoplos 2006). The organizations decisions to exit seemed to have been mostly influenced by lack of funding, and less by elements of mandate and existing needs. This stresses the point that Buchanan and Fabbri (2005, 36) make when they say successful LRRD practice is most often revealed through the available amount of funding for these activities. In the case of Angola, funding for rehabilitation and development quickly evaporated after the emergency was declared to be over. Therefore, the groundwork laid down by relief and rehabilitation efforts have not been linked to development, leaving the LRRD process largely unfinished. As partnerships with Angolan NGOs have resulted in little capacity building on development approaches, and as seen with SNV, efforts to integrate projects with local government has been problematic, future prospects of finishing the LRRD process in Angola look bleak, endangering the outcomes of earlier groundwork.

## Conclusion

This chapter analysed the history of aid in Angola and the humanitarian arena in Huíla province. The history of aid in Angola was shaped by political actors using aid as an instrument to further the war economy and politics. During the 1990s the GoA increasingly withdrew from social service delivery, leaving this responsibility to humanitarian agencies (Christoplos 1998). This gave humanitarian agencies a significant influence in the country. In Huíla during the war there has been a large presence of aid agencies, in which both emergency and development approaches were represented, reiterating the idea that crisis and normality can co-exist in a same region (Hilhorst 2007). When viewing the different

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<sup>88</sup> Interview with Otto Jacinto and Pedro Taleingue, Programme Officers SNV Lubango, 13 February 2007.

<sup>89</sup> Interview with Carlos Figueiredo, former Director of SNV Angola, 19 February 2008.

categories of aid stakeholders in Huíla it becomes clear that aid was shaped through interactions of a large variety of different actors. The analysis of the interface between aid givers and aid beneficiaries allows us to see the agency of aid beneficiaries in the aid process, as well as the organizational discourses that actually devalue and deny people's agency by interpreting it as signs of dependency syndrome. It is at this interface and through these discourses that the future and outcomes of aid are shaped.

The chapter has further zoomed in on the pragmatic translation of humanitarian principles and policies in everyday organizational practice. It shows that the principle of neutrality is often translated into issues of access safety, and that field staff interpret these principles flexibly, as well as that neutrality continued to be relevant in peacetime. This reiterates the fact that humanitarian principles are not static, but subject to continuous adaptation and interpretation, and as such should be reassessed in every new context (Leader 2000).

The chapter finishes with a comparison between two NGOs in Huíla province, to investigate organizational adaptation in the post-conflict context of Angola, and as such has served as an example of LRRD processes in everyday organizational practice. As the experiences of these two NGOs are strikingly similar to those of the majority of aid agencies in Huíla, it has allowed a deeper understanding of the obstacles in applying LRRD in this particular context. As such, the LRRD process had been left largely unfinished with little future prospects of continuation.

## **8. Reconstruction and livelihood recovery in post-war Angola**

### **Introduction**

### **Reconstruction in post-war Angola**

### **Rebuilding livelihoods through the humanitarian lens**

### **Conclusions**

### **Introduction**

This chapter identifies the challenges in post-war Angolan society as they were perceived when peace was signed in 2002 and compares these challenges to the reconstruction and recovery efforts from the Angolan state, aid agencies and people themselves that ensued afterwards. It focuses on the so-called transition period after the conflict ended in 2002 until 2008, from the perspective of the recovery of rural livelihoods. The chapter starts with a conceptual overview of reconstruction, linked to Angolan reality. It investigates which policies for specifically rural rehabilitation were set and whether those goals have been achieved. It then zooms in on the current state of rural livelihood recovery in Huíla province. Recovery, in my view distinguishes itself from reconstruction in that it deals with what people themselves do, and the operational aspects of humanitarian and development programming as part of LRRD processes, whereas I use reconstruction to denote the macro policies that inform the direction recovery takes from a governing perspective.

Especially after the signing of the Luena peace accords in 2002, state and aid agencies played vital roles in aiding displaced people to resettle in their areas of origin, and started assisting the recovery of rural livelihoods. From interviews with state and aid agencies as well as beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of these assistance interventions in rural Huíla, a picture emerges of a uniform and narrow approach to rebuilding rural livelihoods. The chapter analyses the differences in livelihood options by conceptualising the post-conflict livelihoods as either externally driven or self-recovered. It builds this analysis from a comparison of the case studies in Caluquembe and Chibia. The chapter will investigate how seeds and tools programmes fit into livelihood recovery approaches and what the intended and unintended outcomes of these programmes have been.

### **Angola in transition: reconstructing society**

An end to the long and destructive conflict in Angola in 2002 with the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and the signing of the Luena peace agreement soon afterwards, allowed Angolans to finally look forward to a future without war. Plans for the reconstruction of Angola were soon being developed by the Angolan government, donors and civil society. This section analyses the challenges that post-war Angolan society faced, and the nature and effects of reconstruction processes in Angola.

### *Post-conflict Angola: immediate needs and resettlement*

The peace accords in 2002 offered people the opportunity to go back to their areas of origin and recover their livelihoods. The opportunities for livelihood recovery for people returning to their areas of origin during and after the war had ended in Angola, depended on many different factors in the context of rural Huíla province. They faced a whole range of

questions: Were their land and house still available? Would they be able to find a job? What were the opportunities in the area they had ended up in during the war? Did they still have family and social networks they could rely on? The answers to these questions, as well as the opportunities in their new surroundings, often determined people's choices for voluntary or assisted resettlement, or made them decide not to resettle at all.

Many of the displaced people did not wait for the official resettlement programmes to start, but found their own ways to return to their areas of origin. By May 2003 1.8 million IDPs had resettled to their areas of origin. 70% had done so without making use of a formal resettlement plan or assistance offered by the GoA in cooperation with humanitarian agencies (United Nations 2003). Many did not participate in these resettlement programmes to their areas of origin at all, as they had built a life for themselves in the areas where they had ended up during the war. A group of displaced people living in the neighbourhood of Bairro 11 de Novembro in Chibia, decided not to make use of these resettlement opportunities for various reasons. They either were uncertain about a peaceful future as previous peace periods had proven unsustainable, had already found stable livelihoods in their new surroundings, or were waiting for the right opportunities and resources to return. Displacement and migration to the urban areas had been massive, and was part of the many strategies that people undertook to secure their livelihoods. Angola's capital city of Luanda grew from an estimated population of 738.000 in 1978 to 3,277.00 in 2000 (Cain 2003, 9). The rapid urbanization of Luanda cannot be attributed to the war alone, but was also due to the lack of basic services and the limited projects that were available to especially youths in the rural areas (Pacheco 2002). Cain (2003, 8-9) notes that the reluctance to give up their stakes in the urban informal economy and access to education would lead to situations in which some household members would resettle whereas other members stayed behind.

Many assisted returnees, aided by NGOs and the state, received a more or less standardized kit consisting of agricultural tools and seeds. This was later sometimes complemented by a project that handed out a small number of oxen that needed to be shared on a rotational basis within the villages, to make work on the land less dependent on manual labour alone. Attention in these villages thus focused on getting a good first harvest in order to be self-reliant again. Traditionally, working the fields of neighbouring commercial farmers had been an additional job opportunity. This practice did continue somewhat during the war, but only in areas that were deemed safe enough. After the war, with people returning to resettle in their areas of origin many people started working the fields of others as a means to ensure they would obtain some food while preparing their own fields for production.

Experiences of displacement, resettlement and rebuilding lives and livelihoods are never homogeneous. They depend on context, networks, and peoples' differentiated opportunities and desires (Collinson 2003). Data collected in Chibia and Caluquembe demonstrates this varied impact of conflict on rural livelihoods and the diversity in people's own recovery activities.

### *Conceptualising reconstruction and recovery in a post-conflict setting*

Reconstruction can be defined as "an integrated process designed to reactivate development, and at the same time create a peaceful environment" (Barakat 2005, 12). Reconstruction is often imagined as a technological macro process, emphasizing the physical, institutional and economic rebuilding of a country after war or disaster (Cramer 2006, Green and Ahmed 1999). This one-sided image is partly due to the comparison that is made to the type of reconstruction in Western Europe after World War II as stipulated in the Marshall Plan, but exists also because the differences between reconstruction after natural disasters in comparison to post-war reconstruction are often neglected (Green and Ahmed 1999).

Although natural disasters can also profoundly affect people's lives and livelihoods requiring more than purely infrastructural aid and quick solutions to restore 'normality', conflict severely uproots societies on more fundamental levels and usually over prolonged periods of time. Post-war reconstruction is a long-term process in which few quick fixes exist. Conflict affects political, economic and social institutions in such a manner that rebuilding them requires a long-term investment, vision and strategy, as well as an integrated approach in which state involvement is essential. Therefore, post-war reconstruction efforts should avoid the trap of applying short-term fixes to heal very long-term ailments. Post-conflict reconstruction furthermore requires a shared vision among relevant stakeholders like state, people, private sector and civil society (Barakat 2005, Pacheco 2002). It is not a matter of moulding the country back to the shape it had before conflict started, going back to 'normality' (Christoplos 1998, Pacheco 2002, Hilhorst 2007, Bakewell 2000). For the socio-economic rehabilitation of a society there are no quick fixes both on micro and macro level. This complicates the role of humanitarian organizations in rehabilitation processes as envisaged under LRRD approaches. Humanitarian NGO mandates, expertise, and financial means are usually not suited for making the type of long-term commitments that rehabilitation requires. If the ultimate goal or conclusion of a post-war rehabilitation period is not some ill-defined 'normality', what then can be considered as the end of the rehabilitation phase and starting point for development?

Although much attention is given to macro-level reconstruction processes of the economy and infrastructure, reconstruction is fundamental on the micro level, involving the restoration of societal processes through the socio-economic recovery of communities (Barakat 2005, Hilhorst 2007). This chapter aims to shed some light on these micro level recovery processes in Angola. Recovery in this sense encompasses how people have re-established themselves after conflict, have started to rebuild their livelihoods, and how state and aid interventions have supported or hindered these efforts. In this thesis I prefer using the term recovery when discussing these micro level processes. I distinguish recovery from reconstruction, as the notion of recovery captures better what people themselves do to recuperate from conflict and disasters. Furthermore, I see recovery and rehabilitation as the operational aspects of humanitarian and development programming in LRRD processes. The concept of reconstruction is associated with the macro policies of governing bodies, like state and donors, that try to influence and prioritize the directions that recovery ideally should take. I distinguish between three domains of recovery: externally-driven recovery, state recovery and self recovery. Self recovery are those activities that people develop to deal with crisis and to rebuild their livelihoods after conflict. It is the type of recovery that is locally grounded and spontaneous, and which always happens to a certain extent. With externally-driven I mean recovery that is not necessarily based on people's own self recovery experiences and activities, or what they want or need, but on external assumptions from aid agencies, often shaped by a one-dimensional view of the rural society and economy. The state's post-conflict reconstruction activities and the way in which they both positively and negatively influence people's livelihoods is what I call state recovery. The last section of this chapter will examine the different outcomes of recovery processes, and specifically how aid interventions have influenced their outcomes.

"Every place has its own story of reconstruction. It follows from the pre-conflict situation and what the conflict has done, and gets shaped within the confines of what the security situation allows and what opportunities open up" (Hilhorst 2007:13). This underlines that reconstruction processes do not just start after official peace agreement has been signed. People that find themselves in relative security, even during conflict, have ways to re-establish themselves long before official recovery assistance programmes start. It depends for instance on how they assess their own security situation, assets they have managed to

preserve, job opportunities that are available, and the strength of their social networks. Societies reconstruct, instead of being reconstructed only by external and macro-level interventions (Hilhorst 2007).

### *National reconstruction policies and plans*

The first attempt to a national reconstruction plan had already come about in 1995 after the Lusaka peace protocol of 1994-1998 had offered Angola a short chance to rebuild the country's war damaged society. The reconstruction plan's rise and fall has been described by Cain (2003, 3-6) demonstrating its potential as an attempt to a grassroots reconstruction process instigated by the international donor community, as well as shows its failure to materialize due to the lack of commitment and ownership on the part of the government. The international donor community had started a community consultation process that resulted in the Community Rehabilitation Programme (CRP) which was envisaged to act as a Marshall Plan for Angola, with funding promises reaching almost 1 billion USD. A trust fund was created, managed by the GoA and UNDP, to which communities put in requests for either economic or social rehabilitation (each accounting for 45% of the requests) and infrastructure projects (10%). Described by civil society at the time as having real potential for rehabilitation, development and peace, the CRP never really materialized. Reasons for its failure were the lack of ownership by the GoA by not implementing the necessary legal and economic reforms, which also made private investors hesitant to participate, and the UNDPs budgeting system for the trust fund was considered too bureaucratic and became subject to circumvention by stakeholders. Only 5 community projects were eventually implemented of the total of 159 requests, by the time that the Lusaka peace protocol failed in 1998 and the country's civil war resumed.

When a new chance for a national reconstruction plan presented itself in 2002 the challenges that the Angolan post-war society faced had grown significantly. The national economy had become completely reliant on oil exports, previously used to fund the war machine (Hodges 2004). Basic service delivery had become eroded and relied heavily on NGOs financial and capacity support, most visible in the health, agriculture and education sectors (Christoplos 1998). The conflict had stripped many rural households from their assets, leading to a subsistence economy (Hodges 2002). All sectors of Angolan socio-economic and institutional life had been affected by the conflict. This time the GoA maintained strong control over the formulation and implementation of the national reconstruction plans. It was also forced to do so as this time the international donor community proved to be less forthcoming with its funds as it had been during the Lusaka peace period. Since the end of the 1990s international donors had already shown less interest in spending development cooperation resources in Angola because of GoA's lack of commitment on policy measures regarding good governance, poverty reduction and economic management (Hodges 2002). After peace was signed in 2002 the GoA started preparing documents and plans for a donor conference on reconstruction of the country. The donor conference eventually never materialized. According to Paulo Jorge, MPLA's secretary of external relations, the conference was blocked by the US and the UK for political reasons:

“There were two countries that blocked the conference: the US and the UK. I spoke to the ambassadors of both countries about it. The US ambassador said: ‘This will take time because the GoA does not have an agreement with the IMF.’ To which I replied: ‘Is this conference organized by the state or by the IMF? Several months before there was a donor conference for Afghanistan, did they have an agreement with the IMF? No.’ Then I asked the ambassador of the UK. He said he did not see a reason for the

conference because Angola had enough financial resources of its own. To which I replied: ‘Was it possible for Europe to overcome the destruction of the Second World War without the Marshall plan?’ Only Belgium offered to organize the conference. We think that the reason behind blocking the conference was that they were afraid that the money would only flow to the GoA and further weaken UNITA.”<sup>90</sup>

Since the end of the war in 2002 Angola has been described as an economic recovery miracle as it had a steep economic growth due to its increasing oil exports over the years. The Angolan government has for a long time sent out the message that it wishes to control its own economic recovery without interference by IMF, and rather chooses to create partnerships with China for instance in which rehabilitation of infrastructure and reconstruction are exchanged for oil resources (Vines et al. 2005). The first IMF loan agreement with Angola of 1.4 billion USD was only signed at the end of 2009 with the aim to deal with cash flow pressures caused by the worldwide economic crisis. The loans and oil exports have led donors to the assumption that the Angolan state has the necessary financial resources to do its socio-economic rehabilitation on its own, which is reflected by the limited amount of funding that Angolan reconstruction plans, also those developed by the international aid agencies, have received.

At the end of the war the UN agencies and NGOs also prepared resettlement and reconstruction plans, seeking funding through the intra-agency Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP). For the 2002 CAP the donors’ reluctance to fund any sector because of GoA’s perceived ability to fund certain sectors itself was evident. Whereas 101% of food aid requirements was funded (in total 142.979.933 USD had been asked), the request for economic recovery and infrastructure plans (10.199.423 USD had been requested) received 0% funding (OCHA 2009). The UN already mentioned in 2003 that they expected the international community to continue taking over the responsibility of basic service delivery in the education, health and agricultural sectors because of “economic distortions and fiscal constraints” on the side of the Angolan government (United Nations 2003). In practice NGOs had been influential in issues of food security and rural development for years already, and were therefore deemed instrumental in continuing their interventions in post-war rehabilitation processes in Angola. In the CAP for Angola in 2003 the common humanitarian action plan was described as the following:

“The strategic goal for humanitarian partners during the next two years is to progressively shift the humanitarian operation away from emergency assistance towards recovery and reconstruction and by 2005, to focus primarily on programmes aimed at generating growth and overcoming social and economic inequities under the Government’s poverty reduction strategy.” (UN 2002, 37)

The prospect was that by 2005 post-war rehabilitation would be shifted towards more developmental approaches. The next section of this chapter will show how post-war rehabilitation and specifically recovery policies were given meaning in practice by the aid organisations active in Huíla province, as well as if and how the envisaged shift towards development approaches took place after 2005.

The GoA developed an *Estrategia de Combate A Pobreza* (ECP, or Strategy to Combat Poverty) which is the Angolan version of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in September 2003. In this report the GoA identified several priority areas through

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<sup>90</sup> Interview with Paulo Teixeira Jorge, MP, MPLA’s secretary of external relations and former Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1976 until 1984, Luanda, 5 November 2008.



which poverty reduction would take place, in combination with national reconstruction efforts. The main priority areas, and estimated costs for the period of 2003-2005/06 were the following:

Figure 10: ECP priority areas and costs

<b>Priority area</b>	<b>Total estimated costs (in million USD)</b>
Social Reinsertion	350
Demining	285
Food security and Rural Development	70
HIV/Aids	71
Education	450
Health	158
Basic infrastructure	1.038
Employment and professional formation	45
Governance	325
Macroeconomic management	319
Total	3.170

Source: Government of Angola 2003, 106.

From this overview of priority areas and expected costs, it becomes clear that creating employment and rural development is not considered as requiring much funding compared to the other areas, especially basic infrastructures. The social reinsertion strategy had a strong focus on supporting returnees by enhancing their “productive capacities” that would benefit the country’s overall food security and make the national economy less reliant on importing food. For food security and rural development these objectives were: to minimise the risk of hunger starvation, satisfy the internal food needs and re-launch the rural economy as a vital sector for a sustainable development (GoA 2003, 52). Specific attention is given to the “traditional sector”, as this would promote better integration of displaced in their areas of origin, and as such alleviate the pressure on the urban centres (GoA 2003, 53). The main obstacles for reviving the rural economy were thought to be the damaged infrastructure which blocked the arrival of agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizers and tools) and also limited peoples options for transporting their produce, a lack of credit opportunities, and poor local markets (GoA 2003, 52). To overcome these obstacles, priority was given to the strengthening of the municipal Agricultural Development Station (EDA), that were to promote seed and cereal production, take inventory of available lands, introduce adequate technologies, reactivate rural commerce and focus on the rehabilitation of infrastructure. It is surprising to see, realizing the strong role that NGOs played, that at the time of the formulation of the ECP very little mention was made of partnerships and cooperation with NGOs on the issue of food security. The only reference in the ECP to NGOs and food security is made with regard to the reactivation of markets. The report mentions that the state will establish a partnership and co-ordination with humanitarian agencies, donors and NGOs in order to reach the objectives of the reactivation and stabilisation of Internal Market System (GoA 2003, 55). During the years after the formulation of the ECP it can be said that international and national NGOs have played key parts in agricultural development through the distribution of seeds and tools, that only now cooperation between these NGOs and EDAs has become more common and formalized, and that NGOs and the GoA both have paid little attention to reactivation of rural commerce, land availability, and the introduction of technologies to smallholder farmers. More specifically, the GoA has turned its attention primarily on the reconstruction of basic infrastructure, and less on poverty alleviation through rural and industrial development which would create more employment. It seems that building roads has been prioritized under the

assumption that once roads are connecting some of the rural areas to urban centres, development will automatically follow.

#### *Everyday reality of reconstruction in Angola*

Going back to pre-war 'normality', as a central feature in the conceptualization of reconstruction, in Angola's case would have meant going back to the pre-independence state of the Portuguese colonial system, which indeed seems to have influenced the GoA's reconstruction efforts in practice (Pacheco 2002). Ruigrok (2010) explains that the (economic) priority that the Angolan state is giving to those areas geographically closest to government, is a perpetuation of colonial policies in which roads, rails and bridges were only built in the coastal areas, increasing the neglect of the interior and rural areas (Ruigrok 2010, 641-642). Reconstruction in the context of post-war Angola has been most clearly made visible by the large infrastructural construction projects in urban centres, most notably in Luanda. But in the rural areas this very tangible type of reconstruction has been far less prominent. Road rehabilitation was deemed to be essential in order to give rural producers physical market access so they might move beyond subsistence level (Kyle 2005). Some rural towns were benefiting from roads that were rehabilitated, which at least increased options for trade and transportation of agricultural produce from areas that had long been disconnected from the rest of the country. If roads alone would raise the rural farmers beyond subsistence levels however, was questionable. Recovery of rural livelihoods was slowly taking shape, but the type of livelihoods that developed and their sustainability were also highly dependent on the choices that state and aid agencies made with reference to rural social, economic and institutional reconstruction. Reconstruction projects have been executed mostly on macro (economic) level, focusing on rebuilding technical infrastructure (roads, railways, and buildings) and increasing foreign investments in the oil business. In rural areas, GoA's reconstruction efforts were noticeable in a number of programmes, such as big road works by Portuguese, Brazilian or Chinese construction companies, and other forms of primarily infrastructural developments. These sometimes offered rural (male) inhabitants some type of temporary employment or day jobs, but created no structural job opportunities or training programmes. Road works would focus mostly on rehabilitating the already existing roads that connected the main cities. Towns that were connected to these roads would see benefits as an increase in traffic meant more trade opportunities for their local produce. Such had benefited the town of Chibia, where in addition the agricultural development project Sogangelas, and the road rehabilitation works offered some employment opportunities to the local population. However, as local traffic and trade increased due to this road rehabilitation, so did food imports from neighbouring countries, drawing rural people into an unequal competition with the often cheaper food from these countries. The agricultural project in the meantime only provided irrigated plots to a few local farmers, yet at the same time disconnected many more from their land and agricultural livelihoods.

After the 2002 peace agreement, localized land conflicts have been on the rise in both urban and rural areas. In urban areas they have mainly revolved around land-grabbing by elites and private businesses, with reports of forced evictions of residents of Luanda's shanty towns by government being commonplace (Almeida, 2009). In rural areas too, land issues have come to the fore. The availability of land was already a major concern during the resettlement process. 50% of the land that had been in the hands of large Portuguese commercial farmers before Angola's independence had already been redistributed to new large landowners by 1999, leaving smallholder farmers struggling for land on their return after displacement (Hodges 2002, Clover 2005). Examples of conflicts over land are those in areas where internally displaced and residents compete over the same lands. Other conflicts

emerged between large commercial farmers that had fenced off their lands, thereby closing off livestock grazing space for pastoralists in those areas (Clover 2005). The land dispute in the Gambos municipality, a predominantly pastoralist society in southern Huíla, was a much quoted example of this latter type of land conflict. When new large landowners (often said to be ex-generals having been granted land by the GoA) started demarcating large pieces of land in Gambos, it became increasingly difficult for pastoralists in the area to access water and pasture resources (Pacheco 2004, Clover 2005, Clover 2007). Local authorities in 2001 found that these new landowners had demarcated much more land than they were registered for, and in one case this led to a settlement in which the new landowner had to return an amount of land to the local community that had used it previously as grazing land (Clover 2007, 188). However, in 2003 new landowners and fences reappeared in the Gambos region, cutting many pastoralists off from their land, without receiving compensation, some villages being completely enclosed by fences, or its population forcibly removed (Clover 2007, 190). A NGO coordinator formulated the violent and politically sensitive nature of the Gambos conflict as follows:

“Ex-UNITA generals that had received large pieces of land as reintegration package, kept illegal jails on their property. They used these jails to torture the pastoralists that had tried to access their formerly owned land by cutting holes in the fences. There are stories that the former coordinator of an international NGO in Lubango had his visa revoked and was being followed and spied on because he reported on this matter openly”.<sup>91</sup>

Stories about this type of land conflicts emerged soon after the war at the peak of the resettlement process, but are continuing to this day. One consultant working on land issues in Huíla province in 2009 had been told by pastoralists that they had seen themselves becoming confined to a small plot of land, effectively cut off from their former grazing lands. Frustrations had run so high that they told the consultant they were ready to pick up arms again to fight their neighbouring big commercial farmers, who they saw as their new enemies, not necessarily linked to one political party or the other.<sup>92</sup> The large commercial farmers that fence their land, cutting off access to communal grazing lands are officially asked by the government of Angola to ensure compensation for the affected communities. But government institutions insist that they cannot do more than monitor this process, which leaves the matter of compensation up to the individual willingness of the landowner in question. Agricultural rehabilitation in this case is not politically neutral, but can ignite new social conflict if access to land and water for rural communities is not properly regulated (Clover 2005). This is demonstrated by the example in Chibia, where land redistribution brought on by the state’s post-conflict reconstruction projects actually cut off access to land and water to some of the local population.

Concerns over availability of land have dominated many civil society discourses and debates during the resettlement process, but the main bottleneck seems to be the diminishing grazing land for pastoralists due to the fencing practices of large commercial landowners. Land conflicts that are occurring in Huíla today seem to be happening primarily in the southern parts of the province, between the large landowners and pastoralists. The potential for new conflicts over land is on-going as long as there is no real solution found to the problem of land grabbing and lack of standardized political agreements over compensation to affected communities. The issue of land shows a discrepancy between the GoA’s proclaimed

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<sup>91</sup> Interview with NGO coordinator, Lubango, 26 February 2007.

<sup>92</sup> Interview international consultant, Lubango, 04 August 2008.

policy on rural development as stated in the ECP, and its policy in practice. Whereas the ECP states that priority is given to the traditional rural sector, and stimulating agricultural production as a tool for the social reintegration of ex-combatants as well as IDPs in their areas of origin, priorities in practice show that large landowners are allowed to accumulate land at the detriment of the traditional rural sector: namely smallholders and pastoralists. Furthermore, the GoA's prioritization of rebuilding infrastructure and large-scale commercial agricultural development projects over smallholder agriculture, points at a further discrepancy between its proclaimed rural development and food security policy and its actual practice. The policies and practice of aid in assisting the recovery of rural people's livelihoods in Huíla is analysed in the next section.

## **Rebuilding livelihoods through the humanitarian lens**

This section builds on the case studies in Caluquembe and Chibia, in that it compares the experiences and outcomes of livelihood recovery processes in these two municipalities. The section specifically investigates how humanitarian agencies gave meaning to assisting resettlement and rural livelihood recovery in practice. It analyses post-war rehabilitation policies, everyday realities of livelihood recovery assistance, and what the outcomes have been of these type of interventions. More specifically, it analyses the use of seeds and tools programmes as the most common response to livelihood recovery, and investigates reasons for its popularity as well as the assumptions surrounding it and its effects on the long-term.

### *Post-war rehabilitation policies*

According to literature about reconstruction processes in post-war societies, much emphasis is placed on aid agencies' role as main figures in linking relief to development through rehabilitation programmes (Green and Ahmed 1999). Longley (et al 2006) argue that humanitarian organizations choose to act mostly at a micro level, as getting involved in the political processes that define the macro level might compromise their humanitarian principles. Especially humanitarian agencies find themselves playing an assisting role to the state's efforts, by providing aid for the most vulnerable people in society, while states focus their attention at macro level national reconstruction projects. The period of recovery brings some additional challenges to humanitarian agencies and the international donor community with reference to accessing funding and engaging more in-depth with state efforts, as relief can be described as "state-avoiding", whereas development cannot be done without the state's involvement in the process (Harmer and Macrae 2004).

Since the increased financial dependency of agencies on foreign states' budgets for aid, and the short-term donor funding of programmes focusing on rehabilitation activities, agencies' flexibility to respond to all existing needs has become more limited (Green and Ahmed 1999). This financial dependency had the effect that agencies had to change their rehabilitation strategies by focusing more on project cycles with strict budgets and time-spans. This has reduced their ability to respond to local needs that take more time to address properly or needs that fall outside of the policy boundaries that their funding partners have defined (Barakat 2005). With these provisions rehabilitation can be more donor-driven than based on existing needs, and affects the quality of rehabilitation programmes. What these constraints can mean for organizational practice is elaborated on in the next section.

### *Assisting livelihood recovery in Huíla's humanitarian sphere*

After the war ended in 2002 humanitarian actors shifted their approaches from relief to assisting in the resettlement of the IDPs and returnees to their areas of origin.

The focus during the reconstruction period soon turned towards food security as a main thematic area of attention and means to secure peace. This is illustrated by the following quote from a research paper of 2002 on the development challenges that Angola would be facing just after peace was signed:

“At the same time, however, the food crisis that has hit southern Africa has had an impact on Angola with the country needing to import 725,000 tons of cereal. FAO will be distributing seeds and tools to half a million families. Many people are in a bad condition in areas that were formerly under UNITA control and hence previously inaccessible to outside food and relief agencies. Large-scale land mining also impedes food delivery. It is likely in this situation that people's energies (as well as the peace movements) will be concentrated on survival and on returning home rather than on peace and reconciliation matters. Satisfying people's needs will indeed be vital in securing peace and stability”. (Kibble 2002:25)

The challenges for assisting the post-war recovery of rural livelihoods were diverse and complex: protection of land rights; recapitalisation of peasant households; recovery of the rural-urban trade and credit mechanisms; demining of agricultural fields and roads; and reviving the agricultural extension system (Hodges 2002, 31). The main challenge for humanitarian agencies, as formulated in the CAP for Angola in 2003, would first lie in the resettlement of displaced populations which had a strong focus on diminishing vulnerability and reintegration mainly through promoting agricultural production of staple crops, as is shown in the following quote:

“Reduce the dependency of vulnerable, returnee and demobilised groups on emergency food aid and help populations achieve self-sufficiency by improving productive techniques, promoting income-generation and supporting agricultural activities in accordance with the *regulamento*.

Provide seeds, tools and technical assistance to vulnerable, returnee and demobilised populations prior to the planting season and distribute food rations to bridge the gap between planting and harvest seasons, as required.

Promote staple crop seed multiplication, community seed banks, protection against insects and plagues, appropriate seed selection, soil fertility restoration, crop diversification, animal traction, livestock enlargement, use of compost and manure and adequate storage facilities.” (UN 2002, 49)

NGO policies in Huíla were adapted to incorporate the changing post-conflict circumstances. For instance, Norwegian Refugee Council in 2003 switched its focus from distributing food aid to establishing sustainable livelihoods and community infrastructure (Larssen 2008, 8). ZOA Angola in 2004 embarked on a 3-year project aimed at improving food security for 6,000 households in areas where they had previously done food distributions and assisted resettlement processes (Fret 2007). Food security usually becomes one of the major terrains in which relief agencies implement their programs following the assumptions that; small-scale agriculture leads to household food production, diminishes the reliance on food aid, and any surplus harvest can be sold (Levine and Chastre 2004).

Humanitarian agencies operating in Huíla have overwhelmingly chosen to support food security and livelihoods by assisting people to re-establish themselves in rural society

through the distribution of seeds and tools. The rationale was to support people's agricultural productivity and as such diminish the dependency on food aid. This thesis tries to shed light on whether seeds and tools distribution can be viewed as a livelihood approach, or as an extension of relief aid. There is little evidence of needs assessment on livelihoods having taken place. Information on livelihood conditions and strategies were presumed to be known, or extrapolated from the relief period. As the former director of an international NGO that had been operational in Huíla for many years responded:

“The basis of needs we already know. We weren't so much concerned with the ‘what’ as with the ‘how’. We didn't need to ask again what people needed, but rather how to provide them with it. Especially concerning basic needs it's not necessary to ask people, you just know. In the third and last phase, the knowledge about needs came from the fact that we already knew the people. Our own staff were themselves displaced, so they could relate to what was necessary.”<sup>93</sup>

This neglect of assessments and problem analysis was also noted by Levine and Chastre (2004) in the case of aid responses in the Great Lakes region. Needs assessments were sometimes not carried out at all, the emergency situation being cited as a reason for not doing so. “A related problem is that, where assessments were carried out, the results seem to be driven by a desire to find out what one could do (from a limited range of options) or, more commonly, to justify a predetermined response” (Levine and Chastre 2004, 19). This seems to have been the case for most of the agricultural and rural development projects in Angola, where very little needs assessments, viability studies and evaluations were done (Rafael Simões and Pacheco 2009). In rural settings seeds and tools were deemed the only appropriate response to livelihood needs. Questions regarding access to markets, transportation, were often only addressed at the last stages of a project, which meant that there was little continuity or structural support as regards to these issues. Supporting small businesses, skills training and other rural activities fell out of the project scope except in those projects that supported the reintegration of demobilized soldiers. Evidence from interviews and NGO reports show that rarely a livelihood approach or analysis has been implemented in the work of humanitarian NGOs in Angola, contrary to what recent policy discussions, research and scientific articles on livelihood approaches in post-conflict situations may suggest. This lack of awareness on the use of livelihood approaches was not only commonplace within humanitarian organizations, but was also evident in the development organizations.

### *Seeds and tools*

During 33 interviews with staff members of NGOs and government institutions based in Lubango, the most common response (22 of the 33) as to the type of projects they were involved in, was seeds and tools programmes. The other NGO staff members usually were involved in health or education activities, and/or demining. Two NGOs involved in post-war seeds and tools programmes were said to work specifically with a livelihood approach, such as NRC and ACF, although in their own words, not an extensive one. All NGOs involved in seeds and tools distributions mentioned that they did interventions geared towards improving food security and livelihoods in broad terms. In the cases where needs assessments were carried out in communities to identify the assets that people were lacking, seeds, tools and livestock were identified as tangible assets that people needed to resume agricultural production.

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<sup>93</sup> Interview with former national director of ZOA Angola, Utrecht, 15 July 2009.

A workshop was organised in Lubango in March 2007 by one of the biggest international NGOs working in the province at that time, to discuss the approaches that NGOs in Huíla were using. It was found that all were tackling issues of food security by means of seeds and tools programmes, often in the same localities, and almost always with the same type of seeds: maize and beans. Although in 2007 the term transition was mostly used to define the changes in Angolan rural society, broader and longer-term livelihood options other than small-scale agriculture were not discussed. Furthermore regarding their approaches to food security in the province, there was no consultation or consensus about the need for coordination between the NGOs. Most programmes that were presented by the NGOs at that workshop followed identical steps: identifying the 250 most vulnerable people within communities (identification in most cases was done by the local chiefs, not on basis of needs assessments), handing out seeds (maize and beans, sometimes sorghum and millet, on a few occasions horticultural seeds if access to water was available), handing out tools (hoes, machetes, and ploughs), sometimes handing out oxen and in some instances goats (for instance 20 oxen for a group of 250 people, on rotational basis), and creation of a seed bank where the amount of distributed seeds needed to be returned once the crop was harvested. The selection of the type of seeds that were going to be distributed seems to have been done on the assumption that maize and beans are the staple foods in the area. Therefore these seeds would contribute directly to increased food security. One staff member of an international humanitarian NGO described the transition in terms of the food security situation in rural villages in Huíla as following:

“The way people deal with the available food in their villages has become very different, it went from *comer* (eating) only, to *comer, vender e semente* (eating, selling and seeds): *semente* meaning to be able to save seeds for next year or using the community seed banks”.<sup>94</sup>

Already in 1995 the UN’s humanitarian coordination body in Angola, UCAH, founded a Seeds and Tools Working Group consisting of representatives from the GoA, UNITA, donors, UN and NGOs that was especially designed to oversee and analyse seed needs and match them with available resources on national level (Lanzer 1996, 28). Seeds and tools programs further dominated the recovery process that started with the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced from 2002 onwards. Until 2008 not much changed. Few organizations tried to complement their programmes by looking into access to markets, but without proper resources to back those ideas up, they often didn’t come to fruition. For one NGO working in Caluquembe, commercialisation had been set as a specific project objective, which in the end was never achieved as it said that by the time its project ended in 2007 people had not been producing sufficient amounts to be able to sell. However, from this research in the village of Cue 1 where many seeds and tools programmes had been implemented, it emerged that 80% of the respondent households had already been selling their produce on the market in Caluquembe-sede. Village inhabitants indicated at the time of the fieldwork that they wanted to start producing other crops like coffee as the market value for maize was considered too low to bring in cash, but rather could only be exchanged for other items such as salt or soap.<sup>95</sup> Some of the seeds that had been handed out by NGOs required more extensive use of fertilizers than the seeds people had reserved themselves, requiring additional (financial) inputs.<sup>96</sup> Also, whereas seeds and tools programmes are instigated out of an assumption that small scale farmers have been completely dispossessed during conflict, this research uncovered that in most of the villages in Caluquembe people

<sup>94</sup> Interview with Gabriel Lofa, Project Coordinator ZOA Caluquembe, Lubango, 12 February 2007.

<sup>95</sup> Interview with Paulo Chicusse, Cue 1, 30 January 2008.

<sup>96</sup> Interview with Maria Adriano, Catala, 01 February 2008.

had been able to continue producing food during conflict and before seeds and tools programmes were started. Furthermore, people had already been selling their excess produce during the war, sometimes even when they were still receiving food aid.

Livelihoods that fell outside of the agricultural domain, were largely ignored in recovery projects. This is a common oversight that Cramer (2006) addresses when he refers to the typical image of rural society that persists where everyone is automatically assumed to be a smallholder farmer. This image simply ignores the existence of social differentiation and different livelihoods that people employ over time (Cramer 2006). Off-farm livelihoods are often not recognized in interventions that focus on rural areas (Longley et al 2006, Ellis 2000a, Ellis and Biggs 2001). Working the fields of others, migration, firewood collection, hunting or other off-farm activities might be interpreted as undesirable coping strategies. Interventions focusing only on a narrowly defined idea of agricultural rehabilitation do not take into account peoples differentiated desires and capabilities. This narrow idea rather perpetuates the ‘yeoman farmer fallacy’, the myth that all rural people rely on farming alone for their livelihood (Farrington 1998). This is related to what Ellis (2000a) calls the ‘small-farm-first’ paradigm which has dictated rural policies for decades in which it is assumed that rural economic growth is achieved through a narrow focus on assisting small-farmers, and which in effect neglects the diversification of rural livelihoods into non-farm activities. These assumptions on rural homogeneity often shape the one-size-fits-all response towards recovery and development in rural areas.

### *Beyond seeds and tools*

A common response by aid agencies to support local level recovery processes is given through agricultural rehabilitation; and specifically seeds and tools programmes. Longley et al (2006) give several reasons to explain why these programmes are so attractive: “seed aid provides an effective way for donors to spend their money and to be seen assisting rural populations more sustainably; implementing agencies benefit from contracts to deliver the seed; seed companies profit from seed sales; and farmers are unlikely to complain about receiving free inputs, particularly since the seed can be exchanged or eaten if it is not planted” (Longley et al. 2006, 5). Seeds and tools programmes also offer humanitarian agencies a chance to continue working through a similar system of distribution as in food aid, therefore building on their logistical expertise and networks. Furthermore, seed needs assessments are often based on previously done food aid assessments rather than on new contextual assessments within changing circumstances and opportunities (Longley et al 2006, Levine and Chastre 2004, Sperling and McGuire 2010). Seeds and tools programmes aim at assisting (war-affected) people to rely less on food aid and become self-sufficient in terms of food production. It is especially suitable for post-conflict situations that are characterized by a loss of agricultural assets like seeds, tools and livestock due to displacement and theft. The distribution of seed, when done right, can also be seen as a symbolic intervention next to a practical one, as Archibald and Richards (2002) suggest. They regard a successful seed distribution, in terms of transparency in the process and equal access, as an aid agencies’ way of stressing the importance of social inclusion and common humanity for all beneficiaries in a war affected community. Sperling and McGuire (2010) argue that seed aid is a popular response by aid agencies as it provides effective links between relief and development, but despite its extensive implementation it is hardly evaluated. A major assumption on seed aid by the agencies that implement it, is that it can do no harm, even if evidence is showing that it can undermine local markets and seed systems. Agencies are most often concerned with seed availability over issues of access and quality, and that farmer feedback on these issues as well as long-term outcomes of seed aid are rarely sought (ibid.).



In the livelihood recovery programmes currently implemented in Huíla province, the aspects of introducing more valuable crops, attention to markets and transportation of produce, diversification and use of project-created productive resources are lacking. Availability of seeds for different crops, cash and commerce is still very low in these areas. Furthermore, as seen earlier in this chapter, land availability has been an obstacle in some areas. With the withdrawal of many of the initiating organizations, the follow up of the above aspects of livelihood recovery have been left out, creating a peculiar situation in which most farmers produce exactly the same low value crops without diversification or alternative livelihood activities. The low return on especially maize was reason for the local EDA in Chibia to discourage the agricultural development project Sogangelas to produce maize on the irrigated land. The limited possibilities for transportation from the rural areas to markets has a negative effect on the profitability of maize. Farmers in the rural areas who do manage to get their maize produce transported to especially the urban coastal areas find it difficult to compete with the prices of imported maize (Kyle 2005). Furthermore, maize is a very labour intensive crop, with most of the labour for especially processing the maize being the responsibility of women. A staff member working at the Provincial Ministry of Agriculture gave the following example to indicate the low market value and how the inability to access markets exacerbates rural poverty.

“The maize crop is very labour intensive, but the prices at the moment are very low because of lack of transport. The produce doesn’t find its way to the cities. I know an example from Chipindo where farmers had just harvested the maize. A few men from Huambo showed up with trucks, and they bought large quantities of maize for the price of 15 kwanza per kilo<sup>97</sup>. Then they sold it for 50 kwanza per kilo on the markets in Huambo. These cases make me sad. People are not able to buy anything, and they don’t have food reserves. Consider how many kilos of maize they have to sell in order to get just 1,000 kwanza together”.<sup>98</sup>

In order to move away from the more traditional seeds and tools programme and to create more diverse rural opportunities and a long-term strategy NGOs need to invest in other approaches to rural development (Longley et al. 2006). Seeds and tools programmes should work with a vision on market access, crop diversification, micro-credit, commercialisation opportunities and attention to non-farm livelihood activities. However, in Huíla this continuity has as yet hardly taken off as the organizations either lack the expertise and/or vision as they have entered the country with an exclusively humanitarian mandate. Moreover, both local and international NGOs cannot access sufficient funding possibilities as Angola is no longer high on the donor agenda. Therefore there is insufficient financial and institutional capacity for a transition of humanitarian to development programmes. Many times the partnerships that existed between international and local organizations were very instrumentalist in nature, in the sense that they were focused primarily on increasing their access to areas for the distribution of their goods, thus achieving a larger coverage and scale of operations. Capacity building and commitment to further financial assistance of these local NGOs have been limited. This has had consequences for the evolution of local NGOs to become bigger and more durable players in the field of development, and was interpreted as a further lack of trust in the capacities of local organizations (Rafael Simões and Pacheco 2009). They still often lack the capacity and international backing (financially and institutionally) to continue their projects. Because there are no development organizations

<sup>97</sup> The kilo is measured by an empty margarine tin. 15 Kwanza is equal to 15 eurocents.

<sup>98</sup> Interview with Rita Soma, head of section rural engineering and agricultural production MINADER Huíla, Lubango, 11 August 2008.

that can really take over these projects there is a lack of continuity and development in the rural areas. This is compounded by a historical lack of cooperation between aid organizations and the Angolan state, which prevents that projects are integrated in government plans for reconstruction and development. The case of the EDA in Caluquembe and NGOs working there demonstrates that there are opportunities for extensive cooperation and capacity building, but with the withdrawal of many NGOs and a lack of financial resources from the government for these EDA's there is little continuity to these efforts.

*Externally-driven and self recovery: comparing the cases*

By comparing the history of livelihood recovery, aid interventions and reconstruction efforts by the state in the two municipalities, some conclusions can be drawn. For instance, whereas villages in Chibia municipality incidentally received food assistance from WFP and the state, almost all villages in the Caluquembe municipality had seen on average two or three seeds and tools interventions take place, next to the food aid they had received over the years. This had to do with the fact that Chibia had not seen active conflict, although it had hosted groups of displaced people. The area is also more known for pastoralism rather than agriculture due to its semi-arid climate. Caluquembe on the other hand is considered to be a rich agricultural area, where in the past coffee had been produced on a wide scale. Interventions with an agricultural seeds and tools component therefore were deemed to be well-fitted to the Caluquembe circumstances.

Livelihoods in Caluquembe have been singularly pushed towards a meagre agricultural base, where subsistence farming seems to have been the main objective as most projects lacked elements as access to markets and the provision of credit. Small shops and industries have not been re-introduced after the war, and skills training only benefited the demobilised soldiers. Youths, most of them without agricultural experience due to long periods of displacement, seemed to prefer finding a job outside agriculture. The only options for that type of jobs were in the health and education sector where recruiting sessions were flooded by unemployed youths every time. Agriculture seems to have become the only option due to what I call externally-driven recovery. Recovery that is not necessarily based on people's own recovery activities but on external assumptions on rural society and economy. These assumptions then inform the uniform interventions that do not take into account the manifold experiences and ways in which people rebuild their livelihoods. This externally-driven recovery is offering limited options for assistance to livelihood recovery, in a context where people find themselves in extreme poverty without the availability of many other options.

In contrast, the inhabitants of Chibia encountered very little external aid interventions by NGOs. This is related to the fact that Chibia continued to be accessible through its location on the main road to Lubango, which also during the war had remained more or less intact. Therefore, economic recovery with reference to access to markets, was easier obtained here than in an area like Caluquembe where the access road had been severely damaged during the war. Also, the role of the state has been quite strong in Chibia, with both positive as well as negative outcomes on livelihood opportunities. For the displaced people from Quilengues living in Bairro 11 de Novembro in Chibia agricultural livelihood options had become impossible as their access to land had been cut off by an agricultural development project instigated by the state, even after receiving agricultural assistance from an NGO. They managed to find other activities to sustain themselves, such as small trade on the local market, acquiring skills as masons or tailors, or finding employment in the area. Although they would still indicate the need for more employment opportunities and agricultural inputs, some of the inhabitants no longer wanted to go back to their areas of origin as they had found

sufficient opportunities for themselves in Chibia. This group of displaced people in Chibia are representative for the type of self recovery that one can find in many places in Angola where aid never reached the population. It is the type of recovery that is locally grounded and spontaneous, often ignored by agencies, but powerful in its message. People do recovery themselves with the means available to them. Aid can support these activities, but can also ignore, redirect or alter these efforts in unintended ways based on predefined packages for rural livelihood rehabilitation.

## **Conclusions**

This chapter analysed the challenges in post-war Angolan society as they were identified in 2002 and compared them to the reconstruction, rehabilitation and recovery efforts by the Angolan state, aid agencies and people themselves that ensued afterwards. Conflict affects political, economic and social institutions profoundly and their recovery requires long-term commitment and investments by the actors involved in these processes. Reconstruction is a long-term process, where humanitarian agencies increasingly take on a role in the establishment of food security. But the usual short-term and non-political nature of humanitarian organisations is difficult to reconcile with the long-term commitment and engagement with state institutions that these types of reconstruction processes require.

In this chapter I argued that although conflict and displacement have had significant effects on the livelihoods choices people make, state and aid agencies have further limited or redirected the livelihood options in the post-conflict reconstruction phase. The goals that were set by the Angolan state for the reconstruction of Angolan society pertaining to rural livelihoods were rather limitedly focused on agricultural production and the rehabilitation of the roads network. With the rebuilding of roads, access to markets and the reactivation of the rural market system was assumed to be repaired. Meanwhile, the response and interventions by NGOs during the resettlement and rehabilitation phase were also limited in their scope, creating, in the case of Caluquembe, a rather uniform social stratum of small scale farmers with little opportunity to diversify their livelihoods or pursue other opportunities through investments. Because of the lack of follow up in programmes that focus more on access to markets and commercialisation options, rural livelihoods have hardly risen beyond subsistence level. The lack of sustainability manifest in many livelihood recovery programmes can be partly explained by the financial constraints that are inherent to the indistinct lines between relief, rehabilitation and development. A transition from relief to development is also constrained by the lack of development organizations available to take over the 'groundwork' as well as GoA's lack of resources and capacity to systematically incorporate the NGO efforts within their own local state institutions and expand on them. Continuing state interventions, in the meanwhile, have been mostly aimed at large-scale agricultural development projects and infrastructure (Kyle 2005). In between these two opposing approaches to rural rehabilitation and development the local population have continued to diversify and adapt their livelihoods themselves, in which interventions by NGOs and the state have played either minimal or sometimes even constraining roles.

## 9. Conclusion

### Introduction

#### Changes in livelihoods through conflict, displacement and aid

#### Everyday practices of aid and livelihood recovery in Huíla

### Introduction

This thesis studies the interplay between livelihoods and aid in times of crisis. It has captured processes by which people deal with and recover from conflict, and how aid and state actors respond to these processes. As such it has followed how different actors deal with crisis, focusing on the interfaces where these actors meet and co-shape future livelihoods.

The research started with the following assumptions. Firstly, humanitarian agencies have seen their work domain transform from providing basic relief to incorporating more development approaches, while its practices have not always followed these transformations sufficiently (Hilhorst 2007). Secondly, my assumption was that humanitarian agencies tend to approach livelihood recovery differently than their development partners, formulating assistance less on an analysis of the actual livelihood practices that are present (Christoplos 2006). And thirdly, conflict and displacement have profound effects on people's livelihoods and people will adapt their livelihoods, often forcibly so, to respond to these situations. In the absence of a strong state, NGOs become key actors in addressing issues of livelihood recovery, and can significantly impact the recovery processes that people themselves have started. Therefore, this research started with the objective to analyse how people's livelihoods are affected during crisis, and how aid interventions shape the livelihoods that people have created for themselves. During the fieldwork an additional layer of analysis was added with reference to the role of the state in reconstruction processes and how these affected people's own recovery efforts.

This concluding chapter of the thesis will present the main findings of this research from the analysis of information from previous chapters, and provide answers to the following research questions:

*How are people's livelihoods affected in times of crisis, and how do aid interventions influence the livelihood options that people have in Huíla province, Angola?*

The main research question is further translated into the following sub-research questions:

- What are people's past and current livelihoods and how have they been affected and influenced by crisis?
- How have different aid interventions influenced and transformed the livelihood options that people have nowadays?
- How do agencies with different mandates analyse and organize their interventions and how does the livelihood approach fit into the everyday practice of humanitarian agencies?

The chapter combines the theoretical approaches to understanding outcomes of aid, and the debates surrounding linking relief to development, with the empirical material collected on changes in rural livelihoods in Huíla. Fieldwork for this research has been conducted in six villages in the municipalities of Chibia and Caluquembe in Huíla province. The fieldwork in these villages entailed participant observation of everyday livelihood practices of its inhabitants, their individual and collective histories and interfaces pertaining to conflict,

displacement, state and aid. Historical ethnography was used as a tool to investigate not only people's individual life histories spanning colonial times, the conflict and post-conflict period, but the way the village, or that particular locality, had changed and evolved over the last years. The empirical data was collected during fieldwork in 2007 and 2008, and uncover distinct differences in livelihood recovery and the roles that different actors played in this process.

### **Changes in livelihoods through colonialism, conflict and displacement**

In this thesis I have followed Ellis' definition of a livelihood as the way an individual or household makes a living through the assets, activities and access to these assets and activities (2000a, 10). I distinguished between conceptualizing livelihoods as field of study opposed to livelihood approaches as a narrowly defined and schematically presented policy construct. Livelihoods are influenced by internal decisions and actions of the individuals and households, but also by the external social, economic, political and institutional changes surrounding them. Livelihoods are dynamic and fluid and people adapt their livelihoods to respond to these changes, sometimes forcibly so (Kaag et al. 2004). Conflict and colonialism define, and narrow down the parameters within which people can make choices with regards to their livelihoods, as well as affect the availability of material and immaterial resources necessary to sustain the household. I have argued that they also co-shape the way livelihood recovery takes place.

#### *Colonialism and conflict in the everyday lives of rural people*

In Angola, decades of political upheaval have severely affected people's livelihoods. Colonial occupation by the Portuguese had been steadily extended in the country since the 16<sup>th</sup> century, and was characterized by extensive slave trade, which after its official abolishment in 1878 was replaced by a system of forced labour continuing to certain degrees until the end of colonialism in Angola in 1975 (Birmingham 1978, Bender 1978). After the transatlantic slave trade had ended, on which the colonial economy of Angola was built for a long period of time, other economic activities caused shifts in the rural areas, which affected the rural livelihoods of the population in significant ways. Angola was turned into a plantation economy of rubber, sisal, cotton and coffee primarily. To cater to the labour needs of the Portuguese plantation owners, a system of forced labour was used, which effectively was one of the many waves of displacement that the Angolan population encountered throughout its history. As demonstrated in chapter 6, people in Chibia became drawn into the system of forced labour both by working on the fazendas in the municipality itself, or being transferred to plantations in the north of the country. Inhabitants of Cue 1, a village in Caluquembe, were enrolled in a planned agricultural development scheme called a *colonato*. Effectively this meant they had to work on both a plantation type structure, with seeds and tools provided for by the colonial managers, as well as maintain their own fields. Although it meant an additional labour burden on the households, some elderly people in Cue 1 appreciated the benefits that the *colonato* structure gave in terms of additional produce, and the greater availability of goods and agricultural inputs provided for by the Portuguese managers of the *colonato*.

In 1975, due to a revolution in Portugal and ensuing political reforms, the road to Angolan independence was paved. With the declaration of independence, most Portuguese left the country, leading to a collapse of many features of the rural economy such as trading mechanisms, availability of commodities and agricultural inputs, industries, and employment

options. Although the exploitative colonial features had also disappeared, the conflict that emerged after independence led to a neglect of the rural economy and massive dispossession, with no reinsertion of new trade mechanisms, goods and industries.

Immediately after independence in 1975 a power struggle ensued amongst the three main nationalist movements, FNLA, MPLA and UNITA which was the start of a civil war that caused death, destruction and displacement on a massive scale. The country was immersed in a civil war between MPLA and UNITA that lasted from 1975 until 2002, with peace intervals in 1991-1992 and 1994-1998 under the Bicesse and Lusaka peace accords respectively. Although the political economy of war approach has been helpful in understanding the interplay between resources and power, which certainly have shaped the course of the Angolan conflict, it overemphasizes a market-oriented explanation of war. It also neglects the local socio-cultural institutions through which conflict is produced. In chapter 3 of this thesis on the history of conflict in Angola, jointly written with Maliana Serrano, we instead have argued for an understanding of the conflict through a focus on the everyday realities of conflict, to better understand its micro-dynamics and the varied effects that the conflict has on the population. This was demonstrated through the case studies of four municipalities in Huíla province. Experiences of war have been varied in the different localities in the province, and the fieldwork uncovered these multiple realities of conflict and displacement. For example, in Caluquembe the war created massive population displacement, as the municipality had become at the centre of contention between MPLA and UNITA troops. Displacement in Caluquembe occurred in opposite directions, both from 'bush' to 'town' as well as the other way. In 1991 UNITA tried to take over local administration and effectively occupied the IESA mission and hospital, which became an important local institution through which local politics were played out. In 1994, MPLA bombed the hospital grounds and re-occupied Caluquembe, after which local government was formed of both MPLA and UNITA members as part of the Government of National Unity. Chibia on the other hand had remained under MPLA control throughout the war and active conflict did not occur. Effects of the war were mostly seen in terms of displaced people that arrived, which increased local competition over land and employment. Also, basic service delivery diminished, access to the rest of the country became increasingly difficult, which had its effects on local livelihoods and the availability of goods and trade in the municipality.

#### *Colonialism, conflict, and displacement and their effects on livelihoods*

Colonial economic policies pushed rural livelihoods in specific directions. Forced labour and planned agricultural development schemes disconnected people from their families and livelihoods, and narrowed down the amount of time households could spend on their own livelihood activities. Agricultural production was steered towards certain cash crops such as coffee and wheat. The practices of bush traders indebted many local farmers and led to uneven competition with local traders, yet at the same time made commodities, trade and credit more widely available throughout rural societies. With the departure of the Portuguese in 1975, the rural economy collapsed, as important trade, commodities and industrial features disappeared with them. The conflict that followed Angolan independence further dispossessed the rural population of important assets for household survival in various ways. In Caluquembe, rural livelihoods came under direct attack. People were targeted by either MPLA or UNITA, killed or forced to fight with them. Their assets such as livestock and agricultural inputs, as well as other household possessions were stolen, or sold in order to generate cash for food. Farmers were sometimes forced to produce food for the troops if their village had become occupied by soldiers. Also, scorched earth tactics and the widespread

placing of landmines in agricultural fields further dispossessed local farmers of their land, making it a potentially life-threatening activity to undertake.

Displacement was widespread especially in villages in the municipality of Caluquembe. Whole villages were left abandoned, sometimes during decades. For their household survival they deployed a range of activities to generate food and income to sustain the households. Collection of firewood, making and selling charcoal and day labour on farms of others was undertaken frequently. People would either seek refuge in the municipal centre, move to other abandoned villages, or find their way to the provincial capital of Lubango. This not only dispossessed them of their assets further, as they could only take with them whatever they could carry by foot, but also disconnected them from their land and social networks. My research findings however also show that during the displacement period new networks would be formed that proved beneficial to households and villages as a whole during the livelihood recovery phase. For instance, new urban-rural linkages were created that provided market access and commercialization options.

For people being displaced to other areas in the province, livelihood opportunities were dependent on the conditions they were to find. For the inhabitants of Bairro 11 de Novembro in Chibia, this meant they had to adapt their livelihoods to a surrounding in which agriculture was no longer an option. They adapted by negotiating access to the local market, pursuing trade, seeking semi-skilled labour opportunities, and arranging formal job employment. This type of livelihood adaptation extends mere 'coping'. New livelihood activities were successfully incorporated in the household portfolio, even in situations where social assets are considered weak or non-existent. Displacement and the interaction amongst people with different traditions and practices, enables transformations of livelihood activities and sometimes even challenges gender roles.

I conclude that livelihoods were affected in many ways by colonialism, conflict and displacement. Assets were lost, opportunities diminished, and access to necessary inputs became increasingly hard. However, effects varied throughout the province. Some livelihoods were adapted to the new and changing circumstances in ways that have proven beneficial for household survival, especially in situations where external assistance to livelihood recovery was minimal as the following section of findings will show.

### **Everyday practices of aid and livelihood recovery in Huíla**

Fieldwork in Caluquembe and Chibia offered insight into the manifold ways in which people reconstruct their own lives and livelihoods during and after conflict. They develop a variety of activities to deal with effects of the conflict on their livelihoods, some of which are deemed undesirable or unsustainable by the state and aid agencies. Examples of these activities range from collecting firewood, charcoal burning, weaving baskets for trade with neighbours, collecting fruits, vegetables and honey, working on fields of others, and labour migration. It is these activities through which people survive. Aid interventions form another livelihood strategy that gives people access to food, goods and activities necessary for household survival.

Resettlement and recovery of livelihoods is what people do themselves and state and agencies interventions play an assisting role in this process. I have argued that there is a difference in process and outcome between villages in which self recovery, externally driven recovery and state recovery takes place. These three processes are not mutually exclusive or separated in practice, they can happen at the same time and become intertwined. However, as the case studies have shown, the extent to which these processes are set in motion and the

circumstances in which they take place, co-shape and determine the outcomes of livelihood recovery.

### *History and everyday practices of aid*

The research focused on the different types of aid from the post-independence war starting in 1975 onwards, and investigated the policies and everyday practice of humanitarian actors in Huíla province. The concept of a humanitarian arena was used to study the multiple actors that shape humanitarian interventions, with a focus on everyday practices instead of the normative framework of humanitarian principles that is intended to guide practice (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010). This follows from an actor-oriented approach in which interventions are viewed as interfaces where multiple actors meet and actively shape and negotiate the outcomes of aid (Long 2004).

The humanitarian arena in Huíla consisted of a diversity of actors: local people, churches, state institutions, UN agencies and local and international aid agencies. Especially churches played significant and enduring roles in assisting the affected populations in the rural areas throughout the civil war. Only at the beginning of the 1990s did NGOs seriously enter the arena, enabled by several political transformations which allowed for the formation of a local civil society, and improved access for international agencies (Vidal 2009). There were only a few organisations that incorporated development approaches in safe areas in the province during the conflict. The local NGO ADRA was one of the few organizations with a development approach since the beginning of the 1990s. During conflict the goals and objectives that humanitarian agencies put forward in Angola was to assist the population affected by the conflict by mainly providing food aid and basic health services. Aid kept people alive during this time, and to this day people remember the agencies that visited them regularly providing them with food, and occasionally setting up a health post in the area. Food aid was sometimes used to sell on markets if household needs were met in other ways, and people needed the cash for other goods.

Objectives of humanitarian agencies during times of crisis differ by what the security situation allows. In the case of Angola, two peace accords (Bicesse, 1990-1991, and Lusaka, 1994-1998) opened up the space to think about strategies for long-term improvement of people's situations. Development thinking became increasingly relevant, especially so after the signing of the 2002 Luena peace accords. This required extensive organizational adaptation to the changing situation. Not every aid actor was sufficiently equipped in doing so, lacking the necessary finances and staff capacity to switch from relief to development. In Chibia only relief activities took place in the form of food aid or a one-time seeds and tools distribution. Linkages to rehabilitation and development were not made, and NGO presence quickly evaporated after 2002. In Caluquembe on the other hand, the biggest presence of aid agencies only started around 2002, making approaches to linking relief rehabilitation and development especially relevant in the context of large-scale resettlement of IDPs in the region. However, most agencies have not been able to extend their projects beyond the rehabilitation phase, leaving the intended aid process unfinished. Although attempts have been made to incorporate aid strategies within local governance structures such as the EDA, important socio-economic issues such as commercialization, access to markets and diversification have not been touched upon even though these had been specific project objectives for most agencies. The effects of this halted LRRD process on issues of livelihood recovery in Caluquembe is further elaborated in the section below.

At the start of this research I assumed that the practice of labelling people as belonging to pre-set categories of beneficiaries, and subsequent targeting practices by aid agencies might have caused particular problems in villages. The idea that such labels as



“IDP” or “most vulnerable”, become self-perpetuating or that they are used to refer to other village members as being better off due to the fact that they had been labelled as returnee or demobilized soldiers, was proven not to be the case. People did not differentiate between “us” and “them” by using such labels, but rather stated that needs were general instead of different for one group or the other. People also did not distinguish between organizations with a humanitarian or development mandate. Assistance is assessed on quality and quantity, not on approaches or mandates. However, in the fieldwork villages there is one big exception when it comes to labels being relevant or not, and those are the political labels. People will continuously try and categorize others as belonging to either MPLA or UNITA. Any item of clothing or comment is interpreted as a sign of political affiliation. This labelling legacy from the war also affected particularly local staff of aid agencies in peacetime, which had consequences on the delivery of aid to particular villages.

Beneficiaries of aid programmes are not simply receivers of aid, and aid is only part of a multitude of livelihood strategies that people deploy (Collinson 2003). They negotiate, use their knowledge, experiences, and agency, to transform the interventions in a way that suits their own aspirations. For instance, when beneficiaries trade the seeds and tools they received to make investments in other areas or for other purposes, this should not be seen as a failed intervention per se. It is rather a sign of people using these resources to pursue their own goals. Also, statement of need was interpreted by aid agency staff in Huíla province as a sign of dependency syndrome, instigated by prolonged periods of relief assistance. In this thesis I have argued that in fact it should be interpreted as active participation and negotiation in the aid process. The outcome of aid programmes depends on the beneficiaries’ agency and ensuing actions (Bakewell 2000). The notion of beneficiaries’ agency counters the idea that aid beneficiaries passively undergo an intervention. Rather, they give meaning to interventions, and shape them according to their experiences and aspiration. In this research interface analysis helped to uncover and understand these negotiation processes around interventions, and the way in which all actors actively participate in and co-shape aid processes.

People’s perceptions of their own reality and problems usually do not fit neatly within the margins of what an aid programme has defined for them (Long 2004). Quick needs assessments also often do not capture an entire village population’s needs in relation to their livelihoods. Nonetheless a sense of community is something that many aid agencies rely on when they formulate (livelihood) programs. They set up seed banks and reimbursement systems that build on social ties and community structures that may no longer exist. I have argued that building programs on these assumptions of a community existing of social connections and mutual trust when they don’t exist in practice, negatively influences the outcomes of these aid interventions. By applying the concept of a humanitarian arena this research moved away from studying aid on the basis of humanitarian principles, but rather explained aid outcomes through the everyday practices of assistance by all actors, including local people.

### *Self recovery*

As concluded from chapter 3, experiences and effects of the Angolan conflict were very diverse within the province, the municipalities and the villages itself. The research also uncovered the diversity in type of livelihoods that people have deployed over the years, and in different circumstances. There are some generalizations that can be made concerning the nature of livelihood activities in the two municipalities. Households in Chibia were holding a portfolio of activities ranging from small trade, employment, skilled labour and combining livestock rearing with small scale agriculture. Village inhabitants in Caluquembe, on the

other hand, depended solely on agricultural activities such as production of staple crops, and occasional beekeeping and fishing. Amongst the villages in either two municipalities the range and level of activities depended on factors such as: access to water and land, access to markets, agricultural inputs, and employment possibilities. For inhabitants of the villages in Chibia the reduced access to water and land, but the increased availability of trade and employment opportunities has led in a shift in their livelihoods from being purely agriculturally based to finding alternatives for diversification. The reversed seems to have happened in Caluquembe, where the only available shops and industries disappeared during the war, and where small scale agriculture has become the only option. This led to increased out-migration of youth, which felt themselves detached from agriculturally based livelihoods. In Caluquembe, the only options for youth that did not own land or wanted a future in agriculture was working for the state in the municipal administration or health and education sector. Trade, industry and formal employment opportunities were limited. In the fieldwork villages this was reflected by the lack of young people, who villagers said had often stayed behind in the urban centres during the resettlement process. This out-migration of youth to urban areas in turn has increased remittances flowing back into the area, as well as an increase in social networks. This increase in migration of youth after the war was also noted by Pacheco (2002) who argues that rural youth had increasingly become dissatisfied with the lack of basic services and projects aimed at youth specifically, and that rapid urbanization in Angola therefore cannot be explained by displacement during conflict alone but also by migration of youth that no longer feel at home in the post-conflict rural society.

Livelihood recovery in Caluquembe commenced when the Angolan war was still ongoing, but where people found pockets of relative stability back in their villages or at places they had fled to. This recovery process increased after the war officially ended in 2002, with the resettlement of people to their areas of origin. The decision to resettle and rebuild livelihoods in the area of origin is dependent on numerous factors: context, networks, and peoples' differentiated opportunities and desires (Collinson 2003). Moreover, people were not always confident that even this peace would last, and decided to await the results of the 2008 parliamentary elections. Most resettled households were able to start food production relatively fast, and five years after the end of the war households had not only become food secure, but were able to sell some of their produce. One village in Chibia stood out as an exception in which livelihood recovery had not taken place. The inhabitants of the village of Nonguelengue are in a situation today that resembles the circumstances in which people in the other villages found themselves during the conflict: dependent on food aid and disconnected from their livelihoods. Still, they too have shown resilience in finding alternative ways to ensure household survival. Relying on their hunting and gathering skills they manage to find little food stuffs around the village. Also, trade and procuring day labour with their neighbours they are able to obtain some extra income.

The research in Chibia shows that people have gone through a process of self-recovery of livelihoods, and that NGO interventions are not indispensable to rebuild livelihoods but rather play either supporting or redirecting roles. With redirecting I mean that aid programs often have little space and flexibility in supporting those livelihood activities that fall outside of the agricultural production interventions, and as such either only assist farmers, or motivate people with other types of skills or experiences into the direction of farming. The fact that seeds and tools programs in the end were not possible in Bairro 11 de Novembro due to lack of land and water, has resulted in a further lack of support for the activities they have developed on their own throughout the years. This village can therefore be seen as an example of self recovery, in that the inhabitants managed to establish new networks through which employment and trade opportunities became available without having been targeted directly by interventions aimed at the recovery of livelihoods.

Reconstruction is a societal process; it is not something that can only be done by outside actors (Hilhorst 2007).

In this research I have argued for the need to understand the resilience of people in Chibia and Caluquembe, and how they manage to recover and diversify their livelihoods during and after a conflict that left many dispossessed and destitute. The importance of social networks and access to these networks have been proven to be essential elements in these recovery processes. I conclude that the range of activities deployed in times of crisis differed considerable amongst the six villages, and that the width of activities developed depends on a range of contextual factors such as availability of markets, and access to land and water. Furthermore, it is in the midst of this diversity of activities that aid actors come in, and where unfounded assumptions on a common denominator in rural livelihoods dictate the interventions that take shape.

#### *Externally driven recovery*

The humanitarian agencies that were present in Caluquembe played vital roles in aiding the displaced to resettle in their areas of origin, and assisting the livelihood recovery processes. However, the idea that rural post-conflict rehabilitation is a broadly pre-defined package, as Green and Ahmed (1999) have suggested, seems to ring particularly true when looking at the ensuing interventions. The livelihood recovery process was characterized by a singular focus on providing seeds, tools and livestock to the population. The seeds that were handed out were almost exclusively for maize and beans, traditionally strong subsistence crops in the region. The seeds and tools programmes developed by humanitarian agencies seemed to have followed the logic focusing on traditional food consumption patterns and quick crop results. Commercially valuable crops were left out of the projects, aside from two development organizations that experimented with coffee production and soy as pilot projects. Due to the distribution of seeds and promotion of increased maize and beans production the rural landscape of Caluquembe nowadays is dominated by these crops. I have argued that the next step towards commercialization and access to markets has been largely neglected in aid interventions. The surplus maize and beans that are being offered on the markets today are of a very low economic value, and there are insufficient means to access more lucrative markets in urban areas where the value of the produce would be higher. The result is that although people are mostly self-sufficient in terms of their daily food needs, they have little options to diversify, by making investments in other livelihood terrains. I conclude that very little attention has been paid to livelihoods that fall outside the agricultural realm by humanitarian and development agencies. There have been some projects focusing on skills training but these were mainly intended for reintegration purposes of ex-combatants, who would then also receive kits and sometimes credit to start their small businesses.

Especially youths were not included by using this strategy, as they often had no experience with agriculture since having stayed in IDP camps or urban centres during the conflict. The practice of encouraging maize production has also had a significant impact on women's livelihoods, as they are often responsible for maize production which is very labour intensive. Because of the overreliance on maize, market prices have dropped significantly, leaving households very vulnerable to shocks. The agencies practice of handing out maize seeds have therefore increased women's labour burden, as well as reduced possibilities to diversify their livelihoods.

In this research I have argued that a singular focus by NGOs on enhancing agricultural production without taking into account access to markets and support of on- and non-farm diversification, and has left rural livelihoods in Caluquembe uniform with little possibilities to be raised beyond subsistence level. Although NGOs in Caluquembe have played

significant roles in terms of creating food security in the area, there has been little attention for livelihood diversification and creating commercial opportunities with which people can move away from rural poverty. I conclude that livelihood recovery processes in Caluquembe have been very much externally driven by NGOs, directing farmers into a specific type of crop production.

### *State recovery*

The reconstruction plans and projects of the state, and the way in which these efforts affected people's livelihoods in the post-war-reconstruction phase in both positive and negative ways is what I have called state recovery. Reconstruction by the state in Angola has been most visible through the big road reconstruction projects and agricultural development projects which need high technological and financial inputs, and have not targeted households directly. For example, the Sogangelas project in Chibia has been inclusive for only a few farmers, while at the same time disconnecting many others from access to their land and water. The rehabilitation of roads has been prioritized under the assumption that once roads are connecting some of the rural areas to urban centres, development will automatically follow. Furthermore, both road rehabilitation and agricultural development projects are indicative of the Angolan state's discourse on the country's reconstruction which tends to reflect an overreliance on large-scale and high-tech strategies towards rural development. Creating limited and often temporary employment possibilities, they have often created processes of dispossession and displacement for the rural poor that stand in the way of these projects, as the examples in Chibia have shown.

State involvement in reconstruction processes is essential, and the idea should be to support and stimulate further re-establishment of the state's involvement in the rural areas. However, when the state is seen to prioritize the development of other terrains, and the rural areas are left isolated and abandoned, what further role can be expected of aid agencies in such situations? To what extent can and should aid agencies intervene when the state is either absent or does not take responsibility with regards to supporting rural livelihoods. If the objective of an aid agency is to improve people's livelihoods, supporting it half-way and then hoping that someone will take over from there is insufficient. Efforts should be made to effectively integrate, coordinate and follow up these efforts with local institutions and civil society in order to finish a process of LRRD, instead of leaving its conclusion up to chance. Unfortunately this is not so much the unwillingness of the aid agencies as it is the lack of funding sources and mechanisms to ensure that aid processes can be maintained to reach their full objectives. Also, considering that, as in the case of Angola, NGOs have approached livelihood recovery on a micro level through much targeted distributions of seeds and tools, whereas the state focuses its attention on macro level reconstruction with more indirect effects on livelihoods, what then happens at the meso-level? One could assume this is where private investment and the market play a more prominent role. Yet, especially in more isolated areas such as Caluquembe, private investment in, for instance, industries were non-existent, markets were difficult to reach, and reconstruction projects were more or less restricted to a road being rehabilitated. Aid agencies in Angola have taken on the role of assisting smallholders in the resettlement and recovery phase, trying to engage the state in that process, yet were unable to establish linkages with the meso level through industry and markets.

On the one hand, aid interventions by NGOs have been conceptualized through the 'yeoman farmer fallacy' or 'small farm first' assumptions on rural livelihoods (Farrington 1998, Ellis 2000, Ellis and Biggs 2001). On the other hand, state policies on rehabilitation of rural society have approached this mainly through large-scale agricultural development

projects and infrastructure (Kyle 2005). In between these two opposing approaches to rural rehabilitation and development a whole grey area lies, where the local population has diversified and adapted their livelihoods to the changing circumstances, and in which interventions by NGOs and state play either minimal or sometimes constraining roles.

#### *Four popular myths in post-war recovery processes*

In this final section of the conclusion I will discuss four popular myths which have dominated the post-war recovery processes and discourses in Angola.

##### 1. People in crisis survive by deploying negative coping strategies.

Coping strategies are defined as a consequence of steps that households take to deal with the effects of crisis, and are characterized by risk-taking behaviour and short-term solutions that negatively affect the household's future (Ellis 2000a, Corbett 1988). This in contrast to livelihood strategies that are considered more sustainable and do not compromise a household's future ability to deal with shocks. Displacement is considered one of the ultimate coping strategies that people undertake when faced with conflict, which severely increases a household's socio-economic vulnerability.

In this thesis I have made the case for a different view on the way people live through crisis than mere coping or survival. First of all, crisis does not hit all regions of a conflict-affected country equally, there always remain pockets of stability in which people to a certain extent maintain their daily lives, routines and livelihoods. Apart from the people that make benefit from war economies, people also suffer from the negative and destructive effects of conflict. Again, the severity varies per location and household, but often revolves around direct effects of violence, hunger and presence of landmines, to more institutional factors that lessen the availability of goods, trade and services. The majority of people affected by war do not just sit around and wait for aid to come as their only strategy to deal with crisis. They actively seek opportunities to complement or replace their livelihoods activities when some activities become impossible to pursue due to violence, risk and uncertainty. Replacing these activities with new ones, I argue, is not necessarily always a negative and unwanted outcome. Displacement, although mostly considered the worst possible outcome of war and coping strategies, can in some instances be a well-considered livelihood strategy called labour migration. Examples from this thesis show that as practicing agriculture becomes increasingly difficult, working on the informal markets in urban areas, or at mining companies in neighbouring provinces, can be a valuable and effective contribution to the household economy and an investment in the future. As I noted in Caluquembe, the social networks that were formed during displacement and migration was proven to be a decisive factor in opening up trade opportunities in the post-conflict period, from which whole villages benefitted. In conclusion, people actively seek ways to deal with crisis, and dismissing all the activities that occur during wartime as coping strategies or survival ignores the manifold ways in which people pursue new activities that can actually contribute to rural economies and households in the long-term. By paying more attention to self recovery processes, aid interventions can more adequately deal with people's varying needs during and after conflict.

##### 2. Build roads and development will follow.

In 2003 the Government of Angola presented its plan for post-conflict reconstruction of the country. In the *Estrategia de Combate A Pobreza* (ECP, or Strategy to Combat Poverty) several priority areas for poverty reduction were identified, ranging from basic infrastructures to social reinsertion. Although strengthening the rural economy was considered an essential

component, also to relieve the pressures on the urban centres caused by displacement during the war, food security and rural development was one of the least financed priority areas. Rather, Angola's national reconstruction efforts have manifested itself primarily in rebuilding the country's basic infrastructure, with a main focus on urban areas. In some rural areas in Huíla, the rehabilitation of roads was the first and only visible sign of the state's attention in decades. Building roads was prioritized under the assumption that once roads reconnect the rural areas to urban centres, access to markets is ensured and development will automatically follow.

However, this development has of yet taken place. Although roads have or are in the process of being built, the rural areas continue to suffer from an overriding lack of goods, services, employment and trade. Roads alone will not ensure people's access to assets, institutions such as markets or the ability to gain sufficient financial means to arrange transportation of goods. Moreover, as I have argued in chapter 6 on the state's reconstruction projects in Chibia, the rebuilding of roads has also facilitated the transportation of produce from neighbouring countries such as Namibia, which can lead to a situation in which local farmers actually have to increasingly compete with cheap food imports. Therefore, rehabilitation of roads does not necessarily lead to development, it can actually run counter to it. If the rebuilding of roads are accompanied by a more holistic vision and strategy on revitalizing the rural economy, making the country less dependent on food imports, and actually strengthening local farmers transportation, commercialization and production capacities, then roads could certainly contribute to poverty reduction and sustainable rural economic development. However, asphalt alone does not automatically make development happen.

### 3. Seeds and tools are the most logical and effective ways of linking relief to development.

The overwhelming majority of aid responses to post-conflict rural areas in Angola have consisted of seeds and tools programs. Two thirds of the NGOs in Lubango were implementing seeds and tools programmes in the province, with the other one third involved in health, demining and educational projects. NGOs were approaching resettlement programs, and the food security and rural development domain exclusively by means of seeds and tools programmes, often in the same localities and making the same crop choices; maize and beans.

As shown in this thesis, this response has led to a form of externally driven recovery in which all local farmers only produce maize and beans, with little ability to sell their excess produce and are competing with each other on local markets. I have argued that this has not led to a state of development as envisaged under a LRRD approach. In fact it has led to a uniform rural society, with little opportunities for diversification, and in which most available household labour is absorbed by subsistence agriculture alone. Combined with the lack of institutional and industrial developments it leaves the inhabitants vulnerable to new shocks.

Seed aid has become one of the most popular aid responses over the last years, and is seen as an intervention that can "do no harm", despite evidence of disruptions of local markets and seed systems and a relative lack of evaluations of long-term outcomes (Sperling and Mcguire 2010). In Huíla, organizational-wide assumptions about agriculture as the only right livelihood option, funding restrictions and a lack of coordination amongst the organizations and local governments seem to have played into the one-size-fits-all response. Furthermore, seeds and tools programs do not automatically lead to development. Due to rapidly disappearing funding modalities, little capacity building of local NGOs, and a local government that either lacks the capacity or resources to effectively continue where the NGOs have left, the LRRD process was not finished. There is a need to critically assess the assumptions on desirable livelihoods in these contexts. Who defines what 'normal

livelihoods' are in post-conflict recovery processes, which transitions take place along the way, and how do these underlying assumptions inform the shape and directions that interventions and people's future activities take.

4. Humanitarian aid is fundamentally different from other forms of aid.

Humanitarian action is characterized as the alleviation of human suffering, lacking political motivation, led by humanitarian principles and short-term in nature. One of the main differences between humanitarian and development aid is that the former tends to focus on targeting individuals instead of societies, and little engagement with state institutions.

For aid beneficiaries, the approaches of agencies with different mandates appeared similar in practice. Food aid was given by both types of organizations during the war, and resettlement programmes carrying similar programme components of basic service delivery, health, education and livelihood recovery through seeds and tools were implemented irrespective of differing organizational mandates or principles. Interventions were often long-term in nature, focusing on rural societies and villages instead of specific individuals, and especially during the last period state engagement was actively sought by relief organisations. LRRD processes were internalized by organisations rather than coordinated amongst organizations and institutions whose mandates would have made them more suitable for one end of the spectrum rather than the other.

This research has shown that humanitarian and development aid have increasingly converged. Not only do their policies and practices move towards the same domains, organizational decision-making processes have become more similar, and the normative framework of humanitarian principles have lost some of its significance in setting agencies apart from each other. Neutrality was not an overall guiding principle for humanitarians in Huíla, but interpreted flexibly and pragmatically as a way to ensure staff safety and get access to affected populations and which could be ignored if it would stand in the way of getting the job done. In conclusion, the labels of development and humanitarian aid were not significant in the context of Huíla, and in policies and practice these labels have increasingly become intertwined.

If recovery and reconstruction is meant to return to the situation of before the war, 'normality' so to say, then in the Angolan context this means returning to forced labour, planned agricultural production and unequal and exploitative trading mechanisms which characterized the era of colonial rule. Who decides what direction livelihood recovery should take. And moreover, what aims and objectives can be expected from aid agencies when it comes to livelihood recovery in this context? Is rebuilding what was there at some particular point in time sufficient, or could the principles of 'building back better' also apply when it comes to livelihood recovery? Building back better would then come to include a more holistic approach to rural livelihoods, and attention to the diversity in experiences and aspirations that rural people have with regards to their livelihoods. In my opinion, agencies that start LRRD approaches should have the ambition to build back better, instead of aiming for pre-conflict 'normality'. Development as an end-objective is more than maintaining a status-quo, it is about improving the socio-economic wellbeing of populations, which includes reducing people's vulnerability to shocks. As it now stands, this end-objective has not been realized in Huíla province.

In conclusion, this research has been about uncovering diversity. The diversity of conflict experiences, displacement movements, aid actors, and most importantly the diversity of rural people and their livelihood practices. People themselves reconstruct, and efforts to assist that reconstruction process should be built on the notion of local ownership and social

differentiation, as well as better integration, coordination and follow up with the available local institutions and civil society actors to ensure that aid processes can fully reach their intended objectives of supporting socio-economic development in rural areas.





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## Summary

In this thesis I examined the ways in which rural people in Huíla province, Angola, have dealt with crises and adapted their livelihoods accordingly. These responses and adaptations to crises are then juxtaposed against the variety of interventions by state and aid agencies which affect rural livelihoods in broad terms. The Angolan population has lived through a long history of conflict, starting with an independence war against Portugal since 1961, and evolving into a civil war from the start of independence in 1975 lasting until 2002.

Throughout this violent history, humanitarian actors made a significant range of interventions with the intention to alleviate the suffering of the country's population and help them rebuild their lives and livelihoods after the end of the war in 2002. In this thesis I analysed these interventions, especially related to the recovery of rural livelihoods, to understand the assumptions underlying them, as well as their outcomes.

The core question that guided the research underlying this thesis was the following: *How are people's livelihoods affected in times of crisis, and how do aid interventions influence the livelihood options that people have in Huíla province, Angola?* In my analysis I used the concept of a humanitarian arena in order to 1) acknowledge the diversity of actors that shape the outcomes of aid processes, 2) move away from normative explanations of aid and rather focus on its everyday practices, and 3) focus on the negotiations, experiences and agency of the actors at the interface at which processes of aid are shaped. This builds on an actor-oriented approach which calls attention to agency, actors and interfaces to explain that planned development is rarely a linear process but rather a site of struggles and negotiations amongst a variety of actors. The fieldwork underlying this thesis was done in six villages with different experiences of conflict, aid, and livelihoods.

This research has analysed the everyday realities and outcomes of post-war recovery and reconstruction practices by aid agencies and the Angolan state. It shows how aid programmes that focus on resettlement of conflict-affected populations and rebuilding of rural livelihoods can have unintended consequences when little attention is given to follow up of these activities that were assumed to lead to development. At the same time, the research shows how state post-war reconstruction efforts by the state largely bypass rural areas, or at worst even lead to renewed displacement from land and livelihoods. Therefore, the title of this thesis reiterates that livelihoods in conflict and post-conflict situations continuously move between crisis and normality, yet that this phenomenon is not necessarily linked to war itself. Also, the use of the word normality underscores the underlying assumptions on which aid interventions are designed in processes of livelihood recovery: a return to normality. One can question what 'normal' livelihoods are in the Angolan context of long-term instability. Also, who defines normality? As shown in this thesis, aid actors have had quite uniform and fixed assumptions and interpretations about what 'normal' rural livelihoods should look like, reflected in the one-size-fits-all interventions that consequently took place.

Chapter 1 starts with an introduction to the research objectives, questions and methodologies. It describes the process through which the six villages for fieldwork were selected, by taking into account the varied experiences with conflict and aid. This research has relied on mostly qualitative methods such as participant observation, life histories and a comparative analysis of livelihood processes and outcomes in six villages. Choices that have been made in terms of research focus as well as fieldwork are explained. Furthermore, this chapter shows some of the personal difficulties and experiences that have marked the fieldwork in Angola in various ways.



In chapter 2 I introduce and define the conceptual framework underlying the data in the remainder of this thesis. I look at the concept of livelihoods as comprising the assets and activities that people employ to make a living, and the access to these (Ellis 2000a, 10). I deviate from the policy construct of a livelihoods approach, which tends to define livelihoods by a restricted focus on the various capitals. Rather, I have looked at livelihoods as being more flexible in nature in which the disappearance of some assets can be dealt with by strengthening others. Livelihoods are fluid and flexible, and certainly have to be so in situations of crisis and conflict. Aid in this thesis is seen as one of the many strategies that people rely on for their survival in times of crisis. The chapter starts with an overview of the notion of humanitarian aid, its principles and changing practice due to the more protracted nature of the crisis situations it operates in. This has demanded the incorporation of rehabilitation and development approaches, translated in a stronger engagement with the state, and a shift from a focus on individuals to society. I question the practices of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) approaches when it is uncertain whether intervention objectives can be attained or processes have to be abandoned. This thesis sheds light on the consequences of such unfinished LRRD processes.

In chapter 3, jointly written with Maliana Serrano, we have analysed the history of the Angolan conflict in order to shed light on the socio-economic impact in the country. We demonstrate that the motivations and dynamics of war changed continuously due to the major developments over time, and the various internal and external forces that influenced the course of war. We have argued for understanding conflict in Angola through a political economy of war perspective, focusing on issues of power and wealth. Furthermore, power relations and wealth distribution become visible through studying socio-cultural institutions, which demands a focus on the local level in which the micro-dynamics of conflict are shaped and played out. By analysing four cases from different municipalities in Huíla province we have shown the diversity of experiences and effects of war. A limited understanding of these differentiated everyday realities of war can inform assumptions about people's needs during as well as after conflict, but may lead to standardised humanitarian and political responses, without taking into account local capacities in areas or periods of relative stability.

An analysis of Angola's colonial history, as done in chapter 4, is essential in understanding the current processes of rural development. Rural livelihoods and institutions today are the result of the parameters which the colonial state set and enforced during its rule, and are further shaped by the effects of the civil war which ensued after independence. In this chapter the major colonial policies are explained, and highlighted by the local manifestations of colonial rule in the rural area of Huíla province. The analysis of colonial history in Angola shows how its policies had profound negative effects on rural societies by indebting the local population through taxation, forced labour contracts, land grabbing and uneven competition. However, with the withdrawal of the Portuguese from Angola, the rural trading system which also ensured people's access to credit, seeds and employment also collapsed and was not replaced by a new Angolan rural development policy, as the country was engulfed by war. In this chapter I have argued that the state's current post-conflict reconstruction plans bear a strong resemblance to the former colonial policies, by only focusing on large-scale agricultural development schemes and rebuilding infrastructure, with the last point having its primary focus on rebuilding major cities and ports along the coast at the expense of the rural area.

Chapters 5 and 6 contain the empirical data from fieldwork in six villages in the two municipalities Caluquembe (chapter 5) and Chibia (chapter 6). Both chapters start with the history and local experiences with colonialism, conflict and aid interventions. By analysing the data from semi-structured interviews and surveys done in the six villages I present an overview of the type of livelihoods that have emerged in these localities, and the different

factors that played a role throughout time. The municipalities serve as case studies as they represent very different histories, processes and outcomes with regards to livelihoods and aid. Caluquembe was heavily affected by conflict, control over the area was violently fought over by MPLA and UNITA, creating several waves of displacement in different directions. Most people had to cease working on their land and start collecting firewood, working on farms of others, migrate, or seek other alternative strategies for household survival during the war and consequent displacement. During the resettlement period many NGOs worked in the region, and mostly assisted the population through the distribution of seeds and tools. These seeds and tools programmes have led to what I call a process of externally driven recovery. Because of the undiversified crop production, people within villages now have to compete with each other to get the same type of produce sold or traded at the same locations, and are more vulnerable to natural hazards destroying their livelihood base. As Chibia had not been at the centre of fighting, major aid interventions never took place in Chibia, apart from occasional food assistance by WFP and MINARS when cyclical droughts and famines affected the region. The comparison between the three villages in Chibia show that the village that had received the most assistance in the past (Bairro 11 de Novembro) currently seem to have the most diversified livelihood options. However, the agriculture-biased type of assistance was unrelated to the mostly non-agricultural livelihood activities that were developed. The only village that was still receiving food aid, Nonguelengue, was hit not by war, but by modernity. Livelihoods in Chibia are the results of processes of self and state recovery. The role of the state in Chibia was very strong, and its national reconstruction programmes were giving people more, but often temporary, employment options. Yet, at the same time the state made certain livelihoods impossible, either intentionally or unintentionally.

Chapter 7 discusses the history of aid in Angola and the humanitarian arena in Huíla province. Through an analysis of the interface between aid givers and aid beneficiaries organizational discourses on the dependency syndrome are uncovered that downgrade and deny people's agency. The chapter also highlights aid organisations' everyday practices and uses of the humanitarian principle of neutrality, which is often translated into issues of access and safety, and which continues to be relevant in peacetime. By comparing two NGOs that were operational in Huíla province, organizational adaptation in the post-conflict context of Angola is investigated, serving as an example of LRRD processes in everyday organizational practice.

Chapter 8 focuses on reconstruction and recovery processes in post-war Angola. In this chapter I argue that although conflict and displacement have had significant effects on the livelihoods choices people make, state and aid agencies have further limited or redirected the livelihood options in the post-conflict reconstruction phase. Taking the example of seeds and tools programmes I argue that in the case of Caluquembe, aid assistance has created a rather uniform social stratum of small scale farmers with little opportunity to diversify their livelihoods and unable to rise beyond subsistence level. On the other hand, state reconstruction has been narrow in its focus, mostly urban-focused and with the underlying assumption that rebuilding roads will automatically lead to development in the rural areas.

Concluding this thesis, in chapter 9 answers are provided to the research questions by showing the history of Huíla province in terms of conflict and aid, and an analysis of how the diversity of self-, state- and externally driven recovery processes have come together and what the outcomes have been of those processes on the livelihoods of people in post-conflict Angola.



## Samenvatting

In dit proefschrift heb ik de manieren geanalyseerd waarop de plattelandsbevolking in de provincie Huíla, Angola, crises hebben doorstaan en hun bestaansmiddelen en manieren van levensonderhoud (livelihoods) daaraan hebben aangepast. Daarnaast heb ik hun reacties en aanpassingen gesteld tegenover de verscheidenheid aan interventies van staat en hulporganisaties welke in brede zin betrekking hebben op deze rurale methoden van bestaan. De bevolking van Angola heeft een lange geschiedenis van conflicten ondergaan welke begon met een onafhankelijkheidsstrijd met Portugal sinds 1961 die uitmondde in een burgeroorlog welke woedde vanaf het begin van de onafhankelijkheid in 1975 tot aan 2002. Gedurende deze gewelddadige periode hebben humanitaire hulpinstanties een waaier aan interventies op touw gezet om het lijden van het Angolese volk te lenigen en hen te helpen, hun leven en hun middelen van levensonderhoud weer op te bouwen na het einde van de oorlog in 2002. In dit proefschrift heb ik een analyse van deze interventies gemaakt, met name die welke gericht waren op het herstel van de bestaansmethoden van de plattelandsbevolking, om inzicht te krijgen in de uitgangspunten van de interventies alsmede in de resultaten ervan.

De kernvraag welke in het onderzoek werd gesteld dat aan dit proefschrift ten grondslag ligt was de volgende: Op welke wijze wordt in tijden van crises het dagelijkse bestaan van mensen aangetast en hoe beïnvloeden hulpprogramma's de bestaansmogelijkheden van de bevolking van de provincie Huíla, Angola? In mijn analyse heb ik het model van een humanitaire arena gebruikt met als doelen 1) aandacht te vestigen op de verscheidenheid aan actoren waardoor de resultaten van de processen van hulpverlening tot stand zijn gekomen, 2) de normatieve verklaringen van hulpverlening te mijden en liever de dagelijkse praktijk van hulpprogramma's onder de loep te nemen, en 3) de onderhandelingen, ervaringen en rollen te beschouwen van de diverse actoren op het vlak waar hulpverleningsprocessen hun vorm krijgen. Uitgangspunt bij deze analyse is de zogenaamde 'actor' benadering, waarbij de rollen, actoren en speelveld worden uitgelicht om te laten zien dat geplande ontwikkeling zelden een lineair proces is maar veeleer een toneel van strijd en onderhandelingen tussen uiteenlopende actoren. Het veldonderzoek voor dit proefschrift werd uitgevoerd in zes dorpen met verschillende ervaringsgeschiedenissen van conflict, soorten van hulp en manieren van levensonderhoud.

Dit onderzoek behelsde het analyseren van de dagelijkse werkelijkheid en de resultaten van de herstel- en wederopbouwprogramma's welke na de oorlog door hulporganisaties en de Angolese staat in gang waren gezet. Het legt bloot hoe hulpprogramma's gericht op hervestiging van groepen van mensen die door conflicten zijn getroffen en op herstel van middelen en methoden van bestaan, tot onvoorziene uitkomsten kunnen leiden wanneer onvoldoende aandacht wordt geschonken aan een follow-up van deze activiteiten die geacht werden 'ontwikkeling' tot stand te brengen. Tezelfdertijd laat het onderzoek zien dat de naoorlogse herstelprogramma's van de staat de landelijke gebieden grotendeels overslaan, of er in de slechtste gevallen zelfs toe kunnen leiden dat mensen opnieuw van huis en haard worden verdreven. Daarom verwijst de titel van dit proefschrift naar de bevinding dat de mogelijkheden van bestaan en levensonderhoud in situaties van conflicten en hun nasleep zich voortdurend bewegen tussen crisis en normaliteit, maar dat van een direct verband met oorlog zelf geen sprake hoeft te zijn. Tevens bevestigt het gebruik van het woord normaliteit wat de veronderstellingen zijn waarop hulpprogramma's worden toegesneden in het proces van het herstel van levensonderhoud en bestaansmiddelen: een terugkeer naar normaliteit. Men kan zich afvragen wat 'normale' manieren van leven en bestaansonderhoud zijn in de Angolese context van de langdurige periode van instabiliteit.

Bovendien, wie definieert ‘normaliteit’? Dit proefschrift laat zien dat actoren in de humanitaire arena tamelijk uniforme en rigide opvattingen en interpretaties hebben van wat als ‘normale’ wijzen van bestaan beschouwd behoort te worden, zoals blijkt uit de dertien-in-een-dozijn interventies die plaatsvonden met deze veronderstellingen als uitgangspunt.

Hoofdstuk 1 begint met een inleiding tot de doelen, de vragen en de methodologie van het onderzoek. Het beschrijft het proces van het selecteren van de zes dorpen voor het veldonderzoek, waarbij de uiteenlopende ervaringen met conflict en hulp een rol speelden. Dit onderzoek heeft voornamelijk van kwalitatieve methoden gebruik gemaakt zoals participerende observatie, persoonlijke geschiedenissen en een vergelijkende analyse van de praktijken van levensonderhoud en bestaan in zes dorpen. Een uiteenzetting wordt gegeven van de keuzen die werden gemaakt met betrekking tot de gerichtheid van het onderzoek zowel als het veldwerk. Voorts gaat dit hoofdstuk in op enkele persoonlijke moeilijkheden en ervaringen welke het veldwerk in Angola op verschillende wijzen hebben gemarkeerd.

In hoofdstuk 2 introduceer en definieer ik het begrippenkader dat de basis vormt voor de data in het vervolg van dit proefschrift. Ik beschouw het concept ‘livelihoods’ in de betekenis van het geheel aan middelen en activiteiten die mensen tot hun beschikking hebben om in hun levensonderhoud te voorzien, en de toegang tot dezen (Ellis 2000a, 10). Ik kies een andere benadering van het begrip ‘livelihoods’ dan die welke voor beleidsdoeleinden is ontworpen en die de neiging heeft om ‘livelihoods’ in te perken tot de aanwezigheid en het gebruik van verschillende soorten kapitaal. In mijn opvatting is ‘livelihoods’ flexibeler van aard waarbij het verdwijnen van bepaalde factoren gecompenseerd kan worden door het versterken van andere. De manieren van levensonderhoud zijn veranderlijk en flexibel en behoren dit zeker te zijn in tijden van crisis en conflict. In dit proefschrift blijkt dat noodhulp wordt gezien als een van de strategieën welke mensen toepassen om in tijden van crisis te overleven. Het hoofdstuk begint met een exploratie van het begrip humanitaire hulp, de beginselen ervan en de veranderingen welke bij de uitvoer ervan optreden die het gevolg zijn van langer voortdurende crisissituaties waarin deze hulp wordt geboden. Deze noodgedwongen verlenging maakte het opnemen van rehabilitatie- en ontwikkelingsbenaderingen noodzakelijk, vertaalde zich in een sterkere afstemming met de overheid en veroorzaakte een verschuiving van de aandacht van individuen naar gemeenschappen. Ik zet vraagtekens bij de doelmatigheid van Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) benaderingen in situaties waarin het onzeker is of de doelstellingen van de interventie wel gehaald worden of dat de processen moeten worden afgebroken. Dit proefschrift verheldert de consequenties van zulke onvoltooide LRRD processen.

In hoofdstuk 3, gezamenlijk met Maliana Serrano geschreven, wordt de geschiedenis van het Angolese conflict geanalyseerd om de socio-economische impact ervan op het land te belichten. We tonen aan dat de oorlog voortdurend van drijfveren en dynamiek veranderde als gevolg van de opeenvolgende grote ontwikkelingen en de verschillende en wisselende interne en externe krachten die de loop van de oorlog beïnvloedden. We hebben argumenten aangedragen voor een begrip van het conflict in Angola vanuit een politieke economie van oorlog interpretatie, die laat zien hoe macht en rijkdom verdeeld worden en veranderen tijdens conflict. Ook worden machtsverhoudingen en verdeling van rijkdom zichtbaar door het bestuderen van socio-culturele instellingen hetgeen een focus vereist op het lokale niveau waar het conflict zijn eigen dynamiek en vorm vindt. Door middel van een analyse van vier casussen uit verschillende gemeenten in de provincie Huíla hebben we de verscheidenheid aan ervaringen en effecten van de oorlog laten zien. Een beperkt begrip van deze uiteenlopende dagelijkse praktijk van een leven in oorlogstijd kan de aannamen over de behoeften van mensen in conflict en post-conflict situaties wel een zekere onderbouwing

geven maar leidt mogelijkwerijs tot humanitaire en politieke standaardreacties waarin lokaal potentieel in gebieden of perioden van relatieve stabiliteit niet worden verdisconteerd.

Een analyse van Angola's koloniaal verleden welke in hoofdstuk 4 wordt gemaakt is voor een begrip van de huidige processen van rurale ontwikkeling van wezenlijk belang. Bestaansmogelijkheden en instituties op het platteland in de huidige tijd komen voort uit de parameters die tijdens het koloniale bewind werden vastgesteld en opgelegd en werden verder gevormd door de effecten van de burgeroorlog na het verkrijgen van de onafhankelijkheid. In dit hoofdstuk komen de hoofdlijnen van de koloniale politiek aan de orde; deze krijgen een extra dimensie door de beschrijving van de manieren waarop het koloniale bewind zich manifesteerde op het platteland van de provincie Huíla. De analyse van de Angolese koloniale geschiedenis maakt duidelijk hoe ingrijpend de negatieve effecten op het leven van rurale gemeenschappen waren van een koloniaal beleid van belastingheffing, vormen van dwangarbeid, confiscatie van land en concurrentievervalsing. Anderzijds stortte met de terugtrekking van de Portugezen uit Angola het rurale handelssysteem dat de bevolking wel toegang verschaftte tot kredieten, zaden en werk eveneens in. Hiervoor kwam geen nieuw Angolees ruraal beleid in de plaats omdat het land door oorlog werd overspoeld. Mijn betoog in dit hoofdstuk is dat de huidige naoorlogse reconstructieplannen van de overheid een nauwe gelijkenis vertonen met het voorgaande koloniale beleid omdat het zich louter richt op grootschalige landbouwontwikkelingsschema's en infrastructurele herstelwerkzaamheden. Bij dit laatste punt ligt het voornaamste accent op de herbouw van de grote steden en havens aan de kust hetgeen ten koste gaat van het platteland.

De hoofdstukken 5 en 6 bevatten de empirische data van het veldwerk gedaan in zes dorpen in de twee municipaliteiten Caluquembe (hoofdstuk 5) en Chibia (hoofdstuk 6). Beide hoofdstukken beginnen met de historie en de lokale ervaringen met kolonialisme, conflicten en hulpprogramma's. Met mijn analyse van de gegevens die ik door middel van semi-gestructureerde interviews en verkenningen verkreeg bied ik een overzicht van het type livelihoods die in deze plaatsen zijn opgekomen alsmede van de verschillende factoren die in de loop der tijden een rol hebben gespeeld. De municipaliteiten dienen als case studies omdat ze sterk uiteenlopende geschiedenissen, processen en resultaten op het gebied van bestaansmiddelen en hulp vertegenwoordigen. Caluquembe werd zwaar getroffen door de oorlog, MPLA en UNITA vochten hevig om het beheer over het gebied waardoor de bevolking vervolgens in uiteenlopende richtingen werd verdreven. De meeste mensen moesten het werk op hun land op te geven en beginnen met het verzamelen van brandhout, migreren, het werken op andermans boerderijen, of het zoeken van andere alternatieve strategieën om tijdens de oorlog en de daaruit volgende ontheemding het hoofd boven water te houden. Tijdens de periode van terugkeer waren veel NGO's actief in de regio en stonden meestal de bevolking bij door landbouwzaden en gereedschap uit te delen. Deze distributieprogramma's van zaden en gereedschap hebben geleid tot wat ik noem een proces van een van buitenaf gestuurd herstel. Vanwege de ongedifferentieerde productie van gewassen moeten dorpsbewoners nu met elkaar concurreren om hetzelfde soort product op dezelfde plaatsen te kunnen verkopen of te verhandelen en zijn ze kwetsbaarder voor natuurlijke plagen die de basis onder hun manier van levensonderhoud wegvagen. Omdat Chibia nooit in een strijdgebied heeft gelegen heeft het nooit enig hulpprogramma van betekenis gekend, behoudens enige voedselhulp van WFP en MINARS telkens wanneer de regio werd getroffen door cyclische droogtes en hongersnood. Een vergelijking tussen de drie dorpen in Chibia laat zien dat het dorp Bairro 11 de Novembro dat in het verleden relatief de meeste hulp had ontvangen op dit ogenblik de meest gediversifieerde mogelijkheden van bestaan lijkt te hebben. Echter, de meeste activiteiten die werden ontwikkeld om in het levensonderhoud te voorzien hebben weinig te maken met landbouw hoewel het soort hulp dat werd geboden nu juist landbouw als zwaartepunt had. Het enige dorp dat nog steeds

voedselhulp ontving, Nonguelengue, was niet het slachtoffer van de oorlog maar van de vooruitgang. De manieren waarop in Chibia in het levensonderhoud wordt voorzien komen voort uit herstelprocessen die door de staat en de bevolking zelf in gang zijn gezet. In Chibia was de rol van de staat zeer sterk en de nationale wederopbouwprogramma's brachten de bevolking, al dan niet tijdelijk, meer werkgelegenheidskansen. Maar tegelijkertijd maakte de staat, bewust of onbewust, bepaalde manieren van bestaan onmogelijk.

In hoofdstuk 7 wordt de geschiedenis van de hulpverlening in Angola en de humanitaire arena in de provincie Huíla aan de orde gesteld. Door het raakvlak waarop de gevers en de ontvangers van hulp opereren te analyseren komen door organisaties gehanteerde vertogen over het afhankelijkheidsyndroom aan het licht waarin de rol van de bevolking als weinig betekenend wordt gekenmerkt en ontkend. Dit hoofdstuk belicht ook hoe de hulporganisaties de bij humanitaire hulp gebruikelijke principes van neutraliteit toepassen en benutten. In de dagelijkse praktijk komt het gebruik ervan vaak neer op vraagstukken van toegang en veiligheid hetgeen ook in vreedstijd relevant blijft. In een vergelijking tussen twee NGO's die in de provincie Huíla actief waren wordt de aanpassing van organisaties aan de context van het Angola na de oorlog onderzocht, daarmee een voorbeeld gevend van LRRD processen waarmee organisaties in de praktijk van alledag te maken hebben.

Hoofdstuk 8 neemt de wederopbouw- en herstelprocessen in het naoorlogse Angola onder de loep. In dit hoofdstuk draag ik argumenten aan voor mijn stelling dat afgezien van de aanzienlijke effecten die conflict en ontheemding reeds hebben gehad op de manieren van levensonderhoud die mensen kiezen, de staat en de hulporganisaties in de naoorlogse wederopbouwfase de bestaansmogelijkheden verder hebben ingeperkt of omgebogen. Met de distributieprogramma's van zaden en gereedschap als voorbeeld beweer ik dat in het geval van Caluquembe de verstrekking van hulp een tamelijk uniform sociaal stratum van kleine boeren heeft gecreëerd die weinig kansen hebben om variatie aan te brengen in de wijzen waarop zij in hun bestaan voorzien en die niet in staat zijn om zich boven het niveau van overleven op te werken. Anderzijds is de aanpak van de wederopbouw door de overheid smal geweest, met vooral aandacht voor stedelijke gebieden en gebaseerd op de aanname dat het herstel van wegen automatisch leidt tot ontwikkeling in de rurale gebieden.

Tot slot worden in hoofdstuk 9 antwoorden gegeven op de onderzoeksvragen door de aspecten van conflict en hulp in de geschiedenis van de provincie Huíla te belichten, en door de analyse van de waaier aan processen die hebben geleid tot een gezamenlijke wederopbouw door de overheid, de hulporganisaties en de bevolking zelf en wat de resultaten van deze processen zijn geweest voor de livelihoods van de mensen in het Angola van na de oorlog.

## About the author

Hilde van Dijkhorst (1977) was born in Ede, The Netherlands. She obtained her M.Sc. degree in Management of Agro-ecological Knowledge and Social Change at the Wageningen University in 2003. For this study she conducted fieldwork in Botswana for her thesis on the use of indigenous knowledge in research on veld products (Non-Timber Forest Products), and how intellectual property rights could protect this knowledge. This thesis was nominated for the thesis prize of the Netherlands institute of Southern Africa (NiZA) in 2003.

After obtaining the M.Sc degree she embarked on several research projects through her own research agency, Scope. Research topics included an internal evaluation of an NGO's 2004 Tsunami response, gender and humanitarian aid, and an evaluation of the abovementioned M.Sc. programme. In 2006 Hilde started the PhD research at the Disaster Studies group of the Wageningen University, for which she conducted one and a half year of fieldwork in Huíla province, Angola.





**Annex to statement****Name Hilde van Dijkhorst****PhD candidate, Wageningen School of Social Sciences (WASS)****Completed Training and Supervision Plan**

Wageningen School  
of Social Sciences

Name of the activity	Department/Institute	Year	ECTS*
<b>A) Project related competences</b>			
Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction RDS 34806	Disaster Studies/WUR	2006	5
Portuguese language course	KOSMUS, Lisbon	2006	4
“Os efeitos da ajuda humanitária para os modos de vida das populações rurais da Huíla” .	Workshop on Food Security, ACF Angola	2007	1
“Gender Mainstreaming in Humanitarian NGOs”	Gender and Disaster Conference, Kocaeli University	2008	1
“Os efeitos da ajuda humanitária para os modos de vida das populações rurais da Huíla”	The Role of Humanitarian Aid in Angola, WUR/CED	2008	2
“Recovery of Rural Livelihoods in Angola”	World Conference of Humanitarian Studies RUG/WUR	2009	1
Poster “The intended and unintended outcomes of humanitarian aid on rural livelihoods in Huíla Province, Angola ”	NVAS study day “Studies on Africa in the Netherlands and Belgium”	2009	1
“Aid under fire: people, principles & practices of humanitarian aid in Angola”	“Civil society, Politics and Donor Strategies in Southern Africa” University of Coimbra/WUR	2009	2
“Comparing Agencies Approaches in Huíla, Angola”	“The role of civil society in donor strategies and external actors in the current Angolan context”, WUR/University of Coimbra/UCAN	2010	2
<b>B) General research related competences</b>			
Introduction course	CERES	2006	5
Presentation tutorials	CERES	2006	5

CERES Summerschool	CERES	2006	1
Masterclass “Realistic explanations”	WUR	2006	1
A practical course on the methodology of fieldwork	CERES	2007	2
Seminar “Re-thinking the State”	CERES	2006	1

**C) Career related competences/personal development**

Workshops Gender and Humanitarian Aid	ZOA/ICCO	2006	2
Discussion panel on Partnership for Humanitarian and Risk Education Expansion	PHREE-WAY	2006	2

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<b>Total (minimum 30 ECTS)</b>	<b>38</b>
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\*One ECTS on average is equivalent to 28 hours of course work



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