

Climate change Adaptation: A discourse and policy analysis on implications for Zimbabwe

The thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of Development and Rural Innovation

By Nokutula Rachel Mhene
Rural Development Sociology Chair Group
Wageningen University

To my mother, who has stood by me through the ups and the downs. Who when I got the opportunity to study my Masters in the Netherlands was the only one who did not ask "What about your baby?" but instead said "go I will take care of her". Mhamha, those words will forever be embedded in my mind for you have continuously given me wings to fly high and shine (with the occasional clipping when necessary). For all your sacrifices, and your motherly love, I dedicate this thesis to you.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr Alberto Arce, for dedication towards not only improving this thesis, but also for encouraging me to always go a step further in my analysis. He dedicated several hours of his day to go through the text word for word resulting in this end product. Thank you Dr Arce, it was indeed a great opportunity and pleasure to work with you

I would also like to thank my godmother, Amanda Hammer for her constant encouragement and advice. She has been my mentor and confidant through my stay in Wageningen and will continue to be for years to come.

I would also like to thank my lovely daughter Gugulethu.. Life has dealt you some bad cards in the past 2 years, and at a time when mummy was unable to always be there. However, you have been a brave little girl through it all, and my inspiration for striving to achieve more. May God Bless continue to be with you and bless you abundantly. I also thank my brother, Tawanda Mhene, for his loving support not only to me, but to my mother and daughter in my absence.

Last but not least, I thank my Fide, for being a tower of support. I thank you for your love and patience through my 2 years here and beyond.

Abstract

Climate change is a global phenomenon that has been able to bring together actors from various levels and of different scales. The coming together of these actors has resulted in the creation of Climate change arenas at a global level which have resulted in policy processes. Climate change arenas and policy processes have also been created at national levels including Zimbabwe. These arenas are at first glance is ones of struggles with each actor or network of actors seeking a favourable outcome through consolidating power whilst at the same time seeking to have their actions and aims accepted and legitimised in the Climate change Arena. A favourable outcome is one that best conforms to their initial and compromised goals. Actors present their narratives in a manner that they garner the most support. This may be presented by NGOs seeking to represent the voices of the poor through painting a graphic but grim picture of the people failing to adapt to by Climate change. It can be through Governments negotiating with financing options through texts in global policy frameworks. Whichever way, there is a struggle which manifests itself at different levels between the actors themselves and the narratives that they present.

This study shows these struggles are not limited to the different arenas but also transcend to a struggle between the different arenas which occurs when actors attempt to adopt global discourse and policy at national level. This adoption occurs through translation which is shaped by social and economic factors and manifests itself in a policy process at in Zimbabwe that has its own identity. The struggles were also not necessarily manifested between individual actors within the policy process but between and amongst the groups that actors form in an effort to consolidate power and increase the acceptability and legitimacy of the narratives that they present.

In as much as these struggles occur between actors they also occur across scales. When global policies and discourse met Zimbabwean discourse there was a struggle which manifested itself at different scales. This manifestation cascaded even to actors and institutions within the National Climate change Arena whom have different interests and agendas for which they would transcend each other's sovereignty and in some cases allow their sovereignty to be transcended. This results in an emergent arena that was in some ways a reflection of global governance and national interests.

Keywords

Climate change, Discourses, Narratives, sovereignty, legitimacy, arena, policy process

Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	3
Abstract.....	4
Contents.....	5
List of tables, figures and maps.....	6
List of Annexes.....	7
List of Acronyms.....	8
CHAPTER 1: Introduction.....	9
1.1 Background.....	9
1.2 Problem Statement.....	12
1.3 Study Objective.....	13
1.4 Study Orientation.....	14
1.5 Theoretical Framework.....	14
1.6 Study Outline.....	19
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY.....	20
2.1 General approach to the research.....	20
2.2 Perspective	21
2.3. Data collection methods	21
CHAPTER 3: CLIMATE CHANGE AT A GLOBAL LEVEL.....	24
3.1 Introduction.....	24
3.2 Global Policy process	24
3.4 Key Actors at global level.....	35
CHAPTER 4: Climate change as a policy arena in Zimbabwe.....	42
4.1 Introduction.....	42
4.7 An organized policy process?.....	62
CHAPTER 5: ACTORS, KNOWLEDGE AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY PROCESS IN ZIMBABWE	70
5.1 Introduction.....	70
5.2 Government of Zimbabwe and the Climate change Process at National level.....	70
5.3 Government Response to Climate change.....	77
5.4 Multi-lateral Organizations and the Climate change policy process.....	79
5.5 Donors, NGOs and the Policy Process.....	88
5.6 Implication of global level agreements.....	104
5.7 Climate change as a priority?.....	106
Chapter 6: Conclusion.....	109
6.1 Introduction.....	109
6.2 Conclusion 1: Global Climate change policy is translated and creates a different reality at the interface.....	110
6.3 Conclusion 2: Translation and social construction create two sides to a coin.....	111
6.4 Conclusion 3: Within Disorganization lies some order.....	114
6.5 Conclusion 4: National institutional and organizational priorities take precedence over adoption of global Climate change policies.....	115
Final note.....	117
References.....	118
ANNEX 1.....	121
Annex 2.....	122

List of tables, figures and maps

List of Graphs

Graph 1: Collaborative partners of informants

Graph 2: Articulation of global policies by informants

Graph 3: Perception of Climate change policy in Zimbabwe

Graph 4: Description of the Zimbabwean National policy process by informants

Graph 5: Reasons why informants thought GoZ response fell short

Graph 6: Roles played by civil society organisations in the national Climate change Arena

Graph 7: Sources of Knowledge for farmers (University of Zimbabwe 2010)

List of Maps

Map 1: Key actors at national level in Zimbabwe

List of Tables

Table 1: Key actors identified by informants

Table 2: Key Multi-lateral Organisations within the Zimbabwean Climate change Arena

Table 3: Strategic activities of donors

Table 4: percentage of organisations implementing certain practises

List of Figures

Figure 1: Institutions at National level in Zimbabwe

Figure 2: Institutional Arrangements for Implementation of the UNFCCC in Zimbabwe

List of Pictures

Picture 1: A rural kitchen with a mud stove (jengetahuni) designed to use less wood

Picture 2: A Jatropha Plantation in Matoka District of Zimbabwe

Picture 3: Millet Crop yield

List of Annexes

ANNEX 1	Interview guides for key informants
ANNEX 2	Interview guide

List of Acronyms

COP	-	Conference of Parties
DFID	-	UK Department for International Development
EC	-	European Commission
FAO	-	Food and Agriculture Organization
GDP	-	Gross Development Product
GEF	-	Global Environmental Fund
GoZ	-	Government of Zimbabwe
IPCC	-	Inter-governmental Panel on Climate change
MoEnv	-	Ministry of Environment and Tourism
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organization
SADC	-	Southern African Development Committee
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	-	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNFCCC	-	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate change
ZERO	-	Zimbabwe Environmental Regional Organization
ZELA	-	Zimbabwe Environmental Lawyers Association

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

Climate change is a great a challenge for humanity. Climate change has become a phenomenon which has been addressed at various levels and scales including Global and National. It has been discussed at several venues including Rio through to Cancun and it is in these venues where climate change has been problematized¹ (Focault 1991) concept for over 20 years. Countries have agreed on the need to combat climate change and this commitment has been exemplified and practiced partly through the signing of treaties and the ratifying of climate change related agreements. These agreements and practices form a key part of this study.

The study is approached from a social science perspective using theories and concepts from various authors who have studied policy processes. These are then applied to Climate change discourse and policy. As one of the authors, we use McGee methodologically because she has worked with policy and the spaces that are created within it. We assume that spaces is one of the methodological issues of addressing Climate change in Zimbabwe and at a global level. In her work with spaces, McGee explains how these spaces link actors and knowledge in a manner that may generate new spaces. When we apply the above to Climate change we note that as the discussions continued Climate change became a political issue² emphasizing on policy that transcends geographic boundaries leading to several inter-country negotiations and agreements including the 15th Conference of Parties (COP15) held in Copenhagen in 2009. These policies are expected to be adopted at a national level including Zimbabwe despite the fact that these policies would have been formulated in various policy spaces at a global level within which a number of actors participate.

However, one important issue within these spaces, is that actors present different narratives which may be divergent and conflicting. These conflicts and divergent narratives form a key character these spaces. Conflicts result in actors seeking to have their narratives accepted by

¹ By problematization we mean the way in which scientific knowledge has been used to construct the problem of climate change and perhaps possible interventions to mitigate and adapt.

²Climate change is an issues that had been discussed at a governmental level. These governments have different interests which they view as paramount in the process of tackling Climate change. In as such Climate change has created an arena that is political by virtue of the nature of the actors, the struggles for narratives to become discourses, and the processes by which agendas are presented using political methods such as diplomacy and formation of coalitions.

lobbying other actors and the narrative that relates to how people objectify the phenomenon at hand becomes the dominant discourse. Through this lobbying and pressurized process Climate change was rapidly turned into a political issue that needed the support of governments in order to be effectively tackled.

It is important though to highlight that Climate change was not a phenomenon that is limited to governments as key actors. On the contrary, Climate change has garnered much attention and support through other key actors and institutions including the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate change (IPCC), International Non- governmental organizations, G99 and lately the World Bank. These institutions have different mandates and claim to represent different social segments of society. These segments represent different constituents and interests around the policy and political issue of climate change. IPCC is representing the scientists as a knowledge making body, G99 representing the developing countries, an “independent” World Bank and NGOs representing the global poor. It is this difference in representations that shapes the different contributions that they make to Climate change as a discourse. Furthermore, it is the contributions that these institutions make that play important roles in defining the elements that constitute the policy process and possible ways of implementing it.

From the narratives that various actors and institutions have brought and presented to the policy process, we note that two main streams of policy thought are delineated to tackle Climate change. These are mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation seeks to tackle Carbon emissions whilst the adaptation focuses on building the capacity of people and communities to respond and reduce their vulnerability to climate change (Lemos, Boyd et al. 2007). With the Climate change arena being a political arena, there was then a deliberate effort to respond to the scientific and policy needs of the various actors, institutions and communities. This effort has seen global policies have being formulated beginning with the United Nations Convention on Climate change (UNFCCC) in 1992. However, since then, global climate change policies have evolved and their rhetoric changed with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) pushing climate change adaptation as a 2nd mainstream to mitigation. This led to policy makers responding to NGOs' pressure and made them integrate climate change adaptation into already existing Climate change policies. This was manifested in subsequent policies such as the Bali declaration (2007) and the Cancun Framework (2011). Never-the-less, before the Cancun Framework, the World Development Report (WDR) 2010

and the Copenhagen accord³, (which is the outcome of a COP15 meeting held in 2009) also stressed the need to have an effective adaptation programme as a means of tackling the effects of Climate change. This study chooses to focus on the mainstream of Climate change Adaptation as it manifests itself in organizations and institutions at different levels.

The future of structural arrangements of actors in the form of organizations and institutions are mobilized around contemporary debates and Climate change is one of them. It is from these forms of debate that multiple scales of information, scientific facts and meetings are trying to identify the different components of the problem (Climate change) and which are the more relevant actors to tackle issues identified and negotiated at global level. From these encounters has been an assumption that developed countries are unable to deal and tackle them on their own (Fairhead and Leach 2003). As the world increasingly becomes interconnected, countries realize the risk that is carried when some countries go their individual route. It is this realization that encourages governments to become participants in the global Climate change arena.

To tackle global issues, governments become global entities representing their citizens in a complex multi layered deliberation process. These global deliberation processes result in the formulation of policies. In an ideal situation, governments enjoy the same rights and voice. However, reality tends not to be that simple, even as representatives of their citizens the governments not only have different levels of voice (leading to policies at times not being context specific and relevant) and exit (due to different financial situations and prospect of much needed aid developing countries can seldom say no). Whilst these governments have their own internal policies their sovereignty is transcended by global commitments leading to processes of transformation in a policy context. Agency of the state becomes open to use by other powers in ways that may not always be mutually beneficial and policy may be used as a tool of governmentality. It is such processes that also bring into question the success of implementation in the policy process especially for those governments whose voice has not been heard.

³ In November 2009 countries came together in Copenhagen in the hope of reaching a global agreement to tackle climate change. Out of this meeting and a series of negotiations that followed, came the Copenhagen Accord. As of April 2010, over 110 countries had engaged and shown support for the Accord. It has been indicated that those countries that are not party to the accord may not receive funding under it.

1.2 Problem Statement

Climate change is a phenomenon that governments have committed to tackle and implement at a national level. However, Climate change policy has remained an abstract concept that is difficult for developing countries to fully engage throughout the policy processes at national levels. Developing countries including Zimbabwe, once becoming engaged and expressing support for the constitution of a Climate change policy at global level, are expected to adopt and implement global policies in relation to Climate change. This process of adaptation creates tension generating emergent policies that are a compromise between current and new policies together with institutional priorities. Institutions are important as they have the job of making these policies understandable. It is this kind of complexities that the study will try to address. Climate change will be some kind of phenomenon where other issues are presented, transformed and given a new Zimbabwean understanding of the issue of Climate change. What we may end up with is in fact a witch's brew of policies that may work against each other especially if they are housed in different institutions. The study essentially analyses issues of Climate change Adaptation and how policy is translated and transformed from global level through to national level.

However, from global to national level policy is exposed to various changes. It is in this kind of movement where social construction takes place. Through this process; policy is influenced by the social structure and institutions' resistance to change to existing priorities that exist within the spaces that have been created. This is exemplified when we analyse national level policy processes in Zimbabwe. We are confronted with a situation where there is a policy at global level but Zimbabwe has no climate change adaptation policy. Yet at the moment of writing this paper there was in place a Climate change office, with the designated authority for the country with regards to Climate change which is housed under the Ministry of Environment. Zimbabwe is party to the Kyoto Protocol, UNFCCC and Bali declaration. However, despite sending a delegation to COP15 and activities on the ground there is yet no commitment from Zimbabwean Government on the Copenhagen accord. This has not stopped the country from engaging and working with key institutions such as, NGOs and IPCC in the area of climate change.

In light of the participation of various institutions including the government, the study also entail looked at the extent of institutional bricolage, (Cleaver 2002) which is the relational relationship of one institution to another especially in light of climate change adaptation and

its existence within Zimbabwe. This creates examples of how global policies are institutionalized within Zimbabwe as they are adopted and adapted to suit different needs and priorities. In light of institutions being one of the units of analysis, another issue that the study is addressing concerns how notions of degrees of sovereignty of institutions and states are tested in governance of adapting international process to national aims as we go down the vertical slice and how this may lead to multiple power sources that affect differential decision making and implementation of policy. This has an implication on governance beyond politics to governance as shaped by practical activities of Climate change adaptation and food security and livelihoods in relation to agricultural production. This normally happens where institutional agency differs including in Zimbabwe for example the government may give priority (including budgetary) to one institution at the expense of another due to national interests.

1.3 Study Objective

To explore how Global Climate change policy processes are transformed and translated at national level. The study addresses this by looking at relevant stages in the policy process from a global through to local level In the case of Zimbabwe. In doing this the study analyses institutions which are engaged in a process of Climate change which at the moment become paradox between political modernization policies and the actions to address promote practical adaptation to Climate change in a developing Country like Zimbabwe

Study Questions

How have Global policies and practices on Climate change adaptation been translated and socially constructed in Zimbabwe at organizational and institutional level

- a) What are the key issues found in global policies on climate change adaptation
- b) How are these key issues reflected in national and regional policies and discourses on climate change?
- c) What is the configuration of the organizational and institutional that emerge from this encounter of global and national policies and practices

1.4 Study Orientation

The study follows a critical part of discourse analysis within the political modernization approach. The analysis of the results focuses on the case of Zimbabwe and its interaction with climate change policies at a global and national level. The study goes a step further to analyze the impact of these interactions on issues of development which are expressed through Food Security, Energy and Forestry

The study defines the policy process in its broad sense as adapted from Maarten Hajer (2009). For Hajer the policy process is a non-linear one that is complex with all the stages from policy formulation to implementation being intertwined. In as such, the study views the Climate change policy process in its entirety from science through policy making to implementation. According to Hajer, within this complexity, actors within the policy process will interpret policy in different ways rather than as a framework with a single meaning making it abstract. This interpretation will be biased towards the priorities and agendas of the actors within the policy process. This difference in interpretation may result struggles of different narratives within the arena. In light of this, the study has also taken the view of McGee (2005) and who looks policy as a product of struggles within spaces that are shaped by actors, knowledge and history. In addition, I also view these spaces to be shaped by elements of politics, power and culture. In my study, these factors were seen as influencing the extent to which Climate change discourses become involved in struggles under the influence of organizations and institutions seeking to legitimize their actions by making reference to the dominant discourse. From this process will ultimately emerge different translations and interpretation of climate change and development narratives all influencing the type, extent of discourses involved in struggles within the spaces and ultimately the climate change and development narratives that will emerge.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

The study looked at the Climate change policy process at a global level as it relates to national processes and the emergent policy processes. It sought to look at the response of the national Climate change policy process and discourses to global policy frameworks. We take the view that Climate change is a human defined and created concept whose existence relies

on actors problematization of the its effects on human livelihoods and survival. When looked at from a policy perspective at various scales, in this case the national and global, concepts such as sovereignty and legitimacy play a key role. In the analysis of how institutional organisations participate in the Climate change policy process These are the concepts are used in the study to look at political modernisation⁴ (Van Tatenhove and Leroy 2003) within Climate change .

The study will look at the policy process and by this I also adopt the definition of which takes it to encompass “formulation and implementation, and the dynamics and patterns that surround it” and to what extent Climate change Adaptation has manifested itself in Zimbabwe as a phenomenon being adopted from global arena to one that is being localised.

Below I will present the key concepts which I use in the analysis of the data collected on the field (arena, sovereignty, narratives, discourses, adaptation, and governmentality). Each concept will be stated and their use in as far as the study explained to the reader.

1.5.1 Arena

The concept of an arena is one that has been widely used within the realm of social sciences. Long (2002) coined this term which he derived from Bourdieu who looks at the concept of a field. The concept of an arena allows for better exploration issues of power and authority within Climate change and the policy processes at global and national levels. The study adopts the concept of arena is as far as it is used by Long (2002) at the same time taking the view of McGee (2005) who considers the arena as a space where encounters between and among different actors occur and each tries to mobilise the other towards their dispositions.

The arena in the study will encompass the non-physical but socially constructed bounded space where actors in various capacities interact. Such an interaction may be a struggle but this is not always the case as it may also be characterised by the formation of alliances. The study employs the term arena for its meaning in the sense of a bounded non-physical space in which the policy process in relation to Climate change is found as such actors within it may be of various origins and dispositions. As adopted from Long (2002) such an arena does not exist in isolation but is impacted by issues of globalisation. However, I go a step further and

⁴ “Political modernization refers to structural of changing interrelations between state, market and civil society, and to new conceptions and practices of governance.” Arts p93

describe the arena as semi-permeable. This idea feeds off the work of McGee (2005) on spaces which the rules of entry are determined for example use of the phrase “invited spaces”. In this case, actors can enter the arena due to certain credentials that they possess or present. In as such, not everyone can be a part of the Climate change Policy arena and processes within it.

Within the arena lie spaces that are (re)created to accommodate actors, institutions and networks within the arena. These may be closed, invited and or/ open (McGee 2005). Closed spaces are taken to be platform for a predetermined grouping of actors to formulate and concretize their goals while setting out narratives that will enable achievement of the goals. These goals and narratives will shape the manner in which actors engage and participate within the policy process. However, actors are not confined to a single space but can be part of more than one space at the same time in so much as it suits their needs at that point in time. The study also adopts the view of McGee in the same publication, which consider spaces to have history and offer a space for learning to occur. In my view this leads to spaces are continuously being transformed or even split to form new ones as the policy process progresses.

1.5.2 Narratives and Discourses

Discourses have formed a firm part of social sciences study and have been written about by several authors (Williams 1998) (Van Dijk 1997) (Van Dijk 1993) (Nash 2010) (Campbell 1998) (Long 2002). Although authors agree that within discourses, every action and text has a meaning that it communicates, either intentionally or unintentionally, it is the meanings there still exists no standard definition of discourses. Shore and Wright (1997) cites Siedel (1997) as defining discourses as ways of thinking. Long (2002) goes a step further to imply that discourses are used by actors to enable their own agendas to be perpetuated in the face of others. It has been argued in my interpretation by Long that actors may at times have the conflicting versions of the same discourse as discourses are shaped by actors who may have different ideological positions. He argues that although discourses may be the product of institutions (which would be the case in the global policy process); they are in fact still a product of the actors that work within the institutions and their epistemological standpoint. For the purposes of the study, discourses are used within the context of the policy process. In as such, they are principally taken to be the dominant version of subject discussions to which most parties affiliate themselves. The study takes the view of Long 2002 that there can be multiple views

but also goes a step further to say that an actor can be party to many discourses within the same arena.

However, in order to arrive at the discourse, actors present various narratives within the Climate change Arena. These narratives are translated and transformed to suit the needs of various actors. The narratives that best conform to the priorities and needs of actors become the dominant narrative. In as such, narratives and discourses form a key part of the Climate change policy process. Narratives have also been the subject of several pieces of literature especially in as much as they relate to the policy process. Some authors (Sutton and ODI. 1999) look at narratives as stories which represent a simplification of processes such as development. The study adopts this view of narratives as stories that are presented to the policy process by actors but continues to link them to the Climate change Arena and the processes within it. As already mentioned above, it is these narratives that are meant to feed into the process and through translation may become dominant discourses. Narratives are different from discourses and are actor, level and scale defined. What is a discourse at a national level may be a narrative at global level.

Within the Climate change arena, we view discourses as the dominant way of thinking amongst the organisations and institutions that are part of the policy process. In as such, words, actions and texts found within the global and national Climate change arena will be analysed for meaning and significance in as far as they relate to the policy processes.

1.5.3 Adaptation

Climate change adaptation has become found its way up the ladder to become one of the key issues within the Climate change arena. Adaptation is defined in many ways by different authors (Neil Adger, Arnell et al. 2005; Smit and Wandel 2006; Lemos, Boyd et al. 2007). However, all the definitions have a common underlying thread that binds them all which is the reference to human beings coupled with the idea that is a response to stimuli. In this case the stimuli is Climate change.

For Lemos (2004) adaptation is made up of a set of actions that are undertaken by human beings to cope with changes within their environment. Within the study, adaptation is considered as a socially constructed phenomenon that is defined and acted upon by actors. Each action will differ depending on the life worlds (Arce 2002) and standpoint of the actor(s) in-

volved and the people around them. (Lemos, Boyd et al. 2007) adds that actions can be undertaken before or after the stimuli and are primarily undertaken through state interventions. Such an analysis then puts adaptation firmly within the realm of governments and policy processes associated with them. However, whilst we adopt the view of governments as key actors, the study recognises that there is the existence of key non-governmental or quasi-governmental organisations and institutions. In as such our analysis will include several actors and institutions with regards to the policy processes associated with them.

In the study, a firm differentiation is made between adaptation and mitigation within the Climate change Arena. The study will examine the policy process in as far as it relates to adaptation at various scales and levels. This differentiation is useful in narrowing down the scope of the study, whilst at the same time providing a suitable concept common at global level and widely accepted within the context of developing countries. Developing countries like Zimbabwe agree that there is a need for them to adapt to climate change whilst on the other hand there are some reservations and caution when we talk of mitigation.

1.5.6 Sovereignty

The concept has been the subject of a number of academic documents (Sassen 1996) (Krasner 1988) (Voruz 2002) on policy and political studies. Sovereignty is taken to be the ability of government to control what happens within the realm of its borders (Voruz 2002). However, the study distances itself from analysis of sovereignty by these authors as a responsibility of governments. The study instead takes the view that such a responsibility is dispersed amongst the actors within the arena and any actor may allow sovereignty of the arena to be transcended either intentionally or unintentionally. Whilst actors may seek to guard their sovereignty, we concur that there are several types, dimensions and threats to sovereignty as highlighted by several scholars including (Duffield 2004) Both non-governmental actors and governments regard their countries as sovereign nations that have the right and ability to make decisions regarding internal issues without any outside interference. Threats will be taken as any form of interference, either consented or not, to the policy processes within a country.

1.5.7 Governmentality

This concept is adopted from the work of (Foucault 1991) and is taken to be the use of certain tools by governments to control behaviour. In the words of Foucault governmentality is “understood in the broad sense of techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour.

Government of children, government of souls and consciences, government of a household, of a state, or of oneself” (Foucault 1997, p. 82).

For the purposes of the study, the terms shall be used within its applicability to the Climate change policy process. We shall consider the techniques that are used by governments in their individual and collaborative sense at global and national level within the Climate change policy process. We shall also consider the use of some actors as possible objects of governmentality at various levels and scales. Linked to this we shall also use the term governability which is a concept that was coined by Arce (2002). For the purposes of the study it will be taken to mean the response of the governed to the objects of governmentality .

1.6 Study Outline

I present the study in six chapters. The first chapter aims to introduce the reader to the study by providing a background, problem statement, theoretical concepts and research questions. The second chapter will be dedicated to the methodology and this will be followed by Chapter 3 which focuses on Climate change phenomenon as it presents itself at the global level.

Chapter 3 will present and analyze key documents and policies at a global level on Climate change Adaptation. Some reference will be made to interviews with key informants which were conducted in Zimbabwe. Chapter 4 will provide the reader with a general overview of Climate change Arena in Zimbabwe whilst Chapter 5 will introduce the key actors, practices and knowledge which inform the Zimbabwean Climate change Arena. The results will be presented and analyzed in the various chapters all the while juxtaposing relevant literature to explain and support analysis made.

Chapter 6 will be the conclusion Chapter and it will aim to the reader an analysis of the emergent practices and policies from the interaction between the global and national arenas. It will also question the surface meanings of discourses and present the reader with alternative interpretations using the theoretical frameworks outlined above. The references and annexures will be presented thereafter.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

2.1 General approach to the research

This is a qualitative study which focuses on Climate change as a phenomenon that has attracted attention at various scales including the global and national level. This attention has contributed to the formalisation of structures of global governance which are expected to be adopted at national level. Zimbabwe is one of the signatories of various Climate change agreements at a national level. For the study, the Zimbabwe was chosen to represent the national level.

This choice was a strategic decision due to personal preferences and attributes of the Climate change processes in Zimbabwe. At the time of formulating the proposal there had been a significant hype surrounding issues of Climate change around the world. This was also met by a 60 member Zimbabwean delegation attending the 15th Conference of Parties (Copenhagen Summit). Whilst Zimbabwe was one of the many countries that attended the Summit, and voiced its concerns, there was no formal commitment in the form of policy at national level. This is a situation that is not unique in many African Countries. Also like many African countries, Zimbabwe faces a host of economic and poverty concerns which at the time saw a near collapse of basic services. However, organisational and institutional structures remained in place. Ministries continue to function and the structure is maintained in spite of the service delivery aspects being compromised. It is then interesting and significant to study how policy is translated and transformed by social processes in developing country which has surmountable economic concerns, decreased capacity to implement, but also has firm structures in place. Zimbabwe is then a strategic country to analyse the phenomenon of Climate change through the various concepts outlined above.

Within the phenomenon of Climate change the researcher chose to focus on the mainstream of Climate change Adaptation. This choice was due to the economic and social situation in Zimbabwe where there has been a decline in the industrial output. It was also guided by the literature research that was done on Zimbabwe and Climate change which indicated that at a global level Zimbabwe was interested in the Climate change Adaptation mainstream. This is also derived from a speech made by his Excellency Cde Robert Gabriel Mugabe at the Copenhagen Conference of 2009. However, this does not take away from the importance of Climate change mitigation as a discourse at a global level.

2.2 Perspective

This study aims to understand from an insider and outsider perspective the elements under the study. Insider in the sense that I am a Zimbabwean who has done some extensive work within the environmental sector at various levels. However, at the same time, I have since stopped working in the field and may now be an outsider as I am no longer of strategic importance to the actors within the National Climate change Arena. In as such in I towed the thin line between being an outsider and an insider.

2.3. Data collection methods

The study used 2 main methods of data collection i.e. key informant interviews and document analysis. The study, to a lesser extent also relied on group meetings in the form of workshops. How they were used is discussed in the sub-headings below

2.3.1 Key Informant Interviews

These served as the main data collection tool for understanding the Zimbabwean Climate change Arena. For this level of the study, organizations are the units of analysis. There was the use of semi-structural interviews which focused around processed within the climate change arena in as far as they relate to climate change processes and discourses.

The process of selection of the key informants was done by employing purposive sampling and the snowball method. In the case of purposive sampling, I set a criterion of the attributes that key informants would possess in order for them to best inform the study. The key informants were chosen by virtue of them currently being involved in Climate change practices and processes at either in Zimbabwe and/or at a global level.

However, I found that some of the selected key informants were evasive making securing an appointment challenging. As a result, I also employed the snowball method. In this method I asked key informants whom they thought would also be able to contribute to the research and asked them to introduce me. In this way some of the interviews were secured through referrals.

The interviews were conducted in person in formal and informal settings. In some cases, key informants were unable to make time for the interview and hence the researcher sent them the interview guide and they responded via email.

2.3.3 Document Analysis

This was used to study and understand policy processes within the global and the national area. The study sought to focus on the mainstream of Climate change adaptation and hence analyzed the discourses contained within global policy documents on adaptation. The study begins by analyzing the original UNFCCC and goes on to analyze amendments and additions to it that have taken the form of the Bali Plan, Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Framework.

At a national level, the study also analyzed key internal documents and presentations from actors within the Climate change arena. These documents were screened on the basis of them being representative of some form of policy direction.

2.3.4 Group Meetings

The researcher attended meetings and conferences that focused on issues of Climate change. These were used to understand the dominant discourses and discussions within the Zimbabwean Climate change Arena.

The data collected was in the form of interview notes, recordings and field notes. These were then analyzed using the methods detailed below

2.4 Data analysis

Two main forms of analysis are employed i.e. narrative and discourse analysis. The data collected is analysed for the basic ideas, implicit and explicit meanings. At the same time, data is analysed for shifts in discourses between the global and national, and within Zimbabwe. Themes are developed around the responses given and the main issues that the research seeks to tackle.

2.5 Limitations encountered

When the proposal was developed, a clear plan was developed on how the data collection would be tackled. However, like many plans, it faced its own fair share of challenges and these are highlighted below

Organisational Affiliation

When the research began, I was frantically trying to secure a reputable host organisation. Several attempts were made and one proved promising. The organisation indicated that they would be in touch with me to confirm but each time, the supposed date of confirmation was postponed. Noting that there was little time left for the process to begin I decided to proceed with no affiliation to any organisation. Instead I used personal contacts and other methods discussed above.

However, the lack of organisational affiliation also meant that I had to fund all costs incurred during the research. It also meant that I was unable to convene relatively big groups to discuss issues pertaining to the research. I overcame this by soliciting invitations from organisations for workshops that they had convened.

CHAPTER 3: CLIMATE CHANGE AT A GLOBAL LEVEL

3.1 Introduction

Climate change has become a global environmental phenomenon that is human defined. The human race in all its complexity is wholly dependent on the environment and its sustainable use. In as such, environmental issues including Climate change which have effects that transcend geographic boundaries. Climate change has been exposed to multi-faceted mechanisms which are not limited by the geographic boundaries of the state⁵. The authority to govern issues to do with climate change are spread across different actors at different scales (Andonova, Betsill et al. 2009). Governments and quasi-government bodies prefer not to rely on the capacities of individual nations to deal with the phenomenon. However, at the same time, the idea of national sovereignty is one that countries strongly uphold with exceptions being made only when there is a strong breach of human rights. Even in the cases of human rights violations, there is some reluctance to transcend sovereignty of another country. It was with much reluctance and slowness that other countries intervened in Libya during the 2011 protests. In the case of climate change, actors realize that in order to reach the desired goal together, there is need to be able to monitor each other's activities. In order not to circumvent the issue of sovereignty that they hold so dearly, they then seek to gain permission through consensus. This begins from ensuring that there is a universal goal and framework through the signing of several conventions and policy frameworks. In this Chapter of the study I would like to take the opportunity to analyze the policy processes at a global level and the resultant policy documents and directions.

3.2 Global Policy process

It is essential that even at the global level, that Climate change policy process be viewed as non-linear with each phase affecting the other. The Climate change Policy process at global level is relatively mature having gone through all the stages of policy making. (Roberts 2010) divides the policy process into 3 stages which she calls agenda setting, decision making, and implementation. However, the process and phases are continuously being (re)enacted and reproducing themselves as contexts and political rhetoric changes. Climate change has been talked about at a global level since the 1970s but there was little evidence to back up claims that were made. In 1992, the world gathered in Rio at the Earth Summit (popularly known as

⁵ The Rio Summit was the biggest environmental summit of the 1990s which sought to tackle Climate change

the Rio Conference) marking what was the beginning of a series of intergovernmental gatherings that sought to tackle environmental issues including climate change.

From the Rio Conference we note that the policy processes at a global level began to manifest themselves in 2 main ways i.e.

- one way has been through the convening of gatherings that involve representatives from government and quasi-governmental bodies. The process is one of negotiation where consensus is sought and policy documents produced.
- the other way has been through political statements made by governments in their individual or collective capacity.

At this stage of the study we shall continue by analyzing the significance of global Climate change gatherings. Thereafter the study will analyze the subsequent emergent policies.

Climate change Gatherings

Climate change related gatherings have become common around the world and they take various forms. They may be small in terms of the number of participants and the scope of the discussions (workshops) and bring together more than a hundred governments (summits). Whatever their form or scale, they are representative of spaces that are created within the policy process. The first biggest Climate change related gathering was in the form of the Earth Summit in 1992. This saw high level representatives in the form of Head of States and/or their deputies from over 170 countries (Roberts 2010) attending. These high level attendees help to bring not only attention to Climate change but achieve consensus at the highest levels that are expected to filter down to other levels within countries. Since 1995, government representatives have continued to meet year after year to map the evolution of the UNFCCC. Out of these meetings emerge key agreements and political statements that set the policy process direction at global level. Individual countries such as Zimbabwe who will have ratified these agreements are expected to then adopt the contents at national level. At this stage of the study I would like to analyze some of the global policies pertaining to Climate change Adaptation and their change in rhetoric as countries attempt to achieve some form of consensus to enable global governance of Climate change.

3.3 Global Policies

Global Governance has become key during this era of modernisation. As modernisation brings with it more concern about the environment, countries then seek to have legally binding goals with regard to its protection. Climate change is a key environmental issue that has seen global governance with transnational components manifest themselves through Conventions. Some of the conventions, treaties and plans are legally binding whilst in some cases countries fail to reach an agreement resulting in political statements. The study analyses 3 key conventions and 1 political statement all of which shape and form global climate change adaptation processes. It is these same documents and the contents therein that are expected to filter down to Zimbabwe. At this stage, we will discuss the findings in terms of the UNFCCC of 1992, its subsequent amendments through the Bali Plan, Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Framework and the possible implications of the contents.

3.3.1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate change (UNFCCC)

This represents one of the first legal frameworks governing the Global Climate change Arena. This is a Convention that was signed by 192 countries (UNFCCC 1995) and was perhaps inherently, the first global agreement that climate change was a problem that needed to be addressed. It is one of the 3 conventions that were ratified at the Rio Conference with being including the Convention of Biodiversity and the Convention to Combat Desertification. The signing of the conventions is a direct expression of political will on the part of the countries involved. This expression of political will would then result in some pressure to assume some responsibility and roles at a global and national level from the key actors in the process.

In the process of assuming responsibility, we see the framing of Climate change as a problem for which different countries must assume different levels of responsibility, with the developed countries being told that they must bear the most responsibility for the Climate change adaptation process. So, even at this early stage of the policy process, at the Rio Conference, there is a clear distinction of the roles and responsibilities of developed and developing countries creating categorisations of the north and the south, and cast blame and responsibility issues into the spotlight. These are still being manifested 20 years later. This convention came into force in 1994 and remains key within the Climate change arena. The quote below is a direct extraction from the UNFCCC document

“Noting that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs” UNFCCC 1992

From the extract above, we note not only the division of the world into categories, but also that the UNFCCC was originally formulated to enable mitigation of Climate change. In the early stages of the Convention, there was a focus on the preventative measures that could be taken to minimize anthropogenic climate change. This was to be done through control of greenhouse gases with a focus on industrialized countries as shown by the extract below.

“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” (UNFCCC 1992)

At this stage, any focus on adaptation was in the sense of it being a key indicator for success in reducing anthropogenic emissions that may create an enabling environment for Climate change to occur. However, the policy makers realized that contexts may change rendering the UNFCCC irrelevant. As such, the Convention was formulated and signed with the idea of it being a framework that would be amended over time as new ideas and contexts⁶ emerged. As such, the UNFCCC has undergone some changes in the content as the context changed. In the original document, Climate change Adaptation was seen as a desirable outcome as a result of mitigation. However, as time moved and NGOs together with developing country governments began to lobby that Climate change was affecting the global poor who had little or no capacity to adapt. In as such the UNFCCC has moved to accommodate Climate change adaptation as one of the complimentary mainstreams to mitigation.

⁶ Context in this case shall be taken to be the dominant discourses that are found within the policy process of governments and civil society.

In an effort to enact adaptation at policy level the UNFCCC has had several additions including the Bali Plan of 2007. This is discussed further in section 3.3.2 of this chapter. In spite of its initial focus on mitigation, the UNFCCC continued to evolve and in later years, the rhetoric changed to encompass adaptation as an issue that was almost par to mitigation and within it emerged several frameworks the latest of which is the Cancun Framework. It is also under the UNFCCC that the COP gatherings have been held.

The following sections of the Chapter will now look at the policy process documents that served to change the rhetoric of the UNFCCC. These will be analyzed for content as well as rhetoric in as far as they concern Climate change Adaptation. The documents will be analyzed from the Bali Plan of 2007 through to the Cancun Framework in 2010. Whilst there are still a large number of workshops and other gatherings within the Climate change Arena that bring together different nations and allow them to table their narratives and interpretations of the discourses, one of the most popular remains the Conference of Parties gatherings (COP). The 1st COP was held in 1995 and even at that stage it was marred by the high degree of uncertainty to limit greenhouse emissions. At this stage, the rhetoric was about limiting greenhouse emissions with a special focus on developed nations. Thereafter COP gatherings were held every year and with each year policy directions were mapped. The most popular by any means was COP15 which not only garnered the most media attention but brought together one of the largest intergovernmental representation within the history of the climate change arena.. However, our analysis shall be in chronological order beginning with the Bali Action Plan of 2007.

3.3.2 Bali Action Plan - 2007

The Bali Plan is a long term plan which essentially in many ways is an addition to the UNFCCC that allows emphasis on Climate change Adaptation to be expressed. It is a plan that seeks to enhance the implementation of the UNFCCC. It still contains much emphasis on mitigation, much like the UNFCCC but also gives much attention to adaptation. The two statements below are direct extracts from the Bali Action Plan exemplifying the way in which it remains an extension of the UNFCCC.

"1. Decides to launch a comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention

through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012" Bali Action Plan 2007

However, despite its strong connections with the UNFCCC it is unique in that within the Bali Plan we note that there is a change in rhetoric which moves to link Climate change and Developmental objectives of developing and developed countries. This is implied in the phrase "Reaffirming that economic and social development and poverty eradication are global priorities" The same view is also taken by the World Development Report 2010 which 3 years later reaffirmed the link between Climate change and Development. In light of this, the plan essentially not only represents one of the key steps towards adaptation becoming a key mainstream within the Climate change arena but also a conscious effort to link the mainstream to development activities. The idea of linking Climate change to development has been emphasised by a number of authors including Lemos (2007) who argue that Climate change adaptation and development practises all have the same underlying aim, to alleviate poverty and suffering. In as such, the Bali declaration makes a move to enable Climate change to relate better to the needs of developing countries.

This key step enables the Bali Plan takes a less domineering approach on sensitive issues such as the destruction of carbon sinks. In an effort to come across as less dominant than previous policies and frameworks, the plan tries to encourage the pursuing of a shared vision by acknowledging poverty as one of the main causes of destruction of carbon sinks. This is made clear when the plan recognizes deforestation as a product of different national circumstances. In some cases, deforestation has been documented to be the direct result of people seeking to use firewood as a source of energy Fairhead and Leach (1996). However, by the time we get to 2007, there is already agreement that there is a need to halt deforestation through the Convention on biodiversity and provide alternative energy both as means of mitigation and adaptation.

However, such a move to halt deforestation would entail the need to take into account the needs of local people. This aspect of the Bali Plan is a clear exemplification of how the global policy process is affected by changing contexts that are not limited to Climate change. We note that by the year 2007, there was belief in the need for policies to be contextually suited to the local people in order for them to be successfully implemented at national levels and this was fully embraced by the Bali Plan. This view has a two pronged interpretation. On one

hand we see the political nature of the arena and the policies that are produced therein. Politicians realise that without their citizens realising any benefits from interventions they will not participate. At the same time, there a refocus of priorities to include the needs of local people perhaps out of genuine concern for their welfare. This gives a human face to Climate change.

However, at this stage of the policy process we also see that there is an implicit assumption that the needs of local communities may be investigated but there is no direct reference to communities assisting to investigate these needs as exemplified in the extract below from the Bali Plan

“Recognizing that close collaboration between government, industry and the study community particular through public-private partnerships, can stimulate the development of a wide range of mitigation and adaptation technologies and reduce their costs”

This plan instead recognises the importance of collaborations across public-private divides (Evans 1997) and the role that this can play in development of alternative technologies In this way the concept of a sector wide approach is maintained.

Within these collaborations, the Bali Plan is also seen to mention a group of actors that it deems key to processes within the arena. The Bali Plan was no exception. It makes mention of the World Bank, Global Environmental Fund, Least Developed Country Fund, Special and Climate change Fund. This special mention of certain actors rather than others also serves to give more power to the mentioned actors in relation to that possessed by other actors. However, these funds would not be applicable to every country due to the conditions that were attached to each. The Least Developed Country Fund was partly meant to facilitate the formation of National Adaptation plans of action (NAPA) but only targeting least developed countries. As a result, only those countries that were eligible for the fund established NAPAs. This brings into question the rationale for developing country actors entering the climate change arena. Zimbabwe did not put in place a National Adaptation Plan by virtue of it not being eligible for the least developed country fund at that time. One then has to enquire if the rationale for entering and participating in the Climate change arena is based on the funding and incentives that are made available for implementation.

The above-mentioned question again comes to mind when one analyses the use the term voluntary basis, with regard to parties tackling issues of forestry within the Bali Plan. However, this begs the question of how voluntary is especially if within the same document Decision 1/CP.13 (Bali Plan) speaks of policy approaches and positive incentives to those adopting certain voluntary issues as exemplified by the extract below.

".....Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries....." Bali Plan 2007

Put in the context of cash strapped and cash hungry developing countries, the volunteerism may be questioned or even viewed as a façade. Such incentives are exemplified in REDD programmes that are linked to forestry.

3.3.4 Copenhagen Accord - 2009

This is essentially viewed as political statement which has no legal binding whatsoever on parties as exemplified by the extract below

".....We underline that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time. We emphasize our strong political will....." Copenhagen Accord 2009

It was signed by just over 100 actors from all continents and in this way maintaining its inter-governmental nature (www.unfccc.org). The accord again acknowledges Climate change as a priority and governments express their political will to tackle and adapt to it. However, when we look at the order of the text and interpret it as representative of the importance of the two mainstreams, we see that there is still a tussle between the discourses of mitigation and adaptation.. In this particular case, mitigation emerged at the top of the agenda, with it being mentioned and planned actions documented first before adaptation. Countries made a commitment to cut emissions and another was made by the developed countries to help developing countries adapt to Climate change.

At this stage of the discussions, issues such as Capacity Building, building resilience remain a key part of policy whilst the Global Environmental Fund remains the key financial mechan-

ism. However, there is renewed emphasis on the role of forestry in Climate change. I will characterise this point using the following extract from the text of the Copenhagen Accord of 2009

“

We recognize the crucial role of reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas emission by forests and agree on the need to provide positive incentives to such actions through the immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries.” Copenhagen Accord 2009

Whilst at first glance this may immediately be linked to the role of forestry in reducing emissions and acting as carbon sinks, development issues are heavily implied. The Accord recognises that deforestation may be a product of different national circumstances including poverty. In as such the accord calls on parties to identify some of the drivers of deforestation within their countries. People tend to cut down trees either as a source of energy for themselves or for others. In this way, there is some recognition that without tackling issues of poverty, people will continue to live in survival mode rather than participate in conserving the environment.

It is interesting that the Accord does not mention Agriculture as a key factor in terms of adaptation. It instead focuses on forestry raising some potential for conflict in agro-based economies like those of Zimbabwe. The conflict can manifest itself in different ways including the competition for land and manpower for forestry related and agricultural activities. Any kind of competition against agriculture has the potential of affecting food security negatively especially for those people that rely on subsistence agriculture as a source of food security.

The Copenhagen Accord does not fall out of sync with other agreements under the UNFCCC in several respects including the legitimisation of certain organisations and institutions. The accord also calls upon the use of IPCC knowledge to inform processes within the countries. Through the statement it legitimizes the knowledge that is produced by the IPCC within the Climate change Arena. At the same time, it mentions NGOs as some of the key actors within the Climate change arena and in this way legitimising them. This mention of NGOs also

serves to confirm the prominent role of NGOs within the Climate change policy process and perhaps even sets the tone for them transcending the sovereignty of governments This will be discussed further in Chapter 4 and 5.

However, the Copenhagen Accord failed to reach any binding agreement in terms of Climate change. This then placed pressure on the following summit in Mexico to reach some sort of agreement.

3.3.5 Cancun Framework - 2010

This is an outcome of the conference that was held in Cancun in 2010. However, it is a reflection of the talks that were held in Copenhagen but failed to reach a consensus as it contains most of the concepts that were within the Copenhagen Accord with the difference being in the manner in which they are expressed. Within the framework we still find the existence of mitigation and adaptation as main discourses. However, what is the most interesting is the order in which the mainstreams of adaptation and mitigation appear within the framework. Adaptation is documented before mitigation perhaps indicating the growing priority of the mainstream at a global level. This growing priority of adaptation is also highlighted in the financing aspect where the convention refers to a balanced distribution of funds between adaptation and mitigation. In as such we see not only a growing discourse on Climate change Adaptation but also the creation of incentives for developing countries such as Zimbabwe to adopt global Climate change Adaptation related activities throughout its policy process. . The funding would however, did not have its own fair share of conditionalities. Such funding again was to come through international institutions such as the World Bank who required countries to meet certain standard in order to be eligible. In his way, the funding could be used as a tool of governmentality in developing countries such as Zimbabwe.

In the face of such conditionalities, the framework places emphasis on the mainstream of adaptation urging countries to “*enhance action on adaptation*” using projects and programmes as the main vehicles of implementation. This falls squarely in sync with the development agendas which use projects and programmes as their main vehicles through which the policy process is played out (Harrison 2004). However, unlike Climate change, the development agenda has been on the table for several years and over the years the mechanisms of delivering development to those that need it has evolved. In the 1970s the idea of projects was introduced. Projects and programmes are a rational approach to interventions, having an expect-

ted outcome with clear activities to achieve the outcome. This brings to the table the question of the extent to which Climate change and its interventions can be rationalised especially given the uncertainty of weather related phenomenon.

The Framework also calls upon the use of another development related tool in the form of vulnerability assessments. This is perhaps in the name of so called evidence based work in an effort to enhance national programming. The continuous employment of tools that have been used in the development sector and their success questioned then also brings to the table issues of activity similarity in agendas at a policy level between Climate change Adaptation and development. This again highlights the vagueness of Climate change adaptation as a different and separate policy process from those already being implemented in other agendas such as development.

The framework is also a reflection of previous frameworks in that it too also asks parties to have adaptation plans. In the same breath it also calls upon developed countries to help developing countries by providing financing for adaptation needs and plans. What is unique at this stage is the establishment of an adaptation committee composed of representatives from governments, which amongst other functions seeks to promote some form of synergy between global, regional and national initiatives.

“Decides to hereby establish an Adaptation Committee to promote the implementation of enhanced action on adaptation in a coherent manner under the Convention ...” Cancun Framework 2010

This is perhaps one of the first acknowledgement that there is some lack of alignment of policy processes at global and national levels. It assumes that this alignment can be put in place and strengthened through synergising tools amongst key institutions. The framework also like its predecessors mentions some key institutions and in this way legitimizes and reaffirms their participation within the arena. In this case it mentions the World Bank and introduces a new body in the form of the Green Climate Fund. The Green Climate Fund is essentially a body that will manage financial aspects with regard to Climate change Adaptation and mitigation. This body maintains the transnational nature of Climate change arena, perhaps as a means of getting legitimacy, acceptance and as an object of governmentality. The fund will have a board comprising of five categories of representatives:

“

- (a) Seven members from Africa;*
- (b) Seven members from Asia;*
- (c) Seven members from Group of Latin America and the Caribbean;*
- (d) Two members from small island developing States;*
- (e) Two members from the least developed countries;*

Cancun Framework 2010 page 18

The Framework also has a specific section that is dedicated to the element of capacity building. There is the view that developing countries do not have the capacity to adapt to Climate change. This Capacity is at several levels including

- No financial capacity to implement programmes
- Technological capacity to adapt
- Knowledge of how to adapt to Climate change

In this way, the framework reaffirms that developing nations need external interventions to help them to be able to tackle issues of climate change. This intervention may take the form of funding, training amongst other initiatives to build the adaptive capacity of actors in developing nations such as Zimbabwe to climate change.

3.4 Key Actors at global level

There are a number of key actors that have dominated the Climate change Arena over the years. These include NGOs, Labor groups, indigenous people groups, Development Banks, Government representatives, UN agencies, International organizations and the private sector companies. With the exception of Government representatives, the other actors fall under the term observers and according to UNFCCC these may or may not be allowed to speak.

At this stage of the chapter, the study explores the finding that each actor has a perceived and predetermined role that it plays within the policy process. We consider that actors enter the arena with certain clear objectives in mind and a map of how they will achieve them. With this in mind, the work of (Long 2000) and Arce (2002) will inform the section of the chapter with their actor oriented approach. Actors within the arena possess agency and are calculating

with regards to their interactions with each other and with the institutions to which they may or may not belong.

NGOs within the Global Arena

The global NGO sector is made up of many NGOs from different parts of the world, with interests in different or several parts of the policy process. The UNFCCC website states that there are more than 600 NGOs that are accredited to be part of the negotiation process (www.unfccc.org). Some may be more interested with mitigation whilst others may be leaned more towards adaptation. In most cases though there is a mix of both, for example WWF would be interested in both mainstreams (Interview, programme officer, WWF, 2010). However, even at this level, the level of influence that they have will greatly differ depending on several issues. One respondent cited that issues such as where they come from and the amount of resources that they have are key factors (Interview, Environmentalist, 2010)

However, interviews done in Zimbabwe revealed that at the global level, NGOs are limited to the role of observers and may only be asked to speak when spoken to. They took this role seriously acting as the watchdogs and using the media to make noise about any outcome that they did not like. They also serve as advisors to various governments although they are not allowed to negotiate on behalf of governments. Some of the respondents even went as far as saying that at global level, NGOs were the equivalent of spies, gathering information that their governments could use against the other (Interview, Country Manager, Environment Africa 2010)

NGOs were also seen to form networks and coalitions in an effort to consolidate power and increase their legitimacy. One of the networks identified by an NGO employee was the GEF NGO network. The GEF NGO network which as the name suggests was a GEF initiative. It is reported to have 7 focal points in the world. The spreading of the focal points may be interpreted in 2 ways. It may be a means to ensure that they have access to members from several parts of the world hence consolidate their power base and at the same time gain legitimacy at a global level. The more narratives that they can present at a global level, then the higher the chances of what they present being viewed as representative hence legitimate.

Despite their seemingly side-line role, NGOs play a very important role in terms of presenting narratives that they claim belong to the poor people of the world. These narratives are convincing and have also been used as a source of Indigenous Knowledge (IK).

Institutions at a Global level

The term institutions has been widely studied and critiqued at different levels and scales (Hodgson and Calatrava 2006; Schluter and Theesfeld 2008; Wallis 2011). For the purposes of this study the definition of institutions shall be taken from Douglas North who looks at institutions as a humanly devised rules and regulations which can be formal and informal (North 2009). These institutions may be manifested in the form of organisations and bodies that set the rules of the game and have the power to change them. Actors may subscribe to these institutions in their individual capacities or through the organizations that they are members of. We make this distinction as there can be several institutions that govern the way in which actors act in different capacities (MacKenzie and Wajcman 2004).

However, at this stage of the chapter, we limit the discussion to the global level; we will focus the discussion on global level institutions. The findings of the study highlight these institutions and their roles will be discussed here. I also argue that these institutions may also be tools in as much as they are used for the purposes of governmentality (Foucault 1991). The study managed to identify *some* of the key institutions that exist at global level and these are outlined below

United Nations: As the names of the Conventions suggest, the United Nations remains they key custodian of global policies, conventions and policy frameworks. In as such they were considered by respondents as a key institution within the Climate change arena.

IPCC: This is an organisation and yet at the same time commands quite some respect in terms of the knowledge that informs the policy process. Respondents agreed that if the knowledge that was produced by the IPCC would suddenly change, then the policy process and interactions within the arena would change as well. Most of the agreements at global level call upon the use of findings from the IPCC without specifying what the findings are. In this way, it is assumed that whatever the IPCC produces is legitimate and in an arena where response is based upon IPCC knowledge this firmly places it in the realm of an institution.

G77 Countries: This is a grouping of Developing States that represents a consolidation of power at global level within the Climate change arena

African Group: This is a group of African Countries that have come together to form a network and coalition to enable their voices to be heard. They play a key role in defining and stalling certain outcomes within the arena and policy process

The Climate change arena is an area of struggle between different actors within it. These actors are rational to the extent that they also realize the power that they possess relative to that possessed by others within the arena. In some cases this may prompt the formation of coalitions and networks that enable power to be consolidated. This consolidation of power may in fact lead to a greater vantage point in terms of negotiations and the desire to see their narratives being carried forward as part of the discourse in the policy process. An example may be cited from the study findings where the African governments banded together and presented what has come to be known as the African position and in this way enhanced their bargaining potential. I argue that it was this redistribution of power within the arena that contributed to COP15 producing no more than a political statement (Bodansky 2010) in the form of the Copenhagen Accord.

The idea of power manifests itself at a global and national level across actors and institutions. However, at the global front, hierarchical structures are not always clearly defined. The global front represents a space where different world governments come together, each as a representative of a sovereign nation


African Voice

There is widespread agreement from actors at national and global level including the IPCC that Africa will be the most affected by climate change (IPCC 2007). In as such, African Governments have also rolled over and played the part of the victim who needs to be helped and compensated in the face of Climate change. However, this is not without reason as the IPCC states that the climatic changes may wreak havoc on the agro-based economies of Africa (IPCC 2007).

Due to the above, Zimbabwe gained entrance into the negotiating arena on Climate change. All the interviewees reported that they had participated at Copenhagen Conference. Oxfam

GB reported that they were doing a lot of lobbying and advocacy. The idea was to lobby western governments to ratify protocols and “culprits” to put resources in adaptation programmes” (Interview, Director, ZELA, 2011). At national level organisations find gaps in the legislation and advocate for issues to be rectified all the while working with international organisations so that they may be able to help them achieve their intended outcomes. (Interview Programme Officer, Plan International, 2010) (Interview Programme Officer Zimbabwe Red Cross Society, 2010).

However, when asked the extent and effectiveness of their voice alone, the informants within Zimbabwe indicated that they had to form coalitions with other organisations or governments. The graph below shows the responses given by the informants about the collaborative strategies that they used to enhance their voice in the global arena.



Graph 1: Collaborative partners of informants

From the above, we note that most informants relied on collaborations encompassing a range of actors and institutions. Some of the institutions mentioned include the formation of coalitions with the African Group and G77. In the same breath, the same countries that were part of the coalition had formed an alliance with China, an emerging powerhouse, and agreed to look at negotiations from two perspectives i.e. Protocol under the AWG-KP and Convention under the AWG-LCA. The protocol under AWG-KP sought to put pressure on the developed countries in Annex 1 of the Kyoto protocol to reduce emissions.

The Convention on AWG-LCA is one that seeks to address issues of compliance even beyond 2012. In as such the African Group has taken a unified position in terms of the future of the Climate change talks with particular emphasis on the Bali declaration. As pointed out above in the analysis of the Bali declaration, it is essentially a declaration that relates to issues of adaptation with some emphasis on mitigation, financing, technology and capacity building. These aspects will also be explored in depth when we get to the national level.

Yet another issue that Zimbabwe and the African Group agree on is the establishment of a multi-lateral fund that will look at funding climate change initiatives in developing countries. This issue of incentives and funding is what has been key in bringing African Countries to the negotiating table (Anonymous* perscom). However, it is key that I point out that findings indicated that even within the common African position lie other positions that are based on geographic positioning and economic groupings. Zimbabwe is part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) by virtue of its geographic location. In as such SADC has some say in the position that is taken by GoZ in the negotiations. For example SADC in November 2009 endorsed the idea and content of the African position in terms of Conference of parties 15 (COP15). After the COP15, Southern African Development Committee (SADC) Ministers then noted the political outcome of the conference and called on “Member States to develop a comprehensive SADC strategy on climate change in preparation for COP16.”(W. Zhakata interview)

In the same breath, Zimbabwe and other African states are part of the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and African Ministers of Environment (AMCEN) which have supported the African position in relation to Climate change negotiations at global level. Respondents interviewed at a national level viewed the African Group as a very powerful group whose views are heard at a global level. In as such, each actor may form part of a policy network and/or regime and in this way enhance group and self-interests at the same time. These memberships may be formal. Or informal while others have a default vs. selected membership base. However, these networks are not mutually exclusive; meaning that membership in one network does not necessarily preclude membership within another network.

What is interesting is that networks and alliances formed at a global level, at times with the participation of national actors then seek to have their policies and discourses adopted a na-

tional level, in this case, Zimbabwe. However, the study found that actors and institutions within the arena were rationale, entering the arena to achieve a predetermined goal; these goals were not always realized resulting in a National manifestation of global discourses and practices in ways that were not anticipated. However, as networks and coalitions are formed interests from members within the coalition struggle between each other. The actors then go through a process of negotiation where their interests are transformed and translated to accommodate those of others that are within the group. As a result we have emergent interests that become expressed as the dominant narrative

This study will continue by analyzing the Climate change Arena in Zimbabwe and the manifestation of discourses and policies at national level in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4: Climate change as a policy arena in Zimbabwe

4.1 Introduction

Zimbabwe is a country that has been facing economic and social challenges for a long time now with it recording the highest ever level of inflation in history (New York Times 2007). The study findings are consistent with the view proposed by many authors such as Buse et al (2005) that policy making goes beyond the realm of government. The policy process in Zimbabwe has a large number of actors, institutions and within Zimbabwe donors and NGOs also form a large and critical part of the process. In as such, national policy is exposed to a large extent to pressures by global civil society which exists outside the physical country boundaries.

To put this into perspective, one must understand the institutional and policy drivers that exist within Zimbabwe. Institutions are taken in their broadest sense to encompass all arrangements that contribute to the making and enforcement of rules within the arena (North 2009). The Zimbabwean Government, whilst firmly in control, realises that it lacks the financial muscle to participate fully in the policy process with regards to policy formulation through to implementation. The government no longer has enough money to be able to implement most activities within its borders including within the Climate change Arena. However, the arrangements to channel funding to developing countries like Zimbabwe that are established by the global community and which are applicable to Zimbabwe do not allow monetary funds to be channelled through the government. This is due to the strained relationship between the global community and the Zimbabwean government. Instead they are channelled mostly through International NGOs and multi-lateral organisations. In this way we see that there is some degree of by-passing the state which is initiated at a global level. The global level then creates an enabling environment for other actors other than the government to play a prominent role within the global Climate change policy process.

Most of these funding that is provided for the Climate change policy process comes from external sources highlighted in the global policy documents and from aid agencies. However, this funding is wrought with conditionalities as actors have to meet certain standards in order to be able to benefit. The money is channelled into the country with conditions that on one hand aim to better the country but on the other also serve to perpetuate foreign interests.

Zimbabwe the situation is further compounded by cultural factors. Unlike in other countries, Zimbabweans, in both their individual and institutional capacities do not donate money out of free will. Any “donations” are mandatory and enforced by the tax authority for example the HIV levy. In as such, all funding within the Climate change policy process is external and may serve to perpetuate foreign interests in the country leading to Zimbabwe's sovereignty being transcended on various fronts. I argue that such a situation has meant that policies that are formulated and implemented in the country, either formally or informally, are driven by foreigners and awash with their interests which are not necessarily beneficial to Zimbabwe in the long run.

The study found that the by-passing of the Zimbabwean government has been accompanied by a slowing down and in some cases a complete halt of formal policy processes within the Zimbabwe. In light of the above, the Chapter will begin by presenting a description of the Climate change Arena in Zimbabwe. This chapter will encompass mapping out the key actors and institutions. We will also look at the policy process through the eyes of the informants and add character to the study through the use of vignettes and interview extracts.

4.2 Climate change policy as an arena

This section of the Chapter will seek to explain the arena from the perspective of the researcher. The section will denote the researcher’s understanding of the Climate change arena and the interactions within it. Some of the issues raised will be given character and life through field notes and experiences.

When I arrived in Zimbabwe I had a clear idea of who was doing what within the Climate change Arena, having worked as an environmentalist for some years in Zimbabwe⁷. I had worked at a time when civil society was disengaged from the Government of Zimbabwe, when we considered them to be the bad guys. So one can imagine my surprise, during one of the first interviews. I asked the Director of Zimbabwe Environment Regional Organisation (ZERO) who he thought were the main actors within the Climate change arena. ZERO is a regional organisation that has been in operation in Zimbabwe since 1987 focussing on a range of environmental issues ranging from trade through to policy advocacy. For this study, my

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I was involved in the Environmental Sector from the year 2002 until 2008. I worked as an intern, consultant and programmes manager in various environmental spheres.

interest in them was particularly from the perspective of Climate change and the policy process in Zimbabwe. I will characterise his response in the vignette below

Being the current chair of a group that they called the Climate change Working Group he immediately mentioned the other members of the group. I sat across from him and scribbled down the names of the organisation. To my surprise, he went on to mention the Government of Zimbabwe through the Climate change Office. At that stage I had not yet been to the Climate change Office, and I mentioned this to him. He immediately said "Go and see him and tell him that you are coming from ZERO, he will definitely see you." Interview Director ZERO, 2010.

From the vignette above, I could derive that there was some form of a relationship between ZERO and the national Climate change Office. The relationship was perhaps so intimate that the mention of the Director's name would secure me an appointment with a high level government employee. I began to wonder if this relationship even went beyond a professional one to be one that existed at a more personal level and if this was peculiar to the director of ZERO. As I continued making appointments and asking the same question, "Who are the key actors within the Climate change Arena" Climate change Office was constantly mentioned. The Director of Zimbabwe Environmental Lawyers Association asked how they could talk of Climate change without the government especially in light of the global nature of Climate change. A programme Officer at DRI also indicated that they had a good working relationship with the Climate change Office, and went on to explain that he, Mr Zhakata, was supposed to be at a workshop that they had held in January but had sent someone else as he was busy. Clearly, at this stage, the relationship was not limited to the Director of ZERO but extended to other actors within the Climate change Arena.

As the study continued and took shape, I found that the National Climate change office was mentioned by all the informants that I contacted, perhaps showing that there was indeed some form of collaboration between the civil society and government. For me, this puts the Climate change Office firmly in the middle of the Climate change Arena. However, it is important at this stage if to note that there is the reference in all cases to the Climate change Office and not the Ministry of Environment and Tourism. This distinction made is very important in that Climate change is housed under the Ministry of Environment and Tourism with the

Permanent Secretary being in charge (Government of Zimbabwe 2008). And yet for the informants, it was the Climate change Office that was key and it was the person within it with whom they had a close relationship. This shows that the Climate change Arena in Zimbabwe is one that is characterised by relationships and alliance building which is perhaps done for strategic purposes by actors within it.

When we speak of actors within the Climate change arena, the Government of Zimbabwe is undoubtedly also a very key actor. However, it is important that within Government there are various other actors in the form various ministries besides the Ministry of Environment and Tourism. However, the custodian of Climate change in Zimbabwe is the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Management through the National Climate change Office. Other key ministries and government departments include Ministry of Energy and Environmental Management Agency.

From the vignette above, I also noted with key interest that informants knew who was within the Climate change Arena. The informants were asked who they thought were some of the key actors in terms of Climate change at a national level 100% of them were able to name at least 3 other organisations. This is an indication of the closeness of the Climate change arena in Zimbabwe. This is an arena made up of people and organisations that know each other and are part of the Climate change Arena by certain virtues. At this stage I would like to even refer to it as an invited arena. An arena where you become a part of it by invitation or by referral. One's participation is on the basis of being invited. I will account an experience of the invitedness of the Climate change Arena using the following vignette

For this study, I mostly worked on with no affiliation to an organisation. I relied on contacts that I already had and used the snowball method. At one time the Director of ZELA sent me an invitation that had been forwarded to him for an OXFAM GB workshop. I immediately jumped on the chance to attend, and the opportunity to talk to more people in the Climate change Arena. Once I got there, I sat in the crowd, noting who the leaders of the workshop were. At break time I approached them and asked for their contact details. At a later date I set up a meeting. When I arrived at the venue, after the casual greetings, I was asked the question "How did you end up at our workshop, who invited

*you?" I was stuck, not sure if I should reveal the source of the invitation. Having been cornered I highlighted that the Director of ZELA had passed on the details of the workshop. There was some **hint** of understanding and the interview was set in motion. (Fieldwork Notes 2011)*

The above not only exemplifies how one can only enter the Climate change Arena by invitation but also how closely guarded the arena is. Zimbabwe's field is one wrought by fear with everyone wanting some reassurance that the person that they are speaking to is trustworthy. This trust is gained by actors within the Climate change Arena assessing that you have legitimate motives that are not out to hurt them. Such legitimacy may be gained through belonging to a certain organisation or being referred by a trusted organisation. The assumption is then that the referrer has vetted you and deemed you legitimate. As such the attitude "any friend of yours is a friend of mine" is adopted. As such the relationship between the actors in the Climate change Arena may be viewed as close knitted with actors knowing other actors within the arena.

The organisations within the Climate change Arena could also afford and were able to screen and choose whom they were able to and wanted to trust due to the close knittedness of the arena. There were very few organisations that were involved in Climate change (in comparison to the total number of NGOs in Zimbabwe) such that as the study progressed, I began to wonder, to what extent organisations within Zimbabwe were preoccupied with Climate change. This is especially in light of the preoccupation of actors within Zimbabwe with the country as one in crisis and people were concerned with meeting daily needs and rebuilding assets bases. So, even though Zimbabwe had been part of the global Climate change arena since the 90s, Climate change was still considered by some to be a relatively new concept within the Zimbabwean arena.

The thought of actors within the arena considering Climate change a new concept and yet it was not so new played on my mind. At one instance I sat down with a colleague, whom I will not name as the discussion was off the record, and discussed how Climate change could be considered a new concept in Zimbabwe. He said to me that for most parts, organisations were looking for the new buzz words, the new donor focus. So, due to media hype within the country surrounding Climate change in the build- up to Copenhagen. The hype was so big

that the President of Zimbabwe travelled to Denmark to attend the conference. I then decided to include this in my key informant interviews. “When did Climate change become an issue worth attention in Zimbabwe? The view expressed by my colleague was re-emphasised time and again.

A programme officer at FAO laughed at my questions and then took a moment to think about it. He then said “...they hype began just before and continued after Copenhagen...” (Programme Officer FAO, 2011)

One then wonders to what extent the focus on Climate change is of Zimbabwean origin and the rationale for adopting it as a key feature within the country. Is it yet another case of modernisation where western initiatives are imposed upon the south or a calculated decision on the part of the south, and in this case Zimbabwe? At the Copenhagen Conference. I then decided to analyse a speech presented by the President of Zimbabwe, Cde Robert Mugabe as it may also be considered as a key indicator of policy and discourse directions and the position of Zimbabwe within the global climate change arena

In this speech his Excellency makes an important speech at the Summit held in Copenhagen in 2009. I will begin by transcribing relevant sections of the speech in the vignette below


“We raise these questions not out of spite or vindictiveness but out of concern for our very endangered livelihood..... We of Africa aligned with our brothers in the developing world have made proposals predicated on principles of historical responsibility.....It simply has become imperative that the developed world support developing countries to adapt to...this man made planetary if not cosmic disaster. May I say, the developing world, itself the least offending in Climate crime, owns bio-carbon resources and carries in a sense the world’s lungs, now solely needed for cleaning the world let that be recognised as our comparative advantage.We who tend the forests so badly needed to heal the ecosystem deserve better funding and improved access to green technology transfer.....”

From the above vignette we note that Zimbabwe is indeed committed to Climate change as a global initiative that it can adopt. However, such adoption would be based on the securing of funding from developed nations. For me, this then perhaps is an indication that Climate change is indeed an issue that originates from the global level. At the same time, I note that this process is viewed as negotiation in which parties seek to derive maximum gain. What is interesting through is that throughout this speech, agriculture is not mentioned. Instead there is emphasis on forestry as a bargaining tool to enable more funding to enter the country. This confirms the view that Climate change is indeed a buzz word that whose adoption by Zimbabwe is indeed a calculated one on the basis of the perceived benefits.

Despite the reasons for adoption of this global phenomenon, the fact remains that a number of actors are found within the Zimbabwean Climate change arena who may not have the same goal. The next section will analyse the key actors within the national Climate change arena through the eyes of the informants.

4.3 Key Actors at a national level

This section of the study will seek to map the key actors within the Climate change Arena as they were identified by the informants. The informants were asked to name who they thought were the key actors in terms of Climate change Adaptation within the arena. From the names mentioned the following map was drawn.



Map 1: Key actors at national level in Zimbabwe

In addition to the Government, informants highlighted key actors mostly those that they worked with. Donors were quick to highlight NGOs whilst multi-laterals were quick to highlight other multi-laterals. In some instances, I posed the question towards the end of the interview. I would ask, “Who else may I be able to talk to? In terms of the issues that we have just discussed?” and in this way get a feel of who to them was key. The table below shows some of the responses that were given

Table 1: Key actors identified by informants

Respondent	3 Key Actors that were named
Programme Officer OXFAM GB	Bird Life Zimbabwe, SIDA, DRI
Programme Officer DRI	SARDC, World Bank, Action 24
United Nations Development Programme	Food and Agriculture Organisation, ZERO, United Nations Environmental Programme
Food and Agriculture Organisation	Forestry Commission of Zimbabwe, UNDP and UNEP
Global Environmental Fund	Environmental Management Agency, UNDP, OXFAM GB

As can be seen organisations were able to mention other organisations that were within their spaces and were of direct relevance to their work. FAO works with forestry and so would

mention the Forestry Commission of Zimbabwe, OXFAM GB is funded by Swedish International Development Aid hence would see them as a key actor. From the interviews, I also realised that NGOs made relevance to a group that they called the Climate change Working group to which ZERO was chair at the time of the study.

ZELA is a prominent and dynamic organisation made up of lawyers who tackle environmental issues for the less privileged members of society from a litigation perspective. They were in a very good position to assess discourse and policy at both a global and national level in relation to the Climate change Arena. One day, I sat across from the Director of ZELA, talking about the Climate change policy process in his office. As the conversation evolved he mentioned that his organisation was part of the Climate change Working Group. I then asked who the members of this group were and he mentioned the following organisations ZERO, ZELA, Practical Action, Environment Africa, WWF, Africa 2000, Climate change office, FAO, Action Aid International, OXFAM and Bird Life Zimbabwe. (Field Notes, Director, ZELA, 2010). In subsequent interviews I sought to confirm the participation of the named organisations within the working group. At an interview with Bird Life Zimbabwe, before I managed to ask if they were indeed part of the working group they immediately associated themselves with the working group saying they were a part of it Interview , Programme Officer, Bird Life Zimbabwe, 2010

The working group was made up of 13 organisations (relative to the 2000 NGOs that were registered in Zimbabwe at the time of the study (NANGO 2011)). This number is less than 1% of the total number of the organisations that are operational in Zimbabwe. Yet there is some kind of power and prestige associated with being a part of this group. This was derived from the pride expressed at being a member of the group. The pride may stem from the trans-sectorial nature of the group, having representatives from NGOs, government and multi-lateral organisations. The pride may also stem from the view of the group as a specialised and perhaps elite group which is composed of self-proclaimed Climate change experts. Whichever the root of the pride, the existence of this group points to the ability of the arena to generate new organisations and spaces in order to achieve certain goals including the

integration of global perspectives into national level policy process⁸. The members of such organisations would then essentially gain access to certain spaces and have platforms to present their narratives.

One such space was the National Climate change Conference in 2010 where a presentation was made on the Climate change working group and its role within Zimbabwe. At break time I approached the individual who had made the presentation and sought to probe further. The following information is extracted from my brief conversation with him and the power-point presentation that he made. As I was talking to him, I could see that several other people were waiting around for a chance to speak to him as well. Being a person that he did not know, his attention span with me quickly waned and he excused himself to talk to someone who he knew. The dynamics within the arena go beyond elements of trust but extend to whom will enable one to achieve the maximum benefit from participating in the arena. They also extend to who will enable the other's narrative to be heard and perhaps become a discourse. As such natural but unforeseen and unofficial hierarchies and coalitions are established within the arena.

As mentioned in the section above, The NGOs in Zimbabwe had come together to form what is known as the Climate change Working Group. According to the Climate change Working Group, they sought to

"See Zimbabwean communities aware of the impacts of Climate change on their lives and biodiversity and are empowered to actively participate in Climate change issues and decision making and be able to manage the impacts and prevent further damage to the environment." J Chigwada, PowerPoint presentation, 2010

Mr Chigwada spoke about the group with pride and tried his best to exemplify that it was not a fly by night⁹ group. On the contrary, he indicated that it had It became more organised and

⁸ All the members of the Climate change Working Group had been involved in global processes and spaces either as government advisors or simply as pressure groups

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A fly-by-night group is one that emerges for a certain agenda and then disappears as quickly as it started. In Zimbabwe the term is used to refer to organizations that have little legitimacy, output and are most likely to take your money and run before one reaps any of the benefits.

official in 2009, with its role being to partner government in preparation for Conference of Party meetings. Again this exemplifies the close working relationship that exists between government and civil society actors. Essentially in the Zimbabwean context, the role of the NGOs evolved from observers to advisors and key actors within the policy process at a national and global level. The group has identified some strategic areas of involvement within the Climate change Arena and these include agriculture, health, policy capacity building and advocacy. These areas are a reflection of key donor priorities (discussed in the Chapter 5 below) and married to a lesser extent with Government priorities.

In as such, organisations may in some cases be aligned to the priorities of the institutions to which they are affiliated. The extent of the alignment may guide the operations and long terms plans of organisations hence the study will also focus on the institutions within the Climate change Arena in as far as they were identified by the informants. The next section of the study will focus on institutions within the Climate change Arena in Zimbabwe.

4.4 Key Institutions

The study also looked at institutional interaction and mechanisms at national level within the Zimbabwean Climate change arena. We found that in the language used by informants, the terms used by organisations and institutions were used interchangeably by all the informants. However, the study distances itself from this generalisation by taking an approach that looks at institutions as the rule makers and game changers within the Climate change arena. In as such, the following institutions were identified




Figure 1: Institutions at National level in Zimbabwe

The identification of the institutions was derived from the responses of the informants to issues that affected their programming. Most of the informants highlighted that donors' priorities were key to what activities and approaches they used within the Climate change Arena. This was due to the fact that they depended on the money that this particular institution had for their organisations to survive. Essentially, Civil Society organisations changed their tune each time that donors changed theirs. I will again use a vignette to exemplify

Whilst in Zimbabwe I was in touch with a range of organisations trying to revive old connections and make new ones. I also spent quite some time with SNV Zimbabwe, a Dutch organisation which had always focussed on an agricultural capacity building activities with education at all levels as main facet. They are the go to people in terms of Capacity Building with their logo reflecting this. However, in 2010 the DGIS, which is the Dutch arm for development cooperation and one of their key donors, decided to switch its funding priorities from education to renewable energy in the face of Climate change. This sparked some alarm as it meant that there was to be some restructuring and some posts being dissolved. The programming was shifting to suit the new needs of the main funder. Immediately the programming of this organisation changed to encompass Climate change related activities with one advisor previously in education assuming the task of putting together programmes on energy. SNV Zimbabwe has no prior experience with Climate change. (Own experience and reflexive process)

At the same time, multi-lateral institutions were also mentioned as one of the institutions that were affecting the Climate change arena especially from a policy formulation perspective. I will account the interactions that I had with UNDP and THE Climate change Coordinator to exemplify the above.

Situation 1

I sat in the office of the Climate change Coordinator, having an informative interview with him. In the middle of the interview, a young woman came in. She indicated that she was looking for the contribution from the Climate change Office for a purpose

they were both aware of. I noticed that her tone was polite and not demanding. The Coordinator then responded that he was unable to contribute as the funding they were expecting had not yet come from the donor. Apparently there had been a delay in the audit report and the Multi-lateral Agency was waiting for this report to release the next trench of funds. He however, went on to tell the lady to perhaps borrow from another source and he would pay it back as soon as the money came in. (Interview notes, Climate change Coordinator, 2011)

Situation 2

I was glad when the Programme Officer from UNDP agreed to see me with no hassles. UNDP was said by the informants to be funding the Climate change policy formulation process within Zimbabwe. However, at this stage I was quite unclear about the manner in which the process was to proceed. The Climate change Coordinator had indicated that it was still unclear if they would formulate a separate Climate change policy or not. I decided to pose this position to the Programme Officer and she immediately indicated that they would indeed be a separate policy. (Interview Notes, Programme Officer UNDP, 2011)

From the situations above, we note that whilst the government representatives were reluctant and not sure which policy option to choose in terms of formalising Climate change policy within Zimbabwe, this was not the same for UNDP. UNDP was sure that they were on the path of formulating a separate Climate change policy and that the funding that they had would enable Zimbabwe proceed in that direction. For me we see a clear pecking order that has developed between the 2 institutions. One where the Climate change Office is reliant on funds from Multi-laterals whom have the authority to withhold such funds and hinder operations. We also note that although there is some general discord in terms of the way to proceed in the policy process, UNDP seems confident as it holds they access to the much needed financial resources. So within the ad-hoc nature or the arena we see emergence of orders between institutions and organisations, with those that have monetary resources seemingly being in control.

Such an upper hand based on monetary possession is clear throughout the arena. However, such an upper hand can also be based on the notion of knowledge, those that produce the knowledge have some degree of power on how it is presented and perhaps even used by others within the Climate change Arena. In as such, the IPCC remains a key institution in terms of the knowledge in as much as it fed into the policy process even at national level. In all the interviews, each respondent mentioned the IPCC at-least once in their capacity as a key source of knowledge. Even the National Meteorological Department viewed the IPCC as a key institution within the Zimbabwean Climate change arena, relying on its methods and data for its own assessment. I found this out when I was attending The National Climate change Conference in November of 2010. The extract from the PowerPoint presentation made by the National Meteorological Department will be used as evidence for the above.

This is especially important in a country that believes in factual based policy making like Zimbabwe. Any change in the evidence would entail not only a change in the game within the arena but also in the rules that govern it.

So far we note that governance of the arena is spread amongst a number of institutions based on knowledge and financial muscle. However, we have some institutions that derive their status from the power vested to them by the constitution of the state. With this in mind, the Government of Zimbabwe is also an institution in its own right. Whilst none of the actors mentioned the Government as one that affected their operation, they mentioned that it affected and controlled their very existence. They said that the Government had the power to suspend operations of any entity operating within its borders at any time. It is in this way that it is a key institution within the arena. We then see that the interaction that the Government of Zimbabwe had with other institutions in the field may be likened to that of a tamed Lion. Although it may follow commands when it suits it, it has the ability to attack at any time.

With the above in mind, we note that all the institutions identified above indicated that they have some form of interaction with each other. Such an interaction may cause some form of ordering that is in reality very complicated. Whilst at first glance we note that power appears to lie in the hands of those with monetary resources as they are the ones who choose to exercise it. However, this does not take away the power that lies within the Government of Zimbabwe which chooses to exercise its power in a more subtle manner. The Government chooses to be led as what it requires at the moment are the resources for implementation. However it has the ultimate decision about what happens within its borders or does it? This

not only presents the identified institutions as having agency, but as calculating when and how to use this agency whilst at the same time “disguising diverse interests” (McGee 2005). This will be discussed further in Chapter 6.

4.5 Guardian of the policy process

When it came to issues of policy, 100% of the informants immediately referred the interviewer to the Climate change Office. When I began my data collection, being a student of theories of policy process, I sought to engage with actors within the arena through my definition of the policy process. I soon found out that the definition that I had was certainly not the one that was shared within the Climate change arena in Zimbabwe. To them, policy process was limited to formulation, it was limited to government. I will exemplify this using 2 situational encounters during the time of the study:

Situation 2

I walked into the WWF offices early in the morning, hoping to secure an appointment. As I got to the reception I noticed that there was no-one there, so I waited patiently. After some minutes a woman came and asked if she could help me. I began to explain why I was there and that I was looking to talk about the Climate change policy process within Zimbabwe. She then abruptly and rudely said to me “Why don’t you go to the Ministry, we do not do policy here.” I stood there, perplexed and agitated when another woman came. She then explained to me that they were in the process of recruiting a new person to cover Climate change issues within the arena as an employee of WWF. (Field notes 2010)

Situation 3

In another incident, I had booked an appointment with a Programme Officer at SIDA. He was open to discuss initiatives that SIDA was involved in. He however, was quick to reiterate that they were not involved in policy. He said to me “If you want to talk of policy then you must go and see the guy in the Climate change Office...what’s his name....Zhakata. He would be the best person to help you” Interview, Programme Officer, SIDA 2011

In both cases, organisations had programmes that were running within the Climate change arena. WWF was even a member of the Climate change Working group that was a firm part of the policy process. And yet, the very mention of the word policy led people fleeing for cover and putting the responsibility firmly within the realm of government responsibilities, not their own. They viewed civil society as a complimentary body to government measures. This is interesting especially in light of the fact that there was no formal Climate change policy in Zimbabwe bringing to the table what the civil society was complimenting. The study then found that there were some activities to put in place some kind of policy and project interventions that were in the name of Climate change. This brings to the table the issue of a formal policy vis-a-vis an informal policy. It even brings to the table the extent to which global policies begin to act as formal policies at a national level.

4.6 Guiding policy at National level?

As mentioned above, at the international level, Climate change had been on the cards for over 20 years. At the time of the study there was no formal policy on Climate change in Zimbabwe. One then had to wonder where all the initiatives in and around the Climate change Arena were based. So I enquired where all these activities were based. Was it just a common understanding or perhaps grounded in an unwritten document? I will account through a vignette below how global policies may have circumvented national sovereignty and become the default.

I signed in to the Government Offices showed my identification document and was allowed in. I had scheduled an appointment with the man that everyone was talking about, Mr. Zhakata. I waited in the corridor for him to arrive. He arrived and immediately I could tell why people were so taken to him. He was a warm man, very accommodating, one you could immediately relate to. As we began talking I also discovered that he was very well versed with International policies and the negotiation, He would be right, as the man who was in charge at both international and national level. We spoke of a lot of issues most of which will inform this study. At this point though I would like to point out his response to my question about where all these interventions were based. He indicated that at the moment the UNFCCC was guiding interventions within

the Zimbabwean Climate change Arena. (Interview notes, Coordinator Climate change Office, 2011)

A few weeks before, I had been to the offices of Environment Africa. Environment Africa is yet another prominent environmental organization whose wings were spread over most of Southern Africa. They had several programmes on Climate change and had even included Climate change in their strategic focus. Having included it in their focus I asked the country manager, that in the absence of a policy, what were they basing their interventions on? He has given me more or less the same answer...they too based their interventions on the UNFCCC and on donor priorities at the time. It was clear that there was some sort of grounding. But the question was what aspects of the UNFCCC had been adopted within the Zimbabwean arena and what the rationale for adopting some and not others was.

The above and further discussions with representatives of the Government of Zimbabwe indicate that the country remains fully committed to the implementation of the UNFCCC. (Interview Climate change Office), (Interview Ministry of Agriculture.) Zimbabwe was one of the countries to sign the UNFCCC in 1992. It is also committed to the United Nations Convention on bio-diversity and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. Zimbabwe however, is not party to the Copenhagen Declaration but is one of the signatories of the Cancun Framework. These policies have some bearing on the Climate change Policy process within the country.

From the discussions with informants that were operating at a national level so far we derive amongst others, 2 issues.

- That Climate change was described as grey area whose policies were still vague to most discussions.
- That the UNFCCC was the so called default policy that was operating within Zimbabwe

However, as the discussions progressed and I pressed more and more about the global policies, a different issue came to light. Whilst out of the 30 informants that I spoke with 24 mentioned the UNFCCC in response to the question “how do you think national policies are affected by global policies?”, but of these, only 13 could articulate the

contents of the these policies. The study pursues some possible reasons for this lack of failure to articulate in below in this section. However, before these are pursued, I will exemplify this failure to articulate using two incidents from the data collection phase


I was in an interview with a Programme Officer from Bird Life Zimbabwe. We were having a great discussion on everything that concerned Climate change, trying to relate to both the global and the national policies. And of course, they too used the UNFCCC as the default in the absence of a formal Climate change policy. I then began to ask about the Bali Plan and what they had adopted from there and the conversation took a turn. Suddenly it was a case of them mainstreaming Climate change in current conservation activities without them getting specific about international frameworks. This turn in the conversation was not particular to this NGO. (Interview Notes, Programme Officer, Bird Life Zimbabwe, 2010)

I will account another incident with a dear colleague of mine working at the Municipal Development Trust.

Municipal Development Trust is not one of the informants in this study but my experience with them is important for exemplifying how global policies are understood at national level. I had long talks with my colleague trying to convince him how they would be relevant to the study. He agreed to participate, and asked that I send him the interview structure so that he could prepare for the next day, the day of the official interview. I had another interview scheduled on the same day with another organisation across town from his offices. In a rush I walked across town only to hear from him that he was unable to answer and participate on global level issues and hence felt that the interview would not contribute much to the study.

This reluctance and failure to articulate and engage at on global level policies was extended to even those in Government arms such as Ministry of Agriculture who could not articulate what was contained therein. This lack of articulation brings to the table questions of the extent to which the UNFCCC was indeed part of the national climate

change arena and the policy process. The graph below exemplifies how most of the informants could not articulate what was contained within the global policies.



Graph 2: Articulation of global policies by informants

This scenario then brings into question how then UNFCCC could have been the default policy in within the Climate change Arena in Zimbabwe yet more than half of the people were not able to articulate the contents. At the same time there was some reference to local Climate change related policies that were being used at a national level. This may then bring me to the conclusion that people and organisations are using the UN framework as a means of legitimisation of their practises. These practises probably are the outcome of an incremental experience of governance from the field lines of development. However, the true extent to which the UNFCCC is governing activities within the Zimbabwean arena is questionable.


At this stage I would like to give an account of an informant who could articulate the contents of the UNFCCC and how they applied it to their work.

ZELA

As the interview progressed and we spoke of the interactions that existed between the global policies and the national policy process in Zimbabwe. He responded to say that if one looks at the UNFCCC is talks of issues to do with coordination and sectorial approach to ensure that activities are happening on the ground. He went on to say that in his opinion "we are very

good at signing agreements but there has not been any domestication affecting our respond effectively to the Climate change.....” Interview notes, Director, ZERO

However, during the interviews 6 civil society organisations indicated that whilst there was no specific policy on Climate change there were Climate change related laws and policies and those were acting as a default policy for example the Environmental Management Act of 2005 and the Environmental Policy of 2009.



Graph 3: Perception of Climate change policy in Zimbabwe

The idea of tackling Climate change stems from the idea of tackling environmental problems now for the future of future generations. The Environmental Management Act was put in place *“To provide for the sustainable management natural resources and protection of the environment; the prevention of pollution and environmental degradation;...”* (***Environmental Management Act page 1***). In this way the Environmental Management Act contains therein Climate change related texts that cover issues of pollution by atmospheric gases, and for sustainable use of natural resources which encompasses forests. As discussed in Chapter 3, these are key elements of the current global discourse and policies.

The legitimization of activities and the clear lack of a national policy framework were clearly key aspects that formed part of the governance within the arena. However, with a lack of guiding element that came from the top, the next issue would be then to what extent activities

within the arena are organised and aligned. It all seemed like everyone was doing what they wanted, when they wanted and how they wanted. However, it was important that I get the views of the informants on how organised the policy process was. To illustrate and give character to the responses I will give situations around which I discussed the extent to which Climate change practises were organised.


4.7 An organised policy process?

I will again cite an example of an informal interaction that I had with an employee at Action Aid International. We had attended the same meeting at the offices of another NGO in Avondale and he offered me a lift. We began talking about the study that I was conducting in and around the Climate change arena. He was intrigued and so I took the opportunity to ask about the manner in which activities were organised. He indicated that at the moment, Climate change arena was composed of people and organisations organising their own activities without a coordinating mechanisms in place.

The example above leads me to the next section of the chapter that will look at how the informants viewed the Climate change process in Zimbabwe in its entirety. The 1st part will focus on the manner in which the arena is organised through the eyes of the informants.

4.7.1 How people viewed Climate change Policy process

As discussed above, Climate change is a new concept in Zimbabwe amongst the bulk of the actors who were key informants. This is despite the fact that Zimbabwe had been a part of Climate change since the early 90s. However, within Zimbabwe, despite the involvement within the global Climate change Arena for many years, there was still no national specific policy on Climate change. As such there was lack of a guiding mechanism leading to actors within the arena taking stabs at what they thought was relevant whilst at the same time beginning a process of naming and blaming certain institutions for the apparent lack of organisation.. This lack of a guiding framework is perhaps what led most of the informants to the study in Zimbabwe (n=30) to describe the policy process as being very ad-hoc with no specific direction for the country and no harmonisation of aims.



Graph 4: Description of the Zimbabwean National policy process by informants

With the lack of a policy in place they felt that there was no guiding framework for activities and work. Whilst non-governmental departments praised the formation of a Climate change office, they felt that there was still more that needed to be done I will use yet another situation to exemplify the above view

I sat in what seemed a less light hearted interview at OXFAM GB offices. The Programme Officer was warm but I could tell that for him Climate change was a serious issue. As the discussion progressed he indicated that they had held a workshop 2 weeks back in Gweru on Climate change which was attended by a host of local organisations. Although at the time of the interview he told me that the workshop had revealed to him that Climate change was a new concept to the organisations and they were still learning how to mainstream it into their activities. For the programme officer, there was still some way to go in terms of raising awareness on Climate change and Capacity Building NGOs to understand and be able to tackle Climate change (Interview, Programme Officer, OXFAM GB)

The Programme Officer from FAO like many of the informants viewed the implementation of activities by NGOs within Zimbabwe in Climate change as ad-hoc with organisations picking activities that fit into their own agendas rather than a national agenda. In as such organisations reported having a number of activities that they were operating under the

Climate change arena and these are highlighted in Chapter 5. The Programme Officer of FAO reiterated the need for need for coordination from the Ministry through a national policy indicating that the narratives produced by NGOs which took the form of documents and activities may assist in shaping the policy. On the same topic, an interviewee from an NGO indicated that there was some progress towards mapping a national Climate change Strategy for Zimbabwe. Essentially this lack of guidance would then provide an entry point for other actors other than the government, who may even come from other countries with interests that do not have the Zimbabwean situation as central, to take a lead role. In this way we may see sovereignty of the Climate change Arena being transcended and new actors gaining a greater from of legitimacy than those already in the arena

The Director of ZERO also shared the same concept with regards to Climate change and its current implementation. He however was more optimistic, indicating saying “...yes its *ad-hoc* but that is because this a new process and we are all going through a learning curve....”

This perhaps indicated that there was room to make mistakes and that through these mistakes the correct path would be realised. Implicit is that in Zimbabwe, the policy process was taking up a different order than that documented by authors such as Jones (2010) where policy would inform the activities. On the contrary, activities were seen as experiments about what would work and these would guide policy formulation so perhaps placing some kind of justification for the seemingly *ad-hoc* nature of activities.

Whilst most people describe the arena as *ad-hoc*, there were also other different ways that the arena is described. During an interview with one of the NGOs who forms part of the informants the idea of politicisation of Climate change was brought to the table. This informant declined to be named and for the purposes of this interview extract we shall call him John

John indicated that in his opinion the arena was being hijacked by politicians to talk about politics. At first I was taken aback by these statements as in Zimbabwe people rarely include politics in interviews unless they are human rights activists. However, in Zimbabwe Climate change was not viewed with the

connotation that accompanied Human Rights¹⁰. He, John, indicated that "...Climate change has become a topic where government is taking advantage to slander the west and use it as a campaigning tool....." (**Interview, Programme Officer, John**). This may have been perhaps derived from the President's speech at the Copenhagen Conference. I was so flabbergasted by these comments that I decided to ask others what they thought about such views. One who worked for GEF was quick to distance themselves from such comments citing that people must not bring controversy to the arena by politicising Climate change. Whilst this may be true when taken literally, discussions with SCC Rosa indicated that this must not be taken in a negative sense. She agreed that Climate change was political but that the politicisation came from a global level. At the global level she thought that Climate change was politicised hence the politicians in Zimbabwe were only playing the game.

In conclusion, we derive from the interviews that the Climate change Arena is one that is composed of struggles, divided amongst political lines at a global level. However the extent to which such politicization transcends boundaries and is represented at a global level is questionable. As Hajer (2009) rightly states, at times the interactions between organizations and institutions can form a new kind of politics. However, the politics does not necessarily have to be different, as actors within the arena can speak the same kind of politics at a national level. However, as reflected in the paragraph above, the respondents have different views with regards to politicization of the arena. Such different views within the arena are a genuine representation of the different definitions of politics within the Zimbabwean context. For Zimbabweans, politics is dangerous with some seeking to distance themselves from it. However, the Interviews with Environment Africa and the Climate change Office indicated that they thought that the arena was politicized but from the global level. I will exemplify this with the following situation

Situation 3

As the interview progressed with the Country Manager of Environment Africa, we began to talk about the issue of National Adaptation Plans. Zimbabwe does not have a national adaptation

¹⁰Human Rights activists are considered to be almost rebels who criticize the work done by those that are in power regardless of race, party or religion

plan in place as there was no funding. The country manager indicated that this was because of “good guy, bad guy” perspective. In his opinion Zimbabwe is considered the bad guy at a global level. He then asks me “You have been outside the country, what reaction do you get as soon as you say that you are from Zimbabwe?”

The same perspective was echoed by the President of Zimbabwe in his speech at the Copenhagen Conference in 2009 where he indicated that Zimbabwe had only drawn a small amount from the Global Environmental Fund by virtue of the process being politicised. The study does not view this kind of politicisation of the arena in negative connotation. It simply takes these views as evidence that the Climate change Arena even at a global level is not all about the environmental phenomenon. Instead, it is an object of governmentality, being used as an extension of actions to encourage what is termed good governance. In as such, countries such as Zimbabwe who are viewed as having good poor governance do not receive some funds that would enable them to implement some of the agreed action points at a global level for example Zimbabwe did not receive funding to put in place a National Adaptation Plan. This politicisation then manifests itself at a national level through seemingly ad-hoc processes and activities as each organisation attempts to derive as much monetary gain from the global system. This politicisation also manifests itself within the different spaces that have been created

The next section of the Chapter will look at the National Arena using the framework that has been suggested by McGee (2005). She views the arena as made up of spaces. Within these spaces are actors whose actions are informed by the knowledge that they have and are exposed to. The exposure may be during interaction with other members of the arena who are not necessarily limited to their spaces. However, this framework will be presented in through the views of the informants and again characterised by using vignettes from the data collection phase.

We will begin by analysing the spaces that have been created for Climate change within Zimbabwe, then move to the actors within the arena. After these we will then analyse the knowledge that informs the arena and the various actors within it.

4.8 Spaces within the National Climate change Arena

Again, I must highlight that the concept of spaces was one that I had derived from prior works of Long and McGee. I went to Zimbabwe, with this concept and definition in my mind. However, when I started conducting the interviews, the concept that I used of spaces created some confusion amongst the informants. I will begin with an exemplification using the illustration below

I sat in the FAO offices interviewing the programme officer who is one of my key informants. I then posed the question "what spaces exist for Climate change in Zimbabwe?" He paused for a bit then responded that spaces can only be made available if there is a policy direction. It was only after he sought to exemplify his answer and perhaps after reading the puzzled look on my face that he asked me what I meant by spaces. I told him that by spaces I meant any platforms and convenings that had been created for actors to discuss issues pertaining to the Climate change Arena

Despite the fact that I went on to explain what I meant by the term spaces, implicit within this is that the informants perceived different kind of space than the one the study sought to look at. This space would be the space that a policy would provide for actors to participate within the Climate change Arena. In other words this may be taken to mean the roles of different actors within the arena. However, as I will outline below some actors were already occupying the "spaces" that he referred to and these will be discussed in further detail when we speak of actors and the roles that they play. Implicit is that there is a question of legitimacy in terms of who is doing what at the moment in the absence of a policy. In this way the policy is expected to guide both in terms of activities and key actors within the policy

Within this context of spaces there were several spaces that had been created and existed within the Climate change Arena in Zimbabwe. Different actors in the form of organisations and coalition occupied different spaces, with some being found in more than one space. For the purposes of the study, the spaces are identified from the manner in which the informants grouped each other. The Programme Officer from FAO referred to FAO as occupying the technical space together with UNEP where they provided technical support and advise to both government and civil society. Most of the NGOs characterised themselves as either in the

advocacy and/or implementation space whereas government took up the main portion of the formal policy making space. The latter was by virtue of the issues discussed above where policy making was predominantly seen as the realm of government.

The view of the spaces occupied by Donors is characterised by the following 2 field situations

Situation 1

I sat in the SIDA offices, as we spoke of activities that SIDA was involved in in Zimbabwe. He then highlighted specifically that SIDA was not involved in implementation but were acting as funding partners. He said that SIDA works through development partners, and signs funding agreements with them.

Situation 2

*I conveniently showed up at the EC offices, hoping that I would be able to speak to someone about my study. A stern looking man came to the reception and after brief introductions I explained why I was there. He then said "...currently there is no specific initiatives on climate change funded by the EC in Zimbabwe. However, we have recently started to work on renewable energies by **funding** some initiatives but we are still in our early steps towards a more comprehensive approach on that area."*

These situations firmly place donors within the funding realm. However, this position must not be taken lightly especially in light of the fact that any activities within the arena rely on donor funding. Such a reliance on the donor sector for the Climate change policy process places donors as one of the major institutions within the arena having influence in the discussions that take place in all the spaces. This is further discussed in Section...

However, within the context of spaces as I have interpreted them from McGee, there have been a number of spaces created within the Climate change arena. According to the Coordinator of the Climate change Office, there have been consultative forums on Climate change policies in various towns. These have either been convened by government or by civil society. In both cases, the other party is usually present. This form of cooperation is one that is becoming increasingly common across most sectors in Zimbabwe. This may be taken to be

an attempt to present a united front for the people watching including donors. Discussions with the Donor community indicated that although they were not able to work directly with the Government of Zimbabwe, but under the Unity Government they sought to give initiatives by government a chance. In as such, a proposal may be at a greater advantage if it indicates that government at whatever level (district, ward) are supporting the proposed intervention. Whilst this cooperation may be genuine, it also brings to the table once more, the idea of global politicisation affecting how national organisations and institutions relate to each other within the arena. It also affects the narratives and discourses within the given spaces and arena as a whole.

In the next section we will continue to analyse the organisations and institutions within the Zimbabwean Climate change arena. However, we will also analyse the knowledge that each actor uses and brings to the policy process

CHAPTER 5: ACTORS, KNOWLEDGE AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY PROCESS IN ZIMBABWE

5.1 Introduction

Actors form a critical part of the policy process as they possess the agency that guides the course of the process. However, no single actor has the agency to influence the policy process on his own. Such influence is a direct result of a number of actors through active or inactive participation. Albeit, an actor may have a larger degree of influence in the process by various virtues, but it is because other actors lend their support or simply let them have the most influence. In this Chapter, we will discuss the various actors within the Climate change Arena in Zimbabwe and their role within the policy process. We will also look at the knowledge within the arena and the extent to which it affects the policy process in Zimbabwe. The Chapter will begin by analysing the role of the Government of Zimbabwe within the policy process at a national level.

5.2 Government of Zimbabwe and the Climate change Process at National level

We consider the Government of Zimbabwe as a key actor within the policy process by virtue of the informants within the study placing policy making firmly in the realm of government (see Chapter 4). However, the Government of Zimbabwe is a sizable bureaucratic structure with several Ministries and Departments. In as such it cannot be considered as a homogeneous structure. Each department and Ministry has its own mandate which it seeks to perpetuate and by which it is judged. In this way, it is important to see the narratives that Ministries and departments bring to the arena through practises and discourse. However, not all the Ministries are involved with issues of Climate change and in some instance such involvement may be superficial. Key Ministries within the Climate change arena in Zimbabwe include the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Water amongst others. However, the study sought the views of the first 3 ministries due to reasons given in Chapter 2 under the methodologies section. I will exemplify the involvement of the various ministries using vignettes and analysis below.

Ministry of Energy

Interactions with the Ministry of Energy brought to light that they were involved from a clean development perspective, where they seek to tackle Climate change from implementing clean renewable technologies. I will continue my analysis with the vignette below

As I engaged an Officer at the Ministry of Energy I derived that he leaned towards renewable energy and the initiatives that the ministry was taking to tackle Climate change from that perspective. It was with much interest that I listened as he explained how the Ministry was putting in place tax rebates for individuals and companies that were importing and producing renewable and clean energy.

This choice in focus brings to the table issues of organisational focus. As the name suggests, the ministry is mandated to “provide an enabling environment where adequate, reliable, affordable and sustainable energy is made available to all, in an efficient manner”. Their involvement in Climate change is hence limited to their comfort zone and mandate. In this way they strategically perpetuate their narrative of energy as key within the Climate change Arena whilst at the same time unintentionally undermining other narratives. Actors within the arena and citizens that are not actively involved will then also consciously or unconsciously adopt the energy approach to Climate change by virtue of the incentives provided through policy. At this stage we realise that in the energy space, implementation is guided by policy. This is in stark contrast when we take a bird’s eye view of the Climate change Arena in Zimbabwe where as noted in Chapter 4, actors are seeking current practises to help inform the yet to be drafted policy.

Ministry of Environment

As discussed in Chapter 4, the Ministry of Environment and Tourism is the focal point for Climate change in Zimbabwe. The UNFCCC and other Climate change Conventions are housed under the ministry, with the exception of the UNCCD which is implemented by the Environmental Management Agency. From the data presented above and the discussions held with GoZ officials in various capacities, it was agreed that GoZ in the form of Ministry of Environment through the National Climate change Office were the custodians of any national Climate change policy. A 2008 Government of publication documents the institutional

arrangements for implementation of the UNFCCC in Zimbabwe and this is represented in the diagram below.




Figure 2: Institutional Arrangements for Implementation of the UNFCCC in Zimbabwe

Source: National Capacity self-assessment for Climate change, biodiversity and land degradation in Zimbabwe (2008)

The National Climate change Committee is made up of 22 cross-disciplinary members who are aided by the Climate change Office. This is due to the fact that there is some general acknowledgement in Zimbabwe that Climate change is cross-disciplinary affecting several sectors including Energy and Agriculture. They may enlist the help of some experts to meet part of their mandate if they are unable to do so. However, the study found that the institutional arrangements were more complicated than those presented in the diagram above. The above-mentioned arrangement existed on paper as none of the informants mentioned this arrangement. In as such, it is difficult to gauge who is involved and the extent of the involvement of the committee within the narratives and discourses of the arena. At this stage though, we would like to bring to the table the issue of another arrangement that is not represented in the above mentioned figure. I will add character using the vignette below

I was attending a workshop at the prestigious 5 star Monomotapa Hotel. NGOs always held their meetings in some of the fanciest places in town. What excited me the most was that on the agenda it mentioned that there was to be a speech on the policy direction from the Ministry of Environment. I sat patiently, in anticipation but was disappointed, I expected a detailed speech

*but what resulted was a 3 minute statement. He began by saying that the Government of Zimbabwe considered Climate change a serious threat to several sectors. As he continued to talk I derived that that there had also been the formation of a national task force which would look at issues of policy within the Climate change arena. He said "....the formation of a national task force for Climate change.....government is yet to sit down...." **Speech by Mr Samuriwo at Workshop at Monomotapa Hotel.** After the statement the facilitator invited the participants to comment and or ask questions. No-one raised their hand and so the programme continued.*

From the above, we note that the structure may not be set in stone with new structures continuously being set up to accommodate the policy formulation process. This fluidity of the organisation and structure is an indication that the process is one that is continuously evolving to accommodate new events. At the same time, it can perhaps also be an indication of the lack of maturity of Climate change Policy process within Zimbabwe. Although Zimbabwe has been involved in Climate change for many years, the degree of involvement has led it to remain a phenomenon whose significance has remained small. However, with the turn in global discourse, we see an increase in the number of actors involved within the arena, most to whom Climate change is a new phenomenon. In this case the policy process is yet to be fully recognised even after years of involvement. The deliberate vagueness and length of the statement is perhaps also not only an indicator of the way in which government views the way forward at the moment, vague and unsure, but can also be viewed from another angle. It may also be a deliberate coy to maintain the status quo and maintain some form of power by assuring that there is some progress whilst at the same time masking uncertainty on their part.

This vagueness is a true representation of the reality of the situation. At the time of the study it was reported that the National Climate change Office is in the process of putting together a document that will formalise and guide activities within the Climate change Arena.

However, discussions with the Climate change Coordinator indicated that there was still some uncertainty on the way to proceed. One option was to look at having a Climate change strategy document which would fall under the Environmental Management Act of 2005. This would be in light of the fact that

the Act gives mandate to the Minister to enforce any other laws as necessary to protect the Environment. In this way it would be legally binding. The other way would be through the formulation of a separate Climate change policy. This would be legally binding and still serve as a guide for Climate change activities at a national level. An official from the Ministry of Energy also echoed that whilst the way forward was still unclear, there were some spaces that were being created within GoZ to enable discussions on the way forward to be held.

With reference to the vignette on Mr Samuriwo's speech, I was surprised that no one asked when and where the committee would meet, and when they should expect feedback. This downward accountability was lacking. This brings to the table issues of the relationship that the government has with other organisations as mentioned in Chapter 4 .The Government encouraged them to continue with their work, while the policy formulation process was underway. In as such the government had developed a close working relationship with civil society, and made an effort to be present at workshops and discussions as show of support. At most workshops and government documents. The Government reiterates that Climate change is a priority for Zimbabwe. There is also the use of the phrase "we need you and you need us" was consistently uttered as show of unity between government and the civil society in the face of Climate change. Although the nature of the relationship seemed to be that of mutual respect, as mentioned in Chapter 4, different measures of motivations existed for this arrangement. The lack of questions may either be an indication of fear of opposing the government in a public forum as the government is seen as a political body, and actors fear politics within Zimbabwe. However, if one looks at it from another angle it may be seen as being content with status quo and seemingly ad-hoc nature of activities without central control from the Government. This is discussed in the next Chapter.

At this stage the reader may view the role of the Government as limited to the policy formulation sphere. However, the Government of Zimbabwe is not only working at formulating a policy. It is also playing a key role in implementing activities through various Ministries and departments. The focal points for the government were on issues of agriculture, energy, water, and health.

Ministry of Energy

The Ministry has several projects that it is implementing in various areas within Zimbabwe which focus on issues of energy in line with their mandate. Although there are several projects, which focus on solar, biogas and jatropha amongst others, I will focus on the wooden stoves and Jatropha.



Picture 1: A rural kitchen with a mud stove (*jengetahuni*) designed to use less wood

The Ministry has encouraged the adoption and use of such stove in areas that are dependent on wood as a source of fuel. Discussions with an Officer at the Ministry of Energy led to the revelation that this initiative would lead to less deforestation and in this way enhance carbon sinks. This practise is not a new practise in Zimbabwe. It has been in operation for many years as the country seeks to reduce deforestation in line with the Climate change Agenda



Picture 2: A Jatropha Plantation in Matoka District of Zimbabwe

Jatropha is one of the main alternative energy programmes in Zimbabwe that the Ministry of Energy is implementing. Although Jatropha has been in Zimbabwe for over 60 years its use has intensified in the face of the growing energy crisis prompted by economic problems in Zimbabwe. The growing of bio-fuels has received much criticism for the competition that they provide against other agriculture for land. At the same time, they also present competition for forests which is supposedly one of the key areas that Zimbabwe seeks to focus on in the face of Climate change.

From the two practises described above we note that there is some obvious tension between different practises. On one hand, we see a move to conserve forests through appropriate technologies, whilst on the other we see hectares of land being dedicated to biofuels. On one hand there is an acknowledgement that agriculture is the backbone of the economy and on the other we have farmers being contracted to grow Jatropha which not only takes land away from the agriculture but also manpower. Here we see a classic problematisation of two issues, agriculture, deforestation and alternative fuels. The need for alternative fuels may be viewed as home-grown, prompted by energy shortages, whilst deforestation is a global phenomenon which the country seeks to be able to participate in. On the other hand we also note that the mud stoves and jatropha have been in Zimbabwe for a long time. Mud stoves were part of development agenda. However, moving forward, we note that Climate change is now being used to legitimise these practises

Ministry of Environment

The Ministry of Environment also has several projects that it is embarking on in the name of Climate change. The current project focuses on agricultural adaptation to Climate change in the Chiredzi, an area where farmers traditionally rely on rain as a source of water. The project focuses on enabling agricultural livelihoods to adapt to Climate change through crop diversification. In this way the outcomes may provide plausible policy strategies to be included in the national policy. The project is in an area where 95% of food production is from rain fed agriculture. In the face of probable drought the project seeks to encourage crop diversification from the traditional maize to drought resistant varieties. At the same time, they encouraged people to take up aquaculture and set up forecasting stations in Chiredzi. These are exemplified using the picture below



Picture 3: Millet Crop yield


In a presentation at the National Climate change Conference in November 2008, Dr Unganayi highlighted that the project would be used as a national model. Practises under the project include

- The use of plots grown by farmers as a showcase of the interventions
- Encouraging farmers to make use of Climate forecasts generated from both indigenous knowledge and National Meteorological Department

This may be taken to mean that agriculture was one of the key areas that government was focussing on. Agriculture is important to Zimbabwe as the economy is an agro-based one, hence its response to the land redistribution exercise in the 1990s. In this way we see that despite the lack of a policy response, there is some response to Climate change by various Ministries and Departments.

5.3 Government Response to Climate change

However, there were some reservations amongst 50% of the informants that I interviewed during the field research of the study were wary about the effectiveness of government response to Climate change with some saying that their presence was too thin.



Graph 5: Reasons why informants thought GoZ response fell short

When asked what the causes may be they speculated that this may have been due to lack of manpower dedicated to the Climate change Arena by the GoZ. Others indicated that there was a lack of expertise with regards to Climate change within the Climate change Office. However, to put it into perspective, the Climate change office was over-laden with responsibility. The Climate change coordinator was the person who was expected to manage the government's share of global and national Climate change activities. At the same time, he was the key government representative as the country moved towards a formal policy process.

However, such a stance at home did not stop the GoZ from continuing to participate at global forums that related to Climate change. It also echoed the same view with regards to Climate change related activities by civil society and donors.

At the time of the study, the Climate change Office indicated that they were now formally going into the consultative phase of the policy process. This phase would entail a range of workshops and gatherings to get input from various stakeholders on the contents of a policy. The multi-lateral, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) would fund the process effective March 2011.

5.4 Multi-lateral Organisations and the Climate change policy process

Multi-lateral organisations have a key presence within Zimbabwe and the Climate change arena at a global and national level. Their presence at a national level is particularly significant when we analyse Climate change is a global phenomenon which has not been immune to global governance. With Global governance comes instruments that are used as tools of governance and these may come in the form, of institutions. These institutions become particularly visible and important is a country where the government's agency has been depleted. This is the scenario in Zimbabwe, where the Government has limited financial means and capacity to fully control the Climate change arena. In as such, a relationship between the government and multi-lateral organisations becomes increasingly one of mutual dependence, with the government relying of finances from multi-laterals. At the same time- multi-laterals relying on performative participation of the government to increase their legitimacy and herald their narratives.

In an effort to explain the claims made in the paragraph above, it is important that we begin by identifying some multi-lateral organisations that are key and have a presence within the Climate change arena. The study found the existence of tripartite arrangement that focuses on UN mitigation and adaptation and this is made up of FAO, UNEP AND UNDP.

Their names and roles are highlighted in table 1 below.

Table 2: Key Multi-lateral Organisations within the Zimbabwean Climate change Arena

Organisation	Role	
United Nations Development Programme	UNDP plays a key role within the policy process. Discussions with them indicated that they simply support initiatives that are initiated by the government in terms of policy. This would include ensuring that Zimbabwe has in place a strengthened institutional and policy framework. At the moment that are also the channel of funding for the Climate change policy process within the Zimbabwean arena	
United Nations Environmental Programme	UNEP was a technical and Implementing partner within the Zimbabwean Climate change Arena. It had a number of activities that focussed on bio-diversity and desertification amongst others. Some GEF projects also came through UNEP. At the time they had a focal point manager who was housed at the Ministry of Environment and	

	Natural Resources Offices.	
Food and Agriculture Organisation	FAO is essentially also a technical partner in the area of agriculture and forestry. They are engaged within the Climate change policy process in 2 capacities i.e.as a neutral party that can engage government despite any political tensions and from a forestry perspective. They are also a channel for funding for activities dealing with forestry and Climate change. Essentially they are the main partners whom funders look to for issues to do with projects in the agriculture and forestry sector. Primarily they work through partners but they are also able to implement various activities. FAO focuses on conservation agriculture with less use of chemicals as part of its Climate change implementation activities. FAO is also the only multi-lateral to be part of the CCWG	

From the above we note that there is a clear that there was indeed some form of division of sectors and priorities within the multi-nationals. I will further characterise this below with snippets from the interviews.

Food and Agriculture Organisation

I sat in the open plan offices of FAO. Open plan arrangements are not very common in Zimbabwe as most workplaces had clearly demarcated office spaces. There was one clearly demarcated office, the office of the department head. In the middle of the big room was a round table, and the informant and myself sat there, within ear range and view of the rest of the department. I began by asking the role that FAO played within the Climate change Arena in Zimbabwe. He began by justifying that by the very nature of their work, they had to ensure that FAO played its part in tackling Climate change by mainstreaming it into some of its current initiatives. He mentioned that by the nature of their work it was important that they include Climate change. I then asked what the nature if this work was and he indicated that FAO was tasked with having a main role to play mainly in Agriculture and Natural Resource Management at fisheries and forestry levels (Interview notes, Programme Officer FAO. 2011).

11

¹¹ Interview notes, Programme Officer FAO. February 2011

United Nations Development Programme

*We held the interview in a room that looked like an office turning into a store room for various publications. All the meeting rooms were occupied. I had already been to a number of other informants and everyone had been quick to tell me that UNDP was funding the policy formulation process. So as we began the interview I sought a confirmation of this role, and the informant agreed. She indicated that UNDP would be providing funds for the process which would begin in 2011. I then went on to ask, "How UNDP as a donor saw its role in the process" and she was quick to correct me. She highlighted that several people referred to UNDP as a donor but that was not the case. She said that UNDP was a multi-lateral agency that at times merely served as an implementing partner and conduit of funds. She went on to mention that currently other implementing partners included UNEP, FAO, GEF, World Bank with plans to add UNESCO and UNIDO (Interview notes, Programme Officer UNDP, 2011).*¹²

From the above snippets we note that spaces for operation, taking the understanding of spaces from the participants, had been defined already amongst the multi-lateral agencies each multi-lateral had already occupied a space within the arena. What is especially interesting at this point is the perception that other actors within the arena have of UNDP and that which it had of itself. UNDP was clearly seen as a donor who would fund the policy process. However, UNDP sought to distance itself from such a view. This may be due to the fact that UN agencies are traditionally regarded as neutral bodies with no hidden agendas. On the contrary donors have been the subject of several papers which have painted them as having hidden agendas and their aid being wrought with conditionality. In my view the informant sought to distance themselves from such an impression especially when working with a government that is against any form of conditionality's being imposed upon them.

However, at this point I would again like to point back to the general lack of decision on the part of the Government of Zimbabwe in terms of the way to proceed in terms of policy formulation referred to in Chapter 4. However, it was clear that the UNDP sought to have a

¹² Interview notes, Programme Officer UNDP, February 2011

separate policy put in place. At this stage we not only see some tension within the narratives and intentions of actors within the arena. We also see the neutral veil that the UNDP tries to portray being torn away to reveal an actor with an intention and agency to achieve the intention. In as such, the much needed funding through the UNDP is also wrought with conditionality of formulating a separate Climate change policy being dangled to an office that is wholly dependent on external funding. One can only but predict the probability of the office biting the dangled offer. It is due to this that I continue to emphasise that multi-lateral organisations within the Climate change arena are an object of governmentality in the process of policy transformation and global governance.

This difference in agendas is not only seen through the UNDP but also through the Food and Agriculture Organisation which chooses to limit itself to Fisheries and Forestry in the face of Climate change and in this way promoting its mandate as an organisation. This is all being done in a country where the government is yet to articulate its formal policy with regards to Climate change. I will use yet another extract from the interview process.

FAO had some projects that it was running in Zimbabwe some in the name of Climate change. So I then had to ask, in the absence of a formal policy in Zimbabwe on Climate change, what was the basis for the interventions. The informant then proudly handed me a copy of a booklet which he indicated was the basis for Climate change operations. I skimmed through the introduction sector trying to gauge if it was specifically for Zimbabwe. Not seeing anything on Zimbabwe I then posed the question to him and he indicated that it was the global strategy for FAO and it was what they were using in Zimbabwe. (Interview notes, Programme Officer FAO. 2011)

At this stage we see yet another source of tension in the Climate change arena. We note organisations taking their own policies and using them in a country where there are no formal Climate change policies. The question would then be, in the case that a policy was formulated that did not encompass fisheries as a key sector, would FAO pack up that aspect of Climate change or would it continue. In this case we see a case of the sovereignty of a country being transcended in the moment of indecision. The government has indicated that they view Climate change as a “serious threat” and are open to practices that tackle Climate change. In

that way, the interventions by FAO are legitimised. However, in the absence of a binding policy direction, global organisational policy has begun to operate within certain spaces within the arena and gathered some local support through the organisations that FAO works with.

I was clearly perplexed and excited at this idea. The thought of yet another global document existing and guiding practises within the arena. However, that was perhaps the manner in which the multi-laterals operated, as I had also received booklets on early recovery from the UNDP which were being used in Zimbabwe but were not country specific. I then decided to ask how then such a global policy would be context specific in the case of Zimbabwe. He then highlighted that FAO were producing a report together with Forestry Commission of Zimbabwe that documented FAO strategy in Zimbabwe. This document would be context specific but still guided by the global strategy. (Interview notes, Programme Officer FAO. 2011)

In this way we also note the clear effort to legitimise the FAO strategy in Zimbabwe through getting on-board a national actor whom was well respected in the forestry sector. This is not only restricted to FAO. We also note a clear agenda on the part of UNDP which is legitimised by bringing on-board the Government of Zimbabwe and lobbying NGOs to act as pressure groups for a National Climate change policy. In both cases we note that the actors that are brought on-board are incentivised through provision of funding for their institutions and practises.

The clear existence of strategies and intentions indicates that there may be practises that are already running on the ground. At this stage it is important to highlight that each actor had its own strategy in terms of Climate change which they used as a guide for programming. These will be highlighted below

UNDP Practices

As highlighted above, it was clear that the focus for UNDP was on the formulation of a national policy. In as such it made sense that they were focussing on activities that would enable this outcome to be met. I will characterise this with a vignette.

As the interview progressed, I could tell that there was some frustration at the Climate change policy process in Zimbabwe for UNDP. I indicated to her that although she said that the formal process which would begin with a wide consultative process would only start in 2011, there had been some consultations already. She agreed that the Climate change Office had held some consultations but the process was slow and perhaps due to the capacity within the office. My mind then went back to the interview that I had had with the Climate change Coordinator where I could not help but chuckle at the fact that he too was privy to the criticisms that had been levelled against his office. He had indicated that some people blamed him for the apparent lack of progress "vamwe vanongoti ndiZhakata (some people say it's Zhakata) but they do not understand..."I then indicated that the Climate change Coordinator had cited a lack of understanding of Climate change amongst the policy makers in Zimbabwe as one of the factors stalling some significant progress. She agreed and highlighted that UNDP was funding a project that targeted policy makers to try and cross this particular hurdle. (Interview notes, Programme Officer FA0. 2011)

Again, from the vignette above, we see yet again the manifestation of tensions within the policy process. The UNDP is clearly frustrated with the apparent lack of progress in terms of formulating a policy, and seeks to find some fault. At the same time, the office that people blame is also not accepting the blame. However, I must at this point perhaps emphasise the tight rope that the Climate change Office in Zimbabwe walks. On one hand we have a government that detests foreign inference in its policies, and on the other we have multilaterals on whom it depends on for support and institutional survival. (The Climate change Office is mostly funded monetary wise by external donors although the office is housed at the Ministry Offices.) In as much as the President of Zimbabwe supports Climate change, the

country is occupied with other pressing needs. I derived this frustration in the interview with the Climate change Coordinator

As we spoke of the lack of understanding amongst policy makers the Coordinator highlighted that there had been some talk of climate change also being housed in the office of the president. In this way he was excited that if an invitation to attend a Climate change related event came from the President's office, then all the policy makers would attend. (Interview, Climate change Coordinator, 2011)

In as such the Coordinator was a middle man between government and multi-laterals. Although he was a part of government, I derived that he did not receive full support from its other members whilst at the same time he received the criticism for the apparent lack of progress on the part of the government. However, its dependence on foreign funding also meant that its allegiances were stretched. This brings into question issues of neutrality and power to push forward agendas that are purely from a Zimbabwean perspective. In as such the office welcomed initiatives that would enable the struggles within the arena to be managed more efficiently such as the capacity building of policy makers in Zimbabwe.

The UNDP also has a regional capacity building project under which Zimbabwe is a beneficiary. Similar to the project above, the project aims to amongst other things

- Improve the **capacity** of actors in Zimbabwe to comply with the UN Framework Convention on Climate change.
- Awareness raising workshops on Climate change issues across Zimbabwe

(Interview notes, Programme Officer UNDP. 2011)

At this stage we note that yet again as a by-product of the struggles within the policy process, elements of the global policies which have been highlighted in Chapter 3 manifesting themselves at a national level. Global policies under the UNFCCC encourage capacity building at national levels to enable adequate responses to Climate change. In this way global policy is translated at national level in an implicit and perhaps even unintentional manner. At the same time we see spaces being created that are meant to raise awareness of Climate

change at various levels. At this stage it is important to note use of the term awareness raising. The term implies that there is little or no awareness in terms of Climate change amongst the target group. This lack of awareness may then beg the question is it really a priority amongst the group. One would most certainly be aware of issues that are a priority within his or her life-world. However, at the same time, the Government pays lip service to Climate change being a priority at national level. This then brings to the table the discussion on whether Climate change is indeed a priority and if yes, how high on the agenda is it. This is discussed in Section 4.10 below.

FAO practices

As mentioned above, FAO focused on initiatives that pertained to agriculture and natural resource management with an emphasis on fisheries and forestry. I then asked what kind of interventions they had running in Zimbabwe at that moment with a focus on Climate change. As the interview progressed I could tell that the Programme Officer was proud of the work that FAO was doing in Zimbabwe. At each instance he mentioned the involvement of another national actor within the activities. I will use snippets from the interview with the Programme Officer below to exemplify

Snippet 1: What kind of activities is FAO EMBARKING ON IN Zimbabwe?
FAO is currently undertaking a study looking at the impacts of Climate change on the forestry sector. For this we are working with the University of Zimbabwe, Geography department. We are also working on a report to assess Zimbabwe's preparedness for UN RED-PLUS but this is yet to be published. It is our hope that these documents and activities will feed into national policy.

Snippet 2: What else are you doing besides research?
Well...FAO is also encouraging and promoting conservation agriculture with less use of chemicals as part of its Climate change activities. We are promoting minimum tillage and in this way we tackle both mitigation and adaptation.

Snippet 3: I understand that there is also the existence of a Climate change Working Group? Yes, there is and FAO is a member of the working group.

An analysis of the snippets above reveals some key characteristics of the practises by FAO. The programme Officer was keen to link FAO to a national body such as Forestry Commission or the University of Zimbabwe, This shows that he clearly understood that FAO was a foreign body, although part of the United Nations was not fully integrated. In order to gain some form of legitimacy in a country like Zimbabwe it then worked with national agencies that would not be seen as an object of governmentality of global policies. At the same time FAO wanted to be seen as part of the group by quickly mentioning that it too was a member of the Climate change working Group.

We also note with key interest the manner in which issues of agriculture and Climate change are brought to the table only after further probing. At the centre of the discussion lies the issue of forestry and climate change. The FAO strategy is also around Forestry and Climate change. In this way we find that FAO plays a role in presenting a narrative that focuses on Forestry at the expense on agriculture in a country where the economy is agro-based.

In light of the fact that both FAO and UNDP were implementing activities based on strategies that they had as United Nations I wondered what their position was in terms of policy translation from global to national. I then asked about how issues of incentives within the Bali Declaration, which are highlighted in Chapter 3, affected the adoption of certain parts of global policies within their organisations and the country as a whole. I will characterise their responses using the following descriptions:

First description

Food and Agriculture Organisation

He immediately indicated that essentially issues of incentives came down to Carbon sinks and preservation of forests. He thought that through REDD-PLUS there was some likelihood of funding being received if forests were preserved and more created. In such a case, organisations such as FAO with their focus on forestry could play a role. He then then suggested that in such cases, where incentives could be obtained, they may push for adjustment of local policies to global strategies.

Second description

United Nations Development Programme

The programme officer indicated that indeed they were incentives that could be attained if countries adopted certain programmes. However, she was clear that in order to benefit certain criteria had to be met. I highlighted that Zimbabwe did not have a National Adaptation Plan by virtue of it not being a least developed country. She was quick to correct me and highlight that at the time Zimbabwe was not classified as such but that it had now been placed at the bottom of the Human Development Index. She was adamant that despite this grouping some incentives would not filter down to Zimbabwe and hence activities at national level not materialise.

From the above descriptions, we recognise that whilst the actors have a certain goal and rationality, they too are not blind to the political nature of Climate change related practises within the global arena. This politicisation affects practices within the national Climate change Arena and the manner in which they are a direct response to global policies and processes. As the informant from FAO indicated, countries may adopt practises and even change policies so that they too may receive incentives. However, even if such a country adopts these practices, they may not always receive the incentives by virtues of how they are perceived by those that possess the most power in the global arena.

I was very impressed by the passion that the informants showed during the interview. In as much as they were employees of a multi-lateral agency and sought to perpetuate that agenda of that agency, they were also patriotic Zimbabweans. They showed detest at the manner in which Zimbabwe had been snubbed despite efforts to tackle Climate change through globally agreed parameters. This snubbing not only affected governments but also NGOs who formed a key part of the arena and in the constitution of an invited space.

5.5 Donors, NGOs and the Policy Process

Given the scenario that Zimbabwe is a cash strapped country with the Government capacity to implement having been greatly diminished they rely on development aid. However, the providers of such development aid will not work directly with Government of Zimbabwe due to the lack of bi-lateral agreements. In as such, NGOs form the middle ground with donors choosing to fund them instead of the government. The study found that despite the lack of a

national Climate change policy, NGOs formed a key part of the policy process through implementation of activities and advocacy. In this section of the Chapter we will seek to look at the various practises of NGOs within the national Climate change Arena. We will then analyse how these are affected by donor policies within the Climate change Arena.

NGO within the national Climate change Arena

I will begin by putting into focus the structure of the environmental NGO sector in Zimbabwe. I will characterise this with the use of some interview notes.

Instance 1

I sat in the office of the Director of ZERO waiting for the interview to begin. He seemed to be very busy, running around, giving instructions and I began to think that this may have been a bad time. He then finally sat down apologising for the delay. He explained that they were in a hurry to finalise a proposal to the European Commission which they were supposed to hand in the same day (Interview, Director of ZERO 2010).¹³

Another instance

I was conducting an interview with PLAN international. I had promised that it would only take up 20 to 30 minutes of the programme officer's time. However, people kept coming into the room to ask for one thing or another. Noting my frustration at the constant interruption he explained that they were finalising a proposal for funding of a 5 year project hence everyone was chipping in. I understood as I had worked on proposals several times before (Interview, Programme Officer Plan International, 2010) ¹⁴

Using the instances exemplified above we note that NGOs take securing funding very seriously as it is their sole means of survival in a country like Zimbabwe. However, the funding is limited and is secured through open or closed calls for proposals. Proposals form part of a bidding process where some NGOs and practises are chosen over others. In as such, as much as the actors in the arena are close knit, they also appreciate that they represent competition for the other actors in terms of funding. In as such, there are times when

¹³ Interview, Director of ZERO 2010

¹⁴ Interview, Programme Officer Plan International, 2010

coalitions are formed for the purposes of securing funding. I will again exemplify this with an extract from an Interview with DRI

A the interview continued, I began to probe for the key donors within the Climate change Arena. The Programme Officer mentioned IEED as key and I asked if they were receiving funding from IEED. He indicated that they were not, but they were receiving a SIDA grant through OXFAM GB

Using the extract above, we note that there was a partnership that had been formed between DRI and OXFAM and through this DRI had begun to receive funding from SIDA. However, there is need to further contextualise this.

Snippet 1

As I entered the building, I could smell the fresh paint and noted the new furniture in the office. As we walked to the boardroom I asked if they were doing some renovating. The Programme Officer replied that they had just moved there as they previously had been housed at ZERO offices.

Snippet 2

At the beginning of the interview I asked when DRI had been established. The programme officer told me that it was formed in 2009. Noting that this was a new organisation I asked why they had seen the need to form the organisation to be formed. He went on to tell me how they felt that the youth had been left out of Climate change and their voice was not represented at the national level.

As he said this I could not help but drift back to the FAO interview where the Programme Officer had indicated that much of the focus on Climate change within Zimbabwe had begun preceding and just after the Copenhagen Summit of 2009. However, despite whatever reason they had come into existence, of note was the fact that they were a new organisation with perhaps only one year of audited statements. This would have meant that they would be considered a financial risk by the donors and hence were unlikely to receive direct financial support. In such a case, there is power in the formation of coalitions with other well established organisations.

However, such coalitions were not common when it came to implementation. Once the funding had been received, there was some replication of practises within the Climate change Arena. I will exemplify this with some examples

Example 1

ZERO was holding a workshop that would focus on raising awareness amongst the media about Climate change. In their view, they thought that if the media was to report more on Climate change then policy makers may pay more attention

Example 2

As the interview as Environment Africa progressed we began to talk about scare models and their impact on the manner in which people react to Climate change as a buzz word. The country Manager then indicated that it was important that media report information more clearly and accurately in order for people to understand Climate change. He went on to say that was the reason they had held a media training workshop in 2010.

Example 3

In the interview with Christian Aid, I also picked up the idea of media. In this case the informant was displeased at the way a certain reporter had quoted him in the papers. He indicated that there was indeed a need for responsible reporting and that if they secured enough funding they would like to target the media.

Using the examples above, we notice that NGOs are focussing on media as one of their target groups. This cloning of activities may be due to the fact that the arena is such a closely knit one. In a closely knit arena, organisations bring their narratives to the table, and these may be adopted by others. What we see in the end is a manifestation of discourses through the use of common language and the adoption of common practises. These discourses may be a response to certain institutional pressures within the policy arena, for example if more funding can be secured for media training then more organisations would embark on media training. In as such, the roles that different NGOs played within the policy process and Climate change arena would be manifested through their practises. However, this role was seldom limited to a particular sector

Perception of Roles within the policy process by civil society organisations

This information was solicited in order to gauge how the organisation gauged itself within the policy process in Zimbabwe. This was also done to see the perception of Zimbabweans towards the policy process in so far as its non-linear characteristics. Out of the 15 Non-Governmental Organisations interviewed, the bulk of the informants were found in the implementation phase of the policy process. I will characterise this with the following snippets and link to those that have already been highlighted in Chapter 4. The following are responses that were provided to the question “What role does your NGO play in terms of Climate change Adaptation and food security?”

Snippet 1

This is the question that broke the ice in the interview. The programme Officer from OXFAM told me that he was not the expert for Food security in OXFAM GB as the experts were away at a workshop but he had been authorised to be my informant. He indicated that on one side, OXFAM was an implementing partner whilst on the other they were also a donor. According to the informant, OXFAM had a funding mechanism through which the money received would be channelled through local NGOs. On the other hand they also implemented programmes for “big” donors such as DFID.

Snippet 2


The same question was posed to the Director at ZELA. He then told the interviewer that ZELA was interested in Climate change from a litigation perspective. According to him, ZELA did not have a formal Climate change programme but for them their main objective was to ensure that there was the development of a coordinated Climate change policy. In other areas they also provided legal representation to communities seeking judicial justice under environmental laws and policies

Snippet 3

In a separate interview with Action Aid International the same question was posed. The Programme Officer indicated that Action Aid was an international NGO that had a presence at both the national and global level. Within Zimbabwe, they operated as a

lead agency. She told the interviewer that they were active in the area of Food Security in rural areas. According to her, there had been a shifting of seasons may be attributed to Climate change and in this way they could not ignore Climate change in their programming. She noted that Action Aid was also a member of the Climate change Working Group under which they advocated for a national climate change policy.

From the snippets above, we note that most of the organisations occupied more than one role within the arena. However, most of the roles fell under the implementation phase of the policy process (see Chapter 1). In as far as policy making, NGOs distanced themselves from such a role instead limiting themselves to the role of advocacy. Even within this role, they hid under the auspices of a larger group of organisations known as the Climate change Working Group. At this stage we see once more the role of policy making being passed to government and in this way distancing themselves as the cause of any perceived disorganisation of the Climate change Arena and policy process. The graph below attempts a graphical representation of the roles that organisations perceive themselves to play within the process.



Graph 6: Roles played by civil society organisations in the national Climate change Arena

Donors within the National Climate change Arena

In Zimbabwe, there exists an intricate relationships between donors and NGOs. The relationship is one of dependence characterised by funds flowing in one direction and from there desired results being achieved. We characterise donors as having agency and entering the Climate change arena with a specific purpose in mind. They possess power that is derived

from the financial muscle that they possess whilst at the same time; lack the legitimacy to implement activities on their own. They derive this legitimacy through working with NGOs and other partners within the Climate change Arena. Donors within the arena include Global Environmental Fund, European Commission, IEED, DFID and SIDA.

Donors indicated that they were not working directly with the Government of Zimbabwe due to the deterioration of bi-lateral relations. As the study progressed, I was curious to know to what extent institutional dynamics affected the practices within the Climate change Arena in Zimbabwe. In as such, I had to enquire about the manner in which donors interacted with other institutions and organisations. I will characterise this with the vignette below:

I was waiting in the reception areas of the European Commission Offices in Mount Pleasant, Harare after I had originally barged in without an appointment. I had subsequently been given one and I sat there waiting. I looked around noting the familiar surroundings. It had not changed much. I greeted familiar faces whilst I waited for my key informant. During the interview I enquired how they worked in terms of funding. He indicated that they did what they called an Environmental scan where they developed certain objectives for a particular funding stream. They would then ask for proposals which would be assessed for fit into funding streams and these were judged on a pre-set scheme. I then wondered the extent of flexibility that such a funding scheme would possess especially given the fact that situations are constantly changing. I posed the question to him and he accounted an experience to me. He told me that under food security they had some money that they assumed would go towards agricultural inputs. The funding partner that they were working with then pointed out to them that they were working with indicated that the money may not come in time for the planting season and suggested that they divert it to livestock. He said that they then diverted the money to livestock indicating that there is some flexibility.

In essence, donors are a key institution by virtue that they decide the strategic focus areas of interventions within the Climate change Arena. If we look at the definition of policy, from Roberts (2010) page 1, we note that “policy is a set of principles and intentions used to guide

decision making”. In this sense we can safely say that within the Climate change Arena in Zimbabwe, we have policies that are derived from donors manifesting themselves through funding priorities and actual projects that are funded. However, all the actors within the arena firmly place policy making within the realm of the government. When I asked the parties if their strategies were not the same as policies I derived a mixed bag of responses

When I posed the question to my informant at SIDA he was quick to distance himself from this point of view. He told me that it was not the place of SIDA to play a role that should be played by Government. He continued by saying that they were not policy makers but simply sought to see that the money from the Swedish government was used where they thought it would be most relevant.

My informant at the European Commission took a bit more time to think about this. He then said to me that he did not consider strategy the same as policy. To him these were different with policy originating from Government. However, we take the view that in the absence of a formal national policy, NGOs and other civil society actors moulded their work to suit that of donors. The desire to separate their strategies from policies may be two-fold. It may stem from the desire to be disassociated with any policy failure that may stem from government. On the other hand it may be a deliberate effort to ensure that the already strained relationship between government and donors was not further compromised by a conception of strategies being used to by-pass government. However, in reality, there is some degree of government by-pass of in the cases where work is done directly with civil society. This then prompted me to ask about the relationship that they had with the Government of Zimbabwe. Once again I will characterise the responses with interview extracts

Extract 1

I asked DFID how they worked with the Government of Zimbabwe and the answer was similar to the other responses I had had from the other informants. She indicated that there was a time when bi-lateral relationships broke down to the extent that people would walk out of meetings or the government would convene meetings to “shout at us”. However, after the signing of the GOP by the MDC and ZANU PF relations began to improve. She highlighted that now the government had begun to share their plans but there was some

slump as in the face of elections, the government had declared all agricultural information as security items.

Extract 2

When I posed the question to SIDA they indicated that although bi-lateral relations had broken down, SIDA had always tried to encourage dialogue. This stemmed from the long-standing relationship that SIDA had with the Government of Zimbabwe and the support that it had provided to them during the liberation struggle. In as such he went on to explain that when SIDA took over the presidency of the EU they set out to try and improve relations. According to him, although they could not work together with government formally, they still had relatively "better relations" with the Government of Zimbabwe.

Extract 3

The view from the Programme Officer at the World Bank made me see another angle to the operation of donors. I realised that although they did not have an established Climate change Programme in Zimbabwe, they had some working relationship with the Government of Zimbabwe. However, after the signing of the GOP World Bank had provided some money through the multi-donor trust fund directly to the Government of Zimbabwe. However, this was not specifically for Climate change related interventions

From the above, we note that there was still no bi-lateral relationship between the Western donors and the Government of Zimbabwe even though some reported that the relationships were getting better. In as such, government had minimal input in the strategic focus areas of donors hence we see what I may term a degree of sovereignty of government being transcended. However, it is important to note that discussions with the afore-mentioned donors all led to the same conclusion. Although they viewed that Climate change was important and imminent, most of their funds were still focussing on humanitarian initiatives and in some instances, Climate change could be mainstreamed. However, relative to the other funding areas, Climate change was still a very small proportion of their funding. Whilst SIDA is heavily involved in Climate change at a global level, in Zimbabwe, its involvement is relatively minimal from a comparative perspective.

"...at the global level SIDA is quite vocal and involved in Climate change issues....but at a national level, not so much. There are some initiatives...." ¹⁵

Strategies used by donors and multi-lateral organisations at national level

What was interesting was that each donor had their own strategy and approach towards Climate change in Zimbabwe. Each of the donors mentioned in the section above, with the exception of GEF (which is a fund that was established as an outcome of the formal Climate change negotiations) receives its money from its own government. In as such, the positions of their governments at global level in terms of Climate change are well reflected in the country strategy as shown in table 3 below.

Table 3: Strategic activities of donors

Donor	Strategic Activities
SIDA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agriculture and Climate change adaptation • Farmer capacity building
European Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Energy • Institutional Capacity Building
DFID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building • Livelihood security and adaptation • Creation of an enabling institutional and policy environment • Information and knowledge dissemination
GEF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adaptation and Agriculture • Institutional Capacity building • Strengthening community voice in the policy process

The study found that the activities of the civil society sector, in particular NGOs were in line with the funding priorities of donors. This is mostly because activities with the sector are wholly externally funded. Key NGO activities within the Climate change arena included those highlighted in the table 4 below. However, it is important to note that each NGO could be participating in more than one activity at a time.

¹⁵ Interview, Programme Officer SIDA, January 2011

Table 4: percentage of organisations implementing certain practises

Activity,	Percentage of Organisations implementing activity
Capacity building (with most working with farmers to help them adapt to Climate change),	71%
Awareness raising	93%
Knowledge dissemination	46%
Documenting narratives to feed into the policy process,	93%
Advocacy	33%
Sharing best practices on proved adaptation techniques, strategies and experiences at various foras from community level to national level (reviews, working group meetings)	100%

As can be noted from the table above, the practises of NGOs seldom fell far away from the funding priorities of donors. In this way, there is the formation of an formidable partnership between donors and NGOs. This partnership creates and maintains the power of the 2 groups to frame policy process within the Climate change Arena. . This power enables an unofficial policy direction to exist within the country and creates a platform for the partnership to influence any formal policy that may be put in place. With this in mind, we argue that the sovereignty of Zimbabwe in terms of Climate change policy process is transcended by virtue of the financial position of the country and by the reluctance on the part of the government to put in place a formal policy.

However, it would be naive to assume that the policy process in Zimbabwe is only influenced by Actors within the policy process. Again taking the view of McGee, we argue that these actors, including NGOs and Donors, play a key role as knowledge brokers . Knowledge plays a key factor in the manner that policies are framed and directed within the Climate change Arena. It influences the narratives that actors bring to the table and discussions within the spaces provided within the Climate change Arena. New forms of knowledge can in turn also create different policy processes and directions within the Climate change Arena. In as such, the next section in the Chapter will focus on knowledge within the National Climate change arena and the way that it is used by various actors to influence the policy process.

4.8 Knowledge within the National Climate change Arena

For the purposes of the study we take the view presented by in its entirety, from scientific to indigenous, emerging out of “complex..... social, situational, cultural and institutional factors” page 211. In as such, we not only analyse how knowledge is used within the arena, but how it is the product of social processes and struggles within the National Climate change arena. The results of the study pertaining to this section will once again be characterised using vignettes and descriptive accounts from the data collection period.

Sources of Knowledge

The study found that there were two main sources of knowledge within the Climate change arena in Zimbabwe. Scientific knowledge and Indigenous knowledge both served to inform the policy process within Zimbabwe. I asked informants what they considered key sources of knowledge that informed their programming. I will begin by using some interview extracts.

Extract 1

When I posed the question to the Climate change Coordinator the sources of knowledge that they used he began by telling me that Climate change was still being investigated and not all the impacts known as yet. He went on to tell me that they relied on predications from the IPCC and the national Meteorological Department. However, outside of the NGOs, within the academic circles, the researcher found 2 “representatives” of Zimbabwe to the IPCC, 1 of whom had been engaged for over 25 years. I put the word representatives in quotation marks because in as much as they were there in their capacity as Zimbabweans, they had never been summoned by government to prepare for the meeting or even report back. One of the representatives even recalled an event where a government representative came to the 2 week meeting, collected his allowance and left.


The IPCC meetings are global level meetings which seek to have an inter-governmental representation for the reasons highlighted in Chapter 3. However, at this stage we note that although the government adopted the knowledge that was produced by the IPCC it had no real input to the data produced. This serves to add to the power that the IPCC commands at various levels and scales. From the responses given by other informants within the arena, we noted that all the informants mentioned IPCC models as guiding the practises and would

guide the policy that will be developed on Climate change within Zimbabwe Even at national level, the IPCC remained a key and invaluable source of knowledge within the policy process. It was one of the key sources of Scientific Knowledge that were mentioned by actors. This is derived from both interviews and key documents that were produced by the actors within the arena. 93% of the informants indicated that they relied on knowledge from the IPCC to inform their interventions and planning.

Extract 2

When I posed the same question to my informant at Zimbabwe Red Cross Society, he told me that they developed projects on the basis of predictions of droughts by the IPCC. He also stated that due to the predicted incidence of drought, they were encouraging conservation farming including “zero tillage, in fact I mean minimum tillage because there is no such thing as zero tillage” to enable moisture retention.

For this particular informant, there was no mention of the national meteorological department. However, as the data collection continued I noted with key interest the presentations at the National Climate change Conference where when it came to the modelling at district or provincial level there was more reliance on data from the National Meteorological Department. The graph below is an extract from a study done by the University of Zimbabwe for sources of knowledge of Climate for farmers in 2 districts of Zimbabwe.



Graph 7: Sources of Knowledge for farmers (University of Zimbabwe 2010)

As can be noted from the above most farmers relied on the information provided on radios and televisions. In Zimbabwe, the forecasts broadcast on radios and televisions are from the National Meteorological Department. However, it is important to derive from the informants within the study which were their main sources of knowledge. The knowledge that the IPCC produced was reported to be abstract and generalised to the country as a whole unlike that produced by the National Meteorological Department. In this sense the national meteorological department provided a plausible complementarity. Most Government Departments relied on scientific knowledge that was produced by the National Meteorological Department and IPCC.

However, we also note that some of the informants claimed to use indigenous knowledge within the Climate change Arena. However, the use of indigenous knowledge did not inform their practises, instead the documentation of such indigenous knowledge was part of their practices. I will characterise with the vignette below

As the interview with the Country Manger of Environment Africa continued, i then asked what activities they were implementing within the Climate change arena. He told me that they disseminated information on the changing agro-ecological zones they were also trying to use IKS. He said that they asked villagers if they had some early warning signs of some form of climate change and if they do then address how best they can respond to those signs.

In another interview with the Programme Officer of DRI the same question was posed. The response was that DRI was documenting the forecasting techniques that were used by farmers in rural areas as a means of ".....enabling Indigenous Knowledge to feed into science"

Using the vignettes above, we note that there is the social construction of indigenous knowledge to suit the needs of the various organisations within the national Climate change

Arena. These needs ranged from using the IKS to inform programming and/or using them as part of programming and practises. On the other hand there were several cases of Indigenous Knowledge and the manner in which it informed the policy process within Zimbabwe. The Indigenous knowledge was mostly presented by NGOs on behalf of communities. It came through documentation of the challenges that were facing communities and current adaptive strategies Indigenous knowledge was also used in forecasting and mapping past trends in climatic conditions. This data was produced through the use of narratives of individual farmers or projects. I will provide descriptions of the project in Gutu and the documentary that was produced

Documentary of Climate change and Farmers in Gutu

OXFAM and DRI produced a documentary that focussed on Climate change and farmers within an area called Gutu in Zimbabwe. The documentary highlighted interventions that had been brought to the district in order to deal with Climate change. It also focussed on how the project had used the creation of climate models of the area and using the models to analyse possible impacts on livelihoods including agriculture. Within the documentary there were women dancing and a male farmer who thanked the intervention by OXFAM and explained how it had changed his life. He even went on to profess that Climate change was happening and he had experienced its effects through reduced crop yields

The presentation of such narratives within the policy process can be viewed as an attempt to feed some form of evidence of Climate change into the policy process. Even within the multi-lateral organisations there was the agreement of the need for evidence based policy making. They all indicated that in order for policy to be effective there was need for evidence of which sectors would be affected and the way they would be affected. NGOs used donor guides as their own. It is also important to note that the actors within Zimbabwe including the multi-laterals had different sources of knowledge that informed their participation within the Climate change Policy process in addition to the IPCC. Other sources of knowledge included UZ Geography department, Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN), World Bank, IPCC, UNFCCC and internal study arms such as FAO Natural Resource Management

Department. None of these multi-laterals mentioned the National Meteorological Department as a source of knowledge.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change (IPCC) remains one of the key sources of knowledge according to most of the respondents both at a global and national level. As the name suggests that panel brings together representatives from different governments, but this time with the aim of producing knowledge that can inform the policy process. This effort to bring together diverse nations and quasi-governmental bodies is a key indicator of the importance of knowledge within the policy process. This is especially true if we talk from an evidence based policy making perspective. This is the perspective that has dominated the Climate change arena which is ripe with uncertainty of the scale of climate change that different parts of the world will experience. The IPCC creates these platforms for interaction through the use of working groups and task forces. Each working group and task force has a specific role and objective that it is set to pursue and part of the role is the production of text that will act as narratives. The setting of agendas and bringing together different governments can be seen as two pronged. This has the role of producing knowledge that can be accepted by all actors within the policy process. It is difficult for an actor to oppose or attack knowledge that it was involved in producing. So central is this element of universal acceptability to the IPCC that it will not allow any comments on governance practices of governments to appear in any of its documents (perscomm). In this way the knowledge that is produced and communicated is presented as neutral.

However, despite the way that knowledge may be presented, it is never neutral but always leans towards certain interests within the climate change arena. Knowledge is socially constructed and translated by actors as it proceeds through the policy process. It is important that although officially, knowledge may be accredited to an organization or institution, it is in fact produced by people. People whose life experiences and shape the way that they process and analyze data. In the same manner, the organizations that produce knowledge or producing a narrative that is meant to compete in an arena with other knowledge narratives. If the knowledge narratives that are produced are not accepted in the policy process, this may render the organization dispensable and hence investors and donors may begin to pull out.

The approach of presenting the knowledge that they produce as neutral serves to legitimize any knowledge making body in the climate change arena. Essentially they bring on-board

their critics and bring them on-board as part of the process. A good illustration of this position can be found in the case of the view of IPCC on indigenous knowledge. Prior to 2007, the IPCC did not accept indigenous knowledge as one that could contribute to the Climate change policy making process. Climatology was considered to be a specialized field that could only be informed by scientific studies. However, as the year 2007 approached the discourse for climate change adaptation became stronger with NGOs at the forefront. These are the same NGOs that have been working in areas of sustainable development and encouraging the use of participatory methodology and ownership of the any interventions. It is these same NGOs together with some scholars (Fairhead and Leach; Arce 2000) that have advocated for the importance of recognition of indigenous knowledge as important to the development sectors. As NGOs entered the Climate change arena their rhetoric did not change. The IPCC was quick to pick up on the trend and it was only in 2007 through a document produced by working group. This document then heralded the beginning of a new era in knowledge where indigenous knowledge could also inform the policy process. In as such communities forecasting climate change became an acceptable part of climate change adaptation.

At this stage it is crucial that we emphasize that the relationship between knowledge and the policy process is non-linear. Knowledge and the policy process exist in a reciprocal relationship where one is constantly (re)shaping the other. Knowledge is key in framing the issue of a climate change in a certain manner that will feed and support other narratives within the arena. With this in mind, knowledge must be viewed and placed in the context of a process rather than as an event which is as much technical as it is political. As shown in Chapter 4, the organizations that produce and communicate knowledge are funded by donors who have a keen interest in the policy process and its outcome. These have the agency to shape the knowledge that is produced and communicated. At the same time, the policy process in the form of gatherings has the capacity to reinforce and shape the content and implication of knowledge produced. In light of this we find that processes of power and legitimization are ripe in the relationship between knowledge and the climate change policy process.

5.6 Implication of global level agreements

Global policies call on national governments to come up with laws and policies that reflect concepts contained within the agreements. However, the leeway to modify principles to suit

national interests was accepted at national levels, there was the view that this was not happening in Zimbabwe. Informants highlighted that policies need to be harmonised. There was the view that most international policies harm local initiatives but Zimbabwe was jumping onto the bandwagon of Climate change without assessing their own situation.

However, some of the organisations hailed the fact that Zimbabwe had signed global level agreements mostly due to the incentives that were provided for. However, they were worried about the delay in domesticating the global level agreements and viewed this as a hamper to implementation. However, this view is ironic as activities on the ground were continuing without the domestic policy.

100% of the respondent said that the current discourse was affected to a greater extent by global processes. It was cited that the Minister of Environment and Natural Resources, Minister Nhema was the chairperson of UNEP and decisions made at the global level would then ultimately affect. Some of the informants indicated that they based their Monitoring and Evaluation Frameworks on global agreements in the face of a non-existent national policy.

Local organisations indicated that they were not happy with the way that some of the global policies were being filtered down to global level. Of much interest was the issue of carbon credits which were being given to selected countries depending on several issues but particularly the relationships that they had at a political level which affected global political will. There was also the issue carbon credits being used as an incentive for those that had ratified certain agreements. So even if programmes were being implemented on the ground, if the political protocols had not been followed then the country could not receive the credits. It was so much such that one respondent called it a hoax. In this way the Climate change arena is a political one.

Some of the informants had reservations about the extent to which Global policy affected the Zimbabwean process. Whilst they agreed that there was indeed some influence, they argued that this influence was also dependant on the capacity of the country, of which at the time manpower was overstretched. It was also argued that the resources that were made available to the Zimbabwe would influence the extent to which global policies would transcend national boundaries. For example, although global policy called upon the formation of NAPA in countries seeking to adapt, Zimbabwe had not formulated a plan as it was not eligible for

funding as at the time the funding was being provided to least developed countries. At the time, Zimbabwe was not classified as a least developed country.

There was consensus that global level policies were meant to influence processes within the national Climate change arena. This has the implication of issues of governmentality and sovereignty. The lack of policy at a national level was viewed by some as an indication that the response of Zimbabwe was inadequate.

5.7 Climate change as a priority?

When the study began, the researcher then observed the number of organisations that were working on Climate change were few and that there was what we perceived as “reluctance” on the part of the government to put in place a formal policy. This then begged the question “Is Climate change a priority for Zimbabwe at the moment?”

The reaction to this was unanimous. Everyone agreed that Climate change **should be** a priority within the Zimbabwean context. The Climate change Coordinator when asked this question looked outside the window of his 11th floor office and immediately asked the researcher to observe the weather patterns. The study coincided with the rainy season in Zimbabwe. It so happened that the rainy season was somewhat irregular in the 2010 – 2011 season, with the country experiencing heavy rains in December and January followed by a mid-season drought. There were reports of crops failing due to the unanticipated mid-season drought hence affecting food security. In March there was an appeal for more food aid in Zimbabwe. In the same breath, the Climate change Coordinator indicated that Climate change was an issue that had not been given attention in the national budget with issues such as Agriculture receiving the most attention.

However, most informants also added that whilst Climate change should be a priority in Zimbabwe, there were other pressing issues that needed attention. There was also common consensus amongst the informants that most organisations joined the Climate change bandwagon after international noise was made through Copenhagen Conference in 2009.

The informant from UNDP went a step further to highlight and concretise my finding that for organisations and institutions in Zimbabwe, climate change was driven by global policies which were not a priority in Africa including Zimbabwe. In as such she went on to say that this placed the onus on actors in developing countries to link these global policies to their

own needs at a certain level. This perception partially explains the continued participation of Zimbabwe in a policy process of a phenomenon that most actors regarded as foreign.

5.8 Conclusion

The study findings are consistent with the view proposed by many authors such as Buse et al 2005 that policy making is not a role that is limited to government only but encompasses a number of actors. The policy process has a number of actors, institutions and within Zimbabwe donors and NGOs form a large and critical part of the process. In as such, national policy is exposed to a large extent to pressures by global civil society which exists outside the physical country boundaries. In the case of Zimbabwe, there is the emergence of new policy spaces that have served to accommodate some ad-hoc arrangements.

To put this into perspective, one must understand the institutional and policy drivers that exist within Zimbabwe. Institutions are taken in their broadest sense to encompass all arrangements that contribute to the making and enforcement of rules within the arena. The Zimbabwean Government, whilst firmly in control, realizes that it lacks the financial muscle to participate fully in the policy process. However, the financial arrangements that exist do not allow monetary funds to be channeled through government. Instead they are channeled through mostly International NGOs and multi-lateral organizations. Most of these funds come from external sources hence are bound with conditionality.

Prior 2007, Climate change was a relatively new concept in Zimbabwe which affected and involved few actors and institutions. This is despite the fact that the government of Zimbabwe ratified the Rio Declaration (1992) and the Climate change Convention quite early in the process. At the time, GoZ was the main actor in terms of the policy implementation process. The GoZ was heavily favored by the economic giants of the world and was seen as the beacon of light for most African Countries. However, again, the argument is that any such ratification was not hastened by the fact that the GoZ perceived Climate change as a minor issue or threat to the nation's economic and social wellbeing. On the contrary, it was a show of support for agendas proposed on the global scale and perhaps even an attempt to please the World's economic giants and by so doing keep a steady fund flowing into their coffers. This is exemplified by the National communication on Climate change was done in 1998 with the

specific heading “Prepared for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate change”.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

Climate change and its effects, whilst real remains the product of problematization (Escobar 1995) by actors in the form of organisations and institutions. This problematization is done in a way that seeks to accommodate a large number of actors and their priorities, in this way rendering the climate change policy process quite abstract. The study findings indicated that in the case of Zimbabwe, Climate change was a problematization that originated from the global level and remained abstract at national level. It was a phenomenon whose technical jargon and rules were created at a global level by global actors and institutions then passed down to the national level through a small number of actors in the form of organisations and institutions. In as such, it was reported that policy makers in Zimbabwe did not understand Climate change at a global level and how Zimbabwe was involved. To them it was a foreign phenomenon whose rules and regulations were being imposed on them from the global level. However, as the phenomenon and its rules are passed down to national level, it is subjected to processes of social negotiation by actors and institutions at regional and national levels. These processes of negotiations are to a greater extent affected by the policy tools in the form of donors and multi-lateral institutions, coupled with incentives that are established a global level in order to support policy processes in developing countries like Zimbabwe.

This Chapter is going to look at the bigger view of the global and national arena which I will call the stadium and the struggles within it. The term stadiums is a metaphor that I coin and use to approach climate change and the struggles within its spaces. The metaphor feeds off from the analysis made in Chapter 3, 4 and 5 which focus on separate elements of global and national arena. We use the term stadium as it gives a bigger picture that goes beyond an arena. Long (2002) rightly states that the thought of an arena brings to the mind a picture of boxers in a ring. However, in the picture that I paint, the playing field extends to more than just the arena. In his analysis includes the idea of by-standers, whom I will call spectators, have a vested interest in the outcome of the game and will influence it in any way they can. I adopt this idea while at the same time taking the idea that it also includes the vendors who are taking advantage of the business opportunity and the companies who are monopolising the chance to advertise the products that they offer and the owners of the stadium seeking to ensure that it is not vandalised.

Essentially, in most cases the struggle may be seen by the naked eye as between the institutions such as the African Group versus the European Group, but the struggles go beyond the active participants with all the participants having goals which are not always selfless. This has an impact on transformation of policy from global to national, i.e. how an agreement such as the Copenhagen Accord which is global will be given a different form and appearance that is contextually relevant, and the interaction of emergent policy on development and climate adaptation policy process

6.2 Conclusion 1: Global Climate change policy is translated and creates a different reality at the interface

The agenda for Climate change at that Global arena is one that has been negotiated at an intergovernmental level with Governments playing a key role. The result has been a policy process that has evolved over the years continuously transforming itself and responding to pressures at various levels. This is clearly exemplified in the evolution of narratives and discourses that began in 1992 with the main focus being Climate change mitigation with Climate change adaptation being more of a side agenda to it becoming a firm discourse within the Climate change Arena. These changes have resulted in the change of the UNFCCC in text and rhetoric to encompass issues that relate increasingly to development discourses.

However, at national level, Zimbabwe, we find that despite involvement of the country in Global Climate change processes since 1992, there was little change in the Climate change Arena in terms of formal policy processes. In 2011 there is still active participation at a global level from actors at various scales and levels. At the national level we encounter a close knitted invited arena composed of a few actors who share narratives, discourses and practices. Within the arena actors create networks and spaces within which they interact and foster allegiances which perpetuate already existent narratives and discourses. In as such, we see some degree of resistance to change of motions with already existent practices such as crop diversification and jatropha being maintained but simply given a new identity under Climate change. Such resistance is even seen at governmental level where there is still inertia from the Government of Zimbabwe to concretize Climate Adaptation processes in a policy. Instead what we see is what looks to be at first glance, fragmented policies which are related to Climate change but housed under different organizations and institutions.

The meeting of global and national processes results in a complex stadium and policy processes within it. In essence then what we note at the interface is a conscious and deliberate effort to adopt Climate change Adaptation at a national level. I argue that in the case of Zimbabwe, Climate change is in fact a globally created phenomenon that is being imposed to the national level. This imposition is presented in a manner that is disguised to make it seem like a voluntary process but put into context, the incentives provided make it impossible for a developing country like Zimbabwe to exclude itself. It is important to remember that Zimbabwe's economy has been in a depression with unemployment figures reaching over 80% and over 90% living in poverty (Chigwada 2008). In a sense the incentives provided when a country adopts international Climate change policies and practices can in fact provide a much needed lifeline and create employment. As a result what we see is a superficial adoption of global policy practices without much alteration to the status quo of national policies. From an outsider's perspective, I argue that they adopt some aspects of the global Climate change policies genuinely, but only as far as they do not threaten or override their own organizational and institutional interests.

In conclusion I note that there is a shallow and partial adoption of global Climate change policy processes within the Zimbabwean Climate change arena. However, this must not be taken lightly as it has some implications of its own. It is in fact a manifestation and expression of the agency that is possessed by actors in both the national and the global arenas (stadium) as there are always 2 sides to a coin.

6.3 Conclusion 2: Translation and social construction create two sides to a coin

When actors enter the global arena they do so with a purpose, to be able to foster agreements that will benefit both national and transnational interests that they may have. In as such, the global and national arenas are intricately connected by the agency of the actors within it. This agency is exercised in such a way that it presents a win-win situation for both the global and national actors and the interests that they possess.

The first glance at a global level shows a process that seems to be genuinely geared to the achievement of 1 goal, i.e. to tackle Climate change and enable communities to adjust to its effects. However, in as much as there are sincere intentions, the process is riddled with politics turning Climate change into a political arena. The first step towards it being a

political arena is in the intergovernmental nature of the arena. It is important to realize that most governments are put in power through elections and hence remain accountable to some extent to the citizens of their countries. In as such, the narratives that they bring to the arena and the subsequent decisions that they make reflect to a greater extent the priorities and interests at a national level. Needless to say, different countries and regions have different priorities within their own countries hence the apparent struggles within the global Climate change arena between narratives and discourses of adaptation and mitigation. However, I argue that these struggles are simply a manifestation of different actors and institutions exercising agency.

This agency manifests itself through developing countries, as seen by the constant reference to the need for monetary compensation, coming to view developed countries as an alternative source of income. This idea has over the years been cemented by the provision of development aid, in some cases like Zimbabwe, may exceed the GDP of the country. In 2007- 2008, the development aid provided to Zimbabwe exceeded the GDP . In as such, actors within the Zimbabwean Climate change Arena continue seek to derive as much financial gain from the system whilst at the same time provide an improved life for the citizens. This is exemplified in Chapter 4 and 5 when we analyze the processes at national level. We find that both Government and civil society actors continuously adjust their engagement in the national policy process in response to the global arena and financial incentives provided therein. As donors change their strategic focus, civil society adopts that strategic focus. We also see a seemingly reluctant government slowly buckling to international pressure exerted through multi-lateral agencies such as the UNDP to put in place a separate Climate change policy. I argue here that such a change is not a case of actors in Zimbabwe being unable to chart their own path. It is by contrast a calculated way of manipulating the system to achieve personal, organizational and institutional gain.

However, this is a game that actors within the stadium have learnt to play and play well. It is a game of social negotiation with each actor achieving at least a certain part of the goals that they set out to achieve as they entered the arena. In as much as developing countries have learnt to play victim, developed countries have learnt to play hero. In this way they to achieve certain outcomes. Developed countries are not blind to the desires of developing countries to extract financial gain from them and the stadium. What they have however, learnt to do is use

the promise of money to encourage their counterparts to adopt elements of the global policy process that best suit their own domestic, international and political needs.

At the interface we note that Zimbabwe, which adamantly pursues Climate change Agenda and expresses its interest in Climate change Adaptation at the expense of mitigation, being tempted by the incentives. Essentially, although the Zimbabwean economy is an agro-based economy, amendments to the UNFCCC have propagated the discourse of forests and energy over agriculture (Chapter 3). The conservation and creation of forests, the adoption of alternative sources of energy are all part of mitigation of Climate change within the stadium. It is important though to note that such an adoption comes with changes in strategies and policies of international actors such as the Food and Agriculture Organization. It has however, not been accompanied by a change in the policies of the Government of Zimbabwe. What we do see though is the adoption of certain practices and the legitimization of them using the banner of Climate change. The practices identified in Chapter 5 have been in the country for several years prior to the hype surrounding Climate change. However, they have been accommodated in the national Climate change arena through processes of transferring already existent practices

However, the adoption of part of the global policy process, in the form of practices creates a challenge in the emergent processes. In Zimbabwe, we see an adoption of this part of the policy process that presenting a direct competition for the backbone of the Zimbabwean economy. As highlighted in Chapter 4 and 5, creation of forests and growing of biofuels both present competition for land and labor resources in the agricultural sector hence affecting food security in Zimbabwe. Through this adoption of practices that present a direct competition to agriculture, implementation of agricultural activities as they relate to food security and livelihood ceases to be unilineal, simple and exclusively rational according to pre-established universal indicators and in practice usually manifests as not possible to be controlled by policy makers at different scales. In the end there was what I see as a compromise between the developed and the developing world which is now known as UN-REDD. In essence, developing countries get the money that they wanted but in return they create and conserve carbon sinks in the form of forests and woodlands. The creation of these carbon sinks would take up space that could have otherwise been used to modernize infrastructure and create industry.

The adoption of practices without a formal policy in place also creates what the informants in the study describe as an ad-hoc and disorganized policy process at national level.

6.4 Conclusion 3: Within Disorganization lies some order

The study has found in Chapter 5, informants the national Climate change arena as disorganized and lacking guidance. The informants blamed this apparent disorganization on the lack of policy framework. They in turn placed policy making as a government responsibility hence explicitly blaming government for any disorganization within the arena. On the other hand, government representatives all insisted that the arena was organized and encouraged actors to continue with implementation of activities in the absence of a separate and formal national policy on Climate change.

The Government's view is surprising and yet astoundingly correct. What seems like a disorganized process is in fact one that is well calculated and organized to achieve the objectives of actors within it. The Climate change arena at global and national level is made up of a number of rational actors, who seek to achieve a certain goal. For some actors the role is governmentality and economic gain whilst some are concerned with image building. In most cases it is a number of goals that drive and determine extent and level of involvement of different actors within the arena.

Within the disorganization of the national Climate change arena emerged the achievement of some of the goals that actors set out to achieve as they entered the arena. These include

- new organizations for example the Climate change Working Group,
- an alternative income stream and employment for the Zimbabwean population
- new objects and methods of governmentality for western governments within the national Climate change Arena

The above scenario gives the impression that whilst Zimbabwe is benefitting from the order within disorganization, it is doing so at the cost of compromising its own sovereignty. This is perpetuated by local contexts for example the way that the Zimbabwean Government is perceived by the International Community.

The Zimbabwean government has been heavily criticized as corrupt and inefficient (Heritage Foundation 2010) by donor countries resulting in donor countries by-passing the state and choosing to work with NGOs and multi-lateral organizations which work through the use of projects. This has resulted in a scenario where we find NGOs have seemingly become key actors in some instances alienating the state. In the case of governance of climate, it also seemingly creates and perpetuates a reliance on capacity and abilities of other institutions beyond the state . This scenario creates the impression that the sovereignty of a country and government has been transcended. In essence, as actors attempt to adopt global policies, the emergent arena is one that has no formal government policies but runs on informal policy directions expressed through strategies of international organizations within the national Climate change arena. In this way sovereignty is indeed transcended.

However, the nature of the transcession is not a forceful one. It is one of mutual agreement where the Government of Zimbabwe is aware of the presence of parallel informal policies that exist. It actually encourages this transcession by urging civil society to continue with their work whilst it drags its heels on formalizing the policy formulation process in Zimbabwe. At the same time, multi-laterals and donors alike have some degree of free reign in the policy processes and access to vehicles (in the form of NGOs) to achieve their intended outcomes without any close monitoring. Donors and multi-lateral agencies are given the power to create and maintain dominant discourses which form part of informal policy whilst at the same time providing a plausible range of policy options for a plausible formal climate change policy.

6.5 Conclusion 4: National institutional and organizational priorities take precedence over adoption of global Climate change policies

Climate change is a concern in Zimbabwe and at the global level. However, the manner in which the Climate change Arena is depicted in Zimbabwe is a clear illustration of how global policies and phenomenon acquire a new meaning in developing countries. Within the Zimbabwean context there is a clash between global agendas and national interests. This struggle manifests itself in as an ever-changing arena with a number of actors seeking to adopt and adapt, while all the while maintaining some form of their original structure despite pressures coming from within and without. In as such there is some degree of institutional inertia.

Firstly, we note the creation of an arena whose entry by invitation or reference. This makes Climate change manifest itself as a specialised arena at national level where only certain actors can occupy spaces. In this way we see organisations working with the environment attempting to protect their territory so as to remain relevant in an arena whose hype could attract several other actors. These actors may then present competition for the already few resources and threaten survival of organisations and institutions already occupying spaces within the arena.

Any activities that may undermine organizational and institutional survival is met with some resistance. This has resulted in partial adoption of policies and practices at national level, which in some cases undermine national interests for example adopting practices that create direct competition for agriculture, which is the backbone of the Zimbabwean economy. In as such I conclude that organizations translate policies in different ways to suit their current practices and at the same time ensure that they remain relevant in a country always adjusting to global interests.

Such a manifestation is exemplified in Chapter 4 and 5 through the adoption of forestry initiatives at the expense of agriculture. However, such an adoption is best exemplified by initiatives from FAO and the Ministry of Energy. However, in as much as other actors such as NGOs, Ministry of Agriculture are part of the Climate change arena, they continue to place more emphasis on agricultural adaptation to Climate change. If they were too were to focus on forestry, their larger role in the country would be at risk of becoming redundant. As such, they would not fully adopt issues of carbon sinks as they are presented in global policies such as the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Framework. At the same time, although Agriculture is a main priority for Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Energy would not adopt agriculture as their main focus as this would also pose a threat to their institutional survival.

I therefore also conclude that any planned process of translation of Climate change policy from a global to national level is affected by already existent organizations and institutions. This is in light of the fact that these institutions and organizations will make their survival the primary priority. With the existence of a range of organizations and institutions in a country like Zimbabwe, this will manifest in the form of fragmented adoption that does not necessarily resemble or meet agreed objectives at global level. This challenges the success of

centralizing Climate change through the formulation of a single national Climate change policy instead of treating it as a cross-cutting issue whose interests are shared by a range of institutions and organizations looking at Climate change from different perspectives.

Final note

In as much as Climate change has become a global issue whose management does not respect global boundaries, it is still localised to suit local needs and interests. Albeit at times, these needs may be monetary hence working against the other priorities of perhaps agricultural production in the case of Climate change. This translation and social construction to suit local needs is also met by a heterogeneous range of actors who in turn have their own priorities and goals for which Climate change may merely be a means to an end. In this way Climate change policy remains an abstract concept that is manipulated to suit the needs of various actors within the stadium. It remains such an abstract concept such that actors refuse any association with it, placing it firmly as government responsibility whilst at the same time, government is unsure how to proceed. The Study concludes that the concept of Climate change is so vague such that activities that predominantly serve other agendas such as development can be socially translated and constructed to suit it. In essence, even within a mature global policy process, there are no typically related Climate change activities hence organisations and institutions seek to legitimise their status quo using Climate change banner.

As such I argue and conclude that although the study focused on Climate change arena, we note that the translation and social construction of Climate change from a global to a national level seizes to encompass issues to deal with Climate change. Instead, it simply serves as an alternative arena for the manifestation of other interests that may originate nationally or globally. What is clear though is that with the global arena and national arena are not always reflections of each other. Instead we see issues of Climate change being adapted to suit national needs and priorities whilst at the same time giving room for global priorities other than Climate change to be manifested. In this way an emergent arena with its own policies and processes is created. The effectiveness of such an arena to address Climate change in its entirety is one area that may warrant further research.

From the above I further conclude that given the properties of the emergent arena, it may be worthwhile to pursue the mainstreaming of Climate change into already existent policies at

global and national level. It may be beneficial to use and adjust policy practices instead of enacting coherent policies that may never be implemented at national level. In Zimbabwe, I can safely conclude that there are no Climate change specific policies but only Climate change policy practices and this may remain the status quo for several years to come.

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ANNEX 1

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NGOs

1. What role does your NGO play in terms of Climate change Adaptation and food security?
2. Do you play any role at
 - a. Global level
 - b. National Level
 - c. Policy making level
 - d. Implementation level
 - e. Research
3. Please expand on the above including any collaborative work that you take part in.
4. In your opinion, what is the position at national level in terms Climate change Adaptation and Food Security?
5. Where does the organization stand in terms of Climate change and food security (Throughout the policy process)
6. How do you think national policy and activities are affected by global policies and activities?
7. How do these same national and global policies affect the work that the organization does in terms of Food Security and Climate change Adaptation?
8. How has the organization adjusted to contradictions at global and National level especially in light of the fact that you are internationally funded?
9. What is the impact of these global and international policies on the way that you interact with
 - a. NGOs
 - b. Government Departments
 - c. International Organizations
10. What are the synergies or trade-offs that exist in terms of Climate change Adaptation and Food security with
 - a. Current policies as they stand

- b. “Emergent” policies and practices

Annex 2

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT ARMS, DONORS AND WORLD BANK

1. What work does your organization in Zimbabwe?
2. What work do you do in terms of climate change adaptation and food security?
3. What is the organization's policy in terms of climate change adaptation and food security?
4. Is this specific for Zimbabwe? If yes, what are the policies that are used by the international parent body.
5. How does this reconcile with national and global policies on Climate change Adaptation and Food Security.
6. Are you involved in the climate change adaptation global and national policy making?
If yes, in what way?
7. Which organizations and institutions do you work with?
8. What impact have emergent policies had on food security and institutional interaction?

