Bordering in Istanbul

Syrian refugees in border zone Turkey

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Abstract

This thesis revolves around the question how Turkey is turned into a border zone by and for Syrian refugees. Border zones are liminal spaces that are transit points in mobility, which purpose is to restrain the speed and magnitude of migration through sovereignty. The qualitative research for this thesis was done in Istanbul from November 2015 until January 2016. In this thesis a representation of mobility is given from the viewpoint of refugees, instead of the geopolitical or state-centred approach that is most common in migration literature. Following van Houtum (2002, 2007, 2010), the concepts of 'ordering' and 'othering' are used in conceptualizing border zones. Five themes that refugees use to order the world around them are distinguished. These are security, stability, control, possibilities, and community. It is argued that refugees make use of 'crowd navigation' and 'chain migration' for their mobility. Furthermore, policies that declare refugees market redundant or disposable are investigated and the agency of refugees is emphasized. On a last note the recommendation is made that the EU should make more of an effort to help Syrian refugees.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Tarlabasi, a neighbourhood in the centre of Istanbul, is mainly inhabited by Syrian refugees and Kurdish Internally Displaced People. It takes crossing a big four-lane road to get there from the tourist area called Taksim. Colourful flags with HDP – the Peoples' Democratic Party that is unofficially tied to the Kurds – are hanging over the streets, together with laundry that is operated through pulley block mechanisms from house to house. Men huddle up on its corners or play card games and dominos in one of the teahouses. People walk on the roads, avoiding sidewalks that not seem to be maintained since their construction. The roads themselves are filled with holes, in which trash collects itself. Once colourful house fronts – yellow, blue, red – are falling apart. The smell of freshly baked bread and döner is replenished with that of old urine. At night it is the place people go to buy drugs, during the day it is mostly children playing ballgames on the streets.

I go to a solidarity kitchen, called 'mutfak' (kitchen), in this area on a Saturday afternoon. The mutfak is a communal space for everyone who likes to be involved. Different courses, such as Turkish, English, German, and guitar classes, are offered here to the people of the neighbourhood – mostly Syrian and Kurdish refugees - by volunteers. When I arrive I am let in by a German girl. She tells me that where it used to be the adults who came to cook and eat together, the children of the neighbourhood have taken over on Saturday afternoons. Previously there were a lot of children as well, but now it are three times as much. It is not bad per sé, but just different. Children are between the ages of 5 and 13, but sometimes younger children come as well. On this Saturday, we were going to do some origami and the drawing of pictures with the children. While setting up the tables, more and more children assemble in front of the mutfak. They are impatiently knocking on the glass windows of the door and yelling to get attention. When the doors open they storm in. In the course of the afternoon, children are running, screaming, playing and laughing in a space the size of half a classroom. In this kitchen I meet Ahmed and later on also his friend Hassan[1], who will tell you their story in this thesis.[2]

[1] I anonymized my informants' names at their request for matters of privacy.
[2] Field notes November 14, 2015.

I did my fieldwork in Istanbul, Turkey, from November 2015 until January 2016. I had never been there before, but would soon discover just how gigantic, vibrant, and lively this city is. I set out on doing research to Syrian refugees, a target group I had experience with back home in the Netherlands. Istanbul is host to around 366,000 Syrian refugees, which is more than all Syrian refugees in Europe combined.[3] In many parts of the city I would find refugees living, working, panhandling, chatting on street corners, drinking tea, and playing games. I was hoping to find Syrians who could shed their light on their motivations for migration to Europe, or the reasons to stay in Turkey. This country has had a massive influx of Syrians since the armed conflict in Syria started in 2011. Human Rights Watch (2015, p.4) sums up the situation in Syria as follows:

Civilians continue to pay a heavy price in Syria's increasingly bloody armed conflict. Government forces and pro-government militias continue to carry out deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas, including through the use of high explosive barrel bombs. Government forces also arbitrarily arrest, forcibly disappear, and torture those they perceive as opponents, many of whom have died in detention. Non-state armed groups opposing the government are also responsible for war crimes and other serious abuses, including deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, use of child soldiers, kidnapping, and torture in detention. The extremist Islamist groups, the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) and al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, are responsible for systematic and widespread violations including targeting of civilians, kidnappings and extrajudicial executions. Humanitarian aid agencies experience significant challenges in getting vitally-needed assistance to the internally displaced and other civilians within Syria due to sieges imposed by both government forces and non-state armed groups.

Against this reality a lot of Syrians (4,844,111 until now[4]) have decided to leave the country for Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq.

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[3] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/27/istanbul-has-more-syrian-refugees-than-all-of-europe-says-david-miliband (accessed on May 4, 2016).

[4] http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php Accessed on May 20, 2016)

On the other side the European Union has been following the developments with a heightened state of attention and has been struggling to cope with the so-called 'refugee crisis' since the summer of 2015.

Besides representing a serious humanitarian crisis affecting hundreds of thousands of human beings, this migration flow has challenged the fragile geopolitical balance of the region and raised concerns about the future of the borderless Schengen area. Member States have shown limited capacity to agree on a common strategy to deal with the crisis and reluctance in implementing measures which were not unanimously approved (i.e. 'hotspots' and the relocation plan). One of the few points all European leaders seem to agree upon, however, is the need to enhance migration cooperation with Turkey, with the aim to reduce the flow of migrants and asylum seekers moving from or through the country to the EU (Roman et al. 2016, p.1-2).

Amidst this tension I decided to go to Istanbul. I was interested in how Turkey in a sense became a border zone, clasped between a country at war and the EU that attempts to close its borders. This also lead me to my main research question: *How is Turkey turned into a border zone by and for Syrian refugees?* From the literature on borders and border zones, it became clear to me that two concepts play an important role. These are 'ordering' and 'othering'. The sub-questions that I will answer in this thesis are therefore:

1. How, and on what basis, do refugees order the world around them?
2. How are refugees part of a process of othering?
3. what does this learn us with respect to the theory on border zones?

I will address these questions in various chapters in this thesis, and I will answer them in the conclusion. In the next chapter I will start with a methodology section, in which I will explain which methods I used in my qualitative research, what challenges I met, and how I overcame them. I will also include a discussion on case studies, which are the basis of this thesis. Chapter three is a theoretical discussion on mobility, borders, and border zones. Chapter four and five will be entirely devoted to Ahmed and Hassan, who will tell their stories. In chapter six I will discuss those stories and look back at the theoretical notions discussed in chapter three. The last chapter contains my conclusions and recommendations.

Chapter 2: Methodology

I did fieldwork in Istanbul, Turkey, from November 2015 until January 2016. I focussed my research on Syrian refugees that were (temporarily) living there. As told in chapter one I met my key informants through a solidarity kitchen. I will first tell something on the main methods I used, then about the difficulties I encountered, and lastly on the perks of case-study research like the one I have done.

Methods

The main methods I used during my time in Istanbul were participant observation, informal conversations, and semi-structured interviews. The goal of participant observation is to take part "in the daily activities, rituals, interactions, and events of a group of people as one of the means of learning the explicit and tacit aspects of their life routines and their culture" (DeWalt and DeWalt 2011, p.1). I did this as much as possible by having dinners with them, drinking tea, joining them to the community centre, and by just hanging out and talking. During this participant observations I also had the chance to have informal conversations with my informants. This had the big advantage that I could ask questions in a relaxed atmosphere, that there was no sense of importance to my questions – something that can arise when doing actual interviews -, and that I could react to situations on the spot. I believe I was really able to build rapport with my informants to such an extent that I became more of a friend than a researcher. This enabled me to get access to my informants' lives and to receive trustworthy answers to my questions. Next to this I also did actual interviews, which mostly lasted between one and two hours, and were conducted on my informant's place of choice: at their home or in tea houses. DeWalt and DeWalt (2011) identify five types of interviews: conversation, unstructured interviews, semi-structured interviews, structured interviews, and self-administered questionnaires. In my research, I made use of semi-structured interviews. This type of interviews enabled me to move along with the interests of my informants, while still having a grip on where I wanted the interview to go. It was important for this research to get into the perception of refugees and to be able to place their

answers into a proper context. Also, it gave myself as a researcher the freedom to check observations with informants, so as to come to an objective evaluation of their thoughts, behaviour, or feelings. Furthermore, semi-structured interviews have as an additional advantage that me and my informants could wander freely into other topics before coming back to the main theme, and that I could repeat questions multiple times in other ways or from different angles.

Impediments

Whilst doing my research I encountered some setbacks. Before I went to the field I planned on getting in touch with Syrian refugees through NGOs that are working in Istanbul. I made appointments with people from these NGOs and explained my research through e-mail. When I arrived, however, these people were not in the position to help, or were not eager to. Sometimes they wanted to, but did not have the right contacts, and sometimes they simply did not want to give me support because of the integrity of the refugees. What intensified this was the fact that there were already a vast number of researchers and journalists in Istanbul that were interested in refugees and were seeking contact through these NGOs. This is something I heard from multiple sources.[5] The consequence of this was not only that NGOs could not keep up with the demand, and they already have a lot on their plate, but also that refugees themselves became 'research-tired'. The snowball method, something of a holy grail in qualitative research, had therefore limited effect. I was introduced to other refugees through my initial contacts in the solidarity kitchen, but they were never eager to participate in my study. Also when I asked refugees that did participate in my research if they had any friends that were willing to be involved, the response came some time later that they had asked around but none of their friends were interested. This image was confirmed when I was introduced in one of the community centres, were refugees went to hang out, have a chat, read a book, or play ping pong. Multiple journalists and researchers would hang out there to observe or to ask questions. I had approached this community centre myself at an earlier stage as well to see if I was welcome there. This was before I learned about the

[5] For example when I had an appointment at the Centre for Migration Research (November 11, 2015), through my informants (fieldnotes November 26, 2015), my own observations at Ad.Dar (December 22, 2015).

overload of researchers and journalists. Back then I received a negative response, saying they are "strictly a community center for Syrian and Palestinian refugees offering a safe place for learning and community".[6]

Luckily I was able to overcome these obstacles by trying multiple entrances and investing a lot of time in the contacts that I did have. I became aware of the fact that I was only seeing what I did not have, and instead focussed on what I did have – informants with a lot of valuable research material to offer. I made the choice to go in-depth with my informants, instead of trying to broaden my network in the city, and adapted my research set-up to this. As a result of this, I present two case studies in this thesis.

Case studies

Most case-oriented studies "start with the seemingly simple idea that social phenomena in like settings (such as organizations, neighborhoods, cities, countries, regions, cultures, and so on) may parallel each other sufficiently to permit comparing and contrasting them" (Ragin 1997, p.2). Ragin defines case studies as "meaningful but complex configurations of events and structures" (Ragin 1997, p. 2) and sees them a useful tool to understand these social phenomena. There are a lot of misconceptions surrounding case studies, however. In particular that they can only produce context-dependent knowledge, that it is impossible to generalize, that cases are only useful for generating hypotheses, that there is a bias toward verification, and that it is difficult to summarize and develop general propositions and theories. Flyvbjerg (2006) reacts on these five misunderstandings, and argues against one of the standard definition of case studies[7]. He states that this definition is 'oversimplified' and 'grossly misleading', because case studies can have a lot of value in themselves.

The first misunderstanding, Flyvbjerg says, is that general and theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable than concrete and practical (context-dependent)

[6] E-mail conversation with community centre Ad.Dar November 6th, 2015.

[7] *Case Study*. The detailed examination of a single example of a class of phenomena, a case study cannot provide reliable information about the broader class, but it may be useful in the preliminary stages of an investigation since it provides hypotheses, which may be tested systematically with a larger number of cases. (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1984, p. 34)

knowledge. This is a misunderstanding because in the social sciences it is impossible to produce context independent knowledge when it comes to the study of human affairs. "Social science has not succeeded in creating general, context-independent theory and, thus, has in the final instance nothing else to offer than concrete, context-dependent knowledge" (p.223). Furthermore, context dependent knowledge is necessary to allow people to develop from rule-based learners to experts, according to research on learning.

The second misunderstanding is that one cannot generalize on the basis of case studies. Therefore, case studies cannot contribute to scientific development. Also this appears to be wrong, because in the course of history it has proven to be the case that major scientific discoveries were done on the basis of a single case, for example in Galileo's rejection of Aristotle's law of gravity, or in the works of Newton, Einstein, and Bohr. Furthermore, case studies are especially important when falsifying a theory, or by identifying 'black swans'. When the theory holds that there are only white swans, this theory can be falsified by identifying one black swan, which then overrules the whole theory. Some cases that appear white, can be black upon in-depth inspection, something that a case study does.

The third misunderstanding is that case studies are only useful for generating hypotheses, not for the testing of hypotheses or theory building. Case studies, however, can clarify deeper causes behind a given problem and its consequences, instead of just describing the symptoms of the problem and how frequently they occur. Also, "atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied" (p. 229).

The fourth misunderstanding is that the case study contains a bias toward verification or, in other words, case studies tend to confirm preconceived notions of the researcher. Flyvbjerg argues, however, that because the researcher is 'in the field', case studies "can 'close in' on real-life situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice"(p. 235). Moreover, it depends on the stance one has on scientific research. If the goal of a researcher and his or her work is to understand and learn about social phenomena, than research is simply a form of learning. It then becomes clear that the most advanced form of understanding can only be achieved when the researcher places him

or herself within the context being studied. “Only in this way can researchers understand the viewpoints and the behaviour, which characterizes social actors” (p.235).

The fifth and last misunderstanding is that it is often difficult to summarize and develop scientific formulae, general propositions, and theories. But, says Flyvbjerg, this is not necessarily a problem because case studies aim to approach the complexities and contradictions of real life. Those are difficult to summarize, but are also a sign that the study has uncovered a particularly rich problematic, that cannot be easily simplified. It is therefore the question if summarizing and generalization is always desirable.

I aim to do the same in my case studies as well: to give a ‘thick’ description that will uncover a wide array of themes. I will thereby follow Becker’s (2014) advise in how to treat cases. He says: “you find two or more things that are alike in some important way and different in some other ways, and look for the further differences that create the ones you first noticed, searching for the deeper processes those surface differences embody” (p. 41). The narratives of Ahmed and Hassan, that I will present in chapter four and five, are very similar in many respects, but different in other ways as well. I will compare these stories in the discussion chapter of this thesis, thereby searching for the deeper processes that lie at the bottom of these differences and similarities. By comparing and contrasting these I hope to come to a deeper understanding of border zones. In the following chapter, I will start with a theoretical discussion.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

Mobility

Mobility, and therefore migration, should be seen as a relational experience. Cresswell (2006, from: Hannam 2009) distinguishes three relational moments in which mobility could be captured. Firstly, there is mobility as a purely observable fact, as the movement from A to B. Secondly, mobility is captured through various modes of representation: film, photography, literature, philosophy, law, etc. Thirdly, mobility is that which is practiced, experienced, and is embodied. These moments are interlinked. The representations of mobility (re)produce meanings and, here, mobility "becomes synonymous with freedom, with transgression, with creativity, with life itself"(Cresswell 2006, from: Hannam 2009, p.103). Also, while movement is connected to the representational meanings of mobility, these representations are in turn based on the ways in which mobility is embodied and practiced. Mobility can thus be seen as the entanglement of movement, representation, and practice. This makes migration into an integral process in which mobility is experienced and meaningful.

Scheel (2013) also argues that mobility, and therefore migration, should always be seen as relational. He does this from the autonomous migration paradigm, in which the agency of migrants is emphasized. Migrants' agency, he states, always presupposes a structure as its external counterpart. Migration should be investigated as a social construct in which migration as well as borders are brought into being through the "innumerable encounters between people on the move and the actors, means and methods of mobility control"(p.280). Especially illegal migration and control exist in relation to each other: through illegal migration, border control comes into existence and through border control, illegal migration is tried to be contained. Furthermore, migration is an embodied experience: mobility is appropriated in encounters with agents, devices, means and methods of control. This always features a physical body, for it is through this body that mobility is appropriated and turned into a target for surveillance and control. Scheel (2013) thus sees illegal migration as an interaction between agency and structure, in which the one exists in relation to the other.

Borders: keeping the unwanted out

The field of border studies focusses on this structure. Among other things, it studies border controls, the institutionalization of borders, and the building of physical boundaries. Hassner and Wittenberg (2011) make a division in the field of border studies. They do this into two schools of thought. The first school focusses on the symbolic function of borders: "boundaries are treated as institutions that take part in a global system of ordering, construct differences and mobilize identities" (p. 11). This school excludes the physicality of borders in their analysis, ignore the impact on state power, resources and security, and do not focus on borders as obstacles that prevent the movement of people and goods. The second school's work, on the other hand, is concerned with the question as to why states build physical barriers and whether or not they are effective in doing this (see e.g. Hassner and Wittenberg 2011, Carter and Poast 2015). Fortified boundaries, for them, can be defined as "asymmetrical, physical barriers for the purposes of border control" (Hassner and Wittenberg 2011, p.2). It are physical barriers, as opposed to symbolic, virtual, or declaratory boundaries that are asymmetrical in origin and intent, meaning that it is a one-sided act against a perceived threat from non-military agents. The globalization literature, for example, is part of this stream. These authors prophesize the demise of boundaries, or at least see them as irrelevant. Also, in the literature on non-state actors, the ease with which migrants, smugglers, terrorists, or refugees cross the border is emphasized.

From my perspective, the definition that Hassner and Wittenberg (2011) give is very narrow. These authors only focus on the physicality of barriers and its quantitatively measurable effects, i.e. how effective a barrier is for its intended purpose to stop border crossings. They do not focus on symbolical meanings, unintended side-effects (instrument effects), or on borders as part of the larger political frame. Physical barriers can certainly be erected for border control, military defence, or territorial demarcation, and simultaneously take on a plethora of other meanings. Next to being physical, borders are laden with meaning for the people in whose backyard the barrier is build, for the people who have to cross it, for the people who are separated from their friends and family, etcetera. These authors see states as purely calculating and rationalistic actors, and barriers will thus never be build out of an irrational ideal, hope, or prevailing fear. I will designate my attention to the symbolic function that borders may take.

Symbolical borders – giving meaning to borders

Henk van Houtum (2002, 2007, 2010) is very much concerned with the symbolical function of borders, as in the first school as defined by Hassner and Wittenberg (2011). His work is more geopolitically-, instead of state-centred. Borders, for van Houtum, symbolise a social practice of spatial differentiation, rather than a fixed point in time and space (2002). Indeed, he states that borders should be seen as a process that entails three different dimensions: bordering, ordering, and othering. The dimension of bordering is concerned with the constant legitimization, justification, and demarcation of the location of a border. This, in turn, is a manifestation of "one's own claimed, distinct, and exclusive territory/identity/sovereignty" (van Houtum 2010, p.959). Ordering can be seen as a process of making and remaking a socio-spatial order. This means that "in its beginning the socio-spatial container is emptied and purified from its past despotic codes and occupants and […] despotically recoded with the codes and people of the now owner" (van Houtum 2010, p.959). The third dimension, othering, means that a categorical difference between we and them, here and there, is produced (van Houtum 2010). We see here that the process of othering is an inevitable consequence of borders. "Others are needed and therefore constantly produced and reproduced to maintain the cohesion in the formatted order of a territorially demarcated society" (van Houtum 2002, p.134).

This school is less concerned with the technicalities of physical barriers, or borders, but more with the social significance of it and the tension that it produces in terms of in- and exclusion. Houtum and Pijpers (2007), for example, state that the "simultaneous attraction of economically valuable and the rejection of allegedly market-redundant immigrants, are inherently contrasting and incredibly difficult to sustain in combination, let alone manage" (p.292). This idea resonates with the work of Bauman (2004) and Agamben (1988), who also claim that there is a deep inequality between people that is (re)produced at Europe's borders. Market-redundant refugees are not allowed to cross the border, making them into a "faceless, depoliticised subclass excepted from the territorial sovereignty, or what Agamben (1998) famously termed the 'homo sacer'"(van Houtum 2010, p.970). The work of Agamben has been particularly influential in migration studies, where the image of the refugee as the one who is reduced to bare life, stripped of all its rights, and dependent solely on sovereign powers or humanitarian assistance for their existence, is very appealing. Also the work of

Bauman (2004), in which he states that processes of in- and exclusion have declared people redundant, thereby turning their lives into 'wasted lives', has proved to be prominent.

There has been critique on these ideas as well, particularly from the side of the 'autonomous migration' school. This group states that Agamben's and Bauman's work does not leave enough room for the political and social agency that refugees have. This is argued by Walters (2008) in his article on the autonomy of migration. He, for instance, states that

Agamben's line of thinking seems to lead us away from a dynamic, agonistic account of power relations, and instead fosters a rather one-sided and flattened conception of migrant subjects. Things are always done to them not by them. Only occasionally are they granted the capacity to act, and then in desperate ways. For the most part it is a narrative in which authority is just that and sovereign power has the last laugh (p.187).

Instead, Walters (2008) proposes an 'autonomous migration' perspective. This movement sees migrants as active, political subjects, that are capable of acting. Migration, then, should be seen as a causative and constitutive force. "Capitalism incites and exploits the mobility of its subjects, but their mobility always and ultimately exceeds it (p.188). So, instead of looking at the seemingly incapabilities of refugees, we are invited to look at those moments in which refugees present themselves as political subjects in 'acts of citizenship' and 'acts of demonstration'. Acts of citizenship take place in practices and moments of 'being political'. They occur within a social and political order and habitus and produce so-called 'creative breaks'. By making claims to rights, people present or nominate themselves as citizens, i.e. "acts produce actors that do not exist before acts" (Rygiel 2012, p.814). In a similar vein, acts of demonstration occur when a relationship of power is challenged, injustices revealed, or wrongs are protested, but when the identity of the protester is left relatively open.

We thus see that the autonomous migration school finds that theories on wasted lives or homo sacer take the agency of refugees away. Although I agree with this, I would like to emphasise there is a danger to romanticize refugees' lives. One could falsely portray them as independent actors that can fully manage on their own, because they have agency. Bauman and Agamben's theories are in my opinion also rooted in practice. People are being marginalized, not only at Europe's borders, but everywhere. They are declared redundant

and sometimes even put away and reduced to bare life. Autonomous migration theory, however, makes us aware of the fact that people still have agency in miserable conditions, rendering borders porous, instead of impenetrable walls.

Border zones

As we have seen, there are different approaches when studying borders. Borders have their own dynamics, and regulate in- and exclusion with various consequences. I am most interested in the spaces between borders where the same d ynamics arise but spread out over a larger area and on a bigger scale. We can call this border zones. I define border zones as liminal spaces that are transit points in mobility. It are spaces that manifest themselves between borders, where refugees are allowed to stay, but cannot go back or forth. As we will see in chapter 6, many theories on borders can be incorporated in the discussion of border zones.

The purpose of these border zones, according to Papadopoulos et al. (2013) is to institutionalise migration, in contrast to blocking it entirely, by controlling its speed and magnitude. Moreover, this control is achieved through the performance of sovereignty. Cresswell expands on this premise in his 2010 article 'Towards a politics of mobility'. He identifies six aspects of mobility that each has a politics. First, there is the issue of motive force, or why a person or thing moves. This motive can be internal or external, someone is compelled to move or chooses to. The second aspect is rhythm, or: in what rhythm does a person or thing move? "Rhythms are composed of repeated moments of movement and rest, or, alternatively, simply repeated movements with a particular measure" (p. 23). Thirdly, Cresswell identifies experience as an aspect of mobility: how it feels to be on the move. Every form of mobility brings with it its own experience. From upper-class travel by plane and limousine, to walking or travelling in a crowded bus, all forms bring unique feelings to the table. The fourth aspect is friction, or: when and how does it stop? Are people stopped by choice or is it forced? Here, the issue of borders come to mind. Borders produce friction that aim to regulate flows of people and goods, by stopping one part and letting the other pass.
As we will see, these four aspects will all play a role in the narratives of Ahmed and Hassan in the following chapters. What I am most interested in, however, are the last two aspects of

mobility: velocity and route. In my view, these aspects relate closest to what Papadopoulos et al. (2013) define as the purpose of border zones.

The aspect of velocity in mobility is concerned with how fast a person or thing moves. Speed is a valuable resource when considering mobility. Virilio (1986) states that the more speed increases, the faster freedom decreases. He gives the example of highways, railways, or airway infrastructures, where regulation and control is necessary to contain fatal impulses. To study this he proposes *dromology*: a 'science of speed'. But while Virilio states that freedom decreases because of increased control as a reaction on more speed, we also see that speed equals freedom in other instances. In this dichotomy, inequalities arise around matters of speed. Take, for example, business travellers on airports that can skip the queues, take the fast lanes, have a car waiting on a parking spot nearby, etc. The richer the faster, seems to be a true slogan. We can see the same with migration, of course. We, EU citizens, fly all over the world, barely encountering limits to our freedom to go where we please, while other migrants risk their life on a shabby boat or crossing borders at night. We should see mobility as a key 21st century resource that is more and more unequally divided. While travel for us becomes ever faster, we try to slow down that of others by institutionalizing our borders. In this way, speed becomes a matter by which to control in- and exclusion. It is therefore true what Papadopoulos et al. (2013) aim at: the purpose of border zones is controlling speed. We can see this as an attempt at reversing Virilio's statement; it is an attempt at reversing a world that is increasingly becoming faster by slowing down the 'unwanted', or as Bauman (2004) would say the 'redundant'.

Lastly, this is related to the routes that the politics of mobility entails. Routes provide connectivity that transforms topographical space into topological and dromological space: "distance is no longer the relevant variable in assessing accessibility. Connectivity (being in relation to) is added to, or even imposed upon, contiguity (being next to)"(Offner, in Cresswell 2010, p.25). For Deleuze and Guatarri (1977), the designation of routes is a matter of producing order and predictability. Connectivity is not so much a matter of fixing in space, but of producing correct mobilities by channelling motion, or through *striated space*. This space is "over-ordered and segmented, like a map it gives us our exact bearings and orientation" (in: Hannam, in Tribe 2009, p.105) and stands in contrast with *nomad* or *smooth space*, which is nonsegmentary and directionless. Nomad space can be compared to a "map

that is always detachable, connectable reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits and its own lines of flight" (Deleuze and Guattari 1977, p.21). In this sense border zones are striated, they are ordered in ways that try to limit and control entryways and exits in order to restrain the speed and magnitude of mobility.

Conclusion

Migration should be seen as a causative and constitutive force, that is embodied and relational, i.e. it is nomad space. Border zones, however, being part of migration as well, are striated spaces within this nomad space. The purpose of these border zones is the restraining of the speed and magnitude of migration through sovereignty, i.e. by setting various policies in place. Following van Houtum, border zones consist of three processes: bordering, ordering, and othering. This author takes a geopolitical approach to border zones, it does not teach us much on the share that refugees have in creating these zones, let alone on the experiences of refugees in these zones. I see bordering as a process of physically and symbolically demarcating a border, much like van Houtum does. For me, however, this process consists of two related aspects: that of ordering and that of othering. Ordering is the process of assigning meaning to spaces, thereby dividing them in go or no-go areas, places that are 'good' or 'bad'. Characteristics are attributed to certain spaces, and in this way places are created. As I will show, this does not need to happen by the 'owners' of that space, as van Houtum argues; spaces can be coded and recoded also by people who cannot lay claim to these spaces. Othering – the second aspect – is the creation of categorical differences between groups, like van Houtum argues as well. Policies are set in place that lead to practices that reflect an us versus them mentality. Following Bauman this process creates wasted lives, where people are declared redundant, or to the homo sacer, as argued by Agamben. It is important, however, to keep the agency of people in mind as well. As I will show in the following narratives, refugees are also active, political subjects that are capable of acting, which is shown through 'acts of citizenship' or 'acts of demonstration'.

Chapter 4: Ahmed

1. My life in Syria

Me and my family have lived in so many places. It feels like we have been fleeing for war my entire life. I'm tired, I just want peace and quiet. I have been living like this for a long time, not knowing what to do the next day, moving from one to the other unknown place, having to find food and shelter. I don't have a place for myself, a place where I can relax.

I was born from a Palestinian father and an Iraqi mother. My dad fled from Palestine when his home was destroyed by Israeli forces. He went to Syria, but then he had to flee for the regime. So he went to Iraq, where he met my mother. We were living there when the war started in 2003. It seemed a good idea back then to try to go to Europe via Libya. We were not able to get fake passports, so that is why we ended up in Syria, until the war there started.

I was raised a Muslim. My mother is the most devout of the family. She does not drink, does not eat pork, and she prays occasionally. Also, when I was young, my mother would refer to Islam to disapprove of my behaviour. My father never did this, I think. He also drinks alcohol, not much, but sometimes a beer. I had a struggle with religion a few years ago. Before this, I was a good Muslim. But I began to have doubts about whether or not there is a god, and what Islam stands for. Nowadays, I am not so sure about my decision to abandon religion altogether. I think maybe there is something greater, but what this is I don't know.

In Syria I studied Information Systems, and I worked with computer software for four or five years. Life in Damascus was very difficult after the war started. Prices of food and rents skyrocketed. Also, there was this constant feeling of insecurity. I adopted a strategy of not thinking too much about it. Anything could happen anywhere, you have no control over it. My house was on the front lines between the regime controlled area and that controlled by the Free Syrian Army. There would be fights at night, we would hear it from our beds. The next morning dead bodies would be lying on the streets, on the sidewalk. I managed to go to

and from work every day and to pay part of my rent with the money I earned at my job. It wasn't enough though, so my mum had to step in with her savings.

The people had to escape their areas because they were entirely demolished by bombs. And so in a lot of these areas no houses and nothing was available, no shelter anymore, so these people had to find another place. And most of the people came to Damascus from different cities like Homs, and it was particularly hard to find a place. Also, people living in anti-regime areas are dislocated. These people are discriminated against, finding it impossible to find a job, renew passports, get stopped at every roadblock. When the people were looking for a place and when there were places available it would be like so expensive for people to rent. And also most of people lost their houses and their jobs, because they used to work in the same areas where they lived. Also, in many places in Damascus when you want to rent a house you will need to get a permission from the politics in this area and they will make a query about you, where you come from. And probably, if you are from one of these areas, you will not get a permission and also if you will be traveling to Damascus and if you want to travel from one of these areas you will face hard times. So I think this is also the reason why people think about leaving Syria to another country. And because there is not a solution for Syria on the horizon, they can't see it. It's really complicated. Syria is not a stable country, even if they manage to find a house, find a job, but it is not a stable country to build a life there. And there is not many options for Syrians. You know, Iraq is a troubled country, and I have no idea about Jordan, but all I know is it's not possible to get a visa to go to Jordan. You can only go to a camp.

My sister got married in Damascus to an Iraqi who fled the war in Iraq. They decided to move to Istanbul, and I came with them. I found the life in Syria unbearable and also my family was pushing me to get married, move out and start a life of my own. I did not feel like doing it this way. I wanted to be independent for a while, not to get married in order to be able to move out.

2. The day I went to prison

So I came to Turkey one year and three months ago [this would be mid 2014]. I did not really plan to come here, I just decided. I used to stay at friends in Istanbul before the rest of my family came. My friends shared like a house here and they didn't have much money at that

time. They only had money to pay for one month. We could not find a job. It was tough. It was like, in Turkey there were not a lot of possibilities. But I did manage to get a job, but an informal job, you know. Many people have to work this way, people that have no work permission. I did the same as I did in Syria, some software engineering and building websites. Somehow this experience happened in Turkey. I am confident that in Europe governments will show some support. In Sweden, for example, the government will supervise your medical issues, and the language, and there is a program to find a job. Not in Turkey. But still I feel somehow that Istanbul is a good place to live. I would feel more comfortable here in Istanbul than in Europe.

My parents came to Istanbul later. They sold their house for 10000 dollars, nothing compared to what it was worth. But nobody is buying houses in Syria, so they did not have a choice. They had enough money for two people to go to Europe, so my sister and father went. They thought that they would have the best chance of getting asylum. My brother-in-law has an Iraqi passport, and that country is considered safe. They crossed to Greece from Turkey, there they bought fake Italian passports. The Somali people there are big in this business. My sister was rejected 5 times when trying to get on a plane to the Netherlands from Greece. The next time she succeeded to get to Milan, where she was arrested and sent back to Greece. Then she and my father decided to travel over land, by a combination of trains and buses. They eventually managed to arrive in the Netherlands, where they are now in an asylum centre.

Here in Istanbul I spend a lot of time at home with my mother and in the community centre. The community centre is really amazing. We go there to hang out, or we play ping pong. It is the first time my mother is separated from most of her family. It is difficult for her. In Syria she had a job, but not here. She can't work here.

A lot of Syrians come here because like in Turkey they would have the option, they can go to a camp or they will just be, you know, in Turkey. And the border in Turkey with Syria, it was controlled, but it was not so strictly controlled. Many of them stayed around the Syrian border, like Gaziantep and Urfa, and also people come to Istanbul. But many of them come here to be together, they are with each other in the country. But still people want to go to Europe for very different reasons. But I think it is easier for people to adapt to the conditions here. And also, it is really risky and it is also expensive. It is not easy. It costs 1200 dollar to

cross to Greece, and later you will need more money to go to the Netherlands or wherever. So it is also money. I think probably people will face this. And many people can control this. And also, speaking about the reasons why people think about going to these countries, is the stability of these countries. These countries are really stable, so they think about the future.

In September I participated in a protest on Taksim square [in Istanbul]. We demanded safe passage for refugees to Europe, because so many people have died on the sea. There were like hundreds of people, refugees and activists and stuff. Then we decided to walk to the border in Edirne [close to the Bulgarian border]. We first went to the bus station, to go by bus, but they wouldn't sell us tickets. So that's why we walked. Then the number of people was rising to maybe a few hundred people. We walked over the highway at night, but we were stopped by the police. We could not walk further. And then me and my girlfriend were arrested. They thought that we organized it or something. I had to spend 48 days in prison. When we were in prison, we were lucky to mobilize a lot of support for our case. Amnesty, the Palestinian embassy, at one time also Hamas, and we suspect the French embassy interfered with our case and tried to get us out. I quit smoking in the prison, because we could only go out once a day for an hour.

When we got out we had to sign a paper that we would leave the country in three days. And my girlfriend was sent back to France. She is from there. So we went to the French embassy to ask for asylum. And they said that it would be okay. But we have to wait.

3. Let's go to France

The whole thing to go to Europe became easier, because at some point they started to take people from Hungary to where they want to go, to Germany. You know, there were busses and there were also like the people at the Hungarian border to take you. And maybe from Austria. And also, somehow everything became different. The differences between the asylum countries and also like the information provision, like this border is closed, this border is open. There are like apps and many tools, you get many activists who are helping you to get through the way. Also, like I said it became easier because almost everyone knows how things are done. You know, you just go, to Izmir or Bodrum, and someone gives you the number [of the smuggler] and then you take the boat. You know, it is a trade, it is a market. It's not only for the last five years, it has been going on since the Iraqi war. But like, so, you

have this people who fled from Iraq to Europe and it's also been the same. They come to Turkey and take the boat to Greece, and from Greece they find an airplane or another way. In the past three or four years people like had to depend on themselves and on the smugglers to go to Europe. But this year, only this year, it has become much more effective. And people from Europe welcome people from all these countries. People reach Europe easier. And also, the governments from these countries started to put more legislation on the borders and also change the laws. Like four months ago Hungary decided that everyone who crosses the border will be punished legally with three years prison. I don't know if they want to do this, but it was clear that they want to decrease the refugees. And also politically, you know. It was also three months ago when Angela Merkel when she came to Turkey and she offered like to give money to Turkey, to keep much more Syrians, to make the conditions better here so they don't think to go to Europe.

Also the process of accepting refugees in many countries like Netherlands and Germany is becoming slower and maybe due to like a general procedure to make things harder, to make these countries a difficult destination. Because it is harder they will change their destination. And this reduces the people to go to these countries.

I am going to receive a French travel document to travel to France. My feelings about this are double. I can't stay here, so it is nice to have a place, but I don't want to leave. Life will be all new. It will change, again. It will be hard for me to start a new life in France. It is hard to leave my mother behind. It is the first time for her to be without her family in this whole journey. I feel stuck between my mum and my girlfriend. I look forward to seeing her, but I do not know if I really want to live with my girlfriend. We talk about this, however. Also, I feel I am being forced to go. Things worked out this way, without me having a lot of influence over it. Things are moving fast. I got the word last week, on Monday I can go to the embassy to fill in the paperwork and I booked a flight on the twentieth. It is the first time in my life that I booked a flight.

I applied for a visa in France because I have a lot of friends there. Already many of my friends are there, and so it is a logical destination. For me, it became at some point not so important where to go, but just actually for the fact that I could apply for citizenship, a passport, in the future, the ability to travel. Because, you know, I am stateless and even if I could get a passport from the Palestinian authority it is almost useless. You can only go to

very few places. That is the main reason for me. I would prefer living here, but I wouldn't be able to get a passport. The French citizenship is different, it's a different passport, you have working possibilities. When I was at the French embassy to fill out my paperwork today they asked me where I am from. So I told them I'm from Palestine. The woman looked in her computer but couldn't find Palestine in the list. So she asked her colleague. But she could not find it either. So the woman called someone else, and the other one didn't know it. So they just left it blank and filled it in with pen.

We will decide on the ground where to go in France. Now the plan is to go to Marseille, because of the weather, and because my girlfriend says this is a good place. Also, Paris is probably too big, but a more quiet place like Marseille is better to start a new life. We know that everything will be different when we are in France, so it is to no use really to make elaborate plans. We will just do what comes up.

Chapter 5: Hassan

1. Dreaming of Europe

I am wanted by the Syrian regime. When I was still there, I did not leave my house for one year. I used lots of drugs. I had these pills, and people only take one, but I took five. And I read Nietzsche and Kafka. My friend from Jordan would call me sometimes and she would say that I have to go to school. I am a teacher. I teach English. But I did not want to, I wanted to stay at home. I would only see three close friends during this year. I lived with two roommates; they are two musicians, not with family, because I have a bad relationship with my father. I could not live with my father anymore, he was overly protective. I have four brothers and four sisters. Two brothers now live in Germany and two are still in Syria. One brother is only 12 years old. Two sisters are married and wait for family reunification, one in Germany and one in the Netherlands. My sister's husband is now also in the Netherlands, but I didn't know anything about that. The rest is still in Syria. And even my friend is in the Netherlands, and the situation is not that good. They are like in a camp. It is like a big tent. A big tent with a lot of beds.

But really, because I am Palestinian I felt out In Syria, I also felt that I'm homeless. Because the Syrians didn't treat us, the Palestinians, as ... I was born in Syria, but the Syrians didn't give me a Syrian passport. They gave me a travelling permit. Because I am Palestinian. And the Syrians said that the Palestinian people should go back to Palestine, and that they should always remember that they have to go back to Palestine. And we will not give him a Syrian nationality, is what they were saying. So before, there weren't any rights for refugees. So you grow up with this idea. You think okay, I am a refugee, I don't want to stay here. I was thinking of going to Europe before the war, but there were a lot of problems. I had my military service in Syria I needed to finish, and then I could go. So I got through my military service. And after I went there, the problems began in Syria.

During the military service I worked with the theatre. It was before the Syrian revolution, I finished my service six months before that. And I did it in a military theatre. I was an actor. I acted in two plays. But can you imagine they don't give you a passport? If you are born in this country they should give you this nationality. They did not give this right to us, but we did have to go to military service. You shouldn't be a soldier to fight then. If they say this is

not your country, why do you have to serve? The Syrian regime was against Israel. And so the Palestinians should go to military service, because they should be soldiers with the ability to fight Israel someday. One day. They actually pretended like they were doing me a favour, like they were helping me.

So first I had this dream [of going to Europe], okay, but now there were all kinds of things happening here, so I wanted to share in that. So I stopped thinking about going to Europe. But after that, I don't know. I was destroyed. The last two years in Syria I just stayed at home. I didn't go out. And I didn't want to go to Europe, and I didn't know what I wanted to do. Only to stay at home.

My fiancée is a fine artist, but the art schools in Syria are not so good. All the good artists are in Europe. And some people want to make something good in art, but they don't find someone to support them. If you want to work in art in Syria you should know one of the few people who control the art in Syria. And these people are very close to the government. Some have been arrested for this. And the government doesn't allow to express ourselves in a normal way. Artists are always afraid. The government doesn't allow us to express ourselves in a right way. Because art is about expressing ourselves, the feelings of the artist, what happened inside himself, what he thinks, what he feels, the struggle between feelings and thoughts. He should express that in his work. In Syria, if you want to ask something like that it is really hard because the government is controlling everything. It is controlling the schools, controlling the universities, controlling everything. So in all, you are under the government's power. So you try to go to Europe, maybe take your chance there, you think like that. Because there are some Arabic artists that go to Europe and they are all very good. Everyone in Europe knows them. There are in Germany. Or a Kurdish one, he was in Sweden, no, in Swiss. He was there and he is the most perfect artist who mixed the colour. One of the best. They found the reasons for being creative. They found the quiet life. Because in the Arabic world, you are only thinking about your future. How can I make a good life for myself? And after that, how can I make a good life for my kids, my children? How am I going to buy this house? This stuff. People are really tired. Under the government, no one learns to express themselves. If someone would tell about my fiancée, they will arrest her.

And if you want to make a film you should have a paper from the government. And you should let the government see your script. If you want to work in theatre or if you want to

work in TV. Or if you want to make a little report, you should have a paper. Or to photograph on the streets. This is a normal situation. Even someone who plays in the theatre. Like this, no one knows what happened, someone just disappeared. People are even afraid to ask about you.

I met Aleena, my fiancée, in Syria. We had the same friends. She lived in Aleppo, and me in Damascus. The last year we only saw each other two times. One time for a week, and another time for ten days. It was very hard. The bus ride was like 16 hours. You get stopped and then they check your papers. And the roads were really bad. Then we decided to come to Istanbul together. Because my friends are here.

2. Heaven is in Europe

I don't do anything here in Turkey. I just stay in the house as much as possible. I don't want to be arrested again. Then I will have a problem. I live with my fiancée Aleena and a German and Turkish friend. Aleena works for a community centre in Küçükçekmece. They just started out and now they go to houses of Syrian people to offer them programs in the centre. She will give art courses in the community centre.

The Turkish government does not care about the Syrian refugees. The Syrian people are here as refugees, but they treat them as ghosts. So the Syrian people are here and should have the rights of the refugee. Or you should have a permit or something. And if you want to work you should also have a paper from the government. To allow you to work in a legal way.

Actually I wanted to stay in Turkey with Aleena for a year or so, but then I got arrested [together with Ahmed, see chapter 4] and had to sign a paper that I will leave the country. Because of this, I went to the French embassy and applied for asylum. It is all going to be better in France. There you can have education for free as a Syrian, or you can get a job easily in cinema, for example. I love cinema and watch a lot of movies. I know a lot about different actors and styles. I mainly like Arabic cinema and East-European. A lot of my friends are in France, and because of this I tried to go to that country. Otherwise I would like to go to Germany or the U.K. I am now waiting for my status, but at the embassy they were very hopeful and friendly. I will probably get a permanent visa, or so they told me. I also want to go to France for the good social infrastructure. I know I will get money and housing there.

Aleena does not have plans. Her initial contract at the community centre is for three months. She will see what happens with me, before making any plans.

I don't know if I will study again when I go to France. But I will try if there is any chance to study or something. There are more options. If you want to do what you like in Europe there are many ways to do what you like. If you don't want to go to the university to study cinema, there are a lot of institutions where you can do a workshop, if you like to work in cinema. Or to get money or something. And for other things it is the same, the other branches are the same. There was no cinema academy in Syria. There is only a theatre institute. So I know a lot of people, a lot or most of my friends, would go to Europe to study cinema. Because the Syrian people who want to study cinema go to Europe or to Egypt or to another country that has a cinema academy. I mean, if you want. But a lot of creative people from universities in Syria do not find something good to work on, or a good job, something for them. But there are many ways in life. Not in the life in Syria however. Syria is special because Syria has war now.

People dream that the heaven is in Europe, because they have everything. When they go there they will have papers, the government will give them money, and they, maybe, will find a job after they learned the language. A good job. And it's not like that. Because, nowadays, all of us have connections in Europe, okay? So all the people see that the people they know go to Europe and have a good life. And their life has a different form, so they keep in their mind that the heaven is in Europe. That was also the case before the way in Syria. If you want to make money, if you want to be rich, you have to go to Europe. Yes, most of the people think like that. But for me this is not the reason why I want to go to France. No, for me, I thought that I would stay here in Turkey at least one year more. But now I will go there. Actually I would choose Germany, because of different things. Because I like the German literature, I like Kafka in German, and Nietzsche. But France is okay. They also have good literature. I like the poetry in French. Sartre, Camus, also Foucault.

Some people also, young people, think that they have more opportunities in Europe. Some people want to go to Europe, because they were studying at the university in Syria. So they study, during the war, and a lot of them became wanted by the Syrian regime. And then they want to continue their education and keep learning or something like that. And most of them

think like that. But I don't know, maybe after you finish the language courses you can make an assignment to get into one of the universities.

And some of the countries in Europe, like France, make the education and learning easier than other countries, because the university doesn't care about the French language. You just have to get your papers and then you can make an assignment at the university you want. And you can choose which subject you want to study. And it is free in Germany, so many people go there too. And it is free in France as well, but the French government doesn't give you money when you are studying.

But all things are better than Syria. Everyone thinks like that. Everything that will happen is better than Syria. And a lot of people can't go back to Syria because they are wanted or something. So people, at least some people, are wanted by the regime. Other people are wanted by the other forces. And I know people that are wanted by the regime and by other forces that are fighting the regime as well. The situation in Syria is very complicated.

Most refugees like Germany better than the other countries. Because the refugee in Germany is better off than in other countries. They give them more than other countries. But now I think it is the same. And Sweden? The people stopped to think about Sweden for a long time, because the first country that was full of Syrians was Sweden. And it's so cold. And so far away. And the language is really hard. When I was still in Syria, one of my friends went to Sweden and when he lived there I had contact with him. And I asked him, so how is your life in Sweden? And he said, it's very bad, man. I have a hard life here. So I asked him, why? You are in Sweden. And he said to me, I have never seen the sun since three months. He said to me, no, don't come here. I think, before the war, we would have liked to go to Germany as well. And European people also want to go there.

People live in different conditions in Syria, compared to Europe. It is very hard to change people and the people came from the third world. There are different traditions, so it's difficult to integrate people. It's a problem. The Palestinians also faced the same problems. When they were going to Europe they said the Palestinians are terrorists too.

3. You can always find a way

I follow the news on things that happen in Europe. Like yesterday and today, we were talking about the deal between the European Union and Turkey[8]. And they arrested one thousand and five hundred people who want to go to Europe. And then they brought them to a [refugee]camp. And also with the fences that are build, like Bulgaria build a fence with Turkey. But there is always a way, you can always find a way. It is impossible to stop the refugees, because there are always illegal ways between countries. There are always illegal ways, in normal situations and in our situation. No one can stop them. Maybe it makes it harder, much harder, to reach European countries. But I think if they build that there will be other ways to reach the countries. They can't stop it, but there will be less people following that route. There are always small gaps, but it will be more expensive, and the police is hard now. And in Hungary, they try to make something like that. So what happened? There are smugglers who just go around it, but people died in this way. So I think because of that, because you can't stop it, Europe tries to find a solution from here, from Turkey. To stop the refugees from here. But [the border barriers] will make it harder, and thus less people will cross. In this sense, those are effective. Everything is better than Syria. People, and especially the young people, think 'fuck it' and they go anyway. For the young people it is sometimes easy, because they are allowed to study in European universities.

There is a big community of Syrian people on Facebook. And this people say, this is the best route to take, or these are the possibilities. And the cheaper one is from Turkey. The cheaper way is from Turkey because there are borders between Turkey and Syria. And so we saw that it is very easy to come here. Not very easy actually, but it is cheaper than the other ways. If you want to go to Morocco you want to go by plane to Morocco, and from there you want to pay the smuggler to go to Melilla. There are legal ways to go to Europe, and there are others, a lot of others. My friend went to Europe through Morocco. He went to Morocco and

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[8] Talks about a deal between the EU and Turkey in order to stop the refugee flow to Europe started in November 2015. By then, a preliminary deal was struck in which the EU promised 3 billion dollars to Turkey in exchange for better border security at the Aegean sea. This deal was closed in March 2016. Next to aforementioned things, Turkey promised to take back all refugees arriving in Greece per boat. In return, the EU will select refugees from the camps for resettlement to an EU country, with a maximum of 72,000. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34957830, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/29-eu-turkey-meeting-statement/, http://www.euronews.com/2016/03/24/eu-turkey-refugee-deal-what-s-next/ (Accessed on May 4, 2016).

from Morocco het went to Melilla, this is a place in Morocco close to Spain. If you are there, you are in Europe, actually. When I was in prison I met two Moroccan people. The police arrested them when they tried to go to Europe from Turkey. So I asked them, why did you come here? And they told me it's easier from here, because if the Spanish catch you in Melilla and if you are Moroccan, it is a big problem. They send you back to Morocco and in Morocco they go to jail or something like that. The Spanish police would welcome the Syrians, but not the Moroccan.

And people talk to other people and then they decide. Everyone knows someone who is living in the Netherlands, Germany, France, or Sweden. They talk about friends or family there and get information through this. Also, they follow the news. Skype and Facebook messenger are ways for this. And if the person has money, they have to pay more, he has to pay more to get asylum. And I know people that pay about twelve thousand Lira [4000 Euro] and just take a visa for Germany. But not all people in Syria have this number**.** I also know people who go to Europe and when they have their travel document they come back to Turkey. They just want identification documents. In this way they can move, they are coming and going. If we could we would go back to Syria. But which Syria? There are a lot of Syrias now. There will not be a Syria again.

Chapter 6: Discussion

In the last two chapters we heard the stories of Ahmed and Hassan. In this chapter I will go into the main themes that arise in these stories and I will connect these to theoretical notions that are laid out in the theoretical framework, in particular those of ordering and othering. Through an ordering process a distinction is made between spaces, on the basis of qualities or characterizations that are attributed to these spaces. Where van Houtum uses this concept in relation to the state and institutions in the representations of mobility, I will show how my informants order the world around them, i.e. I will take a refugee centred approach. It is shown very clearly in the narratives that my informants ordered at certain points in time and space. In this chapter I will show that refugees are engaged in a constant process of ordering and reordering. I will argue that five themes, or characteristics, are especially important in this process. It will become clear that the aim of this process for my informants is to find a good place for themselves and that ordering is something that is actively done by refugees.

I will also show that there is a process of othering going on that is largely done to refugees. It is an outcome of various policies that are set in place by the Turkish government. Othering is a process that leads to the feeling of 'being a refugee', a feeling of homelessness', and to 'wasted lives'. I will argue, however, that through acts of demonstration, agency is still performed.

Ordering

As mentioned above, the concept of ordering revolves around the question how people order the world around them, or how they order 'places'. We can view the concept of place as a space that is embedded with meaning. The topic of having no place, having to find a place, and needing a better place runs all the way through the narratives of Ahmed and Hassan, for example when Ahmed says 'I don't have a place for myself, a place where I can relax' , or 'I feel somehow that Istanbul is a good place to live'. We can distil five core themes that were important for my informants when creating this sense of place. These themes, derived from their own words as to stay as close as possible to their own experiences, are security, stability, control, possibilities, and community.

The first point of ordering we can identify is in Syria, where Ahmed tells us that life in Syria was unbearable for him: rents went up, jobs were scarce, and the constant feeling of insecurity was overwhelming. Also Hassan did not feel secure in Syria; he did not leave his house for a year. In Turkey this feeling of insecurity continues, for after he got out of prison he did not leave his house much in order to avoid identification by the authorities. Indeed, the topic of physical security is an important element in the process of ordering places. Syria is labelled insecure, and so is Turkey after prison. Public spaces in Istanbul turned into 'no-go areas', while private spaces were labelled secure and safe. Europe is also considered a secure place. We can thus see that the world is divided into places that are 'secure' and 'insecure'.

A second theme that comes up when ordering the world is the issue of stability. Ahmed tells us that 'Syria is not a stable country, even if they manage to find a house, find a job, but it is not a stable country to build a life there'. So is Iraq, because that is a 'troubled country', whereas 'speaking about the reasons why people think about going to [Europe], is the stability of these countries'. Ahmed orders places on the basis of being stable or not. Syria and Iraq are instable countries, no good for building a life, while Europe is. Hassan does the same. One of the reasons for him to go to France is the 'good social infrastructure'. We can interpret this as a form of stability from which the expectation speaks that the government will ensure him of some stability in his life in the form of an income, housing, job or education.

A third theme we can distinguish is control. Ahmed is preoccupied with the notion of who is in control. He states, for example, that his house was in the middle of two areas, one controlled by the regime and one controlled by the Free Syrian Army, or that the border between Turkey and Syria was controlled, 'but not so strictly controlled'. Furthermore, control is a personal issue as well. In Syria, 'anything could happen anywhere, you have no control over it'. According to Hassan, it is the Syrian government that controls everyone and everything, 'it is controlling the schools, controlling the universities, controlling everything. So in all, you are under the government's power'. A loss of control thus equals a loss of power, and it makes it one of the reasons the country became unbearable for them. Ahmed also felt this loss of control in Turkey. He wanted to stay in Istanbul for a longer time, but now had to go to France without him 'having a lot of influence over it'. However all the

disadvantages and hardships of reaching Europe, such as the costs and the danger, he says 'I think probably people will face this […] And many people can control this'. So he also thinks that other people experience this loss of control, and work towards regaining it. This sense of controlling your own future is so utterly important that people will face up to the challenges that it brings with it. We thus see that the issue of control plays a role in ordering places; the places where a loss of control is experienced are declared no-go areas, while the feeling of having your destiny in your own hands makes other places attractive to go to.

The fourth theme, that is linked with the previous three, is possibilities. The consensus seems to be that there are no possibilities for the future in Syria or Turkey, and a lot of possibilities in Europe. As a matter of fact, the main possibilities that are named by Ahmed and Hassan are receiving money, finding a job or receiving education, and the possibility to make plans for the (direct) future. When ordering Syria in terms of possibilities, Hassan tells us that you cannot 'find something good to work on, or a good job, something for them'. Although 'there are many ways in life', this is 'not in the life in Syria however'. In Turkey there are few possibilities as well, as Ahmed's narrative shows. It was not easy to find a job when he arrived: 'it was though [..] it was like, in Turkey there were not a lot of possibilities'. In terms of possibilities, however, Turkey is ordered above Syria's neighbouring countries. 'A lot of Syrians come here because like in Turkey they would have the option, they can go to a camp, or they will just be, you know, in Turkey'. Ahmed and Hassan expect to have more possibilities, a job or education, in Europe. Hassan says 'it is all going to be better in France […] there you can have education for free as a Syrian, or you can get a job easily'. Ahmed is also confident that European governments would support him, in contrast to the Turkish government. He gives the example from Sweden, where the government will care about your medical issues, have you learn the language, and will enrol you in a program to find a job. It is the possibility to not have to worry about the future that orders Europe above Turkey, Syria, and neighbouring countries. Hassan gives the example of Syrian artists, who found the quiet life in Europe. In the Arabic world, he says, you are only thinking about your future. For Ahmed, having a passport, and the possibilities that it brings with it, is ultimately the most important thing: 'for me, it became at some point not so important where to go, but just actually for the fact that I could apply for citizenship, a passport, in the future, the ability to travel [legally]'. Places are thus ordered through the

alleged possibilities that those places have. The possibilities that are particularly important are having money, getting a job or receiving education, having the possibility to travel, and to worry less about the future.

The last way in which meaning is given to spaces is through the Syrian community. This is especially noticeable when decisions are made where and how to travel, i.e. which routes to take. In Syria, Turkey, and Europe the current situation is evaluated and stories from friends are collected and reflected on in this process. Friends and the general Syrian community are very important in the process of ordering. Both Ahmed and Hassan acknowledge that there is a big Syrian community on- and offline that can guide you through your journey as a refugee, as well as giving information on European countries. Hassan states that 'everyone knows someone who is living in the Netherlands, Germany, France, or Sweden. They talk to friends or family there and get information through this.' This happens in Facebook groups, via Facebook Messenger, or on Skype. Also, they follow the news and talk about this with each other. In this way they make up their mind on possible destinations, i.e. they order places. We can call this 'crowd navigation', where on the basis of the crowd routes and destinations are determined. This crowd navigation results in 'chain migration': one after the other goes to the same place because of social bonds or support from friends and relatives, linking one person to the next. Following Deleuze and Guatari (1977), order and predictability is produced through the designation of routes, which is one of Cresswell's (2010) aspects of mobility. For migrants, crowd navigation is the tool for creating this order, in this way turning nomad space into striated space. Ahmed, for example, has already figured out his final destination in France by talking to his girlfriend about it. Turkey is a popular destination for Syrians, not in the least because of the big Syrian community present in Turkey[9]. 'Many of them come here to be together, they are with each other in the country'. The basis for ordering Turkey above Syria's other neighbouring countries is thus also community. In the further journey that refugees undertake, community stays an important factor. Both Ahmed and Hassan state that they applied for a visa in France because they have friends there. This makes that country into a logical destination for

[9] Most Syrians choose to travel to Turkey, instead of other countries neighbouring Syria. Because of this, Turkey is now host to 2,749,140 Syrian refugees, way more than Lebanon (1,048,275), Jordan (642,868) or Iraq (246,123). (Source: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php, accessed on May 4, 2016).

them. In this way practically every refugee has connections in Europe, that can tell them which routes to take and what the conditions are in various European countries.

We can thus see that five themes – security, stability, control, possibilities, and community – come up in the narratives that are important in, and lay on the basis of, the process of ordering for my informants. It is through these elements that one place is ordered over another. These five themes can also be seen as the motive forces behind migration, which is one of the six aspects of mobility as identified by Cresswell (2010).

Ordering and reordering

Next to the fact that refugees order places around them, and that we can distil five themes that lay at its basis, ordering should also be seen as a continuous process of ordering and reordering. When Ahmed qualifies his life in Syria as 'unbearable', he starts putting Syria's neighbouring countries into order. He states that Iraq is a troubled country, and that in Jordan you can only go to a camp. Turkey is thus a logical destination for him. He expects his life to be better in another place than Syria; a place he derives from the information at hand and by putting his options into order. Once in Turkey we see a reordering process taking place. Ahmed states that 'in Turkey there were not a lot of possibilities', but he is confident that in Europe governments will show some support. Where first Turkey was seen as the place to go to, now the attention shifts to Europe. In Syria, however, the order was very clear – here is bad, there is good – whereas in Istanbul things are more ambiguous. Ahmed namely states that 'Istanbul is a good place to live', and even that he would 'feel more comfortable here [in Istanbul] than in Europe'. He has, however, also a lot of thoughts and ideas on living in Europe, and what it would be like.

Hassan was already clearly ordering before in Syria: he already wanted to migrate to Europe before his military service, and the war, started. Eventually, Hassan also chose to go to Turkey, and was motivated by the harsh government repression and control, and by the more existential question of 'How can I make a life for myself and for my children?'. He qualified his living conditions as bad and thinks that 'all things are better than Syria', thus ordering all other places over Syria. When in Turkey, we see a reordering process taking place similar to that of Ahmed. Also Hassan has very clear and outspoken ideas about Europe and what to expect there. He would also have preferred to stay in Istanbul, at least

for a year or so, for his fiancée cannot come with him to France. He says, however, that 'it is all going to be better in France', because 'there you can have education for free as a Syrian', 'you can get a job easily', and 'a lot of […] friends are in France'. He believes France has a good social infrastructure: 'I know I will get money and housing there'. And, 'if you want to do what you like in Europe there are many ways'. He differentiates himself from other Syrians when he states that others dream that 'the heaven is in Europe' and that 'if you want to make money, if you want to be rich, you have to go to Europe'. Although he implies that he personally does not believe in this, he has very positive ideas associated with Europe, not in the least because of statements like 'all the people see that the people they know go to Europe and have a good life'. We can see that after the ordering process that was going on in Syria, now a process of reordering begins in Turkey. And, according to Hassan, reordering also takes place in Europe, because some people migrate to Europe to obtain their travel documents, and then decide to go back to Turkey.

Another aspect that sets a reordering process in motion is when the current situation changes or is different than they expected it to be. In Syria this was of course the war. In Istanbul it is a lack of possibilities that sets a reordering process in motion, with Ahmed's and Hassan's prison debacle added to it. In Turkey, refugees are considered as guests and they cannot lay claim on asylum rights. Turkey is a signatory of both the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 counterpart, but has maintained a geographical limitation that only grants asylum rights to Europeans. This means that almost all non-European asylum seekers are not entitled to stay in Turkey, even after gaining a recognized refugee status. There is a temporary protection protocol, however. In the 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection, asylum seekers are granted temporary protection while their claim for refugee status is being evaluated by UNHCR and Turkey's Ministry of the Interior. This temporary protection comes with limited rights, such as access to healthcare, education, other social services, and to the labour market. When recognized as refugees they are eligible for resettlement to another country (*İçduygu* 2015). In practice, this system does not work in favour of refugees. In a 2014 report, Amnesty International states that there have been reports of abuse and exploitation on the labour market, as well as problematic access to education and healthcare. When summing up the situation Amnesty International (2014) states that:

Despite Turkey's official open-border policy, entering the territory from Syria has become fraught with danger and difficulty. Turkey's border guards have used abusive or unlawful force at irregular crossing points – from push-backs to the use of live ammunition and beatings resulting in deaths and injuries. Once Syrian refugees reach Turkish territory, their legal status is still not entirely clear or secure. Furthermore, with the government-run camps operating at full capacity, the vast majority of refugees from Syria are left to fend for themselves, resulting in widespread destitution (p.36).

Hassan agrees with this when he says that 'The Turkish government does not care about the Syrian refugees. The Syrian people are here as refugees[10], but they treat them as ghosts'. The situation in which refugees live in Istanbul leads to the (re)evaluation of their situation and consequently a process of (re)ordering.

According to Papadopoulos and Tsianos (2013) the aim of the border regime, or what I call bordering, is not to block migration, but to institutionalise it by controlling its speed and magnitude. It does this by setting policies in place in an effort to order spaces into go and no-go areas. Access to places or services is differentiated for different people. For Ahmed and Hassan, access to Greece was clearly restricted. When they tried to cross the border as part of the demonstration they were involved with, their physical movement was restricted by sending them to prison, thereby controlling and limiting speed and magnitude of migration. This can be seen as a reaction on Virilio's dromology: in a world where everything is becoming faster, bordering practices are invented to slow down movement and speed.

These bordering practices, however, do not stop refugees from ordering, which is a way to claim agency over their own destiny or future. It is not something done *to* them, but *by* them, and leads, clearly, to international (and illegal) migration. This corresponds with the idea that originates from the autonomous migration paradigm. Walters (2008) states that migrants are active, political subjects, that are capable of acting. I would like to add that they are also capable of dreaming, of imagining a better place, and visualising better conditions

[10] Hassan does not mean that he is officially recognized as a refugee, but he uses this word in a sociological context, as an expression of how he feels the Syrian people in Turkey should be looked at.

for themselves. From of these dreams actions spring, in this way turning them not into powerless subjects but into autonomous and active agents of their own future.

Ordering is thus a continuous process that depends on the conditions refugees are subject to. A reordering process takes place when a situation changes, sometimes drastically in the form of war, or when a situation is different than anticipated. Also sovereign powers engage in a process of ordering, where certain places are declared no-go areas, by setting up policies that prevent movement. In the context of migration this happens in border zones, and that Turkey is such a border zone is illustrated by Ahmed and Hassan's prison story.

Othering

In the previous paragraph I focussed on how a border zone is created by migrants through ordering. I will now focus on how a border zone is produced through othering, something that is done to refugees, not so much by them. Where through ordering a difference between spaces is created, through a process of othering a categorical difference between groups is produced; it is us versus them. This othering is clearly done by the Turkish authorities by setting policies in place that lead to segregation. As explained in the previous paragraph, Syrian refugees cannot get a residency permit in Turkey or apply for asylum. Instead, they fall under a temporary protection regime. Furthermore, refugees are not integrated into the labour market, and when they are it is often informal and paired with exploitation (Amnesty International 2014, İçduygu 2015). Also, there are issues with education and health care. While these are services available to Syrians in principle, Amnesty International states that when accessing education Syrian families face bureaucratic requirements and financial constraints, and that the access to health services is problematic (Amnesty International 2014). Ahmed and Hassan both faced these difficulties in Istanbul. Ahmed states that 'in Turkey there were not a lot of possibilities. But I did manage to get a job, but an informal job, you know. Many people have to work this way, people that have no work permission'. And also Hassan had the feeling that he was neglected by the government. He tells us that 'the Turkish government does not care about the Syrian refugees. The Syrian people are here as refugees, but they treat them as ghosts'.

These problems are examples of how the other is created. Syrians are not viewed equal to native Turkish people in policy and practice. This is something that resonates with

the work van Houtum (2010), who claims that there is a deep inequality between people that is (re)produced at Europe's borders. Refugees are declared disposable on the labour market and are stripped to bare life by denying them the access to what are supposed to be universal human rights: access to education, healthcare, or work. Agamben's notion of homo sacer comes forth out of the concentration camp. Although I would never argue that border zones are such a camp, they have in common that there is no easy exit. In the case of Turkey it is not easy to cross to Europe, and it is viewed impossible to go back to Syria because of the war, effectively 'locking' refugees 'in'. Furthermore, although Syrian refugees are not stripped of all their rights in principle, I would argue that they are still condemned to bare life because of the problematic access to rights, such as health care, labour, or education. Moreover, refugees in Turkey do not have a right on shelter or sustenance, let alone the right to an official refugee status. This basically offers them nothing but a bare existence.

For my informants this led to a feeling of 'homelessness' and that of 'being a refugee'. Ahmed's narrative starts with an expression of these feelings: 'Me and my family have lived in so many places. It feels like we have been fleeing for war my entire life'. This feeling of being a refugee for such a long time makes him want peace and quiet in his life. This feeling, of course, comes forth of the insecurity that is paired with war, but I believe that this feeling is also due to the fact that it is impossible to really settle in Istanbul. This, in turn, is a consequence of othering: the various policies are aimed towards excluding him from society, declaring him redundant. For Hassan, being turned into the other is something he has been experiencing all his life. He was born in Syria, but the Syrians did not give him a Syrian passport and told him to go back to Palestine instead. He already felt like refugee when he was living in Syria. In Turkey, this did not get better. He feels like he is living in a liminal state in which he is tolerated, but not accepted: he feels like he is treated as a ghost. Also, he is afraid to leave his house and get arrested again, which is also a consequence of othering. Because he has the feeling he does not belong in Turkish society, i.e. he is 'the other', he feels that they will arrest him for whatever reason.

We also see here how ordering can be a consequence of othering. Hassan did not feel at home in Syria, nor Turkey, because of his nationality, and he thus imagines a better place. Also here, however, we can argue that theories on wasted lives or homo sacer do not leave enough room for the political and social agency that refugees have, as argued by Walters

(2008) in my theoretical framework. Walters argues that we should look for 'acts of demonstration' or 'acts of citizenship' in which the (political) agency of refugees manifests itself. One of such instances is very clearly the moment when Ahmed and Hassan decide to participate in a demonstration to demand safe passage for refugees to Greece and get arrested for this. In this moment, Ahmed and Hassan present themselves not as wasted lives, but as citizens that have certain rights. In this instance a power relationship between refugees and the Turkish authorities is challenged, an injustice revealed[11], and a wrong was protested. This is also linked with the embodiment of mobility, in which the body is, on the one hand, turned into an instrument to protest wrongdoings, and on the other is made into a target for surveillance and control to limit the speed and magnitude of migration. This embodiment is exemplified very literally in this instance. The demonstration involved (illegally) moving bodies from A to B, while these same bodies were limited by authorities by robbing them from their freedom to move. This is what Scheel (2013) would argue as well, that migration and control – agency and structure – exist in relation to each other. Mobility is arrogated by migrants through the linkage of the migrant body with means and methods of sovereign control. Furthermore, by slowing down the speed in a border zone such as Turkey, an attempt at controlling migration is made, effectively turning it into striated space.

Othering is thus a process of social segregation in which the other is created by setting various policies in place that qualifies one group over another, thereby creating 'the other'. This leads to wasted lives – people are declared (market) redundant – and to the homo sacer – people stripped of all their rights, thrown back into a bare existence. We also see that people are not just that – wasted lives or homo sacer – in acts of demonstration. In these moments refugees show agency and resist the idea of being only subject to sovereign powers.

When we re-evaluate and stretch the definition of othering we can see a process going on in which refugees themselves engage in othering as well, be it without the negative effects that are created for the group that is being othered. Ahmed and Hassan imagine a group that is different than themselves. For them, Europeans are the other. This comes forth

[11] This instance produced media attention. See, for example, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-police-block-new-refugee-march-greek-border-1631889867, or http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-turkey-greece-idUSKCN0RI1F320150918 (Accessed on May 4, 2016).

out of the narratives when they talk about culture. Hassan, for example, states that 'people live in different conditions in Syria, compared to Europe. It is very hard to change people and the people came from the third world. There are different traditions, so it's difficult to integrate people; It's a problem'. He means that 'they' are different than 'us'. A lot of refugees I spoke to confirm this image: an important reason to stay in Turkey are the similarities in the Syrian and Turkish culture[12]. Ahmed also lists this as one of the downsides of going to Europe: 'it is expensive, dangerous, and the culture is different'. Next to this, they have positive ideas on the European other. Hassan argues that 'all the people see that the people they know go to Europe and have a good life. And their life has a different form, so they keep in their mind that the heaven is in Europe. That was also the case before the way in Syria. If you want to make money, if you want to be rich, you have to go to Europe'. This can be seen as the other side of the other, it is the one with the different culture, but for my informants also the one with possibilities. Ahmed reinforces this image, for him it 'became at some point not so important where to go, but just actually for the fact that [he] could apply for citizenship, a passport, in the future, the ability to travel'. The European other is thus the one with a different culture, but also the one with a lot of possibilities. It is the other whose proximity is looked for, not the other to be separated from. A categorical difference between we and them is produced, but I want to argue that this is not paired with negativity.

[12] Field notes January 7, 2016.

Chapter 7: Conclusion & recommendations

I started this thesis with the question how Turkey is turned into a border zone by and for refugees. I have defined border zones as liminal spaces that are transit points in mobility, which purpose is to restrain the speed and magnitude of migration through sovereignty. Key elements of this border zone are ordering and othering. Through ordering meaning is assigned to spaces, thereby dividing them into go and no-go areas, places that are 'good' or 'bad'. Van Houtum thereby argued that spaces are coded by the owners of that space, I have argued, however, that spaces can also be coded and recoded (ordered and re-ordered) by people that are not the owners of that space, such as refugees.

This brings me to the question how, and on what basis, refugees order the world around them. I have shown that for my informants, five themes where important for doing this. Firstly, there is the issue of security. Hassan and Ahmed were fleeing a war, and therefore did not feel physically secure, ordering Syria as a no-go area. Also in Turkey this feeling continued after being arrested. Secondly, the theme of stability came up. It was important for my informants to live in a stable country, where they are able to build a stable life for themselves. In this regard, European countries were ordered as very stable, while the Middle-East and Turkey were ordered as instable. Thirdly, there was the theme of control. Notions of who is in control, who controls what, and having control over your life were important for them. The feeling of having your destiny in your own hands made places attractive to go to. The fourth theme was possibilities. Places were ordered through the alleged possibilities that these places had. The possibility to find a job, have education, health care, and not having to worry about your future too much was very important. Again we see here that because of this, European countries were ordered over the Middle-East and Turkey. The last theme was community. This theme also very much lies at the basis in the ordering process. I coined the terms 'crowd navigation' and 'chain migration' in this context. Contacts through the on- and offline Syrian community guides my informants through their journey

as refugees, and the community determines to a high degree which places to go to and which routes to take. The Syrian community are the basis for ordering spaces in this way.

Furthermore, ordering is a fluid process that consists of a constant negotiation of the themes above and a continuous practice of ordering and re-ordering. A process of re-ordering is set in motion when the current situation of my informants changed or when the reality was different than they expected it to be. In Syria this change of situation was the war. In Turkey it was a lack of possibilities, security, stability, and control. It is interesting to note, however, that the Syrian community was important enough for them to have stayed in Turkey, only if it was not made impossible by the Turkish authorities.

The next question I have looked at revolved around the second key element of border zones, i.e. how refugees are part of a process of othering. Through a process of othering a categorical difference between groups is produced; it is us versus them. This happens through various policies that are set in place that lead to practices that reflect this mentality. As I have shown, Syrians are not viewed equal to native Turkish people in policy and practice. This comes forth out of the temporary protection regime they fall under, instead of a full refugee status. Also, refugees are not integrated into the labour market at all, or are subject to the indifference of the informal market that goes paired with exploitation. Moreover, there are issues with health care and education, which access is problematic. Othering lead for my informants to a feeling of homelessness and that of being a refugee. It was impossible for them to really settle in Istanbul, because of these policies that aim towards excluding them from society. Especially Hassan feels that, because of this, he is treated as a ghost, instead of a human being that can participate in, and contribute to, Turkish society. In this sense I referred to the work of Bauman (2004) and Agamben (1988), who argue that othering leads to wasted lives and homo sacer. Here, I tried to take the middle ground: while this process leads to 'wasted lives' and 'homo sacer', my informants still showed agency through 'acts of demonstration', thereby resisting the image of naked bodies being only subject to sovereign powers. When my informants participated in a demonstration to demand safe passage for refugees to Greece, such an act of demonstration clearly manifested itself.

On a side-note, I have shown that my informants also othered, be it without the negative implications that this term usually goes paired with. For them, Europeans are the other, but the other whose proximity is looked for, instead of the other to be separated from.

Thirdly, I asked what this learns us with respect to the theory on border zones. While a lot of literature is written on borders and border zones, what lacks in most of these articles is a human centred approach. Authors have been more concerned with the physicality of borders (e.g. Hassner and Wittenberg 2011; Carter and Poast 2015) or with a geopolitically centred approach (e.g. van Houtum 2010; van Houtum and Naerssen 2002; van Houtum and Pijpers 2007). The share that refugees have in creating these border zones, let alone the experience of refugees in these zones, is something that was, in my opinion, overlooked.

I started my theoretical discussion with the notion of mobility, which exists in three relational moments (movement, representation, embodiment). This became apparent in the instance of my informants' demonstration. There was movement from A to B, this movement was represented in journalistic articles (see footnote 9) and the embodiment of mobility became apparent; the body was turned into an instrument to protest wrongdoings by moving it from A to B, and simultaneously into an instrument for surveillance and control by imprisoning it. We thus see that this theory on mobility is very applicable on occurrences within a border zone. The same goes for the Cresswell's six aspects of mobility. We have seen the (1) motive force behind mobility in the five themes that underlie the process of ordering. The (2) rhythm of mobility consist of repeated moments of movement and rest, and we can see the time spend in a border zone as such a moment of (forced) rest. A big part of this thesis was about (3) experience: how it feels to be on the move. An important aspect of border zones is that it has borders, and with borders comes (4) friction. And the last aspects (5) velocity and (6) route is what is tried to be limited in a border zone, but sought by refugees through crowd navigation. We can thus argue that theories on mobility can be used in conceptualizing border zones.

Lastly, Turkey is turned into a border zone by and for refugees on three levels. On one level Turkey becomes a border zone for refugees because it is a place they cannot leave. It is a transit point in mobility from Syria to Europe, making it a literal border between the Middle-East and Europe. The effect of this is that Syrian refugees are caught in a liminal state in which they cannot move back or forth. They are, in a way, caught between two places they

may not or cannot enter. On a second level, various policies are set in place to control the speed and magnitude of migration. These policies, implemented by the Turkish state as well as the EU, aim towards differentiating access to places for different people. The clearest example of this is that it was forbidden for my informants to cross to Greece and was consequently punished by prison. Also, the legal status of refugees in Turkey does, in fact, turn the country into a no-go area, by obstructing access to education or the labour market, for example.. On a third level, Turkey is made into a border zone by refugees, through the practice of ordering and the impact of othering. Because my informants did not feel accepted, they started to imagine a better place, turning Turkey into a transit point rather than a destination.

On a last note I would like to make few recommendations. First of all, further research should be done on border zones from a human perspective, instead of a geopolitically or state-centred one. Other border zones, such as the USA-Mexico border, could be included in these analyses. It is important to look at the effect of border zones on the people that are living in and near these zones. Second of all, it is clear that the EU is really making an effort to keep refugees out. They do this by allowing member states to build walls and fences, and by installing policies as discussed in this thesis.[13] Considering the severity of the war in Syria, and the amount of Syrians Turkey is host to, the EU should accommodate more Syrian refugees. Refusing to do this is not only a human rights violation, but also the disregarding of a moral obligation. Furthermore, the EU should do more to help the Turkish state. As noted, the Syrian community in Turkey is very big, and also my informants would have preferred to stay in Istanbul for a longer period of time. What is important then, is to create a viable environment in which refugees can pick up their lives and create a future for themselves in Turkey. I would strongly advice for a rights-based approach, in which refugees are granted the (human) rights they are entitled to in Turkey, the EU, and on their journey.

[13] See footnote 8 in chapter 5.

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