The Influence of the Politicization of Aid on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

Cordaid: Delivering Aid in South Sudan and the Central African Republic

cordaid

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The number of protracted conflicts is rising, and the aid agencies active in these crises struggle with the unpredictability of these situations as stable and instable periods can fluctuate and overlap. This makes it increasingly difficult to provide durable and effective aid. A method that could be greatly beneficial in these circumstances is 'Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development', a concept designed in the 1980s to link the sectors together, integrating aspects and linkages of both into aid programs. However, while its potential is widely recognized, it has only been successfully implemented after a small number of natural hazards, where the disaster is often clear-cut and linear. In the situations described above LRRD has not yet materialized. A phenomenon that is greatly influential in these situations and the aid sector overall, is the so-called 'politicization of aid'. This relates to the influence of political interests on aid agencies, guiding the where, what and how of aid programs through strict funding and access. This phenomenon has a bigger impact on man-made (protracted) crisis then it has on natural hazards, due to the complex interests attached to the former. Although its influence on both sectors individually has been researched, this is not the case for linking the two together. This thesis examines the influence of aid politicization on the practice of LRRD in protracted crisis. It has done so through a case study, namely the LRRD attempts of Cordaid, a Dutch development and relief organization, in South Sudan and the Central African Republic. The investigation started through desk research and document analysis, followed by participatory observation at Cordaid, and was concluded by qualitative interviewing of involved experts and practitioners. It has been guided by the following research question: *How do the changes in the global- and Dutch aid system affect the practice of linking relief and development within protracted crisis?*

The results show that the effect can be found primarily in the strict institutional- and governmental division of the relief- and development sector; which is guided by a legal- or institutional basis as well as public approval and political interests. Such a division in turn leads to inflexible funding streams which are allocated to the relief- and development sector with a fluctuating emphasis; currently, more money is spend in the relief sector. Proposals that integrate aspects of both sectors and try to link them together will most likely have a hard time getting funding since it is not compliant with the divided guidelines and institutions. This is especially the case in protracted situations, since this requires active linkages instead of mere transitional aspects. Since most NGOs, especially in the Dutch aid sector, heavily depend on government funding, LRRD will not be achieved as long as the strict divide in sectors and funding remains standing. Next to this main obstacle, restricted access given by beneficiary governments' limits aid organizations in effective cooperation and coordination. Lastly, a prerequisite for successful LRRD implementation, which was not found in Cordaid, is a common understanding of its meaning and added value, for both the funding- and the implementing parties in the aid sector.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Term	Definition	Source
LRRD	Linking relief, rehabilitation and longer term development interventions, regardless of the size or character of a disaster (sudden, recurrent or ongoing natural hazards or conflict).	**Voice-Concord Position Paper, 2012: 1**
Relief Aid	The aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations. The terms Relief Aid and Humanitarian Aid can be used interchangeably.	**Global Humanitarian Assistance.org, 2016**
Development	A process through which people's physical/material, social/organizational and motivational/attitudinal vulnerabilities (or capacities) are reduced (or increased).	**Anderson and Woodrow, 1989: 12**
Rehabilitation	It is part of a process of protecting and promoting the livelihoods of people enduring or recovering from emergencies. Its key task is to help reinforce developmental objectives, notably livelihood security, participation, sustainability, gender equity, and local institutional capacity	**Harvey, Campbell et al. 1997: 14**
Disaster	A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources.	**UNISDR.org, 2016**
Protracted Crisis	Those environments in which a significant proportion of the population is acutely vulnerable to death, disease and disruption of their livelihoods over a prolonged period of time. The governance of these environments is usually very weak, with the state having a limited capacity or willingness to respond to or mitigate the threats to the population, or provide adequate levels of protection.	**Macrae & Harmer 2004: 1**

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Term	Definition
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ODA	Official Development Aid
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
UN	United Nations
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

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1. INTRODUCTION

South Sudan is the youngest country in the world. It came into being in 2011, but has, in spite of its short existence, never seen peace. The country is characterized by continuous violent conflict as well as natural disasters such as drought and famine. It is but one of the permanent emergencies currently happening in the world. Man-made conflicts, disasters and natural hazards are an integral part of the world stage. They take place in all parts of the globe and can have a defining impact on the societies and cultures they occur in. In most cases, (foreign) aid is delivered to the affected population in an effort to rebuild what was lost; both materially and culturally. However, when the crisis occurs in a society that was already in turmoil, for example due to an unstable government or food insecurity, it can take the shape of a so-called 'protracted crisis' (also known as permanent emergencies). A protracted crisis is characterized by its longevity, the acute vulnerability of the population with regards to disease and disruption of their livelihoods, and the fact that it is often man-made and deeply embedded in society (Macrae & Harmer, 2004). Over the years, the number of protracted crisis has grown significantly (from 22 to in 2010 (FAO, 2010) to 33 in 2016 (UNOCHA, 2016; Uppsala Conflict Database, 2016) and the international aid community continues to struggle with providing an adequate response, as is emphasized by former United Nations (UN) Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon: "The rising scale of needs, the persistence of protracted crises and the interplay of new risks have led to a continued global deficit in the capacity of governments and humanitarian organizations to respond" (2016). In these crises, periods of relative stability can quickly be disrupted by on-set emergencies (such as violent conflict) and a multitude of both development- and relief agencies are often present. Numerous methods have been developed by both development- and relief agencies to ameliorate these situations and adapt to their instability and longevity, bearing in mind the growing number of societies that are in such a state: in 2015, 89% of all humanitarian funding from 'Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development' (OECD) member states was allocated to aid in protracted crises (UNOCHA, 2015, p.4).

One of the methods conceived to, amongst other things, help bring an end to situations of permanent emergency is Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). The topic emerged from the analysis of the food crisis in the Horn of Africa in the 1980s. At that time, a natural hazard took place during ongoing ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia, and development and relief agencies had to work together. As Singer (1985) stated: "the old division, whether

conceptual, administrative or resource allocative, between emergency and non-emergency (or development), simply collapses in the light of the present African experience" (p.13). The method was designed (by i.a. Singer, 1985, Adams, 1986 and Thomas et. al, 1989), to link the types of aid together in order to ensure the effective and sustainable impact of aid (Seaman, 1994; Green & Ahbed, 1998; Macrae & Bradbury, 2004). This link was not only believed to be needed because relief and development have a different function and structure, but also because it could be beneficial to both sectors and beneficiaries. As Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994, p. 1) pose, "better 'development' can reduce the need for emergency relief; better 'relief' can contribute to more long-lasting development, and better 'rehabilitation' can ease the transition between the two". Especially in situations of protracted crisis, such linkages could address the root causes of the ongoing emergency while also caring for the immediate on-set needs of the population and decrease the risk of another occurrence, by efficiently linking the deliverance of development- and relief aid. If for example there is a case of food insecurity, relief aid could not only hand out food packages but also tools and seeds, while development aid could invest in capacity building of locals, teaching them how to farm and which seeds and methods are 'disaster-proof'. In doing so, livelihoods could, at least partially, be restored.

Although the added value of LRRD has been recognized numerous times by both aid practitioners and governments alike, there are little known successful implementations of the concept (Buchanan-Smit & Maxwell, 1994; Green & Ahbed, 1998; EC communication, 2001; Macrae & Bradbury, 2004; Cristoplos, 2006; Mosel & Levine, 2014). It has continued to develop ever since the 1980s, but the few successes the concept has seen were cases of natural hazards, as witnessed during the 2004 tsunami. An example in this case is that during the Sri Lanka response "the shift from purely humanitarian response to a mixed portfolio of rehabilitation and development programs occurred quickly. […] It was noted that the decision to re-open schools was a driving force for the transition as it resulted in pressures to vacate the schools being used as temporary shelters" (Cristoplos, 2006, p.32). Since in these cases the situation is often clear-cut and linear, the transitional character of the concept could be implemented more easily. However, men have not been able to do so in the more complex, but as stated above, more often occurring man-made permanent crises even though it would be greatly beneficial (Otto & Weingarter, 2013; Mosel & Levine, 2014). The argument can thus be made that it is the situation, not the concept in and of itself that complicates its implementation. The difference between natural hazards and man-made conflict lies primarily

in the source of the disaster. Whereas man-made conflicts are political-, cultural or economical by default, in natural hazards no gain or interests are at the core of the issue; in these cases, everybody loses. Especially in instances of protracted crisis, the multitude of political or ideological interests can have a defining impact on the duration and scope of the situation. Banzet (2007) points to the 'leopard-skin pattern' that can occur, where governmental and non-governmental actors, funding streams and programs overlap, lacking the flexibility and resources to cope with the unclear escalating and de-escalating situation. This greatly restraints the possibilities of efficient cooperation and linkage between relief- and development actors, and thus the possibilities to permanently de-escalate the situation (Duffield, 1994).

One of the factors that has become greatly determining in the aid sector is the increasing influence of political interest on the where and how of aid delivery. (Norton, 2011; Collinson & Elhawary, 2012; Banks et al., 2014) Especially in the situation described above (the cases of man-made protracted crisis) the political agenda of both the aid giving- and receiving governments can determine which resources are spend where, how long this will take and which aid agencies will implement what. An agenda of a donating government can for example be influenced by the number of stakeholders that are already present, or the amount of media attention the crisis receives (Olsen, 2003). Since the number of permanent emergencies has grown, so has the attention given to these situations and the impact these crises have. For example, due to a number of permanent crises in the Horn of Africa, the number of migrants from this region to Europe has grown significantly (Eurostat, 2017). This direct impact on western societies has spurred an increase of funds and developmental assistance to these areas (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2016; ODA, 2016). Because most aid agencies remain dependent on governmental- and institutional funding on the one hand and governmentally approved access to affected territories on the other (Duffield, 1994; Macrae & Leader, 2000; Kappoor, 2008; Reinhardt, 2013; Banks et al, 2014), the impact of this so-called politicization of aid on both development- and relief aid in protracted crises has become irrefutable.

Although the consequences of aid politicization on both the relief- and development sector has been thoroughly researched, this is not the case for the impact it may have on the method of linking these two together: LRRD. However, due to the above-described rise of protracted crises and thus the need for more efficient- and effective aid, the successful implementation of the concept has become all the more crucial. Since the impact of aid politicization is so great, especially in these areas of protracted crisis, it is important to investigate the influence of this politicization 'issue' on LRRD, to discover the possible reason

behind the failure of the LRRD concept in these protracted situations before new solutions can be uncovered. This thesis thus aims to research the influence the politicization of aid has on the translation of LRRD theory and policy into practice, specifically in protracted crisis. Contributing to reduction of this caveat in the LRRD discourse would help future policies and programs in the optimizing of the linkages between relief and development programs. Thus, this thesis will aim to answer the following research questions:

1. How do the changes in the global- and Dutch aid system affect the practice of linking relief and development within protracted crisis?
    1. What are the practical effects of the politicization of aid?
    2. Do the practical effects of the politicization of aid have an adverse effect on attempts at linking relief and development within protracted crisis?

1.1.   Research Methods

The thesis will look at the above stated problem through a practical case study, from which it will reflect on the theoretical debate. It will examine the current situation around relief-and development aid through the double-mandate organization Cordaid, the Dutch 'Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid'. This organization is chosen for two reasons. First of all, because this so-called double mandate NGO offers both development and humanitarian programs, and is primarily active in fragile states and situations of protracted crises. Moreover, in two of the protracted crises Cordaid is active in, South Sudan and the Central African Republic, the organization aims to attempt the implementation of LRRD. However, although discussed on policy level, Cordaid finds itself struggling with the practical application of LRRD and the growing influence external parties have on these. Second, within a so-called double-mandate organization (which can implement both relief- and development programs), the obstacles are demarcated and thus better to investigate: researching LRRD between organizations is outside the scope of this research, because it primarily focusses on external factors influencing the programs within organizations, instead of the possible interests between organizations. Cordaid thus makes for an interesting organization through which to answer the main research question.

The research will focus on two units of investigation. First of all, Cordaid as an organization will be examined looking at the development of the organization within a

changing aid landscape, zooming into the Dutch aid arena, through participatory observation and semi-structured interviews with experts for the duration of six months. An overarching question will be in what way the development of Cordaid as an organization is influenced by the developments in the Dutch aid arena and how this has contributed to the lack of linkages within the organization. Subsequently, their interventions in two protracted crises, South Sudan and the Central African Republic, will be examined. Protracted crises are the best suited landscapes for this investigation, seeing that they often take place in an already politicized environment where relief- and development agencies come together. In cases of natural hazards, this is not always the case. The research will look at Cordaid's structure and goals of the programs within these countries, their funding streams and involved actors, and specifically the policy efforts and opportunities for LRRD. The second unit of investigation is so-called 'expert opinion', consisting out of a number of external experts who will be interviewed to provide an overarching context with regards to the Dutch aid landscape. These exist out of experts working within the Ministry of Development Cooperation and Trade and experts working for single-mandate organizations.

1.2. Thesis Outline

This thesis is structured in such a way that a gradual transition from theory to practice is made, zooming in from a global aid arena and the abstract concept of LRRD to the Dutch aid sector and NGO Cordaid, and their practical experience with LRRD. The theoretical chapter will describe the development of the aid sector, discussing changes since the 1980s and subsequently looking at the development of the concept of LRRD within this context. The subsequent chapter will describe the methodology used to conduct the research and address its limitations. The chapter thereafter combines theory and practice, and will examine the history and development of the Dutch aid landscape and Cordaid as an organization within this arena. In this chapter, the observations made during the researchers' time at Cordaid will be used to sketch a picture of the changes in the Dutch aid sector and the effects this has had on the organizations' culture. The fifth chapter dives into the practice of LRRD, looking at the development of the concept within Cordaid and the practical attempts made within the South Sudan and CAR interventions. In the sixth and final chapter, all findings will be combined and presented in the conclusion, answering the main research question. Lastly, a bibliography closes this piece.

2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GLOBAL AID ARENA

This chapter will describe the theoretical- and conceptual framework within which the main concepts of this thesis (aid politicization and LRRD) have developed. First, the history of relief and development aid will be discussed in order to sketch a clear picture of both sectors and the gradual changes that have led to the politicization of aid. It will then discuss consequences of this phenomenon, in order to create a comprehensive background within which the concept under investigation will be highlighted: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development.

2.1. The History of Relief and Development Aid

The foundation of organized relief aid can be traced back to a battlefield, namely the sight of the battle of Solferino in 1859. It was here that Henri Dunant, a Swiss banker, witnessed the aftermath of the battle and urged everyone to help care for the wounded, whether they were from an opposing army or not. Four years later, Dunant co-founded the Red Cross in Geneva; not only laying the basis for relief aid but also setting the three main humanitarian principles: neutrality, independence and impartiality. At that time, the universal mission for relief aid was defined as the 'desire to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found; to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being', and this still applies today. In the following decades, many NGOs that exist until this day were founded, i.e. Save the Children during World War I and Oxfam during World War II. However, humanitarian NGOs did not become visible as such until the 1960s, when during the crisis in Nigeria's Biafra (1967 – 1970) the media started to pay attention to the ongoing crisis and the subsequent relief efforts. The prominence of NGOs was highlighted and a new 'style' of interventions was undertaken. The sovereignty of the affected country was given a subsidiary importance to the delivering of aid; the newly founded Medicins Sans Frontières (MSF, Doctors without Borders) was leading in this new style. After the Biafran crisis had ended in 1970, multiple famines in the Horn of Africa emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s. Again, humanitarian agencies were present in large numbers (Hilhorst, 2013).

After the fall of the Berlin wall, a promise for peace and unity briefly dominated the international community. However, this soon proved to be a far too positive perspective when in 1991 Iraq invaded Kuwait and in that same year the government of Somalia collapsed, followed by civil war and famine. It was in this crisis that the negative side of humanitarian aid

became visible, when a United Nations resolution provided the military protection of aid delivery and this unexpectedly led to an increase of violence and the use of force by UN troops. Hereafter, there was an increasing reluctance of the international community, and specifically donor governments, to intervene in Africa again. Tragically, this led to a failure to prevent and timely respond to the Rwandan genocide in 1994. This, in combination with the challenge relief agencies experienced to remain independent, neutral and impartial, not wanting to 'feed the killers' (in refugee camps no difference was made between giving aid to Hutus or Tutsis), left the world in shock. It subsequently led to a joint evaluation of involved agencies concerning subjects such as the long-term effect of aid and the universal applicability of the 'do no harm' principle, which concluded that humanitarian intervention cannot substitute for political action (Macrae, 2000). Ironically, this also led to the conclusion that (humanitarian) aid and politics should become more intertwined, in the spirit of a possibly more effective and long-term impact of aid. As Eriksson stated in the report:

> The underlying problem has been and continues to be political. But the international community failed to come to grips directly with the political problem. Thus it has in effect, and by default, left both the political and the humanitarian problem generated by the Rwanda crisis in the hands of the humanitarian community. This is untenable. It puts burdens on the latter that it cannot and should not assume (1996, p. 47).

After previous failures to act, what followed were two so-called politicized interventions in Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2001, setting the scene for an increasing politicization of aid starting in the 2000s, which will be discussed in the next subsection (Macrae, 2000; Schweizer, 2004; Kapoor, 2008).

Different from the humanitarian basis of relief aid, development aid has its roots in colonialism. In the late 1800s, colonial development took place in the shape of economic assistance from governments to their respective colonies. Even though in the course of the 20th century more and more colonies gained independence, economic aid was still distributed and done so from an ideal of westernization. The basic notion of development had taken the shape of 'rich countries giving money to poor countries' (Philips, 2013). During the cold war, this notion further manifested itself in so-called 'third-worldism', where western democracies were the first-, eastern countries (communist states) were the second- and former colonies and independent 'underdeveloped nations' the third world, and this last one had to be 'uplifted' (Philips, 2013). In the 1950s the Marshall plan added a new dimension to the 'rich giving to the poor' structure through the increasing involvement of the UN, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This turned into a more structural commitment in the 1960s when

many countries allocated part of their national budget to development; even western countries that did not have any ex colonies became invested, albeit on humanitarian grounds: the reduction of poverty became the new focus, rather than westernization. When in the 1990s the cold war ended, the purpose of development aid became less clear. As Boutros-Ghali states:

> Development as a common cause is in danger of fading from the forefront of our agenda. The competition for influence during the cold war stimulated interest in development. The motives were not always altruistic, but countries seeking to develop could benefit from that interest. Today, the competition to bring development to the poorest countries has ended. Many donors have grown weary of the task. Many of the poor are dispirited. Development is in crisis. (1994, art. 5).

A new set of actors became active in the development aid landscape; NGOs and philanthropists but also countries that had previously been recognized as 'third world states', such as China. These new actors also led to different trends when it came to the 'why' of development aid: ranging from enhancing economic progress, the good of humanitarian wellbeing or for mutual self-interest. It can thus be stated that throughout its history, development aid has always been part of political agendas, and for this sector, aid and politics were already integrated with each other (Schweizer, 2004; Kapoor, 2008; Philips, 2013).

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2.1.1. An Overarching Phenomenon: The Politicization of Aid

During the cold war, the concept of sovereignty was an undisputed one. Great powers controlled their territories through colonial governance and later, arguably, development aid, but respect for the sovereignty and authority of nations was deemed definite. This unconditional sovereignty had a certain function; by laying down a premise of non-intervention in the internal affairs of any given state, there was less risk of a confrontation between powers. However, what was not apparent within this approach was the matter of influencing other states through economic-, political- and military aid. Such actions were not seen as interventions in political affairs, but as 'assistance' (Macrae & Leader, 2000; Schweizer, 2004; Collinson & Elhawary, 2012). When the Cold War ended the world order became less clear. There were no longer obvious power blocs or super states, and the incentive of investing in (often less developed) countries in order to gain economic-, political- or military influence diminished when the 'necessity' for control faded; a confrontation between super powers had become less likely. Also, there was no longer a need to support dubious regimes as part of an international power bloc; smaller conflicts between third world states were no longer part of global power

politics and did not have to be justified by great states anymore. These developments led to a new interpretation of sovereignty, namely a more conditional one. States could no longer do what they pleased internally, especially if it deviated from the norm. As Macrae and Leader (2000, p. 16) state: "Under growing scrutiny from both human rights advocates and, in the US, increasingly isolationist politicians, unconditional support for states solely because they were allied states became increasingly hard to justify." In combination with an increasingly globalized world, this also led to a new perspective on the legitimacy of humanitarian-, political- and economic interventions (Macrae & Leader, 2000; Schweizer, 2004; Kappoor, 2008; Collinson & Elhawary, 2012).

The United Nations and several donors started to see development aid interventions as a means to bring peace, security and prosperity, and as a way to defend human rights instead of a tool to influence proxy states, as had been the case with development aid (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2003). Although development aid had clearly developed from one function to the other, this new line of thinking also stroked with the humanitarian 'train of thought', already believing in the subsidiarity of sovereignty. For both sectors, this new style of intervention was deemed to be legitimate if the government of a state failed to carry out their main civic duties; to protect their citizens and uphold their rights. The reasons given for such interventions varied; where such states were of significant strategic interest they often had a humanitarian background, all the while having the purpose too politically and socially 'manage' conflict, being backed or funded by western governments or institutions (Collinson & Elhawary, 2012). Next to development aid, humanitarian aid thus slowly started to become intertwined with politics as well. From a political perspective, humanitarian and development aid could be used as a conflict management tool; this was supported by the 'Agenda for Peace', a UN report written by Boutros-Boutros Ghali in 1992. He stated that in order to effectively and sustainably resolve conflict, the social-, cultural-, economic- and political situation in a country needed to be addressed as root causes of conflict, which could most efficiently be done by humanitarian- and development actors (Macrae & Leader, 2000). Thus, although development aid had always had a political aspect, humanitarian aid was now also partially being guided by a politicized agenda, as part of a 'moral responsibility' to address causes of conflict. This was not perceived as a negative change; in the eyes of the aid community, a new and clear purpose of aid was deemed necessary. Not only had the fiascos in Somalia and Rwanda, as described above, led to an idea that aid could 'do harm', the new political world order also led to a decline in aid flows, a growing 'war economy' and a higher cost of aid.

(Macrae & Leader, 2000). These developments led to the ideological notion that aid might need to be more conditional to ensure that the benefits would reach the 'right' people on the one hand, and the practical necessity for a closer cooperation with governments and donors to ensure financial survival on the other.

In the new millennium, this trend of increasing coherence between politics and aid only grew further. As stated above, a number of 'humanitarian' military interventions took place that are exemplary to this, namely Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2001 (Schweizer, 2004). During these interventions, the conflict was 'managed' by humanitarian action, and the aid given was not always in line with the needs. After 9/11, a new dimension was added to the phenomenon of aid politicization, namely the fear of terrorism and the focus on fragile states. This lead to aid 'securitization' as part of the 'war on terror' and went hand in hand with the increasingly popular phenomenon of politically activist humanitarianism. This concept built on ideas which had emerged in the 1990s, such as the 'Agenda for Peace' and 'conditional sovereignty', giving a stronger foundation for the notion of moral responsibility of aid actors to address root causes of conflict and create opportunities for political change. An example of this line of thinking is the so-called 3D approach: defense, diplomacy and development. These three aspects of international security complement each other when it comes to conflict prevention or intervention; at least they do in theory (Norton, 2011). The approach is also known as '3D security' and became especially popular in Canada and the US around 2006, while it was 'invented' by the Dutch ministry of Development Cooperation (Spitz et al., 2013). It sees diplomacy as the first line of interaction, defense as a strategic necessity and development as the means to create a stable society (CPRF, 2011). Looking at these developments, from the notion of 'subsidiary sovereignty' and 'Agenda for Peace' to the '3D Approach', it can be stated that over the last two decades, aid and politics have become intertwined so strongly that both relief- and development aid are influenced by political interests in one way or the other (Macrae & Leader, 2000; Schweizer, 2004; Donini, 2008; Collinson & Elhawary, 2012). As Norton summarizes: "The geo-politics after 9/11 influenced where aid money is spent; where technical resources are deployed and why; the partners aid agencies work with and through; and how development itself is understood and justified to the citizens of donor countries" (2011, p.1).

Zooming in on these consequences, first and most importantly of all, "geo-politics influence where aid money is spent"; funding streams to and between aid agencies are largely influenced and designed by political institutions and interests (Banks, Humble & Edwards,

2014). As Olsen (2003) claims, three factors of crisis determine which money is allocated where; namely media coverage, the degree of political interest and stakeholder commitment. While the first factor plays an important role when it comes to public support and donations, the last two are more important to big western donors, on state or supra state level. As Olsen explains, political interest can be described as the security-, economic- and political interests the donor has in the country and population affected by crisis, and the impact this crisis could possibly have on these interests (but also on the state or organization the donor stems from): the bigger the interests, the bigger the sum of money. Stakeholder commitment describes the strength of humanitarian and development actors present in the specific country in crisis. If there is already a strong basis or presence in the country, it is more likely the country will receive a large donation. Naturally, these factors are not always decisive and do not play the same role in each crisis. However, their impact must not be underestimated (Olsen, 2003). Similar to the determination of where the money is spend, the matter of how the funds will be allocated, for what period of time and to whom can also be influenced by political interests, as will be explained below.

When examining the development of funding streams in Africa over the years through Official Development Aid (ODA) reports (which also incorporates relief aid), two things become clear. First or all, most aid is given bilaterally or through supra-state governmental institutions (in 2014, the United States, the EU and the World Bank (IDA) were the top three donors). Second, relief aid receives a relatively small proportion of such monetary flows. When one looks at development aid, the funding streams are often straightforward, moving bilaterally from government to government or from government to selected implementing partner; often carefully assigned to a long-term development plan or focus country. Out of all aid, the social sector (comprising of education, government & civil society, health and WASH) receives almost half of all funds. Zooming in on relief aid, currently the humanitarian funding landscape is designed in such a way that UN organizations such as UNICEF receive 52% of the total of global humanitarian finance streams, directly from multilateral sources such as governments, governmental institutions and private parties. International NGO's receive 31% of all aid flows in this sector, and in 2015, only 0.4% of traceable funding went directly to local organizations (Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, 2016). For both sectors it is often the case that the funds can be allocated to only one cause and for a limited period of time, with no or limited options of flexibility. These strict funding streams then fail to allow for the flexibility that is necessary in situations of for example protracted conflict, where crisis and periods of relative

stability can overlap and/or occur cyclically. Thus, through the allocation of funds, donors can steer programs, partners and resources of recipient organizations. Naturally, not all donors are governments (or governmental institutions), or have attached restrictions to their funds which can limit the agency of humanitarian- or development organizations to follow their own agenda. In these cases, the politicization of aid is not necessarily found in funding streams, but in the where and how of programs.

Zooming into the 'where and how' aspect, the second consequence of aid politicization can be identified: restricted access. This is not only a pragmatic issue, but also influences "how development itself is understood and justified to the citizens of donor countries" (Norton, 2011, p.1). Over the years, access has more and more become a political tool (Middleton & O'Keefe, 1997; Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010). On the one hand, aid could become conditional in exchange for access and safety if the belligerent parties would actively participate in the agenda of the aid agency or, in extension, donor (this was further facilitated by the so-called 'deal' between aid agencies and belligerent parties: in exchange for access, humanitarian agencies would stick to their principles and provide assistance to all). On the other, agencies must abide by the wishes of the donor (government), or beneficiary government, even if it compromised their humanitarian principles, in exchange for access to affected areas (Middleton & O'Keefe, 1997; Donini, 2008; Norton, 2011; Collinson & Elhawary, 2012). Such seemingly selective deliverance of aid due to mandates and funding streams given by donor (governments) caused a 'good guys – bad guys' division, compromising the neutral and impartial principals and fueling suspicion of the – often rivalling - beneficiaries (Macrae & Leader, 2000). This issue was increased by development agencies often also doing humanitarian work (although not always calling it 'humanitarian' (ODA, 2016)), and more humanitarian agencies coming into existence overall because more money is often allocated to this field (ODA, 2015); in moments of crisis, aid agencies could pop up in large numbers and disappear again when the main needs were attended to. This in turn created a lack of clarity with regards to the goal and intent of aid agencies, strengthened by their discontinuous presence. These aspects have put pressure on the aforementioned 'deal' between aid organizations and belligerents.

Having discussed the evolution of the aid arena over the last two decades and the increasingly intertwined sectors of politics and aid, it must be stated that the politicization of aid is not always necessarily a bad thing, or that its consequences (restricted funding streams and access) have an undeniably negative effect on those in need. In the period of time discussed, transparency with regards to how this funding is spend and the use of methods such as

localization and sustainable livelihoods (and accountability towards beneficiaries) has increased, also due to pressure from governments and supra-national institutions. While the number of protracted crises is rising and the effects of climate change become more evident through i.a. an increased number of refugees and natural hazards such as droughts, ways to make aid more efficient and effective are being introduced and/or reinvented, often in a cooperation between NGOs and governments, leading to for example the introduction of the Grand Bargain in 2016. One method that has been the topic of discussion for over 25 years in a continuous effort to streamline the transition and cooperation between relief and development aid, is 'Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development'. The concept came into being in the 1980s, and has developed ever since. It was quickly adopted and studied by scholars, aid agencies and governments, and became the topic of numerous policy documents as one of the ways to make aid more efficient and effective, and insure a more sustainable impact. However, apart from the successful 'implementation' of LRRD during a number of natural hazards, it has not been possible to integrate the concept within the aid arena and successfully apply it in situations of man-made disasters. Three obstacles that have been identified as reasons for this 'failure', are the lack of clarity with regards to the meaning of the concept, inflexible funding streams and the inability to coordinate and cooperate in disaster situations. While it has been established that aid politicization has influenced both the relief- and the development sector, it is possible that these obstacles in linking the two are also influenced by this phenomenon. In the next subsection, this method will be discussed to investigate the possible relation between the consequences of aid politicization and the obstacles of LRRD on a theoretical level.

2.2.   Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

During the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the aid sector experienced a renewed sense of purpose. In this time period, the concept was widely discussed and was based on a continuum model, where Relief and Development followed each other in a linear fashion. Fundamentally, the idea was that 'better' relief and 'better' development could support each other if aspects of both approaches were implemented in one form or the other (Buchanan-Smith & Maxwell, 1994). This view was based on the notion that crises or disaster were anomalies, isolated events happening within a normally functioning society (Hilhorst, 2013). Relief and development were thus seen as a transition back into the 'normal' state. In the papers before 1996, the idea of rehabilitation was recognized as a concept that could be used to bridge relief and development, but was not incorporated into the 'LR(R)D' phenomenon as such (Seaman, 1994;

Longhurst 1994). This changed after the European Commission Communication on the topic in 1996. It recognized that the use of the continuum model falls short in certain situations, such as permanent emergencies, and here a contiguum model, where all forms can and must take place at once is more appropriate; the R of Rehabilitation was added. Scholars (i.a. Green, 1998; Macrae & Bradbury, 1998; Smilie, 1998) soon followed, supporting the idea that this linear model might be relevant to most natural disasters but not to many other complex (violent) crises.

Besides 'continuum' and transitional thinking, two other ideas characterized the first ten years of the discourse. First of all, the division between humanitarian aid and development was seen as mostly a structural and organizational one. Humanitarian aid was focused on saving lives and operating around governments. Development aid was focused on saving livelihoods and working with governments. This division was strengthened by funding streams being allocated to either relief or development, with very little overlap or integration being possible. "Whereas development was long term, evolutionary, and emphasized decentralized and participatory approaches, relief was short-term and tended to be top down, donor dependent, inflexible and hierarchical" (Buchanan-Smith & Maxwell, 1994: 7). This divide was also reflected in donor strategies and methods. Second and consequential to the above stated aspect, LRRD attempts were focused on linking relief and development on a structural and organizational level. The focus was on capacity building, strengthening livelihoods and working with local parties by relief agencies and reducing vulnerability by development agencies (Longhurst, 1994; Green & Ahbed, 1996). When at the turn of the century more international organizations started to become involved in the humanitarian aid and development landscape, and security and politics started to become more integrated in the aid sector, this division between relief and development did not end. Moreover, the focus started to shift.

In 2001, the European Commission published a new communication, where the contiguum model was formally recognized. Next to this realization, one also started to grasp the concept of crises being embedded in society, made up out of a number of root causes that were not easily defined or generalized for all conflicts. As Otto & Weingarter put it in their report on the development of LRRD:

> Humanitarian aid does not take place in isolated environments. People affected by humanitarian crises have either already been beneficiaries of development interventions or clearly have needs that go beyond immediate-response, life-saving aid and the replacement of the assets lost in the humanitarian crisis. This

is true for most types of crises, sudden onset and protracted crises, as well as natural disasters, conflict related disasters and combinations of both in complex and often protracted humanitarian crises. Long-term poverty, state fragility and extensive humanitarian needs often occur concurrently and are inter-related. (2013, p. 14)

This realization was in line with the overall development of the aid sector; as described above, both development- and humanitarian aid were seen as a means to address root causes of conflict, managing it and bringing peace and prosperity. This also meant that relief and development could not just be two separate sectors with LRRD providing for a transitional phase back to the normal situation (Duffield, 1994). Relief aid had gained a dimension of 'moral responsibility'; while this had always been the basis on which to operate, the security and political aspect that had joined the humanitarian landscape enhanced this focus. Furthermore, development aid started to integrate security into its mandate, and focused more on 'human security' and the prevention of conflicts, especially in fragile states (Mosel & Levine, 2014). As explained in the section above, this was acknowledged not only by relief and development agencies but also by donors. "A range of donor governments have recognized, organizationally at least, that poverty reduction alone will not deliver conflict reduction, and that there is a need for the more systematic linkage of investment in 'soft' and 'hard' security approaches" (Macrae & Harmer, 2004, p.4). Although both sectors had gained a political (and security) aspect and believed in the embeddedness of crisis in society, at least in the cases of man-made conflict, the institutional and structural division that had been in place in the 1990s did not fade. Donors continued to stick to their sector, vested in their own interests, with little possibility of overlap (Banks, Humble & Edwards, 2014).

In this stage of the discourse, similar to the start of the debate, an emergency happened where both natural hazard and conflict came together, in the form of the 2004 tsunami. Here, both Indonesia and Sri-Lanka were involved in internal conflict before the tsunami happened, and development efforts were already taking place. However, in contrast to the 1983 famine in Ethiopia, this is one of the few 'LRRD' success stories. In short, the situation that followed the tsunami was not only unique due to the mix of natural hazard and man-made conflict, it also brought about more money than the agencies on the scene had ever had after one emergency; not only from donors but also from the public. Development and relief efforts were coordinated and integrated in the field through for example cash-for-work and sustainable livelihoods initiatives and the large amount of funding provided flexibility (Cristoplos, 2006). These two events, 9/11 (and subsequently the war on terror) and the tsunami, shaped the second decade

of LRRD discourse. When comparing characteristics of the first and second line of debate, it is primarily evident that more attention is given to the difficulty of permanent and complex emergencies, because of the notion of society-embedded conflict (Otto & Weingarter, 2013). This also led to the idea that LRRD is less about filling the gap between relief and development (if it is taking place in non-chronological order or simultaneously, there is no gap), and more about the most efficient and effective way of linking the two practices. Although it faded from the forefront of the aid landscape for a while, an increase of (humanitarian) protracted crisis has led more agencies to look at the discourse again. The Grand Bargain, as proposed during the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, names harmonization as a key goal, the UN launched the so-called 'New Way of Working' (2016) and the European Union refocuses its efforts on 'Resilience' (establishing an 'Action Plan for Resilience 2013-2020') as a form of LRRD.

However, although widely adapted and acknowledged as a method that could improve the way aid is delivered, another side of the LRRD discourse also developed during this period in time, asking the question whether LRRD is always necessary and desirable. Both in the relief- and development sector, the idea that sometimes these two types of aid should just remain separate, grew. Especially in situations of man-made disaster and conflict, this discourse stated that saving lives should have the priority over complicated constructions such as early recovery or resilience. This perspective has its foundation in the idea that humanitarian aid and development aid differ not only in programmatic structure but also in (ideological) goal and mandate, and is further complicated by the many methods and concepts that have been attached to the LRRD phenomenon (Macrae, 2012; Otto & Weingarter, 2013; Hinds, 2015). Over the years, LRRD developed into a so-called basket concept, meaning different things to different organizations and institutions who all annotated their own goal and method to the concept. Some of these methods became widely adapted on their own, such as 'Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)'[1] or 'Preparedness', and were still linked to LRRD by some but not by others. Especially because the concept has existed for such a long period of time and has shifted in and out of interest over the years, the establishment of a clear, common definition and goal has proved to be impossible. Although understandable, since the concept is meant to bring two very different sectors together, it is also one of the biggest problems when aiming to implement LRRD (Macrae, 2012; Otto & Weingarter, 2013; Mosel & Levine, 2014).

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[1] A more extensive explanation of the four main LRRD methods can be fouond in the anncx.

Next to unclear terminology, two phenomena can be identified that have made the practical implementation of LRRD so difficult. The first obstacle is the inflexibility of funding streams. This issue was already discussed in the 1990s, scholars and practitioners noticing the often restricting and inflexible nature of funding streams. Seaman already stated the issue in 1994:

> If, for no other reason than the administrative difficulties posed by large budgets and multiple grants to other organizations, the larger Governmental donors tend to impose limits on their support, e.g. through NGOs, to relief, rehabilitation and development activities. The distinctions vary from donor to donor, but typically include limitations on action related to its time relationship with an emergency, and on the type of activity which is acceptable in relationship at each period. (p.1)

This 'limitation' or inflexibility has changed little over time. Many scholars in both generations (i.a. Buchanan-Smith, 1994; Lautze & Hammock, 1996; Macrae & Bradbury, 2004; Otto & Weingarter, 2013) point to this issue as one of the main obstacles for effective LRRD implementation. Fixed funding streams namely also lead to fixed programs, by fixed stakeholders who have to stick to the project or program the fund is allocated to. Especially in permanent emergencies this can lead to problems, due to changing circumstances and context and a project and/or party not being able to change with it. Where natural hazards mostly follow a linear path from relief to recovery to development, and organizations often receive (individual) donations from private parties, the organizations working in permanent emergencies call for more flexibility and fluidity of resources to accommodate the unstable situation. As is reiterated in theory, when in a crisis both relief-, rehabilitation- and development aid is needed, this leads to a patchwork of funding streams, often unclear for both the donor and the recipient. As Seaman (1994, p. 33) states: "In the current period, when the donor field increasingly dominated by a small number of large donors and an increasing number of NGOs (that) are largely or entirely dependent on donor financing to work at all, the definitions of 'relief', development' and the transition between these is increasingly defined by the donor position". While this statement was made in 1994, not much has changed. Looking at Official Development Assistance (ODA) reports in comparison to reports of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) in 2015, different types of aid are placed in different sectors. Where ODA places basic education and health within the development sector, UNOCHA refers to these services as being part of humanitarian aid efforts. Furthermore, 'multisector' programs seem to receive a large amount of funds, while it remains up to the donor to decide which programs fall under the 'multisector' banner. This

fluidity of definitions subsequently affects the number of involved parties and the set-up of aid programs.

These involved parties and aid programs are not only affected by funding streams, but also hampered by a lack of possibility to coordinate and cooperate due to restricted access or mandate, or an overflow of aid agencies with unclear goals and tasks. As Cristoplos reiterates: "It has been recognized that LRRD is dependent on flexibility, communication and trust among different actors at different levels. It is also reliant on a shift of responsibilities for upholding the basic rights of affected populations from international actors to national government and local institutions" (2006, p. 33). This can thus be identified as the second main obstacle to LRRD. Different actors within the aid arena, ranging from beneficiary to donor to aid agency, can play different roles and overlap when an emergency happens. Humanitarian- and development agencies can for example take the shape of an implementing NGO, a donor, a second tier implementing partner, etc. When in the field, this can lead to many organizations doing the same job next to each other, led by their given mandate and access to the affected population (Cristoplos, 2006; Otto & Weingarter, 2013; Levine & Mosel, 2014).

Similar to a multitude of funding streams, the number of actors will also grow and become more complicated in the event of a protracted crisis. Where access and cooperation possibilities are often less restricted in the situation of a drought or flood, a permanent emergency can lead to a so-called 'leopard skin pattern' (Banzet et. al, 2007) of crises which emerges in a country, followed by a patchwork of programs and funds, lacking the flexibility and resources to cope with the unclear situation of escalation and de-escalation, violence and unstable peace, and so on. As Macrae & Harmer define:

> Protracted crises are those environments in which a significant proportion of the population is acutely vulnerable to death, disease and disruption of their livelihoods over a prolonged period of time. The governance of these environments is usually very weak, with the state having a limited capacity or willingness to respond to or mitigate the threats to the population, or provide adequate levels of protection. (2004, p.1)

In such a permanent emergency, crisis has become the norm and is embedded in all layers of society, from governmental structures to households. Crisis follows crisis, and periods of upwards development can easily return to emergency, often happening in different parts of the country and not always simultaneously. This leads to the need to apply both relief, rehabilitation and development at the same time in the same or different regions (EC Communication, 2001). Furthermore, this can make for an overlap in mandate and goals. Relief

is more focused on sustainability and resilience, and development on reducing vulnerability and the impact of shocks. This overlap is not always reflected in the financing streams of donors and the programs that are set up and the amount of access different actors have. Another obstacle is that in these environments, governments and local institutions are often so deeply embedded within the crisis, that it becomes hard to work with them and simultaneously stay true to principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality for the humanitarian aid actors. All in all, providing relief- and development aid in situations defined by their 'leopard skin pattern' remains challenging and in these situations linking the two together has not succeeded yet.

2.3.   Conclusion

This chapter has examined the development of the aid sector, zooming in on the politicization of aid and its consequences on the two aid sectors. It subsequently discussed the evolution of the LRRD discourse and its main implementation obstacles.

Over the years, coherence between the political- and the aid sector, propelled by the failure to adequately respond and cooperate during and after the Rwandan genocide, has grown significantly. Especially after 9/11, geo-politics has determined when, how and where aid agencies can carry out their tasks. This has manifested itself primarily in two aspects: restricted funding and restricted access, both guided by (governmental) donors and beneficiary governments. As a result, many western NGO's have lost the 'agency' to implement programs where, how and with whom they want, and look beyond the crisis at hand. The concept of LRRD has developed within this (political) aid arena, receiving more or less attention according to the needs and wishes of aid donors and agencies. It has evolved into a 'basket concept' that holds models such as Resilience, Stabilization and Disaster Risk Reduction, and has started to mean different things to different organizations; its value and goal are not always clear. The concept encounters two more obstacles in its implementation, specifically in man-made crisis. First of all, inflexible funding streams (which lead to inflexible programs and stakeholders) complicate the possibility to cross the divide between relief- and development. Second, restricted access and mandate make it difficult for organizations to cooperate and coordinate according to their own wishes and needs, and implement cross-sectoral methods such as LRRD.

Since the 1980s, the LRRD concept has scarcely been implemented. Only in linear and clear cut situations, where little economic-, cultural- and/or political interests were at play, a number of successes have been registered (during i.a. the aid deliverance after the tsunami in 2004 and the earthquake in Nepal in 2015). This is due to the fact that in these situations, aid agencies are not as restricted in their methods of intervention by a variety of external interests, as they are in cases of man-made (protracted) crisis. In these cases of protracted crisis, providing relief- and development aid remains a challenge in and of itself due to the unpredictable and unstable nature of the emergency and, most importantly, the multitude of different interests that limit them in their movement and program implementation. In these circumstances, the two main obstacles of LRRD (inflexible funding streams and restricted access and -mandate) are undeniably more present and appear to be characteristic of the context. It can thus be argued that it is not the concept but the context that obstructs the implementation of LRRD: when funding restrictions are less draconic and access does not play a significant role, LRRD is theoretically possible.

The next chapter will discuss the methodology used to conduct the research into this issue. Subsequently, the framework sketched in this chapter will be taken from theory into practice for the case at hand, investigating the link between the consequences of aid politicization and the obstacles of LRRD in a 'real-life setting'.

3. RESEARCH DESIGN

In this chapter, the research design of the study is outlined. It will be described in chronological order, looking at the process step by step. First, the research objective will be stated. Second, the qualitative research methods will be outlined, namely document analysis, participatory observation and semi-structured qualitative interviews. Third, the time line, ethical standards and limitations will be discussed.

3.1. Research Objective

The purpose of this study is to investigate the possible linkages between the consequences of aid politicization and the obstacles to implementing LRRD in practice, specifically within protracted crisis. In doing so it offers a new perspective to the already much discussed LRRD discourse. It will look at the effect aid politicization (in the Netherlands) has on the translation of LRRD policy to LRRD practice by reviewing the NGO Cordaid, and its policy and programs in the protracted crises of South Sudan and CAR. The research thus takes the shape of an exploratory case study, which will be investigated through qualitative methods. A case study is chosen because it allows for the testing of LRRD theory in a practical setting. The underlying aim of the study can be summarized as follows:

1. The discovery of future research tasks in the field of aid politicization in relation to LRRD in protracted crisis;
2. Testing the theoretical constructs underlying the proposed research question in a 'real life' setting;
3. Contribute to concrete theory development within the field of LRRD in practice.

The study was guided by the following research question:

1. How do the changes in the global and Dutch aid system affect the practice of linking relief and development within protracted crisis?
   1. What are the practical effects of the politicization of aid?
   2. Do the practical effects of the politicization of aid have an adverse effect on attempts at linking relief and development within protracted crisis?

First, a solid foundation of theory has been constructed. Subsequently, the research methods 'participatory observation' and 'semi-structured interviews' were undertaken. This will be discussed in the following subsection.

3.2. Research Methods

Due to the fact that while both aid politicization and LRRD have been discussed and researched numerous times, but research on the influence on each other (and specifically LRRD practice in protracted crisis) is very limited, the research is qualitative in nature. The writer has chosen to conduct a formal study through an explorative design, and overall, the research can be described as a qualitative exploratory case study. Yin (2014) defines a case study as follows: "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used". The contemporary phenomenon of LRRD is embedded within the context of the politicization of relief- and development aid, and thus relief- and development aid organizations (so-called 'double mandate' organizations), such as Cordaid. Furthermore, multiple types of evidence could be used, namely document-, observation- and interviewing sources. This research was thus best served through a case study. The case study approach can be either single or multiple, and here a single case study was chosen. There are very few organizations which are both double-mandated, focus on fragile states and are active in protracted crises. Cordaid and its programs in protracted crises thus offered such a distinctive perspective that a single case study was merited. Furthermore, the use of different evidence sources (amongst which interviews with external parties) enhanced the validity of the research since the research problem could be analyzed from multiple angles, strengthening the outcome.

3.2.1. Literature Review and Document Analysis

The theoretical framework has been formed through extensive desk research, looking at three types of literature, namely (1) academic literature, consisting out of books, articles, e-journals, etc. written by scholars individually. (2) Grey literature, which are reports and studies often undertaken by scholars per request of an organization or institute, such as Lautze & Hammock (1996) for UNICEF or Otto & Weingarter (2013) for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (3) Official reports and communications by (non) governmental bodies and organizations, such as communications by the European Commission or the Cordaid Annual report. By reviewing

these different types of sources, the thesis has aimed to sketch a complete picture of the development of both the 'aid politicization' and the 'LRRD' discourse.

Further evidence was collected through documents- and archival sources, which were only available within Cordaid's databases. These documents were for example policy briefs, program set-ups, budget overviews, etc., used for internal purposes. They were used to analyze Cordaid's policy, previous attempts and program set-ups relevant to the topic under investigation. These internal sources have been primarily used as an addition to the data set.

3.2.2. Participatory Observation

For a period of 6 months, the author has had access to Cordaid staff and documents, and was invited to staff meetings of different program units, but also country meetings. The author has attended relevant meetings, taken notes and used this information to gain thorough understanding of the organization, structure and culture of Cordaid. This was seen as a by-product of involvement within the organization, and a casual approach was thus used. A systematic structure was set-up, attending all bi-weekly South Sudan- and Central African Republic country meetings and weekly meetings of the Humanitarian Aid unit, but only relevant noteworthy observations were recorded. If for example a remark was made on the linking of humanitarian and health programs within South Sudan, the remark and the person who made it was noted down, and such notes have been used to get a general idea or 'feeling' of the organization and the way people look at the topic at hand.

3.2.3. Semi-Structured Interviews

The technique of qualitative interviewing is the most commonly used method when conducting a case study (Blumberg, 2005). It serves a dual purpose: first, getting the view or take of subjects on the matter under investigation, and second testing the information and ideas the researcher already holds. In this investigation, the interviews have been semi-structured to make sure the interviews remained focussed while still allowing for an open conversation. For these interviews, experts and practitioners have been interviewed regarding three topics: (1) developments in the aid sector, (2) LRRD policy within Cordaid, and (3) LRRD attempts within South Sudan and CAR. While the first group existed out of experts working in the aid sector and experts working in Cordaid, the second and third topic were only discussed with Cordaid experts and practitioners in and out of the field. This choice was made to provide the researcher with insight on the overall context within which the organizations has developed, as

well as the policy and strategy workings of the organization with regards to LRRD, and the translation of operational policy and programs into practice. The following subjects have been interviewed:

Cordaid Experts			
Name	**Position**	**Department**	*Country?*
Inge Leuverink	Expert Humanitarian Aid	Humanitarian Aid	-
Margriet Verhoeven	Program Manager	Humanitarian Aid	-
Jeroen Alberts	Corporate Strategist	IFSR[2]	*South Sudan*
Izabella Toth	Senior Corporate Strategist	IFSR	-
Paul van den Berg	Political Advisor	IFSR	-
Edith Boekraad	Senior Corporate Strategist	IFSR	
Margot Loof	Expert Resilience & DRR	Resilience	-
Paula Mommers	Program Manager	Health & RBF	-
Hetty Burgman	Director Security and Justice	Security & Justice	
Remco van der Veen	Director Programs	Management	-
Piet Spaarman	Director Country Offices	Management	-

CAR			
Name	**Position**	**Department**	**Country**
Bernadette Hermans	Program Manager	Humanitarian Aid	CAR HO
Beatrice Looijenga	Program Manager	Health	CAR HO
Julie Love	Program Manager	Health	CAR HO
Alinda Bosch	Program Manager	Education	CAR HO
Esperant Mulumba	Program Manager	Humanitarian Aid	CAR Field
Flora Kwizera	Program Manager	Security & Justice	CAR Field

South Sudan			
Name	**Position**	**Department**	**Country**
Fenneke Hulshoff	Program Manager	Health	South Sudan HO
Frederique v Drumpt	Program Manager	Security & Justice	South Sudan HO
Harma Rademaker	Program Manager	Resilience	South Sudan HO
Godefroid Nimbona	Program Manager	Humanitarian Aid	South Sudan HO
Lemessa Anbessa	Program Manager	Resilience	South Sudan Field

External Experts			
Name	**Position**	**Company**	**Country/Other**
Volkert Doop	Former Program Manager	IOM & Cordaid	N.A.
Lindsey Goossens	Manager Business Development	SNV	N.A.
Katrien Coppens	Delegate Director NL	MSF	N.A.

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[2]Institutional Fundraising and Strategic Relations

Rob Sijstermans	Security & Counter-Terrorism Coordinator	MFA (DSH)	Horn of Africa
Caro Krijger	Senior Policy Officer	MFA (DSH)	CAR
Christina Hiemstra	Hum. Policy Coordinator	MFA (DSH)	South Sudan

Table 1: Overview Participants, 2017

The following topic points guided the interviews:

All groups:

- Their perception on the latest developments in the aid sector
    - Overall
    - With regards to the politicization of aid
- Their perception of LRRD in general
    - Their reflections on the current LRRD policy within their organization
- Their reflections on the research question (personally)

Additionally to groups involved in South Sudan or CAR

- Regarding South Sudan:
    - Their reflections on the influence of aid politicization with regard to the programs and organizations in South Sudan
    - Their reflections on LRRD within the South Sudan aid projects on an abstract and practical level.
- Regarding Central African Republic
    - Their reflections on the influence of aid politicization with regard to the programs and organizations in the Central African Republic.
    - Their reflections on LRRD within the Central African Republic aid projects on an abstract and practical level.

The aim of the topic list was to allow for a constructive dialogue, while ensuring all relevant topics were being discussed. A more detailed interview topic list has been created for all experts individually, in line with their expertise (these can be found in the annex). The list above was created in chronological order of the interview, asking the research question last, as to not guide the earlier answers of the experts towards the question.

The interviews have partially taken place 'in the field' (within the organization, through face to face interviews) and partially through skype or telephone, since it was not possible to travel to South Sudan and/or CAR and interview the practitioners there, due to security reasons. A voice-recorder was used for all interviews, allowing the researcher to make additional, theoretical notes during the interview. The audio files, together with transcriptions and notes, have provided for a complete data set.

3.2.4. Subject Sampling

Due to the fact that the case under investigation revolves around a singular organization, Cordaid, and the researcher has had access to all staff and resources, the subjects have partially been sampled from the organization itself. This thus took the shape of a non-probability sample; the subjects were 'hand-picked' and provided a focused picture. This has been done based on the expertise of the staff members and their position within the organization. For research into the position of Cordaid on LRRD, staff members involved in the relevant policy making area and program units were interviewed. For research into South Sudan and CAR, all staff members responsible for their program unit within South Sudan and/or CAR have been interviewed, as well the as country staff within South Sudan and CAR. The subjects that were interviewed outside of the organization were also hand-picked: three from single mandate organizations and three from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide for the policy- and donor angle.

3.2.5. Data Analysis

The analysis of data was guided by the theoretical framework, looking at (dis)confirmation of theoretical notions stated in the theoretical framework, focusing on the influence of the 'politicization of aid' discourse on the concept of LRRD. Also, it has looked at the data and aimed to discover patterns of thought, analyzing all quotes and observations and see if specific themes or issues can be found throughout all interviews. Due to the relatively small amount of interview subjects, the use of a data analysis tool such as Atlas was not merited.

3.3. Ethical Standards

For case studies, ethical standards can be summarized within two main guidelines (Blumberg, 2005). First of all, the investigation needs to make sure the rights of the people involved with

the research are not infringed by the writer or the study itself. In particular, privacy can be an issue. The data in this investigation has been treated confidentially. In the case of publication, the subjects and the organization will be consulted with regards to the quotes used. Second, researchers need to be honest in their assessment and interpretation of the information obtained, asking the question if another researcher could come to similar conclusions. If this is the case, justifiable and logical methods were used. These ethical standards have been applied throughout the study.

3.4. Limitations

LRRD has been researched numerous times through numerous perspectives. The scope of this research was demarcated in several ways. First, the theory that provides the framework for this research focused on developments in the global aid landscape and only discussed the Dutch aid arena in combination with the findings of the researcher; it also focused on developments with regards to growing aid politicization, and did not look into other developments or methods that have contributed to the development of the aid sector in a different way. Second, it has primarily looked at LRRD within the context of this politicized aid sector, zooming in on LRRD within protracted crises and not investigating LRRD attempts after natural hazards. Third, it has looked at LRRD within one double mandate organization, Cordaid, and their program and policy in South Sudan and CAR. While this thesis has provided a history of the concept of LRRD and provided examples of previous 'attempts', it has only done so to provide a background for the main research.

This has naturally limited the writer in research scope and perspective. First of all, by focusing on the link between aid politicization and LRRD, it surpassed other influences and factors. Although this has enhanced the focus of the research, it can lead to an incomplete picture of the current situation. Second of all, looking at LRRD through the perspective of only one double-mandate NGO has possibly made for biased data and a narrow view. It is not only a relatively small organization, but also a double-mandate one, and LRRD has not been a relevant topic there for long. Although this made for a distinctive organization to research, it also made it harder to obtain more generally applicable and relevant data which could for example be the case when researching a large international organization, such as Oxfam. While an attempt has been made to broaden the view by interviewing external experts, this remained the biggest limitation of this research. Also, although South Sudan and CAR were selected as

representative cases, and were examined through Cordaid because of the double-mandate nature of Cordaid and the protracted crises aspects of South Sudan and CAR, this does not mean that the obstacles and lessons encountered there are the same for all organizations and all countries in protracted crisis. Further limitations were time, since the writer only had limited access to Cordaid data and staff, and the fact that for this research, it has not been possible to visit South Sudan or CAR itself, due to security reasons. Also, due to a number of crises currently going on in these countries (rebel fighting in CAR and a famine in South Sudan), it was difficult to obtain the necessary data from field staff.

3.5. Conclusion

The subject under investigation, the influence of the politicization of aid on the practice of LRRD in protracted crisis, has been investigated through a case study, and was qualitative and exploratory in nature. It has made use of a literature review, followed by three qualitative research methods: document analysis, participatory observation and semi-structured interviews. The subjects that have been interviewed were experts and practitioners both in and out of the field. The research was limited in research method and focus.

The following chapters will take the next step from the theory on aid politicization and LRRD to the practical setting of the context and concept. Following the same structure as the theoretical chapter, it will first 'set the scene' by looking at the Dutch aid arena and the development of Cordaid within this arena, zooming into the effects of aid politicization on the organization by combining participatory observation and interview results with theory. Second, it will look at the possibilities and attempts at LRRD within Cordaid and how this is affected by the politicization of aid.

4. CORDAID IN THE DUTCH AID ARENA

This chapter will first describe the history of the Dutch aid system[3] and the most recent developments, after which it will zoom into the development of Cordaid within this context. It will do so bearing the following question in mind: 'What are the practical effects of aid politicization in the Dutch aid arena?'.

4.1. The Dutch Aid System: Economic Interest and Moral Responsibility

The Netherlands know a long history of development efforts, in different shapes and sizes. When development aid was formalized in 1949 as a reaction to Truman's 'Point Four' program, the Dutch were already acquainted with the concept; in light of the colonization period (which for example also meant the construction of infrastructure) and a long history of missionary efforts (often turning out to be assistance in the shape of education or health services). Although this type of development had a different background and motive, its place within Dutch culture did lead to broad public support of development aid after the Second World War. It was viewed as both an economic- and a social-, moral reconstruction effort. These two components of development history (colonization as a means to enhance economic self- interests and missionary efforts to spread a religious and moral belief) have remained two pillars in the development of the Dutch aid system, also called the 'merchant' and the 'clergyman' (de Wal, 2009; Spitz et al, 2013).

In line with the global state of affairs in the first decades after the Second World War, development aid was seen as a means to combat 'underdevelopment', especially on the economic front. As described in the first chapter, the sovereignty and internal affairs of a country were undisputed during the cold war (Collinson & Elhawary, 2012) and there was thus little social or moral motivation behind development efforts, as Spitz et al. explain:

> Aid was important to promote Dutch corporate interests and Dutch scientific knowledge, to enhance Dutch international prestige, to maintain Dutch international influence and to create employment for

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[3] The Dutch aid system is designed in such a way that humanitarian aid is part of the ministry of development cooperation and is profiled as such, and is thus also included when speaking about development cooperation in this chapter.

former Dutch colonial experts (Staten-Generaal, 1950). In the mid-sixties the Dutch bilateral aid efforts were greatly augmented following a plea from the Dutch corporate world: doing good for others would (and should) boomerang back to the Netherlands in the shape of economic opportunities (2013, p.12)

It was also in this period that humanitarian efforts started to take place more regularly, next to the existing development aid (Spitz et al., 2013). In the late 1950s and 1960s, the first Dutch humanitarian and development organizations came into being, noticeably in line with the Dutch system of 'pillarization': The Social Democrats were 'represented' in (Oxfam) Novib, the Catholics in Cebemo (later Cordaid) and the Protestants in ICCO. These organizations were also the first receivers of the Dutch co-financing system, later joined by the humanistic organization Hivos. Co-financing (a system in which official aid funds were allocated to aid agencies via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) gave these organizations relative freedom within their allocated budgets, while remaining connected to the main political parties and Dutch governmental aid policy. In 1996, the Ministry of Development Cooperation was officially 'added' to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (de Wal, 2009; Spitz et al., 2013)

After the Cold War, Dutch aid policy followed the global attempt to increase coherence between the political and aid agenda. Instead of being driven by the merchant -the economic 'pillar' of aid which had remained dominant during the Cold War-, the clergyman took over: they committed to a moral responsibility to bring peace, prosperity and defend human rights (Spitz et al., 2013; IOB study, 2016). Aid was seen as a useful tool to bring about societal change and enhance good governance, as well as economic progress. This political coherence was adapted and increased after the events of 9/11, when the focus on fragile states and security led to the development of the 'Dutch approach', or 3D method, as well as an increase in the number of humanitarian actions. However, in spite of these policy commitments, the war on terror and a lack of clear results made for an increase in public- and political criticism on development cooperation and its effectiveness. As one of the interviewees highlights:

"There was a lot of scepticism in the public about the effectiveness of aid. […] The whole idea of intervening to improve the situation was being received with more skepticism, it (public skepticism)[4] has reinforced the crisis in the most desperate, remote areas, where what's being done comes close to altruism.." - VOLKERT DOOP, PROGRAM MANAGER IOM

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[4] Writers edit

It thus became clear that changes had to be made, and this was done after a report from 'The Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policies' in 2010, reflecting on the future of Dutch aid.

In the new policy, which was created after Dutch elections in 2010, three major changes were made. First of all, the number of countries that were given structural bilateral aid was cut back from 33 to 15. Second, four themes were chosen as focus areas, namely (1) security and the rule of law, (2) sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), (3), water and (4) food security. Thus, the education and health sectors become so-called 'posteriorities'. The third change was the intention to alter the co-financing system, still in place after 50 years, into a tender-based financing structure. Although announced at that time, this last change would not go into effect until 2015. The changes were made in an effort to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of Dutch aid, and were the result of careful country and sector selection. The selection criteria included the following: income and poverty levels, opportunities for- and interests of other ministries in the Netherlands, the financial size and possibilities to reduce ongoing programs and the quality of governance (IOB Study, 2016, p. 16). It thus became clear that "Dutch self-interest and economic-diplomacy returned as a centre-piece of its development policies: focus-countries and themes coincided with Dutch commercial interests and expertise. This shift was accompanied by cuts in the development budget from 0.8 to 0.7% of national income, exactly the UN target" (Spitz et al, 2013, p.13). The closer link between aid and politics was even stated in the Coalition Agreement (2010), which noted that "greater coherence will be sought between development cooperation and broader foreign policy" (p.10). This was strengthened further when in 2012, the department of 'Foreign Trade' was transferred from the ministry of Economy, Agriculture and Innovation to the ministry of Development Cooperation (which remains part of the ministry of Foreign Affairs) (de Wal, 2009; Spitz et al., 2013).

All in all, it is clear that politics and aid are intertwined in the Dutch aid sector as much as they are globally; the selection of countries and sectors, and the subsequent effects on funding streams, constrain the possibilities for NGOs to implement their programs how and where they want to. As the delegate director of MSF states:

> *As MSF, we have always said that financial independence is a prerequisite to be able to have this impartial, independent ability to go and react to areas where the needs are biggest; outside of government agendas. - KATRIEN COPPENS, DELEGATE DIRECTOR, MSF*

The biggest example of this are the 2010 policy changes, which affected government institutions, relief- and development agencies alike. Looking at the Ministry itself, it was not only an issue consequential of public- and political dissatisfaction, but also came into being in an effort to increase coordination and way of working in the ministry itself.

> *When I think back over a period of ten years, one of the things that pops up immediately is the effort to coordinate funding streams more and more. Another issue was that the ministry was very reactive; that was one of the trends that the ministry wanted to change.* ***So, they focused on becoming more proactive and having more policy-, and more knowledge on the funding streams and where they would like to go with that***[5]. *That is what set out the change of the subsidy streams, which has led to a refocus of what we are doing and of developing policies on the integrated approach.* ***This means a more holistic approach on development, and a political approach***. *The last trend that I have seen over the past ten years is that a lot of money is allocated as humanitarian aid, but in practice a lot of that is used for stabilization- or even development purposes. Which is logical, because from humanitarian aid you have to go into development of course, but a lot is allocated on humanitarian-, direct short term aid funding, while there is less funding for the question of how we will make that switch to long-term stabilization.* - *ROB SIJSTERMANS, SECURITY & COUNTER TERRORISM COORDINATOR, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS*

Looking at the quote above, the respondent not only points to a change in how funding streams are allocated, but also where they are allocated to. This naturally has had a different effect on the different types of NGOs. In line with the quote above, development agencies may be affected the most. On the hand because they were mostly reliant on the co-financing system, needing to implement long-term programs. On the other, due to the increase in protracted crisis and natural hazards, more money was allocated to humanitarian efforts, leaving development agencies the choice to also engage in humanitarian activities or focus and specialize on other sources of funding. When asking a respondent in the development sector about what she noticed the past ten years, she describes the following:

> *First of all, there is a greater move towards more money for post-conflict and fragile states; this is a noticeable trend. The second one is* ***an increasing political choice of trying to involve donor countries and private sector companies in international development programs*** *in a much more prominent way, sometimes also through investments.. I think an encouraging trend is that you see that donors increasingly want to have national experts instead of expats. Those would be three things. And a greater scrutiny for transparency about the way ODA is being spent, [..] even donors who would not even care, where you could just charge a fee and that's it, they now ask for a breakdown, they want to make sure*

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[5] In this chapters quotations, the emphasis of the quote is added by the author in bold.

they get the best value for money. - LINDSEY GOOSSENS, BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER, SNV

Although this quote shows a visible impact of the 2010 policy changes, it focusses much more on increased political coordination with regards to where and specifically how 'money is spend'. This increased coordination and influence is also felt by single-mandate relief agencies, but is seen in a less positive way:

> *I think it is somehow fair enough that the government makes a choice where they feel they can have the biggest impact. [..] but it seems to be a smaller ambition, in the marginal almost to create an independent humanitarian space, and I think that is an example of a multipolar world with all these different agendas, which leads to a less facilitative environment for NGOs. - KATRIEN COPPENS, DELEGATE DIRECTOR, MSF*

These different agendas are also felt by respondents from a double-mandate agency, who, in line with the respondent from the government, point to the increased funding of humanitarian efforts as one the main effects of the policy changes and the influence of public opinion in this matter:

> *There is an increased focus on humanitarian operations, because of the needs in the world. [There are] multiple ongoing crisis and forgotten crises; while Dutch media is mainly focussing on Syria and the region, South Sudan and CAR are also on the agenda. […]. In the reports you see that the major chunk of budgets is mainly spend on emergency. - JEROEN ALBERTS, INSTITUTIONAL FUNDRAISER, CORDAID*

> *The trend is towards humanitarian aid, this is less controversial and criticized; everyone would still be inclined to support the idea of relief. But they are less and less inclined to support process of change and development in far-away countries. - PIET SPAARMAN, MANAGER COUNTRY OFFICES, CORDAID*

Thus, the effects of the 2010 policy changes were felt differently by different parties. All in all, this not only shows how intertwined aid and politics are, but also how much effect this can have on the structure and identity of an aid organizations. As becomes clear, a shift in focus (towards humanitarian operations and fragile states), greater transparency and stricter coordination of funding streams (and in consequence a smaller independent humanitarian space) are three main issues identified as consequences of the changes made with regards to aid sector policy; a clear manifestation of aid politicization. Having given an overview of the Dutch aid sector and specifically the causes and effects of the policy changes made by the Dutch government in the period of 2010-2015, this chapter will now zoom in on the development of Cordaid within this context.

4.2. The Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid

As stated above, in the 1960s Dutch NGOs came into existence following the pillarization culture in the Netherlands. While for the Catholics –and their political party- this was Cebemo, the predecessors of what later would become Cordaid already existed at that time in the same catholic tradition. In 2000, Cordaid was established out of a merger with two catholic organizations, 'Memisa Medicus Mundi' (1925) and 'Mensen in Nood (1914) while at the same time they entered into close cooperation with Bilance (1995), an organization made up out of the aforementioned Cebemo (1961) and 'Vastenaktie Nederland' (van Heijst, 2014). This subsection will look at the development of Cordaid since its establishment in 2000.

When Cordaid came into existence in 2000, different sectors and cultures that already had a long history were merged, combining development aid (with a focus on healthcare) and humanitarian aid. The organization structured itself into different funds – filled with the co-financing scheme of the Dutch government and individual donations- in line with the organizations that it was made out of. Starting with two (Mensen in Nood and Memisa), three more were added in the next ten years. Cordaid Kinderstem, which used to be part of Cordaid Mensen in Nood [*people in need*] was 'given' an own fund in 2004, so it was able to better focus on (educating) children in slums. Cordaid Microcredit was established in 2006, and in 2007 'Bond zonder Naam [*union without a name*] joined Cordaid as well. In 2011, the cooperation with Bilance ended, leaving five different funds that parties could cooperate with and donate to. However, the structure of the organization did not follow the structure and number of funds. Next to the departments of education, humanitarian aid and healthcare, security and justice and resilience were added in later stages; following trends in the aid sector. The departments cooperated with each other when Cordaid was still structured in country- and regional units, and competed over tenders when they were made into business units after the end of the co-financing system (van Heijst, 2014). All in all, the organization never started with a clean slate –or structure-, its identity made up out of multiple organizations whose staff and culture remained the same. Instead of choosing one core specialization, the organization continuously fluctuates in terms of capacity and focus. This is elaborated on by one of the Cordaid respondents:

Organizations also tend to go where the money is. After the merger[6], we had a big development program, but also a big emergency program. Then the emergency program went down [in capacity] because we started to integrate. There are different models and departments for double mandate organizations, you can integrate, separate, etc. if you integrate, it becomes less operational. This is also what happens in Cordaid, we fluctuate. Now we again have a department of humanitarian aid, but we face difficulties as to where we can get our strength from. It's fluctuating in terms of how much donor money there is, but also in how you invest your capacity. Certainly now with consortia working[7] and big donor programs. [...] In that respect, I can easily see in-house here what is difficult and different in our way of working.
- INGE LEUVERINK, PREPARDNESS EXPERT, CORDAID

In 2010, following the policy changes of the Dutch government (15 partner countries, 4 sectors and the announcement of the end of the co-financing system) a lot of Dutch NGOs came to terms with the necessity to change the way their organization worked. They had to find a new identity, some even a new mandate. Where SNV, the Dutch Organization for Development aid, previously linked directly to the ministry of Foreign Affairs, separated itself from the Dutch Government and became specialized in three development sectors (WASH, Energy and Agriculture), Doctors without Borders (an international relief organizations which was not part of the co-financing system) enforced their effort to remain and function independently in an attempt to create their own humanitarian space.

Similar to these organizations, Cordaid also attempted a change that would decrease their dependency on the Dutch co-financing system and increase their ability to access new funds. As they stated in their annual report:

> During the period 2011 to 2015, Cordaid had managed significant funding made available by the Dutch government (MFS II). The end of this kind of structural co-funding through MFS II required Cordaid to make tough choices. In terms of programs and projects and personnel, the organization had grown to meet the needs of achieving the MDGs, with Cordaid often acting more as a grant-giver than a grant-seeker. With future funding less certain, Cordaid began transforming to a grant-seeker as early as 2013.The final phase of that right-sizing was carried out during the reporting year. This was crucial so that Cordaid could ensure the continuity of its programs and projects as an integrated, flexible organization that is open to the development of new skills and behaviors. (Cordaid Annual Report, 2015, p. 36)

This 'right-sizing' was carried out by restructuring Cordaid from geographical- to business units, who would respond to tenders themselves, even if it was in competition with the others in the same organization. The size of the business units fluctuated in correspondence with the

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[6] Memisa Medicus Mundi and Mensen in Nood
[7] For example with the Dutch Relief Alliance

amount of funding available for each sector. In doing so, Cordaid aimed to prepare itself for the inevitable 'blow' to that would come when the co-financing system would indeed end after the five years notice they had gotten in 2010. However, the annual report showed that after this transition period, Cordaid still struggled with "(1) being perceived as grant-giving institution with related culture rather than implementing partner; (2) non optimized links between programs; (3) still building strategic and practical alliances/partnerships to enhance programming power and fundraising capacity and (4) scattered and diffuse visibility of Cordaid Brand – both proposition and awareness – represented by multiple sub-labels" (Cordaid Annual Report, 2016, p. 33).

The problem of 'sub-labels and diffusity' was also greatly felt within the organization, and was pointed to as the main source of the other weaknesses mentioned, such as non-optimized links between programs and weak 'programming power'. As the program director admits:

We were really a development organization, but not anymore. We're shifting, in the middle somewhere. In the beginning, we [humanitarian unit] were over 30, there was a logistic team. Over time that vanished, now it's increasing again. Development funding took over, then it imploded, now it makes a shift again. We're on the move. For the outside world it's also difficult. - REMCO VAN VEEN, PROGRAM DIRECTOR, CORDAID

This was not only problematic with regards to organizational culture or programming possibilities, but also with regards to the 'survival' of the organization. As two respondents explain:

Now we have less funding. There used to be so much money, we were just managing. Now we have to effectively use it, become more cost efficient, now we have to cooperate to survive. Before it just didn't really happen, only occasionally. - BERNADETTE HERMANS, PROGRAM MANAGER HUMANITARIAN AID, CORDAID

Cordaid is learning to access funds, because in the past we received a big grant. Accessing funds was not a problem. Now we have to learn how we can fill this gap by accessing other funds. We have to learn to take a more proactive stance, influence donors and develop relations with donors on different levels. We are collecting more and more info about funding. So yes, it is difficult, but we are learning. - JEROEN ALBERTS, INSTITUTIONAL FUNDING EXPERT, CORDAID

With less money available, it was thus paramount that resources were used as efficiently and effectively as possible. However, the organization was used to shifting and changing continuously, 'going where the money goes', never specializing or allocating funds to the development of long-term programs and expertise. For example, the Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction programs, which were part of the humanitarian aid unit, were reassigned into

a new 'Resilience' unit because it had become clear that more and more donors were interested in resilience programs. However, this did not benefit the effectiveness or efficiency of the programs themselves.

What was a strength was that DRR and emergency aid was closely linked. But then it was separated. […] That's a missed chance. When we discuss resilient recovery it should be a joined approach by these teams, but in practice that is not happening anymore. -HARMA RADEMAKERS, DRR EXPERT, CORDAID

Thus, in 2016-2017, another 'right-sizing' effort was undertaken, merging departments together and changing business units into program units, promoting close cooperation in countries and between programs in an effort to regain 'programming power' and win funding opportunities. One of the methods employed in an effort to achieve this, was LRRD; a concept already labeled as a big 'opportunity' in the annual report and often used as a Cordaid slogan. The following chapter will look into Cordaids efforts to bring about LRRD, zooming in on two countries in protracted crisis: South Sudan and the Central African Republic.

4.3. Conclusion

From the start, the Dutch aid sector has been characterized by two pillars: economic self-interest and moral responsibility. These two components are embedded in the aid sector as much as they are in Dutch society and politics; the so-called 'merchant and clergyman' going hand in hand. The two pillars have developed themselves in greater or lesser emphasis according to the developments on the world stage; after the cold war moral responsibility had a greater focus than (enlightened) economic self-interest. However, when public- and political support for development (and relief) efforts started to fade, a change was made. Based on i.a. opportunities for and interests of other ministries in the Netherlands and the financial size and possibilities to reduce ongoing programs, the merchant was once again at the center. Politics and aid had become intertwined so strongly, that the policy changes had a big effect on the structure and identity of Dutch aid organizations, including Cordaid. Not only was the core funding system changed, the focus sectors and -countries were also reduced, making it more difficult to get funding for programs that were outside of the ministries scope.

For Cordaid, the changes not only cut off the organizations main funding stream, but also lead to the diversification of the organization in an attempt to work more tender-based. Cordaid had never had a single identity due to its diffuse history and components, and these changes

had a further dividing effect on the organization. Cordaid was 'right-sized' (or downsized) and divided into business-units competing for tenders in an effort to be prepared for the tender-based system introduced in 2015. However, these structural changes only led to a more internally separate organization which was unable to effectively make use of their funds and resources. Thus, Cordaid was reorganized again in 2016, aiming to -opposite of what they had done the year before- enhance closer cooperation. It had become clear this was the only way to efficiently and effectively manage their funds, and thus different methods were employed to strengthen this effort (one of them being LRRD).

All in all, the politicization of aid is so strongly present in the Dutch aid sector that governmental policy changes immediately have a great effect on Dutch NGOs: influencing the why, how, what and where of their programs. The theoretical consequences of aid politicization, restricted funding streams and -access, can also be identified in this practical setting. Especially the influence of restricted funding streams has greatly affected the inner workings of the NGO under investigation. These effects will be examined further in the following chapter, looking at the practical effects of aid politicization on the implementation of the LRRD method within Cordaid.

5. CORDAID AND LRRD

Having sketched the overall context of the development of the Dutch aid sector and the effects this has on the organization under investigation, this chapter will look at the practice of linking relief, rehabilitation and development within Cordaid. It will examine LRRD within a setting of protracted crisis, and discuss the possible effects the above described aid politicization has on the implementation of this method. It will do so through the answers given by the respondents, making the last step from theory to the practice. The main question guiding this chapter is: Do the effects of aid politicization have an adverse effect on attempts at linking relief and development in protracted crisis?

5.1 LRRD: A Concept under Discussion

As explained in the theoretical framework, Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development is a concept that has been discussed for over 25 years. The concept has developed and moved in and out of focus in both the global and Dutch aid arena, depending on the context and occurrence of different crises and the necessity to link the two sectors together. Moreover, exactly because it has existed for such a long time and there are little concrete implementations that exemplify the exact goal and value of the concept, it has become a blurred phenomenon that lacks the clarity it needs for successful coordination- and implementation efforts. Overall, this issue – also identified in theory as an obstacle for LRRD- consists out of three aspects: (1) what (what does it mean), (2) how (how can it be operationalized) and (3) why (what is its added value).

First of all, *what* does it mean? Over the years, LRRD has developed into a basket-concept; while for some it means 'protection', for others it means 'resilience' or 'developmental relief', and others don't know what it is in the first place, as these respondents explain:

> *Everyone is looking at transitioning the one to the other. So on the one hand, there is the obligation, on the other there is an institutionalized way of looking at bridging the perceived gap between humanitarian interventions and development interventions. In every country there is a new term (in South Sudan they were talking about early recovery, in Cordaid about LRRD, in Congo about stabilization). In one form or the other, it is transitioning to the longer term; each of these approaches has their own dogmas and their own theoretical framework. It is challenging in any of these contexts to match the reality with that theoretical*

framework, which are quite complex in different countries and different contexts. - VOLKERT DOOP, PROGRAM MANAGER IOM

[When asked to define LRRD] I don't know exactly, is it Resilience maybe? I know we need to get to a structural approach as soon as possible. - BEATRICE LOOIJENGA, PROGRAM MANAGER HEALTH, CORDAID

As long as its meaning remains unclear, its relevance and value are also difficult to establish. Secondly, even if there is a clear understanding with regards to the meaning of the concept, *how* to implement it is another issue. This is true for double- and single mandate organizations and governments alike, as the following quotes exemplifies:

I believe there is a policy on it, but I'm not very familiar with it. I have noticed the debate on it is continuously changing, the discussion on LRRD, or Early Recovery or the New Way of Working as the UN calls it. We try to put a label on something, also because it is very confronting for donors that there will always be conflict and there will always be people in need. This also means, and it is very uncomfortable to realize, that there will always be a need for money. Of course there have been developments making aid a bit more efficient, and organizations who work with this know they need a broader view on policy level, but on the ground implementing this is often very difficult, because it comes down to individuals and people who often have a different background and different long- or short term perspective. - CHRISTINA HIEMSTRA, HUMANITARIAN POLICY COORDINATOR, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

It has been around as a concept for a very long time. People understand it and believe in it, but they are not able to operationalize it. So, linking it together, yes, does everyone believe in it and understand why it is necessary, yes, I think that 60% understand it and would like to do it. Is it always feasible? No. because of, well, the political situation and reality on the ground, but also because how the funding streams were set up. - ROB SIJSTERMANS, SECURITY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM COORDINATOR, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Thirdly, even if the concept is clear and even if it could be operationalized, not all agree on *why* it should be done in the first place. While many of the respondents do recognize there is an added value in one way or the other, this is not the case for the following interviewee, who looks at the concept from a single-mandate perspective:

By merging these agendas, you run the risk of losing focus, and it is also a different business and trade. Being good at development doesn't mean you are good at emergency response. So it's not that they are all good things and that if you put them all together the world automatically becomes a better place, some things go at the cost of others. - KATRIEN COPPENS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MSF

All in all, the what, how and why of LRRD remains a topic of discussion, both between and within different organizations and institutions within the aid landscape. As has become clear in the chapter above, Cordaid fluctuates as an organization, following 'the money' as one respondent stated. Similar to the different directions of the organization, the concept of LRRD also moved in and out of focus over the years, following different aid trends and definitions (for example, the DRR and Resilience programs were not added until donors pointed to its possibilities). Thus, within Cordaid, the lack of clarity with regards to definition, operationalization and value of LRRD is also clearly evident.

First of all, *what* is LRRD? Similar to the external parties quoted above, this remains unclear to Cordaid as well:

What you see now, is that protection is the new baby. Everybody is talking about it. But what is it actually? You see that different things we were already doing, is brought in this new concept. Every time and again we invent things that are important, and we create a lot of concepts, like dustbins we try to put everything in it and then nobody knows what it is in the end. As an organization, you need to be clear on what it is and you need to make choices. Especially when you look at donor funding, when you have a new baby, they start to put stickers on it, like they did with resilience. - INGE LEUVERINK, PREPARDNESS EXPERT, CORDAID

This lack of clarity is not only felt by this Cordaid expert, but also by those who attempt to put LRRD within their programs since it has been brought forward by the directorate and the humanitarian aid unit. As the following quotes show, *how* it should be done remains a challenge as well:

Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development, closing the gap, tackling the grey zone… It's up in the air forever, I already talked about it 20 years ago. It's an issue in organizations like ours, the double mandate organization. The relief or development organization don't have that problem. But now, the donors are also interested in closing the gap, emergency aid has to be able to be transformed into rehabilitation, resilience, structural development. But that's not possible, because of for example the EU budget. You see, within EU, the financial architecture is protected by their own legal basis. Structural development budgets are organized in a totally different way than ECHO budgets. All these things cannot be matched one on one. - IZABELLA TOTH, SENIOR STRATEGIST, CORDAID

It is a way to answer funding gaps, and to try to make the work more sustainable. The mandate is really nice and all, but it doesn't change anything. ECHO has beautiful guidelines for LRRD, but when you ask for funding to do something like LRRD it just doesn't work. ECHO still says, no, we only do live saving, go to the EU. But the EU says, no we only do development, go to ECHO. That doesn't work. It doesn't work in the old system of just relief or development. - BERNADETTE HERMANS, HUMANITARIAN AID PROGRAM MANAGER, CORDAID

Even if there was a common understanding and the 'institutional straightjacket' could be taken off to operationalize it, there remains a lack of consensus with regards to *why* it should be done in the first place:

> *I'm doubtful about the whole concept. The whole sector is built in a certain way. To go beyond those boundaries of funding and way of working... it's really difficult to break through that. If it were that easy we would have found a solution, but it's a nice challenge to pick it up right now. Maybe we should simply say, what do we need to rebuild people's lives? How can we make their dependency on external aid as little as possible? That's a different approach than saying it should necessarily be linked to each other. That would maybe give it some more flexibility. And that is even more difficult in protracted situations, maybe it's not even possible to think about development in these situations. - HETTY BURGMAN, DIRECTOR SECURITY & JUSTICE, CORDAID*

Thus, although the concept was seen as 'a nice challenge to pick up' in a time where cooperation and coordination were essential for Cordaid, this by no means meant it was feasible to immediately implement it within- and between programs – due to a lack of common understanding within the organization and a remaining division between the two sectors outside of the organization.

Next to the managers in the Head Office, LRRD also became a topic of discussion in the field offices. The following statements were made by two program managers in the field, one from the Central African Republic and one from South Sudan.

> *If we talk to each other about things that would make programs LRRD compliant, we can invent crafty ways that are still in line with the donors, like what we are doing with the Dutch Relief Alliance right now. But this requires a deliberate effort. It is about having flexibility to change approaches, and see which donor can take on which part, and what you can put in a proposal. Donors are strict, but also happy to jump upon new opportunities. If we really try, I think we can come up with things that donors will approve. Donors also talk about LRRD, but they don't know what it means. If you have an NGO that shows what LRRD is, what it can do, how it can be practically implemented, it would really work. In the same donor meeting I mentioned, he said we require you to have an LRRD approach. And someone asked, what do you mean? And the donor says: I don't really know. It comes from Brussels. - ESPERANT MULUMBA, COORDINATOR HUMANITARIAN AID, CORDAID CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC*

> *LRRD is possible and necessary in protracted crisis like South Sudan when it is framed appropriately. The discourse on resilience is about it bringing together development and humanitarian actors, which makes LRRD one of the means of achieving the overall goal of resilience. Building resilience will mean breaking down the barriers between humanitarian and development approaches more fundamentally than ever before. - LEMESSA ANBESSA, PROGRAM MANAGER RESILIENCE, CORDAID SOUTH SUDAN*

Within the field, there also seems to be a lack of clarity with regards to what 'LRRD' is and consequently, how it should be implemented. Where the respondent from the Central African Republic looks at it from a strategic perspective, focusing on what donors want, the respondent from South Sudan looks at it from a programmatic perspective and the need in protracted crises.

All in all, as becomes clear when looking at all statements above, there is little consensus on what LRRD is, how it should be operationalized and why it should be done: where one sees LRRD as a means to achieve Resilience, another looks at it as an answer to funding gaps. Where respondents from the Head Office for example point to a strict division between these funding streams, those in the field see opportunities. Furthermore, the feasibility of the concept in itself is heavily doubted. The way the sector is structured institutionally and, consequently, financially is immediately named as an obstacle when asked what LRRD means. One of the follow-up questions the respondents were asked was how they would go about changing this. As is already stated above, 'give practical examples', 'show how it could be done' was one of the most common answers. Within Cordaid, next to the main resilience programs, LRRD has been attempted in a number of crises. Amongst others, aid given after the Haiti earthquake, the Philippine typhoon and Nepal earthquake, were given an 'LRRD' approach. As one of the interviewees explains:

> *We talk a lot about LRRD, sometimes it is in fashion and sometimes it is not. But we have to make it happen by showing success stories. One of the stories is the Philippines. From the start we have tried to include resilient recovery. Through the years we tried to improve this approach, in the Philippines this could be tested and the people there were very receptive. There was a gap between big money in the first two years up to the development phase when there was small money. It was difficult to bridge that, but we were able to switch from basic-services to capacity building and livelihoods. -HARMA RADEMAKERS, DRR EXPERT, CORDAID*

However, these examples were all cases of natural disasters; in cases of man-made crises, such a success story does not exist (yet). Due to the increase in permanent crises, the influx of funding to the humanitarian sector and Cordaid's organization-wide focus on fragile states, an LRRD attempt in such a situation is not only logical, but necessary. The next section will look at two LRRD attempts in protracted crises: in South Sudan and the Central African Republic.

5.2.   LRRD: A Concept in Practice

This section will first of all discuss the overall context of the two conflicts, examining the situation in South Sudan and the Central African Republic. It will then look closely at the attempts at LRRD undertaken by Cordaid, and the main possibilities and obstacles that are encountered.

5.2.1. South Sudan and the Central African Republic

South Sudan is a country characterized by decades of conflict and deep political-, economic- and cultural divisions. Ethnic conflicts, but also local conflict over land and water, in combination with a lack of effective governance, a weak rule of law and limited conflict-resolution opportunities, make for a nation that remains fragile. On July 9th 2011 it became the world's newest state, but turned to internal conflict again after a period of relative stability. In December 2013, after a clash between supporters of President Kiir and Vice-President Machar in Juba, it became evident how fragile the new founded state was. Although it initially was a conflict between political parties, the conflict spread quickly and showed remaining strive between provinces and tribes, but also, amongst others, dissatisfaction of parties and companies about the inability of the government to turn the natural resources of the country (oil) into economic prosperity. Such dissatisfaction was strengthened by a lack of clarity with regards to borderlines and which authority applied where, leading to territorial disputes and local conflicts. Thus, "competition over natural resources and economic and political power struggles are among the immediate causes of the conflict. They are further exacerbated by the weak institutional capacity to mitigate or resolve conflicts at the local and national level" (Hakim & de Vries, 2017, p. 10). All in all, looking at the definition (Macrae & Harmer, 2004, p.1) of protracted crisis, it 'complies' with all aspects, namely:

1. Protracted crises are those environments in which a significant proportion of the population is acutely vulnerable to death, disease and disruption of their livelihoods, over a prolonged period of time.
2. The governance of these environments is usually very weak, the state having a limited capacity or willingness to respond to or mitigate the threats to the population, or provide adequate levels of protection.

In 2016, 6 out of 10 provinces are involved in the conflict, and the end is nowhere to be found. 1 in 5 people are displaced, 2.3 million people have been forced to flee, out of which 770.000 to other countries. Also, a famine of historical proportion is currently striking the country. Furthermore, South Sudan can be categorized as a so-called 'donor darling'. It closes the top 10 of countries receiving most development aid on average in 2013-2015 receiving 1,517 ml in gross ODA (for reference, Syria received 1,721 ml). Zooming into funding trends in South Sudan, the country has seen a large increase in funding since it came into being in 2011. From 268.8ml in 2011 to 1,674.8 ml in 2015, the country proves to be a nation in growing need. Within the allocation of these funds to development and/or relief efforts and organizations, aid politicization becomes visible; it shifts in line with the political situation in the country; for example, when the war broke out, many donors shifted their fund allocation from the government to NGOs, to make sure they were not 'supporting' the war. The war also resulted in a shift from development- to relief aid, even though the focus on development had increased before the war started[8].

The Humanitarian Response Plan 2017 of UNOCHA furthermore states that needs will become more urgent and the situation will revolve around protection. This points more to a humanitarian than a development focus (a statement confirmed by UNOCHA) and a visible division of funding per sector. Visualizing humanitarian funding specifically, in comparison to the number of people in need[9], the graph shows that humanitarian funding[10] follows these needs (the current requirements for 2017 may also still increase looking at the current food crisis). Furthermore, it becomes clear that the distinct rise of needs in 2013 has continued with some fluctuations, and that it has not dropped significantly after the start of the crisis. It must be added that overall, funding requirements are met (ranging from 61% in 2013 to 92% in 2016)[11], which is exceptional in this field.

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[8] Based on comment L. de Vries, 20-06-2017
[9] Based on Humanitarian Response Plans, 2012-2017 (UNOCHA)
[10] https://fts.unocha.org/countries/211/summary/2017
[11] Because the numbers are so close together they are not displayed in the graph.

Figure 1: Overview People in Need in Comparison to Humanitarian Funding, Financial Tracking System, 2017

Having discussed the overall context in South Sudan, this section will now zoom into Cordaids presence in South Sudan.

Cordaid is one of the 136 humanitarian agencies active in South Sudan. They have, from 2011 to 2016, implemented 52 programs in the country, 25 of which are currently running. Out of these programs, 19 have been implemented with local partners, with a total of nine funding partners. Its projects are mostly developmental, namely healthcare, education and security and justice, with several resilience projects and a number of humanitarian aid projects. They are located in eight different areas of the country. Continuous conflict and an instable security situation make it difficult to work safely and efficiently.

	Projects	Regions	Funding Partners	Implementing Partners	Total Budgeted 2017 (euro)
South Sudan	25	8	9	21	7.966.984 *(incl. multiyear budgets)*

Table 2: Cordaid South Sudan Overview, Cordaid, 2016-2017

Focusing on the donors, there are two UN donors (UNHCR and UNDP), two EU donors (EC and ECHO), one Dutch donor (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)) and a Health Pooled Fund. Internally, Cordaid funds Security and Justice and the Humanitarian Aid department (partially through Mensen in Nood). Looking at the chart, it becomes clear that the

MFA (2.967.582), the European Union (2.654.377[12]) and Cordaid (1.607.472) are the largest donors.


Figure 2: Donor Overview, Cordaid, 2016-2017[13]

Having discussed the current crisis- and aid landscape in South Sudan, this chapter will now look at the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR). In contrast to South Sudan, the conflict in the CAR is less well known and smaller in scale. Due to the instable and continuous nature of the conflict and the high number of affected citizens, it can also be classified as a protracted conflict.

The country is one of the poorest and most underdevelopment countries in the world; it is landlocked between Sudan, South-Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo and Cameroon and ranks the second lowest on the Humanitarian Development Index, namely 187 out of 188 (HDI, 2015). After decades of instability and turmoil, caused by to the lack of public services by the governmental elite outside of the Bangui area, the most recent conflict started in 2012. Grievances that had been building up over the years let to an alliance of several rebel groups from the north east of the country – the Séléka alliance – who went on a violent march towards the capital. After their leader was elected the first Muslim president in 2013, the violence did not end. Moreover, a defense alliance was formed (the Anti-Balaka), attacking Muslim citizens supposedly in league with Séléka (Glawion & de Vries, 2015). Although two parties signed a cease-fire in 2014 and a peace agreement in 2015, the situation

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[12] This is the budget for all 3 years in total, yearly budget is unknown.
[13] The overview is based on data available in Cordaids database. The author is not responsible for possible errors.

remains unstable, suffering from outbursts of violence, and about 2.2- out of 4.6 million inhabitants are in need of emergency aid. Furthermore, according to the latest numbers, there are 384.900 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (OCHA, 2016).

Looking into the funding situation in CAR, it has been relatively stable from 2009 to 2013 (stagnating from 242- to 202 mil. in allocated funds) and spiked in 2014. Naturally, the situation has evolved from 2015 onwards, and looking at the continuous stagnation of needs (from 2.3 million people in need in 2016 to 2.2. million in 2017), the humanitarian aid has also diminished further. Visualizing the total humanitarian funding[14] (both part of official appeal/response plan and other funding) in comparison to the people in need[15], a sharper rise and fall of funding is visible in comparison to the relatively small difference in humanitarian needs. Also, a growing gap between required response plan funding and allocated funding is visible. In reviewing the graph, one must bear in mind there is also a difference in what is pledged and what is given. However, this is harder to visualize. Naturally, the funds for 2017 are still growing, but in for example 2016 only 38% of required funding was allocated; whether this gap is filled by development funding remains to be seen.


Figure 3: Overview People in Need in Comparison to Humanitarian Funding, Financial Tracking System, 2017

Cordaid is currently running 16 projects in CAR, with a total of 29 over a period of four years, carried out with nine funding partners and five implementing partners. In 2009 they started with a health program, and an education program was added in 2013. Recently, an emergency relief program was also implemented. Furthermore, Cordaid supports some local initiatives. The country office has been forced to close a number of times, due to security reasons.

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[14] https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/549/summary
[15] Based on Humanitarian Response Plans, 2012-2017 (UNOCHA)

However, they remain active and also continue to support several peace programs with local organizations.

	Projects	Regions	Funding Partners	Implementing Partners	Total Budgeted 2017 (euro)
CAR	16	17	9	5	18,398.262 *(incl. multiyear budgets)*

Table 3: Cordaid CAR Overview, Cordaid, 2016-2017

Looking at the donors, five out of nine individual donors can be found within the Health program (the sixth being the MFA), and four of these can be classified as 'international donors', namely the Worldbank, DFid, Fund Bekou (EU) and MISEREOR. The other donor is Cordaid Memisa. This is in line with the large number of projects of Cordaids Health Unit, and presence in the regions. Looking at other departments, these are mostly funded internally, by Cordaid Mensen in Nood (Humanitarian Aid) and Cordaid Kinderstem (Education). A donor that funds all departments is the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


DONORS

■ Cordaid ■ MFA ■ Worldbank ■ Fonds Bekou ■ Dfid ■ MISEREOR

850,000 — 459,749
1,205,185
2,350,187
3,314,644
9,769,497

Figure 2: Donor Overview, CAR, Cordaid, 2016-2017

Having given an overview of the situation of the two countries, the following section will look at the LRRD attempts undertaken by Cordaid within these countries. The original programs have not been designed to achieve LRRD, but because many end(ed) in the fiscal year 2016/2017, Cordaid saw an opportunity to redesign programs in an attempt to establish possible linkages between relief and development.

5.2.2. LRRD Attempts in South Sudan and CAR

Looking at the data above, Cordaid's presence in both countries is characterized by a multitude of donors, regions and programs, which are rarely aligned and -overlapping. In attempting LRRD, the respondents point to a number of key obstacles that can be linked to this scattered situation. The obstacles mentioned by the participants relate to both internal, institutional issues (cultural divides and programming) as well as external problems (inflexible funding streams and restricted access). Part of the internal issues was the lack of clarity with regards to the definition of the concept. However, because this is already highlighted in the sections above, this will only be discussed briefly in this subsection. Because the main obstacles were named with regards to LRRD attempts in both South Sudan and the Central African Republic, they will be discussed per obstacle rather than per country.

Obstacle 1: Institutional Divides

This first obstacle, institutional divides, can mainly be linked to the lack of a common identity as a consequence of the diverse history and culture of the organization. Because LRRD is, in essence, a method based on cooperation, it is not strange that this is one of the main obstacles mentioned, as a respondent reiterates:

> *For a long time we have been walking around in circles with this LRRD, and not much progress being made. That mainly had to do with our institutional problems and interests. -INGE LEUVERINK, PREPARDNESS EXPERT, CORDAID*

This obstacle is summarized in the table below, and each component will be discussed in this subsection.

Obstacle Institutional Divides

Different mindset and way of working between sectors	19
• *Lack of communication between units*	6
• *Limited understanding of programs of other units*	4
• *Different people/attitudes*	6
• *Lack of synergy within Country Offices*	3
Lack of Cooperation	18
• *Joint long-term assessments and proposals*	9
• *Target similar areas*	9

Table 3: Overview Obstacle Institutional Divides, Cordaid, 2017

First of all, one must take the protracted nature of the South Sudanese and Central African Republic crises into account. This means that LRRD has to be embedded in the programs: it cannot simply be used as a transitional concept as it is in the case of natural hazards. Second, as stated in the last chapter, LRRD is pursued for different reasons, but primarily out of financial necessity. This can make for a disparity in the will to attempt LRRD, an issue which can be hard to solve. This first obstacle is thus logical, but not easy to overcome.

The main issue that can be identified within this obstacle is the fundamental difference (in way of working and mind-set) between relief- and humanitarian aid, not only within the sector as a whole, but also within Cordaid as an organization. Most people, both in- and outside of the organization, look at Cordaid as more of a development- than a relief organization. Its different units are divided accordingly: within the development sector 'Health, Security and Justice and Education' can be found, the relief 'branch' consists out of two unit: Humanitarian aid and Resilience. The lack of contact between the different 'sectors' is greater than it is between the different units 'within' both sectors. This was not always seen as an obstacle in need of addressing: during the first re-organization, in preparation of the end of the co-funding system, it was even strengthened by the creation of separate business-units. However, in the context of attempting LRRD within protracted crisis, it has been identified as an issue, as the following quote states:

> *There is again a tension for linking relief and development. As far as I'm concerned we have always tried to look for opportunities to link the two, but it has proven very difficult. Because relief is very well defined but humanitarian assistance as a practice is not. There are limits to what it can do. For example financing and time. That limits the possibility to go beyond that, the way it is organized limits the possibility to extend. On the other side it is just different people. Culture is a different aspect. The culture of two areas of work are very different. Relief is very much hands on, quick and dirty. Whereas development is much more structural, long term thinking, policy oriented. Sometimes the way you start humanitarian aid hampers other ways of support to people that are more sustainable. Everybody knows that food aid is not good for local markets and production and initiatives of people. Nevertheless, when there is an emergency situation of hunger there is a push from the humanitarian side to just provide food. - EDITH BOEKRAAD, SENIOR STRATEGIST, CORDAID*

A consequence of this divide is the limited understanding of what people in other departments are doing. While often the superficial and practical knowledge is there, a deeper understanding of programs implemented by other departments seems to be lacking. Respondents mostly point to the first re-organization, separating the geographical departments into business units, as a

reason for this lack of knowledge, as well as the lack of communication, as two respondents clarify:

LRRD is not possible at the moment. It would have been if we had less departmental interests. I experienced so many situations that there have been programs of relief, and people try to go to another department and ask if they could do this or that, but those departments had their own areas in which they worked, their own resources. For me the whole structure of Cordaid is limiting, we had restructuring after restructuring and this didn't create the right set up to have progress like that. After each restructuring people had to rethink and reconnect. If you had geographical areas, this would facilitate the connection. In a country like South Sudan it would be so much more effective if you could make use of everything it had to offer. - EDITH BOEKRAAD, SENIOR STRATEGIST, CORDAID

We have changed the mandate of the units and the country offices a lot, which is problematic because you keep testing the waters. We don't have that luxury, clarity is lacking, while it would benefit from that. We could improve by looking at things within or even as one team. - FREDERIQUE VAN DRUMPT, PROGRAM MANAGER SECURITY AND JUSTICE, CORDAID

The second re-organization, going from business- to program units, has re-opened some doors, but has not been implemented long enough to drastically improve the situation.

Relating to this internal division and lack of communication, is the difficulty to pinpoint where and how to start cooperating, due to the lack of understanding of programs and issues between the different units. Moreover, exactly because it looks hard many assume it is time consuming and do not want to invest in it. This also relates to comments saying that the added value for all parties is not always clear, as is elaborated on in the above sections. To many, LRRD remains a vague and abstract concept, especially in the context of protracted crisis. In the situations of South Sudan and the Central African Republic, there seems to be no possibility to simply add a transitional aspect to the programs, as was done after the Nepal Earthquake. In these countries, preparedness aspects can for example be implemented within health or education programs, in order to prepare for immediate onset emergencies that can suddenly occur in these countries.

Another related issue regarding institutional divides is the lack of coordination between programs. Each department individually reacts to calls and situations, without being proactive or cooperative in their analysis or assessment. This can hamper the long term and sustainable effect of a program, and makes for a waste of opportunity to work together. Two related issues that are mentioned are a lack of long term vision and a lack of exit strategy. Looking at a lack of long-term vision, one respondent says the following:

When you start doing an intervention, you need to think about what comes next. Do we know what systems are in play? Most of the time we just start, and think about it later. There needs to be internal alignment and reflection on choices we make. -REMCO VAN DER VEEN, PROGRAM DIRECTOR, CORDAID

Naturally, knowing what systems are at play is also crucial in determining a starting- and exit point; if you do not know the current context, you cannot know how to adapt and integrate your program's interventions.

Having the same starting point would be great. We need to bring relief, but already think about what is needed as the next step, especially in these protracted situations. Stop having a humanitarian organization intervene for 12 months, then retire until the next situation, and come again. Instead, you have to see it from the start and work on a long-term solution. You need to have a multilateral approach. - EDITH BOEKRAAD, SENIOR STRATEGIST, CORDAID

Overall, both the development of joint assessments and proposals require time and understanding of the added value. However, many note that 'learning by doing' might be the only way forward. This is particularly crucial when bearing in mind that most interviewees have been working at Cordaid for 5 years or longer (17 out of 22), and they are firmly settled in their own way of working, as these quotes state:

I think one of the problems is that you need to sensitize Cordaid staff that have been working in one direction for many years, showing that they could broaden their approach. So guidelines need to be developed and people need to be trained. There is also a lack of knowledge in Cordaid itself. If you have worked with only PBF[16], you tend to forget underlying causes and ways to treat them. - JULIE LOVE, PROGRAM MANAGER HEALTH, CORDAID

[On a possible LRRD guideline] We need to work on what we have right now. I think we are on track. We are always hoping that a change comes. But if you ask who wants to change, nobody raises their own hand. -REMCO VAN DER VEEN, PROGRAM DIRECTOR, CORDAID

Although (too much) continuity of staff can be seen as an issue at the Head Office, the Country Offices cope with discontinuity, making it all the more difficult to establish structure and cooperation between field offices. Amongst others, the following statement was made with regards to LRRD attempts in CAR:

When I was there, I was surprised to see that the country director does not facilitate linkages as well, there are no talks between the departments. They should communicate there [CAR] more. This is not happening enough because the office of country director switches too much. It's a big team there, over 130 people. We need to help them to give more structure from the head office. They could have a newsletter with all the programs, and team meetings. But before you do that there needs to be stability and we need to give more

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[16] Problem Based Financing

All in all, this first obstacle can mainly be seen as an internal issue that effects not only LRRD attempts but the entire functioning of the organization. It has been brought about by both internal issues (the diverse organizational history and lack of coordination) and external factors (the re-organizations as a consequence of the governmental policy changes). The second obstacle is linked to these external factors, namely funding streams and access, and will be discussed below.

Obstacle 2: External Influences

The second obstacle that was found in the attempts to implement LRRD in South Sudan and CAR, was the large influence of external factors on the where, what and how of the programs Cordaid wants to implement. The two issues that were named most often were the (1) inflexible funding streams, limiting in time and scope and (2) restricted access provided by the beneficiary governments. These issues will be discussed one by one in this subsection.

Obstacles (External Barriers)	
Restricted Funding Streams	20
• *Lack of flexibility*	13
• *Donor created divides*	7
Lack of access	6

Table 4: Overview Obstacle External Influences, Cordaid, 2017

First of all, the issue of inflexible funding streams. Out of all the funding partners (9 in total, they completely overlap) five are government based, namely The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, the European Union (via ECHO and Fund Bekou), DFid (United Kingdom), MISEREOR (Germany), and the United Nations (via the Health Pooled Fund, UNHCR and UNDP). The World Bank also gives to both South Sudan and CAR, and the other three donors are found within Cordaid itself: Cordaid Memisa, Cordaid Mensen in Nood and Cordaid Kinderstem. Although the Cordaid based funds and Fund Bekou allow for some flexibility, the other donors provide little wiggle-room when it comes to the duration and scope of the programs they fund, as two of the respondents confirm:

Contracts and projects become shorter and shorter. It's difficult if you have a philosophy that you should do something for 15 years and there's no funding. So we do things ourselves, do it quickly, but that's not sustainable. - PIET SPAARMAN, DIRECTOR COUNTRY OFFICES, CORDAID

The speed of response is a big issue; major donors really have problems in changing their operations. When a crisis hits they stop their development and there is no alternative. It goes to another department responsible for emergency. These institutional barriers created by donors get in the way of the necessary flexibility. - JEROEN ALBERTS, INSTITUTIONAL FUNDRAISER, CORDAID

This is not only the case for the programs themselves, but is especially evident when it comes to possibilities in linking the programs or allowing for multiple types of aid to be present within one program. Out of the 22 Cordaid interviewees, 20 point to this issue as a main obstacle of implementing LRRD; amongst others, the following statement was made:

In the finance modalities, there should be freedom to have an allocation to making linkages with other sectors. Now the donors are too much segmented, and want to keep only to their mandate. You could negotiate as sector to allocate to linkages, to phasing out. This phasing out happens at the end of your program, and if you don't have the means for that, the result you have reached might be lost. At the end you have to start again. It's not strategic. -GODEFROID NIMBONA, PROGRAM MANAGER, HUMANITARIAN AID, CORDAID

Especially in the case of the protracted crisis under investigation, respondents point to the lack of possibilities to create synergy. The following quotes show two perspectives: one with regards to the situation in South Sudan, and one discussing CAR.

In CAR specifically, this LRRD trend could be coming with funding. The funding is more and more geared towards recovery and development activities and emergency funding is being reduced. I think it is twofold. The donors and government have the desire the move out of the crisis towards stability and the funds are channelled to fulfil this desire. However, the conditions on the ground remain in a crisis state. Because of the government's lack of control of the territory, there is a continued control of armed groups. There are still gaps with regards to health services or access to education and WASH. There are parts that have no schools, many areas that are inaccessible. It is true that efforts are being made to balance this relationship between emergency management and development initiatives. Maybe this is the way to go, but I don't know. Maybe it's going to jump start the process. - ESPERANT MULUMBA, HUMANITARIAN AID COORDINATOR, CORDAID CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Donors now look primarily at humanitarian assistance within a fixed period. Longer time funding is very hard to find, but in these difficult areas you really need that. It is difficult to convince donors that you could work on a long term program. Sometimes you can get an extension, but nothing for multiple years. Especially in South Sudan, conditions are so unpredictable donors are hesitant to commit to more. - IZABELLA TOTH, SENIOR STRATEGIST, CORDAID

Where in South Sudan donors are becoming more and more reluctant to invest in long term programs, emergency funding is being reduced in the Central African Republic. However, this is not so much due to the situation on the ground, as well as the situation desired by donors and the government. This phenomenon was also spotted by another Cordaid respondent, who not only sees obstacles but also possibilities within the current situation:

> *There is also a lack of commitment to the LRRD idea. There is a lot of talking about it but too little takes place. […] We can't effort that any longer, especially in protracted crisis. We should get out of the emergency mode. Protracted crisis is also a breeding ground for LRRD. Donors see protracted crisis are here to stay and that only money for humanitarian assistance won't tackle the root causes. This could drive the agenda: protracted crisis are so dominant that it becomes visible this needs to be done. This realization can potentially be helpful to get donors on board. -PAUL VAN DEN BERG, STRATEGY AND FUNDING OFFICER, CORDAID*

The amount of money being allocated to one sector or the other is thus not always linked to the development of the situation on the ground. (Government) Donors can attempt to force the NGOs in one direction or the other, not only through funding streams, but also by influencing where they can carry out their programs. This is the other issue within this obstacle: access.

> *The reduction of security and access is a big issue. It is more difficult to get access, because it is used as a political tool. Aid has become politicized; we are being used by governments and donors. You are so dependent on getting access there is no going around it. In most countries there are still governments in place, you remain dependent on that. You remain dependent upon donor agendas and where their money is coming from. I think that because there is an invested interest of donors to give money to a country, they will be interested in carrying on, and if you accept money from the MFA you become part of that political foreign policy. - MARGRIET VERHOEVEN, PROGRAM MANAGER HUMANITARIAN AID, CORDAID*

This issue becomes immediately visible when you look at the location of aid programs and organizations in the Central African Republic and South Sudan. They are not located where the needs are highest, but in close vicinity of big cities (as becomes clear in a comparison of Cordaid locations and the 2016-2017 UNOCHA Humanitarian Needs reports). This is mainly due to the access to certain areas granted by the governments within both CAR and South Sudan. As the two following quotes describe, this is not something that is easy to influence.

> *It's the same now in South Sudan, [..] I see we are much more in government areas and less in belligerent areas. You have to balance that, which is not always easy. -INGE LEUVERINK, PREPARDNESS EXPERT, CORDAID*

> *For example in CAR, there was a call for food security. After discussion with governments and trust funds, it changed from food security overall to food security for agriculture, and only in the Bangui area. That's really a political decision. You should do a needs assessment, not just focus on improving the Bangui economic*

These examples show how difficult it can be to implement a program where one deems fit, guided by where it is needed the most.

Overall, these external factors prove to be greatly influential and determining when aiming to implement LRRD, because it constraints the organization in deciding how and where it could be done.

5.3. Conclusion

Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development has been a topic of discussion for a long time, and has different value and relevance for different parties. Within Cordaid, the meaning and value of the concept is not the same for everyone; while some see it as a necessary means to closing the funding gap, others look at it as a means to achieve sustainable aid. When asked what they would define as LRRD, respondents gave various answers, but almost all already mention donor wishes and structures within their definitions. In Cordaid, attempting LRRD is thus done from a perspective of both necessity and ideology. Cordaid has already had some successes in the area of LRRD, but only in cases of natural hazards, in protracted crisis it has yet to succeed. They now attempt to do so in South Sudan and the Central African Republic. These countries are disrupted by ethnic conflicts and weak governments, and make for unstable environments to work in. Most of Cordaid's programs take place in different regions (with three or four overlapping), and are mostly funded by government donors. While many of the programs end or are renewed (with new tender allocations), Cordaid aims to reinvent programs in order to enhance LRRD. When looking at the possibilities and attempts to do so, two main obstacles have been identified.

First of all, institutional divides. This obstacle is comprised of a number of issues. First of all the fundamental differences between relief and development. This cultural- and structural gap is experienced by the different units within Cordaid and the lack of communication between the different 'sectors'. Second, a lack of coordinated programming, leading to the absence of joint evaluations and assessments. These issues are causes by two factors: internal

issues (diffuse culture and many re-organizations) and external factors (the policy changes of the Dutch government leading to said re-organizations, creating a deeper rift in the organization).

The second obstacle can be summarized as external influences. These consist of two issues: inflexible funding streams and restricted access. Because Cordaid is heavily dependent on the funding of governments and governmental institutions, they are also influenced by their structure and agenda. This becomes clear when looking at the institutional divisions of relief aid and development aid, leaving no funding for transitional or overlapping programs, and the amount of funding spend on one sector or the other. Where in South Sudan, the situation has become so unstable humanitarian aid has gotten the main focus again, in the Central African Republic recovery and development aid is being allocated the most. The other issue, access, is being seen as a political tool, used to guide the place and scope of the programs. These issues leave little room for programs to go beyond the allocated frameworks.

All in all, LRRD attempts in these protracted crises are hampered by both internal- and external factors. The deep divisions within the organization (in the sense of communication and cooperation) are due to its diffuse history and culture and make it difficult to actually set up LRRD based programs. However, the main, related, issues working against LRRD are the set-in-stone structure of the aid landscape itself, keeping relief and development funding strictly separated, and the politicized interests guiding Cordaid's programs through funding and access. This is enhanced by the inherently political situation of protracted crises, where the interests of numerous parties complicate the situation as a whole.

The chapter below will combine the theoretical and practical findings of this research, in order to answer the research questions.

6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter will answer the research question 'How do the changes in the global and Dutch aid system affect the practice of linking relief and development within protracted crisis?', by looking at the effects of the politicization of aid and whether this has an adverse effect on attempts at linking relief and development within protracted crisis.

First of all, the politicization of aid has manifested itself primarily in its influence on the where and how of aid, and sometimes even on the why. While for development aid this has long been the case, being primarily used by colonial powers such as the Netherlands, humanitarian aid did not gain this dimension until later. Shocked by what had happened in Somalia and Rwanda, both donors and aid agencies believed that aid could not substitute for political interference and a more coherent policy with political institutions and governments could help in their goal to alleviate suffering. The general thought was, and still is, that this suffering by crisis or disaster is often brought on by causes embedded in society, and if these root causes were addressed through increased coordination, this could only be beneficial. How these root causes were addressed thus became, or for development aid remained, under the influence of political interest: depending on where political governments and institutions felt their aid was best spent. This influence has grown over the years, fueled by the war on terror after 9/11. This has had two consequences for the aid sector: (1) the allocation of funding streams were guided by political interest, and (2) access was used as a political tool to the benefit of the beneficiary government.

For the Dutch, this greater coherence between politics and aid was characterized by either economic self-interest or moral responsibility – an emphasis guiding where but also what country and sector would receive funds. Although globally influential, this (coherence) phenomenon was even more prominently present in the Netherlands, who's NGOs – mainly development and double-mandate, but also humanitarian- had become dependent on funds and facilitation of programs by the Dutch government. This became especially evident when in 2010, due to political- and public discontent of the (lack of) a clear effect of aid – in retrospect possibly due to the increased complexity and longevity of conflicts – policy changes were made that affected the whole sector. Next to a stop of the facilitation of 'independent' humanitarian space (by for example local embassies) due to a decrease in partner countries and sectors, the

biggest change was made with regards to the funding of aid. The co-financing system which had been in place for over 50 years was announced to end in 2015 and made way for a tender-based financing system. Also, greater coherence was sought between 'aid policy' and 'broader foreign policy'. In combination with a further increase of protracted crisis, this had three consequences for the sector as a whole: (1) increased focus on the humanitarian sector, (2) stricter and more coordinated funding, next to greater transparency with regards to how the funding was spend by NGOs, and (3) a decrease of independent humanitarian space.

Within this sector, Cordaid had developed itself into one of the biggest double-mandate agencies in the Netherlands, being able to do both relief- and development aid and bringing a long, although not unified, history to the table. After the merger of Memisa and Mensen in Nood into Cordaid in 2000, the structure of the organization fluctuated in accordance with donor funding and capacity, and would do so again after the policy changes in 2010. A re-organization made for a further diffusion within the agency, separated into business-units that had to learn to compete for tenders. However, the business-units also competed against each other, which did not enhance the organization's efficiency or effectiveness. When the funding indeed stopped in 2015, the organization had to re-organize once more to survive. After being apart for so long, fluctuating and never really creating a common identity, the focus was now on cooperation and coordination – and linking relief and development together. The concept of LRRD was thus brought to the fore by the directorate, and although not unfamiliar with the concept, its meaning and value was not clear to all. Some saw it as a necessary means to an end: bridging the funding gap and increasing cooperation. For others, it was a matter of ideology, LRRD could make aid more sustainable and effective. Furthermore, a Resilience unit and Disaster Risk Reduction programs were already part of the organization, and some saw LRRD as a method incorporating these aspects. LRRD had been successfully achieved in a number of natural hazards, where they could transition between relief- and development programs linearly. Thus, the concept was attempted in two protracted crises: South Sudan and the Central African Republic.

Although both countries were haunted by ethnic conflicts and instability, Cordaid had been present there for many years, running multiple programs in different regions of the country while being largely supported by government donors on both state and supra-state level. Since many of their programs were ending and/or renewing, Cordaid attempted to implement LRRD in these states. In doing so, two main obstacles were encountered. First of

all, the *large institutional divides* present within the organization. Although Cordaid had always lacked a common identity, the re-organizations that followed the policy changes had created a deeper rift and added competitiveness to the organization's culture. This had led to a lack of communication and cooperation because everyone was 'on their little island', making joint programming a difficult task. Furthermore, the lack of clarity with regards to the concept made it hard to strive for a common goal and, most importantly, make clear that the concept would indeed have an added value. The second obstacle respondents pointed to were *external issues*. First and foremost, the lack of flexibility with regards to the funding streams was stated to be the main obstacle for LRRD. Even if joint programs would be written, no donor would fund it because the divide between the relief- and development sector was still too strong, and each donor followed their own interest. The second issue was the restricted access by primarily beneficiary governments, following their own interests rather than the highest needs of the affected population. It seems to be the case that attempting LRRD within a protracted situation, where apart from the direct needs of the population other political interests and factors are at play, is incredibly difficult if not impossible.

In conclusion, two factors are crucial when attempting LRRD: (1) the internal motivation and cooperation structures within an organization and (2) the space and flexibility given by external parties. The why, how and where of aid programs are influenced by political interests as well as sectoral divides. In disasters and conflicts where the situation is not as straightforward as these divides are – either relief or development- attempting LRRD seems to be an impossible task. Although the goal and way of working of both relief- and development agencies have developed over the years, already incorporating many of each-others aspects through for example Building Back Better or Disaster Risk Reduction, the institutional structures of donors, and then primarily the funding structures, have not evolved with them. They are set in legal basis (like in the European Union) or are dependent on public approval and political interest, as proved to be the case with the Dutch government. While almost all NGOs are dependent on government funding, those deciding factors extend to them and how they can do their work. In such a political climate, going beyond the boundaries set by governments and institutions in an attempt to link two different sectors together within an unstable environment, is not possible. However, it is not only the effects of the politicization of aid that have an adverse effect on LRRD. This is also highly depends on the internal organization of organizations attempting to employ the method. If there is no clarity on what it

means and what it should achieve, and there is not enough communication to bring about joint proposals, there will be no program for donors to guide in the first place.

6.1. Recommendations

This thesis has shed a new light on the decades old LRRD discourse, looking at the development of the concept within a politicized aid landscape. In its research, it has limited its scope in a many ways, by looking at one double mandate organization within the Dutch aid sector. In doing so, it was able to partially step away from the theoretical discussion into a practical situation. However, having focused on LRRD within one organization (mostly on a policy level), LRRD between organizations and LRRD in the field are topics that were touched upon to create a more complete picture, but were not researched extensively. Further research in these areas could be greatly beneficial to the issue at hand, staying on a policy level but looking at workings between organizations and/or looking at the practical workings of LRRD in the field.

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ANNEX

1. Current Approaches to LRRD

This section will look at the current approaches towards LRRD, to give an overview of the current 'LRRD in practice' landscape and provide for a background that will later be applied to the case under review. It will highlight four strategies, namely resilience, early recovery and disaster risk reduction (DRR) and sustainable livelihoods. Where the first two are mostly rooted in humanitarian aid, the second two are mostly applied in development aid. As Otto & Weingarter summarize:

> While concepts were first aimed at filling 'the gap' between relief, rehabilitation and development, there was later a greater awareness of the complexity of the challenges. Potential negative effects of humanitarian aid on development processes were recognized and the focus of the debate partly shifted to increased demands on what humanitarian aid should achieve. Beyond life-saving, humanitarian aid should be supportive of recovery and long-term development. In order to achieve this development the way of delivering humanitarian aid needs to be adapted. (2013: 14)

However, this is not the case for all. While there are multiple strategies, only the four most used and most relevant will be discussed here.

Resilience. This is a strategy focusing on the R of Rehabilitation within LRRD, through a lens of vulnerability reduction on the one side and enhancing resilience against disaster and shock on the other. Its main goal is to enhance the ability of a country or a region to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks. The concept is found in both literature (i.a. Levine & Mosel, 2014; Otto & Weingarter, 2013; Banzet et al, 2007; Macrae & Harmer, 2004; Buchanan-Smith & Maxwell, 1994) and official reports, such as the "Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 2013-2020" from the European Commission, who state that "The Communication recognizes that strengthening resilience lies at the interface of humanitarian and development assistance. It also establishes that in countries that face recurrent crises, increasing resilience will be a central aim of EU external assistance" (2013 : 4). What makes the resilience strategy unique is the overall recognition that for this to work, a long-term, flexible, multi-sectoral and even multi-partner approach (EC Communication, 2013) is needed, taking into account the diversity of vulnerabilities of different regions but also different people; what is needed in an area with pastoralists and small villages is different from what is needed in an urban area. Furthermore, the approach takes as a starting point the idea that crisis, especially in situations of permanent emergency, is embedded within society, rooted

in economic, political, cultural and societal notions that need to be taken into account for resilience to take hold (Otto & Weingarter, 2013; EC Communication, 2013). It must be added that resilience is also often used outside of the 'LRRD' agenda. Resilience has become a popular component of aid and is sometimes viewed as replacing the need for 'LRRD' altogether, or even seen as the overall goal of LRRD in itself.

Early Recovery. This concept was born during the so-called 'humanitarian reform process' in 2005, where the 'The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER)' was formed, led by the UNDP. The main idea behind early recovery is the structural incorporation of development into humanitarian aid interventions. This means the rebuilding (or building back better, a concept that emerged after the Tsunami in 2004) of buildings and structures, but also to assist in setting up functions such as a basic healthcare system and governance (Otto & Weingarter, 2013). However, early recovery is also seen as bringing a certain amount of stability back after a shock or crisis. The place of 'early recovery' within LRRD lies primarily in relief and rehabilitation, and can be seen as a transitional approach. In other words, "understanding of early recovery taps into the idea of 'transitions': how to improve international responses and the aid architecture to effectively and flexibly respond to shifting priorities in conflict and transitional settings" (Bailey et al., 2009: 7). This strategy, although widely used, is less popular due to precisely this transitional nature, which makes it less appropriate in settings where there is no linear or transitional emergency situation, such as in protracted crisis.

Disaster Risk Reduction. In contrast with the strategies explained above, DRR has its basis in the development side of LRRD, in an effort to make their development interventions and activities less vulnerable to risk. It is the most technical strategy, focusing on for example building stronger houses and shelters and more sustainable agriculture practices, and less on the cultural, political or economical side to (recurrent) conflict or disaster. It is most commonly used in natural hazards and less in man-made disaster or conflict. Even though, it is a widely acknowledged and often used approach, and even has its own body, the 'United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction'. Due to the rehabilitative nature of DRR within development, it proves to be a relevant strategy of LRRD. (Levine & Mosel, 2014; Otto & Weingarter, 2013; Cristoplos, 2006; Macrae & Harmer, 2004)

Sustainable Livelihoods. This very technical approach is one of the oldest and most flexible. What is sustainable can often be determined by the giving and receiving party on their own. It is based on the idea that aid is complementary to what people themselves do to survive, and specifically what is already available to them. It is rooted within development rather than aid, and aims to complement the choices that affected communities and households make (Cristoplos, 2006). It thus also steps away from the idea that affected populations are completely helpless and dependent on aid, but bases help upon their wishes and needs (Bradford et al., 2009). Strategies to implement this approach can be cash-based aid, providing affected populations with money instead of goods, or strengthening the remaining economy by using local goods and foods instead of flying them in.

2. Extensive List of Interview Questions

a. Questions Cordaid Head Office

Personalia

- Can you please state your name and age?
- What is your position at Cordaid
- How long have you worked here at Cordaid?
    - Did you always have this position?
- Can you tell me what your job generally entails?

Theory

- Perception of Relief and Development
    - Can you tell me what you define as relief and what you define as development?
    - Can you reflect on certain trends within the aid 'sector'
    - Where does LRRD fit within these trends?
- Perception of LRRD in general (organization)
    - Can you define LRRD for me? What does it mean to you?

- o Do you think LRRD is always possible and necessary?
- o What about protracted crisis like South Sudan?
- o In general terms, how do you think it should be done?

Cordaid

- Can you name a strength and a weakness of Cordaid?
- What do you feel is the position of Cordaid on the relief and development scale?

South Sudan/CAR

- Can you tell me something about the Cordaid South Sudan/CAR program in general?
  - o How do you feel it is managed from a Headquarters perspective?
  - o Do you feel there is enough communication between departments?
- Can you tell me something about the … program in South Sudan/CAR?
  - o How long, on what scale, etc.?
  - o Why is it implemented in the current areas?
  - o How is the program financed?
    - ▪ Is there any room for flexibility?
  - o Are there any programs being done in cooperation with other Cordaid units?
    - ▪ Why yes/no?

LRRD

- Their reflections on the current LRRD policy within Cordaid (organization)
  - o Do you know of any current LRRD attempts/policy within Cordaid?
  - o Do you think this is something that should be done?
  - o Do you think it is possible to achieve?
    - ▪ Why and how?
  - o Can you identify any primary obstacles?
    - ▪ Donors
    - ▪ Programs
- Their reflections on LRRD policy within South Sudan/CAR
  - o Do you think LRRD would be possible within South Sudan/CAR?
  - o Do you think it is necessary?
  - o What do you think are the primary obstacles?
  - o Do you have any suggestions?

Research Question

- Reflections on the research question (personally)

b. Questions Cordaid Country Offices

1. **Personalia**.

- Can you please state your name and age?
- Can you please state your position in the Country Office
- Do you consider your job as part of emergency aid, rehabilitation or development? Or a combination of both?
- How long have you worked in this position?
    - Did you always have this position?
- Can you tell me what your job generally entails?

2. **Relief and Development**

1. Your perception of Relief and Development
    1. Can you tell me what you define as relief and what you define as development?
    2. Can you name any overall trends within the aid sector over the past 10 years?
    3. How do you think LRRD fits into the aid sector? Do you think that the linking of emergency aid and development aid has changed over the past 10 years?
2. Your perception of LRRD in general
    1. Can you define LRRD for me? What does it mean to you?
    2. Do you think LRRD is always possible and necessary?
        - If yes, why?
        - If no, why /or when not?
3. Is LRRD possible and necessary in protracted crisis like South Sudan or the Central African Republic?
        - if yes, why
        - If no, why not ?
4. In general terms, how do you think emergency response should be linked to development?
5. What do you consider in general as the main challenges in linking relief to development? (max 3)

3. **Country Office**

1. Can you tell me something about the Cordaid program in your country general?
   a. Can you name strengths and weaknesses (max. 3 each) of your country program, such as the cooperation between the head office and country office, speed and efficiency of decision making, level of flexibility with funding and donors, etc.
   b. Do you feel there is enough communication between programme (managers)? Do you for example exchange program content, are you in regular contact with other program managers (within the country office and/or at the head office) and do you develop strategy plans together?
2. Can you tell me something about the program you are involved in?
   a. How long has the programme been going on?
   b. In which geographic area and what scale (what is the budget, what is the number of beneficiaries, etc.) is it implemented?
   c. Why is it implemented in the current areas?
   d. Is it implemented by Cordaid, by local partners or both?
   e. How is the program financed?
      i. Is there any room for flexibility in the budget or donor contract?
   f. Are your program(s) being done in cooperation with other program units?
      i. Why yes/no?
      ii. Do you think your program/ beneficiaries would benefit from cooperation with or contributions of other units?
3. Other:

4. **LRRD**

o Do you know of any current attempts to link relief and development within your country?
o Do you link relief and development could be incorporated in your country strategy ?
   ▪ If yes, how?
   ▪ If no, why not?
o Can you give an example of linking relief and development in your country?
   ▪ If yes, can you share learnings from this experience?
   ▪ If no, do you think this is something that should be done? With which programs?
o Do you think it is possible to achieve this? If so, how would you do it?

o Can you identify internal or external obstacles or challenges to linking relief and development, for example in program development, financing, implementation and/or management.

c. Questions External Experts

1. <u>Personalia</u>

- Can you please state your name?
- Can you please state your current organisation and position?
- Can you tell me what your job generally entails?
- Your years of experience in humanitarian or development cooperation.

2. <u>Relief and Development</u>

Your perception of Relief and Development trends

1. Can you name the in your eyes most important trends related to humanitarian aid & development over the past 10 years?
2. Can you identify the most important trends and developments within funding over the past 10 years?
3. How do you think LRRD fits into the aid sector? Do you think the discussion on linking of emergency aid and development aid has changed over the past years?

6. Your perception of LRRD in general
   3. Can you define LRRD for me? What does it mean to you?
   4. Do you think LRRD is always possible and necessary?
      - If yes, why?
      - If no, why /or when not?
7. In general terms, how do you think emergency response should be linked to development?
8. What do you consider in general as the main challenges in linking relief to development? And when looking specifically in your work?

3. <u>LRRD & Funding Streams</u>

5. Can you tell me something about your organizations LRRD policy in general?

a. Can you name examples of successful LRRD initiatives?

b. Would you consider LRRD as a priority within your field?

c. Do you speak with your colleagues of either the humanitarian department (if you are in development) or development departments (if you are in humanitarian) on how to connect strategies and programs? In general or country specific?

d. Do you consider LRRD in your work?

    i. If so, how?

    ii. If not, why not?

6. Can you tell me something about the programs your involved in?

a. In what way do program& funding strategies evolve with developments within the beneficiary countries?

b. Is there any room for flexibility within the budget you allocate?

    i. Is so, in what way?

    ii. If not, why not?

7. Do you think new instruments that are being developed, such as Fonds Bekou (EU) will contribute to LRRD? Which other instruments do you find useful to support LRRD?

8. Are you familiar with the Grand Bargain? If yes, do you think this will be supportive to LRRD?