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Negative framing of the European Union

How Hard and Soft Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism are related with each other and with negative public opinion about the European Union in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom

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International Development Studies (MID)   **Corné Berkheij**

Politics and Governance of Development   **Dr. T.A.P. Metze**
                                                      Prof.dr.ir. C.J.A.M. Termeer

PAP-80336

WAGENINGEN UNIVERSITY
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Preface

When I started thinking about the topics and goals of my thesis in September 2017, I wanted to understand opposition towards the European Union. During my Bachelor and Master education, I have learned a lot about the cooperation in international institutions, like the EU, and I became increasingly aware of the urgency of solving global problems, like climate change, poverty and the violation of human rights in these institutions. At the same time, I heard an increasing amount of complaints and opposition towards the EU, expressed by the people around me and in national media. It appeared to me that these complaints, or scepticism towards the EU, were often combined with Populist and/or Nationalist rhetoric. Consequently, I combined these three concepts with each other, to understand the dynamics between Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism. I hope that this research may help me, and others, to understand people's motivations for fundamental opposition towards the European Union. Of course, it is always useful to be critical towards international cooperation and decision-making. But this research shows that the combination of Euroscepticism, Populist and Nationalist is not always that useful and constructive. By understanding people's motivations for Euroscepticism, and the way that these are expressed, I hope to turn this around, and make them more aware of my personal conviction that international cooperation is needed for solving worldwide problems, which affect every global citizen.

This thesis would not have been finished successfully without the support of my supervisor, dr. T.A.P. Metze. I would really like to thank her for all our discussions and conversations on the topic, methods and content of this thesis. Also, she had to read a lot of pages to provide feedback, on which I am very grateful. I also want to thank prof. dr. ir. C.J.A.M. Termeer for being the second supervisor and reading and grading this thesis. Furthermore, I would like to give a word of thanks to dr. A.R.P.J. Dewulf for providing feedback on my thesis proposal and discussing the methodology and methods. Finally, I would like to thank my colleagues at IFES who have been very flexible and supportive, especially when the hours for thesis writing and working at IFES reached a climax in April and May.

Abstract

The period of 2000-2017 is often characterized as a period in which the European Union is increasingly criticized. In almost every member state, scepticism is growing (Mair, 2007; Caiani & Guerra, 2017) This period is also characterized by the uprising of PRRP's (Populist Radical Right Parties), which are mainly focussed on populist and nationalist arguments (Caiani & Guerra, 2017). In fact, the European elections of 2009 and 2014 meant the entering of PRRP's, which are predominantly Eurosceptical, in the European Parliament. Furthermore, the results of the Brexit referendum, which is claimed to be influenced by these PRRP's, means a serious threat for the existence of the European Union.

The aim of this research is twofold. First, this research focusses on the overlap between framings of Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism, to understand how criticism on the European Union evolves over seventeen years in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and if, and how, these framings are interrelated. This has been done by a media analysis of critical moments in the public debate about the EU, most notably the European elections, national elections, and referenda on EU issues in the UK and the Netherlands. The media analysis consisted of a selection of 1061 newspaper articles from Dutch and British newspapers. The articles are analysed by using a codebook, which consisted of the main arguments that are used within the four pre-defined frames. These arguments are determined from academic literature and from a preliminary analysis of 20 selected newspaper articles, from which the main arguments from each frame are determined and placed in the codebook. The second aim was to study the interrelation between these four types of critical frames on the EU and shifts in public opinion on the EU, which is defined by analysing selected questions from the Eurobarometer survey. Thus, this research focusses on how Euroscepticism appears in newspaper articles and on possible interrelations with actual public opinion towards the EU.

The results show that there is no direct interrelation between Eurosceptic framing and shifts in public opinion (from the Eurobarometer) on the EU. Therefore, main conclusions are drawn by looking at the episodes around the European elections of 2004, 2009 and 2014, and around the Brexit referendum in 2016. In the Netherlands, where public opinion about the EU is structurally more positive than in the UK, there seems to be a strong overlap between Hard Euroscepticism on the EU and Populism and Nationalism. In the UK, Soft Euroscepticism seems to be often interrelated to Hard Euroscepticism, by making use of Populist and Nationalist arguments, which results in a more radical anti-EU framing in the UK than in the Netherlands.

Around the European elections, the use of Populist arguments is increasing in the UK, which corresponds with a more negative public opinion and the increasing amount of Eurosceptic votes in the elections. However, around the Brexit referendum in 2016, the population is more divided, and positive public opinion almost equals negative public opinion. Also, Populist arguments are used to a lesser extent than Nationalist arguments, which indicates that frames do appeal more specifically to a certain group of the population. This is in line with newspaper articles that claim that the British love for the country is stronger than the disapproval of the European Union, as public opinion on the EU grows increasingly positive after the referendum. In the Netherlands, the Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame are less often used and combined with each other, which results in a less radical anti-European framing in the Netherlands.

Furthermore, it has been found that, when there is an increasing use of the Populism frame, and when this frame is increasingly combined with Soft and Hard Eurosceptic arguments, public opinion about the EU seems to evolve more negative, which indicates an important interrelation between Eurosceptic framing and public opinion. However, this is found in the UK, which indicates that public opinion in the UK is more interrelated with Eurosceptic framing than public opinion in the Netherlands.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

1.1 Context and background

'We must build a kind of United States of Europe' (Churchill, 1946). These are the famous words of Winston Churchill in a speech after the Second World War, in which he stated that what is needed is 'to recreate the European fabric (..) and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, safety and freedom' (Churchill, 1946). What would have been his reaction, when 70 years later, his Great Britain voted to leave the European Union? Is the current European Union indeed a structure in which peace, safety and freedom are assured? Does every European citizen, if this citizen exists though, feel part of the European political process? To what extent are nation states willing to shift their sovereignty towards European institutions? These questions are currently part of the public debate in traditional media, like newspapers and talk shows on television, but also on social media, like Facebook and Twitter. Especially in crisis situations, like after terroristic attacks, during the financial crisis in 2008, the refugee crisis in 2015, and the Brexit referendum in 2016, critics on the structure and scope of the European Union are highly apparent in the media.

The appearance of critique on the European Union is not a new phenomenon. Already since the beginning of European integration, there have been discussions between federalists, neo-functionalists and inter-governmentalists (Bergmann & Niemann, 2013). Federalists do not only strive for a Europe of states; '[their] objective is a Europe of citizens: a Political Union and not only a common market.' (Leinen, 2016:6). Federalists are thus focussed on a Europe in which common goals and political institutions are perceived more important than the authority and sovereignty of the nation states. Neo-functionalists have a slightly different view on European integration, namely that 'created institutions drive the integration further by inertia even if originally it was not aimed so' (Ganeshallingam, 2017). Furthermore, the neo-functionalist integration theory prefers that sovereignty and responsibilities shift to one new centre, 'as the result of a "new political community"'(Ganeshallingam, 2017). On the other side, the inter-governmentalists are emphasizing the role of the nation states, and their governments. They argue that 'the nation state is not obsolete due to European integration' (Hatton & Sonny, 2015). Thus, intergovernmental cooperation is preferred above supranational cooperation, as the national governments must negotiate their positions, and ultimately have the final say in decision-making. Consequently, an increasing tension emerges between internal sovereignty; the relationship between state and society, and external sovereignty; the state's external relations in the international system (Grande & Pauly, 2005).

The process of European integration means a shared sovereignty arrangement, 'under which individuals chosen by international organizations, powerful states, or ad hoc entities would share authority with national governments over some aspects of domestic sovereignty' (Krasner, 2004:89). In case of the European Union, citizens and their national leaders are shifting some parts of internal, or domestic, sovereignty to the supranational institutions of the European Union.

However, these sovereignty shifts do not take place without contestation. One concept that grasps this contestation, and which is increasingly more apparent in media is 'Euroscepticism'. Euroscepticism can be defined as 'the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.' (Taggart, 1998:366). Increasingly, these voices of Euroscepticism are represented by right-wing populist parties.

After the last European elections in 2014, 51 out of 750 European representatives are characterized as part of a Populist Radical Right party (PRRP) or a nationalistic or xenophobic movement, which usually

have a strong anti-Europe profile (Caiani & Guerra, 2017). This trend can also be discovered in the national parliaments. After the elections in 2017 in the Netherlands, the Party of the Freedom (PVV) of Geert Wilders, which had 15 seats since 2012, gained 20 out of 150 seats, and became the second biggest party of the country (Kiesraad, 2017). In Germany, the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AFD), gained 12.6% of the total votes, which is an increase of 7.9% compared to the elections in 2013 (the Guardian, 2017). While not always inducing parliamentary seats or convincing victories in elections, there are also PRRP's apparent in France (*Front National*), Denmark (*Dansk Folkeparti),* Hungary (*Jobbik*), Austria (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs)* and Greece (*Golden Dawn).*

The above described developments raise the question on whether Euroscepticism goes hand in hand with the emergent popularity of populist parties, which have a strong nationalist focus – and are often anti-European Union. In other words; what is the relationship between the emergence of these parties, and the amount of, and content of Euroscepticism in media? In what ways do Eurosceptic parties, and their messages, have an influence on public opinion, regarding their views on the European Union and European integration, and their voting behaviour in elections? It also raises questions on scepticism in media, as PRRP's seem to get a lot of media attention and seem to be quite good in knowing how to use the media to spread their ideas (Burack & Snyder-Hall, 2012). How is this Eurosceptic media framing related to actual public opinion on the European Union? In other words: what is the influence of Eurosceptic, partly populist and/or nationalist framing in newspapers, on public opinion towards the EU, and vice versa?

One of the main characterizations of PRRP is the fact that these parties appear to be increasingly apparent in media (Caiani & Guerra, 2017), due to their negative focus towards the EU. This can be explained by the negativity bias of media logics and the influence of the so-called dumbing down effects, which increasingly emphasize cynicism, entertainment, nationalism and 'the voice of the powerful'. One way of exploring these effects is to research the way that Euroscepticism is framed. Frames are defined as 'aspects of a perceived reality' in which ideologies, visions and opinions are visualized 'in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation' (Entman, 1993:52). Framing can thus be used by PRRP's, but also by other actors that express Euroscepticism, to communicate negative elements of the European Union or scepticism towards the EU. As such, a framing analysis may provide an answer on the influence of Eurosceptic newspaper articles on public opinion.

It can be argued that currently, mainly the PRRP's, are predominantly using new and/or social media, like Facebook and Twitter. Researchers like Koopmans and Statham (2010) and Caiana and Guerra (2017), argue that new, social media is increasingly important for, on the one side, increasing accountability and legitimacy of political decision-making, and on the other side, for increasing use of populist, emotional arguments. However, it can also be argued that the influence of framing Euroscepticism can on public opinion can be found in traditional media, like newspaper articles. In practice, it can be assumed that both traditional and new media might have an influence on public opinion. However, the focus of this research is on newspaper articles. The main reason for this focus is what is explained by Anderson (1991) as *print capitalism*. Print-capitalism is used by Anderson to refer to the usage of newspapers and novels as a way for people to conceive themselves as members of an imagined community, which perceives the nation as a socially constructed community in which people perceive themselves as part of that group. Newspapers and novels created a discourse between members of a nation with the same language, it caused the standardization of language, and it prioritized certain languages, which meant automatically the deterrence of other languages (Breuilly, 2016). In this way, the media was historically one of the causes for the rise of nationalism in Europe. Currently, newspaper articles are still important in creating and sustaining language and frames.

Therefore, the analysis of frames in newspaper articles can be considered as an appropriate method for exploring the influence of Eurosceptic media framing on public opinion.

1.2 Societal relevance

This research aims to contribute to the existing literature on Euroscepticism, media framing, populism and nationalism, by elaborating on the case of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. As argued by Peter Mair: 'one of the principal reasons to address the issue of political opposition in the context of the European Union is that there seems to be a lot of it about' (Mair, 2007:1). Understanding the process of how and when Eurosceptic messages are framed in traditional media and linking this with existing public opinion on the European Union, may help politicians, citizens and other relevant actors to deal with Eurosceptic voices, now and in the future. Since an increase of Eurosceptic forces can be found, the European Union must come with an appropriate reaction on this. One of the ways to come with such a reaction is by using media to emphasize what the alternative of Euroscepticism is. Furthermore, in practice, these Eurosceptic forces often combine rational arguments with emotions, and seem to create a discourse in which populism and nationalism are more appearing. One example of this is the Brexit-referendum in the UK. According to Startin (2015), 'a 'tipping point' has been reached in Britain's relations with the EU, with rational arguments having been surpassed by emotional ones.' (Startin, 2015: 312). This research assumes that four frames are important in this process; Soft Euroscepticism, Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism, and explores the content and the dynamics of these frames. In this way, this research sheds a light on the emotional arguments, and how media frames Euroscepticism, populism and nationalism. Consequently, this research may help to come with a counter reaction to Euroscepticism combined with populism and nationalism, in order to (re-) build a political structure in which Europeans can 'dwell in peace, safety and freedom' (Churchill, 1946).

1.3 Scientific relevance

To do this, the research builds on earlier studies that seek 'to link different contributions on party-based, public and civil society Euroscepticism in order to provide a comprehensive exploration and understanding of the increasing contestation of the EU.' (Caiani & Guerra, 2017:6). According to Caiani and Guerra (2017), this contestation can mainly be found in the emergence of Eurosceptic, populist, parties, but also in referenda, like in Greece (2015), the referendum on the European constitution in France and the Netherlands (2005), and the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom (2016). As argued by Galpin and Trenz (2017), existing research on Euroscepticism has 'only paid little attention to the intermediary processes of communication, interpretation and framing through which knowledge and attitudes are shaped by political agency and the latter is conditioned, in turn, by opinions of citizens' (Galpin & Trenz, 2017:49). This research is therefore focussed on the content of the used frames of Eurosceptic messages in newspapers, in order to understand how Euroscepticism is framed in both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom during the period 2000-2017. Furthermore, this research explores the overlap between the four pre-defined frames (Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism) in order to understand how Euroscepticism overlaps with Populist and Nationalist arguments. Also, the arguments of these frames are compared to prevalent public opinion on the European Union, in order to see what the interrelation of the arguments of these frames are with prevailing public opinion. As such, this research contributes to existing research on the complex concepts of Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism, by empirically researching the way that these concepts are framed and how the arguments of these frames overlap, and to existing research in the interrelation between media framing and public opinion.

1.4 Comparison: the UK and the Netherlands

As earlier mentioned, this research compares the cases of the Netherlands (NL) and the United Kingdom (UK), to give a representative view of the above described processes. These specific countries have been chosen because the both have a historically different relationship with the European Union. The Netherlands can historically be characterized as a pro-integrationist country, while the UK can be characterized as an inter-governmentalist country. The United Kingdom has, already since the establishment of the European Union, been characterized as 'the awkward partner' (George, 1990). Traditionally, there are several reasons for the critical attitude of the United Kingdom. Leruth et al. (2017) mention three main historical reasons for this attitude.

The first one is the geographical position of the UK, which strengthens the development of an 'island mentality'; which implies that the country feels more independent and isolated from countries in 'the continent' Europe, than countries that are geographically in the middle of the continent. The second reason is the historical link with other parts of the world through the British Commonwealth, which implies that the UK feels more connected to countries within the Commonwealth than with the EU. The third reason is the different experience that the UK had in, and after, the Second World War. While the Netherlands, and a lot of other countries on the continent have been occupied by the Nazis, the United Kingdom was never occupied, and was one of the Allies that contributed to the liberation from the Nazis. Consequently, this caused a different starting point for increased European cooperation. Due to these three reasons, an attitude towards the EU evolved that emphasizes national sovereignty, and the protection of British interests.

Therefore, the UK can be characterized as a country that is traditionally inter-governmentalist, which means a preference for limited political European integration in which the main responsibilities and decision-making is in the hands of intergovernmental bodies, instead of supranational European institutions.

The Netherlands, as one of the founding members of the EU, can traditionally be characterized as a pro-integrationist country, which implies that the country is in favour of shifting certain parts of sovereignty towards supranational European institutions. Consequently, in contrary to the UK, Euroscepticism does not have a long history in the Netherlands. According to Startin and Krouwel (2013), Eurosceptic messages have been appearing at a substantial amount since the early 2000s, mainly in the light of the referendum on the European constitution in 2005 and the rise of populistic, Eurosceptic, parties like the Lijst Pim Fortuin (LPF) and the Party of the Freedom (PVV). Taking this into consideration, the Netherlands is a representative for countries in Europe that were formerly quite positive towards European integration, but which have recently become more influenced by Eurosceptic and populistic forces, which caused a possible shift in public opinion, or is caused by this shift in public opinion.

By comparing the cases of the UK and the Netherlands, this research thus provides an overview of the content and dynamics of Eurosceptic media framing in two different kind of countries within the European Union. On the one hand, a country that has always been critical, and on the other hand, a country which has recently become more critical towards the EU.

1.5 Research questions

Considering the questions that are posed in the introduction, and the societal and scientific relevance, this research explores the different Eurosceptic frames that are used in Dutch and British newspapers, to find out in what ways media framing interrelates with public opinion about the European Union. The aim of this research is thus to understand what differences in public opinion towards the European Union can be found during 2000-2017 in the Netherlands and the UK, and, ultimately, to understand

how media framing can be used to inform the public in a preferred and objective way, which is beneficial for the functioning and subsistence of the EU. Considering this, the main research question of the research is:

To what extent do Soft and Hard Eurosceptic, Populist and Nationalist media-framings in newspapers interrelate with public opinion on the European Union in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom?

There are six sub-questions formulated that contribute to answering this research question:

Sub-question 1: *What is public opinion on the European Union in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom during the period 2000-2017?*

Sub-question 2: *What are critical moments in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, during the period 2000-2017, that may increase the use of Eurosceptic, Populist and Nationalist framings?*

Sub-question 3: *What Soft and Hard Eurosceptic framings are used in newspapers in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom during the critical moments in the period 2000-2017?*

Sub-question 4: *What Populist and Nationalist framings are used in newspapers in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom during the critical moments in the period 2000-2017?*

Sub-question 5: *How does the content of the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame, that emerge from the selected newspaper articles, relate to each other?*

Sub-question 6: *How does the content of the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame relate to public opinion in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom during the period 2000-2017?*

Chapter 2 – Conceptual approach: framing analysis and four pre-defined frames

The main concepts that are dealt with in this research are *media framing* and *public opinion.* In order to explore negative media framing on the EU, and to research the influences on public opinion, four frames are identified; *Soft Euroscepticism, Hard Euroscepticism, Populism* and *Nationalism*. As explained in the Methodology chapter (Ch.3), these frames emerge from a prior literature study on Euroscepticism and media framing. The aim of this chapter is to define and operationalize the concepts and frames, in order to answer the research questions, as formulated in the previous chapter. Furthermore, the definitional relationship between media framing and public opinion, media framing and Euroscepticism, and between Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism are discussed in this chapter. The outcome of this chapter is the codebook for framing analysis, which consists of the operationalization of the four frames. This codebook is make by a combination of deductive and inductive research methods. The deductive research method is carried out by a literature study on Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism, while the inductive method is carried out by a preliminary analysis of newspaper articles on the EU. The exact content of the methods is described in section 3.4.

The structure of this chapter is as follows; section 2.1 discusses earlier researches on media framing, public opinion and the relations between these concepts. After that, section 2.2 till 2.4 discuss the operationalization of the frames. Each section has the same structure; firstly, the frame is defined; secondly, the different arguments (which are translated into codes for the framing analysis) that emerge from the created database of articles containing a Eurosceptic element are discussed; thirdly the findings (from the literature and the database) are combined and complemented by examples. Following this structure, section 2.2 discusses Euroscepticism, section 2.3 discusses Populism, and section 2.4 discusses Nationalism. Next to these frames, the literature and the articles show some findings that do not connect directly to one of the three frames. Nevertheless, it is expected that these themes are often used in framing Euroscepticism. Therefore, these other themes are discussed in section 2.5. Finally, section 2.6 discusses the expected relationship between Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism.

2.1 Media framing and public opinion

The aim of this research is to find the influence of media framing on public opinion on the European Union, and vice versa. This section elaborates on the concept of (media) framing, the influence of media framing on public opinion, and the application of this on public opinion towards the European Union.

One of the main concepts of this research is 'frames'. Entman (1993), defines 'frames' as the outcome of 'framing', which is a way to 'select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation (Entman, 1993:52). According to Entman, framing can thus have different functions. When connecting framing to media framing, frames can be explained as 'a way of making sense of the world and providing simple and easily grasped analysis of complex issues' (Caiani and Della Porta, 2001 in Galpin and Trenz, 2017:56). Frames are thus used by the media, and politicians, to make sense of complex issues. However, within framing, there is always a process of selection, which can steer the public opinion to a preferred way of thinking. Consequently, frames can be constituted and used by pro-European, anti-European actors and

populists or extreme-right actors (Caiani and Della Porta, 2011). In this research, four frames, that are expected to be important in answering the main research question, are selected and analysed; *Soft Euroscepticism, Hard Euroscepticism, Populism* and *Nationalism.* Each frame consists of different arguments. All these arguments together are forming the content of the frame. In order to find these arguments in the framing analysis, each argument receives a code. This enables the researcher to both categorize the arguments and elaborate on the content of the predominantly used arguments. For example, one of the ways of how Soft Euroscepticism (frame) is expressed is by criticizing a specific policy of the EU (code), for example, criticism on the economic policies of the EU (argument). As such, the code describes specific examples of the argument, which altogether form the content of the frame. Furthermore, it is expected that there are specific themes that are important occasions for using the frames. For example, the Euro-crisis (theme) might lead to specific scepticism towards economic policies of the European Union (argument), which is in the framing analysis coded as critique on specific policies (code). These themes are considered as the content of public debate and are thus expected to be the main underlying reason for the arguments/framings that are used. The aim of sections 2.2 – 2.4 is to define the codes from each frame, which are in the empirical chapters (4 and 5) used to find the arguments on which the frame consists.

In this research, media framing is applied to a political process; the European Union. Several researches on media and their role in politics have been done earlier. For example, it is found that media can be important in making European governance more transparent and open to the public, which increases the accountability and legitimacy of European governance (Caiana & Guerra, 2017). Furthermore, social media can have the function of intermediate between citizens and elected and unelected politicians, which can increase the quality of representation (Koopmans & Statham, 2010). These functions seem to be mainly positive. However, the influence of media always depends on the content that is presented by media and the frequency of attention. An important component of this is the negativity bias, which is one of the elements from media logics. One of the assumptions made in media is that bad news has more news value than good news, and that attention to events that are perceived as 'far away' from the national context is more easily drawn when, for example, drama and conflict are included, serious repercussions are emphasised, when the integrity of particular actors and institutions are undermined or when the news can be related to feelings of fear and scepticism. One consequence of this negativity bias is that there is a tendency that favours negative news at the expense of balanced or positive reports, as found in several journalism studies (Galpin & Trenz, 2017).

> Negativity bias: bad news has more news value than good news.

In the case of the European Union, earlier studies argue that specific EU policies do not receive much media attention (Caiani & Guerra, 2017), which makes room to boost negative attitudes towards the European Union. One possible explanation for this is the structure and process of European decision making; negotiations and consensus-building processes are kept outside of the media, in order to protect and sustain the compromises (Leino, 2017), through which an increasing gap in transparency and accountability might appear. Therefore, it can be assumed that negative news, in which voices of Euroscepticism come to the fore, are more apparent in media than positive news.

As such, the influence of media on public opinion can be described in multiple ways. Firstly, media can work in a constructive and virtuous way in favour of the political process (Conti & Memoli, 2017), as earlier argued. Secondly, as argued by other researchers, the influence of media and media framing can be less constructive for the political process. Cappella and Jamieson (1997), argue that 'the news media's use of strategic frames (…) invites audiences to attribute cynical motives to political actors in campaigns and policy debates.' (Jacobs, 1998:283). In this way, media can contribute to and strengthen

already existing scepticism, or cynicism, among public opinion, or create new cynicism on political actors and the political process. Additionally, Robinson (1976) found in a study on media and public opinion that media can strengthen disillusionment, suspicion and distrust towards the political process among public opinion. Trenz (2008) visualizes this, so-called ambivalent relation between media and democracy as following:

| Media | Democracy enhancing | | Dumbing down |
	Function	(desired) outcome	(undesired) outcome
Passive	Mirror of the political system	Transparency	Inherent nationalism
	Amplifier of rational discourse	Justification, reasoning	Entertainment
Active	Third estate	Critique, control	Voice of the powerful
	Popular voice	Popularization	Cynicism

Table 2.1: The ambivalent interrelation between media and democracy. Adapted from Trenz (2008): 293

In this model, media is perceived as both a passive actor, which enables citizens to acquire information on the political process and the political actors, and which is inherent to a functioning democracy, and an active actor, by which media is perceived as an independent actor that interferes with democracy. As seen in the model, both roles can have undesired outcomes, which are 'dumbing down' the democratic process.

The focus of this research is on Euroscepticism and media framing. Therefore, the assumption that negative media framing on the EU is not constructive for the political process is taken into consideration. Also, this means that the undesired outcomes/dumbing down effects, as defined by Trenz, are considered. Paradoxically, Conti and Memoli (2017) found in their research that using traditional media, like newspapers, to acquire political information, results in a more optimistic view on the European Union among citizens, while new media is a more substantial driver of Euroscepticism. They argue that this is caused by the fact that traditional media have a long tradition of narratives on the EU, which make it hard to shift the attention to another perspective, while new media became popular during the economic crisis, which enabled them to grow fundamentally more Eurosceptic. Furthermore, new media is more suitable for context-driven messages in which popular stories on the future of the European Union can be proclaimed. However, according to Trenz (2008), the commitment of traditional media 'to the project of European integration is limited to a few elite journalists who distinguish themselves through an attitude of 'progressive Europeanism' from mainstream media particularism.' (Trenz, 2008:303).

When applied to the governance of the European Union, there are two important assumptions to be made regarding media and public opinion. The first assumption is that much of the news around the European Union tends to be negative on its institutions, policies and actors. The main reason for this is that 'the EU remains difficult to understand by citizens; the executive and legislative power dynamics are unclear to most and definitely arduous to understand if compared to the way democracy works in their home countries.' (Conti & Memoli, 2017:126). The EU is, thus, often too complex for ordinary EU citizens. Consequently, media content gets focussed, mainly during a longer period, on certain dimensions of the complex issue. According to Baumgartner et al. (2008), this is the case for almost every public policy in which 'the underlying issues are tremendously complex' (Baumgartner et al., 2008:219). Combining this general finding on public policy and media with the earlier mentioned negativity bias in media logics leads to the assumption that the passive role, which should provide

transparency, justification and reasoning on an objective basis, of the media is lacking regarding the European Union, and that the active role of the media is over-represented.

> The complexity of European decision-making causes a negatively biased focus on a small number of issues in media.

Consequently, the second assumption is that all four 'dumbing down effects', as elaborated by Trenz (2008) are apparent in media framing and public debate on the European Union. These dumbing down effects can also be described, from the perspective of the European Union, as undesired outcomes on public opinion, because of media behaviour.

> The negative focus on EU issues leads to increasing cynicism, entertainment, populism and nationalism, which are effects that are expected to 'dumb down' the democratic process.

The first dumbing down effect is **cynicism**, which refers to the systemic bias of news media in selecting negative news on the European Union. Kevin (2003) argues that strategic framing with a focus on scandals, intrigue, dishonesty and lies leads to erosion of the legitimacy of politics. Combined with a lack of objective and rational content, this lead to the strengthening of the cynical attitude of the public opinion toward the European Union.

'**Entertainment**' is the second dumbing down effect, and according to Trenz; 'many insiders of the EU would probably agree that the rationality of political discourse is continuously undermined by the media.' (Trenz, 2008:296). The effect here is that media does not have the aim to amplify rational discourse in public opinion, but to transform the rational discourse into drama and infotainment (Postman, 1985).

One might say that this is a quite negative view on the behaviour and outcomes of media. Of course, these dumbing down effects do not appear in every quality newspaper or news channel. However, they paint a general picture on how certain parts of media, those who are fundamentally Eurosceptic, are behaving and the reasons behind their behaviour. Two other dumbing down effects, which are expected to be more apparent in this research than cynicism and entertainment, are nationalism and populism.

The third dumbing down effect is '**Voice of the powerful'**, which has an important overlap with the operationalization of the Populism frame. Table 2.1 explains that one of the active roles of media is to be a third estate, or the 'watchdog' on the political process. However, when this active role is too apparent, which is the case on the European Union, media might be used to provide political information. The danger of this increasingly mediatized environment is that the 'media competence' of political actors becomes the main principle of legitimation (Trenz, 2008). In this way, politicians and other important influencers of public opinion, who have a strong populistic discourse, can use media to gain influence on the wider public. This creates a system in which both negative news on the European Union is more apparent in media, and in which populist actors are enabled to use this negative news to gain influence on public opinion. Section 2.3 further elaborates on the concept of Populism and how this concept is used in the research.

The fourth dumbing down effect is '**Inherent nationalism',** which has an important overlap with the operationalization of the Nationalism frame. According to Slaatta (2006), the system of media is inherently nationalistic, because 'both linguistic and cultural boundaries, formatted through historic

structuring of social communication, over time has formed functional communicative spaces along the lines of national borders that work towards social cohesion and strengthening of collective identities (Slaatta, 2006:16). So, by focussing on European issues, media always has the tendency to make the issues smaller and applicable to a national context. Therefore, in foreign news content, journalists are tending to defend national interests above transnational (or European) interests. Section 2.4 of this chapter elaborates further on nationalism and media, and how nationalism is viewed in the context of this research.

In this section, the relationship between media framing and public opinion has been discussed and applied to the context of the European Union. The two main findings from this section are the over-representation of the active and negative role of media in the context of the European Union, and the occurrence of all four 'dumbing down' effects on public opinion, with an emphasis on nationalism and populism. These two concepts are further elaborated on in this chapter. The literature review in this section is not complete yet. Several other important researches on this topic are excluded from this section, as the aim is to provide a theoretical background for the empirical research. A number of these researches are discussed in one of the following sections, which operationalize the four selected frames.

2.2 Euroscepticism and Eurosceptic framing

As earlier mentioned in Chapter 1, the amount of scepticism towards the European Union has been increased during the last decades. Euroscepticism is here defined as 'the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.' (Taggart, 1998:366). Within the concept of Euroscepticism, a division can be made between **Soft Euroscepticism**, 'when there is no opposition to EU integration or EU membership, but scepticism emerges on the basis of specific policies or against the national interest' (Caiani & Guerra, 2017:4), and **Hard Euroscepticism**, when there is 'principled opposition to the EU and European integration' (Taggart & Szcerbiak 2002:7, in Caiani & Guerra, 2017:4).

Using this division between Soft Euroscepticism and Hard Euroscepticism, there are several different aspects that come to the fore in newspaper articles. As argued by Caiani & Guerra (2017), the soft variant emerges based on specific policies, like monetary policy, immigration policy, agricultural policy or security policy. The preliminary analysis on the newspaper articles also finds scepticism towards specific institutions, like the European Parliament and the European Commission, and other member states, like Greece, Germany and Hungary. Also, the question on what priorities the EU should, and should not, have, discussions on the enlargement of the EU and discussions on referenda can be added to 'Soft Euroscepticism'. All these aspects are expected to entail scepticism on a specific element of the European Union and can therefore be considered as codes for the Soft Euroscepticism frame. It is expected that, within each code, a division can be made between the arguments with that code. For example, the arguments on 'Policy' can refer to different policies, and the content of 'Referendum' can refer to different themes on which a referendum is being held. The specific content of the arguments is discussed in the empirical chapters (4 and 5). In this way, eleven arguments, that follow from the inductive and deductive method, can be defined for the Soft Euroscepticism frame. Table 2.2 provides an overview of these eleven arguments, including the code that these arguments received for the framing analysis.

Soft Eurosceptic framing	
Argument	**Code**
Critique on specific European policies	Policy
Critique on specific European institutions	Institution
Critique on a specific EU-member state	Member state
A (demanded) referendum on a specific EU-issue	Referendum
Critique on the enlargement of the EU	Enlargement
Critique emphasising wrong priorities of the EU	Wrong priorities
Critique combined with suggestions for new priorities of the EU	New priorities
Critique regarding the budget of the EU	Budget
Critique referring to problems around (governmental) cooperation in the EU	Cooperation
Critique referring to 'Brussels' as too far away from citizens to have any influence on it	Far away
Critique on the scope of European integration	Integration
Table 2.2: Arguments and corresponding codes of the Soft Euroscepticism frame	

Due to the nature of the Soft Euroscepticism arguments, it is hard to define specific arguments beforehand; scepticism on a specific element on the EU can be referred to in several different ways. Therefore, the arguments of the Soft Euroscepticism frame are formulated more general in here. In chapter 4 and 5, the exact content, for example to which policies scepticism is expressed, is discussed. In the end, the content of the eleven arguments of table 2.2 can be considered as the content of the Soft Euroscepticism frame in the selected Dutch and British newspaper articles. This content reflects the specific elements of the European Union on which scepticism is expressed and the way that this Soft Euroscepticism is expressed.

In contrast to Soft Euroscepticism, which does not necessarily deal with fundamental critique on the European Union, Hard Euroscepticism does have fundamental objections towards the European Union as a whole, or certain parts and processes of the EU. Examples of specific elements on which Hard Euroscepticism is expressed are fundamental opposition on the European Union in general, the Euro or the European symbols. Other common elements are the democratic deficit of the EU, the critique that the EU cannot be stopped, and that resistance is hardly possible, complaints on bureaucracy and the number of rules and interference with national member states. Furthermore, this concept includes the different ideologies on the European Union; like the emphasis on intergovernmental or supranational cooperation, protest towards 'the United States of Europe, and the people/politicians who represent these ideologies. All these elements do not refer to a specific aspect of the European Union but criticize the European Union as a whole. Therefore, these six elements are considered as arguments for the *Hard Euroscepticism* frame. Table 2.3 below shows the arguments and the corresponding codes for the framing analysis, which are discussed in the empirical chapters (4 and 5).

Hard Eurosceptic framing	
Argument	**Code**
General fundamental opposition to the EU	Fundamental opposition
There is too little democracy in the (institutions of the) EU / Democratic deficit	Democracy
There is a lack of possibilities to stop the growth of the EU / too few opportunities for resistance	Resistance
Opposition to Brussels' bureaucracy, rules and interference with nation states	Bureaucracy

There is a need for a fundamental change in the EU	Fundamental change
Fundamental discussion on different ideologies of the EU / intergovernmental vs. federal	Ideology
Table 2.3: Arguments and corresponding codes of the Hard Euroscepticism frame	

2.3 Populism and populist framing on the European Union

As already explained in section 2.1, Populism can be regarded as an important frame that is expected to influence the rise of Euroscepticism. This section provides a theoretical background on the concept of Populism and the operationalization of this concept in this research. Populism is a complex concept in which 'a member of a political party is claiming to represent the common people' and which believes in 'the rights, wisdom, or virtues of the common people' (Merriam-Webster, 2017). According to Taggart (2004), there are five common themes that characterize populism:

- a certain hostility to representative politics
- identification with a 'heartland' that represents an idealised conception of the community that is served
- the imagined ideology is leading, which causes a lack of core values
- populism is a reaction to change, crisis and challenge
- it is hard to sustain populist movements, as, when the crisis is over, they must adopt in a certain way to existing politics (Taggart, 2004).

This definition already implies that populism can be closely connected to nationalism, which is further discussed in section 2.4. Furthermore, the dimensions of Taggart also stress that there is a certain ideology that often stresses the 'power of the people' and a lack of representation in the current political establishment. Additionally, populism is often a reaction on a changing situation or a crisis. Next to these themes, there are researchers that assign a certain political style to populists. According to Schoor (2017), a political style consists of three dimensions: ideological style, social style and rhetoric style. In her article, she explains that by political performances, politicians are creating a certain political identity. During their political performance, they use a certain ideology to connect people to their political thoughts. Also, they take over the style of certain social groups, to connect them to their constituency. Finally, populists also use a rhetoric style, as a certain language, which is often coupled with appealing metaphors and comparisons, in order to connect and persuade citizens (Schoor, 2017). One of the stages in which these political performances are being played is in media. While the dimensions of Taggart are mainly referring to the ideological style of populism, the other two dimensions (social style and rhetoric style) explain how populism can be discovered in newspaper articles.

The European Union can be regarded as one of the big themes that are currently used in the populist style. Therefore, a substantial part of, mainly hard, Eurosceptic themes and statements can be conceptualized as populist, as they are systematically referring to a certain ideology, while appealing a certain social group (in populist terms 'the voice of the people') and using a certain rhetorical style. A combination of the conceptualization of Taggart and Schoor lead to several specific elements on which Populism can be recognized in newspaper articles. Therefore, these elements can be considered as arguments within the Populism frame. Furthermore, the preliminary analysis on newspaper articles confirms that these arguments are used in the context of the EU. As table 2.4 below shows, there are five elements defined as arguments for the Populism frame. The 'anti-…' arguments represents a certain rhetoric style in which populist politicians are appealing to social groups that have the feeling that they have no control on certain aspects of politics, like immigration, the EU, the increase of the

visibility of the Islam or the fact that politics is controlled by an elite establishment. Populist politicians are appealing to these social groups, in order to represent them, and to connect them with their ideology. The same process appeals for populist claims about the representation of the 'common people' and the fact that Europe is in a certain crisis. In all these arguments, populists have an 'anti-attitude', in which they are claiming to represent a social group of citizens that does not feel heard and represented by other politicians in the national parliament, government or in European Union decision-making bodies. Furthermore, when combined with the content of the analysed articles, two other arguments emerge; the frame in which the author refers to the insecurity and mistrust that is caused by the European Union and/or its policies and institutions, and the general negative public opinion towards the European Union that already exists among European citizens.

As Populism in media is often connected to rhetoric, and statements must be read in their context, it is hard to define what are solely populistic framings beforehand. Ultimately, every Eurosceptic argument that is noted in table 2.2 and 2.3 might be placed within a populist context. This means that, depending on the context, a statement (or: argument) can be placed in both the concept of Euroscepticism and Populism. Therefore, it is expected that the arguments of the Populism frame are used independently, as well as in combination with Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, and even Nationalism arguments.

Populist framing	
Argument	**Code**
Claims on, or of, anti-EU / establishment parties	Anti
There is too little representation of citizens in the EU / EU citizens are alienated from the EU	Representation
Europe is in a state of crisis	Crisis
Insecurity, mistrust, concerns, fears and angers, caused by the EU	Insecurity
Reference to (existing) negative public opinion on the EU	Public Opinion
Table 2.4: Arguments and corresponding codes of the Populism frame	

2.4 Nationalism and nationalist framing on the European Union

Like the *Populism* frame, *Nationalism* can be regarded as an important notion of Euroscepticism. The discipline of political philosophy defines the concept of nationalism in two different ways. The first is an attitude that members of a nation have when they care about their national identity. The second definition consists of actions that members of a nation take when they are seeking to achieve or sustain self-determination (Miscevic, 2014). This definition can be combined with the definition of Griffiths and Sullivan (1997), who state that nationalism is 'the desire for the convergence of nation and state' (Griffiths & Sullivan, 1997: 53). In these definitions, the authors make a distinction between a nation; a human community with a shared identity, culture and corresponding symbols, means and values, and a state; a bureaucratic authority in a given territorial area. In the process of modern nationalism, the concept of nation and state are combined. According to Griffiths and Sullivan (1997), nationalism becomes visible by the fusing of 'historical myths and the subjective consciousness of their significance for the political legitimacy of either elites which control the state or those who seek to challenge them (Griffiths & Sullivan, 1997: 56). Nationalism is both a threat and a justification of the existing world order in which the world is divided into sovereign states. On the one side, it binds people together, on the other side, it contests international cooperation and increasing integration of different states, which is the case in the European Union. A deeper look at the historical nation-building process of Western and Eastern Europe, shows that nationalism has evolved differently in these parts of Europe. In Western Europe, the nation, and nationalism, has developed based on shared, connecting elements,

like territory, people and the nation (Kuhelj, 2011). The nations in Western Europe have been connected by a bureaucratic state, on more or less the same territory, during the last centuries. In contrast to Eastern Europe, where the nations belonged to different empires, like the Ottoman empire, the Austro-Hungary empire and the Soviet Union (Kuhelj, 2011). The nations in Eastern Europe thus did not have legitimate authority over their own territory.

However, both in Western and Eastern Europe, there has been a rise in nationalistic expressions during the last decades. One of the ways in which these expressions are made visible is the rise of radical-right parties, or as Eger and Valdez (2015), call them: Neo-nationalistic parties. In their research, Eger and Valdez (2015) explore the ideologies of these parties. One of the domains in which these parties speak out are the preferences towards the European Union. In this way, they connect a negative attitude towards the European Union, or Euroscepticism, to 'protectionist and nationalist concerns' (Eger & Valdez, 2015: 117). In this regard, the parties mainly deal with the protection of national sovereignty, and they find that every radical right party in Europe has formulated an anti-EU position. According to the authors, the reason for increasing nationalism can be found in the acceleration of European political integration after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. This birth of the European Union in 1992 made the nation states less able to endeavour to lower all kinds of risks for citizens, which undermines feelings of national security, and causes an increased appeal for nationalism among voters (Eger and Valdez, 2015). In other words, when administrative and legislative boundaries between states become less visible, which means that sovereignty shifts to authorities other than existing national institutions, citizens are more vulnerable for messages that prioritize the perseverance of the autonomy of the state.

The Nationalism frame is used in the same way as the Populism frame in this research, as Populism is expected to have nationalist fundaments. Combining the findings of the above literature, the findings in section 2.1 from Trenz (2008) on nationalism and media, and the ways in which the Nationalism frame emerges during the preliminary analysis of newspaper articles, leads to four arguments that are considered as important elements of the Nationalism frame, and that can be added to the already mentioned arguments of *Soft and Hard Euroscepticism* and *Populism*. All these arguments emphasize a different dimension of nationalism regarding the European Union. The first argument refers to the national position of the country (the Netherlands or the United Kingdom) in the EU and can be combined to certain policies or events around Euroscepticism. Examples in these arguments are the relations of the country with the EU, but also with other parts of the world, like the USA. The second argument stresses the national identity, and the way that this is affected by the European Union. The third argument refers to the fact that an actor is claiming to act in the national interest of the state, regarding European issues. Finally, the fourth argument recalls the theme of national sovereignty, and consists of claims that show the tensions between nationalism and supra-nationalism. Table 2.5 below provides an overview of these four arguments and their corresponding codes for the framing analysis, which are, altogether, in the empirical chapter (4 and 5) considered as the content of the *Nationalism* frame.

Nationalist framing	
Argument	**Code**
The EU as beneficial / unfavourable for the country's international position	Position
The EU as beneficial / unfavourable for the national identity	Identity
The EU as beneficial / unfavourable for the national interest	National interest
The EU, and the corresponding shifts in sovereignty and responsibilities as beneficial / unfavourable for the national sovereignty	Sovereignty
Table 2.5: Arguments and corresponding codes of the Nationalism frame	

2.5 Other emerging arguments on the European Union

Next to the arguments that are mentioned until now, there are four other emerging arguments that come to the fore after the preliminary analysis of newspaper articles. These arguments cannot be connected to one concept or frame. Therefore, these arguments are not particularly dealt with in the final analysis. However, as they are expected to be important in framing Euroscepticism, they are included in the empirical analysis, to find out to what extent they are present in the analysed newspapers. This is discussed in the final discussion of the research (Chapter 7). Similar to the other frames, these arguments are translated into codes, which are used to define the 'Other emerging arguments' frame. The first argument is the indifference of citizens towards the EU; it is not to say that these citizens are necessarily Eurosceptic, however the outcomes on this might still be important to say something on Euroscepticism and the media. The second argument is the reflection of Euroscepticism in domestic issues; in this case, aspects are connected to broader political and societal problems, or the European Union is used in a negative way in domestic political strategies. The third argument consists of counter-arguments to Euroscepticism; an actor that is Eurosceptic in media is not necessarily sceptic on every part of the EU and might say something positive about it. For that sake, this argument makes room for pro-European statements of Eurosceptic actors. The fourth argument in this section refers to the European Union as a complex governance, or political, system, which is often too complex for citizens to understand, or which is too complex to communicate in an appropriate way. This may lead to unawareness among citizens, and politicians. Also, a lack of information or proper communication from the European Union, national governments or national media is included in this argument. This argument might, as the other three arguments in this section, be one of the underlying reasons for soft or hard Euroscepticism. Table 2.6 below provides an overview of arguments and corresponding codes that come to the fore in Eurosceptic articles, and that cannot be connected to *Soft or Hard Euroscepticism*, *Populism or Nationalism*.

'Other emerging arguments' framing	
Argument	**Code**
National citizens/politicians are indifferent towards the EU	Indifference
The EU is strategically used in a national context	National context
Counter-reactions on Euroscepticism / Positive elements of the EU	Counter-reactions
National citizens are unaware / not properly informed about the EU / Benefits and processes of the EU are not properly communicated	Unawareness
Table 2.6: Arguments and corresponding codes of the 'Other emerging arguments' frame	

2.6 Relations between the four pre-defined frames

As earlier mentioned, the 'negativity bias' of media, acts as a starting point in this research. This means that the assumption is taken that many of the reports in media about the European Union is negative, and that media in this way contributes to the sceptic attitude of citizens. Furthermore, the articles that are included in the analysis all contain a Eurosceptic element, due to the search term, which means that this research also has such a 'negativity bias'. One of the possible consequences of this bias in media, is that citizens might have a lack of knowledge about the positive aspects of the European Union. This assumption is confirmed by longitudinal data in the Eurobarometer. For example, in 2016 (Eurobarometer 86), the respondents were asked 'to what extent do you think that you are well informed or not about European matters?'. In all EU-member states, 60% claimed that they were 'Not well informed'. For the Netherlands, this was number was 59%. In the UK, 48% claimed that they were not well informed. In 2013 (Eurobarometer 80), these numbers were even higher; 69% in both the EU as a whole and in the United Kingdom. In the Netherlands, 65% of the respondents indicated that they were 'not well informed' about European matters. These numbers point out that the provision of information on the European Union has been improved, but that citizens in general still indicate that they are not enough informed on European matters. In this context, earlier studies found that Eurosceptic parties are remarkably good at using the traditional and social media (Bijsmans, 2017), as they make use of the earlier described negativity bias of the media (Galpin & Trenz, 2017). Thus, it makes sense to connect the rise of Euroscepticism among public opinion to Eurosceptic media framing, as these two concepts seem to be connected in a complex and two-sided way.

The above-mentioned assumptions can be found back in the codes of the Soft Euroscepticism frame (table 2.2), as a lot of them entail critique on a certain part of the European Union. Understanding an article which is framed in such a way, does not require a lot of knowledge on how the European Union works. In this way, Soft Euroscepticism focusses on bits and pieces of the European Union, which might contribute to an overall negative attitude towards the European Union as a whole. Hard Euroscepticism, on the other side, is combined with (fundamental) statements about the European Union as a whole. This might mean that Hard Euroscepticism consists of statements and arguments that are expressed in a stronger and more radical rhetoric style. This can be found back in table 2.3, as the statements seem to be stronger and to have more fundamental roots.

As mentioned, both the arguments in table 2.2 (Soft Euroscepticism) and table 2.3 (Hard Euroscepticism) can be used by populist actors. Therefore, the Eurosceptic arguments can be overlapping with those of populism. For example, an anti-attitude towards the 'elite' often implies an example of the lack of citizen participation and democracy in European institutions. Or, an anti-attitude can be strengthened by examples of certain policies that are failing in the eyes of the populist actor. However, while the Soft Euroscepticism arguments solely refer to specific elements, the wider scope of the Hard Euroscepticism frame can be used in a context that might fit the five discussed dimensions of the Populism frame. Therefore, the expectation is that the Populism frame will better fit to Hard Euroscepticism than to Soft Euroscepticism. In other words, it is more likely that someone who expresses Hard Euroscepticism can be identified as a populist, than someone who expresses Soft Euroscepticism. The main reason for this has to do with the earlier discussed political style, in which the discourse, by using stronger words and metaphors, have a stronger overlap with Hard rather than with Soft Euroscepticism.

> Expectation: The Populism frame shows more overlap with the Hard Euroscepticism frame than with the Soft Euroscepticism frame.

Another aspect that can be a part of both Euroscepticism and Populism is the concept of Nationalism. In fact, Nationalism might be a fundamental concept for all Soft and Hard Euroscepticism arguments, and for the Populist arguments, as mentioned in table 2.2 till 2.4. In their political performance, Eurosceptic actors and populists often refer to the position of their own country regarding the European Union, the amount of self-determination, (in)dependence and the consequences of the European Union for the national identity. For example, one might claim that the European Union has a big democratic deficit (Hard Euroscepticism), that citizens' voices are thus not being heard in its institutions (Populism) and that this makes the country's citizens unable to express their national values and identity in the European Union (Nationalism). However, this claim can also be turned around, which means that Nationalism can be considered as the fundament of the claim of a democratic deficit. All in all, Nationalism is expected to have a complex, but important, relationship with both Euroscepticism and Populism. Therefore, in the framing analysis, codes that are already framed as Soft or Hard Eurosceptic, or populist, can also be labelled as nationalist. However, the major expectation is that the overlap with the Hard Euroscepticism frame is stronger than with the Soft Euroscepticism frame, as the claims of the Hard Eurosceptic arguments are expected to be more radical, which makes them more suitable for an overlap with a Nationalist argument. Furthermore, there are some arguments that can more directly be framed as nationalist, as described in table 2.5. In these arguments, actors do directly make a statement on the national pride or the national interest of a country, in relation with the European Union. However, these will often be combined with another statement that fits in another concept.

> Expectation: The Nationalism frame shows more overlap with the Hard Euroscepticism frame than with the Soft Euroscepticism frame.

The expected relationship between nationalism and populism is that arguments within the Nationalism frame will almost always overlap with arguments of the Populism frame. For example, stating that the EU is a threat for the national identity will always be supplemented by an argumentation for an anti-attitude towards the EU, or an argumentation that shows that it is not possible to resist the EU, which strengthens the claim of the threat. So, while the arguments of the Nationalism are expected to emerge independently, the expectation is that they can be combined with arguments from the Populism frame. Consequently, nationalism can also be combined with arguments from the Hard Euroscepticism frame, as these are, as argued, often related to arguments from the Populism frame.

> Expectation: The arguments of the Nationalism frame are predominantly overlapping with the arguments of the Populism frame.

> Expectation: Most empirical and definitional overlap occurs between the Hard Euroscepticism frame, Populism frame and Nationalism frame.

Consequently, the expected relationships between the frames and how they are used in the research, are as following. First, a distinction is being made between the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame. For both Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, codes are formulated that are expected to come to the fore in the framing analysis. Next to these, the Populism and Nationalism frame are analysed. Conceptually, the Nationalism is considered as overlapping with the Populism frame, as it is expected that nationalistic codes and arguments are often expressed in a populist political style, especially when it is

used in an anti-EU context. However, both frames consist of their own arguments, but at the same time, they are expected to overlap with arguments of the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame, as the argumentation itself does this, or the claims that are used refer to a populist political style or a background in nationalism. It is expected that most overlap occurs between the Nationalism, Populism and Hard Euroscepticism frame. The expected conceptual relationship can be visualised as following:

Figure 2.1: Expected relationship between the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame

This figure shows that there is an expected overlap between the Hard Euroscepticism, Nationalism and Populism frame. While this overlap is considered as important, the expectation is that all arguments of these three frames are also used independent from each other. Furthermore, it is expected that there is no significant overlap between the Soft Euroscepticism frame and the other frames.

One of the aims of the framing analysis in this research, is to make a connection between the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame. The expected relationship between these frames, as defined in this section, helps the researcher to place the framing analysis in a theoretical context. After the framing analysis, the content of the different are compared, and the overlap is analysed. In this way, the framing analysis provides an empirical approval or rejection of the expected relationship above.

In sum, the main frames of this research, which are used to reveal a possible empirical relationship between public opinion on the European Union and Euroscepticism in media framing, are Soft Euroscepticism and Hard Euroscepticism. All arguments within these frames have received a code that is used in the codebook, which is the basis for the framing analysis (Annex I – Codebook for framing analysis).

Chapter 3 – Methodology

To answer the research questions, four different methods are used for data gathering. First, data of public opinion towards the EU were gathered, building on the Eurobarometer surveys from 2000 until 2017 (editions 53-87). Second, a database of newspaper articles was created, by using the available articles from four selected newspapers on LexisNexis. Third, the critical moments were defined, which are the most relevant periods on which the further analysis is focussed. Fourth, a preliminary analysis on the created newspaper articles database was done to gather the necessary information on the most occurring codes within the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame, which resulted in the codebook for the framing analysis (Annex I). Fifth, a framing analysis was done, building on the codes of the codebook, and the selected articles from the database around the defined critical moments. After the framing analysis, a comparative analysis was done, to find overlap between public opinion on the EU and the content and occurrence of the analysed frames. Also, the overlap between the frames is analysed in this part. Finally, the seventh part consists of a comparative analysis in which both elements of the latter part are discussed, focussing on the similarities and differences between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the 7 different phases and the corresponding methods, sources and results, which are further discussed in sections 3.1 until 3.7 in this chapter.

Phase	Method	Sources	Results
1. Data gathering: Public opinion on the EU	Analysis of selected questions during 2000-2017	Eurobarometer surveys 53-87	Chapter 4.1 and 5.1
2. Data gathering: Creating database of articles containing a Eurosceptic element	'Powersearch' on LexisNexis	NRC Handelsblad, de Telegraaf, the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph	Chapter 4.2 and 5.2
3. Preliminary analysis: Definition of critical moments	Combining public opinion and newspaper database	Public opinion (Phase 1) and database from LexisNexis (Phase 2)	Chapter 4.2 and 5.2
4. Preliminary analysis: Creating codebook	Preliminary framing analysis on newspaper articles and academic literature	Database from LexisNexis (Phase 2) and academic literature	Chapter 2
5. Data analysis: Content and occurrence of pre-defined frames	Framing analysis	Database from LexisNexis (Phase 1) during critical moments	Chapter 4.2.2 and 5.2.2
6. Data analysis: Influence public opinion and framing, and overlap between frames	Comparative analysis	Chapter 4.1 – 4.3 and 5.1 – 5.3	Chapter 4.2.3, 4.3 and 5.2.3, 5.3
7. Data analysis: Comparison NL and UK	Comparative analysis	Chapter 4.4 and 5.4	Chapter 6
Table 3.1: Methodology of the research and corresponding methods, sources and chapters			

3.1 Data gathering: Public opinion on the EU

The first phase of the research consists of an analysis of general opinion and attitudes of Dutch and British citizens towards the European Union. The determination of this public opinion is done by using the surveys of the Eurobarometer in the period 2000-2017, which entails the editions 53 until 87. The outcome of the public opinion analysis is the answer on sub-question 1.

> Sub-question 1: *What is public opinion on the European Union in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom during the period 2000-2017?*

According to the European Commission (2017ᵃ), the Eurobarometer surveys 'monitor the evolution of public opinion in all 28 EU Member States. The aim is to assess EU citizens' awareness of and support for the European Union's activities.' (European Commission, 2017ᵃ). There are four different kinds of Eurobarometer's. In this research, the Standard Eurobarometer is used. The Standard Eurobarometer is a survey which is done twice a year in each member state. The survey consists of the results of approximately 1000 face to face interviews on the perceptions of citizens towards their own government, European institutions or actual issues, like the economic situation. The first Standard Eurobarometer was established in 1974. The questions are the same in each member state, which makes it suitable to use in a comparative study. While not all questions are exactly the same over the years, some topics come to the fore in every survey, which makes the Eurobarometer a suitable database for a comparison between different years, and between different countries.

In total, there are four questions from the Eurobarometer that are asked in both the UK and the Netherlands over the whole period (with some exceptions). These questions provide a general overview of public opinion towards the EU and are therefore relevant to analyse in this research. These four questions are:

1. EBQ1 – Trust in the European Institutions: 'I would like to ask you a question about how much you trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it → The European Union'
2. EBQ2 – The general image of the European Union: 'In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?'
3. EBQ5 – Opinion on membership in general: 'Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY's) membership of the European Union is...' → a good thing, a bad thing, neither good or bad, don't know'
4. EBQ6 – Benefits of the European Union: 'Taking everything into account, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?'

The combination of the answers of these four questions, in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the European Union in total, provides a clear overview of public opinion on the European Union in the member states. These answers are thus used to define public opinion, and partly to define the critical moments, during which Euroscepticism is expected to increase or decrease. Next to giving a good overview, these questions are also chosen because they are asked in almost every Eurobarometer survey during the period 2000-2017. However, there are 19 out of 140 cases, which are marked grey in the results, in which no appropriate answer could be found in the Eurobarometer, or in which the question was not asked. In these cases, an average of the answers before and after is taken. In this way these missing answers do not influence the results. Database Annex A (Results Public Opinion

Eurobarometer) shows the datasheet with the answers on the Eurobarometer questions and can be requested at the researcher. In the empirical chapters, an average of the answers of the four analysed questions has been made and used as an indicator for public opinion towards the European Union. The reason for this is that an average number of percentages provides a clear general overview, which can be used over the whole period, as well as in both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, a distinction has been made between positive answers (about the EU), negative answers and 'don't know' answers, which refer to answers on which the respondents did not express any opinion on the EU.

3.2 Data gathering: Creating a database of articles

The second phase of the research is the creation of a database of articles, which is used in the framing analysis. Also, a preliminary analysis for defining the critical moments and the codes for the codebook is done by using this database. This section describes how the database is built, by discussing the selection of newspapers, the used search-term on LexisNexis and the further selection of articles.

3.2.1 Selection of newspapers

The newspapers are selected with help from an earlier research of Leruth et al (2017), who did an expert survey on the political orientation and the position on European integration of newspapers. In their analysis, this information is applied to the political orientation of their readers and their position on European integration. In this research, the survey and analysis of Leruth et al. are used to select two newspapers from the Netherlands and two newspapers from the UK that can be compared in a comprehensive way. This has been done by combining two newspapers; one from the Netherlands and one from the UK, that are comparable in political orientation, position on European integration, circulation and readers.

The scale that is used for the position of European integration, as made by Leruth et al (2017), is 1-7, in which one is 'Strongly opposed' and seven is 'Strongly in favour'. The scale that is used for the political orientation of the newspaper is 1-11, in which 1 is 'Extreme-left' and 11 is 'Extreme-right'. The first combination is 'NRC Handelsblad' and 'the Guardian'. Table 3.2 below shows the similarities and differences between these two newspapers.

	Circulation (2016)	Position European integration	Political orientation newspaper	Political orientation readers
NRC Handelsblad	201.750	5.49 (Euro-ambivalent to Euro-positive)	6.21 (Centre right)	Liberal right, D66
The Guardian	164.163	5.64 (Euro-ambivalent to Euro-positive)	4.22 (Centre left)	Left-wing, Labour and Liberal Democrats
Table 3.2: Characteristics of NRC Handelsblad and the Guardian				

Although the political orientation and circulation of these newspapers do not match evidently, the position towards European integration is quite comparable. Also, the political orientation of the readers can be considered as quite comparable. Furthermore, in both countries, these newspapers are opponents of the other two chosen newspapers, 'de Telegraaf' and 'the Daily/Sunday Telegraph', which are showed in table 3.3 below.

	Circulation (2016)	Position European integration	Political orientation newspaper	Political orientation readers
Telegraaf	382.000	2.53 (Euro-sceptic)	8.37 (Right)	PVV, VVD, CDA, 50PLUS
The Daily/Sunday Telegraph	472.033	1.81 (Euro-sceptic	8.31 (Right)	Conservative Party, Ulster Unionist Party, UKIP
Table 3.3: Characteristics of Telegraaf and the Daily Telegraph				

These two newspapers are comparable on both their position on European integration, and the political orientation of the newspapers and the readers.

By choosing these four newspapers, articles are retrieved that are different from each other, as the newspapers in the countries are from different political spectrums and have an opposing view towards the European Union. Furthermore, the newspapers are representative for the inhabitants of both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

3.2.2 Search-term on LexisNexis

The next step in creating a database of newspaper articles was the definition of a search-term, which is used to search for articles in LexisNexis. During the whole analysis, the search term 'Europe OR European Union OR EU OR Brussels w/10 scep***** OR anti' has been used. (For the Netherlands, this was, 'Europa OR Europese Unie OR eu OR Brussel w/10 kritiek OR scep***** OR anti'). After this search, the results have been refined to 'International Relations & Security', 'International Organisations and Bodies' and 'European Union'. This search term has been chosen because it includes the several terms that were expected to generally be used in referring to the European Union. The term also includes several options in which these terms can be combined with criticism or scepticism. The refinement has been done to come to a manageable number of articles for this research.

3.2.3 Selection of articles

To create a database of articles, the earlier described search-term has been applied at the 'Powersearch' option of Lexisnexis, on the four selected newspapers. To make the results of the search more manageable, the timespan of 2000-2017 has been divided into four shorter periods; 2000-2004, 2005-2009, 2010-2014 and 2015-2017. The first three periods end with a European election (2004, 2009 and 2014), while in the last period, the Brexit referendum (2016) has a central role. The result of this analysis is a total amount of 6454 articles. To make the number of articles more manageable for the research, and to make sure that the articles entail a Eurosceptic element, a selection has been made. During this selection, articles that contain the search-term, but are not relevant for the research, were excluded. Examples of these articles are, hits on anti-immigration or anti-Semitism in Europe, or specific articles on the terrorist attacks in Brussels. Furthermore, articles that did not include a domestic perspective on the European Union were excluded, as these could, in the end, not lead to a connection with public opinion in the Netherlands or the UK. Finally, articles that were solely positive concerning the EU (mainly in the NRC and the Guardian), were excluded from the analysis. These articles were in the search results because they, for example, mentioned opponents of the EU (anti-EU) one time, without any further explanation on specific Euroscepticism. In the end, after the selection, the number of articles declined from 6454 to 1672 articles. Due to the search-term and the selection, the complete database can be characterized as a database with articles containing a Eurosceptic element. The articles all have a predominant negative focus on the EU while, however, the scope and content of this Euroscepticism is entirely different. Annex II (Amount of articles containing

a Eurosceptic element) provides an overview of the amount of articles for each newspaper in each period, before as well as after the selection. The articles from the column 'Amount of articles after selection' are used as the database for the definition of the critical moments (section 3.3) as well as for the operationalization of the frames and the building of the codebook (section 3.4). Annex II also shows the amount of articles that are actually analysed in the framing analysis, which is described in section 3.5. The final database of the newspaper articles, which consist of the articles in the following order; the Netherlands: NRC Handelsblad (Database Annex B-F), de Telegraaf (Database Annex G-J), United Kingdom: The Guardian (Database Annex K-o), and the Daily Telegraph (Database Annex P-S) can be requested at the researcher.

3.3 Preliminary analysis: Determination of critical moments of Euroscepticism

While this preliminary analysis can be partly regarded as results, the researcher has chosen to place this in the methodology chapter. The reason for this is that the critical moments are the fundaments on which the research is built. With help from the tables in this section, the framing analysis and the comparative analyses have been done. Therefore, this section is perceived as an important part in building the research framework. The aim of this section is to answer sub-question 2.

> Sub-question 2: *What are critical moments in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, during the period 2000-2017, that may increase the use of Eurosceptic, Populist and Nationalist framings?*

It is expected that the influence of media framing on public opinion is most visible during periods in which the topic of the EU is more present in both the public debate and in newspaper articles; more negative media framing on the EU in newspapers may lead to an increasing amount of negative answers in the Eurobarometer. To define these periods, data from both phase 1 (Eurobarometer survey) and phase 2 (the number of articles) is combined. The outcomes of this preliminary analysis are the so-called 'Critical moments'. This term is used in this research as 'a specific period during which one might expect an increase or decline in Euroscepticism among public opinion as well as in newspaper articles'. In practice, these critical moments take place around European and national elections, and around referenda on an EU-issue, as (negative) attention on the EU increases around these periods. In Database Annex T (Determination of critical moments), which can be requested at the researcher, an overview on the overlap between the amount of articles, the changes in public opinion and the (national and European) elections and the referenda, in the Netherlands and the UK is provided. The graphs in Annex T show that not every change, in the amount of articles or public opinion, takes place exactly during the period of the election or referendum. Therefore, the analysis consists of both a period (of half a year) before and after the actual date of the election or referendum; the run-up and the aftermath. Table 3.4 below provides an overview of the critical moments in the Netherlands, including the corresponding data which is used for the analysis of these critical moments.

Name	Event	Period	Date	Period framing analysis	Eurobarometer
NL1	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	2002-1*	15-5-2002	2001 (1) – 2002 (2)	55 - 58
NL2	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	2003-1	22-1-2003	2002 (2) – 2003 (2)	58 - 60
NL3	European elections	2004-2*	10-6-2004	2004 (1) – 2004 (2)	61 - 62
NL4	Referendum on the European Constitution	2005-1	1-6-2005	2004 (2) – 2005 (2)	62 - 64
NL5	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	2006-2	22-11-2006	2006 (2) – 2007 (1)	66 - 67
NL6	European elections	2009-1	4-6-2009	2009 (1) – 2009 (2)	71 - 72
NL7	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	2010-1	9-6-2010	2010 (1) – 2010 (2)	73 - 74
NL8	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	2012-2	12-9-2012	2012 (1) – 2013 (1)	77 - 79
NL9	European elections	2014-1	22-5-2014	2014 (1) – 2015 (1)	81 - 83
NL10	Referendum on Ukraine association agreement	2016-1**	6-4-2016 & 23-6-2016	2016 (1) – 2016 (2)	85 - 86
NL11	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	2017-1	15-3-2017	2016 (2) – 2017 (1)	86 - 87

*The addition 1 refers to January-June 2 refers to July-December
**While the Referendum took place in the UK, the discussions around it, and around the outcome, was widely discussed in the Netherlands

Table 3.4: Critical Moments and corresponding data in the Netherlands

Table 3.5 below provides an overview of the critical moments, and corresponding data, in the United Kingdom.

Name	Event	Period	Date	Period framing analysis	Eurobarometer
UK1	General elections	2001-1	7-6-2001	2000 (2) – 2001 (2)	54 - 56
UK2	European elections	2004-2	10-6-2004	2003 (2) – 2004 (2)	60 - 62
UK3	General elections	2005-1	5-5-2005	2004 (2) – 2005 (2)	62 - 64
UK4	European elections	2009-1	4-6-2009	2009 (1) – 2009 (2)	70 - 72
UK5	General elections	2010-1	6-5-2010	2009 (2) – 2010 (2)	72 - 74
UK6	European elections	2014-1	22-5-2014	2013 (2) – 2014 (2)	80 - 82
UK7	General elections	2015-1	7-5-2015	2014 (2) – 2015 (2)	82 - 84
UK8	Referendum on European Union membership (Brexit)	2016-1	23-6-2016	2015 (2) – 2016 (2)	84 - 86
UK9	General elections	2017-1	8-6-2017	2016 (2) – 2017 (1)	86 - 87

Table 3.5: Critical Moments and corresponding data in the United Kingdom

Table 3.4 and 3.5 are the basis for further analysis. This means that, for example, the information on the general elections in 2001 in the UK (including context of the elections and focus of public debate) is combined with the results from Eurobarometer 54, 55 and 56 (public opinion) and with the articles from the database in the periods 2000(2), 2001(1) and 2001(2). Combining these different data provides a complete overview of public opinion and public debate on the European Union before, during and after the general elections of 2001. In some cases, for example UK7 and UK8, there is an overlap in episodes; both critical moments include episode 2015(2) in the analysis. This overlap is a

consequence of the fact that some critical moments are following each other up very closely. It is impossible to create a strict division between these critical moments, as the public opinion on the European Union can at the same time be triggered by different critical moments in both the (near) past or future. It is inevitable that public debate around the elections of 2015 was already partly focussed on the Brexit referendum in 2016. Therefore, it is hard, and not necessary, to split these episodes. From the content of the frames, it becomes evident what arguments are most appearing during these periods of overlap. Furthermore, some critical moments only entail two periods for the framing analysis, for example NL7, which only considers 2010(1) and 2010(2). In these cases, the number of articles was too low to consider these periods in the analysis.

3.4 Preliminary analysis: Conceptual approach and codebook for framing analysis

As argued in the Introduction and Chapter 2, the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame are the focus of the research. As explained in section 2.1, each frame consists of different arguments, which are found and categorized by translating them into codes. The preliminary analysis, which aimed to build the codebook for framing analysis is a combination of both deductive coding, by using relevant academic literature for each frame, and inductive coding, by analysing the content of a number of selected newspaper articles. The deductive coding of literature enabled the researcher to define every frame, and to explore the main arguments that come to the fore in earlier researches. Part of these main arguments are translated into codes in the codebook. The selection of the inductive coding has been made by including the periods in which there is a peak in Eurosceptic articles in both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; 2007, 2009, 2012, 2014 and 2016. From these years, five articles from each newspaper and country (a total number of 20 articles) were selected and analysed. The analysis consisted of a scan, after which the main arguments regarding the European Union were collected. These arguments were compared with the earlier deductive findings from the literature. Finally, the findings from the literature were combined with the findings from the preliminary analysis of the Eurosceptic articles, which resulted in the findings in section 2.2 till 2.5 and in the codebook for framing analysis (Annex I).

3.5 Data analysis: framing analysis of newspaper articles

The fifth phase of the research consists of a framing analysis of newspapers articles. As explained in chapter 2, the following definition of 'framing' is used: 'select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation (Entman, 1993:52). The frames are thus explained as 'a way of making sense of the world and providing simple and easily grasped analysis of complex issues' (Caiani and Della Porta, 2001 in Galpin and Trenz, 2017:56). During the analysis, the codes of the codebook (Annex I) are used as so-called framing devices. According to van Gorp and van der Groot, (2012) framing devices are 'manifest elements in a message that function as demonstrable indicators of the frame' (van Gorp and van der Groot, 2012: 131). Lakoff (2010), states that these devices, or words, are used to activate the desired frame, 'in order to communicate a complex fact or a complex truth' (Lakoff, 2010: 73). Ultimately, the aim of the framing analysis is to reveal the different arguments that are used within each frame, and thereby answering sub-question 3 and 4.

Sub-question 3: *What Soft and Hard Eurosceptic framings are used in newspapers in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom during the critical moments in the period 2000-2017?*

Sub-question 4: *What Populist and Nationalist framings are used in newspapers in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom during the critical moments in the period 2000-2017?*

As earlier mentioned, table 3.4 and 3.5, which provide an overview of the (data of the) critical moments, are used as the basis of the framing analysis. Thus, for critical moment NL1, all articles from the period 2001(1), 2001(2) and 2002(1) from NRC Handelsblad and the Telegraaf are analysed. This applies for all critical moments, except for the articles of the Guardian in the periods 2014(1), 2015(1), 2015(2), 2016(1), 2016(2) and 2017(1). In these periods, the number of articles is too high for the scope of this research. Therefore, every second article is analysed in these periods, which results in half of the total amount of articles available. Annex II shows the amount of articles that is analysed from every newspaper for every period. From the table in Annex II, it becomes clear that 80,3% of the selected articles from the Netherlands is analysed, and 55,2% from the United Kingdom. This difference can be connected to the amount of critical moments (11 in the Netherlands and 9 in the United Kingdom), and the absolute amount of articles in the United Kingdom, which was too high to analyse. In the end, 443 articles from the Netherlands are analysed, and 618 articles from the United Kingdom. These numbers are in accordance with the total amount of articles, which is higher in the United Kingdom. The complete datasheets of the results of the framing analysis can be requested at the researcher. (Database Annex U – Results NRC(NL), Database Annex V – Results TL(NL), Database Annex W – Results GU(UK) and Database Annex x – Results DT(UK)).

3.6 Data analysis: comparative analysis of frames and public opinion
The next phase in the research is the comparison of phase 1 (public opinion from the Eurobarometer) and phase 5 (content and occurrence of the frames). In this way, the last two sub-questions are answered;

Sub-question 5: *How does the content of the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame, that emerge from the selected newspaper articles, relate to each other?*

Sub-question 6: *How does the content of the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame relate to public opinion in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom during the period 2000-2017?*

Sub-question 5 is answered by combining the dynamics of occurrence of the four different frames, and the overlapping content of the frames. Sub-question 6 is answered by combining the occurrence and content of the frames (section 4.2 and 5.2) with changes in public opinion, as elaborated in section 4.1 and 5.1. As such, this comparative analysis has a dual aim.

3.7 Data analysis: comparative analysis of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
The final phase of the research consists of a comparison between the results of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. As argued in the Introduction (section 1.4), this comparison gives an overview of two countries with a traditionally different attitude and public opinion towards the European Union. Comparing these two specific countries, provides a valid and stronger overview on the overlap between the four frames and public opinion on the EU. Therefore, this part, which is elaborated in Chapter 6, strengthens the findings of the first comparative analysis on the overlap between the frames, and the influence of Eurosceptic, Populist and Nationalist framing on public opinion towards

the EU. With help from the findings in chapter 4 and 5, main similarities and consequences between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are elaborated on.

The methodology of this research, including the different phases and the chapters in which each phase is elaborated is summarized in figure 3.1 below.

Figure 3.1: Graphical visualization of the methodology of the research. From left to right: phase of the research – source/outcome/method – Methodology chapter → Result chapter – Sub-question

Results

Chapter 4 - Public opinion and four frames on the European Union in the Netherlands

This chapter describes the results from the public opinion analyses and the framing analysis of the newspaper articles in the Netherlands. As already described in chapter 3 (Methodology), 11 critical moments have been selected to analyse the Eurosceptic, Populist and Nationalist framing dynamics and public opinion on the EU in the Netherlands. These critical moments consist of three different events: the national parliamentary elections (in Dutch: 'Tweede Kamerverkiezingen'), which took place in 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012 and 2017; the European elections, which took place in 2004, 2009 and 2014, and referendums regarding European issues, which were the referendum in 2005 (on the European Constitution) and 2016 (on the Ukraine association agreement). Furthermore, the referendum on the UK's membership on the EU has been included, as a lot of articles in the Netherlands cover this event. As the Brexit referendum took place within the same period as the Ukraine association agreement referendum (2016-1), the results of these referenda are combined. Each critical moment entails an episode of approximately 1 or 2 years, in which the period of the election/referendum is included, as well as the episode before and afterwards, depending on the number of articles available. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the selected critical moments and their corresponding episodes and data. A total overview of the results of the Netherlands can be requested at the researcher (Database Annex Y) and shows all data available for each critical moment.

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Amount of articles
NL1	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	15-5-2002	2002-1	55 - 58	2001 (1) – 2002 (2)	31
NL2	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	22-1-2003	2003-1	58 - 60	2002 (2) – 2003 (2)	27
NL3	European elections	10-6-2004	2004-1	61 - 62	2004 (1) – 2004 (2)	39
NL4	Referendum on the European Constitution	1-6-2005	2005-1	62 - 64	2004 (2) – 2005 (2)	57
NL5	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	22-11-2006	2006-2	66 - 67	2006 (2) – 2007 (1)	21
NL6	European elections	4-6-2009	2009-1	71 - 72	2009 (1) – 2009 (2)	31
NL7	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	9-6-2010	2010-1	73 - 74	2010 (1) – 2010 (2)	18
NL8	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	12-9-2012	2012-2	77 - 79	2012 (1) – 2013 (1)	86
NL9	European elections	22-5-2014	2014-1	81 - 83	2014 (1) – 2015 (1)	82
NL10	Referendum on Ukraine association agreement & UK EU-membership (Brexit)	6-4-2016 23-6-2016	2016-1	85 - 86	2016 (1) – 2016 (2)	58
NL11	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	15-3-2017	2017-1	86 - 87	2016 (2) – 2017 (1)	43

Table 4.1: Overview critical moments in the Netherlands

The structure of this chapter is as following: section 4.1 discusses the results of the Eurobarometer, which results in the average percentages of positive and negative answers, and on 'don't know' answers. These averages are perceived as public opinion towards the EU. Then, section 4.2 discusses the results of the framing analysis. After a general overview of the amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element (4.2.1), each pre-defined critical moment is discussed independently (4.2.2). Each critical moment is structured the same way; first, the most used arguments within the four frames

(Soft Euroscepticism, Hard Euroscepticism, Populism, Nationalism) in the selected newspaper articles are discussed. Second, the occurrence of each frame during that critical moment is visualised and shortly discussed. Finally, each critical moment ends with a conclusion on the most important themes of public debate and the arguments that each frame uses to frame this theme. After that, section 4.2.3 discusses the co-occurrence of the frames, by using the content and the correlations between them. Finally, the conclusions from sections 4.1 and 4.2 are combined in section 4.3, which first discusses the main themes in public debate that shape the occasion for the frames, and second, the shifts in public opinion and the content of the frames.

4.1 Public opinion on the EU: Eurobarometer

This section discusses the shifts in public opinion towards the EU, as found in the Eurobarometer. In order to do this, first a general overview of the shifts in public opinion is made. Then, public opinion is divided into seven periods, in which public opinion shifts either positively or negatively. After the determination of these periods, the content of the period is elaborated on, by describing how public opinion changed and what critical moment(s) took place during the period.

4.1.1 General overview public opinion about the EU

Graph 4.1 below shows the movements of public opinion towards the EU in the Netherlands during the period 2000-2017. Overall, public opinion on the EU in the Netherlands is quite positive, as the percentages of positive answers are higher than the negative answers during the whole period. The highest measured percentage of positive answers is 68%, in the survey of 2008-2. The lowest measured percentage of positive answers is 46,8% can be found in 2013-1, which corresponds with the highest measured percentage of negative answers; 33,3%. In general, the average percentage of positive answers is 56%, while the average of the negative answers is 24%. Correspondingly, the average percentage of respondents that answer 'don't know' is 21%. It can be concluded that public opinion in the Netherlands is quite stable, as the highest deviation from the averages is 12%. However, when looking more in depth to the changes of the percentages, seven periods can be designated in which public opinion towards the EU changed. These periods are partly overlapping with the critical moments and are discussed in section 4.2.2 below.

Graph 4.1: Public opinion on the EU in the Netherlands during the period 2000-2017, as found in the Eurobarometer

4.1.2 Seven periods of change in public opinion

This section divides the whole period into seven periods, in which public opinion changes, because looking at public opinion during the whole period (2000-2017) does not lead to specific conclusions. These periods are made by using the movements of the answers, as showed in graph 4.1. Specifically, the periods are chosen based on a more positive or negative change of public opinion. Following both the shifts of the positive and negative answers, the limits of the periods are determined by looking at when a shift takes place. Table 4.2 shows an overview of the seven periods, the predominant changes that occur during these periods, and which critical moments occur during this period. The following section discusses each of these periods by providing background information on the (political) context of the critical moment and describing the changes in public opinion and the number of articles during the period.

Number	Period	Δ % Positive	Δ % Negative	Critical moment(s)
1.	2001(2) – 2003(2)	-13	+13	NL1 (NE*) NL2 (NE)
2.	2003(2) – 2004(2)	+8,5	-3	NL3 (EE*)
3.	2004(2) – 2005(2)	-3,5	+4	NL4 (RE*)
4.	2005(2) – 2007(1)	+12	-10	NL5 (NE)
5.	2007(1) – 2009(1)	-3	-0,7	NL6 (EE)
6.	2009(2) – 2013(1)	-17,5	+16	NL7 (NE) NL8 (NE)
7.	2013(1) – 2017(1)	+14	-10	NL9 (EE) NL10 (RE) NL11 (NE)
* NE = National Election, EE = European Election, RE = Referendum				
Table 4.2: Periods in which EB public opinion changes				

Period 1: 2001(2) – 2003(2): Increasing Euroscepticism caused by election campaigns
The first period starts in 2001(2), when positive answers decline, and negative answers increase, and ends in 2003(2), when positive answers increase, and negative answers decline. As such, the general context of this period consists of a public opinion that has an increasing negative attitude towards the EU. Within this period, the general elections of 2002 (NL1) and 2003 (NL2) take place. The elections of 2002 (NL1) are characterized by the murder on the leader of the LPF Pim Fortuyn, nine days before the elections. Fortuyn is often characterized as a charismatic leader with a populist discourse on many themes, among others the European Union. The murder took place a few days before the elections, therefore the election campaign stopped already a few days before the elections actually took place (Parlement.com, 2002). The influence of Fortuyn, who used increasing populist and nationalist language on the EU are reflected in public opinion, as the percentages of the positive answers declines during the run-up to the elections (from 61,5% in 2001-2 to 58% in 2002-1). Furthermore, this period shows a slight increase in negative answers and 'don't know' answers, which indicates that respondents may be influenced by populist and nationalist language. The elections of 2003 (NL2), took place after the fall of the government Balkenende-I, which was a coalition of Christian democrats (CDA), Liberals (VVD) and of the party of the murdered Pim Fortuyn (LPF). During these elections, asylum and immigration policies were high on the agenda, while this was not specifically connected to the EU (Hippe et. al, 2004). Also, during the elections of 2003, public opinion changes towards more negativity, as positive answers still decline, while the negative answers are significantly increase, mainly in the period after the elections. After the elections, the number of respondents that answered 'don't know' declined as well, which indicates that this group was developing a more negative public opinion on the EU. In totality, positive answers declined from 61,5% (2001-2) to 48,3% (2003-2), negative answers increased from 15% (2001-2) to 27,5% (2003-2) and 'don't know' answers increased from 23,5% (2001-2) to 31% (2003-1), and later declined to 24% (2003-2), in this period.

Period 2: 2003(2) – 2004(2): European elections of 2004 – increasing attention and awareness for EU

The second period of change in public opinion takes place between 2003(2) and 2004(2), which is exactly the period around the European elections of 2004. During the election campaign, national politicians try to translate European issues into domestic politics, to establish a higher turnout for the elections (Hippe et. al, 2005). From that perspective they succeeded, as the turnout increased from 29,9% in 1999 to 39,3% in 2004. One of the key issues during the elections was the European Constitution, and corresponding discussions on the amount of integration in the EU. Also, Euroscepticism increased, as next to traditionally Eurosceptical parties, like the SP, new parties joined the elections, like the party of Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and 'Europa Transparant'. These parties mainly used the campaign to communicate on the European Constitution and the new immigration and freedom of movement policies, that evolved out of the Enlargement of 2004. The percentages of the positive answers increased (from 48,3% to 56,7%), the negative answers declined slightly (from 27,5% to 28,5% to 24,8%), while the percentage of the 'don't know' answers declined significantly in this period, from 24,2 (in 2003-2) to 18,5% (in 2004-2). As such, it can be concluded that, in this period, which is characterized by the uprising of Eurosceptical parties, caused an increasing awareness on the EU, which means that more people became outspokenly positive or negative, but mainly positive, about the European Union.

Period 3: 2004(2) – 2005(2): Referendum on EU Constitution causes lower trust in EU

The third period takes place from 2004(2) to 2005(2) and covers the period around the European Constitution referendum in 2005 (NL4). Discussions on the content of the Constitution were mainly focussed on the amount of European integration versus the protection of national sovereignty and independence, the constitutional securing of European Citizenship and the internal free-market economy (Europa-nu, 2005). The run-up to the referendum on the European Constitutions shows a slightly more negative public opinion towards the EU in the Netherlands. In general, the positive answers changed from 56,8% in 2004-2 to 53,3% in 2005-2, while the negative answers changed from 24,8% to 29%. As shown in graph 4.8, this change may not be that substantial. However, zooming in on the different questions of the Eurobarometer shows that the trust in the EU institutions (EBQ1) decreases significantly during this period; the negative answers change from 41% (in 2004-2) to 52% (in 2005-1). Also, the general image of the EU is perceived more negative, as the positive answers on EBQ2 change from 44% in 2004-2 to 38% in 2005-1. This more negative view towards the EU is confirmed in the results of the referendum; 61,5% of the votes against the EU Constitution, while 38,5% in favour. The turn-out of the referendum was 63,3%, which is quite higher than the turn-out of the European Elections in 2004, which was 39%.

Period 4: 2005(2) – 2007(1): PVV in election campaign causes slight increase of Euroscepticism

The fourth period starts after the referendum (2005-2) and lasts until 2007-1. In general, public opinion grows more positive (from 53,3% in 2005-2 to 65,3% in 2007-1) and less negative (from 29% in 2005-2 to 19% in 2007-1). However, the course of public opinion is different during the run-up to the national elections in 2006 (NL5). During the run-up to these elections, positive answers slightly decrease (54,5% in 2006-2), while negative answers increase (26,8% in 2006-2). The elections of 2006 are characterized by increasing polarization between traditionally left and right parties, and the uprising of the populist Party of the Freedom (PVV) of Geert Wilders (Lucardie et. al, 2008). The PVV is known for its anti-Islam and anti-Europe positions, surrounded by populist language, which might explain the increasing negativity in public opinion during the election campaign. After the elections public opinion changes towards more positivity again, which indicates that Euroscepticism during the campaign has a had a small influence though.

Period 5: 2007(1) – 2009(1): increasing negative public opinion during European elections 2009

The fifth period is characterized by a relatively stable positive public opinion on the EU and takes place from 2007-1 until 2009-1. While positive answers are the highest measured of the whole period (68%

in 2008-2), they decline from period 2009-1 on, while 'don't know' answers slightly increase. This can be explained by the European elections of 2009 (NL6). Different from the elections in 2004, the government stated that these elections had to be about Europe, instead of having a focus on domestic issues (Voerman & van de Walle, 2009).   This may be one of the reasons for the declining turnout; 36,75% (this was 39,26% in 2004). Furthermore, these were the first European elections in which the PVV joined, which caused an increasing anti-European language during the election campaign. During the run-up to the elections, positive answers declined from 68% to 62,3% (in 2009-1), negative answers increased slightly from 17% (in 2008-2) to 18,3% (in 2009-1) and 'don't know' answers increased from 15% (in 2008-2) to 19,4% (in 2009-1).

Period 6: 2009(2) – 2013(1): National elections of 2010 and 2012 – increasing influence of PVV in election campaigns and stronger growing connection between Euroscepticism in newspapers and among public opinion
The sixth period starts after the European elections (2009-2) and endures until 2013-1. In general, public opinion grows increasingly negative during this period. Two national elections take place during this period; in 2010 (NL7) and in 2012 (NL8). The elections of 2010 were called after disagreement within the government about a military intervention in Uruzgan (Afghanistan). In the election campaign, Eurosceptical parties, like the PVV were highly apparent. However, communications of the PVV were majorly anti-Islam, rather than anti-EU. The most discussed EU-related topic was the Euro-crisis, which started in 2008, and corresponding discussions on the Euro, and how monetary cooperation in the EU should look like (de Ruiter, 2013). The election results, in which the PVV gained 15,6% of the votes, together with the negative pattern in the Eurobarometer may indicate that scepticism towards the EU is more apparent among the population.

Around the elections of 2012 (NL8), public opinion changes even more negatively. Similar to the elections of 2010, discussions on the EU mainly considered the Euro-crisis, and the amount of preferred economic, monetary and political integration in the EU. During this election campaign, the PVV combines its anti-Islam rhetoric with anti-EU rhetoric, by claiming that Turkey should not be a member of the EU (Parlement.com, 2012). Meanwhile, public opinion on the EU grows more negative; the percentages of positive answers decline from 64,3% (in 2009-2) to 46,8% (in 2013-1), which is the lowest measured percentage within the whole analysis. The percentage of the negative answers increases from 17,3% (in 2009-2) to 33,3% (in 2013-1). The amount of respondents that answered 'don't know' remains relatively stable around 20%. This indicates that, in a context of wider political polarisation and anti-EU language in the election campaigns of 2010 and 2012, public opinion is also growing more negative towards the EU.

Period 7: 2013(1) – 2017(1): Declining Euroscepticism around EU elections of 2014 and, Ukraine referendum in 2016 and national elections in 2017
The final period starts in 2013-1 and lasts until 2017-1. In general, this period is characterized by an increasing positive public opinion (from 46,8% in 2013-1 to 60,8% in 2017-1), together with a decline of negative answers (from 33,3% in 2013-1 to 23,3% in 2017-1) and in 'don't know' answers (from 19,9% in 2013-1 to 15,9% in 2017-1). Three critical moments take place during this period. The first is the European elections of 2014 (NL9). These were the first European elections that were held after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which is the renegotiation of the European Constitution, that was rejected by the Dutch population in 2005. Europe-wide, these elections mean a stronger competition between pro- and anti-EU parties. While in other member states Eurosceptical parties (like UKIP in the UK and Front National in France) won the elections, the PVV, which is the most anti-EU party in the Netherlands, lost one seat compared to the elections in 2009 (Europa-nu, 2014). It can thus be concluded that the growing scepticism in the EU did not significantly occur in the Netherlands. This is also reflected in Eurobarometer public opinion, as the course of the positive, negative and 'don't know' answers shows no significant changes during the run-up to the elections.

The second critical moment that takes place during this period is the referendum on the Ukrainian association with the EU in 2016 (NL10). This referendum was called upon by a far-right, populist media group in the Netherlands, 'GeenStijl'. Opponents of the agreement were fearing that the agreement with Ukraine meant basically an agreement for future accession in the EU, which is a sensitive issue, regarding the taking down of a passenger plane, with predominantly Dutch citizens, above Ukraine in 2015 (Heck, 2016). Other opponents used the referendum to express their rejection towards the EU. However, public discussion on the EU is dominated by another referendum; the Brexit referendum in the UK, which took place several months after the Dutch referendum. As such, the Eurosceptic content of articles mainly covered the Brexit referendum, rather than the Dutch referendum. This is also reflected in the turnout for the Dutch referendum, which was relatively low; 32,3% (while the turnout for the referendum in 2005 was 63,3%). Of this turn-out, 38,1% voted in favour of the agreement, while 61,1% voted against the accession agreement of Ukraine, which indicates that mainly opponents of the EU came to vote for the referendum. The runup to the referendum shows some slight changes in public opinion, as positive answers decline from 55,3% (in 2015-1) to 53,3% (in 2015-2), and negative answers increase from 25,3% (in 2015-1) to 26,8% (in 2015-2). However, it can also be argued that these changes are influenced by other events in 2015, like the inability of the EU to deal with the refugee/migrant crisis. As such, it cannot be concluded that the referendum on the Ukraine association with the EU had a significant impact on public opinion towards the EU.

The third critical moment that takes place during this period are the national elections of 2017 (NL11). Within the context of rising populism in Europe and the rest of the world, like for example the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump in the USA, it is feared that during these elections, the populist and anti-European PVV would win a high vote during these elections. The elections gained a lot of international attention, as it was seen as the first test for the EU in this election-year (New York Times, 2017). After these elections, election in France, Germany and Austria would take place. In the end, the PVV became the second biggest party, which was not the big win that they hoped for. Themes around the election mainly dealt with immigration, which was combined to visions on EU policies. Also, other national identity issues, like the protection of sovereignty and the emphasis on national history, was highly apparent during the election campaign (van den Noort, 2016). Meanwhile, public opinion, still grows towards a more positive opinion on the EU; positive answers increase from 54,4% (in 2016-1) to 60,8% (in 2017-1), while negative answers decline from 27,8% (in 2016-1) to 23,3% (in 2017-1). Also, the amount of 'don't know' answers declines from 17,8% (in 2016-1) to 15,9% (in 2017-1). These changes indicate that after a longer period of increasing Euroscepticism among the Dutch population (2009 – 2013), the amount of Euroscepticism among the population is declining from 2013 to 2017.

4.2 Eurosceptic framing in newspapers around the critical moments

This section elaborates on the results of the framing analysis in the selected articles in the Netherlands. First, the amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element is discussed (4.2.1). After that, the content of the arguments of the four pre-defined frames (Soft Euroscepticism, Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism) are discussed (4.2.2). Finally, the co-occurrence and correlation between the four frames are discussed (4.2.3).

4.2.1 Newspaper articles containing a Eurosceptic element

Graph 4.2 below shows the amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element that are selected for the framing analysis.

In **general**, it can be stated that the total amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element is increased during the period 2000-2017. However, between the different critical moments, and their

corresponding episodes, the graph shows some differences. For instance, there is a growth in the amount of articles before most of the critical moments; 7 out of 11. Therefore, it can be stated that in many cases, the reporting on Euroscepticism increases before an election or a referendum on a European issue. The only elections during which this does not occur are the national elections of 2003, 2010 and 2012, which implies that the EU was not a highly mentioned topic during these election campaigns. However, this is not the case for the elections of 2012, as the use is still relatively high. The most evident growth in articles containing a Eurosceptic element can be found before the two referenda (in 2005, NL4, and in 2016, NL9), where the amount of articles is 31 (in period 2005-1), and 38 (in period 2016-1). Furthermore, another peak can be found around NL8 and NL9, which are the national elections in 2012, and the European elections in 2014, that counts an amount of 34 (in period 2012-1) and 38 (in period 2016-1). The peak around the national elections can be explained by the high amount of attention for the European debt-crisis, or the Euro-crisis. The events around these crises were now having domestic consequences, for example as the budgetary deficit of the government was not supposed to violate the 3% EU-norm anymore. Consequently, budget cuts and fundamental reforms were needed, also in the Netherlands. As such, topics around the state of the European economy and finances were central during the runup to the national elections of 2012. The peak around the European elections in 2014 can also partly be explained by this, as these topics were also important during the run-up to these elections, as well as other specific criticism towards the EU. What follows each period of substantial growth, is a period of a significant decrease in Eurosceptic articles, which indicates that there is a connection between the critical moment and the amount of articles.

As for the **European elections** (NL3, NL6, NL9), the amount of articles during all these elections shows the same development; a significant increase of articles before the critical moment, and a significant decrease afterwards. There are, however, some differences between the elections; the decrease after the elections in 2004 is smaller than the decrease after the elections in 2009 and 2014. One of the reasons for this is that, after the elections of 2004, the media already reported on the European Constitution referendum in 2005 (NL4). Also, the amount of articles in 2014 is substantially higher than during the elections of 2004 and 2009, this might indicate that the amount of Euroscepticism during that period was higher than in the periods before.

Regarding the **national elections**, the amount of articles around the elections between 2000 and 2010 (NL1:5, NL2:5, NL5:8, NL7:6) was substantially lower than during the elections between 2010 and 2017 (NL8:29, NL11:38), which might imply that the amount of Euroscepticism in newspapers has grown after 2010. There are three elections that differ from the normal movement (growth before and decrease afterwards); NL2 (2003), NL7 (2010), NL11(2017). This might indicate that during these elections, the European Union was not a big issue among public opinion, or that the framing in newspapers was more positive towards the European Union.

During the **referenda** in 2005 (NL4) and 2016 (NL10), the amount of articles increased substantially, and decreased afterwards. The difference between the two referenda is that the amount of articles was higher in 2016, an amount of 38 compared to 31. However, this difference is not that big, which might indicate that the language during the referendum of 2005 was as Eurosceptic as during the referendum of 2016. Nevertheless, Eurosceptic articles around the referendum of 2016 are mainly directed towards the Brexit referendum, rather than towards the Dutch Ukraine referendum. This, on the other hand, implies that the amount of Euroscepticism in 2005 was higher than in 2016.

Graph 4.2: Amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element and the 11 critical moments in the Netherlands in 2000-2017

4.2.2 Eurosceptic, Populist and Nationalist framing around the critical moments

The following sections consist of the results of the framing analysis of the selected newspaper articles from the Dutch newspapers. To make a clearer overview of the results, each critical moment received a title, which refers to the main occurring theme in public debate around that critical moment to which most of the arguments within the frame refer. Each frame received a title, which refers to the main occurring arguments that are used, when referring to that specific theme. The arguments are distracted from the pre-defined codes in the codebook for framing analysis (Annex I). The numbers that are mentioned refer to the occurrence of that specific code and is corrected for the total analysed amount of articles during that critical moment. Finally, the quotes are translated by the researcher from Dutch to English, and the original Dutch quotes can be found in Annex III (Translation Dutch Newspaper quotes).

NL1 – Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 2002: the Enlargement and ideologies on the EU

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Amount of articles
NL1	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	15-5-2002	2002-1*	55 - 58	2001 (1) – 2002 (2)	31

Soft Euroscepticism: Enlargement as costly and increasing the threat of immigration, implementation of the Euro as too costly

Soft Euroscepticism during this episode mainly entails scepticism on the Enlargement and specific European policies, mainly the Euro and the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy). During the run-up to the elections of 2002, there is an increasing use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame. Whilst there is a decrease during the period 2001-1, the use grows to 16 in 2002-1. After the period of the elections, the use is still high (15,3). During this critical moment, there are five arguments that are used to understand the discussed themes in this episode.

The first argument frames on specific policies (SP amount: 2) of the European Union. The most used argument is critique on the Euro, which was established in 2002; *The most negative feeling about the arrival of the euro was, in all countries, the effects on the prices[1].* Another policy that is often criticized is the Nice Agreement, which was established in 2001, and which is seen as the agreement that made the accession of new member states possible. Furthermore, the Common Agricultural Policy, gained some criticism, in this case from the Dutch government; *The Netherlands should, if necessary, use a veto to force reforms on agriculture before the accession of the 10 aspirant members states[2]* After the elections, these arguments are still used.

Another argument that often comes to the fore during this episode frames scepticism towards specific institutions (SI amount: 2) of the EU, for example on the European Commission; *The criticism on the small, glasses-wearing Italian (Prodi) is increasing very fast.[3]* Also, the way of cooperating in Europe is often criticized. This cooperation is claimed to be problematic since *the members states are still too much attached to their own sovereignty[4].*

However, next to solely providing scepticism, there are also some authors (SPS amount: 1,6) who provide some suggestions, which might enable the EU to improve itself. The suggestions within this argument are, for example, on the foreign policy, the social policies, health care and safety policies. Providing a suggestion means indirectly that the author perceives some aspects of the EU as not properly arranged, so these suggestions can be considered as a form of Soft Euroscepticism.

Finally, the soft Eurosceptic argument which is the most often used during this episode frames on the enlargement of the EU (SE amount: 5). An often used aspect here is that the Central and Eastern European (mainly former Soviet countries), who entered the EU in 2004, were not ready yet to enter the EU; *Brussels hopes to mute the criticism that the aspirant members are not ready to enter yet, by represent their rapports too optimistic.[5]* Also, the enlargement is expected to increase the instream of (illegal) migrants to western Europe; *the amount of fortune seeks will increase after the EU accession. I don't know whether the richer countries are happy with that.[6]* Another aspect is the fact that the enlargement drives up the contribution of richer countries to the EU budget; *The political parties CDA and VVD do not want to contribute more after the accession of the new member states.[7]* Additionally, in some cases, the critique on enlargement is applied to one specific country: Turkey; *I am in favour of the accession of Turkey, because then, Europe will fall down by itself.[8]*

The next quote summarizes the main considerations, among the critique on the enlargement, which were apparent in the newspapers in that period; *Is it not too costly? Do we get an inflow of more foreigners? Are those countries even ready yet? What about the security of the eastern borders of the EU? Politicians, diplomats and citizens in Western-Europe are increasingly worried and are more open about it. The great and historic project is in big danger.[9]*

The argument on the Enlargement is used before the elections, as well as after the elections, which indicates that this theme is not only an issue during the election campaign, but that it emerges to be a broader discussion within the public realm.

Hard Euroscepticism: Increasing opposition about shifting responsibilities towards EU and different ideologies on the EU

The main arguments that are used within this frame, frame on scepticism towards the shifts of responsibility from national institutions towards EU institutions, which can be regarded as different ideologies on the EU, and (the threat of) rising opposition towards the EU. Overall, the frame of Hard Euroscepticism is not often used around critical moment NL1, the absolute amount in total is only 12. However, there is an increase visible in the period before the elections (2001-2). The arguments that

are most often used contain fundamental opposition regarding the EU (HF amount: 1), which is for example shown in demonstrations; *Every important European gathering will be accompanied by extreme street-violence[10].* Another argument that is used considers ideological discussions on the EU, and the amount of shifting responsibilities from national governments to EU institutions; *Paris is dreaming of a French Europe, with a strong bureaucracy, centralised institutions, and, of course, a strong president. The British find the idea of a strong super state in Brussels disgusting.'[11]*

Populism: Enlargement happens without considering citizens and the rise of extreme-right populist parties

Like the Soft Euroscepticism frame, one of the most discussed themes in the Populism frame is the enlargement. However, in the Populism frame this theme is combined to the fact that citizens are not considered on whether they agree with this enlargement. Another important theme is the uprising of (new) extreme-right populist parties. The use of the populist frame is increasing substantially in the period before the elections (2001-2), altogether with the other frames. However, the increase of populism is higher than of the Hard Eurosceptic and the Nationalism frame. There are two arguments that are used to understand these themes.

The first argument frames the fact that citizens are not concerned regarding the enlargement (PR amount: 2,3) of the EU in 2004 and is thus combined with the argument from the Soft Eurosceptic frame; *The 'regents' in Brussels decide everything without considering the citizens, also the enlargement. A lot of citizens are fed up with not being heard.[12]*. Additional to this argument is the fact that the citizens are the ones who pay the price for this enlargement; *The citizens in old and new member states are the ones who must pay the price for such an ill-considered enlargement, without even having a say about it.[13]*

The second argument frames the rise of (new) extreme-right populist parties (PA amount: 1). Most of the times, in this period, these parties are just described, and do not speak themselves in the articles; *in several Western-European countries, extreme-right and populist parties have used the concerns, insecurities and irritations of the citizens regarding Brussels.[14]*

In sum, the populist frame in this period follows the same trends as the other frames. Content-wise, this frame is overlapping with the argument of critique on the enlargement from the Soft Eurosceptic frame, which is used during the whole period. This could imply that this Soft Eurosceptic argument is, before the elections, more often combined with Populism than after the elections, as the use of the Populism frame decreases faster than the use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame.

Nationalism: National sovereignty and identity

One of the main discussed themes within the Nationalism frame is, like in the Hard Euroscepticism frame, the different ideologies on the EU. The Nationalism frame is used exactly as many times as the Hard Euroscepticism frame during the episode before the elections (2001-2: amount 0, 2002-1: amount 8). There are two arguments used to understand the mentioned theme during this episode.

The most important argument frames the EU as a threat for the national sovereignty (NSV amount: 3,2); *mainly the bigger member states want to keep their sovereignty. They are not enthusiast about sharing power with smaller member states.[15]* This argument is often used in reference to the economies within the EU; *The member states do not want to shift sovereignty to Brussels by making their economy more dependent of Brussels' coordination.'[16]* These arguments about sovereignty are reflecting the arguments used in the Hard Euroscepticism frame, as the main ideologies (functions of EU institutions, amount of national sovereignty within the EU, scope of European integration) are

discussed here. A discussion between the different member states takes place on what the role of the EU ought to be, and how much sovereignty each country should shift towards Brussels, following this role.

The second argument frames on the national identity, and the way that identity may change because of EU membership. This argument can also be connected to the enlargement of the EU, as *a lot of them (the countries that enter the EU in 2004) see the EU as a direct threat for the own identity, and recently acquired independence.*[17] However, this argument has not been used in combination with the Dutch identity, in the discussed period.

(Co)-occurrence of frames

As shown in table 4.3 and graph 4.3, the occurrence of the frames is at its highest during 2002-1, the period in which the elections of 2002 took place. Before this period (between 2001-1 and 2001-2), all frames show a decrease in occurrence. This means that the amount of Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, as well as Nationalism and Populism grows during the run-up to the elections. After the elections, the occurrence of the frames decreases again. However, the Soft Eurosceptic frame is increasing very slowly, in comparison with the three other frames.

Looking at the overlap between the different frames, shows that the Hard Euroscepticism frame and the Nationalist frame are quite overlapping in amount of occurrence. Furthermore, the Populism frame follows the same line as these frames, while the amount of occurrence is higher between 2001-2 and 2002-2, and lower between 2001-1 and 2001-2. The only frame that follows a different line is the Soft Euroscepticism frame, which is occurring more often than the other frames, and does, interestingly, not decrease as much as the other frames after the elections.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2001-1	8	12	15	4	5	1	1,3	5	6,3
2001-2	3	2	6,7	0	0	0	0	0	0
2002-1	5	8	16	4	8	7	14	4	8
2002-2	15	23	15,3	4	2,7	11	7,3	7	4,7
Table 4.3: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around NL1									

Graph 4.3: Occurrence of the frames in Dutch newspapers around critical moment NL1

Conclusions

In sum, there are two main themes discussed around the elections of 2001; the enlargement (main in the Soft Euroscepticism and Populism frame) and ideologies on the EU (main in the Hard Euroscepticism and Nationalism frame). The Enlargement is criticized in the Soft Euroscepticism frame, while the Populism frame adds that decisions on the Enlargement were made without considering the opinion of the population. The second theme is framed within the Hard Euroscepticism and the Nationalism frame, as fundamental discussions on the amount of integration within the EU, and how the EU should look like, regarding responsibilities of the EU institutions. While the Hard Euroscepticism frame mainly frames this theme by mentioning the different opinions on this, the Nationalism frame emphasizes that, within the EU, national sovereignty and identity need to be protected. The second theme shows a connection with the election campaign, as this collides with the vision of Pim Fortuyn. The first theme was not highly apparent during the election campaign and is thus less connected.

NL2 – Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 2003: the Enlargement, the Euro and the Constitution

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Amount of articles
NL2	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	22-1-2003	2003-1	58 - 60	2002 (2) – 2003 (2)	27

Soft Euroscepticism: scepticism on the enlargement, increasing political integration and incoherent governmental cooperation within the EU

The main discussed theme within this episode is, like critical moment NL1, the enlargement of the EU in 2004. Additionally, scepticism on the enlargement relates to scepticism on the Euro and the proposed European Constitution; *Next year, 10 paupers will be added to the EU, who will even put more pressure on the Euro. And then, we are also expecting to vote in favour of the European Constitution, which will then be manipulated by the big countries.[18]*

Another important argument, which is used during this episode frames public discussion on the size and scope of European integration (SEI amount: 3,7). The content of this argument is overlapping with the Hard Euroscepticism argument on the ideology on the EU, but, in reference to the referendum on the EU Constitution (2005, NL4), the discussion was framed less radical than in the Hard Eurosceptic frame. This includes the fact that, within the frame of Soft Euroscepticism, an actor is less likely to be in favour of the EU but has a critique on certain elements of the EU; *It is too risky to go to a federal Europe, because there is a reasonable chance that it will fail, and that Europe will, as a reaction, disintegrate. Europe is a success; the aim of the EU has succeeded in a brilliant way.[19]*

Another argument that appeared during this period (SLC amount: 3,3), is the fact that it is hard to cooperate inter-governmentally within the EU. This mainly entails the national positions that are taken on foreign and security policies; *The war in Iraq has, except for worse trans-Atlantic relations, led to greater division within the EU on the foreign- and security policy[20].*

Hard Euroscepticism: scepticism on bureaucracy by mentioning unnecessary rules and different ideologies on the EU

The main discussed theme within the Hard Euroscepticism frame is the European Constitution, which is expected to increase European bureaucracy. This bureaucracy is mainly framed by providing examples of 'unnecessary' rules, and the different ideologies that exist on the EU. The use of the Hard Euroscepticism around NL2 is relatively low (2.7, 0 and 1.2). The most used argument (HB amount: 1,5) claims that the institutions of the EU make too much, absurd rules; *why does Brussels deal with the*

colour of the apron of my butcher in Munich?[21] Regarding this interference, it is mentioned that the European Commission should be stopped in their quest to make more and more rules; *national parliaments should be made able to give a red card, which would enable them to stop the Commission in their quest for making rules.[22]*

Next to this argument, the arguments from the previous critical moment are repeated during NL2, though to a lesser extent (HF amount: 0,3); *After the last developments, I am totally fed up with Europe. I do not want to pay for the enlargement with formal Eastern European countries. Currently, I am anti-Europe, anti-Euro and anti-European Constitution. I want the 'gulden' back and I want the Netherlands to terminate from the EU.[23]*

Populism: Enlargement and growing bureaucracy causes increasing disconnection of citizens from the EU

The main discussed theme within the Populism frame is the feeling that citizens do not feel represented, considered in European decision-making. This is mainly done by making a connection with the decision-making on the Enlargement. Furthermore, the Populism frame overlaps with the Hard Eurosceptic frame, as it is claimed that the bureaucracy and rule-making of Brussels is often not in favour of EU citizens. There are three arguments used to understand these themes within this episode.

The most often used argument within the Populism frame around NL2 is the same as around NL1 (PR amount: 3,3), and frames that decisions in the EU are made without considering the citizens, which leads to an alienation of citizens from the EU; *It is certainly true that there is a distance between Brussels and the citizens. The citizens are concerned on affairs which have nothing to do with the EU.[24]*

Another argument frames the disappointment of citizens about the EU (PO amount: 1,1), and the corresponding negative public opinion; *I am deeply disappointed. We are totally f*cked with the Euro. Furthermore, indirectly, we must pay the price for the huge deficits of the big countries.[25]*

Finally, some authors claim that Europe is in a crisis (PC amount: 1,1), which is downgraded by politicians; *Few are realizing the seriousness of the crisis in which the EU has ended up to, by the fiasco in Brussels. They all say it is not that bad, but this seems to me as a big misjudgement of the deep crisis in which Europe finds itself currently.[26]*

Consequently, it can be concluded that in this period, the Populism frame is mainly combined with Hard Euroscepticism, which deals with fundamental opposition to the EU. While the content seems to have an important overlap with the arguments of the Soft Euroscepticism frame, the language and the radical way in which the Populism arguments are formulated shows a stronger connection with the Hard Euroscepticism frame.

Nationalism: the enlargement and the Euro as a threat for national sovereignty and national identity

The main themes within the Nationalism frame are overlapping with the other frames; the Enlargement and the Euro. From the Nationalism frame, these themes are framed by emphasizing the erosion of national sovereignty and national identity. The occurrence of the Nationalism frame follows the same line as the Hard Euroscepticism and Populism frame but is more often used than the Hard Euroscepticism frame and less then often used than the Populism frame. There are two arguments used to understand the themes during this episode.

The first argument that appears (NSV amount: 1,5) frames on the national sovereignty; *Both parties (CU, SGP) value the Dutch sovereignty from a historical point of view, and they watch the big threat in which this sovereignty is endangered within the European context.[27]* This argument is overlapping with

NL1, but the amount of appearance is lower. Also, this argument can be connected to the second argument, which deals with national identity (NI amount: 1,5) and perceives national sovereignty as something connected to the Dutch history, and which should be cherished. One element in which this argument comes to the fore is the Euro; *As a courageous trade-country, the Netherlands abolished the 'gulden', but the deeper meaning regarding the national identity has been underestimated. 'First they took away our gulden, and now our 'Pimmetje' (Pim Fortuyn), said one crying woman during the funeral of Fortuyn[28]*. Consequently, some articles contain some more radical discourse about the erosion of national sovereignty; *During WWII, we were occupied, and after that, I have been scared for 20 years that this would happen again. The next 20 years we have been living relatively quiet. But now, the domination, with France, is there again. The big French/German empire has entered. The future looks dreary.[29]*

The language within the Nationalism frame during this period can be combined to the Hard Euroscepticism frame. While this frame did not appear frequently during this period, the arguments within Nationalism show that there are a lot of Hard Eurosceptic arguments, mainly connected to the erosion of national sovereignty, the domination of the EU and other members of the EU, and the loss of national identity due to this erosion.

(Co-)occurrence of frames

In contrast to the occurrence of the frames around NL1, the usage of Soft Euroscepticism, Hard Euroscepticism and Nationalism seem to decrease before the elections and increase after the elections. This is shown in table 4.4 and graph 4.4 and might indicate that criticism towards the EU was not a big theme during the run-up to the elections of 2003.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2002-2	15	22	14,7	4	2,7	11	7,3	7	4,7
2003-1	5	4	8	0	0	0	0	1	2
2003-2	7	25	35,7	3	1,2	9	12,9	5	7,1
Table 4.4: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around NL2									

Graph 4.4: Occurrence of the frames in Dutch newspapers around critical moment NL2

As for the co-occurrence of the frames, graph 4.4 shows that Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism follow the same pattern before and after the elections. However, the occurrence of the Hard Euroscepticism frame is almost zero, while the Nationalism frame occurred more, and the Populism frame occurred even more. Also, the occurrence of Soft Euroscepticism is, again, substantially more increasing than the other frames after the elections.

Conclusions

The themes around the elections of 2003 are overlapping with the focus on the Enlargement during the elections of 2002. This confirms that these debates cannot be directed to a certain election campaign, but that this scepticism on the EU is broader within public opinion. Next to the enlargement, scepticism is also focussed on the Euro and the European Constitution, which imply more bureaucracy, rule-making from Brussels and European integration. The Soft Euroscepticism frame frames these themes by expressing scepticism on the enlargement, political integration and incoherent governmental cooperation within the EU. The Hard Euroscepticism frame frames these themes by expressing scepticism on the bureaucracy, by mentioning examples of unnecessary rules made by Brussels and by elaborating on different ideologies on the EU. The Populism frame combines scepticism on the enlargement and the growing bureaucracy with the increasing disconnection and dissatisfaction of citizens towards the EU. Finally, the Nationalism frame frames the themes as a threat for the national sovereignty and the national identity.

NL3 – European elections 2004: call for more relevance of EU for its citizens

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Amount of articles
NL3	European elections	10-6-2004	2004-2	61 - 62	2004 (1) – 2004 (2)	39

Soft Euroscepticism: focus on new priorities which should make the EU more relevant for citizens, and examples of structures that cause irrelevance for citizens

The most discussed theme within the Soft Euroscepticism frame are the (preferred) priorities of the EU. It is often stressed that the EU should be more relevant for its citizens, by focussing on what rules and priorities are (not) necessary. While the use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame decreases around NL3, the appearance of the frame is still relatively high, mainly in the period before the European elections. There are four arguments used to understand this theme during this episode.

The first argument frames the enlargement of the EU (SE amount: 3); *I fear that when the EU enlarges next year with ten countries, and the institutions of the EU will not be reformed, this will mean the end of the Union as well as the European Parliament.*[30] This quote already indicates that a change is needed within Europe and its institutions, which can be connected to a later used argument from the Hard Euroscepticism frame; which claims that a fundamental change is needed in the EU.

Furthermore, the run-up to the European elections entails a lot of discussion on what the priorities of the EU should be (SPS amount: 3,3), what current aspects are worthless, (SPE amount: 2,6) and what the right amount of European integration ought to be (SEI amount: 2,4). There are many discussions on the tasks of the European Commission, and what they should do, for example; *taking away the obstacles in the economy and address common problems, like the environment. And they must use economies of scale, in for example, the foreign affairs of the EU*[31]. This also links with one of the main suggestions which the EU should consider as a priority; *it would be good if a common European foreign affairs policy would cause a better balance*.[32] Additionally, the suggestion of a common policy for combatting terrorism, criminality and for asylum is often mentioned as an improvement for the EU.

On the other side, a lot of Soft Euroscepticism appears on some of the rules that are made by 'Brussels'. For example, rules about the size of a ladder, or the fact that *regulations on the environment are astonishing. It is absurd that Brussels decides on what should be the right level of decibels for a lawn mower[33]*. This kind of language can be combined to the argument of Hard Euroscepticism, in which an evident resistance against interference of Brussels is made. However, within the frame of Soft Euroscepticism, the total opposition against the EU is not made clear, and therefore it can be placed within the Soft Euroscepticism frame.

Furthermore, Soft Euroscepticism is framed in the argument that Brussels is too far away for citizens (SFA amount: 2,8). This mainly entails that decisions are made without considering the citizens and is overlapping with some arguments from the Populism frame; *Project Europe: again, and again sold for the citizens, but meanwhile increasingly far away for the citizens[34].*

Another argument that is used is, just as around NL2, emphasizes the fact that there are differences between the member states, which makes it complex to cooperate in an appropriate and efficient way; *Several contradictions come to the fore: between big and small member states about the division of power, between European and Atlantic oriented member states on the foreign policy, and between old and new member states on the size and composition of the Commission.[35]*

This period has showed that the scope of the arguments within the Soft Euroscepticism frame is increasing. Interestingly, this mainly occurs in the 'NRC', and not so evidently in the 'Telegraaf'. Therefore, the most evident quotes used here are from the NRC. The period also shows that some (new) arguments show a connection with the Hard Euroscepticism frame; this mainly entails the rules made by EU institutions, and the fact that a fundamental change needs to happen, and with arguments of the Populism frame; which entails the fact that 'Brussels' is too far away for citizens.

Hard Euroscepticism: bureaucracy and democratic deficit in decision-making as reasons for irrelevance of EU for citizens

The most discussed theme within the Hard Euroscepticism frame is the relevance of the EU for citizens. This is being done by framings on the bureaucracy and rules of Brussels and the amount of democracy within the EU. There is a rising use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame before the elections, and a decrease afterwards. There are three different arguments used to understand the themes during this episode.

The first argument frames hard opposition towards the 'bureaucracy' of Brussels (HB amount: 1,7), which mainly deals with rules made by the EU institutions and the interference of those institutions with member states; *there are a lot of examples of the crazy meddlesome of Brussels, where we should really get rid of. For example, if you have a little zoo, Brussels obliges you to put a sign with the original living environment of every animal. That is totally crazy![36]* As earlier mentioned, this argument partly overlaps with the Soft Euroscepticism frame, as it considers the priorities that the European should (not) have.

The second argument frames the EU as a project which is hard to stop, due to the way that decision-making is done. One author calls this decision-making the 'salami tactic'; *there is hardly discussion on decision-making. But subsequently, it goes on step by step, without the possibility for anyone to raise their hand and say; 'Did we really decide on this?'[37]* Some authors even call the EU *a premature machine. People do not have the idea that they have any influence on it.[38]*

The third argument is connected to the second argument, and frames that there is a democratic deficit in the EU (HD amount: 1), which explains the way that decision-making is done. This argument is mainly

used in relation to the European Parliament, which is the only directly elected institution of the EU. However, there is some criticism about their authorizations and relations with other institutions; *the Parliament not only has to share its authorizations with other institutions, like the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, it also lacks a clear division between governmental parties and opposition parties, and it deals too much with affairs that do not directly (seem to) interfere with citizens.*[39] This argument seems to overlap with the argument of Populism about the representation of citizens.

In sum, there are three arguments among the Hard Euroscepticism frame in this period, of which the first can be combined with the Soft Eurosceptic frame, and the second and third to the representation of citizens, which is a part of the Populism frame.

Populism: irrelevance of the EU emphasised by framing the lack of representation in EU's institutions and growing negative public opinion

Like the other frames, the main theme within the Populism frame is the relevance of the EU for its citizens. The use of the Populism frame is stable during the run-up to the elections of 2004 and decreases afterwards. The arguments used in this frame are mainly framing the strong division between the EU and its citizens. Due to the art of the decision-making (Hard Euroscepticism frame) and the priorities of the EU (Soft Euroscepticism frame); *Europe is a technocratic project. The real concerns of the citizens are not considered.*[40] Another element here is the fact that there is no dialogue between governments (and EU institutions) with their citizens; *the main thing is the lack of dialogue with the electorate on the question: why are we shifting sovereignty, where does this train go, and how can we convert citizens' involvement in new forms of participation?*[41] Consequently, this argument entails the fact that citizens do not feel represented in the decision-making bodies of the EU (PR amount: 4,3), and the aversion of citizens regarding the EU (PO amount: 2,1) is growing: *Nicolai wants to address the problem of the increasing aversion towards Europe among citizens.*[42]

Nationalism: the EU is relevant for citizens when in line with the national interest

The main theme discussed in the Nationalism frame is the national interest. This can partly be connected to the arguments of the other frames, as it is often claimed that the EU must be in the national interest, to be relevant for its citizens. The use of the Nationalism frame shows the same movement as the Populism frame but does occur in to a lower extent. There is one argument used to understand this theme during these episode, which frames national interests in relation to the European Union (NPI amount: 3,5). The argument mainly entails the outcomes of the elections, which showed that a lot of citizens chose for parties that prioritized the national interests. However, from the Dutch perspective, this was not that much the case, as earlier mentioned. Regarding to the Netherlands, the Nationalism frame in this period considers ideas on how the EU could be organised in such a way, which it is most in line the best for the Dutch priorities; *a good understanding of our own priorities – which is certainly not the same as shorth-sighted nationalism – needs to be leading in this. When there is a national interest at stake, perseverance is necessary.*[43]

(Co-)occurrence of frames

Table 4.5 and graph 4.5 show that there is a difference in the occurrence of the different frames. While the Soft Euroscepticism frame is decreasing before, during and after the elections, there is a substantial increase of the Hard Euroscepticism frame before the elections. The occurrence of the Nationalism and Populism frame do not show a lot of changes before the elections. After the elections, the occurrence of all four frames is decreasing, altogether with a decrease in negative answers on the Eurobarometer, and a rise in positive answers.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2003-2	7	25	35,7	3	1,2	9	12,9	5	7,1
2004-1	24	62	25,8	22	9,2	32	13,3	21	8,8
2004-2	15	22	14,7	8	5,3	8	5,3	3	2
Table 4.5: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around NL3									

Graph 4.5: Occurrence of the frames in Dutch newspapers around critical moment NL3

Between 2003-2 and 2004-2, the same occurrence of the Populism and the Nationalism frame can be found, though the occurrence of the Populist frame was higher. Also, while the occurrence of the Soft Euroscepticism frame decreases before the elections, the occurrence of the Hard Eurosceptic frame is rises, which could indicate that formerly Soft arguments turned into Hard arguments in the run-up to the European elections.

Conclusions

In sum, the most discussed theme around the European elections of 2004 is the relevance of the EU for its citizens. While the Soft Euroscepticism frame offers suggestions and/or priorities to do enhance the relevance, the Hard Euroscepticism frame mainly frames the democratic deficit and the unnecessary bureaucracy in Brussels. The Populism frame states that citizens do not feel represented in the current EU, and that this leads to a growing negative public opinion. The Nationalism frames the relevance for citizens as a question of national interest; when the EU is in accordance with the (Dutch) national interest, the EU is assumed to be relevant for its citizens. In this way, it can be concluded that the discussions about the EU are directed to the European elections, as the campaigns were focussed on trying to make the EU relevant for the Netherlands and enhancing the voting turnout during the elections. Furthermore, the framings during this critical moment already acts as preparation on the Referendum of 2005, which is discussed during critical moment NL4.

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Amount of articles
NL4	Referendum on the European Constitution	1-6-2005	2005-1	62 - 64	2004 (2) – 2005 (2)	57

Soft Euroscepticism: the referendum framed as a protest vote; against the government and against the EU as a political union

The theme that is mainly discussed within the Soft Euroscepticism frame during this episode is the European Constitution, which is also the subject of the referendum during this episode. There are four arguments used to understand this theme.

The first argument frames the referendum in general (SR amount: 2,5. The main occurring claim on the referendum is that; *the referendum is, by an increasing number of people, perceived as a political event that offers the chance to express their dissatisfaction with everything.[44]* This argument explains the relatively high occurrence of the Populism and the Nationalism frame partly, as the referendum is used to express dissatisfaction against the government, globalisation or several parts of the EU, while; *the majority of the Dutch population does not feel anti-European.[45]* In case of the EU *the referendum offered a chance to bring a protest vote as an answer to the Europe that proceeds with blinkers on its eyes, for example with the lousy economy, the too fast enlargement and the embracement of Turkey.[46]*

Another argument that is used can be connected to both the current cooperation between members states within the EU (SLC amount: 2,5) and the discussions on the amount of (political) integration in the EU (SEI amount: 1,6). While citizens in the Netherlands (and France) are in majority against the implementation of the EU Constitution, many politicians saw this constitution as the answer to all existing problems in the EU; *There is a lack of common vision on Europe. That is why we must search an answer on the question on what Europe we want. The European Constitutions is called the last chance for Europe to come to common solutions.[47]* The main discussion on this is whether the EU should evolve towards a political union, next to an economical union, as; *Europe has been reduced to an economic entity. Consequently, the enthusiasm has become depended from the state of the economy.[48]* Furthermore, there is a wide division between the member states to what extent the integration of Europe must evolve; *there will be no answers on the fundamental question whether Europe must make effort to establish a political union, which should, in fact, not be more than a big free trade area. De member states remain radically divided on this.[49]*

For most of the member states, and their population, the European Constitution is a symbol for further integration of the EU, which is not in line with their own vision on the EU; *they just want Europe to be less regulatory: yes, to a Europe with a free economic market, but without the heavy political-administrative construction of a Constitution, more rules from Brussels, and later a European 'president'. [50]* But, this discussion also shows that the population does not automatically agree with the position of the government, as *the rejection of the referendum in the Netherlands shows, again, the gap between the population and the government. The Dutch population wants, for a long time, a fewer amount of European integration that the government and the parliament.[51]*

In sum, it can be concluded that the main arguments on the Soft Euroscepticism frame during this episode deal with fundamental questions on the amount of integration within the EU, and that a majority of the Dutch population used the referendum to express their protest, but only against the EU. This indicates the gap between the population and the government and explains why there is a

higher occurrence of the Nationalism and Populism frame. Finally, interestingly, the argumentations within the Soft Euroscepticism frame show a shift; while critique on enlargement was highly apparent during the earlier critical moments, the occurrence of this argument decreased significantly (SE amount: 1,6) during this period.

Hard Euroscepticism: fundamental criticism on the European Constitution expressed by framing the interference of the EU, the democratic deficit and the fact that it is hard to resist this 'even bigger monster'

The most discussed theme within the Hard Euroscepticism frame during this episode is the European Constitution and the corresponding increasing (political) integration. As graph 4.8 shows, there is no high use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame during this period. This might have to do with the fact that a lot of arguments within this frame (like a fundamental change, or discussion on the ideology) can be placed among the Soft Euroscepticism frame. The language in which these arguments are used during this period do not combine it with a fundamental opposition of the EU but are just dealing with criticism on several parts of the EU, mainly the content of the Constitution. However, there are still three arguments that appear within the Hard Euroscepticism frame during this period, and that are used to understand fundamental criticism on the European Constitution.

The first argument frames that *Brussels is too much interfering* (HB amount: 0,9), while the second argument says that *the European Union is in its core not democratic (*HD amount: 1,2) *and the Constitution is way too heavy.[52]* The first argument on the regulatory interference of Brussels overlaps with earlier periods, and with the claims made within the Soft Eurosceptic frame. The same counts for the second argument, which deals with the democratic deficit within the EU. The third argument is a new argument, and deals with the fact that it is hard to offer resistance to the way that the EU is evolving (HR amount: 1,4); *after that Europe has slowly evolved into 'Brussels', the anonymously expanding bureaucratic power, in which the national ownership eroded more and more. Then, after increasing enlargement, it has gained into an even bigger monster.[53]* This argument seems to be connected to the Populism claim that citizens have no say in the whole process of the EU, but also with the Nationalist argument that the expansion of the EU coincides with an erosion of national sovereignty.

Populism: the campaign and results of the referendum framed by mentioning the lack of representation of citizens in the EU, negative public opinion on the EU and the EU in a crisis

The main theme discussed within the Populism frame is also the European Constitution. Next to the content of the Constitution, this frame also frames on the process, the campaign and the results of the referendum. There are three arguments used to understand these themes within the Populism frame. The first argument is already used around the European elections in 2004, and frames that decisions within the EU are made without its citizens, which leads to the alienation of citizens and the fact that they do not feel represented within the EU institutions (PR amount: 3,9). This argument is increasingly used during this episode and referred to the referendum. around critical moment NL4. This argument is combined with the run-up and the results of the referendum in 2005. Before the referendum, it is stated that *for a long time, the population reacted politely to the silent movement towards a federal Europe. But now, they have woken up[54]*. This argument is combined with the argument on the referendum in the frame of Soft Euroscepticism. Also, there is a reference to the protest vote in the referendum, as *the discussion deals more with the feelings of citizens rather than on specific elements of the Constitution[55].* After the elections, these feelings have been increased, due to the way that European politicians reacted on the results; *the double message was that the Constitution will be frozen for a year, but the content will not be adjusted, and the ratification process will go on as*

planned.[56] And that is exactly the fear of those who are sceptical; that Europe will go on like nothing happened. Or; 'pushed through the throats', like Nigel Farage said[57]. The discussion before as well as after the referendum thus shows that the main argument within the Populism frame is, again, the claim that citizens are not represented enough in EU decision-making.

The second argument frames general negative public opinion towards the EU (PO amount: 1,6); *if this is the 'new' and 'open' Europe of the coming months, one should not have the illusion to come back to the Netherlands for a new referendum. The answer will then be an even harder 'NO'.[58]* Furthermore, it is framed that the discussion on the Constitution, and the way that this has been handled by politicians leads to increasing uncertainty of citizens regarding the EU, and an even bigger decrease of trust towards the EU; *the damage is wide. This time no political impasse or another quarrel between member states, but a real and gigantic great crisis of confidence between politicians and the population[59]. So, this is not a crisis of political institutions, it is a crisis of political leadership that does not offer answers to concerned questions of citizens.[60]*

The third argument frames that Europe is in a crisis, similarly to the claim around critical moment NL3; *the no-vote in the referenda also cause an emergency situation in the European Union. Juridically, the ratification procedure will go on, but politically, the evident 'no' in the Netherlands and France will be impossible to ignore. It forces Europe to take a step back and reflect on itself.[61]*

In sum, the framing within the Populism frame is mainly connected to the run-up and the results of the referendum, and the arguments that have been used correspondingly within the Soft Euroscepticism frame. Interestingly, there is no clear connection of the Populism frame with the Nationalism and/or the Hard Euroscepticism frame.

Nationalism: national priorities expressed by supporters of the EU Constitution

The main discussed theme within the Nationalism frame is, like in the other frames, the referendum on the EU constitution. However, within this frame, it is claimed that the Constitution is in favour of the national interest and is thus used by supporters of the Constitution. As such, the main argument that comes forward within this period frames the national interest of the Netherlands (NPI amount: 2,3). This is similar to the previous critical moment, although the use is higher. This argument has been used in the discussion on the referendum. Interestingly, this argument is mainly used by supporters of the European Constitution, as a 'no' vote would weaken the Dutch position within the EU; *those who are critical should not think that the Netherlands is strong in Europe, when the no-votes have the majority in the referendum. You can go and negotiation on the agreement again, say the opponents. But then, it is not sure whether a better result for the Netherlands will be the outcome.[62] A 'no' vote would be first and foremost not good for our own. It does not only harm our image, but also our own interests.[63]*

(Co-)occurrence of frames
When compared to earlier critical moments (NL2, NL3), the occurrence of the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame is relatively low, while the Populism frame rises before the period of the referendum. Table 4.6 and Graph 4.6 show the absolute and relative occurrence of all frames.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2004-2	15	22	14,7	8	5,3	8	5,3	3	2
2005-1	31	57	18,4	18	5,8	39	12,6	12	3,9
2005-2	11	21	19,1	4	3,6	7	6,4	2	1,8
Table 4.6: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around NL4									

Graph 4.6: Occurrence of the frames in Dutch newspapers around critical moment NL4

As already mentioned, the occurrence of both the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame can be considered as relatively low during this period. However, there is a difference; while the occurrence of the Soft Euroscepticism frame rises, and rises even faster after the referendum, the occurrence of the Hard Euroscepticism frame decreases, mainly after the referendum. The occurrence of the Populism frame shows a big rise before the referendum, and a big decrease afterwards. This indicates that this frame was highly apparent in the newspapers before the referendum. Finally, the Nationalism frame has not been used frequently in this period but follows the same pattern as the Hard Euroscepticism frame; a small increase before the referendum, and a bigger decrease afterwards.

Conclusions

In sum, all frames are framing the referendum results as a protest vote against more integration of the EU. The language of the Soft Euroscepticism frame is more radical, and thus shows an evident overlap with the Hard Euroscepticism frame. The Populism frame claims that the referendum shows that voters are done being not considered in the EU, while the Nationalism frame makes clear that information on the content of the Constitution is not well communicated within the newspaper articles. Furthermore, the Nationalism frame is used by supporters of the Constitution, as it is framed to be favourable for the national interest.

NL5 – Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 2006: suggestions to improve the EU

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Amount of articles
NL5	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	22-11-2006	2006-2	66 - 67	2006 (2) – 2007 (1)	21

Soft Euroscepticism: reactions on the referendum results – suggestions for improvement and scepticism on specific policies

The most discussed themes within the Soft Euroscepticism frame are suggestions on the priorities of the EU, predominantly on the security and asylum policies. There are two arguments used to understand these themes during this episode.

The most frequently used argument within the Soft Euroscepticism frame frames on suggestions which the EU must apply (SPS amount: 8,6) to improve. This contains of suggestions that have been done in, for example, the election programmes of the different political parties, and in the agreement that has been made by the new government after the elections. Most of the suggestions proposes; *a European policy on asylum, the environment, criminality and security. A full-fledged minister for European affairs can cause a more active vision on Europe. 'But what exactly will be sanctioned, and what those sanctions will be, remains determined by the member states themselves.*[64] Another suggestion that is often framed is that *Europe definitely needs a common energy policy. But Brussels is not dealing with this currently, which is a mind-blowing mistake.*[65] Most of the suggestions are connected to the negative results of the referendum in 2005, as the political parties wanted to show that they have been listening to the electorate. Therefore, some more popular suggestions are also being mentioned; *We should not be occupied with the European flag, or the European anthem, but with the question whether the Netherlands, with its open economy, is fully taking advantage of the power of the European Union.*[66]

Another argument within this period frames scepticism towards a specific EU policy (SP amount: 3,3). These policies are mainly (again) the entering of the Euro, or: the removal of the 'gulden'; *after 723 years, our national currency was abolished suddenly. If there has been a debate of half an hour in the Parliament, this has been much!*[67] Other policies that are criticized have to do with the economy, like policies on the social security, the budgetary discipline which is demanded from Brussels and competition on the job market; *the far left claimed that the free competition-policy, which is imposed by Brussels, will lead to a race to the bottom, in which 'our jobs' will be taken away by Polish plumbers.*[68]

Interestingly, there is no sign anymore of the fundamental debate on the EU, which has been raised in the period around NL4. Instead of discussing about the amount of integration, it seems that the focus has shifted again to currently existing policies of the EU, and ways to improve these. Though, the suggestions that are made here might indicate a tiny outcome of the discussion on integration, but they do not really gain momentum yet.

Hard Euroscepticism: suggestions to improve the EU – decrease of bureaucracy and (unnecessary) rules

The most important theme within the Hard Euroscepticism frame is, also, suggestions to improve the EU, which are mainly referred to the bureaucracy and interference of Brussels, which is used as a reaction on the negative referendum results. This argument is framed by the claim that Europe is too bureaucratic, with too many (unnecessary) rules, which are not relevant for its citizens (HB amount: 2,4), for example; *the rules on which scientific research programmes have to abide are 'a real nightmare'.*[69] Consequently, it is claimed that; *this Union will collapse, as long as the administrative strength is not enlarged, as long as big discourses are followed by small policy, and as long as the ignorance of The Hague will pave the way for Brussels' interference with ladders, sun crème and obese.*[70]

The content of these arguments can be connected to the suggestions that have been done within the Soft Euroscepticism frame; as they are dealing with the priorities on which the EU should focus, to be relevant for citizens.

Populism: focus on the referendum results by framing negative public opinion and claiming that Europe is in a crisis

The main theme within the Populism frame is the negative public opinion towards the EU, which is connected to the results of the referendum in 2005. There are two arguments used to understand this theme during this episode.

The most often used argument within this frame is a reference to general negative public opinion towards the EU (PO amount: 4,3). Sometimes, this public opinion is connected to the 'awakening of citizens', which is also used around critical moment NL4; *it is mainly the emancipation of the anxious, angry citizens against the established opinions, that has come to the fore the last four years in the Netherlands. The civilian is increasingly aware of the people who have told us for years that this (the EU) is good for us, but we will decide that ourselves.[71]*

Generally, negative public opinion is being used as an argument for the suggestions that are proposed within the Soft Euroscepticism frame; some elements of the EU really must change, if not, *the support for the European Union, which is already low, will decrease even further.[72]* Other explanations for negative public opinion can be found in the fact that the EU is supported by a lot of citizens*, but that the interest from citizens is traditionally low. When asked on an EU issue, for example in a referendum, this low interest comes to the fore, and this creates risks when asking the citizens their opinion on the EU. The only thing to do, when you want to bring Europe closer to the citizens, is facilitate a political discussion.[73]* This argument can, thus, be connected to both the suggestions and the results of the referendum, and thus to elements of the Soft Euroscepticism frame.

The second argument frames that Europe is in a crisis (PC amount: 2,4), mainly due to the negative results of the referenda in the Netherlands and France in 2005. Interestingly, this argument is used by European politicians, to create a language in which member states become aware that they now must contribute to reforms within the EU; *the European Union finds itself in a state of crisis, said Juncker. I wouldn't like to admit it either, that my country is at the basis of that crisis. However, the results of the referendum were not the only reasons, but the voting of the Dutch and French were symbolic for it.[74]*

Nationalism: supporters of the EU express their views by focussing on the national priorities and the protection of national sovereignty

The main theme within the Nationalism frame is the national interest, and the fact that supporters of the EU claim that it is in the Dutch national interest to be an active member of the EU. The use of the Nationalism frame is relatively high in the period before the elections of 2006, and afterwards the occurrence remained relatively stable. There are two arguments used to understand the national interest during this episode.

The first argument frames the importance of national priorities regarding the EU (NPI amount: 2,9), similarly to critical moment NL4; *the debate on Europe must deal with where Europe works in favour of the Netherlands, and where it doesn't. A critical and constructive position, combined with specific propositions that serve the Dutch interests; that should be the answer on the 'no' against the Constitutional Agreement.[75]* The use of the frame is combined with the results of the referendum of 2005. In other articles, the concern of European politicians on increasing nationalism in the member states is mentioned, which is only an indirect use of nationalism: *Will the national self-interest be dominating? Yes, and this is bad news. We are being at risk that a gap will appear between the cultural and institutional Europe and the nationalism of politicians who are campaigning against it. One can deal with this for a while, but after all, Europe will become irrelevant in world politics.[76]*

The second argument frames the erosion of national sovereignty (NSV amount: 2,9), like the arguments around NL1 and NL2; the *fact that by now, even 75% of the Dutch population indicates to be against this European Constitution, means that they are against the shift of authorizations from national level to Brussels.[77]*

However, as seen in earlier periods, these arguments are mainly used by supporters of the EU, who claim that others, those who do not appear in the newspapers, wrongly use these arguments, to

express their disagreement with the EU; *the far right tried to create the image of a disappearing Dutch identity and the increasing shift of power to the bureaucrats in Brussels. These claims are not being supported by facts and figures.*[78]

Finally, these claims and arguments can only be found within the 'NRC Handelsblad', which is labelled as predominantly Euro-ambivalent to Euro-positive (Chapter 2), and not in the 'Telegraaf', which is labelled predominantly Euro-sceptic. Thus, the arguments found within this period are expressed by supporters of the EU, in a newspaper that is predominantly a supporter of the EU, while they are not found in a newspaper which is predominantly critical on the EU.

(Co-)occurrence of frames

It appears from table 4.7 and graph 4.7 that the more positive public opinion towards the EU coincides with a significant rise of the Soft Euroscepticism frame. Before, as well as after, the elections of 2006, the occurrence of this frame is rising towards a significant peak in 2007. The Populism frame follows the same pattern as the Soft Euroscepticism frame; the occurrence rises during the run-up to the elections and increases further afterwards. The occurrence of the Hard Euroscepticism frame appears differently, as this is decreasing before the elections, and rising afterwards. Finally, the occurrence of the Nationalism frame rises in the run-up to the elections, while decreasing afterwards.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2006-2	8	20	25	2	2,5	6	7,5	7	8,8
2007-1	13	45	34,6	10	7,7	15	11,5	11	8,5
Table 4.7: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around NL5									

Graph 4.7: Occurrence of the frames in Dutch newspapers around critical moment NL5

Conclusions

In sum, the main themes discussed around the elections of 2006 are suggestions on the priorities of the EU, and of European integration. Examples which are mentioned within the Soft Euroscepticism frame are suggestions for a common security and asylum policy, as well as reforms on the budgetary policies. These arguments are strengthened by the Populism frame, which connects the urgency to re-prioritize the EU with existing negative public opinion towards the EU. The Nationalism frame consists

of frames of supporters of the EU, who state that the suggestions would lead to an EU which is more in line with the national interest. It can be concluded that these discussions are partly caused by the national elections themselves, as each political party tried to come with a political response on the rejection of the European Constitution. However, the uprising of the PVV, the main Eurosceptical party, is not reflected in the frames, as the occurrence of the Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame is relatively low, and do not entail a significant amount of fundamentally anti-European frames.

NL6 – European Elections 2009: widening Euroscepticism before and after the elections

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Amount of articles
NL6	European elections	4-6-2009	2009-1	71 - 72	2009 (1) – 2009 (2)	31

Soft Euroscepticism: increasing scope of Euroscepticism, with a focus on scepticism on European institutions and scepticism on other (Eastern European) member states

Around the European elections of 2009, the scope of Soft Euroscepticism increases, which seems to be directly connected to the campaign of the elections. As such, there are five arguments used within this frame around the elections. Though the use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame finds itself in a downward pattern, the use is still relatively high (amount: 22), mainly in the period of the European elections (2009-1).

The first argument frames the current cooperation within the EU, which is not going the way it is imagined to go (SLC amount: 3,2). This entails, for example, the differences in taxes and prices between the different member states; *Still, the VAT is different in every European country, just as the examination of cars, butane bottles, cohabitation contracts, adapters, insurances, telephone inputs, debit cards and the rights of inheritances[79]*. These critiques stress the inability of European governments and institutions to create coherence between their policies. Another element of this argument is that the creation of supranational institutions, like the European Commission is complex, as the interests of every member state must be considered; *the personal composition of new functions shows that the EU remains a complex balance of power.[80]*

This argument can be combined with the second argument; which frames criticism on specific institutions of the EU (SI amount: 1,9); *the European Council, the council of heads of state and governmental leaders, has, theoretically more power, but this is disappointing in practice, for two reasons. The presidency rotates every six months, and it is hard to create consensus among the 27 members.[81]* The European Parliament is another EU institution that gains criticism during this period. *It is usually not seen as the most powerful institutions in Brussels*. But this also has to do with the choices of the member states, as *political parties do not send their best people to Brussels. 'When I came here in 1994, the Parliament was mainly a comfortable nursing home after a long career in politics'[82]*. Also, the practices of the Parliament itself are criticized; *the huge amount of amendments, sometimes hundreds for one European law, is astonishing for her. 'For the Parliamentarians it is already hard to follow, how would this be for the population?'[83]*

The third argument frames criticism on the enlargement of the EU (SE amount: 2,9). This mainly entails opposition on the negotiations for accession with Turkey, expressed by the PVV, which is also an anti-Islam party, next to an anti-EU party; *We say: never Turkey. Not now, not in 1000 years. The Turkish culture is an Islamic culture which is not compatible with our Western culture.[84]* Furthermore, the eventual accession is also framed as the step to the accession of other, non-western countries; *there should never be a Turkish membership. Not because of the Islam, but for the fact that, when Turkey*

enters, other countries will also enter. For example, Ukraine, which is 'more European than Turkey'.[85] Finally, the PVV is principally against the enlargement of the EU with *'thoroughly corrupt countries',* like Romania and Bulgaria, which they would like to see erased from the EU. *'Those criminals will find their way to the Netherlands.*[86]

The fourth argument frames criticism towards specific member states (SM amount: 2,6), which are, in this period, mainly Poland*,* about which is said that *the Wilders-story about the Polish plumbers who steals the Dutch jobs, is striking in the eyes of the population, although it is not a factual story.*[87] Other countries that are criticized are Romania and Bulgaria, from which the PVV says that *the Romanians and the Bulgarians have to get out of the EU.*[88] This criticism is, although not that radically, shared by other actors and member states, as; *the Netherlands does not stand alone in its views that more heavy measures have to be taken against Romania and Bulgaria, in order to force them to do more against corruption, and to establish a well-functioning rule of law.*[89]

Finally, the fifth argument frames critique on the budget of the EU (SB amount: 1,9), mainly on the way that it is spend, and the net contribution of the Netherlands, in comparison to other member states; *we want our money back. We don't want to be the bravest kid in the classroom anymore. The Netherlands is the biggest net contributor, we are paying the highest amount to all that nonsense in Europe.*[90]

Compared to the Soft Euroscepticism arguments around NL5, the focus of the frame has changed from critique on specific policies towards specific institutions and member states, combined with an emphasis of the position of the Netherlands, for example in the contribution to the budget. This period is also characterized by a wider scope of arguments within the Soft Euroscepticism frame than earlier periods.

Hard Euroscepticism: the bureaucracy and interference of Brussels expressed in anti-EU rhetoric

The main theme discussed within the Hard Euroscepticism frame is the bureaucracy and interference with national member states of Brussels, which is mainly expressed with anti-EU rhetoric, by the PVV. Before the European elections in 2009, the use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame was relatively high, while the use decreased afterwards. There are three arguments used to understand these themes during this episode.

Like earlier periods, the arguments mainly frame criticism on the bureaucracy within the EU (HB amount: 1,6); *everyday businesses, which hit every European, are not harmonised, while the expensive quest for rule making seems to concentrate itself on trade in potting soil and cucumbers, on which the European population is hardly interested.*[91]

During this episode, this argument is often combined with the frame that the processes of the EU are not democratic (HD amount: 1,3); *'I am in favour of the European Union, but a radically different one. So, not where one small group of not-democratically chosen people in Brussels proposes and monitors laws. A Union with less meetings, and much more openness. The way it goes right now is outright un-democratically.*[92]

Another argument that is often used during this period refers to (groups of) people that have a fundamental opposition towards the EU (HF amount: 1,3), which, in the Dutch case, is mainly the PVV. These anti-EU frames are mainly expressed during the run-up to the European elections; *Less Brussels. Less Europe. Three weeks before the European elections, politicians solely seem to override each other with anti-EU slogans.*[93]

Populism: the election results framed as a reflection of negative public opinion towards the EU and the increasing appearance of Eurosceptic parties

The main theme discussed within the Populism frame are the results of the European elections of 2009, which are perceived to be increasingly Eurosceptic, in comparison to earlier elections. However, it seems that the amount of Eurosceptic votes in the Netherlands is significantly lower than in other member states. The use of the Populism frame is relatively high during the run-up to the European elections, and it decrease after the elections. There are two arguments used to understand the election results.

The argument that is most often used is, like the period around NL5, a general reference to existing negative public opinion on the EU (PO amount: 4,5); *solely the word 'Brussels' recalls feelings of resistance at a lot of people.[94]* One of the explanations of this may be the process that happened after the referendum on which *a lot of people feel betrayed. They voted with a majority 'no' to a European Constitution, but later, the Lisbon Agreement appears, which is similarly for 98%. Then you become sceptical.[95]* After the elections, this argument is used in reference to the relatively high amount of 'Eurosceptic' votes in the European elections; *the Dutch restraining attitude regarding Europe is, in the light of the results of today, a structural thing.[96]* However, it is also claimed that *the anti-European parties who gained seats in the Parliament will have nothing to say due to the incapability of the, mainly, extreme-right representatives to build a group within the Parliament. However, the voice of the disappointed will force the classical parties to reflect on the role of the European Union.[97]*

The second argument frames on the parties that are anti-European, which mainly entails lists of the parties, their points of view, and the countries in which they appear (PA amount: 1,9). Furthermore, there are claims on the role of these parties, and the reflections of the electorate; *the results of the PVV in the elections, anti-Europe, anti-Islam and appealing to xenophobe views among citizens, indicate that there is a solid basis among voters for these kinds of ideas.[98]*

Nationalism: fundamental scepticism expressed by framing the EU as a threat for national interests, the national sovereignty and the national identity by anti-EU parties

The most discussed theme within the Nationalism frame is fundamental scepticism towards the EU, and directly refers to scepticism within the Hard Euroscepticism frame. During the election campaign, this scepticism is mainly expressed by anti-European parties, like the PVV. Interestingly, this means a shift in who uses the Nationalism frame. Where in earlier periods, Nationalism arguments are mainly used by supporters of the EU, which framed the EU as in favour of the national interest, during the elections of 2009, these arguments are mainly used by anti-EU parties, who are claiming to stand up for the national interest, national sovereignty and the national identity. As such, there are three arguments used to understand this scepticism during this episode.

The first argument frames the national sovereignty as eroding, due to shifting responsibilities towards Brussels (NSV amount: 1,9). As mentioned, the different aspect in this period is that these claims are not solely used by supporters of the EU, but that there is a shift towards the anti-European parties, which implies a more radical discourse; *The position of PVV-leader Madlener is clear: anti-Europe; the total undressing of the EU, in order that our country gains all lost authorizations back.[99]* This argument also refers back to the prevailing negative public opinion; *the three ingredients, according to why the population voted against the EU Constitution, are all pointing towards the same direction, which is not in favour of shifting responsibilities to Brussels.[100]*

The second argument is also used by anti-EU parties, who are framing to stand up for the national interest (NPI amount: 1,9); *we are going there for the Dutch interest. Of course, it is big, in Brussels,*

and relatively, you have a little say, but we are going to try our best.[101] The sound that the national interest must be secured, will not be less – parties like the PVV and SP will surely try to benefit from that. However, meanwhile, all political parties have traced some areas on which they think that Brussels should not interfere.[102]

The third argument that is used frames on the national identity, which is feared to erode due to the EU (NI amount: 1,3), like the national sovereignty; *in case of integration and immigrants, 'Europe' is seen as the vehicle of evil: the institution imports other identities, something on which the majority is against. 'Together with the rising political aspirations of Brussels, these counterbalances will grow.'[103]*

(Co-)occurrence of frames

After critical moment NL5, the occurrence of the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, and Populism frame is rising. However, after 2007-1, the rise of these frames stops, and turns into a decrease. This decrease perseveres during the run-up to the European elections in 2009. While the occurrence of the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame is still relatively high, they are in a downward pattern around this period. The same occurs for the Populism and Nationalism frame, though the occurrence of the Populism frame decreases more than the Nationalism frame.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2009-1	22	47	21,4	16	7,3	23	10,5	15	6,8
2009-2	9	13	14,4	0	0	3	3,3	4	4,4
Table 4.8: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around NL6									

Graph 4.8: Occurrence of the frames in Dutch newspapers around critical moment NL6

Conclusions

In sum, most of the arguments of the frames around NL6 are referring to the European elections of 2009. The Soft Euroscepticism mainly states that Euroscepticism is increasing in every member state, with a focus on scepticism towards institutions of the EU and on other EU member states. The Hard Euroscepticism frame consists of fundamental criticism on the bureaucracy and interference of Brussels. The Populism frame consists of claims that highlight the influence of anti-European, populist

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parties in the election results, mainly in other member states, which explains the broader categories of Euroscepticism in the other frames. Finally, the Nationalism frame shows a shift, as populist, anti-EU parties are now using this frame to claim that the EU is a threat for the protection of national interests, the national sovereignty and the national identity. Doing this, the Nationalism frame can be connected to fundamental scepticism towards the EU in the Hard Euroscepticism frame.

NL7 – Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 2010: the Euro-crisis

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Amount of articles
NL7	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	9-6-2010	2010-1	73 - 74	2010 (1) – 2010 (2)	18

Soft Euroscepticism: The Euro-crisis criticized by framing on the European budget, the failing cooperation within the EU, the increasing discussion on political integration and scepticism towards specific economic policies

The most discussed theme within the Soft Euroscepticism frame is the Euro-crisis. All arguments are thus focussed on the events and consequences of this crisis and have a predominant economic focus. Correspondingly the use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame increases around the elections of 2010. The relative use rises from 16,7 (in 2010-1) to 21,7 (in 2010-2). There are four arguments used to understand the Euro-crisis during this episode.

The most often used argument frames the discussion on the budget of the EU (SB amount: 5,6). These discussions are held between the member states, who failed in coming to an agreement about the EU budget during this period, and within the Netherlands itself. The content of the discussions was mainly on the contribution of each member state, and on the fact that *big parts of the budget are not accountable. But everyone just turns their back against it and goes on with their daily lives.[104]* Other discussions frame with the setting up of European taxes, *on which opposition is not 'anti-European'. On the contrary, if the European bureaucracy can feed itself with income, it will grow unrestrained. This will lead to uncontrollable centralism, over-regulation, high taxes and a closed economy with protectionist tendencies.[105]*

Another argument that is predominantly used frames on the lack of efficient cooperation within the EU (SLC amount: 3,9), which mainly comes to the surface during the euro-crisis that started in 2008. During this crisis, it appears that some countries were not able to deal with their national debts, and *the euro-countries appeared unable to agree on a system of automatic sanctions when one of them created a debt that was too high.[106]* From this perspective, the discussion on the cooperation also focusses on the so-called Stability pact, which aims to create better rules for following the European budgetary rules. However, *already at the beginning, a battle started between the members of the Economic Monetary Union who wanted a stricter compliance of the rules, and those wanted to leave room for national governments to manipulate the rules. The line between the two camps was, mainly, the Northern and the Southern members, with Germany and France as leaders of each camp.[107]* Furthermore, the *Euro-crisis shed light to another dramatic conflict; if the EU wants to keep its economic model, more political integration is necessary, but a big part of the European population is hostile against every step in the direction of a federal Europe.[108]* Consequently, the discussion on the Euro-crisis causes a shift towards discussion on the amount of integration again (SEI amount: 2,2); *from an economical perspective, Europe is a giant, but from a political perspective, it is just a dwarf.[109]*

The final argument frames scepticism on specific policies, which mainly consists of policies that have, and have not, been considered before and during the Euro-crisis. These specific policies entail the fiscal

policies of member states, the already mentioned Stability fact, and the emergency fund, which is set up to help countries that were not able to deal with their debts anymore, and to save the Euro from becoming a disaster for its member states. *A lot is still uncertain. But one thing is for sure; if the Netherlands is not joining (the emergency fund), the aid train of the Euro will stand still. In short, with the helping of the Euro, which is a crucial but precarious project, huge interests are involved. So, it is not surprising that international politics becomes national nowadays.[110]*

Hard Euroscepticism: -

The Hard Eurosceptic frame is just one time used in each period (absolute amount). This entails one claim on the bureaucracy of Brussels (HB), and one about ideological discussion on the scope of the EU institutions (HI). However, due to the low amounts, no valid results can be drawn from this.

Populism: The Euro-crisis framed as a significant crisis and anti-EU parties framing on the immigration of foreigners

Within the Populism frame, there are two themes mainly discussed. The first theme is the Euro-crisis, which overlaps with the Soft Euroscepticism and the Nationalism frame. The second theme is immigration, which is mainly framed by anti-European parties. The use of the populism frame slowly rises before, during and after the national elections of 2010. There are two arguments used to understand the two themes of this episode.

The first argument frames that Europe is in a crisis (PC amount: 3,3), which is mainly referred to the Euro-crisis, or financial /debt crisis. *Since the start of September 2008, we are confronted with the hardest situation since the Second World War, maybe even the First World War. We have been suffering from dramatic times and are even still suffering from it.[111]* The consequences of this financial crisis are expanding to other parts of the EU, as also became clear within the Soft Euroscepticism frame; *The current Europe is apathic on its achievements, confused on its future, and is ignored by people on which is does not seem to have a direct effect. Due to the financial crisis and its aftermath, the European problems and limitation seem to have grown towards a real crisis lately[112].*

The second argument frames on parties that are against the EU (PA amount: 3,3); which is combined with frames on the immigration of foreigners, mainly from Islamic countries. *Look at Europe, then it becomes dramatically clear that right parties are on the winning hand everywhere, and that the themes that they are dealing with are the same: immigration, Islam, loss of resources for the welfare state and fear of globalisation.[113]* Thus, it can be concluded that the populist parties that are anti-Europe, are also anti- several other aspects. Interestingly, the parties themselves do not appear in the newspaper articles, it is mainly the journalists that are framing them; *They are ignored, they are criminalized, they are threatened. But all of that cannot stop them, like the PVV, from representing voices that are present in all layers of the population. That anti-Islam voice will constantly increase. Everywhere in Europe, the political landscape will be cut open.[114]* The anti-parties seem to have a special strategy to do this; *they are clever. They are profiling themselves as outsiders and anti-establishment before every election.[115]*

Nationalism: The Euro-crisis as a trigger for increasing nationalistic language among the EU

The main discussed theme within the Nationalism frame is the Euro-crisis. In this frame, the Euro-crisis is framed as an event that triggers increasing nationalist language. The use of the Nationalism frame is relatively low before and during the elections but increases afterwards. There is one argument which his used to understand how the Euro-crisis triggers increasing Nationalism, which is focussed on the importance of the national interests (NPI amount: 3,3). Some articles frame that the Euro-crisis made an end to the *taboo on nationalistic language, which was self-evident within the EU. This is, for example, visible in the way that national interests are expressed. Before the crisis, everyone knew that Bulgaria and Romania were less important than Germany and France, but there was a silent agreement*

that nobody would make notice of that. This situation is over now. Nobody has time anymore to pretend this[116]. Thus, it is not the case that these national interests are mentioned more within the articles in the period, but the articles indicate that the language within the whole EU, regarding the emphasis on national interests, and other nationalistic elements, will change because of the Euro-crisis.

(Co-)occurrence of frames

After a period of decrease (between 2007-1 and 2009-2), all frames are rising during critical moment NL7, except for the Nationalism frame, which is decreasing before the elections. In the period after the elections, graph 4.9 shows that all frames are rising in occurrence, though not very fast, except for the Hard Euroscepticism frame, which is decreasing after the elections. As table 4.9 shows, the only two frames that have a relative high amount of occurrence are the Soft Euroscepticism and the Populism frame.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2010-1	6	10	16,7	1	1,7	5	8,3	2	3,3
2010-2	12	26	21,7	1	0,8	11	9,2	7	5,8
Table 4.9: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around NL7									

Graph 4.9: Occurrence of the frames in Dutch newspapers around critical moment NL7

Conclusions

In sum, the most emerging theme around the elections of 2010 is the Euro-crisis. This theme is mainly framed by the Soft Euroscepticism frame, which has an economic focus on the failing cooperation between the member states while dealing with the crisis, and the Populism frame, which focusses on the fact that the EU is in a crisis and the increasing uprising of anti-EU parties. The Nationalism frame is not often used but frames the Euro-crisis as the trigger for increasing Nationalism in the EU. The Hard Euroscepticism frame is hardly used around the elections. It can be concluded that scepticism on

the EU is, in this case, not connected to the national elections, as the events that are mentioned and criticized are taking place at a higher level than national decision-making. The only connection that can be found is scepticism towards Dutch politicians, who, according to anti-EU parties, act differently domestically, than they are doing in a European context.

NL8 – Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 2012: discussing the amount of (political) integration

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Amount of articles
NL8	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	12-9-2012	2012-2	77 - 79	2012 (1) – 2013 (1)	86

Soft Euroscepticism: the consequences of the Euro-crisis – scepticism on increasing political integration, scepticism towards other member states and on economic policies

The most discussed theme within the Soft Euroscepticism frame is the consequences of the Euro-crisis, which mainly imply discussions on whether the EU should be a solely economic union or also a political union. There are three arguments used to understand this theme during this episode.

The first argument frames the discussion on the amount of European integration (SEI amount: 2,9). This discussion mainly entails proposals that are made by different member states, to improve the cooperation within the EU, which implies more political cooperation. But, there is resistance against these plans; *Europe must cooperate, of course, but this cooperation only needs to deal with trade. No political union, no fiscal union, no monetary union.*[117] But, according to others; *the solution for the European crisis points to one direction: further integration. The economic union in Europe cannot exist without a political union. But exactly this is the word that is less and less pronounced by national politicians*[118]. This is also reflected in the Dutch parliament, as *a majority of the Parliament, consisting of VVD, PvdA, PVV, CDA and SP, does not agree with the plans of a political union, although it is unclear yet what the plans of Merkel exactly consist of.*[119] Article NRC – 4.68 consists of a summary of the election programmes of the biggest parties on their views towards the EU, and shows that, except for D66 and GroenLinks, all parties mention that they do not agree with further European (political) integration. These findings might confirm the second explanation that is earlier stated; that other political parties have grown more Eurosceptical, in case of more European integration.

One of the reasons of the resistance towards more political integration can be found in the second used argument, which frames criticism on other member states (SM amount: 1,9); *integration does not offer a solution for our core problem, which is, namely, that the Southern countries have a non-competitive economy with bad public finances. The integration that was needed, is already there. We are in misery now, because the agreements on the budgetary discipline were not forcible. Now they are, because we asked for it.*[120] Criticism is thus mainly expressed on the Southern countries. Next to these, there is, however, also criticism on other Northern countries, like Germany; *the undisguised leadership as 'new German normality' can lead (according to Jurgen Habermas) easily to a Europe that will be strongly dominated by Germany.*[121] This criticism is strongly connected to the German vision on Europe; which entails more cooperation and political integration. Another country that receives criticism, not only from the Netherlands, is the United Kingdom; *David Cameron receives domestically, as well as in the rest of Europe, firm criticism on the package of requirements that he offered to Brussels yesterday,*[122] which refer to the intentions of the UK to re-negotiate its membership of the EU. Finally, it is also the Netherlands that gains criticism from European institutions, as well as other member states. These criticisms entail the actions of the PVV, which opened a contact point for Polish men who caused nuisance in all forms; *the European Parliament calls this objectionable, discriminating and right*

against the European core values.[123] Romania even wants to call for *a special European summit on 'xenophobia', by which they mean 'the Netherlands'.[124]*

The third argument that comes to the fore frames scepticism on specific policies (SP amount: 2,6); both EU and of specific EU member states, which overlaps with the second argument. The main policies on which criticism is expressed are economical and financial, mainly as an aftermath of the Euro-crisis that started in 2008. For example, there is a lot of criticism on the so-called '3% rule' which forces European government to lower their financial debts to 3% under the national income, and which implies cuts in spending. *If the economic growth is disappointing, there will be a renewed discussion on the budgetary demands of 3%, together with a discussion on how, together with cuts in spending, economic growth in Europe should be stimulated.[125]* Other policies on which criticism is expressed are the Euro emergency fund, which is set up after the Euro crisis, and on the Euro in general: *The EU has 17 Euro-countries, and 10 countries that kept their own currency. The non-Euro countries have a good relationship and are a total member of the common market. The Eurozone has, however, become a fighting-zone. Ten years ago, Germany was the most popular country in Greece, but by now it is hated.[126]* Scepticism on specific economic policies of countries mainly entails Greece, Italy, Spain and France. Finally, criticism is expressed on the subsidy system of the EU; *more than two/third does not believe that the Netherlands profits from European subsidies, and even a greater amount call the subsidies the useless pumping around of money.[127]*

Hard Euroscepticism: Scepticism on increasing political integration, framed by fundamental opposition, the democratic deficit and different ideologies on the EU

The most discussed theme within the Hard Euroscepticism frame is (increasing) political integration. Correspondingly, fundamental scepticism is expressed by mentioning different ideologies on the EU and criticizing the amount of democracy within the EU. The use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame is relatively high around the national elections of 2012. Furthermore, when looking from a wider perspective; this period is the beginning of a period (2012-2014) in which the frame is more used than in other periods during the research. This development is connected to a shift in arguments that are used within the frame. Around the elections of 2012, there are three arguments that are used to understand the discussed theme.

The first argument frames fundamental opposition towards the EU (HF amount: 2,1). This argument frames mainly on the most Eurosceptic party; the PVV; *'Their Brussels, our Netherlands'. This is exactly how the PVV views Europe: away with it, and fastly![128]* It also appears that *he will use his anti-European strategy the following months, as a big part of the Dutch population is anti-European.[129]* However, not every claim is linked to the PVV. Fundamental opposition is also framed in relation to the economic policies and the way of decision-making in the EU; *nowadays, it is only about power and money, a lot of money. This has nothing to do with the core values, which were the starting points of the EU.[130]* There is even one statement that claims that the way the EU works currently will cause a war; *the ambition to establish a European empire, will lead to war. The ambition to push different nations into a straitjacket, will lead to war. In short, it is the European unification that will lead to war.[131]*

The second argument that is used frames that there is a democratic deficit within the EU (HD amount: 1,6). This mainly entails criticism on the European Parliament, *in which there is no room for democracy[132].* However, there are also claims that state that Europe is not democratic in general; *anti-European feelings are majorly originated in the total lack of democracy in Brussels.[133],* which may be caused by *the striving for this one high aim: peace, through which the loss of democracy, sovereignty, transparency appeared[134].* However, sometimes a solution is offered for the existing *democratic deficit*

in Europe, which can be addressed from the basis: locally. It doesn't always have to be on the European Parliament.[135]

The third argument frames on the ideological discussion on what the EU ought to be (HI amount: 0,9) and is connected to discussions within the Soft Euroscepticism frame. However, within this argument, there are predominantly frames on how this discussion is held, and how radical the language of both sides is; *betrayers of the nations versus betrayers of the ideal, open society and economy on a European scale. Europe as an ideology.[136] 'The problem with Europe is that the supporters are acting like believers. There is just one vision: more Europe. All other options have no vision, are populistic or inconsequent. In that way, you are not having a conversation, you are converting, and you are organising your own resistance and failure.[137]*

Populism: Soft and Hard Euroscepticism arguments combined with the uprising of Eurosceptic parties and negative public opinion

The content of the Populism frame during this episode cannot be directly related to one theme, as it mainly exists of frames on anti-European parties and their resemblance among the population. In that way, the frame mainly refers to already mentioned arguments within the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame around the elections of 2012. After the national elections of 2010, the use of the Populism frame rises. Interestingly, this rise stops during the run-up of the elections of 2012, in which there is a decreasing use of the Populism frame. However, after the elections, the use of the Populism frame is rising again. There are two arguments used to understand the anti-European parties during this episode.

The first argument frames the political parties that are anti-European (PA amount: 3), which is like earlier periods. Within the framing of this argument, a significant amount of connections with the Hard Eurosceptic argument on fundamental opposition to the EU can be made. This anti-EU attitude is combined with an anti-attitude towards other phenomenon's; *xenophobia and anti-capitalism are, apparently, leading to the same anger towards 'Europe'. Also, anti-movements with other sources are leading currently to this.[138]* Furthermore, a connection with the criticism on specific member states and their policies can be made; *according to the party (PVV); the power of Brussels and the waste of Euro's in Greece, Spain and other countries must stop[139].* A lot of claims describe the uprising of anti-European parties in other EU countries, like France (Front National), the UK (UKIP), Greece (the Golden Dawn) and Italy (Five Star Movement); *in almost all European countries, we see the uprising of anti-establishment parties that de-stabilize the political establishment[140].*

The second frequently used argument reflects the first argument, and frames that public opinion is negative towards the EU (PO amount: 2); this negative public opinion is mainly referred to earlier described arguments within both the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame, and deal, for example, with the economic policies of several EU member states, more political integration and the democratic deficit. *You don't have to be an unknown, for populistic talks receptive, cavemen to get a painful feeling in your stomach when thinking about Europe. The inconvenience is rising. Economists, central bankers, parliamentarians, more people are asking themselves the question: guys, what are we actually doing?[141]*

The two other arguments that come to the fore in this period frame the insecurity and mistrust in politics that is caused by the EU (PI amount: 1,2); *among citizens, Europe is causing a feeling of suspicion and anger, which is recently called 'democratic alienation' by the 'Raad van State'[142],* and the lack of representation of citizens within the EU institutions and decision-making (PR amount: 0,8); *the members of the European Parliament are three weeks in Brussels, then one week in Strasbourg. Without any direct contact with the population. They have completely lost the feeling of reality[143].*

Nationalism: Opponents of political integration claim that increasing integration harms national sovereignty vs. Supporters of political integration claim that increasing integration is in the Dutch interest

The most discussed theme within the Nationalism frame is, as in the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame, increasing political integration in the EU. Within this frame, this increasing integration is framed as a threat for the national sovereignty and the national interest. The use of the Nationalism frame rises between 2010 and 2012-1. After the elections, the use decreases again. There are two arguments that are predominantly used to understand the connection of political integration with the Nationalism frame.

The first argument frames on the protection of national sovereignty (NSV amount: 2,9). The discussion on the national sovereignty can, in this period, be connected to the Soft Eurosceptic argument on political integration, and to a lesser extent to the ideological discussion in the Hard Eurosceptic frame; *in 2012, the discomfort on a 'political' Europe returns; pleas from Brussels and Berlin in favour of a 'political union' in the Eurozone, are recalling the anxiety for a loss of sovereignty in the Netherlands[144].* This discomfort is strengthened by *the interference of Brussels with internal affairs combined with the continually loss of sovereignty of the member states, that must shift far-reaching authorizations towards Brussels[145].*

The second argument frames on the national interests (NPI amount: 2,4). Interestingly, this argument is in this episode increasingly raised by supporters of further integration; *Europe must integrate further, this is in favour of the Dutch interest. 'We are making the money in Europe.[146]'* In this case, the supporters are (again) calling for a renewed focus on national priorities within the EU.

(Co-)occurrence of frames

As table 4.10 shows, there is an increasing occurrence of the Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame in the period before the elections; 2012-1. The graph below (4.10) shows that during the period of the elections, the occurrence of the Populism and Nationalism frames decreases, and afterwards it rises again. This might indicate that during the campaign (which mainly took place in period 2012-1) these frames were highly occurrent, as well as after the elections. The Hard Euroscepticism frame does, on the contrary not decrease during the period of the elections, but stays at the same amount, while decreasing after the elections. The occurrence of the Soft Euroscepticism frame shows an even more different pattern; the occurrence is relatively high in 2010-2 (21,7), but during the elections of 2012, the occurrence is decreasing to an amount of 8,8 in 2013-1. However, the occurrence of the Soft Euroscepticism frame is still high compared to the other frames.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2012-1	34	66	19,4	24	7,1	31	9,1	35	10,3
2012-2	28	35	12,5	22	7,9	17	6,1	13	4,6
2013-1	24	21	8,8	13	5,4	21	8,8	19	7,9
Table 4.10: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around NL8									

Graph 4.10: Occurrence of the frames in Dutch newspapers around critical moment NL8

Conclusions

In sum, the main theme around the elections of 2012 is the amount of political integration in the EU. Within the Soft Euroscepticism frame, this theme is mainly framed by arguments on economic policies, and the extent to which these should be integrated, during the aftermath of the Euro-crisis. Also, the Soft Euroscepticism frame entails scepticism on specific member states, mainly on the role of Germany, and on the (failing) economies of Southern European member states. The Hard Euroscepticism frame entails discussions on political integration as well, although in this frame, this is mainly expressed as discussions on the ideology of the EU, and the amount of democracy. The Populism frame adds to these frames by focussing on anti-EU parties, which are often framed as also being anti-foreigner, anti-globalisation and anti-politics, and the fact that their views are resembled in a growing negative public opinion towards the EU. The Nationalism frame keeps being focussed on the national interests and the protection of national sovereignty, which must be considered when discussing the amount of preferred European integration. The discussions on the amount of integration reflects the positions of the political parties in the Netherlands, as they all have a different perception on this. However, the declining use of the frames during the runup to the election indicates that these were not a major point of discussion during the election campaign of 2012.

NL9 – European elections 2014: Euro-crisis and migrant/refugee crisis

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Amount of articles
NL9	European elections	22-5-2014	2014-1	81 - 83	2014 (1) – 2015 (1)	82

Soft Euroscepticism: Euro-crisis and immigration framed by scepticism on cooperation within the EU and scepticism on European institutions and policies

Within the Soft Euroscepticism frame, the most discussed themes are the Euro-crisis and the migrant/refugee crisis. Although not always directly mentioned, scepticism can be referred to specific events, measures and procedures from the EU. The use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame is relatively high before and during the elections of 2014 but decreases afterwards. There are three arguments used to understand the themes of this episode.

The first argument frames the way that governments and institutions cooperate within the EU (SLC amount: 2,2). This is a broad argument, which also refers to other arguments within the Soft Euroscepticism frame. For example, there are claims made on negotiations and discussions between (government) leaders, which are sometimes problematic; *while there is a big amount of scepticism on the EU, decisions are made without considering the electorate, and the president of the European Bank is calling for more power towards Brussels, intended European leaders are continually blaming each other[147].* Another claim frames that *the EU is too divided to implement a common foreign policy[148].* Furthermore, the frame of increasing differences between Northern and Southern member states is significantly used within this period; *the growing economic differences between the northern and southern member states will not only lead to a failure of the Euro, but to a failure of the EU as a whole[149].* Another element of this argument comes to the fore after the elections and refers to the increasing amount of Eurosceptic 'seats' in the European Parliament, or the increasing influence of anti-European parties in Europe; *it will be a new phenomenon if the extreme-right changes and turns into a responsible group. What do they want with Europe? Will they be sabotaging, or reforming[150]?* Finally, the argument consists of criticism towards the way the EU cooperates in dealing with the flow of migrants / refugees that increases during this period, and the corresponding actions and policies; *'Fortress Europe' is meanwhile leak as a basket. Solidarity with the southern states, where most of the refugees enter Europe, is nowhere to be found. Europe cannot even agree on the resettlement of 40.000 refugees, which is just a drop in the ocean[151].*

The second argument that is used frames specific European institutions or a specific European politician (SI amount: 2,1). This criticism is mainly directed towards the European Parliament. The criticism deals with the functioning of the Parliament; *as a Euro-parliamentarian, you are in the same basket with 750 other frogs, who all want to have a say on a certain topic. It is hard to stand one's ground there. A mad circuit, which is emotionally poor[152].* As well as on the (possible) reactions on the elections; *after the elections, Brussels goes on with its daily business. Euro-parliamentarians are only there for their own delight and their pleasant salaries, and they have no interest at all in what is happening in Europe, as long as they are in the Parliament[153].* Next to criticism on the Parliament, there are also some other institutions that are criticized, like the European Commission and the President of the European Council; *there is increasingly more critique on the appearance of Donald Tusk. Everyone mentions the same points: he does not interfere in enough topics, and he is inaccessible.[154]*

Finally, the last argument frames criticism on specific EU policies (SP amount: 1,7). There are three areas in which this criticism is expressed. The first is migration; during this period there is criticism on the way that the EU deals with the migrants that are crossing the Mediterranean Sea; *'Europe slack in saving boat-refugees[155]'*, criticism on the resettlement plans of refugees and migrants, the re-enforcement of border controls within the Schengen zone, the protection of the Eastern borders, in sum *it is evident that migration policy is hopelessly dividing Europe[156].* The second area of criticism is the economy, on which the criticism is like earlier periods; *Dijsselbloem was in doubt openly about the recommendation of the budgetary-Tsar of the EU (Olli Rehn) to cut billions next years, to decrease our budgetary deficit to 2,8%[157].* Other criticism deals with the Euro; *we rather want the Gulden with the head of prime minister Rutte, than keep suffering under the Euro[158].* The final area in which criticism is expressed is on the area of foreign affairs, for example, on the war in Iraq and Ukraine; *the current European attitude towards Ukraine lacks the awareness that the Russian attack on Ukraine is indirectly an attack on the EU and its core values[159].*

Hard Euroscepticism: Consequences of the Euro-crisis and immigration combined with fundamental scepticism on the functioning and focus of the EU

The most discussed theme within the Hard Euroscepticism frame is also focussed on the (consequences of) the Euro-crisis and events around immigration. The content of this frame connects these events to the functioning (not enough democratic legitimacy, bureaucracy) and the focus (interference and rules) of the EU. Predominantly, the arguments are used in a more general context, which expresses a fundamental aversion towards the EU, often by (chosen) anti-EU political parties. The use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame rises before, as well as after the European elections of 2014. In the period 2014-2, the use is even the highest (12) measured during the whole analysed period. There are three arguments that are used to understand the mentioned themes during this episode.

The first argument entails frames on the bureaucracy, the amount and content of rules, and the interference of Brussels with the nation states (HB amount: 1,6). *Europe is unpopular, because it has been made too bureaucratically. Even if you work there, it takes years before you figure out how it works[160]*. Also, *Europe should not interfere with the size of apples, and the amount of litres water that may be flushed through the toilette[161]*.

Another argument that is often used contains frames on fundamental opposition towards the EU (HF amount: 1,2), and is mainly expressed by anti-European political parties, who are *unanimous in their disgust towards Europe, and increasingly apparent in the European Parliament[162]*. Their aversion of the EU is for example expressed in the fact that *the Netherlands should remain as far away as possible from Brussels[163]*, and that *nothing finds common ground; the Lisbon-agenda, in which the European economy would be the most competitive in the world, the European army, which would be created; where are they? The only thing we get from Brussels are false promises and a big inability to stop economic decay[164]*. Another claim deals with *Putin's plan with Europe's expansion drift. No anti-European parties can stand against that plan; Europe with its completed defence defeated. This is what 60% of the Europeans want as well[165]*.

The third argument that is used frames the aversion towards the EU in its current state; but an urgent claim that a fundamental change is needed (HC amount: 1). Sometimes, this change is directed towards leaders; *The EU needs a new and fresh face urgently. Someone who can communicate the European message and who can convince the Euro-sceptics. Someone who listens to the proper critique towards Brussels[166]*. Also, this change is proposed to enhance the legitimation of the EU; *the national parliaments should play a bigger role in European politics. We need the legitimacy of the national parliaments to take hard decisions in Europe[167]*.

Populism: Euroscepticism and the campaign and results of the European elections – increasing representation of Eurosceptic citizens framed as both positive and negative

The most discussed theme within the Populism frame is the campaign and the results of the elections of 2014. The arguments within the Populism frame, frame these results as both a good thing, as Eurosceptic sentiments are now represented within the European Parliament, and a bad thing, as this is causing a threat to the European establishment. The general negative public opinion, which is referred to, can be connected to both the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame, as there is scepticism on specific elements of the EU, as well as on the EU. The use of the Populism frame is relatively high around the elections, and even rises afterwards. There are four arguments used to understand the discussed themes within this episode.

The first argument frames on the negative public opinion towards the EU (PO amount: 2,8). The claims within this period mainly entail negative opinion, and indifference, before the elections; *the*

Netherlands is not enthusiast for Europe, let alone for the European elections![168] The Dutch population appears to be sensitive for counter-arguments and negative emotions, due to a lack of interest, and the fact that the visions are no lived through and over-thought enough[169]. After the elections, this argument mainly refers to the results of the elections; *in which 30% of the representatives are now anti-EU. This is ominous for the Union, because one conclusion has to be drawn: the objections of these 30% must be taken seriously, as it must work in a well-functioning democracy[170].*

The second argument is connected to this and refers to the anti-European political parties (PA amount: 1,8), who were highly visible during the campaign, and gained an increasingly amount of votes during the elections of 2014; *they are spawning voters with the promise to exit the EU and implementing a national currency. Outside the EU, everything will be better; more jobs, more welfare[171].*

The third argument contains a reference to the representation of citizens in the EU (PR amount: 1), which increases after the election of 2014; *the entering of Eurosceptic politicians, means that the parliament will be forced to listen what is happening within the society. The positions of parties, like the PVV, as based on what citizen really think (away with the EU and the Euro). These positions should not be framed as 'stupid', 'one-sided' or 'populist'[172].*

In contrast, the fourth argument refers to claims that Europe is in a crisis (PC amount: 1), mainly because of the election results, and the rising anti-EU sentiment; *the establishment in Europe is threatened due to the Euro-crisis, the Ukraine-war, the threat of Brexit, and it a lot of countries, anti-EU parties are rising.[173]*

Nationalism: protection of national sovereignty as the main claim of anti-EU parties during the elections of 2014

The most discussed theme within the Nationalism frame also refers to the European elections of 2014 and is mainly focussed on the national sovereignty. While the Nationalism frame not often used during this episode, the argument on the national sovereignty can be connected to the fundamental opposition towards the EU and scepticism on the bureaucracy within the Hard Euroscepticism frame. Also, the content can be connected to the Populism frame, as this argument is mainly expressed by anti-EU parties. There is one argument predominantly used during this episode. This argument entails, like earlier periods, frames on the loss of national sovereignty due to the EU (NSV amount: 1); Geert Wilders wants to *step out of the EU in the name of the national sovereignty[174].* These claims are also connected to anti-EU politicians in Europe, like *Le Pen and Farage. They want to 're-nationalise Europe'; national states should get the responsibilities that they 'gave away' to Brussels back, or better: they must take them back[175].*

(Co-)occurrence of frames

The occurrence of the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame is relatively high during the European elections of 2014. However, while the Hard Euroscepticism frame still increases after the elections, the Soft Euroscepticism frame decreases towards a significantly low amount. The Populism frame is relatively high, but less rising during the period of the elections, and increasing afterwards, which is like the Hard Euroscepticism frame. The Nationalism frame is relatively low, and almost not occurring during the European elections of 2014.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2014-1	49	46	28,8	34	6,9	40	8,2	12	2,4
2014-2	10	16	16	12	12	10	10	2	2
2015-1	23	23	10	3	1,3	10	4,3	0	0
Table 4.11: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around NL9									

Graph 4.11: Occurrence of the frames in Dutch newspapers around critical moment NL9

Conclusions

In sum, there are three themes that come to the fore during the elections of 2014; which are the campaign and the results of the elections, the (consequences of the) Euro-crisis and events around the migrant/refugee crisis. Within the Soft Euroscepticism frame, arguments are mainly focussed on both intergovernmental cooperation (mainly on how the Euro-crisis was dealt with) and supranational European institutions, like the European Parliament and the European Commission, and referred to the Euro-crisis and immigration. Within the Hard Euroscepticism frame, scepticism is more broadly focussed on fundamental opposition towards the functioning and focus on the EU, because of the Euro-crisis and immigration. The themes on the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frames are reflected in the Populism frame, which emphasizes the appearance and win of anti-EU parties in the Netherlands, but mainly in other EU countries. Additionally, the Populism frame refers to an increasingly negative public opinion towards the EU. The focus of the Nationalism frame, which mainly entails claims on the protection of national sovereignty, can be connected to the claims of the anti-EU parties within the Populism frame and the fundamental opposition within the Hard Euroscepticism frame. As such, it can be concluded that framing on Euroscepticism was, around 2014, strongly connected to the campaign and results of the European elections and influenced by earlier themes; the Euro-crisis and immigration.

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Amount of articles
NL10	Referendum on Ukraine association agreement & UK EU-membership (Brexit)	6-4-2016 23-6-2016	2016-1	85 - 86	2016 (1) – 2016 (2)	58

Soft Euroscepticism: Brexit framed as a trigger for other EU-referenda, Euroscepticism framed by criticizing migration policies and economic policies, mainly the TTIP agreement

There are three themes that are mainly discussed within the Soft Euroscepticism frame, which are the Brexit referendum in the UK, migration policies and corresponding events and economic policies. The use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame increases during the run-up to the referendum and remains stable afterwards. After 2016-2, the use of this frame decreases. During the run-up, and after the referendum, there are three specific arguments that are used to understand the discussed themes within the Soft Euroscepticism frame.

The first argument frames on the referendum itself (SR amount: 5,5). *While it is mainly a trade-agreement, the initiators of the referendum are viewing the political parts as an important step towards EU-membership. The enthusiasm to campaign is low among the supporters, after the referendum on the European Constitution in 2005[176]*. However, most of the claims in this argument are not dealing with the Dutch referendum but are dealing with the UK referendum on the membership of the EU (Brexit); *Cameron wants to present a deal with the EU to its cabinet. If this deal fails, a referendum will be prepared for June 23rd. If Cameron returns home with empty hands, there is a big chance that the British will vote in favour of leaving the EU[177]*. The main claim, before as well as after the British referendum, in which the UK decided to leave the EU and Brexit became reality, was a fear that *a successful British leave will strengthen the credibility of anti-European politicians, especially in the Netherlands, Germany and France, and that there will be a domino series of referenda that will unravel the EU[178]*. After the elections, *Geert Wilders (PVV) claims that the Dutch also have the right to have a referendum on the EU[179]*.

The second argument that comes to the fore, and which is included in the discussions around the two referenda, is scepticism regarding specific policies of the EU (SP amount: 3,3). Like the critique around the European elections in 2014, it was mainly focussed on the migration policy and the economy. As for the migration policy, there is criticism on migration within the EU; immigration *is a European 'project', which is established to replace own employees by cheaper employees from outside[180]*. Furthermore, the critique is focussed on migration to the EU and the *incapability of Brussels to deal decisively with the refugee crisis, through which the anti-European parties are rising in the opinion polls[181]*. As for the economic policy, there is a growing aversion towards the TTIP agreement with the USA; *the Dutch no-voters (to the TTIP) are part of a wider movement: 1600 European municipalities have already stated that they are against TTIP, and this number is still growing[182]*. Also, there is still criticism on the Euro; *'the Euro is a failed experiment. The currency has damaged economic growth, enlarged differences between countries, and led to greater division.'[183]* There are also suggestions for a *decommissioning of the Euro. In which the best scenario is that Germany, maybe with other Northern European countries, like the Netherlands and Finland, resigns from the Euro and starts an own, northern Euro.[184]*

The third argument frames critique on specific member states of the EU (SM amount: 1,9). There are two member states on which the most criticism has been expressed; Poland, *'a democracy is based on checks and balances, which act as an extra mechanism for control for the freedom that we cherish.*

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Those are lacking here right now.[185]', and Hungary, in which the *way that the prime minister is using the gut feeling of the population in favour of his own popularity, which is criticized[186].* Other criticism is expressed on Estonia, Poland and Slovakia (but also on other Central and Eastern European countries); *Estonia get millions of euros of support from Brussels, and they are protected by NATO. But they are doing nothing in return. The Estonians do not want to work, and asylum seekers are not welcome. It is an outright shameful situation[187].*

Hard Euroscepticism: fundamental opposition as a reaction on Brexit

The most discussed theme within the Hard Euroscepticism frame is the Brexit referendum, which is combined with fundamental opposition towards the EU. The argument used in the Hard Euroscepticism frame fits in the fear that is expressed within the Soft Euroscepticism frame; namely that the Brexit referendum will lead to an increasing call for EU-membership referenda in other European countries. There is, as such, one argument that predominantly comes to the fore in this period; which entails fundamental (and general) opposition towards the EU (HF amount: 1,7). This is mainly expressed within the context of the Brexit referendum; *we want a Nexit as soon as possible. 'The EU is disgusting'. If the respondents should have voted at the EU-referendum, the majority would have voted to leave the EU. Also, the majority would like to see a Dutch EU-referendum[188].* This public opinion is expressed by anti-EU politicians, like Wilders, *who called the European leaders 'cowards' who bargain the national interests away, and 'scatterbrains'. 'But the elite, who wanted to silence us, is starting to collapse. Our winter of dissatisfaction is almost over'[189].*

Populism: The Brexit referendum as an indicator for the 'patriotic spring' and a crisis for the EU

Like the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame, there is almost no attention for the Dutch referendum in the Populism frame. The main arguments deal with the Brexit, and its consequences. The Populism frame entails the actors (the anti-EU parties) and the negative electorate who are expressing the arguments in the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame. The use of the Populism frame significantly rises before, during and after the referendum of 2016. The use of the frame between 2016-1 and 2017-1 is even the highest measured use during the whole period of analysis. There are three arguments that are used to understand the Brexit referendum.

The first argument frames the general negative public opinion on the EU (PO amount: 4). *While the challenges become bigger (security, protection of the borders, environment), the EU is in danger by internal bickering and angry citizens[190]. European citizens have disappointedly turned away, as they think that the promises of welfare, democracy and peace have not been met sufficiently. Also, the financial and economic crisis has made deep wounds, and the refugee crisis brought more than differences in opinion to the surface.[191]* Other framing on this public opinion states that; *the political middle (central political parties) has to search for a credible, own sound on the EU, as it has been showed that angry voters are able of reckoning with an expanding union and the establishment.[192]* This process may also indicate a wider phenomenon within the EU; *the democratic fault line between the elite and the citizens. Nigel Farage build his campaign on this; 'say no to your politicians, revolt the establishment'. 'Nations of Europe, united against the Union.'[193]* On the other side, *supporters of blowing up the EU, claim that the so-called benefits of the EU are propaganda[194].* Other authors say that there is a difference between anti-Euro and anti-EU sentiment; *the reality is that an increasing number of people is against the euro. A lot of them, and in here we find the danger, seems to shift from anti-euro to anti-EU. This process is strengthened by extreme-right parties.[195]*

The second argument frames the anti-EU parties (PA amount: 3,8) which were already appearing in the first argument, and who are *entering the 'patriotic spring', as Wilders calls it. Because of the unrest about the refugees who come to Europe, the support of political parties that are against the EU and against migration, is rising[196].* One of the expressions of this 'patriotic spring' is for example the call for

EU-referendum in the Netherlands, and other EU members, after the results of the Brexit referendum were clear. However, *those who kept calling 'exit' and 'away with the EU' appeared to have no plans at all on what to do after the Brexit[197].* Thus, there is also criticism on the anti-EU parties.

The third argument that comes to the fore claims that Europe is finding itself in a crisis (PC amount: 3,4). Again, the claims are mainly referring to the Brexit, rather than to the Dutch referendum; *the Brexit has, everywhere in Europe, caused grief, insecurity and disappointment. A deep, and even historical, break-up[198].* The Brexit is not only framed emotionally, but also economically; *as the big contributor Great-Britain drops out, one can rightfully speak about a gigantic crisis within the EU. Who is the next that drops out?[199]* Finally, there is one claim on the Dutch referendum; *a Dutch 'no' can pave the way for a crisis, and an easy win for Russia. 'Watch out, this might change the balance in Europe[200].'*

Nationalism: Negative public opinion explained by framing the protection of national sovereignty and the national position

The most discussed theme within the Nationalism frame is the negative public opinion on the EU. Therefore, the content of this frame can be connected to the Populism frame. Furthermore, the argument that frames the national sovereignty can be connected to the Hard Euroscepticism argument, which is against the interference of Brussels in national policies. Like the other frames, the use of the Nationalism frame rises before, during and after the referendum in 2016. There are two arguments that predominantly come used to understand the negative public opinion in this episode.

The first argument is like earlier periods, and frames on the erosion of national sovereignty due to the EU (NSV amount: 1,9). Due to several claims, public opinion, which is growing more negatively towards the EU; *is caused by the increasing annoyance of the interference of the European Commission with national policies[201]. Also, angry citizens want to be the boss of their own 'home' with their own (closed) borders, without the EU[202]. The main criticism on the EU finds their basis from the feeling of powerlessness and the loss of control.* However, it is also mentioned that *a backward movement within the national shell, will not decrease the dangers in the world.[203]*

The second argument that is used deals with the position of the Netherlands within the EU (NP amount: 1). This is done with respect to existing negative public opinion towards the EU; *instead of a loose, transatlantic trade agreement, we are currently in the heart of a very political Europe because we are blindly following Berlin, as a province of Germany. We cannot stop with this without significantly harming ourselves.[204]* Furthermore, there is one reference to the Dutch referendum, which says that it is *questionable whether a Dutch 'no' has big consequences in Europe.[205]*

(Co-)occurrence of frames

There is a rise in the occurrence of all four frames within the period 2015-1 and 2016, which is the run-up to the referendum. The Populism and the Nationalism frame, to a lesser extent, are more occurring than the Hard Euroscepticism frame. This pattern is continued after the referendum, after which the Populism frame grows substantially fast, while the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism and Nationalism frame remain relatively stable. This pattern is shown in graph 4.12 below.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2016-1	38	62	16,3	13	3,4	41	10,8	18	4,7
2016-2	20	33	16,5	8	4	42	21	10	5
Table 4.12: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around NL10									

Graph 4.12: Occurrence of the frames in Dutch newspapers around critical moment NL10

Conclusions

In sum, the main theme within this period is not the Ukraine association agreement, which was the issue of the referendum in the Netherlands, but the Brexit referendum in the UK. Criticism on the EU within the Soft Euroscepticism frame is focussed on economic policies (referring to the Euro-crisis) and immigration policies (referring to the refugee crisis in 2015), and on specific Eastern and Central European member states. Within the Hard Euroscepticism frame, fundamental scepticism is framed because of the Brexit referendum, while the Populism frame refers to the 'patriotic spring' among Europe, which places the Brexit referendum in a wider context of populist events. The Nationalism frame explains rising negative public opinion among Europe as rooted in the erosion of national sovereignty from the member states. As such, there is no actual connection between the content of the frames and the Dutch referendum, as the frames are mainly focussed on the process, campaign, results and wider context of the Brexit referendum in the UK.

NL11 –Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 2017: Brexit, economic and immigration policies

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Amount of articles
NL11	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen	15-3-2017	2017-1	86 - 87	2016 (2) – 2017 (1)	43

Soft Euroscepticism: Scepticism on European cooperation by combining Brexit, immigration and economic policies

The most discussed themes in the Soft Euroscepticism frame overlap with critical moment NL10, as the frame mainly focusses on the (consequences of) Brexit, immigration and economic policies. The use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame decreasing during the runup of the national elections of 2017, which indicates that Euroscepticism was less apparent around the elections. There are three arguments used to understand the themes during this episode.

The first argument entails frames about a specific member state of the EU (SM amount: 2,8). The number of member states on which criticism is expressed is relatively high. For example, there is

criticism on Italy; *on the enormous tax evasion, the costly and unnecessary privileges and the too widespread corruption[206].* Other criticism is expressed on Hungary, *which acts in the contradiction of the core values of the EU (f.e. the freedom of education), and Poland, where the complete administration of justice is under threat[207].* Furthermore, criticism is expressed, more indirectly, on the position of the UK, and the negotiations with the EU about Brexit, and on the several Southern European countries; *the financial debacle of Greece is still continuing, the answer on the refugee crisis has not been found yet, the German dominance becomes too big, the inner solidarity is increasingly fading away, and 'villain nations' that do not take European law serious (Poland, Hungary) are arising, unemployment is still way too high in southern states, etc.[208]*

The second argument is connected to the first argument and entails criticism on the cooperation within the EU (SLC amount: 2,6). The predominant content of this criticism entails the extent of disagreement among leader of member states, through which differences between the members become visible. *The Euro-crisis has strengthened and increased the already existing differences between the north and the south. In the same way, the refugee crisis increases and old existing gap between Eastern-European and Western-European countries. As Eastern-Europe refuses to take Muslim-refugees in, it threatens to fall back to a region in which the Enlightenment does not seem to have taken place. In this way, Europe is increasingly fragmenting to older, and newer fault lines.[209]*

The disagreement between member states also becomes visible in the *Brexit; which might be the beginning of the end of the EU. A Europe which is not able to take decisions, will crumble down. Muddling through is not tenable.[210]* One of the reasons for this inability to take decisions might be that *the governmental leaders did not experience the Second World War. They do not award each other, because they are not away of what is at stake. Nobody is defending the EU anymore[211].* This becomes mainly clear from the increasing amount of criticism between member states in the first argument.

The third argument states criticism on specific policies (SP amount: 2,1). The areas are the same as in the period before (as the periods are overlapping). However, the stress during these elections are on the Euro; *the biggest problem of Europe is the Euro[212],* and on the migration policy, mainly criticism of Eastern-European on the plans of the European commission; *Orbán (Hungary) announced a law against the EU-quota. It strikes the prime minister that it is Brussels that decides how many refugees every member state should welcome[213].*

Hard Euroscepticism: fundamental scepticism by anti-EU parties and scepticism combined with claims for fundamental changes in the EU

The focus of the Hard Euroscepticism frame is two-sided. On the one hand, general fundamental scepticism is expressed by anti-EU parties. On the other hand, fundamental scepticism is connected to claims for a fundamental change in the EU. These claims are mainly connected to immigration and economic policies. After the referendum on 2016, the use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame slowly increases. During this period, there are two arguments that are used to understand the discussed themes.

The first argument entails frames on fundamental opposition to the current functioning of the EU, combined with a claim, or a suggestion, that the EU must change fundamentally (HC amount: 1,9). Sometimes, this is combined to the political changes, due to several elections in Europe; *the socialists and republicans are overcome. The existence of the current Europe is over. New ways must be found, as terrorism, Islamization and asylum-seekers have set the tone[214].* Other criticism is connected to the Euro; *If the Euro survives in its current form, this will mean an enormous increase of costs: depression in southern countries, instability, persistent low growth in big parts of the continent. And probably, the*

currency-union will survive for a short while, and after all fall apart anyway[215]. The suggestions that are given are summarized by the next statement; *'Stop complaining and modernize.[216]'*

The second argument that is used frames fundamental criticism on the European Union (HF amount: 1,2) and is mainly expressed by the anti-EU parties. The focus within this period is mainly on the French presidential elections, in which Marine le Pen seemed to win at one point. *She tries to destroy Europe and uses the argument of European solidarity to undermine the whole project[217]. When this scenario becomes reality, this might be the end of the well-payed European jobs that circulate between the member states. Because the resigning of France will mean the end of the EU[218].* In the end, not Marine le Pen, but Emanuel Macron, a pro-European politician, won the elections.

Populism: The EU in a crisis, negative public opinion towards the EU, and increasing influence of Populism in elections worldwide

The most discussed themes within the Populism frame are worldwide elections in which Populism plays a significant role. As such the arguments from the Populism frame are connected to other worldwide elections, like the election of Donald Trump and the French elections, that can be framed as either anti-globalization or populist. Furthermore, the elections in the Netherlands are framed as an indicator for how much anti-EU / populist parties would win in the year 2017. After a significant big peak in the period 2016-2, the use of the Populism frame decreases during the run-up to the elections in 2017. As the period 2016-2 is both discussed in NL10 and NL11, a lot of the used arguments of the Populism frame are overlapping. The predominantly used arguments of the Populism frame are arguments about the anti-EU parties (PA amount: 3,7), claims on a crisis in Europe (PC amount: 3,7) and the existing negative public opinion towards the EU (PO amount: 2,8). The content on which these argument focus, are already discussed during NL10, thus, this section only discusses the content of the period 2017-1.

The argument on the anti-EU parties are connected to wider global political events, like the election of Donald Trump in the USA, and actions of Vladimir Putin, *who is depicted as the villain in a James Bond movie, who wants to destruct the West. He wants to divide the EU, for example by supporting the Front-National in France, and other anti-Brussels parties with money[219].* Other claims deal with the role of the PVV within the Dutch elections, which is framed as *the radical translation of the scared and angry citizen; anti-EU, anti-Euro and pensions to 65 years[220].* Also, Geert Wilders claims his own success as *an international patriotic movement. 'Everywhere in the world, political parties that are fed up with multiculturalism and Islamization are rising. We are going to win.[221]'* From an international perspective, the Dutch elections are seen as the first indicator for anti-EU and anti-Islam parties, as later that year, there will be elections in Germany, France and Italy.

The second argument, with the central claim that Europe is in a crisis, connects all worldwide threats for Europe with each other, and is continually summing up these events, stating that Europe is, or should be, in a crisis; *Europe is not faring well. Refugee crisis, terrorism, Syria, China, Russia, Brexit, and an unchained Donald Trump – the challenges are rising continually[222].* This way of communicating about the challenges of Europe can be framed as populist, as it might increase already negative public opinion towards the EU and decrease the trust in the political leaders.

The third argument is thus, following up the two earlier stated argument, and claims that public opinion towards the EU is negative. In the period, 2017-1, this is mainly connected to the election results; *our election results are not a mandate for Brussels to do nothing with anti-European sentiment. The PVV won seats, and FVD (Forum voor Democratie), that wants a Nexit, enters the Parliament with 2 seats. A lot of voters do not feel at home in the EU and in a multicultural country like the Netherlands[223].*

Nationalism: Negative public opinion explained by framing the EU as a threat for national sovereignty, interest and identity

The most discussed theme within the Nationalism frame is the existing negative public opinion towards the EU, which can directly be connected to the arguments within the Populism frame. The three used arguments within the Nationalism frame provide a deeper explanation for why public opinion is growing more negative.

The first argument frames the erosion of national sovereignty (NSV amount: 1). Sometimes, this is expressed by politicians, in this case, the Estonian ex-president; *we must re-nationalize. The repatriation of power from Brussels[224].* Also, it is made clear that this is an existing argument among the Dutch population: *the majority is shuddered by the interference in national affairs. The criticism on the EU is serious. 'Brussels should stop interfering in the national affairs of a country'. And 'why are they interfering? There has been too much pushed through our throats. Brussels must keep itself busy with improving itself[225]!*

The second argument that is used frames the national interest (NPI amount: 1). In this period, this argument is mainly connected to the anti-EU parties, who *came together in Milano, Brussels and Koblenz, and often claimed their coherence: they are all defending their own nation[226].*

The third argument that is used entails frames on the national identity (NI amount: 1); this is expressed by Geert Wilders; *'We will win, the Dutch nation will win and remember who was at the right side of history.'[227]* Also, an explanation for the increasing feelings of nationalism, and the clash with globalization is given; *Nationalism is for a lot of people an important part of their own identity. We (the mobile, global elite), assumed that those national feelings would fade away with globalization. But that seems to be a miscalculation. That passion is not fading away. So, either we find a way to canalise these feelings, or we will be flushed away by it[228].*

(Co-)occurrence of frames

Graph 4.13 below shows that all frames, except for the Hard Euroscepticism frame, are decreasing in the period before the elections. Still, the Soft Euroscepticism and the Populism frame are relatively highly occurring during this period. The period after the elections (2017-2) is not considered, as the analysis started during this period.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2016-2	20	33	16,5	8	4	42	21	10	5
2017-1	23	23	10	11	4,8	17	7,4	6	2,6
Table 4.13: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around NL11									

Graph 4.13: Occurrence of the frames in Dutch newspapers around critical moment NL11

Conclusions

In sum, the arguments that are used in the frames is overlapping with the content around the referendum in 2016. This means that the Soft Euroscepticism frame still focusses on the complexity of European decision-making and criticism on specific member states, by combining the Brexit, immigration and economic policies. The Hard Euroscepticism frame is mainly focussed on claims for change in the EU and frames on the French presidential elections, which implies that this frame is placed within a wider, international context, rather than in a national context. The Populism frame is focussed on worldwide political events, in which populist, anti-establishment, parties are increasingly apparent, like the French and American elections and the aftermath of the Brexit referendum. Finally, the Nationalism frame is, like in earlier periods focussed on national sovereignty, the national priorities and the national identity. As such, it can be concluded that the content of the frames has no direct connection with the campaign of the national elections in 2017.

4.2.3 Co-occurrence of frames

This section discusses the occurrence and the co-occurrence of the four frames, as found in the articles of *NRC Handelsblad* and *de Telegraaf*. Within this section, the quantitative occurrence (as shown in graph 4.14) is compared with the actual, qualitative, content of the frames during the critical moments.

Graph 4.14 below shows the occurrence of the four analysed frames around the selected critical moments. The occurrence is corrected by the amount of articles for each specific period, which makes it possible to make a comparison over the whole period 2000-2017. A bigger version of this graph can be found in Annex IV (Occurrence of frames around critical moments NL).

Graph 4.14: Relative occurrence of the four frames around the critical moments in the Netherlands (2000-2017)

The graph shows that the Soft Euroscepticism frame is the most occurring frame around almost every critical moment. However, the reason for this is that within the framing analysis, this frame consisted of more codes than the other frames. Consequently, it is even more telling when another frame has a higher occurrence than the Soft Euroscepticism frame, which is the case for the Populism frame during the end of 2016, which is the run-up to the national elections of 2017. The graph shows that the three main peaks of the Soft Euroscepticism frame take place around the three European elections (NL3, NL6, NL9). This is also the case for the peaks of the Hard Euroscepticism frame, which leads to the conclusion that the highest amount of Euroscepticism in the Netherlands can be found around the European elections.

When looking into more detail to the dynamics of the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame, it is remarkable that, around the European elections, the peaks of the Soft Euroscepticism frame occur earlier than the peaks of the Hard Euroscepticism frame. This indicates that the closer to the European elections, the more fundamentally anti-European the Eurosceptic arguments appear. Another remarkable finding is that the occurrence of both frames is relatively close to each other around the

European elections of 2009 (2013-1 and 2014-2), which might indicate that around these elections, daily discourses were more anti-European in general.

As for the **Soft Euroscepticism frame**, there are some national elections during which the occurrence is relatively high, and some during which the occurrence is relatively low. The occurrence of the frame is relatively high around the elections of 2002 (NL1), 2006 (NL5) and 2010 (NL7). Public debate around the elections of 2002 is focussed on the enlargement, but also on the implementation of the Euro, which might explain the relatively high occurrence of all four frames during these elections. As for the elections of 2006 and 2010; these were elections in which the PVV gained a lot of votes, and during which this Eurosceptical, populist party was highly apparent during the election campaign, which might explain the high occurrence of the Soft Euroscepticism frame. During the national elections of 2003 (NL2), 2012 (NL8) and 2017 (NL11), the occurrence of the Soft Euroscepticism frame is relatively low, which indicates that the arguments covered by this frame are not a central theme within the election campaign and among public debate.

As earlier mentioned, the **Hard Euroscepticism frame** has three peaks during the European elections, which indicates that fundamental opposition towards the EU increases when these elections appear. When looking into detail to the focus on the Hard Euroscepticism frame, it can be argued that the focus is changing along the period. Within the first critical moments, the bureaucracy, which expresses opposition towards the rule-making of Brussels and the functioning of Brussels' supra-national institutions, is mainly used within this frame. However, after the elections of 2010 (NL7), a shift takes place towards increasing fundamental opposition, which is not directed towards specific elements of the EU but includes opposition towards the EU. The argument that expresses criticism on the amount of democracy within the EU is appearing over the whole period of analysis. Interestingly, some of the critical moments during which fundamental opposition is expressed (NL3, NL6 and NL10), also show a relatively high occurrence of the Populism frame. Furthermore, when considering the occurrence of the Hard Euroscepticism as a whole, graph 4.14 shows that there is a connection with the Nationalism frame, for example around NL1, NL3, NL6 and NL10. This indicates that fundamental opposition towards the EU is often combined with arguments on the protection of sovereignty, the national interest and the national identity, which are the most prominent arguments within the Nationalism frame.

The **Populism frame** has several peaks during the period 2000-2017. The main peaks can be found around the elections of 2002, which shows a strong relation with the Soft Euroscepticism frame. In this period, it is argued that the Enlargement is not in line with the existing public opinion, that the population has the feeling that they are not considered in processes on Enlargement, but also in other European decision-making, and that this is causing an alienation of citizens from the EU. These framings are mainly used around the referendum in 2005, which explains that this is the main reason, from the Populist frame, why the Dutch population rejected the European Constitution in the referendum of 2005. Around the European elections of 2009 (NL6), another peak of the Populism frame appears. Frames within this period mainly entails claims on the existing negative public opinion, which is used to strengthen arguments from the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame, that also have a high occurrence around these elections. Other peaks (mainly between NL10 and NL11) emphasize the uprising of anti-European populist parties in the Netherlands, as well as in other EU-member states, which is combined with the argument on the existing negative public opinion on the EU. Changes in the occurrence of the Populism frame seem to be predominantly connected to the Soft Euroscepticism frame, as graph 4.14 shows that these frames follow the same line. Content-wise, this means that Soft Euroscepticism arguments are combined with claims that emphasise negative public opinion on these specific arguments. Also, the Populism frame explains who the Eurosceptic forces are (anti-EU parties)

and what arguments they use against the European Union. This indicates that these parties not only express Hard Euroscepticism arguments, on which the connection also seems to be strong, but also Soft Euroscepticism arguments.

The **Nationalism frame** is, in general, not highly occurrent during the period 2000-2017. The main peaks occur around critical moment NL1, NL3, NL5 and before NL8. Except for NL3, these are all national elections, which indicate that the European Union is used in the national election campaigns. Around the elections of 2002 (NL1), 2006 (NL5) and 2012 (NL8), the argument that frames the EU as a threat for national sovereignty is predominantly used. Around NL1 and NL5 the attention of public debate is predominantly focussed on the amount of European integration, which indicates that more integration, or integration on several aspects, means a bigger threat for national sovereignty. In 2012, public debate mainly focussed on the consequences of the Euro-crisis, which indicates that claims were mainly referring to more economic and financial integration of the Eurozone. Around the European elections of 2004 (NL3), the argument which emphasizes the national interest is predominantly used. This means that, in a context of suggestions that would make the EU more relevant for its citizens, this relevance for citizens is framed as being in the national interest. As graph 4.14 shows, the Nationalism frame shows a connection with the course of the Hard Euroscepticism frame, which indicates that the arguments are used to express fundamental opposition to the EU. Furthermore, the movement of the Nationalism frame shows a relation with the Populism frame, which indicates that existing negative public opinion, and the uprising of anti-EU parties can, partly, be connected to claims that emphasize the national sovereignty, interest and identity.

Finally, the connections between the frames can also be seen in the correlation between the frames, which offers additional data to the movements showed in graph 4.14. Table 4.14 below provides an overview of the correlation between the four analysed frames.

	Soft Euroscepticism	Hard Euroscepticism	Populism	Nationalism
Soft Euroscepticism	-	0,232338	0,487025	0,423226
Hard Euroscepticism	0,232338	-	0,423773	0,315905
Populism	0,487025	0,423773	-	0,49959
Nationalism	0,423226	0,315905	0,49959	-
Table 4.14: Correlation between the movements of the frames (2000-2017)				

The correlations between the movements of the frames confirms some earlier made conclusions. The first conclusion is that there is a very weak correlation between the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism. This can be found in the totally different arguments and languages that are used within the frame. However, during the European elections, the correlation between the frames, seems to be stronger. The second conclusion is that the correlation between Soft Euroscepticism and Populism is stronger than between Hard Euroscepticism and Populism. This confirms the conclusion that arguments in the Populism frame are being combined with both Soft and Hard Eurosceptic arguments, but slightly more to (the more specific) Soft Eurosceptic arguments. The third conclusion is that the correlation between Soft Euroscepticism and Nationalism is stronger than between Hard Euroscepticism and Nationalism. This is remarkable, as graph 4.14 shows that there is a stronger correlation with the Hard Euroscepticism frame. However, this indicates that arguments of the Soft Euroscepticism frame, about the amount of integration, immigration policies, the Euro-crisis and the enlargement are predominantly framed as a threat for national sovereignty either/and the national interest and national identity. Finally, there is a relatively strong correlation between the Populism and Nationalism

frame, which confirms that Nationalist arguments are predominantly expressed by anti-EU parties in a context of growing negative public opinion towards the EU.

4.3 Conclusions

4.3.1 Agenda and framing of the public debate about the EU

This section describes the general themes of public debate, which are important occasions for the arguments within the four frames. This means that arguments within the frames are often referring to these themes. Table 4.15 below shows a chronological overview of these themes and the mostly used arguments regarding the themes. These arguments are used in all four frames, but the specific content of the arguments differ in each frame, which is elaborated upon in the sections below and summarized in table 4.16.

Period	Main theme	Corresponding arguments
2004	Enlargement of the EU with central and eastern European states	Political integration, reform of EU institutions
2005	Referendum on the European Constitution in the Netherlands	Political integration, reform of EU institutions, priorities of the EU
2009	European elections in which an increasing number of Eurosceptic parties entered the Parliament	Eurosceptic parties, bureaucracy of EU institutions
2009 - 2013	Euro-crisis / European debt crisis	Scepticism on Southern member states, European cooperation, austerity / economic policies
2015	Migrant/refugee crisis	Immigration policies, European cooperation
2016	Brexit referendum	Immigration and economic policies, role of Populism in elections
Table 4.15: Main themes that shape the agenda of the four frames in Dutch newspapers		

Enlargement: 2001-2004

Around the elections of 2002 and 2003, Euroscepticism in Dutch newspapers is predominantly focussed on the coming Enlargement of the EU in 2004. The Soft Euroscepticism frame is, within this theme, mainly focussed on the consequences of the Enlargement, for example the increasing migration of people from Eastern European countries to Western European countries. Furthermore, it is focussed on the cooperation within the EU, as this big enlargement would change the existing European balance of power. Consequently, reforms in the EU and its institutions are needed, which are elaborated on in the Soft Euroscepticism frame. The Hard Euroscepticism frame builds further on this by expressing fundamental opposition towards more integration of the EU, which would happen after the Enlargement. The Populism frame is focussed on the fact that decisions on the enlargement are being made without considering the opinion of citizens, and that this leads to increasing alienation of citizens from the EU. Increasingly, it is claimed that decisions on this Enlargement are made without the population; as it is being framed that most of the population is against this Enlargement. Among the population it is feared that people from Central- and Eastern European countries will, after the Enlargement legally, migrate to richer EU-countries in Western Europe. Furthermore, the Enlargement is claimed to be too costly for richer European countries. Together with this Enlargement, the EU is negotiating on reforms, as the EU is expanding significantly. These reforms predominantly mean increasing political integration among member states, which is framed by the Nationalism frame as a threat for national sovereignty and identity. These negotiations, in the end, lead to the European Constitution.

European Constitution: 2004 - 2006

Around the European elections of 2004, public debate shifts from the Enlargement into discussions on the European Constitution. Within this discussion, it is often mentioned that the EU must be relevant for its citizens; they must feel represented, which is the main content of the Populism frame. The Soft Euroscepticism frame consists of a lot of suggestions for new priorities of the EU, to make the EU more relevant for its citizens, which indicates that the Soft Euroscepticism and Populism frame are overlapping during this period. Furthermore, it is continually emphasized within the Nationalism frame that these priorities must be in the national interest, which would make it relevant for citizens. This indicates that the overall claim within public debate is that when the EU is in favour of the national interest, the EU is automatically relevant for its citizens. Connected to this claim is the emphasis on the democratic deficit and unnecessary increase of the bureaucracy in Brussels in the Hard Euroscepticism frame. All these issues can be related to measures from the European Constitution. Around the referendum of 2005, it becomes clear that these arguments are still very alive among public opinion, as the Dutch population votes against the European Constitution. This result is framed as 'the awakening of citizens', mainly within the Populism frame, and as a proof of the fact that citizens are fed up with not being considered in European decision-making. The national elections of 2006 are characterized by discussions on how to proceed with the EU. Every political party expresses its own ideas on how to change the EU in such a way that existing negative public opinion is considered. Consequently, several new suggestions to reform the EU are discussed around these elections.

European elections 2009

The European elections of 2009 are characterized by the significant increase of Eurosceptic parliamentarians entering the European Parliament. During the run-up to the elections, increasing Soft Euroscepticism is directed towards European institutions and other member states, while the Hard Euroscepticism frame continues its focus on the bureaucracy and interference of Brussels in domestic affairs. The Populism frame is predominantly focussed on the uprising of anti-EU parties in the Netherlands, as well as in other EU member states, combined with an emphasis on existing negative public opinion towards the EU before and after the elections. These parties are also focused upon in the Nationalism frame. However, within the Nationalism frame the anti-EU parties frame the EU as a threat for national sovereignty and identity. After the elections, the emphasis shifts predominantly to the results of other countries (UK, France), in which Eurosceptic parties have won more seats than in the Netherlands.

Euro-crisis: 2010-2015

During, but predominantly after, the European elections of 2009, the attention of public debate shifts towards the Euro-crisis. Due to the high debts of the Greek government, and the overall state of the economy in Greece, it is often framed that the Eurozone finds itself in a state of crisis. Within the Soft Euroscepticism frame, most of the framings criticize the Southern European countries that have a failing economy and a high amount of debts. Also, the way in which the crisis is dealt with by European and national politicians is criticized. The Populism frame is focussed on these events, by mentioning that the Euro-crisis, and for example the setting up of costly emergency funds that are set up to save the Euro, are causing an increasing uprising of anti-EU parties in Western Europe, as the Euro-crisis basically means that richer EU-countries must provide money for poorer EU-countries. Claims on these events were highly apparent around the elections of 2010, in which the main Eurosceptical/anti-EU party PVV wins an increasing amount of votes. Two years later, around the elections in 2012, the Euro-crisis is still at the centre of attention. However, in this period, framing expands to the consequences of the Euro-crisis, which mainly focus on increasing political integration, reforms of economic policies (austerity measures), criticism on the dominant role of Germany, criticism on Southern European member states and clashes of ideologies on the EU. Interestingly the Hard Euroscepticism and Nationalism frame are hardly framing on this theme, and the theme can therefore solely be related to

the Soft Euroscepticism and Populism frame. After the elections, this broader public debate on the EU continues. A few years later, it is being related to the migrant/refugee crisis.

Migrant/refugee crisis: 2014-2017
Within the context of public debate of the amount of integration within the EU, and discussions on intergovernmental cooperation in the Soft Euroscepticism frame, another important and urgent event emerges. This event is often framed as the 'migrant/refugee crisis' and refers to the event that an increasing amount of refugees/migrants from Syria, but also from African countries, cross the Mediterranean Sea, to find a new (save) life in Europe. Southern and Eastern European countries could not handle the increasing amount of people, and a new discussion starts. In the context of these events, criticism on the intergovernmental cooperation and on European institutions increases in the framing of the Soft Euroscepticism frame. These arguments are overlapping with frames from the Nationalism frame, that connects them to the protection of national sovereignty (national borders) and national identity. The Hard Euroscepticism frame entails more general fundamental opposition, and therefore frames this crisis as a proof that the EU is not functioning at all. The Populism frame combines the three other frames by focussing on the even increasingly rising negative public opinion on the EU and the uprising of anti-EU parties. The combination of these discussions (on the Euro-crisis and the migrant/refugee crisis) characterize the framing around the European elections of 2014, in which a significant victory of anti-EU parties appears. However, this victory mainly takes place in other member states, and framings consist mainly on frames about the UK and France.

Brexit referendum: 2016-2017
According to the framings within the Dutch newspapers, the main discussions during the Brexit referendum were on the EU's economic policies (because of the Euro-crisis) and on immigration policies (because of the migrant/refugee crisis), which are mainly framed within the Soft Euroscepticism frame. Also, in the Netherlands, these discussions occur around the referendum of 2016, which is officially aimed at the Ukraine association agreement. The Populism frame focusses on the results of both referendums, which is framed as being a proof for a 'patriotic spring' in Europe by anti-EU parties, like the PVV, UKIP and Front National. After the Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in the USA, the Dutch elections of 2017 are internationally seen as an indicator for increasing populism in Europe, which is another important focus of the Populism frame. In the Netherlands, the discussion is aimed at a wider context of populist political elections, and during the election campaign these are connected to Nationalism arguments that show an emphasis on   national sovereignty, national interest and national identity. However, the amount of votes from the main populist and/or nationalist party (PVV) is not as high as expected during the elections of 2017.

In sum, public discussion on Euroscepticism, within the Dutch newspapers in the period 2000-2017, is focussed on six themes, which are often connected to each other. Table 4.16 below provides an overview of the main arguments that occur in the newspaper articles during each critical moment, and therefore summarizes the main content of the arguments within each frame in the Netherlands.

Critical moment	Main theme	Soft Euroscepticism framing	Hard Euroscepticism framing	Populism framing	Nationalism framing
NL1 – NL elections 2002	Enlargement	Enlargement too costly, increasing immigration	Increasing political integration due to institutional reforms	Opinion of citizens not concerned	Protection of national sovereignty and identity
NL2 – NL elections 2003	Enlargement	Political integration, inter-governmental cooperation	Bureaucracy and rules from Brussels	Disconnection between citizens and EU	Protection of national sovereignty and identity
NL3 – EU elections 2004	Enlargement – European Constitution	New priorities and suggestions for making the EU more relevant for citizens	Democratic deficit and unnecessary bureaucracy in Brussels	Lack of representation of citizens, more negative public opinion	EU should be in the national interest
NL4 – Referendum 2005	European Constitution	The referendum as a protest vote towards the EU as a political union	Democratic deficit and too much interference of EU in domestic matters	The results of the referendum as the awakening of citizens regarding the EU	Constitution in favour of the national interest
NL5 – NL elections 2006	European Constitution	Suggestions on improvements and reforms of the EU	Suggestions on decreasing bureaucracy and unnecessary rules	Negative public opinion on the EU, Europe in a crisis	EU as beneficial for national interests and national sovereignty
NL6 – EU elections 2009	European elections 2009	Increasing Euroscepticism on EU institutions and other members	Bureaucracy and interference of Brussels in domestic matters	Anti-European populist parties (mainly in other EU-states)	EU as a threat for national sovereignty and identity
NL7 – NL elections 2010	Euro-crisis	Political integration, economic policies, failing EU cooperation, EU budget	-	EU in a crisis, immigration	Increasing nationalism in EU
NL8 – NL elections 2012	Euro-crisis	Political integration, economic policies, Germany, Southern European states	Clashes of ideologies on the EU, democratic deficit	Anti-EU parties, growing negative public opinion	Political integration both in favour of national interest and threat for national sovereignty
NL9 – EU elections 2014	Euro-crisis – Migrant refugee crisis	Intergovernmental cooperation, European institutions, economic and immigration policies	Functioning and focus of the EU in general	Victory of anti-EU parties (mainly in other EU-states), negative public opinion,	Protection of national sovereignty
NL10 – Referendum 2016	Brexit referendum - Euro-crisis – Migrant refugee crisis	Economic policies (TTIP), immigration policies, trigger for other referenda	Brexit as trigger for fundamental opposition	Patriotic spring in Europe, EU in a crisis	Negative public opinion explained by erosion of national sovereignty
NL11 – NL elections 2017	Brexit referendum - Euro-crisis – Migrant refugee crisis	Complexity of European decision-making and cooperation, immigration and economic policies	Claims for fundamental change in EU	Brexit and elections in wider populist context	Negative public opinion explained by EU as a threat for national sovereignty, interest, and identity
Table 4.16: Overview of themes and framing around critical moments in the Netherlands					

The focus of the different frames and the overarching themes shows that there are a lot of overlapping elements that can be found among the four different frames.

The focus on the amount of (political) integration can be found in the **Soft Euroscepticism** frame as well as in the **Hard Euroscepticism** frame. The difference is that arguments within the Hard Euroscepticism frame are more expressed within a context of ideologies on the EU, which mainly insists on the relationship between sovereign nation states and the supra-national European institutions, while arguments within the Soft Euroscepticism frame focus on criticism towards specific elements of the EU, which does not mean that the author is fundamentally against the EU.

> Conclusion: Overlap between the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame can mainly be found in arguments on the (political) European integration.

Another important overlap that appears several times during the analysis can be found between the **Soft Euroscepticism** and the **Populism** frame. Soft Eurosceptic arguments, for example on the enlargement or the amount of political integration, are continually combined with arguments on negative public opinion towards the EU and the uprising of anti-EU parties. This overlap can mainly be found during the aftermath of European elections, in which Soft Euroscepticism arguments are combined with the (increasingly Eurosceptic) results of the elections.

> Conclusion: Overlap between the Soft Euroscepticism and Populism frame can mainly be found after European elections, when the Populism frame combines Soft Eurosceptic arguments with the uprising of anti-EU parties and a negative public opinion towards the EU.

On the topic of increasing European integration, there is also an overlap between the **Soft Euroscepticism** frame and the **Nationalism** frame. Over the whole period, the Nationalism frame is using elements of the EU, which are mainly expressed in the Soft Euroscepticism frame, to claim that the European Union is a threat for the national sovereignty, the national interest and/or the national identity.

> Conclusion: Overlap between the Soft Euroscepticism and Nationalism frame consists mainly of arguments in which increasing European integration is framed as a threat for the national sovereignty/interest/identity.

In some periods, mainly after the Constitution-referendum in 2005, an overlap between the **Soft Euroscepticism** frame, the **Populism** frame and the **Nationalism** frame emerges. Within this period, it is stated that a focus on renewed priorities and reforms of the EU, from the Soft Euroscepticism frame, must be in favour of the national interest and national sovereignty (Nationalism frame), which would make the EU more relevant for its citizens, and lead to a more positive public opinion towards the EU (Populism frame).

> Conclusion: Overlap between the Soft Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame mainly occurs in the period after the referendum of 2005, during which it is claimed that the EU must be in the national interest, to be relevant for its citizens.

Finally, the increasing focus on economic and immigration policies are themes that are framed in all four frames. Where the **Soft Euroscepticism** frame is focussing on specific elements of these policies, like austerity measures and the complexity of EU decision-making, the **Hard Euroscepticism** frame

frames these policies as an example that the EU does not function at all. Both arguments are connected to the **Populism** frame, which frames the increasing influence of anti-EU parties, mainly after the European elections, and after the national elections of 2010 and 2012. The Populism frame overlaps in this, by focussing on the 'patriotic spring', in which the focus expands to other countries within and outside the European Union. These frames are often related to the **Nationalism** frame, which highlights the increasing focus on national (identity) issues, and which often uses economic and immigration policies and an example of the eroding importance of the nation state, to the benefit of the EU.

> Conclusion: Overlap between all four frames occurs increasingly around the Euro-crisis and Migrant/refugee crisis. As such, all frames consist of arguments that follow from their focus on economic and immigration policies.

4.3.2 Shifts in public opinion and framing of the debate

This section discusses the main conclusions that can be drawn from combining the four analysed frames and the changes among public opinion towards the EU in the Netherlands.

Graph 4.15 below combines the movements of public opinion from the Eurobarometer with the amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element (A bigger version of this graph can be found in Annex V). In general, it can be stated that public opinion changes earlier than the amount of articles, and that, thus, an increasing amount of articles is a reaction on changing public opinion. This can, for example, be seen around 2001-2, 2008-2 and 2013-2, in which the change of the percentages of positive answers occurs earlier than the peak of the amount of articles. On the other hand, around 2009-2 and 2003-1, the percentages of the negative answers are increasing after the peak of the amount of articles. This leads to the assumption that positive public opinion changes before the high occurrence of articles containing a Eurosceptic element, while negative public opinion changes occur after the peaks in these articles. However, there seems to be too many exceptions on this assumption to draw a general conclusion on this interrelation between public opinion and framing in newspaper articles. Therefore, this section discusses specific remarkable moments in which the use of all, or some, frames suddenly declines or increases, and during which public opinion seems to change. This is being done by making use of the graphs in Annex VI, which show the use of the frames around each critical moment, and the corresponding changes in public opinion.

Graph 4.15: Public opinion on the EU in the Netherlands during the period 2000-2017, as found in the Eurobarometer and the selected amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element, as found in the NRC Handelsblad and Telegraaf

The most important moments in which the occurrence of the frames, and changes in public opinion occur are the episodes around the European elections of 2004 (NL3), 2009 (NL6) and 2014 (NL9). One of the highest occurrences of the Soft Euroscepticism frame can be found around the **European elections of 2004**, during which the focus is predominantly on the preferred priorities of the EU and the European Constitution. Furthermore, the other three frames are highly used around these elections; the Hard Euroscepticism frame is focussed on the bureaucracy and democratic deficit of the EU, the Populism frame is focussed on the alienation of an increasingly more negative public opinion, and the Nationalism frame is focussed on prioritizing the national interest and protecting the national sovereignty. These arguments seem to relate with growing negative public opinion towards the EU during these episodes. While the total amount of positive answers remains relatively high (around 55%), this period shows a downward shift. Also, the percentage of negative answers increases around the elections. This leads to the conclusion that the increasing use of all four frames around the European elections of 2004 seems to cause a more negative public opinion towards the EU.

The second analysed **European elections (2009, NL6),** show an interesting difference from the elections in 2004. While the Soft Euroscepticism frame (mainly focussed on EU institutions and other member states), and the Hard Euroscepticism frame (mainly focussed on the bureaucracy and interference of Brussels) and the Nationalism frame (mainly focussed on national sovereignty and identity) are highly used, the Populism frame is not often used, compared to the elections of 2004. The focus of the Populism frame is predominantly on the rising of anti-EU parties in other member states. Furthermore, there seems to be less overlap with specific arguments from the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism and Nationalism frame, which leads to a lower use around these episodes. Meanwhile, public opinion is growing more positive around the period of the elections. While there is a slight decline of positive answers during the run-up to the elections, overall, the percentage of the positive answers increases. At the same time, the percentage of the negative answers decline around the elections. This leads to the conclusion that, based on these elections, there seems to be a connection between a lesser amount of Populist arguments in newspapers, and an increasingly positive public opinion towards the EU. In other words, an increasing amount of Populist arguments might cause a more negative public opinion towards the EU, which can also be found back around the elections of 2004.

Interestingly, this conclusion is also confirmed around the **European elections of 2014** (NL9). During these elections, again, the Soft Euroscepticism frame (mainly focussed on intergovernmental cooperation and European institutions) and Hard Euroscepticism frame (mainly focussed on the functioning and focus of the EU) and Nationalism frame (mainly focussed on the national sovereignty) are relatively often used, while the Populism frame is even lower occurrent than around the elections of 2009. Again, most of the arguments within the Populism frame contain framings on anti-EU parties, and the election results in other European countries, which might mean that these countries were relatively less apparent in the Netherlands. Like the elections of 2009, public opinion shifts increasingly more positive; as positive answers increase, while negative answers decline.

> Conclusion: An increasing use of the Populism frame seems to lead to a growing negative public opinion towards the EU.

In sum, the use of the frames and the shifts in public opinion around the European elections predominantly leads to a conclusion on the influence of the Populism frame on public opinion; a higher amount of Populist arguments in newspaper articles seems to cause a more negative public opinion towards the EU.

Next to the European elections, there are five other periods on which a conclusion can be drawn.

The first period is the period around the **national elections of 2002** (NL1). This period shows a high occurrence of both the Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame. The main themes around these elections are the implementation of the Euro and the enlargement of the EU, which have thus led to a more radically critical position on the EU. The higher occurrence of these frames and the more sceptical language can also be explained by the presence, and death, of Pim Fortuyn around the elections. Overall, the period around these elections are characterized by a decline of positive answers and a slight increase of negative answers; which indicates that public opinion becomes more negative towards the EU. As such, it can be concluded that, around the elections of 2002, the higher occurrence of the Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame, which means a more radically critical attitude towards the EU, seems to cause a more negative public opinion towards the EU.

> Conclusion: The high use of the Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame around the national elections of 2002 seems to lead to a more negative public opinion towards the EU.

The second period is around the **referendum of the European Constitution in 2005** (NL4), during which the Populism frame is mainly occurrent. This indicates that discussion on the European Constitution, which mainly entails the amount of political integration and the protection of national sovereignty, is related to Populist arguments. The 'protest vote' of the referendum is also characterized as 'the awakening of citizens'; which implies that with the referendum, the Dutch population expressed their disregard to the fact that they do not feel considered in European decision-making. This negative public opinion is reflected in the Eurobarometer, as positive answers decline, and negative answers increase around the referendum. As such, it can be concluded that around the referendum in 2005, more Eurosceptic arguments seem to be connected to Populist arguments, which seems to cause an increasing negative public opinion towards the EU.

> Conclusion: The high use of the Populism frame around the Constitution-referendum in 2005 seems to lead to a more negative public opinion towards the EU.

During the third period, the **national elections of 2006** (NL5), the occurrence of the Nationalism frame is relatively high. However, the content of the Nationalism frame is expressed by supporters of the EU, who, after the rejection of the European Constitution in 2005, are reframing the European Union as being in favour of the national interest. As such, the general theme within this period consists of suggestions for change in the EU, which is mainly expressed by the political parties during the election campaign. This increasing attention for the EU, in both a positive and national-focussed way, seems to cause a more positive public opinion towards the EU in this period.

> Conclusion: The argument from the Nationalism frame that frames the EU as being in favour of the national interest seems to lead to a more positive public opinion towards the Eu around the national elections of 2006.

The fourth period, **the national elections of 2012** (NL8) also shows a relatively high occurrence of the Nationalism frame. Furthermore, there is a slightly increasing use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame. This period is characterized by the focus on the Euro-crisis, entailing increasing criticism on (the economies of) other member states and the failure of EU-leaders to resolve the Euro-crisis. Within this context, the Nationalism frame expresses criticism on the EU regarding national sovereignty and the national interest, which seems to cause a more negative public opinion towards the EU. As such, it can

be concluded that, after the Euro-crisis, the overlap between a focus on economic policies and national sovereignty and national interests leads to an increasingly negative public opinion on the EU.

> Conclusion: The overlap between the Euro-crisis and the focus on national sovereignty and national interest seems to lead to a more negative public opinion towards the EU around the national elections of 2012.

The fifth period takes place around the **Brexit and Ukraine association referendum in 2016** (NL10) and the **national elections of 2017** (NL11). Again, this period is characterized by an increasing use of the Populism frame, while the use of the other frames is relatively low. However, most of the arguments within the Populism frame consist of events in other countries, like the Brexit and the American and French presidential elections. This does not seem to have an influence on Dutch public opinion towards the EU, as public opinion keeps growing more positive during this period. As such, frames on populist events abroad within the Populism frame seems to have no clear relation with public opinion on the EU in the Netherlands.

> Conclusion: The increasing focus of Populist arguments on the rise of Populism in other countries does not seem to have an influence on public opinion towards the EU in the Netherlands around the referendum of 2016 and the national elections of 2017.

Chapter 5 - Public opinion and four frames on the European Union in the UK

This chapter describes the results from the public opinion analysis and the framing analysis of the United Kingdom. As is the case for the Netherlands, several critical moments have been selected for the United Kingdom. These critical moments consist of 5 General (or national) Elections; in 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017, three European elections; in 2004, 2009 and 2014, and the Referendum on European Union Membership (also known as the Brexit Referendum) in 2016. Dependent on the amount of available articles, two or three episodes around the critical moment are chosen, to analyse the frames and public opinion. For UK1, UK2, UK3, UK5, UK6, UK7, and UK8, these include the episodes before, during and after the elections, for UK4, these include the episode during and after the election, and for UK9, these include the two periods before the election. Table 5.1 below provides an overview of the different critical moments, their episodes, and the corresponding data. The datasheet of the results for the UK can be requested at the researcher (Database Annex Z – Datasheet results UK) and shows the amount of articles for each half a year, the data for each critical moment (occurrence of frames, changes in public opinion), the correlation between the frames, and the occurrence of specific arguments within the frames.

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Total amount of articles
UK1	General Elections	7-6-2001	2001-1	54-56	2000(2) − 2001(2)	79
UK2	European Elections	10-6-2004	2004-1	60-62	2003(2) − 2004(2)	90
UK3	General Elections	5-5-2005	2005-1	62-64	2004(2) − 2005(2)	78
UK4	European Elections	4-6-2009	2009-1	70-72	2009(1) − 2009(2)	36
UK5	General Elections	6-5-2010	2010-1	72-74	2009(2) − 2010(2)	58
UK6	European Elections	22-5-2014	2014-1	80-82	2013(2) − 2014(2)	109 (93 analysed)
UK7	General Elections	7-5-2015	2015-1	82-84	2014(2) − 2015(2)	114 (83 analysed)
UK8	Referendum on European Union Membership (Brexit)	23-6-2016	2016-1	84-86	2015(2) − 2016(2)	292 (172 analysed)
UK9	General Elections	8-6-2017	2017-1	86-87	2016(2) − 2017(1)	94 (66 analysed)

Table 5.1: Overview critical moments in the United Kingdom

The next sections describe the results of the analysis in the UK. In section 5.1, the results of the Eurobarometer public opinion are discussed, and divided into specific periods during which public opinion changes. After that, section 5.2 describes the results of the framing analysis. Section 5.2.1 first provides a general overview on the amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element. Then, section 5.2.2 discusses the contents of the frames around the nine critical moments. Each critical moment is structured in the same way; first the content of the four pre-defined frames (Soft Euroscepticism, Hard Euroscepticism, Populism, Nationalism) are discussed, using the newspaper articles, then, the occurrence and co-occurrence of the frames are discussed, which adds as a quantitative element (5.2.3). Finally, section 5.3 provides the conclusions of the framing analysis of the British newspapers. This section consists of two parts, which discuss the themes that are most occurring in public debate and the different arguments that are used by the four analysed frames (section 5.3.1), and the

influence of these frames on public opinion towards the EU (section 5.3.2), which combines the results of the public opinion analysis (5.1) and the framing analysis (5.2).

5.1 Public opinion on the EU: Eurobarometer

This section discusses the shifts in public opinion towards the EU, as found in the Eurobarometer. To do this, first a general overview of the shifts in public opinion is made. Then, public opinion is divided in six periods, in which public opinion shifts either positively or negatively. After the determination of these periods, the content of the period is elaborated on, by describing how public opinion changed and what critical moment(s) took place during the period.

5.1.1 General overview public opinion about the EU

The graph (5.1) below shows an overview of the shifts in public opinion, based on an average of the answers (in %) of the four analysed questions. In general, it can be stated that in almost every Eurobarometer, the amount of negative answers is higher than the amount of positive answers, except for 2002(1), 2004(2) and between 2015(2) and 2017(1). The period in which the percentage of the negative answers is the highest (51%) is 2011(2). Graph 5.1 also shows the average percentage of the 'don't know' answers, which means that respondents of the Eurobarometer answered, 'don't know' or something similar, when asked on their opinion about the EU. In the whole period 2000-2017, it can be stated that the amount of 'don't know' answers declined significantly, as the percentage is declining towards a minimum at the end of 2016. This indicates that over the whole period, the respondents in the UK were more eager to express their (either positive or negative) opinion on the EU. This goes together with the sudden increase of positive answers from 2015-2 on, where the percentage of positive answers trump the negative answers for the first time in the whole period. It might thus be concluded that people who did not express their opinion on the EU before, are now tending to respond positively when asked on their opinion about the EU. Looking over the whole period, it can be concluded that generally, the British population consists of three groups of people; one group that is predominantly negative towards the EU, one group that is predominantly positive towards the EU and one group that is sometimes positive, sometimes negative, and sometimes they don't know what their opinion on the EU is. Looking at the average answers over the whole period shows that the average amount of negative answers is 40,3%, the average of the positive answers is 30,7% and the average of the 'don't know' answers is 29%. This indicates that, over the whole period, the biggest group is the negative group, and that the positive and 'don't know' group are real close to each other.

Graph 5.1: Public opinion on the EU in the UK during the period 2000-2017, as found in the Eurobarometer

5.1.2 Six periods of shifts in public opinion

This section divides the whole period in smaller periods, in which public opinion is changing. This is done by using graph 5.1, which indicates that there are six periods in which public opinion on the EU is changing. Table 5.2 below shows the six periods in which these graphs can be divided, and the corresponding shifts in the positive and negative answers. The table also shows what critical moment(s) are taking place within the period, as these are elaborated on as well, when analysing the periods.

Number	Period	Δ % Positive	Δ % Negative	Critical moment(s)
1.	2001(1) – 2002(1)	+6	-6	UK1 (GE)
2.	2002(1) – 2004(1)	-6	+12	UK2 (EE)
3.	2004(1) – 2004(2)	+10	-10	UK2 (EE)
4.	2004(2) – 2011(2)	-11	+19	UK3 (GE), UK4 (EE), UK5 (GE)
5.	2011(2) – 2015(1)	+13	-14	UK6 (EE), UK7 (GE)
6.	2015(1) – 2017(1)	+6	-3	UK8 (RE), UK9 (GE)
GE = General Election, EE = European Election, RE = Referendum				
Table 5.2: Periods in which EB public opinion changes				

In general, table 5.2 already implies that main changes of public opinion towards more negative answers take place around European elections (UK2 and UK4). Interestingly, this does not account for the European elections in 2014, around which negative answers seem to decline. However, this might also be caused by the length of the selected period (four years), as graph 5.1 shows that the shift towards more positive answers slows down before the elections of 2014. The table also shows that, in the periods after the European elections, public opinion tends to be more positive, which indicates that Euroscepticism in the UK is fuelled during the run-up to the elections but does not sustain among public opinion for a long time. Interestingly, around the Brexit referendum, public opinion seems to be slightly more positive, which is also confirmed by graph 5.1. The next sections describe each period from table 5.2 separately.

Period 1: 2001(1) – 2002(1): General elections – divided on Europe

The first period in which public opinion changes is between 2001(1) and 2002(1), in which the negative answers are decreasing (from 36% to 30%), while the positive answers are rising (from 26% to 32%). This is rather a short period, though causes of this change can obviously be directed to the General elections of 2001 (UK1). These elections can be characterized as being divided about the EU. The elections are characterized by ongoing internal discussion within the Conservative party about their position towards the EU (BBC, 2001). In the end, the Labour party won the elections, and Tony Blair, who can be characterized as a supporter of the EU, remained Prime Minister. As graph 5.1 shows, negative public opinion starts to decrease after the period of the elections. At the same time, the positive answers are increasing, while the 'don't know' answers are decreasing before and after the election. This indicates that the run-up to the elections of 2001 mainly triggered negative public opinion towards the European Union. After the elections, both the amount of negative and 'don't know' answers decline, while the positive answers keep increasing until the end of 2002.

Period 2: 2002(1) – 2004(1): European elections – increasing negativity

The second period is between 2002(1) and 2004(1). After a stagnation of negative answers, during the aftermath of the General elections, public opinion grows more negative because of the run-up to the European elections of 2004 (UK2). In general, the focus during these elections explains the overall growth of the negative answers and the decline of the positive answers, which implies a growing negative public opinion on the EU. The focus during the election campaign was the pace and direction of European integration, and the promise of Prime Minister Tony Blair to hold a referendum on the European Constitution (BBC, 2004). The turnout of the elections is relatively low, as only 38,2% of the British voters expressed their votes. Both the Conservatives and the Labour party lost seats after the elections, while the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) made the biggest gains (12 seats) (Mellows-Facer et al., 2004). Graph 5.1 shows that during this period, mainly the percentages of the negative answers are increasing (from 29,5% in 2002-1 to 42% in 2004-1). These changes are mainly caused by a lesser amount of trust in the European Union as a whole (EBQ1; 33% negative in 2002-1 and 55% negative in 2004-1). Also, the amount of people that believe that the UK has benefited from its membership of the EU has decreased (EBQ6: 35% negative in 2002-1 and 47% negative in 2004-1).

Period 3: 2004(1) – 2004(2): European elections – increasing trust after elections

This smaller period is taking place during the aftermath of the European elections of 2004. The main topic that is discussed during this period remains the amount of European integration and the (consequences of the) European Constitution. This seems to imply that either there was a big difference between how this topic was communicated in newspaper articles before and after the European elections, influenced public opinion, or that another aspect suddenly changed public opinion towards a more positive stance on the European Union. Meanwhile, graph 5.1 shows that negative answers decline after the elections, while positive answers increase, even to an amount in which the percentage of the positive answers is higher than of the negative answers. This change is caused by an increase of trust in the EU (EBQ1 negative from 55% to 47%, positive from 19% to 35%), and the fact that respondents are increasingly convinced of the fact that the UK has benefited from its EU membership (EBQ6 negative from 47% to 45%, positive 30% to 39%). As such, it can be concluded that the period after the European elections is characterized by increasing trust in the EU, and that the general image of the benefits of the EU also become more positive.

Period 4: 2004(2) – 2011(1): long period of increasing negative public opinion

The fourth period is the longest period and shows the most significant changes in public opinion. The reason for this is that over the whole period, public opinion tends to grow more negative and less positive, as graph 5.1 shows. Though there are some exceptions on these movements, these are not taking place around a critical moment, and are thus not included in the framing analysis. However, it is obvious that around the critical moments that are taking place during this period (UK3, UK4 and UK5), the movements among public opinion are similar. Overall, public opinion shows an increasing

amount of negative answers in the Eurobarometer over the whole period. In total, negative answers increase with 19%, while positive answers decline with 11%. In total, three elections are taking place during this period.

The first elections are the general elections of 2005 (UK3). The traditional parties, Labour and the Conservative party, were the most apparent during the election campaign, and were also the winners of the elections. After the elections, Tony Blair remained Prime Minister. Around the elections, the negative answers increase from 36% in 2004-2 to 39% in 2005-1, and the positive answers decrease from 36% in 2004-2 to 33% in 2005-1, which indicates that, during the run-up to the elections of 2005, public opinion grows slightly more negative towards the EU. This is also reflected in the election results, as the amount of votes for UKIP, the main Eurosceptic party, almost doubled compared to the national elections of 2001; from 390.563 to 605.973. However, in general, it can be argued that other topics, next to the EU, were more apparent during the elections. It is argued that the EU was the fourth most important topic (Cowling, 2005).

The second elections that are taking place within this period are the European elections of 2009 (UK4). The turnout for the elections was lower (34,4%) than the turnout in 2004 (38,2%), which might imply a bigger indifference of the British population towards the EU. Eurobarometer public opinion shows that the rise of the negative answers and the decline of the positive answers is steeper than in the periods before. Also, the amount of respondents that gave 'don't know' answers is growing during the run-up to the European elections. There is no particular question from the Eurobarometer that is changing more than the others, as they are all growing towards more negativity. This indicates that, though the turnout of the elections is relatively low, the run-up to the elections and corresponding public debates caused a shift towards more negative public opinion on the EU. The election campaign is characterized by discussions on the Lisbon Treaty, about which by some Eurosceptics a referendum is demanded. Also, discussions around immigration and the freedom of movement are highly apparent during the election campaign (Hawkins & Miller, 2014).

The third elections are the general elections of 2010 (UK5), during which, the negative answers are increasing again, while the positive answers are declining. The main themes which were discussed regarding the EU were the economic policies, because of the Euro-crisis, and the British relationships with the EU (Bale, 2010). The elections of 2010 meant a power shift in the UK, as the Conservative party won the elections (36,1% of the votes) from the Labour party (29% of the votes). Consequently, Prime Minister Gordon Brown was succeeded by the Conservative David Cameron, who would remain Prime Minister until the Brexit referendum in 2016.

Period 5: 2011(2) – 2015(1): the Referendum – rising positive public opinion
Around this period, the call for a referendum among the population increased after, for example, the Euro-crisis. However, David Cameron, and the rest of the government, was against a referendum. It took the government until 2013 to promise a referendum. David Cameron promised by then, that he would organise a referendum on the EU, when re-elected in the national elections of 2015 (BBC, 2013). In the Eurobarometer survey of 2011(2), the percentage of the negative answers is at its highest (51%), which might explain the call for a referendum on the EU. During this period, the amount of trust in the EU is the lowest (73% negative, 17% positive). It is also remarkable that the positive answers on question 2; in which respondents are asked on their 'general image' of the European Union, are low (13%), while negative answers are 49%. This indicates that quite a high percentage (38%) answered 'don't' know on these questions, and was thus, unsure on their general image on the EU. However, as the period takes on, negative public opinion is decreasing, while positive answers are increasing. These numbers indicate that, after the Euro-crisis, and with the coming possible referendum, more people were taking and changing sides on their position towards the EU. This is not reflected in the percentages of the 'don't know' answers, as these remained around 25% during the whole period. It

does, however indicate that the EU was high on the agenda within public debate. There are two elections taking place between 2011 and 2015.

The first elections within this period are the European elections of 2014 (UK6). These elections are, thus, taking place in a context in which negative public opinion is declining, and positive public opinion rises. However, the periods before the elections (2013-2 and 2014-1) show that this rise in positive public opinion stops, while the amount of 'don't know' answers rises. This is mainly caused by a decline of the amount of trust in the EU (19% positive in 2013-2 and 16% positive in 2014-2). The answers on the other questions are not changing, in contrary to the growth in other episodes of this period. The themes that gain the most attention around the European elections are immigration and the freedom of movement policies of the EU and the membership of the EU in general. Also, these themes are combined with increasing emotional arguments that trigger Euroscepticism among the population (Fitzgibbon, 2014).

The second elections within this period are the national elections of 2015 (UK7), in which David Cameron promised that, when re-elected, he would organise a referendum on the EU. As such, public debate on the EU shifts increasingly from specific issues towards the opinion on the UK's membership in general (Grice, 2015). Zooming in on the periods around the elections (2014-2, 2015-1 and 2015-2), graph 5.3 shows that while the negative answers have an average percentage of 40,8% in 2014-2, it decreases to 37,5% in 2015-1 and 37,8% in 2015-2, which are the same percentages as the positive answers. This indicates that the British population has been widely divided over their opinion on the EU; around 1/3 has a positive opinion, around 1/3 has a negative opinion and another 1/3 doesn't know their opinion (yet). The 1/3 part of the population that is negative towards the EU is reflected in the election results; as UKIP gained 3.881.099 votes, which is 12,6% of the total votes. This is a significant increase compared to the general elections in 2010, during which UKIP gained 3,1% of the votes. As earlier argued, the percentages of votes for UKIP in the European elections (2014: 27,5%) are structurally higher.

Period 6: 2015(1) – 2017(1): Brexit and its consequences – more positive public opinion
The final period in which the public opinion changes endures from 2015(1) to 2017(1) and shows the same development as the period before. The difference between these periods is that the percentages of positive answers are, for the first time for a longer period, higher than the percentages of the negative answers. There are two critical moments taking place within this period.

The first critical moment is the Brexit referendum (UK8). The referendum on the EU-membership in the UK seems to be the ultimate highlight of Euroscepticism in the analysed period (2000-2017). Interestingly, the referendum takes place in a context in which public opinion, based on the Eurobarometer is growing more positive. While in 2015-2, the percentage of the positive answers was 37,8%, like the negative answers; this percentage grows to 40,5% in 2016-1. However, in 2016-1, the percentage of the negative answers also grows to 38,5%, which means that the percentage of people that answered 'don't know' decreased from 24,8% in 2015-2 to 21% in 2016-1. As such, public opinion, during the run-up to the referendum grows more positive as well as more negative. The main changes within public opinion take place on the trust in the EU, which increases during the periods 2015-2 and 2016-1 (positive from 23% to 30%, and negative from 63% to 59%). This is a similar movement compared to the run-ups to the European elections. However, while trust in the EU seems to increase, public opinion during the run-up to the referendum implies that the British population remains deeply divided about their EU-membership, which resulted in a tense night after the referendum day (Asthana et al., 2016). However, in the end, 51,9% of the voters voted to leave the EU, while 48,1% voted for remain. The turnout of the referendum was 72,2%, which is even higher than after earlier elections (66,1% in 2015 and 25,6% in 2014). After the referendum, public opinion seems to become more

positive, as the percentage of the positive answers rises to 42%, while the percentage of the negative answers decreases to 37%. These changes are mainly visible in the general image, which becomes more positively after the referendum (positive from 34% to 36% and negative from 36% to 32% in the period 2016-1 and 2016-2).

Not long after the referendum in 2016, the general elections of 2017 (UK9) are taking place. The general elections of 2017 were call by Prime Minister Theresa May, after she succeeded David Cameron, who decided to resign after the referendum, on which he campaigned for the Remain camp. May wanted to have an election to have a strong mandate for her government from the population, before the negotiations with the EU, on the conditions of the Brexit (soft or hard) would start (BBC, 2017). With the elections, May, and her Conservative party hoped to have a bigger majority in parliament. However, in the end the Conservative partly booked a thin win in the elections, which in the end led to a minority government. Consequently, Theresa May did not have the mandate she hoped for, and the population still seemed to be divided on to how hard the Brexit would be. Key questions on this are: Should the UK leave the customs union or the single market? How fast should the Brexit be? How would a negotiated trade agreement with the EU look like? (Zalan, 2017). Some political parties even claimed for a renewed referendum, as public opinion on Brexit may have changed (Merrick, 2018). This is confirmed by graph 5.1, as after the UK voted to leave the EU in the Brexit referendum, public opinion on the EU grows more positively. The percentage of positive answers is, in the period 2017-1 even the highest measured (43%) in the whole period of analysis.

5.2 Eurosceptic framing in newspapers around the critical moments

5.2.1 Newspaper articles containing a Eurosceptic element
As graph 5.2 below shows, the occurrence of newspaper articles containing a Eurosceptic element is increasing during the period 2000-2017. Except for the period 2005(1)-2011(1), it can be concluded that the amount of articles in the UK is relatively high, which indicates that there is a significant amount of attention for Euroscepticism in the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph. For most of the critical moments, the following pattern appears; an increasing amount of articles in the period before the elections, and a decreasing amount of articles afterwards. This pattern does, however, not appear around UK4 and UK5. While in a period with a relatively lower amount of articles, the amount is increasing before as well as after the European elections of 2009 (UK4). On the contrary, the amount of articles is decreasing before, as well as after the general elections of 2010 (UK5). There are two peaks in the amount of articles during the period 2000-2017, which are the period around the Brexit referendum (UK8), with an amount of 203 articles that falls beyond the margins of graph 5.1, and the period around the European elections of 2014 (UK6), in which a number of 56 articles is found. However, next to these peaks, the amount of articles around UK2, UK3, UK7 and UK9 is also relatively high. These critical moments are thus taking place in a period with increased attention on Euroscepticism in the newspapers.

As for the **European elections** (UK2, UK4 and UK6), the amount of articles around the elections of 2004 and 2014 are both relatively high, and show a pattern of a rising number before, and a decrease afterwards. However, the amount of articles around the elections of 2014 is significantly higher, mainly in the period of the elections (56 in 2014-1 compared to 34 in 2004-1), than around the elections of 2004. On the contrary, the amount of articles around the elections of 2009 (UK4) is significantly lower than around the other European elections. While the number of articles is increasing before, as well as after the elections, these numbers (4 in 2008-2, 12 in 2009-1 and 24 in 2009-2) do not come close

to the numbers around the other elections. Consequently, it can be argued that the European elections of 2004 and 2014 are taking place in a context with a relatively high amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element, while the amount of articles around the elections of 2009 is low but increasing before and after the elections.

The **general elections** show, except for the elections in 2010 (UK5) and 2015 (UK7), the same pattern; an increasing number of articles before the election, and a decreasing number afterwards. However, the number of articles shows some differences among the scope of these in- and decreases. A relatively high increase can be found before the elections of UK1 (+8), UK7 (+22) and UK9(+8). A relatively high decrease can be found after the elections of UK1 (-12) and UK3 (-25). The most divergent general elections are the elections of 2010 (UK5), which are the only elections that entail a decrease in the number of articles before, as well as after the elections. In sum, it can be concluded that all general elections in the UK are taking place around a period with a relatively high amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element in newspapers, except for the elections in 2010.

The **Brexit referendum** (UK8) is obviously the period around which the highest peak of articles can be detected. Next to this peak of 203 articles in the period 2016-1, the amount of articles is also high in the periods before and afterwards; 46 articles in 2015-2 and 43 in 2016-2. The Brexit referendum thus takes place during a period with a high occurrence of articles containing a Eurosceptic element, with the period of the referendum itself as a gigantic boost in the number of articles.

Graph 5.2: Amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element and the 9 critical moments in the UK in 2000-2017

5.2.2 Eurosceptic, Populist and Nationalist framing around the critical moments
The following sections analyse the occurrence and content of the four frames for each critical moment separately. As mentioned, each critical moment (European or national election, referendum) consists of a 'critical episode', which are mainly the periods before, during and after the election. The structure of these sections is as following; firstly, the main elements of how the frame is used is discussed. This is being done by using the most remarkable quotes from the newspapers. Also, for each argument (or: element) the amount is mentioned. This amount is a relative number, which consists of the amount of

occurrence of the code, corrected for the total amount of articles during the specific critical episode. Secondly, the occurrence of each frame is visualized. Finally, each section concludes by summing up the main findings of the critical moment, considering the content of public debate and the overlap between the four frames.

UK1 – General elections 2001: European integration and the single currency

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Total amount of articles
UK1	General Elections	7-6-2001	2001-1	54-56	2000(2) – 2001(2)	79

Soft Euroscepticism: arguments against the Euro, resistance to more European integration and a referendum on the single currency

In the first critical episode – UK general elections in 2001, the occurrence of the Soft Euroscepticism frame is low compared to other critical episodes. As such, this frame is decreasing in importance before the elections of 2001, and increasing afterwards. The themes that mainly occur in the Soft Euroscepticism frame can all be connected to the discussion on the implementation of the single European currency in the UK; national politicians use the discussion during the election campaign, and it nurtured the discussion on the (political) integration of the EU and the calls for a referendum on the EU. In these debates, there are three arguments of the Soft Euroscepticism frame that are predominantly used to understand these topics/issues.

The first argument frames scepticism on specific EU policies (SP amount: 3), mainly on the Euro, which raised a lot of public debate on whether the UK should join. The opponents '*advance familiar economic arguments against the euro: its weakness, its inflexibility, its socialistic hinterland or (depending on who you talk to) its unstoppable momentum away from social protection. They make the political case as well.'* (GU – 1.87). Another way of framing the Euro is that '*joining the euro would remove Britain's ability to decide on the right interest rate for the economy.'* (DT – 1.107). Next to criticism on the Euro, there is also criticism on the defence policy of the EU and on the discussion whether the EU should get a European army. The main framing within this argument is, according to the criticists; '*The Euro army (…) will not happen, at least with British troops.'* (DT – 1.134).

The second argument that is used in the Soft Euroscepticism frame considers the preferred amount of European integration (SEI amount: 2,4). The opponents of EU integration '*don't want Britain to get further engaged with the EU in any field.'* (GU – 1.87). It is framed that '*it is the most important issue in Britain, where is Europe going? It's crucial.'* (DT – 1.149). Specific discussions on this are referred to the possible introduction of the Euro, as '*the euro question can't be decided without considering the larger issue of political integration.'* (GU – 1.61). Also, the amount of integration in the economy, for example the workers' rights are discussed; '*Article 137 of the Amsterdam Treaty, which Labour signed shortly after taking power, gave the EU powers to shape workers' rights.'* But, '*Britain fought the measure for years, arguing that each state should be allowed to set its own work rules for companies operating exclusively on their own territory.'* (DT – 1.127).

The third argument frames the discussion on a referendum about the single currency (SR amount: 2). Around the elections; '*voters believe that they can vote "yes" to Labour on June 7 and then, if they want to, vote "no" to the euro in a year or two's time. The most important Europe-related issue in 2001 is the single currency and Tony Blair has promised the British people a referendum on the single currency.'* (DT – 1.133). However, after the elections '*Downing Street made clear (..) that he (Tony Blair) was in no rush to hold a referendum even though Europhiles claimed Labour's second election victory had given him a mandate to adopt a more positive approach towards the EU.'* (DT – 1.125). This

undecisive attitude increased the public debate and the apathy of the opponents regarding the implementation of the single currency in the UK.

Hard Euroscepticism: resistance to a federal Europe and scepticism on the bureaucracy and rule-making in Brussels, the democratic level and the EU as a whole

The use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame declines in the period before the elections and rising afterwards. Within the Hard Euroscepticism frame, the scepticism on increasing European integration and the single currency are framed in a different way than in the Soft Euroscepticism frame; instead of framing specific aspects of European integration, this frame mainly uses these aspects to state that Europe is becoming a federal state in which unnecessary rules and bureaucracy are too much apparent. Connected with this are statements on the lacking democracy and rules that do not favour the EU population. As such, there are four arguments that are used in this episode to understand these themes.

The first argument frames ideological opposition towards the EU (HI amount: 1,8), which is linked to discussion on the amount of European integration within the Soft Euroscepticism frame; *'The builders of the European Union have always acted as if they merely have to get the money right: the politics will take care of itself. They have approached the EU solely as if it were a trading club, even though their every action is creating a new and clearly political entity.'* (GU – 1.88). Most of the framing within this argument entails the words 'federal super-state' and 'federalism'; *'If other EU members insisted on moving towards a federal super-state he would oppose it, he added.'* (DT – 1.114). '*Surely there can no longer be any doubt: the EU is becoming a federal state. Europhiles are fond of claiming that federalism means different things in different countries. But is there anywhere in the world where a written constitution, a directly elected president and a parliament composed of federal political parties would not denote a federation?'* (DT – 1.108). Also, it is stated that '*British voters are the most hostile to the idea (58% against)'* of a federal Europe (GU – 1.77).

The second argument frames scepticism related to bureaucracy and rule-making in Brussels (HB amount: 1,1); *'The straight bananas (..) are the most famous example of daft edicts from Brussels, though the tabloids could name you plenty more: fishermen forced to wear hairnets, mushy peas to be banned, English apples over 55cm across to be withdrawn from sale, Cornish clotted cream to be made in Brittany, square gin bottles to be replaced by regulatory round ones, shellfish to be given rest breaks and stress-relieving showers during journeys of over 50 km'.* (GU – 1.61). The rule-making is related to criticism on the bureaucracy in Europe; '*We're being told by bureaucrats you have to do this, you have to do that. (..) You've got other people telling you how to live, how to drive, what to eat.'* (DT – 1.153).

The third argument that expresses Hard Euroscepticism entails criticism on the amount of democracy within the EU (HD amount: 1); '*European democracy implies a European demos, which does not exist. States work best when their citizens feel enough in common one with another to accept government from each other's hands'.* (DT – 1.108). This criticism is also referred to the workings of the British parliament, as *'European directives [are] nodded through parliament with no debate – this cannot and should not be allowed to happen in a democracy.'* (GU – 1.77).

The fourth argument that is used frames more general fundamental opposition towards the EU (HF amount: 0,9). It is for example claimed that '*the EU is doomed to fall apart because of its contradictions. (..) He (Wilkinson) doesn't see that anything done in Brussels might be useful.'* (GU – 1.87). Also, a stronger discourse on this can be found; '*We've been invaded without a shot being fired. (..) It's been an absolute waste of time going to war in 1914 and 1939. Millions of people died who didn't want a federal Europe and now Tony Blair's surrendering it.'* (DT – 1.153)

Populism: alienation between the EU and the already sceptical public as an explanation for the discussions on the Euro and European integration

The Populism frame is the only frame that has a different pattern around the elections of 2001; the occurrence is decreasing before as well as after the elections, which indicates that this frame is not (more) often used around the elections. The themes that are mostly discussed are the Euro, European integration and the bureaucracy in Brussels. These themes relate to the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame. There are two arguments that are used to understand these themes.

The first argument frames on negative public opinion towards the EU in the UK (PO amount: 2,5). *'Since 1997, public opinion, already sceptical of Brussels even in the bliss of Mr Blair's dawn, has inclined towards suspicion and cynicism.'* (DT – 1.150). This argument is often used in combination with opinion polls that show *'that most Britons have little enthusiasm for Europe and do not want Britain to sign up to the single currency. "In Europe but not run by Europe" as a slogan has people nodding with it'.* (DT – 1.133). This negative public opinion is thus combined to the discussion on the single currency. However, it is also combined to the discussion on the amount of European integration, as *'only 34% of British voters say they are happy with the way that the EU is going (..). The truth across Europe appears to be that nobody is particularly happy with the way the union is evolving.'* (GU – 1.75).

The second argument frames that the population is not enough represented in the (institutions of) the EU (PR amount: 0,8). One of the claims considers criticism on the Nice treaty, which is underlined by *'a "widespread sense of disconnection" between the union and its people.'* (GU – 1.69). Other claims are combined to specific rulemaking in Brussels; *'some of our most fundamental and sensitive rights as a self-governing democracy will have passed out of the hands of Parliament and the British people, with scarcely a murmur of protest.'* (DT – 1.156).

Nationalism: (increasing) European integration as a thread for national sovereignty and identity and, importance of the EU for UK's international position

The use of the Nationalism frame declines before the elections of 2001, but rises afterwards, to a significant peak around the European elections of 2004. Within this period, there are three arguments that are predominantly used within the Nationalism frame, to understand the already existing criticism on how actions and treaties of the European Union affect the national sovereignty and identity.

The first argument frames the erosion of national sovereignty because of the EU (NSV amount: 2); *'we have lost the power to regulate the conduct of our own democracy because of provisions in the European treaties and the rulings of the European Court of Justice.'* (DT – 1.156). This argument is also combined to specific events, like *'the Commission's intervention [that] provoked government outrage. It was seen by Mr Brown as a deliberate attempt to meddle in domestic affairs, in particular tax and spending decisions, even though Britain is not a member of the single currency.' (*DT – 1.137).

The second argument frames the EU as a threat for the national identity (NI amount: 1,3); *'Brussels and Berlin would threaten the British culture and way of life.'* (GU – 1.71). Also, this argument is used as a reaction to direct actions of EU institutions*: 'This case (the implementation of a specific European directive) has gripped the nation because the imperial system is part of our culture, part of our history, part of our heritage, part of our being and part of our Britishness, and to try and remove it by force and punitive criminal penalties is wrong.'* (GU – 1.78). Others claim that '*for our British passports to be replaced by a common European passport would indeed be a significant and highly emotive proposal.*' (DT – 1.156).

The third argument that comes to the fore within this period frames the position of the UK within the EU (NP amount: 1,3). Interestingly, this argument is predominantly used by supporters of the EU who

combine this argument to the national interest; *'it is about building a stronger Britain in a wider Europe. Europe makes us stronger because 15 or more nations together are better able to fight cross-border crime, drugs, pollution and unemployment'.* (DT – 1.153). Also, the *'the [British] role as "the bridge between the US and Europe" is [framed] as a rejection of isolationism and Euroscepticism'* (GU – 1.82).

(Co)-occurrence of frames

Table 5.3 and graph 5.3 show that the occurrence of all frames decline during the period before the elections of 2001. After the elections, the Soft Euroscepticism, Nationalism and, to a lesser extent, the Hard Euroscepticism frame, are rising in occurrence, while the Populism frame still decreases.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2000-2	25	28	11,2	17	6,8	16	6,4	20	8
2001-1	33	31	9,4	13	3,9	14	4,2	13	3,9
2001-2	21	25	11,9	9	4,3	7	3,3	12	5,7
Table 5.3: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around UK1									

Graph 5.3: Occurrence of the frames in UK newspapers around critical moment UK1

Conclusions

In sum, it can be argued that the main themes within this period are the amount of European integration and, connected to this, the single currency. In the Soft Euroscepticism frame, these themes are mainly framed by criticizing specific policies and parts of the integration, and frames on the call for a referendum on the single currency. From the Hard Euroscepticism frame, the themes are mainly framed in a way that emphasizes the EU as becoming a 'federal super-state', and by mentioning examples of unnecessary rules and processes that are considered as un-democratic. The Populism frame combines these themes to the already existing negative public opinion and emphasizes that more integration leads to more alienation of citizens. However, the use of this frame is significantly lower than the use of the other frames, which indicates that these arguments were not highly important. Finally, the Nationalism frame, frames these themes by stating that more integration harms the national sovereignty and the identity of the UK. These themes are partly connected to the elections, as the rules and bureaucracy might have a negative influence on some parts of the British population, which then became increasingly sceptic on the EU. However, these themes are not often

connected to domestic issues, and thus to the national elections. As such, it can be concluded that the framings on the EU did not really have a connection with the elections of 2001.

UK2 – European elections 2004: European Constitution and rise of anti-EU forces

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Total amount of articles
UK2	European Elections	10-6-2004	2004-1	60-62	2003(2) – 2004(2)	90

Soft Euroscepticism: demands for a referendum on the European Constitution, scepticism on monetary and agricultural policies and resistance to increasing European integration

The use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame in this episode is the highest measured during the whole period of analysis. However, in the period before the elections (2003-2), the use declines, towards a negative peak in 2004-2. The debate around the EU, within this episode, is mainly focussed on the European Constitution. As the (communicated) content of the constitution mainly entail further political integration within the EU, the themes within the Soft Euroscepticism frame are mainly overlapping with the first critical moment. However, the content is not precisely the same. For example, the argument on the referendum shifts from a referendum about the Euro towards a referendum about the European Constitution. Also, the criticism on the policies is more widespread, and deals also with worker's right, fishery and agricultural policies. There are three arguments used to understand these themes.

The first element entails frames on a referendum about the European Constitution (SR amount: 3,8). Where the discussion around UK1 was mainly about a referendum on the Euro, the discussion within this period shifts to a (possible) referendum on the EU constitution. Early in the period, the discussion is predominantly on whether the government would call for a referendum, as *'the Tory leader has promised to hold a referendum on the European constitution within six months of coming to power and to campaign for a No vote.* (DT – 1.9). However, '*by opening the door to a referendum Tony Blair has vastly increased his bargaining power over the final draft of Europe's constitution and caused profound annoyance to other leaders resisting pressure for a vote in their own countries*.' (DT – 1.39). Also, '*we must assume that Blair will refuse a referendum, for the very bad reason that he believes he would lose it.'* (GU – 1.25). Though there has never been a specific proposal for a referendum, the strategies were clear: *'Mr Howard's pledge to call an early referendum on the European constitution, seek a No vote and then go to Brussels to demand a renegotiation of Britain's membership terms, was the "best deal" the Eurosceptics would get.'* (DT – 1.7). Also, the '*Pro-Europeans plan to run a referendum campaign playing up the significance of the constitution and the dire consequences of rejection. Eurosceptics will argue that the constitution is not fundamental to the EU's future. Britain can remain safely within Europe after a no vote, they say*.' (GU – 1.22).

The second argument that is used within this period frames scepticism on specific policies. The policies that are criticized within this period (SP amount: 2,4) are partly overlapping with the earlier period. There is criticism on the Euro, as *'the ordinary voter is well aware of the destruction that the euro has brought the rest of Europe.'* (GU – 1.29), and on the broader monetary union; *'the way the commission attempts to issues fines and impose maximum spending is entirely wrong. In a monetary union we need something that is more, not less, flexible.'* GU – 1.23). However, there are also other policies that are criticized within this period; for example, the Common Agricultural Policy and the common fisheries policy, which implies the 'murder' of Britain's fish (DT – 1.9). Also, the protection of worker's and the corresponding EU policies are criticized; *'this policy is about making British workers easier to exploit, easier to ignore and easier to sack than those anywhere else in the EU.'* (GU – 1.10).

The final argument frames scepticism on the amount of European integration (SEI amount: 2,2); '*One of the things that keeps coming through is the metaphor of ever closer union. Thus, they talk of the development of a common foreign and security policy and the development of a defence policy, closer and closer so that eventually member states are not allowed to have their own.*' (DT – 1.54). This 'metaphor' is made specific in the European Constitution, which '*provides for an EU foreign minister, criminal court, prosecutor and police force, removes the national veto in many areas and gives treaty sanction to an outdated, over-regulated economic model.*' (DT – 1.18). Also, this Constitution includes plans for a social policy, but '*there is no requirement or need for social policy to be the preserve of the EU. It is not necessary for an efficient operation of the single market and seems to be largely driven by protections inside the EU."* (GU – 1.22).

Hard Euroscepticism: resistance to the EU as a political unit and the EU federal 'super-state'

The use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame is rising before the European elections of 2004 but decreasing afterwards. The theme that is mostly discussed in this episode is, like in the Soft Euroscepticism frame, the European Constitution. There are two arguments that predominantly come to the fore within this period. These two were also apparent around critical moment UK1;

The first argument frames the clash of different ideologies on the EU (HI amount: 1,9). Framings of this argument mainly refer to the European Constitution. '*The anti-Europeans have opened a (..) front by arguing that the new European constitution represents a super-state'.* (GU – 1.31). The population that is anti-European claims that they '*do not want to be a part of a country called Europe.'* (GU – 1.14). On the other side, '*Mr Fischer (foreign minister of Germany) gives an assurance that Europe will not become a super-state: "Nobody has an interest in a European super-state in the way it is described by Eurosceptics, especially in the United Kingdom." "*(DT – 1.40). However, most of the frames in the articles are against the European Constitution, some even claim that '*the evil empire is transfigured into a galloping federal super-state.'* (GU – 1.28). One of the explanations for this might be stated by the following quote: *Why can't Brussels pull the skin off a rice pudding? The answer is that Europe is not a natural political unit*. (DT – 1.55). This argument, which mainly frames the EU as becoming a (federal) super-state, is thus connected to the discussion on both the European Constitution, and suspicions about a referendum on this, and the preferred amount of European integration, which are arguments from the Soft Euroscepticism frame.

The second argument that is used frames more general fundamental criticism towards the EU (HF amount: 1,3), thus not directly related to, for example, the European Constitution; '*[I am] deeply unhappy with the way in which they are allowing Britain to be pushed around by the bureaucracy in Brussels. (..) Apart from being cumbersome, expensive and corrupt, the EU represents a serious long-term threat peace in Europe.'* (DT – 1.29).

Populism: scepticism towards the European Constitution framed by negative public opinion and visualized in the rise of anti-European parties

The use of the Populism frame is relatively high, and rising, during the run-up to the European elections of 2004. After the elections, the use declines. The most discussed theme within this period are the European Constitution and the European elections of 2004. There are three arguments used to understand these themes.

The first argument entails frames negative public opinion towards the EU (PO amount: 3,1). The frames within this argument are predominantly predictions on how the population of the UK would vote in a referendum; '*British voters would follow Sweden's example [of rejecting the Euro in a referendum] if there was a referendum here given the considerable Eurosceptic feeling in this country.'* (GU – 1.29). '*British public opinion is two-to-one against: how will such resistance be overcome?'* (GU – 1.12). Also,

businessmen are sceptical towards the EU, as *'only 18 percent of those interviewed believed that the European constitution would be good for their businesses; 59 percent said it would be bad; 23 percent did not know.'* (DT – 1.37). Finally, public opinion is also combined with the election results in 2004, as *'the surge (..) of UKIP, which gained 16 percent of the vote, showed how the anti-constitution message has begun to merge in the minds of large sections of the public with populist appeals to withdraw from the European Union altogether.'* (DT – 1.26). Thus, the use of this argument within this period, combines several elements, like referenda on the Euro and the Constitution, and the results of the European elections, to frame that the population in the UK is sceptical towards the European Union.

The second argument did not emerge around critical moment UK1, and frames on political parties that are anti-European (PA amount: 2,3), in the UK, this was mainly UKIP. Predominantly before the elections, it is claimed that; *'Eurosceptics are set to make record gains in the EU elections, winning enough seats to hold the balance between the centre right and centre left in the European parliament, it was claimed yesterday.'* (GU – 1.17). And, '*once a curiosity item in the European Parliament, they [Eurosceptic parties] could soon form a vigorous bloc of their own in alliance with the UK Independence Party, perhaps even holding the balance of power over key legislation*.' (DT – 1.33). However, next to framing predictions like these, there are also claims about the daily discourses of these parties, UKIP, and the consequences; '*candidates are boasting of being "non-political", independent and non-party. That appeal to "common sense" and "neither right nor left" is an anti-democratic sentiment. (..) Cynicism about politics leads to refusal to vote: the next step is voting for anti-politics which rapidly becomes anti-democracy. (..) But the anti-politics brigade pursues simple, absolute goals inviting voters to despise the building of coalition and consent*.' (GU – 1.13).

The third argument frames on the level of representation within the EU (PR amount: 1,1), which is like the national elections of 2001 (UK1). *'The most difficult thing about the EU (..) is that it has very little to do with the people. It is constructed in a way to make sure that it is an undemocratic structure because the authors of it were frightened of popular power.'* (DT – 1.54). This is also explained by a government representative who attended the negotiations on the EU convention; *'not once (..) in the 16 months I spent on the convention did representatives question whether deeper integration is what the people of Europe want, whether it serves their best interests or whether it provides the best basis for a sustainable structure for an expanding union.'* (GU – 1.25). And, if politicians are considering the population, for example when communicating about a coming referendum, *'the only question [they] as is: "What's in it for me? How much money for us?" Not inspiring.'* (GU – 1.18). According to several claims within this argument, this is not good for the EU and politics. It is even stated that *'this is how wars start, when people feel that they have nothing in common with the powers set over them and can see no means of changing anything except by violence.'* (DT – 1.29)

The arguments within the Populism frame are the same as around critical moment UK1, however, one new argument comes to the fore. The arguments within the Populism frame can be combined with the discussion on the referendum (on the EU Constitution) within the Soft Euroscepticism frame, but in some cases also to ideological and fundamental opposition towards more EU integration, as stated in the Hard Euroscepticism frame. Also, within this period, framing on anti-European, populist and/or far-right parties within the EU, and finally within the European Parliament, starts within the UK.

Nationalism: European Constitution as a threat for national sovereignty and emphasis on the benefits of the EU for UK's global geopolitical position

The use of the Nationalism frame is increasing before the European elections of 2004 and decreasing afterwards. Like the other frames, the main theme within the Nationalism frame in this episode is the European Constitution. The arguments that are used within this frame refer to the constitution as a threat for the national sovereignty. On the other side, opponents of the EU claim that a strong EU has

benefits for the UK's global geopolitical position. There are two arguments that are predominantly used to understand the topic around the elections, which are overlapping with critical moment UK1.

The first argument entails frames on the erosion of national sovereignty due to the EU (NSV amount: 2,6). Within this period, this argument is mainly used as an argument against the (draft) European Constitution, which *'needs much stronger clauses underlining and enforcing the principle of subsidiarity. At present there is only a limited power of delay for national parliaments.'* (GU – 1.22). Also, the *'constitution would end Britain's ability to veto certain EU policies on social policy and employment issues'* (DT – 1.38). Finally, it is claimed that *'any government that hands over power to the degree demanded by the proposed constitution is effectively no longer a government' (DT – 1.14).* This argument can thus be combined with opposition towards the EU, mainly to the integration argument of the Soft Euroscepticism frame and the ideology argument of the Hard Euroscepticism frame.

The second argument frames the national position of the UK within the EU (NP amount: 1,7). Like the claims around UK1, this argument is mainly used by supporters of a UK EU-membership; *'if Britain failed to take its place in Europe, no possible alternative partnership was available, least of all with the US'* (GU – 1.25). From this perspective, this argument is used as a warning against the prevailing anti-European sentiment in society and politics; *'It will be Britain's future in the EU now at risk of removal to the margins, left behind again as Europe moves on.'* (GU – 1.12). Another feature of this argument is that the supports stress the 'unique' position of the UK in the geopolitical world; *'other countries would "give their eye teeth" to be in Britain's position - as the strongest ally of the US, the only superpower, and a member of the biggest political alliance and biggest economic market in the world, through Europe'* (DT – 1.28).

(Co)-occurrence of frames

Table 5.4 and graph 5.4 below show that all four frames have the same pattern of occurrence around critical moment UK2; their occurrence is relatively high before the elections, and relatively low in the period after the elections. The Nationalism frame is the only frame that is increasing in the period before the elections (2003-2), while the occurrence of the Populism frame remains more or less the same in this period.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2003-2	24	43	17,9	18	7,5	21	8,8	15	6,3
2004-1	35	52	14,9	23	6,6	32	9,1	29	8,3
2004-2	31	21	6,8	1	0,3	15	4,8	7	2,3
Table 5.4: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around UK2									

Graph 5.4: Occurrence of the frames in UK newspapers around critical moment UK2

Conclusions

In sum, the main themes within Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame are the amount of political integration in Europe, which is mainly expressed by criticism on, and a call for a referendum on, the European Constitution. This theme is also framed in the Nationalism frame, by stating that the Constitution would lead to more national sovereignty. The Populism frame consists predominantly of frames on anti-EU parties and actors, who are upcoming within this episode, and who use arguments from the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame to claim that the public is increasingly sceptical towards the EU. The themes can be connected to the elections, in a way that the Constitution was an important element for reforming the EU, and there was more criticism on a bigger scope of European policies. On the other hand, there was hardly any focus on the institutions on which the elections dealt with; the European Parliament or the European Commission. As such, it can be stated that the focus was on the EU around the elections, but mainly on one particular aspect.

UK3 – General elections 2005: rejection of the European Constitution

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Total amount of articles
UK3	General Elections	5-5-2005	2005-1	62-64	2004(2) – 2005(2)	78

Soft Euroscepticism: increasing scepticism after rejection of the Constitution and claims on the EU as a solely economic union

The use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame is relatively high during this episode, compared to other critical moments. While the use declines significantly after the European elections of 2004, this frame is, again, highly apparent in the period before the elections of 2005. After the elections, the use declines again. The theme that is mostly discussed is, again, the European Constitution, and more specifically, the rejection of the European Constitution by referenda in France and the Netherlands. There are three arguments that predominantly come to the fore around these elections. Interestingly, these arguments are the same as around critical moment UK1 and UK2.

The most used argument frames on demands of a referendum on the EU Constitution (SR amount: 4,2). A clear pathway of events, and corresponding articles, can be directed within this period. Firstly, there is discussion on the coming/promised referendum on the European Constitution, which created a '*growing tension about the best way to turn around the public's instinctive hostility to Europe in time for a referendum on the constitution, which will be the next big political battle after the general election*.' (DT – 1.2). Communication on the (possible position in the) referendum was thus important during the election campaign. Also, *'the prime minister's spokesman also confirmed that Britain would go ahead with a referendum, even if other countries, such as France, rejected the constitution in their polls, scheduled for 2005.'* (GU – 1.2). Then, secondly, the attention shifts to the referenda in France and the Netherlands, as, *'a "No" vote (..) would solve so many problems for Britain that it seems almost too much to hope for.'* (DT – 2.91). And, indeed, both France and the Netherlands rejected the European Constitution in a referendum in 2005. Then, the attention shifts to the reactions on these referenda; *'although Tony Blair called for "reflection" after the referendum result came in, sceptics in the UK and the rest of Europe are unlikely to let the initiative slip away'* (GU – 2.54). In the end, the British government decided that *'a British referendum on the constitution is off the agenda too, which is reasonable given what happened in France and the Netherlands; but there is no plan, or even germ of an idea, about how to proceed.'* (GU – 2.47).

The second argument frames scepticism on the amount of political integration (SEI amount: 2,2). This argument mainly refers to the European Constitution, which would enlarge the political integration of EU member states. The rejection of the Constitution by France and the Netherlands '*demands a rejection of European integration, at least on its current basis, and a retreat into the protective embrace of the nation state.*' (GU – 2.50). As a reaction, the EU is mainly framed as a community that should only focus on the economy; *'although usually couched in terms of sovereignty and national identity, the real question at the heart of the Europe debate has always been one of political economy.'* (GU – 2.41). '*For years, the EU was only an "economic community". Justice and home affairs first feature in EU treaties with Maastricht in 1991 and have been moving forward ever since.*' (DT – 1.5). It is claimed that this is the fundamental reason why there appears to be so much criticism towards the EU, as *'the simple fact is [that] the British people do not want to give more powers to Brussels'.* (DT – 2.85), and that, for example, '*we don't need a European policy on sport, together with qualified majority voting, or the mandatory celebration of 'Europe Day' on May 9, or a European space programme.*' (DT – 2.80).

The third argument frames scepticism on specific EU policies (SP amount: 1,4). This argument is predominantly used by politicians in their elections campaign, to elaborate on their position towards Europe. For example, Tony Blair, *'[who] sounds serious when he says that the EU should reform the Common Agricultural Policy.'* (DT – 2.78). Criticism on CAP is also expressed by others; *'the 63-year-old peer called the EU system of grants and subsidies to farmers a "whole vast swindle" and said Britons were forced to pay "higher taxes" … "to keep EU farmers in the style to which they have become accustomed".' (*GU – 2.55). Also, the Euro comes to the fore during the election campaign, as Kenneth Clarke promised '*that he had no plans to take Britain into the euro if he became prime minister.*' (DT – 2.74).

The arguments of the Soft Euroscepticism frame overlap with critical moments UK1 and UK2, although the framing of the referendum argument has shifted because of the rejection of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands. The framing of the integration argument remains almost the same, as it still deals with criticism on the European Constitution, and the framing of the policies argument is mainly connected to the domestic elections campaign.

While significantly low in the period before the elections (0,3 in 2004-2), the use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame increases during the period before the elections (2005-1). After the elections, the occurrence declines again to 1,8 in 2005-1. In total, the (absolute) use of the frame is low during this period, therefore the three arguments that are predominantly used around these elections are not discussed in detail. The main framings that can be found within this episode refer to the European Constitution. There are three arguments predominantly used to frame this theme.

The first argument frames fundamental opposition to the EU (HF amount: 0,5), and mainly refers to UKIP, '*the party [that] advocates immediate EU withdrawal, the phased repeal of European laws and regulations and the negotiation of a free trade agreement.* (GU – 2.60).

The second argument frames discussion on the ideologies about the EU (HI amount: 0,4). It is claimed that '*Euro-sceptics believe that a "more flexible Europe" and "ever closer union" are incompatible objectives'* (DT – 2.78), which are roughly the same words as around critical moment UK1 and UK2.

The third argument contains frames opposition against the EU in its current state but is accompanied by claims about the importance of fundamental changes in the EU (HC amount: 0,4). This argument is mainly used as a reaction on the rejection of the EU Constitution: 'We *need a new Europe without excessive competition, without militarism. I am very happy. What has happened is fantastic and a lot more countries will follow our lead.*' (DT – 2.81).

Populism: procedures and reactions on rejection of European Constitution leads to increasing disconnection of citizens and increasing Euroscepticism among populations in the EU

The use of the Populism frame is relatively high during the period before the elections of 2005. After the elections, the use decreases again. The use of the frame thus follows the pattern of the amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element, in this period. All arguments during this episode emphasize the fuelling of Euroscepticism among public opinion, due to the reaction on the rejection of the European Constitution. There are three arguments that predominantly come to the fore within this period.

The first argument frames negative public opinion towards the EU (PO amount: 2,6) and is thus overlapping with UK1 and UK2. This argument is mainly combined with the outcomes of the referenda in France and the Netherlands. As a reaction, '*the Chancellor argues that the Government must start where the voters are, in a sceptical position about Europe, then make the case for EU reform.* (DT – 1.2). However, when the government decided that, due to these referenda, the referendum in Britain would be cancelled, it is claimed that '*the people of this country will once again have been robbed of the opportunity to express their legitimate opinion on the all-important question of who governs Britain – Westminster or Brussels.* (DT – 2.87). It is thus framed as an event due to which the population had no chance anymore to express their opinion towards the EU. Additionally, it is mentioned that public opinion throughout Europe, grows increasingly more sceptical, as '*with the broad anti-European sentiment evident across western Europe as traditional EU members struggle to accept the new constitution.*' (GU – 2.56). As such, this argument is combined with the discussions within the Soft Euroscepticism frame on the referendum and on the amount of preferred (political) integration, as included in the European Constitution.

The second argument, which firstly appears during UK3, contains frames on the fact that Europe is in a crisis (PC amount: 1,4). This argument is predominantly combined with the (outcomes) of the referenda on the Constitution; '*If the French vote No, there will be a crisis across the whole of Europe.*

Europe is now at a crossroads and has to decide in which direction to go.' (DT – 2.82). It is feared that, *'if the constitutional treaty is rejected, European governments might try to implement its measures through behind-the-scenes negotiations using the existing treaties of Amsterdam and Nice.'* (GU – 2.57). However, the framing of a crisis is also used as an opportunity for the EU to have a *'profound debate about its future, adding: "It's time to give ourselves a reality check. To receive the wake-up call.'* (GU – 2.45). This argument is thus used by both supporters and opponents of the EU and is framed as an opportunity for both strengthening and weakening of the EU.

The third argument consists of frames on the connection with, and representation of, citizens and the EU (PR amount: 1,2). It is claimed that the EU mainly consists of increasingly *'longer treaties that meet the preoccupations of the political elites rather than the priorities of its peoples.'* (GU – 2.53). This may be connected to the way that politicians communicate within, and about, the EU; *'they talk of 'the project' making markets more efficient. The 'no' camp does not talk of 'projects'. It taps into the things that matter to people: the urge for security, identity, a sense of belonging. Like it or not, people love their own country more than they love the abstract notion of the European Union.'* (GU – 2.52). Thus, the way that the EU has evolved, and the way it is communicated by politicians, paves the way for anti-European, populist parties, to make a connection with the citizens, and take the electorate with them in their anti-European discourses. To deal with this, the UK government says that *'the EU must change (..) if it is to have any hope of reconnecting with its voters.* (DT – 2.82).

Nationalism: Constitution and other EU policies framed as a threat for national sovereignty and wider perspective on the preferred role of the UK in Europe and the world

The occurrence of the Nationalism frame is different from the three other frames, as it keeps rising after the national elections of 2005, up until 7,3 in 2005-2. After this period, the use declines again. The arguments within the Nationalism frame are mainly used as underlying arguments that express annoyance of Brussels taking power away from the UK. This is mainly done in reference to discussion on the European Constitution within the Soft Euroscepticism frame, which is, thus, the main discussed topic within these episodes. There are two different arguments that are used to understand this annoyance towards Brussels.

The first argument that is predominantly used frames the national position of the UK within the EU and the world (NP amount: 1,8). The claims within this argument are diverse, while all connected to the position of the UK in the EU. In some cases, it is claimed that *'in macro-economic policy (..) there is no doubt that the British model is superior'* (GU – 2.52), compared to other member states. On the other side it is claimed that *'Britain remains one of the most socially divided countries in Europe. (..) This is a record to be ashamed of.* (GU – 2.41). Other claims are more directly referred to the UK's position in Europe: *'Britain is dangerously under-represented in Brussels because it has only one European commissioner and too many of its Euro MPs are hard-line Eurosceptics.'* (DT – 1.20). Other authors claim that *'we need to have a proper overview of what Britain's role in the world should be and lose the myopic obsession with the European Union.'* (DT – 2.75). As such, this argument provides a wider perspective of the discussions within the other frames, as it reflects on the broader role of the UK within the EU and the world system.

The second argument frames on the erosion of national sovereignty due to the EU (NSV amount: 1,7). This argument is related to the European constitution; *'Europe widened its intentions in ways which required an ever-increasing degree of conformity and took from sovereign parliaments some of their powers and prestige. The controversy aroused by this contributed to the rejection of a proposed European constitution by two founder members of the Community.'* (DT – 2.77). In this way, it can be connected to the arguments that are already used within the Soft Euroscepticism and Populism frame on the European Constitution. Also, this argument can be connected to specific policies, for example on the immigration policy, proposed by the EU; *'I do not think that we would see any particular need*

for anything at EU level on this. We have our own citizenship system and that is how it should be.' (GU – 2.42).

(Co)-occurrence of frames

Table 5.5 and graph 5.5 below show the occurrence of the four analysed frames around the General elections of 2005. Three of the four frames show the same pattern; the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism and Populism frame increasingly occur in the period before the elections and decreasing afterwards. This, again, indicates, that critique on the EU, that sometimes implies Populist discourse, is increasingly apparent during the election campaign. The Nationalism frame is also increasingly apparent in the period before the elections, but does, on the contrary, also increase afterwards, and has a positive peak in occurrence during the period 2005-2.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2004-2	31	21	6,8	1	0,3	15	4,8	7	2,3
2005-1	36	56	15,6	14	3,9	32	8,9	21	5,8
2005-2	11	9	8,2	2	1,8	3	2,7	8	7,3
Table 5.5: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around UK3									

Graph 5.5: Occurrence of the frames in UK newspapers around critical moment UK3

Conclusions

The main theme during this critical episode is the European Constitution, more specifically: the rejection of the European Constitution in referenda in France and the Netherlands. Main arguments from the Soft Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame refer to this theme. The Soft Euroscepticism frame predominantly frames scepticism on economic policies, as the EU should solely be an economic union. The Hard Euroscepticism frame mainly frames fundamental opposition which is triggered by the rejection of the European Constitution. Interestingly, the use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame is relatively low during this episode. Most remarkable is the framing of the Populism frame, which claims that the rejection of the Constitution and reaction on this by EU leaders

fuels Euroscepticism and alienation from citizens. Finally, the Nationalism frame emphasises the importance of national sovereignty and the wider role of the UK in the world. Furthermore, it can be concluded that the themes within this period are, thus, like the general election in 2001, not connected to the national elections.

UK4 – European elections 2009: demands for referendum on Lisbon Treaty and fundamental EU opposition

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Total amount of articles
UK4	European Elections	4-6-2009	2009-1	70-72	2009(1) – 2009(2)	36

Soft Euroscepticism: referendum on the Lisbon treaty framed as a membership referendum and scepticism on protection of foreign workers

The main themes that are discussed within the Soft Euroscepticism frame are European economic policies (mainly business policies and worker's protection) and immigration/freedom of movement policies. Furthermore, the British focus on a referendum is still apparent. During this episode there is a demand for a referendum on the Lisbon treaty, but it becomes increasingly visible that what the population actually want is a referendum on the British membership of the EU. The use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame is relatively low in the period before the elections and increasing afterwards. There are two arguments that are used to understand the before-mentioned issues.

The first argument entails frames on (the demands of) a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty (SR amount: 5). After the rejection of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands, a new agreement was made upon; the Lisbon Treaty. However, in several countries, it is claimed that the content of this treaty did not entail enough amendments compared to the Constitution. '*The Irish have already voted no. How can it be that they just keep voting until Brussels has the answer it wants?*' (DT – 2.13). After the referendum in Ireland, in which the Lisbon treaty was rejected, a second referendum was held. '*Nothing in recent constitutional history has been more cynical - or more dangerous - than the fact that referendums voting yes to euro-integration are accepted and those that vote no are rejected.*' (GU – 2.3). Meanwhile, the British government still promises a referendum to the population, which will '*in effect be an in-or-out referendum – and out it would probably be. This is extreme ideological policymaking, commercially and diplomatically disastrous, riskier by far than anything Margaret Thatcher contemplated.*' (GU – 2.15). However, it is claimed that '*the EU has become a vast, bureaucratic, unaccountable empire. It is time we were asked what we think about it.*' (DT – 2.7). As such, the British population still demands a referendum on the EU, where it was earlier on the Euro and the European Constitution, it is now focussed on the Lisbon Treaty, and it becomes increasingly more framed as a referendum on the total membership of the EU.

The second argument that is used frames scepticism on specific EU policies (SP amount: 2,2). These are mainly directed towards European laws on business and employees; '*British business is handicapped by miles of EU red tape (or should that be kilometres?)*' (GU – 2.10). '*The benefits of the single market are compromised by labour laws, says the boss of the advertising powerhouse.*' (DT – 2.9). Furthermore, the interference of Europe in '*the rights of asylum seekers and workers pas proved controversial in Britain.*' As such, this argument frames both economy-related issues and protection of (foreign) workers.

Hard Euroscepticism: fundamental opposition expressed by framing the lack of democracy in general, and in specific processes within the EU

Different from the Soft Euroscepticism frame, the main themes within the Hard Euroscepticism frame are related to the European elections. The most discussed theme is the lack of democracy within the EU, and corresponding fundamental opposition. However, this theme can be combined with the themes within the Soft Euroscepticism frame, as the lack of democracy can be seen as an important reason to demand a referendum on the EU membership. The use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame is relatively high around the European elections of 2009. During the period 2009-2, the occurrence (12,5) is even the highest measured within the analysed period. Before the elections, the use is relatively low, which indicates that the European elections are, in this case, the driver of the frame. After the elections, the occurrence keeps increasing, until its peak in 2009-2. Within this frame, there are two arguments that are predominantly used to understand the discussed themes.

The first argument frames the lack of democracy within the EU (HD amount: 3,9). Claims within this argument are done on the EU, as well as in reference to specific processes in the EU. In the case of general references, the criticism is mainly connected to the fact that politics and the population of the EU are not connected; *'The central problem many of us have with the EU [is]: its democratic deficit. This has, in turn, contributed to a disenchantment with politics and politicians that is unhealthy, playing into the hands of extremists here and elsewhere.* (DT – 2.7). It is also connected to the erosion of powers and responsibilities from national institutions; *'How can we restore purpose to the ballot box when most of our laws come from foreign officials whom we don't elect? How can we decentralise power in Britain while centralising it in Brussels?'* (DT – 2.17). Finally, the process of the election of the first 'European president' is highly criticised within this argument, *'because the process (..) is not only undemocratic, it is being conducted with as much transparency as the pope's selection of a cardinal or the emergence of a new Communist party leader in the old Soviet Union.'* (GU – 2.5).

The second argument frames a more general fundamental scepticism on the EU (HF amount: 2,6). For example, it is claimed that '*the EU is a political construct that has no practical use or benefit.'* (DT – 2.9). The EU is also criticized as an institution that does not tolerate any critique; *'Brussels is like an office of the doctrine of the faith, tolerating no Francis of Assisi. Criticize it and you are damned as anti-European.'* (GU – 2.3).

Populism: framing the elections in a context of increasing Euroscepticism, negative public opinion and a lack of representation of EU citizens

The content of the Populism frame can mainly be related to the European elections, as frames mainly consists of claims on the predictions, and results, of the elections. Furthermore, they indicate that there is an increased amount of Euroscepticism and a greater appearance of anti-European, populist, far-right parties. This increasing Euroscepticism is combined with both public opinion, as well as specific processes within the EU, which is connected to the democracy argument within the Hard Euroscepticism frame. As such, the Populism is the only frame, in this episode, that has a peak in the period during the elections, instead of afterwards. After the elections, the use is decreasing from 15,8 in 2009-1 to 9,2 in 2009-2. There are three arguments that are used to understand the above-mentioned developments, which are overlapping with the earlier elections (UK1, UK2 and UK3).

The first argument frames negative public opinion towards the EU (PO amount: 3,6); *'Britain has turned more anti-European after 12 years of a Labour government, despite Tony Blair promising to put us 'at the heart of Europe' -even- 'leading in Europe'.'* (GU – 2.15). Before the elections, it is also predicted that '*voter confusion, apathy, and anger are likely to cause both a low turnout and a wave of anti-incumbent protest voting that will hit the mainstream parties and benefit extremists on the far right and the hard left.' (*GU – 2.14), will play a significant role during the European elections of 2009. The

results and the turnout indeed show that this happened. While it is stressed that public opinion becomes more negative in the EU as a whole, '*the EU is not as unpopular in other countries as it is in Britain. I don't think European integration has ever been driven by the will of the people… Sceptics are right to say it is driven by elites, but the EU is not built in contradiction to the wishes of the people.'* (DT – 2.12).

The second argument frames anti-European (or other anti-) parties (PA amount: 2,8). This argument is not only used within a British context, but also addresses anti-European parties in other countries, like the PVV in the Netherlands; *'Wilders (leader of the PVV) wants the European parliament abolished, and Bulgaria and Romania kicked out of the EU. The virulence of his anti-Islam and anti-immigrant activities saw him barred from entering Britain this year and the Dutch authorities are prosecuting him for discrimination.'* (GU -2.14).

The third argument frames the representation of citizens within the EU (PR amount: 2,2); *'What started in the 1950s as a six-country grouping bound by reformed trade rules is now accused by many of being an interfering 27-member bureaucracy led by an elite that is out of touch with the wishes of millions of Europeans.'* (DT – 2.12). More specifically, this is combined with processes in which EU representatives (President, Commissioners) are chosen, which is *'a system that heaps power in the hands of officials who are invulnerable to public opinion; a system that gives unelected commissioners a monopoly of the right to initiate legislation; a system that swats aside referendum results when they go the 'wrong way'.'* (GU – 2.1).

Nationalism: protection of national sovereignty and demands for a renegotiated membership of the UK

The main themes that are discussed within the Nationalism frame are the national sovereignty of the UK within the EU and, connected to this, the position of the UK within the EU. During this episode it is demanded that the Prime Minister must renegotiate the position of the UK within the EU. This claim can be used as an argument for a referendum, which is demanded within the Soft Euroscepticism frame, as the PM needs a clear mandate from the population, when re-negotiating the position of the UK. This renegotiation can also be seen as an outcome of all other (Soft and Hard) Euroscepticism arguments, combined with the negative public opinion from the Populism frame, as this might be the specific reaction to increasing Euroscepticism within the UK. In the period before the European elections of 2009, the use of the Nationalism frame is decreasing. However, within the period of the elections (2009-1), the occurrence is rising to 4,2 and to 5,4 in 2009-2. There are two arguments that are predominantly used to understand the themes within this frame.

The first argument is about the erosion of sovereignty due to the EU (NSV amount: 1,9); '*We want to repatriate powers from Brussels, not for the sake of it, but in order to push those powers further down, to local councils or, better yet, to private individuals.'* (DT – 2.17). '*Few people in Britain want to see a re-Balkanised continent. Nor do polls show them wanting more power to shift from national democracies to the institutions of the Union.'* (GU – 2.3). Instead of connected to more general opposition to the EU, the claims within this period are connected to specific policies and laws; *'We can't control our borders because of EU law.'* (GU – 2.10). Finally, the argument is also used within a wider context, as '*the problem is [that] powers are repatriated from London to Beijing. Without recognising that, without having Brussels and the other European capitals on side, London will be marginalised.'* (GU – 2.6)

The second argument is about the position of the UK within the EU and the world system (NP amount: 1,9). During this period, it is demanded that *'David Cameron (the PM) will need to consider a wider renegotiation of Britain's relationship with Brussels and a vote of all the British people will give him the authority for that renegotiation.'* (GU – 2.10). With this vote, a referendum on the Lisbon treaty is

meant, which combines this argument with frames on the referendum within the Soft Euroscepticism frame. *'However, it's unworkable. (..) A renegotiation requires the other 26 to sit down and renegotiate too. They won't. There's agreement in Brussels that the period of treaty-making is, for the moment, over.'* (DT – 2.10). Thus, there is discussion on whether it is useful to have these demands. But, in the end *'the EU exists, and we are members, so we should play and active role to ensure that what we believe is right becomes policy.'* (DT – 2.9).

(Co)-occurrence of frames

All four frames have a peak around the European elections of 2009. But, interestingly, the peak of the Populism frame appears earlier than the peaks of the other frames, as showed in graph 5.6. The occurrence of the Populism frame increases during the run-up to the elections, and in the period of the elections (2009-1). During this period, the highest (relative) occurrence of the whole period of analysis is measured. The Populism frame decreases in occurrence during the period after the election. On the contrary, the three other frames have a peak in the period after the elections (2009-2). Where they are thus increasing in occurrence before, and during, the elections, they are increasing even more after the period of the elections. After 2009-2, the occurrence of all frames is decreasing again.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2009-1	12	11	9,2	10	8,3	19	15,8	5	4,2
2009-2	24	36	15	30	12,5	22	9,2	13	5,4
Table 5.6: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around UK4									

Graph 5.6: Occurrence of the frames in UK newspapers around critical moment UK4

Conclusions

In sum, there are two main themes apparent during this period. The first theme is predominantly covered in the Soft Euroscepticism frame, which frames scepticism on economic and immigration policies. Based on this scepticism a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, which is also framed as a referendum on the EU-membership, is demanded. This is combined with arguments of the Nationalism frame, that demand that the UK must renegotiate its position within the EU, to protect the national sovereignty. After these negotiations, a referendum must take place. The second theme is clearly connected to the European elections, as it entails fundamental opposition to the EU. This theme is covered in both the Hard Euroscepticism frame, that mainly frames the democratic deficit of the EU, and the Populism frame, that combines negative public opinion towards the EU with the high appearance of anti-European parties (UKIP) within the election campaign.

UK5 – General elections 2010: the aftermath of EU elections 2009

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Total amount of articles
UK5	General Elections	6-5-2010	2010-1	72-74	2009(2) – 2010(2)	58

Soft Euroscepticism: demands for an EU-referendum, scepticism because of the Euro-crisis and increasing immigration from Eastern European workers, resistance to new EU budget

The main theme to which the arguments in the Soft Euroscepticism frame refer is the (results of the) European elections of 2009. The use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame declines before the elections and rising afterwards. There are three arguments that are used to understand the before mentioned theme, of which two are overlapping with previous periods.

The first argument frames on the (demands for a) referendum on the Lisbon Treaty (SR amount: 2,4). The discussion on the referendum went on where the discussion in 2009-2 ends; the public, and the opposition, demand a referendum on the EU, as *'Mr Cameron has faced residual Conservative anger over his refusal to hold a British referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.'* (DT – 3.113). It is claimed that *'proposals from Brussels will doubles be dressed up as anything other than triggers for a referendum, just as Lisbon itself was misrepresented by the Labour government to avoid honouring a promise of a poll.'* (DT – 3.128). The discussion continues as *'Cameron is willing to slap down Eurosceptic Tory MPs in the Commons (..) who raised the issue of a referendum on Europe. But Cameron appear unwilling to take on.'* (GU – 3.165).

The second argument frames scepticism on specific EU policies (SP amount: 2,2). The policies on which criticism is expressed are like the policies around UK4; economic policies and immigration policies. As for the economic policies, frames are mainly about the Euro, as '*we need to determine our own interest rate and exchange rate. You see, I'm against the euro for economic reasons.'* (GU – 3.163). Also, the way that the EU deals with Greece, in the aftermath of the Euro-crisis is criticized; *'for ordinary Greeks, out on strike and rioting again yesterday, the aggressive austerity measures are likely to mean years of soul-sapping recession.'* (DT – 3.128). As for the immigration policies, the criticism overlaps with the economic policies; complaints on the fact that the UK does not have control on it anymore; *'Britain can do little to reduce the flow of immigrants from the other 26 EU member states. In the future it will be able to do even less if Bulgaria goes through with its plan to issue 500,000 passports to citizens of non-member countries.'* (DT – 3.114).

The third argument is about the European budget (SB amount: 1,7). This is the first episode in which this argument is predominantly used. During the run-up to the General elections of 2010, the statement that criticized both the scope of the budget and the way that the EU budget is spent; '*I also asked him why British taxpayers had to fund a new sewerage system in Budapest,' says Farage, "that made him angry too."'* (DT – 3.127). Also, David Cameron, who won the elections in the end, claims that he is sceptical on the budget, during a debate he says: '*Am I sceptical that money in Europe is well spent? Yes.'* (DT – 3.113). Others claim that '*instead of spending huge sums on 'communication', the EU should reform its wasteful budget'.* (DT – 3.112). After the elections, the government decides to negotiate again on the European budget, after some winnings, in the end, it is claimed that they lost this, as '*No 10 (the office of the PM) admitted midweek that it could not prevent a modest rise in the budget of about 2,9%, because Britain has no national veto.'* (GU – 3.159).

Hard Euroscepticism: fundamental EU criticism on the democratic deficit within Brussels' bureaucracy and institutions

Like earlier periods, the themes that are mainly discussed within the Hard Euroscepticism frame are the democratic deficit of the EU and opposition to the content and extent of rules and bureaucracy from the EU. All in all, this results to increasing fundamental opposition. However, the use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame is relatively low in the periods 2010-1 and 2010-2, while it is relatively high in 2009-2. This indicates that fundamental opposition mainly sustains among a smaller part of the population. The contents of the arguments of 2009-2 are already discussed in the section on UK4 and entailed general claims of Hard Euroscepticism and criticism on the level of democracy within the EU. The latter argument did not appear anymore in the periods 2010-1 and 2010-2 and was thus mainly an issue directed to the European elections. The argument that predominantly comes to the fore in the periods 2010-1 and 2010-2 frames on the level of bureaucracy and the interference of Brussels in domestic affairs (HB amount: 1,7); '*Until now, Britain has been exempt from EU regulations that forbid the selling of goods by number. But last week MEPs voted to end Britain's deal despite objections from UK members.'* (GU – 3.164). This can also be with the democracy deficit, as it is claimed that Britain's representatives in the EP are not considered enough in this process.

Populism: analyses on the Eurosceptic election results of 2009; increasing negative public opinion and rise of Eurosceptic parties in European Parliament

The themes within the Populism frame are still directed to the European elections of 2009, instead of the UK's general elections of 2010. The main themes are the election results, which show a significant increase of Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament and the negative public opinion towards the EU, which is reflected in the election results. After the European elections of 2009 the use of the Populism frame declines during the period before the national elections of 2010, which means that there appears to be less Euroscepticism framed in a populist way in the newspapers. After the elections, the use increases again. There are two arguments that are used to understand the themes in this episode.

The first argument frames on anti-European parties (PA amount: 2,2). After the European elections, in which Eurosceptical parties won votes and seats across Europe, it is claimed that these parties also have an influence on other, more traditional parties; '*Mainstream leaders such as Berlusconi, the traditional parties in Austria or Holland, and Nicolas Sarkozy in France have blunted the far right by copying policies and rhetoric on immigration, law and order, nationalism, and Euroscepticism'.* (GU – 2.11). Within the periods before the national elections of 2010, UKIP is still apparent in the election campaign; '*Like everyone else in UKIP, I am fed up with the EU and immigration and the two-party politics that dominate Britain.'* (DT – 3.127). The newspaper articles also provide analyses on why these anti-European, anti-establishment parties have risen in recent years; '*there has been a strong anti-authority feeling against all those who have responsibility, who are in charge, in the school, in the*

Church, in the government. They are rather easily discredited [and] easy targets. Europe is a form of authority and Euroscepticism is along those lines.' (DT – 3.126). In this way, it is not the parties itself that frame their positions or their Euroscepticism, but there are predominantly other authors that frame the anti-European parties.

The second argument frames negative public opinion on the EU (PO amount: 1,2). The general sentiment during the run-up for the elections in 2010 is that *'British politicians must win over a sceptical public about the European Union.'* (DT – 3.126). One author complaints on left-wing Guardian readers, and their indifference towards the EU; *'I've often wondered why Guardian readers don't get more agitated about Euro-elitism. The proudest boast of the British left, down the ages, was that it took power away from a remote caste and dispersed it more widely.* (GU – 2.1). However, this argument was mainly apparent during the aftermath of the EU elections in 2009 and is thus already discussed in the section on UK4.

Nationalism: general elections; discussion on views of the UK's position within the EU, and it's relationship with the USA

The main themes discussed within this episode are the different positions of British political parties towards the sovereignty of the UK in the EU, which is thus related to the general elections of 2010. Another important theme is the relationship of the UK with the USA, which leads to questions on whether the UK should focus on the EU or on the USA, or on both. The use of the Nationalism frame is relatively low before, as well as during and after the national elections of 2010. The two arguments, however, do overlap with earlier periods. Like the Hard Euroscepticism and Populism frame, most of the arguments refer to the results of the EU elections and are thus already discussed in the section on UK4. Therefore, this section mainly describes the content of the arguments during 2010-1 and 2010-2.

The first is about the erosion of sovereignty due to the EU (NSV amount: 1,5). It is solely used during a debate on the national elections, where *'Mr Cameron tried to assuage that anger [on his position to the EU] by describing himself as a 'Eurosceptic'. He said: 'Am I sceptical about granting more powers to the EU? Yes.''* (DT – 3.113). However, Cameron also has criticism on his opponents by stating; *'What you're hearing from the other two is frankly don't trust Britain, don't trust the people when you pass powers from Westminster to Brussels. Just give into everything that comes out of Brussels and don't stand up for your country'.* (GU – 3.170). As such, he claims that his Eurosceptical opponents will achieve the opposite of what they claim they will achieve.

The second argument is about the national position of the UK (NP amount: 1,4). This argument is, for example, used by Mr van Rompuy, the president of the European Council who is '*not for criticising any British government (..) because the fact is they have approved the Maastricht treaty, the Amsterdam treaty, the Nice treat, and the Lisbon treaty. (..) Europeans cannot complain, British governments are working with us for Europe as we know it today. (..) they approved the main treaties of the EU and they comply with European directives as well.* (DT – 3.126). This claim thus mainly entails how others frame the position of the UK. There is also discussion on how to view their own role, as, for example, William Hague, *'believes that Washington is a far more reliable guarantor of our national security than Brussels.'* (DT – 3.120). The discussion is thus not only on how the UK should position itself regarding the EU, but also to the USA.

(Co)-occurrence of frames

Graph 5.7 shows that the occurrence of all frames is decreasing before the elections of 2010. A possible explanation for this is that the elections were held close to the European elections of 2009; the period

in which most of the frames have a peak in occurrence (2009-2), is overlapping with UK5. Therefore, also the content of the frames overlaps with the content of the frames around UK4. The decrease of the frames thus indicates that the EU was less an issue in the national elections of 2010, than during the European elections of 2009. After the national elections, the occurrence of all frames is increasing again.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2009-2	24	36	15	30	12,5	22	9,2	13	5,4
2010-1	20	17	8,5	5	2,5	6	3	7	3,5
2010-2	14	16	11,4	5	3,6	7	5	5	3,6
Table 5.7: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around UK5									

Graph 5.7: Occurrence of the frames in UK newspapers around critical moment UK5

Conclusions

The main covered theme within this critical episode is the results (and aftermath) of the European Elections of 2009. This means that Eurosceptic framing is not directly connected to the national (general) elections of 2010 in the UK. The only connection can be found in the Nationalism frame, in which national politicians express their views on the UK's position within the EU and the world, during the election campaign. In the Soft Euroscepticism frame, the results of the elections of 2009 are combined with scepticism on economic and immigration policies. In fact, the Eurosceptic results of the elections are used to strengthen already apparent scepticism on these European policies. In the Hard Euroscepticism frame, the election results are combined with fundamental scepticism on the democratic deficit and bureaucracy in the EU. The arguments from the Populism frame are important on their own, as well as in combination with Soft and Hard Euroscepticism arguments; as these arguments combine the negative public opinion, as expressed in the elections, and the uprising of Eurosceptic parties to specific elements of the EU or scepticism towards the EU.

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Total amount of articles
UK6	European Elections	22-5-2014	2014-1	80-82	2013(2) – 2014(2)	109 (93 analysed)

Soft Euroscepticism: promise of a referendum on EU-membership, increasing scepticism towards the austerity policies and the Euro, and towards internal immigration/freedom of movement policies

The main themes within the Soft Euroscepticism frame are the Euro-crisis and the migrant/refugee crisis. The context of these themes changed, as Prime Minister Cameron has won the general elections of 2010 and the UK finally gets the promise of a referendum on the EU membership, after the Prime Minister would have renegotiated the UK's position. This might be one of the explanations for the increasing scope and use of Soft Eurosceptic arguments. The use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame is relatively high before and during the European elections of 2014 and is increasing after the elections. There are two arguments that are predominantly used to understand the themes.

The first argument frames on the coming referendum on EU-membership (SR amount: 3,7). During this period, there are many claims on the fact that '*there should be a referendum on whether Britain stays or leaves.*' (GU – 3.65), as in earlier periods. However, finally, within this period '*David Cameron has said he wants to renegotiate Britain's membership of the EU and put the new deal to voters in a referendum when he would campaign for Britain to stay in the union.* (DT – 3.33). So, firstly, Cameron promises that he will renegotiate a new deal for the UK with the EU, and afterwards, whether this deal will succeed or not, submit this deal to the population in the shape of a referendum on the EU membership. However, this decision might be a large risk, as also '*Cameron realises that his country really will choose to leave the EU if its flaws can't be fixed.*' (DT – 3.8). Among the claims within this argument, the majority agrees that the population is sceptical on major parts of the current EU, and the corresponding responsibilities of the UK.

The second argument frames scepticism on specific EU policies (SP amount: 2,2). These policies are referred to both the Euro-crisis and the migrant/refugee crisis. As for the economic policies, the way the EU dealt with the Euro-crisis is criticized; '*The fundamental mistake (..) was the perverse decision to force the countries of southern Europe to pay the price for errors made mainly by northern European bankers.*' (DT – 3.22). In earlier periods '*the Common Agricultural Policy used to be the most egregious of these [policies]. But now it must yield to something even more awful: the euro. This is simply the best possible example of bad decision making in the EU.* (DT – 3.19). As for the immigration policies, '*the founders of the EU never envisaged that so many people would move from poor countries to wealthier ones, so Mr Cameron is right to explore whether other states think the rules need to be revised.* (DT – 3.32). One of the main criticisms is that the UK does not want to offer their social domestic policies to other European workers, as they are benefitting too much from the system, however '*the prime minister's call to deprive Europeans in low-paid jobs in Britain of income support for four years is illegal under EU law and in breach of the central EU provision guaranteeing free movement of labour in the union*' (GU – 3.4), and therefore this grew to one of the main clashes for the renegotiations of the UK's membership.

Like the Soft Euroscepticism frame, the arguments within the Hard Euroscepticism frame refer to the Euro-crisis and the migrant/refugee crisis. Additionally, these themes are referred to the European elections. There are three arguments that are predominantly used to understand the themes discussed in this episode.

The first argument frames general fundamental opposition towards the EU (HF amount: 2,8) and is mainly expressed by anti-European parties, who *'just want to shut the whole thing down (but ideally keep the money and the prestige that comes with the job)'* (GU – 3.57). They also state that they '*want to liberate Europe from the monster of Brussels'* (DT – 3.34), that, *'European technocrats must disappear; the European Soviet Union must collapse.' (*DT – 3.30). As for the criticism in the UK, it is mainly UKIP and Farage (UKIP's leader), who express fundamental opposition. For example, during a debate, Farage claims that *'if Britain was voting now on whether to join the EU, it would be presented with the offer "to join a club that will cost £55m a day as a membership fee, and there will be thousands of new laws over which our own parliament and you the electorate can make no difference, and mean an open border, unconditionally, to 485 million people from across the whole of Europe - many of them from very poor countries - who can come here to work and live and settle and bring their families"* (GU – 3.46). By making this statement, he combines several other arguments, like criticism on specific policies (economy and immigration) from the Soft Euroscepticism frame, and the representation argument from the Populism frame. After the European elections, Marine le Pen in France claims that '*tonight is a massive rejection of the EU. What is happening in France prefigures what will happen in all European countries, the return of the nation.* (DT – 3.13). This argument is also used after the promise of a referendum has been done; the *'European Union is failing. Whether we are in our out scarcely seems to matter anymore. In imagining it does, many of our leading businesses and politicians are woefully behind the curve. Something will eventually emerge from the wreckage. But whatever it is, it won't be the status quo* (GU – 3.55)*.*

The second argument frames scepticism on the amount of democracy within the EU (HD amount: 1,1). This argument is used in a general context, as well as about specific processes. In the regular sense, it is, for example, claimed that; *'the sense has lingered that we were hustled, against our will, by an antidemocratic elite, into an organisation whose true aims and nature were hidden from us until too late'.* (DT – 3.43). Also, it is claimed that Spain and Portugal *'seem happy to exchange the formal apparatus of dictatorship for the European Union's emerging antidemocratic system.'* (DT – 3.22). In case of more specific use of this argument, this is mainly referred to the way in which the president of the European Commission is chosen, like the use of the argument around the European elections of 2009; '*the reason given is that Juncker [the new EC president] is a representative of all that is wrong with the EU – and that is certainly true. He believes in doing deals in darkened rooms, away from public scrutiny.'* (DT – 3.9). Also, the way that the EU has dealt with the Euro-crisis is criticized with help from this argument; *'the 'masking' extends above all to the handling of the euro emergency and the triumph of technocracy over democracy in four years of crisis management.'* (GU – 3.34). Like the first argument, this argument can be connected to several other arguments and frames. For example, the argument of the Soft Euroscepticism frame that criticizes the economic policies (see the last quote), and the arguments of the Populist frame that express the lack of representation of citizens and the combination of different anti-views, like anti-European and anti-establishment.

The third argument frames on the clashes between different ideologies on the EU (HI amount: 1,1). Words like 'ever-deeper integration', 'federalism' and 'United States of Europe' are highly apparent during this episode and fit within this argument. As being said by one former EU diplomat; *'We defended ever-deeper integration and ever-wider federalism; a uniform, homogenous Europe, devoid of identities. Is that really what the people of Europe want? I don't think so. And I think they're waking*

up to it. This is a big moment.' (GU – 3.40). During the run-up to the elections, this argument is used to explain positions on the EU; *'Marine Le Pen criticised the EU as a 'global anomaly' and pledged to return the bloc to a 'cooperation of sovereign states''.* (DT – 3.38). Nigel Farage (leader of UKIP) states that; *'For people in power in Brussels (..) a United States of Europe is the only choice on offer – no reform. (..) On May 22 the British people must ask themselves if they want this and vote accordingly.'*

The arguments of the Hard Euroscepticism frame have a significant overlap with arguments from the Soft Euroscepticism frame (integration, economic and immigration policies) and the Populism frame (representation, anti-EU parties). Therefore, the high use of this frame, compared to the Soft Euroscepticism frame, can be explained by the fact that Hard Eurosceptic arguments and Soft Eurosceptic arguments are combined with Populism arguments, to create more urgency, and a more populist language on the EU, which might also explain the high use of the Populism frame.

Populism: increasing Euroscepticism expressed by the victory of anti-EU parties in 2014, explained by Eurosceptic communication and campaigning strategies

The content of the Populism frame during this episode can evidently be connected to the European elections of 2014, which is thus the most discussed theme. In fact, Populist arguments are combined to Soft and Hard Eurosceptic argument and provide the combination of the European elections and the main themes in these frames; the Euro-crisis and the migrant/refugee crisis. These elections are the elections in which the Populism frame has the highest use during the whole period of analysis. The rise of the Populism frame already starts during the period 2013-2 (occurrence: 19,3) and has its peak in the period of the elections, 2014-1 (occurrence: 21,8). After the elections, the use declines, while remaining relatively high. There are four arguments within the Populism frame that are used to understand the campaign and results of the European elections of 2014.

The first, and most often used, argument frames on anti-European parties (PA amount: 6,8), which are mainly framed in combination with anti-immigration, anti-establishment, and far-right and populist parties. Before the elections, this argument appears both in a European context, as well as in a domestic context. Starting with the European context, it is claimed that *'the election could saddle the Parliament with its biggest ever bloc of MEPs who have, to varying degree, anti-EU or anti-euro leanings'* (GU – 3.55). And, the parties are not only anti-European, as *'the danger for the big parties next month – not just here (in the UK), but across Europe – is of an anti-Establishment backlash that principally benefits groups defining themselves against the members of the political class.'* (DT – 3.24). From this perspective *'some observers predict the collapse of the EU itself, and even a new dark age of renewed competing European nationalisms'* (GU – 3.54). As for the domestic context, this argument mainly entails the UKIP party and its leader Farage, on whom is said that '*Farage isn't racist, but his party is very attractive to a racist agenda.* (DT – 3.39). *'The party (UKIP) is practicing what is in effect a form of 'Euracism'. They are deploying the same language and tactics used by openly racist parties like the BNP, but instead of targeting migrants from Africa and Asia they are targeting migrants from within the EU.'* (GU – 3.39). Next to racist characteristics, there are other characteristics that are mentioned about the party, for example the fact that '*much of Ukip's success stems from disillusionment of traditional working-class voters, who feel abandoned by the big parties, and by a modern world that is fast moving in the wrong direction.* (DT – 3.17). As such, UKIP is offering an alternative for the increasingly globalized world. Next to influence on voters, the positions of UKIP also have an influence on other political parties, as *'I have real concerns that Ukip-style isolationism is now abroad in the Tory backbenches, a kind of anti-Europe, anti-immigration [and] anti-foreign aid'* (GU – 3.60). After the elections, in which UKIP becomes the biggest party from the UK in the European Parliament, together with a significant victory of other anti-European parties, Farage states that *'Until now the European project has always had the appearance of inevitability. Tonight's results completely reverse that.'* (DT – 3.13). On the contrary, it is also said that *'they (UKIP) always do well in Euro elections because they're the obvious party of protest, but the idea that they're going to come from nothing to be holding the*

balance of power is ridiculous. I don't expect them to get any seats.' (GU – 3.26). According to another author '*UKIP [is] anti-everything: they're anti-foreigner, they're anti-Europe, they're anti-politics, anti-I haven't found out what they are for. But by goodness, we know what they're against. In a world looking for hope, a negative body like that is not somewhere to put your vote, your hope or your trust. We have to take on that argument.'* (GU – 3.6).

The second argument is also connected to the anti-European votes before, and during the elections, and frames on general negative public opinion on the EU (PO amount: 4,7). Before the elections, there are a significant number of articles that pay attention to the rising of anti-EU parties (which is discussed in the first argument). This argument makes a connection with the voting population. Doing this, it is claimed that the European elections of 2014 '*could mark a historic moment of social and political upheaval, as the subject voters of Europe challenge the political colonialism of the centre. And there are scattered signs that nationalist parties determined to smash the EU system may indeed achieve some substantial successes.'* (DT – 3.22). It is also explained that '*Ukip does well not because people are bothered about Europe per se, but because Nigel Farage can correctly say that if the UK left the EU it could take back control of immigration*.' (GU – 3.51). This is also claimed after the elections; '*It was apathy rather than passionate opposition to the European Union that characterised an election in which so few voted.'* (GU – 3.28). This apathy might have grown because of the positions and issues that are brought forward by anti-European parties, for example like the Soft Euroscepticism arguments on immigration and economic policies or Hard Euroscepticism arguments on the level of democracy within the EU. Though the turnout of the elections was relatively low, most of the authors believe that it is impossible for European and British politicians to ignore the results. For example, '*Theresa May, the Home Secretary, said the Conservatives must now 'respond to the genuine concerns' of Ukip voters.'* (DT – 3.15). And '*the established pro-European parties are going to have to start listening. This has to be seen as a signal that for a lot of people in Europe, the European Union has gone far enough in this direction'* (GU – 3.40), '*to ignore or defy that revolt would be suicidal.'* (GU – 3.30).

The third argument frames that the population that voted on an anti-EU party has voted emotive instead of well-informed and rational (PI amount: 2,3). This corresponds with the strategy of '*fanatics on the right [who] would have us believe tens of millions of criminally minded beggars are about to fill our streets and steal our benefits. Only by breaking the law or ending our relationship with the EU, they claim, can Britain fend off the threatening hordes.'* (GU – 3.49). It is claimed that '*Nigel Farage has a few, very simple propositions that are understandably very attractive when many people are fearful and anxious about what is going on in the modern world. He says we don't need to get entangled with problems elsewhere in the world, we don't need to allow any immigrants to come to this country, we can do everything on our own, we can disentangle ourselves from Europe.'* (GU- 3.44). Thus, this strategy appeals to the general concerns of 'normal' citizens, about wider developments on globalisation, and combines these concerns to certain policies or aspects of the EU (as described in the argument in the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame), which in the end results in an apathy towards the EU among voters; '*It is, of course, people's sense of helplessness at what they see as an uncontrollable and unaccountable global economy that creates the conditions for nationalist movements'* (GU – 3.14), that spread anti-EU discourses. However, in communication, this is also applied the other way around, as '*anyone who starts (..) with stoking fears towards Europe, quickly moves towards stoking fears of immigrants.'* (DT – 3.41). Furthermore, these general concerns are combined with a significant level of mistrust in the (European) political system; '*the temper of the union is one of sullen anger and frustration with a mainstream political class seen as detached and remote, incompetent and venal, and often illegitimate*' (GU – 3.34) and '*there were a lot of reasons why people voted for Ukip; 'There is a great deal of anger about the political system, a great deal of anger about the metropolitan elite that they see running political parties'.* (DT – 3.15).

The fourth argument frames that the EU is in a state of crisis (PC amount: 2). This argument is used in two ways. The first way is mainly used before the elections, and states that Europe is finding itself in a

crisis, because of several threats it is facing. For example; *'The Eurozone debt crisis is still deepening and threatens to re-erupt on a larger scale when the liquidity cycle turns.'* (DT – 3.25) and *'Economically and politically, Europe is sinking fast, and it seems powerless to save itself. Our island nation cannot indefinitely escape these destructive dynamics.'* (DT 3.1). The appearance of these claims in newspapers before the elections, might lead to a strengthening of the concerns, angers, fears and mistrust that are mentioned in the latter argument. The second way in which this argument is used deals with prediction on a possible victory for anti-EU parties in the elections, which *'would be the start of a 'very negative' trend that could have a potentially devastating impact on the continent's potential for growth'.* (GU – 3.55). It is also framed as '*the most serious threat in its history*'. (GU – 3.53).

Nationalism: renegotiation of UK's EU membership with a focus on regaining national sovereignty and immigration and freedom of movement policies

The main themes discussed within the Nationalism frame are both the Euro-crisis and the migrant/refugee crisis, and the European elections of 2014. The Nationalism frame, however, shifts the focus increasingly towards the influence of these themes on the national sovereignty and the national position of the UK. It is claimed that the government feels the pressure, rising from the victory of UKIP in the elections, to stand up for the UK's position and to express more scepticism towards the EU, to take the sentiments in the society into consideration. Furthermore, another important theme is national sovereignty, which shows a significant overlap with the policy argument of the Soft Euroscepticism frame, that focusses on the immigration and freedom of movement policies. It is claimed that the UK (together with other member states) does not have the ability anymore to control its own borders. This might lead to a combination with the argument that focusses on the concerns and angers of the population within the Populism frame, as this inability to control borders may lead to communications on 'endless streams of immigrants' that enter EU countries. The use of the Nationalism frame is relatively high compared to other critical moments. However, when compared to the use of the other frames, mainly the Populism frame, its use is relatively low. During the run-up to the EU elections, the use is decreasing, while it increases afterwards. This might imply that Populist arguments (which decreases afterwards) are replaced by Nationalist arguments during the run-up to the national elections in 2015. There are two arguments that are predominantly used to understand the discussed theme during this episode.

The first argument frames on the national position of the UK within the EU (NP amount: 2,6). The focus of this argument is mainly on David Cameron and his preparations and communications on the coming renegotiations of the UK's membership of the EU. There are two elements that appear in this argument. The first is a focus on the process; after the negotiations, *'Mr Cameron will (..) return to Britain, claiming that he has secured a historic victory, reshaped the British relationship with Brussels, on which basis he is happy to lead the Yes campaign in a referendum.'* (DT – 3.43). While the negotiations and demands of the UK will become very complex and hard, *'they are listened to – at least by those European leaders who recognise that it is not in their interests for the UK to leave the U. As Mr Cameron plans the renegotiations, he can therefore take heart that – though the going may be tough, and the resistance from Brussels relentless – the fundamental and far-reaching reform that Europe so badly needs is not beyond our grasp.'* (DT – 3.10). Thus, by renegotiating the membership, it is thought that the UK can reach fundamental reforms within the EU, one of them will be immigration and free movement of people, which is the second element on which this argument focusses. Cameron states '*I will go to Brussels, I will not take no for an answer … when it comes to free movement*' (GU – 3.12). This focus on immigration and freedom of movement is explained because of the victory of UKIP, as Cameron and his party are '*under pressure from UKIP to bolster their anti-EU credentials*', as such, they are *'embroiled in fights with Brussels and other EU capitals over freedom of movement and immigration within the EU'* (GU – 3.10).

The second argument frames on the erosion of sovereignty due to the EU (NSV amount: 2,2). The claims within this argument mainly entails comparisons with other countries, in which this frame is used; *'She (Marine Le Pen) said the people of Europe had 'no control' over their economy or currency, nor over the movement of people in their territory.'* (DT – 3.38) and *they (Front National in France) share our point of view on the European Union and immigration: everyone must control his borders.* (DT – 3.30). There is also overlap with the German AFD (Alternative für Deutschland) part that states; *'We think the commission is pulling more and more rights to Brussels. We think it's wrong that there are subjects – Europe, immigration controls, national responsibility – that cannot be discussed in Germany, because it is not acceptable.'* (GU – 3.40). These statements can also be found in a British context; *'British politics is visibly dwindling, as decisions are anaesthetically taken in Brussels. (..) As we have seen in the immigration debate, the British people are suddenly furious to find that fundamental questions are no longer controlled by the people they elect.'* (DT – 3.9).

(Co)-occurrence of frames

Looking at table 5.8 and graph 5.8 below, shows some interesting insights. While the Soft Euroscepticism frames appears to be relative high during the whole period around the European elections, the Hard Euroscepticism frame is, during period 2014-1 as high as the Soft Euroscepticism period, which might indicate more radical expressions of opposition to the EU during the run-up of the elections. This can be combined to an increased occurrence of the Populism frame in the same period. Interestingly, the Nationalism frame is decreasing in the same period, while rising in the period after the elections, during which it's occurrence is almost as high as the Soft Euroscepticism frame. After the elections, the occurrence of the Populism frame, as well as the Hard Euroscepticism frame, is decreasing.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2013-2	30	31	10,3	16	5,3	58	19,3	20	6,7
2014-1	40	41	10,3	41	10,3	87	21,8	17	4,3
2014-2	23	28	12,2	7	3	17	7,4	27	11,7
Table 5.8: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around UK6									

Graph 5.8: Occurrence of the frames in UK newspapers around critical moment UK6

Conclusions

There are two themes that predominantly appear within this period. The first theme is immigration, which includes both inter-European migration and the freedom of movement policies (of Eastern

European workers) and immigration from outside the EU. Within the Soft Euroscepticism frame, this theme is mainly framed as a policy problem, and thus specific parts of the policies, like the benefits system for Eastern European migrants in the UK, is criticized. Within the Hard Euroscepticism frame, immigration is framed to make clear that there is too much political integration within the EU, which connects immigration to general fundamental opposition to the EU. Within the Populism frame, immigration is framed as a topic which causes concerns; fear and anger, among the British population, and thus uses mainly emotional claims. Within the Nationalism frame, immigration is framed by making clear that sovereign nation states are not able to control their own borders, and that the EU is, thus, taking national sovereignty away from member states. This theme seems to have no clear connections with the European elections, but rather with other events that are happening during that period, like the increasing amount of migrants that cross the Mediterranean Sea, trying to find their ways into Europe.

The second theme refers to the high amount of Euroscepticism around the European elections of 2014 and is mainly used within the Hard Euroscepticism and Populism frame. Within both frames, mainly emotional arguments are framed to convince the electorate of voting on anti-EU and anti-establishment parties during the elections of 2014. Within the Hard Euroscepticism frame, arguments frame the democratic deficit and the threat of an 'ever closer union'. Within the Populist frame, arguments from both the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame are combined with frames on anti-EU parties in a campaigning strategy that stress the concerns of the population. As such, it can be concluded that, while the first theme seems to be connected to other events, the second theme directly refers to events before and after the European elections of 2014.

UK7 – General elections 2015: start of the Brexit campaign

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Total amount of articles
UK7	General Elections	7-5-2015	2015-1	82-84	2014(2) – 2015(2)	114 (83 analysed)

Soft Euroscepticism: the referendum used in the election campaign, criticism on immigration and economic policies combined with criticism on the way of cooperation and criticism on Germany

With the coming 'Brexit' referendum as the main theme in all frames, the amount of arguments on which the Soft Euroscepticism frame focusses is expanding. On the one side, earlier scepticism on, mainly austerity policies and the Euro, and immigration and freedom of movement policies is now combined to the UK's EU membership. On the other side, new themes come to the fore, which accompany these arguments; it is, for example, increasingly claimed that the EU is not able to cooperate successfully and there is increasing criticism to Germany, which is seen as the driver of the strict austerity policies. The use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame is relatively high in the period before, during, and after the elections, while having a peak in period 2015-1, in which the elections take place. There are four arguments that are predominantly used to understand the themes discussed during this episode.

The first argument frames the content and context of the Brexit referendum (SR amount: 4,7). David Cameron promised the population that he would call for a referendum on the UK membership as he won the elections; *'The promise to hold a referendum on Britain's membership of the EU has been a modest success. It has not suffocated Ukip, nor even stopped Tory MPs defecting to Nigel Farage's side. But it has comforted others with the illusion of agreeing on something about which they disagree. The*

vote may one day rip the Conservative party in half, but on the question of whether that day should come they are strangely united.' (DT – 4.86). However, not everybody agrees with the promise of a referendum, as Tony Blair (former PM) says; *'the British public cannot be trusted to make the 'reasonable and sensible' choice in a European referendum (..). David Cameron will 'let the genie out of the bottle' with his plans to hold a referendum and (..) putting it back in will be a 'Herculean task'.'* (DT – 4.86). After the elections, which was won by the Conservative party of David Cameron, it was claimed that *'Cameron will soon legislate for an EU referendum and Downing Street is considering a polling date in 2016, a year ahead of the deadline set in the Tory manifesto.'* (GU – 4.94). And soon after this a situation emerged in which all political parties are *'jockey[ing] for position in the run-up to the proposed referendum on EU membership.'* (DT – 4.83). As such, the referendum has played a major role during the election campaign, as the winner of the elections promised to hold this referendum if he would win.

The second argument frames scepticism towards specific EU policies (SP amount: 3), which is like earlier periods. There are two main areas that are criticized within this argument; first the Euro and the way that the EU dealt with the Euro-crisis, second the immigration and freedom of movement policies of the EU and the corresponding rights for foreign workers. As for the Euro; *'the fate of the euro dramatically contradicts the fantasy that one size fits all. Trying to operate one currency to satisfy the needs of 19 countries of varying size, wealth and political dynamics was always going to be a near-impossible task.'* (DT – 4.95). After the Euro-crisis the EU has a focus on austerity, which required, among others, a strong budgetary discipline. However, *'through imposing on Europe a German-type austerity programme, she has caused the immiseration of the European peoples which has undermined their confidence in their governments and the European project'.* (GU – 4.104). *'In the eurozone, austerity really is harsh: the needs of big banks and central banks are breaking the working people of the poorer member states, most notably Greece.'* (DT – 4.79). As for the immigration and freedom of movement policies, it is claimed that *'[these are] key demands for Cameron, with the government looking for a way to legally curb the benefits and welfare payments available to EU citizens who come to Britain.'* (GU – 4.92). *'The highest hurdle to clear for a deal is Cameron's insistence that migrants from EU countries wait four years before gaining access to in-work benefits. This potentially discriminates against non-British workers and so picks away at a fundamental tenet of free labour movement, enshrined in treaties other governments have no desire to rewrite'.* (GU – 4.62).

The third argument frames on the lack of (sufficient) cooperation between EU-member states (SLC: 1,7). It said that EU policies or agreements are designed in such a way that they can never meet the interests of all member states, for example the Euro; *'its problem has always been that what has suited one part of the eurozone has not suited the needs of another.'* (DT – 4.95). Also, it is claimed that *'twenty-five years after the Single European Act, the other founding freedoms are not fully honoured by the EU. Not one of them. If freedom of movement is immutable, when will member states complete the single market?'* (GU – 3.6). In fact, this is a claim on the incoherence of the EU's policies, and the way in which it is (not) implanted in several member states. Finally, this argument entails criticism on the way that decisions are made among member states, and the lack of agreement on, for example reforms; *'there is not a leader in the EU who does not urge reform of the union. The trouble is they all mean different things when they declaim the r-word.'* (GU – 4.92). There is also disagreement on the regulations, as *'more EU member states are picking and choosing which regulations they should or should not follow. Germany's complete disregard for the "Dublin rules", which require all refugees to be registered at the first EU country they reach, or Hungary's disregard for the Schengen Agreement by building physical barriers at its border with Croatia, are two examples. Rather than renegotiating Britain's position, we should just draw up a list of which EU laws we will follow and which we will not.'* (DT – 4.74).

The fourth argument frames criticism on specific member states of the EU (SM amount: 1,4). These criticisms are mainly directed towards Germany, and its role in the implementation of the austerity measures; *'Those - and they are many - who see Germany as responsible for the economic austerity measures that have fuelled Euroscepticism and the rise of radical parties will emphasise the irony of Germany scrambling to fix problems that have come about because of its own policies.'* (GU – 4.106). *'The EU is run by the "big battalions" and one in particular - Germany. The euro, a currency union without a debt union which is pursuing unpopular austerity policies, is run largely to suit the interests of Germany*.' (DT – 3.6). Also, this argument consists of claims of other European leaders that are criticizing the UK for holding a membership referendum; *'Sources close to the Merkel point out that her message to David Cameron has been a strong warning, along the lines of "don't play games with European politics*" (GU – 4.106), and *'Emmanuel Macron, the French economy minister, told the BBC that the UK could not be allowed a "Europe a la carte" - a phrase used by those sceptical about Cameron's efforts to negotiate a new deal for the UK.'* (GU – 4.86).

Hard Euroscepticism: general fundamental opposition to the EU, fuelled by the promise of a referendum, and expressing the need to reform the current EU and different ideologies on the EU

This use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame is fuelled by the promise of a referendum on EU-membership by Cameron, which is the main theme within this frame. While the use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame is relatively low around the elections of 2015, there are three arguments used to understand the Brexit referendum.

The first argument frames on fundamental opposition to the EU (HF amount: 0,8). Within this argument it is claimed that *'it is not Britain's quarrels with Brussels that are the real danger to business, but Europe's growing economic and political malaise.'* (DT – 3.1). Also, it is being stated that *''what's true of the eurozone is also true of the wider European Union, where privatisation, deregulation and lack of democratic accountability have been built into successive treaties.'* (GU – 4.88). The general opposition is combined to the anti-argument in the Populism frame, which frames on Eurosceptic parties, the cooperation argument from the Soft Euroscepticism frame, which implies that there are fundamental differences in perspectives and ideologies on the EU, and the argument that expresses the urgency to fundamentally reform the EU, which can be connected to the referendum, as this is seen as a way to reform the EU.

The second argument frames on the clashes of ideologies about the EU (HI amount: 0,7). Within this argument, it is claimed that *'Europe pretends to be a single nation but is incapable of acting like one. That this tragedy is in part caused by the enforced march to federalism is beside the point.'* (DT – 3.1). From the perspective of the UK, it is said that '*We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels'* (DT – 4.93). Therefore, *'he (David Cameron) wants the excision from the treaty, or at least the UK's exemption from, of the stipulation that the EU's aim is "ever closer union" - a federalist manifesto to Eurosceptics'* (GU – 4.92).

The third argument that is used frames opposition to the EU in its current form, combined with an urgency to change this fundamentally (HC amount: 0,6); *'these include reforms to the freedom of movement and placing subsidiarity - defined by Major as the principle that the EU should act only where a nation state cannot - on a new legal footing.' (GU – 3.6).* Also, this argument is used in reference to the Soft Euroscepticism argument on the referendum, as it is being stated that '*voters in Britain will next year be offered the choice of a yet more corporate-controlled EU, shorn of social protections - or withdrawal on the terms of the nationalist right. In the interests of both Britain and Europe, that needs to change, and quickly.* (GU – 4.88).

Populism: Connections between the Eurosceptic results of the European elections of 2014 and predictions on the public vote on the UK's EU membership referendum

There are two main events that are discussed within the Populism frame; the results of the European elections of 2014, and predictions on the EU-membership referendum. While highly apparent during the European elections of 2014, the use of the Populism frames decreases significantly after these elections. However, during the run-up to the national elections of 2015, this decrease stops at a relative amount of 7,7 in the period 2015-1. After the elections, the use starts decreasing again. There are two arguments that predominantly used to understand the results of the EU elections and to predict the outcomes of the referendum.

The first argument frames on anti-European parties (PA amount: 2,8). The content of this argument overlaps with the contents during the period after the EU elections (2014-2). The results of the European elections are translated to national elections, as *'the May 2014 European parliamentary elections were the first sign of a European Union-wide drive towards a populism which is now taking root in domestic politics across the member states, and 2015 will be a year of many general elections in the EU.'* (GU – 4.110). In the UK, indeed, '*the populist anti-European right, in the form of the UK independence party (UKIP), has evolved under the skilful leadership of Nigel Farage from a ragbag collection of misfits, eccentrics and renegades into a real party. It is one whose proven ability to win protest votes at four-yearly elections to the 28-nation European parliament is now threatening the status quo at Westminster'*. (GU – 4.100). However, it is also claimed that Euroscepticism, as expressed by anti-European parties is not aimed at criticism to the EU alone; *'the shocking truth is that swathes of the continent are increasingly in the grip of the wrong kind of Euroscepticism: rabidly populist, anti-capitalist, anti-business and often horrifyingly authoritarian and xenophobic.'* (DT – 4.93).

The second argument frames on existing negative public opinion on the EU (PO amount: 1,7). The general attitude within the public realm is, for example, described as '*Anti-Europe and anti-human rights, Britain is toying with the politics of poison.*' (DT – 3.3). Also, this periods already contains predictions on the results of the EU-membership referendum; the polls *'have habitually shown the no vote ahead, sometimes by as much as 2:1.'* (GU – 4.92). Public opinion is also compared to other member states, for example in Denmark, after a referendum on the op-out on home and justice matters, in which '*an exit poll by state broadcasters DR put the No vote on 53.3 per cent and Yes on 46.7 per cent. The No vote, if confirmed, will be a worrying reminder to David Cameron of the risk he is taking in putting the UK's membership of the EU to a similar referendum vote.*' (GU – 3.8).

Nationalism: the renegotiations between the EU and the UK and the following referendum; emphasis on regaining national sovereignty from the EU and an favourable position of the UK within or without the EU

The main theme within the Nationalism frame is the Brexit referendum and the renegotiations with the EU, that are planned before the referendum. The content of the arguments is already connected to the coming negotiations and referendum, instead of the elections of 2015. After the European elections in 2014, the use of the Nationalism frame is rising. In 2014-2, the use is relatively high; 11,7. After this period, which is the period of the national elections of 2015 and the period afterwards, the use of the Nationalism frame decreases gradually. There are two arguments predominantly used within this frame, to understand the renegotiations with the EU and the following Brexit referendum.

The first argument frames on the national position of the UK within the EU (NP amount: 4,7). This argument is predominantly used in reference to the coming negotiations on reforms in the EU. *'David Cameron, never lacking in self-belief, is sure his membership renegotiation will yield some ingenious formula that allows the yes campaign to advertise itself as the win-win proposition: economic security*

as a player in the single market but with sovereignty restored to satisfy the sceptics.' (GU – 4.80). However, it is also claimed that 'there is no deal that could satisfy the militant sceptics. Other member states have more important things to do than help Cameron in his quest for a formula that somehow severs and preserves Britain's ties to Brussels at the same time'. (GU – 4.108). Also, there is criticism on the negotiations themselves, as 'it's difficult to imagine there would just be a treaty change about the UK," said the senior official, who will be involved in the negotiations. "Remember that decisions at the European council require consensus, something that has to be factored into proposals addressing UK concerns".' (GU – 3.4). Also, 'reform means concessions to UK exceptionalism in the EU, with 27 countries recognising and adjusting to Britain's uniqueness in Europe.' (GU – 4.92). Next to the use of this argument on the negotiations, it is also stated that 'voters are likely to be influenced less by the detail of what Mr Cameron achieves in detailed reforms, or even the way in which the negotiations are conducted, as they will be by the broader, less tangible sense of what Britain's place in Europe should be.' (GU – 4.90).

The second argument frames on the erosion of sovereignty due to the EU (NSV amount: 2,3). Also in this argument, the coming renegotiations and referendum are more apparent than the national elections; for example, it is stated that the Out campaign is using this argument, but that, in order to succeed, they also need to come with other arguments; 'more generally, it will be vital for the Out campaign to project a contemporary, moderately anti-Establishment message: rather than invoking abstract, emotional concepts such as sovereignty, the argument ought to be that the people must regain control and the power to choose how they are governed. The waste and cost of the EU will have to be emphasised over and over again.' (DT – 4.78). What is also being said by 'militant Eurosceptics', is that 'the government is once again capitulating to Brussels and trading away sovereignty. (..) The "Brexit" brigade tends to present rupture from Brussels as a clean break; the final step in a long journey of emancipation. Released from the shackles of continental bureaucracy, the UK can then contemplate a fresh life of buccaneering, free-trading, independent enterprise.' (GU – 3.8). This argument is also connected to scepticism on specific policies, as in the Soft Euroscepticism frame; 'Brussels writes our laws; we've lost control of our borders'. (GU – 4.80) and 'borders define nations, and few prime ministers want to cede yet more control over them to Brussels, something that would be required if an EU quota system is imposed. There are no easy answers, unless you are one of the many populist parties stalking the leaders of Europe.' (GU – 4.78).

(Co)-occurrence of frames

Graph 5.9 shows that three frames are increasing during the run-up to the national elections of 2015, except from the Nationalism frame. The Soft Euroscepticism frame is increasing at the highest rate, while the rise of the Populism frame and the Hard Euroscepticism frame takes place gradually. After the elections, all four frames are decreasing in occurrence.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2014-2	23	28	12,2	7	3	17	7,4	27	11,7
2015-1	30	49	16	11	3	23	7,7	28	9,3
2015-2	30	39	13	8	3,7	15	5	23	7,7
Table 5.9: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around UK7									

Graph 5.9: Occurrence of the frames in UK newspapers around critical moment UK7

Conclusions

This period can already be characterized as the start of the EU referendum campaign, as all frames are already focussed on the referendum. It becomes clear that the promise of a referendum on EU-membership is highly apparent during the election campaign of 2015. David Cameron, while being in favour of EU-membership, has promised that he would renegotiate the position of the UK and then organise a referendum on these renegotiations if he would win the elections. Consequently, all political parties use the election campaign to express their position on the EU. Within the Soft Euroscepticism frame, this position is mainly framed by their position on immigration and freedom of movement policies, the austerity policies (in which mainly the role of Germany is criticized), and the fact that the member states are unable to come to an appropriate and joint solution on these policies. Within the Hard Euroscepticism frame more general opposition, and the urgency to fundamentally reform the EU is framed. The Populism frame frames existing negative public opinion, by already making predictions on the outcomes of a referendum, and the Nationalism frame frames how the renewed position of the UK within or without the EU should look like, framing a Brexit as the reclaiming of national sovereignty. As such, this theme is, in a way connected to the elections, as the position on the EU is an important aspect of the national campaign. But mainly, this theme can be referred to the event that occurs during UK8: the Brexit referendum.

UK8 – Referendum on European Union membership (Brexit): collection of earlier used arguments with an emphasis on emotional arguments about immigration and 'We want our country back'

Name	Event		Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Total amount of articles
UK8	Referendum on European Union Membership (Brexit)		23-6-2016	2016-1	84-86	2015(2) – 2016(2)	292 (172 analysed)

Soft Euroscepticism: scepticism on economic policies (austerity and euro) and immigration (Schengen, refugee crisis, terrorism and crime), and referendum as an opportunity to reclaim the money that is spend on the EU

Evidently, the most discussed theme within this episode is the Brexit referendum on the UK's EU membership. The main arguments that are discussed within the Soft Euroscepticism frame are

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economic policies (mainly austerity policies and the Euro), immigration policies (mainly the freedom of movement policies and the refugee crisis) which relate to terrorism and crime, and the EU budget, as leaving the EU would mean that money from the UK would be reclaimed. Criticism on these specific themes is used as an argument to leave the EU. The Soft Euroscepticism frame makes it clear that the referendum was a highly apparent issue within the whole society. While careful predictions are being made, it is also argued that a high number of votes will be emotional, and thus, hard to predict. It is also brought forward that the discussion completely changed political alliances and positions, and that it forced the population to formulate a position on the EU. Also, discussion on the amount of European integration makes it evident that the UK has always perceived the EU as a free trade market, in which solely economic integration is needed. This perception can be regarded as one of the causes for scepticism on further political integration and a disgust for more treaties, agreements and expansions. The use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame is relatively high in the period before (2015-2) and during (2016-1) the referendum. After the referendum (2016-2) the use of the frame decreases again. There are four arguments predominantly used to understand the Brexit referendum. Interestingly, all these arguments have been used earlier in a period before, which indicates that the referendum is an event in which all scepticism is collected.

The first argument, which occurs most often, frames on the Brexit referendum itself (SR amount: 5,9). The content of this argument can be divided into three categories. The first category frames on the referendum, and the surrounding public discussion in general. It is claimed that, in the past '*the referendum was always a device to delay confrontation over Europe, so Cameron could get on with other business'* (GU – 4.62). Also, the referendum is framed as '*a profound moment in the life of our country. Once the die is cast there will be no turning back.'* (GU – 4.24). Before the run-up to the referendum it is already argued that '*to win such a referendum in the wake of 30 years of media-driven anti-European prejudice is no small task.'* (GU – 4.52). Some authors claim that this prediction is right, as *'the details of the prime minister's 'reform' package are now forgotten by everybody who is not either obsessive or paid to know about such things. The airwaves are instead abuzz with (..) charges of 'Project Fear' [and] counter-claims of 'Project Fact'.* (GU – 5.144). Furthermore, the discussion on the referendum has caused that '*we are in a strange world now where two distinct sets of politics – the old one that follows left-right lines, and a new one that operates around an EU in/out axis – are running concurrently on top of each other.'* (GU – 5.156). In this context, it is framed that the referendum has caused new sentiments and that *'David Cameron has freed the topic from the bonds of party and tribe, but in doing so he may have unleashed stranger conflicts. Voters are told to think for themselves, and many find this unprecedented and painful.'* (GU – 5.148). This claim insists that the discussion on the referendum is highly apparent among society, which is confirmed by other authors, who state, for example, that '[*I] cannot remember a political event that has so consumed public discussion. In every pub, workplace, college and home, friends have argued, families feuded, allegiances splintered.'* (GU – 5.108). The second category frames on the different No-campaigns; before the run-up to the referendum, there were different groups competing to become the main 'Leave campaign'; *the two No campaigns have offered radically different visions of what Britain would be like outside the EU.'* (DT – 4.59). And '*should they refuse to merge; the Electoral Commission will decide which is designated the official EU exit campaign'* (GU – 4.66). Interestingly, claims are not made on the exact content of their visions; only claims of their actions can be found, for example; *'the actions of 'Vote Leave' in disrupting the CBI conference and declaring a strategy of intimidation and protest disqualify Vote Leave from being a designated lead campaigner in the forthcoming EU referendum.'* (GU – 4.60). The third category frames predictions on the results and possible consequences of a Leave-vote. Before the referendum it is argued that *'Britain, the most anti-EU of nations, would vote to stay in were the European referendum to be held tomorrow. A clear majority of voters profoundly dislikes Brussels and its diktats, unlike voters in many other countries; but this very British distaste is being overwhelmed by fear of the unknown.'* (DT – 4.78). However, it is also said that '*the outcome of the referendum is anyone's guess. One should always be wary of what psychologists call availability bias, whereby the people who shout the loudest stick in one's mind.'* (GU – 5.110). It is remarkable that both predictions include a high

relevance of emotional arguments, instead of rational arguments. Other predictions on the results, independent from the outcomes, are, for example, that *'the result will say much about the kind of country that modern Britain wants to be'.* (GU – 5.182). After the referendum, the predominant reaction of other EU-countries is that *'the result of the referendum would weigh on [their] economies (..), mainly because of lower exports to the UK, and increase political risk in Europe.'* (GU – 5.74).

The second argument frames scepticism towards specific EU policies (SP amount: 3,6). As in earlier periods, there are two main policies on which criticism is expressed within this argument; the economy and freedom of movement/immigration. As for the economic policies, the criticism consists of two elements: the austerity measures and the euro. *'It was the euro that proved to be a nightmare, an economic doomsday machine that is still causing low growth, high unemployment and real misery in some European countries'* (DT – 4.72). *'The impact of the great recession in Europe has been exacerbated by monetary union, a policy blunder of catastrophic proportions.'* (GU – 5.101). Consequently, it is argued that *'the euro has translated into brutal austerity on parts of the continent's south, tainting the EU's claims to be a levelling force.'* (GU – 5.144). It is argued that *'the 'real reforms' needed in Brussels included 'an end to austerity'* (GU – 4.38), and that *'austerity policies are clouding the horizon. They have turned the future into a threat. They have given fear a push.'* (GU – 4.48). Interestingly, while the UK is not a member of the single currency and the monetary union, criticism on these are highly apparent in the discussion on the referendum. The second policy that is criticized is the free movement policy (the Schengen agreement) and the immigration policy. In fact, these are different policies, but in the articles, they are used in the same context and arguments. These arguments can be divided into three elements. The first element is the free movement within the EU, and the corresponding policies on working benefits for foreign workers, which was the main issue for David Cameron during the negotiations with the EU. However, it is claimed that; *'his officials and government lawyers warned this was an impossible demand. Other leaders will not, and cannot, in law agree: free movement of labour without discrimination is a founding EU principle.'* (GU – 4.56). However, *'public unease has been fuelled by a failure to prevent immigration from pilling pressure on job markets and public services, and a refusal by politicians to acknowledge the sheer numbers of Europeans making new homes in the UK after the EU's expansion east in 2004 and 2007.'* (GU – 5.91). The second element frames on the 'refugee crisis', and the way that the EU dealt with this crisis, which in the end resulted in the so-called Turkey-deal. It is claimed by the UK government that *'right now the inhumane deal the EU just made with Turkey is surely indefensible.'* (GU – 5.198). Finally, the third element connects immigration with wider problems, like criminality and terrorism; *'In some parts of the country half of all rape and murder suspects are foreigners and in the county as a whole nearly 20 percent of crimes are committed by those born outside the UK. This (..) is one of the terrible problems caused by mass immigration. There can be no better argument for Brexit.'* (GU – 5.175). It is also claimed that *'the EU's free movement of people still exposes Britain to terrorist threats despite us not being in Schengen. A 'cleanskin' could come to the EU, get citizenship several years later and then travel to Britain to commit a crime.'* (GU – 4.6).

The third argument frames criticism on the amount of European integration (SEI amount: 1,5). Within this period, it becomes clear that the perceptions on the EU were originally, and are still, different from the EU in its current form; *'When we joined the EU in 1973, we did not join a 43-year project, we joined ... a project to turn our backs on the default position of war.'* (GU – 5.116). Also, the UK perceives the EU as a free market, which is purely economically integrated, but *the concept of the European Union has changed into something else, something anti-democratic.'* (GU – 4.12). *'When the leave camp argued that Brussels has been on a mission to expand its powers and sought further political integration, which is far removed from what the UK originally voted for.'* (GU – 5.91). Concrete issues are also mentioned, like *'a hurried expansion in the areas for Qualified Majority Voting, so that Britain can be overruled more and more often (as happened in the past five years).'* (DT – 4.65). The Leave camp states that *'we're very tired of a Europe that is petty in what matters and overbearing in what is*

petty, and we're convinced that if Europe doesn't change, we're looking at the onset of European disintegration.' (DT – 4.38).

The fourth argument that is used frames scepticism on the EU budget, and the UK's contribution to this (SB amount: 0,6). It is argued that '*we pay an awful lot in and we don't get a lot out'* (GU – 4.42), and *'We are giving £20bn a year, or £350m a week, to Brussels - about half of which is spent by EU bureaucrats in this country, and half we never see again.'* (GU – 5.192). The referendum is framed as '*the opportunity (..) to strike back and reclaim control of the £350 million we send to the EU every week.'* (DT – 4.53).

Hard Euroscepticism: fundamental criticism used by the Leave campaign, the EU as anti-democratic and resistance against the United States of Europe and an ever-closer/federal Union

The arguments within the Hard Euroscepticism frame overlap with arguments discussed in previous periods; general opposition, which is in this period connected to reasons why the UK should leave the EU, claims on the EU as being anti-democratic, which also entails claims on the fact that to be anti-EU does not mean to be anti-Europe or isolationist, and critique on increasing integration (United States of Europe, 'ever closer Union', federal union) which is connected to discussions from the Soft Euroscepticism frame. The use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame is relatively low, in comparison to the use of the other frames. Probably, this can be explained by a more radical language on the EU within the Soft Euroscepticism frame. However, there is a small increase in use before the referendum, before it decreases afterwards. There are three arguments that are used to understand the Brexit referendum within this episode.

The first argument frames general fundamental opposition towards the EU (HF amount: 1,4). For example, it is claimed that '*we've all had enough of this eurononsense. Like many other I think it's time we regained our own sovereignty.'* (DT – 4.63). '*We've got to get out of Europe as quickly as possible (..) We want our country back.*' (GU – 4.12). Boris Johnson, who is the face of the Leave-campaign *'claimed that Brexit was the 'great project of European liberalism. And I am afraid that it is the European Union – for all the high ideals with which it began, that now represents the ancient regime.'* (GU – 5.162). Johnson also shows a scenario that would happen if the UK would vote to remain in the EU, in which he elaborates on his reasons for his fundamental opposition; *'We may accept, intellectually, that the system is unreformed, and often corrupt, and increasingly anti-democratic. We may recognise that if we were asked to join now, for the first time, that we would not dream of doing so. We may at one level understand that if we vote to Remain, we will continue to sit trapped like passengers in the back seat of some errant minicab with a driver who cannot speak English and who is taking us remorselessly and expensively in the wrong direction'.* (DT – 4.62). Furthermore, the EU is also framed as '*an ultimately doomed, job-destroying, declining and mismanaged behemoth that stands no chance in an increasingly agile, globalised world'* (DT – 4.50).

The second argument frames scepticism on the level of democracy within the EU (HD amount: 1). The Leave campaign states that *'in general (..), the EU is anti-democratic and bureaucratic. We need to get out.'* (DT – 4.74). '*It doesn't look to me like a democracy. Nor does it appear accountable. This matters. Not a single one of my pro-EU friends could name their MEP when I asked them.*' (GU – 4.28). Also, specific aspects of the EU are mentioned; *'Its bureaucracy is strong, its democracy is weak, its accountability is seriously under-developed. The complexity of its tasks is always in danger of overwhelming the consensus needed to carry them out. Getting it to act demands formidable energy and patience and willpower from national leaders.'* (GU – 5.109). While most of the claims is being done by anti-EU groups, it is also stated that *'to be anti-EU is not to be anti-Europe or isolationist. It is to ask whether to continue to prop up this anti-democratic institution is really the progressive position*.'

(GU – 5.198). Somewhere, there is thus still a call for reforming the EU into a more democratic institution.

The third argument frames the discussion on different ideologies about Europe (HI amount: 1). Contents of the argument are referring to 'the United States of Europe', federalism, and an 'ever closer union'. *'This brings the idea of ever-closer union to a new and frightening level. Even more disturbing is the fact that Downing Street appears to be condoning it. How far will the EU go to achieve domination?'* (DT – 4.70). *'The 'five presidents' report' laid down a step-by-step approach to a United States of Europe, with banking union followed by a common budget and finally political union.'* (GU – 5.101). It is also claimed that '*the fundamental problem remains: that they have an ideal that we do not share. They want to create a truly federal union, e pluribus unum, when most British people do not.*' (DT – 4.65). This argument can be connected to the argument on European integration in the Soft Euroscepticism frame, as in both arguments, there is a direct reference to the different perceptions on the EU of the UK and other member states and the EU's institutions.

Populism: Predictions on the referendum results and its consequences, and emotional arguments mainly focussed on immigration, used in the referendum campaign

The main theme discussed within the Populist frame is the Brexit referendum itself. Arguments from both the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame are combined with Populist arguments, to strengthen their language, and make them sound more anti-European. From the Populism frame, this is being done by combining arguments with descriptions of the 'populist revolt' (the increasing influence of Eurosceptic parties) in other EU countries, doing predictions on the results of the referendum, and by bringing emotional arguments into the debate. The use of the Populism frame is relatively high in comparison to other critical moments. Before the referendum, the use increases, while afterwards the use decreases again. There are three arguments that are predominantly used to understand the Brexit referendum during this episode.

The first argument is about anti-EU parties (PA amount: 3) and can be divided into three categories. The first category frames the 'populist revolt' within the EU, during which the referendum takes places. *'As countries struggle to shake off the eurozone's financial crisis, migration and Islamist terror are overtaking the economy as most voters' main concerns, magnifying deeper social changes that have seen support for mainstream parties plunge and anti-austerity, anti-EU or anti-immigrant populism surge across the continent.'* (GU – 4.10). Also, '*it should not be forgotten that the referendum came at a time when populist revolts against elites were gaining momentum, from Eurosceptic parties in France, Germany, Austria and Scandinavia to Trump's brand of Republicanism in the US. The leave campaign has throughout painted the EU and Brussels officials as a hotbed of unaccountable political elites who were not democratically voted by the British people.*' (GU – 5.91). Finally, it is argued that *'there is little doubt that with Euroscepticism on the rise, Brexit would strengthen populist, anti-Brussels parties not just in the Netherlands but across the EU, increasing the potential for fragmentation and leading to what some - including the former chief of Britain's defence staff Lord Bramall - see as a real risk of the structure unravelling.'* (GU – 5.112). The second category frames the anti-European groups, during the run-up to the referendum as xenophobic and racist; *'Let's not forget Nigel Farage's risible anti-migrant "breaking point" poster, which was even reported to the police for allegedly inciting racial hatred. As Sayeeda Warsi told the BBC, "This kind of nudge-nudge, wink-wink xenophobic racist campaign may be politically savvy or useful in the short term, but it causes long-term damage to communities" - a prediction that is unfortunately being proved correct.'* (GU – 5.76). These groups are also framed as forces *'for which Euroscepticism is a wholly inadequate word, range from crude racism and nativist dislike of immigrants, to humble patriotism and yearning for a maybe imaginary lost age. The referendum turns not so much on the national interest as on a national idea.'* (GU – 5.99). The third category frames the anti-EU parties frame themselves as anti-politics and anti-establishment; '*Right, this is very simple, ladies and gentlemen, it's us against the entire political establishment.' And I think,*

frankly, the more that they club together, the better our chances are of winning.' (GU – 5.190). "*The EU works in the interests of the elite - the one per cent - so it is entirely unsurprising to find that the campaign to keep us in the union is financed by big banks like Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan. "These figures show again that we are in a David vs Goliath fight, but it is one we are determined to win for the good of the British people* (DT – 4.53). Doing this, the anti-EU parties frame the EU as a common enemy for the people who tend to be anti-European and connecting them by expressing their positions.

The second argument frames existing negative public opinion towards the EU (PO amount: 2,6). Most of these claims offer a prediction on voting in the referendum. *'According to the report, roughly two thirds of the British public can be considered Eurosceptic, with a total of 65 per cent of voters either wanting to leave the European Union or see Brussels's powers reduced.'* (DT – 4.64). And, *'public opinion in Britain and elsewhere in the EU has become frustrated with the EU's failings.'* (GU – 4.4). However, there are also claims that state that the outcome of the referendum is not easy to predict; *'I have no idea how it's going to work out. I think it's extremely difficult to predict. All I was pointing to is that history tells us that the great majority of referenda support the status quo. But that doesn't mean it's unwinnable. And I think there are a lot who haven't made up their mind.'* (GU – 5.147). There is also a number of articles that visited smaller towns in the UK, to find out how 'normal' citizens think about the EU. The main findings of these articles are that *'everyone we meet is seemingly fixed on different stuff: immigration, obviously, but also their grievances about the decline of their area over two or three decades. (..) No one - literally, no one - mentions Boris Johnson, David Cameron, Michael Gove, Jeremy Corbyn or Nigel Farage.'* (GU – 5.110). These findings are confirmed by the following statement; *'Although Cameron still tended at this time to treat the EU issue as a party management problem, the eurozone crisis and migration pressures were beginning to transform the issue into something much larger, much angrier and less manageable'.* (GU – 5.85). These findings indicate that a significant number of voters did not base their no-vote on big ideals on the EU, or the UK's position in a globalized world, but mainly by the things they experience in their own town or neighbourhood, which may possibly be negatively influenced by EU regulations. Another possible explanation is that these no-voters are influenced by newspapers, television shows and other (social) media, in which the Leave-campaign was highly apparent. This argument can be connected to the referendum argument of the Soft Euroscepticism frame, as it provides explanations for statements and predictions that have been done in that frame.

The third argument offers other frames on why the no-voters voted no in the referendum, and mainly refer to emotional arguments, like feelings of insecurity, distrust in politics and fears and concerns of citizens (PI amount: 2,5). There are four categories in which these claims can be divided. The first category frames more general concerns of the public, which are perceived as important in the Brexit debate; *'Too much change is dizzying. Growing disorder activates passions - often of the nasty sort: intolerance, rejection, fortress building. All this forms the deep undercurrent of the Brexit debate.'* (GU – 4.58). *'Whether the grievance is focused on immigration, regulation, parliamentary sovereignty, human rights law or vague distaste for the thing called Brussels, the common theme is expropriation. It is the feeling that control of the world around you have been carried off by people who do not live like you and who do not like the way you live. If they are not literally foreign, they are alien in the looser sense - disconnected from any place you know and looking down on it.'* (GU – 5.184).
The second category frames actions that have caused a decreasing mistrust in politics among the population; *'it is deeply corrosive of popular trust in democracy that every year UK politicians tell the public that they can cut immigration to the tens of thousands - and then find that they miss their targets by hundreds of thousands.'* (GU – 5.162).
The third category frames on the Remain campaign, that is framed by the Leave campaign as 'Project Fear' and claim that they (and not the Leave campaign) are the ones that appeal to emotions and fears of the population. *'The agents of Project Fear (..) have warned us that leaving the EU would jeopardise police, judicial and intelligence cooperation. We have even been told that the EU has been responsible,*

over the past 70 years, for "keeping the peace in Europe". In every case the message is that Brexit is simply too scary; and the reality is that these threats are so wildly exaggerated as to be nonsense.' (DT – 4.62). Also, 'people on the Remain camp will continue to run scare stories about World War III, or bubonic plague, or whatever it happens to be, and actually they may in the end, inadvertently, do material damage to people's confidence about this country.' (DT – 4.55).

The final category, which most often occurs, frames about immigration, which is framed as 'an emotive issue driving moderate towards extreme Euro-scepticism'. (DT – 4.67). 'With jihadis seemingly free to enter and then crisscross the European Union at will, anti-Europeans are using the Paris attacks as a reason for the UK to quit the EU. Nigel Farage, the Ukip leader, told Channel 4 News last week that he couldn't think of a better reason to leave the union.' (GU – 4.6). It is being framed that leave-voters are people 'often resident in post-industrial towns and cities, who are much less enthusiastic about a globalised world, and – needless to say – full of angst and anger about post-2004 immigration.' (GU – 5.110). It is being stated that 'Leave did well to get immigration, a concern central to the Brexit case, as the most prominent subject in the news three weeks ago. The issue temporarily replaced the economy as the major theme in coverage of the referendum, but this has since re-asserted itself at the top of the media agenda.' (GU – 5.98). In the end, this argument expresses that discussions about Brexit are mainly held among emotional arguments, rather than on rational argument. This is also mentioned in some of the articles; 'The EU was always going to be a battle between the unreliability of facts and the certainty of emotions. It is an argument not over trade deals and statistics but over safety and risk, continuity and disruption, the established order and the little person.' (GU – 5.142). And; 'try arguing with facts and you get nowhere. (..) If you tell these Labour voters that's because of Tory austerity cuts, still they blame "immigrants getting everything first". Warn about a Brexit recession leading to far worse cuts and they just say, "Stop them coming, make room for our own first.' (GU – 5.111).

Nationalism: UK's position; Better Off Out, regaining of national sovereignty and victory of national identity

The main theme within the Nationalism frame is that the UK is 'Better Off Out', and that citizens thus has to vote 'Leave' at the referendum. This theme is combined with claims on the renegotiations, which are perceived as not favourable enough for the position of the UK, the reclaiming of national sovereignty and a focus on national identity. The use of the Nationalism frame in the period of the referendum (2016-1) is the highest measured within the whole research (24,6). Not only is this the highest use of the Nationalism frame, it is also the highest measured use of any frame within the whole research. The peak of the Nationalism frame only takes one period, as the use is already declined (to 7,9) in 2016-2. There are three arguments that are predominantly used to understand the mentioned themes during this episode.

The first argument frames on the national position of the UK, within or without the EU (NP amount: 5,2). The claims within this argument can be divided into three categories.

The first category frames the negotiations between David Cameron and other EU leaders, on the conditions for membership of the UK; 'Speaking to reporters in Brussels [David Cameron] said he would be 'battling for Britain. I will not take a deal that does not meet what we need. With good will and hard work, we can get a good deal for Britain.' (GU – 4.38). After the negotiations, it is claimed that some progress has been made; 'He got the other leaders to pay more attention to the principle of "subsidiarity": decisions being taken as closely as possible to the citizen. He also secured a "red card" that will give national parliaments power to block EU laws if at least 55% of them club together - though that is, admittedly, quite a high threshold.' (GU – 5.140).

The second category frames the current position of the UK within the EU, and on how this can be affected by the referendum; 'We must decide whether we are better off managing the eternal

headache of our relations with the Continent inside or outside the EU, and whether it makes it easier or not to handle a rising China and a revanchist Russia. Ultimately we must decide whether this dysfunctional union is worth saving at all.' (DT – 4.68). *'It is time to seek a new relationship, in which we manage to extricate ourselves from most of the supranational elements.'* (DT – 4.65). Reasons for this are, for example that *'the UK has been outvoted 40 times in Brussels in the last 5 years, and the total bill for those defeats - in extra costs for UK government and business - is put at £2.4 bn a year. How can we have "influence" in the Brussels commission, when only 3.6 per cent of Commission officials come from this country?'* (GU – 5.192). From a historical perspective, it becomes clear that *'Britain serves Europe best when it keeps itself semi-detached. It was right to join the common market but not the subsequent European Union, with all the toxic, undemocratic supranationalism that has come in its train.'* (GU – 5.108).

The third category within this argument frames the position of the UK when it would be outside the EU; *'Britain could deregulate and negotiate trade agreements faster than the EU does on our behalf.'* (DT – 4.59). It is also claimed that, after the Brexit, when *'we are an independent nation again, the British people will thrive and prosper.'*. After the referendum, it is claimed that *'what is done cannot be undone and now we have to get on with making our new relationship with Europe work as well possible.'* (GU – 5.80).

The second argument is about the erosion of national sovereignty due to the EU (NSV amount: 3,8). Claims within this argument mainly entail criticism on the fact that the UK has no control on their policies and/or borders; *'We have lost control of our borders to Brussels; we have lost control of our trade policy; and with every year that passes we see the EU take control of more and more areas of public policy.'* (GU – 5.192) As such, *'We should get out as quick as we can." Why? "I'm sick to death of being told what we can and can't do.'* (GU – 4.42). Other claims frame the Brexit as an opportunity to gain back the freedom of the country; *'those who want Britain to quit Europe will argue that whatever the sacrifice in jobs, higher prices, lost investment and influence, it will all be worth it because we will have regained our "freedom'.'* (GU – 4.24). Also, within this argument, a connection is made to the democracy argument of the Hard Euroscepticism frame; *'We want to be British, [w]e want our government to run our country, not someone we've not elected in another bloody country. And that's it. I want my country back. I'm scared for my country. Scared'.* (GU – 5.110). *'That enrages them; not so much the numbers as the lack of control. That is what we mean by loss of sovereignty - the inability of people to kick out, at elections, the men and women who control their lives.'* (DT – 4.65).

The third argument frames the national identity of the UK, in relation to the EU (NI amount: 1,5). By some authors, it is claimed that the identity issue is at the heart of the Brexit debate; *'The campaign seems hardly about Europe at all, but it's all about us and the English identity.'* (GU – 5.99). *'Whether pro-Europeans like it or not, the impulse to leave the EU triggers nerve endings that reach deep into the British psyche: the island geography, the trauma of post-imperial decline, the sentimental impossibility of judging any hour finer than that one in 1940, when we stood alone against the Evil that had overrun the continent'* (GU – 5.184). However, there is no particular agreement on what entails this national identity; *'The decision to leave or stay is not just about money; it's about who we are. The Leave camp is telling a lie about British identity; Boris is being naive about some of his allies. The Nigel Farage line on culture is clear and crass: we are Brits; we like beer, not wine, and pubs, not Italian restaurants! A vote to leave is to declare that Britain is an island, not just physically but culturally.'* (GU – 4.26). It is also argued that being a member of the EU has been bad for the identity of the UK; *'We have become so used to Nanny in Brussels that we have become infantilised, incapable of imagining an independent future. We used to run the biggest empire the world has ever seen, and with a much smaller domestic population and a relatively tiny Civil Service. Are we really unable to do trade deals?*

We will have at least two years in which the existing treaties will be in force' (DT – 4.65). Others claim that Euroscepticism has been so apparent, already since the entering in 1973, that it is this scepticism that is part of the national identity; *Britain's self-ejection from Europe is the culmination not just of four months of heady campaigning but four decades of latent Euroscepticism, which, through good times and bad, never really went away.'* (GU – 5.91).

(Co)-occurrence of frames

Graph 5.10 below shows the occurrence of the different frames before, during and after the Brexit referendum. It is evident that all four frames are following the same pattern: increasing before the referendum and decreasing afterwards. It is remarkable that the Nationalism frame has the highest occurrence during the period 2016-1, this occurrence (24,6) is even the highest occurrence measured during the whole period of analysis, even compared to other frames.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2015-2	30	39	13	8	3,7	15	5	23	7,7
2016-1	114	181	15,9	63	5,5	154	13,5	280	24,6
2016-2	28	15	5,4	3	1	22	7,9	22	7,9
Table 5.10: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around UK8									

Graph 5.10: Occurrence of the frames in UK newspapers around critical moment UK8

Conclusions

A significant amount of arguments comes to the fore around the Brexit referendum, and several overlaps between the four frames can be found. Within the Soft Euroscepticism frame, the arguments that predominantly appear are: change of political landscape, austerity policies, immigration, European integration and EU budget. Within the Hard Euroscepticism, the arguments are: democratic deficit and fundamental opposition towards 'the United States of Europe'. The Populism frame mainly entails emotional arguments that are connected to several other (Soft and Hard Euroscepticism) arguments, but, predominantly to immigration. The Nationalism frame mainly frames on the 'liberation' from the EU, the regaining of national sovereignty and Euroscepticism as a national identity issue. The contents of the frames within this period can be characterized as a collection of all earlier mentioned claims and arguments, which came to the surface during earlier periods. This confirms the fact that public debate on the referendum was highly apparent during the period of the referendum,

and that this debate changed the political landscape of the UK entirely, as older left/right differences changed into pro-/anti-EU differences. However, when looking at the occurrence of the frames, it can be concluded that there are two themes that were dominant during this period: arguments (Populism frame) about immigration (mainly Soft Euroscepticism frame) and claims that express a 'liberation' of the EU; 'We want our country back', which are mainly used within the Nationalism frame.

UK9 – General elections 2017: evaluation of Brexit; the wider context, consequences and negotiations

Name	Event	Date	Period	Eurobarometer	Period framing analysis	Total amount of articles
UK9	General Elections	8-6-2017	2017-1	86-87	2016(2) – 2017(1)	94 (66 analysed)

Soft Euroscepticism: economic and political consequences of Brexit; criticism on the UK and sustaining criticism on the austerity policies

The main discussed themes within the Soft Euroscepticism frame are the economic and political consequences of the Brexit referendum. It is claimed that the political landscape has changed, as people are still more leaded by their opinion on the EU, rather than on traditional other party principles, and, as such, political parties must rethink these principles to appeal to their voters. Also, the UK is criticized by the EU, on its attitude within the Brexit negotiations. Specific Euroscepticism is solely expressed on the Euro crisis and austerity policies, but this is rather done by actors from other countries than by domestic actors. After the Brexit referendum, the use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame is declining. However, in the period of the elections (2017-1), the use is rising again, which implies that Soft Euroscepticism is, again, an important topic for the national elections. There are three arguments predominantly used to understand the mentioned themes during this episode.

The first argument frames the consequences of the Brexit referendum directly (SR amount: 1,8). As for the economic consequences for the UK, it is claimed that *'investors rushed to the exits after the EU referendum, offloading midcap banks, housebuilders and travel stocks, which are the most sensitive to the UK economy, amid worries over economic growth. (DT – 4.25)'*. However, most of the claims deal with the political consequences of the Brexit referendum, for example for the Labour party, which was opposed to the referendum, but the result of the referendum *'put pressure on Labour to accept the result, not fight it. That was especially true in Labour constituencies where many voters (though not necessarily most of Labour voters) opted for leave.'* (GU – 5.50). It is also claimed that *'everything about the politics of Brexit is a reminder that a representative parliamentary system such as Britain's has a deeply uncomfortable relationship with referendums. May's readiness to bow to the referendum makes a certain kind of political sense. But as a matter of principle it is hard to square with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.'* (GU – 5.14). So, while the Prime Minister was principally against a Brexit, after the referendum she must listen to the majority of the population and promote a Brexit. As for the whole political landscape, *'the British Election Study found people identified more strongly with leave and remain than they did with traditional parties. From the moment of her speech at the Tory party conference, Theresa May has been speaking directly to leave, and even now is fighting a general election campaign with vanishingly small Conservative branding.'* (GU – 5.18). This indicates that the Brexit campaign and referendum changed the British political landscape. Finally, some claims deal with the party positions on how the Brexit would look like. It is, for example suggested that *'the UK would not trigger article 50, which starts the clock on the UK's negotiations to withdraw from the EU, until early in the new year, and said he did not expect the UK to join a customs union with the EU.'* (GU – 5.62). However, the leader of the Liberal Democrats *'pledged to put staying in Europe at the heart of the election campaign'.* (DT – 4.15).

The second argument frames scepticism on specific EU policies (SP amount: 1,8). While occurring in a significant lesser amount, this argument mainly frames on the austerity policies and the eurozone; *'the euro crisis has been put off, not solved, and there is still no way to quit the single currency without unleashing chaos.'* (DT – 4.24). Also, the austerity policies, which are demanded by Germany, is framed as *'[taking] over totally the European dream of democracy'.* (DT – 4.13). Many of these claims do, however, not come from the UK, but mainly from other EU countries, for example from Marine Le Pen in France, who states that: '*It is important that France recovers its national currency. The euro is an obstacle, a millstone for people's spending power and for employment. Brussels has used the euro in Greece not as a currency but as a knife that you stick in a country's ribs to force it to do what its people don't want to do.'* (GU – 5.40).

The third argument frames scepticism on specific member states (SM amount: 1,8). Many of these claims entails criticism of the EU (leaders) on Brexit, and criticism on how these leaders react to Brexit; *'European leaders are forced to strike a balance between respecting Britain's democratic choice and underlining the lack of wisdom - as they see it - of that choice.'* (GU – 5.26). Jean-Claude Juncker (president of the European Commission) states that '*the more I hear, the more sceptical I become over Britain's approach',* (GU – 5.20) during the first negotiations on Brexit. It is claimed that the European leaders *'know that the EU's survival is at stake, so any country leaving their club must end up worse off.'* (GU – 5.20). This attitude of the EU towards the UK is also criticized by Marine Le Pen; *'The way the EU has reacted to Brexit has put paid to the few in Europe who still believe that there is an ounce of democracy in this structure that is the EU. "Europe would be showing its true face, as it already has done so in Greece and tried to do with Britain."'* (DT – 4.33).

Hard Euroscepticism: the democratic deficit in the EU, which fuels fundamental opposition and criticism on the attitude of the EU during the Brexit negotiations

The most discussed theme within the Hard Euroscepticism frame are the consequences of the Brexit, which is mainly framed by the reactions of other EU leaders. It is argued that the way the EU deals with Brexit is totally undemocratic; while the UK used a democratic sovereign right, the EU is criticizing the results entirely. This argument can be combined with the argument that criticizes the attitude of the EU in the Brexit negotiations within the Soft Euroscepticism frame. As every other frame, the use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame decreased after the Brexit referendum. However, during the run-up of the elections, the use of this frame is rising again. There are two arguments predominantly used to understand the themes within this episode.

The first argument frames general fundamental criticism on the EU (HF amount: 0,9). Within this argument, it is repeated that *'the United Kingdom voted to leave the moneygrabbing, inefficient, ineffective and unaccountable EU.'* (DT – 4.23). It is also argued that '*the continent is old and out of ideas. Its leaders have conducted huge experiments with their societies - the euro and mass immigration - and are now struggling to deal with the consequences while taking their voters with them. The EU will probably muddle through for now. But "muddling through" is no way to sustain a great civilisation.'* (DT – 4.13) and that '*membership of the EU was never necessary to British prosperity. The country's overall trade in goods with the EU is not large, and the much larger trade in services is mostly unregulated by Brussels. Britain could survive hard Brexit, and if some of the gilt is shaken off the flatulent City of London it might be no bad thing.'* (GU – 5.38). It is also argued that the Brexit may cause a domino effect of exit referendums within the EU, as *'Wilders (NL, PVV) this week pressed ahead with his vow to make a " Nexit" referendum one of the key themes of the general election next March, calling the EU "a totalitarian, Soviet-like institution.'* (GU – 5.66).

The second argument frames on the level of democracy within the EU (HD amount: 0,9). For example, a senior tory representative from the last government complaints on the way of working within the EU, in which the parliament is ignored; *'We often used to say we could not do something because we*

could not get it through parliament. Everyone does that in Brussels.' (GU – 5.20). It is also being claimed that the way that the EU is reacting on Brexit enable the anti-Establishment parties across Europe *'to claim that the EU is an undemocratic club where a sovereign nation gets punished for merely exercising a right enshrined in the treaties'.* (DT – 4.33).

Populism: Brexit and the wider context of rising populism and far-right parties, Europe in a crisis

The main theme discussed within the Populism frame is the increasing amount of populism within the EU. Consequently, the Brexit referendum is placed in a wider context of populism and the rise of far-right parties. On the one hand, it is argued that Brexit is an event that fits in a wider international context and compared to events like the election of Donald Trump and the elections in France, the Netherlands and Austria; which underline that the EU finds itself in a crisis. On the other hand, it is argued that every country has its own political situation which causes this crisis, and that more focus must be on these national situations. After the Brexit referendum, the use of the Populism frame is declining gradually. This means that the use of this frame is decreasing during the run-up to the election, while at the same time, the use is still relatively high. There are two arguments used predominantly within this frame, to understand the mentioned theme during this episode.

The first argument frames on the anti-European parties (PA amount: 2,5), across the EU. Within this argument, the Brexit referendum is framed as an event within a worldwide populist, nation-focussed context, which also in itself increases populist forces across the EU; '*The angry, anti-establishment, nation-first tide that voted to sweep the UK out of the EU and Trump into the White House - in what the billionaire developer himself called a "Brexit plus, plus, plus" - is rising steadily across the continent.'* (GU – 5.48). More generally, *'Anti-establishment and anti-EU winds are blowing hard and fast across the continent. The great European "project", constructed in the aftermath of the Second World War, has never looked in so much danger of falling apart as it does now.' (DT – 4.19).* The focus is, among others, on the Dutch elections in March 2017, in which *'the possibility that the far-Right firebrand could become the largest party in the Dutch parliament had prompted fears across Europe of further destabilisation following the Brexit vote and US election.'* (DT – 4.21). Also, the Dutch prime Minister Mark Rutte frames it in this way but turns it more positively; *'this is a chance for a big democracy like the Netherlands to make a point – to stop this toppling over of the domino stones of the wrong sort of populism.'* (DT – 4.20). Finally, the rise of the far-right populist parties is, again, framed as having a racist character; '*Following the EU referendum, racist attacks have increased in the UK while the far right is rearing its ugly head in France, Austria, Germany, Denmark and many other European countries.'* (GU – 5.52).

The second argument frames the wider emergence of populist parties within the EU, by combining this to the fact that the EU finds itself in a crisis (PC amount: 1,7); *'the resulting political chaos and economic uncertainty of Brexit appears to have had a direct effect on attitudes in Austria, where a Eurosceptic populist candidate will stand in the repeat presidential elections on 2 October.'* (GU – 5.66). More specifically, it is claimed that *'the shock of British rejection is changing debates around integration and immigration.'* (GU – 5.56), which may lead to the rise of these populist parties. It is claimed that the elections in Austria, in which such a populist party won the elections *'tells us that Europe faces a shared crisis with distinctive national forms.'* (GU – 5.44). On the one hand, the Brexit would lead to *'an impossible situation [and] a loss of spirit and life that might be fatal.'* (DT – 4.16). On the other hand, it is claimed that *'it is important to pay much closer attention to national politics in Europe than biased observers in Britain ever bother to do'* (GU – 5.44). As such, it is not only Brexit that sparked the rise of populist parties, but there are other, national, sentiments that are causing this. In the end, it is concluded that *'Europe is tired. It's tired of crisis, tired of sameness and tired of change, tired of its elites and tired of its voters.'* (DT – 4.13).

Nationalism: Soft or Hard Brexit? Focus on national identity

There are two main themes discussed within the Nationalism frame. The first theme is the future position of the UK outside the EU, and the corresponding Brexit negotiations. During the run-up to the elections, there are discussion on whether a 'hard' or 'soft' Brexit is preferred, and there is both scepticism and support on the way that Prime Minister Theresa May is performing during the negotiations with the EU. The second theme within the Nationalism frame refers to the national identity and provides a deeper explanation of Euroscepticism. It is claimed that Euroscepticism is part of the national identity of the UK, and that the Brexit referendum was an act to listen to this national sentiment. It is also claimed that the focus on (national) identity issues is one explanation for the rise in populist and far-right parties across the EU. After a significant peak during the Brexit referendum, the use of the Nationalism frame is declining gradually during the run-up of the elections in 2017. However, the use is still relatively high. The two discussed themes as explained by two arguments that are predominantly used during this episode.

The first argument frames on the national position of the UK, and on the Brexit negotiations with the EU (NP amount: 4,9). These frames mainly consist of discussion on a 'hard' or 'soft' Brexit; Hard Brexit advocates are already staking out their ground: '*Some vainly advocate retaining features of EU membership after leaving but this is not practical*' (GU – 5.54). However, it is also argued that '*there is no way Brexit can avoid going "soft" in the course of negotiation. As the veteran historian David Marquand said last week, Britain is "part" of Europe in so many ways that amputation is not an option. But there are reckless forces behind hard Brexit, on the right in Britain and among EU finance houses that might benefit from it.*' (GU – 5.38). More general, Britain's vision for Brexit claims that Europe is a '*pluralist, friendly, free-trading zone´, [which] could start to look extremely attractive*' to other member states with increasing Euroscepticism (DT – 4.24). However, there is also critique on the British government, specifically on Theresa May, as she '*remains deliberately and disgracefully vague about both the strategy and detail. If she possesses a strategic post-Brexit vision for Britain's geographically ordained relationship with Europe, she has not shared it. She has never once tried to reach out to the 48% of the country who voted to remain; instead she has taken them for granted. In reality her public policy still boils down to her view that Brexit means Brexit.*' (GU – 5.14). This criticism can also be placed within the discussion on a hard or soft Brexit. However, there is also support for the PM who has pledged '*to deliver a 'red, white and blue Brexit', and [warned] the other 27 EU member states that Britain will fight back by cutting tax and regulation if it is offered a poor deal.*' (GU – 5.32). She has also '*made it clear that, in negotiating Britain's exit from the EU, she is willing to put popular fears and anxiety about immigration above any other consideration including jobs, living standards and the economy.*' (GU – 5.34).

The second argument frames on the national identity (NI amount: 1,5). This argument is used in two ways. Firstly, it is framed as a deeper explanation for the Brexit referendum; '*I don't deny that Euroscepticism has deep roots. It resonates with a sense of historical and geographical detachment from the continent. Nor do I claim that everyone who voted leave is a nationalist. But the politics of Brexit are locked into that trajectory.*' (GU – 5.42). The Brexit referendum is, as such, framed as way to listen to national feelings; '*for Britain and its political leaders, populist backlashes aren't "aberrations" of history that need to be kept tightly under control until they blow over. They are symptoms of something that has gone wrong. The British solution to populism is not to dig in, but to listen.*' (DT – 4.16). Secondly, this argument is combined to the Populism frame, as the rise of populist parties are connected to (national) identity issues. It is argued that '*the focus on questions of identity in the campaign raised fears among Europe's political establishment that a strong showing by Mr Wilders would provide a boost in the forthcoming French presidential election for Marine Le Pen, the far-Right leader.*' (DT – 4.20).

(Co)-occurrence of frames

After the Brexit referendum the occurrence of the Soft Euroscepticism, Nationalism and Populism frame remain relatively high, although not as high as during the period of the referendum. During the run-up, the occurrence of both the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame increases, while the occurrence of the Nationalism and Populism frame is declines, while remaining relatively high.

Period	Amount of articles	Soft EU (Abs.)	Soft EU (Rel.)	Hard EU (Abs.)	Hard EU (Rel.)	Pop. (Abs.)	Pop. (Rel.)	Nat. (Abs.)	Nat. (Rel.)
2016-2	28	15	5,4	3	1	22	7,9	22	7,9
2017-1	37	35	9,5	15	4,1	22	5,9	26	7
Table 5.11: Absolute and relative occurrence of frames around UK9									

*Graph 5.11: Occurrence of the frames in UK newspapers critical moment UK9*

Conclusions

In sum, the main theme that occurs during this period are the Brexit negotiations and the corresponding new position of the UK. Within the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame, the attitude of the EU within these negotiations is mainly criticized. Within the Populism frame, it is claimed that immigration, and other topics that cause fear, anger and uncertainty among the population will be central in these negotiations. The Nationalism frame frames that the UK would not agree with a deal that is not in their interest, and the government must, and will, fight for a favourable new position of the country in the world, and outside the EU. Another theme that occurs is the context in which the Brexit referendum took place. While the Soft Euroscepticism frame mainly frames on specific policies and aspects of this context, the Populism frame continually refers to other 'populist' and anti-establishment elections results in the EU and the USA and combines the anti-establishment parties with racism and xenophobia. The Nationalism frame adds to this by mentioning that these parties have an increasing nationalist focus on the EU, and on national identity issues. As Prime Minister May called the elections to get a strong electoral mandate for their government before the start of the Brexit negotiations, the content of the frames is partly connected to the elections. On the one hand, there is a lot of discussion on what the position of the UK should be, but, on the other hand, few specific aspects of how this position would look like have been made.

5.2.3 Co-occurrence of frames

This section discusses the occurrence and the co-occurrence of the four frames, as found in the articles of the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph. Within this section, the quantitative occurrence (as shown in graph 5.12) is compared with the actual, qualitative, content of the frames during the critical moments.

Graph 5.12 below shows the occurrence of the four analysed frames among each analysed critical moment. The occurrence is corrected by the amount of articles for that specific period, which makes it possible to make a comparison on the occurrence over the whole period 2000-2017. A bigger version of this graph can be found in Annex VII.

Graph 5.12: Relative occurrence of the four frames around the critical moments in the UK (2000-2017)

In general, as graph 5.12 shows, the Soft Euroscepticism frame is predominantly the most occurring frame during the whole period of analysis. The reason for this is that this frame consists of more arguments/codes than the others during the analysis. Nevertheless, this makes it more striking when another frame is more occurrent than the Soft Euroscepticism frame, which is the case for the Populism frame around the European elections of 2009 (UK4), and the Nationalism frame around the Brexit referendum (UK8). The high occurrence of the populism frame around the European elections of 2009 is reflected in the content of the frames. Within this period, the rejection of a referendum of the government triggers anti-European language among the population, which is reflected in both the Populism and the Hard Euroscepticism frame. In these frames, it is argued that the EU is not democratic, and that the British population does not have a say at all in the EU. This resulted in a high appearance of anti-EU parties in the UK.

Around the Brexit Referendum, the occurrence of the Nationalism frame, as well as the Populism frame are relatively high. This indicates that Soft Eurosceptic arguments, mainly on immigration and the economy, are combined with Nationalist and Populist arguments. The nationalist arguments mainly deal with national sovereignty, which should be gained back after the referendum, and the national identity. By stressing the need to choose for their own country, keeping their own identity, and protecting their national sovereignty, the Nationalism frame is highly occurrent around the referendum. Also, claims within this frame are on the current and future position of the UK without

the EU. The Populism frame combines the Soft Euroscepticism frame by adding concerns to criticism on immigration and the economy, which results in a strong connection between these frames during this period.

Furthermore, graph 5.12 shows a significant space between the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame during the whole period, except for the period after the European elections of 2009 (UK4) and during the European elections of 2014 (UK6). In both periods, the Populism frame is also relatively high. The graph also shows that in both periods, the Populism frame is increasing earlier than the Hard Euroscepticism frame. Based on this, it can be concluded that around the European elections of 2009 and 2014, Populist arguments lead to an increased occurrence of Hard Euroscepticism arguments.

The **Soft Euroscepticism** frame has four remarkable peaks during the period 2000-2017; these are taking place in the period before the European elections of 2004 (UK2), the general elections of 2005 (UK3), after the European elections of 2009 (UK4), in the period around the general elections of 2015 (UK7) and around the Brexit referendum in 2016 (UK8). The first peak (2003) does not show a strong interrelation with another frame, which indicates that Soft Euroscepticism, which is in this period mainly directed to the single currency and the European Constitution, is not combined with fundamental resistance towards the EU, and by Populist and Nationalist arguments. The second peak (2005) shows a stronger interrelation with the other frames, mainly with the Populist frame. Soft Euroscepticism in this period was mainly combined with the rejection of the European Constitution in the UK, but also by referenda in the Netherlands and France. As earlier argued, the rejection of a referenda by the British government, triggered negative public opinion and the rise of anti-EU parties, which is reflected by the increasing use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame, the Populism frame and the Nationalism frame in this period. The third peak (2009) shows a strong interrelation between the Soft Euroscepticism frame and the Hard Euroscepticism frame, which may have been triggered by the increasing occurrence of the Populism frame in the previous period. The fourth peak of the Soft Euroscepticism frame occurs during the run-up to the Brexit referendum (2015-2016) and shows an interrelation with the increasing occurrence of the Nationalism and Populism frame. However, the peak of the Soft Euroscepticism frame appears earlier than the peak of the two other frames. This confirms that in the period straight before the referendum, Soft Eurosceptic arguments are increasingly combined by Nationalist and Populist arguments.

The occurrence of the **Hard Euroscepticism** frame mainly peaks around the European elections (2004, 2009 and 2014), and the Brexit referendum (2016). While the content of this frame is among the whole period characterized by fundamental opposition, the focus on this opposition is slightly different among these peaks. In 2004, fundamental resistance on the EU is referred to opposition towards the EU as a federal super-state. This can be combined with the discussion in the Soft Euroscepticism frame on the European Constitution, and the occurrence of the Nationalism frame, in which the protection of national sovereignty is mainly expressed during this period. In 2009, Hard Euroscepticism is mainly used in reference to the democratic deficit within the EU. This seems to be related to the peak of the Populism frame, which entails a high occurrence of the arguments on the alienation of citizens, and the EU as an institution in which citizens are not (enough) represented. In 2014, the arguments are widened into references on fundamental opposition and the democratic deficit and the clash of ideologies on the EU, which can all be connected to the high occurrence of the Populism frame, that express existing negative public opinion, a focus on emotional arguments and the victory of anti-EU parties, who are mainly using the Hard Euroscepticism frame in communicating about the EU. The same overlap can be found around the period of the Brexit referendum (2016). Additionally, fundamental opposition is, in this period, related to the high occurrence of the **Nationalism** frame; as a strong focus on nationalist and national identity issues, often means a fundamental resistance

towards institutions (like the EU) that take away national control, and that can be framed as institutions which are a threat for the national identity and position.

As argued in the earlier sections, the main peaks of the **Populism** frame occur around the European elections and are ascending towards a significantly high occurrence around the elections of 2014 (UK6). The occurrence of the Nationalism frame is relatively stable during the period 2000-2014, with some small peaks around the European elections of 2004 (UK2) and after the general elections of 2005 (UK3). However, after 2014, the occurrence is significantly rising, with an enormous peak during the Brexit referendum (UK8), and a large decrease afterwards. Within this period, earlier discussed arguments on the national identity are discussed with arguments on the national position of the UK.

To visualize the co-occurrence of the different frames, table 5.12 below shows the correlation between the frames.

	Soft Euroscepticism	Hard Euroscepticism	Populism	Nationalism
Soft Euroscepticism	-	0,447706	0,245548	0,407099
Hard Euroscepticism	0,447706	-	0,292145	-0,0059
Populism	0,245548	0,292145	-	0,349318
Nationalism	0,407099	-0,0059	0,349318	-
Table 5.12: Correlation between the movements of the frames (2000-2017)				

In general, it can be concluded that the correlation between the frames is relatively low. However, some conclusions can be drawn from the correlation. Firstly, the correlation between the Hard and Soft Euroscepticism frame is higher than the correlation between the Soft Euroscepticism and the two other frames. As graph 5.12 shows, this stronger correlation mainly occurs in 2009 and 2014, thus when the occurrence of the Populism frame is high as well. This confirms the earlier conclusion that Populist arguments are used to change the Soft Eurosceptic arguments into a more radical, and thus Hard Eurosceptic, language on the EU.

Secondly, the correlation between the Soft Euroscepticism frame and the Nationalism frame is stronger than with the Populism frame. Looking at graph 5.12, this correlation can mainly be found back in the periods after the peaks of the Soft Euroscepticism frame (2003, 2005 and 2015). When the Soft Euroscepticism frame rises earlier, the Nationalism frame follows in the period afterwards. The correlation between the Hard Euroscepticism frame and the Nationalism frame is lower than between the Soft Euroscepticism frame and Nationalist frame. This means that nationalist arguments could not always be combined with fundamental opposition between the EU, but mainly as criticism on specific policies or on specific agreements, on which the population demands a referendum. As such, this confirms the claim that being in favour of your own nation, does not automatically mean being fundamentally anti-European.

Thirdly, the correlation between the Populism frame and the Hard Euroscepticism frame is nearly the same as between the Populism frame and the Soft Euroscepticism frame. This indicates that populist arguments are used in both arguments that refer to scepticism on certain parts of the EU, like on immigration policies, as well as arguments that refer to fundamental opposition towards the EU.

Fourthly, the correlation between the Populism frame and the Nationalism frame is not as high as expected beforehand. This indicates that not every Nationalist argument is automatically combined with a populist argument. In general, nationalist arguments are more often used in combination with a specific policy or agreement of the EU (as the correlation with the Soft Euroscepticism frame is higher than with the Hard Euroscepticism frame), for example because it is framed as a threat for the national

sovereignty, while Populism arguments are used in both a combination with a specific policy/agreement, and in referring to general aspects, like the EU or the existing negative public opinion.

5.3 Conclusions

5.3.1 Agenda and framing of the public debate about the EU

As discussed in section 5.2, the referenda were the most prominent themes in the debates about the EU in the UK. The topics of these referenda on the EU were often discussed in relation to other themes, such as the implementation of the single currency, the EU constitution, the Lisbon treaty and EU membership. Many of these themes are framed from the perspective of Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism. The Soft Euroscepticism frame offers a more nuanced perspective on specific elements of the EU, in reference to these themes. Table 5.13 below provides a chronological overview of the main used themes that are used in the four frames in the UK. Furthermore, the main arguments that are used in all frames are showed in table 5.13. The exact content of the arguments, within each frame, are elaborated in the sections below and summarized in table 5.14.

Period	Main theme	Corresponding arguments
2001-2003	Single currency	Euro, economic integration
2004-2005	European Constitution	Political integration
2008-2010	Lisbon Treaty	Euro-crisis, economic policies, immigration/ freedom of movement policies, political integration
2013-2016	EU-membership (Brexit)	Economic policies, immigration/freedom of movement policies,
Table 5.13: Main themes that shape the agenda of the four frames in British newspapers		

Single currency: 2001-2003
Around UK1 (General elections 2001), the focus is on the single currency, as there is a political discussion on whether the UK should join the single currency (Euro). Regarding this theme, the Soft Euroscepticism mainly consists of arguments on the monetary union, and its corresponding policies and on the amount of economic (and political) integration. In the Hard Euroscepticism frame, this theme is mainly framed by arguments that emphasize the high level of bureaucracy within the EU, and by arguments that consist of examples of unnecessary rules from Brussels. Also, the implementation of the single currency is being framed as an example of the EU's evolvement into a federal state, which is highly criticized. The Populism frame frames the single currency is a theme that strengthens already existing negative public opinion on the EU; as more (economic) integration would lead to even more alienation of citizens from Brussels' institutions. The Nationalism frame frames the implementation of the single currency as a threat for national sovereignty, as the increased bureaucracy in Brussels would take powers away from national governments and parliaments. Also, the sterling currency of the UK is framed as important for the British identity; as such, the implementation of the Euro would be a threat for the national identity.

European Constitution: 2004-2005
In 2004 (UK2), the agenda of the public debate shifts to a focus on the European Constitution, on which criticism mainly entails claims on the amount of political integration which would appear after the ratification of the Constitution. This theme, together with the European elections of 2004, is causing a rise of the anti-EU parties, mainly UKIP. In 2005 (UK3), the European Constitution was rejected by the Dutch and French population, and the British government decides that a referendum is not needed anymore. However, the public still demands a referendum, as the people, according to Euro-sceptics,

have the right to express their opinion on the EU. In the Soft Euroscepticism frame, the focus on this theme is, mainly on the increasing political integration, which would happen after the implementation of the Constitution, mainly the concept of an 'ever-closer Union' is highly criticized. Arguments within the Hard Euroscepticism frame are mainly focussed on fundamental opposition towards increasing integration (the EU as a federal super-state) expressed by Euro-sceptic parties, like UKIP. These parties are also the main actors within the Populism frame, which is mainly focussed on the demand of a referendum. Euro-sceptic parties claim continually that the British citizens have the right to express their negative opinion in a referendum. It is also stressed that the EU has lost its connection with its citizens, which strengthens the demand for a referendum. The Nationalism frame repeats its argument on the national sovereignty, by stating that the implementation of the European Constitution would lead to an increased threat for national sovereignty. It is also stated that this is the right moment to reflect on the UK's position in the EU. Within this frame, there are, consequently, already claims on a referendum about the UK's EU-membership in general.

Lisbon Treaty: 2008-2010

The demand for a referendum is strengthened in 2009, when EU-politicians renegotiated the Constitution into the Lisbon Treaty, which is framed as a light-variant of the Constitution. Euro-sceptics now demand a referendum on this treaty. Together with the European elections in 2009, this causes, again, a growth of anti-EU and Eurosceptic political parties, mainly UKIP and the BNP. Around UK5 (2010), the urgency of a referendum seems to be less present within society, and Euroscepticism is mainly directed towards economic policies, mainly on the austerity measures and the way that the EU dealt with Greece and the Euro-crisis, and policies on immigration and the freedom of movement within the EU. The emphasis on these policies can predominantly be found in the Soft Euroscepticism frame. Consequently, the arguments are expanding from one theme, towards an increasing amount of other themes. This period also includes the focus on economic policies, because of the Euro-crisis, and immigration and freedom of movement policies, which is often mentioned in the Soft Euroscepticism frame. The Hard Euroscepticism frame combines the process of the Lisbon Treaty with the democratic deficit of the EU; while the Constitution has been rejected by citizens, EU politicians renegotiated the Constitution into the Lisbon Treaty, while these two agreements are framed as not significantly different from each other. The Populism frame adds on this by claiming that among the process of establishing the Lisbon Treaty, the voice of the citizens is totally ignored. It is also framed that referenda on the Lisbon Treaty were blocked, to ratify the Lisbon Treaty successfully. This strengthened the already negative public opinion, which leads to an increase of Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament, after the elections of 2009, which is also an important argument of the Populism frame during this episode. The Nationalism frame, again, frames on the EU as a threat for national sovereignty. However, after the announcement of the Lisbon Treaty, it is more often argued that the UK should renegotiate its membership with the EU, which is also combined with framings on the important relationship between the UK and the USA.

EU-membership (Brexit): 2013-2016

In 2014 (UK6), the appearance of anti-EU parties among public discussion increases again around the European elections. After the elections, which are won by anti-EU parties (mainly UKIP), Prime Minister David Cameron promises that, if he would be re-elected in 2015, he would renegotiate the membership of the EU, and then offer this deal to the population in the shape of a referendum. During the elections of 2015 (UK7), this referendum is highly apparent within public debate, together with criticism on the economic and immigration policies, which already came to the fore in 2010. Cameron won the elections and went to other EU leaders to renegotiate the conditions for membership of the EU. The outcomes of these negotiations are, theoretically, the main consideration in the referendum of 2016 (UK8). However, it appears that emotional and populist arguments, combined with the reclaiming of national sovereignty, and a focus on national identity issues, are directed towards the

already apparent scepticism on immigration and economic policies. Consequently, the UK votes to Leave the EU, and the focus of public debate shifts towards the conditions of this Brexit, around UK9 (2017). Around these elections, the Brexit is placed within a broader perspective of other elections and referenda, in which populist anti-establishment parties, that mainly focus on national identity issues, are highly apparent during the campaigns. These themes are framed differently in every specific frame; the Soft Euroscepticism frame is predominantly focussed on criticism on the economic policies of the EU (austerity policies) and the immigration and freedom of movement policies (migrant/refugee crisis and discussions on whether the domestic social benefit system should be available for all income EU-migrants). Within the Hard Euroscepticism frame, fundamental opposition of the Leave campaign is mainly expressed by framing the democratic deficit of European institutions and the unnecessary and overpaid bureaucracy of Brussels. Also, it is framed that the referendum in the UK should and would lead to fundamental reforms within the EU, which would be beneficial for both the EU and the UK. The Populism frame is mainly focussed on emotional arguments that are used by the Leave campaign; concerns, anger and fears among the population are combined with immigration issues, and it is framed that these concerns are caused by the policies of the EU. On the other side, the Leave campaign frame the Remain campaign as 'Project Fear', as they continually claim that leaving the EU would be a disaster for both the EU and the UK. The Nationalism frame is firstly focussed on the renegotiation of the UK's position within or without the EU. The closer to the referendum, the more a shift appears towards a focus on 'liberation'. It is continually claimed that a Brexit would lead to a liberation from the EU, as the UK would get its national sovereignty back. It is also argued that Euro-scepticism is part of the national identity, and that leaving the EU is good for the continuation and flourishing of this identity.

As such, it can be concluded that discussing about a referendum on the EU has been part of public discussion during the whole period (2000-2017), but that the content of this discussion shifts from the single currency to the European Constitution, to the Lisbon Treaty, towards a referendum on the UK's EU-membership. During these discussions, criticism on the economic policies shift from the single currency to the way that the EU deals with the Euro-crisis, into discussion on the austerity measures that mainly harm Southern-European Economies. Also, criticism on immigration and freedom of movement policies are increasingly apparent within public discussion. Criticism on these policies are, mainly around the European elections of 2014 and the Brexit referendum in 2016, combined with emotional arguments that combine criticism with concerns, fears and anger of the population. Table 5.15 below shows an overview of framings for each frame during each critical moment.

Critical moment	Main theme	Soft Euroscepticism framing	Hard Euroscepticism framing	Populism framing	Nationalism framing
UK1 – UK elections 2001	Single currency	European (political) integration	Unnecessary bureaucracy and rules, federal EU	Alienation of citizens	Integration as threat for sovereignty and identity
UK2 – EU elections 2004	European Constitution	European (political) integration	EU as a federal super-state	Negative public opinion and rise of Eurosceptic parties	Constitution as threat for national sovereignty
UK3 – UK elections 2005	European Constitution	Rejection in FR & NL, EU as economic union	UKIP's fundamental opposition & claims for change	Reaction on FR & NL referendum fuels negative public opinion	Emphasis on national sovereignty and UK's place in the world
UK4 – EU elections 2009	Lisbon Treaty	(Foreign) workers protection policies	Democratic deficit of the EU institutions, procedures and processes of decision-making	Lack of representation of citizens in EU institutions, increasing Euroscepticism	Renegotiation of UK's membership, protection of national sovereignty

				and anti-EU parties	
UK5 – UK elections 2010	Lisbon Treaty	Economic and immigration/freedom of movement policies	Democratic deficit and Brussel's bureaucracy	Negative public opinion and increase of Eurosceptic parties in EP	UK's position in the world and relationship with USA, protection of national sovereignty
UK6 – EU elections 2014	EU membership	Austerity policies and immigration/freedom of movement policies	Democratic deficit fuelled by elections and referendum	EU causes problems with immigration, emotional arguments, increasing influence Eurosceptic parties	Protection of national sovereignty, control of own borders, renegotiation of UK's membership
UK7 – UK elections 2015	EU membership	Austerity policies and immigration/freedom of movement policies, inability of coming to appropriate joint solutions	'EU has to change, or the UK will leave', economic vs. political ideologies on the EU	Increasing Euroscepticism has influenced 2014 elections and will influence the referendum	Regaining national sovereignty and favourable national position as keys in renegotiations with EU
UK8 – Referendum 2016	EU membership	Changing political landscape, austerity policies, immigration policies, welfare system for foreign workers, inefficient and expensive EU budget, no political integration	Democratic deficit, no 'United States of Europe' or 'ever-closer Union'	Combination of immigration and concerns of people ('immigrants are terrorists'), outcome referendum hard to predict	Liberation from EU, regaining national sovereignty, Brexit as national identity issue
UK9 – UK elections 2017	EU membership	Economic and political consequences of Brexit, austerity policies, different perspectives on Brexit negotiations	EU reactions on Brexit as example of democratic deficit	Europe in a crisis, Brexit in a wider 'populist' context	Brexit as national identity issue, outcome negotiations should be focussed on favourable national position

Table 5.14: Overview of themes and framing around critical moments in the UK

In general, table 5.14 shows that all four frames refer to the main themes that are forming the agenda of public discussion and that each frame uses different arguments on the main themes. However, it can be argued that the key arguments of every frame are founded in the arguments of the Soft Euroscepticism frame. This is for example the case when immigration/freedom of movement policies are criticized. Where the **Soft Euroscepticism** mainly refers to the content of the policies, for example the critique that the UK does not want to open their benefit system to foreign workers, the **Hard Euroscepticism** frames the immigration policies of the EU as an example on the different ideologies on the EU between the UK and other members states; the UK rather wants to arrange these policies independently. The **Populism** frame frames immigration and freedom of movement policies from a perspective of fears and concerns of the population, which causes an increasingly negative public opinion. Finally, the **Nationalism** frame uses the argument of national sovereignty: because of EU immigration/freedom of movement policies, the UK is not able anymore to control its own borders; thus, the EU is a threat for the UK's national sovereignty. Therefore, the main conclusion is that every

argument from the Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame is used independently, but often has an overlap with arguments from the Soft Euroscepticism frame.

> Conclusion: The arguments of the Soft Euroscepticism frame can be considered as the fundaments for arguments of the other frames.

Consequently, in several occasions, the **Soft Euroscepticism** and **Hard Euroscepticism** frame are increasingly overlapping, as the Hard Euroscepticism frame often combines its arguments with arguments of the Soft Euroscepticism frame. This can for example be seen in arguments that refer to the amount of European (political) integration. Arguments from the Soft Euroscepticism frame argue that increasing integration is not beneficial for the UK, and that this needs to be stopped. These arguments are strengthened by arguments from the Hard Euroscepticism frame, which often argue that increasing integration means the evolvement of the EU as a federal super-state, which is often framed as a reason for fundamental opposition towards the EU.

> Conclusion: Overlap between the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame can mainly be found in arguments on the (political) European integration.

Furthermore, there seems to be an overlap between the **Soft Euroscepticism** frame and the **Populism** frame. During almost every critical moment, more general arguments about negative public opinion towards the EU and frames on anti-EU parties are combined with specific criticism on policies, other member states or institutions, which are arguments of the Soft Euroscepticism frame. This is also the case for the **Hard Euroscepticism** frame; as these arguments are also combined with Populist framings on negative public opinion and anti-EU parties. The Populism frame, thus, seems to have a connection with both the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame. However, as the correlation table (5.13) shows, this connection cannot be find back in the correlations. Thus, while the frames (Soft Euroscepticism and Populism, Hard Euroscepticism and Populism) seem to have a strong connection content-wise, the occurrence seems to have a rather weak correlation. This indicates that arguments within these frames are used on their own, as well as in combination with each other.

> Conclusion: The arguments of the Populism frame are often overlapping with the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame, as Eurosceptic arguments are strengthened by stressing the existing negative public opinion and the rise of anti-EU parties.

The arguments of the **Nationalism** frame also seem to be related to the arguments of the **Soft Euroscepticism** frame. In general, policies, and mainly the themes that are framed on the different referendum subjects, of the EU are framed within the Nationalism frame as a threat for the national sovereignty, and sometimes as a threat for the national identity. Furthermore, the Nationalism frame relates arguments from the Soft Euroscepticism frame to the renegotiations of the national position; for example, on the content of the freedom of movement policies. Therefore, the Nationalism frame seems to have a strong overlap with the Soft Euroscepticism frame, which is also reflected in the occurrences (correlation is 0,41) of the frames. The overlap with the Hard Euroscepticism frame seems to be rather weaker, which means that arguments within the Hard Euroscepticism frame are to a lesser extent used in a context of Nationalism framings, but rather with Populist framings. However, the overlap between the Nationalism and Populism frame seems to be stronger. This can mainly be seen in the framings on the anti-EU parties, that are communicating continually on the protection of national sovereignty.

> Conclusion: Overlap between the Soft Euroscepticism and Nationalism frame occurs when specific elements or policies of the EU are framed as a threat for the national sovereignty or identity.

> Conclusion: The Hard Euroscepticism frame seems to have more overlap with the Populism frame than with the Nationalism frame.

5.3.2 Shifts in public opinion and framing of the debate

This section discusses the main conclusions that can be drawn from combining the four analysed frames and the changes among public opinion towards the EU in the UK.

Graph 5.13 (on which a bigger version is available in Annex VIII) below combines the changes in Eurobarometer public opinion with the amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element (as discussed in section 5.1). This graph indicates some general interrelations between the amount of articles and shifts in public opinion. For example, around critical moment UK4 (European elections 2009), the amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element is increasing, while also the negative answers are increasing, and the positive answers are declining. On the other side, the period around UK6 (European elections 2014) shows that the amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element is increasing, while the negative answers are declining, and the positive answers remain equal. Consequently, no general conclusions can be drawn from solely looking at the interrelation between the amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element and shifts in public opinion. Therefore, this section discusses specific remarkable movements of all frames and public opinion, as seen in Annex IX (Changes in public opinion and frames UK).

Graph 5.13: Public opinion on the EU in the UK during the period 2000-2017, as found in the Eurobarometer and the amount of articles containing a Eurosceptic element, as found in in the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph

In the period around the **European elections of 2004** (UK2), the use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame increases, while public opinion towards the EU grows more negatively; negative answers increase, while positive answers decline. The main theme around this period was the European Constitution, and the corresponding increasing political integration. Annex IX shows that the use of the Hard

Euroscepticism frame, which mainly expresses opposition to Brussels' bureaucracy and rules, and the threat of the EU becoming a federal super-state due to the European Constitution, increased as well during this period. It can thus be concluded that, during the run-up to the European elections of 2004, there seems to be an overlap between the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame, which seems to cause increasing negative public opinion towards the EU. Furthermore, the Populism and Nationalism frame are not used to a high extent around this episode, which indicates that Euroscepticism is, during these elections, not primarily related to populist or nationalist arguments.

> Conclusion: The overlap between the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame on increasing (political) integration seems to cause a more negative public opinion towards the EU around the European elections of 2004, while the use of the Populism and Nationalism frame is rather low.

The same conclusion can be drawn from the **European elections of 2009** (UK4), which also shows a significant increase of negative public opinion towards the EU, combined with a high use of the Soft Euroscepticism and Hard Euroscepticism frame. However, the focus of public debate shifts from scepticism on political integration to scepticism on economic and immigration policies, and scepticism on the Lisbon Treaty. Meanwhile, this period is characterized by a high use of the Populism frame; which specifically seems to be related to the criticism on the Lisbon Treaty (not considering the population in a referendum) and economic and immigration policies. Thus, it can be concluded that where earlier, Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frames are used during these elections, they are now combined with rather Populist framings on not considering citizens and scepticism on the economic and immigration policies.

> Conclusion: Around the European elections of 2009, Soft and Hard Eurosceptic arguments are increasingly combined with Populist arguments, which seems to lead to a more negative public opinion towards the EU.

During the next **European elections in 2014** (UK6), the use of the Soft Euroscepticism is significantly lower than during the earlier European elections. However, the use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame and the Populism frame is still high, while also the Nationalism frame increases in use. This indicates a shift in public debate towards immigration, combined with using emotional arguments on concerns, angers and fears of the population. Also, the EU is increasingly framed as a threat for national sovereignty and the discussion on the UK's EU membership. Meanwhile, during this period, public opinion on the EU grows increasingly positive; negative answers decline while positive answers increase. This might indicate that a certain group of people, which was already negatively influenced by Soft Euroscepticism arguments in earlier European elections, now tends to be more positive towards the EU, as these specific arguments were less present during the elections of 2014. Additionally, this indicates that Populism arguments are only focussed on one group within the population; namely those people among who the concerns, angers and fears are (still) existing. This group, together with groups that have other reasons to be negative towards the EU, is still bigger than the positive group, as the percentage of the negative answers is still higher than of the positive answers. Consequently, populist Eurosceptic parties are focussing on these groups, to gain votes during the elections. Furthermore, the Nationalism frame indicates that this group is also increasingly emphasising national (identity) issues, which indicates that the emotional arguments used in the Populism frame seem to be increasingly connected to nationalist feelings and concerns.

Conclusion: The high use of the Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame, together with the more positive public opinion towards the EU, around the European elections of 2014, shows that radically anti-European arguments are only appealing to a specific group within the population.

During the **Brexit referendum** (UK8), another conclusion can be drawn. The Soft Euroscepticism frame has a high use around the referendum campaign. During this period, the content of this frame discusses all arguments that have earlier been made within this frame; scepticism is expressed on political integration, economic policies, immigration policies as well as on the European budget. This indicates that discussions on the EU are highly present within public debate. Interestingly, the Hard Euroscepticism frame is less present within the newspapers than around earlier described European elections. This indicates that the language about the EU seems to be less radically anti-EU, and that the newspapers discuss the Leave campaign as well as the Remain campaign. The content of the Soft Euroscepticism frame can, thus, be considered as less anti-EU, and more nuanced towards the European Union. The Populism frame is, though, highly occurrent around the referendum, although not as high as during the European elections of 2014, and is, again, combining Soft Eurosceptic arguments with emotional arguments on concerns, angers and fears. Thus, while the discussion during the European elections of 2014 was more focussed on the radically anti-EU arguments (which can be seen in the overlap between the Hard Euroscepticism and the Populism frame), the focus during the referendum seems to be more on specific arguments, which are not per se fundamentally against the EU. However, the Populism frame combines these arguments with emotional arguments, which might have led to most of the UK voting to leave the EU; as the group that they were focussing on expanded during the referendum campaign. Additionally, the Nationalism frame is highly occurrent around the referendum campaign; as the national sovereignty, the national position and the national identity are continually stressed and combined with both Soft Eurosceptic and Populist arguments. This also indicates that public debate was predominantly focussed on the national context, instead of discussing the benefits and functions of the EU itself. Meanwhile, public opinion on the EU grows more positive during the referendum campaign, which explains the difficulty in predicting the referendum results. This, again, leads to the conclusion that populist and nationalist arguments are solely focussed on, and appeal to, a certain group among the population; in this case the group that recognize itself in the expressed fears and concerns (mainly on immigration) and that has feelings of belonging to the nation state, as a vote for Leave was majorly framed as a vote for liberation of the sovereign nation state from the EU, and a question of the protection of national sovereignty and identity. After the referendum, positive answers increase further, while negative answers decline. This means that, after the UK grasped the opportunity to leave, the image on the EU grows less negative.

Conclusion: The high use of the Soft Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame around the Brexit referendum shows that the debate became more nuanced during this episode, as Populist and Nationalist arguments were less radically anti-EU.

Conclusion: The use of the four frames, the results of the referendum, and the more positive public opinion towards the EU shows that Euroscepticism around the Brexit referendum only appealed to a certain group of the population.

Chapter 6 - Comparison: frames and public opinion in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom

This chapter compares the results and conclusions of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. To do this, there are of four different sections. Section 6.1 discusses the similarities and differences within the public debate, to provide a context of the main themes to which the arguments of the frames refer. The second section (6.2) discusses the content of the frames, including the overlap and co-occurrence between the different frames. Section 6.3 discusses the interrelation of the frames and public opinion in both countries. Finally, section 6.4 concludes by summarizing the most remarkable findings within this chapter and making a connection with academic literature.

6.1 Agenda of the public debate about the EU

Combining the agenda of public debate of both the Netherlands and the UK in table 6.1 below shows that there is quite some overlap in themes and arguments that are discussed in Eurosceptic newspaper articles.

Period	Main theme (NL)	Main arguments (NL)	Main theme (UK)	Main arguments (UK)
2001 - 2004	Enlargement	Political integration, reform of EU institutions	Single currency	Euro, economic integration
2004-2006	European Constitution	Political integration, reform of EU institutions, priorities of the EU	European Constitution	Political integration
2009	European elections	Eurosceptic parties, bureaucracy of EU institutions	Lisbon treaty / Euro-crisis	Economic policies, immigration/ freedom of movement policies, political integration
2010 - 2015	Euro-crisis	Scepticism on Southern member states, European cooperation, austerity / economic policies	Euro-crisis / Brexit	Economic policies, immigration/freedom of movement policies
2014-2017	Migrant/refugee crisis	Immigration policies, European cooperation	Brexit	Immigration/freedom of movement policies
2016 - 2017	Brexit referendum	Immigration and economic policies, role of Populism in elections	Brexit	Economic policies, immigration/freedom of movement policies
Table 6.1: Main themes and arguments about the EU in public debate during the period 2000-2017				

Table 6.1 shows that the only differences between the main themes in the UK and NL are taking place during 2001-2004 and 2014-2017. In 2001-2004 public debate on the EU is connected to discussions on the Enlargement in the Netherlands, and discussions on the (implementation of the) single currency in the UK. However, it is remarkable that in both countries the main arguments refer to scepticism towards increasing European integration, although the Netherlands is focussed on political integration, while the UK is focussed on economic integration. In the period 2014-2017, the migrant/refugee crisis is central in public debate in the Netherlands, while in the UK, main arguments refer to the Brexit referendum on the UK's EU membership. However, as table 6.1 shows, immigration policies are used as an important argument during the debate around Brexit, which overlaps with the focus of the Netherlands. The themes and main arguments of the other periods shows in general, an overlap between public debate in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. However, the shape in which these arguments are used in public debate is an important difference between NL and the UK. In the United Kingdom, every theme is combined with the demand for a referendum on a specific EU issue, by the

population and/or Eurosceptic parties. As such, when a new agreement is made, or when other events that seem to affect the UK occur, the UK immediately combines this with demanding a referendum on that particular issue, which, in fact, means a referendum on the UK EU-membership. Therefore, the referendum is a central element in framing Euroscepticism in the UK during the whole period of analysis, while this does not occur in the Netherlands. Section 6.2 below elaborates on the specific content of the arguments (and thus the four frames) in the Netherlands and the UK.

6.2 Framing of public debate about the EU

As elaborated in section 4.3 and 5.3, there are different conclusions drawn on the overlap between the four frames in both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

One of the main differences in the overlap of frames can be found in the overlap between the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame. In the UK, there is a stronger overlap between the Soft and Hard Eurosceptic frame than in the Netherlands. This is because, in some periods, Soft Eurosceptic arguments in the UK are combined with a more radical (for example more Populist or Nationalist) framing, which causes a shift of the art of the argument; from Soft to Hard Euroscepticism. In the Netherlands, this overlap is less present, which implies that there is a more evident division between Soft and Hard Eurosceptic arguments, probably because the arguments are expressed by different actors in different contexts (for example; national or European elections). However, one of the similarities between the NL and the UK is the content of the arguments; as in both countries overlap between the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame can be found in arguments on (increasing) political integration. Within this theme, the division between the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame in the Netherlands is less visible

Another important difference is the stronger overlap between the Hard Euroscepticism and Populism frame and the Hard Euroscepticism and Nationalism frame in the Netherlands. This implies that, in the Netherlands fundamental opposition towards the EU is more often combined with populist or nationalist arguments than in the UK. Consequently, in the UK, fundamental opposition seems to be lesser combined with Populist and Nationalist arguments, as there is a weaker overlap. This implies that populist and nationalist arguments are more often used on their own; as an independent argument against the EU. However, an important similarity is the overlap between the Soft Euroscepticism and Nationalism frame. This overlap is predominantly visible when specific elements of the EU (Soft Euroscepticism), like the Constitution or the immigration policies are framed as a threat for the national sovereignty (Nationalism).

Furthermore, in the Netherlands, there seems to be a stronger overlap between the arguments of the Nationalism and Populism frame, which indicates that the arguments from these frames are often used in the same context, while in the UK these arguments are more often used independently.

Another main difference is the position of the Soft Euroscepticism frame. As argued, in the UK, arguments from the Soft Euroscepticism frame are often used in combination with Populist and Nationalist arguments. In that way, Soft Eurosceptic arguments are transformed into Hard Eurosceptic arguments. This process is not found that evidently in the newspaper articles of the Netherlands.

As such, the relationships between the four frames differs in the Netherlands and the UK. Where the expectation was that the relationship would be the same; namely a strong overlap between the Hard Euroscepticism frame and both the Populism and Nationalism frame, and a weak overlap between the Soft Euroscepticism frame and the other frames, these relations are different for the UK. In the Netherlands, as argued, the expected relationship is more or less found, although the overlap between

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the Soft Euroscepticism frame and the Populism and Nationalism frame seems to be stronger than expected, as shown in figure 6.1 below.

Figure 6.1: Relationships between the frames in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom

Figure 6.1 shows that in the Netherlands; there is a strict(er) division between the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame, and that the amount of found Soft Euroscepticism is higher than the amount of Hard Euroscepticism. Also, the figure shows that, while there is a small overlap between the Soft Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism frame, the overlap with the Hard Euroscepticism frame is significantly more apparent, as Hard Euroscepticism arguments are predominantly combined with Populist and Nationalist arguments. Finally, there is a major overlap between the Populism and Nationalism frame, which means that these arguments are also often combined with each other. In the United Kingdom, the figure shows that there is less overlap between the frames, as the arguments are often used independently. However, the Soft Euroscepticism frame has a central role and is, in some periods (European elections, Brexit referendum) increasingly combined with the Populism and Nationalism frame, which changes the language of the framings more radically anti-European. Consequently, these Soft Eurosceptic arguments are shifting towards the Hard Euroscepticism frame. Thus, there is a wider overlap between the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame than in the Netherlands. However, there is less overlap between the Populism and Nationalism frame and the Hard Euroscepticism frame than in the Netherlands, as these overlaps are mainly made within specific periods, and Populist, Nationalist and Hard Eurosceptic arguments are more often used independently than in the Netherlands.

Table 6.2 below shows the most often used arguments from each frame in the period 2000-2017 and makes thereby clear what the main similarities and differences are regarding the content of the frames. The next sections elaborate on these predominant arguments and how the content of these arguments changed during the period of analysis.

Frame	Argument top 3 UK	Argument top 3 NL
Soft Euroscepticism	1. pro- Referendum on EU-membership or specific condition	1. critique on (intergovernmental) cooperation in EU
Soft Euroscepticism	2.detailed critique on specific EU policies	2. detailed critique on specific EU policies
Soft Euroscepticism	3. critique on increasing (political) integration	3. critique on the enlargement of the EU
Hard Euroscepticism	1. fundamental opposition to the EU	1. critique on bureaucracy and rules from Brussels
Hard Euroscepticism	2. democratic deficit of the EU	2. fundamental opposition
Hard Euroscepticism	3. EU as intergovernmental instead of federal super-state	3. democratic deficit of the EU
Populism	1. anti-EU/establishment political parties	1. emphasis on negative public opinion on the EU
Populism	2. emphasis on negative public opinion on the EU	2. EU representation deficit
Populism	3. EU representation deficit and EU is in a crisis	3. anti-EU/establishment political parties
Nationalism	1. national position, focussed on national interests	1. emphasis on EU and the national interest
Nationalism	2. emphasis on EU as a threat for national sovereignty	2. emphasis on EU as a threat for national sovereignty
Nationalism	3. emphasis on EU as a threat for national identity	3. emphasis on EU as a threat for national identity
Table 6.2: Top-3 of predominant used arguments in the UK and the Netherlands		

Within the **Soft Euroscepticism** frame, it becomes clear that criticism on policies is highly apparent in both countries. As showed in table 6,1, this argument mainly entails scepticism towards the immigration and freedom of movement policies of the EU, and the economic policies, which is divided into the single currency and criticism on the way that the EU dealt with the Euro-crisis. The content of the argument that criticize specific policies changes over the period 2000-2017 in both the Netherlands and the UK. As argued, Soft Euroscepticism in the Netherlands changes from scepticism on the Enlargement, mainly directed to economic and immigration policies, towards scepticism on increasing political integration during discussions on the European Constitution. In the same period, scepticism in the UK is focussed on the implementation of the single currency, thus on economic policies and increasing (economic) integration, which automatically implies political integration. Like the Netherlands, the emphasis also shifts towards scepticism on the increasing political integration due to the European Constitution. After the referendum on this Constitution in the Netherlands and France, there is a different reaction in the two analysed countries. Where in the Netherlands, Soft Euroscepticism arguments contain suggestions for improving the EU, and making the EU more relevant to its citizens, the reaction in the UK is increasing Euroscepticism and demands for a referendum. During the second half of the analysed period (2010-2017), the arguments in both countries express scepticism to mainly economic and immigration policies of the EU. However, in the Netherlands, these are combined with scepticism and suggestions on the (inter-governmental) cooperation within the EU, while in the UK scepticism on these policies is combined with demands for a referendum on its membership of the EU. Therefore, it can be concluded that Soft Eurosceptic framing in the Netherlands is more constructive towards the EU than Soft Eurosceptic framing in the UK.

As for the **Hard Euroscepticism** frame, table 6.2 shows that in both countries, fundamental opposition towards the EU is high on the agenda during the analysed period, combined with arguments on the democratic deficit within the EU. However, in the Netherlands the focus was more on criticism on the bureaucracy in Brussels, while discussion in the UK more dealt with the ideology on the EU, which mainly implies the role of the sovereign nation states in the EU and the threat of the EU becoming a 'federal super-state'. Over the whole period, the content of the Hard Euroscepticism frame changes in both countries. During first half of the period (2000-2010), Hard Eurosceptic arguments mainly entail scepticism on the bureaucracy of Brussels, which refers to the working procedures of the European

institutions, and (examples of) rules that are made by Brussels, and that are framed as being too much interfering in domestic affairs. In the UK, Hard Euroscepticism is also focussed on these arguments. However, at the end of this period (in 2009) these arguments are predominantly transferred into fundamental scepticism on the bureaucratic deficit in the EU, which refers to a lack of influence of citizens and national governments/parliaments in European procedures and processes of decision-making. This shift occurs in both countries, which means that the content of Hard Eurosceptic arguments is similar in both countries, when used independently. However, as argued, Hard Eurosceptic arguments are often combined with either Populist and Nationalist arguments (mainly in the Netherlands) and with Soft Eurosceptic arguments (mainly in the UK).

Within the **Populism frame**, the focus in both countries is predominantly on negative public opinion towards the EU, the anti-EU (Eurosceptic) and anti-Establishment political parties and the low amount of representation of citizens in the EU. Furthermore, in the UK, the argument that claims that the EU is in a crisis is highly apparent. Considering the content of the Populism frame over the whole period in the Netherlands, a shift occurs from emphasizing the representation deficit in the EU institutions towards framing the uprising of Eurosceptic/ anti-EU parties, in mainly other countries, combined with the emphasis on the existing negative public opinion towards the EU. In the UK, the content of the Populism arguments shows a different dynamic. Where the focus in the first half is, like the Netherlands, mainly on the alienation of citizens and the lack of representation in the EU, the content of the arguments shifts around the European elections in 2014 and the Brexit referendum in 2016. Around these critical moments, the Populism frame increasingly combines specific elements of the EU (from the Soft Euroscepticism frame) with concerns, fears and angers of citizens, which may be considered as one of the causes for increasingly negative public opinion towards the EU.

In the **Nationalism** frame, an important difference can be found; where in the UK, the focus is on the national position, which is a general argument on the place of the nation within the EU and the world, the focus of the Nationalism frame in the Netherlands is on the national interest. In the Netherlands, the national interest is framed by both supporters and opponents of the EU; as they both claim that the EU should be in favour of the national interest. On the contrary, the national position argument in the UK is mainly used by opponents of the EU, by claiming that the UK should renegotiate its position in the EU, and in the end leave the EU completely. The other two Nationalism arguments are overlapping, which indicates that both countries are focussing on the national sovereignty and the national identity. The arguments that frame the national sovereignty are used during the whole period of analysis, in both countries, and are evidently connected to the themes that are central in the public debate. For example, during the migrant/refugee crisis the fact that the Netherlands/the UK cannot control its own borders is framed as a threat for the national sovereignty, and, during the discussion on the European Constitution, increasing political integration is framed as a threat for national sovereignty. Thus, this argument is important in both the Netherlands and the UK during the whole period of analysis.

In sum, Euroscepticism over the period 2000-2017 in the UK can be considered as a continually returning wave of demands about a referendum, which builds up to the Brexit referendum in 2016, during which all earlier used Soft and Hard Eurosceptic arguments are combined. Therefore, claims on Euroscepticism being part of the British national identity (The Guardian – 5.91, 5.42, Henderson et. al, 2016) seem very plausible. This can also be seen in the amount of Populist arguments around the European elections in the UK, which shows that Eurosceptic arguments are increasingly combined with arguments that appeal to a specific group of people, by combining these arguments with emotional arguments that include their concerns, fears and angers. In the Netherlands, this automatic demand for a referendum is significantly less present during the period, while even two referenda are taking

place; in 2005 and 2016. While framing in the UK mainly refers to reactions among the population, framing in the Netherlands is more directly connected to specific events, like the Enlargement, events during the Euro-crisis and the implementation of the European Constitution. As such, the essence of what frames are being used is fundamentally different in the Netherlands, as framing seems to be more objective towards EU issues, while in the UK an emerging amount of Euroscepticism seems to overshadow every argument.

6.3 Public opinion and frames on the European Union

The interrelation between public opinion and the analysed frames can best be found by looking at the found data around the European elections, and the two referenda in 2016, as these take place at the same time in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In general, it can be stated that around all European elections, the use of the Nationalism frame is relatively high in the Netherlands, while the use of the Populism frame is relatively high in the UK. When comparing the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame, it can be found that in the UK, the Hard Euroscepticism frame is more often used than the Soft Euroscepticism frame around the European elections of 2009 and 2014. In the Netherlands, the use of the Soft Euroscepticism frame is higher than the Hard Euroscepticism frame around all analysed European elections.

The European elections of 2004 (NL3, UK2) show that public opinion in both countries is growing more negative before the elections. After the elections, this changes in both countries, as public opinion grows more positive. However, the overall percentage of positive answers is significantly higher in the Netherlands than in the UK. In the Netherlands, both the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame and Nationalism frame are more often used, while in the UK, solely the Soft Euroscepticism frame is predominantly used. The combination of these findings indicate that the European elections of 2004 seem to act as a starting point for increasing Euroscepticism in the Netherlands, while in the UK, this was a quite 'normal situation'. Furthermore, the European elections seem to get a lower amount of attention in the UK, except for the already existing discussion on the implementation of the single currency, on which the Soft Euroscepticism frame is focussed during that period. In the Netherlands, the amount of frames and arguments seems to increase around the elections.

The European elections of 2009 (NL6, UK4) show a different situation, as public opinion in the Netherlands is quite positive, while public opinion in the UK is significantly growing more negative. In the UK, this collides with a high use of the Populism frame, which mainly consists of claims of the Eurosceptic UKIP party. Also, the Hard Euroscepticism frame is more often used than the Soft Euroscepticism frame in the UK. In the Netherlands, the Nationalism frame is quite often used, but declines after the national elections of 2006 (in which the Eurosceptic PVV participates for the first time). While the Soft Euroscepticism frame is relatively often used, the use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame is relatively low in the Netherlands. These findings indicate that in the Netherlands, the arguments of the Nationalism frame and the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame are mainly appealing to a small group of voters in the country, as overall public opinion grows more positive. As for the UK, the arguments of the Populism and Hard Euroscepticism frame are radicalizing the Eurosceptic arguments, which leads to a more radically anti-European focus that seems to appeal to an increasing number of people within the country, as overall public opinion grows more negative. As such, Euroscepticism, which is strengthened by Populist arguments, is wider apparent in the British society than in the Dutch society.

Interestingly, this trend is not visible anymore around the **European elections of 2014** (NL9, UK6), where public opinion in both countries seems to grow more positive around the elections. However, the use of the Populism frame is at its highest around these elections, like the use of the Hard Euroscepticism frame, which is relatively often used. On the contrary, the use of the Soft

Euroscepticism and Nationalism frame are quite low around the elections. This indicates that the populist, anti-European arguments did not change content-wise compared to the elections of 2009. However, as already mentioned, the arguments are increasingly combined with concerns and angers of a certain part of the population, which indicates that voters who did not recognize these, might not have voted negatively towards the European Union. As such, in the UK, the communication strategy of Eurosceptic political parties is still populist and anti-European but is now directed towards a more specific group of voters. This is different from the situation in the Netherlands, where the use of the Populism and Nationalism frame is relatively low, while the Soft and Hard Euroscepticism frame are more often used. This implies that anti-European arguments in the Netherlands are less characterized by Populist and Nationalist arguments, but mainly by rather specific (Soft Eurosceptic) arguments or arguments that express fundamental opposition towards the EU (Hard Eurosceptic). As such, public opinion, which is growing more positive towards the EU, in the Netherlands seems to be less influenced by Populist and Nationalist arguments and seems to be only influenced by less radical Eurosceptic arguments, compared to public opinion in the United Kingdom.

Finally, another important moment during which British and Dutch public opinion can be compared is around the **Brexit (and Ukraine) referendum in 2016-1**. As already mentioned, in the Netherlands, frames during this period consist mainly of claims on the Brexit referendum, rather than on the Dutch Ukraine referendum, in which only 32% of the voters came to vote. The use of all frames is rather low, and the increasing amount of Populist arguments consists mainly of claims about the political situation in other countries, like the UK. Meanwhile, public opinion towards the EU is growing more positive in the Netherlands. This is also the case in the UK, however, in the UK the use of all frames is relatively high. This indicates that, mainly the Nationalism and Soft Euroscepticism frame, are appealing to a certain group of voters in the country, which explains the 51% who voted to leave the European Union. Instead of a focus on Populist arguments, the focus thus shifted to a more Nationalist language around the referendum, which caused the appealing of a higher amount of people, than during the European elections of 2014. Furthermore, the turnout for the referendum (72%) was significantly higher than the turnout for the European elections (36%), which implies that more Eurosceptic voters came to vote for the referendum. As such, public opinion grows more positive in both countries around the referendum, however the turnout for the two referenda shows that Euroscepticism was a low priority issue in the Netherlands, while being an absolutely high priority issue in the UK, as it is mainly combined with Nationalist arguments, and people who are not voting normally, now came to vote against the EU.

6.4 Conclusion

Overall, public opinion in the Netherlands is more positive towards the EU over the whole period than in the United Kingdom. Also, public opinion in the Netherlands is more stable than in the UK, which leads to the conclusion that the public seems to be less influenced by an increasing amount of Eurosceptic, Populist and Nationalist arguments in newspapers, and that therefore, the interrelation between public opinion and the four frames is less apparent in the Netherlands. In the United Kingdom, the periods around the European elections show an increasing amount of Populist arguments. This changes around the Brexit referendum, in which Nationalism arguments are more occurring. All in all, the higher use of these two frames, combined with a higher occurrence of the Hard Euroscepticism frame, seems to lead to increasing negativity towards the EU among a specific group of voters. Therefore, the interrelation between public opinion and the four frames seems to be more apparent in the UK than in the Netherlands, at least among a specific group of people which is appealed by Populist and Nationalist arguments. The Populist arguments appeal to a specific group by combining

their emotions with (mainly Soft) Eurosceptic arguments, while the group that does not recognize these emotions seems to become more positive towards the EU over the whole period. Around the Brexit referendum, the focus shifts from Populism to Nationalism, which leads to a bigger group of negative voters. In the Netherlands, there is an increasing and expanding amount of Euroscepticism over the period, with a higher occurrence of nationalist arguments around the EU elections, but the relatively low use of (domestically aimed) populist arguments, seems to lead to a relatively stable public opinion towards the EU. As such, the comparison between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom confirms that an increasing amount of populist and nationalist arguments, combined with Eurosceptic arguments, seems to lead to a more negative public opinion towards the EU.

Next to this interrelation between public opinion and the framing in newspapers, this research confirms the statements of Baumgartner et al (2008) and Conti & Memoli (2017) on framing of complex issues. Both authors state that framing on a complex (governance) issue is predominantly done by choosing one or two elements of the issue, and continually stressing these elements, to make the whole issue more understandable for citizens. In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, this is done by mainly framing on economic policies and immigration policies of the European Union. Systematic negative framing on these elements might thus lead to a negative public opinion towards the EU. Furthermore, for the UK, this can also be connected to the focus on a referendum on the EU, which shows demands for a referendum on different elements of the EU, which finally leads to a referendum on the EU-membership. It can, thus, be argued that negative framing on specific referendum issues (Single currency, European Constitution, Lisbon Treaty) in the UK, might be another important reason for the 'Leave' vote in the Brexit referendum in 2016.

Regarding the four 'dumbing down effects' or the undesired outcomes of media (Trenz, 2008), all four effects seems to come back in the research. As for *inherent nationalism*, it is being argued that media framing on the EU is inherently nationalistic, as journalists and politicians are focussed on applying European issues to the national context. However, it can be argued that, at least in the UK, this nationalist focus has, in the end, been partly responsible for the Brexit. It is being argued that the focus on the Nationalist arguments around the referendum appealed to a higher amount of (Eurosceptic) citizens. This also accounts for the Netherlands, although to a lesser extent. In both countries, it is being found that (parts of) the EU are continually framed as a threat for the national interests, the national position, the national sovereignty and/or the national identity.

Another dumbing down effect of media is *Entertainment,* which refers to media as the amplifier of rational discourse. It is being argued that this effect is caused by the transformation of the rational discourse into drama and infotainment (Postman, 1985). The essence of this effect is that negative framing on the EU, which might include drama and infotainment, have more news value, and are thus more apparent in frames on the European Union. However, as this research solely included articles that have a negative focus on the EU, no valid conclusion can be drawn on this effect, as every article might be influenced by *entertainment.*

The third dumbing down effect refers to the '*voice of the powerful*', which means that the media competence of politicians / or political processes are the main reason for legitimacy. This effect can be found back in the Populism arguments, as the communication strategies of these parties are focussed on appealing to a certain group of citizens, by applying ideological, social and rhetoric styles. These styles are, for example, used when a Soft Euroscepticism argument is being combined with a Populist and/or Nationalist argument, which makes the argument more appealing to a particular group of people, that would not be appealed when solely using the Soft Euroscepticism argument. Furthermore, the five dimensions of Populism (Taggart, 2004) can be found back within the framings of the

newspapers. Table 6.3 below shows the main empirical examples on how the five dimensions are used in newspaper articles.

Dimensions of Populism (Taggart)	Empirical examples
Hostility to representative politics	Continuous claims on the alienation of citizens from the EU, democratic and representative deficit, demands for a referendum in the UK
Identification with a 'heartland' that represents an idealised conception of the community	Focus on the protection of national sovereignty and national identity
The imagined ideology is leading,	Anti-EU/ establishment parties do not express any positive views on the EU
Populism is a reaction to change, crisis and challenge	Populist arguments increase because of Euro-crisis and migrant/refugee crisis, populist arguments state that the EU is in a crisis
It is hard to sustain populist movements, as, when the crisis is over, they must adopt in a certain way to existing politics	After critical moments (European elections, referenda) the use of the Populism arguments declines
Table 6.3: Dimensions of Populism and empirical examples	

Finally, the *cynicism* effect refers to the negativity bias of newspaper articles, in this case on the European Union. The use of strategic frames, and the absence of objective and rational content, leads to a cynical attitude of public opinion. While this research has a negativity bias itself, as all articles contain a Eurosceptic element, the content of the articles seems to be more nuanced than expected according to this dumbing down effect. Mainly in the Netherlands, and in the UK during the referendum campaign, newspaper articles frame negative as well as positive elements of the European Union. However, these positive elements are not used in the research, which is mentioned in the Discussion (Chapter 7).

In sum, it can be concluded that aspects of earlier researches, like the dimensions of Populism and the so-called dumbing down effects of media can be found back in the analysis, which confirms the earlier mentioned conclusions. The next chapter consists of a discussion on these conclusions, shortcomings of the analysis and recommendations for further research on this topic.

Chapter 7 - Discussion

The aim of this research has been to answer the main research question; '*To what extent do Eurosceptic, Populist and Nationalist media-framings in newspapers, during the critical moments in the period 2000 – 2017 in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom influence public opinion on the European Union, or vice versa?'.* The outcomes of the research indicate that it is complex to give a general answer on this research question, as it seems that the interrelation between framings in newspaper articles and public opinion towards the EU differs among the period of analysis. Also, the comparison between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom shows that the interrelation between framings and public opinion depends on the national context. Next to answering the main research question, another aim of this research has been to elaborate on the interrelation and overlap between Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism. In the Netherlands, it has been found that Populism and Nationalism are mainly overlapping with each other, and to Hard Euroscepticism. In the United Kingdom, this relationship seems to be more complex, as Soft Euroscepticism is, when combined with Populism and Nationalism evolving into Hard Euroscepticism. Also, in the UK, the four frames seem to be more often used independently from each other than in the Netherlands.

As the research solely focussed on the framings of Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism, the so-called four *other arguments*, which have been found in the literature study and the first quick analysis of the database of articles, have not been included in the final analysis. The first other argument focusses on the indifference of citizens toward the European Union. Instead of having a positive or negative opinion, they simply do not care about the EU. The second argument considers the national context and entails frames in which the European Union is used in a national (political) strategy. The third argument entails counter-reactions on Euroscepticism, and frames positive elements of the European Union. The fourth argument refers to the unawareness of citizens towards the EU and can therefore be an explanation for existing negative public opinion. It can be argued that these arguments entail important explanations for underlying arguments and processes of Euroscepticism. Therefore, these arguments are included in the framing analysis. The datasheet on the framing analysis show that these arguments are indeed frequently used in newspaper articles. However, to limit the focus of the research to Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism, it has been decided not to elaborate more on these arguments. Therefore, further research can be done on these underlying arguments and the combination with Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism.

One of the main shortcomings of this research is the fact that the research has a negativity bias, which means that the research solely focusses on newspaper articles that have a dominant negative attitude towards the EU. Including articles that provide a more positive view towards the European Union would give a more nuanced and balanced overview of public opinion towards the EU. However, due to the scope of this research, and the fact that it has been argued that most of the newspaper articles on the EU consists of negative content, it has been decided to continue with the negative bias. Further research might combine the results of this research with more positive newspaper articles on the EU, to provide a more balanced overview of Euroscepticism among society.

Next to the exclusion of positive articles, another shortcoming of the research is that applying the search term at LexisNexis might have also excluded some important newspaper articles. Before applying the search term, several tests have been done, which have led to the improvement and expansion of the search term. However, it could not be precluded that some other terms, which refer to a negative attitude towards the EU, are excluded from this.

Another shortcoming of this research is, due to the search on LexisNexis and the actual occurrence of articles containing a Eurosceptic element in newspapers, the amount of selected articles differs for both countries, and within the selected critical moments. For example, the total amount of selected articles in the Netherlands is 443, while the amount for the UK is 618. This might weaken the conclusions of the research. On the other side, it can be argued that these amounts reflect the actual occurrence of newspaper articles, as the total amount of articles is higher for the UK (4183) than for the Netherlands (1676). Also, the differences between the two selected newspapers has not been considered, due to the scope of the research. Looking at the difference between the newspapers might reveal surprising conclusions on Euroscepticism, as the research consists of Euro-critical as well as Euro-positive newspapers.

Furthermore, the actors that express the frames in newspapers articles have not been considered in this research. Therefore, the conclusions on the framings are quite general. Nevertheless, public opinion of the Eurobarometer can also not be directed to specific actors, which makes the two different data sets appropriate to compare with each other. Also, within the Populism frame, a lot of framings are on specific anti-European/Eurosceptical political parties and politicians and can thus be directed to specific actors. However, one of the complexities of the Populism (and to some extent the Nationalism) framings is that most of the framings are on these actors, instead of expressed by the actors themselves. This emerge to a quite indirect point of view on Populist (and Nationalist) framings. However, the aim of a framing analysis is to explore what framings are used within the selected articles. As such, these, quite indirect, results on Populist framings offer an actual display of the content of the selected newspaper articles.

Also, the concepts that are discussed in this research can be considered as complex concepts, that are defined and operationalized differently by every researcher. Therefore, another shortcoming of this research is the limitation of, mainly Populism and Nationalism, to a limited number of aspects and arguments. Due to the scope of the research, there has been no possibility to grasp every existing perspective on these complex concepts. However, the results of this research can be added to the existing perceptions on the used perspectives on the concepts, and further research can be done on this.

Finally, further research on the interrelation between newspaper framings and public opinion can be done, using this research as the basis. For example, the connections between the four frames can be elaborated by applying a framing analysis to another country, for example in Eastern Europe. As a major focus of scepticism in the Netherlands and the UK focusses on one of the countries that entered the EU in 2004, or Southern European countries, applying this research to one of these countries would provide a richer overview of the connections between Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism. Furthermore, other forms of public opinion research can be applied, for example by interviewing citizens in different countries on their opinion about the EU and questioning them on their views on the connection of Euroscepticism, Populism and Nationalism. Finally, further research can be done on the positive effects of knowing the connection between the analysed concepts. This research is mainly focussed on describing connections, and elaborating on these, which can be used as a basis for how to turn these around, so that the acquired knowledge can be made beneficial for the European Union. A possible research question on these researches might be; 'In what ways can communication about the European Union be changed, to create more awareness of the positive aspects of the EU?'.

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