

Power sharing in its local context

The case of Mangu LGA, Nigeria

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Plateau State is one of the 36 states of Nigeria and is located in the Middle Belt of Nigeria. Plateau State is already for a long time the stage of conflicts that have multiple cleavages and multiple causes. This conflict went into violence during a crisis in the capital in 2001 and after that spread all over Plateau State. More than 54,000 people were killed in the 10 years that followed in Plateau State and the state became deeply segregated and divided. However in Plateau State there were some areas that stayed relatively peaceful and one of them is Mangu LGA. Even though everywhere around this area there was violence and even though Mangu LGA itself became very volatile, it never escalated into open violence in Mangu. Of course there also in Mangu where a lot of incidents happen, however these incidents did not cause a vicious cycle of violence. This observation, briefly described in an article of Thaut (2012), forms the starting point of this thesis.

This thesis focuses on conflict mitigation institutions in Mangu Local Government Area (LGA), in the Middle Belt of Nigeria. Mangu LGA is a third tier of government area, comparable with a municipality, headed by a local government areas chairman. The whole Middle Belt is the scene of clashes between different ethnic and religious groups (Paden 2005) and Plateau State is one of the most extreme cases in the Middle Belt (International Crisis Group 2012). The conflict in Plateau State started in the capital of Plateau State Jos in 2001, where the conflict had both religious, ethnic and economic aspects (Mang in Saggiomo 2013, Ojukwu and Onifade 2010), which had a spill-over effect on the whole of Plateau State (Ambe-Uva 2010).

The lens through which we will approach this case is the concept of power sharing. The starting position of this concept is the review articles by Hartzell and Hoddie (2003, 2015) about power sharing. Power can be shared on different terrains, but they all have the same rationale: Different groups or institutions share the power to prevent that one group can dominate the other groups. Because of the mistrust there mostly is in a volatile environment, persons do not trust each other enough to make agreements together on a personal level and in that case a power sharing arrangement can be helpful to guarantee that all different groups have a say in governance processes. In the article of Hartzell and Hoddie articles argue that power sharing has a positive influence on the transition away from violence, because the power sharing institutional arrangement gives institutional certainties that there will not be an active security dilemma: a situation in which a pre-emptive strike will be a rational option. A lot of scholars have criticized this notion and state that the long term outcomes of power sharing are way more doubtful or even negative than what Hartzell and Hoddie claim. That is why, we want to research this academic debate in the local context of Mangu LGA and in that way contribute to this debate.

This research wants to investigate how power sharing arrangements look like in Mangu LGA and how local people perceive this institutional arrangements. Out of the literature we have seen that in Mangu LGA that are some kind of power sharing institutions (Thaut 2012, Scacco 2010), so an assumption will be that there are power sharing institutional arrangements. This research wants to investigate the whole academic debate about power sharing in one certain setting, Mangu LGA. In this setting we want to look at the concept of power sharing and all the nuances that scholars have given power sharing in the literature. This setting is local, contractionary with a lot of other scholars who have investigated power sharing more on a national level. In their cases the power sharing arrangements where quite formal and fixed, while the literature suspects that governance on a local level will be more informal and fluid (van der Haar and Heijke 2013).

Problem statement:

Power sharing has been discussed elaborately in the literature as an institutional arrangement that in the ideal situation has an institutional answer for a security problem that can lead to violence. The people do not have to trust each other, if they have enough faith in the institutional answer the power sharing arrangement offers. However the literature mainly focusses on the national and formal kinds of power sharing, while the local power sharing arrangements are being neglected in the contemporary literature about power sharing. Besides this, there is a lot of criticism what are the outcomes of power sharing arrangements in the long term, do power sharing arrangements really have an impact of solving the conflict or do they focus primarily on maintaining the status quo? And when this last option is the case, and power sharing is mainly a way to maintain the status quo, should we then ask ourselves if power sharing arrangements are something we should support or strive for? Because when power sharing maintain the status quo, this can have negative consequences for some groups and these negative consequences stay the same because the status quo is maintained.. These questions this research aims to address and to answer from a local and informal power sharing perspective. We will add to the existing research with the case of Mangu LGA in Nigeria, because Mangu LGA is somehow more peaceful than other LGAs.

Main research question

Power sharing arrangements do not come in a void, but always in a social context. If we want to map the different kind of power sharing institutions and the outcomes they have in Mangu LGA, we also need to map how people perceive the conflict in Mangu LGA. We need to know what the basic convictions of the people in Mangu are about the nature of conflict and violence and we need to investigate what the short term and the long term conflict mitigation institutions are. In other words:

we need to know how people perceive the security dilemma in Mangu LGA. Because all of this are the part of the essential environment of power sharing institutional arrangements.

This research will have the following research and sub research questions:

What are in the perception of the people in Mangu LGA the short and long term conflict mitigation mechanisms and how effective are they?

Sub research questions.

- *How is the security dilemma being perceived in Mangu LGA?*
- *What are the perceived important institutions and their effectiveness to mitigate the security dilemma.*
- *What are in the perception of the people in Mangu LGA the long term conflict mitigation mechanisms in Mangu LGA?*

This study will research this by trying to have a holistic approach, in such a way that we want to discuss the case of Mangu with as much different people as possible. This means letting both leaders in the community (LGA chairman, chiefs, religious leaders) talk as well as focus group discussions with regular people in Mangu LGA. In this way this research tries to find a lot of different perceptions and not limit itself to the perception of important stakeholders in the system.

Having given a short introduction to the setting, the topic and outlined the problem statement and the research questions, chapter two will give a more thorough review of the literature about power sharing and the security dilemma. Chapter three will share a state of the art of Nigeria, about the history the country has with power sharing and also there will be more background about the Plateau and Jos crises. Chapter four will give some insights about the methodology behind this thesis and also give some more insights about the three research sites we have used in Mangu LGA. Chapter five till seven will each answer one of the three sub research questions with the analysis of the data. Chapter eight is the chapter where we make the link to the academic debate and have the conclusion, directly followed by some point of discussion.

Chapter 2. Theoretical framework

The central concept of this research is power sharing arrangements. The world after the cold war consists of less conflict between states and more conflicts within states (Buzan 2008). In the aftermath of such a civil war there is still a huge lack of trust among the warring parties, power sharing is a concept which creates circumstances where mutual trust can grow according to some scholars (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003).

Power sharing is introduced by Arendt Lijphart, a political scientist at Yale with Dutch roots, who was fascinated by the Dutch and Belgium political system. Lijphart(1977) made in his influential study a connection between the distribution of political power among a country's competing groups and periods of stability. Lijphart his focus was on plural societies that were stable democracies, he argues that the link between power sharing and stability exists because the power sharing institutions make sure that minorities have the guarantee that they will not be excluded from power permanently. The insights of Lijphart about power sharing in plural societies are applied to countries with a history of civil war by a lot of scholars, who all emphasis different parts as power sharing (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003).

Security Dilemma

The logic behind power sharing theory is the security dilemma. The security dilemma is a term used in the International Relations (IR). Key IR thinkers have seen the core of IR is the issue of war and peace between states (Morgenthau 1973). All key thinkers accept the notion that there is no overall authority that can enforce good behaviour of states, so the international system is viewed as anarchic system (Hollis and Smith 2009, Nye 2009, Mearsheimer 1995 and Jervis 2011). Due to this anarchic situation states have to compete with each other to maximize their power and in that way secure their security. This security is defined almost exclusively in terms of weaponry, so called hard power. Later scholars also had eye for economic, societal, environmental and political power as important features for security (O'Brien and Williams 2013, Keohane 1984, Simmons and Martin 2002 and Ovodenko & Keohane 2012). One of the problems that occur in this anarchic situation is the security dilemma. This is a situation in which State A tries to increase its security and becomes a security threat to State B, and State B responds to that by taking security measures that become a threat for country A again. This kind of behaviour we see happening during the Cold War with an arms race between the USSR and the USA (Nye 2009:139). A good illustration how the security dilemma works is the example of a Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). Two people, (A and B), are independently interrogated, which means that there are four different outcomes (years of imprisonment for the two people) that correspond with the behaviour of these two people. A and B both keep quiet (both get a short sentence), A cheats on

B (A gets reduced sentence and B have to go to jail for a long time) , B cheats on A (B gets reduced sentence and A have to go to jail for a long time) and A and B cheat both (A and B both gets a long sentence) (Axelrod 2012). In such a situation there is not much needed before the situation escalates again, the impulse to do a pre-emptive strike is strong. Oberschall (2000) translated this security dilemma from the international level very nicely to the state and local level and shows that this logic of the security dilemma also can be applied within a country. Due to mistrust and uncertainty, warring groups who try to settle their disputes within a peace agreement, can easily choose to do a pre-emptive strike. Especially when there is no clear arrangeable setting in which people can put their trust. This research will from now on use the concept of the security dilemma as a state in which a pre-emptive strike is a logical and rational possibility.

Power sharing some scholars claim offers a solution for this problem of the security dilemma, because power sharing offers institutional guarantees to overcome the security dilemma. In line with Lijphart its reasoning, the modern power sharing proponents suggests that guaranteeing competing collectivises a share of government power would lead to a sense of security which helps overcome the security dilemma. Institutions and mechanisms that distribute power among former enemies is a way to prohibit the domination of one group above others (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015).

Power sharing, criticized and problematized

As we have showed above, proponents of power sharing arrangements believe that institutions can create a sufficient amount of trust to create an environment where cooperation is possible. Where Lijphart only looks at political power sharing, there is an ongoing debate on how topics the power has to be shared. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003, 2015) claim that power sharing institutions should be on four levels, the political, the economical, the military and the territorial (Ibid 2015: 40-41). The political power sharing should be on three levels, in proportional representation in elections, proportional representation in the government's administration, and proportional representation in the government's executive branch. The economical level should prevent economic exclusion, military power sharing would include different groups in key positions or to integrate opponents armies into one government army, and territorial power sharing refers to territorial based decentralization. This fourth way of power sharing would lead to more stability, because the levels combined have a stronger sense of security of the actors and next to that multiple levels help to trade off disagreements on different levels (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003: 321).

This ground work of Hartzell and Hoddie has been criticized in many ways, some authors think more emphasis should be put on one kind of power sharing, while Hartzell and Hoddie claim that power sharing can be on four different topics.. Some discuss the importance of territorial power sharing (Hartmann 2013, Lake and Rothchild 2005, Wolff 2009 and Jarstad and Nilson 2008), other scholars

elaborate over economic power sharing (Wennmars 2012) or about specific arrangements like veto-rights (Ram and Strom 2014).

A lot of discussion and critics have been published about the ideas of power sharing. Many studies argue that the long-term effects of power sharing are rather negative than positive. Vandegiste (2003) states after doing fieldwork in Burundi that power sharing on the short term has a stabilizing effect, but on the long-term power sharing have not make a difference with more ambitious objectives as conflict transformation. Democracy, rule of law and the accountability of the politicians is low, this is because of the institutional design that even losers of the election get a chair in the government (Ibid: 83). Curtis (2012) supports this conclusion as he states that power sharing is more used to keep the status quo intact then that it is really transforming into a real and stable democracy (Ibid: 17). Above that Curtis (2012) argues that power sharing can even encourage violence, because only violent players are invited on the power sharing table. Boix and Svolik (2013) even state that power sharing institutions create the right institutions to keep an authoritarian dictator longer in power. Power sharing arrangements are made with multiple partners, but if not all partners have a reasonable potential to replace the leader, the leader is not threatened and can still rule as a dictator under the name of power sharing agreements.

Schneckener (2012) is very positive about the practise of power sharing, but he also problematizes the concept. He points out that for power sharing there must be one master cleavage being defined, also must there be defined who are legitimate groups that can join the power sharing table. In the end the problem analysis is for a great responsible what kind of power sharing arrangement will be in place to solve this problem. When a conflict analysis concludes that the ethnic cleavage is the biggest source of problems, than it is most likely that power will be shared along ethnic lines. However conflicts do not have one cleavages, but always multiple layers and people have very different incentives to resort to violence. Schneckener concludes that there cannot be one single blueprint for power sharing, but that every situation asks for a custom made solution (Ibid: 175). In my opinion Schneckener misses here one important point to further problematize this concept, because he states correctly that power sharing need one big cleavage by which a conflict is divided and he present this as a hard challenge that is not insurmountable. The question is if that is true, is there always a master cleavage to find in a conflict, or are do people all have different incentives to resort into violence. as Stathis Kalyvas explains in his work? People according to Kalyvas(2003) have multiple identities and civil wars have multiple layers. This is in the basis also the criticism of Byrne and McCulloch (2012), they state that power sharing, with its one cleavage logic, creates the situation that ethno-national side of the story is overemphasized and other power relations are been neglected. They emphasize the role of gender relations or the role of religion (Ibid: 6), a lack of formal institutions about gender leads to resilient power hierarchies. Even though the scholars are wright that the

narrative of one master cleavage is too simple to understand the reasons why people resort into violence, still the master cleavage is important for power sharing arrangements. In the end power sharing arrangements do not seek to satisfy all needs of all people, power sharing arrangements try to satisfy the needs of enough people to form a stable basic foundation.

Last in this overview are the very critical ideas of Ian Spears about power sharing in Africa. Spears (2013) rejects the whole idea of power sharing arrangements in Africa. He argues that power sharing assumes that there is a deeper institutional basis to build on and in which they are embedded. These institutions are not there in Africa, because the institutions are not there, but also the culture of institutionalization is not there. If there as an exercise of political decentralization, then that may be simply institutionalizing and formalizing the already existing power structures. And in that case the whole idea of power sharing is not an accomplishment but the end product of what was already there. Spears states: “the kind of power-sharing in evidence in Africa is more likely to emerge through incremental and indigenously inspired bargaining than to be planned by outsiders” (Spears 2013: 43).

This research wants to contribute to this discussion by putting this debate into a local setting and look also to the informal ways of power sharing. As we agree with a lot of the criticism that is stated above, we still think power sharing is very useful in setting where there is no mutual trust. We are not sure if power sharing in the end will have an influence in changing the conflict dynamics, however it could have a stabilizing effect. So in that way power sharing arrangements do not always have to include all the layers of conflict analysis, but it should give an overwhelming majority a sense of security. Because that is very subjective, this thesis will focus on the local perception of power sharing.

Local power sharing

All the theories above are about power sharing as big national solutions. The interests of this paper are on the local level, because in the end big theories have to work out on the local level. At the local level, people form ideas about what the state is and how it works (van der Haar and van de Berg 2009). At the municipal and district levels the government is closest by its citizens and so it has a big impact on their daily lives. On the local field constitutional arrangements will play a role in the daily lives, but other institutions will have a bigger impact. In the big theories discusses above it is all about national power sharing, this includes grand coalitions, proportional distributions of government position etc. These are power sharing arrangements that are quite clear and will be recognized by everyone as power sharing arrangements. These are even clear in the informal setting of a local context, where power sharing arrangements are not always as formal as they are in national power sharing agreements that are sometimes led by the international community. However on top of these informal power sharing agreements that will be recognized as such, there will also be institutions that

not directly are seen power sharing institutions, but these institutions still have the same logic. As explained above power sharing institutions are those arrangements that try to overcome or lessen the threat of the security dilemma in an institutional way. In this way this research will look at the concept of power sharing institutions in the local setting, as institutions that try to overcome or decrease the tensions of the security dilemma.

Van der Haar and Heijke (2013) state that the discussion in the literature on local government in local settings, the discourse is that the weak or failing state has to deal with an absence of institutions. Van der Haar and Heijke (2013) show that instead of a lack of institutions there is a very dense institutional framework, which in some cases contains a parallel government (Ibid: 3). They show that different institutional designs relate to each other, they do not operate in a vacuum, but position themselves relative to each other. In theory these different institutional arrangement should not come into conflict with each, but in a polarised city of Jos this is more likely then somewhere more stable. Van der Haar and Heijke see possible ways how these institutions relate to each other: *"...contradiction, confrontation and friction, as well as accommodation, mutual adjustment and negotiation. We understand intertwining and interpenetration as a possible, but not a necessary occurrence in the process of interaction."* (Ibid: 4). Parallel service delivery tends to be undertaken to gain legitimacy from the local population (Ibid: 5), this could be tribally organized or religious. The institutional designs relate to each other on three dimensions: *"Confrontation and accommodation"*, *"boundary-testing boundary-setting"* and *"competing legitimacies, conflicting loyalties"* (Ibid: 13). Confrontation and accommodation is about the different agendas. The agendas of different groups are opposite, so this would suggest confrontation, but sometimes institutions have a de-escalation role. This can every time be renegotiated.

Boundary-testing, boundary-setting brings in the dimension of scanning the surrounding. The institutional field is not fixed, it is constantly moving and parallel institutional frameworks always sensing where there territory stops and where the other begins. This is always tested and negotiated.

Competing legitimacies, conflicting loyalties is about competing each other for legitimacy. Van der Haar and Heijke recognize two strategies that exist next to each other. First there is the delivery of services to gain legitimacy, second strategy is the overtaking of important issues of a parallel party. The delivery of services leads to conflicting loyalties. For example, when there are religious institutions that both have hospitals, but the Christian hospital has better medicine against Malaria, then Muslims will have conflicting loyalties when they face Malaria.

In terms of power sharing all the three dimensions will be there. In a formal setting all the three dimensions would be negotiated about and also the lining would be made clear from a top down perspective. In an informal local context power sharing is mostly a process that has been crystalized over time and is not as clear formulated as are more formal power sharing arrangements. So all the

three dimensions will be present, Confrontation and accommodation will be there between different ethnic or religious groups, that sometimes confront each other, but most of the times accommodate each other in a power sharing arrangement. Boundary-testing, boundary setting will also be present in a case of local power sharing, because even though different groups work together, they will also still try to maximize their own benefits and so every time this boundary will be tested and set. However power sharing arrangements will limit the space to manoeuvre for different groups. The same counts for competing legitimacies, in a setting with power sharing arrangements it can be wise to not fully compete for legitimacy. Because the other groups in the power sharing arrangements are on the one hand the competition for the strive for legitimacy, but if you go too far, the legitimacy of the power sharing arrangement will be in danger.

This chapter has looked into the concept of power sharing and combined this with literature about the dynamics of local governance. After reading all the literature about power sharing we are sceptical about the long term effects of power sharing, but we see it as a stabilizing potential on the short term. It has the potential to bring peaceful coexistence on the short term.

Even though not all power sharing agreements will be recognized as power sharing, we will look at how it functions, and as it functions as a power sharing arrangement, we will mention it as a power sharing arrangement. This thesis sees the dynamics around power sharing as an ongoing process. Parties do not stop competing or trying to maximize their gain, because there is a power sharing agreement. However power sharing arrangements can lead to less room to manoeuvre for different parties.

Chapter 3. Background of governance and conflict in Nigeria

Nigeria is a federation, a country that can be divided in broadly three bigger parts which all have their dominant tribes, in the North the Hausa and Fulani were the majority, in the Western region the Yoruba and in the East the Igbo are the largest population. The North region is predominantly Muslim, the Igbo in the East are predominantly Christian and the Yoruba-tribe is religiously diverse. The country is divided in 36 states and these states are subdivided into 776 Local Government Areas (LGAs). This means that the government has three tiers, the central government, the state government and the LGA-government. Through the federal structure it is possible that there is a lot of diversity in legislation between the different states. There is a constitution which is applicable for all states, but there is also room for differences. For example the 12 Northern states have introduced the Sharia in one form or another. Some Northern states like Zamfara choose for the hard-liner interpretation of the sharia, while other states like Kaduna choose for a looser interpretation, which was only applied to predominantly Muslim LGAs.

The most important notion in Nigerian governance is the federal character, every law, every political party and every civil organization of the government must reflect the federal character of the country, so it must include people from all over the country (Paden 2005, Olstien 2009).

Constitutional changes: a historical overview.

Nigeria in its current constitutional model is a product of the history of Nigeria (Elaigwu 2006). In 1999, after years of military rule, Nigeria in its current constitutional state appears. The current state is a process of several rounds of reforms of the political system (Egbe 2014).

First there was the period of colonial rule, till Nigeria became independent in 1960. The newborn country stuck to the Macpherson Constitution, that was put in place in 1951. This constitution divided the country into three regions, which all had their dominant tribe, in the North the Hausa and Fulani where the majority, in the Western region the Yoruba and in the East the Igbo had the largest population. Already in 1951 the responsibility switched from British colonial administrators to the Nigeria people. All three parts of the country could integrate their own system, that was suitable for their region. The Yoruba in the South for example focused much on Western education and on institution building, they were very open for skilled people who were not Yoruba (Ayala 2008). The Northern part put more emphasis on regional grassroots authorities that were already in place and expand that power base. Especially the Northern part functioned very well, while the Southern project failed. Other failures of the Macpherson Constitution were that there were too many different authorities, big amounts of corruption, too high expectations of the public and the lack of trained local government councils (Gboyega 1987:55-56). Next to the failures of the system, this

state system puts much emphasis on the different tribal lines, because political power was divided by tribal lines. The military coup of 1966 gave the country a new chance to reorganize the country which did not function as planned. The military regime divided the country in 12 states, that all had their own system of governance. With the creation of smaller areas the military rulers suspected the areas be better governable (Egbe 2014). Next to that, this reform was a response to the Biafra secession war, and the 12 areas were not solely based on tribal lines anymore. Due to the fact that all 12 states all had their own regime and state format, there was a lot of corruption and mismanagement (Ayala 2008).

In 1979 the national government introduced local government reforms, these reforms show a turning point for local governments. The aim of the reforms was to make the local governments more effective in their primary role of bringing development to the grassroots. To make this easier the national government, which is still under military regime, introduced one system with the same structure and function for every state and local governments were officially seen as the third tier in the federal system. Local area governments from now on needed to be democratic elected. The local government reform was intended to stimulate democratic self-governance as well as to activate the human and material resources for local development. This was quite helpful for bringing the government more closer to the people, because the government became more easily accessible for the people, however some LGAs became too big, resulting in the opposing effect that the government was further away than before.

The reforms of 1979 had some deficits: there were huge differences in size of Local Government Areas (LGAs). Meaning in some LGAs that the government was not more accessible than it was before the reform. In some LGAs there were groups put together that did not have anything in common, which leads to tensions between groups to come to power. At this 1979 reforms the role of the chieftaincy has officially become absolutely ceremonial, all the executive powers that the chieftaincy had in some LGAs where by constitution transferred to the LGA-chairman's office. The role of the chieftaincy however was still acknowledged by the constitution as advisory and the 1979-reforms tried to empower the LGA as third tier of government, to get the government more close to the people. In that way they did not want to push off the chieftaincy. However the central government wanted to make a more clear distinction between traditional and official governance. So to soften the pain of the constitutional reforms for the chiefs, which limited the power of the chiefs and to ensure that the chiefs where still on-board, the central government decided to constitutional arrange that the LGA should give financial stipends to the traditional chieftaincy that was leading in that days. Because the government still saw the added value of the chieftaincy for social cohesion and stability, so even though the chieftaincy was cut out of executive powers, they still had a lot of influence and function within Nigerian society (Gboyega 1987).

The reforms of 1985-1993 tried to steer this by increasing the amount of LGAs. In the Constitution of 1989 the Government of Nigeria recognized 449 LGAs and also the number of states increased. This was done to cut down states and LGAs that were too big and in that way hard to govern and to access for civilians. That same constitution gave a lot of autonomy to the third tier, it increased the percentage of revenue sharing till 15-20% in 1992. In this period the LGAs had a lot of autonomy in comparison with older constitutions.

In 1999 the number of states and LGAs raised till the number they still have nowadays, 36 states and 774 LGAs. All states are approximately alike in size and population. These reforms decreased the executive power of the LGAs in favor of the states governments. States got a lot more executive powers and freedom to govern the state as they thought was suitable for their own subjects. This was for the first since 1975 that there was not one unified system of states, but that states have a lot of autonomy. This new constitution gave the right for Northern states to introduce a form of sharia, and also it strengthen the autonomy of local state governments. Due to the history full of military coups Nigeria is still a very much centralized country, the power is very much centralized within the government in Abuja. The 1999 Constitution has placed local government directly under the state's control, this a opposite trend with all the other reforms, in were the LGA had more and more powers and the trend was then decentralization. While the last constitution of 1999 put more powers with the national and state governments (Ajala 2009).

Power Sharing in Nigeria.

The central concept of this thesis is power sharing, more specifically this thesis will look at power sharing in Mangu LGA. Before we go into this specific context it is useful to know what kind of power sharing there are in the bigger context of Nigeria. Because Mangu is not an environment that is on itself, but is part of the larger context. However the types of power sharing we see in Nigeria on country level, we do not automatically have to see this kinds of power sharing in Mangu LGA. We think this background information is still essential to understand the situation in Mangu LGA.

Nigeria is a federal state. Stepan (1999) wrote an influential article about the concept of federalism, according to him there are three types of federation building: coming together, holding together and put together. These types can also be applied to power sharing. Power sharing is used for groups to come together, to hold them together or if groups are been put together. Nigeria is typical a country that is using federalization and power sharing as holding together mechanisms (Suberu 2009).

Hartzell and Hoddie (2015) identify four types of power sharing arrangements, territorial, political, economic and military power sharing. Hartzell and Hoddie state that *“Territorial power sharing seeks to divide political influence among different levels of government by creating forms of decentralized government that are territorially based.”* (2015: 43). They state that federalism gives regional groups a degree of power that has some independency of the national government. This is seen in Nigeria since Macpherson Constitution in 1951, when it became a federation with three areas. Later this territorial power sharing principle of federalism is more embedded in the three-tier federal structure, where the states and LGAs get more and more autonomy (Egbe 2014). Even though the 1999 Constitution has put the states and LGAs on the leash, still we can speak of an autonomous second and third tier, which is constitutionally anchored.

Next to territorial power sharing, Nigeria also has institutionalized political power sharing. Due to the presidential system, elections have become all or nothing games, where the winner takes all (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004). This is especially threatening for smaller tribes, because they will never get a majority of the votes. The overall benchmark in every Nigerian political decision is the principle of the federal character. This federal character must be seen in the president, the formation of political parties and in the composition of all government agencies (Olstien 2009). The presidential candidate needs to have the majority of the overall votes, but next to that the candidate needs to have 25% of the votes in two thirds of the states and in the capital of Abuja (Suberu 2009). The same procedure is there with the state governor, the candidate needs to have more than 50% of the votes and need to have a quarter of the votes in two thirds of the LGAs. At state level the cabinet must also be representative for all groups in the state (Suberu 2009).

Next to the president and the state governor, also political parties need to reflect the federal character. All official registered political parties have to include persons out of at least 24 states for executive or governing positions. The party headquarters have to be settled in Abuja and the party has to refrain itself the appearance that their activities are only for one part of the population or one geographical area (Suberu 2009).

All of these precautions are taken to make Nigerian national politics more national and not profiling itself as a tribal party or president (Suberu 2008). Even though this is put on paper, both the presidential seat as well as the political parties are tribal dominated. One

party (the AD) is dominated by the Yoruba, the ANPP is dominated by the Hausa/Fulani and also the president is mostly chosen on the basis of tribal issues (Paden 2005: 143-146).

The second aspect of power sharing, the economic power sharing is also happening in Nigeria by means of the oil revenues sharing, every state get an equal amount of revenues money (Elaigwu 2006). The states in the oil-rich Niger Delta claimed more money and they did get a higher percentage than the other states. But this is in practice not much higher, because a lot of the oil is found under water and not on land (Suberu 2009).

Military power sharing is there by the means that the army is national and the different dominant are mixed throughout the army and are stationed throughout the country.

In short we can conclude that power sharing is an idea that already exists on a broad basis in Nigeria and is not new. On the national level it is quite formal and has it multiple dimensions. We see that the federal character is something that is helpful on paper and the laws around these arrangements have a high level of compliance. However the goal to overcome the tribal dynamics in Nigerian politics is something that is very limited achieved by these power sharing arrangements.

Plateau state

Next to the bigger context of Nigeria, Mangu LGA is also located within Plateau State. Plateau state is a state in the Middle Belt of Nigeria, it was created in the reform of 1975. The name Plateau state is derived from the Jos Plateau that covers the whole state, Jos is also the capital of the state. Plateau is subdivided in 17 LGAs.

Plateau state is culturally very diverse, it is composed out of 58 tribes (Best 2007). Some tribes are seen as indigenous, among them the Tangale, Sayawe, Berom, Afizere, Mwangahwul and Anagute (Orji 2010, Ostien 2009, Mang 2014). This concept of indigenous or being an indigene is important in Nigeria, because with being an indigene a lot of advantages come along. Resources for indigenes in a LGA include control over land, jobs, admissions and scholarships for schools and universities, access to healthcare and more (Ostien 2009: 3, Harnischfeger 2004:442, Elaigwu 2006). The administration of the indigene certificate system is in the hands of LGAs, according to the current constitution an indigene of a LGA is: a: either of whose parents or grandparents is an indigene of the LGA in question; or b: who is accepted as an indigene by the Local Government.

In a lot of places in Plateau State there were problems between indigenes and settlers, however the biggest problems were in Jos. A lot of uprooted peasants came to Plateau State, for two reasons. The climate is better in Middle Belt than more Northern located states and Plateau State still

had pieces of unused land due to the low density which was caused by the slave hunts of the nineteenth century (Harnischfeger 2004). Even though the indigenous groups in Jos are very heterogenous, their mutual background is Christianity. The Northern settlers are predominantly Muslim and they try to gain political power, this has changed the balance of power that was there and this led to violence in Jos in 2001. Where it was first an ethnic problem it transformed in an ethnic problem that is played out by religious lines. In Plateau state there are also large Yoruba and Igbo minorities, but so far they have not shown any ambition to challenge the existing authorities. Mang(2014) states that the differences between Igbo and Yoruba settlers and Hausa and Fulani settlers can be explained from the religious background. He states that the Quran calls to make the state subservient to the Islam (2004: 92). Harnischfeger (2004) also points 9/11 out as a catalysator of the escalation of the conflict on religious lines. All these factors have definitely contributed to the escalation of the conflict in 2001 in Jos, which had a spillover effect on the whole population of Plateau State.

Jos

Jos is the capital of Plateau state and is regarded as the center of Middle Belt Christianity. It is subdivided into three LGAs, Jos North, Jos South and Jos East. Already for years there are renewed conflicts. The cause of the conflict is discussed among scholars. Some say that the conflict is political (Orji 2010), others say it is about the rights to the city (Ostien 2009), while Mang (2014) says the deeper conflict is about the land. However all scholars agree that the way the conflict was played out via religious and ethnic cleavages. What exactly was the exact moment or incident that escalated the Jos-conflict into open violence is not exactly clear, however scholars agree that in Jos the attacks in the USA of 9/11 had a catalyzing effect.

The consequences of the violence in Jos are shocking, though numbers are hard to gather and are sometimes contradict each other. Government official reports show that an estimated 54.000 people been killed between 1999 and 2004 (Paden 2005), this number is more to show the scale of violence and the seriousness of the situation, than that is should be taken as a fact. Also later in time there are reports of conflicts, in 2010 two incidents claimed the lives of 350 and 500 people in Jos (Ajaero and Phillips 2010: 12–13). This violence has led to a religious segregated town in Jos and other cities in the North of Plateau State. There where, and still are, Christian dominated areas in Jos, where Muslims left, who were driven out by the Christian majority. The same thing happened in the Muslims dominated neighborhoods. Districts in which the Christians have driven out the Muslim inhabitants have been given new names such as Jesus Zone, New Jerusalem or Promised Land. Similarly, the Muslims have renamed their quarters, indicating to whom they belong: Jihad Zone, Saudi Arabia or Seat of [bin] Laden (Harnischfeger 2004).

The conflict in Jos had led to a spillover effect to other areas of Plateau State, which is caused by two elements. Firstly, the tensions that were present in Jos, were everywhere in Plateau State and in almost all LGAs this has led to conflict, however not necessarily to violence (Paden 2005). Everywhere the balance of power was being disturbed: the settlers were mostly Muslims, while the people who lived already in the LGAs were predominately Christians (Mang 2014). When the conflict in Jos escalated, the relationships between settlers and indigenous groups were put under a lot of pressure and in a lot of LGAs this escalated into violence, which was being played out on the ethnic-religious cleavage (Harnischfeger 2004). Firstly, this was because of the already existing tension, secondly this was because of the big displacement that was caused by the Jos-conflict. This displacement also brought a lot of troublemakers to other LGAs, which were already quite unstable and in where dragged into violence (Dantani et al. 2017).

The Nigerian government first sent in armed forces (military as well as police), as a response to the 2001 unrest of ethno-religious and political violence in Plateau State and Jos metropolis in particular. From 2001, security personnel notably military and Mobile Police Force (known as MOPOL) are staged at major routes in Plateau State (Dantani et al. 2017). This was kind of helpful, however could not prevent other pockets of violence in 2008 in Jos metropolis. The violence was better contained by the launch of Operation Rainbow, which had more an integrated approach and was more community based. This mission had a broader scope and mandate and in this way they could also fight crime, which was a big help in stabilizing Plateau State (Heranu et al 2017).

Mangu LGA

The literature about Mangu LGA is quite limited. That in her research about local power sharing in Mangu LGA states two things: there are power sharing arrangements in Mangu LGA and Mangu LGA is relatively peaceful. When we interviewed experts of the university of Jos they confirmed both the two statements. The fact that Mangu LGA is relatively peaceful makes it a very interesting place for research, to look at the factors of peaceful coexistence in Mangu LGA. This research is not aiming at different cases to compare with each other, it will limit itself of describing the security and governance situation in Mangu LGA as rich as possible and in that way show both why Mangu LGA is a relatively peaceful place.

Out of interviews with experts of the university of Jos we have heard that during the first Jos-crisis in 2001, there was a spill-over effect to Mangu LGA. In Jos the city extremely segregated in religious lines. To less extent this also happened in Mangu LGA, however the local stakeholders (local government administration, the local chiefs and the religious leaders) all worked together to stop this and guarantee the security of both religions in Mangu LGA. Also as in Jos, the conflict has a lot of dimensions, but according to the experts of the university of Jos the ethnic and the religious cleavages

are expected to be the biggest. Next to religious segregation, Plateau State is also very much ethnic divided. This is mostly combined, because some tribes are predominantly Muslim, while other are mostly Christian, so in that case every religious driven conflict will have an ethnic aspect and the other way around. In chapter 5 we will deepen the different perceptions people have on the conflict and how people perceive both the religious as well as the ethnic cleavages.

Chapter 4. Methodology

This part of the thesis is meant to describe the process before the fieldwork, elaborate about the three districts we have done research on, explain how we collected the data, then explain how we tried to triangulate the data as much as possible and as last I will discuss my cooperation with my translator and my own positionality.

Before we went to Mangu, me and my translator Thomas Bala, first spent a week in Jos to get used to Nigeria, to the climate and the people. We decided to spent some time on the Jos University where we have spoken with some experts on governance in Plateau State and some where even from Mangu. This was very helpful to steer the research a bit more and make the focus on the one hand bigger and on the other hand smaller. One example on where the research should be expanded on is the role economics plays in the stabilization of Mangu LGA, because the limited amount of writing about Mangu did not gave any clue on the importance of the market of Mangu LGA. This market is the biggest food market in the Middle-Belt of Nigeria and in that way very much influences the dynamics, so we decided to also interview some economic stakeholders. Another example where the more general literature put a lot of focus on was the role of the indigneship in the conflict, however the experts from Mangu LGA said this did not play a big role in Mangu LGA. So even though I still used it for my interviews, I later decided to not really ask about it anymore, because it did not really have an impact in Mangu LGA.

Three research sites, Mangu Town, Gindiri and Kerang

As told before, Mangu LGA was chosen because it is a relatively peaceful area in a very volatile area, this seemed more feasible and interesting than doing research on for example Jos. Jos, we heard, was already over researched. Both the observations were enough reason for us to focus on Mangu LGA.

On the basis of the information some experts gave us, we decided to research three districts, namely Mangu Town, Gindiri and Kerang. In this part I will describe all three districts shortly and will describe the ethnic and religious numbers that are estimated by the people of this district. Official numbers are missing about the number of inhabitants per district and there are also no official numbers about the proportions of the inhabitants per tribe or religion. Mangu Town is the capital of Mangu LGA, here the LGA chairman is seated and it is a highly urbanized environment. Mangu has a big market in the heart of the city, which is according to the people the biggest market in Plateau State, since the market of Jos burned down and is religiously fragmented now. In Mangu Town the Mwangawhul are predominant, the Pyem are the second biggest group and there is a big Hausa community. There are big minorities of Yoruba's and Igbos. Next to that there are a lot of local tribe

minorities. People could not give exact numbers, but it is safe to say that more than 75% of the inhabitants of Mangu Town is Mwagawhul. In Mangu Town the district head of Mangu is the chief, he is called the Miskagham Mangu. Miskagham is the title for chiefs in the Mwagawhul tribe. The chief of all Mwagawhul also has his palace in Mangu Town, he is called Miskagham Mwagawhul. The fact that the Miskagham Mwagawhul is in Mangu Town shows that Mangu Town is not only the capital of Mangu LGA but also of the bigger Mwagawhul land. The majority of the people in Mangu Town are Christian and some people say this number runs up to 90% of the people. The guesthouse where I stayed was located in Mangu, so I had a lot of small talks with the local people. However Mangu Town is the district where we have spent the least of our time.

Gindiri is the capital of the Pyem kingdom and at the heartland of the Pyem. The Pyem have the majority in Gindiri and one more district, in all other districts of Mangu LGA the Mwagawhul are the majority. Again numbers are not clear, but more than 60% is Pyem, there are also a lot of other tribes living in Gindiri, especially the Fulani community is very big in Gindiri. Much bigger compared to Mangu Town for example. The Pyem are both Christian and Muslim and the Fulani are predominantly Muslim, so most people agree that the Muslims have a majority, but the numbers change from person to person. Some people claim that 75% of the people in Gindiri is Muslim, the lowest number that is mentioned is 60% of Gindiri is Muslim. So the numbers are contested, however it is safe to say that Gindiri has a Muslim majority. The chief of Gindiri is a Muslim Pyem and his title is the Hakimi, the chief of all Pyem-men is also seated in Gindiri and is called the SumPyem. Gindiri has a famous school, that is because of its excellence known in all of Plateau State.

Kerang is the most rural of three sites this research is based on, Kerang is a very rural community with a small village as the center of the district. Here the chief of Kerang, the Miskagham Kerang is seated. The upright majority is a farmer, however a lot of the citizen have part time jobs besides being a farmer. A lot of the people in Kerang are Mwagawhul Christians, up to 95%, however there are also Fulani and Hausa. We have chosen Kerang with the two urban centers to get a comprehensive look on the situation in Mangu LGA. For example a respondent stated that living on the countryside is much more relaxed than in the city and we have noticed that live in Kerang is much more quiet than living in Gindiri or Mangu. Especially the pace of life is much more relaxed and we noticed that we more easily lost track of time in Kerang than in Gindiri or Mangu Town, because the people were less aware of time.

All three LGAs are comparable when it comes to size, however on demographics there are some differences. Mangu Town is the biggest city, Gindiri is the second city and Kerang is more rural, so population wise Mangu Town is the largest, than Gindiri and Kerang has the smallest population.

Data collection

The data for this research has several components, we have done observations, we have done interviews and focus group discussions and we have spoken to experts. At the start of our two-month fieldwork we spoke with experts of the university of Jos to explore the topics in Plateau State and Mangu LGA, we haven't really used it for analysis, because the research focusses on Mangu LGA and how local people perceive the situation over there.

We have interviewed a lot of people, more than 20+ people we have interviewed one on one, and more than 100+ people we have interviewed in focus group discussions. The use of focus group discussion was heavily encouraged by researchers who had a lot of experience of doing research in Plateau State, and their experience was that Nigerians most likely say more in a discussion with other people than one on one. Especially Adam Higazi explained that people in Nigeria who are not used to being interviewed, will very much adapt to the interviewer instead of giving his opinion. When the people are interviewed in groups, they feel more freely and the conversation goes much smoother and natural.

The amount of interviews is not meant to create an equal representation of the people in Mangu, however we tried to interview as much different groups as possible, to hear all the different stories and narratives that are in Mangu LGA. On the first day we were in the district we tried to start interviewing all important figures in the district, starting with visiting the local chief and other important people in that district. The day after we visited mosques and churches to get in contact with the Imam or pastor, we asked if we could interview them one on one and also if they want to organize a focus discussion group. All of the people we talked with were more than willing to help and so that went smoothly. A risk in this way of working is to talk too much within the religious discourse, because when people are invited by the Imam or pastor and the FGDs mostly happen in the church or the mosque, people's opinions are already steered in one way. To mitigate for this bias, we have also interviewed a lot of economic actors and organized FGDs with taxi drivers, market sales men and we hang around a lot of time with the youth on the streets. In the last two weeks we were in Mangu LGA we have looked into the gaps of our data and we realized that we haven't spoken to the Fulani-community for example. So in the last two weeks we really reached out to groups and people that were not included, to get their point of view.

Besides interviews we just hang around a lot with people on the street, having small talk with small business owners were we for example were eating or we played games of chess under a tree with people from the neighborhood. Besides this, we kept our eyes open and observed a lot, later discussing my observations with my translator, to find out if we saw the same things and how to interpret these events. All this small observations I wrote down every day and has also become part of my data, to make it richer and more comprehensive.

Positionality.

My presence in Mangu LGA was the talk of the town. A lot of people called me Bature, which means white man, especially they called me white man on the ground, because most white men are on television or in big cars. In Mangu LGA they do not see a lot of white people, and when there are white people they will not be very visible, but hidden behind the darkened windows of their SYV I did not have a car, but moved with public transport, as the normal people did. So after a couple weeks, I still was an attraction, but it was more normal then before.

I thought beforehand already that it is wiser to be aware of the differentness of my appearance then try to blend in as much as possible and mitigate the effects my appearance have on the research setting. In my research, I have trusted heavily on my translator Thomas Bala to see what is the normality and what was different from normal. During interviews and FGDs, I let him take the first word to comfort people and make them feel at ease. Sometimes, I was used as a kind of trophy. For example: once I was invited to eat with a high placed person and it turned out that the whole community was waiting to see how the white person came to have dinner with this high placed figure. I let this be for the sake of the investigation and it turned out to be an useful resource.

The biggest problem was with the stereotype that all Western people are millionaire. I always emphasized that I was only there for research purposes and that I did not have any money or influence in what kind of government body. However, there is still the possibility that people joined the focus group discussions the hope that I could do something for them. After interviews or FGDs people never asked me for money or visa, however on the streets people did. So, I think, I did everything I could to steer this perception of me being a millionaire, but in the end it is not always possible to manage how you are being perceived.

As a white person, people assumed I was a Christian. My translator was from a tribe that was predominately Muslim, so people assumed he was a Muslim. This combination worked very well, even though people did not judge me on the basis of my appearance. However, a lot of Christians where surprised to find out that Thomas was Christian.

My translator was one of my biggest sources of information and he was also essential in organizing and keeping in contact with stakeholders we wanted to interview. For example, once my translator said out of the blue: They have a water problem in this town. He could see that because he knew what was normal in that region and later when we asked around people agreed that there was a problem with the delivery of drinking water in that town. Also he could estimate very well from appearance if somebody was Muslim or a Christian, and so he could see that in Gindiri a lot of Muslim and Christian kids played together on a soccer field. This is insight information that would cost me years to figure out myself. Next to his observation techniques, I mostly let Thomas start the interview to make people feel at ease. Thomas mostly introduced himself and made a joke, so people laughed

and were more relaxed. Another essential part of Thomas his skillset were his navigation skills. I, myself, am completely lost when I come to a new place, and even after a couple of weeks I am not able to find the way myself. Thomas was also very helpful in this.

I noticed that a lot of people felt that Mangu LGA and Plateau State were forgotten conflicts and they saw me as their messenger. Especially after FGDs, people asked if they could pray for me and then they prayed that my thesis could be helpful to change the situation in Mangu LGA and that this would be brought more in the centre of the attention of the national politicians.

I had some feelings of insecurity, especially going out at night was something that was difficult, because we did not have our own mode of transport. One day our interview ended very late and it already was dark and we did not have any choice but to walk home, I noticed that my translator became nervous, which also gave me a very insecure feeling. We have been plugged from the streets two times by the secret service and especially the first time was very intimidating, because I did at first not know who these guys were and what they wanted.

One day there was an attack in a district in the North of Mangu, even though it was outside of our three research sites, I wanted to go there to interview and observe the people. However my translator explained that this was not a wise thing to do, because the chance for retaliation was too big. I know he was right and we made the right decision, however I still am a bit disappointed that I could not enter such a fresh case as that one.

Chapter 5. How is the security dilemma being perceived in Mangu LGA?

As we have showed in chapter three about the background of Nigeria and Plateau State, it save to say that Mangu LGA is situated in a volatile environment. This chapter will investigate how this environment is perceived in Mangu LGA. Is there an active security dilemma that make a pre-emptive strike a rational thing to do or is there enough trust among different groups that such a situation is not going on? This chapter will also discuss the perception of the root causes of the conflicts and will discuss how this is working out in Mangu LGA.

In Mangu LGA there is a lot of distrust, however not all of that distrust is directly under the surface. More of it is deeply rooted latent distrust and does not automatically leads to action. That's why I in this chapter differentiate between an active and a latent security dilemma. The first is such a perception of the security dilemma that people think direct action is needed, while the latent security dilemma perception lead to a lot of concerns for the future, but this is not translated into immediately action.

A lot of issues in Mangu LGA refer to the perception of a security dilemma. A lot of themes were explained within the security spectrum. Almost all people used the term peaceful coexistence or the expression: *"You don't find peace on Gods platter"*. This shows that almost everyone is aware that there is tension and that peaceful coexistence means working together. So the people in Mangu LGA believe that peace is a manmade phenomenon. This is an indicator of the volatile environment Mangu LGA is in, everywhere across Plateau state there is turmoil, between different religions and different tribes. Not even to speak about the northeaster part of Nigeria where government troops are fighting for years already with Boko Haram. As they see it, in Mangu the people know that peace is not something cheap or easy to get, that is why they emphasize this topic of manmade peace so much. It is to the people of Mangu themselves, to keep this peaceful coexistence and they are very aware of this.

A good example of the security concern is the so called security council. This is a weekly meeting between the most important institutional players in Mangu LGA. They discuss the things that happened inside and outside Mangu LGA and the rumours that are going on. It is the place to share information with each other. The value of these meetings is to discuss everything that can lead to potential conflict and to inform each other about the feelings of the different groups. The fact that it is called security council and the meetings are called security meetings by the local people, reflects that security is the big concern for the people. These meetings could also be called by a different name, cause for instance also economic affairs and social affairs are being discussed, however it is named the security council by the local people. In this way we see that all aspects of life are seen from the

security point of view. The LGA-chairman nor the local chiefs called this meeting the security council, they mostly speak about the weekly meeting with other stakeholders in Mangu LGA.

Perceptions of roots of mistrust and conflict.

Before we can zoom in on the perception of the possible security dilemma in Mangu LGA in more detail, it is necessary to describe how people's perception is of the root causes of mistrust and conflict. This determines the perception of the security dilemma and the possible institutional solutions. There are two narratives in Mangu LGA of why there is mistrust and conflict in Plateau-state in general and to less extent in Mangu as LGA: First, mistrust and conflict are produced by bad communication, unclear regulations and weak conflict resolution mechanisms, which eventually lead to violence. Second, mistrust and violence are produced by "the nature of the other", so *the other* is in itself unreliable and always trying to dominate, which leads to the conclusion that violence in the long run is inevitable when *the other* is present in the area. To put it in other words, conflict is a phenomenon that happens by accident versus the perception that conflict is knowingly being caused by the other group.

The first notion is that mistrust and conflict are produced by bad communication, unclear regulations and weak conflict resolution mechanisms is widely spread in Mangu LGA, which leads to violence. Violence in this perception is a situation, where no one is really after, however it can happen when all the wrong circumstances are there. In a situation where there is bad communication between different groups, small conflicts can easily lead to violence, especially in an environment of Plateau-state, where there is a history of violence between different groups. Unclear regulations are unhelpful to create a peaceful coexistent environment, e.g. due to unclear regulations about who owns which part of the land can lead to violent conflict. Especially the role of conflict resolution mechanisms are important in the volatile environment of Plateau-state, because small incidents can lead to a cycle of revenge and violence.

The second notion is that mistrust and conflict are produced by the bad nature of the other. A lot of people said: *"it is quiet and peaceful for now, however you never know what will happen"*. There is a fundamental mistrust in the other group, who cannot be trusted in its roots. In this perception everything can happen all the time, because *the other* unpredictable and unreliable. This perception was both present in the ethnic as well as the religious cleavages, mostly based on experiences outside Mangu LGA. For example some Christians in Mangu where afraid for Muslims, however the Muslim population was estimated less than 5% in Mangu Town. So these Christians said: *"If something will happen, we will crush them"*. However because the Muslims, according to these Christians, are not trustworthy in the first place, they still where afraid. A popular narrative was that Muslims always want to dominate, they always bring in their brothers and they have multiple wives. So while

Christians now are still by far the majority, still there was a lot of mistrust for that small minority. In Mangu so far there never occurred any real violence between Muslims and Christians, however most of the Christians that told about their feelings of mistrust, some point at Boko Haram to give an example that Muslims are not trustworthy, but this narrative also worked the other way around with stories of Christians killing Muslims in Jos.

These two perceptions are not always used in a consequent distinction, almost all people use a combination of these two perceptions. They see both a big role for conflict resolution mechanisms, however they also see *the other* in some way is responsible for mistrust, conflict and violence. The head of the school in Gindiri told us about the role education and economy play in peaceful coexistence, about education:

I believe, when people are enlightened, they are informed. They are able to take better decisions. So education plays a major role in peacebuilding. Because when people understand each other, when we understand each other, there is less conflict. There is a problem around when I express myself, and you don't get me right, then we don't understand each other and we can get easily into problems.

About the economy:

Economy empowerment is helpful, because a hungry man is an angry man. People here are very occupied, so that is helpful, because there is no time for conflict.

The head of school in Gindiri gives a lot of examples why conflicts are manmade and that violence can be prevented by good education, communication, economic opportunities and conflict resolution mechanisms. However she has also made a point about *the other*, which is in her case is the Islam. In this context she talks clearly from the other perception.

There is a difference between Christianity and Islam about peace, I have a problem with the notion that Islam is peace, because they take up arms with the slightest issue. Why don't you just talk it out, that is what Christianity is all about. We discover that Islam easily take up arms, in Pyem land this is also the case. Although it is differently from Hausa land, because these people here have lives together and are family together.

In this example we see all of what has been discussed above, there is a negative narrative about the other, which is also fed by stories for upcountry Nigeria. This causes a latent security dilemma and a latent feeling of fear, to put it in other words: The feeling of mistrust and insecurity is now not strong enough to talk about a concrete security dilemma, in which a pre-emptive strike is a wise thing to do. So the current balance of power has enough stability, however people are afraid that 'the other' will change the balance of power. So a security dilemma is latent present, it can easily develop into an active security dilemma. The head of the school in Gindiri also shows the other perception very clearly, that peace is manmade and that peaceful coexistence is possible when the good environment is

created for peace to reign. Most people see a combination of these two narratives as their truth about mistrust, conflict and peace, some people are more leaning towards one of the two narratives.

Security dilemma on the ground.

Now the different narratives about the reasons for mistrust and conflict are discussed, we will have a look on how this plays out in Mangu LGA. The two biggest cleavages are being discussed here, namely religion and ethnicity, because they are both mentioned a lot.

Religion

There is a lot of mistrust between Christians and Muslims in Mangu LGA. This mistrust was on its height during the Jos crisis in 2001. This had a great effect on the perception of the security dilemma in Mangu LGA. All interviewees stated that before 2001 there was a very sustainable and cordial peace in Mangu LGA. There was a lot of interaction between Christian and Muslims, a lot of intermarriages and cordial relationships. However the violence in Jos had a spill over effect on Mangu LGA, not in terms of violence, but in terms of suspicion and perception of a security dilemma. Because the Jos crisis was played out on the religious cleavage, there became suspicion among the Muslims and the Christians, especially in the Mwagawhul dominated areas of Mangu LGA. The Jos crisis had a spill over effect all over Plateau State and led to violence in a lot of LGA's around Mangu LGA, this strengthened the feeling of insecurity in Mangu LGA. To put it in the words of the Miskagham Mwagawhul:

“There was no real issues before the Jos crisis between Christians and Muslims, however during the crisis there was a really real tension, all the JNI suspecting the CAN, and the CAN suspecting the JNI. So was a serious tension...”

However it is peaceful now, people are still aware, because they feel that something can happen.

During a focus group discussion with Cocin church member one them recollected an event in 2016 that demonstrates this tension.

“One day the Cocin Church organized an outreach, somewhere down in Mangu Town. And maybe it was coincident of maybe it was deliberate, but there was also an outreach of Muslim youth over there. They were marching on the streets, and I could image what could happen. But I as a Christian, and I know what we stand for, God took us in control. And so nothing happened, even though youths have a low patience level and they can easily fight. Because the Grace brigade was there, that is a Christian group, and they had their clubs and their approach was very provocative, it could easily turn into conflict, violent conflict. But by the grace of God, it stayed peaceful.”

This shows the precarious peace in Mangu LGA, because mutual fear can easily lead to conflict and violence. Even though the tension is now lower than in 2001, during the spoil over from the Jos crisis.

In 2001 there was a classical security dilemma where Christians started to protect their churches and Muslims protected their mosques. One mosque burned down to the ground and even though that in the end did not lead to big turmoil because of institutions that were in place, the tension was then very high. However from then on the tensions slowly lowered. However there is still a lot of mistrust among Christians and Muslims, still there are almost none interreligious marriages in Mangu Town and also the level of interaction is lowered then before 2001. There is still a lot of fear and suspicion amongst Christian and Muslims. Muslims that avoid some Christian neighbourhoods at night, Christians that state to be afraid for Muslims, because *“they always want to dominate”*. A member of COCIN-church focus group said it in this way:

“Because of the 2001 there was a crisis and that created some spill over to Mangu. So there was some fear, but later with the help of the local leaders that calmed down again before it could escalate. By now there is no problem. For now.”

We asked Christians who are the vast majority in Mangu LGA, why they did not throw out all the Muslims, if they are such a big threat to them? Why not work out a pre-emptive strike and deal with this threat? None of the respondents agreed with these words, most of them answered with: *“No, we Christians don’t do that”*. However all of the respondents said: *“If they would do something we will crush them, cause we have the majority”*. So the fear was not for here and now, but the fear was for the future, *“the Muslims bring in their brothers and their three wives and within 50 years they will dominate us”*. Here again we can call of a latent security dilemma, Christians and Muslims now feel unsafe and there are pockets of hostility and even some violence, however the balance of power is for now still clear for the people. However when the dynamics change, the narrative about the other can easily get the best of the people in Mangu LGA and can lead to a pre-emptive strike.

Ethnicity

Ethnicity is the second cleavage in Mangu LGA, this cleavage has multiple dimension between different tribes. Both the relationship between the Mwangawhul and the Pyem as well as the relationship between the Pyem and the Fulani are interesting to focus on in the light of the security dilemma.

Mwangawhul and Pyem

The relationship between the Mwangawhul and the Pyem tribe is causing mixed feelings. In terms of trust and stability there is no issue. Security wise there is no problems anymore, there is a lot of trust in the Mwangawhul, this is attributed to the recent history. The last 20 years has built up a lot of trust between both tribes, this is seen in a lot of different parts of life. There are a lot of intermarriages, the

Miskagham Mwagawhul is married to the sister of the SumPyem and this is seen in every layer of society.

However, when you ask about the politics of Mangu LGA, the Pyem feel marginalized and dominated.

“The relation between the Pyem and the Mwagawhul is very cordial, social interaction and economic. Even in politics, but political there is marginalization and domination. The Pyem need their own voice. Politics now is completely dominated by the Mwagawhul, the ticket is not balanced, the domination is there.” Cocin FGD number 4

The Mwagawhul have the vast majority in Mangu LGA, while there are no official numbers, there was consensus between experts, which we interviewed, that the Mwagawhul are at least 60% till 80% of the citizen of Mangu LGA. The Pyem is the second largest ethnicity in Mangu LGA, estimated with 20% till 30% of the people. So the Mwagawhul have the absolute majority within the democratic system. The position of LGA chairman after an election is since the creation of Mangu LGA always in the hands of a Mwagawhul man. The last 20 years there is an informal power sharing agreement with the Pyem, that makes sure that the deputy LGA chairman is a Pyem. However the deputy office is a silent office, which has no executive power, so the factual power is still in hands with the Mwagawhul. Sometimes there is a transitional LGA chairman, that is appointed instead of elected and it has occurred that this person is a Pyem. However the current LGA chairman is also transitional and is Mwagawhul. This causes a lot of discontent among the Pyem population. The relationship between the Mwagawhul and Pyem is not seen as an equal relationship. Most of the Mwagawhul acknowledge this and state that the relationship between the Mwagawhul and the Pyem is more a charity case than real cooperation between the two ethnicities.

*No it is not equal, because they don't have the number. If we want, we have the number so we can win straight. In the Nigerian case the head has only a lot of power and he will only help himself and his family. It is always the rest of what is left that will go to the minority. **Jute***

So the Pyem feel excluded from the position of LGA chairman and from all the benefits that come with that. The chairman has a big say in how the funds of the LGA are being divided and where utilities and basis services are being provided. However there is a lot of discontent with the current situation, there is no real tension or fear between both ethnicities. This is being explained by two narratives that are being told a lot to us, firstly: *“Politics is a game of numbers”* and secondly: *“Peace is a valuable and costly thing”*.

The first narrative is told by a lot of Mwagawhul and also by a lot of Pyem citizen, politics is a game of numbers. We live a democracy where the majority rule, and the majority is not Pyem, so the current situation is fair as it is now. When we asked further about the fairness of the situation and what citizenship means for the people, most people agreed that things are not perfect in Mangu LGA, but that things are better in Mangu than in other LGAs in Plateau State. Which brings us to the second

narrative, that peace is a valuable and costly thing, while conflict and unrest is very expensive. So a lot of Pyem people accepted the status quo as it is now, because it brings stability in an unstable environment of Plateau State. Or in other words:

I hope to see that the status quo is maintained, because if it was not so peaceful, Mangu would not develop itself as it did. Peace brings development and then the sky is the limit. FDG Catholic

So we see a latent security dilemma that people in Mangu believe is not going to ignite, because the balance of power has not become in real danger. So there is no real mistrust of fear for security, and so we cannot speak about a present security dilemma. However it is important to keep this dynamics into mind, because this is one of the dynamics that influence all other dynamics.

Pyem and Fulani

The second ethnic issue is the relationship between the Pyem and the Fulani, who are mostly located in the two Pyem districts. There are tensions between the Pyem people and the Fulani tribe, the Fulani feel excluded in political, security, social and spatial terms.

The Pyem have a power-sharing arrangement with the Mwagawhul, and in this way they have some influence and power in the local politics of Mangu LGA. The Fulani do not have this kind of arrangement with the Mwagawhul nor the Pyem and have no access to the power and resources of the LGA. The Fulani claim to be the second largest ethnicity in Mangu LGA and they feel excluded by the political informal power sharing settlement. Nowhere in Mangu LGA we have heard the claim of the Fulani being the second ethnic group resonate, not with the Pyem, nor the Mwagawhul nor other minority tribes. Next to not being part of the power sharing table, the Fulani also claim to be not present in the security apparatus. The Fulani are not part of the vigilante of the SumPyem, even though the youth applied multiple times for positions in this vigilante.

So most times issues of government, within local government, Fulani is not represented. Within the security apparatus, the Fulani are not represented." FGD Fulani number 16

Next to the political exclusion the Fulani also describe some kind of social exclusion and stigmatization. When there is an act of crime or a small conflict, the Pyem people directly point at the Fulani people as the people that have started the unrest. This reflects the narrative of the other, because the Fulani are not trustworthy in their deepest nature, so when there is turmoil or even small petty crime, then it is obvious to point at the Fulani.

"We are treated as second class citizens, it is a perennial burden, an everyday struggle in a situation that happens all the time. In this particular society, every criminal, every petty crime, any rustling, any robbery, or any issue that they tend to have around, it is the Fulani person that has committed it.

During interviews with all kinds of people there was always this factor of the Fulani being not trustworthy, however a lot of times during focus group discussions there were also rumours of

incidents where other tribes dressed up as Fulani committed robberies. The Hakimi recognizes this tendency with the people of Mangu LGA to point out Fulani as the perpetrators when bad things happen.

...Because now, when it is robbery, they will say it is Fulani people, they will blame always Fulani. So there is sentiment against a certain tribe, so other tribes can go and attack

Last, Fulani feel excluded in a spatial way. The Fulani claim to be the founders of Gindiri and to have a historical claim on Gindiri and the land. They claim that the Fulani were in Gindiri already before the white men came and that the Pyem and other tribes came in later. So due to this historical roots they claim to have the right to feel the owners of the land. However they don't own any land and they are not entitled to it. This gives them problems in the provision of their livelihoods and makes the Fulani feel as second class citizen.

First and foremost, the most important issue we are having is the issue of they are born here, they grew up here, but most times we are treated as strangers, we tend not to have land for grazing, and they don't own land to grow crops. That is a big problem for us. Most times we are asked to leave the area. We are grown up here and born here and then they are saying we should leave.

The Pyem do not recognize the claim that the Fulani have historical reasons to call themselves the custodian of the land. The Pyem say that they are the owners of the land, however that everyone is welcome, if they are willing to live in peace.

Conclusion

As we have seen there are two narratives about the root of mistrust and conflict and we see that in both the ethnic as well as the religious cleavage both narratives are present. Both in religious as well as ethnic terms there are conflicts that could be prevented by good communication, clear regulations and strong and present conflict resolution mechanisms. Besides that, in both the religious as well as the ethnic cleavage there is also the narrative of the "the other". Even though in both cleavages in Mangu there is no active security dilemma, still there are feelings of insecurity and mistrust and is there a latent security dilemma. In the coming chapters we will investigate what kind of institutions and institutional arrangements there are in place to generate trust among the people in Mangu LGA.

Chapter 6. Perceived important institutions and their effectiveness for peaceful coexistence.

This chapter will zoom in on the institutional actors that are in Mangu LGA, how they are perceived to work and being organized and what the perceived role of this institutions are in the short time solutions for mitigating the security dilemma and the possible factors for conflict. We will zoom in on the role of the chieftaincy, the local government and the role of religious leaders. Next to that the role of the economy and education will be described, which are of utmost importance for the fragile peaceful coexistence in Mangu LGA.

Chieftaincy

The chieftaincy is very present in the everyday life of the people in Mangu LGA. Especially the district head plays a central role in the community, because he is very close to the people. People describe him as a father of the people and they come to the chief for advice about customs and to ask for support in governance related conflicts. Like mentioned before, there are eleven district heads, nine of them are Mwangawhul and are called Miskagham plus the name of their districts, for example the Miskagham Kerang. Two chiefs are Pyem, and are the paramount ruler of the two Pyem-dominated districts. The chief of the Pyem dominated district of Gindiri is called the Hakimi. On top of that all tribes have their own chief, the chief of all Mwangawhul has the title of Miskagham Mwangawhul, the chief of the Pyem is called SumPyem and the chief of the Fulani tribe is called by the title Ardo.

Role of chieftaincy in mitigating security dilemma and peaceful coexistence.

It is hard to overestimate the value the chieftaincy has for peaceful coexistence in Mangu LGA, this is something that all interviewees were clear about. Both the people as also other institutions stated that the chieftaincy is very much respected and appreciated by the people and they are named as the foremost mitigating institute by a lot of respondents. Reasons for the popularity are the tirelessly efforts of the chieftaincy to bring people together, their accessibility and the fact that they founded vigilante groups.

Efforts of the chieftaincy

The first reason the chieftaincy is named often as the most important factor for peaceful coexistence is its tireless efforts to preach peace, bring people together and continuity of this institution in this process. Especially the Miskagham Mwangawhul goes often to locations where conflict erupt, together with the LGA-chairman and religious leaders. In the local region the Miskagham Mwangawhul earns a lot of respect and has a lot of goodwill, the people are eager to listen to him. Due to the lifetime

appointment all of the chiefs have, the Miskagham Mwagawhul is already for decades at reign. In this years the Miskagham Mwagawhul has built up a very good reputation and proved to be a good chief to the people, which has led to a lot of goodwill with the local people. Chiefs portray themselves as a-political and they try to publicly keep distance from politics, they cannot speak their mind about politics. This has the effect that chiefs in the end stand above the parties and even above the LGA chairman. One person told us: *"LGA chairmen come and go, but the chiefs are here to stay and look out for our interest."*

The fact that the chief is appointed for life gives him a certain independent position above the parties. Chiefs do formally not engage with politics, because they have to deal with all kind of politicians over the years. All of this features give the chiefs a lot of respect from the community, not only from their own tribe but also from other minorities. As already mentioned the Fulani and the SumPyem do not get along very well, however the Hakimi has a very good relationship with both and so the chieftaincy also regulates itself in some form.

All of the above mentioned factors make that the chieftaincy is seen as a symbol of continuity, which results in a lot of trust in the institutional power of the chieftaincy. While chiefs themselves also put emphasis on the fact that peaceful coexistence is the work of a lot of people and institutions and mostly state that everybody plays its role in peaceful coexistence, the people are much more inclined to say that the chiefs have the most dominant role of all institutions in peaceful coexistence.

Also his efforts to stand above the parties gives a lot of trust to the people we have spoken with. For example during the Jos crisis, that had a spoil over effect on Mangu LGA, which led in Mangu Town to religious segregation, even though this was on a much smaller scale than in other LGA's in Plateau State, like Jos.. A lot of Muslims fled to the Gindiri district, because there are more Muslims among the Pyem people. Other Muslims left Christian dominated neighbourhood and Christians left Muslim dominated neighbourhoods. The Miskagham Mwagawhul, the LGA chairman and representatives of Muslims and Christians get around the LGA to preach peace and unity. Next to that the Miskagham persuaded the people who fled to Gindiri, to come back to Mangu Town. He personally guaranteed their safety and the people came back, this was important also for the authority of the Miskagham Mwagawhul.

All this effort was to make sure the tension did not escalated into violence. To convince the people that there was no security dilemma and this was quite successful. Especially the relocation of Muslims into their old neighbourhoods had a big symbolic meaning, it showed that the Miskagham Mwagawhul, who is a Christian, is concerned with the welfare of the Muslim citizen. The upcoming crisis, which could easily turn into violence was averted, suspicion slowly decreased. This results in more mutual trust between different groups which is based on the trust the people have in the chieftaincy, and makes the feelings of fear and insecurity about the other smaller. When there are

times of turmoil, the people know that the chief will serve the interest of all people in their district and in Mangu LGA.

Accessibility

The second important factor that makes the chieftaincy an important instrument in peaceful coexistence according to the people is the accessibility and responsiveness of the chief's office. The accessibility and responsiveness of the office of the chiefs, as well the district chiefs as the Miskagham Mwagawhul and the SumPyem, is essential in people's perception of the conflict narrative.

The office of the chief works as a conflict regulating mechanism, when people have trouble with other people they go to the chief together, especially about custom law. Examples that were mentioned often are about land issues and rivalry between families. Arguments between different families about land rights or other concerns can easily get into a larger conflict, especially when there are two different ethnicities or religions. In Mangu LGA, located in the Plateau State context, people are very aware of the volatile environment they live in and the people realize that possible conflicts should be avoided and eliminated. That is why the accessibility of the chieftaincy is so important. This is also something that a lot of people see as the biggest difference between the LGA chairman's office and the traditional leaders, the LGA office is very hard to access, only important people or people close to the chairman are eligible to go in. Others have to make an appointment, however if you don't have the right network it can take more than six months to make an appointment.

Respondents see in the accessibility of the chiefs office one of the most important reasons for the peaceful coexistence in Mangu LGA. This point was mainly mentioned together with the security dilemma narrative one: mistrust and conflict are produced by bad communication, unclear regulations and weak conflict resolution mechanisms. The office of the chief creates an arena where people can dispute their differences in a fair and independent place, in the office there is space for to talk out problems. In this setting the chief is there to promote mutual communication. Sometimes when the troubled parties do not sort out the problems themselves, the chief acts like a judge and tries to resolve the conflict by judging the situation. Based on this conflict the chief sometimes appoint a commission of wise men that have to investigate how these situations in the future can be presented. An important example are the recurring small conflicts between herders and farmers in Mangu LGA. Mangu is located in the nomadic route of passing by Fulani herders, so every year they come by twice, when they move to the South during the hot summers of Northern Nigeria. The Hakimi of Gindiri had most to deal with this kind of problems, so he appointed a commission to investigate the problems and to come with a solution. The commission concluded that the farmers in Gindiri had taken too much of the land that was used as a pass through and that the separation between the road and the beginning of their land was not clear enough. So the Hakimi charged the farmers to make a wall of

rocks around their land. Next to that he told the farmers, who are under his ruling, two things: Firstly to never be their own judge and second that the Hakimi himself would make sure that the damage would be paid fairly. So it is kind of a carrot and stick method, people that try to be their own judge will be severely punished to set an example and the people that come to the office will get a solution. This system only is successful when the chieftaincy have the amount of respect, moral leadership and good will that the chieftaincy has in Mangu LGA.

Every chief has his own qualities and procedures. For example not all offices are equally accessible, because every chief has its own personality. The one chief is more accessible than the other chief. We found this out ourselves, we had very easily an appointment with the Miskaghan Mwangawhul. However with the local district chief of Mangu town, the Miskaghan Mangu, it took a lot of time before we could get an interview with him. Also the reception with all chiefs where different, the Miskaghan Mangu let us wait for a long while and when we could enter he was first sitting on his throne. On the other end we had a meeting with the Miskaghan Kerang and he was just sitting at the same level as we and the Hakimi of Gindiri was welcoming us at his house. This has all to do with personal preferences of the chief and how the chief sees himself and how the chief chooses to perform its role as chief. However in general the people say that the accessibility of the chiefs provide a lot of security and even the people in Mangu Town where quite unanimous that the district head of Mangu Town was good accessible. This are personal preferences and differences that show that the personality of the chief is important in the way the chiefs office is accessible or is hanging on to traditions.

Vigilante

After the riots in Jos in 2001 the military came in Plateau State to keep the peace, they started with creating road blocks, patrolling and peacekeeping. This was quite successful in Plateau State where open violence ended. A lot of leaders in Mangu and other LGA's asked the military to also fight crime instead of only peacekeeping, because the leaders saw that crime can lead to an eruption of violence in the volatile environment of Plateau State. After first being unwilling, the military later agreed to also fight crime. This resulted in more stability and rest in Plateau State and also in Mangu LGA.

Early 2014 the military scaled down the efforts in Plateau State and first of all they left relatively peaceful places as Mangu LGA. In response to this move the chiefs decided to establish a vigilante group in every district, to cover for the gap in crimefighting the military left. The vigilante is a group of voluntary men, that helps the police with fighting crime. This is a very common practise in Nigeria, however in other areas they are also founded as paramilitary units. The reputation of vigilante groups in other areas is ambiguous, however the vigilante in Mangu LGA have a very good reputation. People claim this success because of the clear leadership of the district heads. In the urbanised

districts as Mangu Town and Gindiri, the vigilante is active and everywhere around, in the rural areas as for example Kerang district, their presence is not so existing, due to the sparsely populated areas that are hard to patrol. However, both the rural districts and the urban districts are very content with the establishment of the vigilante groups by the chiefs.

The importance of the vigilante is mostly mentioned in a threefold way, first of all they fight crime, secondly they are the eyes and ears of the chiefs and thirdly it keeps the youth occupied. First of all they fight crime, this is mentioned a lot of times. Even though this should be the main task of the national police of Nigeria, the police in Nigeria is federal organized and the police officers are not from around, but police officers rotate through the whole country. The rationale behind this policy is to keep the power centralized and not to create a police which can eventually turn out to become a sub-clan paramilitary organization. Nigeria has a history of coups and the fear for a new coup has led to the creation of a police that is mixed geographically and ethnically (Suberu 2009: 10). A big problem in Mangu LGA that is often recalled in interviews and focus group discussion is the absence of the police. Cops are corrupt or just not concerned with Mangu, a lot of examples and anecdotes were mentioned about this. For example, a lot of times when there is a robbery going on, people call the police. However the police officer tells that there is no money for fuel, in other words the person who calls should first promise to give money to the police before they come. Another problem with the police is that they are badly informed and trigger-happy, a lot of times when the police intervenes in cases of crime they arrest the wrong person or they shoot the people that are the victim of crime instead of the perpetrator. The vigilante on the other hand are youth from the neighbourhood who know which house belongs to whom and in that respect they are better informed who is a possible perpetrator. Because the vigilante are the local youth the level of bribery is very low according to people, *"you don't ask a bribe from your own family or neighbour"*. However there are some stories of abuse of power of the vigilante, for example: The constitution does not allow vigilante groups to lock people up or to punish people, but this happens sometimes. A pastor told us that some people are being locked up for a couple of weeks and we ourselves saw a punishment of a young thief by 25 strokes. When we asked about the pastor about his opinion on the vigilante he told that the negative impact of the abuses of power do not outweigh the positive impact the vigilantes have. Even though several vigilante leaders claim that the cooperation between the vigilante and the police is a synergy and that every criminal that is being arrested by the vigilante is brought to the police to give them a fair trial, we see that there is some kind of parallel security apparatus in place.

The second role of the vigilante is being the eyes and ears of the chieftaincy, due to the vigilante the chiefs know what is going on in their districts or their kingdoms. This gives them a big information advantage compared to other institutions as the local government. The chiefs are close to

the people, a common heard expression was: *“The LGA has the money, but the chiefs have the people”*. This shows the influence the chiefs have, while their factual powers are quite limited.

The third reason for the positive influence of the vigilante on peaceful coexistence that is often mentioned in the interviews is that the youth is occupied by joining the vigilante. A very common saying in Nigeria is: *“An idle men is the devil’s workshop”*. People in Mangu LGA associate idleness and unemployment with an eager to riot. So the vigilante keeps the youth occupied and helps to create civilians that contribute to the society. As an interviewee says: *“Youth that is sitting idle, will get to use drugs and alcohol and will be easily distracted by rumours of agitators, Youth that is occupied works on a future and then they are occupied and they have something to strive for and a position and reputation to loose when they get into violence”*.

Local Government Area chairman office.

The role of the office of the LGA chairman is more ambiguous than the role of the chieftaincy. Criticism on the LGA is focused on both the accessibility of the office as well as the dividing role politicians play during time of elections. However people see that the LGA chairman’s office plays an essential role within the institutional framework to achieve peaceful coexistence within Mangu LGA.

The role of the LGA chairman’s office

First and foremost people know and acknowledge the LGA chairman as the constitutional leader who is the number one security officer. He is the chairman of the security council and he is seen as the person that is de facto responsible for the proper functioning of the police, even though the police is a federal institution. Next to that, the LGA chairman has the control over all financial resources the LGA, in the perception of the people this goes a long way for peaceful coexistence in Mangu LGA. However a lot of people also refer to the oligarchy that every LGA chairman has with the jobs that are being divided, here the LGA chairman’s office fails according to the people to really make a difference for Mangu LGA.

The importance of the LGA chairman

The people in Mangu LGA see the value of the LGA chairman in peaceful coexistence. One of the things that is most mentioned is that in times of turmoil the chairman visits the places of unrest, together with the traditional leaders, to preach peace. We have seen this in our observations. We had an interview planned with the chairman, but we had to reschedule, because there was a Fulani herdsman killed in the Langai district. The chairman went to the district, together with the Miskaghan Mwangawhul, to preach peace and to try to avoid there was a cycle of revenge.

A lot of people in Mangu Town recall an incident when Christian youth burned down a mosque around 2001, this was during the peak of the Jos crisis, so there was a very volatile environment, which easily could escalate into violence. The LGA chairman went to the place of the fire, together with the Miskagham Mwagawhul and preached peace, in the presence of the chief-Iman of Mangu Town. In that speech the Christian LGA chairman offered to pay for the complete rebuilding of the mosque, this was a big statement for Muslims in the Christian dominated Mangu Town. The LGA chairman was able to do this, because he has the final say in how tax and oil revenues are being spent. So even though the bill is paid by the community, the LGA chairman that was in office then, get a lot of credits for it and the present office still benefits from it.

Criticism on the LGA

The people in Mangu make a differentiation between politicians and politicians ending up in office, once the political battle is over. The LGA chairman tries to keep the LGA together and preach peace, however most of the times during election politicians try to divide people on the basis of ethnicity and religion. Mobilization of people to rally and to vote is mostly happening by dividing the people and to create a common enemy or threat, that is why times of election are always times when the tensions between different groups rise. This in the end also affect the chairman's office, because for people it is hard to move on after the elections. They mostly don't see the chairman as a genuine peace preacher.

Next to that there are more negative notions about the functioning of the local government. The most heard criticism anywhere is that the LGA is hard to access. All people state that the chairman's office is hard to access and that the chieftaincy is more easily accessible. Here we see a difference between the leaders of the community and the regular guys. For example the chief Iman of Mangu is close with the chairman, because he meets weekly with him during security meetings. He states that it is really depending on the chairman, this chairman his door is more open than other chairman in the past. The regular people are less nuanced and they see the chairman more as far away and not really concerned with their issues. The people in Gindiri also say the LGA chairman is hard to access, however they have more fundamental critique. They state that the Pyem in general do not feel represented by the LGA, because the LGA is dominated by the Mwagawhul. There has never been an elected LGA chairman that was Pyem, only transitional chairmen have been Pyem. A lot of people mention this in the context of the relationship between Mwagawhul and Pyem in general, they make a distinction between politics and the other factors. *"The relationship between the Mwagawhul and the Pyem are very cordial, we have a lot of interaction and intermarriages. Only in politics we are not as one"*. **FDG Cocin number 3**

Next to the accessibility of the local government, there was also a lot of criticism of the division of resources. The LGA does not live up to the expectations the people have when it comes to the division

of resources. There is a lot corruption, nepotism and it is hard hold the local government accountable. The power in Nigeria is top down and very much focussed centrally , in the Mangu case this means that the chairman has a lot of executive power. The majority of the people see that the chairman will only help himself and the people around him. Next to that he uses the resources to appease the divisions that were made during the elections. Ethnicity is dominating the politics and the elections and people say that politicians use the differences there are to drift people apart. So almost all politicians use the Mwagawhul identity to get into power. Later resources are used to appease the differences that were made during elections. In general the people of Mangu think a good use of resources would go a long way in keeping peace and stability, but that this is not the case right now. *“Politics are there for themselves, cause if you don’t know who is up there, you cannot get anything.”*
Jute.

Religious Leaders

The role of religious leaders is the least clear of all institutions and is mentioned the least by people when it comes to peaceful coexistence. Most of the people say the religious leaders have a role in peaceful coexistence, but it is more on the background than the chieftaincy and the LGA chairman. The religious leaders themselves are very aware of the role they play in ensuring peaceful coexistence.

Role of religious leaders in peaceful coexistence

The role of religious institutions on peaceful coexistence in Mangu LGA is three fold. Firstly, the religious leaders are part of the security council, this is helpful to have an arena to discuss issues and concerns. Both religions have their own umbrella organizations, the Christians are represented by the Christian Association Nigeria (CAN), while the Muslims are united in the Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI), what can be translates as: Society for the Support of Islam. Because you have both CAN and JNI at one table, it is more easily to discuss issues of concern. One member of CAN described it very clear:

“I was part of CAN, and we had our security meetings. And in security meetings we try to see how to involve both religions. Because at times our brothers were afraid of Muslims, because the Muslim men cannot be trusted. So while you’ll be guiding them, you’ll be grinding them as well.” (FGD Catholic

Mangu, number 4)

In this example we see that the narrative of ‘the other’ is present, however they see religious dialogue as a first step in overcoming this concern. In this way we see that the religious leaders play a big role. We found out that the pastors, the imams and the fathers are mostly more nuanced than the people from their flock. We see that clergymen are very much aware of the volatile environment of Mangu LGA and that they deliberately choose the words they preach with care. Both Christian and Muslim

leaders preach peace, this is mentioned in all three districts. Pastors, Imams and catholic fathers, all are very aware that peace does not come easily, it is something that needs to be constantly strived for. That is why they preach often about the importance of peace and with respect for the other religion. We have noticed this also in our interviews, the religious leaders talk with respect about the other religion during the interviews, however the differences between the religions are mentioned clearly.

Another advantage of the security council was mentioned by a lot of religious leaders: The issues that are discussed by the security council are channeled down and discussed in the local churches and mosques by their pastor or Imam. This is very useful to spread a certain message or point of view from the security council to the local people. Besides messages from the security council, the district heads also personally invite religious leaders to discuss certain issues that are ongoing in the district.

Last reason people mentioned about the importance of religious leaders in peaceful coexistence in Mangu Town, is the role pastors and Imams play in conflicts that happen within a church or within the denomination. Religious leaders are mostly the first point of contact when there is a conflict within a religion, people will not easily seek for help outside of the church or mosque when it concerns a conflict within a religion. For example for conflicts within a family or between families the Imam's or the pastor's office functions as a conflict resolution mechanism. Especially interesting in the context of peaceful coexistence are conflicts between families of different tribes, an Muslim participant of a focus group discussion told us a hypothetical example of a Fulani and a Pyem Muslim who have a dispute about a business transaction. They will go to the chief-Imam, because there are Islamic rules about doing business together amongst Muslims. However when the conflict is not settled in a good and just way other Fulani and Pyem men can get involved and frame this conflict in an ethnic way for their own agenda of hate. So in the perception of the people religious leaders can mediate in some conflicts that are religious of nature, but have the potential to grow into another framework.

Importance of the religious leaders in peaceful coexistence.

The perception of the people in Mangu is that the religious leaders play their role, however that the religious leaders are not the foremost important actor for peaceful coexistence in Mangu. Only the Ardo of the Fulani claims that the religious leaders are very important for the Fulani for peace in Mangu.

"..., the reality is that these clergymen have played their role. The religious leaders have been doing their work on both sides. This is one of the most important factors why Mangu is living in peace."

(Ardo)

The Fulani don't have very good relationships with the LGA chairman's office and especially their relationship with the chieftaincy is severely troubled, so this could be a reason why the Ardo sees the religious leaders as one of the most important factors for peace.

In 1995 there were some land issues between the Pyem and the Mwangawhul, which led to a small war. This war was mediated by the traditional leaders, however the religious leaders played a significant role in that conflict according to the Miskagham Mwangawhul. The two warring parties were both predominantly members of the COCIN-church and in this way the COCIN-church was in a very good position to accommodate the negotiations about peace and also to initiate the bigger debate about the boundaries between the Mwangawhul and the Pyem. A lot of people actually recalled this conflict to show that the relationship between the Mwangawhul and the Pyem are very cordial and that the last conflict between both tribes was already in 2015. The Miskagham acknowledged that with the coming of other Christian denominations in Mangu LGA the role of for example COCIN-leaders is a bit smaller than it was in the past, however that religious leaders can still play a role within conflict mitigation.

Economy

A not so obvious institution to mention in the context of the possible security dilemma in Mangu LGA is the position of the economy and more specific the weekly Mangu Town market in peaceful coexistence. All respondents, we have spoken with, have the perception that the market is playing an essential part in peaceful coexistence. All agree that there is no discrimination on the market, there is no differentiation between religions nor tribe. The only thing that matters on the market is price and quality.

The Mangu Town market is very important for the local economy, but also for the bigger region. It is the biggest market in Plateau State, since the markets in Jos have been burned down during the riots in 2001. The market of Mangu Town is so big that even brokers from the Igbo-dominated south of Nigeria come to Mangu, but also brokers from Cameroon and Niger come to Mangu Town to buy their wholesale.

People see the costs a potential conflict can have for the market and in that way for the livelihoods of the people in Mangu LGA, they have seen the Jos market been destroyed during the 2001 crisis and not being rebuilt since. Mangu LGA is largely a farmer community, so most of the people in Mangu LGA are dependent on the market for their livelihood. Mangu has thrived since the Jos crisis and has profited a lot of the burning down of the Jos market, which was before 2001 the biggest market of the Middle Belt. The shocking example of the Jos market has a deterrent effect for conflict according to the people in Mangu LGA.

Other reasons the people in Mangu LGA give for the positive effect of the market on peaceful coexistence is that the market is a place of interaction, where mutual trust can grow. Because of positive interaction with people from all over Mangu they have more interaction crosscutting religious or ethnic lines. Besides the interaction, there is also the mutual dependency that creates stability. The Fulani for example in Nigeria have a big trade network, build up in years of nomadic lifestyle, next to that the Fulani tribe is bigger than only Nigeria, so they have a regional network. In this way the Fulani have a broker position, however they are also dependent on the supply of agricultural products by the local farmers. So this interdependency creates according to the people of Mangu a lot of stability, people will think twice to riot.

The market itself has a quite strict hierarchy, in which every section of the market has its own chairman. The chairman of the different sections come from all tribal and religious backgrounds, which already show the diversity on the market. The market chairmen offices make sure that all transactions run smoothly and that there are no reasons for complaining. This helps to prevent small conflict from happening and helps to come out unified to ask for resources to the LGA chairman.

Next to interdependency and the interaction between different tribes and religions, the market is creating a lot of economic opportunities, as well for traders as for farmers. Occupation and not sitting idle creates a lot of stability according to the people, as earlier mentioned on the section of the vigilante.

Conclusion

When we look at the perception of the effectiveness of the different institutions on short time conflict mitigation, we can conclude that in the perception of the people the chieftaincy is the most important in addressing conflicts that are caused by bad communication, unclear regulations and weak conflict resolution mechanisms. The LGA chairman's office has in potential a lot of potential, but does not always deliver. The religious leaders have an influence, however are mostly limited to their own denomination. The Mangu Town market gives a lot of people an incentive to strive for peace on a personal level, because they are dependent on trade, and trade can only thrive when there is peace.

The influence of this institutions on the long term is very much dependent on the person that is in charge of that office. Both chieftaincy, LGA chairman and religious leaders change from time to time and from place to place and so does their office. However there are some long term institutional arrangements that better guarantee that 'the other' cannot completely dominate the group. These institutional arrangements will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 7. Perceived long term institutional arrangements for peaceful coexistence

In this section we will address the two different kinds of institutional arrangements that have a big influence for peaceful coexistence, which are both different kinds of power sharing in Mangu LGA. The difference between the conflict mitigation institutions and these two institutional arrangements lays in the nature of the arrangements. We call them both power sharing, because both relationships have in their nature the guaranteed interdependency, which limits the power of one side to completely overrule the other side. Firstly there is an informal power sharing arrangement in the political sphere between the Mwagawhul and the Pyem and secondly there is a kind of power and influence sharing between the LGA chairman's office and the chieftaincies. Both institutional arrangements addressing the lack of trust not from event to event or from crisis to crisis, but these institutional arrangements function on a more structural level and give to some extent guarantees to groups of people that their place on the governance table is assured. We will describe both the institutional arrangements, starting with the political power sharing.

Political power sharing in Mangu LGA

In Mangu LGA there is an informal kind of political power sharing agreement between the Mwagawhul and the Pyem. It is called informal, because nothing is put on paper about the arrangements, it is more a arrangement that is established out of tradition. In the 1990s there still was a lot of tribal conflict between the Mwagawhul and the Pyem, especially about land boundaries. End of the 1990s most conflicts where settled and there followed an appeasement politics from the LGA office, which resulted into this political arrangement that turned out to be very convenient in timing in connection with the outbreak of the Jos crisis.

The arrangement means basically that the offices of the LGA are being divided between the Mwagawhul and the Pyem, the Mwagawhul providing the LGA chairman and the LGA secretary, while the Pyem take care of the deputy chairman's office. Because of the centralized nature of Nigerian politics and the top down hierarchy of Nigerian society in general, all the executive powers are in the hands of the LGA chairman. That why all of my respondents described the deputy LGA chairman and the office of the secretary as silent offices, that have no real power, however they work closely together with the LGA chairman, so in that way they can influence him. Next to the deputy's office the Pyem also get the LGA chairman's office when the LGA was in need of a transitional LGA chairman. This is for example when the current LGA chairman gets a new position or when he has to resign, then mostly the deputy chairman will be the transitional chairman until there are new elections organized. This power sharing agreement is not a solid agreement, which is always honored, it is constantly

renegotiated and so the outcome is not always exactly the same. For example the chairman that was in office during our research was a transitional chairman and he was a Mwagawhul, while according to the informal arrangements the transitional chairman is always a Pyem. That is mostly up to the Mwagawhul to decide, because they have such a big majority, that they are able to make decisions without the consent of the Pyem.

The Pyem do not always feel very comfortable with the power sharing, however they realize that this is the best strategy to maximize their power and influence at this moment. The perception that *“politics is a game of numbers”* is a frequently heard story during the interviews with Pyem people and leaders. The SumPyem expressed the opinion of the people in a telling way:

“Politics is a game of numbers, the Mwagawhul people are our senior brothers in terms of population. If there is no consensus, politics is a game of numbers. So without consensus the Mwagawhul man will take it all. We do a give and take arrangement, so that we can also have a say.”

It is a dual perception towards the power sharing arrangements, it is not the Pyem their ultimate first choice, however they realize it is more than having nothing.

Most of the Mwagawhul frame the power sharing arrangement in the first place as a gentlemen’s agreement between the big and the smaller brother. The relationship between the Mwagawhul and the Pyem is very cordial and they have worked together for years, they have quite compatible common law and practices and so the Mwagawhul see the Pyem as their smaller brother, who they look out for. A lot of regular people do not see more behind this power sharing scheme. However when we talked with Mwagawhul leaders, such as the chieftaincy, they acknowledge the role of the Pyem within the greater Plateau State politics. The Mwagawhul are one of the bigger tribes within Plateau State and they are always running for the State Governor’s offices, but there are bigger tribes within Plateau State, especially the Berom-tribe is bigger than the Mwagawhul, and so the current State Governor is a Berom-man. With the support of the Pyem, the Mwagawhul tribe is almost as big as the Berom-tribe and in that way they can compete for the Governor’s office. This is according to the leaders one of biggest reasons why there is a stable power sharing agreement between the Pyem and the Mwagawhul, because the Pyem have an institutional guarantee, that the Mwagawhul will keep their end of the institutional deal. Because there is a clear moment, during State elections, where the Pyem can come with payback if the Mwagawhul do not honor their side of the deal. So for both sides there is an institutional way to push the other side to provide for their end of the bargain.

Winners and losers on the power sharing table.

The informal power sharing arrangement creates a relatively stable coalition which has the support of the vast majority of Mangu. There was agreement among my respondents that the Mwagawhul are

the big winner of the power sharing agreement, they have a peaceful and stable political environment with the minimum of loss of political power. The role of the Pyem is more ambiguous, a lot of people among the Mwagawhul see the Pyem also as winners with this agreement, however amongst the Pyem itself this is not always perceived, however all Pyem see that this is the highest achievable for this moment.

Where there are winners on the power sharing table, there are also losers. Especially the Fulani tribe is the biggest loser of the power sharing agreement. The Fulani is the third biggest tribe in Mangu LGA and has no political power of offices in the LGA. Within bigger Nigeria they are one of the biggest tribes, however their power base is in the North of Nigeria and not in the Middle Belt. The power sharing agreement between the Mwagawhul and the Pyem makes it difficult for the Fulani to influence the political process and the Fulani feel excluded because of that. LGA chairman and some traditional leaders do not acknowledge this, they say that Mangu LGA is accommodating everybody equally. However the Hakimi of Gindiri was quite clear about the exclusion of the Fulani and also the perception of the normal Mwagawhul and Pyem on the exclusion of the Fulani is dual. On the hand they agree with the leaders that there are equal chances for everybody, on the other hand there are some people that state that the Fulani do not have the same rights as the other tribal groups. The Fulani have a strategy to maximize their powers by positioning themselves as the second biggest ethnic group, which is bigger than the Pyem. This claim does not find conformation elsewhere in Mangu LGA, but this is the Fulani's strategy to claim legitimacy in political power sharing in Mangu LGA. Because the Fulani position themselves as the second largest ethnic group, they especially have tense relations with the Pyem, the Mwagawhul is also in this relationship the winner, because they are too big to compete with. The Fulani are politically excluded and there is also a tendency to exclude the Fulani socially. The Fulani have a bad name, because most of Boko Haram is Fulani and this creates negative stereotypes about Fulani's in general.

"Because now, when it is robbery, they will say it is Fulani people, they will blame always Fulani. So there is sentiment against a certain tribe, so other tribes can go and attack. Our security forces have caught multiple times armed robbers that where dressed as Fulani, but turned out to not Fulani, but Berom or Anghaz for example." **Hakimi**

It is difficult for the Fulani in Mangu LGA to position themselves, they try to seek refuge at the State Governor, however the anti-Fulani sentiment is all around Plateau State. The power sharing agreement in Mangu makes sure that the LGA chairman does not have to address the issue of the Fulani. We saw that in our own observations, the road to the Fulani-village was much worse than that of other villages. Besides, due to the political exclusion the Fulani are not seen as indigenous people of Mangu and are not allowed to own land for themselves. All this issues are not addressed by the local government and it is not in the interest of the local government to fulfil the needs of the Fulani,

because they are not part of the power sharing arrangement. This observation is being confirmed by some local Mwangwuhul and Pyem, however the leaders will never publicly admit this. This is the biggest complaint of the chief of the Fulani, in times of elections and political campaigns, the politicians also come to Fulani tribal villages. The politicians then make a lot of promises to the Fulani, however it lacks the Fulani of clear leverage within Mangu and Plateau State politics. So they do not have the leverage that the Pyem have with State politics.

“Also other tribes we work with, do not like how the situation is now. But however, an agreement was made between them, and they share those political powers. Leaving us aside, we are just watching and we have lodged our complaints time after time, but they won’t listen. They only want our help during the political season and they all sit here, and they make promises time after time. But when the political season has ended, they do not listen anymore” Ardo

In the end this situation leads to the exclusion of the Fulani and to the lack of democratic power to hold the people in power responsible for the exclusion of this group. Besides, there is a the narrative of the Fulani bringing in their brother and all of them have multiple wives and after a period of time they become dominant. This system that works pretty much on the saying that politics is a game of numbers, gives the Fulani also the incentive to try to expand their influence in an attempt to not be excluded from the political power table. On the other side, the strategy of the Fulani to try to claim that they are the second biggest tribe and in that way try to oppose the Pyem is maybe not the best strategy. Other tribes do not contest the position of the Pyem and they do not have any issues with exclusion.

Influence sharing

In this part we focus on the relationship between the LGA chairman’s office and the chieftaincy. The LGA and the chieftaincy have a complex relationship, on one side they are close partners and they work together quite effectively, especially in the preaching of peace and keeping the peaceful overinsistence with the cooperation of the police and the vigilante. On the other side there is some contestation between the two institutions which is being balanced by the interdependence they have on each other. The LGA has the resources, while the chieftaincy have the people: People acknowledge that the LGA has the executive powers and also the powers to allocate the financial resources, however the chieftaincy has much more legitimacy as a ruler under the people. People claim that especially when it comes to times of insecurity, people pretty much fall back on the district heads and the tribal heads, because they are much more close to the people. The LGA chairman realizes very much that he needs the support of the chiefs to keep the LGA peaceful and governable, however the chieftaincy also needs the LGA, because of the funding. The chieftaincy is getting funding from the

local government to maintain its office, this is donated by the LGA chairman's office and is not formally signed for or written down in federal laws. However it is common all over Nigeria and is also a kind of recognition from the government, which sees the important role the chieftaincy plays in social cohesion. In an interview with the local chairman of Mangu, he also recognizes the important influence of the chiefs in social cohesion and in peaceful coexistence. So they work closely together and they have the opportunity to force the other party to change its policies.

The choice of the LGA and the chiefs to work together is not a logical one, in other parts of Nigeria the chieftaincy is much more tribal oriented and they all represent their own tribe. In Mangu the chiefs of the Mwagawhul and the Pyem are one, so even though they both try to maximize the gain for their tribe, they do not let themselves being divided and conquered. That is the reason why they are a good counterpart to a LGA-government. As described in earlier chapters the LGA and the chiefs accommodate and strengthen each other, especially the cooperation between the vigilante and the police is a good example of the cooperation between the chiefs and the LGA instead of contestation. Next to that, in preaching peace they work very closely together, they deliberately go together in one big car to show that the chieftaincy and the LGA are one.

Among the chiefs there is are two points of criticism on the office of the LGA chairman. Firstly, criticism on the functioning of the LGA office itself and secondly on the constitutional recognition the chieftaincy get when it comes to their contribution to peaceful coexistence.

Amongst all respondents we have spoken with, it was clear that providing basic services would go a long way in strengthening peaceful coexistence. People talked about the unfairness of the distribution of basic services; that the LGA chairman's office was too much involved in politics and because of that the services were mostly provided to the districts where the chairman has its most support. In this way the allocation of resources is highly politicized, the people understand that this happens in the context of Nigeria and that is quite normal. However they state that the right use and distribution of resources could strengthen and sustain the peaceful coexistence much more than it does now. This gives a lot of dissatisfaction with the people of Mangu LGA, especially the chiefs advocate for more honesty in the provision of basic services, they counterbalance the LGA a bit in the politicization of resource delivery. They argue that this would make the people more satisfied and less eager to create violence, especially when it comes to long run investments, like infrastructural investments.

"...when you going to politics, people just feel, what I am going to get and what you are going to get is where is politics all about. So that is what is bringing the differences. And then the opportunity to have to power, to manoeuvre one or two things to your area. If you don't have that power, you cannot be able to manipulate. But when you once become the local chairman of Mangu, you have the power to

say, this tap water is going to this area. This road should go to that area, this this should go to that place. Just because you are on the seat and you can manoeuvre your own way.” Hakimi

The Miskagham Mangu goes even further and claims that a lot of violence in Mangu LGA is caused by the unequal distribution of resources. *“People in Mangu are quiet by nature and they do not come to unrest easily. However when you see people fighting, it is because of the discrimination of access to resources, but when everything is divided equally then there is peace.”* Miskagham Mangu This quote has to be seen in the context of the interview where we zoomed pretty much in on the role basic services could play and chief wanted to emphasize the role of equally distribution of services can have in the strengthening of peaceful coexistence. From his role as the chief he focusses on the first narrative of violence as something that can be prevented by clear regulations, communications and conflict resolution mechanisms. The mistrust of *‘the other’* he also recognizes in the society, however he sees this especially from a resource point-of-view, so that the mistrust is there because there are political stakes and so there are resources to gain or to loose. The Miskagham Mangu is a bit extreme in this view, however all chiefs really acknowledge the role of unequal distribution of government resources as a potential source of peaceful coexistence and that this should be less politicized.

The other point of criticism of the chieftaincy is the lack of recognition for the office of the chief, especially within the constitution. The chiefs has lost all executive powers during the constitutional reform of 1976, where the LGA was created as the third tier of government. In this and later constitutional reforms the role of the chiefs was made very ceremonial, because the power of the chieftaincy in especially the North was so big, that it was hard for the national government to effectively govern this part of the country. Both the chiefs as other people in Mangu say that this competition was not there in Mangu and that the chieftaincy during the introduction of the LGAs did not form a challenge for the national government. However there is still a lot of discontent of the totally ceremonial role of the chieftaincy.

The chiefs are just pushed to the side, they are ceremonial. They are only used when there is crisis, to talk etc. Because you have the people. They take us for granted. That is why we think, traditional rulers should have a constitutional meaning. I cannot arrest or punish people, we can only advice. When we have executive powers we can go a long way in bringing more peace and stability in Mangu, because we know the people and we know where the trouble is. We can be above the politicians and really be independent and work for the benefit of the people.”. Miskagham Mangu

Because of the ceremonial nature of the chieftaincy, the chiefs have no executive powers, this is especially challenging in the security sector. The chiefs feel that their role in peaceful coexistence is sometimes not being appreciated enough, especially when it comes to the official constitutional role they play. This also has an economic aspect. The chieftaincy is now mostly depended on the stipend

of the LGA chairman. The LGA chairman can support the chiefs financially according to its own insights, there is no constitutional anchoring about the role of the chiefs and how they should be rewarded and supported. However it is common courtesy in Nigeria to support the chiefs and this is happening all over Nigeria, it is not a certainty. Chiefs plea for a stipend that is constitutionally bound, because then the chiefs are not dependent on the LGA for goodwill anymore. The chiefs want more recognition in their effort for peaceful coexistence and in that way also want more resources to maintain their vigilante troops and to give them for example the same rights as police officers and give the chiefs the right to punish people or to act like a real judge and not only have an advisory say.

“Unfortunately we are not politicians, we don’t have a say about that. We can only advice, but we are not stake players in that game. We see that traditional leaders should be in cooperated in the government. The traditional rulers do not have any constitutional rights. However every time there is trouble, the government comes to us, they say you are the people that have the people, you are the custodians and the people respect you. Please come to us aid, but when there is peace they forget about us and that is how things stay as they are. If we had a stake, the traditional rulers know the people, the circumstances and the background of people. So we are the people that can control the politicians and we can steer them. The LGA does not really listen to us and that is a bad thing.”

SumPyem

These quotes show the discontent of the chiefs about their current role in Mangu LGA, however the LGA chairman does not speak about these things. Even when I directly asked him if he would be in favour of more constitutional executive power for the chieftaincy, he tried to avoid to give an answer. He kept it vague, because if he said he was in favour his powers and resources would be reduced. However when he stated against more executive powers for the chieftaincy, he would antagonize the chieftaincy.

So both institutions work together closely when it comes to governance and security and this is more than only balancing each other out. They accommodate and strengthen each other, while they do not really contest the role of the other institution. Even though they do not agree on everything, they realize that their existence is dependent on each other and that they both benefit from each other’s existence. Both parties have the leverage to force the other party to move their position, so in that way it is a relationship and not an unequal forced cooperation. In that way, this is a stable power-influence sharing relationship, that brings quite a stable environment. The power base of the chieftaincy is the public support and their historical roots, the power base of the LGA chairman is their constitutional power and their resources. Of course the LGA chairman has an electoral basis, because there are elections every four years, however people do not have a lot of trust in politicians in general and are more like to trust to the chieftaincy. People emphasized that especially in times of conflict the people fall back to the things they trust most, like the chieftaincy.

Chapter 8: Conclusion and Discussion

Conclusion

The conclusion of this research will consist of three parts, firstly it will give an answer to the main research question, secondly it will try to connect the literature discussed in the theoretical framework with the data and analysis of the following chapters. This part will be very much reflect on the literature about power sharing and will especially zoom in on the criticism to power sharing strategies and how this is working out in Mangu LGA. The last part of the conclusion will be a bit more normative and written from the writers point of view and criticizes the theories about power sharing on a higher level than responding to individual scholars.

Main research question

To recapture the main research question was: *What are in the perception of the people in Mangu LGA the short and long term conflict mitigation mechanisms and how effective are they?* When we look at institutions that play a big role in the short term conflict mitigation mechanisms we can say that the chieftaincy is the number one important according to most of the people. Also the LGA play an important role, as it has all the resources. The religious leaders mostly have two smaller roles, the role of conflict mitigation within their own congregations and denominations and secondly to channel down information from the security council meetings to the people. Also the Mangu Town market has a very positive influence on peaceful coexistence.

When it comes to long term solutions, we see that the chieftaincy and the LGA gain in importance, while the religious leaders are more on the background and do not play a very big role in the long term solutions in the perception of the citizen of Mangu LGA. This is because the master cleavage that is addressed in the long term solutions is dominated by ethnicity and religious leaders could have difficulty to contribute to the mitigation of this cleavage. Another explanation we heard was that both the Muslim as the Christian umbrella organizations are not as unified as they could be, and this is also one of the reasons why the religious leaders do not have a big contribution to the long term solutions.

When we look at the efficiency of the short and long term conflict resolution mechanisms, we see that on the short term resolution mechanism people complain a lot about the LGA chairman's office. It lacks accessibility and a lot of corruption and nepotism is going on. So according to the people in Mangu LGA, the LGA does not live up to the possibilities it has. When we look at the long term solutions we see that there are winners and losers of the power sharing table. The Mwagawhul and the Pyem dominated both power sharing arrangements and this creates a lot of stability. The Fulani are not in the position now to create a real security threat, however on the long term a lot can happen

and the long term effectiveness of the power sharing arrangements will be determined by the will of the people in this arrangements to include the people outside the power sharing arrangements. To make the power sharing system sustainable for the longer future, the needs of the Fulani should not be neglected, because that would delegitimize the power sharing arrangement itself. Because these power sharing arrangements are the foundation on which this policy is built.

Power sharing in Mangu, problematized and criticized.

The informal political power sharing arrangement between the Mwagawhul and the Pyem is a classic example of a power sharing arrangement from the literature. There are two parties that used to have conflicts and violence about boundaries and could potential become rivals, that decide to share the political power in a certain region. In this way an active security dilemma is turned away and the parties have found a mundus operandi to exchange the positions and resources of the LGA. This is exactly the condition that Hartzell and Hoddie (2003, 2015) pose for power sharing arrangements, that there is proportional representation.

The power sharing arrangement between the LGA and the chiefs may not address a direct security dilemma, but it is in our opinion still justified to call it a power sharing arrangement, because it has a lot of features of it. It certainly contains elements of economic power sharing (Wennmars 2012) and also the through the district heads there are some elements of territorial power sharing between the LGA as a whole and the governance of districts (Hartmann 2013, Lake and Rothchild 2005, Wolff 2009 and Jarstad and Nilson 2008).

Besides both the two power sharing arrangements have some kind of veto right in the form of political or institutional leverage. This is very important to make sure it is not a dominated relationship, but that for example the Pyem can retaliate on the Mwagawhul and in this way the Mwagawhul cannot bandwagon (Ram and Strom 2014). This political leverage also makes sure that for example the LGA will not exclude and dominate the chieftaincy completely, and rule out the possibility of dictatorship (Boix and Svulik 2013).

In the end we can say that -till now- these arrangements have brought a kind of security, satisfaction among the majority of the citizen and even some economic stability with the Mangu Town Market. The Mwagawhul and the Pyem have no reason to resort to violence, because both their seats are guaranteed on the governance table, the chieftaincy brings a lot of legitimacy to the arrangement, while the LGA is using its resources. We should not forget the tremendous achievement it is that Mangu LGA did not resort into violence in the very volatile environment of Plateau State.

What are the effects of this two power sharing arrangements. We can conclude that in general both the two arrangements work very good to keep the status quo as it is. The two most dominant

parties control the political power sharing and in this way also control the LGA and also the influence-sharing is dominated by the Pyem and the Mwagawhul. The Fulani can be excluded, because the Mwagawhul and the Pyem together have such a solid power base that they do not need to include the Fulani to have a peaceful coexistent LGA with enough demographic legitimacy. This links to the criticism of Vandegiste (2003) that power sharing is a solution that is there for the short term objectives. Vandegiste (2003) states after doing fieldwork in Burundi that power sharing on the short term has a stabilizing effect, but on the long-term power sharing have not make a difference with more ambitious objectives. Democracy, rule of law and the accountability of the politicians is low, this is because of the institutional design that even losers of the election get a chair in the government. On the other hand, we see that the marginalization of the Fulani is not unlimited. Even within this stable environment, with a lack of democratic accountability, the different power sharing institutions are bound to the limitations of for example the constitution. On top of that the people that are part of the power sharing arrangement also realise too much inequality would be bad for the overall legitimacy of the power sharing institutions.

In other words, the Fulani are not marginalised to the maximum, however we can conclude that this power sharing arrangement creates a big democratic deficit, because the LGA cannot be held accountable by civilians. Instead the LGA is being held accountable by the chiefs, that are also dominated by the Mwagawhul and the Pyem. According to Curtis (2012) this can lead to a rationale that the excluded party, in this case the Fulani, will seek resort to violence to ensure their seat on the power sharing table. In order to get access to the power sharing table, you must potentially be a danger to peace and security and ensure that cooperation is easier than to fight them. However we do not see this happening very fast, even though there are no precise numbers, it is safe to say that the coalition of the Mwagawhul and the Pyem have such a big majority, that the Fulani could not form a substantive security dilemma that this would imbalance the status quo. It would be easier for the Mwagawhul and the Pyem to fight the Fulani and in that way keep total control than it is to cooperate the Fulani into the power sharing agreements. The Fulani in Mangu LGA try at the moment to seek political support on the state and the national level, because the Fulani are a big tribe with their powerbase located in the North of Nigeria. However when this is not given any results and the marginalization would continue, it could always be possible that some Fulani would resort to violence. Because of the limited number of Fulani there currently are in Mangu LGA, this will not be a serious threat for the order in Mangu LGA and so this can be framed as terrorism and so the status quo does not have to change for this.

The criticism of Schneckener (2012) that power sharing favours one cleavage above the other is also something that can be seen in Mangu LGA. Conflict and eruptions of violence are most of the times not out of one reason, but consists of a lot of individual cleavages and incentives, like the

economic, the religious and the ethnic incentive. The power sharing arrangements both focus on the ethnical aspect of conflicts and addresses the ethnical cleavage. In this case, Byrne and McCulloch (2012) do have a point in their criticism to power sharing when it comes to this case, especially religion does not get the place they deserve in the power sharing arrangements. Even though religion is often mentioned as a big cleavage that makes people in Mangu LGA feeling insecure. The current power sharing arrangements do not address this issues, because of the nature of the institutional arrangements. Because this is the case, the role of religious leaders in long term solutions for conflict mitigation is very limited at the moment in Mangu LGA.

The criticism of Spears (2013) that power sharing is a top-down Western process can be firmly rejected by the Mangu case. The kind of institutional arrangements that are in place in Mangu, can definitely be seen as an indigenous and local process.

Contrasting worlds, contrasting normality's.

This research clearly shows that peaceful coexistence is something that has the number one priority for the citizen of Mangu LGA, a lot of awareness about this subject is there among the people. They see that peaceful coexistence is not a given fact, but that it is something that has to be accomplished by all people inside the borders of the LGA. They have seen the effects of riots in the neighboring LGA's and realize that violence is not only dangerous for the existence of the LGA, but also that violence is expensive and harmful for the economy of Mangu, which is mostly based on the Mangu Town market. It shows that there are short-term as well as long-term conflict resolution methods and that both the short-term as well as the long-term do have their added value for peaceful coexistence.

The discussion we find in the literature is about the long term effects of power sharing. Paraphrasing and summarizing the most heard criticism to power sharing is that power sharing keeps the status quo, is not inclusive and that it has no power to transform conflicts. We see this happening in Mangu LGA, where the status quo is much more important than conflict transformation. Nobody in Mangu LGA ever talked about the long term consequences of the two power sharing arrangements, because everybody is to aware that peaceful coexistence is for now so much more important than equal citizenship. For example: the somewhat political marginalization of the Pyem is acknowledged by a lot of Pyem people, however they also say that it will change within time and that they do not to make too big steps at once. In other words, they do not want to change the current balance of power if it means that this can jeopardize the current situation of peaceful coexistence.

The people of Mangu LGA or no real political purist or democratic tigers, they are more being pragmatic. When everywhere around them there is conflict and openly violence, Mangu citizen count their blessings and wait till better times to address things as the first elected LGA Pyem-chairman. This is also something that can be seen in the economy. All people we have spoken with, if they are Muslim

or Christian, Mwagawhul or Fulani, everybody agreed that there was no discrimination on the market. This shows that the people in Mangu LGA are very pragmatic and they have the mind of the merchant and not necessarily the mind of purists.

When conflict is your normality, then peaceful coexistence is already something high to strive for and conflict transformation is way out of picture. This is, in my opinion, the crux in the whole discussion about the long term effects of power sharing: what do scholars see as the normality? Is peace the normality and is conflict the exception or is conflict the normality and is peace the never long-lasting exception? The people in Mangu are quite clear about it, they see conflict all over Plateau State, they see Boko Haram in the North and also a lot unrest and violence in the Niger Delta in the South: they see conflict as the normality. Because they see so, they are not seeking for long-term solutions, because there will not be a solution where all tribes, religions or any other form of group formation, will all like each other and do not compete with each other for the available resources. Due to this notion, they do not seek for conflict transformation and inclusive citizenship. They realize the value of this peaceful safe haven called Mangu and they try to expand their agency within this environment. They get that there are silent rules and they get why the Mwagawhul most of the time have the office of the LGA chairman. It is not because they approve it, but they know that the current situation of peaceful coexistence in Mangu LGA is fragile and precious.

In the end when we want to give a final judgement about the power sharing arrangements in Mangu LGA, we cannot avoid being normative about it. Because the question is not really: what is going on in Mangu, but do we estimate the way of working in Mangu as being effective or do we judge it as underachieving? On basis of our experiences, conversations, focus group discussions and observations would say that yes, power sharing in Mangu LGA is excluding both the Fulani-tribe as well as not addressing the religious or gender problems. However in the perception of the people in Mangu this is the highest achievable at this moment and even though we are critical and know that inclusive governance does not fall out of the air, we tend to agree with the people in Mangu. Peaceful coexistence in Mangu is already a very big blessing and that small balance can be easily disrupted if one of the parties in this case will push too hard for progress.

Discussion

Broader significance

This thesis has explored the role of power sharing and other conflict mitigation mechanisms in Mangu LGA and made some conclusions.

One of the questions that is worth exploring is what the case of Mangu LGA learn us about power sharing and if these lessons also could be more generalised? To know this, this research should in some sort be duplicated to other contexts and look what stands out in every research as the same and which dynamics are contextually bound. We would get some interesting academic debates about the long term consequences of power sharing arrangements, but also discussions about normality and crisis.

Limitations of this research

The aim of this research has from the beginning on been to describe the perceptions of the people in Mangu LGA. This is considerably done, because the researches are aware of the difference between reality and perception. Especially in topics like insecurity and security and effectiveness of governance, there is no 'real' reality, there is only the construct of perception. However we do believe that the perceptions of people steer peoples actions, so in that way we do not think that there is no reality or that this perceptual study does not have outcome that affect people's reality.

Even though the researchers have tried to triangulate the data as much as possible, there is always the possibility that this research has a bias. The bias that is most likely is that people tell Western researchers other stories than they would tell to themselves or to people they completely trust. We have tried to mitigate this by hanging around with youth and gain their trust and build a relationship. Besides, several researches that have experience in Nigeria (both Western and Nigerian) assured me that Nigerian in general are not shy to answer and speak out their hearts. Especially in focus group discussions. By all of this ways, we tried to mitigate this possible bias, and we are convinced that the results of this research are reliable.

Other research opportunities

The scope of this research is due to time constraints still quite limited and so much more detailed research could be done on the role of gender relations within the power sharing mechanisms. Some people described the role of oldest woman as head of the extended family and how influential they are in conflict mitigation. Because it was not directly relevant for this thesis, we decided to not dive

into this section, however it sure has some influence on the dynamics around power sharing and around peaceful coexistence.

The same can be said about the role of education in peaceful coexistence. Some people mentioned the role of education as an important factor of peaceful coexistence, however when we asked deeper into this, they could not really tell how education in their opinion leads to peaceful coexistence. The interviewees mostly said that education broadens the mind and some refer to the European or American countries in this matter as a good example of the role of education. The role of education in peaceful coexistence is not clear in this study. However it would be very interesting to do more research about the role of education in peaceful coexistence in Nigeria, especially because education is something that can easily be improved in Nigeria. There is already a system of state sponsored schooling, however when more research turns out that education is also an important feature for peaceful coexistence, the Nigerian government should make it more a priority.

An important recommendation in general about doing research on power sharing and conflict mitigation is the people speak who are affected by this conflict. We can make great frameworks and have big conceptual discussions, but if this only makes sense to the people in the West, we are definitely on the wrong track. New research should be done on the similarities on big International Relations-concepts and game theory and how this is working out on the local context. Again, this should be data driven, cause a lot of see people in conflict areas as rational human being that can choose between A or B, however people never have two options. People have dozens of options, some rational in our eyes, some irrational in our eyes but rational in their eyes.

More research could be done in different setting with experience with power sharing, for example Burundi would be a very interesting case at this moment. Just because the power sharing arrangement that kept the country together for a long time has now changed and this would give us some good insights about the long term effects of power sharing arrangements.

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