


‘Everyone is a possibility’

**A messy social network study of refugees
from Syria in Şanlıurfa, Turkey**

Judith van Uden

Master thesis



‘Everyone is a possibility’

A messy social network study of refugees from Syria in Şanlıurfa, Turkey

Source cover picture: Uden, J.J.M. van (2017, May 17). Public café in Şanlıurfa where people bond and bridge.

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Foreword

By handing in this thesis, not only my largest life project ends but I also quit being a student for the first time in my life. This thesis has been quite a ride from the first moments of waiting on permission of the university board and the Turkish consulate to go to Şanlıurfa, to drinking *çay* with my informants until writing my last words. A ride filled by a spectrum of emotions ranging from melancholy to joy and helplessness to empowerment. During this thesis, I had moments of curiosity, insight, and doubt. I remember walking the streets in Şanlıurfa wondering about refugees from Syria their flight to Turkey, the challenges they encounter in Şanlıurfa, and how the humanitarian sector could support them better. Insights came when drawing mental maps of social networks of refugees from Syria while sipping *çay* at Nobel cafe. But I also experienced doubts when sitting behind my desk at the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM) looking for patterns and perspectives of refugees from Syria concerning their social networking efforts. I kept on scanting that *'nothing is wrong with doubt but it is a path to wisdom'* like a mantra to keep myself motivated. And I do think that these doubts lead to relevant questions that finally resulted in this thesis. This thesis is something I am proud of. I hope you enjoy reading it while I sure enjoyed making it.

Of course, I could not make this thesis all by myself. I first of all would like to thank all my informants for making time, opening their homes, and sharing their personal and intimate stories with me. Stories about their lives back in Syria, when fleeing and struggling in Şanlıurfa. Thanks for sharing your smiles and tears! Without all of your hospitality and kindness this thesis would not been possible.

Then, I would also like to thank ASAM and especially field officer Beste Okan for all their help. ASAM helped me with practicalities like visa but also by opening up their offices to me and their beneficiaries. *Çok teşekkürler* Beste, for supporting me as an intern supervisor, roommate but essentially as a friend with all kind of worries throughout my stay.

Moreover, I would like to thank Joost Jongerden for his guidance. Joost knew exactly when to ask sharp questions, check on me in Turkey after diplomatic tensions, or bring up different perspectives. Thanks for providing new ideas, critical feedback and motivating words!

To end with, I would like to thank my family and friends for brainstorming about my thesis, giving feedback on the first hundred drafts, and most of all by motivating me. Thanks for the inspiring words, good laughs and, warm hugs.

Shukran bezzaf!

Executive summary

Refugees from Syria became forcibly displaced after the war broke out in Syria in 2011. Since then refugees from Syria fled to neighbouring countries but the majority, an astonishing 3.4. million refugees from Syria, fled to Turkey. The largest share of refugees from Syria in Turkey reside in urban areas. Although Turkey provides basic services the temporary protection regime and humanitarians provide aid the needs of refugees from Syria are not met. They live under great uncertainty legally, economically, and socially. One of the ways urban refugees from Syria create opportunities for a better future is by belonging to social networks.

This research is a qualitative research investigating the ways refugees from Syria utilise their social networks and what these social networks deliver. The data is obtained during four months of fieldwork in Şanlıurfa, a city in Turkey, and consists out of 34 interviews -with refugees from Syria, humanitarians and scholars-, informal conversations, and observations. This research aims to contribute to the understanding how refugees from Syria utilise their social networks, what the role of identity is in this, and what social networks convey.

This research presents nine social networks refugees from Syria are part of. These social networks are based on different identity traits and characterised by different composition and rules. As a result of multiple identities and multiple networks refugees from Syria are able to socially navigate. Refugees showed themselves as capable agents socially navigating within and between social networks. Social networks are messy because of its fluidity, diversity, socio-spatial range, and multi-layered character. This messiness make it possible for individuals to socially navigate in the social arena like a ship on the sea.

Sailing the social arena full of social networks results for refugees from Syria in having various opportunities. But as each social network differs so does what they deliver. Each social network delivers different resources ranging from employment, housing, to retrieving aid. However, social networks are not based on a smooth social fundament based on equality but instead on a rocky one based on inequality and characterised by power struggles.

Refugees from Syria create and maintain their social networks by bonding and bridging. Bonding among those similar to them and bridging towards them socially remote from them. Bonding occurs among refugees from Syria and bridging refers to links between refugees from Syria and hosts. Bridging remains harder but of utmost importance since social tensions are rising in Turkey among hosts and refugees from Syria.

Therefore, I recommend humanitarians and Turkish government officials to invest in social cohesion programmes without shutting their eyes for the diversity among refugees from Syria and their networks.

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1. Introduction

On a sunny afternoon I was drinking *chay* at Nobel Café in Şanlıurfa with Ahmed, a young man from Aleppo, while discussing how my research was going. I shared a bit frustrated that I was stuck and no longer oversee how refugees from Syria create and maintain their social networks. It is just all so messy I complained. Then Ahmed laughed and responded that ‘everyone is a possibility’, so sure it is messy. In his experience every person met is a possibility that might lead to gaining access, information, aid, and so forth. Ahmed talked about various social networks he belongs to and feels part of scattered across Turkey, Europe and the Middle East. He confidently shared that after four years in Turkey he has enough contacts to help him with obtaining what he needs in Turkey. If I need information from the Turkish government I can call my old boss. If I need to travel to the North I can stay with my aunt in Izmir. Or when I need to access humanitarian organisations I can contact Rohat. Ahmed’s words helped me in understanding the messiness of social networks and how it contributes to refugees from Syria their well-being.

Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011 over thirteen million Syrians fled their homes of whom five and a half million became refugees (UNHCR, 2018a). Turkey hosts 3.4 million refugees from Syria at the end of 2017 according to the Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management (hereafter: DGMM) (DGMM, 2017). An astonishing 92 percent of them live in Turkish urban areas making the refugee issues mainly an urban challenge. Refugees from Syria currently live in Turkey in a precarious situation characterised by insecurity regarding their guest status, its associated rights, employment, and safety. Uncertain legally while it is unknown for how long the temporary protection regime is put in place. Uncertain institutionally on how and when to access governmental services and humanitarian aid. Insecure economically as most refugees from Syria are unemployed or have informal and sporadic jobs without a contract nor insurance. Unsafe socially because of the rising tensions among hosts towards refugees from Syria in areas which are densely populated by refugees from Syria (International Crisis Group, 2018; UNHCR, 2017b; World Bank, 2015; Yıldız & Uzgören, 2016). Uncertainty, insecurity and unsafety shape everyday lives of refugees from Syria in Turkey and are core characteristics of our contemporary times (Bauman, 2000). In a society in constant flux, which is even accelerating, with limited security people seek for support to others. Social networks where they belong to and can be part of. Belonging to a social network creates some sense of security in these insecure times. Especially refugees long for security after being forcibly displaced.

It remains a challenge for refugees from Syria to access Turkish governmental services and humanitarian aid. Even though the Turkish government and humanitarian organisations aim to provide services and aid to refugees from Syria, it is simply not enough (Henderson, 2013; UNHCR, 2017b). Although the Turkish government grants access to basic services and humanitarian organisations provide aid refugees from Syria still struggle to get by. The inadequacy of the Turkish government and humanitarian field is a result of the large number of refugees from Syria, the complexity of the urban setting, budget deficiencies and the diversity of refugees their needs (Crisp et al., 2012). One of the major issues refugees from Syria in Turkey face is ensuring their livelihoods as a result of insufficient support by the Turkish government and humanitarian organisations (Sanduvac, 2013; UNHCR, 2017b).

The current service provision and aid architecture is not sufficient for refugees from Syria to ensure their livelihoods in urban areas in Turkey. Landau and Duponchel (2011) confirm that direct

assistance of the Turkish government and humanitarian organisations only play a minor role regarding ensuring a sustainable livelihood for urban refugees. Their study reveals that for urban refugees ensuring their livelihoods is more dependent on personal choices and positions in social and institutional networks than on aid and governmental services. Another research underlines that humanitarian efforts are simply not enough for refugees from Syria in Urfa (Support to Life, 2014). This research indicates that aid is only for 9 percent of the refugees from Syria in Urfa part of their income. Hence, formal support systems do not provide enough resources to refugees from Syria to ensure their livelihoods.

But refugees from Syria do not sit on the side-line and merely undergo the insecurity concerning humanitarian aid, governmental provisions, livelihoods, and host tensions. They rather engage, commit, and create ways to ensure their lives in a world signified by constant change (Bauman, 2000). This research looks with a sociological lens how urban refugees from Syria create and maintain their social networks. Social networks are a manner to gain access to and secure resources functioning as a safety net. However social networks can also act as a barrier not being able to access much needed forms of capital. This ambiguity is closely looked upon within this thesis.

This thesis does not focus on how formal support systems are implemented but rather how refugees from Syria themselves build and utilise their own support systems. Resulting in the main research question: *How do refugees from Syria utilise their social networks to secure their livelihoods in Urfa?* Little is known on how urban refugees survive in urban areas (Crisp et al., 2012). This research will show how creative, playful, and tactic urban refugees from Syria socially navigate within the social arena to gain urgent and vital resources. This research adds new information and insights into the lived realities and bonding and bridging efforts as acts of agency of urban refugees. This thesis will set out that social navigation between multiple social networks can be a rather fruitful manner to retrieve resources. Although on the downside, the same social networks that enable an individual can restrict it and hamper possibilities. Throughout this research there is attention for especially social networks their set-up, bonding and bridging efforts, and navigating identities. So far little research has been done about these sociological concepts in regard to urban refugees.

This research will give an in-depth insight into the messiness of social networks of refugees from Syria residing in Şanlıurfa (hereafter: Urfa), Turkey. As this research will show are social networks messy as a consequence of their fluidity, diversity, various socio-spatial ranges, and multi-layered character. This research will not only illustrate which social networks are paramount but also how they are internally structured, relate to other social networks, and the role identities is discussed. Furthermore, this research will cover what social networks cost and deliver. In addition, bonding and bridging efforts are studied.

This thesis consists of eight chapters full of theories, research methods, results and conclusions. Chapter 2 situates this research relating to academic literature on urban refugees and pictures how refugees from Syria live in Turkey and Urfa demographically, economically, and socially. The third chapter depicts the theoretical lens that analyses social networking efforts of refugees from Syria conceptualising identity, social networks, bonding and bridging. The fourth chapter sets out how this research was conducted in Urfa. Chapters five, six and seven are the results of four months of fieldwork describing how refugees in Syria in Urfa socially navigate between social networks, capitalise on social networks, and bond and bridge. Chapter eight is the final chapter consist of the conclusions and discussions.

2. Setting the scene

This chapter provides an overview of challenges refugees from Syria encounter in urban areas in Turkey and more precisely in Urfa. It consists of two sections. The first section outlines the contemporary demographics, legal, and socio-economic situation of refugees from Syria in Turkey and Urfa. The second section is a literature review which sketches the state of the art on the increasing numbers of refugees residing in urban areas, the relevance of social networks for urban refugees, and how humanitarian organisations adapt to this new trend.

2.1. On the ground realities

2.1.1. Demographics

The war in Syria is causing the worst humanitarian crisis of our times according to Filippo Grandi, the current UNHCR High Commissioner (UNHCR, 2016). Since the outbreak of the conflict in Syria in 2011 over thirteen million Syrians have been forcibly displaced, of whom five and a half million became refugees (UNHCR, 2018a). The majority of the refugees from Syria found refuge in neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey (UNHCR, 2016). Turkey currently shelters the biggest share of refugees from Syria in absolute numbers worldwide (UNHCR, 2017a; World Bank, 2015). But the Turkish government ended their open border policy (Babacan, 2017). The Turkish government build a wall between the Turkish and Syrian border trying to secure its border provinces from terrorist threats from Islamic State and Kurdish militias, but simultaneously hinders refugees from Syria from entering Turkey (Babacan, 2017; Weise, 2016).

Turkey shelters approximately 3.4 million refugees from Syria at the end of 2017 according to DGMM (DGMM, 2017). 92 percent of the refugees from Syria reside in urban areas (Seferis, 2015; UNHCR, 2017b). The majority of refugees from Syria live in the Southeast of Turkey, a mostly Kurdish region (Baban et al., 2017; Cetingulec, 2016a; Seferis, 2015 ; Yildiz & Uzgören, 2016).

DISTRIBUTION OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN THE SCOPE OF TEMPORARY PROTECTION BY TOP TEN PROVINCE




Figure 1: Distribution of Syrian refugees in the scope of the temporary protection by top ten province. Source: DGMM. (2017, December).

As figure 1 shows, in Urfa, a city in Southeast of Turkey, 462.077 refugees from Syria reside. In total 1.940.627 people live in Urfa, so 24 percent of the inhabitants are refugees from Syria (DGMM, 2017). The majority of refugees from Syria in Urfa come from Kobane, Aleppo, Raqqah, li Qamslo and Deir ezZur (ORSAM, 2015). Figure 2 displays the redistribution of refugees from Syria in Turkey colouring Urfa province red as a result of the high density of refugees from Syria here.




Figure 2: Provincial Breakdown All Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Turkey. Source: UNHCR. (2017).

2.1.2. Temporary protection

Turkey signed the “1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees”. This convention contains a geographical limitation proclaiming that only Europeans can become refugees within Turkish law (Baban et al., 2017). Refugees from Syria thus do not receive a refugee status but fall under the Turkish temporary protection regime which makes them mere “guests” (Baban et al., 2017; Yildiz & Uzgören, 2016). On the plus side does the temporary protection regime respects the *non-refoulement* principle meaning that refugees from Syria cannot be send back to Syria without exceptions. Also basic services are provided to the newly-arrived refugees from Syria by the Turkish government (DGMM, 2016). But only refugees from Syria who register receive support under the temporary protection regime (Sanduvac, 2013). Registered refugees from Syria can access health, protection, and educational services. And besides have the possibility to apply for a work permit.

Yet is there an ongoing debate between academics and humanitarians on the one hand and Turkish government officials and the UNHCR on the other hand. The UNHCR and government officials are in favour of the temporary protection regime. António Guterres, the previous United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, applauded Turkish hospitality accentuating how generous the Turkish government has been towards refugees from Syria with their temporary protection regime. The

UNHCR agrees with DGMM that the temporary protection regime grants the most fundamental rights and needs for refugees from Syria (UNHCR,2018b).

However, academics state that the temporary protection regime prevents refugees from Syria from fully participating in Turkish society. Refugees from Syria are only partially included according to Baban et al. (2017). This is shown by the difficulty refugees from Syria face when trying to access basic services (Kaygisiz, 2016). And by the fact that the temporary protection regime leads to restrictions on livelihood opportunities (Baban et al., 2017). They argue that the Turkish government provides refugees from Syria with limited citizenship rights while placing them in a precarious position (ibid.). Yıldız and Uzgören (2016) support this criticism with their empirical research revealing that *'...the sustainability of the temporary protection regime is approaching its limits and extending this emergency measure as an alternative to refugee protection cannot be considered as a viable solution'*(p. 207). Kivilcim (2016) goes a step further arguing that the temporary protection regime *'does not provide 'rights' but rather regulates 'access to services''*(p. 204).

Another widely debated topic of the temporary protection regime is its temporariness (Kaygisiz, 2016). Kaygisiz (2016) among others warns that the temporary protection regime can seem to exist within a day if the Council of Ministers decide so. Rendering refugees from Syria vulnerable to political trends. As a consequence it is difficult for refugees from Syria to make long-term plans because of the current insecure political situation.

According to a professor at Hacettepe university (Erdoğan, M.M., personal communication, April 11, 2017) the two main issues with the current response to the Syrian migration flow is that after more than six years there is still insufficient data about the millions of refugees from Syria nor a clear strategy formulated on how to host them. There is no overview on how many refugees from Syria are in Turkey nor what they exactly cost. This huge information deficiency makes it hard to form solid policies. However now rather inaction prevails. But even more important is that there is no long-term strategy on how to deal with this large refugee population. *'The Turkish government is focused on Damascus and on fighting Kurdish militia in Syria but is not looking land inwards and seeing what is exactly happening on the ground here with millions of Syrians. There is geopolitical focus but not a national one'* (Erdoğan, M.M., personal communication, April 11, 2017)

The reluctance and short-sightedness of the Turkish government regarding the millions of refugees from Syria residing in Turkey can be explained by the fact that the Turkish government would like to encourage refugees from Syria to return back to Syria (International Crisis Group, 2018). So transforming the temporariness of the current protection regime into a lasting system is not in the Turkish government their interest. Moreover, the Turkish government fears public repercussions when it might appear to the public that refugees from Syria stay permanently. Besides this, the insecurity and vagueness of the temporary protection regime is not only unpleasant for refugees from Syria but for hosts as well who are also left in the dark. Exactly this insecurity fuels the social turmoil already present and increases the impatience of hosts (International Crisis Group, 2018).

2.1.3. Livelihood challenges

The humanitarian situation in and outside Syria is further deteriorating and continues to be under threat (UNHCR, 2017a). Refugees from Syria have limited livelihood and educational opportunities while living under poor housing conditions (ibid.). Refugees from Syria have become *'increasingly vulnerable to protection risks and many resort to negative coping mechanisms such as child labour*

and early marriage' (UNHCR, 2017b, p. 6). This paragraph elaborates on the living conditions, employment issues, and social cohesion issues that refugees from Syria encounter in Urfa.

A survey done among refugees from Syria in Urfa indicates that 16,5 percent of the them stated that their living conditions are extremely poor (Support to life, 2014). Another 55 percent of the respondents said that they live under poor conditions. And 71 percent of the respondents have at least one family member who works, however this does not imply decent work or a regular income. Refugees from Syria often are underpaid compared to the hosts and in most instances only hired as daily workers without a structural income. Other forms of livelihoods are savings, borrowing, and other kinds of support from social networks. And this research exactly focuses on how social networks provide support and how this enhances refugees from Syria their livelihoods.

Ensuring a livelihood remains a challenge for refugees from Syria as a result of prolonged displacement, reduction in humanitarian aid, reduction in savings, and difficulties getting formal access to the labour market (World Bank, 2015). Refugees from Syria work almost entirely in the informal sector in unskilled and irregular jobs often in construction or factories. Being hired in the informal sector entails working on irregular basis, not receiving any social benefits, having no insurance and receiving a wage under the minimum. However since 2016 refugees from Syria can apply for a work permit (Sanduvac, 2013; UNHCR, 2017b; World Bank, 2015). Applying for a work permit is not easy indicated by the fact that only 0.1 percent of the refugees from Syria in Turkey are in line for a work permit (Kingsley, 2016). One of the reasons why the number of applications is so low has to do with the rule that the employer has to apply for the permit and pay for the it (Grisgraber & Hollingsworth, 2016). Simultaneously are there are several incentives for an employer to hire a refugees from Syria informally such as not being obliged to pay minimum wage or to pay for work related insurances or to sign a contract for a fixed amount of time (Grisgraber & Hollingsworth, 2016; Kingsley, 2016). As a result only limited permits have been granted leaving refugees from Syria at risk for uncovered injuries, underpayment, forced bribes, and robberies (Crisp et al., 2012).

Notwithstanding, being employed informally is rather prevalent in Turkey. Davutyan (2008) sketches an image of a large amount of informal jobs in Turkey in all kinds of economic sectors which are beyond the reach of the government. Also the unemployment rate in Turkey is high with 12 percent of the total labour force (OECD, 2017). M.M. Erdoğan, from the Hacettepe university, states that particularly the position of refugees from Syria on the labour market is weak, because they are perceived as unattractive employees to hire formally (personal communication, April 11, 2007). For one is it rather easy to hire refugees from Syria informally in construction, agricultural and service industry. Secondly, the language barrier and the insecure asylum situation refugees from Syria are not alluring for employees. Therefore Erdoğan argues that putting effort in hiring a refugee from Syria formally is not likely, because there are enough unemployed Turkish nationals that compete.

Besides this, discontent is increasing within Turkish society about the Syrian presence (International Crisis Group, 2018; UNHCR, 2017b; Yıldız & Uzgören, 2016). There are growing concerns among hosts about increasing rents, decreasing wages, increasing job competition, longer waiting times for health services, and the rise of crime (UNHCR, 2017b; World Bank, 2015). Perceptions of refugees from Syria as a threat to livelihoods is growing among hosts (UNHCR, 2017b). Hosts also feel marginalised by ethnic, sectarian and ideological differences (International Crisis Group, 2018). A survey done by the German Marshall Fund underpin the growing discontent among hosts about presence of refugees from Syria (as cited in World Bank, 2015, p. 9). The findings highlight that the vast majority of the

host respondents do not think refugees from Syria integrate well and 68 percent of the respondents want more restrictive policies.

Social tensions can escalate and result in violence. In the second half of 2017 the violence between hosts and refugees from Syria increased threefold compared to the year before (International Crisis Group, 2018). There were two incidents in Urfa underlining this trend. First there was a demonstration against refugees from Syria organised by hosts. Hosts chanting that they do not want any Syrians anymore (Cetingulec, 2016a). Another incident escalated into a riot in which several Syrian shops were vandalised. However it is not surprising violence in Urfa is on the rise towards refugees from Syria. Because the central Turkish government in Ankara allocates funds to municipalities based on the amount of Turkish citizens residing without taking the refugee population into account (International Crisis Group, 2018). Hence Urfa's municipality does not receive a budget for the actual amount of people residing, but only for three-quarters while 24 percent of the population in Urfa is a refugee from Syria.

2.2. Literature review

An urbanization of refugees is taking place worldwide. This trend will be clarified and problematized in this section. With special regard for the contemporary service provision of the Turkish government and the aid architecture of humanitarian organisations. First of all, the knowledge gap concerning urban refugees is discussed. Secondly, the mayor pull factors for refugees to move to urban areas are exemplified. Thirdly, a discussion on the effects of the urbanization of refugees for the host country is elaborated on. Fourthly, the two lenses that analyse livelihood strategies of urban refugees are depicted. Fifthly, livelihood strategies of urban refugees and the role of social networks have in regard to this is touched upon. Finally, this section concludes with the correlation between social networks and identities and the reason why this research focuses on this.

2.2.1. Urbanization of refugees

The large proportion of refugees worldwide live in urban areas (UNHCR, 2009). However there is not much known about this large population. *'We still know extremely little about how urban refugees survive'* (Crisp et al., 2012, p. S38). There is a significant knowledge gap on how urban refugees ensure their livelihoods, how refugees are positioned in complex urban systems, and how their presence effects host communities (Crisp et al., 2012; Earle, 2016; Jacobsen, 2006; Monteith & Lwasa, 2017; Pavanello & Montemurro, 2010). How can this apparent knowledge gap be explained? First of all, governments often have little information about urban refugees because they are dispersed, unremunerated, and unmanaged (Marfleet, 2007). Secondly, there is little accurate data of available because refugees sometimes hide on purpose from governments (Jacobsen, 2006; Marfleet, 2007; Pavanello & Montemurro, 2010). This is a reaction to governments that view urban refugees as anomalous, illegitimate, and unacceptable. These perceptions of governments about refugees make refugees distrust governments and rather remain invisible to them (Marfleet, 2007). This strategy of keeping a low profile resonates with Kibreab's theory about the strategy of invisibility. Kibreab argues that those who are 'informally' integrated adopt invisibility as a means of survival (Kibreab, 2012).

Traditionally refugees are encamped in host countries but since last decade there is an urbanization of refugees taking place (Henderson, 2013; Sanyal, 2010; UNHCR, 2009). There are many reasons for refugees to settle in urban areas instead of camps. Among pull factors to move to urban areas are employment opportunities, greater security, and anonymity (Crisp et al., 2012). Yet living in urban

areas also pose livelihood challenges. Socio-economically speaking, the vast majority of refugees live among the urban poor. Thus the majority of urban refugees face the same issues as the urban poor such as exploitation, unemployment, and inadequate housing (Crisp et al., 2012). On top of that, refugees have to cope with additional legal and psychosocial issues or obstacles. There are legal restrictions for refugees regarding the right to work, to move and refugees from Syria have to deal with the precariousness of the temporary protection regime. Psycho-socially refugees have to endure war and or flight trauma's, losing parts of their social networks, and face issues concerning expressing themselves as a consequence of the language barriers (Crisp et al., 2012; Monteith & Lwasa, 2017).

There is an ongoing debate on how the urbanization of refugees influences host communities and economies. On the one hand, some scholars argue that refugees have positive effects on urban areas such as rejuvenating communities, expanding markets, importing new skills, and creating transnational linkages (Jacobsen, 2006). But the World Bank (2015) states that refugees only contribute to host countries' economies if they become socially and economically self-reliant and mobile arguing thus in favour of more legal margin. On the other hand, host communities often assume refugees have negative effects like decreasing wages, increasing rents, more job competition and more pressure on public services (World Bank, 2015; UNHCR, 2017a). There is not one singular answer to this debate because the host and refugee population are heterogeneous with various interests and impacts. For instance, an employer might see refugees as a cheap workforce while for a labourer refugees are a threat causing more job competition. In other words, it is impossible to draw general conclusions because it is highly case specific and person bound how an urban refugee population influences host communities and economies.

So if refugees contribute to urban areas socio-economically remains the question, but for refugees *'Cities represent opportunities for self-reliance and for some, durable solutions to displacement'* (Crisp et al., 2012, p. S26). Although an urban context creates opportunities for livelihoods and thus simultaneously increased the change of self-reliance, it is not easy to achieve. Refugees from Syria need support in ensuring their livelihoods. The body of literature on urban refugees' livelihoods has two main lenses: one fixates on the vulnerability and the other on the capacity of urban refugees (Monteith & Lwasa, 2017). The former outlines the legal structures that constrain livelihoods. In which the government is examined as the most important player in assisting refugees. In line with this Jacobsen notes that *'the refugee policies of the host government is a key determinant to refugees' vulnerabilities and their ability to pursue their livelihoods'* (2002, p. 101). In this perspective, the dependence on the informal market is portrayed as a failure from governmental institutions and humanitarian organisations (Monteith & Lwasa, 2017). The later lens, on capacity, explains the skills and networks that facilitate urban refugees to flourish. This literature commences from the assumption that personal choices and social order in institutional and social networks are important to determine an individual's ability to ensure a livelihood. Jacobsen (2006) states the following:

'legal status does not make much difference in the lived experience of refugees in urban settings. Those with formal legal status do not seem to do much better than those without legal status, in terms of livelihoods and protection. While recognized refugees have the right to work, even skilled workers or professionals usually can find only low paid, unskilled jobs, often without work contracts or social benefits' (p. 282).

The perception underlying this body of literature is that urban refugees can be self-reliant while working in the informal sector and by doing so contribute to host countries (Jacobsen, 2006). This research takes both lenses into account and perceives refugees as vulnerable and capable simultaneously. However this research is about the role social networks play as a livelihood strategy of urban refugees from Syria in Urfa. Logically more emphasis will be on the capacity of refugees looking at how they socially navigate while bonding and bridging.

According to Monteith and Lwasa (2017) these two lenses do not help urban humanitarian responses forward. First of all, refugees are studied based on their experiences without integrating host interactions. These host interactions are rather valuable argue Willems (2005) and Landau and Duponchel (2011) in regard to livelihood opportunities. The latter argue even that having a legal refugee status is negligible in regard to ensuring livelihoods. Therefore they state that humanitarians should rather focus on a form of silent integration without asylum or citizenship rights which seems to be a more effective protection strategy for urban refugees (Landau & Duponchel, 2011). Secondly, these studies only look at traditional supportive systems of governments and humanitarian organisations (Monteith & Lwasa, 2017). But there is an apparent knowledge gap in regard to refugees organising themselves aiming at enhancing their well-being. Therefore this research focuses on how refugees from Syria bond among each other and bridge with hosts. This research thus focuses on how Syrians themselves create supportive systems among their social networks beyond the formal support systems.

So why does this research focus on social networks? Because Landau and Duponchel (2011) revealed with their study that for urban livelihoods personal choices and positions in social and institutional networks are more important than direct assistance and policy frameworks. This finding points out the relevance of studying social networks among urban refugees. That social networks matter is underlined by Landau and Duponchel's (2011) finding that urban refugees who joined friends or relatives in the same city were more successful in accessing food, jobs, housing, and were more physically secure. Hence social networks are an important strategy for urban refugees to broaden their social capital and enhance their self-reliance in an complex urban setting. However Landau and Duponchel (2011) and Willems (2005) deem that more research is needed to fully grasp the role of social networks in regard to livelihood strategies and self-reliance of urban refugees. This poses the questions: what kind of social networks are urban refugees part of? And what do these social networks deliver?

2.2.2. Governmental services and humanitarian aid

An increasing number of refugees live in urban areas instead of camps which entails that governments, the UNHCR, and its partners have to adjust their support systems to assist urban refugees (Sanyal, 2010). So far, 75 percent of the refugees from Syria hosted in the region -including Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey- live in urban areas and have no or limited access to basic services such as health and education (Henderson, 2013; UNHCR, 2017a). Ergo, urban refugees face challenges regarding appropriating aid and accessing basic services indicating that the current governmental and humanitarian support system is inadequate (Crisp et al., 2012). In this section Turkish governmental services available to refugees from Syria are discussed. Then the struggles humanitarians have to locate and support urban refugees are exemplified. To finalise with a paragraph on the relation between social networks and governmental and humanitarian support systems.

Refugees from Syria in Turkey fall under the temporary protection regime and are legally entitled to utilise basic services for free. However it remains challenging for urban refugees to access certain of these services. This is shown by the figure that only 29 percent of the Syrian families send one or more children to an educational facility in Urfa (Support to life, 2014). Receiving appropriate health care is also a struggle because of the gap between increasing demands and limited capacity which result in long queues in hospitals, short doctor visitations, and create situations in which quality cannot always be upheld (UNHCR, 2017b). Both educational and health services are strongly coordinated by the Turkish government but are complicated to utilise because of the language barrier and the lack of information regarding the availability and accessibility of these services (Sanduvac, 2013; UNHCR, 2017b). Sanduvac (2013) already warned in 2013 that gaps in governmental service provision are apparent and are likely to become more pronounced as numbers increase.

Also concerning humanitarian aid there is a lot to improve. Urban refugees continue to slip through the net and thus do not receive appropriate aid (Henderson, 2013). This is mainly related to the fact that humanitarian organisations struggle reaching urban refugees (Henderson, 2013; Sanyal, 2010). This has to do with the issues of a lack of data, trouble with identifying refugees, and budget deficiencies. First of all, the large lack of data concerning who these urban refugees exactly are and how they survive make it difficult to formulate adequate policy and guidelines to assist them. Secondly, identifying and separating urban refugees from other marginalised urban poor is not only hard but also time consuming and costly (Crisp et al., 2012). Thirdly, getting funds from donors for urban projects is challenging which result in less budget thus also less assistance (ibid.).

Another reason why humanitarian organisations lag behind with adapting to the issues urban refugees face is as a consequence of the fact that humanitarian organisations are operating outside of their field of expertise (Pavanello & Montemurro, 2010). Traditionally humanitarian' tasks are feeding, protecting, and sheltering people in camps but meeting the needs of urban refugees resembles more to development work (Crisp et al., 2012). Humanitarians are accustomed to work on short-timeline projects, in sectors and piecemeal. Reaching urban refugees needs long-term planning and leaving sectoral silos behind.

Again another reason of the failure of humanitarians assisting urban refugees is the fact that the heterogeneous nature of urban refugees makes it hard to provide sufficient and adequate aid to them. Each refugee differs and need different forms and levels of aid. It depends on age, gender, country of origin, previous profession, access to social networks, the deprivation level, and so forth what a refugee actually needs. Urban refugees are regarded as a 'messy' group with diverse needs (Crisp et al., 2012, p. S37).

Moreover, another challenge humanitarian organisations face when providing aid to urban refugees is not to single out struggling and marginalised host communities. As explained before urban poor face similar challenges as refugees do, thus fully excluding urban poor is not in line with humanitarian principles but also might cause counterproductive effects. When urban poor witness their refugee neighbours receive aid and they do not can cause xenophobic feelings and fuel violence towards refugee population (Crisp et al., 2012). Thus excluding urban poor from retrieving aid might further alienate and increase hostilities towards urban refugees which in the end makes it only harder for refugees to bridge.

Having said all this, governments and humanitarian organisations often play a minor role that only make minimal improvements in the lives of urban refugees (Landau & Duponchel, 2017). It is empirically proven that urban refugees gain most by interacting in the informal sphere opposed to the assistance from host governments and humanitarian organisations (ibid.). Landau and Duponchel (2017) in this sense are part of the second lens emphasizing capacity and importance of not the legal but the informal side. So although refugees from Syria in Turkey are entitled to use formal services from the Turkish government and benefit from humanitarian aid, these provisions do not contribute substantially to their well-being.

Hence, within this research governmental services and humanitarian aid are taken into account and studies how they relate to social networks but the focus is on how refugees from Syria organise themselves via social networks as a livelihood strategy. In line with this, there seems to be a correlation between the amount of support given by social networks and utilising formal support structures. The vast majority of people contact formal support services, from the government or humanitarian organisations, as a last resort (Beggs et al., 1996). So if people can obtain sufficient informal support via their social networks they are less likely to utilise formal aid and services from the government or humanitarian organisations. Therefore, Calhoun (2010) argues that humanitarian organisations should focus on fostering social ties so that less humanitarian assistance is necessary. Calhoun is in favour of facilitating events and places where refugees can meet and mingle enlarging their social networks that open shut doors and might provide support.

Despite the fact that there is a lot to say about governmental services and humanitarian assistance I will briefly touch upon these topics in chapter 6 but this is not the main focus of this research. The primary focus is describing how urban refugees from Syria make and maintain their social networks and how these enhance their well-being and ensure their livelihoods.

3. Conceptualising social networks

This chapter depicts relevant academic debates, trends, and theories about concepts that form the fundament to analyse all data on social networks of refugees from Syria during four months of fieldwork. Key concepts such as identity, social networks, bonding, and bridging and are the tools from which the data is analysed. Each concept is defined, discussed, and operationalised. Firstly, the concept of social networks is demarcated and analysed. Secondly, the concept of identity is depicted and related to theories about intersectionality and social navigation. Thirdly, the concepts of bonding and bridging are discussed. Finally, the interrelations between these concepts are discussed and what it entails for this research.

3.1. Being part of and doing social networks

3.1.1. Conceptualisation

This section firstly elaborates on the development of groups to networks. Secondly, four crucial aspects of social networks are discussed such as the socio-spatial range, multi-layered nature, diversity, and its multiplicity which renders options to socially navigate. Thirdly, social networks are portrayed as social structures with its accompanied rules and norms. Fourthly, social networks dictate roles people have to abide to. Fifthly, an overview is given of what social networks cost and deliver.

Simmel is one of the first academics explaining the sociological development of small-scale tightly knit groups into large and loosely knit networks. Simmel describes how social groups transcended into social networks with his theory on a web of ties (Chayko, 2015). Before modern times individuals had contact with a relatively small number of other socially similar others. Groups could be seen as concentric social circles based on kinship or residence that did not cross each other creating one not so diverse whole (Simmel, 1955). The individual was absorbed by the group where especially social identity was valued while the individual itself stood not central, but was perceived as a group member. After technological innovations, people became more mobile and able to virtually connect, and people could become part of multiple intersecting groups. Being able to communicate with a diverse range of people increases an individual's freedom to develop their identities and simultaneously enhances an individual's agency. Individuals nowadays are more unique than the pre-modern one because they have their personalized networks with him-or herself at the core making it completely rare because no one is at the same social point where diverse networks intersect (Chayko, 2015).

Lee and Barry Wellman lift this theory to a higher stage and describe how social networks are also changing (Ling, 2014). They relate not only how in current times small and dense social networks such as kin are receding but that social networks are becoming larger, more loosely knit, uprooted and fragmented. The Wellman's depict how individuals become more and more networked. In contemporary societies, social networks are increasingly independent of their surroundings with little connection between the social and the physical. The Wellman's call this "glocalized" networks combining the local with the global sphere. The Wellman's build forward on this by creating the notion of networked individualism (Wellman, 2005). This idea entails that individuals are no longer embedded in groups but in networks that are not spatially defined and the individual is the operator of his or her network. Communities are not groups anymore but social networks in which members are not directly connected, sparsely knit, and unbound (ibid.) Social networks evolved into partial, permeable, and transitory linked by cross-cutting ties. This fluidity of social networks opens the door

for the individual to manoeuvre, negotiate, and navigate within and across intersecting social networks. Of course, this might resolve in conflict and tensions, but because of the more loose nature of social relations within these social networks, these tend to be less restrictive and thus less tensions arise.

Before the social world existed out of groups, evolved to "glocalized" networks and eventually to contemporary networked individualism (Wellman, 2002). Currently, "glocalized" networks are transforming into networked individualism. "Glocalized" networks are sparsely-knit networks based on clusters linking the local with the global. Networked individuals are the next step connecting individuals with each other with little regard to space. In other words, *'the nature of the community is changing: from being a social network of households to a social network of individuals'* (Wellman, 2005, p. 55). In contemporary society there are many choices, options, and opportunities to develop an own identity. *'No more are people identified as members of a single group; they can switch among multiple networks'* (Wellman, 2002, p. 15).

The development from a group to a networked individual has its costs socially wise or as Bauman would say adds *'a new fragility to human bonds'* (Bauman, 2000, p. 170; Wellman, 2002). The reluctance of a visible local group that provides a social identity or a sense of belonging and the non-spatial nature of networks, relating person-to-person instead of place-to-place, can result in feeling isolated and lonely. On the plus side, individuals are more autonomous and have more agency to develop themselves personally without the controlling aspects of a group.

Furthermore, social networks are *'highly dependent on space, are intersectional, and belonging to them can be negotiated as the various identities which purchase membership are re-inscribed'* (Stevens, 2016, p. 61). This quote underlines four crucial aspects of social networks. First of all that social networks have a socio-spatial dimension, are multi-layered, and are "navigatable" (Vigh, 2009). Firstly, the fact that social networks are not only multiple but also have a socio-spatial range is necessary to note. Social networks have a socio-spatial range from the local, to the national until the international. Social networks are not compact situated in only one location. Social networks are rather scattered on various locations. In addition, Wellman (2005) adds another space not occurring in the physical world, but on the Internet. In the online world social networks exist which sometimes overlap with social networks in the physical world and vice versa.

Secondly, Stevens (2016) touches upon the multi-layered character of social networks by referring to their intersection. Multi-layered means that social networks are networks where two individuals are connected with each other by more than one relation (Newman, 2010). Social networks, in other words, overlap when individuals link with one another based on different layers. For instance, someone's neighbour can intersect with a professional and religious network by knowing a colleague and the Imam. The multi-layered character underlines that social networks are not closed boxes easy distinguishable but are dynamic accessible in various ways.

Thirdly, as the quote used from Stevens (2016) indicates that belonging to a social network is vital for being able to access it. However, concurrently this access can be negotiated. The next subsection will shed more light regarding this but now the focus is on the concept of belonging. According to Bauman (2000) contemporary society is based on divisions relating to the question of belonging. A classification between 'We' and 'They' is made. 'We' means people like us and 'They' are significantly different than 'Us'. Although 'We' is never fully identical but the similarities are defused and

neutralised by the similarities (ibid.). According to Hobsbawm, this idea renders no room for individuals to socially navigate and prove their agency since individuals think that the person in charge has no choice but to choose the network he or she belongs to (As cited in Bauman, 2000, p. 171). Hence, social networks are diverse concerning their members identities but depending on what kind of network it is certain identity traits matter and on the basis of that people belong to social networks. For instance, a social network based on religion an individual's religious beliefs matters and not its profession.

Fourthly, Stevens 'words indicate the importance of strategically switching between various identities, or as Vigh (2009) would say "navigate", between multiple identities to access various social networks. An individual's identity determines being in-or excluded from a social network. So having multiple identities means being able to access multiple social networks, but concurrently excluded from others. As Sen describes *'the adversity of exclusion can be made to go hand in hand with the gifts of inclusion'* (2006, p. 3). Meaning that inclusion simultaneously leads to exclusion of others.

Furthermore are social networks social structures which create social norms and rules that define people and dictate behaviour but simultaneously social networks are influenced by people within them. Next paragraph goes more in-depth into the agency structure debate. For now, social structures influence how people interact, see themselves and represent themselves. They make sense of themselves, their identities and what these identities mean (Zhang, 2017). Social networks thus also influence how people perceive themselves. These rules be constraining and encouraging simultaneously (ibid.). Each social network has its own set of rules that members have to abide by. These rules are carried out often implicitly or sometimes explicitly by its members. In most instances, individuals seem not to be aware of these social rules or do not perceive them as such after being internalising. Instead people experience social rules as universal truths.

A structure is conceptualized as enforced sets of rules that pattern social relations (Giddens, 1984). Agency involves having the power to make choices or influence decisions, explicit or implicit (ibid.). Structuralism is a school of thought, to which Marx and Durkheim belong, that argues from a top-down perspective that societies are made out of structures that shape human behaviour. On the other hand, interactionalism views from a bottom-up perspective and sees people as agents that have the capacity to (re)construct their worlds. Giddens (1984) goes a step further and argues that the boundaries between structure and agency are not as fixed and contrary as they are depicted, but are a duality. With his theory on duality of structure he explains that structures are both the medium and the outcome they organise. Structures are as well external as internal. Structures become internal by internalization processes. Each individual internalises social forces and rules as given truths. Within this research I take this agency structure debate into account.

Moreover, identity theory states that social positions in-or outside a social network entails taking on roles. Each role has its own associated socially appropriate expected behaviour. In each social network different identity traits matter and based on these traits expectations are created. For instance, a father within a nuclear family is expected to behave as an example for his children and to provide for his family members. Being an adult and male are two crucial identity traits in this case. However, it can occur that individuals are not committed to their role. Zhang (2017) argues that an individual's commitment to their role within a social network is contingent to the cost of losing these social relations that create behavioural expectations. This can be expressed quantitative and

qualitative. Quantitative is for example the number of social relations an individual might lose after not behaving accordingly to his or her role. Qualitative is for instance the emotional bond an individual has to other network members.

Now we know what social networks consist of, but what do they deliver? One of the ways refugees try to secure their livelihoods is by utilising their social networks (Daniş, 2007; Korkmaz, 2016; Willems, 2005). Social networks create opportunities for employment, assist with housing, financial matters, support with access, increase influence and, enhance well-being. Willems (2005) researched that social networks can be used as a safety net to overcome livelihood shocks after being forcibly displaced. She revealed with her research in Tanzania that the five most important supportive social network members are met via neighbours, through a mutual friend, a relative, religious crowd or via daily activities as school attendance. In line with utilising social networks in a refugee context, Stevens (2016) states that being part of social networks correlates positively with employment in refugee communities. Meaning that after being forced to cross the border, social networks matter significantly in regard to finding a job. This is logically taking into account that degrees are left home and often not internationally supported. Getting employed in a formal way is less likely, as shown in chapter two, so more emphasis is on social networks.

Social networks are also beneficial, especially after forced displacement, to function as a source of familiarity and belonging according to the Overseas Development Institute (hereafter: ODI) (1999). Familiarity continues after bonding with people culturally and socially close. Bonding while talking over Syrian cuisine, ancient ruins in Damascus, or by hearing the same language contributes to feeling less lost in a new environment. At the same time having a sense of belonging to a certain social network harms against loneliness and meaningless. A sense of belonging particularly matters in a life characterised by insecurity and being forcibly uprooted like refugees from Syria are in Turkey.

In contrast, Putnam stresses that *'we cannot assume that social capital is everywhere and always a good thing'* (2002, p. 8). Examples of negative outcomes within social networks are distrust, exploitation, oppression, and isolation (ODI, 1999; Sabatini, 2005). Research on social capital tends to celebrate the concept instead of critically analysing the possible downsides it may inflict on people and society (Portes, 2014). To prove this point two short examples of negative outcomes of social capital are made. Number one is that inclusion simultaneously means the exclusion of others (Sen, 2006). An example is that of the study done by Waldinger that illustrates that tight ethnic bonds only give the best jobs to members of their network and thus excluding and further marginalising those without the right ethnic bonds (As cited in Portes, 2014, p. 18407). The second example is that social capital, for instance, is more likely to be widespread among groups who are already advantaged, thereby widening existing social, economic, and political inequalities (Putnam, 2002). Another example is that network members can have exorbitant claims that might influence the ego unfavourably. Being connected within a social network obliges maintenance which translates into supporting network members. This can have substantial macro effects on an investment climate as shown by Geertz study in Bali on failed enterprises (As cited in Portes, 2014, p. 18407). So before applauding and stimulating social capital its purpose and effects should be studied (Putnam, 2002).

3.1.2. Debates

There been several discussions on the relevance of the intensity or also called strength between social ties and its added value. One discussion is on the impact of having strong and weak ties and which is most beneficial. A tie is strong is characterised by a level of time spend, intimacy, emotional

intensity, and reciprocal exchange (Granovetter, 1973). A weak tie is then characterised by an insignificant level of time spend, intimacy, emotional intensity and little reciprocal exchange. According to several scholars who executed a network study argue that dense and homogeneous networks consisting out of strong ties give more social support than wide-ranging heterogeneous networks consisting out of weak ties (Beggs et al., 1996; Willems, 2005). Willems (2005) found out that homogenous networks give more support in a crisis than heterogeneous networks. Willems (2005) argues therefore that strong ties give more social support than weak ties. Beggs et al. (1996) observe that strong ties have a significant motivation to assist. Having a strong tie, therefore, implies that two or more actors have some kind of intimacy, trust, and reciprocity and hence the chance is higher to exchange resources.

However, Granovetter (1973) disagrees with Willems (2005) and Beggs (1996) arguing that strong ties are good for well-being but weak ties are more crucial for economic development. This is based on the assumption that *'no strong tie is a bridge'* (Granovetter, 1973, p. 1365). Granovetter illustrates that jobs are more often facilitated via weak ties than via strong ties (As cited in Daniş, 2007). Granovetter sees weak ties as *'indispensable to individuals' opportunities and their integration into communities'* (1973, p. 1378). Strong ties can enhance cohesion which also lead to fragmentation (Granovetter, 1973).

Also Daniş (2007), in contrast to Willems and Beggs's findings, states that strong ties within a network can be a hurdle in getting access to the outer world because strong ties tend to be constraining and exclusive. Strong ties can give social support but simultaneously because of their strong connection and expected social returns they can hinder other social relations that can be of added value. Thus being part of a network with strong ties can be constraining and have adverse effects of creating weak ties or entering heterogeneous networks.

Another discussion on ties is about the intensity and density of social networks. Is the strength of a tie more important than the distance between ties? Burt (1997) and Granovetter (1973) have a theoretical debate on which social ties are more important to find a job: weak or distant ones? Burt (1997) argues, based on his structural hole theory, that the more distant a tie is, the better for retrieving relevant information and opportunities jobwise. In other words, the lower the density and the wider the range the better. According to him, weak ties are only an advantage if they correlate with structural holes. The primary hole is the player's direct contact, and the secondary hole is between the player and indirect contacts. Within the secondary hole the distance between the ego and other is broader, hence implying the network is larger. The optimal structural hole occurs when the ego and the tie lack cohesion and have strong equivalence. The structural hole, in this case, is the deepest and hence provides non-redundant information and opportunities. Hence according to Burt key is the positioning of the tie, not the strength per se. Granovetter (1973) in contrast debates that weak ties tend to be more heterogeneous and thus has a larger variety of connections. Accordingly, weak ties offer different information and opportunities. To summarize Burt thinks in range and Granovetter in the strength.

Again another discussion is about the spatial dimension of social networks. Stevens (2016) studied refugees from Syria in Jordan and came to the conclusion that social networks are highly dependent on space. The environment people are in influences how they shape their identities and simultaneously their social networks. Stevens opposes Wellman's (2005) notion of networked

individualism that proclaims that individuals are becoming more and more separated from their direct surroundings.

3.1.3. Operationalisation social networks

As the Milroy's beautifully define social networks as '*a boundless web of ties that reaches out through whole society, linking people to one another, however remotely*' (1992, p. 5). Milroy their words capture the fluidity of social networks and highlight the unlimited forms social networks can have. In this research social networks are operationalised as dynamic social entities consisting out of social groupings based on social relations which are socially structured. There are two ways of looking at social networks: structural and interactional (Milroy, 1992). Structural analysis entails defining the shape of a network, for example, its density. Interactional analysis means researching the content of ties for example intensity.

Moreover, the sociological lens used when analysing social networks contains out of four aspects. First of all, within this research reality is not perceived as coherent, but rather as a fragmented and chaotic social reality that is in constant flux. Secondly, social networks are based on social and historical backgrounds and environmental factors and thus cannot be seen separate from society but are affected by it. Hence context matters. Thirdly, social networks are just like identity not fixed and definite, but open, fluid and not easy to demarcate. Although answering the first sub-question asks for demarcation it should be made clear these are meagre categorisations that aim to grasp reality without making it into rigid borderlines. Fourthly, social networks are social structures with its own sets of rules and norms that shape behaviour, but simultaneously networks are not entirely dictating an individual's life. While individuals are perceived as agents with a degree of ownership about their social life.

3.2. Navigating multiple identities

3.2.1. Conceptualisation

Identities are socially constructed, multiple and multi-layered (Sen, 2006). Sen states that '*We are all individually involved in identities of various kinds in disparate contexts, in our own respective lives, arising from our background, or associations, or social activities*' (Sen, 2006, p. 23). As this quote illustrates identity is created and situated by a specific background, belonging to social groups, and social activities someone undertakes. Because identity is constructed, identity is in constant flux (Bauman, 2000; Stevens, 2005).

This again relates to another important characteristic of identity: fluidity (Moroni, 2014). According to Hall, identities are always an incomplete, unfinished and open-ended process (As cited in van Meijl, 2017, p. 175). Hence, identities are a never-ending process (van Meijl, 2017). Identity is shaped, performed and judged by others who can endorse or refute someone's identity. Identity is fluid and socially constructed between the self and others. Identity is made by the ego and its surrounding but never stands still nor does it stop developing.

Especially nowadays identity is more fluid than before because of globalisation and the digital era (Moroni, 2014). Identities are no longer build out of solid focuses on which a person can create a personality, but instead on incoherent and inconstant focuses (Moroni, 2014). This relates to Bauman (2000; 2004) who paints a picture of contemporary society that is rapidly and constantly changing. Also identity and human interactions are affected by this. The tempo in which people switch from identities is high. Identities are more temporary and interchangeable now than last decade. Bauman (2000) emphasises that human interactions also changed in which social bonds are

seen and used as *'things meant to be consumed'* (2000, p. 163). Throwing away relations if expectations are not met or desires unfulfilled. In this sense a human being becomes a disposable good no longer consumable.

Due to this fluidity, people can strategically switch between their identities and socially navigate (Jongerden, 2003; Moroni, 2014; Sen, 2006; Vigh, 2009). According to Sen, people make explicit or implicit choices in determining the relevance and lucidity of their identities (2006). This entails representing oneself in different ways adapted to the person or group addressed (Moroni, 2014). In other words, people can strategize to come across a certain way by highlighting, disguising or switching their identities in different social situations. Social navigation is related to this strategically switching between identities. This concept highlights how individuals move around in social landscape that is continually changing which Vigh (2009) describes as motions within motions. Social navigating is a three-dimensional concept taking the influences an agent has on the social scape, the influences and imperatives the social scape has on an agent, and the intersection of these two forces. Interactivity is the underlying notion of the analytical optic of navigation Everything is connected. This idea takes into account how people and social environments keep on shaping and changing each other over time.

Furthermore, identities intersect. Theory on intersectionality explains how identities do not exist apart from each other but mix and are scaled into hierarchies. There are several distinct discrete systems of for example race, gender, and class. Within these systems, there are dominant and subordinate identities (Cooper, 2007). For instance, being black in the contemporary United States is not the hegemonic racial identity. Thus being black is a subordinate identity or as Cooper would argue is oppressed. Moreover, multiple identities co-exist and where these identities intersect new identities are formed. These intersections can lead to double forms of oppression which Cooper calls hybrid forms of oppression. For example, being a black woman in the United States implies double oppression because being a man and white is preferable. Finally, it should be noted that subordinates in groups still have resources to challenge their superiors (Giddens, 1984). So the forms of oppression which Cooper describes are not fixed nor absolute but negotiable.

Depending on the context an individual negotiates and shapes his or her identity. In a professional setting, an individual identifies different than within a kinship setting. To explain these difference Tönnies created the sociological categories of *Gemein-*and *Geselleschaft* (As cited in Harris, 2001, p. 13). *Gemeinschaft* is the 'organic' community connected by ties of kinship and custom. *Geselleschaft* is the 'mechanical' society where individuals relate to one another by self-interest. Identity is developed differently within these two categories. Within *Gemeinschaft* identity is created community wise within a comprehensive and coinciding whole. Within *Geselleschaft* identity is developed individually and attachment is secondary and instrumental. Within this research, I will take this division into account when analysing how Refugees from Syria build their identities.

3.2.2. Operationalisation identity

Identity remains a complex concept. The following five points are essential about identity within this research. One, each individual has multiple identities. These identities are multi-layered, intersectional and with various levels. This means that an individual has a range of identities distinguishing in levels and layers that might seem contradictory or not compatible. Two, identity is situational. Context matters how, when and which identity trait is emphasised. Three, identity is perceived as fluid and open. Four, identities are interchangeable as a result of its fluid nature. Hence

identities can be strategized and are very relevant for this research on livelihood strategies. To conclude, every respondent is perceived as an agent that socially navigates and alters strategically his or her identities to a social setting that seems the most convenient.

3.3. Bonding and bridging

3.3.1. Conceptualisation

Social networks links need to be made and maintained. Two concepts relating to this process are bonding and bridging. This and the next paragraph depict both concepts. Firstly, bonding entails individuals connecting within homogeneous groups. Bonding happens between homogeneous groups among strong ties, because they are so similar (Calhoun, 2010). Bonding efforts enhance social safety nets which protect its members and generate a cooperative spirit. Thus, bonding within social networks contributes to social support and well-being of refugees in host countries (Calhoun, 2010). Bonding social networks between refugees is furthermore useful because in this manner refugees share their social capital more resulting in less dependence on humanitarian assistance. Calhoun, therefore, argues that humanitarians should foster more social connectedness within refugee communities.

Secondly, bridging entails individuals connecting between heterogeneous groups. Bridging are often weak ties while the ego differs significantly from the other. Bridging is intrinsically harder than bonding because there are less shared social norms and values to start with. There is in this sense more social distance between refugees from Syria and host networks. However, bridging reduces forming of stereotypes about one another and as Cheung and Phillimore (2013) found out that connecting with hosts has positive effects on language proficiency and employment opportunities. In sequence social networks are important for the economic advancement of refugees in host countries, because *'people need these more distant ties to get new information, about job opportunities or markets'* (Calhoun, 2010, p. 2). Bridging might also have additional benefits for example in helping refugees to feel less isolated, giving information on how to solve issues and access services in a new environment.

3.3.2. Debate

However as Putnam warned before, social capital is not always a good thing. Bonding, for instance, has a higher risk on more negative externalities than bridging. Bonding is connecting people with similar threats together and living among homogeneous groups can more easily combine for sinister ends (Putnam, 2002). Being among homogeneous and likeminded people can create a vacuum of singularity and emphasizes on in-group similarities that simultaneously enlarge out-group differences. According to Putnam *'bonding without bridging equals Bosnia'* (2002, 13). In contrast to several scholars arguing blindly in favour of bonding. For example, Calhoun (2010) rather bluntly lobbies for more social bonding efforts without taking into regard the possible negative externalities.

3.3.3. Operationalisation

In this research, I refer to bonding when refugees from Syria relate to other refugees from Syria. However I am aware that bonding relates to connecting with similar others (homogenous) and although I do not see refugees from Syria as homogenous but rather the opposite, I explain their social networking efforts as bonding. Refugees from Syria are heterogeneous and differ from one another in many instances. So in a sense refugees from Syria can bridge between them. For instance, a Kurdish Syrian can bridge with an Arabic Syrian. Although this is a rather simplistic way of looking at

bonding and bridging but to prevent confusion I only refer to bridging when refugees from Syria relate to hosts.

3.4. Core concepts' interrelation

As this chapter indicates are social networks and identity complex concepts closely related. Identity is the pillar on which a social network is build. Although an individual is never just one thing. A human being consist of many identities. Because of the fluidity of contemporary identities and its multitude individuals play with them. Hence, one individual can belong to numerous social networks. Depending on a given context an individual emphasises or ignores a certain identity. While within a social network members are not exactly the same but similar at least on that identity trait or those traits deemed relevant in a specific context. In this research both identity and social networks are dynamic resulting in opportunities for the individual but simultaneously rendering them vulnerable.

However, social networks do not come into existing people have to make, recreate and maintain them. To do so people bond and bridge. Bonding and bridging relates to identity closely related to identity. On the basis of an individual its identity people bond or bridge. Bonding refers to similar others and bridging to remote others. Bonding occurs to people with similar identity traits and bridging occurs with those with different identity traits. Again on the basis of these identity traits an individual belongs within a social network or not.

4. Methodology

In this chapter, the methods for the data collection and analysis are elucidated. For four months I gathered qualitative data in Urfa by looking, listening, hanging around and talking with refugees from Syria and hosts. The main methods used are semi-structured interviews and observations. In total, I conducted thirty-four semi-structured interviews, had many informal chats and made countless observations. This chapter is divided into six paragraphs including the research questions, the methodological approach, gathering data, negotiating access, analysing data, accountability and reliability, and terminology.

4.1. The research questions

Previous three chapters capture the difficulties refugees from Syria in Turkey are confronted with. To understand how urban refugees from Syria survive in Urfa I look from a sociological lens researching the role of social networks and related identities. The main objective of this research is to grasp the role social networks play in ensuring their livelihoods in an urban complex setting. I closely looked for four months how refugees from Syria bond and bridge to gain resources from social networks. To meet this goal, I formulated the main research question: *How do refugees from Syria utilise their social networks to secure their livelihoods in Urfa?*

Four sub-questions underpin the main research question by cutting it into pieces. The first sub-question is: *What kind of social networks are refugees from Syria in Urfa part of?* The second sub-question is: *What do these social networks deliver?* The third sub-question is: *How to understand social networks of refugees from Syria concerning bonding and bridging efforts?*

4.2. Methodological approach

An ethnography studies people in their everyday lives collecting whatever data available (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). I used an ethnographic approach to study urban refugees from Syria in Urfa because identity and social networks are dynamic and complex concepts that need to be closely looked upon. I included whatever data available ranging from an observation of a social situation till newspapers articles to better grasp the social processes taking place among refugees from Syria and hosts in Urfa. Also important to note is that this research takes on a constructivist approach in which informants are perceived as autonomous agents who influence and are influenced by their social and cultural setting.

The aim of using qualitative research methods for this research is to identify how informants make sense and utilise of their identities and social networks. Thus being close to informants is a premise. Especially to study social and complex themes like identity and social networks a researcher has to move beyond formal research methods. A questionnaire simply does not answer all questions relating to social networks, identity, and bonding and bridging efforts. Hence for four months I had dinners, visited Quran courses, smoked *nargile*, played *tavla*, participated in community centre lessons and had many (informal) conversations with refugees from Syria and hosts. Via these informal ways, I saw things which would be unseen when using a formal approach instead but due to the informal aspect of this research I could understand the reasons why my informants represented themselves as they did and shared what they shared leaving some stories untold. Meeting an informant several times was also another way to cross check what they said earlier or what others said to me.

However, when meeting several times with someone a bond starts to exist. This bond to an informant might trouble the researcher's sight and endanger the necessary distance to critically analyse findings. According to Robben (1995) being close can lead to feelings of empathy can lead to ethnographic seduction. Bonding and feeling along with an informant is not a sin, but a requirement for sound ethnographic study (ibid.). Although simultaneously a researcher should be able to detach from this bond and be able to critically assess its data. Diphooorn (2012) argues in line with this that emotions are apparent in doing qualitative research and thus should also be part of the data analysis. By making emotions explicit, the chance of being seduced by informants becomes smaller. Emotions, just like thoughts and ideas, influence doing research and thus should be clarified and included in the data analysis. Taking emotions into account enriches the data and enhances understanding of the research setting (Diphooorn, 2012). I noticed during my fieldwork I had emotions of guilt – about not being able to help while being in such a more resource-rich position-, melancholy – about the hopelessness of the situation of many refugees from Syria-, and unsafety – after a riot took place or my passport was checked for the fourth time-. Not only for myself but also for my research grasping and writing these emotions down made me understand myself better, why I looked a certain way at the data, and also enhanced the diversity of my data.

To finalise, the data collection occurred relatively unstructured in line with the ethnographic approach as a result of two things (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). First, this research started with an unfixed and undetailed research design in which the research questions are tentative based on a loosely defined theoretical framework. Second, from the data, I build a vast theoretical lens and structured social networks. The data was analysed by coding and via these codes patterns were distinguished. Hence this research design is inductive aiming to let the data speak for itself.

4.3. Gathering data

During the four months of fieldwork I used various data gathering methods. I conducted interviews, observed, had informal chats, and experimented with mapping techniques. The combination of these methods enhanced the quality, the range of the data, and strengthens the research by triangulation. In total I conducted thirty four semi-structured. I interviewed twenty-four refugees from Syria to whom I refer as my informants. In total, I interviewed sixteen Syrian men and fourteen Syrian women. The demographics of my informants differ in various ways. Examples in difference are concerning class, ethnicity, and place of residence. The socio-economic classes of my informants varies from lower class till middle class. The majority of the informants were Arabic (15), Kurdish (7) and as far as I know, only two informants had a mixed ethnic backgrounds composed out of Arabic, Turkman and Kurdish descendent. My informants lived all over Urfa from the Southern parts of Eyyübiye till the North-eastern parts of Haliliye. Plus I interviewed seven humanitarians, two scholars, and one Turkish governmental official. All these experts are Turkish nationals apart from one refugees from Syria as humanitarian officer.

My main method was conducting semi-structured interviews and only occasionally unstructured interviews were conducted. My goal was to let informants talk about their experiences and perspectives in their language and concepts (Clarke & Braun, 2013). For these interviews I used a topic list which is included in annex B. Each interview differed in focus, setting and length. The focus within the interviews varied because each person has their own personal story to share, so reasonably different topics are in-depth discussed or skipped. The setting differed from homes, offices, community centres, shops and cafés. Most of the time I met refugees from Syria at their

homes. I preferred to go to Syrian homes because how an informant lives gives extra information and additionally is an extra reassurance informants would feel effortlessly comfortable. With humanitarians I gathered at their office or in a café. Furthermore, the length of an interview ranges from one till three hour(s). Some informants are more willing to share but also others joining the interview influenced the time span.

During these interviews, I switched between several roles depending on the person in front of me. I played a semi-ignorant stranger, a comforting listener and an expert. For the majority of informants I acted as a semi-ignorant stranger and a comforting listener. With playing a semi-ignorant stranger I mean portraying myself as a socially acceptable incompetent watcher and listener (Babbie, 2010). I acted on purpose a bit more uninformed than I actually was to motivate informants to share their views and stories. In practice this meant sometimes questioning the obvious or asking for elaborating while assumingly I already did know the answer. But my aim was to get explicit information on what they meant. I think the role of a semi-ignorant stranger helped with this. My role as a comforting listener seemed apt when informants wanted to share stories about the pain they endured when fleeing or during the war. After listening to them, also off topic, several informants thanked me for coming from the Netherlands to listen to them. Although these interviews won't change their lives, but for just one afternoon some informants felt being heard and noticed. This made me realise that an interview is also beneficial for them. My final role was that of an expert when meeting with humanitarians, scholars or the Muhtar. During these meetings, I acted competent shown by in-depth and critical questions. Hence, I played ignorant and comforting when discussing personal issues with refugees from Syria but became critical when talking on a more abstract level with experts.

Another method was observation. Observation means that the ethnographer is present at the scene of action but does not interact to a great extent (Spradley, 2016). Most of the time I participated passively in social settings as a result of the language barrier. Passive participation took place during the Quran lessons, English lessons within a private Syrian school, when being at a humanitarian community centre or hanging around in shops owned by refugees from Syria. In some instances, I actively participated within English lessons talking to students from Syria and give two full lessons together with a key informant.

Another method used was that of having random conversations while walking the street, shopping, or having a drink somewhere publicly. I spoke to all kind of nationalities, ages, classes and so forth. This method is valuable because people are more impulsive in charring their thoughts when chatting compared to being questioned in an interview. For example a host managed a hotel in Urfa and he shared his concerns about seeing 'his' city change the couple of years. He was worried about the future of his city because of so many unemployed refugees from Syria. I assume he might have been less open about his opinion and experiences if I would introduced myself as a researcher interested in refugees from Syria their lives.

The final method drawing a map of social networks was meant as an experiment and therefore I only questioned two informants. This exercise was rather hard for both of them. Both did not draw but summarised their social networks in a chronological order using arrows how these networks again interrelate. Both started with kin, former friends back in Syria and ending with newly made friends in Turkey. When I asked how these networks supported them both could not easily describe it. Especially their kin networks seemed hard to define in terms of their added value. This method did

not create hard data but at least indicated that social networks are not easy to demarcate, nor is it easy to explain what they deliver and social networks change over time.

4.4. Negotiating access

When I was in Urfa, its travel code was coloured orange by the Dutch government advising not to go to visit only when strictly necessary (Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2017). It was assumed that this area is unstable and dangerous for foreigners. I only felt this instability occasionally, for instance when a riot in Urfa took place resulting in trashed shops owned by refugees from Syria. But I even felt more unsafe when I heard humanitarians complain about the Turkish government monitoring all their activities from close by. This made me feel uncomfortable because I was also part of the humanitarian field and did not have a research permit. In practice, this translated into passport checks while in the office or walking the streets but also having a hard time accessing humanitarian organisations and their beneficiaries.

Although almost one in four is a refugee from Syria in Urfa, it remained challenging to make contact with them in the beginning because of the language barrier and having hardly any social contacts (DGMM, 2017). However, when I got to know a few humanitarians better, they acted as my gatekeepers providing phone numbers of possible interpreters and informants. Also via my internship at ASAM I had access to an interpreter and other NGOs. Although I started my research by support from humanitarians I wanted to disengage myself from them because I assumed that informants would think I could help them. Eventually, when I met two helpful interpreters I used snowball sampling asking informants if they knew other refugees from Syria willing to talk to me.

Building trust is a crucial component when gaining access to potential research participants (Norman, 2009). People feeling comfortable and more importantly secure with a researcher enriches the data by adding more depth to it. A rational way how I created trust was by promising informants that their names would be pseudonyms and their answers are confidential, but Norman (2009) states that for people who experienced situations in which rules are violated such as war this is not enough. An emotional way to gain trust was by asking my interpreters or humanitarians if they knew anyone who would like to participate within this research. Via this snowball method I used the social position of my interpreters and humanitarians to free ride on their already built trust relations within their social networks. An example of this trust relationship was shown when one interpreter who was also a teacher arranged an interview with one of his students. This student said something like that she really wanted to participate and help my research further because my interpreter was the best teacher she ever had. However, a downfall with this tactic is that informants might feel more shy to share certain information while the interpreter is also part of their social network. Truly trusting someone with sensitive information takes time and therefore I had many dinners, drank many *chays* and played *lots of tavla* games with my informants (Norman, 2009). Those informants I saw a couple of times or even regularly shared gradually more about themselves and were less shy to talk about sensitive topics.

A related issue with gaining trust is that while I studied my informants' social networks, I became part of theirs. Informants also study the researcher (Brown, 2009). When researching a social setting the researcher's identity is important because those we met in the field form an opinion about the researcher which again influences access to information. Self-representation matters for the further process of the research (ibid.). As a result of my identity as an intern at ASAM and a European citizen I was asked many times by informants to act as a broker in regard of retaining ASAM funds or helping

with arranging third country resettlement via the UNHCR or the EU. The most overwhelming request I got in this sense was to get married. With one key informant I became friends, and on one of my last nights, he shyly asked if I would marry him on paper so that he can join me to the Netherlands. He explained for an hour how great it would be and how he dreamed of a nice house and job in Europe. I kindly declined his offer by explaining that marrying is not an easy way to get asylum in the Netherlands and it is time and money intensive. My responses to the other resettlement and financial requests were similar explaining my position as a student not having the power to influence migration procedures nor that I have access to ASAM's finances.

Being professional and behaving appropriately when off duty is relevant during fieldwork (Brown, 2009). Professional conduct is reading cultural and social clues on how to behave when meeting informant, for instance knowing when to start or end an interview. When meeting an informant I always observed them in the sense of their body language and how they communicated. If I saw that someone looking nervous or uncomfortable I addressed this by pausing the interview or questioning how they felt. According to Brown (2009) off duty does not exist when in the field because the lines between public and private are blurred. Although I was well aware how I spend my leisure time might influence the research I made a few mistakes. I made a mistake after a few too many beers sharing information about certain topics, not culturally appropriate to discuss, perplexed one of my interpreters and eventually led to him swearing his love to me.

Another challenge regarding access was overcoming the language barrier. I only know how to have a short conversation about the wheatear in Arabic so inviting someone for an interview or having the actual interview on my own is impossible. Hence I used four Syrian interpreters. Before interviewing I instructed them explaining the aim of my research, the main research questions and examples of relevant information which they should look out for. Furthermore, I explained to them the more literal a translation is, the better. While rhetoric means a lot in a qualitative study. Without interpreters, this research would not have been possible, but using interpreters has several pitfalls. First of all, an interpreter not only translates but also interprets a question and then again interprets and translates the informants answer. So twice a question is made sense of and framed a specific way to grasp the question. This process in some cases might have led to miscommunication and misunderstanding. A few times I encountered a weird answer to a particular question, and I immediately addressed it by asking for clarification and explaining my question and aimed answer. As a consequence of this, I stopped working with one interpreter because his level of English was too low. Secondly, I chose words consciously and well taught through but when a question got translated it is not manageable for a researcher to check if it's well understood by the informant. Translating from English to Arabic or Kurdish means a specific nuance and meaning is lost. It is inevitable that within this research I mistakes were made and I interpreted words and actions wrongly.

4.5. Analysing data

First of all, when analysing social networks among refugees from Syria in Urfa, I came to understand that socialising and thinking in several distinct networks does not occur to most informants. Networking among their neighbours or colleagues is not anticipated or calculated, nor they seem aware of these efforts. For most informants when asked about their social interactions they were curious why I asked them about something so insignificant and natural to them. They would instead prefer to discuss the political issues in Syria, their dream to migrate to Europe, or about their daily

struggle to get by. So making the social explicit was sometimes harder than expected while it happens so naturally.

All these interviews, chitchats, observations, participating in community centres and in Quran courses, checking up on newspapers, and reading academic and humanitarian sources add up to the data. I processed this data by coding which is the first step from description to conceptualisation (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012). From a constructivist grounded theory perspective I acknowledge that I as the researcher define the data. From this constructivist grounded theory standpoint I started coding meaning, I did not neglect my theoretical and research knowledge beforehand. This resulted in hybrid codes gained by an inductive and deductive approach. In a deductive manner I made a priori codes such as identity, belonging, and in- and exclusion. Inductively I created emergent codes such as psychological issues, flight motivation, and insecurity. Deductive codes are based on the academic research while the inductive codes derive from the data. Moreover, are there two steps in grounded theory: open and selective coding (ibid.). Open codes are done initially and force the researcher to make first analytical decisions. Selective codes are step two and entail using the most frequent or relevant codes to organise, synthesise, and conceptualise the red lines of the data. Step one was taking a literal quote and making open or descriptive codes. Step two was analysing, structuring open codes leading to new insights and recreating new more abstract codes. The list of open and abstract codes is included in annex C.

Watching, participating and listening to informants is not seeing, experiencing, nor hearing something objective. As van der Haar et al. (2013) depict that knowledge is partial and situated. Hence the sense-making process of an informant is not a neutral act. Informants just like the researcher construct reality also known as the second-level narrative (Borland, 1991). An informant makes sense of a narrated event and narrates on a certain way thinking the audience into account. The researcher hears this and interprets it with his or her own background. This issue was tackled by recording interviews, transcribing them word-for-word, and by verifying data with informants. But within qualitative research interpretation remains. When interpreting data researchers bring their own knowledge, background, and concerns, and hope to enrich the data (Robben, 1995). In other words, interpretation is necessary or else a researcher would not say anything. I am well aware that this thesis is my story made out of my interpretations of my informant's interpretations of dozens of ideas, experiences, and emotions. As van der Haar et al. (2013) state that the absence of neutrality does not pose a threat as long as the researcher is aware of the subjective and contextual character of sense-making. Thus to mediate this, I reflected upon my role when gathering and interpreting data.

4.6. Reflections

Refugees from Syria in Urfa are in a politically complex position after being forced to flee their homes and uncertain about their rights and future under the temporary protection regime. Due to this, they are in a vulnerable position and often suffer from psychological issues. I also encountered intense emotions, like anger and sadness, during interviews highlighting informants their vulnerability. Thus a researcher should be aware of its possible effects on people's their well-being questioning personal and complex situations. Goodhand (2000) stresses the importance of balancing the need for knowledge generation against ethical concerns and underlines the 'do no harm' principle which refers to being aware of the risks certain respondents take while participating in research. As mentioned before when meeting informants I checked informants their comfort level by reading

their body language or asking how they were feeling. For instance, when one informant cried I asked if we should stop, but she responded that it is normal for her to cry and she prefers to talk about her deceased daughter. Although some interviews led to tears, I assume that during my fieldwork I could read social and cultural clues well enough and possess enough pre-knowledge about the situation to know the limits of my research to not cross any emotional or social border.

Another ethical dimension while conducting research has to do with gaining trust. Trust is essential for gaining access to research participants (Norman, 2009). Winning someone's trust can be done by guaranteeing and maximizing the confidentiality of the research. I took several measures to ensure consent, confidentiality, and trust. First of all, I made sure that every interview would only partake if the informants understood my research aim, what would happen with the interview and after explaining interview principles such as being able to stop the interview at any time. I would ask for verbal consent after explaining this. Secondly, when I noticed an informant feeling uncomfortable I explained again that if a question is too hard or too personal they are not obliged to answer, and we can move on another topic or stop the interview. Thirdly, I ensured confidentiality and trust by not writing down their full names, their address, and anonymize their names in this thesis. In doing so informants cannot be traced back. Furthermore, I explained I would not use the interview for other purposes than the research. This came up after a couple argued on what not to share about their negative experiences with humanitarian organizations. The female informant asked her husband to stop expressing his critical opinion about ASAM, so I explained no one from ASAM would hear any of this.

During the four months of fieldwork my aim was to act as culturally sensitive as possible. I acted and dressed as culturally appropriate therefore I wore concealing clothes that covered my arms and did not show any cleavage. Regarding physical contact I learned that giving a hand to an unknown man is not appropriate, so after a while I touched with my right hand my left chest as a welcoming sign instead of offering my hand. I tried to adapt to the Urfa style of living which also includes eating meat. I went to Turkey as a vegetarian but started eating meat when it was offered to me. In line with this, I acted as culturally sensitive as possible which includes saying yes to invitations which allows me to have a gaze at their personal lives. Turning down social invitations could also be possibly harmful to building trust relations (Brown, 2009). However only a one time I felt so uncomfortable with an informant I refused an offer to have dinner. This informant was flirting too much and said that I could be his second wife.

Another issue was the obscurity if informants were reliable or not. Qualitative social science research is situated in a socio-political landscape in which different social rules apply, and power struggles arise. Informants are not neutral, objective beings nor are their stories. Informants want to come across as likeable and competent persons and therefore talk and behave socially acceptable. Hence, informants tend to give socially desirable answers. For instance, talking negatively about a kin member is not socially acceptable and I did not hear this during fieldwork. Also the fact that informants wanted to benefit from their participation in this research raised questions about reliability. As an ASAM intern and a European citizen, informants saw me as a possible opportunity to benefit from financially or by a visa. Therefore, I suspect some informants of overemphasizing their emotional hardship and livelihood struggles. This does not entail refugees from Syria in Urfa do not suffer, but for some, I think it was a strategy to enlarge their struggle hoping to get supported.

Regarding reliability, I would like to stress that it is not the goal to find “the truth” but instead social science research studies how people construct, make sense and give meaning to situations. However by cross-checking information or asking a question twice on different occasions helped to validate my data. In some cases informants contradicted him- or herself and this allowed me to go more in-depth into this discrepancy.

Finally, because of translations and the second level narrative, the data includes misinterpretations. The informant's frame of reference and what is perceived as normal is rather different than that of the researcher. The researcher remains an outsider with his or her own biases. Besides talking and thinking in different languages the informant and the researcher can use the same words but might mean something entirely different. It is an advantage and a disadvantage to research a culturally, socially and politically different field than the researcher its own background. Advantageous as a result of being able to identify for the research subjects invisible social rules and disadvantageous because it is hard to grasp a certain social setting fully. It is, therefore, the task of an anthropologist to make the exotic familiar and the familiar exotic. I tried to do so by talking with as many people from different social backgrounds as much as possible and checking up on various papers or virtual sources to get a broad and profound understanding of the social context. However, it is not clear which interpretations are based on a misunderstanding so I cannot exclude mental errors from this research.

4.7. Terminology

Throughout this research I use the terms refugee and host. Within this paragraph I explain why I refer to my informants as refugees from Syria and to Turkish nationals as hosts. These labels are social constructs with their own associations. The refugee label can be beneficial as well as burdensome (Ludwig, 2016). Beneficial in that sense it creates access to aid or governmental services but burdensome in an informal manner portraying people who were forced to flee as victims.

The Turkish government calls refugees from Syria guests. This term depoliticises the issue at hand. The term guests sounds like refugees from Syria are having a friendly visit and underlines its temporariness. First of all, I call my informants refugees in line with the 1951 Geneva convention. Secondly, I also use the refugee label as a sociological concept underlining the struggles with forced displacement. Thirdly, I call my Syrian informants refugees is because I want to stress the urgency of their situation and they sometimes refer to themselves as refugees. Fourthly, I call my informants refugees from Syria because one of my conclusions is that “the Syrian community” does not exist. The Syrian identity is merely a construct used by humanitarians while in reality Syrians are fragmented in various sub-divisions. I do call them Syrian as a geographical indication emphasizing they experienced the effects of the Syrian conflict.

However, although I call informants refugees in this thesis I did not during fieldwork. This is the result of hearing my informants complain about the refugee label and the ways hosts use it. Several informants shared feeling awkward with being a refugee with a low status. Host perspectives on refugees range from seeing refugees as helpless victims that need support, as thieves and rapists that need to be controlled to ensure safety, or as lazy and spoiled who depend too much on their resources (Diken, 2004) . Diken (2004) argues that contemporary modern societies are incapable to agree if a refugee is a true object for human rights or is simply a criminal who threatens society. I think this also applies to Turkey where I heard all these three perspectives. Hence, because of the uncomfortable experiences among refugees from Syria with the refugee label and the strong

connotations the refugee label has among hosts I choose to minimise the use of this concept during fieldwork in Urfa.

Furthermore, I choose for the term host because the local population residing in Urfa is diverse. Hosts in that sense is less political than calling people from Urfa Turks. I know for instance that many Kurdish Turks do not like to be called Turkish. So to step away from the ethnic dimension I use the term host although it implies host are helping or assisting while this is not always the case.

A final side note regarding rhetoric concerns the level of English within the quotes. The informants as well as the translators do not fully master English and as a consequence the grammar and syntax is often incorrect.

5. Social networks: Inclusion & exclusion

This chapter sets out the results of four months of fieldwork in order to answer the research questions. Based on quotes from interviews, observations, and informal conversations I construct lived realities of refugees from Syria residing in Urfa. Within this chapter the most important social networks refugees from Syria are part of are taxonomic depicted. These paragraphs consist out of the nine social networks encountered based on kinship, Syrian nationality, region, ethnicity, neighbourhood, religion, class, profession, and online presence. The last paragraph are the sub-conclusions and an answer to the first research sub-question: *What kind of social networks are refugees from Syria in Urfa part of?*

5.1. Kinship networks

The most prominent social network among my informants is that of kinship. Kin networks are intense, dense and share many resources. Informants speak highly of family solidarity and loyalty. Especially the nuclear family is important. This is reflected by the choice of residence of informants and the amount of contact. Often kin members live close to each other or even live together. When spatially apart from each other kinship relations are still emotionally close by the frequent contact they have via their smartphone. Kin networks are dense, although spatially divided, the social lines are short and they watch each other closely. This relates also to a negative externality of dense relations and that is that dense networks can also be restrictive.

Kinship deviates into the nuclear and extended family. The nuclear family consists out of one or more parents and their children. The extended family includes grandparents, siblings, uncles, aunts, and cousins. Kin networks are easily distinguishable compared to other networks because it is ascribed and the relation among kin members are societally formulated. In Urfa most refugees from Syria live together with their extended families in one house. It is usual that a household consists of a nuclear family plus one or more members of the extended family. Widows or divorced women seek shelter with her patrilineal lineages such as their brother or uncle. Several informants expressed that living with their extended family is not preferable, but a strategic way to save money.

Although people are born into a kin network these relations still need work to be made and maintained. This maintenance calls Rabo (2008) 'doing family' illustrating that being a sister, cousin, or mother is not something you have but act upon. Family can be seen as a framework, discourse, or language that dictates morality (Rabo, 2008). In this sense family or kin is a discursive ideological force within society that dispenses legitimacy to certain behaviour. I noticed that kin networks indeed dictate a lot of personal choices such as wedding partners or private investment.

Moreover, each human relation contains power. I observed that relations between kin among refugees from Syria exist out of power based on gender and age. Firstly, kinship is patrilineal ordered among refugees from Syria (Collelo, 1988). This entails that men inherit property, the family name and family titles. Kin is not only emotionally but also spatially close. Within Syrian society different roles are ascribed to men and women. Men are expected to be responsible within the public sphere and women within the domestic sphere. This division becomes clear while walking the streets of Urfa and observing refugees from Syria in the domestic sphere. The large majority of workers in Urfa are men and it is uncommon to see refugee women from Syria working in the public sector. Although some refugee women from Syria work if it is necessary to ensure their livelihood but this is not preferred. As one dentist from Syria once expressed that a man should take care of his family so that his wife does not have to work.

The dentist's standpoint explains the expected role of men as family providers. But when this role is not fulfilled men their masculinity is contested. As a result this has a negative psychological impact on men leading to feelings of depression and shame (Calhoun, 2010). This is illustrated by Fajah who shared how her husband feels about being unemployed and cannot fulfil his societal role as a man. Fajah tells the story of her husband being very much respect in Syria. Now however he is merely an unemployed refugee. This status makes him like a failure.

'We lived out of our savings. My man felt bad. He is a pharmacists, we call it a doctor in Syria, but he felt so bad he could not work. He felt so bad he could not provide for his family. He felt disabled. He felt he has nothing here'.

Fajah, 35 years old, Deir ezZur

Women are in charge of the household and clean, cook, and do other house related chores. However refugee women also work especially in urban areas (Earle, 2016). Refugee women that I encounter working was often in the humanitarian field. However, the fact that women become an income-earner can destabilise male roles (Crisp et al., 2012). Which in its turn can lead to rising domestic tensions. Fajah's husband felt ashamed he could not find a job while his wife worked.

Secondly, age is an important indicator for someone's position within a (kin) social network. Older kin and elders in general enjoy a lot of respect among my informants. I noticed this during house visits. The young kin members arranged the tea, cookies, and so forth while the parents or grandparents were obeyed. Especially parents and children have a strong power balance in this regard. Social norms dictate that parents take care of their children when they are young but when the children are old enough to assist within the household they are expected to support their parents (Rabo, 2008). If parents grow old the oldest son is expected to take them into his house.

However as a consequence of the low socio-economic status of the majority of informants with children struggle with not being able to fully meet the needs of their children. Several married Syrian couples expressed their concern with not being able to give their children what they need. The next quote is from a couple that shares their discomfort in regard to not being able to provide for their children.

'General, life is not so good. No luxury. The rights children have is not complete. They want a good future for their children: luxury, safety, peace. But living is so expensive for them... They cannot make a good living for them. They cannot ...buy everything for them. She wants them to play with toys. She cannot give them what she wants to give them'.

Othman and Nada, 35 years old, Kobane

That kin networks matter is made clear by three observations I made. First of all, in many instances informants referred to kin if I asked them who they would turn to in great need. Supporting kin is seen as a primary obligation that informants are willing to make (Rabo, 2008). Often I noticed the closer the tie, the more was expected to support. For instance, a brother is expected to assist more than a cousin does. Another indicator that Syrians value and focus on kinship is the fact that many Syrian respondents marry endogamous with their cousins from the other side of the family. This occurs to strengthen family ties and to keep family assets within the family. However it is not always the case that kin are trustworthy or supportive towards each other. Again another indicator is that kinship, its values and terms are strongly interwoven in society is shown by rhetoric. In the public

sphere strangers refer to one another with for example sister or brother. Both refugees from Syria as hosts speak in kinship terms as a sign of respect. This illustrates the social significance given to kinship ties in Urfa.

An example that kin networks are not only influential in the intimate sphere is shown among others by Amir who co-owned his shop with his brother in law and his son. In contrast to Amir, I also saw how consciously kin is evaded in other spheres than the intimate one. For instance by Mahdi, who explained he made an explicit choice not to hire kin. Mahdi's attitude towards kin interference with his shop illustrates that although kin relations are highly valued these are not always wanted and not everything among kin is shared.

But also within kin networks tensions and struggles occur. An UNHCR senior shared that within extended families also struggles occur. He told me he had witnessed two brothers fighting over resources when he was working in a camp near Urfa. UNHCR staff were handing out blankets and one brother got six blankets, because his nuclear family consisted out of six members, and the other brother got four blankets, because his nuclear family consisted out of four members. The brother who received fewer blankets complained to the UNHCR staff and showed hostile attitude towards his brother because he felt neglected by humanitarians and was jealous his brother received more. Another example that kin is not always solidary is that of Amir who experienced that kin can cheat and steal. Amir's uncle kidnapped his son Murat for ransom short after the war started in Syria. Murat was kidnapped by an armed gang hired by his father's uncle. Murat was blindfolded and held for ten days. Finally Amir payed the ransom and Murat was released. These incidents exhibit that within a kinship network not everyone is supportive and not all kin members have the same aim, but towards the outside world people would not quickly communicate negativity about their kin.

5.2. "The Syrian network"

Hosts and humanitarians often speak of the Syrian community portraying them as one homogeneous network. Although I encountered there is no such thing. Instead refugees from Syria networks are fragmented and there is no nationality based network of solidarity. A former researcher at a Turkish university investigated how refugees from Syria live in Mersin and found out that upper or middle class refugees from Syria care as little for deprived refugees from Syria as hosts do (Anonymous, April 8, 2017). This finding hints that there is not one solidary Syrian community.

I oppose the term Syrian community and argue that informants distinguish among each other based on region, ethnicity, religion and so forth. This Syrian community only exists on macro-level analyses and in policy. Although during fieldwork it became clear that there is more contact between refugees from Syria among each other than with hosts but this does not mean there is one overarching Syrian community. I encountered many stories that mark there is not one Syrian community but rather fragmented networks. One example is that of Qamar, a Syrian single mother, who expressed her discontent about the Syrian community in Urfa and how Syrians support each other. She proclaimed that *'Syrians don't help each other here. No, no, no, they only help themselves. The Syrian people here are poor'*. Before in Syria she felt part of Syrian communities and supported by these. According to her because of the economic hardship Syrians in Urfa support each other less leading to less solidarity and not feeling included. She felt like she did not belong to the Syrian community in Urfa, she rather felt detached.

Although having said this, I consider myself obliged to categorise them as such to explain the issues why refugees from Syria are perceived as one community and the differences between refugees from Syria in dealing with their nationality. I saw two main attitudes of informants towards other refugees from Syria. The vast majority of informants are looking inward and have contact with each other because they knew each other before the war, share a common language, or the same struggles they face bond them. One informant, Rayan, stated that he became a nationalist in Urfa, because of the difficulty with communication and socialization hosts.

However the second category looks outward. Only two informant had this almost absolute look. An example is Osman who looks outward and prefers contact with hosts instead of Syrians. He repeatedly announced that Syrians changed a lot because of the war and felt that refugees from Syria in Urfa envy him and are jealous because he is doing relatively well. Because of the harsh environment refugees from Syria have to live in cheating and lying become strategies to survive. He has been cheated by a family with a Syrian background and this impaired his trust in others with a Syrian background. Osman's quote illustrates that he does not like the way refugees from Syria behave in Urfa and based on this reason and his earlier experienced cheating he distances himself from them. Osman is not actively part of social networks consisting of refugees from Syria besides his kin.

'I do not trust people [Syrians] here. They lie about what they have to get money from NGOs. They cheat. It is just wrong. I do not trust Syrians here. I made some new friends of course. I am a teacher I know many Syrian families. They know me. It is good. Sometimes if they really need something I want to help. But you have to watch out. If other Syrians see your new car and hear you are doing well financially Syrians get envious and jealous. They also want a new car. They will ask you what you do and want to join or something. They look for money or even take your car. So always be careful'.

Osman, 28, Deir ezZur

Although I argue there is not one Syrian community the refugee status bonds Syrians. The fact of being a newcomer and having the political status of being a refugee unites refugees from Syria. They have to adjust to their status as a guest in a foreign country and many informants expressed their concern being a refugee feeling that no one cares for them. As Ahmed once said *'I am just a refugee. A lower status cannot be'*. Ahmed emphasises the low social position refugees are in after being discriminated by hosts. This process from a located citizen to becoming a refugee is dynamic and Malkki calls it "refugeeness" (Malkki, 1995). Step for step a refugee learns how to act like one informed by the humanitarian field, the host government, hosts, and other fellow refugees. This results in strategic usage by refugees playing with the refugee label and their expected behaviour (Kibreab, 2004). As shown in this and the coming chapters, refugees from Syria in Urfa have several ways, like victimising oneself, aiming at obtaining resources from humanitarian organisations and myself -a European capital rich woman-. "Victimcy" means that someone is representing oneself as a victim that is vulnerable in a particular situation hoping to obtain resources playing at compassion of the other (Utas, 2005). Victimising is an act of agency executed under disempowering circumstances. This strategy indicates the complexity and creativity of refugees to use all possible options to enhance their situation. The notion of "victimcy" shows how refugees are not seen as a holistic human being anymore but as someone who experienced violence.

So the refugee label is something refugees play with and leads to opportunities but it also has a downside. The refugee label is associated with many various negative connotations which are also heard, seen and experienced by informants. Ahmed and Zahra are two examples of informants feeling unhappy and awkward regarding their forced displacement and the complementary ascribed refugee label. Ahmed one day shared he felt disempowered when being discriminated by his colleagues at the factory. His colleagues, which were all hosts, were complaining about refugees from Syria working for a lower salary leading to more job competition. Ahmed felt he could not say anything because he is just a refugee with a low societal status. Also Zahra felt awkward with the changing social status from being respected as a school manager in Raqqah to a 'nobody' refugee in Urfa. *'My name is refugee'* underlines the pain when feeling reduced from a holistic and respectable individual to a mere faceless and socio-political label. The experienced struggle of Ahmed and Zahra with the refugee label shows that they are still in the process of "refugeeness" and are still busy with finding their way as a refugee.

5.3. Regional networks

Informants relate to their region where they lived before becoming forcedly displaced. In Urfa informants are part of a social networks based on their region. The solidarity network based on region is also known as *hemsehrlik* (Esendemir, 2010). The majority of refugees from Syria residing in Urfa come from Northern Syria especially from Kobane, Deir ezZur and Raqqah. That these social networks are large but still intact is indicated by the incident when one of my interpreters and I were on Instagram watching a clip of an informant from Raqqah playing lute and all three males present in the shop knew him because they also came from Raqqah. I found this striking considering more than four hundred thousand refugees from Syria live in Urfa. Another example that regional networks are relevant for refugees from Syria in Urfa is that neighbours are often from the same region.

Regional networks are wide-ranging and semi-intense. Regional networks consist of weak and strong ties. These networks are based on a former collective identity that is much cherished although being displaced. As one informant, Amir, once stated in line with the *hemsehrlik* principle is that informants first help their family and then their fellow regional network members. That regional background matters to refugees from Syria is supported by research done by a former employee at the Mersin university. She stated that regional background says a lot about his or her identity in regard to ethnicity and religion, and loyalty (Anonymous, April 8, 2017).

Zahra is strongly attached to her hometown Raqqah and feels nostalgic when talking about it. Once she shared an expression illustrating the deep connection between a person and its region. The expression is loosely translated into *'those who leave their hometown lose their value'* and underlines the idea that people belong to a specific place and explains why Zahra now feels like a matter out of place. Being displaced is thus not merely a place that is left behind but also influences their identity. Another example of an informant feeling uprooted is that of Ayman. Ayman does not feel like he belongs in Urfa and this affects his feeling of security and comfort. He does not feel ownership in regard to his life in Urfa and is still wondering where he can feel at home despite Raqqah.

'This is not my life. I have no residents. I cannot move. It is a bad feeling to not be able to feel secure. This is not my place. Before in Raqqah, it was my place. My life, my city. However I do not belong here. I am looking for a home.'

Ayman, 34 years old, Raqqah

A joke indicating the sense of belonging informants have towards their previous region is made by Nabil. He and his friends from Deir ezZur call Urfa UrfaZur as a result of the high amount of refugees from Deir ezZur residing in Urfa and the similarity he sees between his hometown and Urfa. He and his friends also give Arabic names to central roundabouts in Urfa which were formerly used in Deir ezZur like the dove roundabout. This reusing former words hint at trying to get acquainted with a new spatial area without forgetting the old cherished region.

Relating to these feelings of belonging and nostalgia most informants shared they want to return to Syria when the war is over. This desire to return depends on variables such as age, well-being in Urfa, and future perspectives in Turkey. Most of my informants were thirty or older, struggled with getting by, and did not have many perspectives on employment. Thus returning sounds good in their ears. But informants who were young, doing well and have perspectives in Turkey doubt or know for sure they want to stay. An example of an informant wanting to stay is Ahmed. He is a young man, almost graduated in medicine and employed as a freelance translator. Ahmed's current and future perspectives are good in Turkey. He even states that Turkey is the best thing ever happened to him proclaiming that his life in Turkey is preferable compared to that back in Syria in which he felt caged politically, socially and culturally.

5.4. Ethnic networks

The biggest part of informants shared that their ethnic network members feel familiar, comfortable, and describe a sense of belonging to these networks. Regionalism and ethnicity is closely interwoven which is demonstrated on how informants introduce themselves. When informants introduce they often share their regional background but do not make their ethnicity right away explicit. However by telling where he or she originates from implicitly unveils their ethnicity. Because being from a certain region indicates a person's ethnicity. This is because Syria can be divided in several ethnic areas. The vast majority of Syrian nationals are Arabic, residing throughout the country, and about 10 percent is Kurdish, residing in the Northern regions (Central Intelligence Agency, 2018).

Ethnic networks in Urfa include intense and not-intense ties and are wide-ranging. Ethnic networks consist of weak and strong ties. These ties can be intense but not so intense as kinship networks with exceptions. Ethnic networks consist out of many members. Furthermore, ethnic networks are inward-looking because ethnicity is an ascribed identity trait and ethnic networks strive the best for their ethnic members.

Illustrative for the importance given to ethnicity is that it transcends nationality. For instance a Turkish national can have the same ethnicity as a Syrian. This results in Kurds mingle among each other without taken their nationality in regard. However, I encountered that informants in Urfa prefer refugees from Syria with the same ethnicity above hosts with the same ethnicity. To summarise, most informants value ethnicity above nationality but when possible prefer an individual with the same regional background as well instead of a host.

There is a variety of attitudes how people relate to their ethnicity. It ranges from people who don't care about ethnicity, hide their ethnicity or emphasise their ethnicity. I met informants who focus on ethnicity and prefer to meet other people with the same ethnicity but there are also informants who couldn't care less about ethnicity. For example Afran, a 35 year old Kurdish man from Kobane relates strongly to his Kurdish ethnicity. The social networks members Afran has, are predominantly Kurdish. Afran from Kobane feels he can relate best with other Kurds irrespective of nationality. Stating that

'Kurds are 'like me. We are the same. I contact with them and we are really close'. While others do not think about others in terms of ethnicity. Some prefer to think in humanity as one instead of dividing via ascribed categorizations such as ethnicity. Osman's quote illustrates this way of dealing with ethnicity.

'For me, I have a lot of Turkish Kurdish friends here. I don't make a difference among them. I know people who do this. I think they do think very much about I am Arabic or I don't like Kurdish. Maybe you hear it. It's a big problem I think. I see it as we are one.'

Osman, 28 years old, Deir ezZur

Relating to this, do age and ethnicity play a role in how someone experiences and verbalizes their ethnicity. Young informants refer less to their ethnicity than informants in their middle-ages. I also observed that there is a difference in how Kurds and Arabs ventilate their ethnicity. Kurds are often more expressive about their ethnicity and it seems they are more focused on their Kurdish culture than Arabs are. In my encounters with Kurds from Syria they are not shy to talk about their ethnic background to me but proud of it. Many times I had to listen and dance on Kurdish songs.

There are furthermore examples of informants differentiating among ethnicity but not preferring their own ethnic group. For example Said, an Arab from Syria, explained he did not like any of his Arabic neighbours from Urfa. He stated he preferred Kurdish hosts instead of Arabs. In other words, ethnic social networks do not have to be rigid. This is also apt in regard to other social networks.

5.5. Neighbourhood networks

Neighbourhoods shape everyday life. It is where people live, interact, and socialise. Time and time again informants shared how their neighbours helped them with housing, food, or information on humanitarian organisations. This finding endorses Beggs et al. (1996) study in which neighbour ties are essential assets to receive material support from and are perceived as resources. Hence, neighbourhood networks play a pivotal role for the majority of informants in terms of livelihoods. Neighbourhood networks are characterised by diversity although, as will be explain in this section, before neighbourhoods are based on national, former regional, and ethnic lines. According to Forrest and Kearns (2001) *'it is important not to see the neighbourhood as just a territorially bounded entity but as a series of overlapping social networks'* (p. 2130). A neighbourhood brings more networks together such as class, ethnic, and regional networks.

The desire of Syrians to continue normality, focus on familiarity, and keep close to people from their region and ethnicity is reflected by the way refugees from Syria resettle in Urfa. In Urfa neighbourhoods are divided based on class, regional background and ethnicity. Refugees from Syria often live in the deprived areas while hosts live in the more advanced areas. Because of the lower economic status of refugees from Syria they cannot afford to live in the relatively wealthy areas in Urfa. Via this way are refugees from Syria and hosts spatially segregated. In Urfa there are furthermore Kurdish, Arabic and mixed neighbourhoods. The host population in Urfa consists primarily out of Arabs, Kurds and some Turkmen. Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen refugees from Syria settle in Urfa in those areas where people with the same ethnicity live. The different ethnic neighbourhoods are visual while walking the street in Urfa. For example I saw in Eyyübiye, an Arabic neighbourhood, that almost all signs of shops are in Arabic and many Arabic women walk there which are easily recognisable because of their shiny veils. There are no clear Turkmen neighbourhoods to distinguish, but as a consequence of the previously explained class division I assume that in the richer area of

Karaköprü many Turkmen live. Also mixed neighbourhoods exist where every ethnicities lives without a dominant one. This ethnic division within Urfa is explainable while looking at Syria's ethnic lines. In Urfa many refugees from Syria come from Kobane, Deir ezZur and Raqqah. The Northern parts of Syria are Kurdish including parts of Aleppo, Afrin, Kobane and Li Qamslo. In the Eastern parts of Syria such as Deir ezZur and Raqqah many Arabs reside. Neighbourhoods full of refugees from Syria are scattered out over Urfa and ordered along ethnic lines and in alignment with their regional background.

Seeing a neighbourhood as overlapping social networks are an essential part of the way in which people are socialized into the wider social order (Forrest & Kearns, 2001). Hence a neighbourhood is a crucial component of social identity. A neighbourhood is crucial for identity and as indicated by the previous paragraph several identity traits like class, regional background, and ethnicity are visible when analysing neighbourhoods. However, there is a difference how informants interact with neighbours. One way how refugees from Syria relate to their neighbourhood is intense. Informants who value neighbourhood relations made sure they live next to their kin members or invest in their neighbour relations by cooking or assisting each other with practicalities. For this segment, they feel some sense of belonging to the neighbourhood and the neighbourhood defines their social identity. In contrast, other informants do not have any or only a little contact with their neighbours and are just 'bought into' the neighbourhood. They do not know their neighbours well nor want to. They tend to feel no belonging and for them there neighbourhood is not a building block of their identity.

When comparing how informants connect and interact in neighbourhood networks I noted that for elder informants neighbourhood integration seems to mean more valued than for young informants. My findings suggest that young informants perceive neighbourhood integration as less important than elder informants do. I noticed this by elder informants talking more about their neighbourhood. This is logical because elderly often do not work and mainly sit in or around their homes. One example is that of Maryam. Her spatial and simultaneously social arena was very small. Besides her kin network she only had a neighbouring couple she interacted with on daily basis because her health condition constrained her physical mobility. Amir is another example of an elder informant who talked a lot about his neighbours mainly complaining about their noise and rudeness. For him his neighbouring relations matter and he felt rather a bit frustrated about the struggling nature of their bond. A possible explanation for this disparity can be that young people are more active and gone away from their house or the tendency of young informants to seek networks online instead of in their backyard.

5.6. Religious networks

Religion connects people like corn-starch does with a soup. Religion is an overarching set of beliefs that can cut across class and other societally constructed divisions. Religion can be ascribed and achieved, via conversion, and this makes religious networks more out-ward looking than encountered so far. Although I should mention that there are many different divisions regarding Islam. Religious status however matters while being a pious believer enhances an individual's position among refugees from Syria in Urfa significantly.

There are all kind of ways and degrees in how people are religious and express their religiosity. Each refugee from Syria I spoke to consider themselves Muslim except one. On the basis of a few examples these degradations and ways of religiosity are highlighted. Firstly, Afran for instance does not have a lot with religion but is Muslim. He can be described as a cultural Muslim not dissociating

from Islam but simultaneously not feeling any kind of devotion towards religious practices. In contrast Qasim emphasises in every conversation I had with him the importance of the Islam. There are also many interpretations what being a pious Muslim entails. I met a refugee from Syria who took religious beliefs rather strict and explained that being a good Muslim for him meant not shaking an unknown woman her hand nor talking to an unwed foreign woman. So our conversation was short. Simultaneously the majority of informants shook my hand without a doubt and do not think religion prohibits them to shake a hand of an unwed foreign woman. Shaking a female stranger's hand is a mere symbol of the diversity how people look at live from a religious perspective. I heard for example so many different ideas about topics such as *salat* (prayer) and *zakāt* (charity).

There are several divisions within Islam. In Syria the majority is Sunni Islam. As far as I know all my respondents were Sunni Muslim. Only three Syrians remarked the different Islamic branches and described being part of a religious network. For Alina, Zahra and Qasim being religious and showing their religious engagement by going to mosque or giving or following Quran lessons are a way to receive social credit. Being a just Muslim is received well in Urfa taken into account that it is a conservative and Islamic province. The religious network of Alina circulates around Quran course. This network consists of only women from Syria and many of them are kin. The other women following Quran lessons are from the same neighbourhood. I cannot claim these women are from the same ethnicity or region but I do assume so in accordance with my previous analysis of neighbourhoods, they are divided along ethnic and regional affiliation. The other female informant, Zahra, teaches Quran verses to predominantly host women. She uses her knowledge in teaching and Arabic to socialize with the hosts. Zahra's religious network is diverse in the sense that she bridges with non-Syrians. Zahra's Quran group meets in her apartment building and only women from the neighbourhood stop by. Zahra is living in Haliliye, a richer area, and because of this many of these women are hosts. Zahra described her relation with these women not as close but comfortable while these women support each other emotionally especially concerning her grief for her deceased daughter. Finally, Qasim's religious network is larger because as a man he goes to mosque where more men come than at a Quran lesson group. Further there is also room for bridging efforts because Turkish men also pray in the same mosque.

Within each human relation and thus also in social networks power struggles occur. Identities are scaled into hierarchies relating to Cooper's (2007) theory about intersectionality and its correlation to hierarchal scales. Depending on identity traits deemed important in a network someone gains more power than other members. For instance as observed among Zahra's Quran class in Urfa a Muslima who went to Mekka, called a *Hajji*, received great respect for this and logically gained influence in this class. The *Hajji* was in charge and had more religious power within this Islamic group than the other women who did not go to Mekka. In this case the *Hajji's* identity as a religious pious Muslima aiming to complete the five pillars of Islam hierarchically orders her above the women who did not go to Mekka. Although the women who did not go to Mekka are subordinates they still possess resources to influence their superior (Giddens, 1984). A subordinate can still challenge the *Hajji* and question her authority.

In Syria you are normally born into a religious network. It is ascribed, and thus not easy to change, however it is possible to change your Islamic beliefs but the consequences are presumably negative for social relations. I met one young man, Ahmed, who distanced himself from his Islamic upbringing. Although he clearly feels atheist he prefers not to share this openly with other than his nuclear family. This is a clear example of Zhang's (2017) theory of people making a risk analysis before

breaking from their roles within a network. Ahmed is expected to be a Muslim by each social network he is part of but does not distance himself publicly from his Islamic identity out of fear of becoming an outcast. His social networks can be negatively affected because of his transgressing societal norms regarding his Muslim identity. This illustrates that social rules can be restrictive and pressure people into certain identities and behaviour.

Religion and ethnicity are interlinked since I heard many discussions from Turkey as well as Syria about the religiousness of Kurds. Some Kurds state that Kurds are Muslim, but do not have a lot with religion, while other Kurds are not Muslim and again other Kurds strongly identify as a Muslim. Once while having an interview a Syrian respondent started asking questions to my Kurdish interpreter about the religiosity of Kurds in general. She was an Arabic woman from Deir ezZur and thinks that Kurds are not so called real Muslims. My interpreter felt uncomfortable that she said this and described that Kurds are Muslim. Although later on my interpreter told me in private that he is not religious but he does not want to tell publically that Kurds are not religious. Comparing among my Syrian informants I notice that the Kurdish ones are less vocalizing their Muslim identity than Arabic Syrians.

Finally, I want to end with some observations during *sawm* (fasting). During thirty days of Ramadan Muslims do not eat, drink, smoke, nor have sexual activity while there is daylight. When in Urfa I noticed there were small solidarity initiatives organised by imams or Urfa's municipality. Based on *zakat* (charity), one of the five pillars of Islam, host imams gave out bread to deprived people in Eyyübiye including Syrians. With delivery vans imams and other religious members of the mosque handed out bread to everyone who wanted. Urfa's civil servants hosted a daily public *iftar* (dinner) for everyone who wanted to join. In public areas such as the square near Balıklıgöl or near Nevali hotel tables and chairs were arranged for people to dine. These dinners included among others dates, soup, and bread. These were truly inclusive events for everyone without exception. However, this public inclusion hosted by the government and religious networks only lasted a month.

5.7. Class networks

A class is according to Weber an economic stratification '*composed of people who have live chances in common, as determined by their power to dispose goods and skills for the sake of income*' (Clark & Lipset, 1991, p. 398). However being part of a socio-economic class in society is an achieved status and thus can change more easily over time than an ascribed one. An individual can climb or fall from the socio-economic ladder. The position on this ladder has many consequences for an individual's course of life. Class differentiation is significant because someone's wealth shapes the level of protection and security a refugee is able to obtain (Campbell, 2006).

Being of a certain class shapes an individual's life including its social interaction. Class networks seem to be wide-ranging with some intense ties. Wide-ranging in the sense that also within these networks hosts are included. Belonging to the middle class entails living within a middle class neighbourhood and working with other middle-income earning colleagues. Neighbourhoods in Urfa are not only segregated by ethnic lines but also along class lines, as described in section 5.5. The data suggests that refugees from Syria who belong to the middle or upper class in Turkey have closer ties to hosts than the lower class. This has to do with the fact they live among hosts and are not excluding from activities that take financial means. According to Crisp et al.(2012) a refugee is locally integrated when they are self-reliant and develop close ties with hosts. In this instance refugees from Syria from the middle class are more integrated into Turkey than lower class. Being able to bridge as a refugee

from Syria with hosts has many advantages. Having ties with hosts is precious social capital as a consequence of hosts being social, political, economic, and cultural embedded in Turkish society having or having access to various resources.

The majority of refugees from Syria in Urfa belong to the socio-economic lowest class and a few Syrians are part of the middle class (Okan, B., personal communication, March 7, 2017). After fleeing from war refugees from Syria lost their homes, jobs, and possessions. This economic shock is not easily compensated and that is one of the reasons why most refugees from Syria are socio-economically suffering in Urfa. Although the vast majority of them face economic hardship my informants still dissociate each other in accordance to class. Especially those in middle or upper classes differentiate one another according to class. A few middle and upper class informants refer to the lower class as backward, consisting out of commoners, or uneducated farmers.

What an individual's former class was before the war in Syria strongly correlates with what class they are part of nowadays in Turkey. My informants from the upper or middle class are more likely to be part of the middle class or upper lower class in Turkey. And especially those informants who were part of the middle or upper class in Syria expressed their struggles with their decrease in status and the decline in socio-economic well-being.

5.8. Professional networks

The professional network is one of the least intense, outward-looking, and fluid social networks investigated. Professional network are formal in the sense that there is less emphasis on an individual's characteristics and more on an individual's competence. Tönnies would describe professional networks as *Gesellschaft* in which personal attachment is secondary (As cited in Harris, 2001, p. 13). For example Mahmoud started his language institute not with a friend but a Syrian fellow student who also saw an investment opportunity not because of their interpersonal strong relation. Outward-looking comes down to trying to bond and bridge with other professionals to enrich employment changes. Fluid means in this case the often quickly changing environment of promotions and reorganisations within organisations but also the fact that among several informants jobs were only on a daily basis.

Refugees from Syria work in different sectors but often work in low-skilled and informal jobs. My informants work mainly in factories, language institutes, humanitarian organizations, or have their own shop. There is no need for a high level of trust nor reciprocity because of the formal interaction. Nonetheless some colleagues can be friends. The value of such a relation depends on the intensity of the friendship. If someone is a close friend he or she is trustworthy and more willing to engage and invest in this friend. So if someone needs money it is more likely a good befriended colleague would lend it instead of a distant colleague.

Illustrating the fact that professional networks are often not based on strong ties is the gap between staff members. As stated before several informants have only jobs on occasional basis so do not feel much relations with their colleagues knowing their relation won't last long. Furthermore, I did not hear many informants talk how colleagues helped them. Of course, colleagues can tip each other on certain positions.

Moreover, refugee students from Syria are part of social networks based on their department, dormitory, and study associations. Via these social settings they make bond and sometimes bridge. Who they befriend depends on personal connection. However I saw three attitudes from refugee

students from Syria towards other students. Mahir and Safae were both engaging towards all nationalities. In contrast to Rohat and Sera who mainly focused on other refugee students from Syria. For example, Sera lives in a dormitory with two hundred women but only interacts with the nine refugees from Syria present. Finally Ahmed tries only to mingle with others instead of refugee students from Syria at university.

Refugee students from Syria at Harran University created themselves a Syrian student association only for refugees from Syria called *Bukra*. This association helps new refugee students from Syria with university formalities and organise social events for Syrian students. The association is a way to be part of a compact Syrian only network. This associations network is exclusive, inward-looking aiming at only bonding instead of bridging.

5.9. Online networks

The online and offline dichotomy is a false one (Wellman, 2005). Computer based communication extends rather than reduces social interactions (ibid). Internet enables people to easily maintain weak ties and foster new ties. Social networks based in the physical sphere are continued and maintained virtually. Also the social range of social networks are enlarged with befriending new people online. Social networks online are not that different from those in the physical sphere but often overlap. The virtual social networks my informants were part of seemed the most fluid social networks encountered during this fieldwork. Fluid in the sense that the new made contacts change quickly and seem not be durable nor aim to be. Online are not intense but with a few exceptions. It is hard to say something general and solid about online networks because each network online is diverse. However in this section I describe how my informants use their always present mobile phone, various online networks, and the distinct manners how people connect online.

I was flabbergasted with how many times informants and interpreters phone each other, send Skype invitations and Whatsapp voice messages. The vast majority of my informants have a smartphone. Their smartphone is important since via this way they can maintain their social networks who have been scattered since the war. Phones seemed especially useful when there was unrest in parts of Syria where people live they know. Beside this urgent utilization of a smartphone, many times it was employed to share leisure things. More than once interpreters or informants took up their phone during an interview without seeming in any way second guessing if it was appropriate. Often this resolved in asking me if I wanted to say something in Arabic to their father, sister, or friends on the other side of the line. After being uprooted and social networks are scattered worldwide as a result being visible online or reachable by phone is of utmost importance. As my interpreter Osman once said to me while walking to the bus *'without my phone I am nothing. Without my phone I cannot talk with my family'*.

Many of my informants, mostly young adults, have online profiles on social media like Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. These online social platforms have a social and practical function. Social media are a way to connect with already known and unknown people. Social networks on social media range from close to superficial interpersonal contact with people already known from their physical sphere networks or people only contacted virtually.

The Internet is able to connect diverse people from fragmented networks (Wellman, 2005). One example of a strong connection solely made on the Internet is the relation between Ahmed and his girlfriend. She still lives in Syria and they did not know each other before their connection of

Facebook. Their contact intensified and ultimately developed into an intimate love relation which lasts for almost two years now. Although they have similar identity traits like nationality and ethnicity the Internet bridged the gap between them.

On a practical level social media is used to share information and sell or buy (non-)material goods. Social media platforms function among my Syrian informants as information portals about institutions such as charities, the Turkish government, and schools. Some online groups on social media are created by refugees from Syria for other refugees from Syria. For example there is a Facebook group that focuses only on Turkish temporary protection regime developments or Facebook pages where refugees from Syria share migration routes to Europe. There are also commercial Facebook groups where informants try to sell and buy second hand material goods to others.

Another practical social media network illustrates that lines between online and offline are blurred, in line with Wellman (2005), is that of refugee student from Syria groups. In these online groups students can assist each other with information or other practicalities regarding university procedures or housing. Via this online network a friend from one of my informants even hosted another refugee student from Syria who was temporarily homeless.

5.10. Sub-conclusions

This section highlights, discusses, and relates the most relevant theories and findings when analysing social networks refugees from Syria in Urfa are part of. Firstly, the role identity has within social networks is analysed. Secondly, key findings of social networks of refugees from Syria in Urfa are elaborated on and broadly discussed. With special attention given to the messiness of social networks. Thirdly, cross comparisons between social networks are made.

5.10.1. Navigating between identities

Identities are social constructs that come to exist in dialogue between the ego and its social counterparts. Identity development is a dyadic process between social structures and the individual. Moroni (2014) states in line with Bauman's (2000) conceptualisation of liquid times that nowadays identity is not built out of solid focuses on which a person can build a personality but rather on incoherent and inconstant focuses due to globalization and the Internet. I also think that identity traits are more fluid than before globalization and the digital era, however as I argue in this chapter among my informants in Urfa there are still certain ascribed and clear cut identity traits demarcated. In this sense there is a difference in ascribed and achieved statuses. Ascribed means being born into a certain status for example ethnicity and achieved comes down to earning or choosing a status such as class. I state that ascribed identity traits remain rather clear cut and solid focuses among refugees from Syria in Urfa. However, the younger generation of informants pay less attention to ascribed identity traits than the older generation indicating a shift in solid to more liquid modernity.

Contingent to a social situation specific identity traits play a role. Refugees from Syria identify and represent themselves in various ways depending on the social setting. This is in line with Sen's (2006) and Steven's (2016) ideas that identity is not prescribed but highly dependent on context. Having a Syrian national identity might be a relevant identity trait when interacting with hosts, but being a Syrian national is not relevant when being among other refugees from Syria. When among refugees from Syria nationality does not matter but other identity traits become essential such as region,

religion, or ethnicity. This chapter demonstrates the various manners refugees from Syria have to identify themselves and organise themselves into social networks based on their identities.

To stay in Vigh's (2009) terms refugees from Syria are social navigating within the social arena in Urfa. Informants are able to socially navigate within and between ever changing networks. With playfulness, tact, and skills informants show agency by negotiating and switching between identities. Informants play with their multiple identities accentuating different elements of who they are and their societal position. Knowing how to navigate with identities is a useful skill in regard to becoming part of and doing social networks. Bonding or bridging seems to be and will be an even more important asset according to Wellman (2005). He argues that social networks are becoming more sparsely knit and unbound, so being able to function within this rather fluid environment social network skills are becoming more and more a requirement. The importance of bonding and bridging of social relations is highlighted when Ahmed explains how he sees every individual he meets as an opportunity to enhance his situation. As a result of the insecure social, economic, and political situation refugees from Syria are in social networks become a valuable asset. Making from everyone a possible link to a better future, so being able to bond or bridge is a necessity.

All relations have an element of power thus also within social networks power struggles are prevalent. Within social networks and across social networks power is ranked hierarchical (Cooper, 2007). Within social networks are two important identity traits that influences the role an individual has within a network and the ability to gain from them; gender and age. Within for example a kinship network elders and males tend to have a stronger voice in decision making processes than youngsters and women.

5.10.2. Doing social networks

First of all are social networks exclusive. An individual's identity influences the process of in-and exclusion from a social network. In-and outsiders are defined based on identity traits such as gender or kinship. These identity traits influence if an individual comes in contact, belongs, and is able to access a social network. Based on this research, the rule seems to be that young adults have more vibrant lives leading up to larger and broader social networks. The younger generation is often actively participating in society in most cases knowing Turkish better than their elders resulting in more bridging efforts. Those younger informants were part of a multitude of social networks while informants of middle-age seem to be part of less social networks. Again there is a relevant difference between achieved and ascribed status relating to this. An achieved status is possible to obtain and lose thus making it is easier to negotiate access and socially navigate in social networks based on an achieved status than on an ascribed status. Social mobility from a lower to a middle class status is less difficult than integrating as an Arab into a Kurdish social network.

Moreover, it also matters who the broker is that introduces or connects the ego with a social network. If the broker takes on a dominant position within the network he or she has a lot of influence the ego takes on a strong position. This relates with Cooper's (2007) study that identities are scaled into hierarchy. Take for example Osman and his patron. The patron –a former government official, Arab and elder male- has a large social network and political power within Urfa's municipality, so Osman could be quickly and successfully helped.

As this chapter shows, social networks can both facilitate and restrict individuals also in regard to accessing other social networks (Zhang, 2017). Facilitating in a manner of making cross-linkages between individuals and their networks. Restricting by excluding certain people or prioritising others.

Networks can be transitive, for instance getting acquainted with a friend from a friend. This is a common example of broadening social network. Contrary, the same social relation can be intransitive by restricting access to other networks. For instance, a kin network might dictate not to connect with other kin lineages because of a dispute. Belonging to a network can simultaneously imply exclusion from other networks but the rigidity of these exclusive rules vary among networks. It depends on the intensity and density of a social network and the perceived loss of losing that network to what extend individuals comply to imposed social rules (Zhang, 2017).

The more intense and dense the network the more restrictive but concurrently the harder it is to break from them. Separation from kin or ethnic networks have huge social consequences. Another factor that plays a significant role is that of dependency. If an individual is strongly dependent on a certain social network he or she will abide more than when the individual has many other social networks and can discard behavioural expectations. This finding confirms Zhang's (2017) statement that an individual is an agent that makes its own cost and benefit analysis if they conform or oppose imposed behavioural expectations.

Hence even though social networks can be controlling and restrictive the individual is still an agent who can negotiate and switch with their multiple identities and position within a social network to enlarge and widen their social circles. People are part of multiple social networks and no longer is expected to belong to one. This leaves room to manoeuvre. Sometimes this can lead to tensions when social networks differ significantly or are perceived contradicting. But an individual remains able to go along with pre-inscribed and imposed sets of rules related to a network or disregard these. An example of this is illustrated by Said. Said is an Arab from Syria but did not get along with other Arabic host neighbours. Although it was implicit assumed to mingle with his Arabic counterparts he would rather interact with Kurdish hosts. Said's attitude shows how individuals are agents able to choose how to socially navigate. So although social networks define social lines that shape human behaviour these sets of rules and norms are not rigid.

5.10.3. Social networks its messiness

Besides all this are there four social network characteristics that lead to its messiness. This messiness makes it possible for individuals to socially navigate in the social arena like a ship on the sea. Exactly the messiness creates room in which refugees from Syria can socially navigate.

Social networks are messy because of their fluidity, diversity, socio-spatial range, and multi-layered trait. First of all, social networks are fluid. Social networks' fluidity is a consequence of the structured but simultaneously chaotic social arena in which refugees from Syria find themselves. Social networks are fluid because they are highly variable in its members and their rules and norms change. Simultaneously it is a whole exercise to demarcate social networks in Urfa. Social networks are not groups of people. Social networks are broader, more loosely knit, and less easy to outline than groups. Social networks compositions change over time because social networks can dilute, members can be removed, or distance themselves. Moreover, social networks in itself are dynamic and not static similar to their members. Social network members fluctuate in ideas, emotions and interest and social networks move along with these flows. Social networks their rules and norms change because their members change their minds. Even though social networks can be controlling and restrictive the individual is still an agent who can negotiate. An individual can put pressure and change social rules, customs and expected behaviour. This is underlined by Giddens (1984) who argues that the boundaries between structures and agency are not as fixed and contrary as they are

depicted but rather are a duality. The concept of duality fits in perfect here. Social networks structures are internal as external (ibid.). Hence, these also change when internal changes take place which is illustrated among social networks in Urfa.

Secondly, social networks are diverse. Social networks are a broad concept including many different variables shaping them, but social networks are especially different in ascribed and achieved identity characteristics, intensity, density. The vastness of social networks relates to specific identity traits relevant to a social network. When a social network is based on an ascribed identity it is often more vast than networks based on achieved identities. To some social networks individuals are ascribed to since birth. For instance, you are born a Kurd or an Arab. There are ways to try to get included within an ethnic network, but an individual's ethnicity is something given. While other social networks based on an achieved identity an individual can become part of, like class. Regarding intensity, some social networks consist of trusting, solidary and intimate relations while others exist out of friendly but superficial acquaintances. An example of this is the comparison between ethnic networks and a professional one. Also social networks density differs. Some social networks are densely composed while others are loosely knit, for example kin versus online networks.

Thirdly, enhancing the messiness is that refugees from Syria are part of social networks on different layers. Multi-layered networks are networks where two individuals are connected with each other by more than one relation (Newman, 2010). For instance, Afran knows Salma from his Kurdish, neighbourhood and regional network. Social networks overlap. The more layers overlap the higher the chance is that people connect and bond later on. There are a lot of examples among refugees in Syria in Urfa connected via different layers. For instance, Nabil has a cousin who has a friend who knows a man who owns a shop. This friend introduced Nabil to the shop owner who eventually hired Nabil and afterward also appeared to be Nabil's neighbour from next block. Nabil is connected by his kin and neighbourhood layer mixing both networks which resulted in employment.

Fourthly, social networks are formed on different socio-spatial ranges. Social networks move beyond the local and are footloose. Social networks take place online in the digital sphere but also in the physical world on the local, national and international level. Refugees from Syria are part of scattered and fragmented social networks around the world physically and digitally. As this chapter demonstrates, refugees from Syria have kin residing in Canada, others have a colleagues back in Syria, and again others chat with friends online around the globe.

The last point relates to Wellman's (2005) perception that social networks are larger, looser-knit, and more uprooted than ever before. He introduces the concepts of "glocalized" networks and networked individualism. However in Urfa a combination of both concepts are relevant. The notion of "glocalized" networks describes social processes in Urfa half. Considering social networks are sparsely-knit and linking households both local and global. Many informants were part of scattered social networks across the globe as a consequence of the conflict in Syria. However these networks were not always based on clusters. Some were based on clusters, for instance the app groups of former study mates or kin. But there are also examples of individuals connecting on their own within local and global networks. The second concept of networked individualism also suits only half. The focus on the individual linking within sparsely-knit wide networks describes social networking efforts of refugees from Syria well, yet Wellman describes how the spatial dimension of social interaction is minimal and this is not the case among refugees from Syria in Urfa. Thus I would argue that a combination of both concepts is applicable in Urfa among refugees from Syria. When combining the

individual aspect of the concept of networked individualism and the spatial aspect in “glocalized” networks describe the current social networking efforts among refugees from Syria in Urfa well.

A final remark I want to make concerns the spatial dimension. As briefly mentioned in previous paragraph according to Wellman (2005) social networks are developing with only a minimum amount of social interaction in the local physical social arena. In contrast to this, Stevens (2016) argues that social networks are based on identities that are shaped highly dependent on space. As this chapter describes are refugees from Syria part of scattered spatial social networks made possible by communication technology like the smartphone and Internet. Although these scattered social networks still matter and are part of lived daily realities social networks also exist in the local social setting. Daily interaction with others remains a significant variable in defining oneself and concurrently depending its social network participation. So, although Wellman has a point regarding the importance of social networks not based on daily interactions but are sustained via technological means the daily physical interactions with others remains the most relevant spatial dimension in which refugees from Syria bond and bridge.

5.10.4. Comparing social networks

When looking how social networks are build, members interact, and their added value I noticed three striking things. To start with kin is the most intense social network, middle class networks bridge most, and young adults possess the most wide-ranging social networks. Moreover, the ambivalent nature of the social arena is touched upon.

Kin networks are the most prominent because of its intensity. This result endorses Beggs et al. (1996) research in which kin is portrayed as a primary source of support. As a consequence of the societally strong emphasis on kinship, the intensity of the social network is high. Ties are often intimate, trusting and frequently contacted. As a result of this intensity kinship networks shape and restrict informants the most compared to the other social networks depicted. Choices for example that parents made should be followed. Osman for example was looking for a bride and his parents opinion of her is of significant importance. However on the positive side the intensity results in giving and receiving support. Besides this, although seldom negative sounds were expressed about kin because of socially desired answers to my question I also encountered within these seemingly harmonious kinship networks trust is not omnipresent. Stories about stealing, competition and cheating among kin occurs too but remains taboo to discuss.

The most beneficial network to be part of is that of the middle class. Informants from the middle class possess the most assets and also are most up to date on governmental services and humanitarian programmes. Those informants part of the middle-class now were middle or upper class before in Syria. Middle class informants seem to have wide-ranging social networks which has a beneficial effect on gaining information and influence. They are more successful in bridging as a consequence of living among hosts and working with hosts. Bridging is an important network effort that results in easier access to aid, governmental services, and better chances on the labour market while hosts have knowledge about the Turkish government and labour market.

Young adult informants seem to be part of more wide-ranging networks than middle-aged informants or seniors. When identifying informants their social circles I came to the conclusion that most of the time middle-aged informants expand their social networks less when compared to young adults. Young adults often see Turkey as less temporary and a place able to live also when Syria is safe again. They think in opportunities and anticipate on the future. This attitude of willingness to

engage and thinking ahead results in more bridging efforts. What also helps with bridging is being able to learn a language. Younger adults receive education or have more options to school themselves in Turkish than the older generation who sometimes does not bother to learn Turkish. And as concluded before bridging is important. Bridging produces several crucial benefits such as accessing governmental services, getting a job or obtaining economic advancement (Calhoun, 2010; Cheung & Phillimore, 2013).

When comparing social networks I came to conclusion that the social arena ambiguous. Ambiguous because it is structured and random simultaneously. In line with Coleman (1964) social interactions are structured in the sense that there are clear patterns on who, how, when, and where people interact with one another. For instance, when looking at the spatial division of people patterns are indicated. As explained in section 5.5., in Urfa neighbourhoods are defined on the basis of class, ethnicity, and regional background. Hence when doing groceries around the block the chance of meeting people with the same ethnic, regional, and class identity is high. In contrast human interactions can also be random in for example public social spaces people from different backgrounds can come together and meet one another. There are examples of informants sharing they met hosts when playing football or a market. Although they were socially remote from one another people can mingle and meet in public areas.

6. Giving and taking

This chapter depicts what social networks deliver and cost refugees from Syria in Urfa. This chapter is thematically divided in seven sub-sections of the most relevant support social networks deliver. Informants benefit from social networks in regard to their well-being, housing, influence, employment, and accessing aid and Turkish governmental services. However, social networks rules are based on reciprocity depicted in section 6.7. The last paragraph are the sub-conclusions and an answer of the second research sub-question.

6.1. Improving well-being

Being part of social networks can enhance a person's well-being. I observed that feeling part of a larger community makes my informants feel more at ease in Urfa. Being part of a social network among other refugees from Syria continues some kind of normality and familiarity in refugees their lives which have been violently disturbed. They can proceed life among each other in a similar way. This is shown how refugees from Syria bonding and bridging attitudes depicted in chapter 7.

Another point that enhances well-being is feeling a sense of belonging. Belonging to a certain networks feels good. People are social beings which need some kind of inclusion from social counterparts. Being isolated is not good for someone's well-being on the long run. I noticed members of a social network give emotional support when someone is struggling by talking and motivating one another. I heard several stories of Zahra, a mother who lost her child and three grandchildren in the war, who receives support via her kin and religious network to process this grief. Also several informants stated that a kin member or former fellow student motivated them to flee from Syria to Turkey.

Nevertheless, there is a huge variety in strong and weak ties sharing delicate information. It is not on the basis of a social network decided what is shared but rather on the intensity of a tie. Personal information is not randomly shared with weak ties. Rather only those who are trusted hear personal stories. But when comparing networks and tie intensity, often close and intimate contact with kin members sensitive information is shared among these social circles. However it should be noted that also between kin members social rules apply and transgressing social rules are not appreciated. As a result of this also from kinship networks informants hide information like for example who they are dating.

6.2. Finding a home

Not only the composition of a network influences what it can deliver, but also when a network is called upon. When a refugee from Syria just crossed the border he or she generally speaking has none or limited ties with Urfa and focuses on those pre-existing relations. In the first stage kinship plays a pivotal role in informants their survival in Urfa. I observed that most informants have kin ties in Urfa. Generally the extended family shelters the freshly arrived kin briefly or for a longer period to suppress renting costs. It is usual that extended families from Syria live together with eight persons or more in one residence. Later on the extended family normally facilitates their kin in finding a suitable residence for themselves. If a place is found the extended family supports also with preparing the house with furniture. If informants did not have kin or did not receive appropriate care there are several NGOs in Urfa who helped with housing.

6.3. Having power

Refugees from Syria start from (almost) zero when they come to Urfa. While finding their way in Urfa they need others who stands surety for them while renting a house or confirm their capacity when applying for a job. Often refugees from Syria need hosts to endorse them (in)formally. Osman, for example, shared how an important former Turkish civil servant helped him in obtaining a job at a Turkish temporary protection school. This man was an Arabic host and helped Osman with retrieving a temporary protection identity card (hereafter ID) because without an ID card it is impossible to work for the government. Normally getting an ID card takes months but because the Arabic host went with Osman to the migration office of DGMM he got it within one day. Furthermore, the host helped Osman with his second interview for the job as a teacher at a Turkish school by calling the civil servant who did the interview and convinced him to hire Osman. Osman had trouble explaining me who this man was but he stated the following:

'I don't know this old man, he is like an angel from the sky. The old man said no problem I will help you. He is responsible for 100 or 200 people. He is the owner. He owns people. In Syria for example is an old man who governs a lot of people. He knows a lot of persons. His position in the past was at municipality. He is like a muhtar but not from the government. I love him very much like my father. He helped me with everything.'

Osman, 28 years old, Deir ezZur

This is an example of a patron-client relation. This so called old man worked within the government before and has the power to influence processes within the Turkish migration and education department. Osman is the weaker link who has been taken care of also known as the client. This man is a political powerful individual in Urfa and functions as the patron. After the patron assisted Osman, he declares his gratitude by loving him as his father. Even though Osman benefitted from his patron he might be expected to pay his debt later on the basis of reciprocity principles.

Another situation in which a refugee from Syria is handed down to someone else is when Fajah had to find a host who could function as a guarantee for her residence. In some cases Turkish landlords do not want to rent residences to refugees from Syria because they often live with a large number and concurrently make much noise or do not pay rent on time because of their low economic status. So before Fajah could rent her current house she needed a host guarantee to sign a contract with the landlord. Fajah's Turkish friend functioned as a referent who supports her. These kind of constructions make Syrians dependent on others and create power imbalances within society. So far I understood Fajah did not give this Turkish friend anything back but based the social principle of reciprocity she might have to assist her Turkish friend one day.

6.4. Retrieving aid

This sub-section depicts what humanitarian aid is and how it is provided. First of all, information is given on who are the humanitarians and what aid is. Secondly, the political climate in which humanitarians provide is examined. Thirdly, often heard complaints from informants about humanitarian aid is depicted with a special focus on nepotism. Fourthly, the effects of refugees victimising themselves on humanitarians is discussed. To conclude, the strategies refugees from Syria have to obtain (more) aid is demonstrated relating to social networks.

Aid is given by various NGOs and the UNHCR. There are many NGOs active in Urfa and these organisations support refugees in various material and nonmaterial ways. Refugees from Syria

receive material aid such as money, furniture, and clothes. Nonmaterial aid consist out of translating efforts, legal or psychosocial counselling, and offering courses.

Humanitarian often express how much Syrians share among themselves. In each social network identified in chapter 5 members share information about accessing aid. Aid is often accessed after hearing about it or advice given by kin, friends, or the Imam. Humanitarian organisations are aware their target group might not know about their services so many NGOs like the Red Cross make house visits in deprived neighbourhoods aiming to find refugees in need. Those informants more isolated from social networks are less likely to gain information on humanitarian aid provisions from counterparts so have a harder time accessing humanitarian aid. Hence, having many contact within wide-ranging social networks are beneficial for retrieving information and access to NGOs.

I heard from many humanitarians in Urfa that their organisations have a tough time collaborating with the Turkish government. On a frequent base legislation changes, new permits have to be obtained and the police checks humanitarian offices. During my four months in Urfa I experienced one police check at a humanitarian office and saw how several NGOs were closed in Urfa and nationally. Mercy Corps and IMPR were shut down and Save the Children was closed for a few months just to mention a few examples. Why these NGOs are shut remains unclear but public statements refer to expired permits or other bureaucratic reasons. However there are also critical sounds in Turkey protesting against the stronger grip of the Turkish government on the civil society in Turkey. Since the coup attempt on 15 July 2016 around 1500 NGOs have been banned because of linkages with Gulenists, Kurdistan Workers Party, or Islamic State (Cetingulec, 2016b). This trend seems to affect how the Turkish government assesses NGOs and is rather strict on how and by whom humanitarian aid is provided.

Several informants share their discontent about the way NGOs distribute aid. Although there are differences between various NGOs there is general critique. First of all, it is not always clear why some people receive aid and others not. Many informants experience the current aid architecture as obscure. Aicha illustrates the discontent with this obscurity. She leads a female headed household as a consequence of her detained husband back in Syria. She received support when her daughter, who was shut, stayed in Urfa but since she has been resettled NGOs stop providing aid. The one NGO that still assisted her stopped providing aid after a fieldworker saw her smartphone. This humanitarian organisation immediately stopped providing aid based on the assumption that someone with a smartphone can handle themselves. The fact that Aicha leads a female headed household which makes her and her family members extra vulnerable to livelihood fluctuations. Although it might be the case that Aicha took on the role of a victim emphasising her misery and deprivation to me hoping to retrieve aid from ASAM or me as a resource-rich European. This would be in line with Utas's(2005) notion of "victimcy" which entails that refugees victimise themselves highlighting their vulnerabilities aiming to gain more resources. I will never know, but the point is that she did not understand the decisions NGOs made to stop supporting her while assisting her neighbour, who in her eyes is doing better than her.

'But my neighbour who took the card has a husband and is in a good situation. Her children and husband help her. I am a woman without a husband and I do not get help.'

Aicha & Qamar, 23 and 50 years old, Deir ezZur

Another frequently heard complaint was that humanitarian aid is not distributed fairly, but is based on nepotism. Not those people who need it most get support but those who know the right humanitarians. Often those humanitarians in the field who have direct contact with refugees from Syria also have a Syrian nationality and are thus part of the field in which they operate. Amir shared that he felt neglected by NGOs and he encountered that NGOs only assist their friends, kin and, people from the same region and ethnicity. I cannot endorse nor deny this claim based on this research. However, I wanted to share this discontent while I heard it several times.

'NGOs do not support me. Only ASAM helped once with the PTT card of 600tl. I do not feel supported. Only friends for friends with NGOs. Also Arabic organizations only help refugees if they are their own family, friends and city people. [For example] this NGO is from Deir ez-Zur. So in this case people from Deir ez-Zur get support.'

Amir, 65 years old, Raqqah

The issue of fair distribution of aid is known within the humanitarian sector. Aid is in some cases not distributed to those most in need but those who know humanitarian staff. One humanitarian field officer shared that his organisation is aware of this issue and build a mechanism that monitors which fieldworker, who are also refugees from Syria, assists who. He made sure that the person who distributes aid most equally among different social networks was put in charge of a team to prevent nepotism as much as possible. The humanitarian principle of impartiality is rather difficult to practise when staff members are part of the target group.

'First of all, people being prioritized can happen in every sector. Especially if there is no good monitoring system. The fieldwork is done by the effected population. Our staff is mainly Syrian and part of the beneficiaries. However it is inevitable that staff prioritises some persons, for example if its family or are from the same city or ethnic group. But we do monitor and measure who are the most fair staff members. We measure the performance of the staff and if we see some people are more fair than others. In Urfa I noticed it indirectly that it occurs. One woman was more fair and then I made her responsible of the team.'

Shêro, humanitarian field officer

My informants complain about humanitarians but vice versa also occurs. Those humanitarian interviewed also expressed their discontent about the lies refugees tell to gain more aid or get resettled. Humanitarians know that refugees cheat to get more aid and some expressed trusting refugees less over time. Humanitarians are aware of with Utas's (2005) notion of "victimcy" which as an act of agency of refugees who perform to be under severe livelihood threats to gain more aid. They act more vulnerable than they actually are.

I also encountered that my informants portrayed themselves as victims. When having an interview I introduced myself. Sometimes I was introduced as an intern from ASAM and other times as a student. I observed that informants tended to highlight their suffering more explicitly when I was introduced as an ASAM intern than when I was introduced as a student. I conclude from this observation that those informants that understood I was from ASAM assumed I could assist them later on with aid. However, when I was introduced as a student I was assumingly less useful so they did not need to emphasise their hardship. My informants dodgy choose their words and experimented with the refugee label in regard to retrieving aid when talking to me.

This playful attitude with their label and hardship however negatively affects some humanitarians. Most of the humanitarians were fully aware of this playful attitude of Syrians to get more aid. They found it pure logic refugees would act like this. One UNHCR staff member stated that *'all Syrians lie'* (Anonymous, personal communication, February 3, 2017). Anouar is part of UNHCR third country resettlement department and his job is to analyse who is entitled to be resettled. He explains that he notices how refugees from Syria inform each other about how to make it through the screening processes. In contrast to him, other humanitarians do not understand the 'creative' framing of refugees. For example, one field officer shared her concerns that at the beginning of her job she felt sorry for refugees and wanted to help, but now lost her faith in refugees telling the truth about their hardship. She feels disrespected by beneficiaries their lies and this creates for her more distance between them.

'I try to do my best. I work as hard and as good as possible to help many people. But then they lie about their lives. They lie and just want money. In the beginning I felt sorry for them but now I know they lie. Sometimes they don't even say thank you when they leave. Sometimes I really don't feel respected.'

Anonymous humanitarian field officer

Finally, I want to explain what strategies refugees have to access aid effectively. This is by befriending humanitarians or volunteering at NGOs. As intern at ASAM several refugees from Syria saw me as an easy accessible target to get closer to ASAM's services and assets. They assumed that if financial aid is given or winterisation materials are handed out I would not forget about them. Murat directly asked me not to forget him and his family when ASAM gives away money. This attitude illustrates the hope of refugees from Syria to receive more aid when close via social ties to the source. Also by volunteering within a NGO refugees from Syria do hope to access more aid, help their social networks, or to get hired. Several informants expressed their aim to work within the humanitarian sector. Humanitarian jobs are favoured because they provide a steady income, have regular working hours, and can help others. One of my interpreters was also a volunteer within ASAM and functioned as a broker between his social network and humanitarian organisations.

There is not one social network to identify that gains more access to humanitarian aid but middle class networks seem to be more aware on developments concerning aid. It does not matter so much which social network an individual is part of but more on how an individual interact with humanitarians. For example, Rohat who volunteered at a NGO arranged a meeting with this NGO with the field officer and his friends. He also brought a father from a friend to the Red Cross office to apply for a Red Cross voucher. He was able to socially navigate well knowing people working in several NGOs.

6.5. Accessing Turkish services

This sub-section sheds light upon basic services provided by the Turkish government for refugees from Syria under the temporary protection regime. First of all, nepotism and bribery among Turkish institutions is described. Secondly, the role of social networks in regard to governmental services. Thirdly, accessing governmental services is not the issue but following procedures and quality of services are. Fourthly, the current set-up temporary protection regime is discussed. Fifthly, ideas and emotions of refugees from Syria concerning the police are demonstrated.

Having the right contacts or money matters in accessing Turkish services. If you want to speed up the registration process or have a specific request to travel it helps to have a contact within a governmental institution to fasten it and enlarge the amount of possibilities. Knowing the right Turkish civil servant has significant influence in accessing services. For example Said, an agricultural engineer, wanted to follow a course organised by the Turkish government. However, he was denied participating in this course. He assumes this is because only those refugees from Syria with personal connections with civil servants are chosen. I heard this complaint several times, however I cannot verify if it is correct or not. Although Osman's stories with his patron illustrates how valuable it is to know a powerful (former) civil servant. As a result of Osman's tie with his patron he got a job at a Turkish temporary protection school and could get his Turkish temporary protection ID card quickly.

'I was looking for a job, but did not find (it). I wanted to join the course [facilitated by Turkish government], but I couldn't. Turkish government here is not clear with people, with refugees from Syria. [They] choose only special people that they know. They get support or a job from the government or some organizations. If you know someone then he or she can help you.'

Said & Fatma, 57 and 50 years old, Deir ezZur

Money used as bribes also seem effective in speeding up or influencing governmental processes. These statements were commonly expressed among my informants. Also a humanitarian field officer shared his concerns regarding fraud and corruption within Urfa's municipality and how this influenced the proper execution of humanitarian programmes for refugees from Syria. Certain health programmes for instance in Urfa were not up and running because of financial deficiencies while in other provinces programmes were successfully implemented. The field officer explanation was fraud. Although I heard complaints about nepotism and fraud several times I cannot endorse nor deny these claims on the basis of this research. Yet because of the amount of times mentioned I wanted to share this finding.

Those informants isolated and part of minimal social networks are less likely to gain information on governmental processes and accordingly might have issues with accessing governmental services. Besides this, I noticed informants from the middle class came across more updated about developments regarding the temporary protection regime than those from the lower class. Osman, Ahmed, Mahir, and Rohat all come from a relatively wealthy family and seem to be more aware and up to date on how the Turkish government operates. For example, Mahir registered with university exact on time to receive a scholarship. In line with this, I observed that informants who mingle with hosts seem to be more updated on where, when and how to access governmental services. Bridging often occurs in middle class neighbourhoods where refugees from Syria and hosts are confronted with one another. Simultaneously those informants from the middle class master a level of Turkish and are able to connect with hosts while the lower class often does not know Turkish. The ability to talk Turkish seemed an important asset when trying to access governmental services. Although there are translators present in public places, for example hospitals, being able to communicate on your own is beneficial for retrieving information.

In general terms locating basic services provided by the Turkish government goes rather smooth at least in regard to hospitals, temporary protection schools, and the DGMM centre. When I asked informants if it was hard to find these institutions they did not share any concerns. Taking the first step to access governmental services is not an issue but the subsequent processes and the quality of

the provided services are common worries. There were especially complaints about the quality of delivered services at hospitals and at schools. At hospitals people have to wait long before their consult, it's dirty, and the received care is often insufficient. However according to Rayan the hospital improved over the years *'when I first came it was very hard. Language was a hurdle, but after a while it got better. Later each hospital has a translator. Things are getting more easy'*.

Also the temporary protection schools for Syrian children are not well organised according to many informants. One refugee student from Syria complained that she had to wait for school books for six months and that the teachers at school are not professionally trained. M.M. Erdoğan from Hacettepe University confirms these complaints and counts those students attending temporary protection schools as a lost generation because of the poor quality of education provided at these schools (personal communication, April 11, 2017).

In addition, the services provided by the migration office also had several shortcomings. At the migration office of DGMM Refugees from Syria have to apply for their Turkish temporary protection ID card, ask for permission to travel, and other legal and residential matters. An informant called Rana laughed about the fact that her husband slept outside the migration office to ask for an ID card. The lines are during the day so long that they had to sleep in front of the building to claim their turn. I also saw each time I visited the migration office that there were around a hundred refugees from Syria waiting outside and another fifty inside. The migration office looked dirty, smelled a bit funny, and came across chaotic. A commonly heard criticism was that it took too long to receive an ID card. Without an ID card it is impossible to get access to Turkish institutions or receive humanitarian aid from several organisations.

Some informants expressed their gratitude that the basic services at least exist apart from the poor arrangements, but the temporary protection regime does not meet the needs of refugees from Syria in Urfa. The next quote of Ayman, a young Syrian man, illustrates feeling restricted under the temporary protection regime in Turkey. He feels denied the right in regard to mobility and work opportunities. I include this quote because it highlights the largely felt discontent with how the Turkish government is taking care of refugees from Syria. Instead of empowering or supporting refugees from Syria, so that they can contribute to Turkish economy and society, the Turkish government pins them down.

'Turkey puts on several legal hurdles for Syrian refugees to live and work here. For example, it is hard to get a kimlek (Turkish temporary protection ID card). Or a work permit is difficult because you need an employer first... Also little movement is possible. The kimlek is giving by Urfa, so if I want to get out of this province I should first ask permission. From who? The government should take it into account and decide if it is possible. Pay little, but wait long. It is hard to get to Gaziantep even, it is like a jail...Many Syrian friends here. Many Syrians they help each other, but if government restricts us, we cannot do anything about it. They [Turkish government] say we help you, but what do they do? Restrictions after restrictions. They don't help us. They want us to go back. Back to Syria, and to die.'

Ayman, 34 years old, Raqqa

Not only refugees from Syria express their discontent but also humanitarians state the temporary protection regime is too little but also refugees themselves. Refugees from Syria can access basic services but other services are harder to appropriate (Okan, B., personal communication, March 2, 2017). Several other humanitarians interviewed in Urfa agree that the current regime is too little and

too temporary to truly and fully assist refugees from Syria. Another humanitarian worker stated that the temporary protection regime is only trying to address urgent needs that might impact Turkey now or later on negatively only focusing on their own position and not caring how refugees are doing (Anonymous, personal communication, February 14, 2017).

Another Turkish institution that is respected as well as feared is the police. Several informants criticized the police for the frequent and random stops to check their ID card. Another situation in which refugees from Syria felt discontent was after the previously mentioned riot. Allegedly a refugee from Syria hit a Turkish police officer and this created an angry mob consisting out of one hundred fifty people. This mob trashed several shops owned by refugees from Syria. After a few hours the police send reinforcement to stop the aggression and violence. Afterwards I spoke with several refugees from Syria about this and all of them expressed concerns about feeling unsafe, unwelcome, and unprotected by Turkish police. Mahdi shared his worries about his shop close by the location where the riot took place. He has nothing good to say about how the police handled the situation. He feels the Turkish police does not protect him as a refugee from Syria.

'Even if the man [who started the riot after beating his girlfriend and a police officer] was a Syrian. Do these Turks have the right to trash Syrian shops? The police should protect us, but they do not. Turkish police let it happen, looked how several shops were trashed. Turkey does not let us go, migrate to other countries, but won't protect us too.'

Mahdi, 58 years old, Deir ezZur

6.6. Finding a job

Number one challenge almost all refugees from Syria face in Urfa is to ensure their livelihoods. Jobs are scarce and especially jobs with steady hours, insurances, a liveable salary. I have seen refugee men from Syria lined up in the outskirts of Urfa waiting in the sun for Turkish contractors who offer jobs for just one or a few days without any contract or complimenting insurances. Often these jobs are in construction or factories. Some of my informants also done these kind of jobs but most have are unemployed or have their own shop, work at translation offices, or work within the humanitarian field. Almost all refugees from Syria who own a shop in Urfa were back in Syria middle class citizens because starting capital is necessary to begin a shop. Those informants working at translation offices and humanitarian organisations are educated and come from at least upper low to middle class. This shows that having a starting capital financial or educational wise makes a difference to create a new livelihood in Urfa.

Furthermore, I find it striking that most refugees from Syria I met do not work closely with hosts. They work on their own, with other non-Turkish interpreters, or international staff from humanitarian organisations. Although refugee shop owner from Syria also have hosts as customers there are several shops only a small amount of hosts shops. However in restaurants often one employee is Syrian, because of the many customers from Syria. In general, concerning employment not much bridging is taking place.

Ahmed's words, that everyone is a possibility, show the value and necessity of social networks in regard to becoming employed as a refugee from Syria in Urfa. Ahmed explains that he and other refugees from Syria are not looking for money but for people who can help them with a job. Every new person is for him an opportunity. Refugees from Syria are in an unfavourable employment situation and need social connections to find a job and make a living in Turkey. Being new in a

country means not knowing bureaucracy, employment opportunities, and so forth. Within this vulnerable position social relations are vital. Hence, being open and social towards strangers hoping to befriend them and gain access to their resources is part of this.

'They (refugees from Syria) don't look for more money. But they need more people, for connections, more job opportunities. So they are more friendly, everyone they know, everyone you meet are a possible opportunity in the future. I felt this. If I need anything in Istanbul I can rely on my friends. If I need anything done here I can ask my friends. In Izmir I have my aunt. Like this, you really need when you are Syrian in Turkey'.

Ahmed, 21 years old, Aleppo

Ahmed's words were confirmed by other informants who explained becoming hired via a friend who suggested them or who tipped them about a job. In other words, an individual using his or her social networks in finding a job in Urfa is common. Many times I heard refugees from Syria found a job via a (distant) friend or acquaintance. Professional selection procedures are among others based on *Wasta* also known as favouritism. *Wasta* means that a person prefers someone from his or her social network such as a kin or from the same region instead of someone more strange and distant to them. *Wasta* can have positive and negative effects depending on a person's situation. *Wasta* can make someone's life easier in regard to finding a job but also regarding speeding up bureaucratic processes. A negative effect of *Wasta* is that if you do not have influential connections you are left out. Being excluded and being one step behind can be frustrating. In this quote, Cemal expresses his worries about *Wasta* which is in his eyes an unfair system because he is not benefitting from it. He is an experienced and educated worker but cannot find a job because, according to him, he does not possess the right *Wasta*.

'With Concern Worldwide there is dealing under the table also at the Danish Refugee Council. Believe me they share only with their relatives, with their relations. If you are my friend and work at Concern than I will get a job. It's a problem with Syrian people. Everyone helps to try their friends. We are looking for the fair dealing. I have 17 years of experience with dealing with people, different nationalities, different countries, working under pressure, working with death lines. This experience is required everywhere. But I do not get a job.'

Cemal, 44 years old, Deir ezZur

6.7. Reciprocal exchange

As defined before social relations are built on principles like trust and reciprocity. If you scratch my back now I will scratch yours later. Reciprocity is an exchange between two or more social actors who give and take each other assets. A goal of reciprocity is to create or alter social ties. In the case of Osman and his patron created a social tie after the patron assisted him. Reciprocity can have a positive, balanced and negative effect. A positive effect is when someone gives something without expecting a(n) (immediate) return or reward. This is for example the case of Fajah. A host assists her but she does not have to reward him directly. A balanced effect entails a (direct) reward or return for giving something else. For example, Rohat, one of my translators, helped me with translating an Arabic document while I helped him with corresponding with an Erasmus exchange coordinator. A negative effect contains that one side loses in the exchange or receives less than anticipated. For instance Osman who financially supported his fiancé but then she suddenly broke of the engagement and left with his money. He not only lose his money but also his honour was negatively affected.

6.8. Sub-conclusions

As a consequence of forced displacement refugees from Syria (often) face severe livelihood challenges in Urfa. Social networks can be useful in improving their livelihood conditions in Urfa. Being part of social networks opens doors to people who possess a mixture of assets. My informants are supported in a variety of ways by their social network members. Most of the time informants increased their well-being as a result of feeling a sense of belonging and were supported by receiving information, gaining influence, or with practicalities such as housing. But simultaneously social networks can also restrict access to other possible beneficial social networks and cost input from the ego.

The sub-conclusions starts with elaborating on the multiple and diverse good social networks can deliver. Secondly, intensity and density as social network characteristics are discussed. Thirdly, bribery and nepotism and its adverse effects are discussed. Fourthly, a debate on the density and intensity of ties are debated concerning employment. Fifthly, I demonstrate that social networks their importance are subjected to an individual's needs. To conclude with the fact that social networks are not always a safety net.

Social networks deliver multiple and diverse material and nonmaterial goods but there are differences in what each social network delivers. Examples of material goods social networks attain range from clothing to employment. Examples of nonmaterial goods that social networks facilitate are information, influence, social credentials and reinforcement (Lin, 1999). Via social networks my informants receive monetary, material, physical, and emotional support.

The difference in what social networks deliver has to do with the intensity of a tie. When a social tie is strong it delivers more assets than a weak ties. Strong relations support each other more because of mutual trust and expectations that each effort will be paid of sooner or later. Often relations are strong when relevant identity traits match and they simultaneously are part of several social networks. For example, for Afran from Kobane being a Kurd is meaningful or for many informants kin ties matter a lot especially regarding nuclear family members. But the strength, meaning an intimate trusting relation, of a tie within a social network matters more than other network characteristics like density.

Wide-ranging social networks are also handy when trying to gain information and access to governmental services and humanitarian aid. In general having ties with professionals within the government or humanitarian field has a positive effect on obtaining information, access to services, and receiving privileges. When accessing aid and governmental services being part of large and wide-ranging social networks is fruitful. Having various and many ties in different sectors stands for more entry points. Having a large, but more importantly a wide-ranging social network entails knowing many people in different sectors. Knowing people well enough to be able to ask for support is beneficial when trying to obtain formal support.

Even though on paper governmental services and aid should be divided equally this is in reality not the case. As mentioned before in this chapter, bribery and nepotism is recurrent benefitting those with rich social capital and economic wealth. So in this sense being part of a middle class or higher social networks opens more doors because of having more (financial) asset. This again relates to Putnam's (2002) statement that social capital is not fairly distributed. Mostly those with a lot of assets have a lot of ways to gain more assets in contrast to those with little social capital. Hence, the

gap between the resource-rich and resource-poor is only widened. Therefore, I argue that social networks cannot be seen as a panacea for inequality issues and NGOs should be careful when doing community based programmes taken internal differences into account.

Burt (1997) and Granovetter (1973) have a theoretical debate on which social ties are more valuable to find a job. Is a distant tie or a weak tie more useful in obtaining a job? Burt argues that the more distant a tie is the larger the network hence more information and possibilities on finding a job. Granovetter in contrast debates that weak ties are less similar and thus has more different connection hence different information and opportunities. During my fieldwork I encountered that both ties useful with informants finding jobs via weak and distant ties. For example Ayman found a job via a weak tie, namely his former colleague who he did not know well gave him the right information at the right time to get his current job. Another example is of Afran who got a job via a distant tie. His former university friend hired him later on in Urfa. First of all, the assumption that a weak tie is less similar does not automatically mean that this tie has such a different network. There are also cases of homogenous ties that are not strong. This is rather rigid thinking in pre-inscribed lines while I encounter that human interactions are also fluid and random. I rather underline Burt's structural whole theory and that not strength but distance between the ego and ties is vital for finding employment. The larger the reach, the more opportunities in Urfa. Seeking for more information on jobs or governmental services or housing the wide-range characteristic of a network matters, but when asking for a favour like lending money or babysitting the strength of a tie matters. In other words depending on the individuals need a specific characteristic network matters.

This closely relates to another key finding about the relevance of social networks. The relevance of a social networks depends on the individual's necessity. An individual's necessity depends again on the phase they are in. I encountered different needs of refugees from Syria in different phases. When newly arrived housing is relevant and thus kinship networks matter. But after staying for years in Urfa other needs should be met like employment. In this instance, wide-ranging social networks like online or professional ones are relevant rather than kinship networks.

Besides these social network characteristics I also found out that an individual's identity and position matters when gaining resources from a social network. When having a prominent position or relevant identity traits within a network an individual can influence how and when to gain resources. That having a prominent position counts when looking at Osman's patron who has lots of influence in governmental processes. Concerning relevant identity traits I refer to significant identity traits like age and gender. When trying to influence decision-making processes an individual identity shapes this process.

Social networks are a valuable asset but social networks are not always supportive. First of all are there incidents of ties within social networks that manipulate, cheat, or steal. For instance the distant uncle who stole from Amir or the neighbour who robbed electronics from Mahdi's store. Being part of social network and being connected with many people does not always have a positive outcome. Secondly, another downside of social network participation is that members expect that the individual who flourishes should share his or her wealth and profits. According Waldinger this can lead to exorbitant claims of social network members (As cited in Portes, 2014, p. 18407). This is a reason why Mahdi, who owns a successful shop in city centre, does not want to get his kin involved. He assumes that when his kin gets any influence in his business finances he has to share his profit. Thirdly, reciprocity is an exchange between two or more people and the outcome is not always

balanced nor positive. In some incidents there are losers after an exchange. A social network does not merely deliver benefits, but also creates costs. Based on reciprocity people among each other give and take (non-)material assets. Not only the actual exchange are the costs a network makes, but also the social norms and rules a social network imposes. Via social networks people are moulded into norms and values aspired and sometimes even contradict which leaves room to manoeuvre for the individual. However it depends on the importance and strength of social networks on how strong these norms and values are pressed on and how much the individual cares to comply.

To conclude, informants have to provide for themselves and their social network members but they only have limited resources as a result of their own low socio-economic status in Turkey. This was mentioned many times by my informants. Feeling disempowered was a recurrent theme within conversations. Frustration prevails while talking about feeling disempowered. Frustration about not being able to use their Syrian degrees in Turkey or about the difficulty with obtaining a work permit is commonly shared. Ayman a translator for an NGO expresses his concerns. He felt uneasy with the mobility restrictions and legal hurdles the Turkish government puts on Syrians in regard to housing and finding a job. He concludes that Syrians are limited in their options to provide for themselves and simultaneously supporting other Syrians. Ayman refers in this quote to the hardship of a friend when trying to find a job although having a Master's degree.

'You know your real friends if you get in trouble. Real Syrian friends help me. But what can they do? They are also helpless. For example my friend Mo studied economics and had difficulty finding a job. So I helped him with his struggle. Syrians cannot do anything. They barely can save themselves.'

Ayman, 34 years old, Raqqah

7. Bonding and bridging

Refugees from Syria bond and bridge to create and maintain their social networks. Often they bond, sometimes they bridge. Within this chapter are bonding and bridging efforts of refugees from Syria depicted. Bonding efforts of Syrians are shopping, moving around in the public domain, creating organisations, doing religion, volunteering and/or following courses. Bridging efforts are moving in the public domain, mingling with host neighbours, learning Turkish, doing religion, volunteering, and following courses. Before going into bridging efforts the social context in Urfa is elaborated on relating to the rising tensions between hosts and refugees from Syria (International Crisis Group, 2018; World Bank, 2015). To conclude with the sub-conclusions that answer the third research sub-question of this research.

7.1. Bonding

Bonding entails connecting social networks between homogeneous groups. In this thesis I refer to bonding when refugees from Syria relate to other refugees from Syria. Although I use bonding when refugees from Syria mingle with one another I do not mean to imply that refugees from Syria are very similar or homogenous. Rather as described in chapter 5 refugees from Syria are part of fragmented and scattered social networks far from being homogenous. But I choose to use the notion of bridging only when refugees from Urfa connect

There are several practices that can be interpreted as bonding efforts. Often are these efforts based on expected gains in the future. Refugees from Syria have most contact among each other instead of with the host population. There is not one strong overlapping “Syrian community” but instead fragmented and scattered social networks. Refugees from Syria their bonding efforts in Urfa consist out of shopping at Syrian shops, eating at a Syrian restaurant, relaxing in a park, and forming social organisations for refugees from Syria by refugees from Syria.

There are so many refugees from Syria in Urfa that Mahir, a young Syrian man, once joked that *‘Syrians are occupying the city’*. The presence of Syrians in Urfa becomes evident when walking the streets in the Southern parts of Eyyübiye where the shop signs are no longer in Turkish but Arabic. There are of course also hosts with Arabic backgrounds residing here but Urfa changed since 23 percent of its population became refugees from Syria (DGMM, 2017). However when I drank tea with a Turkish hotel owner named Eren he was unhappy with the changes his neighbourhood made since the coming of almost half a million refugees from Syria. According to Eren the streets are busier, many new shops with different foreign products are created and even the smell changed because of all the Syrian restaurants.

7.1.1. Moving around in the public domain

Shopping is partly distinguished based on nationality. I observe that refugees from Syria their shopping habits often are based on a personal relation with the shop owner. Hence the background and personality of a shop owner matters. Having similar identity traits are seen as something positive and results in shopping based on homogeneity. So some informants prefer to shop at Syrian shops. Rohat for instance had specific shops where he bought groceries. One afternoon he stopped me buying gum at a shop close by and convinced me to buy it at another shop owned by a refugee from Syria even though it was further away. I asked him why he wanted me to buy gum at this specific shop and he replied that the shop owner was a good man and also a refugee from Syria. Another example is that of Othman and Nada who both prefer to shop at a Syrian store instead of a Turkish one. They feel more at ease dealing with refugees from Syria than with hosts. This emotion came into

being or was intensified after hosts came to Othman's mobile repair shop but did not buy anything because of his Syrian descent. Hosts left without any explanations after hearing his accent. This occurred three times and resulted in Othman and Nada preferring Syrian shops. *'If they know a shop is from a Syrian they will go to the Syrian shop. They feel more comfortable dealing with Syrians only'*. This story illustrates how cold and distant ties between refugees from Syria and hosts can be. Furthermore it shows how discriminatory behaviour leads to segregation.

I also questioned and observed what kind of customers Syrian shops attract. Ahmed owns Tala market a small grocery shop. His shop is in a side street of Urfa's main road in city centre. His customers are for 95 percent refugees from Syria while in city centre also many hosts live and shop. Mahdi's more luxurious grocery shop is based on the main street in city centre. He estimates that half of his customers are Syrian and the other half are hosts. The same numbers applies for the customers of Nabil's shoe shop. Nabil's shop is close to Balıklıgöl, an ancient memorial in Urfa. In this area a same amount of Syrians and hosts live. At Othman's mobile repair shop 75 percent of the customers is a refugee from Syria, but this has to do with the location of the shop considering Othman works in a mainly Kurdish Syrian neighbourhood. Hence there are shops almost exclusively for refugees from Syria and equally divided among refugees from Syria and hosts. Location matters of course when deciding where to shop, but this does not explain why so little hosts shop at Amir's and so many at Mahdi's.

Also other identity traits, such as ethnicity or religious background play a role how refugees from Syria decide to shop somewhere. Assumingly people like to buy products near to their residence and taking into account that many refugees from Syria live in neighbourhoods existing out of other refugees from Syria with the same region and ethnic background shopping often has an ethnic and regional component. However not all my informants spend their money in Syrian, Kurdish or Arabic shops. Nabil for example goes shopping in host and Syrian shops. He searches for the best quality with the cheapest price. He goes to Syrian hairdressers and restaurants because the Syrian hairdressers are better and Syrian food is tastier, but for textile he goes to Turkish shops because the quality of the clothes are better here.

Besides shopping several informants drink *chay* in a café and eat *kufta* in their favourite restaurant. However these interactions in the public domain are influenced by nationality, class, and gender. In local cafés people from that neighbourhood meet. In contrast to cafés in city centre where all kinds of people meet however as a consequence of the location prices are higher and more hosts than refugees from Syria can be found here. This rule also applies to restaurants. The majority of informants prefer the Syrian cuisine and if they visit a restaurant it is often a Syrian one. The times I ate in Syrian restaurants almost all guests were refugees from Syria. In this sense local cafés and Syrian restaurants are not mixed but rather segregated in regard to hosts. Withal as a consequence of an individual's socio-economic status he or she is able to move around in public areas. Informants from the lower class have less money to spend and therefore do not drink *chay* or eat *kufta* in public places. Those informants part of the middle class meet more often in cafés and restaurants in their neighbourhood and in city centre. Besides the socio-economic factor, also gender influences the movement in public areas. I observed many cafés with only adult men drinking *chay* and playing *tavla*, while it is uncommon to see Syrian women without male counterparts in a café especially in local cafés.

Nationality, socio-economic status and gender still plays a role in regard to meeting in the park but a minor one compared to visiting cafés and restaurants. Of course are the parks in middle class neighbourhoods more frequently visited by the local residents resulting in national and class segregation. The main difference is however that the park is free and all kind of activities can be done ranging from playing soccer to barbecuing. When observing social interactions in several parks in Urfa distinct social networks become visible. Kin networks hang out, groups of elder men eat sunflower seeds or male youngsters play basketball. I did notice a small proportion of only female groups sitting in the park. During the day gender seems to play a lesser role than when it becomes later. I experienced as a young woman that when the night has fallen a proper woman should not wonder around alone nor in company of another woman. More than once friends emphasised of walking me home after dark although in the beginning I often declined in the end after experiencing unwanted male attention when sitting in the park or walking the streets of Urfa I became aware that I should comply with socio-cultural gender norms. This explains why women in Urfa do not sit alone late in parks or cafés.

7.1.2. Organising together

There are several (semi-)formal institutions created by refugees from Syria for refugees from Syria in Urfa. All these institutions or groups differ greatly in their aim and their members but they all facilitate a space or reason to bond among refugees from Syria and enhance the chance to expand participants their social networks and gain resources from these social networks. Some organisations strive to accumulate money but simultaneously bond Syrians among each other while other organisations or groups aim to bond is explicit.

Singdikt is an example of an organisation created by refugees from Syria for refugees from Syria. It is a centre where agricultural engineers and veterinarians meet and its aim is to collectively find employment within the agricultural sector in Turkey. So far it has been unsuccessful while they are waiting for a license from the government. But what Said describes the centre now functions as a meeting place where he and his friends drink tea and talk about possible employment opportunities. This organisation only exists out of adult Syrian men and only those with expertise in the agricultural sector. Hence, this is not an inclusive social organisation aiming at bonding.

Another example is *Palden* which is an educational centre for all refugees, but in practice 99 percent is a refugee from Syria. They teach English and Turkish courses and assists students with applying for universities and scholarships. This institute was the biggest educational centre in Urfa and the only one with a governmental approval. *Palden* also has relations with two humanitarian organisations the Norwegian Refugee Council and IMPR that refer refugees from Syria in need for extra schooling to this centre. Another educational centre was managed by Osman. Within this centre English, Turkish and chemistry lessons were given. However also in Osman's centre there were excursions and after lessons students hang out at the centre. So in this sense mostly young students from Syria pay for the courses, learn, and bond. Relevant to mention is that both Mahmoud who co-owns *Palden* and Osman have a rather wealthy family. Therefore they have enough means to invest in these centres. This is another example of how a previous socio-economic position influences the individuals current position and room to manoeuvre in Urfa.

Also a student association for refugees from Syria was made. It is called *Burk* and is a non-profit organisation that assists refugee students from Syria and fosters social ties them.

To finalise, via social media groups on Facebook informants give and receive relevant information to each other relating to migration trajectories, second hand stuff, governmental services and humanitarian aid. Mahir explains that he learned about relevant educational procedures from Facebook groups. Or Ahmed reviews different online platforms when searching for a job or housing.

7.1.3. Doing religion

Becoming part of a religious group is also a way to connect to other refugees from Syria for women or going to Mosque for men. I encountered one Quran course only consisted out of refugees from Syria and the other was mixed between hosts and refugees from Syria. These Quran courses are besides praying a way to socialize with other women. It is a method to expand one's social network.

7.1.4. Volunteering and following courses

Another way how refugees from Syria bond with other refugees from Syria is by volunteering within humanitarian organisations. Several informants were unemployed and were volunteers for humanitarian organisations doing tasks ranging from executing home visits till translating documents. Via volunteering at NGOs they get to know more refugees from Syria but simultaneously bridge with host and international staff. Hence, via their volunteer jobs they bond and bridge concurrently.

Another strategy to bond is to follow courses at community centres. At these centres language and practical skills courses are given. Some of my informants visit community centres to improve their Turkish or English language skills, practical skills like sewing, and to socialise. According to a humanitarian community centre manager a community centre is a meeting place that facilitates social interaction between Syrians and hosts (Anonymous, personal communication, March 8, 2017). A community centre is a meeting place for all ages and genders to come together and socialize. It is foremost a place to mingle with other Syrians rather than to integrate with hosts. Yet in practice, even though there are programs focussing on enhancing social cohesion between hosts and Syrians, no hosts joined these courses yet. Nancy explains that it is hard to reach hosts and to include them into their programs. Nonetheless the Syrian staff of this particular community centre did not like it that hosts could participate in the community centre programs because in their eyes Syrians only need these kinds of support and not hosts.

7.2. Bridging

Bridging entails individuals connecting with not so similar others and occurs between heterogeneous groups. In this thesis I refer to bridging when refugees from Syria relate to hosts. Bridging is harder than bonding because there are less shared social norms and values to start with. There is in this sense more social distance between refugees from Syria and hosts. Before depicting those bridging efforts of my informants this chapter contextualises the social cohesion between refugees from Syria and hosts in Urfa and I distinguish three distinct bridging attitudes of informants.

7.2.1. Social cohesion

Discontent is increasing within Turkish society about the Syrian presence (UNHCR, 2017b; Yıldız & Uzgören, 2016). The host community's perception that refugees from Syria are a threat to their livelihood is growing (UNHCR, 2017b) causing that the majority of hosts is not in favour of further migration of refugees from Syria to Turkey nor to extend the economic and social rights of refugees from Syria within the temporary protection regime (Yavçan, 2017). Assistant professor Yavçan from the TOBB University executed a survey among refugees living in non-camp settlements in Southeast Turkey. She researched to what extent refugees from Syria in the Southeast of Turkey are socially

integrated. Her research indicates that refugees from Syria do not feel socially remote from hosts as their neighbour, colleague, or friend. However, there is more social distance when social relations are closer and tighter like roommates or as husband or wife.

Another indicator for analysing the level of social cohesion is by measuring the experience of discrimination. Yavcan's (2017) study illustrates that refugees from Syria are being discriminated because of their nationality and discrimination occurs mostly among children or when adults look for a job or are in the public arena. Once Cemal remarked that he felt bad that his children were beaten by host children when playing on the street. His children were harassed by host children who called them bad names because of their Syrian descent. Since the beating he watches over his children more carefully and restricts them to play when host children are playing in the same street. There are more discriminatory stories like this, for instance when informants walk on the street. Especially when my informants ask around for jobs they get discriminated. Asking for a job fuels the experience of threat hosts have concerning refugees from Syria their presence. The amount of unemployment in Urfa is rather high especially among young adults (Erdoğan, M.M., personal communication, April 11, 2017).

Besides discrimination, there are also cases of informants feeling unsafe because of protests against the presence of refugees from Syria in Turkey and a riot. There were several protests against the Syrian presence in Turkey during my fieldwork in Izmir and Adana. Also in July 2016 there was a protest in Urfa where hosts chanted that they do not want any more Syrians in Urfa (Cetingulec, 2016a). Informants were especially shocked by the riot in Urfa resulting in demolished Syrian shops. These incidents are indicators that there is social unrest between the host population and refugees from Syria in Urfa and is in line with the finding of the International Crisis Group (2018) that violence of hosts towards refugees from Syria is increasing.

7.2.2. Bridging attitudes

First of all should be noted that the language barrier plays a huge role in the (dis)connection with the host population. Because of the struggle with communication a large amount of refugees from Syria does not try to bridge (anymore). Another factor that explains why bridging occurs so little occurs, is because there are four hundred thousand refugees from Syria in Urfa. If a refugee from Syria needs certain resources they can ask among their social networks consisting of refugees from Syria instead of looking for contact with hosts which are harder to find and access successfully. A final factor that influences bridging efforts is the perception of the future. If an informant is planning to go back to Syria investing in relations with hosts seems less relevant.

During my fieldwork I encountered three bridging attitudes towards hosts. The first group is in my experience the largest consisting of informants who are not able nor desire (anymore) to bridge towards hosts. The second group consists of informants who try to bridge to some extent but prefer social networks including mostly other refugees from Syria. The third group is the smallest and includes only a few informants who rather focus on relations with hosts than with other refugees from Syria.

The first group does not put any effort into bridging. This group consists of all ages, regions, and ethnicities. However the younger generation is inclined to be more open and willing to invest in getting acquainted with the Turkish language, adapting to Turkish customs, and befriending hosts. Several mostly middle aged or older informants do not have contact with hosts and do not want to either. It is a diverse group and all of them have their reasons not to invest in social relations with

hosts. For example Afran from Kobane has almost exclusively contact with Kurds from Syria and wants to go back to Syria so he feels that investing in social relations with hosts won't be fruitful on the long-term. Another example is Maryam who had heart issues and suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and is not in the condition to invest in new social relations especially not with hosts because this would demand her to go out of her neighbourhood. She thinks her social network is rich enough and trusts upon her kin who live in the same Arabic neighbourhood full of refugees from Syria to take care of her.

One of the reasons why refugees from Syria not want to bridge correlates with feeling welcomed by hosts. Othman and Nada do not longer want to bridge as a consequence of being discriminated by hosts. They own a shop and because of their Syrian descent they lose host customers. However, those informants that do not want to bridge do not paint the world in black and white, but often share at least one positive example of a nice host such as a former landlord, neighbour, or customer.

The second and smaller group of informants bridge. They are part of social networks that connect them to hosts. These refugees from Syria know sufficient Turkish and aim to stay at least a few more years in Turkey for their studies or jobs. Their level of socio-economic integration is higher than that of the previously discussed group. These informants bridge to some extent anticipating that the effort put into bridging might pay off. Rohat exemplifies this groups attitude and shows its ambiguity concerning hosts. Rohat is a young Syrian man who bridges by volunteering at humanitarian organisations. He stated several times he dislikes Turkish men but concurrently has one male host friend with whom he smokes *nargile* regularly. In general he has some interpersonal relations with one host, nevertheless with other hosts he does not have (strong) relations. As the quote illustrates Rohat felt uncomfortable in Urfa after some hosts demonstrated against or fought with refugees from Syria. He feels sad about the political and social tension that sometimes arise in Turkey. Moreover he thinks hosts are looking for small incidents to become violent towards Syrians and this makes him anxious.

'As a Syrian I don't like Urfa. However I am used to live here for two years. But it is hard to be here. Sometimes I am happy, sometimes sad. For example when Turkish people demonstrate against Syrians in Adana a while ago or the riot in Urfa a few weeks ago. People here are searching for Syrians to blame. A Syrian does something and then they think Syrians are all the same.'

Rohat, 23 years old, Li Qamislo

The third group is the smallest while only two informants are part of this group. These two men, Osman and Ahmed, are focused mainly on becoming part of social networks full of hosts. They look outward and accomplished several strong social ties with hosts. Both are from a former wealthy family in Syria. And Ahmed is half Turkman. They both know Turkish well and prefer to create social relations with the host population than on relations with other Syrians. Ahmed furthermore stated that he does not like to mix with refugees from Syria. Osman's attitude is not as rigid as Ahmed's. But Osman also stated he likes to focus more on his relations with hosts than with refugees from Syria and is currently in the trajectory to receive Turkish citizenship. Sera judges refugees from Syria who only aim on bridging with hosts without paying attention to other refugees from Syria. This quote shows how she thinks about refugees from Syria (Us) versus hosts (Them). Those refugees from Syria according to her want to fit in with hosts are on their own and take it too extreme.

'There are people who are on their own and want to fit in with the Turks. They don't go out with Syrian friends either. They focus on Turkish friend to improve their language. It is okay but they take it too extreme. And they don't have contact with old friends. But that is a minority.'

Sera, 21 years old, Aleppo

Besides these attitudes of refugees from Syria in regard to hosts, several informants who have lived in Urfa for more than four years also saw or experienced a decline in the willingness and actual support hosts give to refugees from Syria. Furthermore they sense in general a more hostile environment than before. In the outbreak of the Syrian conflict there was broad support for those victims of war but since the Syrian war became protracted without a perspective of ending anytime soon hosts turned into less eager to support and patient with refugees from Syria. The growing discontent among hosts regarding refugees from Syria is endorsed by several academic and humanitarian sources (UNHCR, 2017b; World bank, 2015; Yıldız & Uzgören, 2016).

The more hostile environment is also sensible in Urfa. Indicated by hosts protesting against growing numbers of refugees from Syria and becoming occasionally violent towards them. When I was in Urfa a riot broke out starting after an allegedly Syrian man hit his girlfriend and a police officer. This incident created so much public dissatisfaction within Urfa that in a few hours approximately one hundred fifty men gathered on the main street. A small fraction of this mob vandalized several Syrian shops close by. This is an example of hosts not tolerating misconduct of a refugee from Syria and becoming violent after a refugee from Syria crossed the social and legal border of hitting a Turkish police officer. These incidents affirm that there is tension among hosts and refugees from Syria in Urfa. Several informants felt discriminated, unwanted, and sometimes afraid of hosts because of this riot. Informants shared that they try to act like model inhabitants because when they as guest misbehave the consequences can be tough. Refugees from Syria are legally only a guest in Turkey so they think and feel that their actions are put under a magnifier and there is no room to misbehave.

7.2.3. Bridging strategies

To start with, bridging occurs significant less than bonding. Bridging efforts are seldom executed purely to enlarge social networks but often go hand in hand with other practical reasons. As Shêro, a humanitarian project manager, noted that refugees from Syria learn Turkish because they want to find a job rather than to be able to talk with their host neighbours. In other words, bridging is often an implicit action in reaching for other goals like employment. Informants their bridging efforts in Urfa consist out of learning Turkish, doing religion, moving in public and private space, and volunteering and/or working.

7.2.3.1. Learning Turkish

An important bridging effort is learning Turkish. Being able to express yourself is vital for developing social relations. However, when asked why my informants learn Turkish their aim is not to socialize but is rather more practical such as finding a job and being able to function within the Turkish bureaucracy.

7.2.3.2. Moving around in public spaces

Another bridging method is actively engaging with host neighbours. This entails sharing food or inviting neighbours over for *chay* aiming at enhancing personal relations with host neighbours. Sharing food and inviting neighbours for *chay* or diner seems to be a common way of mingling. Several informants that live next to hosts interact with them on a practical level when lending sugar

for example. In some instances informants shared food with their neighbours which is common among refugees from Syria. However often informants describe their relation with host neighbours as superficial. The main hurdle remains the language barrier.

Mixing in public areas is another strategy refugees from Syria use when trying to meet hosts. This is however less common than the other mentioned bridging efforts. Some of my informants meet hosts at the mosque, park, café, restaurant, shop, or on the street. Often these social interactions partake in a situation when they need help. As Mahir explained that contact with hosts is made after struggling to communicate with a shop owner about the price or when searching for an address. In most cases the host is asked to assist with translating. In a few minor cases these short meetings evolve into a relation. In Mahir's case it led to exchanging phone numbers with two hosts who he could call when in need for a translator. These interactions between informants and hosts however are ethnically distinguished. Hosts with an Arabic background know a certain level and dialect of Arabic and can assist Syrians to some extent. Those hosts assisting often were Arabic and because of their ethnicity could communicate to a certain degree with Syrians. Also Kurdish hosts helped out but could only communicate with Kurds from Syria. Besides this, ethnicity is a binding identity trait that stimulates people to assist one another.

7.2.3.3. Doing religion

Another bridging method is blending with hosts amidst religious gatherings or knowledge. Being part of a religious network and visiting the mosque or a Quran course is a way to meet hosts. Religion is an overarching socio-cultural phenomenon that transcends borders and all kinds of different identities. In Urfa the identity of being a pious Muslim transcends nationality or the refugee label. Several informants shared they mingle with hosts after prayer or when learning about the Quran in small groups. One informant teaches these Quran lessons. Zahra, a former Syrian school manager, uses her capacities as a former teacher and her knowledge of Arabic and the Quran to bridge with host women. Via this way she meets several host women, mainly from the same neighbourhood, and they come together four times a week. However their relations are not so in-depth because of the language hurdle. Also Qasim bridges via religion with hosts at the mosque in his neighbourhood.

7.2.3.4. Volunteering

In addition is volunteering another way to bridge. Via volunteering at NGOs informants find a way to have frequent contact with not only other refugees from Syria (hence: bonding), but also to get to know hosts and international staff. By volunteering informants enlarge and diversify their social networks. Several informants shared that they volunteer in the first place to find a job within this sector and secondly for gaining contact with hosts and international humanitarians which might function as gateways to resources.

7.3. Sub-conclusions

Bonding and bridging often occurs implicitly. In almost all instances bonding or bridging efforts were not solely focused on social gain but instead had other practical and often in the eyes of informants more significant reasons. Social interactions of course come into existence by participating in society. Generally speaking bonding is easier and more common than bridging. Bonding with socio-culturally similar people who master the same language costs less input than bridging with less socio-culturally close people who talk an Arabic dialect that is hard to understand or don't even speak a common language. Besides, bonding often occurs via a broker who introduces someone to other members of

a network. So having no contact with hosts is a difficult starting point compared to bonding within networks of which acquaintances are already part of.

Bonding is perceived and as indicated by this research easier than bridging. Advantages with bonding are the having the same language and understanding and having the same socio-cultural background. However, too much bonding can also occur. According to Putnam (2002) when people only bond violence can occur. Putnam (200) states that '*bonding without bridging equals Bosnia*' (p. 13). This quote points to the fact that similar people among each other without any opposite views can lead to radicalism and violence towards perceived others.

The intensity and engagement of bridging efforts depend on the time spend in Urfa, previous experiences, and future perceptions. When refugees from Syria just arrive in Urfa urgent matters are handled first. Afterwards there is more room within informants their psychosocial mind-set to become social and seek for possible social networks to access. However, as a humanitarian worker once shared that she is not surprised that their beneficiaries from Syria do not bridge because of their daily hardship when struggling for a livelihood or some beneficiaries are still processing their traumatic experiences with war or their flight (Anonymous, personal communication, March 8, 2017). The large majority of refugees from Syria think of their stay in Turkey as something temporary. Informants describe their lives in Turkey as a break. So due to expecting to move to Europe or back to Syria they do not invest in social contacts nor mastering Turkish.

Furthermore, bridging takes place in a social environment where mixed emotions of hosts prevail towards refugees from Syria. Bridging thus takes place in a field filled of tensions. Firstly, there are hosts that do not like the Syrian presence in their city so they will not be socially open towards Syrians. Secondly, it remains tricky to communicate when not mastering Turkish. Hence this context raises the bar higher when trying to connect as a refugee from Syria with hosts. I encountered three different attitudes of informants towards socializing with hosts ranging from not trying to mingle to preferring to socialize with hosts. The most common was the attitude of not wanting nor trying (anymore) to socialize with hosts. One of the main reasons for this is the language hurdle, feeling unwelcome and disinterest in hosts when there are so many Syrians possible to meet.

When comparing social networks of which refugees from Syria, the middle class is doing the best concerning bridging. The middle class informants have a socio-economic stable position in society and because of this they can participate more actively in society. They have leisure time, can spend money on *chay* in a bar and live in more host populated neighbourhoods. Being of higher socio-economic class thus influences the level of integration. Moreover, young adult informants tend to bridge more than the older generations. Young adults seem to be thinking less in rigid terms regarding ascribed identity traits, hence are more open for 'others'. Besides young adults are more eager to engage in society while still developing themselves.

To finalise, informants bridge and bond among others to organise themselves. As concluded before gaps in service provisions by the Turkish government and humanitarian actors are apparent causing refugees from Syria to organise themselves. This results in initiatives like the agricultural organisation or several educational centres in Urfa. These initiatives are all private sector gatherings aiming to be commercial. Only once an informant stated he build a non-profit school just outside Urfa for refugee children from Syria. After a while, however, he needed to gain income to support himself, so he needed to find paid employment. As this story indicates is there little room for informants to

organise themselves non-profit as a result of livelihood struggles refugees from Syria are in. Although, there are free and easy accessible social media networks for refugees from Syria. These online networks deliver information and connect one to another.

8. Conclusions and discussions

When coding and writing this thesis I heard Ahmed's words in the back of my head. '*Everyone is a possibility*'. Each person is perceived as a possibility that might lead to employment, education, housing opportunities, and so forth. After months of fieldwork in Urfa Ahmed's words proved true. Refugees from Syria try to improve their poor living conditions and ensure their livelihoods via social networks in various ways. Refugees from Syria show their agency by switching between identities and negotiating access to social networks.

Social networks play a paramount role for refugees from Syria and are a resource to hold on to. They need some kind of entity to hold on to as the result of the precarious situation they live in after being forcibly displaced and the liquid times we live in (Bauman, 2000). They are in limbo institutionally, legally, economically, and socially. In addition is society developing rapidly and the social arena constantly fluctuating. In all this insecurity refugees from Syria are working with the resources at hand to create some kind of security in their insecure lives. This research indicates that one of these resources are social networks and depicts how refugees from Syria utilise their social networks to create some kind of safety net in a constantly changing and insecure world.

As the chapters 5 illustrates: social networks are messy. Messy as a result of their fluidity, diversity, socio-spatial range, and multi-layered character. Chapter 6 demonstrates that social networks do not equally distribute resources among social network members but are subjected to several variables like an individual's identity. And chapter 7 exhibits that bonding and bridging occurs in a chaotic social arena with all kinds of power struggles. In other words, refugees from Syria socially navigate within a social arena between and within social networks. To put it metaphorically: refugees are the sailors of ships –social networks- sailing a wild and untameable sea –social arena-. As a consequence, I sometimes felt that distinguishing between social networks was an undoable exercise. Even when I write this, I think I only saw a tip of the ice berg of the social networks of refugees from Syria are part of. There are for sure more nuances and gradations concerning the social networks they are part of. So as a disclaimer, I am well aware that this thesis is my story made out of my interpretations of my informant's interpretations of dozens of ideas, experiences, and emotions.

However after hours of interpreting, searching for sociological patterns, and reading up on academic research I found order in the messiness of social networks refugees from Syria are part of in Urfa. Within this chapter I will answer the main research question: *How do refugees from Syria utilise their social networks to secure their livelihoods in Urfa?*. First of all by describing those social networks vital for refugees from Syria in Urfa and the role of identity in this. Secondly, when analysing these social networks certain characteristics came afore as crucial and are in this sub-section depicted and linked with academic theories and debates. Thirdly, social networks are compared concerning network characteristics. Fourthly, the question on what social networks deliver is answered. The focus is on what social networks deliver, such as trust and cooperation, and cost, input and negative reciprocal outcomes. Fifthly,, bonding and bridging efforts are discussed and related to the rising tension between hosts and refugees from Syria in Turkey. Sixthly, this sub-section includes discussions concerning network characteristics related to academic theories. To end with some final concluding remarks.

8.1. “Belonging” to social networks

To start with I encountered that each refugee from Syria in Urfa is part of multiple social networks. I distinguish nine social networks. Refugees from Syria are part of social networks based on kinship, Syrian nationality, region, ethnicity, neighbourhood, religion, class, profession and online presence. A relevant finding within this research is that some of these social networks intersect and overlap. This has to do with the fact that social networks are based on multiple and multi-layered identities (Sen, 2006). To start with, identities are socially constructed. Identity shaping is a process structured by society and its internalised values while concurrently an individual has or can claim room to negotiate values and ideas about his or her identity (Giddens, 1984). So identities are multiple and are created top-down societally and bottom-up by the individual agent. An individual is never one thing, but many. For instance, Rohat is Syrian, Kurd, male, young adult, brother, son, soccer player, and so forth. The multiple and multi-layers of identity result in individuals being part of several distinct social networks. Because to become part of a social network an individual needs to have certain identity traits similar to those that is valued within a social network. Based on these similarities the individual belongs to this social network and is included but simultaneously an individual belongs to several social networks.

People are connected with each other based on ascribed and achieved identity traits in social networks. Ascribed identity traits, like ethnicity, still play relevant roles among refugees from Syria in Urfa. Achieved identity traits, like profession, are also relevant but is put more emphasis on by the younger generation than the older generations.

Another striking difference between ascribed and achieved identities concerns their solidity. Ascribed identities are perceived and experienced as fixed and solid while achieved identities as fluid. Ascribed identities are solid in the sense that an individual is from a certain kin linkage, region, or ethnicity. Rendering little room for debate if someone belongs to a social network based on ascribed identity traits. You are an Arab, a Kurd, or Turkman. You belong to ‘Us’ or ‘Them’. Achieved identity traits like profession are more fluid in the sense that these identities are intrinsically more subjected to societal change. You are not born a doctor you become one.

Although ascribed identity traits and aligned social networks are perceived and experienced as solid. This does not mean that in practice individuals do not show their agency by bending social rules and norms regarding their identities. In most cases people behave in line with their social paths, based on their ascribed identity traits, lied out for them but there are also exemptions. Complying or refusing social rules still remains a choice of the individual agent. Said is an exemptions and showed his agency. Said is a Syrian Arab did not get along with Arabic hosts, but connected with Kurdish hosts. So although ascribed identity traits are perceived and experienced as vast individuals can socially navigate disregarding certain ascribed identity traits when interacting with social networks.

Besides this, the younger generation of refugees from Syria pay less attention to ascribed identity traits. Especially regarding ethnicity they seem to move away from often neglecting it. Although a side note should be made regarding Kurdish young adults who tend to stress their ethnicity and are proud of it but simultaneously embrace other ethnicities without conviction. To conclude, the fluidity of achieved identity traits and hopping from social network to social network underlines Moroni’s and Bauman’s (2000) theories but the solid ascribed identity traits and their alignment with semi-solid social networks disregards it.

To end with, there are two identity traits that form an individual's social life within and across social networks. Gender and age are influential identity traits restricting or liberating behaviour or access to social networks. These identity traits have far reaching consequences on how you have to behave, how you are perceived, and likewise who you meet. Age and gender also influences the role an individual has within a social network and simultaneously what the individual can benefit from the social network. Generally speaking elders have more decisive voices than youngsters and often men have more decision-making power than women among refugees from Syria their social networks in Urfa.

8.2. Social networks their set-up & comparisons

The most explicit and omnipresent finding is that social networks are messy. Messy because of its fluidity, diversity, socio-spatial range and multi-layered character. These characteristics are fully explained in sub-section 5.10 and only briefly discussed here. Fluid concerning the amount of social network members and its internal rules and norms. Diverse regarding difference in composition, intensity, and density. Its socio-spatial range while social networks are footloose and as well as local also international. Or even in the digital sphere online via social media networks. The multi-layered of social networks leads to individuals bonding and bridging with one another as neighbours, colleagues, and religious peers.

This messiness makes it possible for individuals to socially navigate in the social arena like a ship on the sea. Exactly the messiness creates room in which refugees from Syria can manoeuvre or as Vigh (2009) would say socially navigate. The fluidity, diversity, various socio-spatial ranges and multi-layers illustrates how ambiguous and chaotic the social arena is.

The intersection between multiple social networks can lead to tensions. Belonging to various social networks can result into conflicting loyalties. Friction between social networks occurs. There are situations in which individuals are expected to be loyal to various social networks simultaneously. For instance, the fight between the brothers over a blanket illustrates that between the nuclear and extended household struggles can arise. Both brothers are fathers who are expected to take care of their families. This eventually resulted in a clash between the brothers both wanting the same resource. Even though loyalty is highly valued among kin. Another example is of Mahdi who had a neighbour with the same regional and ethnic background who stole from him. Although within ethnic and regional networks solidarity is expected Mahdi's neighbour felt responsible to take care of his kin and stole from Mahdi against various social network rules.

Why do social network members comply or disregard to pre-inscribed rules? This relates to Zhang's (2017) theory. He argues that the chance of complying to social networks their norms and rules depend on the expected loss of the social network (Zhang, 2017). People make a cost-benefit analysis when they choose not to abide to certain rules ascribed to their identity and role within a social network. Both examples just referred to indicate that with limited resources informants choose to prioritise their nuclear kin networks above other social networks. Hence, demonstrating once again the importance of kin networks and especially the nuclear family. Zhang's (2017) theory is a rather rational focused when analysing decision-making processes. Although several informants thought about possibly losing social ties and being excluded from some social networks as horrifying, it seemed to be more an emotional loss feared than Zhang describes. When discussing alienation from social networks informants were rather anxious of the experienced shame and emotional loss of ties

more than their personal gain of this relation. So I would like the emphasis the emotional component within the cost-benefit analysis when adhering to ascribed norms and rules within a social network.

To conclude, when comparing the nine significant social networks encountered in Urfa among refugees from Syria I came to the following conclusions. In chapter 5 these conclusions are broadly discussed and I only mention them here. Firstly, kin is the most intense social network. Secondly, middle class networks bridge most, are most updated concerning governmental services and humanitarian aid, and integrate best in Turkish society. Thirdly, young adults possess the most wide-ranging social networks.

8.3. Giving and taking

Social networks and its ties are based on identity similarities, reciprocal agreements, and mutual dependency. Social networks built on principles like trust and reciprocity. If you scratch my back, I will scratch yours later. Especially when forcedly displaced social networks are vital. When not knowing Turkish, not knowing the governmental infrastructure, and so on renders refugees from Syria vulnerable in Turkey. Also taking into account the speed in which the world spins nowadays refugees from Syria are in need of some stability. A safety net is needed. And in some cases a social network can secure this stability. Nevertheless, this is not always the case.

In this section the most paramount characteristics of social networks that influence what they deliver and cost are explained. Debates on intensity and density characteristics of social networks are touched upon and the relation between an individual's necessities and social networks their added value is depicted. Lastly, the possible downsides of social networks are elaborated on.

Via social networks refugees from Syria in Urfa receive all kinds of support ranging from financial assets, knowledge, influence, access and other social contacts. Most widely heard what social networks give is assistance with housing, finding employment and emotional support. There are many differences in what members among each other in social network give and take.

Social networks provide familiarity, belonging, and concrete benefits like employment, influence and money. Trust, belonging and reciprocity are core values to guarantee positive outcomes from social networks. Examples of informants who benefitted from their social networks are Ahmet who got his job at an international NGO via his old study friend or Jiyan's family who stayed for a long period at her kin's house in Urfa. However also distrust as a consequence of stealing, lying and power struggles within social networks resulting in negative outcomes. For instance, when Mahdi got robbed by his neighbour or when he consciously separates his business from his kin trying to prevent his kin from claiming his capital. I cannot find a pattern which social networks raises the most benefits and the most advantages. Reciprocity is not a clear sum of one and one equals two.

However, I could distinguish the vital trait of a social network, namely intensity. The intensity of a tie within a social network matters more than other network characteristics like density. Hence deep and intimate relations are strong building blocks to receive support from. In practice I observed the importance of kinship networks providing a lot of support and loyalty to one another. This is in line with Willems (2005) finding that kinship networks offer most when displaced. However, my findings are in contrast with Granovetter who argues that we live in a world in which weak ties flourish (As cited in Bauman, 2000, p. 149). Weak ties are becoming more important as social relations change quickly and are often only temporary. Or with Sennett who goes even further suggesting that fleeting forms of association are more handy (As cited in Bauman, 2000, p. 149). Their ideas are

based on the concept of liquid times. Insecurity and change is omnipresent in these times. I do agree the insecurity of contemporary society influences identity and social networks, but among refugees from Syria in Urfa intensity remains an important network characteristic when aiming at gaining resources.

But intensity not only matters. It rather depends on what the individual exactly needs from a social network. Is it a lot of input on the long-term? Than kinship networks are useful. But when seeking for employment distance between ties is more relevant. But in other instances I rather underline Burt's (1997) structural whole theory. Hence, not intensity but density matters. The distance between the ego and ties is vital for finding employment. While looking for a job the more information to obtain the higher chance of finding a job. To conclude when seeking for more information on jobs or governmental services or housing the density of a network matters more than intensity. However when asking for a favour like lending money or babysitting the strength of a tie matters. In other words, depending on the individuals need a specific characteristic of a social network tie matters.

In line with this, focus on social networks vary subjected to phases. Social networks their importance and intensity differs per situation and specific necessity. I noticed especially when refugees from Syria just arrive in Urfa kin plays a major role. This is the result of not knowing anyone and the fact that refugees from Syria settle where their kin settles. Often kin assists temporary host their kin or helps with search for a house. After residing for a while in Urfa relations with hosts become more relevant. Hosts are part of society having relevant knowledge, access and contacts to mingle well. So becoming related to a host might open the door to steady employment, better housing, and increases changes to access governmental services and aid (Calhoun, 2010).

Besides intensity, an individual's identity and its related position within a social network has effect on what he or she receives. If an individual has a prominent position within a network he or she has enough power to pressure and stir social networks assets towards him-or herself. As in every human relation it contains an element of power and simultaneously in each social network power struggles occur. As Rohat once complained to me stating to strongly dislike a guy named Mahdi because he had enough money to buy friends and become present of a private institution.

Moreover, a strong form of social capital is to have ties with professionals within the government or humanitarian field. Having personal connections with these resource rich people has a positive effect on obtaining information, access to services, and receiving privileges. Nepotism is recurrent in Urfa as Osman's story with his patron exemplifies. When accessing aid and governmental services being part of large and wide-ranging social networks is fruitful. I also experienced myself how refugees from Syria try to gain from you as an intern at a humanitarian organisation by victimising themselves (Utas, 2005). Several informants tried to access monetary support, information or contacts via me to enhance their situation.

Social networks are a valuable asset that can lead to many possibilities but not social networks are not always beneficial to be part of. Sometimes social networks cost more than they deliver. Chapter 5 shows that social networks can both facilitate and restrict individuals. Also concerning accessing other social networks (Zhang, 2017). Social networks facilitate in a manner of making cross-linkages between individuals and their networks but restrict by excluding certain people or prioritising others. Hence, via social networks an individual can become part of more social networks but simultaneously social networks can also restrict access to other social networks.

In addition, reciprocal exchange can also be negative. On the basis of reciprocity there are expected inputs and returns, however it is not always balanced. This has to do with exorbitant claims, unequal reciprocal efforts, power imbalances and cheating behaviour of network members. These actions create a disadvantage for an individual and can result in the individual breaking or taking a distance from a social network. The more intense and dense a social network is the higher the chance people would adhere to a negative reciprocal outcome. This is in line with Zhang's (2017) theory that people make a cost and benefit analysis before jeopardising their social relations. So although within social networks there is some sense of solidarity. This layer of solidarity towards each other might be rather thin.

8.4. Bonding and bridging

Bonding and bridging often occurs implicitly but can be an explicit main goal too. In almost all instances bonding or bridging efforts were not solely focused on social gain but had other practical and often in the eyes of informants more significant reasons. Learning Turkish can be interpreted as a bridging effort but by informants it was rather expressed as a necessity to understand the Turkish bureaucracy better and find a job. Regarding bridging a humanitarian community centre manager once said that *'I can imagine you have other things on your mind instead of mingling with Turkish locals'* (Anonymous, personal communication, March 8, 2017). She wanted to emphasise the severe stress and acute worries refugees from Syria have when resettling in Urfa.

Bonding efforts encountered were mingling with people in public areas, shopping, organising themselves in (private) organisations, doing religion, volunteering, giving courses, and following courses. Generally speaking bonding is easier and more common than bridging because of the cultural closeness and language competency. Bonding however can lead to negative social outcomes when only homogenous people interact and segregate more from 'others' (Putnam, 2002). In this way people live fragmented in their small-scale society where people support each other's claims without hearing different views which can lead to radicalism. As Putnam stated *'bonding without bridging equals Bosnia'* (2002, 13). Hence, bridging efforts and being exposed and connected with less similar people is necessary for a fragmented and diverse society to successfully co-exist.

To wrap up bonding occurs among my informants in Urfa aiming at organising themselves. Often they bond to organise themselves in a commercial way to ensure their livelihoods. I only encountered one non-profit humanitarian initiative that had to be stopped after insufficient funds. So because of the weak economic position of refugees from Syria they are little initiatives to do something for fellow refugees from Syria. This also confirms in a way the fact that there is no such thing as one overarching Syrian community but rather fragmented and diverse small-scale networks.

Bridging takes place in a field of tension. Refugees from Syria face discrimination and sometimes even encounter violent behaviour of hosts towards them. Tensions among hosts towards refugees from Syria are rising in areas which is densely populated by refugees from Syria (International Crisis Group, 2018; UNHCR, 2017b; World Bank, 2015; Yıldız & Uzgören, 2016). This research also indicates that the majority of hosts does not think refugees from Syria integrate well and therefore want more restrictive policies (World Bank, 2015). Having said this it is rather logic that bridging occurs less in this tense context. It is not only harder than bonding because of the assumed or experienced differences but also because of the ethno-political situation in Turkey.

Bridging efforts encountered were learning Turkish, doing religion, mingling in public areas, volunteering, working, and following and giving courses. The engagement of refugees from Syria to bridge depends on the time spend in Urfa, previous experiences and future perceptions. If informants stayed in Turkey or Urfa for a longer period there is a higher chance they know Turkish, their neighbours and might have host colleagues. Time has a positive effect on bridging. But taking into account that informants have been negatively treated the chance that he or she is no longer willing to network among hosts is evident. The case of Othman illustrated this. After being excluded and negatively approached Othman chooses to neglect interactions with hosts. When informants want to return to Syria and are convinced they will do so Turkey becomes merely a temporary place of residence thus bridging efforts do not seem fruitful.

When comparing informants among each other in regard of successful bridging efforts the middle class is doing the best. This strongly relates to the fact middle class informants often have jobs with host colleagues and live among them in the wealthier neighbourhoods of Urfa. Moreover, young adult informants tend to bridge more than the older generations. Young adults seem to be thinking less in rigid terms regarding ascribed identity traits, hence are more open for 'others'. Besides young adults are more eager to engage in society while still developing themselves.

8.5. Discussions

This section contains out of six debates about homo- and heterogeneity, the premise underlying the concepts of bonding and bridging, social networks characteristics –such as intensity, density and spatiality-, and the dangers of bonding. Furthermore, I make two recommendations regarding social cohesion programmes and the construction of “the Syrian community” among humanitarians and Turkish government officials.

The first debate discussed is about the homogeneity premise of social networks. When starting this research I was focussed on the social network characteristic of homogeneity and heterogeneity. I read a lot about the importance of homogenous networks in studies of Beggs et al. (1996) and Willems (2005). Their theory is that homogenous networks tend to support each other more than heterogeneous ones. But when looking closer at what kind of member social networks consist of I came to the conclusion it is nearly impossible to use these terms. Impossible as a consequence of the multiple and multi-layered identities on which social networks are built (Sen, 2006). I do not want to disregard the whole concepts of homo-and heterogeneity but they rather need clear operationalisations before used as labels. I can also see linkages between ethnic networks and often corresponding regional background and current place of residence. In this regard, ethnic networks can be seen as homogenous concerning neighbourhood network and regional background but are rather heterogeneous concerning kin, profession, and gender.

As a result of the previous debate I want to raise a discussion on the concepts of bonding and bridging. Bonding and bridging are based on the notions of homo-and heterogeneity. In short, bonding entails relating to similar others and bridging means relating to others that differ from the ego. I would argue again in favour of a more clearly demarcated way in which people bond and bridge. Now bonding and bridging often refers to hosts versus refugees. But as one of my main findings in this research is that “the Syrian community” does not exist nor that the host community exists by the way. By underlining the premise of difference between hosts and refugees scholars and policy makers only widen the gap between them. While rhetoric matter because how people talk influences how they perceive one another. Hence, I would like to emphasise that the underlying

premise dividing bonding from bridging or refugees from hosts are often macro-level notions less relevant on the local scale.

The third debate is about a relevant social network characteristic: intensity. Scholars asked themselves the question if weak or strong ties matter more (Beggs et al., 1996; Daniş, 2007; Granovetter, 1973; Willems, 2005). To briefly refresh, a tie is strong is characterised by a level of time spend, intimacy, emotional intensity, and reciprocal exchange and a weak tie is then characterised by an insignificant level of time spend, intimacy, emotional intensity and little reciprocal exchange (Granovetter, 1973). Beggs et al. (1996) and Willems (2005) state that strong ties support each other more because they are often homogenous. Hence, strong ties are of utmost importance. Granovetter (1973) and Daniş (2007) oppose this and emphasise the significance of weak ties. They agree that strong ties are good for well-being but not for economic development. The former showed that people find employment via weak ties (1973). Besides, strong ties tend to form restrictive isolated social networks which are not beneficial for social cohesion. As this research indicates is intensity an important characteristic when trying to gain resources. A strong tie is often more motivated to assist the ego in comparison to a weak tie, however strong ties form a nice but secluded safety net. Weak ties are more valuable in retrieving information or access. As displayed in this research, both strong and weak ties have their own (dis)advantages. I would therefore argue not to prioritise one above the other but take into account what the inspired goal before arguing which intensity level is preferable.

Closely related to the intensity debate is the debate between the intensity and density of social networks. Burt (1997) and Granovetter (1973) have a theoretical debate on which social ties are more important to find employment: weak or distant ones? In a nutshell, Burt (1997) conceptualised the structural hole theory. Based on this theory he deducted the rule: the more distant a tie, the better. Granovetter (1973) opposes this and argues that weak ties tend to be more heterogeneous and thus has a larger variety of connections. Accordingly, weak ties offer different information and opportunities. In general, I would argue on the basis of this research that density of a network matters in regard to retrieving information on for example governmental services or humanitarian aid. The intensity of a tie however is useful as a social insurance. So when asking for a reciprocal extensive exchange intensity matters. However, I cannot fully answer this theoretical question on the basis of this research, but my data hints at density as more relevant when finding employment. I come to this conclusion based on the finding that weak ties do not have to be more heterogeneous as Granovetter (1973) assumes. Moreover, moving crisscross between social networks enhances the amount of information obtained. Furthermore, I often heard informants state social network members referred them to people they knew about a job.

The fifth debate is about spatial dimension of social networks and closely relates to the concept of density. Stevens (2016) and Wellman (2005) are diametrically opposed from one another. Stevens (2016) argues that refugees from Syria in Jordan form their identities and aligned social networks based on space while Wellman (2005) proclaims with his notion on networked individualism that individuals are becoming more and more separated from their direct surroundings. Based on my findings I agree with Stevens (2016) that refugees from Syria define and create themselves and their social networks based on the physical space they move in on daily basis. However this should be nuances with Wellman's argument that due to the Internet people mingle more easily with spatially remote others. However, among most informants -although social networks are footloose- interact with social networks present in their daily lives. A side note should be made that Wellman's notion is

developed based on contemporary Western societies like the United States and does not focus on the Middle East nor takes forced displacement into account.

The last debate is about the possible dangers of bonding. According to Putnam (2002) *'bonding without bridging equals Bosnia'* (p. 13) while Calhoun (2010) debates that bonding should occur more among refugee populations because it can enhance their self-reliance. I disagree with Calhoun (2010) who sees bonding as something pink and sweet. Bonding can result in negative externalities which Putnam (2002) points out to. I encountered that hosts and refugees from Syria who do not bridge often think in stereotypes of those socially remote from them causing less tolerance towards others. When hosts and refugees from Syria only bond social cohesion is not promoted. Especially currently in Turkey social tensions are on the rise (International Crisis Group, 2018) so especially now the negative externalities of bonding without bridging occurs.

This debate close relates to a recommendation I want to give to humanitarian organisations and Turkish government officials working for DGMM. Taking the current rising tensions in Turkey into account humanitarians should focus more on social cohesion programmes. When talking with humanitarians social cohesion often was perceived as something relevant but considering the limited funds, time, and the urgency of deprivation among refugees from Syria it remains under exposed. However, I also met humanitarians not seeing the relevance of social cohesion programmes stating that *'I can imagine you have other things on your mind instead of mingling with Turkish locals'* (Anonymous, personal communication, March 8, 2017). This humanitarian emphasises the severe stress and acute worries refugees from Syria have in Urfa. Nevertheless, programmes aiming at enhancing social cohesion in my opinion should receive more attention since the Syrian war is protracted and social tensions are on the rise. As this research illustrates, social networks can function as a safety net and especially bridging is crucial when people are long-term forced displaced. Aside from providing aid I think fostering relations between refugees from Syria and hosts are vital. There should be more places and events that facilitate this social crossover, while as my research shows now mainly the middle and upper class benefit from social network relations with hosts. There are projects in Gaziantep, like the international migrants day (2017), of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) intending to improve relations between hosts and refugees from Syria. Organisations in Urfa should take this as an example. Especially social cohesion programmes combined with a livelihood perspective would play into the needs of refugees from Syria. Refugees from Syria and hosts should be brought together following workshops on employment opportunities and co-create solutions to integration issues. Especially, neutral zones where refugees and hosts can meet are important. Because now is expected of hosts to join events at community centre where almost one hundred of the visitors are refugees, so this does not appeal to hosts.

Besides this, I want to explain my choice regarding the categorisation of "the Syrian community". Although I included the category of a Syrian network I do not see this as a coherent and apparent social network in reality. "The Syrian community" is a recurrent term in UNHCR policy papers or DGMM's documents. The Syrian community is an overarching concept not prevalent in reality as I encountered refugees from Syria in Urfa. The Syrian community is conceptualized with little attention to the complexity of the fragmented and diverse networks refugees from Syria are part of.

As this research demonstrates, refugees from Syria identity and organise themselves into social networks based on more specific identity traits than nationality. My argument is that the tendency of policy makers and humanitarians to tar with the same brush is not only a wrong oversimplification

but also harmful. It is a distortion of complex, ambivalent, and diverse social networks of refugees from Syria who have different agendas, aims, and social reach. Although it might complicate their work to be more specific and careful with this conceptualisation, I would like to advise these professionals to look better how they construct the concept of 'Syrian' refugees. This also relates to an informant who complained that humanitarians all see Syrians as the same. So also informants in the field feel they are been reduced to one single entity.

8.6. Concluding remarks

This research demonstrates how refugees from Syria utilise their social networks to ensure their livelihoods. Refugees from Syria are part of nine, often overlapping, social networks. Each social network differs from other social networks focusing on different identity traits and having their own set of rules. Rules that can be rigid but are mostly negotiable.

Social networks deliver and cost. It depends on the intensity and density of a network, and an individual its position what he or she gains. Refugees from Syria move crisscross from one social network to another depending on their necessity which is again subjected to the phases of displacement they are in. When newly arrived in Urfa refugees from Syria have other needs than after four years of residing in Urfa. Besides this, social networks are not constructed on a fair and smooth social base but rather on rocky and unfair subordinate to power struggles.

Furthermore, this thesis displays how resilient refugees from Syria are and creative they bond and bridge. Although there is a large variety among refugees from Syria how much and how intense they bond and bridge. Bonding remains easier than bridging. Bridging however is relevant now since the rise of social tensions in Turkey among hosts and refugees from Syria. Social cohesion needs to be improved.

Refugees from Syria are institutional, legal, economic, and social insecure position in Urfa. But as this research indicates social networks offer opportunities. Opportunities containing a range of resources like employment or accessing governmental services. Each social networks offers different opportunities based on their social network characteristics. These opportunities might offer possible outcomes to refugees from Syria their worries and livelihood threats. In all of this, the messiness of social networks make it possible for individuals to socially navigate in the social arena like a ship on the sea. Sailing to seize these opportunities. So when Ahmed is walking the streets of Urfa, ordering *kufta* in a restaurant, or surfing on the Internet each newly made contact might connect him with that other person who can help him. Hence, this research mark his words '*Everyone is a possibility*'.

9. References

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10. Annexes

Annex A- List of informants

This list includes all informants cited in the text by pseudonyms. Some names are mentioned more than once, so this list helps the reader keep an eye on who is who. Each name is a pseudonym to ensure confidentiality, privacy and security of my informants. Concerning occupation in the table, the stripe means that there is none and the question marks means I do not know this aspect. Another note about the list is that I only included occupations that contribute financially. Hence being a housewife is not included as an occupation.

Pseudonym	Age	Regional background	Ethnicity	Occupation or Education in Syria	Occupation or Education in Urfa
Afran	35	Kobane	Kurd	Primary teacher	-
Rayan	38	Damascus	Arab	Manager at education facility	Humanitarian case worker
Fajah	35	Deir ezZur	Arab	Social worker	Humanitarian social worker
Salma	60	Kobane	Kurd	-	-
Marouan	35	Raqqah	Arab	Farmer	-
Othman & Nada	30 & 28	Kobane	Kurd	Mobile repair shop owner	Mobile repair shop owner
Nabil	26	Raqqah	Arab	Student	Shoe shop owner
Qasim & Alina	39 & 36	Deir ezZur	Arab	Primary teacher	-
Cemal & Khadija	44 & 33	Deir ezZur	Arab	Geologist & music teacher	Volunteer at humanitarian organisation
Said & Fatma	57 & 50	Deir ezZur	Arab	Agricultural engineer	-
Zahra	61	Raqqah	Arab	School manager	-
Rana & Amir	35 & 38	Deir ezZur	Arab	Baker	-
Aicha & Qamar	23 & 52	Deir ezZur	Arab	Student	Humanitarian nurse & student
Maryam	55	Deir ezZur	Arab	Farmer	-

Ahmed	21	Aleppo	Arab & Turkman	Student	Translator & student
Jiyan	21	Raqqah	Kurd	Student	-
Mahir	24	Raqqah	Arab	Student	Student
Safae	20	Kobane	Kurd	Student	Student
Sera	21	Aleppo	-	Student	Student
Ayman	34	Raqqah	Kurd & Arab	Sales	Humanitarian translator
Mahdi	58	Deir ezZur	Arab	Shop owner of three shops regarding electronics	Shop owner selling live supplies
Osman	29	Deir ezZur	Arab	University teacher	Owner and teacher at his education institute & teacher at humanitarian centre
Rohat	23	li-Qamslo	Kurd	Student	Student & volunteer humanitarian organization
Amir	60	Deir ezZur	Arab	?	Shop owner selling live supplies
Murat	34	Deir ezZur	Arab	?	Shop owner selling live supplies
Shero	32	Kobane	Kurd	-	Humanitarian field officer
Mahmoud	27	?	?	Student	University student advisor

Annex B- Topic list

This topic list was used during interviews functioning as a guideline rather than a strict set of questions. Each interview had a different focus based on what informants shared. So there are questions I asked that are not on this list. The questions are straight forward but on the hardcopy version notes on how to ask a question more openly without steering too much was included.

Introduction

Introduce myself

Explaining the purpose of the research and what will happen with this interview

Confidentiality principle

Asking permission to record

Elaborating on interview rules

Background

- 1. How long do you live here?*
- 2. Where are you from?*
- 3. What did you do in Syria?*
- 4. With whom did you flee?*
- 5. Have you already been to Turkey before the war?*
- 6. Did you already know people in Turkey before the war?*

Livelihoods

- 1. How would you describe your current living conditions in Urfa?*
- 2. How do you make a living in Urfa?*

What work do you do?

What kind of support do you get from humanitarian organizations?

What kind of support do you get from the Turkish government?

Social networks

- 1. Who were an important support/help to you to flee Syria?*

With whom did you flee Syria?

- 2. Why do you live in Urfa?*
- 3. Since when do you live here?*

Where did you live before?

3. Who helped you with finding accommodation in Urfa?

With whom do you live?

4. Do you have children that go to school?

If yes, who helped you finding a school?

Was it hard to get access to a school?

5. Do you have job

If yes, how did you find this job?

Who helped you with finding work in Urfa?

6. Have you ever been sick in Urfa and went to a medical post?

If yes, how did you go?

Who went with you?

How did you know of this doctor and/or hospital?

7. If you or a family member can suddenly not work anymore. Who would you reach out for support?

8. Do you feel supported by other Syrians?

Is there in your experience, a Syrian community in Urfa?

If so, are you part of this community?

Social cohesion

1. Do you feel at home in Urfa?

Why (not)?

Does Urfa resemble your previous place of residence in Syria?

Do you feel welcomed by the people from Urfa?

2. Do you have contact with people from Urfa?

When do you have contact with people from Urfa?

How do you have contact with people from Urfa?

Would you describe your contact with people from Urfa?

3. How do you describe your connectedness with locals from Urfa?

Do you feel strongly connected?

Annex C- Coding scheme

This scheme shows the descriptive fist code, the following abstract code and its overall theme it relates to. The descriptive code remains close to the informants words. The abstract code deduced the descriptive code and is the sum of several descriptive codes.

Theme	Abstract code	Descriptive code
Social networks	Networking	Contacting former colleagues, kin refers to housing, remittances from kin in other country, retrieving information via neighbour, visiting hospital with kin, friend arranging housing, dormitory friends, feeling supported by Syrians, scattered kin, looking out for others, reciprocity, (not) trusting, needing each other, encouraging to move, asking to relations for information
Well-being	Psychosocial issue	Worries about safety, worries about kin, feeling unstable, fear of losing job, losing hope, feeling stressed, fear of losing aid, mourning, missing kin, worries about sick kin, traumatic experience
	Pre-war life	Feeling caged, feeling safe, feeling insecure, living wealthy, household, former employment, detained by government, contact with IS, well-being, corruption
	Livelihood struggle	Unemployment, low salary, time pressure, cannot provide for children, working conditions, scattered kin, leaving behind Syria, nostalgic feelings, high rent, no hot water, fleeing with nothing, no freedom of choice, not gaining work permit
Livelihood strategies	Livelihood strategy	Searching for a job, working in fabrics, translating, entire nuclear family working in fabric, online trading, short-term jobs, analysing economic climate in Urfa, sharing information on livelihood strategies among relations, informal job, humanitarian job, applying for aid, lying to get aid, volunteering, utilising savings, offer services to me, following course,

		marrying, having a shop, crossing Syrian border, migrating to other city, utilising networks, sold gold
	Self-organised	Freelance translator, finding EU scholarship, trading online, owning shop, starting own public school, creating own private school, start language website, creating student association
	Wasta	Only helping friends, helping friend from same region, getting job via friend, hinted for a job via friend, nepotism
	Coping mechanism	Moving beyond shame, not watching the news, relative hardship, emotionally distancing, losing religion, block out memories, not attaching to others
Services	Humanitarian	Red cross card, monetary support, language assistance, counselling, courses, aid refused
	Governmental	Hospitals, schools, courses, receiving food, TP ID card, travel permit, working permit, not receiving support
Mobility	Mobility aspirations	Going to EU, going back to Syria, being able to move freely
	Flight motivation	Avoiding military, fighting, losing kin, medical condition
	Flight experience	Smuggling, cheating border guards, kidnapping, fleeing with family, fleeing alone, danger, struggling, violence, fear
Cohesion	Inclusion	Host support, cultural closeness, ethnic sameness, knowing Turkish, opening own shop, meeting in public places (Mosque/Park), belonging to the region (new border), host neighbours assisting, friendly interaction hosts, same street spirit as in Syria
	Exclusion	Feeling a stranger, cultural differences, language barrier, no sense of belonging, not having host customers, no friendly interaction with hosts, discrimination,

		negative framing of Syrians, feeling a refugee, having lowest status in society, host violence, host riot, unemployment, bureaucratic hurdles (work permit/host guarantee for housing), feeling misunderstood, feeling marginalised , getting blamed for being a refugee from Syria, not feeling welcome, 'guest' status, feeling unsafe
	Bonding	Making friends, being encouraging to mingle, meeting in public places, guiding others with information, motivating one another, maintaining previous friendships from Syria, mingling student association, not feeling alone, mourning together, as customer, as seller, assisting physically, assisting financially, Ramadan
	Bridging	Making friends with hosts, volunteering, invited for Quran lessons, as customer, as seller, interacting with host neighbours, watching football, Ramadan, working via host middle-man, interacting based on ethnicity, focussing only on hosts, learning Turkish