# HOW SOCIAL CAPITAL SHAPES COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

## A CASE STUDY ON A COMMUNITY-BASED ECOTOURISM INTERVENTION IN AMBOSELI, KENYA

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## ABSTRACT

New nature conservation mechanisms for habitat preservation are indispensably. Ecotourism is seen as part of the solution and is used as a tool to conserve the environment since the 1990's, by offering nature sensitive responsible travel options. Planning ecotourism projects in and around conservation areas, was mainly done in a top-down management manner and has neglected to view the local community as essential partners for its proper development. Local people were not involved in the ecotourism planning process, and therefore could not guide it in line with their culture and needs. There are several challenges and limitations concerning the use of genuine community participation in a tourism intervention, especially in development countries. This thesis aims to explore a Community-Based Ecotourism (CBE) development in Amboseli, Kenya with help of a case study. More specifically with this research I explored the influence that Social Capital has on the community participation process of the local community. The social structure of the host community needs to be respected in order to know what is needed for this community to participate in the intervention. In this thesis I am examining community participation within the bonding and linking dimension of a community, by zooming in on trust and power relations. Tourism is a crucial part of the Amboseli ecosystem but local landowners keep struggling with unequal distribution of benefits and no involvement in the tourism industry. The Kilitome Conservancy serves as an example of public-private partnerships for CBE, which was initiated by the African Wildlife Foundation and financed by Tawi lodge.



*Keywords: Community-Based Ecotourism, tourism development, interventions, Social Capital, trust, power, community participation, Kenya.*

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## List of Acronyms

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| AWF | – | African Wildlife Foundation |
| CBT | – | Community-Based Tourism |
| CBE | – | Community-Based Ecotourism |
| KGR | – | Kimana Group Ranch |
| SC | – | Social Capital |

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# 1. Introduction

This thesis aims to explore the influence that Social Capital has on the Community Participation process in Community-Based Ecotourism development. The following chapter introduces the context in which the research is embedded. The problem statement as well as the therefrom emerging research questions and the relevancy of the study will be presented.

## 1.1. ECOTOURISM & COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN ECOTOURISM INTERVENTIONS

In economic terms, the tourism industry can be seen as the world's largest transfer of resources from the rich to the poor. Tourists have spent three times the amount of money in the year 2007 in development countries, than official aid organizations that are devoted to poverty reduction. This illustrates the large dimension of tourism that raises concern about transformations of destinations through disappearing culture, social exploitation and environmental degradation caused by the tourism industry (Mitchell & Ashley, 2010). Simultaneously, decreasing biodiversity is proven to be accelerated by unsustainable use of resources and the therefrom resulting climate change (IPCC Assessment Report, 2007). Accordingly, new nature conservation mechanisms for habitat preservation are indispensably and ecotourism is seen as a solution. It is used as a tool to conserve the environment since the 1990's, by offering nature sensitive responsible travel options (Wood, 2002). Planning tourism projects in and around conservation areas, was mainly done in a top-down management manner and has neglected to view the local community as essential partners for its proper development (Castro & Nielsen, 2001; Johnson *et al*. 2001 as cited in Garrod, 2003). Local people were not involved in the ecotourism planning process, and therefore could not guide it in line with their culture and needs. There are many examples where not participatory ecotourism interventions have led to the forceful displacement of local peoples (Garrod, 2003; Scheyvens, 1999; Mowforth & Munt, 2016). Consequently, engaging locals in the development of ecotourism seemed the asserted solution that could lead to sustainable management of areas in need of conservation.

Community-Based Ecotourism (CBE) projects are defined to be environmentally conscious but also ensure the well-being of the local community, improve their livelihood and provide the community members a degree of control over the intervention (Liu, 1994; Kiss, 2004). Adams *et al.* (2004) realized that in rural areas, the local community determines the effectiveness and long-term viability of conservation strategies. Already in the 70's, as Stone *et al.* (2010) describes, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 *"led to a shift towards integrated resource management, calling for more participation by rural communities (…)" (p.98).* Some years later, tourism literature significantly paid attention to community involvement in tourism development, after scholars recognized that local people can be the key in sustaining these development

interventions (Stone *et al.* 2010). Participation of communities in the development process has been extensively highlighted by Brandon (1993) and Drake (1991) in ecotourism research, as well as by others (Scheyvens, 1999; Mitchell & Reid, 2001; Simmons 1994) who believe that ecotourism requires partnerships with local communities to protect nature.

In Kenya, ecotourism gained attention roughly after independence in 1963, when safari tourism increased through the establishment of national parks. After officially assigning borders to the parks, the Maasai were confronted with the issue of land shortage. The Maasai as traditional nomadic pastoralists were forced to settle and conflicts about landownership and the use of resources emerged. Settling required the participation in economic activities such as agriculture and tourism practices (Zeppel, 2006). Communities slowly started to get engaged by setting up wildlife sanctuaries and manage them locally (Chongwa, 2012). The sub-division of communal Maasailand of the Kimana Group Ranch into private parcels in 2004 reinforced the human wildlife conflict and eventually called for the nature and wildlife conservation. This thesis looks at a particular case in Kenya, whereby the partnership between local landowners, a private investor and Africa's biggest NGO, intended to establish a steady Community-Based-Ecotourism (CBE) structure. The focal point of this research is a CBE intervention in an area outside of the national park (governmental protected zone) of Amboseli, Kenya. Here, wildlife moves through private, communal or public land, threatening local inhabitants who in turn become a threat for nature conservation and species protection (Gadd 2005, as cited in Van der Duim 2011).

## 1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Bottom-up tourism strategies with a focus on the involvement of the host community are often being promoted for community development but are also contested, due to the lack of successful real life examples. There are several challenges and limitations concerning the use of Community Participation in a tourism intervention, illustrated by the fact that most Community-Based Tourism (CBT) initiatives collapse after external funding stops because they have not been implemented sustainably (Mitchell & Muckosy, 2008). Many scholars propose that participation is a necessary element in Community-Based Tourism (CBT) (Strzelecka & Wicks, 2015), but also requires to be properly applied by practitioners for an intervention to succeed (Campbell & Vainio-Mattila, 2003). Mowforth and Munt (2009) have doubts about practitioners' abilities of respecting the host communities' social structures to implement the community involvement properly. Involving all stakeholders as suggested by Saarinen (2006) to achieve CBT, is a big challenge due to their diverse

interests. Another challenge is that the Community Participation processes can be dominated by external consultants, government staff and development or aid agency personnel (Johnson & Wilson, 2000). CBT generally aims at economic benefits for locals, but only an insignificant number of projects let the community members actually participate in discussions or even decision-making-process (Simpson, 2008; Mowforth & Munt, 2009; Garrod, 2003). The just mentioned aspects also account for Community-Based Ecotourism (CBE). CBE is critically referred to by Campbell and Vainio-Mattila (2003), who state that CBE interventions are mainly induced by organizations with clear nature conservation priorities.

What significantly limits local residents' ability to participate in tourism decision-making is the lack of their understanding about their own rights and on tourism in general (Okech, 2006). Moscardo (2006) argues that the lack of knowledge of tourism markets has been used by practitioners in many developing and peripheral regions to justify the exclusion of local residents and other community stakeholders from participation. To accomplish Community Participation in the future, it is crucial to gain insights on the capacity building process of a host community, during a CBE-intervention. As Mowforth and Munt, (2009) claim, the social structure of the host community needs to be respected, which is a vital part of Social Capital (SC) of a community. The attention paid on the role of SC in tourism studies is not big (Strzelecka & Wicks, 2015) with a few exceptions (Jones, 2005; McGehee, 2010; Zhao, 2013; Thammajinda, 2013). The concept of Social Capital (SC) refers to immaterial resources of a community like relationships (Narayan, 1997). A common view of SC in tourism studies is that SC influences quality of Community Participation in local development (Richie & Echtner, 2011). In detail, this thesis makes use of two of the three network perspectives by Pretty (2003), namely bonding (among the community) as well as linking (among the community and institutions or authorities) structures. These will be identified with help of two inherent concepts, namely trust and power which, in combination with SC, are basically absent in tourism literature, even though they are considered fundamental to SC (Nunkoo, 2015). The feasibility of a tourism development intervention depends on the power distribution between crucial stakeholders, which is often unequal by nature. Trust relations among individuals determine social life and are therefore seen as fundamental principle of SC (Jones, 2004), and significantly interrelated with participation (Seligson *et al.,* 2006).

Referring to the situation at hand, it can be said that tourism is a crucial part of the Amboseli ecosystem but locals and especially landowners keep struggling with unequal distribution of benefits (Okello *et al.,* 2011). In this area are examples of public-private partnerships for CBE, of which one is the Kilitome Conservancy. The Kilitome conservancy was initiated by the African Wildlife Foundation

and financed by Tawi lodge. This thesis aims to present the interrelation between SC and Community Participation within this particular tourism intervention.

## 1.3. Research Objectives & Question

For my study, I chose for the theoretical focus of Social Capital to better understand the participation of the concerning landowners during the rural Community-Based Ecotourism development. Community Participation, to be achieved through capacity building is linked with the aspects of trust and power within the bonding as well as linking dimension of Social Capital. I intend to contribute to literature about the interrelation of the concepts of bonding and linking Social Capital, their aspects of power and trust, with the Community Participation criteria. The study provides qualitative insights on a CBE to contribute to the optimization of similar interventions by NGO's. Practitioners can be informed on what to consider for the planning and implementation phase to ensure more sustainable interventions in the future.

The following research question emerges from the identification of the problem:

- **How does Bonding and Linking Social Capital influence Community Participation during a CBE intervention?**

To gather data for the analysis, the establishment of a community conservation area (Kilitome conservancy) in Amboseli, Kenya, served as appropriate case study. The local landowners within the conservation area were the main subjects of this research.

## 1.4. Significance of the Study

The suggestion of the importance of Community Participation has often been made, but it has rarely been stated what exactly needs to be considered to achieve it (Okazaki, 2008). Also the issue of enhancing community capacity to be able to achieve benefits from tourism has been given little attention (Moscardo, 2008). Nevertheless, Community Participation combined with capacity building in tourism development has been researched (Stem, 2002 ; Tosun, 2006; Saufi *et al.* 2015; Raik, 2002; Hiner & Galt, 2011; Aref & Redzuan 2009, 2010), but few connected those concepts with Social Capital (Jones 2005, Karlsson, 2005; Macbeth *et al.* 2004; Nordin & Westlund, 2009). Vermaak (2009) states that previous studies using Social Capital have mostly focused on industrialized countries, whereas in the context of the developing countries the relevancy even increases. This gap in literature makes this study scientifically significant. Eventually, the results of this research can serve

local communities living outside nationally protected parks and dealing with landownership matters to benefit from tourism development.

### 1.5. Structure of the Thesis

At first, the research topic was embedded in its broad context of ecotourism and the importance of Community Participation, followed by the formulation of the problem, backed up with theoretical relevancy. Then the research questions and its sub-questions were presented as well as the research objective. Chapter 2 gives a detailed context description about Community-Based Ecotourism in Kenya. The third chapter contains the conceptual framework, which guides the research. Social Capital in the ecotourism context, its network dimensions of bonding and linking and inherent aspects of trust and power, are discussed. Furthermore, the concept of Community Participation and its criteria will be explained. The fourth chapter presents the research methodology, including data collection, the case study introduction and a plan for the data analysis. Furthermore, limitations of the study and the researcher's personality are being discussed. The next chapter provides a qualitative data analysis in accordance to the conceptual framework. In chapter 6, conclusions are being formulated and results discussed. Recommendations for better practical applicability for CBE-practitioners as well as for further research and a discussion on the literature and conceptual framework close the thesis.

# 2. Community-Based Ecotourism in Kenya

This section provides in depth insights about Community-Based Ecotourism (CBE) in Kenya and zooms in on the Amboseli Ecosystem, where this research is conducted. CBE is embedded in the context of nature conservation and wildlife protection, which will be introduced. The shift in conservation and land use policies, with the effects of land scarcity and change in the Maasai lifestyle are presented. Furthermore, the sub-division of land and conservancy structures located in group ranches outside protected areas will contribute to an understanding of the local context. Also Ecotourism in Amboseli and Kilitome Conservancy partnership agreement will be introduced to give a broad overview for the background of the case study. The part ends with short insights about the social structures of Maasai communities.

## 2.1. CBE – A DEVELOPMENT AND CONSERVATION TOOL

Since the emergence of so called Community-Based-Tourism (CBT) strategies in the 1970's, there has been no common definition for it (Mayaka *et al.*, 2012 as cited in Mtapuri & Giampiccoli, 2014). As Salazar (2012) claims, the term CBT is a buzzword in literature on tourism development and planning, even though its definition stays fuzzy. He argues that the wide ranging scope of what CBT should or could include, led to conflicts due to power differences, unfair benefit sharing and ambiguous ownership of tourism ventures and therefore led to exploitative behavior. Thus, the concept is contested, even though it is being promoted as having the potential to bring economic benefits to marginalized communities, not only for the protection of their natural resources but also their socio-cultural resources (Mtapuri & Giampiccoli, 2014). The UNWTO (2001) promoted CBT by claiming that tourism can only truly succeed if it engages the local community in its practices. CBT is based on a participatory approach and ultimately emerged as a result of the failure of top-down management approaches to both, conservation and development (Goodwin & Santilli, 2009). Many organizations have had problems implementing participatory CBT interventions in practice. Research revealed that 40% of CBT projects in developing countries do not involve community members in decision-making (Mitchell & Muckosy, 2008).

In recent years, CBT became a very important form of tourism in Eastern and Southern Africa (UNWTO, 2001), whereas simultaneously ecotourism proved its potential for having a good economic impact on the local communities as well (Ashley *et al.*, 2001). Tourism is one of the largest industries worldwide, and ecotourism is the sector growing fastest within this industry (UNWTO, 2005). Ecotourism is a form of responsible travel to undisturbed natural areas, promotes conservation and involves the local communities. It combines cultural and environmental tourism (Scheyvens, 1999). For this reason, ecotourism merged with CBT and scholars formed the term Community-Based Ecotourism (CBE) (Novelli, 2016). CBE interventions basically differ from ecotourism in a way that they are not entirely planned by external operators, which most likely produce economic leakages and lack participation (Akama, 1996). More specifically, CBE incorporates the concept of collective conservation by local people who eventually take ownership of conservation activities, and thus will be more likely to support it (Campbell & Vainio-Mattila, 2003). WWF, one of the biggest NGO's in conservation, defines CBE as a tourism practice wherein the community significantly participates in development and management issues and where large amounts of benefits are being kept within the community (WWF, 2001). CBE is thus understood to have the potential to contribute significantly to

sustainable[1] development. International Conservation Organization's programs increasingly involve Community Participation in their program objectives (UNEP 2006).

## 2.2. National and Regional Context

In the following, the emergence of conservation policies in form of national parks and the therefrom resulting land shortage is outlined. I will elaborate on the transformation of the Maasai from a nomadic towards sedentary lifestyle caused by the change in conservation policies and landownership. Moreover, the establishment of group ranches and the sub-division of those will be described, in particular the Kimana Group Ranch. As a consequence, the Kilitome conservancy was established together with Tawi Lodge and the African Wildlife Foundation. To place the conservation intervention in the context, tourism an Ecotourism in the Amboseli region is being discussed, ending with insights on the Maasai way of life and social structures.

### 2.2.1. From Nomadism to Landownership & the Emergence of Protected Areas

Kenya's economy is based on land since pre-colonial times, and is still today considered as the most important form of social security (Karanja, 1991). Land scarcity and the commercialization of agriculture, has led to a formal individualization of land after the Independence of Kenya in 1963. According to customs, Maasailand is communal land and regulated under traditional laws that are being enforced by well-respected elders (Seno & Shaw, 2002). Half of all pastoral people in the world are located in Africa, mainly in Kenya, where 70 per cent of the country's surface is used by pastoralists. Pastoralists are dependent on livestock; raising domestic animals such as cattle, goats, sheep for nutrition and trade (Fratkin, 2001) and usually occupy savannah and dry, communally shared land. The Maasai provide a good example for researching relationships between wildlife, tourism and pastoralists in East Africa (Anderson & Grove, 1987). Traditionally, the Maasai are pastoralists and still today they mostly depend on livestock rearing as primary livelihood activity (Western & Wright, 1994). Nowadays the Maasai are formally located in southwestern Kenya[2] and

[1] With sustainable development, I make use of the definition of the Bruntland Report (WCED, 1987, cited in Wearing and Neil, 1999), which says that development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability for future generations to meet their own needs. The World Tourism organization related this definition to sustainable tourism: "*Sustainable tourism development meets the needs of present tourists and host regions while protecting and enhancing opportunities for the future. It is envisaged as leading to management of all resources in such a way that economic, social and aesthetic needs can be fulfilled while maintaining cultural integrity, essential ecological processes, biological diversity and life support system."*Australia's Department of Environment and Heritage guide for planning sustainable tourism (2004, p.1).

[2] In Kajiado and Narok Districts. In the 1500s, they migrated from the northern Nile valley region down, to take over the Great Rift Valley (Kituyi, 1990).

historians say that the pastoralist Maasai tribe might have existed for about 3,000 years already (Marshall, 1989). The pastoral lifestyle of the Maasai in Kenya changed with the promotion of land ownership by the government. Western aid organizations in the 60's and 70's aimed at improving livelihoods of pastoralists in East African countries, based on the contested theory of Hardin (1968)[3] the 'tragedy of the commons". This theory sees traditional herding and farming practices and the common use of communal resources as environmentally degrading and wasteful. Based on the assumption that private land-use is more sustainable, local governments started promoting private ranching and agriculture as an alternative source of income (Fratkin, 2001). Also schooling and consuming were incentives for a sedentary lifestyle (McCabe *et al.,* 1992).

Begin 1900 game-viewing became popular and the need for wildlife protection was discerned. A shift in conservation policy took place, from protection through hunting regulation, to preservation through land protection (Simon, 1962). After gazetting the first national parks in the early 90's, pastoralists were not granted to use the land anymore for grazing. Available land got scarce. Especially the tribe of the Maasai went from nomadic pastoralism towards settling for agriculture and taking part in the cash economy as described in the following section. This change raised a lot of conflicts over ownership of land and resources (Zeppel, 2006). Some integrated ecotourism in their pastoralism lifestyle by setting up their own small ventures on their land or lease land to eco-lodges or conservation reserves or partner with tour operators (Okello, 2003). Today, 70% of the country's tourism income is dependent on wildlife tourists visiting game parks and protected areas, which is and more than 10% of gross domestic product of the tourism industry (KNBS, 2010). Okello *et al.* (2003) state that numerous Maasai's have settled along roadsides, close to national parks to sell handmade beads or charge for photographs. Also, demonstrating their culture in form of dances in cultural centres, located close to tourist accommodations or park entrances as a form of income generation, is seen regularly. Not only by setting up cultural villages, Maasai's have increasingly joined the tourism branch. Some become partners in safari businesses, work in lodges or own safari cars for game drives, others own bars or shops attractive for tourists. Also leasing land to hotel or campsite owners is a form of newly gained involvement into ecotourism (Zeppel, 2006). Generally, Maasai's profit from tourism and increasingly become part of the capitalist system, whereby modern values like individualism and competition are slowly replacing traditional ones (Nagle, 1999).

[3] Garrett Hardin's article, "The Tragedy of the Commons" brings population growth and the finiteness of natural resources in relation and suggests controlling the world's population. He rejects ideas about improved production through advanced technology and stresses *"a finite world can support only a finite population*". In his view, people are self-centred and only interested in maximizing their own gains, therefore exploiting common resources of the earth (Hardin, 1968).

Ecotourism on pastoralist land increased (Zeppel, 2006) and for tourism to continue, landscapes and biodiversity has to be maintained. When Amboseli Game Reserve became an officially gazetted national park shortly after the 2nd World War, the communities who originally lived there received no compensation for their land loss. Little access for local residents to resources like drinking water, grazing areas and agricultural land, where the consequences of severely reduced Maasailand (Berger 1993). Inhabitants were prohibited from entering the park to collect or utilize natural resources, whereas safari tourists were allowed in large numbers (Okello *et al*., 2009). This eventually led to the communities' indifference towards wildlife and nature conservation. A difficulty for the pastoralists was and still is the lack of formal education, which often results in not knowing how to unite and claim their rights (Nagle, 1999; Kebathi, 2008). After Kenyan independence, other tribes started to settle the Kilimanjaro area, which increased land shortage even more. Hence, the need for landownership extended, which is considered as form of land administration that does not go along well with wildlife protection (Western & Wright, 1994). As an alternative way of conserving nature without having to expand national parks, but include communities in the process, conservancies have been increasingly implemented in Africa (the first in the 1970 in South Africa) (Duim *et al.*, 2015). National parks are a form of governmental conservation with defined borders (Muhumuaza & Balkwill, 2013), but vulnerable environment stretches wider than these borders. To enable the development of tourism for the main purpose of conserving areas outside state-protection, new arrangements have been established between private entrepreneurs and local communities (Lamers *et al.,* 2013). Integrating conservation with development is now undertaken by conservancies (Novelli and Gebhardt, 2007, Ashley 2000), among other arrangements which are primarily existent in Southern and Eastern Africa. There is yet little understanding about the engagement of conservation organizations, such as the African Wildlife Foundation in tourism, at places where these arrangements shape great parts of the landscape.

Figure 1: Landscape in the Amboseli Ecosystem

### 2.2.2. Group Ranches & The sub-division of Kimana Group Ranch

The Amboseli National Park is the core of the so-called Kilimanjaro Heartland which is a wide area stretching from Amboseli to the Chyulu Hills, Tsavo West until Mt. Kilimanjaro National Park in Tanzania. The area consists of six group ranches namely, Olgulului/Lolarashi, Imbirikani, Eselenkei, Kimana, Kuku and Rombo that surround the national park, which is declared a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve in 1991 due to its ecological significance. The ecosystem counts an elephant population of about 1,500, whereof the majority lives in the unprotected areas outside the park, due to insufficient space in the in the Amboseli National Park of 392 km$^2$ (Fitzgerald, 2013). A migration corridor for wildlife, from Amboseli National Park to the Chulu Hills, had been identified in 2010 as conservation priority for the ecosystem to stay functional. The east-west wildlife linkage is a viable movement route, not only for the elephant population, but also for lions, zebras, cheetahs, elands, gazelles and jackals for example. The biggest challenge in this context is to protect locally-owned land from destructive wildlife-passing, as well as securing the land to keep a safe habitat for the animals (Fitzgerald, 2013). The Kilitome conservancy, established in 2008, formed a solution by which the landowners could keep their titles, but lease their land to the African Wildlife Foundation for the continuous existence of the vital habitat of the national parks surroundings (Fitzgerald, 2013).




Figure 2: Overview of the area

Under the Land Act of 1968, the Maasai had been organized in different group ranches that hold the rights over their area of land and can allow permission for others to enter. It should have served to the improvement of pastoralists' productivity and therefore their income. At the same time overgrazing on communal land should be eliminated. It was a popular concept at first glance due to its character of keeping the land in the hand of the Maasai. Supposedly, government involvement in the group ranch processes was most probably shaped by corrupt practices and poor leadership, thus not leading to success (Ntiati, 2002). Challenges of land shortage threatened their existence, such as the expansion of private farms, wheat producers and game-viewing reserves. But, East African livestock-keeping people learned how to adapt and for a big part, kept their pastoralism traditions alive (Fratkin, 2001).

The Kimana Group Ranch (KGR) originally was a region of about 25,120 hectares of land, owned jointly by 843 registered members (status as of October 2001), mainly Masaai pastoralists. The communal land system failed in terms of improving sustainable livelihoods and was replaced by one that allows individual landownership and required the sub-division of all group ranches in Amboseli area (Fitzgerald, 2013). When KGR was split into 60 acre lots between 2004 and 2006, of which a number would border with the national park - it formed a threat towards the future of wildlife's habitat and free movement (Fitzgerald, 2013). Agriculture was the main motivator among the Maasai to support the sub-division, which even increased the scarcity of water for people and wildlife likewise (Okello, 2012). After the transformation into private land, the members formed five landowner associations of about 340 landowners in total, whereof 100 were part of Kilitome association (Fitzgerald, 2013) which is now the so called Kilitome[4] conservancy. Sub-division of a group ranch meant a change in the Maasai lifestyle and land use, meaning pastoralists started farming or leased their land to skilled farmers (ILRI, 2003). Especially lands that were located close to wetlands or swamps are popular for leasing, which implicated even more limited access to essential drinking water sources for elephants and wildlife. The result is a severe human-wildlife conflict through encroaching animals on cultivated farmland (Fitzgerald, 2013).

### 2.2.3. The Kilitome Conservancy Agreement

After the sub-division of the communal Maasai land of the Kimana group ranch (KGR) between 2004 and 2006, the land was privately owned by the community members and was gradually being sold or rented to farming and other commercial projects. Due to continuous damage by passing elephants, the local population started killing them to protect their crops. To counteract this behavior and secure the necessary habitat and migration of the animals, Maasai landowners have been convinced to agree to rent their land to Tawi lodge and the African Wildlife Foundation. With AWF´s PES (Payment for ecosystem services) lease program, the land of about 85 landowners is now the Kilitome conservancy and consists of 6,000 acres of vital land in order to help save this vast ecosystem. The land is now run as a partnership between the three parties: AWF, as the leading foundation on conservation issues on the African continent; Tawi lodge, a community-based eco-tourism business that uses natural resources and traditional culture in a socially respectful manner; and the members of the KGR who agreed to concede their 60 acres for a financial compensation (Fitzgerald, 2013). A conservancy fee paid by tourists entering the conservancy or using the lodge

[4] The name of the conservancy had officially been changed to "Tawi conservancy" (according Tawi lodge document), but the landowners still use the name "Kilitome conservancy" as it is described in the partnership agreement they signed.

facilities is used for social community projects and as compensation for local residents who are not allowed to use their land otherwise anymore (Duim *et al.*, 2015).

### 2.2.4. Tourism as part of the ecosystem

Amboseli holds one of the world's best wildlife viewing experiences, due to its dense animal population. The frequent tourist arrivals of the Amboseli Game Reserve showed that the area was suitable also for ecotourism development. Infrastructure in terms of airstrips and roads as well as the proximity to Kenya's capital city and the Amboseli National Park contribute to the popularity of KGR as tourist destination (Fitzgerald, 2013). These characteristics added to realization of the Kimana Wildlife Sanctuary (Odich, 2012). KGR was the first community initiated wildlife conservation area in Kenya in 1996 (Okello, 2012). At the east side of Amboseli National park most lodges and tourism accommodations exist (778 beds), due to its proximity to the park`s main entrance. Environmental degradation of the area negatively influences the tourism experience due to decaying wildlife and, therefore will reduce the number of tourist visits and their expenditures (Fitzgerald, 2013). Even the government was worried and assigned the Kenyan Ministry of Tourism to tackle *"the growing concerns in government and civil society about the deteriorating status of the environment and the tourism product in the Greater Mara and Amboseli ecosystems."(p.8)* in 2009 (Fitzgerald, 2013)

Tourism in the Amboseli region, just like other tourist destinations in Kenya, is declining since unrest and terroristic acts have started threatening the country. In the early 1990's the decline in tourism started because of insecurity due to civil unrest or so called tribal clashes. The worst period in terms of tourism started in 2008 caused by severe tensions after the elections, paired with the global financial crisis (Government of Kenya, 2009). In addition, since 2009 the Somali terror militia increased attacks in Kenya even on soft targets[5], it had a large impact on the tourism sector and the country's overall image abroad (Gehani, 2014). Kenya's coastal areas and wildlife that have always been the main points of attraction for international tourists, but are degrading due to poor tourism planning policies and changes in lifestyles, such as increasing sedentary people. On top of that, political interests affect environmental management policies negatively and therefore enlarge environmental challenges (Balala, 2011). The Kenyan Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife (2007) wrote that wildlife is an important income creator for national and local economies. Kenya's wildlife is one of the richest in Africa but its population has heavily declined in number over the past few decades, inside and outside parks and reserves. These losses showed the necessity for a national change in conservation strategies towards more community-based interventions (Western *et al.,* 2009). Local

[5] Soft targets are public places such as bars, restaurants, shopping malls, universities.

people like the former KGR members, or members of other group ranches have most likely insufficient capacities in terms of knowledge and management experience, to start a tourism business, without external or professional partners. Partnering with private organizations or investors is a way to overcome this deficit (Kiss, 2004).

### 2.2.5. Maasai lifestyle

The social structure and livelihood of the Maasai are associated with their environment and largely depend on their land and cattle. Traditionally their homes are made of dung and mud and are seen as the place where "all life is protected" (Ndagala, 1992). A few houses grouped in a circle, hosting several families are called a 'boma'. Either befriended families or married sons with their wives and children are living together in one boma. A marriage binds two domestic groups or families together and provides a certain social and financial security (Ndagala, 1992). Children are expected to help their parents with the daily responsibilities, such as herding, farming or chores. Age plays a distinctive role in a Maasai society. For instance, elders have a central position in resolving conflicts in a community, and are even described as *"conscience of society"* in literature (Saitoti, 1980, p. 185). Furthermore, the fact that a Maasai wife is traditionally much younger than the husband contributes to the inequality between the status of men and women. Polygamy is the traditional form of marriage and not seen as a tool to lower the status of a woman, as Ndagala (1992) claims. Wives usually treat each other like a family and help each other out. According to customs, wives are not of more importance to man than cattle and referred to as property (Ndagala, 1992). Maasai customs prohibit women from registering as a group ranch member, unless they are widowed. But in spite of that, widows were not involved in the division process in Amboseli, due to their traditional and cultural marginalization (Ntiati, 2002). Not many Maasai men are educated but always have authority over women, of which even fewer gain education. Regarding schooling and literacy it is noteworthy that 38,5 % adults and 29,9 % young

Figure 3: Traditional house in boma, Namelok

people (aged 15-19) are illiterate in Kenya, (status as of 2006; Kebathi, 2008[6]). Due to low education and a big age difference in marriage, the view on the marginalized role of women in society established (Spencer, 2003). Nowadays, the role has changed slightly, due to a shift in gender roles in livestock production and agricultural activities (Wangui, 2008).

# 3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The following framework of concepts was used in this research, in order to understand how Community Participation in ecotourism development may be influenced by a community's bonding and linking Social Capital, as well as the inherent power and trust relations.

Empowerment, effectiveness, efficiency and sharing costs and benefits are a number of interrelated required aspects for genuine Community Participation, which are to be reached through community capacity building. Participation is a critical success factor of CBE –intervention and to learn more about the process of achieving it, Social Capital will serve insights on its effect on the participation process.

## 3.1. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN TOURISM DEVELOPMENT

Community Participation is treated by scholars as fundamental to community development through tourism, where the recognition of natural and cultural resources plays an important role (Hibbard & Lurie, 2000; Mitchell & Reid, 2001). The definitions of 'community' and the contested subject of 'participation' have rather complex meanings. Crow and Allan (1994) make an often used distinction between community ties being characterized by *"common residence, common interest, common attachments or other shared experience generating a sense of belonging" (p.1).* Sheaff (2005) translates this into *"a shared geographic locality or lifestyle, an occupation or some other interest or involvement." (p.159).* Willmott (1989) explains that it can also be related to religion, sexuality or ethnicity. In this research, I am using community rather in a geographical sense, when referring to the Namelok community in Kajiado district in Kenya. Within this local community, I am often times pointing out the 'landowners' as a group of Maasai men who share the common characteristic of owning land in a specific area that has been reassigned into Kilitome conservancy. Therefore, these men share common interests about their land and the institutions of the

[6] The Kenya National Adult Literacy Survey (KNALS) was conducted between June and August 2006 by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) in collaboration with the Department of Adult Education, UNESCO Nairobi Office and other key partners (Kebathi, 2008).

conservancy. Field (2008) summarizes, that participation among communities is generally considered an abstract but positive concept that represents interactions amongst people. This concept has only really been considered in tourism planning since the millennium and is perceived as having the potential to achieve a more equal distribution of costs and benefits among the stakeholders of the tourism destination. Active participation of the community can add significantly to the preservation and conservation of cultural and natural resources (Tosun & Timothy 2003). Community Participation in tourism can be defined as beneficiaries mobilizing their own resources, identify their own needs and shape the decision-making process (Stone, 1989). To distinguish involvement from participation it can be said, that involvement only implies achieving a community's co-operation to carry out a project; participation is a term that implies more of a co-creation of the tourism development process (Habito-Javier, 2012) where the focus of this research lies. Habito-Javier (2012) furthermore clarifies the appropriateness of participation in the begin phases of community tourism development projects when residents should speak up and share their perceptions and expectations with the tourism authorities.

Involving communities in externally funded interventions, for example by international NGO's, became prominent in the 1970's. At that time it was increasingly recognized that beneficiaries of development aid have very diverse interests, and the term 'stakeholder' emerged. The idea of including all stakeholders, created problems for participatory development practitioners because it suggests the participation of equal partners, which is not a realistic assumption due to large power differences and divergent interests (Campbell & Vainio-Mattila, 2003). Likewise, proper expectation management carried out by the assigned field staff in an early phase of the project cycle is difficult due to the large number of diverse stakeholders. Nevertheless, expectation management is vital to the long-term success of the intervention because it can avoid frustrations (Snyman & Spenceley 2012). A drawback for local participation especially in economically weak places, is the need for locals to get through and care for their own and their family's existence, rather than making plans and participating in tourism projects. Mostly, benefits are too far in the future to be able to put time and energy into it, in a situation of hardship (Timothy, 1999). As discussed later on, another difficulty for local participation might be that people are not willing to contribute and be involved, because they lack the confidence to believe that their word counts and is valuable to the process (Cole, 2006).

Tosun (2004) says that achieving Community Participation plays a decisive role for satisfaction of the community with the project and its results. For examining and identifying Community Participation in this study, I am referring to Paul (1987), who described various participation goals that should guide the execution of development projects. His theory consists of intertwined concepts

without ascending order. Paul`s research is based on World Bank supported but his publication 1987 was influential in development and tourism research worldwide. He is oftentimes cited among the first authors regarding an explanation of participatory projects processes in tourism as well as development literature (King, 2014; Olatunbosun & Bayode, 2014; Oakley, 1991; Griffin & Marpeth, 2010). Paul refers to participation in externally funded projects. According to him, it is an active process in which beneficiaries can influence the directions of developments, rather than simply get a share of the benefits the project yields. He identified Community Participation goals for development projects and emphasized concepts of 'capacity building', 'empowerment', 'effectiveness', 'efficiency' and 'shared costs'. Summarized, his theory is based on the following assumptions: Building capacities among beneficiaries refers to management and monitoring tasks which then lead to an enhanced level of interest in the intervention. Beneficiaries can be empowered through a redistribution of power (also see Arnstein, 1996). This means, shifting power about decision making from the power-holders to the powerless. The project effectiveness can be influenced by participating and hence improvement of the project design and implementation. An improved project design is for example an alteration which will be useful in the long term for the beneficiaries and at the same time, meet the involved stakeholders' interests. The support of cooperation, agreement and interaction among beneficiaries and the external project authorities can lead to the efficient implementation of project goals concerning time and costs. Facilitating a collective understanding on cost sharing among the beneficiaries is necessary to spread a sense of ownership of the particular project. Costs are contributions in form of money, manpower or natural resources (Paul, 1987).

I will use the objective of building community member's capacities in a wider extend and elaborate on his work. In this thesis, as defined in the next section, capacity building is considered needed for the achievement of each of the remaining four participation objectives identified by Paul. Based on Jamal and Getz (1999), Seiichi and Yokoyama (2006) and Lin (2001), it can be assumed that capacity building is necessary as a tool or precondition to get involved and reach effective participation. For applying the identified objectives and assessing them in this thesis, they will be referred to as criteria rather than goals. By evaluating these criteria, substantiated findings about Community Participation are the result.

### 3.1.1. Capacity Building for Community Participation

The community capacity building process is a means for community development by improving abilities to participate in tourism activities and decision-making (Reid & Gibb, 2004; Smith *et al.,* 2001

as cited in Aref & Redzuan, 2009). Moscardo (2008) also incorporates the concept of capacity building in the CBT planning approach and claims that capacity building should ideally run simultaneously to tourism planning activities. Therefore it enhances the host community's abilities to retain a certain amount of control over the plans themselves. Mostly NGO's, governments or other external stakeholders, hold the power about providing opportunities to obtain these abilities (Jamal & Getz, 1999). To focus on stakeholders' ability to participate in decision-making, it is suggested among others, to adopt a definition of capacity from Lavarack (2005, as cited in Moscardo 2008), who says *"community capacity includes the assets and attributes that a community is able to draw upon in order to improve their lives" (p.267)*. In the context of this thesis, capacity building is seen as assistance in self-help as part of the tourism development planning and implementation process. Many definitions about community capacity share common themes, which Moscardo (2008) summarizes as collective[7] knowledge and ability, as well as the usage of both to define problems and find options and solutions.

In practice, community concerned tourism operators invest in local trainings to contribute to community development. When certain information or even the flow of information is not provided, participation is being hampered. Tosun (2000) knows that in development countries, data about tourism for the host communities are insufficient and if present, not being spread in a comprehensible way. This leads to uninformed people regarding ecotourism development. Tosun (2000) says that this shortage of communication between tourism authorities and the host community "*not only increases the knowledge gap between local communities and decision-makers but also accelerates isolation of the local community from the tourism development process" (p.620).* Also Seiichi and Yokoyama (2006) claim, that essential tourism information need to be disseminated to the involved people, to create confidence in participating.

#### 3.1.1.1. Community Participation Criteria

For this study the capacity building processes of a tourism intervention have been explored and for the analysis the theory of the four criteria of Community Participation, namely 'sharing cost and benefits', 'efficiency' 'effectiveness' and 'empowerment' is used. In this section, I will describe in detail what each of the participation criteria entail in terms of capacities needed. All have in common that they require the establishing of knowledge.

[7] Collective action describes the process and as well as the consequences of peoples' decisions to coordinate their behaviour voluntarily (White & Runge, 1995).

Knowledge capacity and agreement about the realistic ***costs and benefits*** of the intervention for the community, therefore about the local sharing systems is necessary to fulfill the participation goal of sharing costs and benefits. Costs are contributions in form of money, manpower or natural resources, for the realization of the intervention. Paul did not include the concept of benefit sharing among the beneficiaries, but I see it as complementary to cost sharing since costs and benefits are inseparable in terms of equity. The equity in sharing benefits is based on contributions made (Mohammed 2011). More clearly, I am referring to the distribution of benefits at community level, of financial nature or in form of natural resources or access to information etc. (IFC 2015). It is about ensuring that everyone involved comprehends and accepts the costs the intervention requires of them as individuals and the community as a whole. Expectation management is a vital concept in this context, since managing the beneficiary's expectations about the realistic costs and gains is necessary for a well-managed and implemented sharing system (Snyman & Spenceley 2012). A host community is unlikely to participate in the intervention when the benefits are not in proportion to the costs and efforts made (Murphree, 1999 as cited in Stone 2010). Sharing one´s private property is seen as making the owner vulnerable, Ritchie & Echnter (2011) claim. This means that especially contributions made, in this case in terms of land handed over due to a lease agreement, need to be well thought through and the possible consequences evaluated.

The ***efficiency*** increases and decreases with the degree of agreement, interaction, communication and cooperation between the beneficiaries and the project authorities, as Paul (1987) claims. Depending on the project at stake, the skills necessary for seamless project operations differ but for instance, basic training in teamwork, communication and listening benefit each project. The enhancement of these skills can improve the efficiency of a tourism intervention by enabling a smoother implementation of difficult project steps and hence saving time and resources, according to Paul (1987). Consulting with local people about the implementation and the management of the project increases its efficiency. If not managed well, local participation often requires a higher number of staff running the project, as well as extending the initial time scope that exceeds the initial budget (Drake, 1991). Beneficials might request or require more than initially planned, which also reflects in the project costs (Swarbrooke, 1999). Whether or not sustainability of the development intervention has been reached, shows how efficient the same is. Sustainability in this sense refers to the continuation of the project, once the donor agency withdraws (Cooke & Kothari, 2001).

For the criterion of ***effectiveness***, the creation of knowledge capacity among the community members about the tourism industry like the market, the target group, tourism products and tourism experiences is helpful to eventually improve the intervention design (Paul 1987). Regarding this

particular research, especially the understanding about ecotourism and the contribution to a long-term conservation strategy, with the help of tourism is needed. Tosun (2000) specifies this by referring to the dissemination of comprehensible information to the local community, about the structure of the communities in the area and data about local, national and international tourism. This implies that a wide range of information and the access to it should be given. Using the newly gained capacities to revise the project plans, a cyclical process of revision and re-negotiation between the beneficiaries and the project authorities can take place, aiming at consensus among all stakeholders. Even though consensus cannot always be achieved, this can still lead to a fundamentally improved project result, which is aligned with the beneficiary's constraints and necessities. Local participation is increasingly being regarded as fundamental to the effectiveness of the planning and management of tourism projects (Garrod 2003).

The last criterion to evaluate is the concept of ***empowerment***, which has been extensively discussed in various disciplines such as community development, psychology, education, and economic, with the effect of numerous inconsistent definitions (Strzelecka, 2012). For this research, I adopt the definition of Ife (2003) who says that assisting a community to achieve empowerment means *"providing people with the resources, opportunities, vocabulary, knowledge and skills to increase their capacity to determine their own future and to participate in and affect the life of their community" (P. 208).* This comes from the domain of social work and their community-based strategies, but is used by Giampiccoli and Hayward Kalis (2012) in the CBT-context. To link empowerment to capacity building, I refer to Rappaport (1981) who stated: *"increased capacity can contribute to empowerment of individuals and groups, which has been shown to lead to sustained and meaningful action".* Also Scheyvens (2003) stresses that empowerment is a crucial step towards meaningful participation. Following this line of thought, it needs to be mentioned that Foster-Fishman *et al.* (2001, as cited in Raik, 2002) found empowerment to be an outcome of capacity building. Hence, the opportunity to gain new capacities to initiate actions and shape decision-making processes, needs to be available to those who are not yet empowered. This is essential to the research of Alsop *et al.* (2006) who found that the existence of opportunities and choices available are important for tracking empowerment for research purposes. It is suggested that one should ask whether or not this opportunity has been seized and whether the choice brought the desired result. Participating in the decision making process of tourism development is a key achievement for the insurance of acceptability of a project (Tosun, 2006). Once an individual or a group has acquired the capacity to determine their own affairs and reach a point where factors that affect their lives are being under own control, one can speak of being empowered (Cole, 2005). Additionally, confidence to take part in the decision-making process is needed. Concerning cultural traditions and history,

confidence is mostly lacking in marginalized communities (Cole, 2006). Strengthening confidence through the involvement in tourism activities can encourage self-belief, which is necessary for decision-making. Tourism can enhance a communities' access to information, media as well as new language skills (Williams, 1998). With these signs of empowerment, a community can challenge actions by outsiders who have a divergent interest in the destination (Johnston, 1992; Swain, 1990 as stated in Cole, 2005). When people feel that they have nothing valuable to contribute to, they become unwilling to participate because they have no courage to deal with involved issues (Timothy, 1999). Oftentimes, communities lack the knowledge about what they can or have to make a decision about (Sofield, 2003). The following table summarizes the participation criteria and their identification used:

Table 1: Capacities and Community Participation Criteria

| Capacities for Community Participation | Community Participation Criteria |
|---|---|
| Acceptability and comprehension of contributions and advantages of intervention. | **Sharing Costs & Benefits** |
| Agreement, interaction and communication for time and cost efficiency; reaching sustainability (continuity) | **Efficiency** |
| Knowledge about tourism industry to improve project plans (revision and re-negotiation). | **Effectiveness** |
| Shaping decision-making processes; gain confidence; determine and control own affairs; seizing opportunities. | **Empowerment** |

In the subsequent paragraphs, the link between Community Participation and Social Capital will be established. Building capacities in the context of this thesis is essentially about creating understanding about ecotourism and how one is able to contribute to it (Drake, 1991).

## 3.2. SOCIAL CAPITAL IN ECOTOURISM DEVELOPMENT

Social Capital (SC) has been a relevant concept in development studies and viewed as essential for the sustainability of projects since 1990 (World Bank, 2009). Yet little attention was paid to Community-Based Tourism development through the lens of SC (MCGehee, 2010). The existing studies in this area view SC as having the potential to extensively influence the process of participation in community tourism development interventions (Johannesson *et al.,* 2003; Jones, 2005; Karlsson, 2005; Macbeth *et al.,* 2004; Nordin & Westlund, 2009 as cited in Zhao *et al.,* 2011). Building a community's capacities relies on Social Capital, as Hounslow (2002) and Woodhouse (2006) claim. Aref and Redzuan (2009) outline that many scholars agree, that community capacity building emphasizes *"a collaborative, ongoing, influential process based on the relationships between people for development processes." (p.1).* Relationships and social networks define Social Capital, which therefore indicates the relevancy to couple the concepts of community capacity building for participation with Social Capital. Relationships with, and trust in others can influence the way an individual resource is used. Therefore, trust relationships can be seen as a critical component for the performance of community capacity (Balint, 2006). At the same time, differences in power need to be considered, and identified whether or not they are effectively contributing to enhance the participation in meetings and trainings for capacity building (Chu, 2003, as cited in Wong, 2007). To summarize, SC includes themes of relationships, networks and competencies as well as its integrated concepts of trust and power. Those, as well as different perspectives such as bonding, bridging, linking relationships are elaborated on in the following to structure SC.

The term Social Capital is defined as the immaterial and complex resources of a community, like shared values and relationships (Stone, 2010) and incorporates several perspectives on social relations (Macbeth *et al.*, 2004). SC has been extensively conceptualized in different ways in literature by sociologists, philosophers and political scientists like Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988), Putnam (1993) and Ostrom (2000). In particular, Putnam[8] explains: *"Social capital (… ) refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions*"(p. 167). For this research I adopted the definition by Pooley *et al.* (2005) who see SC as 'glue' between individuals or groups and explain the concept with integrated themes namely relationships, networks and competencies. Without this glue, people would be fully unconnected to one another and relationships between individuals or groups would not be existent. Hence, to develop SC, relationships must be strengthened. Lin (2001) describes

[8] Putnam's work about Social Capital is most generally cited in contemporary political or economic sciences (Schultheis, 2009).

networks as *"the social relationships between individual actors, groups, organizations, communities, regions and nations that serve as a resource to produce positive returns" (p.6).* Therefore, it can be said that relationships are inherent to networks. To analyse such a social network, according to Lin, size and heterogeneity are the two major components to examine. With size he refers to the amount of connections or ties someone has. Heterogeneity describes whether actors in one's network are rather similar or diverse. The structure of such a network is defined through the density of relationships (Lin, 2001). Dense relationships facilitate social support and information flow (Wellman & Frank, 2001). The denser the network, the bigger the inherent potential for change and grasping of new opportunities among the individuals of the network. Tourism development could illustrate these new opportunities and change. Woolcock & Narayan (2000) claim that people from dense networks are more likely to participate effectively in tourism development to be part of the change. For Maru (2005) as well as Coleman (1988), dense networks not only facilitate participation, but also trust, which is an inherent concept of the SC of a community. Trust is therefore a crucial aspect to examine within the SC of a community. Schneider (2006) stresses the importance of power to the concept of SC, which scholars such as Coleman and Putnam ignore. For Schneider, applying SC in particular involves the understanding of power relations and claims that this understanding is essential for achieving action. Especially in the context of poverty, it is widely recognized that unequal power relations are fundamental to continued poverty, therefore acquires attention in order for change to happen (Wacquant, 1998, as stated in Schneider, 2006). With competencies, the individual's resources are meant, including for example one's self-esteem and the ability to cooperate with others (Maru *et al.* 2005, as cited in Moscardo, 2008). Here is to be added, that according to Moscardo (2008), knowledge is an individual's resource and underlies all competencies or capacities. Competences of network actors in this research are referred to as capacities needed for well operating a CBT-intervention. Seiichi and Yokoyama (2006) describe that SC facilitates collective action that benefits the community and binds it together.

To be able to view relationships, networks and competencies of the community from different angles in my analysis, I am borrowing the 'synergy' view by Woolcock and Narayan (2000) that describes SC as a mix of integrated perspectives, namely bonding, bridging and linking. First, bonding and bridging were identified as perspectives to analyze the SC of a community (Portes, 1998; Putnam, 2000). Then, the linking element was added to the framework by Szreter and Woolcock in 2004 (Poortinga, 2011). Bonding SC refers to relationships between similar network members or the reinforcement of homogeneous groups and identities. Bridging SC implies outward looking individuals of a community that establish relationships across social and ethnic groups and therefore the establishment of new ideas and perspectives (Gittell & Vidal, 1998). Economically seen,

communities with high bridging SC might be an accelerator for small businesses to emerge and develop (Karlsson, 2005). Linking SC refers to relationships between individuals and institutions across all power gradients. Those are oftentimes relatively weak ties, but those with the most significant outcomes, like job opportunities (Woolcock, 2001; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004).

### 3.2.1. Bonding Social Capital

Bonding (internal) SC occurs "horizontally", meaning within a community (Putnam, 1993) or between people with similar objectives (Pretty, 2003; Lin, 2001). It is shaped by dense relationships and implies trust (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). Strong ties of similar individuals can generate productivity (MacBeth, 2004) and empowerment among a social group (Onyx & Bullen, 2000), and are supported by a sense of belonging and shared identity (Reicher *et al.,* 2010). By empowerment, the increased capacity of a person to determine his or her own affairs and deduce foreign control is meant (Ife, 2003). From development literature can be drawn that poor communities may have dense relationships to support each other and make ends meet but often lack of more outreaching relationships like the bridging and linking SC to develop new ideas for progress (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Tajfel and Turner (1986) tell us that bonding or categorizing oneself to a group leads to positive effects concerning one's self-esteem. People define their identity in relation to others, thus rather in terms of "we", than "I".

The bonding relationships of a community's SC are relevant for this research because it provides the insights on internal community ties of rather like-minded residents. These ties can be families, friends and neighbors, or groups with similar objectives such as sports clubs or mothers` groups (Pretty *et al.,* 2003; Okazaki, 2008). Botes and Rensburg (2000, as cited in Thammajinda, 2013) argue that each community consists of a variety of social groups with differing interests. Once these are conflicting, Community Participation might be hindered or at least more difficult to be achieved.

This thesis looks at the bonding ties mainly among landowners from the community of Namelok, who own land, which is transformed to the Kilitome conservancy. Insights on bonding relationships among Namelok community member serve to understand the context in which the landowners are embedded. Therefore, looking at family- and community structures will be helpful to gain insight on the community and therefore the social group of landowners.

### 3.2.2. Linking Social Capital

The linking perspective of SC has not particularly been discussed in tourism development literature – yet its importance had been noticed by for example Jones (2004), MCGehee (2010) and Moscardo (2006; 2008), who examine the concept of SC more holistically in the tourism context.

Linking SC considers relations of unequal power, meaning connections between less similar network members across all power gradients and with institutions. It is a vertical and not homogeneous dimension (Warren *et al.*, 2001). Linking SC is about the engagements to the state or external institutions for the sake of acquiring resources or influencing policy decisions (Pretty, 2003; Okazaki, 2008). Especially in poor communities, linking SC comprises the existent ties and their intensity to representatives of formal institutions that hold the power of influencing the community's welfare, as Szreter and Woolcock (2004) summarized. Moreover, linking ties are characterized by the exposure of the community to new perspectives, ideas and values and therefore of added value. For instance, external agents like NGO's can provide help for the local community to access certain resources and knowledge that eventually enable them to participate actively and improve living conditions (Grant, 2001). Wong (2007) found that leaders and people in authoritarian positions can increase the project efficiency and the effectiveness of the enforcement of contractual agreements. But she and also Beall (1997) argue that tourism development projects that intervene without sufficient understanding of the local power structures might only reinforce present inequalities in terms of power.

In the framework of this research, linking SC implies relationships with power holding parties that can create opportunities for the local people to participate in the CBE intervention and contribute to the sustainability of it. I examined linking SC only to the group of landowners related to the case, and their ties to the tourism authorities of the addressed case.

### 3.2.3. Trust as aspect of Social Capital

This section discusses trust with regard to Community Participation, because trust in tourism institutions is vital for tourism processes with equal voices, since they can prevent corruption and unfairness (Thammajinda, 2013). High trust can be an indicator for more collaboration. For the analysis of the concept, the structure of relationships, risk acceptability and the agreement of legitimate authority is being discussed in the following.

Bonding and linking ties are highly interwoven with trust relationships (Flora, 2004). Mendoza-Botelho (2013), Jones (2004) and Putnam (2000), think of trust between individuals but also in organizations surrounding them as one of the fundamental principles of SC. Individuals that show high inter-personal trust among one other, most likely create more willingness to cooperate, while likewise frequent social interaction strengthen inter-personal trust. These mutual trust relations are nurturing cooperation and reduce time and costs between individuals for various sorts of transactions (Pretty, 2003). Trust and social participation are therefore highly correlated and mutually reinforcing (Seligson *et al.*, 2006). Trust is inherit in community relations (Stein & Harper, 2003), and requires reciprocity (the mutual exchange of goods and knowledge). When reciprocity is not given, cooperative activities (like tourism development) are unlikely to happen and consequently suspiciousness, opportunistic behaviour, conflicts or simply distrust arise (Svendsen & Bjornskov, 2007). Therefore it can be said that, when the level of trust is high in a community, collaborative behaviour with others is more likely.

Analytical studies in the field of trust often use the following concepts: the structure of relationships, the amount of acceptable risk and agreement on legitimate authority (Lachapelle, 2008[9]). Trust emerges from repeated interaction and the completion of mutual expectations between people which can only take place when those have faith in each other's integrity (Weber & Carter, 2003). Therefore, examining relationships between individuals is a crucial step in applying the concept of trust for analysis, which is in the following referred to as relational trust. It has been found that trust is about having positive expectations about others (Weber & Carter, 2003) which can lead to people having trust in the decisions of others and develop confidence to engage similarly. I would also like to refer to Rousseau *et al.* (1998), who claim that trust can lead to a shared identity, by which he means shared information, status and concern. As described earlier, similar objectives and dense associations can create the perception of belonging to a group of people that share same values and interests, which is basically shaped by trust relationships (MacBeth, 2004; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004).

Furthermore, about Lachapelle's analytical framework for analyzing trust, the concept of risk is being discussed. Following Rousseau *et al.* (1998), the existence of risk is necessary in order for trust or distrust to establish because taking a risk reflects becoming vulnerable. He claims that an individual would not be in need of trust when actions and consequences are characterized by

[9] Lachapelle uses these concepts in the context of his study on the potential of ownership in community development practices. In this thesis, they will be used to gain understanding of trust in linking as well as bonding links within a tourism development intervention.

complete certainty. The concept of risk can be defined as the existence of the possibility of unfavorable events, whose consequences are not acceptable (Tsai *et al.,* 2012). Rousseau *et al*. (1998) as well as Ross and LaCroix (1996) therefore claim that risk taking symbolizes an outcome of trust or expresses the presence of it. For this research, risk is being translated into entering an uncertain situation, such as the conservancy agreement, with consequences that are difficult to oversee.

With the agreement on legitimate authority, scholars like Forester (1989) refer to the perception of an individual about those in charge, and whether this is considered as legitimate[10] or illegitimate. The unbiased distribution of information, a neutral facilitator for meetings and clear rules of the process can help to have a positive influence on the perception of legitimacy of the authorities (Hudson, 1979). By recognizing this, a better understanding of those in power of the decision-making process can be achieved (Lachapelle, 2008). Forester (1989) links this to trust relationships, since in her view, the decision-making authority constantly *"establishes, refines, and recreates and thus reproduces social relations of trust or distrust" (p.71).* Thus, approving the legitimacy of an authority is depending on the authorities' ability to create trust (Forester, 1989). Trustworthiness and honest behaviour can prevent corruption and unfairness. This is essential for tourism interventions when the benefits for the community become existential (Thammajinda, 2013). Nunkoo (2015) argues that locals´ trust in tourism institutions is vital for a democratic tourism planning process.

In summary it can be said that the insights on the concepts of relationship structures, the amount of acceptable risk and agreement on legitimate authority are indications for existent or non-existent trust among the landowners as well as their trust towards the tourism authorities. Furthermore, trust leads to collaboration among communities and increases willingness to cooperate with others.

### 3.2.4. Power as aspect of Social Capital.

The following reveals the concept of power within SC, with an emphasis on balancing divergent degrees of power differences, in order to implement Community Participation. Concepts for analytically approaching (unequal) power relations are authority and leadership, conflicts and knowledge, which I will elaborate on in this section after a general definition.

[10] Legitimacy emerges when those under the authority believe that it is beneficial or rational to obey the authority (Jost & Major, 2001).

Power in the context of SC often refers to relationships among different power gradients (linking SC), but also among community members (bonding SC). In particular, what refers to the power relations of a political, social or cultural system and their unequal distribution (Jones, 2004). Reed (1997) who followed West (1994) defined power as *"ability to impose one's will or advance one's own interest" (p.415).* Thammajinda (2013) found that ensuring a power balance of a community as well as among various stakeholders seems to be a decisive condition for the achievement of genuine Community Participation in tourism development. Conflict is a possible outcome of unequal power relations, also within communities. Generally, scholars find that residents often have less control, thus less power, over tourism interventions than other stakeholders, which is probably caused by the local residents' dependency on external businesses for which they often give up their resources. A lack of democracy and participation in the tourism process does only enhance this lack (Nunkoo *et al.,* 2012*).* Bramwell (2004) refers to tourism development with regards to power *as a ''multi-actor field, where different actors have their own specific interests, can espouse certain views, and have varying degrees of influence on the policy process and on the resulting policy direction'' (p. 32).*

The concepts of authority and power are intertwined as in authority being the base for the execution of powerful acts (Reed, 1997). The understanding of authority as a precondition for power within bonding and linking SC can help managing the process of working together effectively for tourism development. Arrangements or structures of authority refer to social roles and rules as regulating mechanisms (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003; Weber, 1987). Effective authority structures at the local level can be identified through the presence of committees, elected leaders, regular meetings and the striving towards collective action. Sanctions and procedures based on rules are part of these structures (Chu, 2003, as cited in Wong, 2007). Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000, in Wong, 2007) stated that: "*Crafting clear roles and rules is crucial to create a structure of organisation to produce decisions, mobilise resources, facilitate communication and resolve conflict" (p.15)*. It appears that authority is closely linked to leadership structures. For example, in the context of local participation, Prideaux (2002) states that the more committed community leaders' act and are willing to represent the communities' interests, the more effective on-going issues can be identified and addressed. Leadership simply implies authority that guides and supervises a group of individuals (Shields & Gardner, 1997). Whereas leadership is based on vision and personal drive to motivate and coach people towards change, management is a function for carrying out facilitating and organizing tasks as well as providing structure that is needed in order for the leaders to be able to lead (Drucker, 1988; Macobby, 2000 as cited in Toor & Ofori, 2008). Research has shown that locally influential and wealthy people might become the spokesperson (De Kadt, 1979) and power stays often among the

elite or vocally strong ones so that the silent ones are superseded (Tosun, 2006). In this sense it is to be mentioned that hierarchical structures within communities hinder collaborative behaviour as locals do not usually break traditions and rather avoid authoritarian people (Timothy, 1999). When looking at linking SC in this thesis, the concept of authority and leadership is applied to what I refer to as tourism authorities, as in the private tourism operator and the NGO and the authority structures they established.

Power inequality can lead to conflicts among a community or between the community and authorities, which makes the concept of conflicts, another component for the identification of power structures. Sanginga *et al.* (2007) in their research on conflict resolution in common resource management, define conflicts as *"situations involving people or social groups with different interests, and mutually antagonist tendencies and opposing influences competing for the use of limited resources to ensure or enhance their livelihoods".* Conflicts between community members and external institutions or individuals representing these institution, can result from that. Narayan (1999) wrote that the same ties that bind also exclude, and that very tightly knit social groups can practice corruption and lead to the existence of various social groups with very unequal access to participate in grabbing opportunities. Also, Nieburg (1969) stated in that sense, that power will always shape people's conflicts.

The distribution of knowledge is another important expression of power to be examined in the process of achieving Community Participation. People are often skeptical of participating in the planning process due to lacking experience with tourism and limited options presented to them by so called experts (Raj *et al*., 2013). The concept of power is not only all-present in no matter what kind of social situation, it is also closely linked with knowledge, as Foucault (1980) claims. This means that power evolves and is regulated by establishing new rules, discourses or messages, which count as knowledge (Foucault, 1980). Social networks are essential for the information to flow effectively (Seiichi & Yokoyama, 2006), therefore it can be said that SC can assist to overcome the obstacle of insufficient information provision or knowledge distribution in tourism development. Cheong and Miller (2000) built on this notion and used the concept of knowledge to analyse power distributions in their studies on coastal tourism. Also Cole (1999) and Sofield (2003) discuss the lack of knowledge or different access to it within tourism and see it as constraining factor for Community Participation in tourism development. Knowledge as a form of power is therefore analytically considered in this research. In this research I emphasize knowledge distribution with regard to power relationships, since knowledge is considered as crucial in this context. As earlier acknowledged, all CP criteria need knowledge distribution within the capacity building process, but I will only specifically examine those

criteria in terms of knowledge, which are coupled to power structures and presuppose its existence und underlying function to the remaining ones.

In summary, authority and leadership, conflict and knowledge are concepts that contain many different aspects of power and are therefore appropriate to look at when examining power structures among the landowners and towards the tourism authorities.

### 3.2.5. Summary of the aspects of Social Capital

The following table gives an overview about the concepts that lead the research on part of Social Capital as just described. Analysing those concepts helps to understand the influence they had or still have on Community Participation during the selected intervention. The inherent aspects of SC of trust and power shape the network actors competencies to achieve Community Participation. The choice was made to look at SC's networks with inherent relationships alone, and use competencies of people within the framework of Community Participation, as presented previously.

Table 2: Aspects of Social Capital

| **SOCIAL CAPITAL (bonding & linking networks)** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **TRUST** | Structure of **Relationships** | Repeated interaction, trust, fulfilling of mutual expectations, sharing values and interests. |
| | Acceptability of **Risk** | Entering an uncertain situation. |
| | Agreement on **Legitimate Authority** | Unbiased distribution of information, neutral facilitation of meetings and communication of clear rules. |
| **POWER** | **Authority** & **Leadership** | Committees, elected leaders, regular meetings, collective action, rules and sanctions and their enforcement. |
| | **Conflicts** | Enhanced by power inequality; differing interests. |
| | **Knowledge** distribution | The distribution of information (new rules, discourses, messages). |

### 3.2.6. Research Sub-Questions derive from the Conceptual Framework

In order to be able to answer the main research question '*How does Bonding and Linking Social Capital influence Community Participation during a CBE intervention?*' a closer look into Social Capital as well as Community Participation of the case study is needed. As guidance, the following sub-questions have been formulated emerging from this overall conceptual framework:

Table 3: Conceptual Framework




1. ***How does trust within linking relationships shape the acceptance of the host community towards sharing the intervention´s costs and benefits?***

This first question about the cost and benefit sharing of the intervention is interesting because a host community is unlikely to participate in the intervention when the benefits are not in proportion to the costs or efforts made (Murphree, 1999) and therefore expectations are not fulfilled. Evident trust relationships also in the linking perspective (in organizations that surround individuals) are seen as accelerator for cooperation (Pretty, 2003). Especially trusting those who set up the sharing system plays in important role in this case study, in order to accept it and perceive the system as fair and reasonable. Sharing one´s private property is seen as making the owner vulnerable and thus requires trust as Ritchie & Echnter (2011) claim. The costs these act involves are accepted under a risky condition (Rousseau *et al*., 1998). Moreover, agreeing on the legitimacy of an authority among the community members, depends on the authorities' ability to create trust (Forester, 1989) through clear structures and rules. This is illustrated through the lease agreement in this case which defines costs and benefits.

2. ***How does trust within bonding relationships shape efficiency of the intervention?***

Sub-question 2 relates to the aspect of trust within bonding SC and the efficiency of the intervention, which is important to look at because the concept of trust has the ability to build confidence in collective action within communities (Wade, 1994 as cited Pretty *et al.,* 2003). Trust among community members can be strengthened through frequent interactions which can lead to cooperative behaviour that reduce time and costs between individuals (Pretty, 2003), thus enhances efficiency. Trusting one another's decision making capacity about a certain thing, in this case the lease agreement (entering a risky situation), make the process very efficient, because people tend to act likewise as those they trust (Weber & Carter, 2003). Trusting and cooperating can ensure sustainability of the project in terms of continuity (Paul, 1987), which is, for this question, dependent on local leaders and their perceived legitimacy by the community.

3. ***How does power within linking relationships shape the effectiveness of the intervention?***

Sub-question 3 is relevant because power differences between host communities and tourism authorities can be supporting or hampering tourism development planning through the provision of viable information about the intervention and the tourism branch. A lack of this information flow among different power gradients withholds participation, according to Tosun (2000). Furthermore, effective leadership activities by the tourism authorities, can enable revisions and negotiations of the project plan with the local community, which would be a way to ensure a power balance among linking relationships (Thammajinda, 2013). To find out about power inequality, conflicts are an indicator (Nieburg, 1969), which at the same time can give insight in the different interests of the stakeholders and reveal their know-how on the issue at stake. Since knowledge is seen as power by scholars (Foucault, 1980), withholding information is a powerful act.

4. ***How does power within bonding relationships shape the empowerment of the host community?***

The last question is interesting to look at because the ability to share ideas, speak up and have some extend of control, is generated in in-group power relationships (Hutchings & Michailova 2006). The authority and leadership activities of local leaders, could add to establishing the capacities and opportunities to lead oneself and the community to participate decision-making processes (Cole, 2005). Conflicts can emerge from exclusion and social groups with tight bonds and different opposing interests to other groups, as well as unequal access to knowledge and opportunities (Narayan, 1999). Knowing about these conflicts, gives insights in empowerment, which refers to having access and the capacity to seize an opportunity that provides more control over one's life (in this case the tourism

intervention). Knowledge is crucial for empowerment to emerge, since it can give people confidence to have a say and therefore are motivated to participate (Raj et al. 2013).

# 4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, the applied qualitative method approach of semi-structured and unstructured interviews, as well as a focus group and a document analysis, will be explained. This will provide a clear picture on how the data was collected empirically. The case study will be presented in detail wherein the study context will be clarified; the emergence of the interview questions as well as the sampling procedure of informants discussed. A plan for a scientific analysis of the data is presented as well as the validity of the study, the positionality of the researcher and the limitations encountered.

## 4.1. THE CASE STUDY RESEARCH DESIGN

The research objective is, to understand how Social Capital of a community influences the process of Community Participation in the context of CBE. Therefore, a qualitative research design was employed, in order to make meaning of the researched community's social reality (Boeije, 2010) regarding the alleged community-based intervention. Based on the interpretative research paradigm (Schwandt, 2000), this was attempted to be reached by open interviewing based on prepared interview guides.

As research design of this thesis, a single-case study was selected as the most appropriate approach to examine a host community's perception regarding participation in a local CBE venture. The choice of the case study methodology, results from the fact that the research is highly contextual and limited to a particular instance (Babbie, 1995). As De Vaus (2001) knows, a case study provides an understanding of the whole situation as hand and presents it within its wider context. Case studies are an approach that supports detailed investigation to answer how and why question, holistically. To explore more than one in depth and collect the according data on communities Social Capital, would have been too cost and time intensive. Therefore, the choice was made to approach the case in detailed and holistically, instead of comparative towards other. Feagin *et al.* (1991) advocate single case studies in that those enable the nearly complete examination of social action and provide insights in what drives people to act in certain ways.

De Vaus (2001) claims that the selection of a case study requires extensive groundwork and investigation in the cases available and the according sources for relevant information. Before finding and selecting this case study, a considerable search went ahead, by contacting knowledgeable people who work in the field of community based nature conservation combined with tourism interventions. The research objective directed me in the direction of East Africa, since part of the underdeveloped world contains a number of CBE examples induced by conservation NGO's. I learned about the selected case study by meeting the senior manager of the Southern Conservation Area of the Kenyan Wildlife Service on a conference in the Netherlands. He spoke about tourism as a tool for nature conservation and handling the human-wildlife conflict in protected areas as well as its surroundings. His suggestion was to look at Tawi lodge as possible case study and he provided access to and contacts of Amboseli National Park from whereon I started my research. A Kenyan PhD student from WUR shared her contacts of for example AWF officers and other people in the field with me, and gave me crucial insights on how to prepare on the trip and on the logistic details and infrastructure of the region.

Several lodges and tourism projects in the area have been researched in connection with conservation purposes. But Tawi lodge and its conservancy started operating in 2008, and is therefore relatively new Tawi lodge have not been subject to a case study or research in the context of Community-Based Tourism before, neither Kilitome conservancy. The uninvestigated nature of this particular case made it a suitable one for this thesis, in order to contribute something new to literature.

### 4.1.1. The case presentation - The tourism Authorities and Partnership with the Community

AWF, an international conservation organization initiated a partnership relationship with the tourism business Tawi lodge, and numerous Maasai land owners of the Kilitome Conservancy Area, with the intention of fair benefit distribution and the creation of employment opportunities. Before these new arrangements, wildlife would often get into conflict with locals by destroying private and communal land and crops, due to the limited free land for travel (Lamers *et al.,* 2014). Especially the Amboseli–Chyulu Wildlife Corridor is a critical asset that allows free movement for wildlife. According to AWF ("Amboseli–Chyulu Wildlife Corridor"), the surroundings of Amboseli National Park are home to many species, such as elephants, lion, giraffes, and cheetahs that need protection. The community lands provide a great share of the wildlife dispersal area because the park itself only constitutes a small percentage of wildlife. Okello & Kioko (2010) found this to have the potential for leading to the

'insularization[11]' of the national park – when no resolution for wildlife movement as well as human livelihood assurance can be developed. As part of the solution to the human-wildlife conflict at the base of the Kilimanjaro, a partnership arrangement between the private safari lodge, AWF and the local communities, shaped the basis of the CBE- intervention. Tawi lodge and Kilitome conservancy were established in 2008, and enabled the landowners to keep their titles, but release their land for conservation of the vital habitat of the national parks surroundings and the enabling of tourism (Fitzgerald, 2013). The subject of analysis is a selection of the landowners who leased their land. The official lessee is Tawi lodge, and together with AWF, will be referred to as the 'tourism authorities' in the following.

#### 4.1.1.1. The African Wildlife Foundation in Amboseli

As an international NGO, the African Wildlife Foundation´s (AWF) mission is *"to work together with the people of Africa to ensure that the wildlife and wild lands of Africa endure forever."* (http://www.awf.org/). The organization was founded in 1961 to solve conservation problems and facilitate natural resource management challenges while at the same time care for livelihood improvement. AWF's main concern is to enable the development of conservation tourism outside state-protected areas in Eastern and Southern Africa. Land use change and fragmentation in the Amboseli area, in our case the KGR, started threatening the eco-system. To sustain and restore it and at the same time provide economic alternatives for landowners, the 'Payment for Ecosystem Service' (PES) lease program seemed the most suitable way to deal with this problem for the foundation (Fitzgerald, 2013). It was launched with the KGR landowners in 2008.




Figure 4: The division of Kimana Group Ranch

The conservation lease agreement was developed by AWF with the following aim: *"To provide habitat, dispersal and movement areas for wildlife and to help connect conservation areas. In addition, to contribute to the survival of wildlife area in the Amboseli ecosystem as well as the*

[11] At risk of becoming an ecological island. Newmark (1996) found that in Tanzanian parks, insularized parks experienced vastly growing rates of mammal extinction compared to larger reserves.

*continued existence of ecotourism as a means of poverty reduction and economic development and overall public benefit by ensuring that wildlife species endure for the benefit of future generations."* (p.10) (Fitzgerald, 2013). The first pilot conservancy program was established together with the Osupuko Landowner association. Later, with the Kilitome conservancy, about 20,000 acres of critical wildlife dispersal area was and still is protected. The program is designed only for those owning land in the wildlife corridor – others are excluded. Calculating with an average of seven people per household, the AWF lease agreement program claims to directly benefits about 2,450 community members.

#### 4.1.1.2. Tawi Lodge

Tawi Lodge Limited is a luxurious accommodation for Safari tourists, located in proximity to the Amboseli national park, in the wildlife migration corridor. The lodge claims to aim at community integration and poverty reduction and at the same time strives to meet international standards of Eco-Tourism ("Tawi Lodge Description", 2015). This is realized by using natural resources respectfully, as well as a socially acceptable approach with respect towards local traditions. Tawi lodge is a Community-Based Ecotourism business that, among others, attempts to create alternative income generating activities for the local communities that are affected by the conservancy agreement, and are leasing their land to them. The venture promotes local land ownership and supports land-leasing policies rather than land-purchase. With the conservancy strategy, Tawi claims to attempt to brand the Amboseli Ecosystem as authentic and green destination.

Figure 5: Tawi lodge

#### 4.1.1.3. Community Integration & The Partnership

Tawi Lodge is sharing revenues with the local landowners. The landowners who lease their land to Tawi receive a yearly fee for the protection of the land. Tawi also writes that the income they receive will increase according to the tourists' development in the conservancy ("Tawi Lodge Description", 2015). The African Wildlife Foundation established a partnership together with the community of landowners and Tawi Lodge. Community integration is described by Tawi as mobilisation of local people, capacity building and partnership creation. The lodge refers to so called

sensitisation meetings and educative sessions on conservation. These sessions were claimed to be held with the landowners of the Kimana Group Ranch whose land is located in the area, which is now called, Kilitome conservancy.

A landowner committee was formed who is presented as having co-developed a set of rules and the conservancy lease agreement. Conservancy land zones are defined which community members have to respect when grazing their cattle. AWF supposedly funded the training of community leaders and provides scientific information on conservation. The African Wildlife Foundation is donor dependent, meaning the foundation works with limited resources[12], as the senior community officer of Amboseli stated in an interview. This makes the implementation of sustainable projects, to which the coordination and realization of workshops and regular meetings belong, scarce. Nevertheless, Tawi describes this leadership and financial management training among their key achievements regarding community integration strategies in their documents ("Tawi Lodge Description", 2015).

The so-called "Kilitome Conservancy Area" includes the land located in Loitoktok Division in Kajiado District of about 6,000 acres. This area counts 100 landowners who each own parcels of 60 acres. The lease agreement reserves rights for the lessors (the landowners) like for example, collecting firewood and grazing in the designated area. It restricts the construction of any structure determined for settlements like houses, sheds or alike. Furthermore it prevents the landowners from fencing, logging, hunting, agricultural activities and any kind of resource extraction or land pollution for the coming 15 years ("Lease Agreement", 2008). The leased property should remain predominantly in its natural and scenic condition for the preservation of plants and animals as well as maintaining natural water systems. Regarding the payment of the lease fees, the tourism authorities, Tawi and AWF chose to deliver financial community benefits equally to separate bank accounts, instead of paying a committee who then distributes the money. AWF helped to set up bank accounts for the landowners who did not have one. The lease fee is being collected from the visitors of the conservancy, mainly lodge guests. The yearly payment towards the landowners started at 500 Kenya Shillings per acre and increased of 3% Tawi took over the full payment of lease fees towards the landowners after the first five years after the agreement entered into force. AWF initially paid the lease program through raising funds ("Tawi Lodge Description", 2015). Contracted workers at Tawi lodge get very poorly paid and are requested irregularly, due to declining tourism arrivals. This does not make it appealing to community members to apply for work at Tawi, since the job also means being kept from your family for a long time. The Tawi and AWF representatives both state this in the interviews. Tawi representatives said in interviews that the core problem in the area is that no

[12] AWF names their financial situation 'limited' due to donor dependency. How large the money amounts are for exactly this project is not clear and the investigation of this would exceed my research.

proper system exists to educate people, therefore people are not qualified to work at the lodge. Changing this, one has to begin at the very beginning, namely the education system in Amboseli, to make a chance to qualify for a steady job at the lodge. Once the current agreement expires (in year 2023) and a majority of landowners refuse to sign a follow-up contract, essential problems for the lodge as well as the wildlife could arise. The animals' migration corridor might be threatened by the land use practices of the landowners, once the conservancy is abrogated. Also AWF stated in their documents that the lease program is completely voluntarily, which incorporates the risk of landowners not participating and jeopardizing the long-term viability of it. Selling the land to speculators or developers at low prices has a direct impact on the landscape and the conservancy, and therefore tourism (Fitzgerald, 2013). From interviews with AWF representatives and a selected number of landowners, the possibility of no follow-up agreement is surely present.

Namelok is the largest village that borders with the conservancy and is located in close proximity of a few kilometers from Tawi lodge. Namelok domiciles the majority of landowners who entered the lease agreement. Other communities affected by the tourism development and partly involved in the conservancy agreement are very small and not significant for this empirical research.

## 4.2. Method of Data Collection

This section will provide an overview about the way the interviews were prepared upfront, as well as conducted in the field. Also the sampling of the respondents and the characteristics of those, are described. Additionally, a short explanation on the documents used as source of data is given.

### 4.2.1. The interviews

To be able to conduct rich interviews, unstructured and semi-structured qualitative interviews assisted in getting an understanding of an individual's meaning and opinion (Boeije, 2010) on certain aspects and perspectives of the community's Social Capital as well as their participation in the tourism intervention. Several community members of Namelok, landowners of Kilitome conservancy, AWF community officers and Tawi lodge representatives were selected and interviews conducted. The largest group of informants are the landowners, whose responses lead the analysis of this thesis. All the other respondents were important to gain an understanding of the overall situation and issues at hand. The amount of interviews carried out derived from the situation in the field. To gain deeper

Figure 6: Interview setting, example 1, Namelok

Figure 7: Interview setting, example 2, Namelok

understanding of the respondents, employing empathy[13] on parts of the researcher is recommended (King *et al*., 1994).

The research started by meeting with AWF staff and a visit at Tawi lodge where I gained insights through informal conversations and unstructured interviewing, which provided a structure and grip of the situation as well as valuable contacts to the community members. These interviews were still directive and required some pre-knowledge and a clear study-purpose (Patton, 2002). Prepared topics and notes, called an aide memoire, that guide the interviews (Briggs, 2000) were used. Ideally the interviewees' narrations lead the researcher to spontaneously generated questions, which are open-ended and flexible (Burgess, 1984).

Semi-structured interviews with open ended questions on the topics of bonding and linking relationships as well as participation and capacity building were then held with the landowners, often with the help of a local translator. Creswell (2007) claims, for the effective capturing of respondents narrations, it is suggested to record the interviews, since hand written notes might be unreliable when conducting semi-structured interviews. Recording an interview lets the researcher focus on the communication and listen better to the story told. During this field research, recording was not applicable with all the respondents because not everyone agreed to it, just like people refused to have their pictures taken. Furthermore, working with a translator led to very much lengthened interviews that digressed easily to personal topics that are irrelevant to this research (which I decided after inquiring the translator to tell me what they spoke about). Transcribing interviews with

[13] Empathy as in understanding the meanings of action and interactions from the members' own point of view (Eckstein, 1975)

a translator as well as respondents with bad English skills quickly revealed as ineffective and very time-consuming. This is due to bad and unclear sentence structures or long sequences about irrelevant topics, which led to the decision to summarize the spoken instead of transcribing it. Nonetheless, recording did help to catch the essence of the conversation and not missing crucial points, when allowed. Mostly, transcribing or summarizing the interviews from recordings or intensive note-taking, took place at the end of the day or on the next day. One challenge faced was limited electricity in the villages and homes I stayed, which delayed the process of working with the information gained through respondents and preparing next interviews or follow-up interviews.

A young Maasai (28yrs old) helped me in the field by translating many interviews, and who had no personal stake in the agreement at hand since he is part of a different group ranch. But he knew most people in the village of Namelok and had means of transportation, which made it easier for the interviews to take place by just visiting people's homes. We communicated well and he could mediate between me and the locals to avoid miscommunications. He is married to a Dutch lady who lives with him in a neighbouring village, thus understands the Western way of life and assumptions.

The semi-structured interview guides were formulated with respect to the conceptual framework to discuss issues of the community members and their bonding relationships. But also more specifically, most interviews pointed at the case of the conservancy agreement and bonding as well as linking structures regarding trust and power issues of the landowners of Kilitome. The aide memoires and semi-structured interview guides (see Appendix 2) included questions that led to find out about:

- The bonding ties of the community of Namelok in terms of the community structure family structures (leadership), tightness of social bonds, collaborative actions and social groups. This entails the examination of concepts such as 'trust´ and 'power' among people in Namelok.
- The bonding ties of the landowners of Kilitome (who are Namelok community members) in terms of trust and power relations, especially towards the Kilitome committee members. Moreover, to find out about the seizing of opportunities of capacity building in consensus finding and negotiation skills, to gain confidence for participation in terms of sharing ideas and speaking up. The issue of landownership and its importance was also discussed.
- The landowner's linking ties, in terms of trust and power relationships with the tourism authorities.
- Furthermore to find out about benefit sharing, possible conflicts and the access to opportunities for capacity building on the industry and intervention planning provided.

### 4.2.2. Sampling procedure and respondents

The interviewees were selected by a snowball sampling technique, meaning I started by identifying a few target subjects which then lead me to other possible respondents (Babbie 1995). The main sources of data for this research were individuals such as selected community members, landowners of Kilitome, AWF officers and Tawi representatives. The size of sampling in qualitative research is open, and dependent on the amount of information the respondents reveal (Boeije, 2010). Silverman (2005) indicates that scope is sacrificed for detailed data about people's lives, perceptions or interaction. The criteria for selecting the right people derive from the theoretical framework, but are also guided by the field research process that leads the researcher to find respondents that are willing to participate and share information (Ezzy, 2002). Sampling of the landowners and community members was rather random, dependent on their availability. Regarding the landowners, oftentimes, I just went to the person's homes that we picked randomly from the list of landowners who signed the lease agreement to avoid sampling bias. I was guided by my translator and assistant who had a motorbike, which enabled us to visit different parts of the village. His understanding of the daily routine of the local people helped finding respondents. The chairperson and the secretary of the Kilitome committee were not chosen randomly, but with the purpose of gathering different perspectives on the same matter.

The research emphasis lies on the local residents and their perceptions, but the tourism authorities provided valuable experiences and insights needed to gain a wider and better understanding on the case. The AWF community officer, whose contact I got from my preparations in the Netherlands, was the key informant that led the sampling process. He connected me with the lodge manager and committee members, a Kilitome scout and the AWF senior community officer. From here, I got enough connections that were independent and not closely connected to the foundation, for a broader research scope.

Two Tawi representatives were available for unstructured and semi-structured interviews: the lodge manager and one of the lodge owners and managing director. Furthermore, AWF was represented by the community officer which I had several informal conversations about the topic and who acted partly as mediator and connector as well as translator for several interviews. The AWF senior community officer of the intervention was only available via the phone. I spoke to 14 landowners, of which one half did speak well enough English for the interview to be carried out by me alone. The landowners were all male and their age ranged from mid twenty to early eighties. 3 of them were elected committee members and one manages the conservancy rangers in the area. One landowner was interviewed who did not enter the agreement to also find out about his point of view.

All landowner-respondents were Maasai, pastoralists and about half of them also farmers. I talked to 8 community members, of which 7 were women and 4 formed an informal focus group when I visited the home of the young girl who works as a teacher and who translated for me.

**Table 4: List of respondents**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | John Gisa | AWF Community officer Amboseli region (AWF Namanga office) |
| 2 | Philip Lenaiyasa | AWF Senior Community Officer, Amboseli region (AWF Namanga office) |
| 3 | Menno Bartlema | Tawi Lodge manager |
| 4 | Axel Lohwasser | Tawi Lodge director, partly owner - maintenance, logistics |
| 5 | Mary Nasieku Israel | Community member, teaching internship in Lemong'o |
| 6 | Kumoklosho Teei | Community member, neighbor to Mary, (no English) |
| 7 | Margret Nabulu Samuel | Community member, sister to Mary, (no English) |
| 8 | Mekaanki Yiontia Israel | Community member, stepmother to Mary, (no English) |
| 9 | Noorpusheni Joyce Isreal | Community member, mother to Mary, (no English) |
| 10 | Solomon Kiroiya | Community member, employed at Tawi as „Naturalist", |
| 11 | Mary John Maitei | Community member, Chief of Namelok |
| 12 | Rose Ologela | Community member, (no English) |
| 13 | David Ole Kaanki | Landowner, pastoralist, police chief of a village close by, Kilitome committee member, 45 yrs. old |
| 14 | Korduni Sampeke | Landowner, Farmer, pastoralist, 30 yrs. old |
| 15 | Medukori Senteu | Landowner, Farmer, pastoralist, 83 yrs. old (no English) |
| 16 | Olegei Ole Naudo | Landowner, Farmer, pastoralist, 75 yrs. (no English) |
| 17 | Jonah Ole Tuluapei | Landowner, pastoralist, 32 yrs. old |
| 18 | Lekeni Tuluapei | Landowner, pastoralist, 25 yrs. old (no English) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 19 | Sakimba Ole Kishil | Landowner, pastoralist, 79 yrs. old (no English) |
| 20 | Samson Newuata | Landowner, pastoralist, 46 yrs. old |
| 21 | Sitonik Kereyian | Landowner, Senior sergeant, emplpyed by Biglife. (responsible for all 6 conservancies). Before, Scout in Kilitome Conservancy, 46 yrs. old |
| 22 | Joshuea Penuka | Landowner, farmer, pastoralist, businessman and chairman of Kilitome conservancy and Amboseli Landowners Conservancies Association. 54 yrs. old (no English) |
| 23 | Moses Salaash | Landowner, secretary of the Kilitome conservancy committee and landowner, 51 yrs. old, (no English) |
| 24 | Dickson Maitei | Landowner, farmer and deals with land; landowner, didn't sign agreement. 28 yrs. old |
| 25 | Joseph Lekinasa Parmuat | Landowner, environmentalist, employee at NGO, Kilitome community representative - boardmember, 35 yrs. |
| 26 | David Loiparuni Musa | Landowner, pastoralist, 38 yrs. Old, (no English) |
| 27 | Kipaa Shuaka | Son of landowner Shianka Keretu, 18 yrs. old |

### 4.2.3. Document analysis

Analyzing documents for qualitative research includes searching for underlying meaning with help of documents (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). For this research the conservancy agreement for the Kilitome landowners had been reviewed, to get a fuller understanding of what kind of restrictions the agreement contains and how these are formulated. Furthermore this document contained the list of landowners who entered the agreement which was valuable for finding the right respondents. Other documents used were the Tawi description files with the ventures policies, strategy, vision and mission statements that gave much richer information on the lodge than is presented on their website. Moreover, the document “Community Payment for ecosystem services in Amboseli ecosystem” formulated by the AWF vice President Conservation Strategy, has been useful to review to find out about the conservation strategies they apply in the area, where the Kilitome conservancy is a part of. It contains history about the ecosystem and the prolonged problem of the human-wildlife conflict.

## 4.3. DATA ANALYSIS

Analysing the gathered data is an extensive task wherein all summarized and transcribed interviews, field notes, impressions and documents have to be made sense of. To analyse the data gathered deductively, I started with a set of defined research questions before going into the field. Content analysis in qualitative research is a way for subjective interpretation of the content of data by following a systematic process of coding and the identification of themes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Nevertheless, the defining of categories that emerged from the raw data, was done rather inductively to see whether or not the large amount of data fit to the theory in mind or whether adjustments are needed according to the focus of the research. Layder (1998) sais that underlining relevant parts in the texts on an early stage help to see what still needs clarification, more in-depth research or shows links between highlighted important themes. Then, coding and memoing are suggested to use as two complementary data analysis tools by Layder (1998). I provided code categories and sub-codes to most parts of the transcripts or interview summaries (like for example: landowners; landowners_power; landowners_bonding; intervention; intervention_agreement; intervention_interaction_leadership etc.). During the process of coding, ideas come up and connections are made between codes, with regard to the theoretical framework established beforehand. These ideas were held on to by the use of memoing, meaning adding comments to a word, sentence or even paragraph that might be of importance later.

The data collection and according analysis is being inspired by Jones (2005), who used topics as conflict, trust, power, sharing, norms and rules and more, to operationalize her research on, among other things, understanding and measuring SC during the development of a community-based Ecotourism venture in the Gambia. Her research is of quantitative nature and even though I did not measure the level of SC, the concepts still fit my research framework. In this research, SC is categorized by the linking and the bonding perspective as well as the large aspects of power and trust that determine every relationship. To SC to my research, I primarily focused on the bonding and linking relationships that define the characteristics of the case study. Shortly after starting the field research, it became apparent that bridging relationships of the target community were barely apparent, especially with regards to tourism development, most probably due to large distances between communities. Bonding relationships were present, supposedly due to the culturally and traditional shaped dense relationships of families within the Maasai tribe. Linking relationships revealed to be interesting to look at, partly due to the noticeable tension between tourism authorities and the local community. For the application of the concept of trust in the analysis of the findings I will look at the degree of agreement on legitimate authority among the landowners, who

represent the focus of my study among the community of Namelok, as well as towards external agencies (tourism authorities). Followed by taking a look at relationship structures, which will yield insights on relational trust between the landowners (as well extended to the Namelok-community) and towards the tourism authorities. To operationalize the aspect of power within the bonding and linking aspects of the SC of my research subject, the Namelok community, I will use the concepts of authority and leadership, conflicts and knowledge, which are deriving from literature to guide the analysis in Chapter 5.

Capacity building is seen as a precondition for Community Participation and can lead to participation by the following criteria of sharing costs & benefits, effectiveness, efficiency and empowerment. The goal is to conduct an analysis to find out how SC influenced the process of achieving Community Participation in this tourism intervention. The following grid represents an overview of the analysis conducted:

Table 5: Overview of the analysis

| **SC aspects** | **Identification of SC aspects** | **SC perspectives** | **Community Participation criteria** |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Trust** | - Relationships<br>- Risk<br>- Legitimate authority | Linking | Sharing costs and benefits |
| | | Bonding | Efficiency |
| **Power** | - Authority & Leadership<br>- Conflicts<br>- Knowledge | Linking | Effectiveness |
| | | Bonding | Empowerment |

In the bonding perspective of SC, trust relationships can be characterized by several factors, such as the structure of relationships in terms of relational trust and the fulfilling of mutual expectations among the community members and among the landowners of Kilitome. In the linking dimension, relationship structures refer to repeated interaction with the tourism authorities and also the fulfilling of mutual expectations, which can tell us more about their trust relationships. The

acceptability of risk for bonding as well as linking SC refers to the risk taken with regarding landownership and the tourism intervention. The agreement on legitimate authority among landowners and among the community refers to local leaders and people like the conservancy committee. In linking SC, the perceived legitimacy of the tourism authorities is to be looked at in order to learn about trust relationships between those stakeholder groups. Furthermore, when looking at the aspect of power of communities' SC, authority and leadership is to be examined regarding those having a voice or a role as local leader, particularly in relation to the tourism intervention. In order to understand the power relationships among the linking perspective the structure of the authority regarding rules and their enforcement as well as leadership activities can provide insights. Furthermore, power relationships among landowners have to do with knowledge one possesses and has access to, or not. In the linking perspectives, the concept of knowledge provides the same insights, only with regard to the tourism authorities who have access to knowledge and the power to provide or withhold it. The last factor to consider when looking at power relationships is the existence of conflicts among landowners or between landowners and the tourism authorities. Examining whether these conflicts arose due to unequal power relationships, provides insights on the level of inequality. Concerning the Community Participation criteria, summarized the conceptual framework refers to the following: A well-established functioning sharing system is crucial to reach participation in the project, which includes the dissemination of transparent information about costs and benefits and to keep expectations compliant to reality. Project time and cost efficiency rises and falls with the degree of interaction, communication and cooperation. Participation that leads to agreement of certain project steps and management strategies help the intervention to be long term viable. Knowledge and the spreading of understandable information about tourism in general as well as the particular project, increases the potential effectiveness in terms of an improved project result according to people's needs. Getting the opportunity to participate and gain the confidence to actually do so, and eventually gain control over the project are vital when speaking of an empowered host community in this framework.

Table 6: Operationalizing Social Capital

| | | **Bonding SC** | **Linking SC** |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Trust** | Structure of **Relationships** | *- Relational trust within the Namelok community and in particular among the landowners*<br>*- Fulfilling of mutual expectations* | *- Repeated interaction with tourism authorities*<br>*- Fulfilling of mutual expectations* |
| | Acceptability of **Risk** | *- Risk taken related to landownership and the tourism intervention* | *- Risk taken related to landownership and the tourism intervention* |
| | Agreement on legitimate **Authority** | *- Agreement on legitimacy of local leaders*<br>*- distribution of information and rules* | *- Legitimacy of tourism authorities*<br>*- distribution of information and rules* |
| **Power** | **Authority** and **Leadership** | *- Roles of local leaders with regard to the tourism intervention (Who has a voice?)* | *- Structure of authority and leadership activities*<br>*- Rules and their enforcement* |
| | **Conflict** | *- Existence of conflicts among landowners or other community members due to unequal power relationships* | *- Existence of conflicts between landowners and the tourism authorities due to unequal power relationships* |
| | **Knowledge** | *- knowledge distribution among landowners* | *- knowledge distribution between landowners and the tourism authorities* |

### 4.3.1. Validity of the research

Validity needs to be considered in order to present a credible and trustworthy interpretative research of high quality (Golafshani, 2003). Campbell and Stanley (1966) differentiate the terms internal and external validity, to assist qualitative researchers. Denzin (1970) applied these terms to qualitative research designs and claims that internal validity refers to the extent to which results of a study are credible representations of reality without external distorting factors. Guba and Lincoln (1994) verify this by checking how believable the findings are. This is applicable regarding the highly interpretative design of the case study, which is characterized by being conducted in a high-context culture. External validity describes to which degree such representations are transferrable to other contexts and generalizable (Lecompte & Goets 1982; Guba & Lincoln, 1994, as stated in Brink, 1993). The results are difficult to transfer to similar projects due to their very context specific case study characteristics.

Brink (1993) also refers to Leininger (1991) in his article, who states that the researcher needs to be trusted by the participants to be able to get reliable information. I learned quickly, that I should clarify upfront, what the information I am asking for will be used for and that I am an independent researcher and not involved with Tawi or AWF. With this I intended to clear their assumptions about me being able to improve their individual situation in terms of generating higher lease fees etc. Also did I visit most respondents together with a community member (but from a different group ranch) who has a good reputation and good bonds with many. He had the crucial task of introducing me and therefore built the first notion of trust towards me. This social context also needs to be paid attention to when producing data. I was prepared for the real-life context and that I have not much control over the data collection process and need to adapt to my interviewees schedules and life events anytime (Yin 2009). As Argyris (1952) described in Brink (1993), the participants may have revealed themselves 'in the best possible light', altered or withhold certain information due to the investigators' presence or simply just remembers things wrongly (Bradburn 1983 as cited in Denzin & Lincoln 2005). Moreover, many respondents, especially landowners, have been visited at least twice to gather missing data and verify what has being said before. Also, email contact with representatives of all three parties (AWF, Tawi and the community) took place, in order to verify unclear-, or add missing information. That way, member validation has been carried out to the possible extend. Also some answers had to be verified and maybe interpreted by key-informants to get a perspective on why certain respondents answered the way they did. Furthermore, Yin (2009) claims that multiple sources of data provide compound measure of the same phenomenon and increase the overall quality of the study. In this research, a combination of document analysis,

structured and unstructured interviews have been carried out to underpin certain findings. I tried to appear very self-conscious, aware about the Maasai culture and referred to people from the community that I already knew. This way, I could show that I was aware of the situation, talking to many people about the same issue, and therefore maximize the validity of the respondents' answers.

Due to the use of a single-case study design, the external validity of the research is not considered very high since it is missing the comparison to a similar case (de Vaus, 2001). Nevertheless, regarding the fact that there are multiple examples in the area and in East Africa, like Satao Elerai, Safari Camp, Koija Starbeds, Ol Lentille (Duim, 2010) or El Karama Eco lodge, Naboisho Conservancy, Tortilis Camp (Ecotourism Kenya, 2016) established under similar conditions and comparable characteristics, it can be argued the transferability of the study is given.

### 4.3.2. Positionality of the researcher

Regarding my background as a researcher it is to be mentioned that I have visited Kenya twice before, in 2007 and 2011 for two month each. I travelled through the country, spend time in rural areas and visited several development or environment projects. This equipped me with the necessary experiences, prior knowledge on the culture and the ability to adapt easily to different circumstances. I was equipped to apply a different perspective than my own western values would suggest. Friendships with Kenyans (living in Kenya) extending over the past years, have kept me conscious on the way of communicating, behavior and thinking that is culturally defined.

Hopkins (2007) knows that the researcher always shapes the encounter with the respondent due to his or her identity. My appearance as a very light-skinned, blond woman could have influenced the interviewees' answers due to culturally shaped expectations. Due to my former experiences in the country, I was very aware of my effect, especially on local communities and tried to overcome it by expressing my objectivity and independence in the study.

Even though I stayed neutral during the interviews, pre-knowledge on the topic might have created a subconscious bias. During my education and the preparation of the research, I learned a lot about how common failures of community-based-tourism interventions are, due to the complexity of it.

## 4.4. LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

To evaluate the scientific merits of this thesis research, limitations have to be taken into account, which are described in this section. One factor that hampered the course of the field research was the communication barrier between the researcher and the respondents. Fifty percent of the informants spoke no English and most of the others spoke in unclearly structured sentences, which led to misunderstandings and required very careful listening and follow-up questions, to ensure the accuracy of the given information. This is something to be trained by the researcher, since these situations cannot really be prevented. An acclimatization period upfront would have helped, to adjust to the local way communicating and getting used to the accent. Working with a translator involves his or her interpretation during transferring the local language into the target language (Van Nes *et al.,* 2010). The communicated message is then shaped by the meaning the translator gave to it. By working with not professional and entirely independent translators, the risk of falsification of results due to the translators' interpretation or even hidden agenda can occur. Sometimes I realized, when an interview took long, the translator would get tired and impatient, and therefore shortened translated answers. When I noticed this happened, I insisted to clarify again what had been said once more and shortened the interview or rescheduled more interviews to the next day. In the future, this can be prevented by finding translators upfront who are ideally from a different community some, to prevent bias within translations. Also a person who has experience in translation work and speaks excellent English would reduce the risk. Also private conversations crossing the questioning process would decrease and therefore make interviews more efficient.

The collection of qualitative data might have been shaped by social circumstances that can be avoided in a future research. Bink (1993) mentions, that different social circumstance can impact individuals' behavior. Social circumstances are characterized by the number of participants within an interview as well as the number of researcher or the presence of a translator etc. I held a few interviews together with the AWF community officer, who functioned as an interpreter and key contact person. He seemed to have a good relationship to the people he arranged for the interview, in particular the Kilitome committee chairman and secretary. Since they knew each other quite well, the power difference between them might not have been predominant in the conversation. Nevertheless, a social situation was created where answers were possibly adjusted to what would please the African Wildlife Foundation. This problem can be avoided in the future by employing an independent interpreter and ask the person who might create bias to leave the setting. This must happen with cautions and good explanation, for everyone to understand the purpose and to avoid a

feeling of distrust towards anyone. Under these conditions, the committee members for example might have spoken more openly.

# 5. ANALYSIS

This chapter discusses the findings of the field research among community members living in the village of Namelok and owning land in the Kimana Group Ranch. These landowners leased their land to Tawi Lodge and the African Wildlife Foundation who established a conservancy, financed by the lodge. The analysis will provide useful insight on trust and power relations among landowners themselves, but also between the tourism authorities and the landowners.

## 5.1. TRUST INFLUENCING COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

The following analysis on trust provides insights in bonding and linking SC of the Namelok community. Putnam (2000) and others[14] think of trust between individuals but also in organizations surrounding them, as one of the fundamental principles of SC. To operationalize trust in the bonding and linking perspective, I am following Lachapelle's (2008) framework. Therefore, I am elaborating first on structures of relationships, as in fulfilling mutual expectations, relational trust among landowners (and community members) and interaction among the landowners and the tourism authorities. Furthermore, the taken risks of the landowners concerning the tourism intervention will be examined, followed by an analysis on the legitimacy of authority of local leaders and the tourism authorities. The results provide insights in how Community Participation is influenced by trust, in particular regarding the efficiency of the tourism project and the community's acceptance of the costs and benefits.

### 5.1.1. Trust within linking relations

In this section, an analysis of trust as aspect of linking Social Capital of the landowners towards the tourism authorities will be given.

#### 5.1.1.1. Relational trust

The interviewed landowners initially trusted the authorities and their tourism and conservation plan, but over the course of the past few years distrust emerged. Contributions seem too high in relation

[14] Like Mendoza-Botelho (2013) and Jones (2004).

to what is received in return – even though it is recognized by landowners that the agreement saves valuable land, which might otherwise get lost. Nevertheless, badly managed expectations on the sharing system (in terms of contributions and costs made) and distrust towards the tourism authorities, might have hindered Community Participation eventually. Expectation management is vital to the long-term success of an intervention, as Snyman & Spenceley (2012) claim. The reasons for the emerged distrust are often of financial nature, like not being paid as expected and not receiving compensation for damage caused by wildlife:

*"I expected a raise of the payment, because Tawi and AWF made a promise about the entrance fees for the conservancy. That did not happen. The agreement has contradictory points. What had been told to us in early meetings is not what the contract includes."* Samson Newuata (landowner, farmer, 46 yrs.)

*"Since AWF's responsibility is slowly fading (and shifting over to Tawi), I am losing faith in the whole partnership. Everybody earns with wildlife, except us, we are left with poverty."* Sakimba Ole Kishil (landowner, pastoralist, 79 yrs.)

*"No substitution for other fencing has been given, so that lions have killed our livestock (like bulls) which is a great loss for me".* Olegei Ole Naudo (landowner, pastoralist, 75 yrs.)

Also the lack of information about for example employment opportunities can have caused this distrust towards Tawi, AWF and the conservancy combined. Employment opportunities were something the landowners expected in return for their collaboration.

*"Any meeting so far had been organized by AWF, but also they did not talk about involvement and employment issues in tourisms."* (Samson Newuata, landowner, farmer, 46 yrs.)

Analysing not fulfilled expectations and lack of information further, the interaction of the landowners with the tourism authorities needs to be looked at. In this sense, the Tawi director explained that he resigned to attend board meetings.

*"I am invited to board meetings, but I don't feel like joining them anymore because there is no point and no progress. They can figure it out themselves."* Axel Lohwasser (Tawi Lodge director)

To him, the discussions are not adding to the effectiveness of the intervention. Conforming to other persons' expectations is simpler when those involved believe in each other's respectability (Weber & Carter, 2003), which is not evident in here. The Tawi director expressed antipathy towards AWF as partner, and AWF admitted having difficulties speaking and negotiating with the Tawi director, which

does not provide a well fundament for the landowners to get into a discussion or negotiation with Tawi in the future.

*"The difficulty with Tawi, lies in the fact that Mr. Lohwassers' focus lies on the business and not the sustainability of the community involvement or conservation. I think, AWF pulled out because they were afraid of Axel."* Joseph Lekinasa Parmuat (landowner, environmentalist, community representative of Kilitome conservancy, 35 yrs.)

From the landowners' perspective, similar concerns about communicating with Tawi were suggested. This goes along with the few and irregular interactions Tawi organizes with the Kilitome committee, who represent the landowners. Samson Newuata (landowner, farmer, 46 yrs.) stated:

*"Tawi seems not interested in any meetings with the community members; therefore also nothing to inform the people about employment requirements etc. had taken place."*

*"… there was and is no interaction between Tawi and the community."* (David Ole Kaanki, landowner, Kilitome committee member, 45 yrs.)

Mostly, the interviewees referred to very little or no interaction with Tawi, which also might explain why there is no inclusion of the landowners in the tourism sector as claimed earlier. Repeated interaction among individuals creates or reinforces trust relations (Weber & Carter, 2003), which are not evident here. Also AWF (the community officer and the senior community officer) knows that landowners want to meet more frequently, and that meetings have been postponed often. Nevertheless, they do not feel in the position to change this situation, due to the financial limitations of the project. Even, the amount of meetings for initiating the conservancy had been few:

*"The agreement was being introduced and discussed with us in a total of three meetings, which is not enough. By explaining the conservancy contract as simple as possible, AWF made sure that there were not many questions to be asked. "* Samson Newuata (landowner, farmer, 46 yrs.)

When a meeting is being requested and the landowners do not hear back from AWF, it influences the trust relations towards AWF negatively due to the missing reciprocity (Svendsen & Bjornskov, 2007). AWF has the task to manage the intervention on community level. The missing reciprocity might be a crucial factor in why trust relations in AWF as mediator between Tawi and the community declined over the past years.

*"When lions have killed my bulls, which is a great loss for me, I requested a meeting to discuss this issue among others, I am being told to wait. And then I don't hear back from AWF".* Olegei Ole Naudo (landowner, pastoralist, 75 yrs.)

Even the Kilitome committee member does not believe in the partnership anymore because his expectations on how Tawi would operate the venture were not attained.

*"…the conservancy will not remain, once the agreement ended. Tourism is important, if we could only change the way Tawi is operating at this moment."* David Ole Kaanki (landowner, committee member of Kilitome, 45 yrs.)

The pointed-out shortcomings, show that distrust emerges from the lack of mutually exchanged goods and knowledge (Svendsen & Bjornskov, 2007), which are in this case deprived finances and information, as stated by the landowners. This had also already been noticed by the AWF senior community officer of this intervention, who admitted that he realizes, people do not feel comfortable signing another time momentarily:

*"Partnership with Tawi ends when the agreement ends, and especially young people don't want to sign a similar agreement in the future."* Philip Lenaiyasa (senior community officer of Amboseli)

The notion that landowners are not willing to sign a follow-up agreement, indicates that they are not willing anymore to contribute as much (60 acres of land), as they are doing now. Benefits of the agreement apparently are not enough to truly compensate for costs or contributions made. Nonetheless, many state that they believe they are better off than before the introduction of tourism intervention. Even though contributions made and benefits received seem unfairly distributed and expectations were not managed well, what worries the elders more is that the younger generation will sell the land when the contract ends.

*"Even though I don't like some things that are going on, I still believe that I am better off with the agreement, compared to people in other group ranches that have not yet sub-divided and privatized the land. He could not cultivate the land, because the soil is too salty."* Medukori Senteu (landowner, pastoralist, 83 yrs.)

*"I am still happy to have entered the agreement, because my 3 sons are also land owners, and they would have otherwise sold the land and not doing anything sustainable and useful for the future with it."* Olegei Ole Naudo (landowner, pastoralist, 75 yrs.)

Despite all their frustrations it can be argued, that the landowners accept the terms of the agreement by entering the partnership, but are not positive about it. The acceptance probably derives from the landowners' fear of losing land and slipping off into poverty. But support or even a positive attitude towards the sharing systems, was not visible in the results, since the benefits are still perceived as too few.

Thus, leasing the land for conservation purposes is agreed on by some as a better alternative to selling. By many, contributions in form of resources (IFC, 2015) are not perceived proportional towards benefits, thus do not foster Community Participation in the intervention (Murphree, 1999, as cited in Stone, 2010). Therefore it can be argued that expectations of the lessor about costs and benefits of the intervention have not been managed well (Snyman & Spenceley, 2012). This mismanagement of expectations did lead to mistrust and no Community Participation. The few moments of interaction and communication between both tourism authorities and the landowners, made it difficult for trust relations to establish. As result, the cooperation and openness to participate in the intervention of the landowners is not really evident.

#### 5.1.1.2. Risks taken

It is to assume that risking handing over newly gained property towards the lessee (authorities who carry out the intervention) was based on trust. The landowners initially sought the opportunity and signed the lease contract without much resistance, in hope for future (financial) benefits.

*"I and the others saw a private donor and so we believed that they can keep their promises. We trusted it to be a good opportunity."* Medukori Senteu (landowner, pastoralist, 83 yrs.)

According to Rousseau *et al.* (1998), risk is necessary in order for trust or distrust to establish. Landowners took the risk of leasing their land to the tourism authorities and therefore lost grazing or cultivable land for to next 15 years. The risk lies in wildlife that can approach houses easily, destroy crops or even attack cattle, due to no proper fencing options available.

*"Elephants come up until our homes and destroy things. The damage is not being compensated by the conservancy committee or AWF, as promised in the beginning."*
Shianka Keretu (landowner, pastoralist, 45yrs.)

Agreeing to an uncertain situation is a risk, which has been taken based on trust. The consequences of the partnership agreement have not been overseen by the landowners. Thus, trust towards the authorities was evident, but changed over time and is not leading towards collective behaviour as

project outcome anymore, as Pretty (2003) suggests. Today, the risks are more evident (like wildlife causing damage and not being paid enough or on time) to the landowners, which led to distrust.

#### 5.1.1.3. Agreement on legitimate authority

Insufficient interaction between the landowners and the tourism authorities as described earlier, is also relevant when examining in how far the community agrees on the legitimacy of the authorities. The distribution of information between the tourism authorities and the landowners is very low. This assumption is, among others, based on statements about board meetings where rules about the conservancy and other issues should be discussed:

*"Board meetings are planned quarterly, but AWF is not always available when the landowners call for a meeting. Then it will be postponed."* Philip Lenaiyasa (senior community officer of Amboseli)

*"The last meeting of that kind (board-meeting) was more than a year ago, and the main topic was cows that were being arrested by Tawi because they had passed the protected zone."* Moses Salaash (secretary of Kilitome committee, 51 yrs.)

As Hudson (1979) described, the unbiased distribution of information and clear rules help to create a positively perceived legitimacy of the authorities. There are no results on whether information provided in these meetings is biased or unbiased. The Tawi director confirms that the distribution of information is left to the Kilitome committee, and is not followed-up or checked upon. Whether or not the authorities are being perceived as legitimate or not also, relates to the transparency and clarity of the rules of the intervention. It can be derived from several interviews that the landowners do not fully know what the conservancy agreement and the bylaws entail. Misconceptions range from the amount of exact conservancy payment, over held workshops and built entrances.

*"The committee members passed information such as the bylaws (regulations for behavior inside the conservancy) to the landowners by means of one or two meetings. The new rules are not yet in the heads of the people."* Sitonik Kereyian (landowner, senior sergeant Big Life, 40 yrs.)

*"AWF promised, that cattle would be allowed to graze in the conservancy, which is not the case now. I signed the contract because he thought it would be beneficial for me. But since the beginning, he is only getting 15.000 KSH per 6 month, which is very little; certainly not enough*." David Loiparuni Musa (landowner, baker, farmer, pastoralist, 38 yrs.)

*"I cannot remember any workshops or seminars that have been held. 30.000 KSH a year is very little money for me. We were told that the money would increase at least for a 1000 each year."* Olegei Ole Naudo (landowner, pastoralist, 70 yrs.)

*"One thing I am not happy with is that the agreement said an entrance would be built, that would require entrance fees to the Kilitome conservancy. It said that gates and roads will be built for the clients of Tawi or other visitors – we expected that to happen, but so far it did not."* Moses Salaash (secretary of Kilitome committee, 51 yrs.)

These misconceptions led to unfulfilled expectations. For instance, the demand for compensation for loss of crops and cattle increases and since nothing happens, trusting the authorities and their legitimacy is decreasing. It is known that consulting and informing local people about the intervention implementation process, enhances the project efficiency (Paul, 1987). The expressed discontentment of landowners about insufficient communication and interaction can therefore be linked to a low level of agreement on the authorities' legitimacy and hence a not very efficient project operation.

### 5.1.2. Trust within bonding relations

In the following trust within bonding relationships of the host community and the landowners will be elaborated.

#### 5.1.2.1. Relational trust

People in Namelok generally have tight bonds and the landowners of Kilitome as well, because they formed a common interests and concerns. Trust relations are therefore evident in the community. Many interviewed community members state that they have many contacts in the community, and claim to know nearly everyone in the village. Logistically this is impossible since Namelok is too large, considering a population of about 7,000 people (stated as of 2010; Ministry of Agriculture Kenya, Baraza & Njogholo, 2010). The number of inhabitants is not known by many, and estimates range from 500 to 10,000 inhabitants. Many respondents stated to have good relationships with their neighbors and help each other out when needed. Also people that do not live in one's neighborhood can be acquaintances since they meet regularly, among others, in the church, the Namelok shopping center or schools. Community relationships emerge furthermore through the attendance at organized groups for women, men or the youth, for example to help each other out financially, do joint agricultural activities or even to promote education. In an interview with 4 Maasai women (3 of one family and 1 as neighbour) it was said that the majority of people in

Namelok are part of at least one group, because they like the social connections. During the same interview the following was mentioned:

*"We have a very good relationship with our neighbours. Whenever someone needs help or advice, they just walk over to the next house. Also the neighbours are invited to ceremonies and festivities."*

*"We have a tight bond in the family and the community. You know in Namelok, people have developed. We have groups for woman, men, contributing money to help the poor, providing money for a child that wants to go to school. You know, it is kind of a mandatory thing, to help people that are in need. We have churches, which bring people together. You can meet friends at churches and the word of god by itself changes people. We have a very good relationship."* Solomon Kiroiya (community member, employed by Tawi, 26 yrs.)

People join these activities because they enjoy being part of a social group and develop a sense of belonging (Reicher *et al.,* 2010), which is shaped by trust relationships (MacBeth, 2004). What furthermore ads to the assumption about dense relationships, are the similar family structures of Maasai's in this area. For instance, men in Namelok are the heads of their families and rarely married to only one wife.

"*I have 3 wives and more than 20 children and I am the boss."* Sakimba Ole Kishil (landowner, pastoralist, 79 yrs.)

*"I have seven children and three wives. My wives like each other. "* David Loiparuni Musa (landowner, baker, farmer, pastoralist, 38 yrs.)

*"Three wives. I have never counted the amount of children I have. I make the rules in this family, definitely. As soon as my children are married, they have to care for themselves and make their own decisions."* Olegei Ole Naudo (landowner, pastoralist, 70 yrs.)

Since the community members of Namelok are predominantly Maasai people, they share similar occupations (pastoralism) and ways of living due to the deeply rooted Maasai traditions (Zeppel, 2006). Similarities in terms of objectives or lifestyle are a good fundament for bonding SC (Pretty, 2003; Lin, 2001), and bonding ties are based on trust (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). Trust in turn, facilitates the emergence of relationships. Due to similarity in terms of culture and tradition, it can be assumed that Maasai's in Namelok can relate to one another easily. Getting to know some Maasai families during the field research, showed that family life takes a crucial part in an individuals' life in Namelok. It is common in the lifestyle of the Maasai that children are expected to help with the

daily activities and as well serve to secure strong bonds with other families through marriage (Ndagala, 1992). Mary Nasieku Israel (community member, teacher, 23yrs) described about her family:

*"My father has two wives and I have 10 brothers and sisters. I love all of them the same way. Naturally family members care a lot about each other. Especially my brothers and sisters have very tight bonds, and everyone helps each other whenever possible."*

It is plausible to deduce, that people in Namelok have very tight bonds among one another, which according to Seligson *et al*. (2006) implies inter-personal trust. This context formed the men that are now landowners, wherefore it can be argued that the group of landowners is also experiencing relational trust among one another. Literature states that this relational trust implies positive expectations about others (Weber & Carter, 2003), which is reflected for example in the way that landowners trusted the initiator of the conservancy idea, who is a fellow landowner. Rousseau *et al.* (1998) explains that trust can lead to shared information, status and concern, which supports to the assumption that the landowners trusted one another before entering the conservancy agreement. Then they gained a shared status and a newly emerged common interest about the Kilitome landownership. The study does not reveal in how frequently the landowners interacted before the intervention. What is known is that their relationships clearly emerged through meetings and the common concern over their land:

*"Landowners were somehow forced to be united and have closer connections through the conservancy agreement".* David Ole Kaanki (landowner, committee member of Kilitome, 45 yrs.)

*"Between the landowners, there is a lot of communication and sharing since the agreement."* Joseph Lekinasa Parmuat (landowner, environmentalist, community representative of Kilitome conservancy, 35 yrs.)

Due to strong trust relations among the Namelok community and assumedly also among the landowners, one could have expected that Community Participation in this tourism intervention was achieved, since trust most likely creates more willingness to cooperate (Pretty, 2003). But according to the findings so far, that was not the case.

#### 5.1.2.2. Risks taken

The trust among the landowners is also visible through the amount of risk they accepted by joining the lease agreement in the context of the tourism intervention. The majority of the landowners signed the lease agreement in 2008 because "the others" signed it as well:

> *"I initially signed the agreement because it sounded like a good deal, and the majority of the other landowners signed as well."* Korduni Sampeke (landowner, farmer, pastoralist, 30 yrs.)

The statement demonstrates that the landowners took the risk of entering the partnership collectively, based on the expectations that the others weight the decision painstakingly. Entering the partnership is being described as a risk, because the landowners entered an uncertain situation by giving their property out of their own hands for the coming 15 years. Ritchie & Echnter (2011) claim that such situation of giving away or sharing private property make a person vulnerable, whereas vulnerability refers to taking a risk (Rousseau *et al.,* 1998). Rousseau therefore argues, that taking a risk is seen as requirement for trust. According to Pretty (2003) trust in the decisions of others, develops confidence to act the same way and to justify their actions in that way. *S*triving to be part of the same social category and therefore create one's own identity (Reicher, Spears & Haslam, 2010) can be the reason for trusting others' opinions and entering an uncertain situation. This literature also backs up the eagerness of the Namelok community members of being part of a social group that exist in the village.

In summary it can be argued that the risks taken by the landowners concerning the tourism intervention, reveals trust among them. It is a first step in approaching collaboration, which is needed for Community Participation (Pretty, 2003). Nevertheless, since there are limited findings on the acceptability of risks taken apart from those listed, this section is not decisive for the presence of trust among bonding relationships.

#### 5.1.2.3. Agreement of legitimate authority

The legitimate authority of the Kilitome committee is not agreed on among all the landowners, who show a lack of trust in the committee´s leadership qualities and thus a hindrance for collaboration among the committee members and the landowners.

In the community of Namelok it is recognizable, that despite strong bonds, local leaders are not always trustworthy, but still in power. Only elders in Namelok, traditional carry certain wisdom and are trusted to take care of injustice (Saitoti, 1980). Most landowners interviewed, referred to the

elders solving conflicts in the community by means of their wisdom. David Loiparuni Musa (landowner, baker, farmer, pastoralist, 38 yrs.) explained:

*"The elders are just people that are the oldest and they are trusted to be able to judge about the truth and lies."*

The community therefore agrees on the elders' legitimacy. This accepted wisdom of the elders, implies their traditional authority still today. On the other hand, corruptive[15] leadership practices of for example the neighbourhood leaders, is evident according to the interviewees, but not yet to a level that requires action. An interview with a group of women of the community of Namelok revealed:

*"Even though our local leaders are trustworthy at this moment, we see that the rich men in the community can influence their decisions, by offering them money. Corruption does take place, and we know that some local leaders are not acting trustworthy anymore. In the past you could trust nearly everyone. Money makes people selfish and proud."* Meekaani Yiontia Israel (community member, 50 yrs.).

Richer peoples' ability to influence decisions shows, that local leaders in Namelok can be bribed, and that this is a well-known fact to the community members. By the given quote, it can be assumed that trust is fading towards local leaders nowadays in Namelok, backed up by the theory that corruptive behaviour indicates a low trust level (Thammajinda, 2013). Thammajinda furthermore claimed that the prevention of corruption by honesty is essential for participatory tourism projects.

Trust of the landowners towards the Kilitome committee members, has been described with similar characteristics than trust of community members towards their local leaders. The Kilitome committee members are currently trusted by some befriended landowners. Even these friends do not trust them thoroughly when it comes to the committee's job on the conservancy and the agreement.

*"I know the committee members well. Yes, they do their job good, even though they don't accomplish much. I blame AWF for that, because they are the ones who wrote the agreement. We like the committee members, because we have elected them."* David Loiparuni Musa (landowner, baker, farmer, pastoralist, 38 yrs.)

[15] Although the concept of corruption is hard to define, there is consensus in literature that corruption relates to actions whereby public offices are being abused for personal interests by infringing the rules. It is being referred to a misuse of power by decision-makers (Jain, 2001). I am using this definition of corruption for the discussion of the findings on local leadership and trust.

But others even mentioned dishonesty of the committee and distrust towards them[16]. About the aspect of honesty, one landowner is even convinced that money is being withheld by the Kilitome committee and furthermore, joining the committee regardless of skills or experiences is not appreciated as to be seen in the following. Also it is perceived that information have not been passed on well and improvements achieved:

*"The committee is not doing a very good job. It started with the fact that they would not show all the landowners their plots in the conservancy. I don't trust them, because for example, the treasurer was not even group ranch member before he became treasurer, but he bought a land and bought himself in. I don't like that behavior."* Sakimba Ole Kishil (landowner, pastoralist, 79 yrs.)

*"The committee members are not doing a good job. It has been 6 years and they have not achieved to get more payment. You will hear by other homes that no one will sign the agreement again. Until now, the committee members have not passed on any information. I think, they have achieved a higher payment, and just put all of it in their own pockets."* Olegei Ole Naudo (landowner, pastoralist, 70 yrs.)

These statements about perceived dishonesty and fading trust in their actions, demonstrate that the legitimate authority of the Kilitome committee is not agreed among all the landowners.

Furthermore, it is important to mention that most of the committee members are illiterate, which serves as another indication of not very legitimately perceived authority. Illiteracy is widespread in Kenya (Kebathi, 2008) hence it is not an unusual condition. According to some, it is perceived as incompetence for carrying out leadership in the tourism intervention.

*"No one really understood this agreement, not even the committee members. You can even take that from the fact that the chairman of Kilitome is an illiterate man, who never gained any education."* Samson Newuata (landowner, farmer, 46 yrs.)

*"Yes, the chairman is illiterate and only a few of us are literate, and we believe that this is a hindrance to future progress. It's unfortunate that many of our members are illiterate, more than 90 percent. 4 out of 11 committee members know how to read and write. The rest not at all."* Joseph Lekinasa Parmuat (landowner, environmentalist, community representative of Kilitome conservancy, 35 yrs.)

[16] This study does not reveal how honest the committee is really operating and whether or not they practice corruption in any sense.

Approving the legitimacy of an authority is depending on the authorities' ability to create trust (Forester, 1989). Regarding the fact that some landowners perceive the committee members as dishonest, not trusting their actions and knowing about their illiteracy, it does not indicate an agreed legitimate authority. This assumption implies a hindrance for an efficient and seamless project operations, and is therefore not enabling collaboration among the landowners and the committee members.

## 5.2. POWER INFLUENCING COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

Power relations strongly influence Community Participation and power imbalances within a community as well as between the community and various stakeholders. Balancing power relations for collaboration in a tourism intervention seems to be a decisive condition for collaboration in a tourism intervention (Thammajinda, 2013). I will discuss the authority and leadership activities in terms of enforced rules (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003) of tourism authorities and of local leaders, and moreover I will examine power in relation to knowledge (Foucault, 1980). Conflict is a possible outcome of unequal power relations and therefore a concept to be considered when examining power (Thammajinda, 2013). Analysing these concepts enables us to understand the process of Community Participation and in particular the participation criteria of empowerment & effectiveness.

### 5.2.1. Power within linking relations

In this part, the connection between linking ties and power is discussed. In particular, the relationships between the landowners and the tourism authorities are examined. It is a relationship that already implies a power difference due to the characteristics of the actors in terms of access to knowledge and financial resources.

#### 5.2.1.1. Authority and leadership

As seen in the results, there is a lack of information flow between the landowners and the tourism authorities, which does not contribute to the effectiveness of the project, even though Tawi claims full transparency towards the committee. Authority, in terms of rules and regulating mechanisms (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003), is present in the conservancy agreement and its bylaws, and the work of the conservancy rangers to impose these rules, by distributing sanctions.

*"The daily duties of the conservancy scouts are to patrol through the whole conservancy looking for cattle that is not allowed to graze in the enclosed area around Tawi lodge. (…) These herders have to be charged a fee of 1000 Kenyan Shillings. Every week I had to pass by the Maasai homesteads that*

*are still inside the conservancy to check whether or not building, digging, logging or burning chuckle had taken place there. (…) The cattle that is grazing in the restricted area, are being chased away and when the herder is to be found, the scouts are supposed to explain them that this is wrong behavior. People from the communities respect me and my people, so that it doesn't get to a big conflict when this happens."* Sitonik Kereyian (landowner, senior sergeant at Big Life, 46 yrs.)

Due to irregular landowner meetings, as described earlier, these rules are not communicated well. Meaning, management of the intervention and enforcing its rules by the tourism authorities concerning the conservancy is not carried out well due to insufficient communication channels.

*"So what is happening concerning conservancy management is very much not transparent and chaotic, which I find even embarrassing in front of others and especially our clients."* Axel Lohwasser (Tawi Lodge director)

Crafting clear rules is necessary to create a structure that facilitates communication, for decision making for instance (Uphoff & Wijayaratna 2000). These structures need to be enforced by management (Drucker, 1988). The problem at hand is that there is no conservancy manager to facilitate the regulations of the intervention on community level. Therefore can be argued, that authority is present in form of rules but leadership is not imposed well, which feeds the power differences between the actors.

The behaviour of one, can lead to the suffering of many. This is a form of sanctions, which shows the execution of power by Tawi lodge. Power structures inherit sanctions and procedures based rules (Chu, 2003, as cited in Wong, 2007). When those are disrespected, like in this case cattle grazing in prohibited zones of land, the leadership decision is to impose sanctions. Landowners for example receive fees too late as a form of (unofficial) sanctions, without being informed. Problems can arise for those who have no other income to pay for example school fees, or have a long travel to reach the bank account. The systematic delaying of payments as punishment for all landowners is a crucial means for those who are living in poverty.

*"I liked the partnerships with AWF, but when Tawi took over, the issue of late payment, is annoying me. The problem in Namelok is poverty. When people cannot count on their money to arrive in time, they cannot do certain payments in time."* (Sakimba Ole Kishil, landowner, pastoralist, 80 yrs.)

*"In Oloitoktok is the only bank in the region. To go there and go back costs him many hours and a lot of money (maybe up to 10,000 KSH), which means that this agreement is not profitable for him at all. What also happens sometimes is that the money is delayed and so the man went to collect*

*Oloitoktok for nothing, or has to spend the night there. "* Dikson Meitei (landowner, not in agreement)

The interviewed landowners do not approve this decision, due to their financial dependency on the authorities and their claim to not being informed about the decision upfront. Furthermore the issue of land-shortage of the area is connected with the enforcement of rules, since the most noted struggle between the landowners and Tawi refers to the grazing zones and the attempt to control them. The lodge does not allow cattle of Maasai too close to the lodge, to maintain the tourism experience for its guests. Land with good grass for the cattle is getting scarce due to the increasing sedentary lifestyle of the Maasai and the population growth of the village of Namelok. This clashes with the principles of the conservancy that were agreed on in the beginning of the intervention.

One of the most visible power relations that derive from these findings is the financial dependency on the lodge and AWF. It is noted that the community cannot organize meetings on their own without help of the tourism authorities for approval and financial support. John Gisa told that the landowners committee had requested a meeting in June, and AWF has postponed it until the next financial year, because then the plans would be more concrete and the finances will be there to pay for this meeting. It is very expensive to get transportation to one location and food for the day for all the participants (85 landowners plus Tawi and AWF managers and officers). Also the senior community officer of AWF admitted that board meeting should happen quarterly, but AWF is not always available when the landowners call for a meeting. This shows a dependency on the authorities. Regarding the power inequality and authority applied, it can be argued that the tourism authorities control the Kilitome committee in terms of finances and therefore limit their scope for independent action.

"*The committee does not have money for transportation and food for all the members to come together, only when AWF is helping them out."* Joseph Lekinasa Parmuat (landowner, environmentalist, community representative of Kilitome conservancy, 35 yrs.)

Power inequality is strongly visible between the actors. There are formulated conservancy rules but as derived from the analysis, there are no clear structures of authority recognizable in terms of regular meetings and properly enforced rules which implies no well imposed leadership. Striving towards collective action is not visible among the landowners and the tourism authorities.

#### 5.2.1.2. Knowledge distribution

Not getting informed about the bylaws or any change in conservancy regulations as well as no information about employment opportunities, as promised, can be seen as an act of power and

has probably caused distrust. So far, the landowners barely got the chance to participate in actions that would have an impact on their own lives. The chance to take part in workshops to gain know-how about the relevancy of conservancy was given in the beginning phase of the intervention. However, these were held solely for a selected group of individuals, due to financial limitations of AWF:

"*I only remember 2 or 3 workshops organized by AWF."* (David Ole Kaanki, landowner, committee member of Kilitome, 45 yrs.)

"*About seminars to teach about conservation issues, I can only remember that it might have taken place, but only between 5 and 10 people were invited."* Samson Newuata (landowner, farmer, 46 yrs.)

Generally, there are very different memories about meetings and workshops or seminars held and attended. AWF does not seem to have records of dates and participants of the meetings and seminars they organized. Since the meetings are so hard to memorize for many, it can be argued, that they were not of big importance. Tosun (2000) argues that a knowledge gap between an authority and the host community of a tourism development project withhold the community from participating in the process. People often doubt their abilities of being able to participate in the tourism process, due to their lack of experience with it and the lack of options given (Raj *et al.,* 2013). By not organizing meetings and moments for reciprocity between the authorities and the landowners, required information about the intervention are unlikely to be disseminated effectively.

*"Information by Tawi probably only flow to the landowners of the Tawi property and anyone related to the airstrip, the road that is supposed to be build, or the direct neighbors of the lodge. I personally cannot remember a situation in which Tawi had passed on information. Since AWF had handed over the conservancy to Tawi, there are not any meetings held anymore between Tawi and us"* David Loiparuni Musa (landowner, baker, farmer, pastoralist, 38 yrs.)

When there are landowner meetings taking place, it is questionable whether or not these are effective due to the large number of participants. Regarding the number of participants, these meetings take many hours in order to allow a fair discussion to take place:

*"The leaders speak and when others have a question they can raise their hand and await their turn before they can speak."* John Gisa (AWF Community officer Amboseli region)

The meetings are being held with all landowners of the 6 conservancies in the Amboseli region organized by AWF. These meetings hold 300 – 400 people who sit together outside by a meeting

tree. Here, issues concerning the agreement like the lease fee are being discussed. It is said that everybody can participate in the discussion, not only the committee members of each conservancy.

Moreover, the initially formulated agreement was revised collectively and explained to the landowners in simple language, which shows that the tourism authorities started off alleged transparent and contribute to effectiveness. To some this provided the chance to articulate ideas and critical points regarding the contract democratically and might have led to a feeling of control over the planning process (Ife, 2003).

*The agreement had been read and discussed many times, until all was clear and consensus had been reached".* Joshuea Penuka (landowner and chairman Kilitome conservancy committee, 54 yrs.)

*"The agreement was read to us about three times by a lawyer, and explained. Then anyone of the landowners could tell his remarks."* (Moses Salaash, secretary of Kilitome committee, 51 yrs.)

But others, like Samson Newuata, an educated landowner, realized quickly that this is a too complex venture to fully understand, even for the ones who received schooling. He stated that no one really understood this agreement, not even the committee members. This seems like a genuine argument, since the chairman of Kilitome is an illiterate man as well as many other committee members (Joseph Parmuat). I, as a researcher, found the agreement difficult to understand due to its legal language.

In a multi-stakeholder situation like this one, people have different degrees of influential power on the policy direction of the intervention (Brammwell, 2004). Nunkoo (2015) stated residents are often the ones having less control over tourism interventions than others, which was also found in this research. The lacking dissemination of comprehensible and wide-ranging information about the region and ecotourism operation indicates a non-effective execution of the intervention, as Tosun (2000) describes. Even though quite some people, especially elderly, understand that selling their land, does only lead to short term income and the loss of control over the Maasailand in the region, many would like to rather do that. This shows certain ignorance about the future of the land, which might be fed by a lack of built knowledge capacities about it. Also, the community representative noticed a lack of capacities and that without clear messages, the continued existence of the CBE is threatened.

*"Most are not empowered and cannot do much with this piece of land, and will sell it at a very cheap price. (…) For them to sign the agreement another time, when this one is over, it will take a lot of*

*convincing and especially transparency by Tawi and AWF".* Joseph Lekinasa Parmuat (landowner, environmentalist, community representative of Kilitome conservancy, 35 yrs.)

Only a few exceptions of the interviewees did consider tourism as not necessary in order to conserve the land, or neglected the necessity of conservation. But also those who claim to have understood the process and importance say that momentarily compensation is too little to be able to care about the environment and not about oneself and would rather sell.

*"The benefits are too few to care about ecotourism. Ecotourism and especially Tawi will collapse for about 80% after the agreement ends. Ecotourism is not per se very important for this area at this moment, because its benefits still lie far in the future."*
(Samson Newuata, landowner, farmer, 46 yrs.)

Especially in poorer places, the need for locals to get through and care for their own and their families' existence is bigger than participating in tourism interventions, since benefits are often too far in the future (Timothy, 1999). It would only be for the authorities' own good to communicate messages and discourses transparently about the way the tourism business is operating. Power is conceptualized as knowledge and can be transferred and established in various ways (Foucault, 1980; Cheong & Miller, 2000). Leaving people unaware, in this case fuels rumour and frustration.

The results reveal that the tourism authorities withhold the provision of knowledge, skills and opportunities, which demonstrates their power. This does not contribute to the effectiveness of the project design due to the remaining and reinforced power inequalities between the landowners and the tourism authorities.

#### 5.2.1.3. Conflicts

This section is more a description of conflicts being avoided on behalf of the landowners, rather than executed, which shows that conflicts are not decisive in examining power inequalities in this research. Regarding the interviews, the landowners have difficulties to complain about issues they disagree with:

*"When we want to express complaint there are not many possibilities of doing so. Calling in a meeting is difficult, because the director of Kilitome has to approve it and organize it, which he then doesn't do. I find it very hard to complain and I don't know really how to do it, so it has an effect."*
Korduni Sampeke, (landowner, farmer, pastoralist, 30 yrs.)

But when they do express complaints in board meetings, Joseph Lekinasa Parmuat (landowner, environmentalist, community representative of Kilitome conservancy, 35 yrs.) tells, they are about Tawi and too poor payment for leasing the land. He also said, there is always disagreement, but also consensus at the end of the day. Concerning disagreement, Jonah Ole Tuluapei (Landowner, pastoralist, 32 yrs. old) expressed his ambition is to group up the landowners to negotiate about different terms for the lease contract. The fact that he has not done it in the past years, speaks for it to be a difficult task. The landowners feel that requesting a meeting with AWF or express a complaint is very hard, partly because their request stays unanswered by AWF. Another reason could be that some do not want to complain officially to not get into trouble, which is not directly to be derived from this research, but plausible regarding the findings about very few conflicts among community members of Namelok, as described in the last section of this analysis. Others do not know how to begin and who to talk to since basically there is very little interaction between the tourism authorities and the landowners. Another possible explanation is that capacities have not been built for taking a stand, which goes together with knowledge creation about the intervention and tourism in general. The findings are all characterized of landowners not shaping the project design, thus no effectiveness.

In summary, landowners do rarely approach the authorities with a complaint, despite their discontentment with the intervention. Nieburg, (1969) claims that nearly every conflict is linked to authority issues. By avoiding confrontation that might lead to conflicts at all, the result is that the project design is not shaped or altered by the landowners due to no active participation, and therefore not reflects their needs.

### 5.2.2. Power within bonding relations

#### 5.2.2.1. Authority and leadership

The opportunity to gain the capacity for initiating own actions is not given for all the landowners since the opportunities to attend seminars, trainings or meetings, are mostly given to the committee members who do not disseminate the learnt to the rest. Therefore, gaining control over the tourism project is hindered.

To understand the context, power among community members in the context of the traditional Maasai lifestyle is examined, before focussing on the landowners' power-relations. Authority in Namelok is visible due to a relatively strong sense of power of the Maasai men over their wives and children. The power inequality between men and women of the Maasai tribe is traditionally determined (Spencer, 2003).

*"All Maasai men are dominant, not only my father. What my father says has to be done. There is no more argument. I can argue with my father, but his wives cannot."*
Solomon Kiroiya (community member, employed at Tawi lodge, 26yrs.)

Thus it is common to deal with power inequalities in the community, also due to the accepted authority of the elders in a Maasai community, who have the power to decide over right and wrong, in a conflict situation. Also power inequality between the landowners and those who are landowners but also committee members of Kilitome is present, despite the landowners bonding ties, as concluded earlier. The committee has the authority to discuss decisions regarding the conservancy together with Tawi and AWF (for instance during board meetings), and has the power to inform the rest of the landowners about it, or not. This is the main power difference, which is strongly connected to the communities linking relations with the tourism authorities, and the their power of withholding crucial information. But the present authority of the committee members is not perceived legitimate by the other landowners. This derived from the findings that reflect the by some perceived dishonesty of the committee. Some think the committee members are not doing a good job, especially with regard to sharing information and the lack of leadership skills due to their illiteracy. It can be argued, that the same structures of authority, in terms of setting up meetings for the purpose of sharing information and discussing them, is not visible. Neither are leadership activities advantaged by the committee members illiteracy. The enforcement of rules or leadership activities is not recognized by the landowners, as also argued in the beginning of the analysis. Even though, a re-election of committee members is the landowner's right, when distrust regarding their actions arose, it cannot be applied in praxis because the landowners do not have enough financial resources to organize it.

*"For a re-election, all landowners must be gathered in one place. The committee of Kilitome never calls in a meeting to update the landowners on new rules within the conservancy or any other issue concerning it. Even though I believe that it could work, it just never happened. Because it concerns everyone's personal future."* Samson Newuata (landowner, farmer, 46 yrs.)

*"Last year the landowners attempted to replace the chairman, but it did not go through, because of a lack of financial resources to get all landowners together to vote for a new one."* Joseph Lekinasa Parmuat (landowner, environmentalist, community representative of Kilitome conservancy, 35 yrs.)

Empowerment, as in providing and seizing the choice to learn and develop new skills in order to be able to determine their own affairs (Ife, 2003; Cole, 2005), is not evident in the results. Being empowered or having control over one´s own affairs in the landowners' case should mean at least to have a say over who is representing their interests during important meetings with the tourism

authorities. According to Foster-Fishman (2001), the opportunity to gain the capacity to initiate action (like setting up own meetings etc.) needs to be available to the powerless, in order to empower them. Therefore, the power does not shift and the authority remains with the committee members, by being the only ones with access to decision-making processes, in case any is granted. Because we know about the limited opportunities the committee members get (due to few meetings and few capacity building), the insights on the committee members' authority and leadership are not determining in examining how power shapes Community Participation.

#### 5.2.2.2. Knowledge distribution

This section describes how the findings show that unequal power relations were reinforced by weak reciprocal information sharing between the committee members and the other landowners. Not being sufficiently informed led to the emergence of false expectations and eventually distrust towards the whole intervention.

Some landowners had never heard that seminars or workshops on the importance of conservation had been held. These sessions were held to prepare the landowners to understand the significance of the planned conservancy and the connected tourism venture. Due to financial limitations, only a selected group of landowners were invited and according to John Gisa, encouraged to spread the learnt among the others. The earlier presented quotes on committee members not spreading what they have learned to the rest of the landowners, demonstrate that the information has not disseminated sufficiently.

*"I think the committee members are doing a good job and we are friends. But they don't really pass information and they should organize more meetings."* Shianka Keretu (landowner, pastoralist, 45 yrs.)

*"Under my rules, the committee members do not receive a special treatment, except their position of being the ones that are getting informed about what is going on or changes concerning Tawi and the partnership with the community. It is then their responsibility to communicate this transparency to the rest of the landowners, not ours. So with them, I can say Tawi is very transparent." Axel Lohwasser (Tawi Lodge director)*

The choice of withholding information even though it is not a conscious choice (Foucault, 1980) can be viewed as an act of power, defined as imposing one's own interest over someone else's (Reed, 1997). Since comprehensible information about the project design and tourism development

in the region is necessary to enable participation (Tosun, 2000), one can conclude that not spreading the learnt among fellow landowners properly, can work counterproductive towards participation. It is important to note that not spreading gained knowledge among ones' own community can also be indicative of insufficient capacities in terms of finances, communication and leadership skills on how to facilitate that. The accusations towards the committee about withholding money are based on a lack of information about how the benefits are being shared among all landowners. After 6 years of intervention, landowners still have expressed false assumptions about the source of the conservancy fee payment and the payment structure. This also shows that the committee, who is better informed than the others, withholds the proper dissemination of gained information to fellow landowners, wherefore empowerment for Community Participation is obviated.

#### 5.2.2.3. Conflicts

Conflicts are an indicator for possible unequal power relationships. The results of this research do not reflect this, as this section will present. The absence of considerable conflicts in Namelok and conflicts among the landowners might speak for little power differences. Regarding the previous analysis, it can be assumed that despite (or perhaps exactly for that reason) the traditionally induced power differences present, problem solving mechanisms and consensus finding strategies are well implemented and functioning. Concerning the landowners' case, the regulations of the conservancy reduces conflicts rather than increases them, which might also be supported by the traditional acceptance of those in power.

*"There are conflicts sometimes and then they gather together in front of the elders to solve the issue. The issue of land ownership is a very sensitive issue. But she cannot recall one conflict that is very major. Problems usually get solved quickly."* Mary John Maitei (community member, chief of Namelok)

Landowners stated that since the introduction of the conservancy, conflicts among each other, for example about cattle grazing and landownership diminished because it is now regulated.

*"There are still sometimes small conflicts, but nothing big. Most of all, it had brought the landowners together. Now they became a group with a common interest."* Sitonik Kereyian (landowner, senior sergeant at Big Life, 46 yrs.)

*"There was no conflict up to now, just some complaints towards the committee, which he considers as very much normal."* (David Ole Kaanki, landowner, committee member of Kilitome, 45 yrs.)

In literature it is argued, that each community consists of a variety of social groups and once these clash, conflicts and exclusion might arise and work counterproductive towards Community Participation (Botes & Rensburg, 2000). The research has not revealed significant signs of this type of conflicts among social groups within the community, or among the landowners in particular. Nevertheless, the previously detected power inequality between the landowners and the committee regarding the tourism intervention, leads to no induction of a re-election process, despite their frustration, due to insufficient financial resources. This in mind, one can conclude that a power inequality does not always lead to conflicts; it can also lead to suppressing them.

# 6. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISCUSSION

This final chapter summarizes the main findings of this study with regard to the research question. The applicability of the findings in practice will be discussed as well as recommendations for further research or practitioners presented. A critical discussion of the theories applied and suggestions for alternatives will end the thesis.

## 6.1. CONCLUSIONS

In order to answer the particular research question *'How does bonding and linking Social Capital influence Community Participation during a CBE intervention?'* specific interrelations between the aspects of trust and power within bonding and linking relationships and the Community Participation aspects were looked for. This section starts with stating more general conclusions that derive from trust and power relations, and will end with answering the specific research sub-questions that also address the Community Participation criteria.

Regarding trust relationships, there is evidence for tight bonds among the community members of Namelok, which implies trust relationships according to Seligson *et al*. (2006). The pre-existing high bonding relations among community members of the Maasailand is assumed to have had a positive influence on landowners entering the agreement collectively without in-depths understanding about it. As derived from literature by Rousseau *et al.* (1998), trust can lead to shared information, status and concern which is documented in the findings about the respondents newly gained status of being landowners. The landowners have taken a risk by entering the agreement to lease their possession, which implies trust relations (Rousseau *et al*., 1998; Ross & LaCroix, 1996). This trust has led to an efficient start of the intervention, as the collective behavior about entering the lease agreement showed. But it can be concluded that trust has vanished and no significant

interaction with Tawi and only little with AWF was noted so far. The analysis showed that trust relationships can change over time due to this inconsistent interaction. The arousal of distrust because of absent reciprocity (mutual exchange of goods and knowledge) (Svendsen & Bjornskov, 2007) is evident in my findings, wherefore no direct inclusion in the tourism sector could emerge. Due to mislead expectations and very rare scheduled meetings, it is concluded that trust relations between the landowners and the tourism authorities are weak. Despite the lack of trust, especially elderly landowners know that the agreement saves valuable land and is beneficial to keep, especially for the younger generations. But 6 years after the start of the intervention landowners still feel that promises made by AWF and Tawi were neglected, which resulted in overall dissatisfaction of the partnership and the disagreement about the legitimacy of the tourism authorities. To create acceptable legitimacy as an authority, one needs the ability to create trust (Forester, 1989). A lack of trust towards the committee members´ leadership abilities as well as those of the tourism authorities is evident in the findings. Also collective action in the sense of the intervention was rarely mentioned in my findings. Thus, tight community bonds among the landowners, contrary to literature (Pretty, 2003; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000; Wellman & Frank, 2001), did not facilitate cooperative behavior or participation in tourism development, neither among landowners, nor towards the tourism authorities.

When looking at power relationships, a general conclusion from the findings is that tourism and project-specific knowledge was not fairly spread and those with better access benefit of more opportunities. Next to the access to knowledge, power differences emerge from the access to money. Money allows the organization and facilitation of meetings, which is not possible otherwise due to high logistic effort. Community members generally depend on the tourism authorities to take action for initiating meetings, which is at the expense of the project effectiveness. The systematic delaying of payment by Tawi towards the landowners is a form of sanctions that proves authority and power inequality, and caused distress among the landowners, especially those who depend on the money. Rules can be imposed and can give structure (Wong, 2007), but they have to be communicated clearly in order to function. The findings show that the mentioned sanctions had not been shared beforehand and accordingly reinforce power inequalities. Unclear managed authority structures as evident in this case, do not motivate people to participate and co-operate, as also Wong, (2007) claimed. When operationalizing the concept of power for Social Capital, the concept of conflicts was not very valuable to the analysis and the conclusions that derived from the data. Looking at conflicts delivered limited results. There was no capacity for this research to thoroughly fathom the reasons why conflicts are basically referred to as non-existent, even though the found data points towards the possible emergence of conflicts.

In the following, the defined sub-questions will be answered.

### 6.1.1. How does trust within linking relationships shape the acceptance of the host community towards sharing the intervention´s costs and benefits?

The landowners perceive that what they get in return for handing over their land for conservation purposes is not fair. It is shown that currently, contributions are not perceived proportional to the benefits, which works counterproductive towards Community Participation, as also suggested by Murphree (1999). This had not been that way from the start. Initially, the presence of the private investor (Tawi Lodge) seemed promising and trustworthy to the landowners and their families, so the majority of landowners entered the agreement without much resistance. It is therefore evident, that initial trust by the community members towards the tourism authorities in the beginning phase of an intervention, led to an obstacle-free acceptance of the terms and conditions of the sharing system. This initial trust has been identified by what Rousseau *et al.* (1998) refers to as the acceptance of risk. Entering an uncertain situation like the conservancy agreement collectively, attests trust relationships among one another and towards the tourism authorities. The study confirms that trust within linking Social Capital can positively influence the acceptance of perceived costs and benefits for the landowners.

Weak trust relations affected the acceptance of costs and benefits of and from the intervention by the landowners negatively. Thus, not supporting the sharing system does not account for Community Participation eventually. For this case it can be argued that trust within linking Social Capital has not developed to an extent, that encourages the acceptance of the sharing system in the long run, rather evoked the opposite.

### 6.1.2. How does trust within bonding relationships shape the efficiency of the intervention?

Even though landownership and the conservancy caused the landowners to become a group with common interests, the research revealed no concrete indications that this has led to more collective action so far. More meetings and other interaction to involve with issues of the intervention, among the landowners or towards the tourism authorities, are meant. Since efficiency of an intervention increases with cooperation between the tourism authorities and the respective community (Paul, 1987), is to be concluded regarding the findings, that the long-term efficiency of this intervention is not given or increased. This derives from the findings, that the lease agreement and its enforced rules are not very much accepted among the landowners. The sustainability and long-term existence of the conservancy is therefore threatened, which is a sign for inefficiency (Cooke & Kothan, 2001).

The study results reveal no clear interrelation between high trust among community members and increased collective action among them or even with committee members or tourism authorities, which would contribute to the time and cost efficiency of the project.

### 6.1.3. How does power within linking relationships shape the effectiveness of the intervention?

The effectiveness of the intervention is shaped by the lack of information flow and the lack of creation of knowledge capacities by the tourism authorities towards the landowners. To conclude, it can be said that when the power differences between the community and the tourism authorities is large, the effectiveness of the tourism intervention suffers. Project plans and their implementation remain top-bottom and do not include much of the communities' real needs when equal say between stakeholders are not given, as also suggested by Bramwell (2004). Unequal power relationships are present and recognizable in terms of no knowledge transfer, financial dependency and the enforcement of bylaws and sanctions of the conservancy. Due to irregular landowner meetings, any kind of knowledge is not transferred well, which is according to Tosun (2000) and Paul (1987) the foundation for an effective intervention. Requested meetings are often postponed by AWF which impedes the landowners from expressing their concerns to exchange information and to create a bond with the authorities. A number of meetings have been initiated by the tourism authorities to allow the landowners to make suggestions for the improvement of the conservancy lease agreement in the initiation phase. This had the potential to add to the project effectiveness. A revision of the lease did take place, but not to a sufficient extent when considering the illiteracy of most landowners. Trainings in the initiation phase of the intervention should have established capacities among the community members to give them the opportunity to have a say in the structure of the project and its outcomes. Since these opportunities were not given and capacity building not evident, it can be argued that power structures among linking relations did not contribute to the participation criteria of effectiveness.

### 6.1.4. How does power within bonding relationships shape the empowerment of the host community?

The landowners and the community as a whole have tight bonds, despite existent traditional power structures yet. Nevertheless, these bonding relations did not lead to influencing decision-making processes. More concretely, the committee members, who are part of the social group of the landowners, have access to knowledge and decision-making processes with the tourism authorities but have not initiated actions that lead to empowerment of the landowners, nor themselves really.

The research results show sparse involvement of the Namelok community and in particular the landowners in tourism activities and in the intervention as a whole. Thus, the tourism intervention has not (yet) nurtured self-belief[17] or confidence for participation. Furthermore, insufficient opportunities for enhancing this confidence, knowledge capacities and skills to take part in a decision-making process have been offered, like Alsop *et al.* (2006) suggests. This would enable participants to slowly gain some control over the tourism project. The opportunities offered do often only reach the committee members. This means, the committee has received the power to share or withhold new information and get the chance to discuss with the tourism authorities in meetings. The landowners mistakenly believed to be fully aware of what the agreement entails in the initiation phase. Findings revealed that assumingly only those who were literate had a better understanding of it. Therefore, the choice for participation remained with those who already were empowered (in terms of communication skills and knowledge) or were part of the Kilitome committee, contrary to the MacBeth (2004) and (Onyx & Bullen, 2000) who claim that strong ties of similar identities can generate empowerment among a social group. Besides, empowerment in the landowners' case means to decide over who is representing their interests during important meetings with the tourism authorities. This is not given due to the difficulties a re-election entails, and therefore the chance of achieving empowerment is even less available. It can therefore be concluded that the power inequalities among the landowners can lead to processes that have a counteractive effect on participation. In sum, power has not been shifted towards the rest of the landowners, and left them rather uninformed. As Arnstein (1996) claims empowerment of the powerless requires a shift of power coming from those who have it. Also my research suggests that this shift towards the powerless is necessary, since not gaining information and knowledge by neither the tourism authorities themselves nor the committee members, has definitely not led to participative actions of the landowners. By participative actions, activities are meant, that can direct the intervention towards their own needs, therefore gain control.

## 6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

Considering the conclusions on how Social Capital of a community can shape the Community Participation process of a CBE intervention, in the following I will suggest recommendations for CBE practitioners. These insights can help to plan CBE interventions more thoroughly with the goal of actual Community Participation.

[17] According to Cole (2006), this is necessary to engage in decision-making. Believing in oneself and one's own capacities as well as understanding the significance of one's participation.

At first I would like to refer to the often failed function of NGO's, governments or other external stakeholders who, according to Jamal & Getz (1999), have the task to develop extensive capacity building programs for the community. Especially when a conservation organization is involved, I support the view that participation of the community in the tourism project is largely dependent on the opportunities given and the capacities to seize this opportunities. When claiming to build an ecotourism structure in partnership with the community, the conservation organization's task should be to engage the locals in the conservation initiative in order to create sustainability of the effort. Community Participation is advocated for sustainable development of interventions and the environment (Fox & Van Rooyen, 2004). A large NGO working in this field like the AWF should be capable of implementing sufficient outreach programs and offer trainings and learning opportunities. If this is not the case, first capacity building on organizational level should forgo an intervention in order to provide the staff tools and skills to teach and transfer knowledge to the community to ensure genuine cooperation. The private partner of the intervention brings the knowledge on how to run a viable business and train local people for employment. Management and knowledge about tourism normally is their area of expertise and they should collaborate with the conservation organization or NGO for proper capacity building. Depending on, whether or not large cultural or professional differences between the investor and the NGO exist, meetings to get to know each other well, need to be considered. Discussing and sharing one another's working (management-) style openly can lead to trust in the other's actions and intentions. Getting to know each other is crucial for a smooth teamwork and to avoid misunderstanding and frustrations through false expectations over the course of the project. Even though the relationship between the two tourism authorities was directly not part of the research framework, I gained insights about it. The case that both parties indicated bad co-working, and even the landowners made a clear distinction between the two and their way of operating, led to the conclusion that a coherent collaboration was not existent, neither was trust in one another among all parties. This shows, that it I vital to establish consensus on goals and interests among the tourism authorities, in order to gain trust of the affected community. Only when the tourism actors work well together, coordinated information can reach the beneficials. In this research, trust towards the tourism authorities, led to a low threshold towards entering the lease agreement and its terms and conditions. This turned into distrust over time and low acceptance of the sharing system of benefits and costs. CBE practitioners need to find a way to foster mutual trust already in the intervention preparation phase. On the go, for example proper expectation management and intensive linking relationships are to be maintained for the trust to remain. From the results can be derived that more meetings and workshops would help this process. Repeated landowner meetings with a manageable size of participants as well as board-meetings in this particular case are suggested to diminish the problem of non-collaboration. Giving the host

community the opportunity for building trust towards the tourism authorities by frequent interaction could help sustaining this trust. Not only with those who already have linking relationships like the committee members, but also everyone who has a question or requires a meeting (for well-argued reasons). About trainings and learning opportunities, a recommendation is to hire experts that can merge the necessary knowledge of both parties and design and facilitate effective training programs, and grouping the participants according their capacities. That way it can be ensured, that not only committee members for instance, or those in more powerful positions than others receive certain trainings, but others will also get the chance to be able to formulate their thoughts and ideas for this purpose.

Improving the channels for expressing complaints and the reactions to those in this particular case study, would also help to improve the community's view on the partnership – at least in terms of giving them the feeling to be heard. This could be realized through the forming of a 'complain board' (who is maybe part of the conservancy committee, but not necessarily), that every landowner is familiar with and has access to and who encourages them to speak out. This 'complain board' (name still to be determined), regularly schedules meetings with the representatives of Tawi and AWF (f.i. once in 6 weeks), at a neutral location. Furthermore, all financial documents must be made public in order to create transparency and therefore gain support for equitable fund distribution and prevent rumours. The transparency on financial issues could also be solved through better developed communication channels, so no one has to travel far in vein to pick up money from their bank account, which was stated by one of the respondents. According to my observation, every landowner I spoke possessed a phone, therefore an idea would be for Tawi lodge to send an SMS via a website, to inform the landowners of the bank transfer, or about a possible delay.

High trust among community members did not lead to the significant initiation of collective action among one another, but also no collaboration with the authorities, therefor did not add to the efficiency of the project. A community with tight bonds and high trust relations according to literature, is more likely to facilitate a flow of information and engagement in cooperative behavior (Davidsson & Honig, 2003 as stated in Ritchie & Echnter, 2011), but does not guarantee it. Practitioners should be aware that it takes more than perceived tight bonds between the host community members to create collaboration and a well-functioning efficient conservation strategy with fairly distributed benefits. It takes for example the courage and capacity to engage in the intervention, as well as the understanding and attitude that this is a necessary step and beneficial for all stakeholders in the future.

Large power differences among host community and tourism authorities in terms of finances, knowledge and opportunities hindered the project effectiveness in terms of re-negotiations and eventual control over parts of the project. To establish Community Participation, it would be helpful to balance the power differences, for example by means of capacity building towards adjusting the project plan according to their own needs etc. Balancing power differences is a highly complex task, but achievable through the above mentioned long-term trainings programs, that aim at all stakeholders having an equal say and the ability to make well-grounded decisions. Extensive trainings for the tourism authorities and maybe the committee members on how to manage a problem in a multi-stakeholder situation and reach consensus could contribute to the effectiveness of the meetings taking place and decisions being made. A tourism practitioner should be aware about the local power structures, about who has a voice and how to make use of traditional power structures in favor of the intervention. This way spreading of information through those community members in power (like the committee members in this case), could be ensures. A way to control whether or not the necessary knowledge had reached the remaining landowners or beneficiaries in general could be introduced – like a signature list with all men's signatures who have received the message, written or orally. The idea is, that this list has to be handed in to the tourism authorities by the committee members, one month after the message was spread. Furthermore, establishing a way for the host community or the landowners to autonomously be able to set up meetings for discussions or even re-elections to work towards a more deliberate and democratic future could be a step towards empowerment. They should also be enabled and encouraged by AWF to do that and provided funding by the tourism authorities, since money is crucial to overcome the large distances between the homes of the landowners (the landowners who are not from Namelok were not included in this research, but should be considered in the improvement of the intervention).

Furthermore it is to recommend that investing in sustainability might eventually be more cost effective for the overall intervention. In our case, if the landowners refuse to sign a follow-up agreement, the problem of conserving the area is back where it was right after the division of the communal land. The investor will have to stop the operation after some time because he will not be able to ensure the tourism product anymore. I estimate that it will cost more to keep the ecosystem intact without a conservancy structure that benefit from tourism, than putting more effort in the sustainability of the whole intervention right from the start.

### 6.2.1. Recommendations for further research

The study focuses on only certain parts of Community Participation. I think, to build on my research and more thoroughly understand the situation, an analysis about the capacity building process is needed. How should capacities be built best and what is necessary for this process? Which capacities have been acquired or attempted to be acquired in the past? What are the essential capacities for the landowners in order to make the intervention long-lasting and sustainable and beneficial for all stakeholders? It is interesting to researching current problems concerning communication (by evaluating meetings etc.) and consequently formulating an effective communication strategy for the tourism authorities towards the landowners.

The research should be widened towards all the landowners from the Kimana Group Ranch, not only those that belong to Namelok community. The study should look at what is inevitable in this context to enable meaningful participation and therefore guarantee the landowners to be part of the decision-making processes in the tourism intervention. Here, one should take into consideration that for a community, of which a large part is illiterate and received no, or a very low level of education, the process of teaching certain skills should be tailored towards this specific target group. Formal education might not be as successful as Okello and Wishitemi (2006) found. Additionally, maybe a study about attitudes towards wildlife, land-use and nature conservation could give the first insights on how capacity building should be best implemented.

## 6.3. Discussion of the Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework worked in many respects to find out about the influence of Social Capital on the Community Participation process. Nevertheless, several matters are noted in the following on how a more in-depth production of data and sub-sequent analysis could have been achieved.

The aim of this thesis was finding out how Community Participation was influenced by the existent social structures of a community. To examine that, it was necessary to identify many aspects of these networks and inherent components of those, like trust and power relationships. Trust and power are complex concepts to analyse, due to their broad underlying or indicating components of relationships, authority, risk, conflict, knowledge etc. According to literature, those aspects are inevitable to consider for an in-depth analysis of trust and power, and in my case serve to give insights in how it influences capacities or competencies, needed to reach Community Participation.

Even though, for example the concept of 'knowledge' is clearly inherent to trust as well as power, for the analysis, I decided to dedicate knowledge only to power.

Eventually, it would have made more sense to use different sub-questions aiming at specific "competencies" that enable Community Participation during tourism intervention. The concepts which are linked to the used participation objectives by Paul (1987) revealed to be difficult to analyse due to their broadness and entanglement, to eventually formulate in-depths answers to the sub-questions. The criteria are not equally weighing concepts, for instance the criteria of empowerment could also be used as overarching one, which includes the others. Empowerment is mostly conceptualized in development and tourism literature individually as a holistic concept (Cole, 2006; Alsop *et al*. 2006; Strzelecka & Wicks, 2015). Characteristics that define empowerment, like influencing the decision-making process, are also often used in literature as overall goal of Community Participation. Therefore it would have been an option to focus only on empowerment (achieved by capacity building). Accordingly, capacity building for empowerment should have been more extensively conceptualized, to gain more in-depth understanding of the barriers and supporting factors of skill and knowledge development in the specific case study.

The four evaluated participation criteria linked with the complexity of finding out about a communities' trust and power relationships, left a gap between the theoretical choice of SC and its applicability to capacity building efforts. The choice was made to look at SC's networks with inherent relationships (meaning bonding and linking relationships that are shaped by trust and power) alone, and use competencies of people within the framework of Community Participation, despite the fact that competencies are also part of a communities' SC. To reduce the complexity of my total conceptual framework, I could have more clearly used Community Participation (and therefore the building of capacities) as the overarching context, wherein all concepts of Social Capital such as relationships, networks, competencies and trust and power are placed. Focussing the framework more on identification of limiting and enabling factors of Community Participation through examining SC, would have made the outcomes of the research more in line with the conceptual framework. The relevant results are currently somewhat detached from the Community Participation criteria of sharing costs and benefits, efficiency, effectiveness and empowerment. An idea for an alternative Research Question would be *"How do power and trust relationships of a network influence the building of key competencies of the network actors, to enable Community Participation?"*.

Furthermore, the concept of reciprocity (mutual exchange of goods and knowledge) plays a large role in Social Capital and development literature (Flora, 2004), and therefore should have received more attention during the operationalization of SC and the analysis of the findings. For

instance, when reciprocity is strong among communities, the members are more likely to participate and take advantage of economic and capacity building opportunities (Carpenter, Daniere, & Takahashi 2004, in McGehee 2010). Reciprocity is closely knit to knowledge and information transfer, as Ritchie and Echtner (2011) claim, which are also recurring concepts in this research. Ritchie and Echtner (2011) suggest that close and repeated interactions are needed for detailed information as well as tacit knowledge to be transferred to another individual. Tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966), also referred to as informal knowledge, includes unspoken and personal experiences, insights and observations. Formal as well as informal knowledge could have been valuable to look at in more depth, when examining the linking perspective of Social Capital. Especially, ways of disseminating data or knowledge in order to create useful capacities such as management, negotiation skills, critical thinking that are needed for the tourism participation process. The dissemination of information can be analysed by taking a close look at formal and informal leadership structures at hand. The formal and the informal sector are merging in terms of the multi-actor-partnership at hand, which requires several ways of looking at leadership (Gutterman, 2015). Regarding leadership in African countries Gutterman (2015) claims *"In Africa, a different culture of leadership is visible with emphasis on ceremony, ritual, interpersonal relations, reciprocity and the distribution of scant resources to clan and ethnic affiliates over and above profit and competition."* De Ver (2008) adds in this sense, that in development countries, leadership occurs *"within a given indigenous configuration of power, authority and legitimacy, shaped by history, institutions, goals and political culture."* Local, mostly informal forms of leadership must be taken into account when trying to develop management and leadership for a specific development purpose (De Ver, 2008), in this case for tourism and conservation purposes. The researcher noted that in development countries leaders must be able to forge formal and informal coalitions to solve collective action problems. De Ver (2008) is concerned about how little research had been conducted in how leadership can be practiced in the unstable, hybrid and evolving institutional contexts (condition of many development countries). Giving leadership another focus in the just described sense could make the conceptualization of power and authority more clear and specific, and provide a more in-depth analysis. In summary, what this thesis misses to discuss, is reciprocity as key element of Social Capital, which inherits knowledge distribution and is influenced by different forms of leadership.

From this process, I have learned how important it is to set the focus on the right concepts, in order to avoid getting lost in their intricacies and interrelations towards one another. Clear definitions of used concepts and the consistent use of those, definitely helps this process. To evaluate the use of a concept for a framework, I learned that it is crucial to study it holistically, before applying it, in order to avoid missing out on important or more suitable theories. Last but not

least, the process of writing this thesis showed me how important it is to clearly formulate interrelations and causalities of the theories before using them in the analysis. Otherwise vague and difficult to comprehend results are being produced.

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# APPENDIXES

## Appendix 1: Aide mémoires

Tawi manager

- How lodge operates?
- Tourism at this time?
- Plan for ecotourism activities for community? Cultural village visits?
- Management Plan for Kilitome conservancy?
- Relationship with Scouts? Experiences with community?
- How community-based is this venture?
- Interaction with landowners? Conflicts?
- Distribution of benefits?
- Problem of employing / trainings? Who works here from the community?
- Former manager?

AWF community officer

- Who owns land? How did that change in the past years?
- Involvement of community in Kilitome intervention / in Lodge
- Project plan/ reports/ agreements?
- Thoughts about Tawi
- Community members had to move out of conservancy?
- Skill or knowledge enhancing activities / workshops on conservation/ participation/employment
- Communal land vs. conservancy
- Why sub-division of land?
- Attempts to request meetings
- Collabortion with Kilitome committee
- When AWF approaches community?
- Tawi took over payment
- Chairmen reelection?
- Committee members of Kilitome
- Clarify lease agreement
- Minutes/reports of meetings, wokshops with landowners?

## Appendix 2: Semi-structured interview guides

Tawi director in Nairobi

- Can you tell me more about the process of building partnerships between Tawi, AWF and the community? Which role did each party take over?
- What kind of activities where initiated by Tawi and AWF?
- How did you make sure the land owners understood the agreement fully?
- What kind of capacity building activities took place from the beginning up until today?
- I read in the "Tawi Lodge Description" document that 200 local community members have been sensibilised about conservation and that training in leadership and basic financial administration for the landowners. Also, it states about funding the conservancy association's activities. Can you confirm these statements and tell me more about it?
- What are and were the biggest challenges with the formation of the conservancy according to Tawi?
- What is your and Tawis relationship with the local community? How would you describe the collaboration with them? Especially the conservancy committee members. What is their role?
- How would you describe the collaboration with AWF?
- Do you plan to employ more community members in the future?
- Did you approach the community in the beginning of Tawi, to inform them how they could participate in this tourism development process?
- Is Tawi transparent in terms of money towards the land owners?

AWF senior community officer

- In your words, how did the process of partnership building between Tawi/AWF and the community look like back then?
- What type of meetings and seminars that took place? (like sensibilisation for conservation; leadership training for committee members; …)
- What were major challenges and benefits since agreement came into effect?
- Which projects did AWF to undertake to support the community?
- Challenges related to landownership?
- Exact payment to community?

Landowners

- Name, age, occupation
- You own 60 acres of land in the Kilitome conservancy?
- Please tell me more about the process of forming the conservancy. Did you learn fully about the agreement? Have you attended the meetings?
- What does the agreement with Tawi, AWF and the landowners include? What do you benefit from, what not? Can you recall experiences from fellow land owners?
- Why did you enter the agreement? What was your major motivation?
- Have you learned about the reason why a conservancy is of great importance for this area?
- How much rent does the AWF/Tawi pay you as a lessor? How much is that for you? Do you think the amount is enough/fair?
- What do you think of the Tawi lodge? What is your relationship to it?
- Have you heard of any involvement in tourism activities, like employment opportunities? Have you or your community member been approached by Tawi or AWF to explain about possible employment opportunities? Do you know what it requires to work there and would you generally be interested?
- Do you consider Namelok your community?
- Do you know most people of this community? Do you trust them?
- Do you interact often with your fellow landowners?
- Does the community as a whole interact a lot with other communities in this area, does it more stand on its own?
- If you are a committee member, what are your tasks and duties? And what is your relationship to the chairman? And the other landowners?
- Do you know the Kilitome committee members well? What do you think of them and their job?
- Did they approach you and the other landowners, back I the beginning of the conservancy, to teach you what they had learned about conservation by AWF?
- Do you think there is now more or less trust among the landowners since the conservancy had been created? Do you feel unified with the other landowners?
- Did conflicts about landownership arise among the landowners? If so, what could that mean for the area in the future?
- What does landownership mean to you?
- What do you tell your sons about landownership, once they inherit your land or have their own land.

- How big is your family? How many wives and how many children do you have? Do you make the rules?

Chairman of Kilitome conservancy

- What is your job exactly? Can you tell me more about your daily duties and activities?
- What community are you from?
- Tell me more about the process about the creation of the conservancy.
- What are benefits and challenges the conservancy brings?
- What is your relationship with the Tawi management?
- Do you interact a lot with the landowners? Do they approach you directly to call a meeting or do they do that through your committee members? Do they have a lot of respect of you, because of your position?
- Do you think the landowners are generally content with the agreement and how it went the past 6-7 years? Or do you feel some tension?
- Does the community you are fro, have tight relationships?

Secretary of the Kilitome committee

- What does your position as secretary of the conservancy committee include? What are your responsibilities and how does your position differ from the other committee members?
- So are you one of the contact persons for landowners, whenever they have an issue that they want to discuss?
- What are your experiences with the creation of the conservancy? Any challenges? What are the benefits?
- What is your relationship to Tawi? What is that partnership about?
- The chairman told me in an interview that the relationship with Tawi is a very much equal one.
- What is your relationship to the chairman?
- Did you attend workshops about conservation issues held by AWF? If so, did you teach what you learned to the rest of the landowners?
- Did you feel that you were at some point able to revise the intervention plan?
- Whose idea was the creation of the conservancy?
- Do you think that most landowners are happy with the conservancy?

- Do you think there is more or less trust among the landowners since the conservancy creation?
- Are there more or less conflicts about landownership than before?
- What do you think about the issue of population growth and conservancies? Does this not clash?
- Do you think tourism development is important for the conservancy and the future of this area?

Community members (who are not landowners)

- How big is your family and how would you describe the relationships to your family members? What are structures in your family? Have you moved before?
- And to your neighbours in Namelok? Do you help each other out?
- Would you say you know everyone in the village? How many people would you say you know very well?
- Can you tell me more about the composition of the community?
    ~ How big are most families?
    ~ Groups within communities?
    ~ Who are local leaders? Who has the power? Your or your families' relationship to them? Do you think leaders make good decisions?
    ~Do you think there are many people acting selfish in Namelok?
- Do people generally trust each other in Namelok?
- What are conflicts about? Are there major conflicts in the community? Conflicts that last over generations?
- Did Kilitome conservancy members or some local leader ever teach or told you or the others about importance of conservation?
- Did you notice a change in behaviour within your community during the last ten years? Or any change about the things that you have just told me about?

## Appendix 3: The Lease Agreement



**THIS AGREEMENT TO LEASE** is made on 2008 between:

1. **THE BENEFICIAL OWNERS OF ALL THOSE PIECES OF LAND MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED IN SCHEDULE I TO THIS AGREEMENT** the ("**Lessors**") of the postal addresses indicated against their respective names in the said Schedule I, and

2. **TAWI CONSERVANCY LIMITED**, (the "**Lessee**") a limited liability company incorporated in Kenya under the provisions of the Companies Act (Cap 486) of the Laws of Kenya and of P.O. Box 40286-00100, Nairobi, and

3. **AFRICAN WILDLIFE FOUNDATION**, ("**AWF**") a body corporate operating in Kenya pursuant to the provisions of the Privileges and Immunities Act (Cap 179) of the laws of Kenya and having a postal address of P.O. Box 48177-00100, Nairobi.

**WHEREAS**:

(A) The Lessors are the respective beneficial owners of the parcels of land as indicated in Schedule I to this agreement to lease (the "**Agreement**").

(B) The Properties have not been issued with titles yet as the land adjudication process is still ongoing. However, the Properties have been allocated to the Lessors awaiting the issuance of titles and the Lessors are in possession.

(C) AWF has undertaken a community awareness programme in the Kilitome Area to inform landowners of the need to conserve their respective parcels of land. The Lessors recognize the need to conserve their respective parcels of land and to that end they have agreed to grant leases over their respective parcels of land to the Lessee to achieve sustainable conservation of the Kilitome Conservation Area (as defined in the Lease (defined below)). A plan of the Kilitome Conservancy Area is attached as Schedule II (the "**Kilitome Conservancy Plan**") hereto.

(D) Pursuant to the said agreement by the Lessors to grant leases over their properties, AWF entered into a separate agreement with the Lessee, in which AWF has agreed to provide funding for the Rent payable under the Lease for a period of up to four (4) years from the date of this Agreement and further, on the terms and conditions contained herein;

(E) The Lessors have jointly and severally agreed to lease their respective parcels of land forming the Kilitome Conservancy Area, and the Lessee has agreed to take the same at the Rent (as particularised against the lot number for the Property in Schedule I hereto).

(F) The Lessors and the Lessee have jointly and severally agreed to appoint AWF to monitor and supervise observance with the terms of this Agreement.

(G) Tawi Lodge Limited ("**Tawi Lodge**") is in the process of setting up a lodge on the Lodge Site (as defined in the Lease) and to provide tourist related activities on the Lodge Site. The Lessee intends to grant Tawi Lodge the right to traverse the Property and conduct tourism activities in accordance with the terms and conditions to be agreed with Tawi Lodge, subject however to the provisions of this Agreement, the Lease and the Management Plan.

AGN/AP57_6 Master for non titles 8 people.doc
lwp

**NOW IT IS AGREED** as follows:

1. The Lessors shall individually grant to the Lessee and the Lessee shall accept a lease from each of the Lessors of their respective individual Property at the Rent for the Term (as defined in the Lease) and subject to the terms and conditions substantially contained in the form of lease (the "**Lease**") annexed hereto and marked Annexure 1.

2. The Lessee shall have the responsibility of obtaining the Land Control Board consent or Presidential exemption to the Agreement and the Lease solely at its own cost.

3. All reasonable and proper costs and expenses incurred by the parties herein, including stamp duties, copying fees and other disbursements relating to the completion this Agreement shall be paid by AWF.

4. The Lessee having been permitted to take possession of the respective parcels of land forming the Kilitome Conservancy Area on December 2008 (the "**Commencement Date**"), shall from the Commencement Date until the respective Leases shall have been completed be in possession thereof upon the same terms as those contained in the Lease.

5. Until such time as a title shall be issued for the Property and the Lease shall have been completed and registered against such title, the Lessee shall pay the Rent to the Lessors (from the Commencement Date) and the Lessors shall observe and comply with all the covenants, agreements, conditions, restrictions, stipulations and provisions contained in and implied in the Lease (including the Term) as if the same had been actually executed and completed.

6. For the avoidance of doubt, Rent for the bi-annual period beginning on the Commencement Date shall be paid by the Lessee to the Lessors immediately upon execution of this Agreement in the manner contemplated in clause 9 (a) of the Lease. Accordingly:

   (i) AWF shall pay Rent in the first year of the Term for and on behalf of the Lessee in the manner contemplated in clause 9 (a) of the Lease and the said payment shall be made directly from AWF to the Lessor;

   (ii) AWF shall contribute a proportion of the Rent for the second, third and fourth years of the Term in the amount to be agreed as between the Lessee and AWF.

7. The Lessors and the Lessee hereby jointly and severally appoint AWF to monitor and supervise observance by all parties of the terms of this Agreement.

8. This Agreement embodies the entire understanding of the parties and there are no other arrangements between the parties relating to the subject matter of this agreement. No amendments or modifications of this Agreement shall be valid or binding on any party unless they:

   (i) are made in writing;

   (ii) refer expressly to this Agreement; and

   (iii) are signed by the party concerned or its duly authorised representative.

9. Upon completion of the Lease if there shall be any inconsistency between the provisions of this Agreement and the provisions of the Lease, the provisions of the Lease shall prevail.

10. This Agreement binds and benefits the respective successors in title and assigns of the parties. However, the Lessors may not assign or delegate any of their respective rights or obligations under this Agreement and for the sake of clarity, the Lessee is permitted to assign its rights and obligations under this Agreement subject however to the approval in writing by AWF but without having to obtain consent from the Lessors. AWF shall consult with the Lessors prior to such approval.

11. It is agreed that the Lessee shall not later than one (1) year from the date of this Agreement or such other time as AWF shall in its sole discretion determine, assign the benefit of this Agreement and the Lease to such entity as shall be identified by AWF for that purpose.

12. Each of the Lessors hereby warrants that:

    a) they are the beneficial owners of the Property identified against each of their names in Schedule I.

    b) they are in actual occupation of the Property identified against each of their names in Schedule I and no lease, tenancy, or licence has been granted or agreed to be granted to any person in relation thereto.

    c) they shall do and execute or procure to be done and executed all such acts, deeds, documents and things as may be within their power to give full effect to this Agreement and to procure that all provisions of this Agreement and the Lease are observed and performed.

13. Save as expressly provided in this Agreement, the definitions contained in the Lease shall have the same meaning as if they were included in this Agreement.

**IN WITNESS** this Agreement has been duly executed.

Signed by **LESSORS** )
)
**DANIEL NINA** )
)
)
)
)
**KIRADASH LEDAU** )
)
)
)
)
**LAON OLE LENTEYO** )
)
)
)
)

**SCHEDULE I**

| Lessor First Name | Lessor Middle Name | Lessor Last Name | LR # | Address | Rent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Daniel | | Nina | 3058 | | |
| Kiradash | | Ledau | 3059 | | |
| Laon | Ole | Lenteyo | 3007 | | |
| Lankoi | Ole | Laon | 3009 | | |
| Saita | | Kaaka | 3011 | | |
| Ratia | | Kashiro | 3014 | | |
| Lais | Ole | Kaanka | 2984 | | |
| Bana | Ole | Lenkoyia | 3003 | | |
| Kipoipoi | | Kitisia | 3035 | | |

* = Joint ownership of one lot.

NOTE: Lessors with Rent of Kshs. 15,000 indicates that a portion of their property falls within the Namelok fence. Lessors with Rent of Kshs. 0 indicates that all their property falls within the Namelok fence. Full payment will be given to the affected Lessors, as per this Agreement, if and when the fence is moved.


KILITOME CONSERVANCY PLAN
Amboseli National Park
Kimana Gate
Tawi Lodge
Boma
Cultural Boma
Campsite
Lodge
Tawi Lodge
Joint Ownership
streams
Roads
Group Ranch
Old Fence Line
Mada Hotel Fence
Cultivation, Farms
Lot numbers
Not Signing
Group Ranch owned
National Park
Approximate Location Kilitome Conservancy Area
Kimana Swamp
Kimana Sanctuary
A/TIKONDO
Kimana fenced area
SCHEDULE I

2. **WHEREAS**

(A) The Lessee is committed to the protection of the Kilitome Conservancy Area, its plants, animals and intact landscape as well as its sound management and community benefits.

(B) The Lessor recognizes the value of land and wildlife conservation, and is interested in conserving his Property as part of the Kilitome Conservancy Area for purposes of nature conservation, wildlife management and ecotourism.

(C) The Lessor and the Lessee both recognise that the Kilitome Conservancy Area, including the Property, is currently in a substantially natural state and provides habitat, dispersal and movement area for wildlife including elephants and herbivores and connects to other conservation areas such as Amboseli National Park and Kimana Wildlife Sanctuary; the protection of the Kilitome Conservancy Area will contribute to the survival of wildlife areas in the Amboseli ecosystem as well as the continued existence of ecotourism as a means of poverty reduction and economic development and the overall public benefit by ensuring that wildlife species endure for the benefit of future generations.

(D) The Lessor and the Lessee have agreed to appoint AWF to monitor and supervise observance with the terms of this Lease.

(E) Tawi Lodge Limited ("**Tawi Lodge**") is in the process of or has already set up a lodge and tourist related activities on all those parcels of land known as # 87, Lot # 1993 (together or separately the "**Lodge Site**") within the Kilitome Conservancy Area. The Lessee intends to grant Tawi Lodge the right to traverse the Property and conduct tourism activities in accordance with the terms and conditions to be agreed with Tawi Lodge, subject however to the provisions of this Lease and the Management Plan.

(F) Pursuant to the agreement for lease dated _____ December 2008 (the "**Agreement for Lease**"), the Lessor agreed to grant a lease to the Lessee of the Property for the Term subject to the terms and conditions contained herein.

3. **DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS**

3.1. For all purposes of this Lease the terms defined in this clause have the meanings herein specified:-

(a) "**Approvals**" means all appeovals consents permissions and licences of any local or other competent authority which may from time to time be necessary and "Approval" shall be construed accordingly.

(b) "**Baseline Report**" means the Baseline Report of the Kilitome Conservancy Area that describes the characteristics, state and use of the Kilitome Conservancy Area and which will be prepared by AWF in partnership with the owners of the parcels of land forming the Kilitome Conservancy Area, including the Lessor, and will be registered at the Registry of Documents in Nairobi in Vol Folio File within six (6) months of the signing of the Agreement for Lease.

(c) "**Buffer Area**" means a portion of the Kilitome Conservancy Area containing by measurement approximately 3,000 acres being the portion of land that will be more particularly delineated in the Management Plan.

(d) the "**Business**" means the preservation, management and maintenance of the Property and the Kilitome Conservancy Area at large and the provision of conservancy related services on the Property and the Kilitome Conservancy Area at large including but not limited to preservation of the natural environment, water, wildlife flora and fauna thereon and the operation of low-impact, eco-tourism on the Property and the Kilitome Conservancy Area.

(e) "**Kilitome Conservancy Area**" means together, all those parcels of land situated in Loitokitok Division in the Kajiado District and contained in the title numbers mentioned in the Schedule hereto comprising approximately 6,000 acres in total and as more particularly identified on the plan (the "**Sketch Plan**") attached hereto and marked "**Kilitome Conservancy Area**" together with all developments being or at anytime hereinafter erected thereon. The Lessee may from time to time acquire additional land in the Kilitome Area by way of lease or otherwise and such land shall form part of the Kilitome Conservancy Area.

(f) "**Entrance Fees**" means the fees collected by the Lessee from its customers, licencees, Tawi Lodge guests or visitors to any part of the Kilitome Conservancy Area (including the Property) as entrance fees or other similar fees, being a levy for entering upon any part of the Kilitome Conservancy Area.

(g) "**Conservancy Fees**" means thirty percent (30%) of the Entrance Fees being a conservation fee payable by the Lessee to all owners of the parcels of land forming the Kilitome Conservancy Area.

(h) "**Kenyan Shillings**" or "**Kshs**" shall mean the lawful currency of Republic of Kenya.

(i) "**Management Plan**" means the management plan for the Kilitome Conservancy Area (including the Property) to be developed in the manner contemplated in Clause 9 (f).

3.2. The expression "AWF", "the Lessor" and/or "the Lessee" shall where the context so admits includes the their respective personal representatives or successors in title as the case may be and where there are two or more persons means all of them jointly and severally.

3.3. Words importing the one gender include all other genders and words importing the singular include the plural and vice versa.

3.4. References to any right of the Lessor to have access to the Kilitome Conservancy Area or any part thereof shall not be construed as extending to all persons authorised by the Lessor.

3.5. Any covenant by the Lessor or the Lessee not to do an act or thing shall be deemed to include an obligation not to permit such act or thing to be done and to use its best endeavours to prevent such act or thing being done by a third party.

3.6. References to "consent of the Lessor", "consent of the AWF", or "consent of the Lessee" or words to similar effect mean a consent in writing signed by or on behalf of the Lessor, AWF, or the Lessee as is appropriate and to "approved" and "authorised" or words to similar effect mean (as the case may be) approved or authorised in writing by or on behalf of the Lessor, AWF, or the Lessee as is appropriate.

3.7. The paragraph headings do not form part of this Lease and shall not be taken into account in its construction or interpretation.

3.8. References to any clause or schedule without further designation shall be construed as a reference to the clause or schedule of this Lease so numbered.

3.9. The clause and schedule headings do not form part of this Lease and shall not be taken into account in its construction and interpretation.

4. **GRANT OF LEASE**

The Lessor **HEREBY LEASES** to the Lessee and the Lessee hereby accepts this Lease of **ALL THAT** the Property together with the rights specified herein **TO HOLD** subject to the Memorandum endorsed hereon and including all rights, easements, privileges, restrictions, covenants and stipulations of whatever nature affecting the Property for the Term and at the Rent but excepting and reserving to the Lessor the rights specified in clause 5 below.

5. **RIGHTS RESERVED**

The Lessor hereby reserves the right to:-

(a) Gather deadwood for domestic use as firewood in accordance with the Management Plan.

(b) Limited grazing **strictly** within the Buffer Area (and not on any other part of the Kilitome Conservancy Area) in accordance with the Management Plan.

(c) Passage along the designated roads and paths that the Lessee, the Lessor and AWF will mutually agree to in the Management Plan **PROVIDED THAT** during the period that the Management Plan is being developed, the Lessor shall continue using the roads and paths already established by him.

6. **RIGHTS GRANTED**

6.1 The right of the Lessee and all persons expressly or by implication authorised by it to pass and re-pass to and from the Property with or without vehicles at all times and for all purposes connected with the use of the Kilitome Conservancy Area for the Business (excluding horse riding) including, but not limited to, game drives, camping and guided walks on the Property and on the Kilitome Conservancy Area **SUBJECT HOWEVER TO**

(a) the preservation, management and maintenance of the flora, fauna and natural environment of the Property according to the best comparable management practices

established for comparable lands anywhere in Kenya and where no comparable management practices exist, to the highest standards practicable; and

(b) the provisions of the Management Plan;

6.2 The right of the Lessee to charge Entrance Fees subject however to the following guidelines:

(a) The Entrance Fees structure for the Kilitome Conservancy Area will be set by both the Lessee & AWF (or such other person as shall be appointed jointly by the Lessee and AWF) on a calendar year basis and shall be competitively aligned in relation to other comparable wildlife tourism and/or conservation areas in Kenya.

(b) Children (having attained their 3rd birthday but not yet having attained their 12th birthday) and Kenyan and East African Citizens will be charged 50% of the adult rate (this will be rounded to the nearest whole dollar number) per 24 hours or less spent within the Kilitome Conservancy Area.

(c) Infants (not having attained their 3rd birthday) will not be charged any Entrance Fees.

(d) Without prejudice to the foregoing clause, in the ordinary course of doing business the Lessee shall be permitted to:

(i) Grant 100% discounts on Entrance Fees to professional sales agents and/or travel agents/journalists visiting the Kilitome Conservancy Area specifically for the purposes of assisting in promoting it as a preferred destination for tourists for up to a maximum of 250 nights in any calendar year. The Lessee may consider discounts for other professionals visiting the Kilitome Conservancy Area for the purpose of promoting it for conservation and/or supporting it financially.

(ii) Exempt its directors from paying Entrance Fees when visiting the Kilitome Conservancy Area in their official capacity subject to a consolidated total of 50 nights per calendar year. In addition, AWF, its staff, family members and licencees, and Directors, employees and family members of Tawi Lodge shall at all times be exempt from payment of the Entrance Fees.

## 7. LESSOR'S OBLIGATIONS

The Lessor hereby covenants with the Lessee as follows-

(a) Subject to clause 4, to permit the Lessee, peaceably and quietly to hold and enjoy the Property without any interruption or disturbance from or by the Lessor or any person claiming under or in trust for him;

(b) To pay all rates taxes charges or duties of whatever description that may be levied imposed or charged by the Government or any local authority upon the Property.

8. **LESSOR'S RESTRICTIONS**

The Lessor hereby covenants with the Lessee as follows:-

(a) Not to interfere with the Lessee's possession of the Property except in accordance with the provisions of this Lease.

(b) Not to construct any kind of settlements, structures, houses, huts, sheds, camps, garages or any other structure or expand any existing structures except in accordance with the provisions of the Management Plan **PROVIDED THAT** during the period that the Management Plan is being developed the Lessor shall not undertake any such construction without the express written consent of the Lessee.

(c) Not to graze any cattle on the Property, save as provided in clause 5 (b) above, and to prevent persons who are not Lessors in the Kilitome Conservancy Area from grazing on any part of the Property and the Kilitome Conservancy Area at large.

(d) Not to undertake any agricultural activity on the Property.

(e) Not to cut any trees or other plants on the Property for fuel (including charcoal) or for any other purpose other than as contemplated in this Lease, the Management Plan and/or with the approval of AWF.

(f) Not to excavate the Property or create dumps.

(g) Not to unlawfully kill any animal.

(h) Not to undertake any non-conservation, or commercial or industrial activities (such activities to be determined by the Lessee in its sole discretion).

(i) To maintain the Property at all times in good conservation value as described in the Baseline Report, and in the event that the Property is degraded, to rehabilitate and restore the degraded area as far as possible to the original state as described in the Baseline Report.

(j) Not to fence the Property with any and all materials, including but not limited to wire, metal, branches, wood or create any barriers that may limit wildlife movement.

(k) To keep the Property in good condition free of any waste, rubbish or refuse.

(l) To exercise any of its reserved rights on the Property in accordance with the Management Plan.

(m) To ensure that the Property is retained predominantly in its natural and scenic condition, to protect the native plants and animals.

(n) To prevent damage to or destruction of wildlife, habitat and to prevent any use of the Property that will significantly impair or interfere with the conservation values of this Lease.

(o) To protect and maintain the natural land and water systems of the Property and to rehabilitate eroded and disturbed areas of the Property.

(p) Not to discharge or dispose on the Property or any part thereof any hazardous, toxic or radioactive substance, chemical, oil or mixture containing oil contrary the provisions of this Lease or any law in Kenya.

(q) To take all practicable steps to ensure that all persons who are lawfully on the Property shall use natural resources within the Property in an ecologically sustainable manner and shall not adversely affect the biodiversity in the Property.

(r) To take all reasonable precautions against animal and plant diseases on the Property and in the event of any such disease occurring to report the same forthwith in writing to the proper authority and to the Lessee.

(s) To take all necessary steps to prevent:

(i) the creation of new and un-necessary footpaths or roads over the Property, excepting those approved in accordance with the Management Plan and clause 9 (e).

(ii) any trespass on the Property and to inform the Lessor in the event of such trespass.

(iii) any encroachment on the Property or the acquisition of any new right of passage, drainage or other easement over upon or under the Property and to give notice to the Lessee of any threatened encroachment or attempt to acquire such easement.

(t) To ensure that any transfer of any Property by him contains a covenant that the new owner of the Property or any part thereof will be bound by the covenants, terms, conditions, rights and restrictions detailed in this Lease and that any charge over or sub-lease of the Property or any part thereof or other encumbrance as may be registered against any of the title is made subject to this Lease. In the event that the Lessor transfers title, notice must be given to the Lessee in writing.

9. **LESSEE'S OBLIGATIONS**

The Lessee hereby covenants with the Lessor as follows:

(a) To pay the Rent biannually to the Lessor on or before the 20th day of December every year and also on or before the 20th day of June every year at a public meeting where all other lessors in the Kilitome Conservancy Area shall also be paid their rent or directly to individual bank accounts **AND** it is hereby agreed as follows:

(i) AWF shall pay Rent in the first year of the Term for and on behalf of the Lessee in the manner contemplated in clause 9 (a) above and the said payment shall be made directly from AWF to the Lessor;

(ii) AWF shall contribute a proportion of the Rent for the second, third and fourth years of the Term in the amount to be agreed as between the Lessee and AWF.

(b) To pay the proportionate amount of the Conservancy Fees to the Lessor. The Conservancy Fees shall be payable as soon as the Lessee is financially stable and able to support the management of the Kilitome Conservancy Area and establish reserve funds for future Rent payment in the event of an economic downturn or political crisis, but in any event not later than 1st January 2013 and shall be payable by way of additional Rent and in the same manner and on the same day as the Rent. For the purposes of this clause, it is agreed that:

(i) During the Term, the Lessor, or such person as may from time to time be appointed by the Lessor, including AWF, shall upon prior written request have reasonable access at the end of each quarter in a year, to the revenue accounts of the Lessee.

(ii) The Lessee shall furnish the Lessor or such person as the Lessor may nominate from time to time, including AWF, with the annual audited financial statement (the '**Financial Statement**) providing details of the Lessee's revenues for the period starting from the Commencement Date or from the start of the last financial year to the end of the current financial year.

(iii) In the event of there being any dispute between the parties relating to the calculation of the proportionate Conservancy Fee payable or already paid to the Lessor, the matter shall be referred for final determination to a Certified Public Accountant, being a partner of an internationally recognised firm of Certified Public Accountants, acting as an independent expert and not as an arbitrator to be appointed by the parties jointly and in the event that such appointment shall not have been effected within twenty one (21) days of the notification by either party of such a dispute, then upon the application of either party, the Chairman for the time being of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators of the United Kingdom, Kenya Branch shall appoint an arbitrator to hear and determine the dispute.

(c) To initiate (if and only if deemed necessary by the Lessee and AWF), in consultation with AWF, a community scouts program to ensure that the Kilitome Conservancy Area is managed and maintained at all times in good conservation value.

(d) To build structures (if and only if deemed necessary by the Lessee and AWF), for the community scouts programme in accordance with the Management Plan and such other structures as shall be deemed necessary by AWF for the purposes of the Business and this Lease.

(e) To develop (if and only if deemed necessary by the Lessee and AWF), a road and/or trail network, and other tourism infrastructure for purposes of the Business **strictly** in accordance with the Management Plan.

(f) To develop in consultation with the Lessor and AWF, a management plan for the Property (the "**Management Plan**") and the Kilitome Conservancy Area at large, to among other things, guide the conservation of the Property, establish grazing guidelines and a plan for eco-tourism activities. Save as expressly provided elsewhere in this Lease, the rights of the Lessee and/or the Lessor to undertake any activities on the Property shall not commence until such time as the Management Plan shall have been completed and adopted by the Lessee, the Lessor and AWF.

(g) To ensure compliance with and enforce the terms of this Lease.

(h) To prevent any activity on or use of the Property and the Kilitome Conservancy Area that is inconsistent with this Lease and to require the restoration of such areas or features of the Kilitome Conservancy Area that may be damaged by any inconsistent activity or use.

(i) To promote the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Property and within the Kilitome Conservancy Area having regard to:

(i) The encouragement and appropriate use, appreciation and enjoyment of the Property and the Kilitome Conservancy Area.

(ii) The interests of the Lessor in the Property.

(iii) The preservation of the Property in its natural condition.

(iv) The protection, conservation and management of the wildlife and natural habitat within the Property and the Kilitome Conservancy Area.

(j) Not to undertake any activity, except as provided herein and in the Management Plan, that may have a negative environmental impact on the Property and the Kilitome Conservancy Area.

(k) Not to search, attempt to win or win any minerals or remove any minerals from the Property and the Kilitome Conservancy Area without the express written consent of both AWF and the Lessor.

(l) Not to damage, remove or attempt to remove any object of geological, prehistoric, archaeological, historic, or other interest within the Property and the Kilitome Conservancy Area.

(m) To operate the Business in a proper, ethical and efficient manner.

(n) Not to use the Property in any manner which shall be dangerous or offensive to the public or the neighbourhood;

(o) Save as expressly contemplated herein, not to charge sublet sublease or otherwise part with possession of the Property without the prior written consent of AWF such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.

(p) To build (if and only if deemed necessary by the Lessee and AWF) one (1) airstrip on the Property in accordance with the Management Plan.

(q) To ensure that tourists and other visitors entering the Property comply with the provisions of the Management Plan, this Lease, and any regulations and by-laws of the local community that may from time to time be in force.

(r) To obtain and maintain in force all Approvals required for the Business and other Approvals required from time to time.

(s) To comply with all laws, rules, regulations and bye-laws relating to the use of the Property including without limitation, any laws, rules, regulations and bye-laws issued by any municipal township local or other authority in relation to the occupation conduct of Business or user of the Property.

(t) To permit other visitors, including but not limited to guests from other lodges in the area, into the Kilitome Conservancy Area, subject to the Management Plan. Said visitors will pay a daily visitor fee that shall be established by the Lessee. Tawi Lodge shall have preference over other visitors.

(u) Not to construct any kind of structures, houses, huts, sheds, camps, garages or any other structure or expand any existing structures except those as deemed necessary in clause 9 (d);

(v) Not to graze any cattle on the Property or undertake any agricultural activity on the Property;

(w) Not to cut any trees or other plants on the Property for fuel (including charcoal) or for any other purpose;

(x) Not to excavate the Property or create dumps and to keep the Property free of waste, rubbish or refuse;

(y) Not to unlawfully kill any animal;

(z) Not to undertake any non-conservation or industrial activities ;

(aa) To maintain the natural and scenic quality of the Property as described in the Baseline Report, and in the event that the Property is degraded, to rehabilitate and restore the degraded area as far as possible to the original state as described in the Baseline Report;

(bb) Not to fence the Property with any and all materials, including but not limited to wire, metal, branches, wood or create any barriers that may limit wildlife movement, except fencing that is required for wildlife reintroduction or other conservation purposes and in accordance with the Management Plan;

(cc) To protect and prevent damage to or destruction of wildlife, habitat, native plants and to prevent any use of the Property that will significantly impair or interfere with the conservation values of this Lease;

(dd) Not to discharge or dispose on the Property or any part thereof any hazardous, toxic or radioactive substance, chemical, oil or mixture containing oil contrary the provisions of this Lease or any law in Kenya;

(ee) To take all practicable steps to ensure that all persons who are lawfully on the Property shall use natural resources within the Property in an ecologically sustainable manner and shall not adversely affect the biodiversity in the Property;

(ff) To take all necessary steps to prevent any trespass on the Property and to inform the Lessee in the event of such trespass.

10. **ENFORCEMENT**

The Lessor and the Lessee hereby jointly and severally appoint AWF to monitor and supervise observance by them of the terms of this Lease and for this purpose:

(a) AWF shall have the right to enter any part of the Property for the purpose of monitoring and supervising observance with the terms of this Lease;

(b) AWF shall have the right to prevent the Lessor or the Lessee or persons claiming under them from undertaking any activities that are inconsistent to terms of this Lease.

(c) AWF may in its sole discretion require the Lessor or the Lessee to stop any activity that is in its opinion (which opinion shall be final and conclusive) inconsistent with the provisions of this Lease and to correct any breach of the terms of this Lease.

(d) If the Lessee upon inspection of the Property finds that the Lessor has been in breach of this Lease or that the Lessor has undertaken or permitted to be undertaken any activity that is inconsistent with the Lessee's rights and obligations, the Lessee will give notice in writing to the Lessor and the disciplinary committee to be created in the Management Plan, to allow for thirty (30) days for the Lessor to correct any such breach or activity. The Lessee reserves the right to withhold the Rent until the breach or activity is corrected and the Lessor understands that payment of the Rent is contingent upon full compliance with this Lease.

(e) The Lessee will not hold the Lessor liable for changes to the Property resulting from natural causes such as persistent drought, floods, wild fires or anything that are beyond the control of the Lessor.

11. **RIGHT TO ASSIGN**

The Lessor shall not assign this Lease without the express written consent of the Lessee and AWF **AND** save as expressly contemplated in this Lease the Lessee shall not assign this Lease without the express written consent of both the Lessor and AWF. For the avoidance of

doubt, it is hereby agreed that any change in shareholding of the Lessee that amounts to a change of control of the Lessee is an assignment of this Lease. In addition, it is agreed that the Lessee shall not later than one (1) year from the date of this Lease or such other time as AWF shall in its sole discretion determine, assign the benefit of this Lease to such entity as shall be identified by AWF for that purpose.

12. **OPTION TO RENEW**

If the Lessee shall be desirous of renewing this Lease for up to an additional term of fifteen (15) years from the expiration of this Lease at a rent to be agreed as between the parties at the time of such renewal and otherwise on the same terms and conditions in this Lease including this renewal clause, the Lessee shall, not more than six months and less than three months, before the expiration of the Term give to the Lessor notice in writing of its desire to renew this Lease as aforesaid, and the Lessor will respond in writing of its interest in renewing this Lease for a further term of up to fifteen (15) years from the date of expiration of this Lease.

13. **OPTION TO PURCHASE**

(a) AWF shall at all times have the first right and opportunity to purchase the Property at fair market price, as determined by an independent assessor **if and only if** the Lessor desires to sell. AWF hereby agrees to provide the Lessors of the Kilitome Conservancy Area an opportunity to purchase the Property in advance of AWF to be managed and used in accordance with the Lease.

(b) If the Lessor receives a legitimate offer (hereinafter "**Initial Offer**") of purchase from a legitimate third party including the Lessee, it shall give forty five (45) days written notice (the "**Notice**") to the Lessee and AWF of the Initial Offer and require AWF to elect to purchase the Property (on terms and conditions to be agreed) prior to the expiry of the said forty five (45) days.

(c) Any purchaser or owner of the Property, including the AWF, shall use the Property in accordance with and subject to the terms of this Lease.

14. **RE-ENTRY**

Save as otherwise provided in this Lease, if the Rent shall be in arrears and unpaid for the space of ninety (90) days after the date it is due and at no fault of the Lessor, (whether the same shall have been legally demanded or not) or if there shall be any breach or non-performance or non-observance by the Lessee of any of the terms and conditions of this Lease by the Lessee which the Lessee has failed to remedy within forty five (45) days of having been notified by the Lessor then and in any such case it shall and may be lawful for the Lessor at any time thereafter to re-enter into and upon the Property or any part thereof in the name of the whole and the same to have again repossess and enjoy as in its former state but without prejudice to any right or action or remedy of either party in respect of any antecedent breach of the terms of this Lease.

15. **FORCE MAJEURE**

It is hereby agreed that:

(a) if a party is prevented in the performance or the punctual performance (as the case may be) of any of its obligations under this Lease by Force Majeure and if such party gives written notice thereof to the other party specifying the matters constituting Force Majeure together with such evidence as can be reasonably given and specifying the period for which it is estimated that such prevention or delay will last, then the affected party shall be excused from the performance or the punctual performance (as the case may be) of that obligation as from the date of such notice for so long as such cause of prevention or delay shall continue and provided that the performance or punctual performance (as the case may be) of that party's obligations under this Lease as aforesaid ceases to be continuing, that party shall immediately perform those of its obligations under this Lease the performance or punctual performance (as the case may be) of which was prevented as a result of the occurrence of that Force Majeure event;

(b) if the Lessee is unable or is prevented from fulfilling its obligations otherwise than as a result of its own negligence default or omission, the Lessee shall give prompt notice thereof to the Lessor specifying the nature of the disruption and specifying the period for which it is estimated that the disruption will last and in such case the Lessee shall not be required to pay the rent for so long as the disruption continues; and

(c) for the purposes of this Lease the term "**Force Majeure**" means all circumstances beyond the control of the party affected where such circumstances shall render impossible the performance of that party's duties and obligations under the Lease, including but not limited to an event that causes a substantial decline in performance of the tourism industry in Kenya.

16. **PROVISO**

(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Lease, if the Lessee shall at any time be in breach of any of its obligations under this Lease, AWF may at any time thereafter and without reference to the Lessee, procure the assignment of this Lease to itself and shall from the time of such assignment, perform and discharge each of the obligations of the Lessee under this Lease **PROVIDED THAT** AWF shall not procure the assignment the Lease to itself if the said breach is remedied.

(b) Whereas the Lessee and AWF shall take all reasonable measures to prevent any injury or harm to the Lessor's livestock or other animals on the Property, neither the Lessee nor AWF shall be held liable whatsoever in the event of injury or harm to the Lessor's livestock or other animals.

17. **DISPUTE RESOLUTION**

(a) Save as may be otherwise provided in this Lease, if there shall be any dispute whatsoever and howsoever arising out of or in connection with this Lease, the parties shall in the first instance, attempt to settle by negotiations between them in good faith all disputes or differences which arise between them out of or in connection with this Lease. The parties further agree that (provided both parties consider that such negotiations would be assisted thereby) they will appoint a mediator by mutual agreement, to assist them in such negotiations. Both parties agree to co-operate fully with such mediator, provide such assistance as is necessary to enable the mediator to discharge his duties, and to bear equally between them the fees and expenses of the mediator.

(b) Save as specifically provided herein, if the negotiations and mediation undertaken pursuant to clause 17 (a) above shall fail, the dispute shall be referred for final determinations to a single arbitrator to be appointed by agreement between the parties hereto or in default of any such agreement within thirty (30) days of the notification of any dispute by either party to the other then, upon application by either party, by the Chairman for the time being of the Kenya Branch of the Chartered Institute of Arbitration of the United Kingdom (the "**Institute**").

(i) Such Arbitration shall take place in Nairobi and shall be conducted in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the Institute.

(ii) To the extent permissible by law the determination of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal.

(c) All rights of the Lessor to take any action for forfeiture or recovery of any rent in dispute shall be suspended until determination of any Arbitration proceedings.

18. **VARIATION**

This Lease shall not be amended without the express written consent of the Lessor, the Lessee and AWF; such written consent to be in the form of a variation of lease and must be consistent with the purpose of this Lease. No variation that weakens such purpose shall be allowed.

19. **NOTICES**

All notices or other communications to be given under this Lease to any party shall be made in writing and sent by letter or electronic transmission (unless as otherwise stated herein) and shall be deemed to be duly given or made at 9.00 a.m. on the business day following the date when delivered at the address specified below (in the case of personal delivery), when dispatched (in the case of electronic transmission, **PROVIDED THAT** the sender has received a receipt indicating proper transmission and a hard copy of such notice or communication is forthwith delivered or is sent by prepaid post as set out herein) or ten (10) days after being deposited in the post, postage prepaid, by the quickest mail available and by registered mail if available (in the case of a letter) to such party at its address or address for

receipt of electronic notice specified below or at such other address or electronic address as such party may hereafter specify for such purpose to the other by notice in writing.

The addresses referred to are:

(i) in the case of a notice given to Lessor

Attention: [insert name of landlord]
Delivery:
Postal: P. O. Box
Electronic: Fax:

(ii) in the case of a notice to given to the Lessee

Attention: [ ], [ ]
Delivery:
Postal: P. O. Box Nairobi
Electronic: Fax:

(iii) in the case of a notice to given to AWF

Attention: Kathleen H. Fitzgerald, African Wildlife Foundation
Delivery: Britak Centre, Mara/Ragati Road, Upperhill, Nairobi
Postal: P. O. Box 48177-00200 Nairobi
Electronic: kfitzgerald@awfke.org Fax: +254 (0) 20-271-0372

A notice or other communication received on a day other than a business day, in the place of receipt shall be deemed to be given on the next following business day in such place.

20. **MUTUAL COOPERATION**

The parties agree to cooperate in good faith with each other in the administration of this Lease. Each party will, upon the reasonable request of the other party, execute, acknowledge and deliver or cause to be executed, acknowledged and delivered such further instruments and documents that may be reasonably necessary in order to fulfil the purposes of this Lease.

21. **ACCEPTANCE**

(a) This Lease and the Agreement to Lease constitute the entire agreement and understanding between the parties with respect to all matters relating to the lease of the Property to the Lessee.

(b) The Lessor hereby grants and the Lessee hereby accepts this Lease subject to the conditions, restrictions and stipulations set out herein.

**IN WITNESS** whereof this Lease has been duly executed.

**SCHEDULE I**

| Lessor First Name | Lessor Middle Name | Lessor Last Name | LR # | Address | Rent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pius | Amashol | Lolkinyiel | 3051 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 15,000 |
| Masiato | Ene | Kaanki | 3031 | 176 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Samuel Lootu | Ole | Kaanki* | 3029 | 176 LOITOKITOK | 15,000 |
| Mutana | Ole | Kaanki* | 3029 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 15,000 |
| Daudi Lepayon | Ole | Kaanki | 3030 | 176 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Naiganya | Ole | Kasaro | 2972 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| John Sakimba | Ole | Kishil | 3044 | 81 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Shuaka | Ole | Keleto | 3049 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 15,000 |
| Kayiapa | Ene | Parsaloi | 3025 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Sakimba | | Kishil | 3008 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Muteine | Ole | Kisikoni | 3029 | 176 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Daniel | Metui | Koipaton | 3020 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Pilanoi | Ene | Lapulu* | 3037 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Monika Nasieku | Ene | Lapulu* | 3037 | 176 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Joel | Lemaiyian | Leshao | 2995 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Ntimama | | Lemoira | 3065 | 81 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Keturai | Ole | Lenguna | 3000 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Nteseiya | Ole | Lenguna | 2999 | 81 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Kavawa | Ole | Logginye | 2973 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Nankinyi | Ene | Lolkinyei | 2992 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Musa | Sarone | Lolkinyel | 3019 | 81 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Karerian | | Lolkinyel | 2974 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Nkiba | | Longututi | 3012 | 107 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Molomet | | Lewuanga | 3047 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Olegei | Ole | Naumo | 3050 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 0 |
| Morinke | Ole | Masarie | 3021 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Naanyo | Ole | Pasha | 2994 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Olubi | | Mekuti | 2987 | 107 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Leso | Ole | Melupuki* | 3048 | 153 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Ntimama | | Melompuki* | 3048 | 153 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Siringeti | Ole | Lei* | 2979 | 107 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Solonka | Ole | Murua* | 2979 | 244 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Haron | Meseyeki | Lolkinyiei | 3023 | 81 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Leah | Somoina | Mepukori | 2988 | 107 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Tuluapei | Ole | Meseyeki | 3064 | 68 LOITOKITOK | 0 |
| Njokuti | Ole | Mulukei | 3055 | 81 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Tipape | Ole | Munuke | 3057 | 107 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Panian | Ole | Mutoa | 2968 | 81 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Naimi | Ene | Sane | 3046 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 15,000 |
| Moses Salash | Ole | Nairoti | 2989 | 117 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Saroni | Ole | Ngereto | 3062 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Taiko | Ole | Ngilisho | 2997 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Kadaine | Ole | Ngisha | 3028 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Noloitai | Ene | Nkonkat | 3033 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Korduni | | Ntawausa | 3038 | 84 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Kamonjo | Ene | Oloirusha | 3045 | 68 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Simon | Shapashina | Olongututi | 3026 | 107 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Saruni | Ole | Parashino | 2990 | 118 Namanga | 30,000 |
| Lekanis | | Parmuat* | 3015 | 176 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Solonka | | Parmuat* | 3015 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Olubi | | Pasha | 2996 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Seyiai | Ole | Pasha | 2991 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Kasaine | Ole | Punuka | 2970 | 372 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Amos | Nteete | Saabu | 3002 | 81 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Paul | Letayial | Sairiamu* | 3042 | 176 LOITOKITOK | 15,000 |
| David | Loiparuni | Musa* | 3042 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 15,000 |
| Seleina | Ene | Sakimba | 3006 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Leshan | | Skimba | 3010 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Ngentui | Ene | Sakimba | 3034 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Katito | Ene | Sakimpa | 3043 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 15,000 |
| Margaret | Serea | Saitamany | 3036 | 81 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Korduni | | Sampeke | 3001 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Angela | | Korduni | 2985 | 81 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Nina | Ene | Sampeke | 3004 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Mepukori | Ole | Senteu | 3060 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Seyiani | Ene | Somuleki | 2986 | 107 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Jeremiah | Sakimba | Sumulek | 2980 | 107 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Samar | Oltalesoi | Kool | 3018 | 81 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Loramatisho | Ole | Talia | 3022 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Lekoko | Ole | Talian | 2998 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Pelela | Ene | Tuluapei | 3063 | 68 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Jonah | | Tuluapei | 3024 | 165 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Parsalo | Ole | Tunke | 3061 | 81 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Tumpes | | Kuya | 3041 | 81 LOITOKITOK | 15,000 |
| Patrick | Wanyika | Lemapala | 3040 | 107 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Loodokishu Society | | | 3027 | 84 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Saningo | | Olanana | 3039 | 107 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |
| Nkeyiki | | Tikorian | 3016 | 107 LOITOKITOK | 30,000 |

* = Joint ownership of one (1) lot.

NOTE: Lessors with Rent of Kshs. 15,000 indicates that a portion of their property falls within the Namelok fence. Lessors with Rent of Kshs. 0 indicates that all their property falls within the Namelok fence. Full payment will be given to the Lessors, as per this Lease, if and when the fence is moved.